The Role of Transition Assistance: 
The Case of Nigeria
EVALUATION BRIEF NUMBER 4
Summary
Responding to the opportunity to foster and support Nigeria’s return to democratic rule,
USAID mobilized its Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) to launch a country 
program that included activities related to civilian-military relations, conflict
management, and civil society. The trigger was moderate military leader Atiku Abubakar’s
holding of elections in late 1998 and early 1999. OTI first established a field office in Lagos,
followed in early 1999 by others in Abuja (the capital), Ibadan, and Port Harcourt.
An assessment by USAID’s Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE)
found that the decision to initiate an OTI program in Nigeria generally followed OTI’s
established guidelines. The quality and comprehensiveness of the initial planning effort stood
out, but the quality of planning declined as implementation proceeded.
CDIE’s review also found that OTI’s transition assistance was successfully initiated, but that
the level and quality of interaction and communication between OTI and other USAID
offices deteriorated, hindering program coordination and integration. The CDIE team
recommended that USAID develop clear guidance to
address the structural and line-of-authority issues
that complicate program implementation,
monitoring, and results reporting.
The CDIE evaluators concluded that OTI
assistance played an important role in Nigeria by
complementing other USAID assistance with
timely, relevant, and innovative activities. The good
governance training provided a timely and useful
foundation for newly elected officials assuming
leadership roles. The civilian-military relations
initiative set the framework for a continued
dialogue and actions for strengthening civilian
oversight. The extensive conflict management
activity showed promising results in addressing
conflict at the local level in a society plagued by
endemic violence. However, the team also found
that OTI’s short-term and one-time events need to
be replicated or followed up to yield lasting results.
The team believes this followup is particularly
important to the U.S. Government’s conflict
management strategy to reduce potential threats to
Nigeria’s fragile democracy. ■
■ OTI assistance can play an
important role in countries in
transition. However, follow-on
assistance is often necessary to
achieve lasting results.
■ The conflict management initiative
showed promising initial results.
■ Coordination and communication
between OTI and other mission
entities are essential.
■ Early planning helps make initiative
handoff efficient and effective.
■ The SWIFT contract is useful for
implementing transition activities.
KEY IDEAS
SEPTEMBER 2002 BUREAU FOR POLICY AND PROGRAM COORDINATION PN-ACN-771
2 Evaluation Brief No. 4 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Nigeria
The Case of Nigeria
Background
After the sudden death in 1998 of military
dictator Sani Abacha, military leader Atiku
Abubakar assumed power and scheduled
elections. Elections were held in December 1998
and January 1999 for local government and state
representatives. Presidential elections followed in
February 1999. 
Taking advantage of the opportunity to support
Nigeria’s return to democratic rule, OTI
collaborated with other USAID offices and the
State Department in assessing prospects for a
program in Nigeria. In March 1999, OTI initiated
the program, implementing activities in the areas
of conflict management, democracy/governance,
and energy policy.
In 2000, CDIE began an evaluation of the general
role of transition assistance and specifically of OTI’s
role and activities. Transition assistance, as used
here, refers to the OTI-administered programs
providing flexible, short-term responses to advance
peaceful, democratic change. OTI transition
assistance is usually provided during a postcrisis
period when a country is vulnerable to renewed
conflict or instability. 
This Evaluation Brief summarizes the findings and
lessons learned from the country study of transition
assistance in Nigeria, based on field research
conducted in November 2000. The evaluators
reviewed documents, visited four sites in Nigeria,
and interviewed representatives of USAID
(including OTI), the U.S. embassy, the Department
of Defense, Nigerian grantees, and other donors.
The CDIE study 1) sought to determine if the
decision to initiate a transition program was 
made in a transparent fashion and considered
appropriate criteria, 2) analyzed the strengths and
weaknesses of the planning process, 3) assessed
program implementation, 4) discussed program
duration and handoff issues, and 5) determined
whether the transition activities achieved their
objectives effectively.
Deciding to Engage
OTI’s work in Nigeria grew out of USAID’s
Nigeria task force, formed in 1998 to coordinate
USAID planning, and a National Security 
Council-led interagency working group (IAWG)
that coordinated all U.S. assistance to Nigeria. 
In August 1998, the task force assessed prospects
for the country’s transition to democracy and
developed activity proposals.
The decision to engage was marked by an
extraordinary degree of collaboration and support,
both within USAID and between USAID and the
State Department. The decision turned on the
importance of Nigeria to U.S. national interests—
Nigeria is one of four countries where promoting
democracy is a U.S. national priority—and the
“catalytic event” of new elections.
The evaluators concluded that the decision to
initiate an OTI program in Nigeria generally met
OTI engagement guidelines established to allocate
scarce transition resources for furthering priority
democracy and stability objectives. Predictably,
projecting a successful outcome—one of the key
guidelines—was difficult because of Nigeria’s history
of unsuccessful attempts at democratic rule. OTI
did not formally apply or document the extent to
which the decision to engage met the guidelines. 
Planning Transition Assistance 
Planning activities shifted to a broader, interagency
context after the February 1999 elections. In
support of USAID’s democracy/governance
The decision to engage was marked by an
extraordinary degree of collaboration and
support, both within USAID and between
USAID and the State Department. The
decision turned on the importance of
Nigeria to U.S. national interests.
Evaluation Brief No. 4 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Nigeria 3
strategic objective, a June 1999 IAWG report
suggested OTI be involved in civilian-military
relations and governance, conflict management,
and anticorruption efforts. The interagency
planning process demonstrated a high degree of
collaboration, resulting in a close fit of initial plans. 
The quality and comprehensiveness of the USAID
and interagency early planning effort for Nigeria
stood out among four programs reviewed by CDIE.
However, subsequent planning and monitoring
revealed some confusion on the relationship of
OTI’s goals and objectives to those of the overall
USAID country transition strategy. As OTI further
developed its program, planning became diffuse,
with multiple objectives less focused on the country
transition strategy objectives. Non-OTI mission
staff were unable to report on all OTI efforts
within the country strategy context. Thus, while
OTI and mission program planning was highly
collaborative initially, the quality of planning and
program integration declined over time.
Implementing Activities
OTI initiated its program in Nigeria quickly,
establishing regional offices within a few months to
provide nearly nationwide support to local groups.
The regional offices extended program reach and
strengthened activity management capacity. The first
initiative—training for 10,300 elected officials—was
implemented in early 1999. The Support Which
Implements Fast Transitions (SWIFT) contractor
sent a startup team to Nigeria in early 1999 to set up
logistics and support implementation. 
Following the June 1999 IAWG assessment, OTI
implemented activities in the following areas:
■ Conflict management. OTI assisted local groups
and civil society organizations aiding conflict￾prone communities.
■ Democracy/governance. The key areas included
civilian-military relations, where OTI-funded
experts and their civilian and military Nigerian
counterparts took the essential first steps
toward restructuring the military’s role to one
appropriate to a democratic society. OTI
assisted private print media, trained journalists
in reporting techniques to improve overall
journalistic quality, and developed a program 
to improve police performance.
■ Energy. OTI-financed consultants advised
USAID/Nigeria and Nigerian partners on
energy policy options and a privatization plan,
based on a preliminary assessment of the
Nigeria Electric Power Authority. 
Through November 2000, OTI/Nigeria committed
$11.4 million for 197 grants, including some
grants for overall logistics and support. Although
OTI’s small grants are management-intensive, they
encouraged experimentation; provided an ability to
support local and emerging organizations, especially
those with weak management capacity; and resulted
in more focused activities at the local level.
CDIE evaluators concluded that OTI played 
an important role in accelerating the U.S.
Government transition response. However, as
implementation proceeded, the level and quality of
Africa’s most populous country is important to U.S. interests.
USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) launched a nationwide
program in Nigeria to foster return to democratic rule.
4 Evaluation Brief No. 4 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Nigeria
interaction between OTI and other USAID offices
declined. Inadequate communication between OTI
and others in the mission also impeded program
coordination and the development of a fuller
understanding of the OTI program by other
mission staff. Factors contributing to this situation
included the OTI/Nigeria director’s move to
quarters separate from the USAID mission and the
separate handling of administrative support.
Disagreement between OTI and the mission
executive officer on operations and procurement
further exacerbated relationships. Most importantly,
the parallel structures and authority relationships
for OTI and other mission programs presented a
particular challenge to coordinating USAID
programs at the country level and within the
country strategic context.
Handing Off Transition Activities
The OTI program in Nigeria was expected to end
in September 2001—a duration of nearly two and
one-half years, close to the three-year median for
OTI programs. USAID/Nigeria and OTI
anticipated a timely phaseout. Initial training for
officials, civilian-military relations, and electric
power activities were completed or handed off on
schedule. But ineffective communication and
coordination between OTI and other mission
programs slowed and complicated the planning for
handoff of other activities. By early November
2000, both OTI and other mission staff were
beginning to address handoff issues.
CDIE evaluators concluded that the planned
duration of the OTI program in Nigeria appeared
appropriate. The team noted, however, that
planning had to move forward quickly if programs
meriting continuation were to be handed off
effectively by September 2001.
Achieving Objectives
The team examined OTI/Nigeria program
achievements in the key areas of civilian-military
relations, conflict management, and civil
society/media support. According to an
independent assessment, the OTI training program
for elected officials contributed to an open
leadership approach, strengthened participation,
and encouraged transparency, accountability, and
responsiveness to the electorate’s needs. 
Civilian-Military Relations
The legacy of military rule is one of the greatest
threats to rebuilding Nigerian democracy. OTI’s
development of an action plan for a civilian-military
relations program was a crucial intermediate step to
promoting broad understanding within Nigeria of
the role of the military in a democracy. A military
sensitive to its role in a democracy is clearly central
to U.S. foreign policy interests in Nigeria. OTI’s
contribution to overall U.S. objectives in initiating
the civilian-military relations effort was significant
and catalytic. The OTI-developed plan
encompassed a program involving the military
establishment and civilian branches of
government—notably the National Assembly. OTI
also supported the preparation of public service
announcements that informed the public on the
role of the military in a democracy. CDIE
evaluators confirmed that the initiative stimulated
the transfer of governance from military to civilian
rule—clearly the right solution, at the right time, to
the problems posed by a series of autocratic military
regimes and a civilian-military cadre inexperienced
in dealing with a subordinate military. 
CDIE evaluators also examined how the initial plan
was being jointly implemented by the U.S.
Department of Defense and the Nigerian
government. Although too early to measure the
results, they suggested the need to reassess the
fundamental assumption of the plan—that the
military was ready for reform—and the contractor’s
performance. The evaluators also stressed that
greater coherence and coordination between U.S.
programs would strengthen Nigeria’s commitment
to the program and that tools used might include
Ineffective communication and coordina￾tion between OTI and other mission 
programs slowed and complicated the 
planning for handoff. 
Evaluation Brief No. 4 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Nigeria 5
the interactive, participatory workshop approach
that showed promising results in addressing conflict
management issues.
Conflict Management
Emanating from ethnic differences or religious
affiliation, conflict is common in Nigerian society.
Violence may be large scale, such as the religious
rioting in the north, or local, such as the ethnic
conflicts in the southeast Delta region. To address
conflict, OTI initiated an activity at the grassroots
level, providing grants to local organizations to
hold workshops for groups with high potential for
conflict and to train trainers in conflict mitigation.
Training seminars were held in six Nigerian
geopolitical zones. The 200 Nigerian trainers who
were trained are now part of a national network of
conflict mitigation facilitators. 
OTI’s participatory workshop approach produced
widespread and significant initial results. Perhaps
the most important contribution was helping local
organizations build capacity to address local and
regional conflicts. OTI’s activities changed
attitudes toward conflict, helped resolve specific
conflicts, prevented or reduced violent conflict,
and generated interest in addressing conflict more
systematically nationwide. The results included
the major, highly visible conflict resolution effort
in which OTI-sponsored and -trained mediators
were able to stabilize the long-standing Ife￾Modakeke fighting that presidential, state, and
local government interventions had failed to quell
in March 2000. Another result was the success in
changing police attitudes toward dealing with
conflict in Oke Ogun: a participating police
commander was so enthusiastic he subsequently
moved to initiate conflict resolution training for
police nationwide. The OTI initiative’s appeal was
not limited to a particular area; positive results
were demonstrated in several geographic areas.
The growing interest in effective conflict
management in Nigeria is a particularly positive
outcome of the OTI initiative.
However, some grantees and USAID staff noted
that the OTI effort was too often a “one-shot”
approach that covered only limited areas of Nigeria’s
conflict environment. They also noted the lack of
follow-on activity or much effort to replicate the
success on a larger scale.1 Both OTI and the longer
term mission program staff recognized the need for
greater collaboration to ensure appropriate program
continuation after OTI departed.
Conflict management is an important and
appropriate program in Nigeria, underlined by the
OTI provided grants to local organizations to hold workshops for
groups with high potential for conflict and to train trainers in
conflict mitigation.
OTI’s participatory workshop approach
produced widespread and significant 
initial results, helping local organizations
build capacity to address local and 
regional conflicts.
1 OTI staff reviewing the report disagreed with this conclusion and maintained that their approach is to experiment with a variety of approaches
and organizations, ultimately selecting those that are most promising. The issue here is not whether experimentation is valuable but whether,
without followup and closer integration with long-term USAID efforts, these short-term investments will have lasting impact in the country or
realize the full potential of the investment. 
6 Evaluation Brief No. 4 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Nigeria
painful reminder that significant conflict, left
unresolved, jeopardizes the success of Nigeria’s
extremely fragile democracy. Clearly, systematic
followup and replication are needed for achieving
greater impact and developing sustainable capacity
in conflict management. Participants in the conflict
management and resolution process uniformly
stressed the need to maintain momentum. Such
followup, however, is labor intensive and will likely
require an implementing modality like that of the
SWIFT contract. 
Civil Society/Media Support
OTI’s several civil society initiatives led to the
formation of a national nongovernmental
organization network for dealing with general
constituency issues, such as local democratic action,
conflict management, and human rights. 
OTI also worked with civil society groups on using
media for airing public issues. OTI activities helped
develop capacity in print media organizations,
trained journalists in quality reporting, and
supported internet sites for journalists. OTI also
supported Voice of America programs on conflict
topics in Nigeria.
The CDIE evaluators found that OTI’s pilot
television series on corruption generated public and
corporate interest and potential funding for follow￾on efforts. The success of this program stimulated
ideas for using television and radio to address other
public issues. ■
Lessons Learned and
Recommendation
OTI assistance can play an important role 
in countries in transition. However, 
follow-on assistance is often necessary to achieve
lasting results.
OTI’s activities can play an important role in
transition countries, complementing USAID’s longer
term country programs. However, OTI’s activities are
often short-term or one-time events that need to be
replicated or extended to achieve lasting results.
OTI’s assistance in Nigeria included innovative,
timely, and relevant activities. But OTI’s approach
features “experiments” that produce a range of
results. Donor transition investments—OTI’s in
particular—are validated and sustained only to the
extent that there is timely and appropriate
followup. Longer term support for promising
activities is required to achieve fuller and
sustainable impact. 
Continuing the conflict management effort is
central to USAID’s and the U.S. Government’s
strategy to reduce potential threats to Nigeria’s
fragile democracy. Workshop effectiveness is
optimized when followup workshops deepen
learning. Peace mediation committees and other
activities that flow from workshops may need
nurturing, supplementary funding, and course
corrections before they can be reliably placed on
autopilot. Sustaining OTI’s contribution requires a
follow-on, repetitive approach with the same
groups and expanded programs for others.
Followup support is also needed to continue
OTI’s promising pilot media initiatives, such as
the anticorruption television series. The viability
of the internet press centers is likely to be
jeopardized if USAID or other donors do not
continue funding and technical assistance after
OTI departs. 
The conflict management initiative showed 
promising initial results.
OTI’s interactive, participatory workshop training
2
1
OTI helped provide training, technical assistance, and other
support for local Nigerian journalists.
Evaluation Brief No. 4 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Nigeria 7
for conflict management showed a wide range of
impacts in Nigeria, confirming the approach’s
effectiveness. Moreover, OTI achieved its highly
visible success with relatively modest financial
outlays. Conflict management training is
particularly important in Nigeria because the
country is permeated by conflict. If left
unchecked, such conflict constitutes the greatest
threat to building an effective democracy. Conflict
management programs can help reduce conflicts,
even those engendered by the obligatory checks
and balances of the democratic process.
Participatory workshop training that OTI used 
to address conflict management, may also be
applicable to other areas, such as developing a
national or defense strategy, engaging military and
legislative leaders on civilian-military relations
issues, professionalizing the military on human
rights and ethics, and building teamwork for good
governance at state and local levels. 
Dissemination of lessons learned on managing and
resolving conflict could extend the impact of this
initial effort throughout Nigeria. For example,
lessons could be shared with Nigerian state and
local governments, as well as other donors, UN
agencies, and nongovernmental organizations. 
Coordination and communication between 
OTI and other mission entities are essential.
OTI and other mission entities must coordinate and
communicate effectively to develop mutual
understanding, build ownership of OTI initiatives, and
integrate all USAID efforts. The high level of
collaboration between OTI and other USAID
entities that characterized the decisionmaking and
initial program planning stages became less effective
as implementation proceeded. Coordination and
communication were hindered by the relocation of
OTI outside the mission, the disagreement between
OTI and the mission executive officer on operations
and procurement issues, and the structural and
authority relationships dividing OTI and other
mission operations.
Coordinating OTI and other mission programs is
important for effective program integration and
handoff. Less than optimal coordination and
communication during the implementation of the
conflict management activity hindered the
development of program synergy. Subsequent to the
evaluation, both offices took major steps to improve
communication and better integrate the programs in
preparation for OTI’s departure. Improved program
coordination and integration facilitated handing off
conflict management activities.
Early planning helps makes handoff efficient 
and effective. 
Early planning for handoff—preferably during design
but no later than the initial year—is important for
ensuring that the mission (or others) can continue
successful initiatives to achieve sustainable impact,
thus taking full advantage of OTI’s short-term
program. Planning for handoff was an integral part
of some activity designs, including those relating to
civilian-military relations and energy, where OTI
was responsible for the first phase. However,
planning for handoff of the conflict management
and media activities was delayed.
4
3
Conflict management programs can help
reduce conflicts, even those engendered by
the obligatory checks and balances of the
democratic process. 
Senator Florence Ita Giwa greets Mrs. Onikepo Oshodi and 
Mr. A. Gudiga (regional counterpart, OTI Abuja). OTI funded
training in constituency building, transparency, legislative
processes, and conflict management for more than 10,000
elected officials in Nigeria.
8 Evaluation Brief No. 4 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Nigeria
The SWIFT contract is useful for 
implementing transition activities.
OTI effectively used the SWIFT indefinite quantity
contract in Nigeria to implement its short-term,
quick-response activities, including those with
emerging organizations that had limited institutional
capacity. The contract proved effective for quick in￾country startup, rapid procurement, and flexible
programming. That missions can also use the
SWIFT mechanism to continue OTI transition
initiatives is not well known. USAID/Nigeria could
benefit from picking up selected OTI programs
before OTI departs, perhaps consolidating and
expanding promising initiatives and using the
SWIFT mechanism where appropriate.
Recommendation
Provide guidance to deal with structural and 
authority issues.
For maximum effectiveness, USAID needs to develop
clear guidance to address the issues stemming from
structural and line-of-authority differences between
OTI and other mission elements. The guidance
could emphasize how important it is for OTI to
become an integral part of mission operations and
encourage unified program planning,
implementation, and results reporting. If such
guidance came from a high level within the
Agency, it would more likely encourage
compliance. In Kosovo, OTI reported to the
USAID mission director. More recently, OTI and
some missions have developed memoranda of
understanding that set out roles and program
responsibilities. These are constructive approaches
to improving coordination. ■
1
5
Working Papers on the Role of Transition Assistance
The Case of East Timor (PN-ACN-764)
The Case of Indonesia (PN-ACN-766)
The Case of Kosovo (PN-ACN-768)
The Case of Nigeria (PN-ACN-770)
Evaluation Briefs on the Role of Transition Assistance
The Case of East Timor (PN-ACN-765)
The Case of Indonesia (PN-ACN-767)
The Case of Kosovo (PN-ACN-769)
The Case of Nigeria (PN-ACN-771)
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
About this publication: This Evaluation Brief summarizes USAID Working Paper No. 325, prepared by Arthur E. Dewey of the International
Resources Group and Glenn Slocum of Associates for Global Change. Brian R. Furness prepared this Evaluation Brief and IBI–International
Business Initiatives, Inc. furnished editorial and production assistance.
To order or download copies: This Evaluation Brief and the Working Paper can be ordered from USAID’s Development Experience
Clearinghouse (DEC). To order or download, go to www.dec.org and enter PN-ACN-771 as the document identification number in the
search box. The DEC may also be contacted at 1611 N. Kent St., Ste. 200, Arlington, VA 22209; tel 703-351-4006; fax 703-351-4039;
email docorder@dec.cdie.org. 
Photo credits: page 3, Liz Gilbert, courtesy of the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, M/MC Photoshare at www.jhuccp.org/mmc;
pages 5 and 6, M/MC Photoshare; page 7, Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID.