The Role of Transition Assistance: 
The Case of East Timor
EVALUATION BRIEF NUMBER 1
Summary
RESPONDING TO conflict-inspired
devastation, USAID’s Office of Transition
Initiatives (OTI) played an important role
in helping the U.S. Government quickly provide
reconstruction assistance and strengthen East
Timorese capacity to manage the transition to an
independent democratic state. Called upon to
provide short-term transition assistance in a
sensitive region devastated by civil conflict
following East Timor’s August 1999 referendum
on independence, OTI launched its program
rapidly, developing initial grants in November
1999 and establishing a regional office in East
Timor in January 2000.
A study by USAID’s Center for Development
Information and Evaluation (CDIE) found that
OTI’s rapid-response initiatives played a major role
in filling the gap between relief and longer term
development programs. The decision to initiate 
a transition program considered all important
guidelines and was undertaken in close consultation
with other U.S. entities and donors. Planning
addressed logistics and reviewed potential activities
collaboratively with the interim government, other
funding organizations, and other USAID offices.
Potential activities were set within a strategic
framework. 
CDIE’s review also found that the transition
assistance provided by OTI in East Timor had 
a comparative advantage in getting activities
underway until more conventional donor activities
could begin. OTI’s quick action helped stem
further instability and economic deterioration. 
The study identified various implementation
problems—lack of spare parts and maintenance for
equipment, excessive remuneration, and weak
■ Transition assistance has particular
advantages in a startup, multi￾donor, postconflict situation such
as existed in East Timor. 
■ Responding rapidly may be critical
in a postconflict situation to prevent
further conflict or instability, out￾weighing potential costs or risks.
The challenge is to address critical
needs while minimizing problems
and side effects.
■ The OTI operation in East Timor
proved a distinct and useful model
for coordinating USAID assistance
in locations that lack a conventional
USAID mission.
■ Planning for handoff as part of the
activity design process facilitates
timely handoff. The absence of a
clear and consistently applied
Agency policy on duration and
phaseout of OTI country programs
provides flexibility but makes it
easier to postpone establishing
alternative program management
mechanisms.
■ The SWIFT contract is especially
effective for quick startup, rapid
procurement of commodities, and
flexible programming.
KEY IDEAS
SEPTEMBER 2002 BUREAU FOR POLICY AND PROGRAM COORDINATION PN-ACN-765
2 Evaluation Brief No. 1 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of East Timor
partner organizations—but concluded that the
need for fast action justified the risks. The Support
Which Implements Fast Transitions (SWIFT)
mechanism, an indefinite quantity contract,
proved especially effective for program startup,
rapid procurement, and flexible programming. 
The CDIE evaluators concluded that the East
Timor intervention provided a successful model
for USAID intervention in situations that do not
call for establishing a conventional on-site mission.
Continued slippage in OTI’s exit date indicated
problems in handing off transitional activities:
despite planning for handoff, the lack of more
permanent mechanisms for managing initiatives
created pressure to retain OTI past its scheduled
departure. Lack of a clear and consistent Agency
policy on transition program duration further
hindered timely phaseout of OTI initiatives. ■
The Case of East Timor
Background
I
n September 1999, an Indonesian military￾backed militia ransacked the province of East
Timor. The destruction was triggered by the
referendum of August 30, when the East Timorese
voted overwhelmingly in favor of independence,
ending Indonesia’s unilateral occupation dating
from 1975. The conflict destroyed much of 
East Timor’s infrastructure, burning 70 percent of
the capital city of Dili and laying much of the
province to waste. More than 60 percent—
approximately 500,000 people—of the indigenous
East Timorese fled their homes.
A UN peacekeeping force arrived in late September
1999. Shortly thereafter, an interim government—
the UN Transitional Authority for East Timor
(UNTAET)—was established to bring order to the
territory and prepare an orderly transition to a
democratic government.
In November 1999, OTI launched programs aimed
at helping develop the political and economic
environment for nationbuilding and transition to
full independence. Under general guidance from
USAID/Indonesia, OTI established an office in
Dili. Its activities drew on implementation
assistance provided under the SWIFT mechanism,
and included transition employment, community
stabilization, and support for the media, civil
society organizations, and demobilized East
Timorese excombatants.
In 2000, CDIE began an evaluation of the general
role of transition assistance and specifically of OTI’s
role and activities. Transition assistance, as used
here, refers to the OTI-administered programs
providing flexible, short-term responses to help
advance peaceful, democratic change. It is usually
provided during a postcrisis period when a country
is vulnerable to renewed conflict or instability.
As part of this study, CDIE evaluators visited 
East Timor September 20–22, 2000 to examine
OTI programs at the country level and their
effectiveness. The evaluators reviewed documents
and interviewed representatives of USAID, other
OTI’s quick action helped stem further
instability and economic deterioration.
On August 30th, 2001, over 90 percent of registered voters in
East Timor went to the polls to cast their votes for the 88-seat
Constituent Assembly. OTI staff served as observers or visited
polling centers in several districts.
Evaluation Brief No. 1 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of East Timor 3
U.S. Government entities, other donors, and
USAID-funded contractors and grantees. They also
interviewed Washington-based representatives
familiar with the OTI programs. 
The study 1) sought to determine if the decision to
initiate a transition program was made in a
transparent fashion and considered appropriate
guidelines, 2) analyzed the strengths and
weaknesses of the planning process, 3) assessed
program implementation, 4) discussed duration
and program handoff issues, and 5) determined
whether the transition activities achieved their
objectives effectively.
Deciding to Engage
Interviews and documents indicated that OTI used
the guidelines established to make its decision to
allocate scarce transition resources to priority
conflict-prone countries. Although not a formal
decisionmaking document, the initial assessment
provided the principal justification for the
transition program. Factors in the decision were 
the importance of the East Timor-Indonesia
relationship to U.S. interests and the opportunity
to establish a stable democratic country in the area.
The decisionmaking process leading to OTI
involvement in East Timor involved considerable
consultation within USAID and with other U.S.
entities, including the Department of State. 
Planning Transition Assistance 
OTI followed up its initial November 1999 
program and logistical assessment with more
detailed activity planning and implementation.
Organizationally, OTI set up its own office in 
Dili in early FY2000. While East Timor would
have a separate program, the USAID/Indonesia
OTI head in Jakarta exercised overall authority. 
Operational planning identified activities that
could be undertaken quickly to support and 
build on humanitarian relief efforts and address
immediate reconstruction and transition issues.
Political development priorities included civil
society organizations, media, employment and
community development, and civic education. 
In June 2000, USAID/Indonesia set out an 18-
month transition planning framework for assisting
East Timor. OTI’s activities were clearly within the
principal strategic goal of strengthening East
Timorese capacity to manage the transition to an
independent democratic state. OTI’s role was to:
■ Revitalize local economic activity. OTI’s
Transitional Employment Program (TEP) 
contributed to short-term employment and
public works efforts until other assistance
became available.
■ Strengthen democratic development. OTI was 
to support media development, contributing 
to the establishment of a professional media 
and dissemination of information on
nationbuilding issues. OTI support for
indigenous organizations contributed to 
their participation in the political process and
provided civic education. 
Backed by the Transitional Employment Program (TEP), East
Timorese workers construct a fishpond. 
OTI’s activities were clearly within the
principal strategic goal of strengthening East
Timorese capacity to manage the transition
to an independent democratic state. 
4 Evaluation Brief No. 1 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of East Timor
The CDIE evaluators determined that OTI’s
country program for East Timor identified priority
activities that could address reconstruction needs
and enable the citizenry to participate in decisions
about their future. Planning was carried out
collaboratively with the interim government, other
funding organizations, and other USAID offices.
The strategic planning framework for East Timor,
reviewed in Washington in June 2000, integrated
all USAID assistance within one country plan. 
Although the organizational arrangements
functioned effectively in the field, the study
identified a concern with program performance
monitoring and reporting. OTI monitors program
impact separately from the country planning
framework, making it difficult to demonstrate
progress toward agreed-upon objectives.
Implementing Activities
OTI served as the on-site presence for USAID in
East Timor. It played a lead role in coordinating
USAID assistance with the interim government,
the U.S. embassy officer-in-charge resident in Dili,
other donors, and visiting USAID/Indonesia staff.
The approach permitted USAID to play an
important role in the territory without setting up a
conventional mission. The OTI director in Dili had
significant operating discretion that
facilitated on-site decisionmaking and
implementation.
OTI launched its East Timor program
quickly. With the help of the SWIFT staff
and U.S. personal service contractors, OTI
was able to initiate postrelief activities and
procure commodities far more rapidly than
other donors or funding organizations. The
flexibility of the SWIFT contract facilitated
OTI’s rapid startup in East Timor. Most
assistance was in kind, with materials
imported mainly from Australia or
Indonesia.
Interviews with representatives from
UNTAET, other donors, and local
organizations confirmed OTI’s ability to start
up and to procure materials rapidly. Some local
organizations noted problems with initial
equipment and the lack of spare parts and repair
facilities, but on balance they found the in-kind
approach addressed their needs. The evaluators
noted that the spare part and repair problems
illustrate the dilemma USAID faces when
undertaking transition activities in a devastated
environment: moving ahead quickly may carry
some risk but is important for political and
economic reasons.
OTI/East Timor coordinated implementation with
other donors and funding organizations, including
Australia, Japan, Portugal, the United Nations, and
the World Bank. The level of coordination
contributed to mutual learning and promoted
complementarity between initial and future donor
activities. Dili is a small community in which
OTI’s Transition Employment Program (TEP) included a water project to
flood rice fields in the district of Oecussi. 
OTI’s country program for East Timor
identified priority activities that could
address reconstruction needs and enable the
citizenry to participate in decisions about
their future.
Evaluation Brief No. 1 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of East Timor 5
informal coordination and communication
networks functioned effectively.
From October 1, 1999 to September 20, 2000,
OTI administered 129 grants totaling $6.7 million
for activities in East Timor. Of these grants, $4.2
million supported TEP; grants of $937,000 helped
build civil society; community stabilization,
governance, and media programs received
approximately $500,000 each. 
Handing Off Transition Activities
USAID’s initial expectations were that OTI
involvement in East Timor would be limited to two
years. This expectation proved unrealistic due to
various factors, including uncertainty about future
USAID involvement in the development of East
Timor, strong support by the USAID mission and
the U.S. ambassador for a continued OTI presence,
congressional support for continuing high levels of
assistance for East Timor, and absence of a clear
and consistently applied policy on the duration and
phaseout of OTI programs.
OTI programs generally considered handoff as part
of the design. For example, OTI conceived of the
initial assistance for 26 nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) as a short-term effort to
enable these organizations to work with UNTAET
to determine priorities and address other
nationbuilding issues. TEP was specifically
designed to provide six months of support until
funding from other assistance organizations was
available, but it was extended when other funding
was delayed. After September 2000, OTI worked
actively to hand off media activities by forming a
media working group with the UN, World Bank,
other donors, and East Timorese media groups.
Despite planning for it, OTI was unable to hand
off its program as promptly as planned, in part
because alternative program management
mechanisms were not established. Exit plans now
foresee OTI’s departure in September 2002.
Achieving Objectives
The evaluation found that OTI’s transition
activities generally achieved short-term objectives of
revitalizing local economic activity and
strengthening democratic development quickly and
effectively. The SWIFT mechanism was particularly
useful for accelerating the procurement of materials
and equipment for districts where management
capacity was often weaker than anticipated. TEP
financed salaries, materials, equipment, and tools
for projects that included emergency road repair
and reconstruction, as well as income-generating
activities. In the face of economic devastation and
growing unemployment (estimated as high as 80
percent), TEP employed 50,000 East Timorese,
engaging them directly in public works activities in
all 13 districts and injecting much-needed financial
liquidity. Thus, OTI’s short-term programs helped
stem further deterioration and instability during an
interim period when East Timorese expectations
were high and other anticipated transition
assistance was not yet available.
Strengthening democratic development included
media support that helped expand news circulation.
For example, with in-kind commodity and short￾term recurring cost assistance, the Timor Post was
able to expand its daily print run of 1,000 from
Spare part and repair problems illustrate the
dilemma USAID faces when undertaking
transition activities in a devastated
environment: moving ahead quickly may
carry some risk but is important for political
and economic reasons.
In the face of economic devastation and
growing unemployment, TEP employed
50,000 East Timorese, engaging them
directly in public works activities to rebuild
their country, and injecting much-needed
financial liquidity.
6 Evaluation Brief No. 1 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of East Timor
two to six days a week and pursue
advertising support. Similar
assistance helped launch the weekly
tabloid Lananok and expand its
operations. These and other media
support activities helped supply the
need for information on nation￾building activities during the critical
postconflict period.
OTI’s ability to target needs,
procure materials, and respond
rapidly stood out among donors,
but was not entirely without
problems. OTI’s initial grant
assistance to local NGOs was
important in enabling the local
NGO community to work with
UNTAET and the international
NGOs, but some observers believed
that the assistance might have been even more
effective if NGOs had been chosen more
selectively. TEP provided important benefits—
including jump-starting reconstruction, injecting
liquidity into the community, and boosting
morale—but the maintenance of appropriate
incentives required rotation of workers to limit
each one’s participation and suspension of
individual salary payments during the coffee
harvest season. ■
Lessons Learned
USAID transition assistance played an
important role in helping the U.S.
Government respond quickly to the need
for reconstruction in East Timor following the
postreferendum conflict of September 1999. 
OTI’s initiatives played a major role in filling the
gap between humanitarian relief and longer term
development programs. The first year’s civil
society, employment, and media activities
effectively began reconstruction and capacity
building in the seriously devastated environment.
Transition assistance has comparative 
advantages. Transition assistance has particular advantages in a
startup, multidonor, postconflict environment such as
existed in East Timor. In the aftermath of the
referendum for independence and the ensuing
conflict, USAID was the principal donor able to
assess needs, target assistance, and initiate the
postrelief reconstruction effort rapidly. Most
international and bilateral organizations were
unable to respond quickly and flexibly beyond 
the provision of basic humanitarian relief. 
By closely coordinating its assistance with that 
of other donors, OTI was able to get interim
activities operating until funding from other
donors became available. In this volatile
environment, OTI’s quick action helped stem
further instability and economic deterioration.
The need for fast action may outweigh
potential risks. There is a tradeoff between rapid response and risk.
Responding rapidly may be critical in a postconflict
situation to prevent further conflict or instability.
The first year’s civil society, employment,
and media activities effectively began
reconstruction and capacity building in 
the seriously devastated environment.
2
1
OTI’s Transition Employment Program (TEP) provided for the renovation of a
community building in Baucau. 
Evaluation Brief No. 1 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of East Timor 7
The need for fast action may also outweigh the
potential costs or risks. The challenge is to address
critical needs while minimizing problems and side
effects. OTI’s quick provision of assistance to local
NGOs effectively enabled the East Timorese to
participate in initial reconstruction and
nationbuilding efforts. However, the rapid
response also led to implementation problems—
including lack of maintenance capacity and spare
parts for newly provided equipment—and
provoked concerns about recurring costs. On
balance, the benefits of helping stem further
political and economic deterioration outweighed
drawbacks that OTI could address over time.
OTI East Timor proved a useful operating 
model.
OTI’s successful operation in East Timor showed that
it could serve as a distinct and useful model for
coordinating USAID assistance where a conventional
USAID mission is absent. OTI served as the on-site
presence for USAID in East Timor. It played a lead
role in coordinating USAID assistance with the
interim government, the on-site U.S. embassy
officer in charge, other donors, and visiting
USAID/Indonesia staff. 
The approach permitted USAID to play an
important role in the territory without setting up a
conventional mission. It also minimized the
coordination and authority concerns observed in
other locations where OTI operated within a larger
on-site USAID mission. The applicability of the
model elsewhere would depend on various factors,
including the size of the country, U.S. foreign
policy interests, and the nature of the USAID
program. 
Planning handoff from the outset facilitates 
timely transfer.
The East Timor experience demonstrates that
planning handoff as part of the activity design process
makes it easier to hand off activities in a timely
fashion. By and large, OTI planned for the handoff
of its short-term activities as part of the respective
activity designs. This contributed to timely
handoff of its first-year initiatives. However, over
time the program was extended from two to nearly
three years. 
Factors contributing to the extension included
uncertainty about future USAID involvement in
the development of East Timor, strong support by
the USAID mission and the U.S. ambassador for a
continued OTI presence, congressional support for
East Timor, and absence of a clear and consistently
applied policy on duration and phaseout. The lack
of such a policy provides flexibility, but makes 
it easier for USAID to postpone establishing
alternative mechanisms to manage programs over
the long term. Without alternatives for managing
OTI initiatives, OTI continues its on-site presence
in East Timor.
A clearer policy on the duration of OTI transition
programs could facilitate timelier handoff. Such a
policy could address the conditions under which
programs would be phased out or down as well as
the roles and responsibilities of OTI and the
regional bureaus (or missions) in identifying and
establishing mechanisms for program management. 
The SWIFT contract enables a rapid 
response.
The SWIFT contract is especially effective for quick
startup, rapid procurement of commodities, and
flexible programming. OTI used the Indonesia￾based SWIFT contractor staff to help get its
transition program in East Timor under way.
SWIFT’s capacity to rapidly develop specifications OTI supported the visit of Indonesian journalists to East Timor. 
3
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8 Evaluation Brief No. 1 | The Role of Transition Assistance: The Case of East Timor
and procure goods and services enabled OTI to aid
local NGOs and implement the highly praised
employment program quickly and effectively. The
SWIFT mechanism was especially well suited for
providing in-kind assistance to districts where
indigenous East Timorese capacity to manage local
groups was often weak. The flexibility of the
mechanism allowed USAID to adjust programs
and deadlines as needed to respond to changing
situations. Other USAID entities could also use
the SWIFT contract to implement transition
activities. ■
Working Papers on the Role of Transition Assistance
The Case of East Timor (PN-ACN-764)
The Case of Indonesia (PN-ACN-766)
The Case of Kosovo (PN-ACN-768)
The Case of Nigeria (PN-ACN-770)
Evaluation Briefs on the Role of Transition Assistance
The Case of East Timor (PN-ACN-765)
The Case of Indonesia (PN-ACN-767)
The Case of Kosovo (PN-ACN-769)
The Case of Nigeria (PN-ACN-771)
RELATED PUBLICATIONS
About this publication: This Evaluation Brief summarizes USAID Working Paper No. 322, prepared by Jean DuRette of CDIE and Glenn
Slocum of Associates for Global Change. Brian R. Furness prepared this issue of Evaluation Brief, and IBI–International Business Initiatives,
Inc. furnished editorial and production assistance.
To order copies or download: This Evaluation Brief and the Working Paper can be ordered from USAID’s Development Experience
Clearinghouse (DEC). To order or download, go to www.dec.org and enter PN-ACN-765 as the document identification number in the
search box. The DEC may also be contacted at 1611 N. Kent St., Ste. 200, Arlington, VA 22209; tel 703-351-4006; fax 703-351-4039; 
email docorder@dec.cdie.org. 
Photo credits: Office of Transition Initiatives, USAID.
A clearer policy on the duration of 
OTI transition programs could facilitate
timelier handoff.