FINAL EVALUATION OF
USAID/OTI’S PROGRAM IN COLOMBIA
Prepared by: 
Gerard Bowers 
USAID/DCHA/Office of Transition Initiatives 
December 2001 
2 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
This assessment could not have been conducted without the valuable help of several 
people in Washington and Colombia. I am especially grateful for the candor, openness, 
and most of all the patience of OTI’s many partners and counterparts in Colombia during 
what must have seemed to be interminable interviews. The OTI Representative for 
Colombia, David Gould, needed more than patience, and was well onto the endurance 
portion of the scale by the time the evaluation was completed. His keen insights, and 
relentless good cheer, were invaluable to the substance of the assessment and the morale 
of the evaluator. 
Above all, I am grateful for the administrative, logistic and culinary support provided by 
the USAID/Colombia General Development Division’s Pilar Carrasco, without whose 
help I would have wandered confused, aimless and hungry for two weeks in a strange 
land. 
Finally, it should be noted that I conducted this assessment alone, and did not have the 
opportunity to ‘field test’ my findings or conclusions with a co-evaluator(s) before putting 
them into print. Thus, while the facts presented herein are probably correct, my 
interpretations of them--and thus my conclusions--are at times highly subjective. 
Informed readers are invited to challenge those conclusions. 
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY........................................................................................................................... 4 
I. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................. 12 
II. INITIAL ACTIVITIES: OCTOBER-DECEMBER, 1998 .............................................................. 15 
III. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION: PHASE I................................................................................. 17 
IV. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION: PHASE II ............................................................................... 26 
V. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................... 38 
ANNEX A: PERSONS CONTACTED.................................................................................................. 41
ANNEX B: METHODOLOGY.............................................................................................................. 43 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Background 
Colombia has been at war with itself for the better part of fifty years--strife interrupted 
but not ended by the National Front accord of 1958-1974. Several Colombian presidents 
have attempted to reach negotiated settlements with various armed factions over the past 
twenty years. Some of these efforts were successful, most notably including the 
dismantling of the M-19 guerilla in the late 1980s-early 1990s, and the transformation of 
that group into a mainstream political party. 
Meaningful negotiations stalled in 1994 with the election of Ernesto Samper, and the 
armed guerillas’ increasing reliance on criminal activity and narcotics trafficking (rather 
than on any substantive ideological convictions) as the bases for their continuing struggle. 
The United States had worked with Colombian administrations for over two decades 
prior to 1994 to stem the production and shipment of illicit narcotics. These contacts 
were greatly reduced after 1994, however, as the USG concluded that the Samper 
administration was not a reliable partner in those efforts. Meanwhile, the narcotics 
industry, its linkages with armed rebel groups such as the FARC and ELN--and the 
overall level lawlessness and armed conflict increased dramatically in Colombia. 
Andes Pastrana campaigned successfully for the Colombian presidency in 1998 as a 
candidate committed to the pursuit of peace. His message resonated well with a 
Colombian population exhausted by chronic conflict, and with the USG, which indicated 
its readiness to once again engage with a Colombian Government eager to undertake a 
genuine assault on the narcotics sector. In August of 1998 an USG Interagency Working 
Group chaired by the NSC instructed USAID to develop a proposal to support Colombian 
alternative development efforts as part of an overall counter-narcotics strategy, and a 
proposal to strengthen the protection of human rights as part of a process to end the 
violence in Colombia. The response, which USAID developed during August-December 
1998, included a nascent long-term strategy (what was to become the USG-assisted 
portion of Plan Colombia), and a short-term strategy managed by OTI. 
The essential thrust of the OTI strategy developed during the autumn-winter of 1998 was 
to 1) support GOC peace initiatives at the national level (though the precise mechanism 
for doing so would not be established for another year); 2) enlist the participation of civil 
society as advocates in support of the peace process; and 3) work with communities in 
rural conflict areas in ways which would give these communities a stake in peace, an 
alternative to the armed guerillas’ blandishments, and a strengthened confidence in the 
Colombian Government’s capacity to address their needs. An initial focus of the 
community-based activities was to have been the despeje, or demilitarized zone, 
established by President Pastrana as a good faith gesture to the FARC. 
5 
Phase I 
“Phase I” is used in this report to describe those activities which were designed during the 
period (August 1998-December 1999) when OTI managed the Colombia program from 
OTI/Washington. Phase I projects included: 
Project: “Emergency Response to the Conflict Zone in Meta” 
Grantee: Salesian Missions, Arlington, VA (on behalf of the Diocese of 
 Ariari, Meta) 
Project: “ICRC ‘Peace Fund’” 
Grantee: International Committee of the Red Cross, Bogota, Colombia 
Project: “Technical Study Groups on the Issues of the Colombian Peace Process 
Agenda” 
Grantee: Georgetown University, Washington, DC; sub grantee: Javiariana 
University, Bogota, Colombia 
By early 1999 OTI was prepared to launch the first elements of its Colombia program. 
These included a community empowerment and development project managed by the 
Salesian Missions in the department of Meta (January, 1999-December, 2001. Value: 
$314,000); and a geographically broader community development activity (“Quick 
Impact Projects”) sponsored by the International Committee of the Red Cross (March, 
1999-September, 2000. Value: $750,000). 
The Salesian Missions’ project--eventually designed to work in areas contiguous to but 
not inside the despeje-- included a sub-activity intended to “insulate” area youth from 
possible recruitment by the FARC by providing these young people with scholarships to 
attend agricultural and vocational training institutions located outside of the despeje. The 
project also emphasized the development of income-generating/micro credit activities 
which would give low-income families (and especially internally displaced families) an 
opportunity to regain an economic footing in their new communities. The ICRC 
implemented its subprojects in conflict areas located throughout the country. Unlike the 
Salesians’ activity, however, the ICRC tended to emphasize community infrastructure 
activities (schools, community recreation facilities, health posts, etc.) in the belief that 
“economic” projects such as those favored by the Salesians might serve as inducements to 
potential IDPs to leave their home communities. 
Further to its original intention to support the peace process at the national level, OTI’s 
third “Phase I” project was designed to help the GOC develop the elements of its 
negotiation agenda vis-à-vis the Fuerzas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC). The 
grant agreement which OTI signed with Georgetown University--and with Javiariana 
University, Bogota serving as the sub-grantee and implementing party--was intended 
to develop the information GOC negotiators needed to interact substantively with their 
6 
FARC counterparts. 
Phase I: Performance and Impact 
The Salesian Missions’ project in Meta was implemented in a manner generally 
consistent with their grant agreement. The Salesians completed some 14 community 
infrastructure projects, approved 326 micro credit loans, and awarded 343 scholarships to 
students attending eight training institutions in Meta department. Importantly, the project 
represented the first instance in Colombia in which a USG-financed project focused--by 
design--on the plight of IDPs. The project also broke new ground in its demonstration to 
other elements of the USG that USG-supported programs could be successfully 
implemented in high-conflict areas of the country. OTI concerns with the project focused 
on the grantee’s chronic lateness in providing project performance information (which, 
given the country’s security situation, were needed by OTI staff who could only rarely 
visit project sites to observe operations first-hand), and repeated inaccuracies in the 
grantee’s financial reporting. Moreover, OTI grew increasingly skeptical of the project’s 
claims regarding the number of students “rescued” from the FARC via the project’s 
scholarship program. The activity effectively ended on schedule in April 2001, and has 
been granted a no-funds extension to December of this year to complete its closeout tasks 
and to prepare a final report. 
Despite some initial disagreements between OTI and the ICRC regarding the ground 
rules for their project (regarding, e.g., contacts with rebels, prohibitions on project work 
inside rebel-controlled areas; the need to screen potential beneficiaries to exclude those 
affiliated with guerillas, etc.), the project was implemented with considerable success in 
several regions of the country. By the time the project ended in September 2000 it had 
completed a total of 54 community development and (eventually) income-generating 
grants which benefited, by the ICRC’s calculations, over 120,000 people directly and 
indirectly. Moreover, the project had leveraged some $510,000 in counterpart funding 
(cash and in-kind) from participating communities and various local/national government 
entities. As an indication of the project’s success, USAID proposed to extend the activity 
into urban and additional rural areas (and to add $1.5 million to the grant agreement), but 
the extension was declined by ICRC/Geneva--which noted its risk of being politicized by 
continuing cooperation with the USG under Plan Colombia. The ICRC is currently 
continuing a somewhat smaller version of the project, using its own funds. 
The Georgetown University/Javiariana University Project was beset by delays and 
other problems from the start. The GOC’s official endorsement of the project (September 
1999) was never followed up by a GOC “call-forward” for assistance from Javiariana. 
The project’s nominal GOC counterpart (the Minister of Interior) held the project at arm’s 
length for over six months before resigning his post. At about the same time, Javiariana’s 
own project director left the university to accept a cabinet position. Subsequent attempts 
by Javiariana to fashion a role for itself in support of their erstwhile colleague’s efforts 
(the former project director had been designated as the president’s personal envoy to the 
7 
peace process) failed. OTI and Javiariana eventually agreed to change the focus of the 
project to enlist civil society in the peace process; but those efforts also failed to produce 
any lasting results. The project ended in July, 2001. 
While OTI’s “Phase I” projects produced mixed results in terms of their explicit 
objectives, they did have a significant, longer-term impact on other elements of the 
USAID assistance program in Colombia. The Salesian Missions and ICRC projects, for 
example, were: 
• The first instance in which an element of the USG (OTI) specifically identified 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a key target group for US attention in 
Colombia. 
• A demonstration that IDPs could be reached, and their critical needs addressed, by 
intermediary institutions responsible for the implementation of USG-funded 
activities. 
• A demonstration that US-funded intermediary institutions could work in conflicted 
areas of the country. 
• The first instance in which an element of the USG (OTI) specifically identified the 
issue of child combatants in Colombia, and undertook a program to address some of 
the root causes of the issue. 
• A valuable demonstration--to the US, Colombian and international community--that 
USG interests in Colombia had a “human face”, that went beyond a focus on 
coca/poppy eradication and military solutions to Colombia‘s narcotics-driven civil 
strife. 
• A demonstration that indigenous and international NGOs having their own 
institutional cultures, values and operating systems could work constructively with 
USAID in the pursuit of USG policy objectives in conflicted areas of the country.
The Georgetown/Javiariana project was, by most objective criteria, a failed effort--not so 
much as a result of its own mis-steps, but because the circumstances surrounding the 
project changed dramatically during its implementation. Most notable among those 
changed circumstances was a greatly diminished interest by either party in seeking a 
negotiated end to the armed conflict. Certainly, the project’s prospects had appeared 
brighter in 1999, when the GOC was aggressively pursing a peace agenda, and when the 
FARC appeared to be a willing partner in the search for a negotiated settlement. In 
retrospect, and in that context, OTI would have defaulted on one of its critical missions 
and mandates if it had not attempted to bolster that peace process. 
8 
Phase II 
“Phase II” refers to the period during which a second “package” of projects was 
developed by OTI, after OTI had established an in-country presence in Colombia. These 
include: 
Project: “Strengthening Peace Through Civil Society 
 Initiatives at the Community Level” 
Grantee: International Organization for Migration--IOM 
Implementation arrangement: 
Designed, funded and managed by OTI. 
Project: “Colombia Former Child Soldier Reintegration Program” 
Grantee: IOM 
Implementation arrangement: 
Designed by OTI; managed by OTI during its early (i.e., current) phase of 
operations; funded from the International Law and Narcotics (ILN) 
account. 
Project: “Addressing the Needs of Internally Displaced Persons“--IDPS 
Grantees: Pan American Development Foundation, UNICEF, World Vision, IOM 
and PROFAMILIA 
Implementation arrangement: 
Designed by OTI; initially managed by OTI; transferred to AID/Colombia 
management (as SO-3) in early 2001. 
The “Strengthening Peace Through Civil Society Initiatives at the Community 
Level” project with IOM (September 2000-September 2002. Value: $1.5 million) 
represented, at least in part, an opportunity to reinvigorate the “civil society” objective 
which OTI developed during in 1998, but which they did not pursue under Phase I. The 
project also reflected OTI’s readiness to continue its community-based peace strategy 
after ICRC/Geneva declined to continue its involvement with USAID. The project 
differed significantly from OTI’s other community-based activities (the ICRC and 
Salesian Missions projects) in that it included a focus on development of the participating 
NGOs themselves. These were often smaller, more innovative organizations that tended 
to get overlooked by international donors, but which had the imagination and flexibility 
to develop creative--sometimes provocative--new ways to get community groups 
involved in the peace process. OTI was able to launch this new activity--its “Small Peace 
Grants” project--despite a growing sense within USAID/Colombia that OTI’s work in the 
9 
country was essentially completed by the beginning of 2000. These perceptions were 
strengthened by negative feelings among Mission personnel who felt that OTI had been 
insufficiently cooperative with other elements of USAID during 1998-2000. The project 
fashioned by OTI was nonetheless sufficiently attractive that it was able to overcome the 
Mission’s resistance to a further expansion of the OTI/Colombia program. 
Somewhere between 3000-7000 children are members--voluntary and otherwise--of 
Colombian guerilla organizations. OTI designed the “Colombia Former Child Soldier 
Reintegration Program” with IOM (March 2001-February 2003. Value: $2.5 million) 
in response to an earmark in the FY 2001 supplemental legislation which funded the 
USG-assisted portion of Plan Colombia. Although the earmarked funds were originally 
to be disbursed to the International Labor Organization of the United Nations, OTI 
successfully sought the opportunity to design and manage the new project on behalf of 
USAID/Colombia--which welcomed OTI‘s readiness to develop the initiative. OTI 
pursued this opportunity because it would have drawn on OTI’s extensive similar 
experience in other countries--including the personal experience of OTI’s country 
representative, who had worked on similar initiatives in Guatemala and Angola before 
joining OTI. As designed by an OTI team which visited Colombia in October 2000, the 
project aims to significantly strengthen the GOC’s capacity to receive, counsel, 
rehabilitate and reintegrate former child combatants into Colombian society; to clarify 
their legal status; and to prepare a practical plan for the management of a large number of 
young ex-combatants in the event of a major demobilization. The project’s major 
counterpart agency is the Colombian Family Welfare Institute, known by his Spanish 
initials ICBF. 
Colombia has one of the highest rates of forced internal displacement in the world. By 
2001, approximately 1.5 million persons had left their homes, farms and livelihoods in 
the country’s conflicted areas, and had sought refuge in cities and municipalities. Not 
surprisingly, both OTI and USAID had identified the IDP issue as a key element of their 
respective programs when OTI and USAID undertook joint assessment visits to Colombia 
in 1998. The specific impetus for OTI’s design work on the USAID Mission’s program 
to Address the Needs of Internally Displaced Persons was an instruction from the new 
Mission Director, who arrived in-country in January 2000, and who determined that the 
OTI country representative would function as a fully-integrated member of the Mission 
workforce. The Mission Director’s enlistment of the OTI representative for this design 
task was driven in part by the mission’s severe personnel shortage at the time, as well as 
by the Director’s recognition that the OTI representative’s other-country experience was 
relevant to the assignment. 
10 
Phase II: Performance and Impact 
By the end of December 2001, IOM will have identified the last of the 24 subprojects it is 
funding/will fund under its “Strengthening Peace Through Civil Society Initiatives at 
the Community Level” project. The final year of the project will be devoted to the 
implementation of these activities (typically six months to one year in duration, each 
subproject funded at the level of $50,000 or less). The subprojects themselves range from 
the unconventional and provocative (work with street gangs, former guerillas, urban 
“muralists”, alternative media, etc.) to collaborative relations with municipal 
governments, departmental Peace Commissions, the development of websites for 
journalists, and civic education/vocational training for marginalized groups such as Afro￾Colombian youth. The USAID Mission is ambivalent about the project--citing, for 
example, the relatively insignificant “footprint” left by its small number of small-scale 
activities. But the Mission also intends to assume responsibility--under its larger and 
almost identical “Peace Grants Project”--for some of the initiatives launched under the 
OTI project. Indeed, the Peace Grants Project itself was modeled in many ways on the 
smaller OTI project, and is implemented by the same grantee (IOM). IOM itself 
acknowledges the difficulty involved in trying to assess the impact of programs designed 
to affect peoples’ attitudes and ultimately, behavior, especially over the short term. Some 
of those results may not be evident for years, and even then will probably not be credited 
to the project. That said, some of the more obvious results of the project appear to 
include: 
• The identification of IOM as a valuable working partner for USAID/C (IOM currently 
manages four USAID-funded grants), and the development of the modus operandi 
between IOM and USAID for management of those programs. 
• Development of a model for the Mission’s larger Peace Grants Project 
• A likely positive impact on the attitudes of project beneficiaries toward peace, the 
value of civil discourse in resolving differences, and the capacity of citizens’ 
organizations to influence public policy. 
• Development of selected interventions which are advancing broader US policy 
interests in Colombia (truth in media, improved governance at local levels) 
The Colombia Former Child Soldiers Reintegration Program with IOM has already 
achieved two of its end-of-project objectives, namely its receipt and care of 
approximately 200 ex-combatants at the project’s specialized treatment centers, and the 
opening of three additional reception/treatment centers. OTI and IOM agree that the 
project’s early attainment of its sub-goal of 200 ex-combatants indicates that the initial 
target was set too low, and should be increased. (The project’s other sub-goal is to 
receive and attend to the needs of up to 600 young ex-combatants who might enter the 
ICBF system as a result of accelerated and/or unexpected release events). OTI and IOM 
11 
are urging ICBF to participate more earnestly in efforts to develop community and 
family-based networks (halfway houses, job training and placement, family placement, 
legal assistance, etc.) to support the ex-combatants once they leave the ICBF system. 
The OTI country representative is gradually turning over management responsibility for 
this project to USAID/C, which will assume full responsibility for the activity in January 
2002. 
USAID/Colombia relied on OTI to design--and to initially manage--the Mission’s 
program to Address the Needs of Displaced Persons in Colombia. OTI’s role in this 
instance was to develop an overall framework for the program, to work through its legal 
and procurement processes, and to have the program “package” ready for funding once 
ILN funds were allotted to the Mission. The OTI country representative completed all of 
these tasks, to the extent that the Mission was able to execute all five grants under the 
program within 24 hours of the receipt of program funds in September, 2001. 
An important, if unintended consequence of OTI’s work in developing the Child 
Combatants and IDP programs was a rehabilitation, of sorts, for OTI in the eyes of the 
Mission and LAC Bureau. OTI’s cooperativeness and professionalism in developing the 
two initiatives helped reverse much of the Mission’s resentment over OTI’s previous 
aloofness and refusal (in the Mission’s view) to be a team player in Colombia. 
12 
I. BACKGROUND 
Colombia has been at war with itself for much of the past 50 years. During the period 
1948-1958, (La Violencia) the country was wracked by civil war between supporters of 
the Liberal and Conservative parties. An estimated 200,000 people lost their lives in that 
conflict. La Violencia ended when the two parties agreed to a ceasefire and a far-reaching 
administrative and political power-sharing agreement that lasted for the next 16 years--a 
period known as the National Front. That arrangement brought a measure of peace and 
stability to Colombia until the National Front collapsed in 1974--weakened by the 
internal fragmentation of the traditional political parties, increasing lawlessness and 
intimidation by organized crime, and the emergence of armed guerilla groups. The 
security situation deteriorated further during the 1980s in the context of a fast-growing 
illegal drug economy. 
Several Colombian administrations subsequently attempted to address the worsening 
political, economic and security situation. Belisario Betancourt (1982-86) initiated peace 
negotiations with the various guerilla groups, including the Fuerzas Revolucionarias de 
Colombia (FARC), offering conditional amnesties and the release of prisoners in 
exchange for a cease-fire. Those talks ended in November 1985 when the M-19 assaulted 
the National Palace of Justice in the heart of Bogota, taking 300 persons hostage, 
including the entire High Court of Justice. The ensuing battle for the building left about 
100 persons dead, including almost all of the M-19 guerillas and eleven supreme court 
justices. 
Subsequent administrations nonetheless continued the peace process. Virgilio Barco 
(1986-90) and Cesar Gaviria (1990-94) successfully negotiated the demobilization and 
disarming of eight guerilla groups, with a combined total of 4000 members. Among 
these were M-19, Quintain Lame (formed by members of Indian communities, but co￾opted by the FARC), and the Maoist EPL. Their members were reincorporated into 
Colombian society, while some of the former guerilla groups transformed themselves into 
legal political parties and competed in local, departmental and national elections. A 
political result of the peace process was the writing, in 1991, of a new constitution which 
modernized the state’s governing apparatus at national, departmental and local levels. 
Despite these changes, the FARC and the Ejercito de Liberacion National (ELN) 
continued their armed struggle. 
Throughout this period the United States Government repeatedly stressed its position that 
Colombia’s efforts to combat drug-related activities were closely related to US national 
interests--and most obviously to US efforts to curb the import of illicit drugs in the US. 
The USG underscored its resolve by providing significant assistance to Colombian police 
and intelligence agencies to improve their effectiveness in the fight against the country’s 
drug cartels. This cooperation led to the relatively successful breakup of drug cartels in 
Medellin (1991-93) and Cali (1994-95). 
13 
US-Colombia cooperation in the war on drugs--and US-Colombia bilateral relations in 
general-- diminished significantly during the administration of Ernesto Samper (1994-
98), whose alleged ties to the Colombian narcotics sector undermined US confidence in 
his role as a partner in the anti-drugs campaign. Unfortunately, this period of relative 
disengagement coincided with an increase in the strength and intransigence of the FARC 
and the ELN, both of which increasingly involved themselves in the lucrative narcotics 
sector. Their brutal assaults on hamlets and villages, kidnappings, massacres and other 
acts of terror exasperated local populations--and contributed in some important respects 
to the emergence of paramilitary forces which themselves drew financial support from the 
narcotics sector. 
In 1998 Andres Pastrana campaigned successfully for the presidency of Colombia on a 
platform calling for renewed peace negotiations with the guerilla and for a far more 
vigorous campaign against the growing, processing and exporting of illicit drugs. 
Importantly, he linked these initiatives to a call for the development of alternatives to 
coca production for the country’s rural population, and for the modernization of the 
Colombian armed forces, with special attention to a strengthening of their respect for and 
protection of human rights. The USG saw Pastrana’s election as an important new 
opportunity to further USG longstanding policy interests in Colombia, and indeed to 
broadening its policy agenda beyond narcotics eradication to include alternative 
development, enhancement of human rights initiatives, and support for the peace process. 
Pastrana was elected to the presidency in May, 1998. On July 2, 1998 an Inter-Agency 
Working Group (IWG) chaired by the National Security Council tasked USAID with 
preparing a proposal to support Colombian alternative development efforts as part of an 
overall counter-narcotics strategy and a proposal to strengthen the protection of human 
rights as part of a process to end the violence in Colombia. In August and September of 
that year, representatives of BHR/OTI and the LAC Bureau visited Colombia to assess 
the prospects for a USAID response to the Working Group’s instruction. USAID 
planners generally understood at the time that up to 18 months would be needed to ramp 
up the planning, funding and implementation of a long-term assistance program (i.e. what 
would eventually emerge as the USG portion of Plan Colombia). The Agency therefore 
sought to develop a more immediate, interim response--the OTI component--that would 
help support the new Colombian government’s nascent peace process, while also 
demonstrating the USG’s readiness to help Colombia confront its larger security, 
developmental and human rights issues. 
An important consideration in USAID planning was Pastrana’s announcement, at his 
August 7, 1998 inauguration, that his new administration and the guerillas would initiate 
a despeje, (literally, “clearing a space”, or “disoccupation”) of five municipalities 
controlled by the insurgents in two departments--San Vicente del Caguan in the 
department of Caqueta, and Vista Hermosa, Mesetas, La Macarena and Uribe in the 
department of Meta. Both the government and the guerillas declared their intentions to 
use the despeje/demilitarized zone as municipal “peace laboratories”, where a community 
14 
dialogue among national and local officials, armed combatants, civil society and the 
community would take place in an environment of peace. While the precise agenda for 
this dialogue was not made clear at the time by any of the parties to the agreement, their 
apparent readiness to enter substantive negotiations fueled considerable optimism in the 
country that peace might be within reach. USAID shared this view at the time; and OTI 
was encouraged to develop initiatives that would support the peace process at both the 
national and despeje levels. 
15 
II. INITIAL ACTIVITIES: October-December, 1998 
OTI’s assessment visits to Colombia during July-October of 1998 identified three 
potential “openings” for OTI assistance. At the national level, these included: 1) 
provision of assistance to the GOC’s High Commission for Peace to help the High 
Commission conceptualize various options for its peace negotiation agenda with the 
insurgent groups; and 2) support for activities by civil society (including the Catholic 
Church, labor unions, trade and business associations, international organizations, 
“populist” organizations including peasants’ and indigenous unions, etc.) to exert 
constructive pressure on the GOC and insurgents to maintain negotiations. At the 
community level, the intention was to address the extreme marginality of Colombia’s 
rural areas, where lack of public and private investment, and bleak economic prospects 
for these regions’ citizens contributed to the country’s endemic violence. 
The initial focal point of the community-based ‘opening’ was the despeje, where OTI 
proposed to undertake five projects. The first two of these--an activity to strengthen 
municipal development in San Vicente del Caguan, and a workshop on “Sustainable 
Development and Peace in the Ariari Region”--were scheduled to begin in mid-October, 
1998. The only activity to be implemented was the development workshop for the Ariari 
Region. None of the other four activities took place--primarily because they would have, 
in the view of the NSC, facilitated direct engagement with the FARC in the selection and 
implementation of community-level activities. The activities were therefore considered 
to be inconsistent with USG policy prohibiting any actions which might directly or 
indirectly enhance the role or status of the guerilla factions. 
As noted, the OTI-funded workshop on “Sustainable Development and Peace in the 
Ariari Region” did take place, on October 22-23 in Bogotá. Facilitated by Javieriana 
University, the session brought together 42 participants, including the mayors of four of 
the five despeje municipalities, representatives of civil society (including the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, the National Reconciliation Commission and the Catholic 
Episcopal Conference), the High Commissioner of Peace, the Director of PLANTE (the 
GOC agency responsible for alternative development), and some participants nominally 
representing campesino associations, but assumed by some to be affiliated with the 
FARC. A key purpose of the workshop was to develop community-level projects that 
would be attractive to various donor agencies; indeed, an OTI-proposed follow-up 
conference was to have presented these project designs to representatives of the Inter￾American Development Bank, the World Bank and various bilateral and multi-national 
donors. The LAC Bureau declined to approve the follow-up conference, again citing 
concerns over the potential participation of guerilla elements in any activities that might 
emerge from the second workshop. On the surface, than, this first OTI activity in 
Colombia produced little if any obvious results. On the other hand, the workshop did 
provide Bogotá-based decision makers with a rare--and for many, their first-- opportunity 
to hear directly from local-level leaders about rural communities’ needs and priorities. 
16 
These local level leaders, and especially the five mayors, had been assigned important 
roles in the peace process by the High Commissioner for Peace; but prior to this 
workshop there had been virtually no discussion among the mayors and the High 
Commissioner as to how those roles would be played out. OTI support for the workshop 
was clearly consistent with its mandate to promote and facilitate such a dialogue in the 
search for peace. 
By the end of 1998, some parameters for OTI’s role in Colombia had become clear. First, 
no field activities were to take place inside the despeje. Instead, OTI would look for 
opportunities in other marginalized, conflicted areas, preferably close to the demilitarized 
zone. As the year drew to a close, OTI initiated discussions with the Salesian Missions to 
develop such community level activities, the objective of which would be to “empower 
communities affected by conflict to participate in democratic processes”. More 
specifically, it was hoped that local level activities would advance the peace process by 
“1) restoring confidence in the government by providing municipal-level services to 
neglected communities; and 2) helping local governments and communities identify and 
implement social and productive projects that respond to citizens’ needs” (OTI Biweekly 
Report, 9/99). 
Second, the OTI/Colombia program manager had concluded by the end of the year that 
the civil society “opening” was not likely to be a productive investment for OTI. OTI had 
initially identified this element as a promising candidate for OTI involvement largely 
because civil society had played a major role in a 1997 plebiscite wherein 10-12 million 
Colombian voters called for substantive peace negotiations. The OTI program manager 
was not able, however, to reach agreement with any specific NGO or group of civil 
society partners to develop a meaningful advocacy effort in support of the peace process. 
OTI’s preliminary discussions with prospective civil society partners appear to have 
broken down over the potential partners’ unreasonable demands for resources, coupled 
with their close and often jealous attention to the funding requests of other potential 
partners. 
As OTI entered 1999, it had sponsored the Bogotá workshop on development and peace 
in the Ariari region, had essentially jettisoned the civil society opening, and was poised to 
develop a community-level initiative(s) with the Salesian Missions and other appropriate 
partner(s). Although OTI had been closely monitoring the work of the GOC High 
Commissioner for Peace throughout the July-December period, it did not yet have any 
serious plans (or GOC request) in hand for work in support of the negotiation process. 
17 
III. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION: Phase I 
A. Background 
Phase I of the OTI/Colombia program took shape during the summer-autumn of 1998, as 
the product of a series of consultations between the OTI/Washington-based program 
manager and various contacts in Colombia. The three projects that emerged from these 
discussions reflected two broad themes: 1) empowerment of local communities to give 
them a stake in peace and democracy; and 2) support for the Government of Colombia’s 
(GOC) negotiation process with the armed opposition. The three projects were as 
follows: 
Community-based activities: 
Project: “Emergency Response to the Conflict Zone in Meta” 
Grantee: Salesian Missions, Arlington, VA (on behalf of the Diocese of Ariari, 
Meta) 
Project: “ICRC ‘Peace Fund’” 
Grantee: International Committee of the Red Cross, Bogotá, Colombia 
Support for the National-level Negotiation Process: 
Project: “Technical Study Groups on the Issues of the Colombian Peace 
 Process Agenda” 
Grantee: Georgetown University, Washington, DC; sub grantee: Javiariana 
 University, Bogotá, Colombia 
B. Description and Assessment, Phase I 
 
i. Community-Based Projects 
a) “Responding to the Emergency in the Conflict Zone of Colombia (Diocese of 
Ariari, Meta”): Salesian Missions. 
Background and Description: OTI signed its first grant agreement in Colombia with the 
Salesian Missions in January, 1999. The objective of the one-year, $251,000 project 
(later amended to $314,456, including a no-cost extension to the end of December, 2001) 
was to “support the efforts of the Diocese of Ariari and the Church to work with those 
communities greatly affected by the conflict to identify and implement projects that 
respond to the communities’ immediate needs”. The project was designed to work in 
communities that were outside of, but bordered, the FARC-controlled desjeje, and 
18 
specifically with communities which received the bulk of the displaced population fleeing 
from the despeje itself. In order to promote the sustainability of the project, the Salesian 
Missions agreed to establish the “Fundacion Ariari”, which would seek to mobilize non￾USG resources to facilitate development work in the region--much of it to be financed by 
micro-credit loans. Finally, the project included funds for the provision of “agricultural 
scholarships” for boys and girls of the Ariari region--a program that would offer young 
people an alternative to recruitment into the guerilla. 
OTI’s decision to support this project in this particular area was not, evidently, a direct 
consequence of the October, 1998 workshop which focused on the needs of the Ariari 
region. Rather, OTI’s commitment to the activity emerged in the course of several 
personal contacts and communications between the Bishop of Ariari, Msgr. Hector 
Lopez, and the OTI program manager--who concluded that Msgr. Lopez had both the 
vision and the capacity to “champion” a key part of the OTI agenda in Colombia. The 
OTI manager also recognized that any effective OTI partner in such sensitive areas would 
have to be perceived as non-threatening to the FARC, and credible to the beneficiary 
population. The Catholic Church, represented in this instance by the Salesians, enjoyed 
such standing on both sides of the demilitarized zone. The Salesians had worked in the 
area for over a century, providing basic education and health services to poorer 
communities in the region. 
As originally conceived, most of the activities to be funded under the project were to be 
very small (average cost: $3000) infrastructure projects--e.g., classrooms, school 
kitchens, community centers, libraries, etc., generally referred to as “social” projects by 
the grantee. Within a fairly short period of time, however, the Salesian Missions 
concluded that the project should strengthen its emphasis on efforts to improve the 
productive, income-earning capacity of persons who were displaced from the despeje into 
the project area. Thus, the project’s micro-credit component and its associated revolving 
fund--originally intended to be small parts of the project--became its dominant elements. 
This change in project orientation was effected without any disruption or delays, owing to 
OTI’s flexibility and more-or-less typical avoidance of “over-design” in its project 
agreements. 
Performance: The Salesian Missions offices in Bogotá and Washington are preparing a 
final project report, so extensive performance data will not be repeated in this document. 
To summarize, however, as of November, 2001 the Salesians had completed a total of 14 
“social” projects; awarded 343 scholarships to students attending eight Salesian training 
facilities in the Meta region; had created the revolving credit fund, and approved 326 
loans benefiting more than 1,460 families. 
Throughout its duration, the project generally moved slower than had been anticipated by 
both OTI and the grantee, with much of the delay due to the difficult field environment 
and occasional security problems. Two of the project’s target areas, for example, had 
been the scenes of fierce battles between the army and guerilla units. Moreover, routine 
19 
monitoring of the project by OTI staff was not possible due to the security situation, 
leaving OTI to depend almost entirely on grantee reporting for a sense of the project’s 
performance. That reporting was, in the view of the resident OTI representative, 
inadequate to allow meaningful project oversight by OTI. Similarly, the grantee’s 
financial reporting was often late, inaccurate or both. The OTI representative alerted the 
grantee regarding his concerns several times, albeit without any subsequent 
improvements in the grantee’s financial or performance reporting. 
Perhaps more troubling to OTI were its observations--during the OTI representative’s 
infrequent visits--that the majority of children benefiting from project-funded 
scholarships had in fact been enrolled at participating training institutions well before the 
beginning of the project, and had not, therefore, been newly “rescued“ from the despeje, 
as claimed by the grantee. There were indications, moreover, that some lenders’ 
participation in the micro-credit program might have been due to their active role in the 
Church and/or their personal relationships with grantee staff. (It should be noted, 
however, that these relationships did not appear to have any effect on the viability of the 
project’s loan fund; indeed, the grantee reports that the percentage of bad loans did not 
exceed 2.5% of the project’s loan portfolio.). 
In general, than, OTI’s regard for the project was somewhat mixed. On one hand, OTI 
was growing increasingly frustrated with the project’s pace and responsiveness. Yet the 
activity had clearly played an important role in shaping not only OTI’s own strategic 
approach in Colombia, but it had provided some key lessons as well for the larger USAID 
program that was then taking shape in Colombia (see below). Given its ambivalence 
regarding the project, OTI decided to essentially allow the activity to run its course, and 
to end on schedule in April, 2001. A no-cost extension to the end of December 2001 was 
granted to give the grantee time to effect an orderly closeout and to prepare a final project 
report. 
Impact: From USAID’s normal perspective, a project’s “impact” is a measure of the 
breadth and depth of positive changes it brought to people’s lives, and the likely 
durability of those changes. The OTI standard is of course different, and would ask if the 
activity contributed in any meaningful way to the advancement of peace in Colombia, or 
to the ability of local communities to restore some economic and/or social stability to 
citizens’ lives in a strife-torn environment. Applying either of those standards to the 
Salesian Missions project reveals a mixed outcome. The several subprojects were very 
small, were spread over a fairly wide area, and reached a relatively small number of direct 
and indirect beneficiaries--even in the context of the low population densities which 
characterize Colombia’s rural areas. At the level of individual families, however, the 
subprojects may have had a profoundly important effect. Perhaps most importantly, 
however, the Salesian Missions project introduced some major lessons into the USG’s 
larger program effort in Colombia. These included: 
• The first instance in which an element of the USG (OTI) specifically identified 
20 
internally displaced persons (IDPs) as a key target group for US attention in 
Colombia. 
• A demonstration that IDPs could be reached, and their critical needs addressed, by 
intermediary institutions responsible for the implementation of USG-funded 
activities. 
• A demonstration that US-funded intermediary institutions could work in conflicted 
areas of the country. 
• The first instance in which an element of the USG (OTI) specifically identified the 
issue of child combatants in Colombia, and undertook a program to address some of 
the root causes of the issue. 
Finally, the project--along with the other elements of OTI’s Colombia program (discussed 
below)--demonstrated that credible, culturally-sensitive organizations (Salesian Missions, 
ICRC, International Organization for Migration, etc.) can offer a practical alternative to 
the SWIFT family of contractors in instances when OTI must quickly ramp up a program 
in areas not receptive (or hostile) to assistance provided by US-based organizations. 
By way of an epilogue to the Salesian Missions project, it should be noted that the grantee 
has successfully sought follow-on assistance from the U.S. Department of Agriculture to 
continue the Salesian Mission’s work in Meta province, and to expand its three-part 
program (social projects, scholarships and micro-credit) to other conflicted areas in 
northern Colombia. Specifically, the Salesians expect to receive approximately $1.5 
million (equivalent) in excess USDA agricultural products by the end of 2001, and a 
similar amount in 2002. The Salesians intend to monetize these products to cover the 
costs of their ongoing program in the current and planned project areas. 
b) The “Peace Fund”: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
Background and Description: OTI signed an 18-month, $750,000 grant agreement with 
the ICRC in March, 1999 where the ICRC agreed to manage a “Peace Fund” which the 
organization would use to finance “Quick Impact Projects” (QIP) in rural areas. Unlike 
the community-based project with the Salesian Missions--whose activities were focused 
in Meta province--ICRC project resources were made available for activities in conflicted 
areas throughout the country. All of ICRC’s 17 “delegations” around the country were 
encouraged to develop, with local counterparts, sub-projects which would enhance the 
quality of life of people living in the country’s rural communities. Another distinguishing 
feature of the ICRC activity was the grantee’s decision to focus not on the kind of 
economic/income-generating subprojects eventually favored by the Salesian Missions, 
but rather on community infrastructure initiatives such as community centers, libraries, 
health posts, school buildings, etc. The ICRC’s premise in adopting this emphasis was 
that such projects could serve as catalysts for community life--that they could help would-
21 
be displaced persons decide not to move because they had a stake in their own 
community. Indeed, many ICRC personnel associated with the project believed that 
income-generating projects may have contributed to the displacement problem by 
creating certain “enticements” (or at least reduced economic hardship) for DPs in their 
destination communities. 
The ICRC also differed with OTI over some key features of OTI’s community-based 
peace strategy. First, the ICRC did not consider the project to be related in any way with 
the peace process; it was, in their view, a humanitarian effort intended above all to 
improve the quality of life for poor citizens (including potential DP’s) in the country’s 
neglected rural communities. Second, the ICRC did not agree to undertake any activities 
designed to, in OTI terms, “(restore) confidence in the government by providing 
municipal-level services to neglected communities”. Such an approach would have, in 
the ICRC’s view, severely undercut the organization’s excellent credibility in and access 
to its potential partners in the target communities. (OTI did not press ICRC on this point, 
since the ICRC’s almost-unique access, coverage and credibility were primary factors in 
OTI’s decision to seek a partnership with ICRC in the first place). Finally, the ICRC 
found some of OTI’s ground rules for the project to be, in the words of the current 
ICRC/Colombia Representative, “shocking”, and incompatible with ICRC methodology, 
principles and values. These included USAID’s insistence that no project-related work 
take place inside the desjeje; that no contact be made with the guerilla factions; and that 
the ICRC needed to screen potential project beneficiaries to ensure that none of them had 
any affiliation with any guerilla faction. 
In practice, virtually all of these OTI-USAID concerns got worked out without the 
necessity of formal challenges or extended negotiations. For the record, the ICRC did not 
undertake any projects that might enhance the image or role of the government--but their 
cooperation with municipal and departmental authorities on water projects, school and 
health clinic construction, recreation areas, etc. did in fact attract sometimes significant 
government counterpart funding, along with the introduction of additional government 
presence (i.e., personnel) at the schools and health facilities constructed under the project. 
Similarly, no project-funded activities inside the despeje were ever proposed by the 
ICRC, even if the organization never explicitly accepted such a limitation. The guerilla 
factions were never consulted re project possibilities--even if ICRC delegates did from 
time to time seek assurances from the guerilla would it not destroy a project-funded 
activity (e.g., school, clinic, community center) if it were built. And despite the ICRC’s 
initial reluctance to support activities for displaced persons, or for income-generating 
initiatives, the project eventually included several examples of each--reflecting the 
organization’s deference to the proposals it received from its delegates in the countryside. 
As the project neared its end-date, USAID/Colombia offered an additional $1.5 million to 
ICRC to extend the project for an additional year, and to extend its activities into urban, 
as well as rural areas. ICRC/Geneva declined to draw on Plan Colombia funds, however, 
noting its reluctance to be too-closely associated with USG policy in Colombia. OTI did 
22 
not propose that the project be continued with OTI (i.e., non-Plan Colombia) funds, and 
the project ended on schedule in September 2000. 
Performance: The “Peace Fund” was generally successful in completing a large number 
of activities during its brief (March, 1999- September, 2000) time period. By the end of 
the project it has completed a total of 54 community development and income-generating 
grants which benefited, by the ICRC’s calculations, over 120,000 people directly and 
indirectly. Moreover, the project had leveraged some $510,000 in counterpart funding 
(cash and in-kind) from participating communities and various local/national government 
entities. The ICRC achieved these results despite having been evicted from its Bogotá 
headquarters in December 1999 by several displaced persons who took up residence in 
the building--and who were still there as of November, 2001. Perhaps the most notable 
indicator of the project’s success was ICRC’s decision to continue the activity--albeit 
under its own operating norms, and at about 50% of the funding provided under the OTI 
grant. ICRC’s version of the project continues to this day. 
Impact: The ICRC project illustrates many of the achievements and limitations of the 
Salesian Missions project, as discussed above. Its impact, spread over dozens of small 
activities in many parts of the country, was most apparent at the community and family 
levels, rather than in terms of its impact on either the peace process or in its promotion of 
democracy and stability in conflicted areas of the country. Like the Salesian Missions 
project, however, the ICRC activity does appear to have played an important 
demonstration role for the USAID/Colombia Mission as the latter refined its own 
implementation methodology for the US portion of Plan Colombia. These lessons, many 
of them shared with the Salesian project, included demonstrations that: 
• The USG needed to include a “human” element in a program (Plan Colombia) which 
was generally perceived (in Colombia and on Capitol Hill) as including an over￾emphasis on coca/poppy eradication and military solutions to Colombia‘s narcotics￾driven civil strife. While USAID/Colombia does not acknowledge that the Salesian 
Missions or ICRC projects were laboratories for elements of USAID/Colombia’s 
current program, it should be noted that the Mission’s SO-1 (Democracy and 
Governance) includes a $2.7 million “Peace Fund” fashioned loosely on the OTI 
initiative, as well as on OTI’s later “Small Grants Peace Fund” with the International 
Organization for Migration. 
• Like the Salesian Missions project, the ICRC activity raised the visibility and 
awareness level of the IDP issue within USAID, and tested a variety of approaches to 
address the needs of the displaced population. 
• An international NGO having its own institutional culture, values and operating 
systems could work constructively with USAID in the pursuit of shared objectives in 
conflicted areas of the country. 
23 
ii. Support for the National-Level Peace Process: “Project to Structure ‘Technical 
 Study Groups’ About the Issues of the Colombian Peace Process Negotiation 
 Agenda” 
Background and Description: In January, 2000 OTI signed an 18-month (Jan. 2000-
July 2001), $195,625 agreement with Georgetown University, whereby Georgetown was 
to collaborate with Javiariana University of Bogotá to support President Pastrana’s 
negotiation process with the armed guerilla, and especially with the FARC. In many 
respects, this project had begun to take shape almost two years earlier--and had its origins 
in Javiariana’s earlier attempt to support the new president’s overtures to the ELN. 
President Pastrana took office in August, 1998 in the context of widespread optimism that 
peace was at hand. His overtures to the ELN and FARC had been constructively received 
by both armed groups; and the Office of the High Commissioner for Peace was headed by 
a respected member of the president’s inner-circle. The president and the High 
Commissioner decided that their initial focus of peace negotiations would be with the 
ELN. The High Commissioner recognized, however, that the GOC’s negotiation agenda 
lacked substance and consistency, without which his team would not be able to propose 
specific solutions to the conflict. Largely on the basis of personal relationships between 
the High Commissioner and senior faculty at Javiariana, the latter agreed to informally 
help the High Commissioner develop GOC negotiating positions, primarily by 
undertaking a series of studies into key issues related to the conflict. The studies were to 
be short, concise and specific in terms of their recommendations to the High 
Commissioner’s negotiating team. Javiariana’s initial intention was to conduct three such 
studies, focusing on 1) international human rights; 2) the rights of belligerents and 
prisoners of war; and 3) protection of natural resources (prompted by the ELN’s practice 
of sabotaging pipelines and utility towers). 
Negotiations between the High Commissioner and the ELN broke down in February, 
1999 as a result of the GOC’s refusal to designate a despeje north of Bogotá for the ELN. 
In April of that year, the GOC and the FARC created their own preliminary agenda for 
peace negotiations. It included reference to, inter alia, 12 negotiation “themes” which 
would be further developed by so-called “thematic committees”. Once again, Javiariana 
offered to assist the High Commissioner’s negotiating team by helping to develop GOC 
negotiation positions around the 12 themes. 
The OTI country program manager had been in continuous if informal contact with 
Javiariana personnel since the beginnings of the failed GOC-ELN initiative. Now, a year 
later, the prospect of meaningful negotiations between the GOC and the FARC--a process 
which could build upon the lessons of the earlier failed effort with the ELN--led the OTI 
representative and his Javiariana counterparts to conclude that Javiariana could play a 
major role in facilitating the success of the GOC-FARC negotiation process. Javiariana 
submitted its formal request for support to OTI in July, 1999. OTI sought assurances that 
Javiariana’s participation in the process would indeed be welcomed by the Ministry of 
24 
Interior (nominally in charge of the High Commissioner’s Office), and urged Javiariana to 
secure a formal request from the MOI for Javiariana’s assistance. That request was 
confirmed in a MOI letter dated September 13, 1999. 
The cooperative agreement which OTI eventually executed in January, 2000 engaged 
Georgetown University as the grantee of record, and Javiariana University as a sub￾grantee to Georgetown. On one hand, OTI’s reason for involving Georgetown in the 
project was the latter’s familiarity with Colombia--and with USAID--by virtue of the GU 
Center for Latin American Studies’ longstanding cooperative agreement with the 
Agency’s LAC Bureau. GU’s familiarity with USAID financial management and 
reporting requirements (vs. Javiariana’s inexperience in these areas) led OTI to conclude 
that it could avoid accountability-related distractions in the project by positioning GU as 
the grantee of record. In practice, however, GU had virtually no operational role in the 
project. 
Performance: The project immediately encountered major problems. Project startup was 
delayed repeatedly on instructions from the Minister of Interior, who noted that the peace 
process had not yet started. Finally, after six months of such delays, the Interior Minister 
resigned from government, never having authorized a go-ahead for the project. Further 
complicating the situation, Javiariana’s project director for the activity (Augusto Ramirez 
Ocampo) was named Minister of Development--producing a situation whereby both the 
project’s nominal GOC counterpart and its senior project manager both stepped from the 
scene at about the same time (June, 2000). 
Javiariana replaced Augusto Ocampo with another senior faculty member, Ernesto Borda, 
who had been involved in the project since its beginning. Over the next several months 
Javiariana continued to seek a substantive role for itself along the lines of the project 
design, i.e., to develop GOC negotiating points for peace talks with the FARC. The 
GOC, however, never called on Javiariana to play such a role; and GOC-FARC 
negotiations by this time were stalled anyway, seeming to obviate the usefulness of the 
project.. By December, 2000--a little less than a year after the project was launched--it 
appeared to be effectively over. 
OTI and Javiariana tried to breath new life into the activity by redirecting its focus. 
Javiariana would henceforth work with the Minister of Development (Ocampo), whom 
President Pastrana had designated to be his personal envoy to the peace process, to help 
Ocampo draw in different sectors of civil society as advocates for and stakeholders in a 
peace plan. The intention was to enlist the oil industry, power companies, transport 
agencies, NGOs, private industry, etc. as advisors to the peace process, and possibly as 
investors in peace-related initiatives. Javiariana was in fact able to convene six such 
sectoral meetings over the next several months, and submitted a series of sectoral reports 
to the President through the Minister of Development. The effort, however, did not seem 
to capture the GOC’s attention with any more success than had Javiariana’s earlier efforts 
to inform the negotiation process. As the project neared its July, 2001 end-date, 
25 
Javiariana proposed to OTI that the activity be extended, i.e., to give it another 
opportunity to realize its objectives. OTI declined, noting the several factors that had 
impeded the project’s success--and which would likely continue to do so (including the 
project’s frequent changes in GOC counterparts, apparent lack of GOC interest, and most 
notably, the effective collapse of the peace process itself). The project ended as originally 
scheduled, in July, 2001. 
Impact: On the surface, this project would appear to have been a failure. Its role in 
support of peace negotiations was negligible; the GOC was apparently never serious in its 
stated intention to draw upon Javiariana’s help; and toward the end, the project appeared 
to be engaged in an unseemly quest for some/any role to play in the peace process. That 
assessment, however, has benefit of hindsight; at the time the project was designed, it was 
probably the right thing to do. 
In 1999 the guerilla was winning. The GOC’s response was the creation of a two track 
approach consisting of 1) negotiations with the guerilla, and 2) a deterrence strategy. The 
first track required a substantive negotiation agenda; the second called for a strengthened 
military and, hopefully, success on the battlefield. During the intervening period the 
guerilla has grown weaker, while the GOC military has grown stronger (with more 
improvements in the pipeline). As 2001 comes to a close, neither party embraces its 
original incentive to negotiate, such that the prospect for substantive peace talks is 
currently near-nil. This situation could not have been forecast in 1999, however. And 
indeed, had OTI not attempted to bolster the peace process at the time, it would have 
defaulted on one of its critical missions and mandates. In short, the project failed, but the 
attempt itself was both appropriate and necessary--or put differently, the project did not 
so much fail as it was overtaken by changed circumstances. 
Finally, those changing circumstances in Colombia serve as a useful reminder that 
conditions in that country may change again--to the extent that the GOC and the guerilla 
might once again seek a negotiated solution to the armed conflict (e.g., when the FARC, 
like the M-19 before it, comes to view a negotiated settlement as the only viable survival 
strategy). If and when that day arrives, the body of experience which OTI and Javiariana 
have assembled may once again be brought to bear, possibly with more lasting effect. 
26 
IV. PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION: PHASE II 
A. Background 
The OTI/Colombia representative (David Gould) arrived in country in January 2000. For 
the next three months Gould overlapped with the OTI/Washington-based Colombia 
program manager, Robert Kramer, while the two effected a gradual transfer of day-to-day 
responsibilities for the country program. Prior to the Gould’s arrival, however, the new 
USAID/Colombia Mission Director (George Wachtenheim) had announced his intention 
to reorganize the staffing and reporting structure of what was to be a significantly 
enlarged USAID Mission. As part of that restructuring, the new Mission Director 
determined that the OTI country representative would report to and through Mission 
management--as well as directly to OTI/Washington--and that the OTI representative 
would, in addition to working on his OTI-specific tasks, also assist the Mission in the 
development of key elements of the emerging Plan Colombia. Specifically, the OTI 
representative was tasked with developing the Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) 
component of the Mission’s nascent program. 
It should be pointed out that the Mission Director’s decision to more fully incorporate 
OTI into the Mission’s “normal” structure was due at least in part to growing concerns 
within the LAC Bureau and in USAID/C regarding the independence with which the 
original OTI program manager exercised his responsibilities. These concerns, which 
began to emerge even during the 1998 design phase of the OTI/Colombia program, 
focused on the OTI program manager’s apparent reluctance to adequately review or clear 
OTI initiatives with either the LAC Bureau or Mission leadership, as well as with his 
reluctance to share information regarding country-level counterparts, discussions with 
them, or any findings which might help inform the development of the Mission’s larger 
bilateral program. (These same LAC Bureau and Mission personnel acknowledge that 
the OTI program manager’s in-depth familiarity with Colombia enabled OTI to develop a 
country program quickly--as OTI was tasked to do. But the subsequent lack of 
meaningful dialogue on OTI interventions led some to note that they could not determine 
the objective utility of the OTI program design versus, for example, the extent to which it 
might reflect the personal biases of the program’s designers). 
Meanwhile, personnel changes in OTI/Washington were to have their own impact on the 
program’s direction in Colombia, and on the Agency’s perceptions of OTI relevance and 
usefulness. As noted above, OTI’s Washington-based Colombia program manager was 
replaced in early 1990. OTI’s new Latin America Team Leader (Russell Porter) 
recognized the need to engage colleagues elsewhere in the Agency and in the Mission, 
and to ensure these parties’ support for OTI initiatives prior to their launch. Importantly, 
his efforts to explain and promote OTI’s role to other-bureau and Mission colleagues, and 
to make the necessary accommodations to their concerns (see preceding paragraphs) led 
many of these partners to re-think their hostility to OTI. Indeed, it is probably not an 
27 
over-statement to suggest that this changed management style--marked most notably by 
increased communication and consultation with agency partners--went very far toward 
”rehabilitating” OTI in the eyes of other managers responsible for the overall USAID 
program in Colombia. This more positive view of OTI would be reinforced later by 
OTI/Washington’s direct role in the development of the Former Child Combatants 
initiative (see below). 
The OTI/Colombia program that emerged from these discussions was more closely￾circumscribed in terms of its tasks and reporting channels. But the program was still 
fairly expansive in its scope--including responsibility as of January, 2000 for the 
management and oversight of the three ongoing ‘Phase I’ projects--one of which (the 
Georgetown/Javiariana activity) was just getting started. These projects were 
implemented as discussed above; eventually the ICRC “Peace Fund” project ended in 
September, 2000; the Georgetown/Javiariana project ended in July, 2001, and the 
Salesian Missions project will officially end in December of this year. 
It should be recalled that OTI had by this time grown ambivalent with regard to two of 
these activities--the Salesian Missions project and the Georgetown/Javiariana project. 
OTI would have preferred to continue (and expand) the ICRC initiative, however, but had 
to end the project on schedule when ICRC/Geneva withdrew its support for an activity 
which was, in ICRC/Geneva’s view, too closely linked to the politically-charged Plan 
Colombia. Rather than allowing a good idea to die, however, OTI later launched 
(September, 2000) a successor activity--a project with the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) entitled “Strengthening Peace Through Civil Society Initiatives at the 
Community Level”. Although the IOM project clearly had its roots in the “community 
empowerment” focus of the earlier ICRC activity, it also drew upon the premise of the 
civil society “opening” which had been identified, and discarded, 1998. 
By late 2000, than, OTI had funded four projects in Colombia. These included the three 
‘Phase I’ activities and the “Phase II” IOM project (eventually referred to as the “Small 
Peace Grants Project”). During Phase II, OTI was also to develop--on behalf of 
USAID/Colombia--two additional programs which utilized USAID-managed/State 
Department ILN (International Law and Narcotics) funds. These OTI-developed, ILN￾funded programs include the previously-mentioned IDP activity, and an initiative to 
facilitate the reintegration of former child combatants into mainstream economic and 
social life in Colombia. (The IDP program has already been merged into the Mission‘s 
program portfolio as SO-3; the Former Child Combatants project will be handed off to 
the Mission when the current OTI representative ends his assignment in January, 2002). 
Neither the IDP program nor the Former Child Combatants initiative would have been 
launched as quickly--nor developed as well--in the absence of OTI support for their 
development and management. In summary, Phase II activities were as follows: 
28 
OTI-Funded “Hybrid” (community and civil society focus) Project: 
Project: “Strengthening Peace Through Civil Society Initiatives at the Community 
Level” 
Grantee: International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
OTI-Developed/INL-Funded Projects: 
Project: Colombia Former Child Soldier Reintegration Program 
Cooperative Agreement: International Organization for Migration 
Project: Addressing the Needs of Internally-Displaced Persons (IDPs) 
Grantee: International Organization for Migration, UNICEF, World Vision, the 
Pan American Development Foundation, and PROFAMILIA 
B. Description and Assessment: Phase II 
i. OTI-Funded Project: “Strengthening Peace Through Civil Society Initiatives at 
the Community Level” 
Background and Description: Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this project is that 
it exists at all. As noted above, USAID/Colombia management had generally concluded 
in early 2000 that OTI’s work in the country would likely be confined to oversight of 
OTI’s then-current portfolio, and to development of the new IDP initiative (the Former 
Child Combatants opportunity was to emerge a few months later). Yet OTI was able to 
design and implement the new IOM activity even after this presumably terminal 
understanding had been reached with the Mission. 
The broad outlines for the new project were developed during a May, 2000 visit to 
Colombia by the OTI/LAC Team Leader. Following meetings with the director and staff 
of the Javiariana project, the OTI team leader and country representative concluded that 
OTI’s support for the national peace process was not going well through that particular 
mechanism--but that some opportunities to promote peace did exist at the local level. 
The project that emerged from this decision to seek alternative support mechanisms for 
the peace process included several attractive and innovative features--even for a Mission 
that was somewhat skeptical of OTI’s continuing utility. These features included: 1) a 
continuing opportunity to maintain a “human face” on the Mission’s overall program--a 
program (the USG-assisted portion of Plan Colombia) which was still being perceived in 
Colombia and on Capitol Hill as a military assistance effort with a very thin 
developmental veneer; 2) an opportunity to recapture the “missed” role for civil society, 
with special focus on the participation of hitherto little-known NGOs in the peace 
process; 3) an opportunity to enhance the accuracy and quality of popular debate on the 
peace process, and to correct the misinformation campaigns of the guerilla; and 4) an 
opportunity to develop and test innovative models (“catalyst projects”) which might have 
29 
the potential to have an impact beyond the life of their OTI funding (assuming the 
readiness of other donors to continue support for their activities). The project later 
included creative approaches to reach special groups (women, youth, war victims, DPs, 
etc.) affected by the conflict, but generally excluded from the development and peace 
process. 
Another attractive aspect of the project was its partnership with IOM--a highly respected, 
UN-affiliated organization whose very good performance in Guatemala and Honduras 
had been observed first-hand by the OTI/Colombia representative during his previous 
assignments in those countries. That said, IOM/Colombia’s staffing at the program 
management level was generally viewed as weak by the donor community, including 
USAID. The OTI/Colombia representative had a personal role in convincing IOM to 
strengthen the depth and quality of IOM’s management team as an informal condition 
precedent to receipt of USAID grant assistance. IOM‘s current leadership and program 
management are very highly regarded by OTI and IOM’s partners. 
The ongoing two-year (September, 2000-September, 2002) $1.5 million project is 
essentially a small grants activity, whereby IOM identifies (mostly indigenous) 
organizations that meet the criteria noted above, and provides short-term (six months-one 
year) sub-grants (generally less than $50,000 each) which support these organizations’ 
various initiatives. The sub-projects themselves are often unconventional. Examples 
include working with street gangs and former guerillas to produce (highly popular) 
videos of their efforts to take up more constructive roles in society; support for the 
“alternative media” efforts of radio stations in conflicted rural communities; training in 
citizenship, community organization and income-generation for displaced Afro￾Colombian youth; an urban “Memory and Peace Murals” project for young artists in Cali, 
etc. Other projects are more conventional: journalism training for print and other media 
professionals and the development of websites for accurate information on the conflict; 
development of “Guides on Municipal Development” for leaders and staff at hundreds of 
local communities; institutional strengthening of the Peace Commission Offices in five 
departments, etc. The cross-cutting theme underscored by IOM, however, is that all of 
these several activities are helping to create a “culture for peace”--which, if not national 
in scope, is probably affecting the actions and attitudes of the direct and indirect 
beneficiaries reached by the project. 
Performance: IOM has approved 24 sub-grants over the life of the project. No new sub￾grants will be approved after December, 2001. The final year (project ends September, 
2002) will be used for oversight of the ongoing sub-grants and eventual closeout of the 
project. 
The individual subprojects appear to be performing well, although few of them are 
structured to produce measurable impacts. IOM is sensitive to this, and is struggling to 
develop performance standards for activities often designed to affect attitudes and long￾term behavior, rather than specific “products” such as workshops, publications, students 
30 
trained, diseases cured, etc. 
 
Impact: The project was launched in September, 2000 as a one-year activity with an 
initial grant of $200,000 in OTI funds. The grant agreement has been amended twice, 
raising the OTI funding level to $1.5 million, and extending the project an additional 
year, to September, 2002 (almost one year beyond the departure of the current OTI 
country representative). OTI’s readiness to expand the activity was due to several factors, 
most notably including 1) a shared view with IOM that many of the subprojects are 
indeed changing the individual lives of their beneficiaries, and are possibly contributing 
to the emergence of a more open, tolerant and democratic mindset within the several 
subprojects’ “catchment basins”; 2) the project’s success in finding and enhancing the 
role of innovative new NGOs; and 3) OTI’s high regard for IOM’s professionalism in 
managing the project. 
Some USAID/Colombia personnel, on the other hand, tend to be dismissive of the 
project, citing its focus on small, highly-localized activities that have little prospect of 
meaningful impact, and the project’s perhaps self-indulgent engagement with fringe 
counterparts (gang members, former/current leftists, urban street artists, etc.). The truth 
probably lies somewhere in the middle. OTI is indeed investing in some high-risk 
ventures--many of its more provocative subprojects have little chance of continuing post￾project in the absence of other-donor support. Moreover, IOM may be providing 
substitute assistance for activities that existed before the project started, and which will 
continue after the project ends (e.g., community theater opportunities for DPs in Bogotá; 
a public information campaign by an international NGO to prevent recruitment of former 
child combatants). Finally, some of the subprojects are being implemented by sub￾grantees which had been previously known to IOM program managers--in some cases on 
a personal level. This may be, at least in part, a response to the need to get activities under 
way in a short period of time--thus the tendency to work with organizations known by 
IOM to be competent. But it also creates the appearance--even if unfair--of favoritism in 
the grants award process. 
That said, several of the project’s sub-grants do appear to be leaving a significant 
“footprint” in Colombia: the “Guides on Municipal Development” activity is reaching 
thousands of local-level decision makers and managers, and is likely to play an important 
role in USAID’s larger effort to address corruption and mismanagement in the country’s 
municipalities. The project’s alternative media, website support and journalism training 
efforts are helping inject accurate, objective reporting into an environment too-often 
characterized by error, deliberate distortion and rumor. The project’s outreach to 
neglected sub-groups such as the Afro-Colombian community may be helping to create a 
leadership cadre whose debt to the project won’t be clear--if ever--for another decade. 
The value of some of these subprojects has in fact been recognized by the Mission--as 
demonstrated by the SO 1 (Democracy and Governance) Team’s intention to assume 
ongoing responsibility for the Municipal Guides, journalism training and website 
activities under SO 1’s own Peace Grants Project with IOM. 
31 
The USAID Mission’s larger ($2.7 million) Peace Grants Project (also with IOM) would 
probably not exist, in fact, if the earlier OTI-funded (“Small Peace Grants Project”) 
initiative had not tested, demonstrated and refined the grant-making and grant 
management methodology later adopted by the Mission project. Moreover, IOM’s 
success in managing the OTI Small Peace Grants Project--and IOM’s constructiveness in 
working with OTI--were fundamental considerations behind the USAID Mission’s 
subsequent decisions to work with IOM on other Mission initiatives as well, including the 
Former Child Combatants project, and the IDP program (see below). 
Finally, the small grants model developed by OTI is soon to be adopted by the US 
Embassy in Bogota. Specifically, the embassy’s political section expects to receive 
$250,000 in ILN funds in the near future, and plans to implement its own small grants 
program along the lines of the OTI effort. The OTI Colombia representative is providing 
operational guidance and advice to his Emb/Pol counterparts to help ensure the successful 
implementation of the embassy program. 
To summarize, the IOM Small Peace Grants Project appears to have produced some 
notable results, including: 
• Development of selected interventions which are advancing broader US policy 
interests in Colombia (truth in media, improved governance at local levels) 
• The identification of IOM as a valuable working partner for USAID/C (IOM currently 
manages four USAID-funded grants), and the development of the modus operandi 
between IOM and USAID for management of those four programs. 
• Development of a model for the Mission’s Peace Grants Project and for the US 
Embassy’s similar small grants project. 
• A likely positive impact on the attitudes of project beneficiaries toward peace, the 
value of civil discourse in resolving differences, and the capacity of citizens’ 
organizations to influence public policy. 
Whether or not the project actually attained any portion of its ultimate objective--the 
promotion of peace--is open to conjecture. The collapse of the peace process in 
Colombia was certainly not due to any shortcomings of this modest activity; but it would 
probably be over-reaching to suggest that the project might have played a significant role 
in furthering that process either--at least in the short term. A more conservative, albeit 
more confident assessment would conclude that the activity produced models and tools 
that were picked up by the USAID Mission so that the latter could do its work more 
effectively; and that the seeds left behind by the project may--may--some day produce 
results which will never be credited to the project 
32 
ii. OTI-Developed & Managed/ILN-Funded Project: “Colombia Former Child 
Soldier Reintegration Program” 
Background and Description: The child combatants issue is, of course, an international 
one--with special relevance in countries such as Sierra Leone, Angola, Uganda, 
Myanmar, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to name a few. The problem is 
similarly acute in Colombia, where 3000-7000 child soldiers (accurate estimates are not 
available) are serving in the country’s three largest armed rebel groups. One informal 
estimate suggests, for example, that up to one-third of the Colombian armed factions’ 
personnel are probably 18 years of age and younger. 
In July, 2000 President Clinton signed a supplemental appropriations act which provided 
funding for the US-supported portion of Plan Colombia. That legislation included a $2.5 
million earmark directing the administration to design and implement a program to 
reintegrate into Colombian society former child soldiers who had served in various armed 
factions. The legislative history leading up to the earmark had initially identified the 
International Labor Organization (ILO) of the United Nations as the implementing agency 
for the program. OTI nonetheless actively sought--and secured--the lead responsibility 
for the initiative, citing OTI’s prior experience with demobilization and reintegration 
programs in Haiti, Guatemala, the Philippines, Sierra Leone and the Balkans. OTI’s 
capacity was further enhanced by the personal experience of the OTI country 
representative, who had worked in support of child combatant issues in Guatemala and 
Angola prior to joining OTI. Moreover, the child combatants topic had been on OTI’s 
country agenda throughout 1998-2000--reflected in the Salesian Missions’ scholarship 
program, and in a number of the IOM’s small “peace grants” to organizations working on 
the child combatants problem. 
OTI was therefore in a position to move rapidly once the earmark was in place--and had 
in fact been more-or-less anticipating the challenge well before the July 2000 date of the 
legislation. In fact, the initial stimulus for a USG response to the issue occurred in 1998, 
when the newly-elected President Pastrana asked President Clinton for US assistance in 
addressing the child combatants problem. To put this request in perspective, it should be 
recalled that Pastrana had campaigned as a “peace candidate”, and had promised to 
engage the armed factions in negotiations that could lead to peace--and therefore to a 
major demobilization of the rebel militias. Pastrana had concluded that the country was 
not prepared to respond to the psycho-social, educational or economic needs of thousands 
of young people who might be quickly demobilized as the result of success in the peace 
negotiations. When the July, 2000 earmark provided significant resources to address the 
issue, OTI was able to immediately begin at least the preliminary design work on a new 
project. 
In October, 2000 an OTI project design team headed by the OTI Team Leader for Latin 
America visited Colombia for two weeks to complete development of the “Former Child 
Soldier Reintegration Program“. Building on the OTI/Colombia representative’s 
33 
previous data-gathering work and consultations with prospective partners, the OTI team 
was able to quickly design a comprehensive new project that included three key elements: 
1) institutional strengthening of GOC and NGO capacity to receive, support, counsel, 
train and successfully reintegrate former child soldiers; 2) development of a quick￾response mechanism in the event of large-scale releases of child soldiers in the future; 
and 3) efforts to clarify the legal status of child soldiers. 
IOM submitted its proposal to OTI in December, 2000. Beginning in January 2001, the 
OTI/LAC Team Leader met several times with representatives of Senator Harkin’s office, 
as well as with representatives of the labor groups which had strongly promoted the 
senator’s legislative earmark. The purposes of these meetings were to obtain the 
participants’ feedback on the project’s draft design, and to assure these parties that OTI 
was prepared and able to manage the program in a manner consistent with the vision set 
forth in the earmark. The senator’s office and the labor groups signaled their approval of 
the OTI project design in February. 
In March 2001, USAID and IOM executed a two-year, $2.5 million cooperative 
agreement whereby IOM would implement the new project. IOM’s key counterpart in the 
project is the GOC Family Welfare Institute, known by its Spanish initials as ICBF. Save 
the Children/United Kingdom participates in the project as a sub-grantee. 
Once beyond the initial planning and organizational steps, the parties to the agreement 
focused on the project’s first major task--improving the technical, professional and 
physical capacity of ICBF’s four pilot “specialized treatment centers” (opened in 1999), 
and the preparation and opening of new centers, some of which would be managed by 
NGOs working under the policy direction of ICBF. (According to the pilot system 
developed by ICBF, each of the centers is structured to provide housing, counseling and 
vocational skills training for 20-22 youths). Specifically, the project provides resources 
to improve operations at the four pilot ICBF facilities; for the construction and initial 
operating costs of two additional treatment centers (one in Macondo, north of Bogotá, and 
another in Cali); and for the operation of one emergency reception center, in Bogotá, 
which attends to the needs of child combatants who need special care and/or attention 
before proceeding to one of the specialized treatment centers. 
The project has also begun work on the legal status of ex-combatant children. The focus 
of this part of the project is being revised, however, to concentrate on training of Juvenile 
Defenders and Judges of Minors, rather than on the more intractable issue of changing 
laws that relate to the children. 
The long-term success of the reintegration effort will depend on the ability of ICBF, other 
GOC agencies such as the Reinsercion Office of the Ministry of Interior, and various 
indigenous NGOs to address the continuing (i.e., post-treatment center) needs of the ex￾combatants. This phase of the project is still in its early stages, and will be a special 
focus of the project during its remaining 15 months. 
34 
Performance: Although the project has been effectively under way for only seven 
months (since April, 2001), it is already well ahead of schedule in meeting some of its 
objectives. Two new specialized treatment centers (one in Macondo, the other in Cali) 
have been brought “on line”; the new Reception Center in Bogotá is fully functioning; 
and 200 former child combatants have been attended to by the treatment centers since the 
project started. That 200 figure is significant because it represents the end-of-project 
(early 2003) objective for the project. More precisely, the project was designed to attend 
to 200 youths under normal circumstances, i.e., in the absence of a large-scale 
demobilization, and up to 600 additional ex-combatants in the event of a major release (or 
several quasi-major releases) of young soldiers. Together, the two sub-targets amount to 
800 ex-combatants over the life of the project. The project’s sub-goal of 200 ex￾combatants has already been reached. 
OTI rightly views this rapid attainment of one of its objectives as an indication that the 
project’s original target was set too low, and is working with IOM and ICBF to raise the 
project’s target of “normal circumstances” ex-combatants to approximately 400-500. A 
contingency plan to manage a significant increase in the release-rate of child soldiers has 
been developed. That plan would nonetheless require more intense use of existing 
facilities and/or the use of encampments and other temporary measures, so it may not be 
adequate in the event of a major demobilization. 
ICBF’s methodical approach to the project may be inconsistent with the need to do some 
more aggressive forward-thinking regarding ex-combatant’s needs after they leave the 
centers--needs that will include assignment, if needed, to halfway houses; family 
placement; ongoing vocational training and job placement; access to legal services; 
access to income-generation opportunities supported by other GOC agencies (such as 
Reinsercion), etc. OTI and IOM are trying to ensure that ICBF participates in that 
longer-term planning process; but ICBF staff sometimes perceive these OTI and IOM 
urgings as pressure on ICBF to take on too much too soon--possibly at the risk of 
jeopardizing the overall quality of services at existing centers. OTI and IOM plan to 
work as closely as possible with ICBF in developing the critically-important reintegration 
phase of the project; but they are also prepared to develop that later phase with other 
agencies--such as Reinsercion--if ICBF is not ready to fully engage in the effort. 
 
Both OTI and IOM point out that ICBF’s conservative approach to the project can also be 
interpreted in a positive sense. They emphasize, for example, that ICBF takes its 
responsibilities under the project very seriously, and that ICBF’s concerns arise from their 
desire to preserve a high quality of care for seriously traumatized youth. That 
commitment to quality is evident in the centers themselves, where staff are attentive to 
the young people under their supervision, interact well with them, and are providing 
professional care of consistently high caliber. ICBF is also participating substantively in 
its own institutional strengthening: it has doubled the size of its core project management 
team (from four to eight), and has successfully recruited managers, psychologists and 
35 
educators who seem to be well-prepared and well-motivated for their roles. Although 
ICBF is responsible for the welfare of some 74,000 young people in ICBF orphanages, 
shelters and other facilities, the head of the agency takes a close and supportive interest in 
the project. 
 
The performance of the sub grantee Save the Children in the project has disappointed 
IOM and ICBF. Representatives of the latter two agencies point out that Save has done 
little if anything to date with the resources ($140,000) it has received under its IOM 
subgrant--resources it was supposed to use to provide technical assistance at the treatment 
centers and to develop psycho-social counseling materials and training sessions. IOM 
and ICBF individually and separately agree that the project would function more 
smoothly--and economically--without Save; but neither organization wants to take the 
lead in terminating a relationship with an NGO which is held in such high international 
esteem in the field of child health. IOM and ICBF have apparently agreed to adopt a 
passive stance whereby they will continue to hope for better performance by Save. 
Neither organization, however, is prepared to take any openly hostile action (such as 
terminating the sub-grant--a move which OTI would support) up to the time the subgrant 
expires in a few months’ time. 
Impact: The most obvious impact of the project has been its central role in creating the 
prospect of safe, constructive lives for the 200 young people who have been reached thus 
far by the activity. That impact will be deepened and expanded as the project attends to 
additional ex-combatants, and as it develops its follow-on/post-treatment components. 
As noted above, however, much work needs to be done to better prepare ICBF to manage 
a prospective (and perhaps sudden) release of child combatants, and to adopt a more 
vigorous timetable for development of post-treatment services for the affected youth. As 
the only institution in Colombia with formal responsibility for the reception and treatment 
of former child soldiers, the future of the reintegration effort depends heavily on ICBF’s 
ability to support and sustain the program. An important test of that resolve will emerge 
in year two of the project, when the GOC and ICBF are obliged, per the terms of their 
agreement, to assume responsibility for 50% of the operating costs of the specialized 
treatment centers (and 100% of those costs by the beginning of year 3). 
USAID/Colombia, which assumes management responsibility for the project in January, 
2002, should closely monitor ICBF’s compliance with this requirement. 
An unintended, if positive, result of this project was its effect on USAID-OTI relations. 
As explained previously, USAID/Colombia management had been skeptical regarding 
OTI’s continuing relevance in the country as the new and enlarged Mission took shape in 
early 2000. However, OTI’s skill and responsiveness in developing this high-visibility 
project changed some minds in the Mission. Indeed, OTI’s work on the Child 
Combatants earmark--and its work to develop the IDP initiative (discussed below)--cast 
OTI in the role of “indispensable partner” at a critical period in the Mission’s program 
development phase. At the risk of overstatement, OTI success in designing and launching 
this project (and the IDP program) effectively “rehabilitated” OTI in the eyes of Mission 
36 
personnel who had been resentful of OTI’s autonomy and free-wheeling ways. 
iii. OTI-Developed/Mission-Managed Program: Addressing the Needs of 
Internally Displaced Persons 
Background and Description: Colombia has one of the highest rates of forced internal 
displacement in the world. By 2001, approximately 1.5 million persons had left their 
homes, farms and livelihoods in the country’s conflicted areas, and had sought refuge in 
cities and municipalities. Such involuntary upheaval can shatter the lives of the displaced 
persons, and places huge social and economic burdens on destination communities ill￾prepared to support sizeable new population groups. 
Not surprisingly than, a joint USAID/OTI assessment team that visited Colombia in 1998 
identified the plight of IDPs as a key focus for their respective program design efforts. 
OTI was, as noted above, the first USG agency to support IDP-oriented programs in 
Colombia, (during the course of which it developed many of the intervention strategies 
which would later be reflected in the larger, Mission-funded program). Once 
USAID/Colombia began to organize itself to address the IDP issue (November 1999-
January 2000), it turned to OTI to design that program. 
The Mission’s decision to enlist OTI (i.e., the new resident OTI representative) in the task 
was, to a considerable extent, borne of necessity. The new Mission Director had earlier 
asked USAID/Washington for authority to recruit a personal services contractor who 
would be responsible for design and management of the IDP program--but that request 
was denied. The Mission, moreover, was very thinly-staffed at this critical period-- while 
it was being charged with the task of developing a five-year, $500 million program (the 
USG component of Plan Colombia). The Mission Director--taking note of the Mission’s 
near-desperate staffing situation, as well as the new OTI representative’s personal 
experience with IDP programs--instructed the OTI representative to take on the IDP 
design assignment. This instruction was consistent with the new Mission Director‘s 
determination that OTI would function in Colombia as a fully-integrated element of the 
USAID Mission. 
Over the next several months, the resident OTI representative consulted widely with 
Colombian and international counterparts knowledgeable about the country’s IDP 
problem, and drew on support from OTI/Washington to refine the program‘s design 
elements. He also maintained close contact with USAID’s regional legal adviser and 
procurement officer to ensure that his consultations with prospective participants in the 
program were consistent with Agency policy and procurement procedures. Under the 
procurement officer’s guidance, he managed the receipt and review process for several 
unsolicited proposals from prospective implementing agencies, to the point that virtually 
all of the pre-award tasks had been completed before Plan Colombia funds were allotted 
to the Mission for this initiative in September, 2000. The Mission was consequently able 
to execute five grants with the selected implementing agencies within 24 hours of receipt 
of those funds. The IDP program fashioned by OTI represented approximately $30 
37 
million of the $120 million obligated by the Mission in FY 2000. 
The OTI representative served as program manager for the five grants (the Mission’s SO￾3) through their October 2000-January 2001 startup phase, after which time USAID/C 
assumed responsibility for the program. As the IDP program is still relatively new, and 
since OTI is not managing the program during its ongoing implementation phase, this 
assessment does not report on the performance or impact of the IDP program. It is 
possible, however, to identify some of the key products of OTI’s role in developing and 
launching this important new initiative. These included: 
• An IDP assistance program that included innovative response mechanisms to address 
the needs of Colombia’s displaced persons, as well as tried-and-tested methodologies 
to reach these communities; and 
• A fully-developed “package” of five grants, for which virtually all developmental, 
administrative and start-up requirements had been met, and which was 
“implementation-ready” when transferred from the OTI project developer to the 
USAID Mission program managers 
Finally, and as mentioned previously, OTI’s indispensable assistance in pulling this 
program together helped create a positive climate for OTI’s exit in January, 2002. 
38 
V. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The OTI/Colombia program is closing out within one month, so any program-specific 
recommendations would have very limited utility for OTI in that country. However, 
some of the lessons that emerged from OTI/Colombia’s experience, and their associated 
recommendations, may have potential relevance for other country programs which are 
currently receiving OTI support --or which may be candidates for future OTI assistance. 
Lesson 1: The design of new country programs requires the involvement of person(s) 
who have in-depth personal/professional experience in the prospective recipient country. 
In such circumstances OTI needs to take care to ensure that proposed programs reflect 
objectively-determined needs, and that they are not the product of consultants’ personal 
biases and/or preconceptions. 
Recommendation 1: OTI assessment teams responsible for the design of new country 
programs should include at least one person who is knowledgeable of --and experienced 
in--the cultural, developmental and political environment in the prospective recipient 
country. OTI should challenge its design teams to present the reasons why their action 
recommendations would more likely address OTI and USG objectives than would other 
prospective interventions which had been considered but discarded in the assessment 
process. 
__________________ 
Lesson 2:The SWIFT family of contractors/grantees may not be OTI‘s most appropriate 
rapid-response mechanism in some countries. 
Recommendation 2: OTI should consider the special requirements of each country as it 
selects its implementing (contractor/grantee) partners. In some countries, e.g., in high￾risk security environments or in highly-charged political environments, better results 
might be achieved by working with international and/or indigenous organizations not 
clearly-identifiable as USG contractors. 
__________________ 
Lesson 3: Achievement of the task (conflict resolution; improved dialogue among 
contentious parties; a successful transition from strife to peace and stability, etc.) is more 
important than accretion of “credit” to the USG, including OTI. 
Recommendation 3: Whenever necessary and appropriate, OTI should be prepared to 
provide its support without fanfare, publicity or public relations efforts that might impede 
the ability of OTI’s in-country partners to perform their tasks. This low profile might 
require waivers to dispense with USAID markings on project vehicles and other 
commodities, eschewing prominent roles at OTI-supported conferences, workshops, etc., 
and deference to partners’ claims of success in peace promotion efforts. 
39 
__________________ 
Lesson 4: Good ideas can go bad; projects that looked promising during the design stage 
don’t always work out as planned. It’s OK to shut them down and move on. The 
determination that a project is not performing may often be subjective; but when 
subjective and/or anecdotal evidence of non-performance is compelling, OTI managers 
need not rely on “hard” data to make their decision to terminate a program. 
Recommendation 4: The nature of OTI’s high-stakes assignment requires that it support 
high-risk activities, i.e., when the potential end-result (a cessation of conflict and a 
transition to peace) may warrant OTI investment in areas/activities normally avoided by 
USAID. When the prospects or performance of such activities fall consistently short of 
expectations, OTI should feel no reluctance to terminate the activity(s), and refocus its 
resources on other promising initiatives. 
__________________ 
Lesson 5: OTI plays an essential role in USAID; but its speed, agility and creativity--
especially in the context of the Agency’s “normal” procedures--frequently provoke 
resentment elsewhere in USAID. These resentments--which may seriously impede OTI’s 
effectiveness--can be avoided by simple considerations and courtesies vis-à-vis other 
elements of the Agency. OTI personnel changes, with consequent differences in 
managers’ operating styles, can also have a profound effect on OTI’s success in dealing 
with other elements of the agency.
Recommendation 5: OTI needs to maintain, to the fullest extent practicable, its unique 
operating style, quasi-autonomy and reporting channels. These should not, however, be 
allowed to emerge as conflict issues with other-bureau or USAID mission management. 
OTI should present its special capacities (speed, flexibility) as a valuable tool--rather than 
as a challenge--to Agency partners, and should be sensitive to Agency colleagues’ 
expectations regarding information-sharing, program review and approval authority, and 
when appropriate, supervisory relationships vis-à-vis Mission-level PSCs. 
__________________ 
Lesson 6: The “Transition” component of OTI’s mandate need not imply a transition 
from strife to peace. The OTI/ Colombia program illustrates OTI success in effecting a 
different kind of transition, i.e., from the development of small, pilot activities that help 
identify program objectives, methodologies, and partners--and which develops model 
approaches to achieve these larger objectives--to a larger bilateral assistance program that 
incorporates many of those objectives, approaches and models. Under this kind of 
scenario, OTI’s job is accomplished not when a conflict-resolution or peace process is 
well on track, but rather when a USAID Mission has the funds, personnel and program in 
place to continue without further need for OTI assistance. 
40 
Recommendation 6: OTI should consider adopting a broader definition of its mandate to 
include service as a “vanguard” element of USAID, prepared to help identify key US 
policy interests in candidate countries, and to launch/support pilot activities to identify, 
test and strengthen organizations which might be USAID’s potential partners in an 
expanded assistance program. 
__________________ 
Lesson 7: OTI can work successfully in high-security risk environments, often through 
indigenous and/or international NGOs not generally identified as USG contractors or 
intermediaries. When OTI determines that such (grant) relationships would be the most 
effective way to further USG/OTI objectives, OTI should be prepared to accept the 
tradeoff between enhanced access to target populations, and diminished rigor in the 
collection and reporting of empirical and/or qualitative data normally used to assess 
project performance. 
Recommendation 7: OTI should be flexible in its application of project performance 
and evaluation criteria. Performance data for programs implemented in high-risk areas 
can not always meet the quantitative and qualitative standards expected of projects 
implemented in more secure areas. 
41 
ANNEX A: PERSONS CONTACTED 
USAID/Washington: 
Russell Porter, DCHA/OTI Team Leader for Latin America and the Caribbean 
Cressida Slote, DCHA/OTI Program Development Team 
George Wachtenheim, Acting AA/LAC 
Ross Wherry, LAC Bureau 
Other US: 
H. Robert Kramer, Chemonics Corp. 
Thomas Cornell, ARD 
William Hyde, IOM 
Jaime Correa-Montalvo, Salesian Missions 
John Sanbrailo, Pan American Development Foundation 
Miguel Ceballos, Georgetown University 
USAID/Colombia: 
Kenneth Ellis, Mission Director 
Clifford Brown, Deputy Director 
Jeffrey Bakken, Supervisory General Development Officer 
Scott Taylor, Program Officer 
Christina Schultz, SO 1 Team Leader, Democracy and Governance Division 
Harry Wing, Project Manager-Alternative Development 
Jennifer VerNooy, SO-3 (IDPs) Team Leader 
David Gould, OTI Country Representative 
Laura Zambrano, IDP Program Manager 
OTI Partners and Counterparts/Colombia: 
Julian Fernando Aguirre Buenaventura, Program Coordinator, the Colombian Family 
Welfare Institute (ICBF) 
Mabel Gonzalez, Project Coordinator for Ex-combatant Children, ICBF 
Ellen Beattie, Coordinator, Red de Solidaridad (Ministry of Interior, GOC) 
Manuel Manrique Castro, UNICEF Representative 
Cesar Romero Rodriguez, Program Coordinator for Displaced Persons, UNICEF 
Katie Kerr, Program Officer, International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
Marcelo Pisani, Program Officer, IOM 
Marta Yolanda Gonzales, Program Officer/Peace Grants, IOM 
Maria Alicia Fuentes, Program Officer/Child Combatants, IOM 
Georges Comninos, Chief of Mission, International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 
Geert Haghebaert, Program Coordinator for Health and Welfare, ICRC 
Liliana Schmitz, Director of Public Relations, PROFAMILIA 
Jaime Buitrago Ruiz, Finance Officer, PROFAMILIA 
Samuel Albarracin, IDP Project Officer, World Vision 
42 
Constanza Vieira, Acting Project Director, Medios Para La Paz 
Gloria Herney Galindez, President, Asociacion de Familiares de Detinidos Desaparedidos 
(ASFADDES) 
Vilma A. Gomez P., Secretary General, Coalition Against the Involvement of Children in 
the Armed Conflict in Colombia 
Ernesto Borda Medina, Director, Institute for Human Rights and International Relations, 
Javiariana University 
Arturo Guerrero, Journalist/Trainer, Medios Para La Paz 
Florinda Martinez Castro, Director of Develoment, Salesian Missions 
Fr. Guillermo Marquez, Diocesis of Grondde. 
Jose Amir, Director of Youth Artists Project, Diocesis of Cali 
Msgr. Jesus Gonzales, Director, Don Bosco Vocational Training Center, Cali 
Jorge Montoya, Director, Macondo Specialized Treatment Center 
Carmen Ocampo Velasquez, Co-Director, Macondo Specialized Treatment Center 
Enrique King, Director, Kaisos Reception Center, Bogota 
Gustavo Bolivar, TV Director 
Cesar Serrano, Gang member/actor 
Jose Baguero, Ward Representative, Cuidad Bolivar, Bogota 
Carlos Satizabal, Director, Cultura Callejera para Salir de la Hoguera 
Catalina Valencia, Director, PROCOMUN 
43 
ANNEX B: METHODOLOGY 
This assessment was conducted in accordance with the scope of work (SOW) appended 
to this report as annex D. 
The consultant prepared for the assignment by reviewing OTI/Colombia project files at 
the USAID/DCHA/OTI office in Washington, and by interviewing key members of 
OTI/Washington staff. Additional interviews were conducted with former USAID staff, 
current employees of the LAC Bureau, and with Washington-based individuals who had 
been involved in, or were aware of, the OTI/Colombia program--including the earlier 
phase (1998-2000) of the program. Additional interviews were conducted with 
Washington-based representatives of OTI-funded grantee institutions. Telephone 
interviews were conducted with US-based personnel not residing in the Washington DC 
area. 
Fieldwork in Colombia (October 29-November 10, 2001) included interviews with the 
OTI/Colombia representative, USAID/Colombia staff, and representatives of OTI-funded 
grantee institutions which participate, or had participated in, the OTI/Colombia program. 
The consultant visited the offices and/or project sites of approximately one dozen sub￾grantees of OTI-funded grantee organizations, and interviewed sub-grantee personnel 
responsible for project implementation. Most of these observation visits and interviews 
were conducted in Bogota due to security-related restrictions on travel within Colombia. 
Fieldwork did include, however, travel to Macondo (north of Bogota), and to Cali. 
Fieldwork conducted outside of Bogota included interviews with beneficiaries of OTI￾supported projects. 
The assessment report was prepared in the U.S. following the consultant’s return from 
Colombia, and was submitted to DCHA/OTI on December 7, 2001.