Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination
October 2004 
PN-ADA-850
EVALUATION PAPER NUMBER 1
An Assessment of USAID’s 
Global Development Alliances
Cover Photos
Top: Cassava Enterprise Development Project-Andrew Levin, USAID/Nigeria; Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance; Central American Coffee Initiative.
Middle: AMORE Renewable Energy-USAID/Philippines; Remittances for Economic Growth Alliance-Denise Knudsvig, WOCCU; Sea-Freight Exporters/Atomic Energy
Commission Alliance-Pineapple Exporters of Ghana.
Bottom: Netmark Alliance-Sheila Somashekhar, AED; Achieving Market-Friendly Initiatives and Results (AMIR) Project-The Case Foundation; Huancavelica Economic
Service Center.
Cynthia Clapp-Wincek 
Assessment Team Leader
Donald Pressley, Dan O’Brien, Wendy Stickel, Woody Navin, 
Jeff Swedberg, Lane Vanderslice, Caryn Sweeney, Katie Croake, 
Jill Jackson, Brianne Miers
Assessment of USAID’s 
Global Development Alliances
U.S. Agency for International Development
Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination
October 2004

An Assessment of USAID’s Global Development Alliances III
Contents
Overview 1
Methodology 1
Key Ideas 2
A New Approach to Development 3
Phase I Is a Success 5
Creating and Managing Alliances 10
Recommendations on Moving to Phase II 14
Appendix: GDA Alliances Investigated 19

An Assessment of USAID’s Global Development Alliances 1
Overview
USAID’s GDA initiative, announced in
2001, actively promotes strategic alliances
between USAID and private- and public￾sector partners. These alliances serve as an 
important way of achieving U.S. Government
development assistance objectives. 
The GDA concept is well known and broadly
accepted in the Agency. Its business model has been
applied to USAID programs in all regions of the
world. Successful GDA alliances exist, and signifi￾cant activities have begun. Alliances that partnered
producers and buyers along a supply chain—in 
timber, coffee, and cocoa—were particularly suc￾cessful. Other promising partnerships were in 
information technology training and distribution 
of vaccines and treated bednets. A few high-profile
partnerships between extractive industries and their
local communities are progressing toward socially
and environmentally responsible operations.
It will take time and effort to realize GDA’s huge
potential. USAID management discussed the find￾ings and recommendations from this assessment
and is collaborating to act on them. USAID will
implement most assessment recommendations. 
The Agency will
■ fully integrate GDA into standard Agency 
operations and planning
■ develop a new procurement approach for 
GDA alliances
■ improve monitoring and evaluation
Management supported the idea of moving away
from Washington-based incentive funds. It will 
leave decisions on incentive funds to regional
bureaus while maintaining a modest reserve fund in
the GDA Secretariat. Recommendations from this
assessment also include phasing out the GDA
Secretariat and moving GDA functions from the
Administrator’s office to USAID bureaus. After
reviewing various options, USAID management
decided to maintain the current structure for the
time being—until the GDA approach can be more
fully mainstreamed within the Agency—and con￾tinue to provide the private sector with a one-stop
entrance into USAID. Splitting GDA functions
might undercut that objective.
Methodology
This assessment was coordinated by USAID’s
Office of Development Evaluation and
Information (DEI). The GDA Secretariat
and the Bureau for Asia and the Near East (ANE)
were key participants. The assessment entailed over
60 interviews in Washington, D.C., and brief field
visits to Ghana, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Mexico,
Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Zambia.
With the exception of Morocco and Jordan (added
for geographic balance), countries selected for field
visits were those with the greatest number of
alliances—a total of 50.
Working with missions, the assessment team 
selected a few alliances to be examined in depth.
The team also used a web-based survey of random￾ly selected holders of USAID email addresses to
capture data from missions that were not visited
The Need for Change
In the 1970s, 70 percent of resource flows
from the United States to the developing world
were from official development assistance and
30 percent were private. Today, 80 percent of
resource flows from the United States to the
developing world are private and 20 percent
are public, underscoring the need to diversify
development approaches. In response to the
changing global environment, USAID’s Global
Development Alliance is an initiative designed
to encourage public-private partnerships with
for-profit companies, NGOs, foundations, and
others. These alliance partners share risks,
responsibility, planning, and decisionmaking.
This approach combines the complementary
strengths of government, the private sector, and
nonprofit organizations to broaden and deepen
USAID’s development impact.
2 Evaluation Paper No. 1
Key Ideas
■ The Global Development Alliance (GDA) concept has been broadly accepted in the Agency. Its
purpose is well known, there is broad acceptance of the value of partnering with the for-profit
private sector, and there are successful examples of GDA alliances in all regions where USAID
operates.
■ Large alliances that engage the core business interests and senior managers of private-sector 
partners are more likely to have high impact and become sustainable.
■ While useful in defining and promoting the GDA concept, the focus on leveraging resources
should not overshadow the importance of targeting maximum development impact in the 
selection and design of alliances.
■ Procurement and competition remain challenging issues. Negotiating alliances with the private
sector and nontraditional partners is a dynamic process that requires flexibility, but many of 
the Agency’s processes are rigid and slow. Accordingly, the Agency Procurement Office is 
working on new approaches to better support this model.
■ Because alliances are new and complex, more attention should be paid to monitoring and 
evaluation to accelerate Agency learning.
■ Written GDA agreements should set out planned development impacts and the roles, 
responsibilities, and contributions of partners. More focus is needed on such impacts and 
specific, local situations. Direct and honest communication about the objectives and 
motivations of each partner is required.
■ The Agency is taking steps to better incorporate GDA into the Agency’s mainline operations.
These steps should include 1) emphasizing GDA in the joint strategic thinking of the
Department of State and USAID, regional bureau strategic frameworks, and country strategic
plans; 2) phasing out GDA incentive funds so that alliances compete for Agency resources 
on a level playing field; 3) phasing out the GDA Secretariat and relocating its key functions of
advocacy and support to permanent USAID organizational structures; and 4) building up the
Agency’s capacity to provide technical support to missions developing GDA through recruit￾ment, training, and advancement of GDA champions.
and those not as active in alliance building. The
survey was anonymous, to encourage objective
responses to the primary question: Have public￾private alliances and strategic partnering permeated
the Agency? The team also sought staff views on
the appropriateness of USAID participation in
public-private partnerships and whether such part￾nerships add value to the Agency’s programs.
A New Approach to
Development
A Global Development Alliance is an initia￾tive and business model designed to
encourage public-private partnerships that
more effectively achieve U.S. Government develop￾ment assistance objectives. Recognizing that pri￾vate, for-profit companies and NGOs are signifi￾cant participants in the development process, GDA
brings new partners, resources, and approaches to
international development. GDA involves, at a
minimum, an equal ratio of partner and U.S.
Government funds, shared risk and responsibility,
and joint planning and decisionmaking. The initia￾tive seeks to link the rapidly expanding stream of
private financing to the U.S. Government’s devel￾opment assistance programming, thereby maximiz￾ing the impact of both. Each partner brings its own
strengths to bear on development problems of com￾mon interest and concern.
USAID has a long history of working with part￾ners—public and private, for profit and not for
profit. But the GDA model is somewhat different.
It was proposed in 2000 by career USAID employ￾ees preparing for the new administration. The con￾cept, announced in 2001, was built around best
practices of Agency partnering and the New
Partnership Initiative. GDA was embraced by
Administrator Andrew Natsios and Secretary of
State Colin Powell. It is a new Agency tool for car￾rying forward the basic principles of the Monterrey
Conference on Financing for Development. GDA
also exemplifies USAID’s response to objectives laid
out at the World Symposium on Sustainable
Development in 2002.
The Role of the GDA Secretariat
To advance GDA objectives and mainstream the
business model throughout Agency operations, the
GDA Secretariat was established as a temporary
unit reporting to the USAID Administrator. Its
small staff does not manage alliances. Instead, it
■ offers outreach to prospective and current
strategic partners 
■ provides in-house outreach and education 
■ addresses legal and regulatory issues, including
due diligence examinations
■ advocates reforms of policies and practices to
support effective use of alliances
■ manages the GDA incentive fund
The GDA incentive fund was established in FY
2002 with $20 million to finance startup alliances.
Proposals for innovative public-private partnerships
submitted to the GDA Secretariat were reviewed by
a panel. One review criterion rigorously applied was
that U.S. Government funds needed to be matched
by private-sector resources. This was called a 1:1
leverage ratio. The fund supported several large,
high-profile alliances, including the Entra 21
Alliance, which targeted unemployed youth; the
South America Coffee Corps volunteer program;
and the Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance.
In FY 2003, the GDA Secretariat changed the
funding approach and introduced the Annual
Program Statement (APS) as a solicitation instru￾ment. It was the first time the APS had been used
to solicit development proposals across a range of
technical sectors and organizational units. The APS
outlined broad criteria for applicants outside
USAID. In addition to meeting the criteria, a suc￾cessful proposal had to win an implementation
expression of interest from a bureau or mission.
Some resources from the FY 2003 incentive fund
were used to expand FY 2002 alliances, but all new
alliances it funded were proposals received through
the APS. Proposals accepted could be funded from
the incentive fund, other bureau funds, or individ￾ual mission funds.
An Assessment of USAID’s Global Development Alliances 3
Part of the secretariat’s role was to inculcate the
business model throughout the Agency. Each
bureau was to develop an approach for supporting
GDA. The secretariat supported in-house outreach
and education, providing over a dozen two- or
three-day training programs to USAID staff at
headquarters and overseas. The secretariat also 
presented modules on GDA in other USAID
training programs. Taken together, this training
reached some 530 people. Two other outreach
approaches were the online Tools for Alliance
Builders and advice and support provided to 
field missions.
GDA and the Regional Bureaus
In FY 2002, ANE created a $20 million GDA
incentive fund and required a 2:1 leverage ratio. 
At least part of this contribution had to be in cash.
ANE staff believed that bigger alliances were more
likely to engage senior management and core 
business interests of private-sector partners. This
approach was believed to lead to the greatest levels
of partner commitment and impact and the best
chances for sustainability. In FY 2002, ANE’s
incentive fund supported alliances in six countries
and two regional alliances. In FY 2003, the fund
supported nine alliances with $14 million. In 
FY 2003, ANE put more emphasis on providing
technical assistance to missions during the applica￾tion process. Indonesia, India, the Philippines, 
Sri Lanka, and Egypt were among missions 
receiving assistance.
In FY 2002, the Bureau for Africa set aside $30
million for GDA. Missions submitted over 50 
proposals for committee review and 35 were fund￾ed. Among them were Ghana’s Food Industry
Development Program and Zambia’s Warehouse
Receipts Program. In FY 2003, the bureau took a
different approach: each mission was asked to
develop alliances. The budget office did not pro￾vide mission budgets until a sufficient number of
missions demonstrated that they had developed
alliances. This became known as the “no alliances,
no allowances” approach. The bureau had a GDA
coordinator, but did not provide significant techni￾cal assistance to missions.
In FY 2002 the Bureau for Latin America and the
Caribbean (LAC) set aside $10 million for GDA.
Rather than burdening missions with developing
proposals, LAC’s Office of Development Resources
designed four regional alliances that were funded
from set-aside resources. These included the
Centers of Excellence for Teacher Training and the
Mesoamerican Coral Reef Alliance. In FY 2003,
LAC attracted the largest share of secretariat fund￾ing. LAC set aside another $10 million to fund
ideas generated by the APS and expand earlier
alliances. Much of the set-aside money was ear￾marked for environmental programs.
The Bureau for Europe and Eurasia (E&E) was not
an active early participant in GDA for a variety of
reasons. But E&E now has a comprehensive busi￾ness plan and a bureau-managed GDA incentive
fund at a planned level of $15 million for two years.
GDA and the Pillar Bureaus
The Bureau for Global Health (GH) and EGAT,
which have long histories of working with public￾private alliances, facilitated GDA’s development. 
In resource terms, GH alliances dwarf other Agency
alliances. World-changing alliances have been estab￾lished in the health sector, though these may not be
broadly transferable as GDA models. Some missions
benefited directly from GH alliances, but their staff
had little knowledge and understanding of the
process of developing or implementing them. Some
GH alliances reportedly face some of the same pro￾curement obstacles as field alliances, although some￾times on a bigger scale.
EGAT also has a long history of public-private
partnerships. There have always been such opportu￾nities in the sectors in which the bureau works. In
FY 2002, EGAT supported $10–12 million in
alliances, including some of the most visible and
innovative in the Agency’s portfolio. The Certified
Forests and International Markets Alliance and the
West Africa Water Initiative were partially funded
by EGAT. The bureau has a large and growing
number of alliances in development, including the
Global Gene Bank Conservation Trust.
4 Evaluation Paper No. 1
An Assessment of USAID’s Global Development Alliances 5
EGAT is also responsible for the Development
Credit Authority (DCA). The Agency views DCA￾funded activities as leveraged partnerships. Not all
DCA activities meet the test of being GDA
alliances. For example, convincing a local bank to
expand its credit window in exchange for USAID
bearing 50 percent of the risk does not constitute
partnership. Shared management—joint planning
and decisionmaking and shared responsibility and
risk—is a key factor in GDA alliances.
Partnering with the private sector has long been 
at the core of the programs of the Bureau for
Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
(DCHA). Work done under DCHA’s matching
grant program evolved into some of the Agency’s
earliest public-private alliances. In addition, DCHA
sponsored a program designed to identify opportu￾nities for private voluntary organizations (PVOs) to
partner with corporations. The program provided
training in support of this partnering.
With the end of DCHA’s matching grant program
and the shift to capacity building for indigenous
PVOs, the bureau reports greater challenge in find￾ing promising alliance opportunities. Nevertheless,
its leadership strongly supports alliances and active￾ly seeks out new opportunities for them. DCHA
has sponsored bureau-wide GDA training and
recently issued an RFA that gives additional points
to cooperative development proposals that bring in
significant private-sector funding. The bureau is
also implementing the Capable Partners Program,
which is designed to help create local partnerships
between business and PVOs.
Phase I Is a Success
GDA is clearly recognized as a priority and
broadly accepted by headquarters and 
field staff. While not every staff member 
is familiar with GDA concepts and principles,
there is sufficient awareness and openness to 
GDA principles. The survey questions for this
assessment were designed to capture respondents’
knowledge and understanding about 1) what steps
to take to develop a GDA alliance, 2) how to con￾duct due diligence, and 3) how to develop an
alliance under existing procurement regulations
concerning competition. 
Most respondents expressed confidence in their
abilities to develop alliances: 24.1 percent had solid
confidence, and another 20.7 percent said they
knew exactly or mostly knew what to do.1
However, 47 percent of respondents expressed
much less confidence in their ability to conduct
due diligence. One-third said they understood the
procurement process and competition, contradict￾ing information received in interviews. Though sur￾vey respondents said they felt comfortable initiating
private-sector discussions and scanning the business
environment for alliance opportunities, staff who
were interviewed said they needed help with 
these tasks.
USAID staff acknowledge that public-private
alliances can achieve development impact. The
broad spectrum of respondents felt the private sec￾tor is an appropriate partner for USAID and could
add value to Agency programs. Though senior
managers showed broad support for GDA’s poten￾tial to achieve development impact, they consistent￾ly added these questions:
■ Is this the only business model for the Agency,
and does it merit continued status as a pillar?
■ Should resources such as incentive funds be set
aside for alliances?
■ How much management attention should
GDA have?
Senior managers strongly supporting GDA also
stated that the approach needs to be selectively
applied. Development impact requires more than
one tool, and adjustments may be needed in how
GDA is implemented.
1 One-third of respondents indicated they had very little or no idea
what to do to develop alliances, but they were not among staff
expected to know about GDA. Nearly all were in missions. Of 
these, 67 percent were foreign service nationals, and 41 percent
characterized their work as support. Another 21 percent were
engaged in contract work.
The GDA Secretariat and USAID leaders have
rapidly instilled GDA as a viable methodology for
achieving the Agency’s development objectives.
The GDA business model’s success at the country
level is due in part to the fact that similar public￾private partnerships have existed for some time.
The original GDA concept deliberately built on
this history. Many activities now counted as 
GDA grew out of years of prior discussion, pilot
undertakings, and partnership activities. To
demonstrate GDA’s newness to Congress and 
others, the Agency discounted some important
efforts already underway.
GDA is a long way from becoming “the” Agency
business model. Most do not regard it as a pillar of
Agency strategy. Instead, GDA is an evolving and
increasingly important business methodology that
is taking hold at country, regional, and global lev￾els. Though its potential has not yet fully material￾ized, GDA’s approach is of increasing interest to
Agency staff.
What Constitutes a GDA Alliance
GDA comes out of a long heritage of USAID part￾nering.2 Since direct-hire staff stopped implement￾ing projects in the 1970s, all of USAID’s work is a
public-private partnership in one form or another.
But GDA means that private-sector partners share
risks, planning, responsibility, and decisionmaking.
The definition used in GDA training and its
toolkit included partnering criteria of shared
responsibility, shared decisionmaking, and joint
planning, including defining the development
problem jointly.
The assessment team considered the participation
of private-sector resource partners as the defining
factor of GDA alliances, along with greater than
normal resource contributions for USAID activi￾ties. To be considered a GDA alliance, the private￾sector contribution had to be a notable combina￾tion of cash, technology, and/or knowledge. The
partner had to have proprietary rights to the tech￾nology and knowledge, or these had to be unique
to the partner.3 If the knowledge or technology was
critical to the development impact, a cash contribu￾tion was not required.
The assessment team reviewed 50 alliances in 10
countries, analyzing 25 that met the team’s GDA
standard. The other 25 were various forms of pre￾alliances and projects, not failed or unsuccessful
GDA efforts. While some were too new to analyze
fully, they offered information on developing
alliances and obstacles that may be encountered.
Others were excellent development projects with
insufficient partnering.
Almost half the 25 alliances investigated began
prior to 2001. Most of the others built on relation￾ships and trust already established, though partner￾ships intensified after the GDA initiative began.
Several of the strongest alliances built on preexist￾ing relationships to work in new ways. For exam￾ple, GDA empowered Indonesia’s pre-GDA cocoa
alliance to take risks. Royal Ahold’s work in Ghana
built on established relationships between USAID
contractors and grantees and farmer organizations.
Royal Ahold’s participation provided a sharper
focus on export-market connections and greater
credibility with farmers, greatly enhancing the
potential for market development. However, some
alliances built from the ground up seemed as strong
as those built on longstanding relationships. While
USAID needs to acknowledge that good partner￾ships can take years to develop, the Agency needs
the flexibility to respond to opportunities that pres￾ent themselves unexpectedly. 
Who Alliance Partners Are
Alliance partners were placed into four categories:
1. Resource partners provide resources for an
alliance.
2. Resource and implementing partners contribute
resources and implement an alliance.
3. Implementing partners are paid to provide 
services. 
6 Evaluation Paper No. 1
2 Anne Marie Spevacek, USAID’s Experience with Multisectoral
Partnerships and Strategic Alliances: An Analysis of Best Practices and
Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: USAID, 2001).
<http://www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNACN271.pdf>
3 This proviso captures the important alliance criteria of innovations
and new ideas. For example, the unique technology and knowledge
of Sesame Street were critical to a GDA project.
An Assessment of USAID’s Global Development Alliances 7
4. Beneficiary partners receive the benefits from 
an alliance and, in most cases, are expected to 
contribute development impact over time.
Many partnering models appear to be successful.
There were approximately 120 instances of partner￾ing within the 25 alliances investigated. There was
an average of 4.5 partners per alliance, and the
range was broad. 
Most instances of partnering occurred in Indonesia
and Zambia and the least in the Philippines. In
Indonesia, the Sustainable Forest Management
Alliance comprised 21 partners, while the Hybrid
Corn Production, Procession, and Marketing
Alliance (with Monsanto) and the AMORE
Renewable Energy Alliance in the Philippines con￾sisted of one partner each. Nevertheless, each
alliance had the potential for high impact.
The assessment focused on for-profit private-sector
alliances because these reflect the GDA business
model. However, the NGO sector is still very active
in GDA. There were more examples of partnerships
with local, for-profit, private-sector organizations
than with multinational corporations. There were
also more alliances with multinational NGOs than
with local NGOs. This may be attributed to the
dual tactic used by missions in alliance building:
relying on existing relationships—such as with 
multinational NGOs—while seeking out new part￾ners and approaches in the local private sector.
Many variations and combinations can lead to 
successful alliances.
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to building and
managing alliances. A number of governance struc￾tures seemed successful in specific circumstances.
Alliances are relationship based, requiring a degree of
trust and understanding that comes from direct and
honest communication about each partner’s needs
and motivations. The best alliances are those where
all partners participate actively in the planning from
the outset and feel a sense of ownership throughout.
All partners should define and record their expecta￾tions for development impact, the responsibilities
and contributions of each, and how expectations and
responsibilities will be monitored.
Sectors Where GDA Alliances Occur
Some sectors have lent themselves more readily to
public-private alliances than others. All but one of
the alliances studied were in economic growth,
agriculture, and environment.4These are the sectors
where USAID has the skills and relationships. The
availability of earmarked funds may have influ￾enced activity selection. The ANE incentive fund
was largely earmarked for environmental alliances,
and LAC alliances also used environment funds.
Furthermore, in the environment sector, contacts
and relationships with the for-profit private sector
that furthered GDA alliances had already been
developed in the United States-Asia Environmental
Partnership (USAEP). GDA-level environmental
alliances in South Asia tended to be a direct result
of USAEP’s work.
Some sectors have been a less natural fit with
alliance building, particularly within the mission
context. In the health sector, there is longstanding
experience with public-private alliances managed
from USAID headquarters. Centrally funded health
Banking Services in Mexico
GDA funding permitted the Caja Popular,
Mexico’s largest savings and loan institution, to
add remittance payments from family members
living in the United States to services provided
to clients. When community members come to
Caja branches to receive remittances, they are
offered other financial services, such as savings
accounts and loans. The productive use of
remittances is increased, and useful financial
services are offered to very low income clients.
4 Many of the 25 alliances studied combined all three sectors.
Twenty-two were economic growth (including agriculture), two were
environment (without significant economic growth components), and
one was health. About three-quarters of activities in the prealliance
and project group were a combination of economic growth, agricul￾ture, and environment. There were four education activities and one
governance activity within this group.
alliances relate to development issues that can be
addressed globally, including availability and afford￾ability of vaccines, medicines, and treated bednets.
In mission health programs, strategies tend to focus
on system-wide institutional change and reform in
the public sector. In 10 countries investigated, only
one GDA health alliance was identified: the
Northern Border Trauma Center in Mexico.
Governance and education alliances may take
longer to organize and achieve impact than
alliances in other sectors. In the education sector,
prealliance projects reviewed included the
Scholarship for Success in Morocco, the Center for
Excellence in Teacher Training in Latin America,
the Quality Education and Skill Training activity in
India, and the new education initiative in Jordan.
Governance was included in two alliances. The
Papua Bird’s Head Alliance in Indonesia included
governance and civil society capacity building,
along with economic growth, environment, and
health. A pre-GDA project, the Cities Alliance in
Tetouan, Morocco, has potential to support decen￾tralized governance.
Resource Contributions and
Leverage Ratios
The size of alliances—the level of resources invested
and their leverage ratios—has been emphasized to
the point that they have come to define a GDA
alliance. A leverage ratio of 1:1 was the threshold
for inclusion in the GDA database. This caused
some friction when offices and missions felt they
had accomplished other criteria—new partners,
innovations, joint planning—without necessarily
achieving required leverage ratios.
When the initiative was new, such tracking of
resources demonstrated momentum and provided a
concise way to define and promote GDA alliances.
However, leverage ratios are not an effective defini￾tion. They may undervalue technology and knowl￾edge contributions as well as the creative design
synergies fostered in strategic partnerships. Rather
than focusing on the quantity and nature of inputs,
a more inclusive and flexible approach would be to
focus on the developmental impact of GDA
alliances. This requires greater emphasis on moni￾toring and evaluating results.
The assessment team used resource contributions 
to calculate leverage ratios, though the methodolo￾gy was fraught with problems. Data relating to 
private-sector resources were not accurate or con￾sistently developed. Reasonable professionals 
disagreed on what should be counted as resource
contributions. Numbers were not comparable from
one mission or alliance to another.
In-kind contributions—estimated values for staff
time, travel, per diem expenses, and office space—
were part of the calculation if they were the only
contribution from resource partners. However,
partners’ overhead and money received from other
donors or as grants were not counted. The team
included estimated costs of project management as
resource contributions only if the costs were
incurred specifically for the alliance. The team
counsels against alliances that rely too heavily on
in-kind contributions. Partners are more commit￾ted to the success of the alliance when cash is on
the line.
8 Evaluation Paper No. 1
Indonesia’s tropical rain forests are being lost at
an alarming rate, mainly due to the demand
within Asia for timber and pulp. Two-thirds of
logging in Indonesia is illegal, but law enforce￾ment is ineffective. The military and govern￾ment are responsible for a large percentage of
the logging. The Sustainable Forest
Management Alliance in Indonesia provides an
opportunity to approach the problem from a
new angle—the demand side—by encouraging
major retailers (such as IKEA, The Home
Depot, and Lowe’s) to exclude illegally cut
timber from their supplies. USAID also works
with Japan and China, which are important
markets for Indonesian timber.
Timber Alliance, Indonesia
An Assessment of USAID’s Global Development Alliances 9
Development Impact and
Sustainability
Large alliances with cash contributions engage sen￾ior management and the core business interests of
private-sector partners. On balance, these provide
the best models for high impact and sustainability.
This drive is most apparent in ANE, one of the
first bureaus to take up the GDA initiative.
Alliances with the most potential for sustainability
were those in which the private sector seemed to
have a strong motivation to invest. This was partic￾ularly true of resource-based, extractive industries.
Oil, cocoa, mining, and timber companies cannot
simply move elsewhere. Their stake in the commu￾nity makes investment their best choice. Still, 
private financing cannot guarantee sustainability.
Resource contributions for one Asian alliance 
were delayed, perhaps due to Chapter 11 filing 
by the U.S. private-sector partner. And within the
prealliance group, some private donors did not 
fulfill commitments.
The assessment analyzed the level of impact each
alliance was designed to achieve in relation to the
level of resource contributions. Resource contribu￾tions included all non-U.S. Government resources
reported, including estimates of in-kind contribu￾tions. Of 12 high-impact alliances, five had high
resource contributions. Three of the five were
regional alliances, and four of the five were in Asia. 
The five high-impact alliances with high resource
contributions were the following:
■ Indonesia Sustainable Forest Management
Alliance, which aims to sustain the country’s
tropical rainforest
■ Papua Bird’s Head Alliance (Indonesia), which
is helping establish a well-planned economic
boom by generating employment and income,
managing environmental resources, and provid￾ing increased access to services
■ Philippines Cleaner Fuels Alliance, which
includes an innovation with the potential to
drastically lower toxic emissions from diesel fuel
■ West Africa Sustainable Tree Crops Alliance
(Ghana), which seeks to raise cocoa farmers’
incomes and reduce child labor
■ India Livable Communities Initiative, which is
developing designated high-occupancy bus
lanes in Delhi and purchasing 30 buses that use
clean fuels
Seven high-impact alliances had lower resource
contributions:
■ Indonesia SUCCESS Asia Alliance (Cocoa) 
■ Mexico Remittances for Economic Growth
Alliance
■ Mexico portion of the Central American 
Coffee Initiative
■ India Solar Finance Capacity Building Initiative 
■ Sri Lanka Air Pollution Reduction Alliance
■ Ghana Food Industry Development Program
Alliance
■ Ghana Sea Freight Pineapple Exporters/Atomic
Energy Commission Alliance
Four of 12 high-impact alliances were centrally
designed, multicountry alliances. In this model, the
High
impact
Low
impact
$1–3 million $5 million or more
Alliance
Alliance with strategy
to achieve higher impact
Development Impact and 
Partner Resource Contribution
alliance relationship is developed and nurtured by
the Agency’s technical leaders, including the GDA
Secretariat. Technical staff then hammer out with
industry representatives a framework for develop￾ment interventions. The alliance then gets “market￾ed” to missions where the strategic fit is good and
staff can support in-country implementation. This
model of alliance design offers maximum payout
for the time it takes to develop an alliance and 
significant potential impact. It can attract private￾sector players with substantial resources, and it
offers transnational reach. 
Nine of 15 other alliances had discernible strategies
for becoming high impact. But two low-impact
alliances with high resource contributions had no
such strategies. 
Creating and Managing
Alliances
Procurement and Competition
Challenges
Procurement and competition were the most fre￾quently identified challenges in building alliances.
GDA does not fit existing procurement models.
Many USAID processes are rigid and slow; negoti￾ating with the private sector requires flexibility.
Early alliances suffered the longest delays, while
exceptions and variations on procurement and
legal problems were identified and addressed.
Alliance managers said they spent more time in
dialogue with contract officers and lawyers than in
other procurement activities. The dialogue was 
further complicated when a contracting officer 
was not experienced with GDAs or in the same
country as an alliance. However, the contract offi￾cer corps has been building understanding, and
time delays are decreasing.
Although GDA planned for reform of Agency pro￾cedures, USAID’s contracts office continued to 
follow standard regulations. The office identified
problems and crafted exceptions on a case-by-case
basis, though consistency in procurement decisions
is essential to missions planning and developing
alliances. Policies and regulations that are more sup￾portive of the unique qualities of GDA are needed.
GDA has inherent conflicts with full and open
competition. Some mission staff were concerned
that seeking out private-sector partners called into
question fair and open competition. They thus
reacted to opportunities rather than seeking them
out. These missions also tended to fit alliances into
normal USAID procurement models. More than a
third of the alliances studied had cooperative
agreements, a de facto best practice for dealing
with difficult competition issues. Though some
cooperative agreements provided support in the
best way possible, in many cases they distorted the
balance of responsibility.
Some competitive procurement regulations also
conflict with the need for continuity after alliance
relationships are established. The procurement
cycle—prescribed deadlines for contracting in a
given year—impeded the development of some
GDA alliances. Zambia lost two partners while
waiting for USAID procurement actions to work
their way through the cycle. A longer “life of 
project” as an accepted practice for alliances could
make a difference.
Because USAID is precluded from signing legally
binding memoranda of understanding (MoUs),
some contractors or grantees signed MoUs with
private-sector partners. This puts the Agency at
arm’s length to the partnerships. Without shared
responsibility and decisionmaking, such alliances
will become a variation on USAID programming,
but with extra GDA rhetoric. 
The obstacles inherent in the Agency’s usual 
practices also affect technical bureaus. Several 
global alliances—such as GAIN and the Cities
Alliance—used the World Bank for fiduciary
responsibility. Though this creative approach 
solved legal problems in the short term, some real
problems emerged.
10 Evaluation Paper No. 1
Approaches to Initiating Alliances
The APS mechanism for soliciting alliance ideas
played a role in a number of alliances. Staff cited
instances where contracting went more smoothly
because the process met U.S. Government competi￾tion requirements. However, some partners in high￾impact alliances would not have responded to the
APS. Other respondents thought the APS exacer￾bated the problem of missions being held responsi￾ble for activities they had not initiated.
GDA alliances were also initiated by the local pri￾vate sector and multinational corporations. In
Ghana, all alliances were initiated by interests out￾side the mission. The West Africa Sustainable Tree
Crops Alliance was initiated by the cocoa industry.
The World Cocoa Foundation collaborated with
the international agricultural research community
to develop a regional program of research and
extension to support more environmentally sustain￾able cocoa production. This alliance won USAID’s
participation as a result of a series of planning
workshops conducted at the industry’s expense in
1999–2000. The first step was bringing in leaders
in industry and research to shape the program’s
parameters and create a broad programmatic frame￾work. Then governments and donors were brought
in to help define how to make these ideas opera￾tional. A fruitful approach for global or multicoun￾try alliances appears to be developing a coherent
strategy and then building ownership for it by suc￾cessively bringing in all stakeholder groups.
In Zambia, GDA training was open to private-sec￾tor partners. The mission asked all teams to identi￾fy potential partners and invite them to a workshop
that introduced GDA concepts, offered success sto￾ries, and addressed corporate social responsibility.
The workshop attracted 117 participants. The U.S.
ambassador was the keynote speaker and the minis￾ter of finance the chief guest speaker. Other partici￾pants included representatives from banks, govern￾ment, the mining sector, microfinance, small and
medium enterprises, farmers’ associations, and
NGOs. There was good media coverage, and the
workshop fostered relationships with new partners.
Though this workshop could be used as a model
for finding GDA partners, not all contracting offi￾cers viewed it as an adequate means of competition.
Because mission staff time is scarce, it seems logical
to delegate responsibility to contractors or grantees.
However, issuing RFAs that give extra points to
bidders who bring in private-sector partners may
not be the most effective method of developing sus￾tainable alliances. Delegating such tasks to contrac￾tors has the appearance of business as usual.
Further, having USAID contractors (or contractor￾like entities) “beating the bushes” for private-sector
partners is less likely to successfully engage the core
business interests of the private sector and gain the
commitment of its senior managers.
Communication
Frequent and open communication was repeatedly
cited as an important factor in the ongoing success
of alliances. The right kind of communication
builds trust, gets issues resolved, and sustains 
energy and commitment. Strong communication 
in early stages helps USAID understand the motiva￾tions and decisionmaking processes of private-sector
actors and potential areas for overlapping objectives.
Communication is the currency of alliances. Early
and open communication between Agency head￾quarters and the field contributed to some of the
strongest alliances. Communication between mis￾sion staff and the secretariat is also important. It
conveys corporate leads, the energy and excitement
of the new way of doing business, and helps mis￾sions keep up with the latest thinking. 
Patterns of communication can reflect shared
responsibility and decisionmaking. For example,
partners in the Cleaner Fuels Alliance in the
Philippines are competitors who communicate
infrequently. USAID enhances communication,
serving as a buffer and liaison. The Air Pollution
Reduction Alliance in Sri Lanka was characterized
by interaction between partners, though coordina￾tion and communication centered on USAID. 
The Solar Finance Capacity Building Initiative in
India is implemented by a local affiliate of a U.S.
An Assessment of USAID’s Global Development Alliances 11
contractor, but USAID maintains a strong advisory
role and serves as cheerleader, moderator, negotia￾tor, and convener between banks, agencies, and
evaluators. The level of partner investment in
Energy Wise India is more modest and cautious.
Communication problems have resulted because
the alliance is implemented more unilaterally and
the project manager is located in Washington,
D.C. The mission’s involvement in the ongoing
communication and relationship building con￾tributes to making the Solar Finance Capacity
Building Initiative a potentially stronger alliance
than Energy Wise India.
Monitoring and Evaluation
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems are
needed to capture the impact and key lessons of
GDA alliances. But most lacked baseline data and
processes to obtain information about how they are
functioning. This makes it more difficult to make
midcourse corrections or assess impact. The dearth
of good information on effectiveness and impact
leads to more pressure to report on resources and
leveraged contributions.
Because GDA emphasizes new partners and
approaches, more resources need to be invested in
M&E. Instead, USAID missions expected imple￾menters to monitor and evaluate GDA alliances,
using annual reporting processes and normal imple￾mentation mechanisms. However, these are not
likely to measure anything directly relevant to 
public-private alliances. One of the best approaches
was to allot a portion of the funds to an independ￾ent contract for M&E. USAID expanded the
M&E budget for the Indonesia Sustainable Forest
Management Alliance after the U.K. Department
for International Development, a potential partner,
suggested building in a bigger M&E component.
Implementing partners then contracted a research
institute to handle an M&E system that allows
each partner to find out how much of its contribu￾tion is going toward timber tracking and the
amount of wood it saved. Similarly, the Solar
Finance Capacity Building Initiative in India
retained a separate partner to conduct M&E and
impact-level evaluations at various points in the
project cycle.
Mission Support for Alliance
Building
Missions with sufficient budgets, staff, and leader￾ship have the time and resources to initiate and
develop alliances. Most missions visited—notably
Indonesia and the Philippines—were in this catego￾ry. By contrast, some smaller missions were particu￾larly creative and active in alliance building. Smaller
missions tended to dwell on money made available
by incentive funds. Incentive funds set aside from
FY 2002 and FY 2003 budgets encouraged mis￾sions to build alliances and, in some cases, repack￾age old work. 
12 Evaluation Paper No. 1
In 1995, the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(USDA) started a program with the World
Cocoa Foundation, Masterfood, and Hershey
to increase the quantity and quality of small￾holder production through combating cocoa
pod borers and funding farmer field training.
The SUCCESS program started in 2000, while
the private, nonprofit organization
ACDI/VOCA was already working with indus￾try partners. In early 2002, as the USDA pro￾gram was about to end, the cocoa industry saw
an opportunity to link with USAID. The cocoa
industry had representatives in Indonesia to
buy cocoa and interact with processing plants.
ANE brought in newer partners such as Archer
Daniels Midland. USAID/Indonesia submitted
a proposal to ANE for incentive funds, and the
Cocoa Alliance was officially launched in June
2003. As a result, industry is already beginning
to see improvements in yields, quality, and
increased farmer incomes. The GDA model has
also sparked ideas for other activities, such as
how manufacturing plants and universities can
work together to make cocoa production in
South Sulawesi more sustainable.
Indonesia Smallholder Cocoa Production
An Assessment of USAID’s Global Development Alliances 13
Secretariat-conducted training was valued by atten￾dees. Private-sector panels were valued the most.
Examples of alliances, ideas for future alliances,
procurement and legal issues, and introductory
materials were deemed informative and useful.
The GDA Secretariat developed an online hand￾book, the Tools for Alliance Builders. Though many
staff were unaware of its existence, those who were
found its sample MoU particularly useful. Staff also
consulted the handbook’s section on due diligence.
Technical assistance in initiating and building
alliances was also assessed as very useful, but mis￾sions reported they wanted more assistance than
was available.
The training that introduced the GDA business
model to Agency staff was a good start, but should
be continued and enhanced. Participants were sup￾posed to share what they learned with mission col￾leagues, but this plan did not always succeed.
Capacity building, in-depth learning, mentoring,
and technical assistance are needed. In Zambia,
GDA offered a different training program that
included potential private-sector partners. Those
attending the training workshop were better
informed about the potential for USAID alliances.
This approach could be useful.
Support for Champions and 
Risk-Taking
When senior managers support the energy and 
creativity of GDA champions, risks are taken and
innovative alliances result. When their bureaus 
support them, mission directors are more willing 
to take risks. In turn, mission staff are more willing
to take risks when supported by their directors.
GDA models were more successfully integrated
into operations when mission directors rewarded
risk-taking and recognized that alliances take time
and effort. Another key factor was the presence of
GDA champions within the mission. One or the
other—champions who offer powerful advocacy 
or leadership-level engagement and support—is 
the minimal requirement for a mission to imple￾ment alliances. Having both resulted in the most
successful alliances.
Direct Involvement of USAID Staff
The strongest alliances reduce USAID’s manage￾ment burden. Citing the Food Industry Alliance,
the USAID/Ghana mission director reported,
“When you have a partner who has commercial
interests at stake, alliances drive themselves.” The
mission reaped the benefits of the time invested 
in negotiating overlapping goals with the private￾sector resource partner. However, USAID/Sri
Lanka managed alliances because it was unwilling
to use limited resources to pay for implementation
and preferred direct involvement. A concern was
expressed about losing the “closeness and spirit” of
an alliance if the Agency relied on an implementing
partner.
Procurement and competition problems, along with
lack of staff, encourage USAID missions to delegate
alliance building to contractors. This can reduce
GDA alliances to “business as usual.” Successful
alliances require shared planning and identification
of shared objectives, which are beyond the negotiat￾ing authority of contractors and grantees.
Further, private-sector partners often want access to
top USAID officials—for advice as well as the sake
of credibility with host governments. Alliances with
policy implications also require USAID’s close
involvement. Partners in two alliances—Solar
Finance Capacity Building in India and Sri Lanka’s
Ecotourism Alliance—testified that establishing a
relationship with the U.S. Government made the
alliance a valuable investment. In other cases, the
role of the U.S. Government was not attractive.
One multinational corporation said it had no inter￾est in partnering with the U.S. Government: it was
above partnerships with bilateral agencies. In
Jordan, the manager of a Ministry of Education
information and communication technology initia￾tive stays at arm’s length from USAID/Jordan.
14 Evaluation Paper No. 1
Knowing the Country
Many missions noted that familiarity with the busi￾ness practices of a country is essential. Though a
handshake is binding in Asia, it is not in other cul￾tures. For example, the Scholarships for Success in
Morocco, managed by a small NGO, wrongly
counted on a verbal commitment from a multina￾tional’s local affiliate for $30,000 for each of three
years, but received only the first $30,000. For this
reason, written GDA agreements should spell out
planned development impacts and the roles,
responsibilities, and contributions of partners.
A full-time resident technical advisor learns about
country conditions, makes informed decisions on
the spot, and can deal with issues and problems
promptly. For example, Royal Ahold’s marketing
expert for Ghana’s Food Industry Alliance spoke
with authority to producers and modeled private￾sector business practices and standards.
All development activities need to be crafted to 
specific circumstances. Joint planning means part￾ners come to a common understanding of a local
problem and work together to plan the best possi￾ble solution in that location. Layers of individuality
are added by each partner’s objectives and styles.
Recommendations on
Moving to Phase II
The Agency needs to share ownership of the
GDA business model. To develop its poten￾tial and enter Phase II requires significant
modifications for the mandate and structure of the
GDA Secretariat. Its role should be divided among
the mainstream functions of the Agency. This
would engage a wider talent bank of staff resources,
strengthen the depth of the involvement within
operating bureaus, and continue the permeation 
of GDA concepts into the Agency’s thinking on
development.
Since it reports directly to the Administrator’s
office, the GDA Secretariat could be perceived as a
political unit. While this gives GDA visibility and
attention, it also makes the secretariat—and the
GDA initiative—vulnerable to administrative
turnover. To internalize the public-private concepts
of GDA into the mainstream structure of the
Agency, the team recommended that the GDA
Secretariat be phased out over a reasonable transi￾tion period.
To make GDA an integral business model, engage￾ment on a much broader front is required. GDA
needs to be included across key functions in a way
that encourages involvement and ownership at the
many levels of Agency operation. At a minimum,
this should occur in four areas: strategy, funding,
obtaining services, and human resources.
Strategy
As a means of achieving development impact, 
GDA should be emphasized as a specific priority 
of USAID strategy. It should be highlighted more
explicitly in the joint strategic thinking of the
Department of State and USAID, strategic 
frameworks of regional bureaus, and country 
strategic plans. 
The team recommends that PPC’s Office of Policy
or another appropriate PPC unit should add
“strategic support for GDA” to its mandate. The
office should develop an action plan to more
explicitly incorporate GDA into the Agency’s
strategic approach. Policy leaders need to develop
clear guidance around achieving results and results
reporting with GDA. PPC-developed guidelines for
monitoring, evaluating, and reporting on the devel￾opmental impact of GDA will enhance the shift in
thinking.
Funding
Incentive funds were useful in GDA’s startup phase
and tangibly demonstrated the commitment of
Agency leadership. Now two predictable reactions
have set in. First, new alliances get funding while
those already designed move into crowded operat￾ing year budget plans of regular mission funding.
Second, money outside normal channels may not
be regarded as core to mission strategies. Incentive
An Assessment of USAID’s Global Development Alliances 15
fund money may not have the same level of mis￾sion ownership. It is frequently perceived as a way
to fund an otherwise nonstrategic activity.
This assessment recommends that GDA incentive
funds be eliminated, except for a small reserve of
unallocated funds for very high priority GDA
opportunities. Some seed capital may be required
for new, unanticipated alliances. If a new GDA
opportunity is so good that it is an Agency priori￾ty—not just a mission or bureau priority—it should
withstand the scrutiny and competition required to
gain access to this kind of high-level reserve.
The Agency’s best interests do not lie in creating
yet another internal funding constraint. Missions
are already hamstrung by earmarks, requirements,
directives, and other funding limitations. Instead,
GDA should be made a policy practice. This
means removing procurement obstacles that 
make building alliances difficult. It also means
providing the support and technical assistance that
missions need to develop good alliances and hold￾ing mission directors accountable for following
Agency guidance.
Obtaining Services
Established concepts of grants and contracts do not
meet new Agency needs. USAID should devise a
new way of entering into alliances that is independ￾ent of existing grant and contracting regulations.
This may require legislation or, more simply, an
amendment to the AID Acquisition Regulations.
The obligation of funds via contracts, grants, and
cooperative agreements is not yet a critical bottle￾neck, thanks to creative use of the APS and grant
and cooperative agreements. However, these
workarounds may not be sustainable. 
Using traditional solicitation documents to award
alliance-based cooperative agreements can cause
problems. USAID may not reach the private-sector
and nontraditional alliance partners it seeks.
Serious resource partners want a tailored, specific
negotiation, whether or not an implementing 
partner brings them to USAID. Alliances clearly 
in the interests of the U.S. Government need to 
be funded using more dynamic and flexible pro￾curement processes.
Leveraging resources is a clear benefit to the gov￾ernment. But this practice needs to be evaluated
on its own merit, not squeezed under existing
rules. At present, leveraging is not the basis for a
noncompetitive action. Moreover, in-kind
resources are hard to value correctly and compara￾bly. The Agency should be able to determine gov￾ernment best practices and adapt them to fit its
unique needs.
Some consistency from procurement officers
should be possible. Missions trying to copy best
practices of other missions have run into opposi￾tion from contracting officers. For example, a
workshop that invited private-sector partners was
considered adequate competition in some cases but
rejected in others. Since the Policy Division in the
Office of Procurement is overworked, it may be
worth contracting out the solution to problems
caused by inconsistency.
A related issue is that MoUs among GDA partners
are not legally binding. However, incorporating spe￾cific terms into alliance agreements that clearly iden￾tify the roles and responsibilities of parties would
help alliances achieve desired developmental goals.
Human Resources
The Agency should pay more attention to the
recruitment, training, motivation, and advance￾ment of GDA champions. In order to address the
skill set needed to develop good alliances, the
Office of Human Resources emphasizes the ability
to manage resources. This may not go far enough.
The Agency needs more staff who are familiar with
—and comfortable dealing with—the productive
private sector. Adding alliance-building skills to the
recruitment skills matrix would be helpful. Alliance
building requires facilitation and resource manage￾ment skills and the ability to work with others
bringing their own resources, objectives, and
requirements to partnerships.
16 Evaluation Paper No. 1
The Agency has established two GDA awards and
has tried to give credit to GDA builders. This effort
should be continued and strengthened. Notable
alliance builders could be in the bonus pool. There
are concrete ways to motivate behavior outside the
award system; all possibilities should be explored.
The Agency should also offer GDA champions
good onward assignments with advancement
potential and seek them out for highly competitive
assignments.
GDA-specific training needs to focus more on
“how to.” Instead of treating GDA as a separate,
new initiative, the Agency should include it as 
one alternative option for achieving its objectives
and offer training that will make it work. GDA
best practices, skills, and approaches should be
incorporated into orientation for staff with pro￾gram management responsibilities. Junior staff
require clear guidance and training that promotes
mainstreaming GDA.
Advocacy
The evaluation team recommends that a deputy
assistant administrator (DAA) position be estab￾lished to be GDA’s advocate. This would retain the
prominence of GDA among USAID’s priorities as
well as the energy and drive provided by the GDA
Secretariat. 
The advocacy and reporting functions, as well as
representational roles, for GDA might be housed 
in LPA. This bureau is the point of contact with
many elements of the private sector, and is respon￾sible for public outreach. Another option is to 
create an office that incorporates GDA, other
innovative relationships, and public outreach. In
effect, this would mainstream other parts of the
Agency into the concept of public-private partner￾ships. In addition, university relations, NGO 
relations, and other partnerships would receive 
the kind of attention that GDA has brought to
alliances with the private sector.
The advocate would be the central point of contact
for GDA. Top-level and center-driven internal sup￾port ensures consistency of message and promotes
greater coordination and partnership possibilities.
The advocate’s role would ensure that one GDA
face is presented to the rest of the government,
including Congress. The advocate would actively
promote and continue to spread GDA principles
throughout the Agency. The advocate would also
explain the value and potential of alliances to mis￾sions and encourage them to invite private-sector
participation in their activities. Finally, the advocate
would be the main interlocutor between USAID
and the private sector, assuming responsibilities for
proactive outreach, marketing, and networking.
Having a central GDA organization to communi￾cate with multinational corporations and global
organizations is important, since multiregional
partnerships affect multiple missions and bureaus.
The advocate could negotiate large-scale alliances
with private-sector partners, working closely with
implementing arms of the Agency or delegating
such actions.
Alliance Support
Some USAID missions feel that the GDA
Secretariat has been focused more on “its” alliances
than on supporting missions to develop their own
alliances. During Phase II, GDA activities by mis￾sions should receive central support. A field-sup￾port focus makes sense. Requiring the advocate to
serve missions as a technical expert in GDA deep￾ens the advocate’s role. In addition, field support
would require the formation and maintenance of
an Agency-wide network to guide alliance building. 
An Alliance Support Office (ASO) could be housed
in EGAT. Wherever it is, the office should be
assigned several key functions. It should become
the GDA expert within USAID. The ASO would
disseminate information and expertise to missions,
including technical assistance on how to establish
alliances. ASO staff could assist cross-mission 
support efforts, including making mission-based
champions available to provide advice and counsel.
The ASO should create a centralized repository of
information and expertise on alliance building and
private-sector involvement in development. It
An Assessment of USAID’s Global Development Alliances 17
should collect best practices from missions and the
private sector, compiling them into a centralized
form. The ASO should then institute a knowledge
management system, including computer databases
and websites. The ASO should maintain this sys￾tem and market its use to missions. 
To this end, the ASO would formalize a support
network to help missions establish and run
alliances. This network would include GDA cham￾pions—staff who know how to establish and imple￾ment alliances. The network would include experts
on the private sector and staff at regional bureaus
who are dedicated to fostering alliance building.
The ASO would cultivate these experts, encourage
staff to become GDA champions, and convince
regional bureaus to develop their own experts. An
informal mentoring system between missions—or
from ASO to missions—could be formed and
encouraged.
As noted, USAID management discussed the find￾ings and recommendations from this assessment
and is collaborating to act on them. USAID will
implement most assessment recommendations,
including fully integrating GDA into standard
Agency operations and planning, developing a new
procurement approach for GDA alliances, and
improving monitoring and evaluation
Management supported the idea of moving away
from Washington-based incentive funds over time.
But it will leave decisions on incentive funds to
regional bureaus and maintain a modest reserve
fund in the GDA Secretariat through FY 2006. 
This assessment also recommended phasing out the
GDA Secretariat and moving GDA functions from
the Administrator’s office to USAID bureaus. After
reviewing various options, USAID management
decided to maintain the current structure until the
GDA approach can be more fully mainstreamed
within the Agency and because it continues to pro￾vide the private sector with a one-stop entrance
into USAID. ■

An Assessment of USAID’s Global Development Alliances 19
Appendix: GDA Alliances Investigated
Partner Contributions Development
Location Alliance ($ million) Impact
Africa
Zambia Fresh Vegetable Exports Alliance 1–3
Milk Collection Centers Alliance 1–3
Copperbelt Economic Diversification Alliance 1–3
ICT Skills Building Alliance < 1*
Ghana Food Industry Development Program Alliance 1–3 High
Sea-Freight Pineapple Exporters/
Atomic Energy Commission Alliance < 1
Sustainable Tree Crops Alliance > 3 ** High
Asia and the Near East
Philippines AMORE Renewable Energy > 3 High
Cleaner Fuels to Reduce Vehicle Emissions > 3
Hybrid Corn Production, Processing, and Marketing < 1
Indonesia Papua Bird’s Head Alliance (Biodiversity) > 3 High
SUCCESS Asia Alliance (Cocoa) 1–3 High
Sustainable Forest Management Alliance > 3 High
India Green Business Center > 3 
Solar Finance Capacity Building Initiative 1–3 High
Livable Communities Initiative > 3 High
Sri Lanka Air Pollution Reduction Alliance 1–3 
Alliance Supporting Environment and Community
through Ecotourism (SENCE) 1–3
Latin America
Peru Huancavelica Economic Service Center 1–3 
Sustainable Forest Products Global Alliance < 1
Cordillera Azul National Park 1–3
Mexico Remittances for Economic Growth Alliance < 1 High
Northern Border Trauma Center 1–3
Certified Sustainable Products Alliance < 1
Central American Coffee Initiative < 1 High
* The Zambia portion of a much bigger alliance.
** The total amount for all countries.

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