TRANSITIONING TO LONG￾TERM DEVELOPMENT
An Evaluation of the USAID/OTI Program in Kosovo
Submitted to:
United States Agency for
International Development
Bureau of Humanitarian Response
Office of Transition Initiatives
Kosovo Transition Initiative
Submitted by:
ARD, Inc. ARD, Inc.
159 Bank Street
Ste. 300
Burlington,
Vermont
Cover and Layout Design:
Tracy Simmons
Cover Photos:
Left Young Kosovar women singing at inauguration of newly
expanded school in Ferizaj (Photo Credit: Robert Morin)
Top Right Radio announcer at KTI-funded broadcasting station in Prizren
(Photo Credit: Robert Morin)
Bottom Right Installation of new electrical transformer financed through KTI
grant (Photo Credit: Courtesy of IOM Kosovo)
Transitioning to Long-Term Development
An Evaluation of the USAID/OTI Program
In Kosovo
Robert J. Morin Jr. Robert J. Morin Jr.
Dana S. Stinson
November 2001
Submitted to:
United States Agency for International Development
Bureau of Humanitarian Response
Office of Transition Initiatives
Kosovo Transition Initiative
Washington, DC
Submitted by:
ARD, Inc. ARD, Inc.
159 Bank Street, Ste. 300
Burlington, Vermont
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACRONYMS 1 ACRONYMS 1
USAID/OTI/KOSOVO – PASSING IN REVIEW 2 USAID/OTI/KOSOVO – PASSING IN REVIEW 2
An Executive Summary 2
IN CONSIDERING AN EVALUATION4
Purpose 4
Transition Program – Mandates and Roles 4
Determining Impact 5
Structuring the Evaluation Methodology 5
OTI IN KOSOVO – THE CONTEXT 6 OTI IN KOSOVO – THE CONTEXT 6
In the Midst of Conflict 6
Crisis Brews 7
Crisis to Transition 8
OTI IN KOSOVO - THE PROGRAM 9 OTI IN KOSOVO - THE PROGRAM 9
Setting the Goal and Outlining the Approach 9
Designing Activities 11
A Word About Transition Activities 18
FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION 19 FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION 19
Agency Coordination 19
KTI Program Goals 19
Program Impact 21
Management/Administrative Findings 26
CONSIDERING THE FUTURE 28 CONSIDERING THE FUTURE 28
Transition Programming 28
Program Staffing 29
Measuring Performance 29
Intra-Agency Coordination 30
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 1 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
ACRONYMS
BHR
CIC
ENI
FY
IREX
KFOR
KLA
KTI
NATO
NGO
OFDA
OSCE
OTI
USAID
UN
UNMIK
USG
Bureau for Humanitarian Response
Community Improvement Council
Europe and the New Independent States
Fiscal Year
International Research and Exchanges Board (ProMedia)
Kosovo Forces
Kosovo Liberation Army (Albanian acronym is UCK)
Kosovo Transition Initiative (OTI Kosovo)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Nongovernmental Organization
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
Office of Transition Initiatives
United States Agency for International Development
United Nations
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
United States Government
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 2 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
USAID/OTI/KOSOVO – PASSING IN REVIEW
An Executive Summary
The role of OTI in Kosovo was to bridge
USAID’s humanitarian relief efforts with
a long-term development program. OTI’s
interventions in Kosovo spanned a period
of approximately three years, from 1988
to 2001. However, it experienced
significant periods of time when program
activities were severely curtailed and
even halted for reasons of security.
OTI’s goal in Kosovo, as an agent of
transition from relief to long-term
development, was to initiate, reestablish
or expand democratic political processes.
To achieve this goal, OTI through the
Kosovo Transition Initiative, chose to
maximize the number of Kosovars
involved in and recognizing the value of
participation in decision making and the
future development of democracy in
Kosovo.
This document is an evaluation of OTI’s
program in Kosovo. Its purpose is to tell
the story of OTI in Kosovo and to
provide a critical eye for use in planning
future programming in countries where
OTI is considering establishing offices. In
doing so, the evaluation team consulted
the existing body of documentation and
conducted extensive interviews with
Washington and Kosovo-based OTI staff
and key KTI partners. More importantly,
in order to determine the extent to which
KTI contributed to building democratic
political processes, the team developed
and used an evaluation framework model
that illustrates the extent of KTI’s impact.
The model affords OTI the opportunity of
moving beyond reliance on anecdotal
information in determining success by
introducing a greater degree of
objectivity in measurement than had
previously existed.
Over the course of the KTI program, over
$15 million in transition assistance was
programmed. Approximately 80% of
program funds were devoted to
developing political processes at the
community level. It also is the program
area in which the greatest impact was
achieved. Communities now have locally
elected governance structures, grassroots
organizations articulating needs to elected
officials, accountability and transparency
becoming more important issues, and
issues of diversity in representation being
addressed.
KTI also contributed significantly to the
development of the media sector in
Kosovo and achieved similar levels of
impact with just under 15% of program
funds.
This evaluation examines these results as
well as other programmatic areas. In
general, it concludes that KTI was
successful in fulfilling its mandate of
providing transition assistance and in
handing over its program to the USAID
Mission. The evaluation also brings to
light that the success of KTI was due in
large part to an excellent understanding
among KTI and Mission staffs of the role
of transition assistance in USAID’s
overarching program objectives. Finally,
and most importantly, the evaluation
highlights the need for OTI to bring a
greater degree of structure to transition
programming, in order to more
objectively determine achievement of
results.
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 3 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 4 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
IN CONSIDERING AN EVALUATION
Purpose
This is the final program evaluation of
the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID)
Office of Transition Initiatives’ (OTI)
work in Kosovo. ARD was contracted to
conduct an objective, external evaluation
of OTI’s Kosovo Transition Initiative
(KTI). The evaluation examined the three
key programmatic areas of KTI’s work:
grassroots community participation, local
media development, and non￾governmental organization (NGO)
development. An examination of
management issues was also conducted
as they relate to increased or decreased
program efficiency and effectiveness.
The purpose of this evaluation is to tell
the story of OTI in Kosovo, but also to
provide a critical eye for use in planning
future programming in countries where
OTI is considering establishing offices.
KTI provides an excellent platform to
examine what the organization has
learned, how it can more effectively
monitor and evaluate activities, and how
its work fits into the broader framework
of USAID’s work worldwide.
The evaluation was conducted in a
relatively short time frame. The team
worked in Kosovo from September 5 –
22. The events of September 11 however,
severely impacted the team’s ability to
conduct interviews in Pristina and
moreover to travel into the field.
Transition Program – Mandates and
Roles
In 1994, USAID initiated a new area of
programming to provide quick response
to “transitioning” democracies. This new
initiative was called the Office of
Transition Initiatives and was envisioned
as a stepping stone between the Agency’s
traditional humanitarian relief aid and
long-term development missions.
OTI’s mission is “to help local partners
advance peaceful, democratic change in
conflict-prone countries.”1
 OTI’s
country-specific programs have a goal of
placing staff on the ground to assess the
particular situation and implement hands￾on programming to bridge the gap
between crisis and development.
The situation in post-conflict Kosovo was
ripe for OTI’s program. OTI staff had
been active in the pre-conflict phase with
programs aimed at conflict prevention. In
the wake of the conflict however, OTI’s
staff was poised to enter Kosovo in the
emergency phase, seeking opportunities
outside the humanitarian relief area to
assist communities with immediate needs
and begin thinking about longer-term
concerns.
Throughout the program, OTI’s staff
struggled with the definition of
“transition.” Although working
relationships with the Office of Foreign
Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and later
long-term development Mission staff
were generally excellent, OTI Kosovo’s
lack of clear definition of transition
occasionally came into conflict with its
partner offices. Early on, for example,
KTI field staff’s desire to work in the
area of shelter created some problems
with OFDA, and in some cases their
commitment to housing projects was
beyond their scope of expertise or
manpower. Similarly, KTI involvement
in media caused tensions with the
Mission’s long-term media development
strategies, particularly when KTI staff
committed to projects in areas beyond the
capacity of technical expertise.
 
1
 USAID/OTI website.
http://www.usaid.gov/hum_response/oti/
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 5 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
In general, OTI describes “transition”
programming in statements similar to the
following:
When a crisis occurs in a
priority country, OTI designs a
country program to address the
fundamental constraints that
inhibit governance and
economic functioning. Each
country program has a set of
objectives, a set of program
performance indicators, an
implementation strategy for
accomplishing the program
objectives, an approved budget,
and a plan for periodic program
reviews and exit strategy.2
These words adequately describe the
fundamental policy priorities for the
United States government (USG) in
Kosovo under which KTI functioned and
the general structure under which the
program functioned. This evaluation will
seek to examine more closely KTI’s
monitoring and evaluation techniques in
terms of implementation within the stated
framework.
Determining Impact
During the process of evaluation, one key
question that is often raised relates to
program impact. In addressing the issue
of impact, evaluators look for direct links
between cause and effect. In the realm of
development however, impact carries
with it a sense of looking at effect over
long periods of time, generally from 10 to
20 years. Given that OTI’s operational
mandate in a given country is usually two
years and that impact is an identified
issue, it was necessary to modify the
scope of impact’s customary parameters
in carrying out this evaluation. To do so,
a framework was constructed for
examining KTI’s contribution to
developing to democratic political
 
2
 KTI Final Evaluation Scope of Work.
process during a transitory phase from
humanitarian relief efforts to a longer￾term development program. With this
overarching framework as a guide it
became possible to review each of KTI’s
programmatic areas and determine the
extent to which each contributed to the
building of democratic process in
Kosovo.
Structuring the Evaluation
Methodology
In order to effectively examine and
evaluate KTI’s program, the evaluation
team conducted interviews with current
and former program staff in Washington,
DC, and Kosovo. Given the flexible
nature of OTI programming and the
philosophy of fast, direct assistance for
effective programming, as well as a
relatively short time frame for program
implementation, there is often inadequate
time for development of an overarching
implementation and monitoring strategy.
As a result, evaluation under such
established guidelines is difficult. In
order to build a more structured approach
to stated program goals, objectives, and
activities, the evaluation team conducted
an evaluation workshop with KTI staff in
Pristina. The results helped build a
clearer picture of the conditions under
which OTI attempted to change behavior
or impact attitudes in development of
post-conflict civil society in Kosovo.
This report will begin by providing some
historical and political background on the
conflict in Kosovo followed by an
examination of the program objective,
goals, and activities. The final half of the
report provides the substance of the
evaluation, findings, and
recommendations.
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 6 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
OTI IN KOSOVO – THE CONTEXT
In the Midst of Conflict
In 1989, under the leadership of Slobodan
Milosevic, the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia enforced a harsh regime in
the Serbian Republic’s province of
Kosovo. This regime was designed to
control what the Belgrade government
perceived as a growing threat of Albanian
nationalism in the province. In context,
the Yugoslav federation had reached a
fragile state after the death of long-term
leader and strongman, Marshall Tito.
Threats of disintegration of Yugoslavia
from the Republics of Slovenia and
Croatia and a growing Serb nationalist
movement built on rhetoric regarding
threats to Serb minorities living in
Croatia, Kosovo, and other parts of
Yugoslavia, contributed to the crackdown
in Kosovo.
In addition to the general nature of these
building tensions, Kosovo was unique
within Yugoslavia. The federation had
struggled throughout its history with
governance of the province, whose
population was over ninety percent ethnic
Albanian and spoke a completely
different language and followed
significantly different traditions than
other citizens of Yugoslavia. The culture,
language, and fierce independence of the
Albanian people had long been a problem
for the government in Belgrade, which
wavered between providing more
autonomy for the province and managing
strict controls to thwart attempts to assert
independence from central authorities.
Furthermore, the relationship between the
Yugoslav Republic of Serbia and its
province of Kosovo included an intense
mythology revolving around the historic
Battle of the Blackbirds, considered by
the Serbs to be a defining moment in their
historical development and resistance to
Ottoman domination. Kosovo was also
considered the heartland of Serbian
culture and the sacred home of the
Serbian Orthodox Church. Thus, as
Serbian nationalism developed, Kosovo
was the logical place for the Milosevic
regime to assert early repressive actions
and dominance.
In 1989, the regime in Belgrade began to
enforce a systematic, apartheid-like
campaign to disenfranchise Albanians in
every aspect of life. Albanians were
dismissed or forced to resign from state
posts across all sectors, from schools to
hospitals to government. Police were
given free reign to punish perceived
troublemakers, enforce curfews, harass,
and generally enforce an atmosphere of
fear. Use of Albanian language, cultural
symbols, or other expressions of culture
were controlled.
In response, the Albanian leadership in
Pristina determined that nonviolent
protest would be the most effective
method of resistance. Drawing on a
strong tradition of family networks and
pride in the Albanian community, an
elaborate parallel system of schooling,
health, and other public functions was
organized across the entire province. A
government in exile based in Europe was
created, which used small cells of secret
leadership in Kosovo to manage the
parallel system. Although some “taxes”
were collected through this system, the
activities were largely supported by
contributions from the diaspora
community living in the United States
and Europe.
In the period between 1989 and 1998, the
passive resistance effort was largely
unsuccessful. International attention
focused on wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Croatia, which began in 1992 and
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 7 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
were followed by huge international
assistance efforts. During this period,
violent resistance was not considered by
the majority of Albanians living in
Kosovo due to visions of the war
destruction wrought on their neighbors to
the north. However, as time dragged on
and the situation in Kosovo grew more
repressive, a small violent resistance
movement began to grow in the
countryside.
Where the original, passive resistance
movement to Serb domination had been
led by intellectuals and political leaders
based in the cities, new tactics emerged
from rural areas. The new approach
focused on surprise attacks on police and
other official Serbian institutions. Known
as the Kosovar Liberation Army (KLA),
it is unclear exactly when the movement
began. Originally comprising less than
one hundred men, Serb attempts to
destroy the movement contributed to its
rapid growth. By early 1998, the rebel
Kosovar army was engaged in a full-scale
guerilla war with the Yugoslav army and
police.
Crisis Brews
OTI began programming in Yugoslavia
(Serbia/Montenegro) in July 1997.
Although the USAID Mission in
Belgrade conducted democracy programs
designed to support moderate leadership
in Serbia, OTI’s program was designed to
reach more deeply into civil society to
support the growth of citizen’s initiatives.
While the program was based in
Belgrade, it supported programming
throughout both republics and their
constituent provinces. Working
conditions in Serbia and Montenegro
were difficult, as international pressure to
unseat Milosevic mounted in the wake of
the wars in Bosnia and Croatia. In
addition, increasing tension between
Serbia and Montenegro after the election
of more moderate Montenegrin
leadership in 1997 increased interest in
supporting other forces aligned against
the Milosevic regime.
After conducting a specific assessment of
Kosovo in late October/early November
1998, OTI opened an office in Pristina.
The stated objective of the new program
was to “promote local participation in
community decision making.”3
Unfortunately, extremely repressive
conditions in Kosovo made the work
difficult. KTI first attempted to engage
both Serb and Albanian participants in
programs aimed chiefly at media and
NGO activities. Although there were
some measures of success, the Serb
community in Kosovo generally felt
supported by their government and thus
found participation irrelevant. In contrast,
the Albanian community recognized great
needs in terms of material assistance
projects as well as in the media and NGO
sectors, but security concerns and lack of
support from Serb authorities made
anything outside of small grants in the
media and NGO sectors next to
impossible.
Meanwhile, as fighting in the countryside
grew, international attention focused on
the tiny province out of concern for a
spread of the conflict and growing
humanitarian outcry. Although the
Milosevic regime insisted the conflict
was an internal problem, requiring strong
measures to destroy a dangerous
“terrorist” movement, the international
community viewed the conflict as a
continuation of Serbia’s nationalist
policies, which could potentially ignite
the southern Balkans.
Diplomatic pressure on Belgrade resulted
in a series of peace conferences held in
Rambouillet, France. When negotiations
between Serb and Albanian leaders failed
in early March due to Belgrade’s refusal
to initial a peace agreement, the Serbs
 
3
 BHR/ENI Assessment Mission Report,
November 1998.
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 8 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
were given ultimatums by the
international interlocutors to cease
military actions in Kosovo. Instead,
Belgrade initiated a full military
operation designed to drive out Kosovar
terrorists. In response international
observers were withdrawn from the
province and on 28 March 1999, and the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) began what would be more than
three months of bombing in Kosovo,
Montenegro, and Serbia.
As the bombing campaign commenced
KTI’s offices were closed and staff
located in Pristina were evacuated to
Skopje, Macedonia. Administrative and
managerial staff based in Belgrade were
evacuated to Budapest, Hungary, along
with other USAID Mission staff.4
 The
program continued to function minimally
in Macedonia, building relationships with
Kosovar refugees who had fled the surge
of violence in Kosovo.
Crisis to Transition
Kosovo, after international intervention,
presented an entirely new foundation on
which the KTI program could be built.
Post-conflict Kosovo was a virtual
vacuum of leadership, governance, and
order. Security concerns from Serb police
and other Yugoslav authorities were
gone. In place of the Serb authorities
were a confusing array of self-appointed
local leaders and United Nations
appointed administrators, none of which
seemed to draw legitimacy from local
communities. The presence of
international donors resulted in a
mushrooming of local NGOs, which drew
their mandates from donor priorities
versus community needs. Destruction of
housing stock and food resources left
citizens focused on individual
 
4
 Background provided via telephone
interview with former KTI administrative
manager Nives Mattich, 1 September 2001,
Washington, DC.
humanitarian needs instead of community
concerns. An atmosphere of revenge and
fear among Albanians resulted in killings
and the exile of the majority of Serbs and
other minority populations living in the
province. Finally, destruction from war
and generally poor maintenance from
1989–1998 meant that the needs for
reconstruction were overwhelming and
basic utilities like water, electricity, and
communication barely functioned.
Facing these daunting challenges, KTI
began its program with focus on three
areas:
1. Media
2. NGOs
3. Citizen Participation
The theme of the program would remain
true to the original objective. The
activities however, would be greatly
expanded and increased as the post￾conflict emergency phase passed and a
return to order in daily life resumed.
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 9 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
OTI IN KOSOVO - THE PROGRAM
Setting the Goal and Outlining the
Approach
Prior to March 1999, the KTI program
goal was “ to promote local participation
in community decision making.”5
 This
program goal was derived in the context
of U.S. policy goals for the USAID
mission in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, which generally sought to
expand democracy and moderate
leadership in opposition to the nationalist
Milosevic regime. At that time, conflict
aversion through citizen initiatives and
support of moderate leaders throughout
Serbia was the focus of activities.
Following international intervention in
Kosovo and resumption of the KTI
program in July 1999, the general goal
remained the same, but the focus shifted
 
5
 BHR/ENI Assessment Mission Report,
November 1998.
away from Belgrade to Pristina. The goal
of normalizing life in post-conflict
Kosovo and promoting moderate Kosovar
leadership focused policy and
programming on local communities. In
addition, security circumstances allowed
for a completely different implementation
strategy. Instead of programming
primarily in the media and NGO sectors
in Pristina, the focus of execution now
shifted to community-based infrastructure
projects and citizen participation through
Community Improvement Councils
(CICs) throughout the province.
Shifting circumstances in Kosovo led to
shifting programmatic concerns, but
reporting and monitoring for the program
still related back to OTI’s Strategic
Results Framework, as designed in 1999.
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 10 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
Under this framework, KTI’s program
traveled through three distinct phases in
FY 1999, which reflected the changing
circumstances in the province:
Phase 1, Crisis Aversion (October–
March): KTI funded NGO and media
projects in Kosovo and Serbia promoting
anti-war actions.
Phase 2, Programming in Exile (May–
June): In Macedonia, KTI supported the
leadership structure in refugee camps,
promoted better relations between camps
and local Macedonian communities.
Phase 3, Kosovo Emergency/Re-Entry
Phase (July–September): KTI returned to
Kosovo and began working in
communities to implement community
improvement projects. Media and NGO
projects were managed by KTI Pristina.
In October 1999, program goals and
objectives were reviewed by KTI staff at
a retreat in Kosovo. The overarching
program objective agreed by the staff
was:
Democratic political processes
initiated, reestablished, or
expanded.
This fell within the intermediate results of
OTI’s strategic results framework and
provided what was felt to be a reasonable
goal given the circumstances on the
ground in Kosovo. A sub-objective of
that goal became the mission statement
most frequently cited by KTI staff:
To maximize the number of
Kosovars involved in and
recognizing the value of
participating in decision making
and the future development of
democracy in Kosovo.
Beyond understanding the objective,
long-term activity planning was not
engaged by staff or management. This
followed OTI’s philosophy of flexibility
and response to changing circumstances
on the ground. Established programming
continued in the community, media, and
NGO sectors with primary responsibility
for the community sector devolved to the
field staff. The driving force behind
project grants was a desire to build trust
and community participation by showing
that KTI could realize desired projects in
a reasonable time frame. Media and NGO
programming remained centered with
management staff in Pristina until April
2000 when the schedule for local
elections allowed a more dovetailed
approach at the regional level for
programming in all three sectors.
In the months leading up to the October
2000 municipal-level elections, voter
participation became the driving force
behind KTI programming. To this end,
responsibility for all three program areas
was shifted into the seven regional
offices. CICs, local NGOs, and local
media outlets were encouraged to submit
projects for pre-election activities. In the
post-election phase, KTI programming
was driven by a desire to build
relationships between citizens and elected
leaders. Therefore, work with CICs was
dropped as a primary focus. Community
leaders interested in funding for projects
were referred by KTI staff to municipal
assembly members to gain approval and
acceptance of the project at the municipal
level.
The phases of programming from April
2000 through September 2001 in
summary are:
Phase 1, Pre-Election (April-October
2000): Local media and NGOs receive
grants, technical support. Community
election activities include local debates,
radio call-in shows, and public service
announcements.
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 11 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
Phase 2, Post-Election (October 2000-
July 2001): Newly elected municipal
assemblies included in community
improvement grant approval process.
Ties between elected officials and
communities encouraged.
Phase 3, Close Out (July–September
2001): Focus on completing final cycle of
projects, close out, and final hand over to
USAID Mission.
Designing Activities
Throughout the program, the three
components remained the same, but
activities were designed to fit the
changing circumstances on the ground in
Kosovo. Although the citizen
participation, media, and NGO
components were originally designed as
three complementary elements, they
functioned largely independently until
April 2000 when the province-wide
municipal elections provided a
framework for coordinated activities. A
detailed description of each program
component and a timeline of OTI’s
involvement in Kosovo follow.
Media Component
From the outset of the KTI in November
1998, the KTI program had a defined
media component. Pre-war media
activities were considered essential in
providing both Serb and ethnic Albanian
citizens free and unbiased news in the
highly restrictive pre-conflict atmosphere.
In addition, support for moderate
journalists and media sources was
considered an essential part of conflict￾prevention.
Pre-war substantial grants were provided
to several Kosovar Albanian newspapers
as well as radio stations. These grants
provided support for Internet access, as
well as limited print and broadcast
capacity. Support for multi-ethnic radio
contact was also provided. In addition,
Radio B-21 in Belgrade received
substantial funding to support anti-war
broadcasting.
In the pre-war phase, media programming
was designed to provide better
information to the community. In the
post-war phase, the activities were
designed to tie the media more closely to
the community with a goal of not only
providing more objective information,
but also serving as a forum for citizen
concerns. The program faced several
challenges, however. First, local media
outlets were largely not functioning due
to lack of equipment and funding.
Second, KTI field staff were
overburdened with implementing quick
impact community improvement projects
designed to establish goodwill and create
strong ties to the community.
As a result, management staff in Pristina
took control of media activities and
devolved little authority to the regional
offices. Program activities included
highly technical equipment support for
radio and television, and equipment
packages for local radio stations.
Unfortunately this resulted in the initial
phase of the media program having little
direct connection to the larger component
dedicated to citizen participation. This
gap became critical in later phases of the
program designed to encourage more
open citizen participation in the election
process. Relationships had to be built by
regional staff who had not developed this
kind of working relationship with local
media. Support for local stations had
arrived with few conditions and no
additional training. Coordination between
KTI and Mission personnel, which might
have filled some gaps, had been minimal.
As a result of these factors and lack of
technical support, much of the equipment
provided to local media outlets was
ineffective or required large investments
of staff time and additional financial
resources to correct.
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 12 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
Jul thru Sep – Phase 3 Programming. Focus
completing projects, close out procedures
final hand over to USAID
Jul – USAID/OTI begins programming out
Belgrade, Yugoslavia for activities in Serbia f
Montenegro in their constituent
Oct thru Jul – Phase 2 Post-Election
Newly elected municipal authorities included Pi
community improve process. Tie between
authorities and communities
Apr thru Oct – Phase 1 Pre-Election
Programming. Media and NGOs
support. Community election
undertaken.
Jul thru Nov – Field offices conducts first phase of
community participation program. Grant making
community projects
Jul – USAID/OTI opens 7 field offices in
Kosovo, but security concerns require
to return to Pristina at night. ff
Jun/Jul - USAID/OTI staff returns to Kosovo,
additional staff hired and program focuses
community participation, media and
GO
Mar – NATO bombing of Kosovo commences.
evacuates to Macedonia and focuses on working with S /O
Kosovar Albanians communities in anticipation of il d
return.
Oct/Nov - Assessment mission from
Belgrade arrives in Kosovo to
dt i scope of USAID/OTI Program
Nov – USAID/OTI opens office in
K
Timeline of OTI’s Involvement in Kosovo
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 13 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
These issues recognized, however, the
importance of these early activities
cannot be underscored. The network of
local stations supported early in the
program provided the broadcasting
foundation on which later election-related
projects could be built. The network of
regional radio outlets supported by KTI
became crucial in creating an open forum
for debate and discussion in the pre- and
post-election phase. Moderate journalists
were recruited to host debates between
local candidates. Debates were broadcast
live for citizens. Call-in shows with
candidates and leading citizens were
featured broadcasts.
The shift in activities was also
accompanied by new personnel at the
Pristina level. A media program manager
and technical support expert were hired in
July 1999. This team completed an
assessment of KTI’s media project in
August 2000 and brought beneficiaries
from across the province together to
discuss technical, licensing, training, and
other needs with a variety of donors,
international organizations with media
oversight responsibilities, and Kosovo
Forces (KFOR) counterparts.6
 This
coordination allowed beneficiaries to
finally connect with international agents
responsible for licensing and training,
two key areas that had hampered their
operation.
Sustainability was also an issue of
concern for KTI-supported media outlets.
According to the Media Affairs
Department of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE), there are currently 70 licensed
radio stations, of which 50 are
transmitting; 24 licensed television
stations, of which 10 are transmitting;
and 7 daily newspapers.7
 This huge
number of outlets covers a relatively
small media market and clearly
represents large investments of donor
funding versus locally funded initiatives.
In August 2000, a sustainability study of
KTI beneficiary radio stations was
conducted by the East-West Management
Institute. The study reviewed 14 out of 15
KTI-supported stations and primary
results indicated eight of the fourteen
were likely able to support themselves
over time from advertising and other
sources of local funding.8
 Although the
reports indicated that some continued
transitional donor funding was probably
necessary, the long-term prognosis was
good.
 
6
 Interview with Vjollca Krasniqi, KTI media
officer, 13 September 2001, Pristina. 7 Local Capacity Building: An Assessment of
USAID/Kosovo’s Efforts, December 2000. 8
 Interview with Fron Nazi, E-W Management
Institute, 6 September 2001, Pristina.
VOTE…
FOR A BETTER KOSOVO
Man: Hey my woman, you are going to vote for
who I tell you to. Do we understand each other?
Woman: You keep thinking that way my
husband, but for sure I will vote for the person I
want to. That’s my right!
(Cover Page from targeted educational material
on voting - published by a KTI’s grantees.)
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 14 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
NGO Component
Prior to NATO bombing, the NGO sector
played a key role in organizing civil
society in Kosovo. Human rights,
humanitarian, and youth NGOs were key
players in supporting community needs
and in bringing moderate leadership
voices to the forefront in both ethnic
groups.9
 International donors, including
KTI, supported these efforts.
Following the conflict and broader
international intervention in Kosovo,
donor aid for NGOs increased
significantly. Prior to the conflict,
approximately 15 to 20 well-established
and experienced NGOs were operating in
the province, for the most part from a
base in Pristina.10 In the year 2000, the
number of registered NGOs surpassed
570.11 International donors largely drove
this huge swell in numbers and some
donors focused on promoting agendas
that were not always in line with
community priorities.
Many fledgling NGOs took advantage of
this situation in order to leverage donor
funding for operational costs versus
activities. Most of these nascent
organizations were able to secure initial
funding without well-developed mission
statements, recognized role in the
community, or organizational plans.
KTI’s focus on providing grant funding
to NGOs for broad-based community
projects that incorporated democratic
development proved problematic for the
inexperienced and unfocused groups. In
addition, even experienced organizations
were loosing focus and had difficulty
 
9
 Serb organizations were largely based in
Belgrade and operated in Kosovo 10 Interview with Dina Cernebregu, former
KTI NGO program manager, 14 September
2001, Pristina. 11 Registered by the UN provisional
government as reported in Local Capacity
Building: An Assessment of USAID/
Kosovo’s Efforts, December 2000.
adjusting their missions to the changed
circumstances and plethora of donor
requirements and goals tied to funding
conditions. An attempt was made to
sensitize NGO leadership to community￾based needs by encouraging CICs to
reach out to NGO representatives but the
success of this attempt was negligible.
In general, KTI field staff did not support
grants for NGOs in the regions. During
interviews regarding this subject, staff
indicated that the organizational capacity
of NGOs was low and few donors had
initiated capacity-building support
programs. Most NGOs sought operational
funds for undefined objectives and
therefore few clear activities that might
have been of interest for KTI support.
KTI did support grants for Pristina-based
NGOs with province-wide activities. For
example, the Forum, a Pristina-based
youth organization, received funding to
organize and support pre- and post￾elections debate activities. The Forum’s
mission statement incorporated ideals of
broad citizen participation and activities
included various media projects designed
to increase accountability of elected and
appointed officials.12 KTI also supported
regional partners of the Forum in
execution of their activities wherever
possible, hoping to build on the Forum’s
desire to work in coalition with
organizations across the province.
Citizen Participation Component
This was by far the largest part of the
overall KTI program in Kosovo. Citizen
participation included three stages that
linked closely to the situation on the
ground in Kosovo at the time of
execution.
 
12 Interview with Jetemir Balaj, CEO & Co￾founder of The Forum, 21 September 2001,
Pristina.
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 15 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
Stage 1: Community Improvement
Councils (CICs)
This stage evolved over time and varied
slightly from region to region as
circumstances for implementation
dictated. The goal of this activity was to
connect individual citizens with the
decision-making process for community￾level reconstruction projects supported by
international donors.
In the emergency period (July-December
1999), the process of community
participation was relatively unstructured.
During this period, KTI management and
field staff primarily focused on quick
impact projects which would build trust
in the communities. Since KTI did not
support large-scale shelter initiatives or
other types of relief programs, building a
sense of trust in the communities was a
difficult but necessary consideration in
the face of high expectations resulting
from promises made by other donors.
Working in coordination with BHR’s
other component organization, the
OFDA, some of the emergency
humanitarian needs were met in
communities, but KTI’s focus on projects
benefiting a broader base of citizens and
on citizen participation remained the
primary task at hand.
During the KTI staff retreat in October
1999, regions shared experiences
regarding methods used to encourage
participation and decision making at the
community level. Various techniques
included working with self-appointed
local authorities, seeking out political
party representatives, calling on village
elders, and convening spontaneous town
meetings. Most of the regions
experienced similar problems in
promoting and working with CICs. The
most significant problem was that of
older males dominating the decision￾making process. A related problem was
the nonexistence of broad-based
representation as self-appointed
powerbrokers sought to dominate.
Nevertheless, diluting that power in favor
of participation remained a clear goal of
the activity.
After October 1999, a more structured
approach was adopted for the CIC
process. Participation of women was
made a prerequisite for grant approval. In
addition, organizers of initial town
meetings were encouraged to incorporate
the broadest base of representation
possible. From this broad base a CIC
would be elected. That CIC would then
be responsible for calling subsequent
meetings to inform citizens about
progress on the project. Characteristics of
a typical CIC included an average
membership of 15, a delimited
geographic region, a diverse
representation including youth and
women, a focus on the process of
participation and decision making versus
the material reward of the project.13
Other lessons learned about community
participation and CIC projects included a
 
13 KTI Implementation Guide 1 May-August
2000.
Community members contributing manpower for
a local infrastructure improvement project.
(Photo Credit: IOM Kosovo)
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 16 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
clear difference between rural and urban
communities. The CIC model did not
work for cities and larger towns. Citizens
in larger population centers were unable
to agree on priorities except in a few
cases where CICs operated at the
neighborhood level. Effective
representation of all citizens’ interests
was also difficult if not impossible to
achieve in an elected CIC. Some group or
area always felt left out. At the staff
retreat, KTI also concluded that large￾scale urban projects such as
electrification or supply of water were
difficult to sustain. Problems involving
maintenance and payment of utilities
were pervasive. Overall, KTI learned to
focus on smaller communities in rural
areas as a result of early failures in urban
communities.
In addition, the CIC model encountered
difficulties when applied to minority
communities. Attempts to initiate
programs in these communities were
mostly hampered by the fact that citizens
were largely displaced from their original
homes, meaning they had little
“ownership” of or attachment to their
current community. Early attempts to
build trust, particularly in the Serb
communities, were difficult due to
general distrust of America and American
initiatives. These barriers took time and
initiative to break down. Where Albanian
communities were constantly
approaching KTI with new projects,
minority communities required outreach.
Furthermore, in other communities, such
as the various Roma enclaves, a tradition
of community participation did not exist,
requiring more effort in terms of working
with the community to gain an
understanding of how community
investment and participation might be
demonstrated. Therefore, although
programming with minorities was an
objective for all regional offices, the
accepted CIC model was difficult to
apply across the diversity of ethnic
groups and thus projects in these
communities were slower to implement.
Finally, at the October 1999 retreat, KTI
adopted a requirement for community
contributions to project financing. KTI
always had and continued to maintain a
policy of not paying for labor as part of
its grant funding and as a result
communities often contributed the labor
themselves or solicited donations to cover
this cost. Levels of contributions varied
regionally and by community, however.
In deciding to leverage financial
investments from communities, a sense of
community ownership of the project was
instilled and a commitment to
maintenance strengthened. In addition,
leveraging contributed to the feeling of
community pride and achievement, which
found widespread appeal, especially in
Albanian communities. Based on these
results, leveraging community investment
became a key element of the grant
approval process thereafter.
Stage 2: Election-Related Activities
During the summer and fall of 2000, KTI
gradually distanced itself from CICs in
preparation for the election of municipal
officials. As a first step, KTI initiated a
number of election related activities at the
KTI Ferizaj Field Office Staff Emine Qerkini and
Brian Kelly discussing KTI-funded grant for
school expansion with local government official.
(Photo Credit: Robert Morin)
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 17 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
regional level which involved citizens,
local media, and NGOs.
Initial activities included the completion
of a CIC-based survey of voter opinions
on various community issues that were
intended to stimulate debate during the
election campaign. This project was
completed in coordination with OSCE’s
Elections Office and the UN’s Interim
Administration Mission in Kosovo
(UNMIK). The completed “Voter’s
Voices” was published as an outline of
Kosovar concerns and used by political
parties, candidates, and international
officials.
During the election campaign period a
variety of activities were initiated in order
to provide forums for citizens to address
political candidates directly with their
concerns. Candidate debates with
representatives from all political parties
were held in every region. In some
regions separate debates were also held
for women candidates, many of whom
were first time candidates due to a newly
mandated election law requiring that 30%
of party lists include women.
Media coverage was encouraged for all
election activities, and local media
participation was excellent. Local
journalists also participated as moderators
in some events. In addition to the
Pristina-based Forum, local student
organizations and NGOs initiated
activities and organized events. This was
the first time all three KTI program
component areas worked in a coordinated
fashion. The framework of the elections
provided a platform for citizens, media,
and NGOs to work together in common
activities.
Stage 3: Transition to Local Governance
Following the election of local municipal
officials in October 2000, KTI staff
determined that continued work with CIC
structures would undermine locally
elected officials. The CICs were not
official, elected bodies, and it was feared
that continuing to work with them would
empower a parallel network of
community leaders with financial
resources and decision making. As a
result, KTI initiated a new process for
project approval. When communities
approached KTI with new projects, they
were directed to municipal assembly
presidents and committees with oversight
on community improvement measures.
Given the municipal-level involvement,
KTI also increased its project funding
level, so that larger projects could be
considered. KTI staff followed up with
municipal officials regarding community
projects referred to the municipality. In
coordination with local communities,
meetings were held between communities
and municipal officials to discuss
projects, to clear up technical issues (such
as land use), or to consolidate municipal
budget contributions towards project
implementation.
In some cases CICs continued to function
after direct KTI involvement. Since
village-level elections were not part of
the internationally initiated and
supervised election structure, CICs
served as an interim representative
structure in some areas. Often CIC
structures acted as a liaison between local
communities and other international
donors. One legacy of the CIC process
appears to have been increased member
savvy on how to work with donors and
local and international officials. To KTI’s
credit, some donors adopted the CIC
model to better inform their community￾level project priorities.
In this final stage of community
improvement project funding, KTI
continued to fund community-based
priorities, but the process expanded to
incorporate interaction between elected
officials and community representatives.
KTI also worked with local media,
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 18 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
NGOs, and community leaders to lobby
for more open practices within the
municipal structures. In several
municipalities the number of municipal
assembly meetings open to the public was
increased from the minimum of two per
year, as required under UN regulation
1244, to one per month. The presence of
elected officials allowed KTI to
incorporate elements of accountability
into programming.
A Word About Transition Activities
USAID and KTI staffs began devoting to
transition strategies in September 2000.
That these “hand over” strategies became
a focus early on is exemplary. Friendly
working relationships at the management
level also contributed heavily to this
process, as did early recognition by the
Mission Director of the value of KTI’s
programs.
KTI’s community-based philosophy for
infrastructure improvement projects was
adopted by the Mission’s long-term
infrastructure development program.
KTI’s staff members were instrumental
liaisons between USAID project
managers, local officials, and
communities.
Shortfalls in KTI media projects are
being addressed by USAID grantees in
terms of capacity building and training,
and finally, some of KTI’s NGO partners
are serving as a valuable network in NGO
capacity-building and advocacy
programs.
Although smoother working relationships
could be developed and better definition
of OTI’s “transitional” role may be
necessary (particularly in the area of
media); overall integration of OTI’s
program into USAID’s strategic objective
framework was successful. KTI provides
an example of how OTI programs can
assist with the transition between post￾conflict emergency humanitarian aid and
the initiation of long-term development
programs. However, the details of how
transition functions in a post-emergency
phase and into long-term development, as
well as strategies for the eventual
integration into USAID’s program and
staff requires some refinement.
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 19 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATION
Agency Coordination
In 1994, USAID entered a new phase of
institutional approach when it initiated
the OTI with the specific mission of
addressing the needs of “transitioning”
democracies. Envisioned as a stepping
stone between the Agency’s humanitarian
relief aid and long-term development
missions, OTI was a concept which has
operationally met some difficulties as it
struggles to find its place beside the more
established and traditional roles of
USAID programming.
At the crucial stage between crisis and
development, OTI has attempted to
define “transition” through a variety of
program activities. Those activities range
from conflict prevention/resolution to
peace building projects, including but not
limited to demobilization and civil￾military relations, to community
development through support for NGOs
and media and small grant community
improvement projects. Although the logic
of this transitional approach is widely
accepted, OTI programs in the field have
sometimes come into conflict with other
Agency programs or have suffered from a
lack of clear overall strategy of how
AID’s component parts fit together to
achieve common goals.
In Kosovo many of the institutional
conflicts were resolved due to the
excellent working relationships of
individuals on the ground. As a result, it
is possible to look at KTI’s activities and
how they helped to further define
“transition” and the role of OTI in
developing countries.
KTI Program Goals
Given the relatively short duration of OTI
programming, objectives and results are
formulated to be more immediately
achievable relative to the overarching and
longer-term Agency goals. Recognizing
the defined latitude of its interventions,
OTI focuses on designing programs that
successfully advance political transitions,
regardless of the country in which it
establishes a presence. To advance
political transitions in Kosovo, OTI’s
intent was to design programs that would
contribute to “democratic political
processes being initiated, reestablished,
or expanded.”14 To operationalize this
intent, KTI chose to “to maximize the
number of Kosovars involved in, and
recognizing the value of, participating in
decision making and the future
development of democracy in Kosovo.”15
In terms of the transition from relief to
development in the context of the stated
goals, three program areas were defined:
citizen participation, NGO development,
and media. KTI began its work in Kosovo
in the emergency phase when OFDA’s
relief mission was addressing its
objective of saving lives through
provision of basic humanitarian services
such as emergency food, basic health
needs and materials for winterization.
This was a difficult period for KTI as the
pressure to initiate activities through
grant making was high, but the reality of
conditions on the ground did not
necessarily fit within the three program
areas. KTI staff often struggled to
program funds in an atmosphere where
individuals and communities were
demanding projects relating to
humanitarian needs versus needs in the
wider KTI programmatically defined
areas. This led to coordinating with
OFDA on a few shelter projects, with
 
14 Intermediate Result 2 of the OTI Strategic
Objective Framework. 15 USAID/BHR/OTI/Kosovo Program FY
2001 Budget.
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 20 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
KTI focusing on mobilizing local
communities to help identify problem
areas and specific humanitarian needs.
Despite the tendency to characterize this
period as one fraught with difficulties, in
retrospect, KTI’s contribution was more
important than realized at the time,
particularly as it relates to coming to
understand the role of community
participation in building democratic
processes. Through early efforts to
involve communities in identifying
problems and needs, KTI was able to
refine its community involvement
strategy, and very soon thereafter, began
making community improvement grants.
These grants not only helped establish the
credibility of KTI in the regions but they
provided a platform on which the CIC
approach could be built. This eventually
led to a strategy that fit more readily into
the Agency’s, and in general, the
international community’s focus on
stability, restoring security, and
stabilizing community services.
The early months of the KTI program
were not unique in presenting a challenge
to staff but to KTI’s credit the issue of
generating equitable community
participation within a sustainable context
was addressed. Aggressively encouraging
communities to involve women and
youth in determining priorities, followed
by adopting a policy of compulsory in￾kind or financial contributions as part of
the grant application process, were
contributing factors to establishing a
sense of community ownership.
Consequently, community ownership
weighed heavily on maximizing the
potential for sustainable community
involvement in decision making.
Well into the program, the role of CICs
as decision-making bodies came into
question as municipal elections resulted
in local governing entities. KTI reacted
by shifting the community involvement
focus to the newly elected body of
officials. Some CICs repositioned
themselves as representatives of
community interests while others
disbanded. With the change in focus, KTI
also had to also consider how best to
begin planning for the close out or hand
over of its program to the Mission. Here
again KTI faced some challenges and
realigned its approach to more coherently
fit within the Mission’s goal of achieving
sustainable improvements in the
province, both economically and socially.
Sensitivity to the Mission’s development
strategies helped to avert potential
programming conflicts and some program
synergy was established.
Throughout the process of conducting
this evaluation it was obvious KTI was
identified or recognized almost solely for
the innovative contributions it made in
promoting participation through the CIC
program. This mindset was encountered
early on during interviews in Washington
and on the ground in Kosovo. Interest in
or concerns over the results and impact of
the media and NGO programs tended to
come almost exclusively from individuals
most directly involved in their
implementation. That the CIC program
overshadows the media and NGO
programs without obvious or objective
reasoning became of immediate concern
and in short order provoked more
sustentative questions surrounding
overall program impact.
While KTI made extensive use of the
OTI Grant Database, an impressive data
tool and the subject of further discussion
below, no framework existed by which
regular evaluation against results and
objectives could be measured. Moreover
there was no mechanism to determine the
degree to which KTI’s transition
assistance in Kosovo contributed to the
Agency’s focus on long-term economic
development and social welfare. That
recognized, the evaluators set about
designing a structure to facilitate a
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 21 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
participatory assessment of KTI’s impact
and provide answers to the larger
question of contributions to the transition
initiative in Kosovo.
Program Impact
Although KTI produced regular field
reports and utilized the OTI Grant
Database, designed in Washington and
used principally in the field to track
grants funding, these reports did not lend
themselves to results analysis other than
determining efficiency in programming
grant funds by period, region, and
program area. Undeniably, extensive
efforts were made to populate the
database with additional data sets such as
grant processing information and even
evaluative information on each grant
made, but the potential value of this
information could not be exploited in
determining results and objectives
without a contextual evaluation
framework. Subsequently, no information
was collected regarding the baseline
status of Kosovar society in terms of
media, community participation, or NGO
development. Program reports provided
anecdotal information about communities
and project activities, but the lack of
baseline information made it difficult to
evaluate the true impact of program
activities in terms of results.
Given these circumstances, the evaluation
team discussed methods of designing a
framework and instrument to measure
achievement of results and objectives and
to shed light on program impact. The
outcome of the discussion was the
decision to structure an evaluation
framework around OTI’s Intermediary
Result 2: “democratic political processes
being initiated, reestablished, or
expanded”. The rationale behind this
structure was that inherent to the result
statement is the notion that democratic
processes can evolve or devolve over
time and thus pass through various phases
of development. Using this logic set the
stage for determining the extent to which
KTI’s program contributed to initiating,
reestablishing or expanding the
democratic processes in Kosovo.
Additionally, the logic, once transformed
into an evaluation instrument, would
contribute to the analysis of KTI’s goal of
“maximizing the number of Kosovars
involved in, and recognizing the value of,
participating in the development of
democracy in Kosovo.”
To further build the evaluation structure
and instrument, the evaluators initially
opted to capitalize on the participation of
a wide representation of individuals from
among KTI staff and its partners.
However, time constraints narrowed the
options to calling upon the KTI staff as a
source of expertise. They would be
tasked with describing the characteristics
of the various phases in the development
of democratic processes in the Kosovar
context and then use those stages to
determine the level of development of the
processes in each of the seven regions
where KTI worked.
During a one-day workshop the
evaluators led the staff through a series of
exercises, the first of which resulted in
identifying stages associated with the
development of democratic processes.
However, instead of using the
terminology employed in OTI’s
intermediary result (initiated,
reestablished, and expanded) the
participants chose to associate the phases
with the terms nascent, emerging,
expanding, and mature. This exercise was
followed by a collaborative effort to
describe, based upon their experience in
the Kosovar context, characteristics for
each stage as they applied to the
development of community involvement,
media, and NGOs. These characteristics
were then fit into a matrix as illustrated
below.
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 22 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
In constructing the matrix a consensus
was reached on combining KTI’s
programmatic efforts involving
communities and local governance. This
was justified by the fact both areas were
so closely linked that the characteristics
for one could not be disassociated from
the other.
Based on this work, staff from each
region were then asked to provide an
assessment of where their regional
programs fit in this framework. Although
the process was highly subjective in
nature, it nevertheless provided a
revealing and useful illustration of KTI’s
impact on of the development of political
processes by program area and region.
The results presented in the following
diagram.
KTI Program Assessment
Characteristic of Stages of Development
Nascent Emerging Expanding Mature
Communities & Local Governance
• communities demonstrate
ability to regroup after cri￾sis in absence of formal￾ized governance structure
• solidarity within communi￾ties evidenced by willing￾ness to address immediate
needs
• some citizens groups be￾gin to act towards improv￾ing environment
• decision making tends to
be made by a few and in
non-representation of en￾tire community
• international governance
structures operating
• community demonstrates
ability to articulate goals in
terms of needs
• larger community audi￾ence begins to become
part of decision-making
process
• recognition of need for
locally elected governance
structures exists
• local governance struc￾tures elected and begin￾ning to operate
• grassroots community
organizations more
independently articulating
needs to elected officials
• accountability and trans￾parency become issues for
local communities
• issues of diversity in rep￾resentation begin to be
addressed by community
• formalization of interaction
between municipal struc￾tures and communities to
address needs and ac￾complish goals
• diversity of community
represented in governance
and grassroots structures
• local government officials
are fully accountable to
community and operate in
transparent manner
Media
• government controlled
print and electronic media
predominates
• independent media nomi￾nal and may operate par￾tially in exile
• equipment lacking, little
networking among mem￾bers of media
• few resources exist
• standards of journalistic
professionalism minimal
• proliferation of media out￾lets, evidence of im￾provements of in media
infrastructure
• new technical equipment
available making external
contact possible
• issues of licensing and
spectrum management
entertained, citizens expe￾rience increased access to
information from news
sources
• journalistic standards im￾prove but are uneven
across region
• some media groups gen￾erating income and
showing evidence of
sustainability
• media organizations in￾corporate newer tech￾nologies into operations
• regulations and standards
established
• media becomes critical in
coverage of news events,
investigative reporting skill
improved
• associations of journalists
become organized
• media organizations are
secure and free from in￾timidation and control
• media is unbiased and
objective in reporting on
news events,
• most media organizations
self-sustainable
NGOs
• role of NGOs in civil soci￾ety not clear to majority of
population
• limited number of high
profile NGOs operating
mostly in capital city
• NGO focus on providing
humanitarian services
• absence of recognized
legal parameters for NGOs
• funding not diversified
• role of NGOs in civil soci￾ety beginning to be dis￾cussed
• as external influences
increase number of or￾ganizations grows and
roles change
• basic legal statutes for
NGOs in place
• community outreach and
services broaden
• regionally based NGOs
organize, funding base
limited
• NGOs define missions and
goals
• community begins to un￾derstand role of NGOs in
civil society
• training and professional￾ism of NGO leadership
• organizations creating
networks and beginning to
understand their role in
citizen advocacy
• recognition of importance
of accountability to citizens
• full legal regulations exist
• NGOs are able to clearly
define their mission in civil
society
• citizen advocacy role de￾fined and when appropri￾ate organizations working
together in coalition
• NGOs addressing issues
of sustainability by diver￾sifying funding base
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 23 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
Insufficient time and logistical difficulties
prevented design and implementation of a
truly objective and tested instrument for
gathering data. With more time a
framework would have been developed
that incorporated a questionnaire that
could have been taken to focus groups in
the field. Data gathered from this
instrument would have provided a more
accurate picture of democratic political
process development in Kosovo similar
to the matrix built with KTI staff. Use of
a more sophisticated instrument would
have provided fuller measurement of
KTI’s impact in terms of stated
objectives.
That said, given the circumstances, the
tool constructed with KTI staff was
useful in providing data by which some
conclusions could be drawn. In addition,
it provided KTI staff with a framework
with which they could provide some
insight on the program objectives and in
turn served to underline the need for the
collection of a set of baseline data during
the early stages of program
implementation.
Communities & Local Governance
Concerning the development of
democratic processes within communities
and in the area of local governance, there
was little variation across regional offices
except in the case of Ferizaj and Gilan. In
general, the impact of KTI’s program was
that communities and local government
structures are entering a stage of
expansion: local governance structures
are elected and beginning to operate;
grassroots community organizations are
more independently articulating needs to
elected officials; accountability and
transparency are becoming more
important issues for local communities;
and issues of diversity in representation
are beginning to be addressed by the
community.
Staff from Gilan readily acknowledged
that difficulties in community
involvement were encountered from the
very early stages of KTI due in part to the
presence of larger minority populations.
While Ferizaj staff was not in a position
to clarify its rating vis-à-vis the other
regional offices, a discussion ensued
regarding the extent to which results
could be directly attributed to KTI. Most
KTI Program Assessment
By Program Area and Regional Office
Program
Area
Regional
Office
Nascent
Stage
Emerging
Stage
Expanding
Stage
Mature
Stage
Ferizaj
Gjakova
Gilan
Mitrovica
Peja
Pristina
Communities
& Local
Governance
Prizren
Ferizaj
Gjakova
Gilan
Mitrovica
Peja
Pristina
Media
Prizren
Ferizaj
Gjakova
Gilan
Mitrovica
Peja
Pristina
NGOs
Prizren
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 24 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
agreed that prior to KTI’s program, many
communities, particularly in terms of
participation, were well into the nascent
stage due in large part to the strong
tradition of solidarity among ethnic
Albanians.
Although the information gathered
provided more shape to the program in
terms of the objectives, the evaluators
recognized that the outcome also
reflected some of the internal program
biases. The impact on minority
communities was not readily apparent.
The reason was that Kosovar democratic
development mainly focused on the
Albanian community in terms of
programs and results. Considering the
overall community, including minorities,
measurement of evolution became more
complicated. Where characteristics of
development might show an advanced
stage of development in terms of the
Albanian community in the area of
community participation, for example,
when minority communities were taken
into account those results might not
register as strongly in the developmental
stage.
Media
The ratings of the impact of KTI’s media
activities indicate that this sector is also
entering into the expanding stage. More
precisely, some media groups are
generating income and showing evidence
of sustainability; media organizations are
incorporate newer technologies into their
operations; regulations and standards are
established; media is becoming critical in
coverage of news events and
investigative reporting skill are improved;
and associations of journalists are
organized.
Gjakova proved the exception to this
rating as, in terms of media development,
it is just passing from the nascent to the
emerging stage. Staff felt that this
underlines the fact that the Gjakova area
is unlike other regions in Kosovo and
demonstrates the extent of regional
diversity within the confines what is
generally considered to be a small
geographic area.
Without prompting from the evaluators
KTI staff commented on the similarity in
ratings between community & local
governance and media. The pervasive
feeling was one of surprise given that so
much programmatic attention had been
paid to the former as opposed to the
latter. The question raised and discussed
(but for which no conclusive answer was
provided) related to levels of funding for
each programmatic area. Were similar
levels of impact in the two areas achieved
with similar funding levels? The general
opinion was that question alone might
merit being the subject of a study unto
itself.
NGOs
The results of ratings in the area of
support to NGOs varied greatly by
regional office. In some areas,
particularly in Gjakova, Mitrovica and
Prizren, the development of the NGO
sector remains solidly in the nascent
stage. In the Pristina region however, the
NGO sector is well into the emerging
stage. The Pristina region has an NGO
sector that can be characterized as NGOs
clearly define missions and goals; a
community that is beginning to
understand the role of NGOs in civil
society; a trained and professional NGO
leadership; NGOs creating networks and
beginning to understand their role in
citizen advocacy; and NGOs which
recognize the importance of
accountability to citizens.
The disparity in ratings was of no
surprise to KTI staff. It was readily
acknowledged that the focus of support to
NGOs had always been on the larger,
established and Pristina-based
organizations. The question raised
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 25 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
however, was whether greater impact
could have been achieved throughout
Kosovo through stronger KTI
programming in this area. Most staff felt
the answer to this question was definitely
yes, but that increased programmatic
support would have required a significant
increase in KTI expertise in NGO
strengthening and capacity building.
Funding Levels vs. Impact
In the course of conducting the
evaluation, the question of correlation
between program funding levels and
impact was raised. To shed light on this
matter, the evaluators extracted data from
the OTI Grant Database and constructed
two reports in table format. The first
report details funding levels by
programmatic area and regional office.
The second report examines funding
levels by programmatic area and year.
Because the database disaggregates
community improvement funding from
local governance activities, the funding
for these two areas is presented
separately. However, in discussing
possible correlations between funding
levels and impact, the two areas are
considered as one.
The most revealing information is in
terms of total funding levels for
communities & local governance and
media versus the impact in both areas. In
support of communities & local
governance, KTI programmed
$12,475,445. To strengthen media the
total funding was $2,130.773. The gap in
funding is significant, particularly when
compared to program impact in each
area. Based on the results of the impact
rating exercise both communities & local
governance and media programs achieved
the expanding stage. The immediate
question is whether KTI could have more
efficiently programmed funds in the area
of communities & local governance and
achieved the similar results. The
evaluators agreed the answer is most
Estimated Grant Funding
By Program Area and Office
Regional
Office
Community
Improvement
Local
Governance
Media NGO Support Total
Belgrade 0 0 49,770 22,630 72,400
Freizaj 1,835,160 459,576 72,103 10,491 2,377,330
Gjakova 1,631,597 410,044 43,336 174,324 2,259,301
Gjilan 787,066 514,328 78,709 40,396 1,420,499
Mitrovica 1,172,450 361,609 56,417 25,666 1,616,142
Peja 1,281,477 458,530 109,188 143,251 1,992,446
Pristina 1,354748 594,131 860,067 265,747 3,074,693
Prizren 1,153,864 455,280 212,613 16,395 1,838,152
Skopje 00 0 15,000 15,000
Unspecified 5,585 0 648,570 12,751 666,906
Total $9,221,947 $3,253,498 $2,130,773 $726,651 $15,332,869
Estimated Grant Funding
By Program Area and Year
Year
Community
Improvement
Local
Governance
Media NGO Support Total
1998 0 0 65,000 17,746 84,744
1999 4,812,040 0 823,014 150,208 5,787,261
2000 4,005,755 21,993 695,650 194,754 4,920,152
2001 404,151 3,231,505 515,695 363,943 4,517,295
Unspecified 0 0 31,415 0 0
Total $9,221,946 $3,253,498. $2,130,774 $726,651 $15,332,869
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 26 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
probably a resounding yes but that more
importantly, the question merits further
examination in order to serve as a lesson
learned for future OTI programs.
The first report also reflects the degree of
attention paid to supporting NGOs in
Kosovo. Of the three programmatic areas,
support to NGOs was significantly lower
and correlates to the results of the impact
rating in this area.
The second report, which presents
program funding by program area and
year, serves principally to show the
dramatic increase in funding from 1998
to 1999 and the subsequent relatively
equal funding levels thereafter.
Management/Administrative Findings
Implementing Partners
Although the evaluation team did not
examine management practices or
administrative functions, these issues
were addressed in terms of their effect on
program function. Like all field
operations, the smooth function of the
program depended on efficient
administrative and logistical support. In
the conflict stage of the program, KTI
was supported by RONCO as the primary
agent in charge of administration and
logistics. That relationship continued
when the program returned to Kosovo in
July 1999, with the exception of two
regional offices which were managed by
IOM as a result of relationships
developed in Albania during the period of
exile from Kosovo.
Overall, staff indicated that the
relationship with RONCO was difficult.
Slow procurement practices and low
quality of materials impacted program
credibility and efficiency. Delays in
procurement resulted in loss of credibility
when OTI was unable to meet its
commitments even though the
community fulfilled their obligations in
terms of meeting criteria designed to
encourage wide participation in the
decision-making process and contribution
of matching funds, materials, and labor.
In addition, the gap in funding resulting
from the transition to overall IOM
management from RONCO created some
difficulties for field staff. The funding
gap meant that commitments made in the
initial phases of programming were
delayed in some cases for six months.
This left field staff in an awkward
position in terms of enforcing process
criteria and managing credibility issues
with participants despite long delays in
project implementation and funding.
Problems with RONCO were evident
prior to departure from Kosovo in March
1999. KTI program managers seemed
reluctant to demand changes in contractor
support due to perceived difficulties this
would incur, but in the end problems
were prolonged or delayed due to this
hesitation. Criteria for periodic review of
contractor performance and a more
formalized process for field staff to report
problems likely would have provided a
more efficient path to correcting
difficulties with existing support
organizations or initiating the process of
hiring a new organization. Resolution of
these support issues and processes would
have saved staff hours and contributed to
maximizing program efficiency.
Early Planning and Coordination for
handing off KTI’s program to the USAID
Mission
In Kosovo, excellent relationships
between KTI and USAID Mission staffs
contributed to a uniquely smooth
coordination and hand-off process. These
relationships resulted in the inclusion of a
hand-over plan in the Mission’s strategic
framework, which has not been the case
in other countries where OTI has worked.
OTI’s role as a stepping stone between
relief and development mandates a need
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 27 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
for clearer guidelines for hand off
between the various stages of Mission
involvement in a post-conflict situation.
In addition, clearer hand off strategies
will help OTI to better define its role in
the transition process in other countries.
In many post-conflict circumstances,
Missions require time to rebuild or build
staff, assess strategic objectives, and
create strategic frameworks. Once basic
objectives are determined, OTI program
activities can be assessed for the
intermediate term. OTI programs can
bridge the gap between relief and
development by contributing to building
a foundation for USAID community-level
development and finding a baseline
against which the growth of a democratic
society can be measured.
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 28 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
CONSIDERING THE FUTURE
OTI/KTI successfully engaged Kosovar
communities with the goal of self￾identification and prioritization of
development projects. OTI/KTI stands
out among international donor programs
focused on reconstruction and
infrastructure development as the only
organization which followed the
approach of asking citizens what they
needed or wanted versus presenting
project ideas to them to accept or reject.
OTI/KTI also appears to be the only
organization which insisted on a wide
reaching participatory community
process not only to identify projects, but
to contribute to their implementation and
supervise their completion.
Although transitional programming is
unique to the particular circumstances
and working relationships between
Mission components in a given country,
KTI provides some lessons learned which
might be applied to future programming.
The successes and failures of KTI have
certainly contributed to helping define the
role of transition programs in post￾conflict countries.
Transition Programming
OTI Mission/Flexibility
Flexibility in terms of KTI program
activities allowed for quick response to
changing political, security, and
community concerns in Kosovo. A
propensity to believe in the flexibility of
program objectives and strategy,
however, created confusion and
sometimes led to over-extension of staff
when political prerogatives flowed from
Washington and the international
community.
Flexibility was important because it
allowed KTI to answer community-based
priorities more readily and provided a
results-oriented time frame for funding.
This built trust with program participants
and goodwill with communities. In an
atmosphere of readily available donor
funding with mixed results it also
provided support for grant criteria
designed to encourage broad-based
community participation, such as the
inclusion of women and youth in the
decision-making process. Participants
responding to the sticks of the grant
criteria quickly recognized the carrots
resulting from their efforts.
Donor Coordination
Regional coordination with other donors
maximized community influence over
donor priorities and decisions regarding
projects. This “leveraging” of funds from
other donors allowed wider community
satisfaction and more productive
community-donor relations.
In the context of massive multinational
reconstruction and recovery efforts in
Kosovo, the importance of coordination
cannot be underestimated. KTI’s ability
to build relationships with local
communities proved to be a valuable
resource to the scope of international
actors as well as contributing to
maximizing the benefits for the citizens
of Kosovo.
Attitudinal & Behavior Change
Grant criteria requiring a diversity of
participation (including women and
youth) in the decision-making and
implementation process likely
contributed to changing attitudes and
behaviors in the community and opening
grassroots community participation to
these previously marginalized groups. As
a traditional, rural society, Kosovo was
not culturally biased towards broad-based
participation despite the development of
grassroots communities during the ten-
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 29 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
year period of Serb domination in the
province. The community improvement
councils provided a forum for KTI to
enforce its grant criteria for diversity in
decision making. The empowerment of
new leaders through this process helped
broaden the base for future participation
in community development.
Missing Pieces
Lack of a conflict resolution agenda
contributed to failures in minority
programming. Although clearly early in
the program conflict resolution was not
appropriate due to harsh post-conflict
conditions, later stages of the program
could have benefited by inclusion of this
agenda in a strategic plan.
Program Staffing
Selection of enthusiastic and professional
national and international staff was an
essential element in the success of the
community participation program.
Training must be made available to
national and international staff at
intervals throughout the evolution of the
program. Investment in staff resources
will contribute to a more effective
function of the program. For national
staff, training in basic areas of discussion
facilitation, office management, and even
software applications will allow them to
take a more active role in the program
earlier. For international staff, training in
grant management, strategic planning,
USAID regulations, and monitoring and
evaluation will increase their contribution
to the overall program development and
success.
Appropriate training modules or a
training plan for national and
international staff was never developed.
Hindsight provided opportunity for
training of national staff in the final
stages of the program, but earlier efforts
would have clearly benefited staff,
particularly national.
Although OTI has a pool of staff
designed to support ongoing operations
(the “bullpen”), it is unclear if the
resource is being properly utilized or
staffed. In order to properly support field
operations, OTI should have a pool of
technical experts to provide assistance to
ongoing or planned programs on a rapid
response basis. Areas of expertise might
include strategic planning, monitoring
and evaluation, media, democratization,
conflict resolution, and training.
Technical Support
It is clear that lack of technical expertise
in media, democratization, and other
areas hindered the KTI program. Properly
utilized technical expertise, particularly
in the area of media, would have saved
staff hours and contributed significantly
to the strategic planning and development
of the program. Furthermore, concrete
methods of taking advantage of existing
expertise present in USAID grantees
working in a country could also be
considered in the context of smooth
transition initiatives and maximizing
ongoing program impact.
In general, KTI’s unclear strategic plan or
program framework left the organization
unable to recognize its limitations. As a
result, staff members were engaged in
activities inappropriate to their skill level
or technical expertise due to their sheer
presence and experience working on the
ground in Kosovo.
Measuring Performance
No baseline study was conducted to
determine a context for democratic
development at the community level in
Kosovo. As a result, KTI lost an
opportunity to better define its program
strategy and address specific goals. In
addition, the lack of baseline data
Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo 30 Transitioning to Long-Term Development In Kosovo
provided no defined starting point for
KTI to measure the program’s potential
impact on the evolution of community￾level democratic development.
The grant management database provided
by OTI Washington was an important
tool for tracking program data.
KTI has no monitoring and evaluation
systems included in program plans or
infrastructure. This contributes to a lack
of follow up or clear analysis of impact
relating to KTI activities.
Misunderstanding among the KTI staff of
election activities led to a
characterization of a new program area –
“elections”. In fact, these activities were
carried out in relation to the existing
program components (community, media,
NGO). The framework of the elections
provided the context for KTI to
regionalize more effectively component
activities, particularly in the area of
media.
As an initial phase of program planning
and implementation, baseline frameworks
should be developed which will provide a
context for measuring and evaluating
program activities and impact. KTI
missed a valuable opportunity to measure
the influence of its program on
community participation by not having a
framework for monitoring developments.
In addition, these baseline frameworks
could be utilized in long-term Mission
planning and programming to provide
context for strategic planning and results
analysis.
Intra-Agency Coordination
Collaboration between OTI’s mission and
the development of the longer-term,
broader reaching USAID mission goals
was important to addressing the overall
objectives of the United States in
Kosovo. USAID’s early recognition of
the value of OTI personnel and
programming clearly facilitated the
transition process.
Open and ongoing dialogue relating to
KTI II maximized seamless hand over to
USAID.