Transparency and System Support in Peru

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Abstract:

Powerful international actors have vigorously promoted transparency for developing countries, yet we know little about the actual effects of transparency. In this paper, we use a series of survey experiments conducted on the streets of Lima, Peru to investigate a fairly simple question: what are the effects of government transparency on attitudes regarding support for the Peruvian political system? Like many developing countries, Peru lacks much system support, making it more difficult to improve governance and democracy. We find that transparency has little impact on political attitudes, unless accompanied by either one of two conditions: the information is attributed to a credible third-party (in our case, USAID), or the information provides a fram in which the government is associate with comparative socioeconomic wellbeing. Under those conditions, Peruvians increase their approval of the national political community, the regime's performance, regime institutions, and local government. The increases are substantively large, ranging between 6 to 11 points on our 100-point scales, or about half of a standard deviation of the variation in the control groups.

Keywords: Transparency, Peru, Africa, Governance, Survey Experiments

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AidData – a joint venture of the College of William and Mary, Development Gateway and Brigham Young University – is a research and innovation lab that seeks to make development finance more transparent, accountable, and effective. Users can track over $40 trillion in funding for development including remittances, foreign direct investment, aid, and most recently US private foundation flows all on a publicly accessible data portal on AidData.org. AidData's work is made possible through funding from and partnerships with USAID, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the Open Aid Partnership, DFATD, the Hewlett Foundation, the Gates Foundation, Humanity United, and 20+ finance and planning ministries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

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1. Introduction

The global transparency bandwagon is large and growing. The Open Government Partnership, launched in September 2011 with eight founding governments, had grown to sixty-five governments by mid-2014 (Open Government Partnership 2014). Among other things, member states commit to "increase the availability of information about governmental activities" as part of the effort to "foster a global culture of open government that empowers and delivers for citizens, and advances the ideals of open and participatory 21st century government." Civil society organizations have promoted and joined this movement through networks such as the Global Transparency Initiative, which promotes openness in international financial institutions such as the World Bank (Global Transparency Initiative 2014). The World Bank, in turn, first developed a governance strategy promoting transparency in 2007 in which it argued that "building 'capable, transparent and accountable' country institutions will be fundamental to ensuring sustainable development" (World Bank 2012). Government officials in powerful states have been important cheerleaders for transparency, claiming, for example, that "transparency can be transformative. It can help build trust, efficiency and save lives" (Macdonald 2011).

Despite these substantial efforts and claims about positive outcomes, we know relatively little about the actual effects of transparency. In this paper, we use a series of survey experiments conducted on the streets of Lima, Peru, to investigate a fairly simple question: what are the effects of government transparency on attitudes regarding support for the Peruvian political system? In the experiments, we asked subjects to watch short videos that highlighted information about Peru culled from online transparency portals sponsored by the Peruvian government. We then questioned respondents about their evaluations of the Peruvian system generally, their views of the regime's performance, their trust in regime institutions, and their trust in local government. These four factors may be conceptualized as constituting important dimensions of system support or legitimacy, terms that we use interchangeably (Booth and Seligson 2009; Norris 2011).

Concerns about the legitimacy of democratic governments in Latin America and other developing countries are widespread. Third-wave democracies remain wobbly in many parts of the world, unconsolidated or "partial" and prone to democratic backsliding or reversals (Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005; Converse and Kapstein 2008), a process that could be caused in part by low or declining system support (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005). Low system support can become a self-perpetuating cycle because it prevents the government from marshaling resources to accomplish its goals, which then decreases trust levels further (Hetherington 1998). Such a situation is dangerous because "whereas autocratic or hybrid systems can survive for extended periods on the basis of enforced popular

acquiescence or the distribution of rewards, democratic regimes depend centrally on the creation and constant renewal of popular legitimacy" (Bratton, Mattes, and Gyimah-Boadi 2005, 30). Concerns about legitimacy are not confined to the developing world; they also arise in wealthy, developed democracies, usually centered on indicators of trust in institutions (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Keele 2007). While scholars have sometimes labeled these problems "legitimacy crises," the difficulties seem small when compared with those of developing countries (Gilley 2009, 20-27).

Peru has particularly large problems with system support. Government performance—measured by levels of governance, democracy, rights protection and development—is frequently a good predictor of system support (Gilley 2009, 46-49). In Peru, however, government performance is quite a bit higher than system support. As noted by the 2010 AmericasBarometer survey, "public opinion in Peru has reached a state of deep misgiving and discontent with the country's political institutions, which then influences attitudes towards democracy and its associated principles" (Carrión, Zárate, and Seligson 2011, xxv). Peruvians have a higher tolerance for military coups than all but four other Latin American countries, and they have the fourth-lowest level of support for the political system in the region. Trust in Peru is so low that one scholar characterized it as an "absence" of trust in political institutions (Carrión 2009). Despite promising economic projections, "recent public opinion polls show that most Peruvians exhibit a degree of discontent with their political institutions that is usually associated with situations involving civil strife and economic stagnation" (Carrión 2009). In sum, "In almost all the attitudes that would be conducive to the establishment of a stable democracy, Peru is at extremely low levels when compared to other countries in the region" (Carrión, Zárate, and Seligson 2011, xxvii).

Does increased transparency alter this situation? We find that transparency has little impact on political attitudes, unless accompanied by either one of two conditions: the information is attributed to a credible third-party, or the information provides a frame associating the government with socioeconomic wellbeing. In the first condition, we found only certain sources produced an effect. If the Peruvian government itself is identified as the source of the information, transparency makes no difference in respondents' political attitudes. If a little-known Peruvian NGO is identified as the source of the information, there is also no effect. If the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is identified as the source of the information, however, respondents' support for the Peruvian political system increases substantially. We attribute these findings to the credibility of the source (Miller and Krosnick 2000; Druckman 2001; Iyengar and Valentino 2000), though a different causal pathway is possible. In the second condition, transparency information suggesting that respondents are relatively well off compared to those in other communities also increases system support. We expect this is due to framing effects that associate the government with improved socioeconomic outcomes, but other pathways are possible. Regardless of the particular mechanism, this result suggests an important refinement of the common finding that

government performance influences system support (Espinal, Hartlyn, and Kelly 2006; Levitt 2011; Mishler and Rose 2001). Much of that debate has focused on whether voters are narrowly self-interested or are influenced by the general economy. Our findings suggest that scholars should think about the ways in which citizens make judgments about the well-being of their local communities when compared to others (McClendon 2014; Weitz-Shapiro 2008).

In the first section, we lay out scholarly debates over system support and its causes and address the potential importance of transparency. In the succeeding section, we develop two conditions under which transparency is likely to influence political attitudes: when the information source is credible or when the information provides comparatively favorable socioeconomic news. We then lay out our experimental design and methods. The final section summarizes and reports our findings.

2. System Support and Transparency

While there are a variety of ways to approach political attitudes toward the government, we adopt the conceptual framework of "system support." Utilizing groundbreaking work by Easton, Norris defines system support as "reflect[ing] orientations toward the nation-state, its agencies, and its actors" (Norris 2011, 21). As the definition indicates, system support is a multi-dimensional concept that does not simply refer to citizen support for the political system as a whole, but rather related areas of support at different governance levels. In contrast to Easton's famous distinction between diffuse and specific system support (Easton 1975), Norris identifies five levels: support for the nation-state or "political community," the principles that the government embodies, government performance, public confidence in the institutions of government, and support for specific office-holders (Norris 2011, 24-25). In a sophisticated analysis of public opinion in eight Latin American countries, Booth and Seligson generally confirm the validity and importance of these dimensions but also find a local government dimension to be salient (Booth and Seligson 2009, 49). Other scholars have confirmed the existence of this local government dimension as well (Hiskey and Seligson 2003; Weitz-Shapiro 2008).

In this study, we examine four dimensions of system support: support for the broad national political community, perceptions of regime performance, confidence in regime institutions, and perceptions of local government institutions. Our factor analysis, discussed in more detail later, suggests that these four dimensions emerged from our survey of political attitudes among Peruvians in ways that are similar to the dimensions identified by Booth and Seligson (2009). Our dependent variable, which includes all four of these dimensions, is thus broader than, but related to, the "trust in government" issue that many scholars have examined (Caillier 2010; Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Dalton 2005; Espinal, Hartlyn, and Kelly 2006; Hetherington 1998; Keele 2007; Levitt 2011; Mishler and Rose 2001). Our "confidence in

institutions" dimension is most similar to their conception of "trust in government". Scholars also note that questions about citizen "satisfaction with democracy" are frequently correlated with system support (Canache, Mondak, and Seligson 2001), so we also draw on this literature.

System support is important because it can influence regime stability and the success of government programs (Easton 1965; Easton 1975; Gibson and Caldeira 2003; Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998). In a study on whether political trust matters, Marien and Hooghe (2011) conclude that stability is undermined when trust in government is low. This is a direct result of public unwillingness to abide by the laws enforced by the government, including tax laws (Scholz and Lubell 1998). Morris and Klesner find that decreasing trust increases perceptions of corruption in a self-perpetuating cycle that effectively prevents governments from making much progress in the fight against corruption. Low trust leads citizens to "justify their own participation in corruption and also spawns apathy toward doing anything about it" (Morris and Klesner 2010, 1278). Mishler and Rose (2005, 1069) find that institutional trust contributes "in important ways to democratic values and to citizen involvement in politics." In the relatively new democracies in the developing world, then, we might rightly be concerned about levels of system support and institutional trust.

What determines the extent of system support and trust in government? Most research suggests that government activities and programs— and outputs that citizens associate with government efforts, such as economic growth—have important influences on system support and trust (Espinal, Hartlyn, and Kelly 2006; Levitt 2011; Mishler and Rose 2001). A variety of scholars have found that, among other factors, high levels of crime and/or corruption significantly decrease citizen trust in government (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Booth and Seligson 2009; Caillier 2010; Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000; Espinal, Hartlyn, and Kelly 2006; Fernandez and Kuenzi 2010; Kim and Voorhees 2011; Wagner, Schneider, and Halla 2009). Economic performance is also influential, as citizens tend to equate high levels of economic performance with success and efficiency in government, which raises trust levels (Mishler and Rose 2001; Wagner, Schneider, and Halla 2009).

These theories and findings suggest that government transparency might influence political attitudes. Transparency provides citizens with another venue for interaction with their government, and it offers them additional information on government activities and outputs. Transparency, with regard to government, is defined as "the ability to find out what is going on inside government [or]…inside a public sector organization through avenues such as open meetings, access to records, the proactive posting of information on websites, whistle-blower protections, and even illegally leaked information" (Piotrowski and Van Ryzin 2007, 306-308). Transparency is itself an activity of the government, and it also provides information about other governmental activities. As transparency provides information about government

performance, levels of system support could change if citizens are exposed to that information. Despite the increasing use of transparency as a tool, few scholars have studied the link between transparency and political attitudes. One exception is Tolbert and Mossberger who find that the use of e-government (and thus transparency) increases public trust in government (Tolbert and Mossberger 2006).

At the same time, it is difficult for new information to change citizens' perceptions because people often discount new information if it disagrees with their preexisting views (Taber, Cann, and Kucsova 2009; Lebo and Cassino 2007; Taber and Lodge 2006). As Lupia and McCubbins (2000, 48) describe it, "persuasion in political contexts can be difficult. Differing ideologies and competition for scarce resources give political actors a reason to mistrust one another." Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many citizens retained deeply held opinions about their government in the face of rapid social, economic and political change (Shabad and Slomczynski 1999). Most people do not have a tabula rasa on which transparency information can be inscribed with clear effects. This makes political persuasion difficult.

2.1 Source Credibility

Since political persuasion has proven to be difficult, information must have certain characteristics if it is to change political attitudes. In fact, whether citizens accept a particular message may have more to do with external cues than it does with the content of the message itself (Lee 2005, 1001). Scholars have identified credibility as perhaps the most important external cue that makes for communicating persuasive messages (Callison 2004; Priester and Petty 2005). Since persuasion is difficult and requires some level of trust, messages have no hope of being persuasive and changing political attitudes without credibility (O'Keefe 2002). Citizens will not be persuaded by a politician or campaign that they perceive as dishonest or manipulative.

Therefore, citizens are more likely to trust and be persuaded by a source they believe to be credible (Greer 2003; Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey 1987). Despite a scholarly consensus on the importance of information sources, the actual elements that contribute to a source's credibility are contested. Many researchers cite the bias associated with a source as responsible for its credibility. Some have found that the political party and/or ideology associated with a source affects citizen perceptions of the information provided by that source (Baum and Groeling 2008; Druckman 2001; Malka, Krosnick, and Langer 2009).

Other researchers note the importance of source status in determining credibility. Druckman, for example, found that people held a significantly higher opinion of an issue if it was attributed to The New York Times rather than The National Enquirer and to Colin Powell rather than Jerry Springer (Druckman 2001).

Similarly, Greer and Pornpitakpan find that high-credibility sources, such as the New York Times, are more influential than lower-credibility sources (Greer 2003; Pornpitakpan 2006). It also has been argued that when an issue is debated, independent sources are more credible than sources associated with the issue (Garramone 1985).

Conceptually, governments that seek to improve their image by providing positive information to citizens through transparency efforts are similar to corporate public relations departments. However, people distrust public relations practitioners because they assume that information selected and reported benefits only the company (Durham 1997; Sallot 2002). People do not accept messages from sources that, although often trustworthy, are lacking in credibility because of a conflict of interest (O'Keefe 2002, 187-190). Attorneys also understand this concept and, therefore, seek to show that, although the testimony stands up in every other way, the witness is biased because of self-interest (Lee 2005, 1002). The public understands that affiliated government agencies, like public relations spokespersons and self-interested witnesses, have biased reporting (Murphy 2001). This is the reason why research suggests that positive information coming from a source that is directly affiliated with a company is less persuasive than information that is attributed to an unaffiliated organization (Callison 2004). Callison reports that if information is attributed to an internal organization such as public relations, it has no chance of receiving a positive audience reaction (Callison 2001). Studies show that while citizens have a favorable opinion of government workers and programs with which they interact, they also tend to distrust the government and public employees in the abstract (Frederickson and Frederickson 1995, 165-67). It is likely, therefore, that if a government advocates for a position, the message is not received as positively as if an independent and hence credible third-party advocates the same position. This may be especially true in countries such as Peru, where government credibility is quite low, as previously noted. As a result, we suggest:

Hypothesis 1: Transparency information will increase system support when it is endorsed by credible third parties.

2.2 Framing Effects: Comparative Wellbeing

Our second hypothesis focuses on the content of the information being provided. The information on transparency websites can frame government institutions and behavior in particular ways. Informally, "framing refers to the process by which people develop a particular conceptualization of an issue or reorient their thinking about an issue" (Chong and Druckman 2007, 105). Frames orient citizen understandings by providing interpretations of events and issues. For example, many more people support a hate group holding a political rally if framed by the value of "free speech" rather than the "risk of

violence" (Sniderman and Theriault 2004). Citizens are of course not blank slates on which governments and political groups inscribe particular opinions, but citizen attitudes are comprised of a large number of underlying beliefs, ideas and values. Where communicative efforts increase the salience of some of those underlying values, citizen attitudes can shift as those values rise to active consideration in citizens' thought processes (Chong and Druckman 2007, 105).

While no piece of information is completely value-free, not all information on transparency websites communicates a coherent frame. In fact, a lot of it is probably difficult to interpret or could be interpreted in a very large number of ways. What does it mean if a transparency website reveals that the government paid a little-known contractor 1,000 Peruvian soles for an office-supplies product? Or if it reveals that the subject of a recent government meeting was traffic problems? Such information probably does not provide a frame capable of affecting political attitudes because it offers no coherent interpretation of government institutions or processes.

What sort of information is most likely to induce a framing effect on opinions about system support? We noted earlier that numerous studies have shown that government performance affects system support. One relevant and important scholarly tradition examines the relationship between economic conditions and support for particular political leaders, especially in the context of voting. In Western Europe, voters appear to be most influenced by the overall state of the economy (Nadeau, Lewis-Beck and Bélanger 2012), but in Latin America the picture is more nuanced (Singer and Carlin 2013, 740). In particular, pocketbook voting—where citizens give greater weight to their own circumstances than to the overall economy—is somewhat more prominent. Some studies have found a strong relationship between the government's provision of benefits and citizen support. Layton and Smith (2015) found that Latin American citizens who receive social assistance are more likely to turn out to vote and to vote for the incumbent. Rosas, Johnston and Hawkins (2014) found that incumbents allocate public and private goods in ways that increase support for the government, with evidence from Venezuela.

Moving outside the voting literature, some scholars have found correlations between personal wellbeing and system support. Hiskey and Seligson found that, in Bolivia, "citizens with more positive views of local government services had higher levels of system support than those who viewed the quality of local government services as poor" (Hiskey and Seligson 2003, 84). Similarly, another study conducted in the Dominican Republic found that "the single most important factor explaining levels of trust in institutions was citizens' evaluation of the provision of basic services, such as education, health, and transportation" (Espinal, Hartlyn, and Kelly 2006, 216). These findings are supported by research conducted in Argentina, which shows that citizens' "evaluations of their nation's and city's political and economic situations" were significantly correlated with measures of system support (Weitz-Shapiro 2008, 296-298).

Interestingly, a study conducted in Belgium produced similar results (Kampen, Van De Walle, and Bouckaert 2006).

While these studies find correlations between citizen attitudes about the economy and system support, they do not offer much insight into the mechanism connecting these two. Framing provides one possible mechanism that has been understudied in Latin America. Citizen attitudes, especially on something as complex as system support, are comprised of many underlying evaluations of the system on a variety of dimensions, weighted by the salience of those dimensions (Chong and Druckman 2007; Jerit 2009). When respondents are asked questions about system support, they are likely accessing related attitudes on more specific dimensions. In theory, these "frames in thought" then influence the way they respond to broader questions like system support. In analyzing public opinion surveys, scholars thus observe correlations on attitudinal dimensions, as just discussed.

If discrete underlying attitudes are influencing system support, then communications that emphasize those particular attitudes (frames in communication) should increase the influence of those attitudes on system support. Observed citizen responses to system support questions will thus change. Communication frames do not create fundamentally new attitudes; citizens have already formed opinions on these issues. However, they do increase the saliency of those attitudes and the weight they carry as citizens articulate their views of system support. Citizens use communication frames as they update their views on issues like system support. If we find evidence that communication frames alter system support, then we increase the likelihood that the correlations found by other scholars between economic assessments and system support are causally related. We also would have evidence that system support can be altered through elite communication efforts, a possibility that previous Latin American research has not examined carefully.

We thus suggest:
Hypothesis 2: Transparency will increase system support when it provides information that frames the government as improving socioeconomic wellbeing and will decrease system support when it frames the government as decreasing socioeconomic wellbeing.

3. Experimental Design and Methods

We developed three separate, but related, experiments aimed at understanding how transparency information affects the political attitudes of Peruvian citizens. The Peruvian government has spent much time and expense in recent years developing elaborate internet "transparency portals" that contain a wealth of information about government activities and a broad array of socioeconomic and governance

indicators. These are collected in the "Portal del Estado Peruano" (Peruvian Government 2014). The welcome note reads: "Here you will find friendly and clear information about the State. The State is getting closer to you!" More than 2,500 distinct government entities—including the office of the president, various other entities in the executive branch, the legislature, the Supreme Court and other courts, autonomous organizations (i.e. universities), regional governments, and various types of local governments—all provide links to information about themselves and their activities. The information is grouped into one of nine categories that range from planning and organization to budgetary information and official activities. With little effort we were able to find information such as yearly expenses on particular public works projects, lists of government contractors and payment amounts, and the make and model of the personal vehicle of a particular city council member, among many other things.

Our experiments were designed to understand the conditions under which transparency might produce changes in Peruvians' political attitudes. The treatments consisted of showing respondents videos ranging from one-and-a-half to four minutes long that displayed information from these official transparency portals and other similar portals. Subjects viewed these videos on tablet computers and then answered questions posed by hired surveyors. Twenty-five of these questions probed political attitudes while the remaining ten questions covered demographic information. We selected all questions from the most recent editions of the AmericasBarometer and Transparency International surveys. These surveys are some of the most well-known and well-respected efforts to collect data on political attitudes, thus enabling us to utilize established, field-tested questions and to engage in comparisons with their findings. We conducted these experiments in Peru's capital city of Lima in public areas with a diverse array of people, such as parks, shopping malls, and busy commercial streets, as detailed below.

In designing these experiments, we sought to preserve the nature of the transparency websites as much as possible, thereby prizing experimental realism. Our videos showed multiple screen shots of the websites, preserving both the content and layout of the information. Our treatments are faithful to the sources and nature of the information found on the websites. In our experiment on sources, we use the actual sources named on a transparency website even though different sources may have been better known or produced interesting results. In our experiment on framing, we used the framing available on a transparency website even though other information frames would be possible.

3.1 Experiment One: Transparency Portal Overview

In this first experiment, we wished to know whether exposure to transparency portals generally would effect change in subjects' political attitudes. We use two treatments and one control. Treatment One

provides only a limited amount of information to the subject, with a video of 1 minute and 40 seconds in length. This video shows the main transparency portal for the city of Lima and discusses the types of information available there, including government investment projects, the mayor's schedule, personal information about members of the municipal council, and government contracts and acquisitions. No specific information about these categories is displayed. Treatment Two, with a video of 3 minutes and 40 seconds, provides a glimpse of detailed information available on the portal in each category. This video shows budget information and location of several government investment projects, details of the mayor's daily schedule, the email addresses and resume of a member of the municipal council, and details on a government contract, including the name of the contractor and the amount paid. The control group received the survey without viewing any information.

3.2 Experiment Two: Source of Information

In this experiment, we wished to understand whether the purported source of the information might influence subjects' political attitudes. The experiment is composed of three treatments and one control. Each treatment, as well as the control, provides the same information on the municipality of Lima, including Lima's budget per capita, illiteracy rate, infant mortality rate, the percentage of households with access to water and sewage, a rating of the government's capacity to execute plans for investments, information on whether the government published required details on the participative budget process, the rate of political participation of women, and information on the local government's accountability to the national government. Where applicable, the statistics for Lima are compared with the national average. Lima generally compares very favorably to other areas of the country on these indicators. We accessed this information on a website sponsored by USAID in cooperation with the Peruvian government and a Peruvian NGO with the purpose of purpose of increasing transparency (USAID 2013). The videos for the treatment and control groups are identical except for the logo that is displayed as the source of the information and the narration for the video that calls attention to that logo. Treatment One attributes the information to the Comptroller General of Peru, an office within the government of Peru that serves (in theory) as an independent auditor. Treatment Two attributes the information to USAID, the foreign aid agency of the U.S. government. Treatment Three attributes the information to Peru ProDescentralización, a little-known Peruvian NGO. The control does not provide a source of the information. We culled the information from a website jointly sponsored by those three entities.

As Peruvian trust in government is so low, it follows that Peruvians would be skeptical of any data provided by their government via transparency initiatives. It also makes sense that an unknown Peruvian NGO could be perceived as not very credible (though this result partly runs against findings by Weber,

Dunaway and Johnson 2012 that unknown interest groups are more credible than well-known interest groups). However, when an independent actor, such as USAID, provides information to Peruvian citizens, it seems plausible that Peruvians would view it as more credible and legitimate. We therefore predict that transparency information attributed to USAID will increase support for Peru's government.

3.3 Experiment Three: Framing Effects of Comparative Wellbeing

In this experiment, with two treatment groups and one control group, we tested whether information about community socioeconomic wellbeing might increase system support. We focused on the district of San Juan de Lurigancho (SJL), one of forty-three municipal districts in the province of Lima. All individuals were shown information on socioeconomic indicators for SJL in comparison with ten other districts in Lima. These indicators included the percentage of children under the age of five that are malnourished, the percentage of households with electricity, the percentage of households with access to water and sewage, the investment budget spent per capita, and the Human Development Index. We retrieved the information from the same website employed in Experiment Two. We emphasized and slightly altered the graphs on the website to emphasize SJL's relative placement.

Existing studies of voting behavior and system support have not investigated whether citizen views are informed by their community's wellbeing. Rather, they have focused on either the citizen's view of her own wellbeing (egotropic) or the citizen's view of the national economy (sociotropic). Yet it is reasonable to think that citizen political attitudes might also be informed by the socioeconomic wellbeing of their local municipality, especially when indicators of that wellbeing are tied to public goods for which the government shares some responsibility. Citizens of course interact frequently with others in their own community and thus form opinions about their quality of life through these interactions.

The first treatment group was shown information in which SJL performed better than ten other districts, providing a frame in which socioeconomic indicators related to government programs were relatively good. The second treatment group was shown the same information, but SJL was contrasted against other districts that performed better. In this condition, the framing suggests that socioeconomic indicators related to government programs are not performing well. The control group was shown the same information on the socioeconomic performance of the respondents' district without providing a comparison to any other districts.

We selected respondents randomly from those walking down a major street in the district, several blocks from the offices of the municipality. The street has a variety of small shops, stores and street vendors and

was relatively busy. However, it was not a shopping or business destination for other residents of Lima. A large shopping mall and major bus routes that may have attracted non-residents of SJL lay several minutes by taxi from this particular street. It is worth noting that SJL is comparatively geographically isolated within Lima by the Rímac River on the south and by hills to the east and west. It is most easily accessible by public transportation from downtown Lima rather than from other areas of the city. It thus seems unlikely that non-residents of SJL—or those without vested economic interests in the area by way of their business—were roaming the street in which we administered the survey, though we cannot rule it out as we did not ask for the district of residence of our respondents.

3.4 Survey Design and Administration Method

Our dependent variable, system support, was measured by a survey consisting of fourteen questions about a variety of political attitudes. These survey items were mostly taken from AmericasBarometer, a survey conducted every other year through the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University. For each control and treatment group within each experiment, participants viewed the corresponding video in its entirety before responding to the survey questions. In efforts to curb framing effects caused by item ordering, we randomized the order in which the survey items appeared. We also included a battery of demographic questions at the end of the survey.

The surveys administered to the treatment groups for Experiments Two and Three included an additional manipulation check question designed to decipher which respondents had absorbed the treatment. In Experiment Two, respondents were asked to identify the source of the information they were shown (the Peruvian government, USAID, or the Peruvian NGO); and in Experiment Three, they were required to report whether San Juan de Lurigancho had been compared favorably or unfavorably to other areas in the presentation they saw. Though there was some variance among treatments and experiments in the rates at which respondents answered the manipulation checks correctly, well over half of respondents were able to correctly identify the treatment they had received (see Appendix Table 10).

We conducted these experiments in Peru's capital city of Lima in June and July 2013. We hired and trained a total of twenty Peruvian nationals to conduct the surveys, mostly twenty-something students studying at a variety of technical institutes. Each enumerator was given a tablet computer and assigned a randomized treatment and a randomized selection number. The enumerator then approached the nth person that passed by according to the selection number. If the enumerator was rejected (the person they approached chose not to participate), he or she would then approach the next nth person. Enumerators repeated this process until they were successful in administering a survey. At the end of the treatment

video and survey, the subjects were offered three Peruvian soles (the rough equivalent of one US dollar). The enumerators were then assigned a new random treatment and random selection number, repeating the process.

With an average of ten to twelve enumerators per day working over the course of roughly two and a half weeks, we conducted 1,431 surveys. The average survey lasted about fourteen minutes, though there was some variation across experiments. These surveys took place in four different locations within Lima: a public park in the district of Miraflores, a busy commercial street in the city's center, a middle-class neighborhood in the district of San Juan de Lurigancho, and outside of a popular mall, "Plaza Norte," in the northern region of Lima. We utilized the SJL location only for Experiment Three, which compared SJL to other districts. The conditions were not optimal for viewing and listening to videos, but most subjects seemed to be able to see them and understand them, as demonstrated by our manipulation check. Subjects faced distractions such as loud background noise, street performers, constant movement around them, and—on one memorable afternoon—tear gas from a nearby demonstration.

Some considerations with regards to both external validity and internal validity bear mentioning. First, our experiments were carried out exclusively in Lima and thus we make no claims about generalizing to the population of Peru as a whole or to other countries. Even though we utilized a "convenience" sample of passers-by in public spaces, our sample is not much different from the AmericasBarometer survey (see Appendix Table 1). We include demographic controls in some models of our analyses to help correct for random imbalances between treatment and control groups within a given experiment (see Appendix Tables 2-4 for demographic details on each experiment). As mentioned above, the experimental setting was not ideal; clearly, a busy city street is not a prime survey location. It is possible that differing levels of street activity from day to day could have affected respondents' attentiveness. However, we control for fixed effects associated with the day on which each survey was conducted and find that our findings generally remain unchanged. We also controlled for interviewer effects, also without changing the findings substantially. Finally, we were conservative in our estimates of the treatment effects by selecting a relatively large control group in comparison to each treatment group (Appendix Table 5).

3.5 Dependent Variables: Constructing Indices

Previous research suggests that system support is a multi-dimensional concept (Booth and Seligson 2009). As mentioned, we identified four dimensions of interest: *National Political Community, Regime Performance, Confidence in Regime Institutions,* and *Local Government*. Exploratory factor analyses

suggested the presence of these dimensions in our survey data.[1] We constructed indices for each dimension comprised of three to six questions each. To facilitate index construction, we rescaled individual questions from 0-100 (the same scale used by AmericasBarometer), where 100 represents higher levels of approval or trust. Confirmatory factor analysis of these indices in MPlus provided strong evidence that each index measures a single dimension and that the included indicators loaded well onto the index. See the Appendix (Tables 6-9) for the specific questions used in these indexes.

3.6 Statistical Analysis

We conducted three types of analysis in order to determine the extent to which treatments affected dependent variable outcomes: (1) difference of means tests, (2) standard OLS regression (with variations), and (3) calculation of the complier average causal effect (CACE). In this paper, we report on our preferred model of the OLS regressions that include both treatments and demographic controls (gender, age, race, education level, and income level). For space reasons, we only report the coefficients for the treatment effects; the full set of results may be found in Appendix Tables 11-22.

We also calculated the CACE, a measure that represents the average effect of a treatment on an individual who absorbed the experimental treatment (Gerber and Green 2012, 141-160). The CACE was calculated by dividing the difference between the control and treatment means for a given dependent variable by the proportion of the treatment group respondents who were "compliers," that is, those who correctly answered the manipulation check questions (see Appendix Table 10). Calculation of the CACE allows for isolated analysis of treatment effects when information in the treatment is absorbed and understood.

4. Findings

4.1 Experiment One: Transparency Alone is Insufficient

In Experiment One, subjects watched brief videos that provided an overview of the official transparency portals for the municipality of Lima. The results strongly suggest that, in the Peruvian context, the basic knowledge that the government has undertaken transparency efforts has little effect on individuals'

[1] Exploratory factor analysis using MPlus software identified a four-factor model as the most promising. Eigenvalues for the sample correlation matrix reported four factors above 1 and model fit statistics favored four factors when compared to other possible outcomes.

evaluations of their government or the extent to which they believe the government is trustworthy. Table 1 presents the results of Experiment One. As shown, neither a brief overview of the portals a somewhat longer, more detailed overview had a statistically significant effect on the indices, with the exception of *National Political Community* in the case of the detailed overview. This result is robust to all model specifications. It is possible that respondents felt some pride in the nation-state as they viewed fairly positive information about their country. Generally, if the Peruvian government seeks to improve its standing with its constituents, however, it appears that transparency portals alone are insufficient.

Table 1. Experiment One: Regression results

VARIABLES	(1) National Political Community	(2) Regime Performance	(3) Confidence in Regime Institutions	(4) Local Government
Brief Overview	0.897	-1.109	0.205	0.525
	(2.770)	(2.355)	(3.641)	(2.865)
Detailed Overview	7.667***	2.142	5.070	3.789
	(2.780)	(2.653)	(3.688)	(2.927)
Constant	52.55***	54.82***	55.61***	43.15***
	(8.872)	(6.898)	(10.22)	(8.260)
Observations	227	225	227	226
R-squared	0.106	0.064	0.049	0.050

Controlling for gender, age, education, income, and race; Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

4.2 Experiment Two: Source Credibility Matters

Experiment Two indicates large differences in public response to transparency information depending on the source to which the information is attributed. Interestingly, when presented with socioeconomic information attributed to USAID, Lima residents reported attitudes and evaluations of the Peruvian political system that were significantly more positive than the control group responses. By contrast, when the Office of the Peruvian Controller or an unknown NGO was identified as the source, respondents' attitudes did not change with regard to any of the dependent variables. This contrast seems to indicate that (1) Peruvians attribute differing levels of credibility to different sources; (2) Peruvians do not consider their government to be a credible source, even when a semi-independent office such as the Comptroller is mentioned; and (3) transparency information does, in fact, appear capable of improving respondents'

perceptions of their government, but only when the information is attributed to a source previously considered credible.

Importantly, then, a government considered less than credible seemingly cannot foster credibility for itself on its own; we suspect that if the public does not consider the government a credible source, transparency efforts will likely do little to foster improved appraisals of governmental performance. In general, based on these results, we believe that a credible third-party endorser is required to alter respondents' political attitudes. Table 2 presents the regression results. Results from other models (reported in the appendix) are qualitatively similar, though in the fixed effects model the USAID treatment sometimes loses its statistical significance as the coefficient shrinks slightly.

Table 2. Experiment Two: Regression results

VARIABLES	(1) National Political Community	(2) Regime Performance	(3) Confidence in Regime Institutions	(4) Local Government
Peruvian Controller	0.822	0.900	-2.809	-0.466
	(2.386)	(2.244)	(2.900)	(2.536)
USAID	5.382**	6.455***	4.951*	6.340**
	(2.714)	(2.429)	(2.836)	(3.089)
Peruvian NGO	2.479	1.596	1.056	-0.641
	(2.598)	(2.449)	(3.115)	(2.808)
Constant	41.29***	43.23***	37.19***	43.46***
	(6.381)	(6.184)	(7.637)	(7.156)
Observations	377	377	379	375
R-squared	0.029	0.058	0.037	0.034

Controlling for gender, age, education, income, and race; Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

The effect size for the USAID treatment is relatively large. Control group means for *National Political Community*, *Regime Performance*, and *Local Government* range between 40 and 52 on our 100-point scale. The USAID treatment raises the index levels by approximately six points in every case. If one calculates the CACE, which accounts for those who actually received the treatment, levels go up by 7 to 8 points. When compared with the standard deviations of each corresponding index in the control group, these increases represent about 38 to 47 percent of those values. We believe increases of nearly half of a standard deviation are substantively large.

4.3 Experiment Three: Information Frames Matter

Experiment Three's findings suggest that individuals' attitudes toward their government improve when they are shown that their community is benefiting relative to others. In Treatment One, residents of San Juan de Lurigancho (SJL) were shown socioeconomic indicators for their community in positive comparisons with other, more poorly performing communities. As Table 3 below depicts, residents responded with improved perceptions of their government on the dimensions of *National Political Community* and *Confidence in Regime Institutions*. Results from other models (reported in the appendix) are qualitatively similar, though in the fixed effects model *Confidence in Regime Institutions* loses significance as the coefficient decreases slightly and *Local Government* gains significance as the coefficient increases slightly.

Table 3. Experiment Three: Regression results

VARIABLES	(1) National Political Community	(2) Regime Performance	(3) Confidence in Regime Institutions	(4) Local Government
Neighborhood Compares Well	7.649**	3.432	7.504*	4.569
	(3.066)	(2.822)	(3.872)	(3.058)
Neighborhood Compares Poorly	1.708	3.781	3.625	-1.311
	(3.016)	(2.776)	(3.640)	(2.828)
Constant	45.41***	46.85***	40.84***	39.32***
	(8.271)	(7.193)	(10.27)	(8.761)
Observations	171	171	172	174
R-squared	0.113	0.036	0.051	0.115

Controlling for gender, age, education, income, and race; Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Substantively, these increases are even larger than those in the previous experiment. The control group means for *National Political Community* and *Confidence in Regime Institutions* are about 50 and 45 on our 100-point scale. In the first condition, the treatment increases those averages by about 7 points for each index. The CACE calculates the treatment increase as about 10 and 11 points respectively. For each index, this increase is 56 percent of the standard deviation of the control group, a substantively large change.

Generally, this experiment suggests that information frames matter in shaping public opinion. While this result is hardly news, it is more interesting to note that a frame demonstrating the relative well-being of

one's community can improve some dimensions of system support. No previous scholarship on frames or system support has examined such a linkage. In the control group for this experiment, the interpretation of the data was less clear and the frame thus less strong. We simply presented five socioeconomic indicators and briefly showed a figure placing SJL in the context of all of the 42 other districts in Lima. Even someone paying close attention would have been hard-pressed to surmise much more than the fact that there was a lot of data available by district. The first experiment in this paper also lacked strong frames in both treatment and control conditions, again taking the approach of providing a lot of raw information in a relatively short period of time. Hence, we cannot say which frames work the best, but we can say that this particular frame alters system support. As previous scholarship on system support has focused mostly on individual and national levels of analysis, it seems possible that scholars have overlooked an important level of analysis—one's own community—in thinking about the bases of system support (Weitz-Shapiro 2008 is an important exception).

5. Discussion

Why do residents of Lima trust their government more when the transparency information is endorsed by USAID or when the information is framed in a way that associates the government with comparatively good socioeconomic outcomes? While it is difficult to say with certainty, we can bring some evidence to bear on these questions.

It seems unlikely that most Peruvians know USAID by name. Rather, they are likely to rely instead on their views of the United States generally when making judgments about USAID-endorsed information. USAID has made strong efforts to improve branding in recent years and has had some success at increasing public knowledge of the agency and its mission (USAID 2008). Still, it seems unlikely that most Peruvians possess any knowledge of or views about the agency. On the other hand, almost all Peruvians would have some views about the United States. The USAID logo clearly utilizes the letters "US" and "USA," which are well-known acronyms of the United States in Latin America. Our video presentation stated clearly both at the beginning and at the end that USAID is an agency of the United States government. Hence, it would have been easy for respondents to associated USAID with the United States. For Peruvians who do have an understanding of USAID, we expect their views of USAID to be correlated with their overall views of the United States in any case.

How, then, do Peruvians feel about the United States? Baker and Cupery (2013) report that about 80 percent of Peruvians hold favorable attitudes toward the United States, higher than any other country in

South America.[2] Moreover, they find that aid is a significant predictor of pro-American attitudes in Latin America (2013, 125). Pew research surveys put the U.S. favorability percentage among Peruvians at 65 percent, the global median.[3] Perhaps an even better measure is an AmericasBarometer question about the trustworthiness of the United States. In 2012, Peruvian trust in the U.S. government stood at 53.6 on a 100-point scale (Silliman 2014). That level of trust was higher than Peruvian citizens' trust in their own president (52.9), armed forces (52.0), municipal governments (41.2), Supreme Court (40.3), national police (40.1), justice system (39.4), Congress (35.5) or political parties (32.0). It was lower than trust in the Catholic Church (60.5), the media (58.7) or "elections" (55.2) (Carrión, Zárate and Seligson 2012, 129). The survey did not ask about trust in the government generally or in the particular arm of the government utilized in our survey, but one can infer that trust in the Peruvian government generally would be lower than trust in the United States government because most elements of the Peruvian government (Congress, justice system) do not fare well.

It is also possible that respondents were influenced not by good feelings toward or trust in the United States, but rather in its credibility as an outside party with conflicting interests. Most of the information shown in our treatment reflected positively on the city of Lima, including low illiteracy and infant mortality rates, and high access to water and sewage, among other indicators. In 2013 when we conducted our survey, both the mayor of Lima (Susana Villarán) and the president of Peru (Ollanta Humala) were on the left of the political spectrum and expected to implement policies and programs unfriendly to U.S. preferences. Hence, apparent U.S. endorsement of socioeconomic achievements in Lima could have sent a credible signal to respondents that Peruvian government institutions and individuals could be trusted.

It is also unlikely that Peruvians knew much about the other two specific entities in our treatments, the Comptroller General, the primary auditor of government expenditures, or the NGO, PeruProDescentralización. As with USAID, we suspect that our respondents would have relied on attitudes about associated entities as they encountered the names of these organizations. In the case of the Comptroller, we noted in our treatment that it was part of the Peruvian government and in the case of PeruProDescentralización, we simply noted that that it is an NGO. Hence, we expect that we are examining the results of respondents' general views of the Peruvian government and of NGOs. We interpret the absence of change in respondents' attitudes as a general unwillingness to trust either the Peruvian government or unknown NGOs. It is also possible that Peruvians understood the NGO to have a particular political agenda—namely, decentralization, which is the meaning of its name. In this case, some may have found it more credible and some less credible, depending on their views on decentralization.

[2] See their blog post, "Gringo Stay Here!" at the Americas Quarterly website for specific data on Peru: http://www.americasquarterly.org/gringo-stay-here. Accessed 6 May 2015.
[3] Pew Research Center Global Attitudes and Trends, http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter-1-the-american-brand/, accessed 6 May 2015.

We chose these organizations not for their visibility but to maintain the realism of the experiment. The transparency website we relied on most heavily was in fact produced by these three organizations. The control group viewed unsourced information. It is possible that control group respondents assumed that the information source was the government, thus explaining the lack of change in results when we specifically referenced the government as a source. With respect to the NGO condition, it is perhaps too broad of a category to be of any assistance to respondents in interpreting the credibility of the information. Further research might investigate what would happen if the data source were a more well-known organization.

Turning to the issue of framing, we utilized socioeconomic indicators that would be meaningful and important to most Peruvians and that they are likely to associate with government institutions and programs. We thus expect that as they evaluate how their municipality compares with others, they are also judging the quality of their government, both at the local and national level, as the two levels work together to implement the relevant programs in Peru.

The first indicator in our treatment videos concerned the percentage of malnourished children under five years old. Since the 1980s, the national government has sought to combat malnourishment through well-known programs like “Glass of Milk,” which serves children under six (Acosta and Haddad 2014, 28). In the mid-2000s, these programs dramatically increased in scope and visibility. The national government adopted a conditional cash transfer system, JUNTOS, aimed at the poorest Peruvians, with one of its chief goals a decrease in child malnutrition (Acosta and Haddad 2014, 29). Around the same time, it adopted a National Strategy for Poverty Reduction that broadened the approach to malnutrition and that involved decentralization of important programs to local municipalities. A new public-private partnership, the Child Malnutrition Initiative, was established and won public commitments from all presidential candidates in the 2006 election to work on malnutrition (Acosta and Haddad 2014, 30). The winning candidate, Alan Garcia, made it a centerpiece of his first 100 days in office. Problems arose as municipalities either lacked the capacity or the political interest to implement national programs to combat malnutrition, and the success of the programs clearly depends on cooperation between local and national governments (Acosta and Haddad 2014, 32). When viewing indicators of childhood malnutrition in their municipality, Peruvians would naturally associate those with government performance and services.

We make a similar conclusion about the other indicators used in our treatments. Water is a particularly important problem in Lima, which exists in a very dry desert. Access to water was included in the five socioeconomic indicators in our treatment video. The Peruvian government tried to privatize water services in the mid-1990s, but only partly succeeded. Access to water in Lima is thus determined by a set

of overlapping interests, including private companies and municipal and national governments (Rossotto Ioris 2012). Residents of Lima tend to see access to water as a political game in which the well-off benefit and the poor lose (Rossotto Ioris 2012, 274). While private companies provide water, government officials determine the process by which those companies bid for contracts, which areas will be served, and the building of infrastructure like water treatment plants. High-profile corruption scandals involving cabinet ministers and utility officials receiving bribes and kickbacks for water services feed public perceptions that the provision of household water services is fundamentally a political decision (Rossotto Ioris 2012, 274).

In brief, we interpret the increase of trust in Experiment Three to be the result of respondents associating the relatively good socioeconomic outcomes they see in the information frame with relatively good government performance. Why does system support not decrease when respondents see information showing relatively poor socioeconomic outcomes? One possibility is that they expect poor outcomes and so when they observe what they expect to observe, they don't change their opinions of their government. In mid-2013 when we conducted our survey, expectations about Pres. Humala's government were quite low in SJL. In the 2011 election during the two-candidate runoff phase, only 49 percent of the municipality's residents voted for Humala, though this was higher than the 42 percent who voted for him in Lima generally. From April to July 2013, a series of problems drove down his approval rating by 20 points to the mid-30s.[4] In this context, specific good news about the community's socioeconomic indicators increased system support, though not support for Pres. Humala.

6. Conclusions

A difficult problem in many developing countries is a corrosive lack of confidence in government institutions. While skepticism of government motives and activities undoubtedly plays a healthy role in any democratic system, hard-core cynical attitudes go beyond reasonable skepticism because they are disconnected from actual government performance (Gilley 2009, 49-57). Latin American and Eastern European countries have been particularly susceptible to these "cycles of despair" (Gilley 2009, 55) in which states manage resources relatively well but citizens do not recognize or believe that to be the case. Citizen belief in hapless and corrupt governments can be a self-fulfilling prophecy in which government actions cannot make any progress as no one believes they will do any good. If everyone believes government officials are corrupt, it is easier for them to be corrupt. Likewise, governments might have to allocate resources away from development issues and social problems in order to simply maintain stability and power (Englebert 2000).

[4] "Humala Humbled." *The Economist*. 3 Aug. 2013. http://www.economist.com/news/americas/21582580-lonelier-president-faces-protests-humala-humbled, accessed 6 May 2015.

Transparency is an oft-recommended remedy for many government ills. We wanted to know whether transparency might help break this cycle of cynicism by increasing confidence in the government when citizens feel they can learn more about government actions and when citizens realize that government efforts may produce more positive results than expected. The Peruvian government has undertaken extraordinary transparency efforts on the internet, producing a flood of information about its activities. Peruvian citizens are also among the most cynical in the world; they predict their government will perform 30 percent worse than it actually does (Gilley 2009, 54). Of the 72 states in Gilley's study, only seven have a more cynical citizenry.

Given this level of cynicism, it is perhaps not unexpected that transparency information on its own did little to build system support in Peru. At the same time, we found that transparency can increase system support under two conditions: if the information is endorsed by a credible third-party and if the information is framed to associate the government with comparatively high socioeconomic wellbeing. In those cases, changes in system support can actually be quite dramatic. When USAID was reported as the source of transparency data, system support increased from 6-8 points in all the indexes, or nearly half of one standard deviation of those indexes for the control group. When citizens received information showing that they benefitted relative to other Lima communities, evaluations of system support increased by 7-11 points for two of the indexes, or a little more than half of a standard deviation.

These findings are interesting but do not necessarily bode well for governments trapped in cycles of cynicism. It may be quite difficult to identify credible third-party endorsers without yielding (or appearing to yield) some control over important government data and programs. It may also be psychologically difficult for government officials to ask for or accept outside endorsements. Moreover, if citizens are only satisfied by information suggesting that they are benefitting relative to other nearby communities, then system support can only increase if some citizens improve their wellbeing while others do not, of if they improve more rapidly than others are improving. Such scenarios may be undesirable for a number of reasons.

Our findings have important implications for research on transparency, credibility and system support. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to examine the effects of transparency on political attitudes in a developing country. While transparency is widely applauded and supported in principle, we know relatively little about its effects and need to learn more. Governments do not (solely) undertake transparency to boost system support, but the link between these factors is plausible and deserves further exploration. Peru is not alone in its efforts to increase transparency, nor is it alone in the problems it faces with credibility and weak support for democratic institutions. Transparency is also likely to affect a range of other outcomes that are worthy of more investigation.

With respect to credibility, scholars have repeatedly found that source credibility facilitates persuasion, but they have not fully specified the characteristics that make a source credible. This study raises the intriguing possibility—not previously explored—that one government could serve as a credible source for another with respect to the trust of its own citizens. In international relations, credible third parties are frequently essential for conflict resolution among two warring parties, including civil wars. Perhaps credible third parties could also ease problems created by corrosive mistrust in everyday political life or, alternatively, call into question the credibility of governments whose citizens are too trusting. Finally, this study makes an important contribution to scholarly knowledge about the roots of system support. Most of the literature examines government performance in different issue areas (e.g., political vs. economic) or asks whether citizen attitudes are influenced by pocketbook or sociotropic measures. Our study, on the other hand, suggests the importance of local community wellbeing in increasing system support.

Appendix

Appendix Table 1:

Demographic Features of Each Experiment Compared to AmericasBarometer

	Gender	Avg. Age	Education	Avg. Income	Race
AmericasBarometer Lima, Peru 2012	50% Male	40	42% University	901-1010 soles	80% Mestiza
Experiment One	50% Male	35	39% University	1011-1180 soles	73% Mestiza
Experiment Two	42% Male	41	33% University	1011-1180 soles	77% Mestiza
Experiment Three	65% Male	41	48% University	1011-1180 soles	83% Mestiza

Appendix Table 2:

Experiment One Demographics

	Gender	**Avg. Age**	**Education**	**Avg. Income**	**Race**
Control	44% Male	34	41% University	1011-1180 soles	73% Mestiza
Treatment 1	58% Male	36	34% University	1011-1180 soles	71% Mestiza
Treatment 2	54% Male	37	41% University	1181-1350 soles	79% Mestiza

Appendix Table 3:

Experiment Two Demographics

	Gender	**Avg. Age**	**Education**	**Avg. Income**	**Race**
Control	49% Male	41	32% University	1011-1180 soles	78% Mestiza
Treatment 1	40% Male	41	33% University	1011-1180 soles	87% Mestiza
Treatment 2	33% Male	39	35% University	1011-1180 soles	71% Mestiza

Appendix Table 4:

Experiment Three Demographics

	Gender	Avg. Age	Education	Avg. Income	Race
Control	63% Male	41	49% University	1011-1180 soles	85% Mestiza
Treatment 1	61% Male	42	49% University	1181-1350 soles	84% Mestiza
Treatment 2	70% Male	39	53% University	1011-1180 soles	85% Mestiza
Treatment 3	73% Male	42	40% University	1181-1350 soles	78% Mestiza

Appendix Table 5:

Sample Sizes

Experiment	Control n	Treatment 1 n	Treatment 2 n	Treatment 3 n
Experiment One	122	59	59	n/a
Experiment Two	81	52	52	n/a
Experiment Three	182	79	60	70

Appendix Table 6:

National Political Community

Index Makeup

Q	Question Summary	Question Text
5	Pride in Peru's political institutions	To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Peru?
18	Peru's economic situation	How would you describe the country's economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?
21	Level of democracy in Peru	In your opinion, is Peru very democratic, somewhat democratic, not very democratic or not at all democratic?

Appendix Table 7:

Regime Performance

Index Makeup

Q	Question Summary	Question Text
11	Performance of President	Speaking in general of the current administration, how would you rate the job performance of President Ollanta Humala?
14	Satisfaction with national gov't informing citizens	Would you say that you are frustrated or satisfied with the national government's ability to keep the public informed about National policy?
15	Satisfaction with national gov't use of resources	Would you say that you are frustrated or satisfied with the National government's ability to use resources efficiently?
18	Peru's economic situation	How would you describe the country's economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad or very bad?

Appendix Table 8:

Confidence in Regime Institutions

Index Makeup

Q	Question Summary	Question Text
3	Trust in municipal gov't	To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?
4	Respect for Peru's political institutions	To what extent do you respect the political institutions of Peru?
5	Pride in Peru's political institutions	To what extent do you feel proud of living under the political system of Peru?
6	How much should one support Peru's political system	To what extent do you think that one should support the political system of Peru?

Appendix Table 9:

Local Government

Index Makeup

Q	Question Summary	Question Text
3	Trust in municipal gov't	To what extent do you trust the local or municipal government?
12	Confidence in municipality's management of funds	What level of confidence do you have in the good fiscal management on the part of the municipality?
13	Performance of mayor	Turning now to the municipality of Lima, how would you rate the job performance of Mayor Susana Villarán?
26	Municipality fights corruption	How interested do you believe Lima's current municipal government is in fighting corruption?

Appendix Table 10:

Manipulation Check Success Rates

	Experiment two	Experiment three
Treatment 1	67.09%	65.38%
Treatment 2	83.33%	72.55%
Treatment 3	78.57%	-----

Appendix Table 11:

Experiment One Means Tests

Dependent Variable	Control Group	Brief Overview	Detailed Overview
National Political Community	50	51.27	**58.57*** **
Regime Performance	46.28	45.37	48.83
Confidence in Regime Institutions	51.05	51.34	55.93
Local Government	38.11	38.60	42.32

****p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 relative to control group*

Appendix Table 12: *Experiment Two Means Tests*

Dependent Variable	Control Group	Peruvian Controller	USAID	Peruvian NGO
National Political Community	52.41	53.63	**58.333** **(7.11)**	55.08
Regime Performance	46.33	47.20	**52.92***** **(7.91)**	48.28
Confidence in Regime Institutions	50.94	47.89	55.68	51.61
Local Government	39.69	39.13	**46.01**** **(7.58)**	39.49

****p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 relative to control group. CACE in parentheses when results are statistically significant*

Appendix Table 13: *Experiment Three Means Tests*

Dependent Variable	Control Group	Neighborhood Compares Well	Neighborhood Compares Poorly
National Political Community	49.65	**56.44**** **(10.38)**	49.42
Regime Performance	42.80	45.5	45.41
Confidence in Regime Institutions	45.19	**52.64**** **(11.39)**	47.14
Local Government	33.58	37.58	30.75

****p<.01, **p<.05, *p<.1 relative to control group. CACE in parentheses when statistically significant.*

Appendix Table 14:

Experiment One Regressions Without Demographic Controls

VARIABLES	(1) National Political Community	(2) Regime Performance	(3) Confidence in Regime Institutions	(4) Local Government
Brief Overview	1.271	-0.905	0.291	0.487
	(2.856)	(2.412)	(3.592)	(2.771)
Detailed Overview	8.569***	2.564	4.882	4.217
	(2.669)	(2.529)	(3.570)	(2.818)
Constant	50.00***	46.27***	51.05***	38.11***
	(1.665)	(1.477)	(1.911)	(1.622)
Observations	238	236	237	236
R-squared	0.040	0.007	0.009	0.010

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 15:

Experiment Two Regressions Without Demographic Controls

VARIABLES	(1) National Political Community	(2) Regime Performance	(3) Confidence in Regime Institutions	(4) Local Government
Peruvian Controller	1.225	0.862	-3.048	-0.559
	(2.374)	(2.223)	(2.881)	(2.513)
USAID	5.926**	6.583***	4.737*	6.319**
	(2.665)	(2.392)	(2.782)	(2.993)
Peruvian NGO	2.672	1.945	0.668	-0.198
	(2.628)	(2.447)	(3.009)	(2.736)
Constant	52.41***	46.33***	50.94***	39.69***
	(1.402)	(1.270)	(1.577)	(1.433)
Observations	387	386	389	384
R-squared	0.013	0.018	0.012	0.015

Robust standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Appendix Table 16:

Experiment Three Regressions Without Demographic Controls

VARIABLES	(1) National Political Community	(2) Regime Performance	(3) Confidence in Regime Institutions	(4) Local Government
Neighborhood Compares Well	6.796**	2.699	7.452**	3.798
	(3.018)	(2.707)	(3.761)	(3.158)
Neighborhood Compares Poorly	-0.227	2.608	1.943	-3.032
	(3.034)	(2.672)	(3.445)	(2.807)
Constant	49.65***	42.80***	45.19***	33.78***
	(2.078)	(1.697)	(2.293)	(1.867)
Observations	177	178	178	181
R-squared	0.033	0.008	0.025	0.024

Robust standard errors in parentheses

**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

Appendix Table 17:
Experiment One Regressions With Demographic Controls

VARIABLES	(1) National Political Community	(2) Regime Performance	(3) Confidence in Regime Institutions	(4) Local Government
Brief Overview	0.897	-1.109	0.205	0.525
	(2.770)	(2.355)	(3.641)	(2.865)
Detailed Overview	7.667***	2.142	5.070	3.789
	(2.780)	(2.653)	(3.688)	(2.927)
Gender	-3.859	-3.362	-2.219	-1.137
	(2.485)	(2.127)	(3.162)	(2.398)
Age	-0.119	-0.156*	-0.199*	-0.174**
	(0.0834)	(0.0802)	(0.109)	(0.0796)
Education	1.443	1.426	2.933	0.660
	(1.449)	(1.377)	(1.870)	(1.523)
Income	0.723*	0.189	0.0281	0.386
	(0.368)	(0.330)	(0.437)	(0.335)
Race	-1.598	-1.627**	-1.181	-1.295
	(0.983)	(0.820)	(1.292)	(0.984)
Constant	52.55***	54.82***	55.61***	43.15***
	(8.872)	(6.898)	(10.22)	(8.260)
Observations	227	225	227	226
R-squared	0.106	0.064	0.049	0.050

Robust standard errors in parentheses
**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

Appendix Table 18:
Experiment Two Regressions With Demographic Controls

VARIABLES	(1) National Political Community	(2) Regime Performance	(3) Confidence in Regime Institutions	(4) Local Government
Peruvian Controller	0.822	0.900	-2.809	-0.466
	(2.386)	(2.244)	(2.900)	(2.536)
USAID	5.382**	6.455***	4.951*	6.340**
	(2.714)	(2.429)	(2.836)	(3.089)
Peruvian NGO	2.479	1.596	1.056	-0.641
	(2.598)	(2.449)	(3.115)	(2.808)
Gender	-0.333	-2.975	1.972	-4.163**
	(2.028)	(1.873)	(2.293)	(2.073)
Age	0.0142	-0.0849	-0.0582	-0.0652
	(0.0601)	(0.0552)	(0.0670)	(0.0613)
Education	1.668	1.062	2.420	0.756
	(1.327)	(1.289)	(1.567)	(1.327)
Income	0.214	0.425*	0.412	0.221
	(0.258)	(0.220)	(0.286)	(0.272)
Race	1.933**	1.395*	0.905	0.0874
	(0.790)	(0.829)	(0.958)	(0.836)
Constant	41.29***	43.23***	37.19***	43.46***
	(6.381)	(6.184)	(7.637)	(7.156)
Observations	377	377	379	375
R-squared	0.029	0.058	0.037	0.034

Robust standard errors in parentheses
**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

Appendix Table 19:
Experiment Three Regressions With Demographic Controls

VARIABLES	(1) National Political Community	(2) Regime Performance	(3) Confidence in Regime Institutions	(4) Local Government
Brief Overview	7.649**	3.432	7.504*	4.569
	(3.066)	(2.822)	(3.872)	(3.058)
Detailed Overview	1.708	3.781	3.625	-1.311
	(3.016)	(2.776)	(3.640)	(2.828)
Gender	-5.376*	-2.071	-0.802	-1.500
	(2.965)	(2.573)	(3.296)	(2.923)
Age	0.106	-0.0550	0.0293	0.00110
	(0.0838)	(0.0739)	(0.105)	(0.0838)
Education	3.395**	0.921	3.359*	-0.352
	(1.399)	(1.367)	(1.957)	(1.523)
Income	0.174	0.149	-0.0832	0.621
	(0.402)	(0.348)	(0.474)	(0.391)
Race	-1.400	-1.452	-2.081	-4.238***
	(1.066)	(1.267)	(1.481)	(1.234)
Constant	45.41***	46.85***	40.84***	39.32***
	(8.271)	(7.193)	(10.27)	(8.761)
Observations	171	171	172	174
R-squared	0.113	0.036	0.051	0.115

Robust standard errors in parentheses
**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

Appendix Table 20:
Experiment One Regressions With Fixed Effects

VARIABLES	(1) National Political Community	(2) Regime Performance	(3) Confidence in Regime Institutions	(4) Local Government
Brief Overview	0.593	-1.427	0.0255	-0.463
	(2.910)	(2.336)	(3.750)	(2.868)
Detailed Overview	6.267**	1.908	3.476	3.575
	(2.903)	(2.662)	(3.785)	(2.846)
Gender	-4.953*	-4.752**	-1.458	0.253
	(2.634)	(2.306)	(3.327)	(2.460)
Age	-0.109	-0.190**	-0.165	-0.143*
	(0.0874)	(0.0793)	(0.110)	(0.0788)
Education	1.830	0.778	0.729	-0.536
	(1.590)	(1.439)	(1.999)	(1.583)
Income	0.700*	0.0410	0.385	0.363
	(0.392)	(0.360)	(0.456)	(0.337)
Race	-2.113**	-2.098**	-1.441	-1.485
	(0.991)	(0.841)	(1.373)	(0.975)
Interviewer 2	-10.12	-3.403	10.07	5.064
	(8.073)	(5.829)	(6.910)	(6.096)
Interviewer 3	-5.612	8.345*	6.047	5.754
	(6.450)	(4.269)	(6.457)	(4.761)
Interviewer 4	-4.962	5.123	20.22***	6.937
	(6.944)	(5.028)	(5.784)	(4.989)
Interviewer 5	-3.087	6.762	14.21*	12.65**
	(7.189)	(5.374)	(8.100)	(6.280)
Interviewer 6	-12.22	0.751	7.424	-3.278
	(9.364)	(7.341)	(10.54)	(8.909)
Interviewer 7	3.818	7.892	0.136	-12.81**
	(8.139)	(6.619)	(8.440)	(6.006)
Interviewer 8	0.693	11.75*	16.92**	9.523
	(6.995)	(6.169)	(7.197)	(7.934)
Interviewer 9	-7.115	1.495	0.655	-0.590
	(7.565)	(5.131)	(8.157)	(6.476)

Interviewer 10	-8.338	10.98*	12.84	9.955*
	(7.816)	(5.664)	(7.884)	(5.481)
Interviewer 11	-0.247	6.810	4.168	1.395
	(7.935)	(5.417)	(7.822)	(6.581)
Interviewer 12	-0.409	10.44*	7.949	7.780
	(7.942)	(6.069)	(9.374)	(6.104)
Interviewer 13	-3.007	0.630	17.80***	0.699
	(6.924)	(5.129)	(6.492)	(4.956)
Interviewer 14	4.989	7.361	19.44***	8.430
	(6.250)	(5.248)	(6.132)	(5.197)
Interviewer 15	-23.39***	12.78**	-36.65***	-31.80***
	(7.139)	(5.309)	(7.072)	(5.840)
Date 2	2.408	-1.234	4.942	7.752**
	(3.964)	(3.529)	(4.898)	(3.763)
Date 3	3.741	-10.79**	2.272	0.703
	(6.173)	(5.150)	(8.166)	(6.151)
Date 4	10.87**	4.587	7.407	8.616**
	(4.680)	(3.852)	(6.242)	(4.360)
Constant	55.20***	58.02***	42.63***	34.61***
	(11.86)	(9.572)	(13.91)	(10.22)
Observations	227	225	227	226
R-squared	0.192	0.173	0.159	0.207

Robust standard errors in parentheses
**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

Appendix Table 21:
Experiment Two Regressions With Fixed Effects

VARIABLES	(1) National Political Community	(2) Regime Performance	(3) Confidence in Regime Institutions	(4) Local Government
Peruvian Controller	-0.148 (2.504)	1.670 (2.395)	-1.800 (3.082)	0.331 (2.689)
USAID	4.597 (2.827)	5.476** (2.525)	4.087 (2.971)	5.009 (3.293)
Peruvian NGO	2.326 (2.645)	2.659 (2.417)	0.327 (3.132)	-0.276 (2.894)
Gender	-0.277 (2.122)	-3.477* (1.894)	1.950 (2.496)	-5.510** (2.165)
Age	-0.00367 (0.0644)	-0.0530 (0.0605)	-0.0981 (0.0696)	-0.0703 (0.0658)
Education	1.938 (1.426)	0.626 (1.379)	3.040* (1.693)	0.452 (1.425)
Income	0.326 (0.278)	0.427* (0.248)	0.433 (0.312)	0.308 (0.299)
Race	1.414 (0.876)	1.271 (0.956)	0.0576 (1.002)	-0.418 (0.959)
Interviewer 2	0.0159 (4.980)	1.191 (4.823)	-1.008 (6.421)	3.785 (7.537)
Interviewer 3	7.435 (4.646)	12.69** (5.494)	0.0881 (7.266)	10.54 (8.042)
Interviewer 4	5.830 (8.000)	14.14** (7.080)	4.318 (10.33)	2.948 (8.604)
Interviewer 5	-7.877 (5.104)	-2.066 (5.306)	-11.41* (6.569)	-6.116 (7.333)
Interviewer 6	6.520 (7.992)	4.365 (6.578)	1.670 (9.992)	9.562 (8.935)
Interviewer 7	6.978 (5.477)	6.821 (5.339)	7.138 (6.950)	7.752 (8.048)
Interviewer 8	-4.542 (5.050)	-1.903 (5.167)	-7.613 (7.508)	-3.463 (7.625)

Interviewer 9	-7.938	8.937	-11.57	-6.490
	(9.213)	(8.834)	(12.51)	(9.019)
Interviewer 10	0.397	7.065	-11.39	11.79
	(6.602)	(6.458)	(7.338)	(7.530)
Interviewer 11	-2.252	5.398	-6.571	-0.398
	(5.301)	(5.192)	(6.710)	(7.163)
Interviewer 12	0.671	3.085	-0.375	8.612
	(4.470)	(4.844)	(6.489)	(7.451)
Interviewer 13	2.480	0.0465	-9.796	-1.524
	(5.483)	(5.811)	(7.291)	(7.568)
Interviewer 14	-7.239	1.401	-2.023	-4.678
	(7.241)	(16.45)	(9.997)	(12.41)
Interviewer 15	-1.483	-1.160	-4.447	2.625
	(5.173)	(5.599)	(6.788)	(7.724)
Interviewer 16	-9.785	-14.74*	1.257	5.594
	(13.90)	(8.164)	(16.83)	(11.15)
Interviewer 17	1.444	16.73**	-5.686	2.640
	(7.242)	(7.468)	(9.052)	(10.37)
Interviewer 18	6.391	4.997	-2.631	5.839
	(4.899)	(5.430)	(7.177)	(7.895)
Interviewer 19	-0.00869	-0.0911	2.410	-0.0665
	(7.442)	(6.961)	(8.611)	(9.208)
Day 2	-9.389	-2.424	-13.96	-16.59*
	(7.177)	(6.318)	(9.169)	(8.477)
Day 3	0.362	8.896	-1.016	-5.970
	(7.545)	(6.360)	(8.805)	(6.624)
Day 4	-6.369	-3.710	-8.830	-13.29**
	(5.670)	(5.044)	(7.200)	(5.193)
Day 5	-5.026	2.354	-9.005	-11.33**
	(5.782)	(4.953)	(7.274)	(5.341)
Day 6	1.503	-1.042	-7.075	-12.17**
	(6.315)	(5.087)	(7.795)	(5.973)
Constant	45.55***	40.78***	49.95***	55.24***
	(9.335)	(8.702)	(11.43)	(10.68)

Observations	374	374	376	372
R-squared	0.102	0.145	0.103	0.109

Robust standard errors in parentheses
**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

Appendix Table 22:
Experiment Three Regressions With Fixed Effects

VARIABLES	(1) National Political Community	(2) Regime Performance	(3) Confidence in Regime Institutions	(4) Local Government
Neighborhood Compares Well	7.373**	3.499	5.858	5.798*
	(3.640)	(3.310)	(4.324)	(3.352)
Neighborhood Compares Poorly	1.650	2.057	0.803	-1.548
	(3.177)	(2.896)	(4.165)	(2.944)
Gender	-3.816	-1.057	2.054	-0.489
	(3.190)	(2.704)	(3.481)	(3.011)
Age	0.0795	-0.0563	0.0183	-0.00509
	(0.0961)	(0.0852)	(0.106)	(0.0981)
Education	2.746	-0.608	2.104	-1.015
	(1.898)	(1.603)	(2.102)	(1.539)
Income	0.391	0.338	0.513	0.879**
	(0.438)	(0.384)	(0.542)	(0.387)
Race	-1.432	-1.427	-1.515	-3.895***
	(1.127)	(1.260)	(1.530)	(1.306)
Interviewer 2	-12.94	1.337	-31.97***	-20.02***
	(8.237)	(8.329)	(6.204)	(6.130)
Interviewer 4	-9.171	3.934	-27.89**	1.340
	(7.237)	(6.549)	(11.40)	(6.029)
Interviewer 5	-7.117	4.293	-15.40**	-10.73*
	(7.552)	(7.577)	(7.384)	(5.910)
Interviewer 6	-9.752	4.067	-20.19***	-5.255
	(6.201)	(5.877)	(7.370)	(5.505)
Interviewer 7	-1.223	7.622	-8.601	-3.205
	(5.716)	(5.466)	(5.402)	(4.546)
Interviewer 8	31.79***	17.81***	16.88**	26.04***
	(6.307)	(6.010)	(6.739)	(5.724)
Interviewer 10	-4.522	-5.070	-22.31***	-14.96***
	(5.556)	(4.975)	(6.112)	(5.076)
Interviewer 11	-4.289	10.13*	-10.88	-2.387
	(5.699)	(5.815)	(6.991)	(6.702)

Interviewer 12	-4.838	2.933	-11.22**	-7.005
	(5.467)	(5.399)	(4.727)	(4.765)
Interviewer 13	-7.419	0.00318	-8.975	-14.56**
	(7.355)	(5.308)	(6.871)	(5.667)
Interviewer 14	-5.857	3.470	-18.46***	-8.507
	(6.476)	(5.512)	(6.685)	(6.043)
Interviewer 16	-6.501	-0.569	-18.59**	-4.313
	(7.040)	(5.972)	(7.966)	(5.789)
Interviewer 17	-1.460	-0.309	-8.989*	-7.814
	(6.502)	(7.836)	(5.140)	(8.497)
Day 2	-0.121	2.997	2.840	-2.032
	(4.000)	(3.499)	(4.894)	(3.799)
Day 3	0.637	2.715	-4.200	-3.758
	(4.032)	(3.301)	(5.002)	(3.712)
Constant	48.55***	43.10***	49.20***	44.99***
	(8.766)	(8.248)	(10.52)	(9.522)
Observations	171	171	172	174
R-squared	0.174	0.118	0.199	0.252

Robust standard errors in parentheses
**** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1*

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