The Role of Transition Assistance: 
The Case of Kosovo
EVALUATION BRIEF NUMBER 3
Summary
I
N THE AFTERMATH of the devastation and dislocation of the NATO members’ air war in
Kosovo, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) played an important role in 
helping the U.S. Government respond quickly and effectively to the hope engendered by
Serbian withdrawal and UN administration. OTI’s pre-air war efforts had been frustrated by
Serbian oppression of Kosovo’s Albanian majority. After Serbian forces withdrew in June 1999,
OTI launched its programs rapidly, establishing a regional headquarters in the Kosovar capital
of Pristina and six field offices throughout the province.
A study by USAID’s Center for Development Information and Evaluation (CDIE) found 
that OTI’s rapid response initiatives played a valuable role in helping USAID and the U.S.
Government get reconstruction and development activities under way in Kosovo. Factors 
considered during the planning process met OTI’s guidelines for engagement. The program was
integrated nearly seamlessly within USAID’s strategic plan. Bringing the OTI country program
under the authority of the USAID/Kosovo mission director ensured that implementation and
support were effectively integrated at the field level. OTI’s programming approach allowed for
strategy changes as the transition evolved. OTI concentrated its efforts on the creation of grass￾roots organizations—Community Improvement Councils (CICs)—to impart basic democratic
practices and initiate reconstruction efforts. Planning for handoff was timely and effective. The
activities pursued reflect OTI’s comparative advantage
in introducing initiatives at the local level. 
The CDIE evaluation concluded that OTI’s 
successful intervention in Kosovo—and particularly
its effective coordination with the sustainable 
development program—could usefully serve as a
model in other situations. This model could be 
further strengthened, the study recommended, 
by reporting results within the overall mission￾reporting framework rather than that of OTI. The
study found that OTI’s community-development
approach effectively introduced grassroots decision￾making practices—previously outside of Kosovar 
or Serbian experience—while meeting community
reconstruction needs. OTI’s self-help programs
encouraged communities to seek multiple sources
of funding, which resulted in $4 million in 
additional resources and discouraged single-donor
dependency. ■
■ USAID/Kosovo presents a success￾ful model for effective coordination
of sustainable development and
OTI transition programs.
■ OTI’s community development
approach was effective.
■ Emphasizing community self-help
and self-reliance discouraged
dependency.
■ OTI program results are best
reported in the USAID/Kosovo
Results Review and Resource
Request.
KEY IDEAS
SEPTEMBER 2002 BUREAU FOR POLICY AND PROGRAM COORDINATION PN-ACN-769
2 Evaluation Brief No. 3 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Kosovo
The Case of Kosovo
Background
I
n March 1999, NATO member countries
launched an air war against Serbia. This action
was a response to Serbia’s oppressive rule of
Kosovo and the ethnic Albanians who constitute 
90 percent of its population. Serbian withdrawal in
June 1999 ended 10 years of repression that had
restricted Kosovars’ basic rights and generated alle￾gations of massive human rights violations. Serbian
police and military were replaced by the Kosovo
Force (KFOR)—security forces provided by NATO
member countries—which maintained peace while
protecting the remaining Serbian and other minori￾ties. The UN mission in Kosovo served as the inter￾im governmental authority.
OTI’s involvement in Kosovo actually predated the
war, though Serbian pressure and a deteriorating
security situation had made it impossible to under￾take community-based programming. During 
the war, OTI worked with Kosovar exiles in
Macedonia. Upon OTI’s return, many Serbs had
already fled. More would leave Kosovo in the
months following installation of the UN interim
government. The short- and long-term challenge
was to foster democratic and participatory commu￾nity decisionmaking and to address urgent postwar
needs. OTI was asked to complement the USAID
mission’s democracy/governance program by 
forming local community organizations and 
supporting reconstruction. 
CDIE has been assessing the role of USAID transi￾tion assistance, with a specific emphasis on OTI’s
role and activities. OTI was established in 1994 to
help address the increasing number of postcrisis 
situations. It has provided assistance to more than
20 countries worldwide. Transition assistance, as
used here, refers to the OTI-administered programs
that provide flexible, short-term responses to help
advance peaceful, democratic change in conflict￾prone countries. This assistance is usually provided
during the critical two-year period after conflict
when countries are most vulnerable to renewed
conflict or instability.
As part of this study, a CDIE evaluator visited
Kosovo October 3–7, 2000 to examine the effec￾tiveness of the OTI program at the country level.
The evaluator reviewed documents and interviewed
representatives of USAID, other U.S. Government
entities, other donors, and USAID-funded contrac￾tors and grantees. He also interviewed Washington￾based representatives familiar with the OTI pro￾gram. The study 1) sought to determine if the 
decision to initiate a transition program was made
in a transparent fashion and considered appropriate
guidelines, 2) analyzed the strengths and weaknesses
of the planning process, 3) assessed program imple￾mentation, 4) discussed duration and program
handoff issues, and 5) determined whether the tran￾sition activities achieved their objectives effectively.
Transition assistance, as used here, refers 
to the OTI-administered programs that 
provide flexible, short-term responses to 
help advance peaceful, democratic change
in conflict-prone countries. 
A grand opening ceremony marks the rehabilitation of the local
primary school in the village of Talinoc, western Kosovo. OTI’s
Kosovo Transition Initiative contributed building materials and
supplies.
Evaluation Brief No. 3 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Kosovo 3
Deciding to Engage
The CDIE study found that OTI’s decision to
intervene in Kosovo was within the established
guidelines for such decisions, but OTI did not for￾mally document the process. The strategic impor￾tance to the United States of peace and stability in
the Balkans and resolution of the Kosovo crisis
within Serbia were important factors favoring
engagement.
Planning Transition Assistance
The importance of Kosovo to U.S. national inter￾ests in Europe, and the complicated political con￾text, made necessary close coordination of all U.S.
Government efforts, including those of USAID.
The Agency’s Kosovo Transition Initiative aimed to
encourage Kosovars “to recognize the real benefits
of participation and citizen action for the improve￾ment of their communities and the creation of
good government in the early stages and succeed￾ing years of Kosovo’s democratic development.”
The initiative called for OTI to create CICs to 1)
empower citizens to maximize their broad-based
political influence in their communities, 2)
encourage and support the development of local
leadership, and 3) help Kosovars mobilize and
direct resources to meet priorities identified by
communities.
These aims melded with the USAID/Kosovo strate￾gic plan, particularly the objective of “accountable
and transparent governance,” by fostering free and
fair elections and an independent media and civil
society. OTI plans also supported objectives relat￾ing to strengthening civil institutions and sustain￾ing social services and community infrastructure.
All those interviewed cited the very close coopera￾tion and constructive spirit evident between OTI
and other USAID/Kosovo staff. 
The clear strength of the Kosovo planning process
was the mission’s formulation of a strategic plan
that effectively integrated OTI’s short-term transi￾tion effort and the mission’s longer term program
objectives. Kosovo’s small territory, population of
only 1.8 million, and the robust international effort
may have also contributed to the success in coordi￾nating the OTI programs with those of other mis￾sion entities. The synergy developed at the plan￾ning stage substantially facilitated the establishment
of a close and cooperative partnership between 
OTI and other USAID/Kosovo staff during 
implementation.
Implementing Activities
OTI’s community development model used grants
to support priority, locally identified, small-scale
reconstruction projects as incentives to develop
civic participation and democratic skills. This grass￾roots approach is not new to the development
world, but OTI has developed an expertise in using
it to meet basic postconflict reconstruction needs.
OTI’s media efforts, while short term, provided
skills that may contribute over time to better
reporting and airing of public issues. OTI programs
also helped increase civic awareness.
To support community organizations and to extend
program reach and strengthen management con￾trol, OTI established a headquarters in Pristina and
six regional offices, staffing them with locally hired
personnel with expertise and knowledge of the
principal players in each region. 
OTI and other USAID entities in the field reported
to the USAID/Kosovo mission director, at his insis￾tence. Nevertheless, the director let OTI work
largely independently within the USAID mission
The community celebrates Gjakova 2000, a ceremony that kicked
off the rebuilding of the historic old town that had burned down
during the war. OTI helped the Community Improvement
Council develop a multiphased approach to the rehabilitation. 
4 Evaluation Brief No. 3 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Kosovo
structure. The result was an effective partnership,
because OTI and non-OTI staff recognized and
wanted to preserve the complementary relationship
and their respective program strengths. This man￾agement style, Kosovo’s small size, and other factors
made collaboration easier, but clearly the authority
relationship was important in establishing an effec￾tive formal structure to guide field operations.
Unlike a number of recent OTI country programs,
the Kosovo program did not use the SWIFT
(Support Which Implements Fast Transitions) con￾tract. However, OTI worked out a similar approach
by engaging the International Organization for
Migration (IOM) to implement its activities.
Affiliated with the UN, the organization had
greater operational flexibility and fewer security
restrictions than U.S. contractors. Both IOM and
OTI were satisfied with the arrangement, which
was unique in that it used a grant to produce
results similar to those achieved using SWIFT.
Replication of this arrangement elsewhere would
likely depend on whether a grantee and OTI could
develop a similar mutually agreeable arrangement.
Coordination with nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs) and international organizations at the vil￾lage, town, or city district level brought additional
benefits. 
Conflicts between traditional disaster relief and
transition efforts complicated implementation. In
postwar Kosovo, USAID provided disaster relief,
managed by the Office of Foreign Disaster
Assistance (OFDA), and transition assistance, 
managed by OTI. OFDA responded to immediate
basic shelter needs by offering tents and plastic
sheeting—a conventional disaster response. OTI
responded to needs identified by the community by
offering bricks and roof tiles—which OTI also used
as an incentive to support effective community
interaction and decisionmaking, OTI’s primary
objective. Eventually, OTI and OFDA reached a
compromise whereby OFDA provided tents and
plastic sheeting in lower elevations and OTI fur￾nished bricks and tiles in higher, colder environs.
The compromise allowed each USAID office to
pursue its primary mandate—saving lives for
OFDA and advancing political development 
for OTI. 
The combination of the authority relationship, a
strategic plan that closely integrated OTI activities
with those of the long-term USAID program, and
collocation of offices with integrated operations
produced a unique model for OTI field programs.
OTI’s grant to IOM permitted effective and 
coordinated management of the field operations.
OTI/Kosovo used frequent retreats, meetings, 
and other techniques to evaluate and correct 
implementation of its programs.
Handing Off Activities
OTI/Kosovo noted the difficulty in planning for
handoff in the face of such questions as Kosovo’s
future political status and the impact of Serbian
leadership changes. However, USAID/Kosovo 
contacts indicated that OTI’s plans and handoff
options—such as continuing to support some of
the field offices to broaden contacts and maintain￾ing some support for the CICs, perhaps by extend￾ing the IOM grant—would be sufficient to allow
the USAID mission to assume responsibility for
appropriate key activities.
USAID/Kosovo’s buy-in to the OTI activities
meant that longer term mission programs could
build on OTI’s short-term investment, experience,
and contacts with the more than 3,000 Kosovars
directly associated with the CICs. USAID mission
leadership indicated that OTI’s work at the CIC
level, spurred by the October 28, 2000 elections,
would create sufficient momentum for achieving
the longer term results of the mission’s democra￾cy/governance program. Maintaining field offices
would permit continued access to targeted benefi￾The authority relationship, a strategic plan
that closely integrated OTI activities with
those of the long-term USAID program,
and collocation of offices with integrated
operations produced a unique model for
OTI field programs.
Evaluation Brief No. 3 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Kosovo 5
ciaries to help strengthen nascent community and
political practices and facilitate the identification
and implementation of other development initia￾tives. OTI’s cooperation with other donors pro￾vided additional opportunities to hand off its
activities and approaches.
Achieving Objectives
Between June 1999 and September 2000, OTI
made 361 transition assistance grants totaling
$7.78 million, including support to community
organizations ($6.6 million), media ($1 million),
and civil society organizations ($180,000). More
than 3,000 Kosovars participated directly in the
CIC process and an estimated 30,000–40,000
Kosovars actively participated in the implementa￾tion of a variety of community improvement activi￾ties. OTI supported the formation of more than
220 CICs that reflected the political, social, and
intellectual diversity of the respective local popula￾tions. These built consensus to identify community
improvement needs, decided on priority activities,
obtained resources, and monitored implementation.
Based on close monitoring and extensive activities
implemented, OTI estimated that a million people
would ultimately benefit from the CIC improve￾ment activities that produced rebuilt schools, 
houses, electrical systems, roads and bridges, water
and sewage systems, health facilities, heating 
systems, and community and youth centers.
In the absence of baseline data, assessment of over￾all program impact on the development of demo￾cratic practices was difficult. Anecdotal information
provided examples of successful community inter￾action and decisionmaking on community
improvement activities. The former U.S. chief of
mission in Kosovo observed that many of the CICs
had taken on a life of their own, supporting the
growth of grassroots democracy in a region where
both grassroots decisionmaking and democracy
were far from the historical or cultural norm. An
OTI-funded assessment noted the CICs’ important
contributions to recovery from the effects of the
war and provided anecdotal information that the
CIC approach appropriately filled the vacuum in
the absence of local government. Although unable
to draw conclusions about the collective impact of
the numerous and widespread activities, the assess￾ment showed that the CIC effort helped communi￾ties articulate their needs and interests, learn organ￾izing principles, and dampen the tendency to vest
power in a small number of traditional leaders.
Sustainability is not usually characteristic of OTI’s
short-term efforts, but observers believed that
OTI’s activities contributed to the development of
long-term political objectives. Other donors adopt￾ed the CIC model to establish community-level
project priorities.
OTI also used the CICs to promote participation
in elections and conduct surveys on community
issues that would be debated during the municipal
election campaigns at town meetings and media
programs. As a result, more than 130 CIC mem￾bers competed in Kosovo’s first-ever democratic
local elections. An indication of the success of the
CIC effort is that 25 won election from a field of
5,350 candidates vying for 869 seats. 
In late 2001, external evaluators assessed the contri￾bution of the CIC activity to building democratic Cleaning and repairing the old town bazaar in Gjakova.
USAID/Kosovo’s buy-in to the OTI activi￾ties meant that longer term mission pro￾grams could build on OTI’s short-term
investment, experience, and contacts.
6 Evaluation Brief No. 3 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Kosovo
political processes by using a framework depicting
four developmental stages—nascent, emerging,
expanding, and mature. The evaluation found that
most communities and local governments were
entering the expanding stage: governance structures
were elected and beginning to operate, community
organizations were independently articulating needs
to elected officials, accountability and transparency
were becoming more important community issues,
and communities were beginning to address issues
of diversity in representation. In addition, the eval￾uation noted that the councils were learning to
communicate their concerns and priorities to the
international community, thereby helping donors
respond better to local needs. 
Program achievement was also shown by OTI’s
ability to leverage additional assistance from other
donors. Calculated at $4 million, this was 60 per￾cent above the CIC allocation of $6.6 million
through 2000. Kosovar communities themselves
contributed an additional $2 million in cash and in
kind—an important measure of successful develop￾ment of community ownership of improvement
activities. 
OTI assistance also effectively complemented other
mission programs by identifying local contacts for
other development programs, validating the com￾munity development model for assessing needs, and
providing civic education and media support for
elections. OTI’s activities contributed substantially
to helping achieve USAID objectives in Kosovo.
Flexible programming—a characteristic of transi￾tion assistance—was crucial in permitting program
changes over time. ■
Lessons Learned &
Recommendation
Transition assistance played a valuable role in
forming grassroots organizations in seven
areas of Kosovo, imparting basic democrat￾ic practices, and initiating reconstruction efforts.
The activities reflected OTI’s comparative advan￾tage in initiating activities at the local level. The
Kosovo program was integrated nearly seamlessly
within the USAID strategic plan, permitting
USAID to maximize results from its investment.
OTI employed a flexible programming approach
that allowed for strategy changes as the transition
evolved.
Lessons Learned
Kosovo presents a successful model for coor￾dinating USAID transition programs.
The mission evolved a successful operation to carry
out postconflict relief, transition, and development,
presenting a model for effective coordination of
sustainable development and OTI transition 
programs. 
The CIC effort helped communities 
articulate their needs and interests, learn
organizing principles, and dampen the 
tendency to vest power in a small number
of traditional leaders.
1
In February 2001, the Kosovo Transition Initiative supported a
youth-initiated campaign to raise awareness about the dangers
of drug use. The youth group developed an integrated awareness
campaign that included radio and television programming, the
production of a video, and billboard ads.
Evaluation Brief No. 3 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Kosovo 7
Factors contributing to this success included: 1)
placement of field authority under the mission
director, 2) a management style that provided suf￾ficient independence for OTI to manage activity
implementation, 3) a strategic plan that closely
integrated OTI and other mission activities, 4) a
shared understanding among OTI and sustainable
development staff of their complementary roles in
achieving shared objectives, and 5) office colloca￾tion in Pristina. Partners viewed OTI as part of the
USAID presence rather than as a separate entity.
CDIE interviewed mission directors who had
experience with OTI programs; many had con￾cerns about inadequate coordination and integra￾tion of the OTI program with longer term mission
programs. The Kosovo case thus holds considerable
promise as a model for future OTI field programs. 
OTI’s community development approach 
was effective.
The community development approach used in
Kosovo effectively introduced basic democratic
processes at the grassroots level while helping war￾devastated communities address reconstruction
needs. Grants were provided for community-identi￾fied infrastructure and services as an incentive and
a means to introduce and practice democratic orga￾nizational skills. 
OTI successfully used its field offices throughout
the province to provide the close consultation with
and support for communities required to realize
results. Rather than apply a rigid structure for
developing community interaction, OTI helped
Kosovars establish flexible structures—CICs—that
could operate with democratic principles when
local governmental structures were not in place. 
Emphasizing community self-help and self￾reliance discouraged dependency.
By encouraging communities to seek multiple
sources of funding and assistance, OTI expanded
resources and discouraged dependency. Even in
poor, devastated postconflict situations such as
Kosovo, communities can provide in-kind assis￾tance or identify alternative funding to help them
achieve their goals. By insisting that communities
obtain other resources to complement OTI sup￾port, OTI discouraged dependence on a sole fund￾ing source. The self-help approach also helped
inculcate skills for obtaining other assistance and
boosted community confidence in its capacity to
meet its needs and improve its wellbeing. 
Recommendation
Report results through the regular USAID
reporting channel.
OTI program results are best reported in the
USAID/Kosovo Results Review and Resource
Request (R4). OTI has its own results framework
that measures intermediate results independent of
The community development approach
used in Kosovo effectively introduced basic
democratic processes at the grassroots level
while helping war-devastated communities
address reconstruction needs.
A meeting of the USAID/OTI-sponsored Community improvement
Council in Klina, November 1999. 
2
1
3
8 Evaluation Brief No. 3 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Kosovo
those of country strategic plans. OTI/Kosovo ini￾tially developed its program with this framework in
mind, establishing objectives that differed from
USAID/Kosovo’s strategic plan. While the USAID/
Kosovo strategy identified links between its pro￾gram objectives and those of the OTI program, it
was not clear whether the results would be reported
principally within the USAID/Kosovo framework
or that of OTI. Because the principal results of all
transition programs were those realized within the
country context itself, it is appropriate for OTI to
report the results for its transition programs prima￾rily in the USAID/Kosovo report. ■
Working Papers on the Role of Transition Assistance
The Case of East Timor (PN-ACN-764)
The Case of Indonesia (PN-ACN-766)
The Case of Kosovo (PN-ACN-768)
The Case of Nigeria (PN-ACN-770)
Evaluation Briefs on the Role of Transition Assistance
The Case of East Timor (PN-ACN-765)
The Case of Indonesia (PN-ACN-767)
The Case of Kosovo (PN-ACN-769)
The Case of Nigeria (PN-ACN-771)
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
About this publication: This Evaluation Brief summarizes USAID Working Paper No. 324, prepared by Glenn Slocum of Associates for
Global Change. Brian R. Furness prepared this Evaluation Brief, and IBI–International Business Initiatives, Inc. furnished editorial and
production assistance.
To order copies or download: This Evaluation Brief and the Working Paper can be ordered from USAID’s Development Experience
Clearinghouse (DEC). To order or download, go to www.dec.org and enter PCN-ACN-769 as the document identification number in the
search box. The DEC may also be contacted at 1611 N. Kent St., Ste. 200, Arlington, VA 22209; tel 703-351-4006; fax 703-351-4039;
email docorder@dec.cdie.org. 
Photo credits: Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID.