1616 North Fort Myer Drive
Arlington, VA 20036
(703) 741-1000
Policy and Program Coordination Bureau
Center for Development, Information & Evaluation
Performance Measurement & Evaluation Division
Contract #: AEP-C-00-99-00034-00
Training for Good Governance &
Civil-Military Relations
Impact Assessment of the Office of Transition
Initiatives/Nigeria Program
John Mason, Ph.D., Team Lead
Bolaji M. Fapohunda, Ph.D.
Felicia Onibon, M.A.
April 11, 2000
1616 North Fort Myer Drive
Arlington, VA 20036
(703) 741-1000
Table of Contents
 page
Executive Summary iii
Abbreviations iv
Chapter 1: Introduction 1
Chapter 2: Training for Good Governance Program 4
Chapter 3: Civil-Military Affairs Program 10
Chapter 4: Program Results and OTI Reporting 17
Chapter 5: Conclusions, Lessons Learned and Recommendations 25
Annexes
1. Scope of Work
2. Methodology
3. Interview Guides (Coded for SOs and IRs)
4. Work Plan
5. Persons Contacted
6. References
2
Executive Summary
Purpose—Review and analyze the impact of the country transition program in Nigeria,
focusing on the Good Governance and Civil-Military Relations and report on results through the
OTI strategy. Dates of the assessment were 15 March-3 April 2000. Interviews took place in
Lagos, Abuja and Port Harcourt and in Niger, Nasarawa, Rivers, Bayelsa, and Lagos States.
Findings generally reflect respondents’ perceptions and do not purport to reflect structural
changes in the political system.
Findings
Good Governance—training stimulated an enabling environment of democratic governance for
the 10,300 elected officials trained and their constituents. The conflict resolution module was
especially appropriate in preparing leaders at all levels for conflict mediation and resolution.
Civil-Military Relations—The program helped stimulate a process to aid the transfer of
governance from military to civilian rule. It was the right application at the right time.
Program Results and OTI Reporting—The two programs have progressed significantly
towards the expected results. These results contribute to OTI’s goal of “Nigeria’s democratic
transformation advanced through rapid, pivotal, catalytic interventions.”
Lessons Learned
Good Governance—a) women’s inclusion in similar programs for political parity and equitable
knowledge and representation would have been productive and b) training in conflict resolution
paid high dividends in dealing with conflict in transition situations.
Civil-Military—a) visible results that directly reduce the potential for a return to military rule
have been pivotal in Nigeria’s democratic transition and b) a lack of funding by government to
continue the full return to civilian rule could prove troublesome.
Program Results & OTI Reporting—a) the availability of a country strategic plan was useful
and essential as a framework for this assessment, while b) absence of statements of expected
results required their identification in order to complete the assessment.
Recommendations
Good Governance—a) OTI should (for future reference) provide parallel training for women
leaders to sensitize them in democratic governance and b) provide additional training to all
elected officials in conflict resolution to deal with continuing conflict. Civil-Military—a) OTI’s
initial strategy should include an estimate of downstream funding so government can maintain
and continue improvement of projected achievements and b) ensure that its approach to training
and TA in civil-military relations is hands-on, people-oriented and done in partnership with a
professional training group.
3
Program Results and OTI Reporting—OTI should develop a performance monitoring plan,
so that it can monitor against expected results and targets.
4
Abbreviations
APP—All People’s Party
BHR—Bureau of Humanitarian Response
IR—Intermediate Result
LGA—Local Government Area
MOD—Ministry of Defense
MPRI—(none: a U.S.-based consulting firm with expertise in civil-military relations)
NA—National Assembly
NAF—Nigerian Armed Forces
NGO—Non-Governmental Organization
NUJ—Nigerian Union of Journalists
OTI—Office of Transition Initiatives
PMP—Performance Monitoring Plan
R4—Results Review/Resource Request
SO—Strategic Objective
TA—Technical Assistance
U.S.—United States of America
USAID—U.S. Agency for International Development
5
Chapter 1: Introduction
A. Background
Following more than fifteen years of military dictatorship, Nigeria has recently embarked on a
new experiment in democracy. In the period since the inauguration of the new president on
May 29, 1999, the transition to civilian government has triggered a series of political, economic,
and military reforms. These reforms are designed to restore national unity and provide a
democratic government for Nigerians.
Given its foreign policy interests in Nigeria, the U.S. sees a critical need to ensure that this
nascent democracy succeeds. As a pivotal part of a larger U.S. presence, USAID’s Office of
Transition Initiatives (OTI) has been positioned to mitigate factors that may threaten the stability
of Nigeria’s fragile democracy. OTI has placed specific emphasis on civil-military relations and
strengthening civil society activities.
B. Purpose
The stated purpose of this assessment is to review and analyze the impact of the country
transition programs in Nigeria, an OTI priority country along with Indonesia and Kosovo.
Similar assessments are being done in those two places. It is timed and designed to provide key
information for the Bureau of Humanitarian Response’s (BHR) results reporting document. The
assessment is also designed to provide relevant findings to managers on the effectiveness,
efficiency, and appropriateness of the programs reviewed. It also provides lessons learned and
recommendations for management, with both short to mid-term and longer-term perspectives in
mind. The assessment focuses on the Good Governance and Civil-Military Relations
components of OTI’s Nigeria program. (The Scope of Work for this assignment is located in
Annex 1.)
A complementary activity to the assessment included support in implementing and facilitating an
OTI workshop for its country staff on program monitoring and evaluation and grant
administration. This took place in Lagos April 6-8, 2000.
C. Methodology
Specific methods used in this assessment include the following: key informant interviews, focus
group interviews, site observations, and documentation review. (These are elaborated in a
more detailed methodology section located in Annex 2.)
6
Table: Methods Employed in OTI/Nigeria Program Assessment—by Level of Use
Method Employed Training for Good
Governance
Civil-Military
Relations
Key Informant Interview 11 8
Focus Groups Interview 7 1
Observation Site Visit 12 4
The assessment took place in-country during 15 March—3 April 2000. It included interviews,
site visits, and documentation reviews in Lagos, Abuja, Port Harcourt and several selected sites
in other urban and as well as rural areas. These sites were selected on the basis of a critical
mass of program participants being present, the presence of OTI offices as a central base for
the research activities, and the time frame of two weeks.
Random sampling could not be done because of time constraints. Therefore, we do not
presume to represent regional, cultural, religious, or political party points of view. Our findings
generally reflect respondents’ perceptions of the impact of the training, but we do not directly
attribute the success of the ongoing political transition to the training. Rather, the training served
to help leaders articulate knowledge and capabilities they already had.
For purposes of analysis of the Good Governance and Elected Officials activities presented in
Chapters 2 and 3, the following criteria are defined:
effectiveness—the extent to which an activity or project achieved its expected result,
efficiency—the degree to which it produced the expected result while minimizing
resources and financial cost; also the timeliness of the effort,
appropriateness—whether the activity fit the sociopolitical or economic environment, and
impact—degree of the effect of an activity in modifying a condition or behavior
D. Team Composition
The team consisted of the following individuals:
? a U.S. development professional specialized in monitoring and evaluation; democracy and
governance; and Sub-Saharan Africa,
? a Nigerian development sociologist specialized in research design and evaluation; gender;
and democracy and governance, and
? a Nigerian social scientist specialized in conflict mitigation; gender; and organization
management.
7
E. Organization of Report
Chapter 2 reviews and analyzes findings for the Training for Good Governance Program. It is
followed by Chapter 3, which does the same for the Civil-Military Relations Program. A
review of program results in the context of OTI/Nigeria’s strategic plan comprises Chapter 4. It
provides an assessment of progress towards these results in the context of the BHR’s R4
process. Chapter 5 includes overall conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations.
8
Chapter 2: Training for Good Governance Program
A. Introduction
During the past year, OTI in concert with the USAID Mission decided to train elected officials
in such areas as constituency building, transparency, structural reform and local capacity
building. Known as Training for Good Governance, this program included training for all
elected officials at national and state levels, namely all Governors, other State elected officials,
and National Assembly Members. It also covered more than half of all local elected officials.
The training, implemented by Nigerians who completed a training-of-trainers course provided
by OTI, was carried out during a six-week period in mid-1999. This time frame was prior to
the inauguration of the president and before the swearing-in of the newly elected officials. A
total of 10,300 Nigerian officials were trained in workshops held throughout the country.
In addition to the above purposes, Training for Good Governance covered additional topics
relevant to a government in transition to democracy. These topics included organizational
structures of government, leadership roles, effective management of government resources, and
the challenges of transparency and accountability. Tied to the training was a media strategy that
was designed to bring national attention to the activity and to encourage a broad dialogue on the
transition to democracy. From a management perspective, OTI’s implementation of the
Program was a test of its and its partners’ capacities for rapid responsiveness, timeliness, and
willingness to manage risk.
Key informant and focus group interviews of elected officials were carried out at three levels of
elective government: Federal, State and Local. The interviews were administered in Abuja (the
Federal capital) and in the states of Niger, Nasarawa, River, Bayelsa, and Lagos.
B. Findings
Overview—During the course of the interviews a number of key issues were identified among
officials at the three levels of elective government. The more critical the issues identified, the
more determined and challenged were the legislators to grapple with them.
Overall, the training was seen as a useful foundation, which has sustained elected officials’
commitment to democratic governance. Prior to the training many of the elected officials were
not sure of their roles and responsibilities. They had been elected to represent their people,
whom they assumed responsibility for, but some of them had very little knowledge of the
leadership style they should to adopt. The OTI/USAID training gave them the focus and
direction they needed.
9
State legislators attribute the peaceful co-existence and cooperation in their houses of assembly
to the good governance training. This is particularly interesting in Bayelsa and Rivers, where
legislators represent areas that define each other as “enemies,” though in fact they are working
together in the interest of the state.
Federal
Respondents included a senator in the National Assembly who chairs the senate
committee on police affairs and who had chaired the defense committee during his first six
months in office; a member of the house of representatives who is also leader of All People’s
Party (APP); and an expert working as the clerk of the senate committee on appropriation and
finance. Their level of understanding of the key issues was good. An
especially poignant example of understanding the balance of power among democratic
institutions was expressed by the House leader of the minority party, APP (see Box).
“Kaduna” and the Balance of Power among Democratic Institutions “The House debated
the ‘sharia’ riots [that had been responsible for the deaths of many citizens] in Kaduna State. The
discussions took place in a very deliberate, rational and constitutional manner. Once the House understood
its role in this context it became clear that the constitution placed the resolution of the Kaduna issue in the
hands of the Judiciary. Further discussion would not avoid the fact that this was a question for the
appropriate authorities, that is, the courts. The House did, however, call for public calm in the matter.”—
House All Peoples Party Leader, Federal House of Representatives
Leadership—Federal elected officials depicted the leadership style they adopted as open and
consultative. This style is new to leaders who have only known autocratic governance over the
last several decades. The training exposed them to ways of working closely with their
constituents in advocating the principles of justice, security and education. They felt that all
elected leaders must have full knowledge of how to practice the tenets of democracy.
Coalition Building—Officials felt that they gained significantly from the training in coalition
building. They indicated that building coalitions, negotiating, dialoguing, forming caucuses at
different levels are all attributes that make democracy thrive. Some officials said that they had
even begun to make strong links across party lines during the training, which they have
continued into the present.
Democratic Governance—The principles of democracy were already familiar to the officials.
But while they knew the principles, many had minimal knowledge of how to apply them in
practical terms to the political process.
The Officials were often eloquent on the subject of democracy, speaking of how it thrives in
environments of good accountability, transparency, and respect for the rule of law, maintenance
of state security and the respect for the fundamental human rights and free opinions of citizenry.
One of the participants narrated the story of a senator whose unpatriotic statements regarding
the transition was repudiated, as seen in the box below.
10
Senator Who Rejects Democracy, Roundly Repudiated! During an interview with the press
(Tell), Senator Waku was quoted as saying he would support the return of the military. This statement led
to rancor within and outside the National Assembly (NA). His colleagues in the NA repudiated him, almost
leading to his impeachment and his constituents disavowed his statements, saying their beliefs were just the
opposite. The dispute was resolved when he was forced to publicly apologize by withdrawing his
statement. While the reaction was not a direct outcome of the good governance training, it underscores
the precept of a robust civil society in action embodied in that training.
Federal elected officials defined democracy as the capacity to respond to constituents’ needs.
Representatives’ ability to respond to constituents’ requests on a timely basis usually determines
constituents’ perceptions of the representative. These officials have
had good relationships with their constituents because they are aware of their expectations and
respond to them accordingly. They defined the following four aspects, covered in the training
program, as critical to democracy: a) transparency and accountability; b) respect for the rule of
law; c) maintenance of state security; and d) respect for fundamental human rights.
A key area of democratic governance discussed with elected officials was conflict management.
Data showed considerable involvement is issues of civil strife. In response to acts of civil strife,
the Senate established several investigative committees. Use of dialogue, compromise and
listening skills for resolving these conflicts was effective. For example, there was a problem in
Bayelsa State; the military were sent to round up youths who were stirring up trouble, and they
started shooting at the people; the house committee on defense took up this issue:
We first castigated the youth for their disruptive behavior, we criticized the
military for its excessive use of force, and then held a legislative hearing in which
top military officials were asked to come to provide testimony about what
happened.
State
Interviews were conducted in Rivers and Bayelsa States, including three key informants and two
focus groups.
Leadership—Officials described the system of leadership commonly adopted by elected
officials as an open, consultative process that promotes participation, exchange of ideas,
networking and avoidance of unitary decisions.
Building Coalitions—Elected officials often hold informal meetings with other members of the
House across party lines. The general consensus was that they embrace the views and ideas of
others more easily because of the training. The process of dialoguing and networking was also
found as a means of building consensus. State officials found these useful in their work and
attribute them to the training.
Democratic Governance—Generally, these officials felt they had gained a new sense of doing
business in a democratic setting. They have adopted the principles of transparency and
11
accountability. One official said that the first step to success in a democracy is to operate a
transparent government. Others described the different ways in which they obtain feedback
from their constituents.
The legislators also said that they do not control funds but can influence what funds can be spent
on. They hold regular meetings with their constituents on their role as members in the house of
assembly. Additionally, respondents received training on how to relate with the executive. They
attributed their ability to resolve conflicts amicably and their new ways of identifying and
responding to the needs of their constituents to the training.
Responsiveness to Public Needs—State officials claim that they respond to their constituents’
needs effectively; however, they find that constituents who are members of the same party give
positive feedback while those of opposing parties often criticize. As elected officials, they feel
they were given mandates of trust and confidence, and that they are working hard not to erode
that trust.
Local
Interviews were carried out in five local government areas, including Suleja, Tafa, Gurara in
Niger State, Akwanga in Nasarawa State and Port-Harcourt in Rivers State). Local officials’
understanding of the questions diminished as we moved from urban centers to rural areas. We
were able, however, to capture a realistic picture of the democratic process in the rural area.
Key informants were mainly chairmen of local government areas and in the case of Port
Harcourt a councilor who was once a youth leader was interviewed.
Leadership—Local officials indicated that their leadership style is transparent, open, and
participatory. Some reported that they use dialogue in addition to an evaluative approach that
enables them to seek the opinion of constituents, receive consent for projects and assess
whether the appropriate actions are being taken. 
Building Coalition—Many of the elected local officials said that they started coalition building
as early as during the training itself. Informal interactions with other participants in the training
helped to promote a cross breeding of ideas that continued after the training. They all indicated
the use of dialogue, flexibility, making sacrifices and compromise in building coalitions. This has
helped them in relating effectively to their constituents and colleagues outside their jurisdiction.
Democratic Governance—Local officials agreed that the regular meetings they now hold with
their colleagues and constituents give them the opportunity to interact effectively, identify the
needs of their constituents, report back on progress made, and generate new ideas.
Most were satisfied with the knowledge they had acquired from the training on passing and
formulating bills, though they have had all too little chance to practice their skills. Through their
interactive skills, however, they have tried to correct this, by meeting with members of their
12
State assembly and representatives at the Federal level sometimes through their local
government chairman. This then acts as an information conduit from the Ward to the State and
Federal levels.
Responsiveness to Needs—A large number of these officials said their constituents were
appreciative of their work. This is the first time the electorate had voted for local councilors.
Participation and dialogue has helped build relationships that had never existed at that level of
governance. They attribute these successes to the training. One official said that his constituents
were encouraging him to campaign for the House in the National Assembly in the next election
and they promised him their votes. Most of the respondents have received praise from their
constituents in recognition and appreciation of the jobs they are doing.
Conflict Management— Training of local government officials included a module on conflict
management. Local officials reported that they have engaged in resolving many conflicts since
they assumed office. Conflict resolution has been practiced much more in the Niger/Delta area,
where youth restiveness, communal crisis, land disputes and industrial crises between oil
industries, workers and the community thrive. They found the conflict management training
useful. Most of the respondents set up conflict resolution committees to help resolve issues of
civil strife in their constituencies.
Many local officials mentioned the “sharia” crisis in Kaduna and its effect on their areas. The
northern officials had taken quick action to avert similar uprisings among their constituents. They
held meetings with religious, youth and community leaders, discussing with them the dangerous
effects of such uprisings. Poverty, unemployment, marginalization of some areas in infrastructure
development, ignorance and lack of quality education were mentioned as significant causes of
these conflicts.
C. Analysis
In assessing the above findings, four evaluation criteria are applied. These criteria are used in
assessing the good-governance training program in the context of the leadership contents,
coalition building, democratic governance, responsiveness to needs, conflict management and
civilian-military relations. These four criteria are effectiveness, efficiency, appropriateness and
impact.
Effectiveness
The good governance program organized by OTI is recognized by elected officials as important
for them in their participation in the transition. The training has given these officials good
leadership direction that enables them to work in a participatory and responsive manner.
13
Efficiency
The content of the good governance training was well articulated. It is reflected in the
seriousness that officials gave to this assessment. These officials expressed appreciation for the
timeliness of the training in the context of the rapid political transition. They were encouraged
that this assessment was taking place at this time, as it will encourage them to reappraise their
work and become more efficient in applying the principles of the training. Some officials
wondered what would have happened if they had not received the training. They were
impressed with the efforts of the training team, especially in transmitting so much information in
such a short time.
The timing of the workshop was considered just right: it occurred just prior to the new
president’s inauguration and to the swearing in of the newly elected officials.
Appropriateness
The fact that people had been exposed to autocratic leadership for almost two decades
complicated the transition to democracy in Nigeria. Therefore, the OTI training gave direction
for participating in the transition. Many indicated that they have adopted an open door
leadership approach that encourages dialogue, community participation, and creating an
enabling environment for good democratic governance.
The incessant civil strife seems to be more manageable as a result of the conflict resolution
portion of the training. Elected officials are now able to mediate a dispute from
an informed, balanced point of view. The result is less likelihood of a dispute leading to a
breakdown of law and order.
Impact
The OTI training program contributed to the following: an open leadership approach; a
participatory mode; efforts towards being transparent, accountable and responsive to the needs
of the electorate; communal efforts towards infrastructure development; the successful resolution
of conflicts; and the military acceptance of their new role.
The absence of women participants in this program, a reflection of their low participation in the
political process generally, diminishes the full impact of the training.
14
Chapter 3: Civil-Military Relations Program
A. Introduction
Strengthening the civil-military relationship was a focal area of USAID/OTI’s program
given its critical importance to Nigeria’s transition to democratic governance. Potentially military
spoilers could have had a devastating impact on the transition. Therefore, it was critical for OTI
to improve civilian oversight of the military as well as relations between civilians and military.
Overall, the purpose of OTI support is to build relationships among civilians and military in
order to develop an action plan for the reprofessionalization of the Nigerian Armed Forces.
OTI’s effort aims to create the initial steps of the process, then to transfer the effort as
seamlessly as possible to the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD).
A series of interventions were designed to assert civilian control of the military and to
reprofessionalize the Nigerian Armed Forces. These interventions include several parts,
simplified as follows:
(a) executive leader seminars offered in the north and south of the country, and
including the senior leader seminar, ‘Civil-Military Professionalism in a Democracy,’
(b) strengthening the oversight by the National Assembly of the Ministry of Defense and
military, and
(c) an action plan to reorient civil-military institutions in Nigeria’s new democracy,
The main focus of the assessment is (a) above, the executive leader seminars, held in September
1999 and January 2000. It is noted that the portion of the OTI civil-military program assessed
is only a piece of the series of civil-military activities. Other activities include a seminar for
National Assembly members in the house and senate to strengthen legislative knowledge of the
MOD and to help members improve their understanding of oversight of military expenditures.
A study visit by National Assembly Defense Committee took place at the end of March, 2000.
Key informant interviews were carried out with two senior MOD officials and one senior
military official in Abuja, with the Deputy Chairman of the National Assembly House Committee
on Defense, and the executive director of the Nigerian Union of Journalists (NUJ), also in
Abuja. In Lagos, similar interviews were held with three non-governmental organization (NGO)
representatives who had either participated in or were familiar with the senior leadership training
seminar. One focus group interview with civilian staff from the MOD was held in Abuja. Site
visits were made to four offices, including the MOD, National Assembly, NUJ offices, and an
NGO office in Lagos.
While just under half of the participants in the seminars were military, they are poorly
represented in our sample. This is a result of a military training visit that many of the trainees
were taking at the time of the assessment.
15
B. Findings
Overview—Site visits and interviews pointed to initial steps towards improvement in civil￾military relations. The senior leader seminar and the interactions of civilian and military leaders
with the implementer, MPRI, a U.S.-based consulting firm with technical expertise in civil￾military issues, have contributed to the process of redressing the civilian side of the civil-military
equation. Civil-military relations that had deteriorated so severely are now a topic of an open,
public dialogue. As a result of the assistance, several recommendations of the joint Nigerian￾MPRI action plan will be implemented by
the Nigerian and U.S. governments.
One indicator of the perceived success of the transition is the language used by civilians and
military to depict the newly unfolding relationship. Oversight of the military by both executive
and legislative branches is now common parlance in the MOD and the Legislature. Civilian
officials and military alike speak of a reprofessionalization of the Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF)
that is underway. Most interviewed, however, say that this process is moving at a modest pace,
given the availability of resources and the poor condition of NAF infrastructure (both physical
and human). The latter was wrought by decades of neglect and exploitation by a succession of
military dictators.
Civilian Oversight of the Military—Most interviewees suggested that the transition to civilian
oversight was on track, that appropriate actions were being taken to ensure the success of the
transition, and they remained optimistic that in the end Nigeria would succeed. However, these
same interviewees, from MOD, National Assembly, and other groups retained a guarded
optimism about the full transition to civilian rule, given the culture of military autocracy that
prevailed for several decades.
One stark exception to this skepticism derived from an interview with a leader in the National
Assembly, who suggested that the transition is complete, and that the military knows its role,
which is to protect the sovereign territory of the nation. Furthermore, as he noted, there is little
possibility of breaching the new norm of the professional, apolitical, soldier. In his words, “no
soldier is so stupid as to organize a coup…except one who wants to commit suicide…All
service chiefs appointed by [President] Obasanjo are professional soldiers and loyal; they are
not interested in politics.”
The most powerful tool for civilian authorities’ recapture of its proper role of oversight of the
military, according to our interviews, is the Constitution itself. It speaks to the question of
military adherence to the ‘rule of law’ and the specifically non-civilian role of the NAF. Military
adherence to civilian rule is gradually becoming a part of conscious public policy, such that the
public is beginning to take for granted the reversal of military domination of civilian government.
An MOD official thought that civilians have to “assert their authority, to develop the perception
that the military are not the only ones who can restore law and order.” Yet another indication of
the transition was that President Obasanjo retired many of the high level military officials whom
16
he believed may cause problems for democratic rule. While not a direct outcome of the
assistance, it is useful to mention that promotion of general officers is now done on the basis of
merit, not regional or other types of favoritism.
There are four structures that contribute to enhancing the transition. The first and second have
been in place for some time, long before the transition began, while the third and fourth are
directly attributable to the civil-military training. First was the establishment of the Center for
Peace and Conflict Resolution, a training resource directed at senior and mid-level military
officers and government civilian officials alike. A second was the establishment of the Nigerian
Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies, aimed at the same audience, and intended to sensitize
its clientele to the government official’s rightful role and duty of oversight, and the military
officer’s duty to obey civilian authority.
Placement of military personnel in MOD civilian-led departments, where they are deployed as
subordinates to civilian directors, and where they advise civilians on the basis of their specific,
technical knowledge, is yet a third action. That action was a direct result of the MPRI
assistance rendered through OTI. A sign of increased civilian and military interaction, according
to a focus group, is regular senior civilian and military
meetings. During these meetings the Service Chiefs, other high-ranking military officers and
Ministers and other high civilian officials discuss issues facing the civilian government and each of
the military services. These officials then report back to their offices to brief their colleagues.
The fourth and last action to support the transition is the establishment of a formal liaison
between the MOD and the National Assembly. This liaison includes MOD offices at the
Assembly, as well as regular interactions between both military and civilian officials with
members of the Assembly.
A further activity we learned about was a tour made by the Assembly House Committee of
Defense of military bases around the country. It was organized by the MOD to familiarize
legislators with the condition of the NAF, to expose them to problems of the military firsthand,
and promote the legislator-military relationship through increased understanding.
Budgetary Oversight—A broad action cited by many respondents in the National Assembly’s
oversight of the military appropriation and expenditures. The MOD according, to one
interview, has the largest share of the national budget. A legislator interviewed said he thought
there was enough funding “to ensure a comfortable living for the military, provide new
equipment, refurbish old equipment, and pay for the training to make them proficient to do their
job.” Because the military budget has been susceptible to manipulation in previous
administrations (involving not just military but also civilian officials), oversight is all the more
important. MOD officials took a somewhat different stance, stressing the under-funding of what
the Ministry sees as necessary to re-professionalize the NAF. These differences would seem to
reflect the usual tensions between the executive and legislative branches in a typical democratic
setting.
17
The training covered the need for legislative oversight of the military budgets. It is a U.S.
legislative mandatory audit requirement, according to which the Government of Nigeria must
comply with the ‘Transparency of Budgets (Military Expenditures) Law.’ The assessment
suggests that the MOD is more attuned to meeting this requirement.
Quality of the Civil-Military Relationship—Civilian staff of the MOD, in a focus group,
suggested a broad array of qualities of the civil-military relationship, including mutual respect,
esprit de corps, and full knowledge of each other’s positions. Quite different perspectives
characterized senior MOD staff and senior legislators regarding the quality of the relationship.
An MOD senior official stressed the mutual confidence aspect, the need to avoid stereotypes of
one another, and faith in each other’s potentials. A senior legislator on the House Defense
Committee focused on the civilian branch of government reinforcing the military to a point of
readiness, through training and updating of equipment. Since, as the legislator indicated, the
military had been “sanitized” of its political military officers, he believes the focus should be its
material well being.
Since the military is no longer seen as an avenue to political office and wealth, the relationship
between civil and military has a much better chance of “normalizing,” according to interviews.
One sign of gradual improvement is the unacceptability of harassment of the public by the
military. Another, slightly more mundane example is that soldiers must now pay for the bus, in
contrast to the “free ride” of the past. A constraint mentioned by many respondents is that in its
transitional state, the military is presently not of appeal to young men because it does not
promise a “gold paved street.” Further, and perhaps more basic, because the ordinary “mess
life” of officers and troops was degraded so much under previous military dictators, many of the
basic comforts of military life are lacking. Both MOD senior staff and legislators agreed that
improving these basic elements of military service life is critical.
On the Perception of the Likelihood of a Military Coup—As a general indicator of progress
in the enhancement of civil-military relations in Nigeria, we asked if there was a fear of a military
coup. A senior MOD official’s response is instructive:
I fear it in one sense, even though we see it as an abnormality. But in remembering the past, any
African should dread a military coup; it is still too short a transition period to so quickly forget
the past. I also believe that if there were a coup, members of the civil society will put up a stiff
resistance, even at the mere fact of hearing any such news.
Several respondents were clear in their perceptions of how they thought the public would react
to a coup. This response was shared in interviews with both civil-military and elected officials.
In general, they said the public in general would simply not tolerate a return of the military to any
role in the governance of Nigerian society. A final quote, from the same MOD senior official
captures the sentiments of many concerning the relationship between civilians and military in
Nigeria today: “Now, the military is to be driven by goals that are selfless, nationalistic, versus
those of the past, which were selfish and opportunistic.”
18
Program Implementation Issues—This assessment did not emphasize the implementation of
the civilian-military relations program per se. Nevertheless it is instructive to relate some
findings that may be useful for future design and implementation purposes.
MOD and the OTI implementing partner, MPRI, worked closely in conceptualizing the
transition process from military to civilian rule. Overall the participants were highly impressed
with the caliber of the very senior and other retired U.S. military officers who conducted the
senior leadership seminar. That said, it is less clear that military personnel had much direct input
to the design of the curriculum of that seminar, ‘Civil-Military Professionalism in a Democracy.’
Senior civilian and military officials indicated that participants in the Abuja session of the seminar
sensed the presentation was a bit one-sided, that it did not reflect the Nigerian side of the
equation. This criticism was based on the perception of an absence of direct Nigerian input to
the preparation and presentation of the seminar. Also, because the cost of the seminar was
shared by the U.S. and
Nigerian partners, the latter felt they should have participated in designing the seminar.
Seminar participants also had communicated that the model of a military rooted fully in the
western tradition should have been balanced by input from the “non-western, developing
country” context of the participants themselves. Granted, one of the intended outcomes of the
seminar was to replace the Nigerian military model of rule with a model rooted in civil society
and rule of law, they still felt that the Nigerian connection was missing.
A related issue is the style of implementation of the leadership seminar. Many participants
reportedly said the seminar was “one-sided,” that is, too western in its tone. Second, they
perceived it as “top-down” in its structure, reflecting a style of presentation perceived as “overly
military” in its orientation. At the same time, the seminar was characterized as participatory in
that discussion was encouraged. The training-of-trainers and their use in the seminar was
suggested as a way of relieving some of the frustration. But while the first part of the seminar,
the “presentation” portion, was seen to be “didactic,” opportunity was provided in the second
part for a more participatory style, including a small group exercise. Participants, however, saw
that exercise as too short.
The Lagos session of the seminar was seen in a different light. A civilian with no military
background who participated in that session heard very favorable comments from the military
participants. While many of these officers had already been exposed to the western model of
civilian-military relations through study abroad, they were pleased with the training. They
thought it would “enhance their careers” by informing them of how to operate in the new
environment. And they indicated that they hoped the application of the training might contribute
to creating a positive environment for the military.
Finally, senior civilian and military officials of MOD were clear that MPRI inputs were very
important to the process of improved civil-military relations, since there was “probably no
source in Nigeria that was likely to come up with the concept for the seminar.”
19
C. Analysis
The same four criteria are used for assessing the above findings as were employed for the good
governance program.
Effectiveness
The Civil-Military Relations program has played a part in stimulating a process conducive to the
transfer of governance from military to civilian rule. It was clearly the right solution, at the right
time, to the problems posed by a series of autocratic military regimes and a civilian military
cadre inexperienced in dealing with a subordinate military. Results associated with the program
directly aim to reduce the potential for a repeat of the past military record. NAF Centers’
curricula in professionalizing and sensitizing the military to civilian rule, the civil-military liaison
with the Legislature, and military staff support of civilian offices of MOD are associated with
OTI support. Budgetary oversight by the Legislature of military allocations and expenditures is
another associated result.
Overall the program imprints are still present, although it is not clear if the program itself will
have adequate funding from the MOD beyond the first year of implementation. So, while a
commitment is there on the part of the Ministry, it is unclear how it will be able to sustain the
program. The completion of the transition from military to civilian rule is incomplete and still
somewhat tentative. Therefore, it is imperative for the Government of Nigeria and MOD to
continue to pay particular attention to moving the transition along.
Efficiency
The approach to civil-military relations was adequate to fulfill its intended purposes. The
training provided by MPRI represented a reasonable balance of hands-on, people-oriented
activities with the technical assistance (TA) given to the MOD and NAF. Given the stature of
the individuals provided by MPRI and the sophistication of the technical inputs to the training
and TA, we are hard put to see the activity being done at less cost. Many of the persons
interviewed felt the seminar should be delivered more broadly among the ranks of military and
civilian staff, and even to the public. Nevertheless, the OTI package fit the more urgent purpose
of triggering an interest and commitment by senior civilian and military officials to address such a
critical issue as the possibility of repeating a return from civilian to military rule.
Appropriateness
The seminar presentations and technical assistance were generally appropriate to the activity
purpose. The role of very senior retired U.S. military officers, the study of legislative oversight
of the military budget, preparation of an action plan, and the leadership seminars were fitting in
meeting OTI’s aims.
20
In light of statements cited earlier by senior MOD officials, it seems that the style of presentation
in the senior leadership seminar was perhaps a bit too formal, and also a notch too westernized.
At least the participants did not feel totally comfortable with the overall approach to the subject
at hand. They also thought that the seminar should have been longer, especially the small group
exercises.
Impact
Given OTI’s mandate to deal with transitions through “rapid, pivotal, and catalytic
interventions,” according to its mission statement for Nigeria, the program has achieved its goal.
It has set the framework for a continued dialogue among civilian-military officials and for actions
to put the words into practice. Furthermore, several important structures and processes are in
place and Federal elected and appointed officials seem committed to the need to continue the
effort. Only then will it be sustainable.
Program impact is probably the most elusive characteristic to trace. Nevertheless, footprints of
the activity are clearly visible. Civilian and military officials, with a few exceptions, are speaking
the appropriate language to reflect their concerns about the tentativeness of the transition. They
are wary about the possibility of a return to military rule. This concern is probably a good sign
in some respects, if it makes them ever more vigilant to the need to attend to the quality of this
relationship.
In addition, the handoff by OTI of the action plan to the U.S. Department of Defense has gone
very smoothly. This is evidenced by the visit, towards the end of the assessment, on April 1, of
U.S. Secretary of Defense Cohen to Abuja. There, he signed an agreement to assist the NAF
in its reprofessionalization and thus to sustain the initial efforts of OTI.
21
Chapter 4: Program Results and OTI Reporting
A. Introduction
This chapter assesses each of the USAID/OTI strategic objectives (SO) and intermediate
results (IR) and presents results on progress made toward the fulfillment of the SOs and IRs. It
relies on the USAID/Nigeria strategy and the OTI revised country strategic plan as its
framework. It also reflects the R4 (results review/resource request) process used by the
Agency for measuring results and allocating funds. The OTI/Nigeria strategic plan articulates
with USAID/Nigeria's strategic objective (SO) number 1, which is:
? Sustain transition to democratic civilian government.
A second point of articulation between the two strategies falls under this same SO1, at the level
of USAID/Nigeria’s intermediate result IR 1.3:
? Destabilizing forces mitigated
OTI’s strategy, while clearly interfacing with the Mission strategy, differs in that its interventions
in the Nigeria context are defined as "rapid, pivotal, and catalytic." While OTI's strategy is by
definition and mandate only short-term, its results are surely intended to contribute to long-term,
developmental results, a mandate of the Mission. OTI's revised country strategic plan
(September 1999) itself has three SOs, which are:
? SO1: Democratic processes used to achieve tangible results on key transition issues
? SO2: Improved responsiveness of key decision-makers and institutions
? SO3: Reduced capacity of potential destabilizing forces from derailing Nigeria's
peaceful democratic transformation
Underlying these SOs are three, selected IRs that reflect the Good Governance and Civil￾Military activities and which are used to frame this assessment. These are:
? IR1.2 Democratic institutions’ capacity for representing constituents’
interests/concerns enhanced
? IR1.2.1 State/local government representatives capacity for reaching out to
constituents improved
? IR2.1 Decision-makers capacity to address constituents’ priority issues
strengthened
? IR2.1 Military re-professionalized …
While each of these IRs had associated indicators, we will not try to measure against each one
of those indicators in this assessment. The reasons for this stance are that, one, insufficient time
22
has evolved for at least one of the programs to show definitive results and, two, even were there
such results, the type of assessment called for in the Scope of Work makes collection of such
detailed data impracticable. Nevertheless, we endeavor to obtain a clear sense of how well the
program is faring against the above four IRs.
B. Results Achieved under OTI’s Strategic Plan in Democratic Governance and
Civil-Military Relations
In order to have some criteria to “measure” against, the team developed a matrix (see following
page) of expected results, actual results and potential constraints. The rationale for the matrix is
that, while the OTI strategic plan is explicit in its statements of the SOs and IRs, and as well
includes indicators, it does not present a statement of expected results. That exercise awaits the
preparation of a performance monitoring plan. However, to do our job of assessing results
under the OTI plan, we felt the need first to try to articulate these results. We have done so in
language that is general, non-technical and, we trust, more easily understandable. With this
matrix in hand, we begin with a review of the first SO and its two IRs.
SO1: Democratic processes used to achieve tangible results on key transition issues
Progress toward achievement of SO1 is indicated by perceptions that people are expecting
more of their elected representatives and appointed officials (Federal, State, and Local).
Interview data reveal that the actual result achieved is as follows:
SO1 Actual Result: people are successfully using the mechanism of government
in meeting their needs and are demanding that their representatives be
accountable and transparent.
Our interviews suggest that people go to their leaders when they have problems or need their
assistance. Examples where assistance has been rendered are: cases of wrongful dismissal from
employment; resolution of conflict, including land disputes; assistance in combating outbreaks of
disease; and provision of health clinics, among others.
Additionally, according to respondents, leaders obtain voters’ views on key legislative issues
and incorporate those views in the deliberations at the local, state, and federal government
levels. Elected officials are more responsive to discussing the priorities of their people and
allocating resources to meet them as indicated in the following quotes:
In the past, they [the electorates] could not get close to the government and had little contact
with the people. Now we are more open, and people are feeling the impact of the government.
They see the improvements with their own eyes … Now people knock on your door to ask for
help.
23
Constituents now channel their concerns to the executive through the representatives. They do
not go directly to the government official (civil servants) since nothing would happen …In this
way, constituents have come to understand the concept of representation.
24
TABLE: PROGRESS TOWARDS THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE USAID/OTI STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE
RESULTS
SOs/IRs Expected Result Actual Result Constraints/What’s
Missing
SO1: Democratic
processes used to
achieve tangible results
on key transition issues
Perceptions that people are
expecting more of their elected
representatives and appointed
officials (Fed, State, Local)
People are successfully
using the mechanisms of
government in meeting
their needs
People have to know how to
access the system
IR1.2 Democratic
institutions’ capacity
for representing
constituents’
interests/concerns
enhanced
Democratic Governance
Civil society participation
Deliberative Capacity
Conflict Resolution
Coalition Building
Compromise
The elements of good
government are seen by
most people to be in place
People may not see the
necessity of how to actively
use the mechanisms of
government to meet their
needs
IR1.2.1 State/local
government
representatives capacity
for reaching out to
constituents improved
Leadership
Outreach (interaction)
Dissemination(informing;
educating)
Elected and appointed
officials seen to be
responsive to the
electorate
Political infrastructure may
be inadequate to provide
effective representation
SO2: Improved
responsiveness of key
decision-makers and
institutions
Perceptions that elected
representatives and appointed
officials are more responsive to
public expectations
Elected and appointed
officials feel that they are
adequately representing
the electorate
Party politics, ethnic￾religious, and regional
divisions could cause
gridlock in governance
IR 2.1 Decision-makers
capacity to address
constituents’ priority
issues strengthened
Leadership
(Rule of law)
Communication
Issues addressed in legislation
Elected and appointed
officials feel that they are
responding to critical
issues affecting their
constituencies
Poor mechanisms for
processing the political will
of the people
SO3: Reduced capacity
of potential
destabilizing forces from
derailing Nigeria's
peaceful democratic
transformation
Perception that the transition
from military to civilian rule can
result in a stable society
People perceive that a
stable society is
achievable
Potential for a military
intervention and a return to
autocratic rule
IR 3.2 Military re￾professionalized…
Transition from Military to
Civilian Rule
Civilian oversight of the
military
Budgetary oversight
Quality of civil military
relationship
Structures in place to facilitate
civil--mil relations and
professionalization
People perceive that
conflict can be resolved
peacefully
Perception that people will
resist destabilizing forces,
including strong
resistance to any
possibility of a military
coup
Fear the existing structures
are not adequately
protective of the civil order
(evidence of youths killing
policemen and vice versa)
Potential for destabilizing
forces to overcome the will
of the people to resist
25
IR1.2 Democratic institutions’ capacity for representing constituents’
 interests/concerns enhanced
Interviews and focus groups conducted among elected and appointed officials indicate
that elements of good governance are in place. Officials feel that they owe their electorate
explanations for their actions or the lack of action. In contrast to the practice of previous
regimes, transparency and accountability are important elements of the current administration.
Our data reveals the following for this IR:
IR1.2 Actual Result The training in good governance enhanced the elected and
appointed officials’ capacity to demonstrate a democratic style of governance
(involving openness, participation, shared ideas, networking and brainstorming).
The analysis also reveals the potential for dialogue, coalition building and compromise, indicating
that the desire of the people to participate in governance is being met. That desire has been
pivotal in the transition from military to civilian rule. The data show that most officials engage in
dialogue with their colleagues in resolving issues of national interest. This approach represents a
break from the past, which was characterized by exclusion of minority interests and the pursuit
of selfish agendas. The good governance training is assessed to have contributed to the
development of the new perspective. A National Assembly member interviewed in Abuja
reflects views in the following quote:
…there are certain cardinal prerequisites that need to be known. New comers didn’t know what
to expect, i.e., the processes, the steps of how to process a bill, the steps to dealing with a bill in
all detail, e.g. appropriation bills that come from the executive…the training was very important
to our understanding of the concepts.
Some of the advantages of dialogue include the opportunity to see other peoples’ point of
view and by so doing, encourage tolerance and participation; discover the fundamentals of
democracy (justice, security and education); collaborate for the attainment of diverse objectives;
and promote rapport and compromise between and among the executive and the legislative
arms of government.
Another indicator of institutional capacity to achieve democratic objectives is the approach to
conflict resolution. Common conflicts include youth unrest, land disputes, and discord over
political affiliation. Most participants said that they have mediated in many conflicts and that
their involvement has prevented those conflicts from degenerating into a major breakdown of
law and order in the area.
IR1.2.1 State/local government representatives capacity for reaching out to
 constituents improved
Most elected and appointed officials were found to make the effort to reach out to the
electorate through visits and regular meetings, including the ones organized by the communities.
26
When asked how many times they have met with their constituencies over the last six months,
almost all our key informants said they have visited their local areas more than six times. Similar
answers were obtained from the focus group participants.
IR1.2.1 Actual Result: Elected and appointed officials are responsive to the
electorate.
Local government officials, as expected, visit their constituencies more regularly than State and
Federal Government officials. These meetings and outreach programs granted constituents
unlimited access to their leaders, and, are catalytic in helping elected officials identify the key
issues affecting the electorate. Some of the issues identified by the participants, beyond water
and electricity, include local government creation, conflict management, and youth
unemployment, youth unrest and the poor definition of the role of the traditional council in a
presidential system. The knowledge of the voters’ key concerns and needs is evidence of the
potential for good leadership, that is the capacity to reflect the views, opinions, interests, needs
of their constituencies in debates and discussions regarding bills and projects.
The consensus is that the workshop was critical in the officials’ ability to respond to the needs of
their electorate. One participant stated:
Before now, I thought that once you got elected, you wait for people to come to you with their
problems or views. After the training, I realized that it is important to go the people, visit them in
their homes, and reach out to them with information on latest issues being addressed. Hearing their
problems equips you for action.
Most of the elected officials have used the opportunity of their visits to their local communities to
educate their electorate on the principles of good governance. Such education has promoted
voters’ recognition of their rights and ability to participate fully within the system.
The inadequacy of political infrastructure to provide effective representation, involving the
capacity for effective communication and feedback, is a constraint. Many rural areas lack good
access roads. Most are not on the telephone grid. The telephone does not work in most areas
that are on the grid, including urban centers such as Lagos, which coincidentally is a major
industrial area. Only a tiny segment of the population has access to the Internet, mainly the elite
in urban areas. Even if they were willing to use this forum to network with their electorate, most
the officials do not know how to use the Internet. These limitations affect local government
capacity to represent the electorate.
SO 2: Improved responsiveness of key decision-makers and institutions
Study data reveal that elected and appointed officials feel they are adequately representing their
constituents.
SO2 Actual Result: Perceptions are that elected representatives and appointed
27
officials are responsive to public expectations.
Although the electorate was not included in our sample, which made it difficult to validate most
of the claims made by the elected officials, most participants said that their
constituents like the work they are doing.
IR2.1: Decision makers capacity to address constituents’ priority issues
Progress toward this intermediate result is reflected by the leadership styles adopted by the
officials, communication with constituents, and key issues addressed in legislation.
IR2.1 Actual Result: The leadership style of elected officials is participatory,
marked by openness, transparency, accountability, and respect for the rule of law.
This contrasts with the autocratic system of the past where people had no choice. As one
participant said,
Our leadership is so open to people, we speak with them freely, we go to them, and they come to
us. In the past, people had no choice of who ran government.
There is ample evidence of communication among and between the officials and between the
officials and the electorate. The officials meet with the public, organize outreach activities and
other campaigns. In one constituency in Nasarawa State, such campaigns were used to
mobilize communities for self help projects. In this locality, participants helped in completing the
community health clinic. The local government officials indicated that self-help projects
represent a new skill they had taught to their constituents. In the past, people waited for the
government to do everything for them. This attitude is currently being transformed,
demonstrating the decision makers ability to deal with constituents’ priority issues.
Evidence that sufficient communication exists is indicated by the officials’ knowledge of the key
issues affecting the electorate. Some of those concerns include lack of basic infrastructure
(water, electricity, and roads), environmental degradation, desertification, ethno-religious
skirmishes, youth unrest, land disputes, host community-corporate relations, and allocation of
funds to the community. Community-corporate relations are a predominant problem, triggering
other major conflicts in the oil producing regions in the country. Several bills that deal with these
problems have been passed. One State House of Assembly said it has passed five-six bills
dealing with local community issues. Another said that it has passed four bills and twelve new
ones have been proposed.
A key constraint to the achievement of IR 2.1 is party politics, ethnic-religious, and regional
divisions. For instance, party politics almost caused a major riot in one of the Local
Government Areas (LGA) of Nasarawa State. One family who lost the last election had
initiated the crisis in order to get back at the family who won. Both families had contested on
28
separate political party lines. Evidence of ethno-religious riots abound in the country, including
the famous Kaduna riots which claimed many lives, the Ife-Modakeke riots which is yet to be
resolved, and youth crises in the oil producing states. Examples of the latter abound in Bayelsa,
Delta, and River States. These riots, if not properly managed could derail the young
democracy. Our assessment points to achievement of this IR, as follows:
Another constraint is a lack in the clarity of provisions of enforcing oversight of the executive by
the legislature. Although one State House of Assembly participant indicated that his colleagues
are able to enforce transparency and accountability on both themselves and the executive arm,
the absence of constitutional backing for legislative oversight of the executive means that the
balance of power between the two cannot be guaranteed. The lack of a legislative bill defining
the structure and functions of the local council, which reflects a lack of clarity in the
Constitutional provision for local governance, cripples performance at the local level.
Consequently, the LGAs have evolved different systems, including “Chairman in Council”
system (Port Harcourt LGA), the presidential system (Akwanga LGA); other LGAs adopt the
parliamentary approach. The application of a non-uniform method of governance across the
country can cause a tremendous amount of confusion and reflect immaturity of the system. The
lack of a State bill authorizing local government structure and functions is named as the major
reason officials in one of the LGAs have not implemented lessons learned from the good
governance training.
SO 3.0 Reduced capacity of potential destabilizing forces from derailing Nigeria’s
peaceful democratic transformation
Progress towards the attainment of SO 3.0 is articulated in people’s perception that the
transition to civilian rule can work. Consistent with this objective, most of the interviewees felt
that a stable society is achievable.
SO 3.0 Actual Result People perceive that a stable society is achievable
Given that the military has been a key destabilizing influence in previous civilian administrations,
a few steps have been taken to improve civil-military relations, engender military acceptance of
civilian oversight and reprofessionalize the NAF. These include the establishment of the Center
for peace and conflict resolution; Institute for policy strategic studies; and the Liaison office
between MOD and the National Assembly. Other steps include the placement of military staff
in civilian departments and the tour of military institutions by the Defence committee of the
National Assembly. Insights provided by the latter enabled the National Assembly to better
articulate the fears and concerns of NAF. These fears and concerns, involving the perception
that a civilian government cannot adequately represent military constituents, were key to the
military incursions of the past.
29
Overall, civilian-military relationships have improved within the short life of democratic
governance; civilians are reaching out to the military and vice versa. Participants felt that there
is need to formulate strategies that will enhance military acceptance of civilian oversight of the
NAF. The key constraint is that the persistence of ethno-religions and regional divisions
provide recipes for military coup.
IR 3.2 Military reprofesionalized
Movement toward IR 3.2 is articulated in two results presented as follows:
IR 3.3 Actual Results (1) The perception that conflict can be resolved peacefully, and
(2) Perception that people will resist destabilizing forces, including
strong resistance to any possibility of a military coup.
Several results presented in this report are indicative of the first result. The current
administration promote peaceful resolution of conflict using the mechanism of dialogue, coalition,
compromise and consensus building. This initiative contrasts the practice in formal
administration where leaders actually used the machinery of the state to propagate social
conflict. With respect to the second result, officials feel that military incursion are possible but
that it will be resisted. The consensus is that the Nigeria public is ready to resist any military
intervention and the soldiers are aware of this fact. That awareness is a disincentive to military
moves to destabilize the transition. The major constraint to the attainment of SO 3.0 and IR 3.2
is the potential for destabilizing forces to overcome the will of the people. The control of
weapons by the military and the various crises, including the Sharia riot in Kaduna, ongoing Ife￾Modakeke riots, youth crises in the Niger-Delta areas (oil producing regions), provide
opportunities for that to happen.
30
Chapter 5: Conclusions, Lessons Learned and Recommendations
A. Conclusions
Good Governance Program
The good governance training was a useful tool for stimulating an enabling environment of
democratic governance for the 10,300 elected officials trained and their constituents. OTI’s
intervention was timely, swift, appropriate and useful for the creation of an enabling environment
for democracy to thrive. The effect of long military rule and incessant uprisings around the
country would have constituted a threat but for the determination of the Nigerian civil society to
resist any form of military coups. The conflict resolution and management component of the
training of the local elected officials’ training was appropriate in preparing leaders at all levels for
conflict mediation and resolution. The foundation laid by this program is strong and can be
sustained with appropriate follow-up programs.
Civil-Military Relations
This program has played a significant part in stimulating a process conducive to the transfer of
governance from military to civilian rule. It was clearly the right solution, at the right time, to the
problems posed by a series of autocratic military regimes and a civilian military cadre
inexperienced in dealing with a subordinate military. The completion of the transition from
military to civilian rule is incomplete and still somewhat tentative.
Given OTI’s mandate to deal with transitions through “rapid, pivotal, and catalytic
interventions,” according to its mission statement for Nigeria, the program has achieved its goal.
It has set the framework for a continued dialogue among civilian-military officials and for actions
to put the words into practice. Furthermore, several important structures and processes are in
place and Federal elected and appointed officials are fully committed to the need to continue the
effort. Only then will it be sustainable.
Program Results and OTI Reporting
Assessment findings revealed that the two programs evaluated have progressed significantly
towards the attainment of the expected results. Consistent with the provisions of the SOs and
the IRs, we learned that:
? People are successfully using the mechanism of government in meeting their needs and are
demanding that their representatives be accountable and transparent;
? Elected officials’ capacity to demonstrate a democratic style of governance, involving
openness, participation, shared ideas, networking and brainstorming, has been enhanced;
? Elected and appointed officials’ responsiveness to the electorate has been improved; and
31
? There is a perception that a stable society is achievable, indicated by the potential capacity
to resolve conflict peacefully and minimize destabilizing forces.
The results appear to have cumulatively rolled up to OTI’s goal of “Nigeria's democratic
transformation advanced through rapid, pivotal, catalytic interventions.” It is underscored,
however, that many of the results depicted here are based on perceptions of persons
interviewed, not on actual changes in the political structure. We therefore feel that the reader has
to be a bit cautious in interpreting these results. Nevertheless, we are confident that the two
programs have attained important achievements.
B. Lessons Learned
Each of the programs assessed, as well as the overall assessment of results in the framework of
OTI’s strategic plan, have generated lessons learned. These are as follows.
Good Governance Program
? The need to include women in similar training programs to make room for seemingly
politically disadvantaged groups in respect to representation at all levels of government.
? There are too many conflicts to manage. Could democratic governance have triggered the
expressive power of the people, could a military autocracy that people have always known
give rise to the urge to violently seek redress? Training in conflict resolution is clearly useful
in dealing with conflict in transition situations.
? The informal relationships fostered by the training among elected officials prior to their
succession to office fostered an excellent enabling environment for good governance.
Civil-Military Relations Program
? A program to enhance civil-military relations in a setting where the transfer of governance
from military to civilian rule is urgent, requires a timely, highly visible jump-start. Results that
are readily visible and contribute directly to reducing the potential for a repeat of the past
military record may be a critical element in such a transition as Nigeria is making.
? While the initial stimulus to jump-start a transition to civilian control over the military was
necessary, an absence of a commitment by the Government to adequately fund the
continuing needs could mitigate against long-term results. Continued vigilance by a
government, but especially the defense ministry, to completing a transition from military to
civilian rule is imperative.
32
? An approach to training and TA in civil-military relations that balances hands-on, people￾oriented information and more sophisticated, technical concepts is appropriate. Use of
senior retired U.S. military officers and provision of TA in such areas as budgetary oversight
and preparation of an action plan are appropriate to achieving intended program results.
? Despite the need for considerable emphasis on a military orientation to training and TA, this
does not mean that a military style needs to be applied to implementing those activities. A
more participatory, adult learning orientation contrasts with the military orientation.
? Implementation by OTI of “rapid, pivotal, and catalytic interventions” to improving civil￾military relations in an unstable political environment can be highly effective. When such
interventions do not include strategies for the host country continuing to address these
relations in a transition process that remains tenuous, there may be a cost.
Program Results and OTI Reporting
? The availability of a country strategic plan was not only highly useful but in effect essential
for this assessment. This strategy shaped the framework for the methodology, as well as for
all of the questions identified for use in the interview guides. Furthermore, it strongly shaped
the data analysis process.
? An assessment such as this is constrained by the absence of statements of expected results.
Such expected results were not available because OTI had only recently competed its
country strategic plan. This made necessary the identification by the assessment team of
some “proxy” results that it could use to guide the assessment.
C. Recommendations
Recommendations for each of the programs assessed, as well as the overall assessment of
results in the framework of OTI’s strategic plan, are presented in the following section.
Good Governance Program
? OTI should (for future reference) provide some parallel training for women leaders at
community, organization, and institution levels alongside good governance training for (as it
turns out, mostly) men. The intent is for future good governance programs to sensitize
women leaders in democratic governance, so they can contribute to the political dialogue
alongside men. OTI should consult women leaders in an effort to obtain their input into
approaches to redress this problem.
? OTI should provide additional training to elected officials at all levels in conflict resolution
and management, in order to increase their capacity to deal even more effectively with
present and potential conflict
33
? OTI should expand on its coalition building activities in future programs so as to promote
cross-party relationships; this could be done in part through small group exercises in which
different party members were invited to resolve an important issue.
Civil-Military Relations Program
? OTI should develop a case study of its experience in supporting enhanced civil-military
relations. There are important lessons to be learned from different cases of supporting these
often high-risk activities.
? OTI should include in its initial strategy for a civilian-military relations program an estimate of
downstream funding by which government can maintain and continue improvement of
projected achievements. Where such costs would seem to cut into military hardware and
other projected costs, a case should be made for the importance of conflict mitigation in this
high-risk arena.
? OTI should ensure that its approach to training and TA in civil-military relations balances a
hands-on, people-oriented orientation with a more technical, information dissemination
mode. While it should continue use of senior retired U.S. military officers, it should do so in
partnership with a professional management training organization that would focus on the
training process.
? OTI should ensure that training in its civil-military programs employs a participatory, adult￾learning orientation, in which participants are considered and used as an important resource
of knowledge and experience.
Program Results and OTI Reporting
? OTI/Nigeria should develop a performance monitoring plan (PMP) with clear statements of
expected results and targets incorporated in it. OTI can back into this process through its
program reviews and testing the matrix presented in Chapter 4. At some point, however,
technical assistance should be introduced in developing a PMP.
34
Annex 1 – Scope of Work
Project Title: Nigeria – OTI Impact Assessment
Internal Client at USAID: USAID/BHR/OTI
Background
? The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) wishes to assess
the impact of its country transition programs in Nigeria
which is one of its priority countries. The report is timed
to and designed to provide key information for BHR/OTI’s R4
document and other reports.
Objectives of Task
? The objectives of this task are as follows:
? Identify key field programs for review.
? Collect qualitative and/or quantitative data on those
principal field program/activities
? Provide a qualitative and quantitative review of data on
the impact/results of key field programs
? Provide a brief analysis of the entire emergency
transition program with a focus on incorporating major
findings from the impact assessment.
Process Steps
? The task will be accomplished by:
? Conducting interviews with OTI staff and grantees
? Conducting focus groups with beneficiaries of OTI programs
? Reviewing grantee reports, evaluations and other
background material
Deliverables
? The consultant will provide the following deliverables to
the client
? Workplan and methodology
? Draft and final reports
? Exit briefings with OTI/Nigeria and OTI/Washington
Project Timeline
? The work will be performed from March 13th 2000 to April 8th
2000.
35
Annex 2 – Methodology
Introduction
The methodology is designed to assess two of the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) major
programs in Nigeria:
? Training for Good Governance and
? Civil-Military Affairs
Following OTI’s Scope of Work for an Impact Assessment (see Annex 1), this study identifies
critical field activities, collects data that demonstrate results, and reports on OTI’s contribution
to the transition to peace and democracy in Nigeria. The assessment reviews programs deemed
by OTI as "already achieving significant results.” It uses mainly qualitative data, analyzes these
data in the context of the emergency transition program, and reports the product of the analysis
in report.
While this assessment is designated by the term "impact," it also shares some elements of a
process evaluation in that aspects of at least one of the two programs are not yet completed.
So, while we will search for the footprints of impact of the training of elected officials program,
we will look for interim results of the civil-military program.
B. Evaluation Framework and Linkage to the R4 Process
The assessment uses the USAID/Nigeria strategic plan and the OTI revised country strategic
plan for a framework. It also reflects the R4 (results review/resource request) used by the
Agency for measuring results and allocating funds. While it is not often that OTI and a country
mission work side-by-side, this is the case for Nigeria
OTI’s strategy, while clearly interfacing with the Mission strategy, differs in that its interventions
in the Nigeria context are defined as "rapid, pivotal, and catalytic." While OTI's strategy is by
definition and mandate only short-term, its results are surely intended to contribute to long-term,
developmental results, whose mandate is the Mission's.
While indicators have been identified for the OTI strategic plan, we will not try to measure
against these indicators per se. The reasons for this stance are that, one, insufficient time has
evolved for the programs to show definitive results and, two, even were there such results, the
type of assessment called for in the Scope of Work makes collection of such detailed data
impracticable. Nevertheless, we endeavor to obtain a clear sense of how well the program is
faring against the strategic objectives and intermediate results.
36
C. Approach
Given the short timeframe for this research (two weeks of field research), the approach relies on
rapid appraisal methods. These methods are neither fully informal nor formal, and borrow from
each approach. Methods used in this assessment largely lack quantitative data from which
generalizations can de drawn on the entire population of Nigerian elected officials benefiting
from Good Governance training or military and civilian officials participating in the Civil-Military
Relations activities. Nevertheless, findings are valid for reporting results and sufficient for
decision-making needs.
Specific evaluation questions are generated to meet the requirements of the rapid appraisal
approach. These are designed for each of the populations affected by the two programs.
Included in guides designed for each type of interview used, these questions are presented in
Annex 3.
Techniques used in supporting the evaluation approach are four in number:
? Key Informant Interview
? Focus Group Interview
? Direct Observation and
? Documentation Review
The first, key informant interview, is used with participants in the Good Governance program,
namely recently elected local, state and national representatives, as well as military and civilian
officials for the Civil-Military activity. Focus group interviews are also used with the same
participants. Direct observation is made at all the sites visited during this assessment. A review
of documents was made of all reports concerning these two programs. Titles of these are
included Annex 5, References.
D. Site and Interviewee Selection
Easier access to potential participants to interview in Lagos, Abuja, and Port Harcourt and
surrounding areas, as well as time constraints, dictated the selection of those sites for visits.
OTI offices in those locales arranged the interviews for the assessment. In some cases the
possession of a telephone was important in locating participants to determine their availability.
However, an effort to locate participants who did not have telephones, especially those in rural
areas, was successfully made. An information list of participants in the Good Governance
program and, where available, a telephone number, facilitated the selection process, along with
the persuasive cajoling of OTI Office heads and staff.
One clear constraint to the availability of participants from the civil-military activity was the
paucity of military officers available to interview. Several of them had purportedly been
37
reassigned out of Abuja, where the majority of participants reside, and, more importantly, the
majority was away on a military training visit. A number of Ministry of Defense civilian officials
was available, as well as some representatives of the press, the Deputy Chairman of the
Defense Committee of the House of Representatives, and a Naval Commodore (Admiral).
E. Team Composition
Team members included:
? a U.S. development professional specialized in monitoring and evaluation; democracy and
governance; and Sub-Saharan Africa,
? a Nigerian development sociologist specialized in research design and evaluation; gender;
and democracy and governance, and
? a Nigerian social scientist specialized in conflict mitigation; gender; and organization
management.
38
Annex 3 – Interview Guides
39
Table: Interview Guide for Good Governance Interviews Coded by SOs & IRs
1. What kind of leadership style have you adopted as a result of the
training? [e.g. leadership as someone who represents the people]
(Elaborate)
SO2 IR2.1
2. What have you done as a leader to demonstrate your leadership?
(Describe)
SO1 IR1.2
3. In what ways have you participated in a dialogue with your newly
elected colleagues concerning issues of [choose one (national) (state)
(local)] importance? How did your participation in such a dialogue
affect the outcome? (Describe).
 “
4. Have you seen a “new way of doing business” as a result of the training
(assuming the individual knows something about the “old way”)?
(Describe) How is it different? (Explain).
 “
5. How has your understanding of the fundamentals of democracy and
democratic governance helped you to do a better job of representing
your constituency? Of interacting with the executive branch? (Explain)
How much of this understanding is directly to the training you received?
 “
6. How has the training helped you to become more transparent and
accountable to your constituents?
SO2 IR2.1
7. How has the training helped you to become more transparent and
accountable to your constituents?
SO2 IR2.1
8. Have you addressed any issue of civil strife since you got elected and
how has the training helped you in this process
participation in such conflict management? (Explain)
SO3
9. What experience have you had in your legislative role in conflict
management? (Elaborate) How did the training affect your “
10. How often have you applied coalition building, compromise or other,
similar approaches in your negotiations? (Describe) Where did you use
them? How big a difference did they make?
SO3 IR3.2
11. How do you assess your constituents’ perception of your
responsiveness to their needs? (Describe) What do your constituents
think about the job you are doing? (Describe)
SO1 IR1.2.1
12 Have you participated in public meetings with your constituents that
dealt with “critical transition issues”? What are some of these issues?
What was the approach used to dealing with these issues?
S03
13 How have you been able to educate others (e.g., constituents, and
executive branch officers) in the lessons learned from the workshop in
good governance? (Describe)
SO2
40
14. (a) [Local Government Only] Do you feel you have played a
“reformer” role in your position as a local government official? If so,
how have you carried out this role? (Give examples) Do you consider
any of your colleagues from the workshop as reformers?
Approximately how many? What makes them reformers?
(b) [National and State only] Do you feel you have played a “reformer”
role in your position as legislator? If so, how have you carried out this
role? (Give examples) Do you consider any of your colleagues from
the workshop as reformers? Approximately how many? What makes
them reformers?
SO2 IR2.1
15. What are one or two “best practice” stories of how your training in
good governance has been applied to practical situations since you
were sworn into office? (I.e., what are some good examples?
Provide)
GENERIC+
16. What constraints have you experienced in executing your acquired
skills?[give examples] What practical steps have you taken to address
these constraints.[Describe]
SO2 IR2.1
17. How many times in the last six months have you met with your
constituents? What are the most important issues your constituents are
relating with you?
SO1, IR1.2
18. [National and State] What legislative issues are you addressing that
concern your constituents’ priority issues?
SO2 IR2.1
19. How many bills have you participated in formulating and sponsoring?
 “
20. Are you fearful of a military coup? SO3 IR3.2
21 Do you feel secure that today’s Nigerian soldier can defend your right?
 “
22 Do you feel that today’s Nigerian Soldiers are more professional than
they were a year ago.
 “
+ Fit under all SOs
41
Table Qualitative Check List for Good Governance Interviews
1. What kind of leadership style have you adopted as a result of the
training? [e.g. leadership as someone who represents the people]
(Elaborate)
SO2 IR2.1
2. What have you done as a leader to demonstrate your leadership?
(Describe)
SO1 IR1.2
3. In what ways have you participated in a dialogue with your newly
elected colleagues concerning issues of [choose one (national) (state)
(local)] importance? How did your participation in such a dialogue
affect the outcome? (Describe).
 “
4. Have you seen a “new way of doing business” as a result of the training
(assuming the individual knows something about the “old way”)?
(Describe) How is it different? (Explain).
 “
5. How has your understanding of the fundamentals of democracy and
democratic governance helped you to do a better job of representing
your constituency? Of interacting with the executive branch? (Explain)
How much of this understanding is directly to the training you received?
 “
6. How has the training helped you to become more transparent and
accountable to your constituents?
SO2 IR2.1
7. How has the training helped you to become more transparent and
accountable to your constituents?
SO2 IR2.1
8. Have you addressed any issue of civil strife since you got elected and
how has the training helped you in this process
participation in such conflict management? (Explain)
SO3
9. What experience have you had in your legislative role in conflict
management? (Elaborate) How did the training affect your “
10. How often have you applied coalition building, compromise or other,
similar approaches in your negotiations? (Describe) Where did you use
them? How big a difference did they make?
SO3 IR3.2
11. How do you assess your constituents’ perception of your
responsiveness to their needs? (Describe) What do your constituents
think about the job you are doing? (Describe)
SO1 IR1.2.1
12 Have you participated in public meetings with your constituents that
dealt with “critical transition issues”? What are some of these issues?
What was the approach used to dealing with these issues?
S03
13 How have you been able to educate others (e.g., constituents, and
executive branch officers) in the lessons learned from the workshop in
good governance? (Describe)
SO2
42
14. (a) [Local Government Only] Do you feel you have played a
“reformer” role in your position as a local government official? If so,
how have you carried out this role? (Give examples) Do you consider
any of your colleagues from the workshop as reformers?
Approximately how many? What makes them reformers?
(b) [National and State only] Do you feel you have played a “reformer”
role in your position as legislator? If so, how have you carried out this
role? (Give examples) Do you consider any of your colleagues from
the workshop as reformers? Approximately how many? What makes
them reformers?
SO2 IR2.1
15. What are one or two “best practice” stories of how your training in
good governance has been applied to practical situations since you
were sworn into office? (I.e., what are some good examples?
Provide)
GENERIC+
16. What constraints have you experienced in executing your acquired
skills?[give examples] What practical steps have you taken to address
these constraints.[Describe]
SO2 IR2.1
17. How many times in the last six months have you met with your
constituents? What are the most important issues your constituents are
relating with you?
SO1, IR1.2
18. [National and State] What legislative issues are you addressing that
concern your constituents’ priority issues?
SO2 IR2.1
19. How many bills have you participated in formulating and sponsoring?
20. Are you fearful of a military coup? SO3 IR3.2
21 Do you feel secure that today’s Nigerian soldier can defend your right?
22 Do you feel that today’s Nigerian Soldiers are more professional than
they were a year ago.
+ Fit under all SOs
43
Interview Guide for Civil-Military Relations Interviews
 ALL--SO3 IR3.2
1. What do you see, as some of the most important means for giving civilians authority over the
military? (Describe)
2. What are some of the steps that are being taken to improve relationships between civilians
and military?
3. What are the most important qualities in the relation between the military and the civilians?
[E.g., is it built on trust, confidence, and communications?)
4. How well would you say the improvement of civilian-military relations has gone so far?
(Explain) What are some good examples of such improvements?
5. What are some of the specific programs and policies to assist in the
re-professionalization of the Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF)? (Please list and briefly
describe)
6. What efforts are being made both in the Ministry of Defense and NAF to develop and
define a basic relationship between the officer’s corps and a democratic society? (e.g., in
terms of legal status, institutional arrangements, and military and political activity--describe)
7. What kinds of issues have arisen in moving from the policy stage to implementation of new
ways of organizing the civilian—military relationship? (Describe)
8. What specific steps are being taken to re-professionalize the NAF? (e.g., is civil--mil
relations training being offered, is transition assistance being offered to NAF personnel
leaving the services, etc.?)
9. What actions have been taken to improve relations between the legislative and executive
branches concerning military matters? (List/Describe) Are there any new structures in place
to provide legislative authority? (If yes, describe)
10. Are you aware of any plans to set up a legislative liaison staff between the MOD or NAF
and the legislature? (Yes/no/if yes, list/define)
11. Are you aware of any actions taken to assist the National Emergency Management Agency
in its interactions with the MOD? (Yes/no/if yes, list/define)
12. What steps are being taken to enhance professionalism in the military?)
13. Are you aware of whether or not the audit plan for FY99 financial statements for MOD has
been carried out? (If yes, describe)
14. (Military ONLY) How would you assess your role as a soldier today? (Describe)
15. (Military ONLY) Is being a soldier of less appeal to you today than it was a year ago?
(Explain)
16. (Civilians ONLY) How would you assess the role of the soldier today? (Describe).
44
Annex 4 – Work Plan
WORKPLAN—ASSESSMENT OF OTI/NIGERIA PROGRAMS &
PARTICIPATION IN MONITORING & EVALUATION WORKSHOP
DATE/PLACE/PERSON STEP IN EVALUATION
PROCESS
DESCRIPTION OF
WORK
March 10/WDC/S Roquitte
(USAID)/ Z Nelson, S
Gnanaselvam, D. Cosloy
(PWC)
Planning TDY, field visits,
Logistics
Meetings to review
assignment / Arrange logistics
March 13/WDC/Travel to
Lagos
Develop preliminary work
plan
Select sites, design
preliminary questionnaires
March 14/arrive Lagos Logistics
March 15/Lagos/L DeSoto,
C Becerra, S Hayatuddini
(OTI); S Suggs, M Brown
(USAID)
Review Civ-Mil/Governance
programs, review workshop
plan
Adapt and complete
workplan
March 16/Lagos/OTI staff
(cont’d.)
Program review of Civ-Mil
program; develop guides for
Good Governance key
informant/focus group
interviews
Meetings to discuss
objectives, activities and
general progress of program;
review OTI strategic plan, R4
requirements; review elected
officials info. sheets and post￾training evaluations
March
17/Lagos/Government of
Nigeria officials
Develop guides for Civil￾Military Relations key
informant/focus group
interviews
Develop list of prospective
interviewees for Good Gov
and Civ-Mil interviews in
Abuja, Pt. Harcourt, Lagos;
Meet FSNs and develop
SOWs for their contribution
March 18/Lagos Refine design of interview
guides
Complete design of research
methodology, including
interview
guides/questionnaires
March 19/Lagos-Abuja Logistics Travel to Abuja; meet with
Idris Kuta
45
March 20Abuja/Ministry of
Defense
Interviews with Ministry of
Defense(MOD)—Minister of
State for Defense and
Support Staff Committee
Meet MOD officials; arrange
field visits, interviews
46
DATE/PLACE/PERSON STEP IN EVALUATION
PROCESS
DESCRIPTION OF
WORK
March 21/Abuja/House
Members/Local Elected
officials
Field visits to Suleja Local
Gov’t Area in Niger State
Focus group interview at
MOD;
Key informant interview with
Deputy Chairman House
Defense Committee
Meeting with sampling of local
and state officials participating
in good governance training;
interviews for Civ-Mil activity
March 22/Abuja/House
Reps./Local Elected Officials
Field trip to Local Gov’t
Council, Akwanga, in
Nasarawa state Focus group
and key informant interviews;
prepare interview summaries
Meetings with local elected
reps;
Key informant interviews with
Senate Deputy Chairman,
Appropriations Committee;
Clerk, Senate Committee
March 23/Abuja/Pt.
Harcourt/ Yenagoa/National
Assembly members, State
House members
Continue interviews
Prepare summaries of
interviews
Part of team travels to Pt.
Harcourt, part remains in
Abuja
March 24/Abuja/Pt.
Harcourt/ Rivers State/State
House of Assembly
members/Local Government
area
Continue interviews for Good
Gov/Civ-Mil programs
Analyze data for report
presentation/against OTI
strategic plan
March 25/Abuja-Port
Harcourt
Travel
Begin Report Writing
Travel from Abuja and Pt.
Harcourt to Lagos
March 26/Lagos Report preparation Prepare first draft
March 27/Lagos Report preparation Complete and present first
draft to OTI/Lagos and WDC
March 28/Lagos Continue report preparation Complete annexes for draft
final of report
March 29 Lagos/Elected
officials
“ “ “ “
Meet with NGOs
“ “ “
“
March 30/Lagos/Elected
officials/OTI Staff
Continue report preparation
Meet with NGOs
“ “ “
“
March
31/Lagos/USAID/OTI
Return of first draft for
revisions
Meet with NGOs
Begin revisions
47
DATE/PLACE/PERSON STEP IN EVALUATION
PROCESS
DESCRIPTION OF
WORK
April 1/Lagos Revise first draft
Prepare M & E workshop
contributions
Continue revisions
April 2/Lagos Continue revisions on draft
report
“ “ “ “
April 3/Lagos “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “
Turn in Revised draft to
OTI/Lagos and WDC
April 4/Lagos Continue preparations for M
& E workshop
Preparation of workshop
curriculum and materials
April 5/Lagos “ “ “ “ “ “ “ “
April 6/Lagos/Workshop
retreat site
Participate in implementation
of workshop
Participate in and support
facilitation of workshop
April 7/Workshop Site ” “ “ “ “ “ “ “
April 8/Workshop site/return
to Lagos/depart Lagos to
WDC
“ “ “ “
End of activity
“ “ “ “
Travel to US
April 9/Paris, Dulles USA Logistics Continue return travel to US
48
Annex 5 – Persons Contacted
USAID/Washington
Sheila Roquitte, OTI, Coordinator, Nigeria Program
Michael Korin, Humanitarian Response Coordinator, ENI Bureau
Heather McHugh, OTI, Senior Program Development Officer
Anne Lee, OTI, Senior Program Development Officer
USAID/OTI and USAID/Nigeria
Lisa Desoto, OTI, Country Director
Melissa Brown, USAID Democracy Officer
Michael Braxton, OTI Press Officer
Carmenza Becerra, OTI/SWIFT/Louis Berger
Shan Hayatuddini, OTI/SWIFT/Louis Berger
Ime Essien Udom, OTI/SWIFT/Louis Berger
Idris Kutu, Head, OTI Abuja Office
Reggie Simmons, OTI Kano Office
Tom Simpson, USAID Energy Advisor
Jamie Raile, Head, OTI Port Harcourt Office
Simon Enajedu, OTI Port Harcourt Office
CIVIL-MILITARY
Mrs. Modupe Adelaja, Honorable Minister of State for Defense
Dr. Segun Matanmi, Special Assistant to the Minister of State, MOD.
Commodore K.C.K. Amauche, Naval Adviser, Ministry of Defense
Mr. H. F. Osobu, Ministry of Defense
Alhaji Kutiji, Ministry of Defense
Mr. S. O. Golo, Ministry of Defense (Coordinator for MPRI)
Mr. F. I. Chukwura, Ministry of Defense
Ms. E. C. Nwogwugwu, Ministry of Defense (Press officer)
Hon. [Major] Ngada, Deputy Chairman, House Committee on Defense
Innocent Chukwuma, Executive Director, Center for Law Enforcement
Education
Muhammad Khalid, Nigeria Union of Journalists (National Secretary)
Mr. Ishola Williams (Ret. Maj. Gen.), Transparency in Nigeria (NGO), Lagos
Mr. Innocent Chukwuma, Centre for Law Enforcement Education, Lagos
49
GOOD GOVERNANCE
Abuja
Senator Nwagbara, Chairman Senate Committee on Police Affairs / Former Chairman
Senate Committee on Defense.
Honorable [Barr.] Mohammed U. Kumalia, House APP Leader, Federal House of
Representatives.
Mr. Friday Efodu, Clerk of the Senate Committee on Appropriation and Finance.
Niger State
Suleja Local Government Area
Hon. Uman Magaji Kwamba, Maje Ward
Hon. Alhaji Ahmed J. Bawa, Bagamma ‘B’ Ward
Hon. Mohammed Kabir Aliyu, Bagamma ‘A’ Ward
Hon. Alhassan Nuhu, Iku South 11 Ward
Hon. Awwal A. Dattijo, Magaji Ward
Hon. Alhaji Yahuja Aliyu, Hashimi-A Ward
Hon. Ado Danlami, Wambai Ward
Hon. Abdulhabib Saidu Barau, Kurmin Sarki Ward
Tafa Local Government Area
Mr. S. B. Gwomna, Chairman, Tafa Local Government
Gurara Local Government Area
Hon. J. G. Koce
Hon. Samson B. Talukpe
Hon. Thomas M. Yerima
Hon. Aliyu D. Madugu
Hon. Musa Garba
Hon. Gideon Hassan, Izom Ward
Hon. Isaiah Chanse, Kabo Ward
Hon. Baba Umar Abdulkadir, Chairman Gurara Local Government
Nasarawa State
Akwanga Local Government Area
Hon. Mwanza Isa Mohammed, Chief Whip, LGA Council
50
Hon. Philip Limbo, Councilor, Chairman Finance Committee
Hon. Forouk Gyado, J.P. Chairman, Primary Health Care
Sale Chigbe, Personnel Secretary
Hon. Albert A. Gado, ‘Speaker of the Legislature’
Rivers State
Hon. Amadi Brillant
Hon. Moses Tobin 
Hon. Legigrato Innocent
Hon. Ben D. Odun
Hon. Victor Inhunwa
Hon. Adolpus Sege Worlu
Hon. Amadi Moris Onyemaechi
Hon. Amadi Kenneth
Hon. Ogoloma Maxwel
Hon. Ineye Ingbaifegha
Hon. Alex A. Ajikere -a former youth leader.
Rivers State House of Assembly
Hon. Paul Awoyesuku
Hon. Glory Chiku
Hon. Magnus Abe
Hon. Tonye Harry
Hon. Amaechi C. Rotimi
Hon. Tonye Harry
Hon. Tamunsisi G. Juja
Hon. Kennedy S. Ebeku
Hon. Tolofasi G. Fubabu
Hon. Orunari Adokiye
Hon. Ideozu O. Kachukwu
Hon Aloys A. Nweke
Hon. Otelemaba D. Amachree
Hon. Marcus N. Ejii
Hon. Godstime B. Horsfall
Bayelsa State
Bayelsa State House of Assembly
Hon. Chief Prosper Idafe Nwaguzo
Hon. Charles Immanuel
51
Hon. I.T. Komonibo
Hon. Bzi Onniye
Lagos State
Tive Denedo, Director of Campaigns, Media Rights Agenda
Maxwell Kadiri, Legal Officer, Media Rights Agenda
Other
Prince Obio/Akpor, Local Government Area
52
Annex 6 – References
Election Needs Assessment, May-July. Washington D. C.: USAID/OTI.
International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES). 1999. Final Project Report: IFES’
Langdon, Steven. 2000. Report on EMCAP Project in Nigeria. World Bank Report.
Management Systems International (MSI). 1999. Nigeria: Training for Good Governance
Workshops Final Report. Washington, D.C. USAID/OTI.
MPRI. 1999. Civil Military Professionalism in a Democracy. Arlington, VA: MPRI.
MPRI. 1999. Legislative and Defense Coordination in a Democracy. Arlington, VA:
MPRI.
MPRI. 1999. Action Plan for Nigeria. Arlington, VA: MPRI.
MPRI: 1999. Civil-Military Transition to Nigeria Phase 11: Action Plan Implementation.
Arlington, VA: MPRI.
Technical Assistance to Nigeria's Independent National Commission (INEC) Joint Post.
USAID, OTI and Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance. 1999. OTI Results Review FY
1998. Washington, D.C.: USAID.
USAID/OTI. 2000. Program Information for Nigeria. Lagos: USAID/OTI.
USAID. 1999. OTI Results Review FY 1998. Washington, D.C.: USAID.
USAID, OTI and Bureau for Humanitarian Assistance. 1999. OTI Nigeria Fact Sheet
Washington, D.C.: USAID.
USAID/OTI. 1999. Nigeria: Transition Civil-Military Program Scope of Work for MPRI.
Lagos, Nigeria: USAID/OTI