The Role of Transition Assistance: 
The Case of Indonesia
EVALUATION BRIEF NUMBER 2
Summary
F ACING A DETERIORATING ECONOMY, civil unrest, and political uncertainty in a country
important to U.S. interests, USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) began in
August 1998 to assist USAID/Indonesia with programs that aimed to move Indonesia
to a more open, democratic system. Principal activities funded by the approximately 
$30 million allocated to OTI through FY2000 included supporting Indonesian elections,
strengthening the media, building civil society, improving civilian-military relations, and
mitigating conflict.
A study of transition assistance by USAID’s Center for Development Information and
Evaluation (CDIE) found OTI’s programs played an important role in helping USAID
respond quickly and appropriately with short-term
assistance to support postemergency political reform.
OTI’s capacity to identify opportunities and respond
immediately to conflict situations enabled the U.S.
Government to provide immediate support to peace
committees and local groups addressing issues in
volatile environments. The study also explored the
limitations of transition assistance, including the
need for effective integration and coordination with
sustainable development programs. 
The CDIE evaluators found that the decision to
launch transition assistance was characterized by
consultation with the relevant U.S. Government
agencies and considered the appropriate guidelines,
albeit informally. Although OTI’s initiative-planning
approach maximized flexibility and quick response,
it also led to a proliferation of program objectives
and dual monitoring systems. Initial tension
between OTI and USAID/Indonesia staff eased over
time, but OTI’s separate planning and monitoring
processes worked against full integration. The
formation of cross-sectoral teams improved
coordination of OTI and USAID/Indonesia
activities in conflict-prone regions. Election
assistance and media strengthening activities proved
particularly effective. Exiting from Indonesia has
proven difficult, complicated by the need to respond
to new situations, strong support for OTI activities
■ Transition assistance planning needs
to balance flexibility with program
integration.
■ Enhancing coordination between
transition assistance and other
programs can encourage integration
and cooperation.
■ Lack of handoff policy creates
uncertainty and delay.
■ Linking short-term assistance with
institution building can help 
achieve sustainable results.
■ Transition assistance is no panacea
for addressing fundamental issues.
■ OTI’s rapid response contract
provides quick and flexible assistance. 
■ Approaches to monitoring results
should be realistic.
KEY IDEAS
SEPTEMBER 2002 BUREAU FOR POLICY AND PROGRAM COORDINATION PN-ACN-767
2 Evaluation Brief No. 2 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Indonesia
by other U.S. entities, and lack of a clear phaseout
policy.
The lessons derived from OTI’s Indonesia
experience, according to CDIE evaluators, include
the need to balance short-term flexibility—
important in responding to crisis situations—with
long-term, capacity building programming. The
CDIE evaluators concluded that transition
assistance could help reduce tension, but it was not
a panacea for addressing underlying conflict issues.
Linking OTI’s short-term assistance with longer
term activities could help maximize overall
effectiveness, as would an approach to monitoring
results within the country context. A clear and
consistent duration and phaseout policy would
facilitate activity handoff and an orderly transition
to regular programs. ■
The Case of Indonesia
Background
OTI initiated its program in Indonesia in
August 1998 in the aftermath of a
deteriorating economy, extensive civil
unrest, and resignation of the country’s president.
Since then, the country has faced serious challenges
in moving from a largely autocratic, military￾dominated rule to a more open, democratic rule.
Increased interethnic strife, interreligious struggle,
and provincial movements for independence have
complicated the transition.
The objective of OTI’s program was to assist
USAID/Indonesia with activities aimed
specifically at issues of political transition.
Principal OTI activities included elections
support, media strengthening, civil society
support, civilian-military relations, and conflict
mitigation. Funding through FY2000 totaled
approximately $30 million. Phaseout was 
targeted for 2001.
In 2000, CDIE began an evaluation of the general
role of USAID transition assistance, with a specific
emphasis on OTI’s role and activities. Established
in 1994, OTI has helped
address postcrisis situations
in more than 20 countries
worldwide. Transition
assistance, as used here,
refers to the OTI￾administered programs that
provide flexible, short-term
responses to help advance
peaceful, democratic change
in conflict-prone countries.
This assistance is usually
provided during the critical
two-year period after conflict
when countries are most
vulnerable to renewed
conflict or instability. 
As part of this study, CDIE
evaluators visited Indonesia
The objective of OTI’s program was to 
assist USAID/Indonesia with activities
aimed specifically at issues of political 
transition.
Property destroyed during fighting between Christians and Muslims in North Maluku. The
Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) provided those hardest hit by the fighting with materials
for rebuilding.
Evaluation Brief No. 2 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Indonesia 3
September 9–19, 2000 to evaluate
OTI programs at the country level.
The evaluators reviewed documents
and interviewed representatives of
USAID, other U.S. Government
entities, other donors, and USAID￾funded contractors and grantees. They
also interviewed Washington-based
representatives familiar with the OTI
program. 
The study 1) sought to determine if
the decision to initiate a transition
program was made in a transparent
fashion and considered appropriate
guidelines, 2) analyzed the strengths
and weaknesses of the planning
process, 3) assessed program
implementation, 4) discussed
duration and program handoff issues,
and 5) determined whether the transition activities
achieved their objectives effectively.
Deciding to Engage
USAID senior management asked OTI to initiate a
program after consultation with other U.S.
Government entities, including the White House,
the State Department, the National Security
Council, and the Treasury Department. To allocate
scarce transition resources to priority countries, OTI
interventions must meet established guidelines.
CDIE evaluators determined that the decision to
mount an OTI program in Indonesia considered the
guidelines informally, and that the decision had
turned on the importance of Indonesia to U.S.
national interests, the readiness of the country to
make a peaceful transition to a democratically
elected government, and an environment that was
sufficiently stable to implement a program. The
informal decisionmaking process provided USAID
maximum flexibility for quick action, though not
for transparent documentation or determination of
program duration.
Planning Transition Assistance
OTI’s approach to planning permitted
experimentation and quickly shifting emphasis—
from election to postelection issues, and then to
emerging conflict in the outer island regions.
However, the approach also led to the proliferation
of program objectives and dual monitoring systems.
Because USAID/Washington supported a broader
role for OTI than the one recommended by the
mission, there was considerable initial rivalry and
program overlap between OTI and USAID/
Indonesia and lack of understanding of each 
other’s roles.
Over time, the OTI program began focusing on
broader objectives related to the country plan. Fuller
integration of planning and impact monitoring
increased efficiency, maximizing USAID’s ability to
capture the impact of OTI’s efforts within the
combined program and facilitating the handoff of
initiatives to other mission programs. Still, OTI’s
separate planning and monitoring processes worked
against full integration.
Implementing the Program
OTI initiated the transition program in Indonesia
quickly, putting in place implementing mechanisms
within two months. Its establishment of regional
offices facilitated broad geographical coverage and
the identification of local contacts and organizations. 
Members of Indonesia’s Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) participate in a 
pre-election rally in 1999.
4 Evaluation Brief No. 2 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Indonesia
OTI activities are more management intensive
than are other USAID programs in Indonesia
because of the need for direct staff involvement 
in helping strengthen the many experimental
activities of grassroots organizations. Through 
the Support Which Implements Fast Transitions
(SWIFT) contracting mechanism, OTI effectively
and quickly funded numerous small activities
(ranging from $5,000 to $15,000) of emerging
local organizations. The provision of in-kind
assistance did not, however, permit these
organizations to develop institutional capacity 
in areas such as financial management and
procurement. The mission democracy and
governance (DG) program supported long-term
institutional capacity building grants. 
Coordination of the OTI and mission DG programs
improved with the clearer distinction of roles and
program responsibilities. The creation of informal
teams that worked across strategic objectives in
conflict-prone regions facilitated program
coordination. Indeed, crisis-prone Indonesia
provided opportunities to maximize the integration
of relief, transition, and development assistance in
constructive ways. The integration of OTI into
mission administrative services worked well.
Handing Off Activities
OTI provides postemergency response programs
during the two-year critical period when countries
are most vulnerable to renewed conflict or
instability. However, exiting these programs can be
difficult, especially when 1) crises continue to
emerge, 2) there is strong support from U.S. entities
for a continued OTI presence, or 3) transition
initiatives require continuation to realize meaningful
impact. Indonesia illustrates the dilemma OTI faces
in transition situations that require conflict
mitigation capacity over the longer term. 
Exiting from Indonesia has been complicated,
although once initiated the handoff proceeded
systematically, some through short-term bridging
activities. Other handoff activities included OTI’s
identification of grantees that the mission might
consider for longer term support.
The issue of duration sparked considerable
discussion within and outside OTI. The phaseout
date continued to shift, eventually slipping from
one to three years. Reflecting Indonesia’s high
priority to U.S. national interests, U.S. policy￾makers strongly supported a continuing OTI
presence to address the ongoing sectarian and
political conflict across the archipelago. An
important factor was that USAID did not consider
duration during early engagement stages; another
was the absence of a clear and consistently applied
policy on duration and phaseout. 
While the absence of a clear program-duration
policy provided flexibility, it also led to confusion
and uncertainty about OTI’s role and contributed
to the postponement of decisions by the mission
and the regional bureau on both handoff and the
identification of alternatives for addressing
extended conflict. Moreover, in Indonesia and
elsewhere, longer term approaches that are beyond
OTI’s mandate and capacity are required to
address the fundamental issues behind the conflict. 
Achieving Objectives
OTI’s mission in Indonesia was to provide flexible,
short-term, high-impact assistance to help local
partners advance peaceful, democratic change in a
conflict-prone environment. The office funded
more than 450 grants totaling more than $16
million during FY1999–2000. CDIE looked at the
role of transition assistance generally as well as
individual program areas, addressing effectiveness,
relevance, and impact within the limits of available
impact data and evaluators’ time in country. 
Coordination of the OTI and mission 
DG programs improved with the clearer
distinction of roles and program responsi￾bilities. The creation of informal teams 
that worked across strategic objectives in
conflict-prone regions facilitated program
coordination.
Evaluation Brief No. 2 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Indonesia 5
■ Elections. OTI and DG programs
together contributed to the successful
holding of elections. OTI initiated a
variety of efforts in voter education,
media strengthening, and civil society
mobilization to inform the public on
participation and democracy issues.
OTI-funded election-related public
service announcements reached an
estimated 140–180 million television
viewers; print media reached 23 million.
The voter education surveys initiated by
OTI became the building blocks for
USAID surveys during the elections.
Building on election experiences, some
grantees launched postelection activities
related to governance and regional
autonomy issues. 
■ Media. The media strengthening
initiative was especially timely and
effective, contributing to the short-term
objective of informing the public on
political issues and to longer term
sustainable development goals of institution
building. Results included upgrading the skills
of journalists and print and radio producers,
developing news programs for radio, and
crafting new broadcast and print press laws.
The new laws facilitated the establishment of
more than 200 new publications.
■ Civil Society. Civil society support provided
numerous emerging nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) with opportunities to
improve their capacity to use media, inform the
public on political issues, and advocate for
reforms. Some activities had national impact,
such as efforts to combat corruption in
government and a constitutional amendment
on human rights. Anecdotal information
indicates that a number of NGOs effectively
informed public audiences on important issues
and influenced action in some cases. However,
overall impact was difficult to quantify in the
absence of a monitoring system that collected
comparable data for all grants. 
■ Conflict Mitigation. OTI’s conflict mitigation
activities aimed at increasing access to accurate,
objective information through media and other
means, thereby reducing rumors and tensions.
In early 2000, OTI turned its attention to the
conflict-prone regions beyond the central island
of Java. Anecdotal information indicates OTI
responded to the initial crises in North Sumatra
and Aceh regions with flexible, timely, and
critical support, but it was still too early to
assess impact of these efforts.
■ Civilian-Military Relations. OTI initiated
activities in this important area at the request of
the USAID mission director. While the initiatives
supported needed reforms, civilian-military
relations involve fundamental institutional
changes. Bringing about such changes requires a
longer term effort beyond OTI’s tenure. 
■ Gender. OTI supported the inclusion of a
women’s participation dimension in all grants,
promoting women’s issues and increased political
awareness among women. Some activities had
Casting ballots in Indonesia in June 1999. Support for elections was an
important goal of the Office of Transition Initiatives. 
6 Evaluation Brief No. 2 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Indonesia
national impact—such as the women’s radio
programs. However, the evaluators were unable
to assess overall impact of this approach due to
lack of available impact data.
■ Bridging to Longer Term Activities. A number 
of OTI initiatives effectively served as bridging
for long-term institutional development.
USAID/Indonesia or other donors strengthened
institutional capacity through continued
support for successful initiatives, such as the
media strengthening effort, NGO work on
decentralization issues, and support for
women’s rights and the legal aid foundation.
However, USAID/Indonesia did not continue
assisting NGO civic or political events unless
there was a compelling long-term development
agenda and promising leadership. 
The evaluation team concluded that while transition
assistance can help quell immediate crises, it is not a
panacea for dealing with deeply rooted issues that
require a broad and sustained effort—issues such as
civilian-military relations, sectarian and ethic
violence, and sustainable media development. The
optimum is to have a combination of short- and
long-term approaches available, especially during
periods of intermittent conflict. ■
Lessons Learned
Transition assistance played an important role
in helping USAID respond quickly with
appropriate short-term assistance to support
post-emergency political reform. The elections
support was timely and effective. The media
strengthening initiative was effective in informing
the public on political issues and supporting
institutional and legal reform. OTI’s capacity to
identify opportunities and respond immediately
enabled the U.S. Government to provide immediate
support to groups addressing issues in volatile
environments. However, transition assistance has
limitations; it must also be effectively integrated and
coordinated with sustainable development programs.
Transition assistance planning needs to 
balance flexibility with program integration.
Retaining flexibility to experiment and shift emphasis
is important in planning transition assistance. This
approach needs to be balanced with greater program
integration to reduce overlap, facilitate monitoring and
reporting, and ease program handoff. The OTI
planning process in Indonesia allowed for flexibility
to experiment and to shift emphasis to permit quick
and responsive action. However, the process also led
to program overlap with the mission’s democracy
program, redundant reporting and monitoring
systems, and difficulty measuring overall USAID
program impact. The FY2000 strategic plan for
Indonesia better adapted the OTI program to the
country context and focused the bulk of the efforts
on conflict reduction. This change helped reduce
program overlap, ease program handoff, and
enhance opportunities for integrated monitoring.
More effort to integrate monitoring systems would
enable USAID/Indonesia to better report on overall
results. 
Enhancing coordination between transition
assistance and other programs can encourage
integration and cooperation.
It is important to achieve effective coordination between
OTI transition assistance and other USAID programs
in a country. Effective coordination requires mission
leadership, clear definition of roles and authorities,
OTI purchased and transported basic building materials to 
support community reconstruction and the resettlement of
internally displaced persons in North Maluku. Local govern￾ments and communities determined the most appropriate 
use of materials. 
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Evaluation Brief No. 2 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Indonesia 7
administrative systems that encourage integration and
cooperation, and understanding of each other’s roles and
approaches. In Indonesia, numerous factors initially
supported rivalry rather than coordination between
the OTI and mission democracy programs. One was
USAID/Washington’s decision to launch a broader
OTI program than recommended by the mission
director. Another was the differing structures, roles,
and lines of authority for program management
under the Bureau for Humanitarian Response,
which managed transition assistance, and the Asia
and Near East Bureau, responsible for other 
USAID programs in Indonesia. A third factor was
the lack of understanding of or appreciation for each
other’s roles, priorities, and approaches. A fourth
factor was the congressional earmark designating
OTI as implementer of development assistance funds
programmed for Indonesia. Finally, there were other
factors related to different staff backgrounds and
leadership styles.
New mission leadership took several actions to
facilitate coordination, including integrating
administrative services, clarifying roles and program
responsibilities within the FY2000 strategic plan,
and initiating informal cross-strategic objective
teams to coordinate all programs in conflict-prone
areas. Another option would have been to place
responsibility for all programs directly under the
mission director—an approach that enhanced
cooperation in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Lack of a handoff policy creates uncertainty 
and delay.
The absence of a clear and consistently applied policy
on program duration and phaseout provided USAID
with considerable flexibility in decisionmaking, but it
contributed to confusion and uncertainty about OTI’s
role, postponement of planning for handoff, and delay
in identifying options to address conflict over the
longer term. The decision to initiate a transition
program in Indonesia was based on consideration
of important questions related to effective
engagement, but it did not address program
duration. The duration of OTI’s program
expanded from one to three years. Contributing
factors included strong support by other U.S.
entities for a continued OTI presence, continuing
emergence of violent conflict in various outer
islands of Indonesia, and delays in planning for
and initiating handoff of OTI initiatives.
Subsequent to the field study, OTI indicated its
intent to provide postemergency response programs
only for a two-year period when countries are 
most vulnerable to renewed conflict or instability. 
Early planning for handoff—preferably during
activity design—would facilitate timelier transfer.
Moreover, a clearer policy on duration—including
the conditions under which a program would be
extended, phased down, or phased out—would
help encourage missions and regional bureaus to
plan alternative mechanisms for managing longer
term OTI initiatives.
Linking short-term assistance with institu￾tion building can help achieve sustainable
results.
Transition assistance that links short-term assistance
effectively with institution building elements has
greater potential for achieving sustainable results.
Transition assistance was most effective in
Indonesia when short-term efforts were linked to
longer term sustainable development activities. For
example, OTI’s media strengthening initiative
effectively supported legal reform and capacity
building as well as use of media in short-term
activities such as elections and conflict reporting.
The mission democracy staff is continuing the
institution strengthening elements for more
sustainable results. 
Transition assistance is no panacea for 
addressing fundamental issues.
While transition assistance can play an important 
role in helping quell conflict or its immediate
ramifications, it is not a panacea. A sustained and
broad effort is needed to address the fundamental,
deeply rooted political issues that fuel conflict. In
Indonesia, transition assistance was used to
address conflict with small, short-term efforts 
that helped diminish tensions and encourage
constructive action. Such approaches cannot
address the complex, deeply rooted political
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8 Evaluation Brief No. 2 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of Indonesia
issues—civilian-military, ethnic, and sectarian
relations—that contribute to continuing conflict.
A broad-based, sustained approach is needed to
address underlying causes of conflict and
strengthen democratic institutions. Thus, a
combination of short- and long-term approaches
appears to be optimum during a transition period.
OTI’s rapid response mechanism provides 
quick and flexible assistance.
OTI used the SWIFT indefinite quantity contract to
implement short-term transition assistance quickly
and flexibly. The approach is less helpful in
providing participating organizations with
opportunities to build institutional capacity in areas
such as financial management and procurement.
OTI used SWIFT in Indonesia to implement
pilot activities, including activity programming,
financial management, and procurement. The
approach facilitated the rapid programming of
many small, short-term grants to numerous
emerging NGOs with weak institutional capacity.
Other USAID entities may also use the SWIFT
contract for implementing short-term transition
activities with emerging organizations.
Approaches to monitoring results should be 
realistic.
Short-term, flexible transition assistance does not
always lend itself to the more rigorous monitoring
systems characteristic of sustainable development
programs. Nevertheless, a realistic approach to
monitoring results can realize efficiencies. By
September 2000, OTI had identified seven specific
results it was seeking in Indonesia, but it had not
established a formal monitoring system with
indicators and data-collection methods to monitor
progress. Furthermore, many of the results OTI
sought were too ambitious to achieve on its own or
were in areas where other mission programs were
active. A more realistic approach is to regularly
monitor the many small activities only at the
output level, collecting informal impact
information on an ad hoc basis. Where OTI and
other mission programs are targeting similar
objectives, a joint integrated monitoring system
within the country strategic plan is appropriate. ■
Working Papers on the Role of Transition Assistance
The Case of East Timor (PN-ACN-764)
The Case of Indonesia (PN-ACN-766)
The Case of Kosovo (PN-ACN-768)
The Case of Nigeria (PN-ACN-770)
Evaluation Briefs on the Role of Transition Assistance
The Case of East Timor (PN-ACN-765)
The Case of Indonesia (PN-ACN-767)
The Case of Kosovo (PN-ACN-769)
The Case of Nigeria (PN-ACN-771)
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
About this publication: This Evaluation Brief summarizes Working Paper No. 323, prepared by Jean Du Rette of CDIE and Glenn Slocum of
Associates for Global Change. John Engels and Brian R. Furness prepared this Evaluation Brief, and IBI–International Business Initiatives,
Inc. furnished editorial and production assistance.
To order copies or download: This Evaluation Brief and the Working Paper can be ordered from USAID’s Development Experience
Clearinghouse (DEC). To order or download, go to www.dec.org and enter PCN-CAN-767 as the document identification number in the
search box. The DEC may also be contacted at 1611 N. Kent St., Ste. 200, Arlington, VA 22209; tel 703-351-4006; fax 703-351-4039;
email docorder@dec.cdie.org. 
Photo credits: page 2 and 6, Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID; pages 3 and 5, International Foundation for Election Systems. 
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