October 2013
This publication was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International Development by
International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc. (IBTCI) under the Evaluation Services IQC, AID-688-TO￾13-00001.
USAID/MALI
Integrated Initiatives for Economic Growth in Mali 
(IICEM) Performance Evaluation
Farmer Assessment – Group discussions of IICEM Activities - in the morning shade (photo Al Sanchez)
Integrated Initiatives for Economic Growth in Mali 
(IICEM) Performance Evaluation 
(28 May – 21 August 2013) 
Order No.: AID-688-TO-13-00001 
DISCLAIMER 
The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States 
Agency for International Development or the United States Government. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This performance evaluation of the IICEM project was made possible with assistance from 
various stakeholders at national, regional and community levels. Many institutions and 
stakeholders provided valuable time and opinions during the assessment. IBTCI and the 
evaluation team would like to thank the following institutions and individuals for their support 
and information provided: 
 USAID/Mali, Office of the AEG, Contracts and Project Officers; 
 Dr. Sokona Dagnoko, President of SENESO; 
 Ministry of Agriculture; 
 IICEM project partners, and
 Other donors and implementing agencies. 
Special gratitude is also extended to the many farmer groups, organizations, extension agents and 
other participants who provided invaluable information without which this evaluation would not 
have been possible. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF MAPS, FIGURES, AND TABLES ................................................................................ i
ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................ ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .......................................................................................................... iii
I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1
II. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ 5
III. QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS ............................................................................................. 10
IV. ANSWERS TO THE KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS ................................................. 15
1. How have IICEM’s activities resulted in improved livelihoods for members of farming 
cooperatives and producer organizations? ........................................................................ 15
2. Has IICEM succeeded in helping farmers and farming businesses become more 
organized, productive, and financially secure? ................................................................. 20
3. What are IICEM’s relative strengths and weaknesses of intervening along the entire 
rice, millet, and sorghum value chains, as opposed to targeting specific areas? .............. 22
4. What is the relative value-added (monetary and non-monetary) of the integration of 
IICEM’s infrastructure with other productivity inputs? ................................................... 24
5. Will the relationship between farmers, processors (and/or cereal traders), and banks 
continue to function without the technical and financial support of IICEM? ................... 26
6. How has the recent instability in the country affected IICEM stakeholder behavior? . 28
V. OTHER RELEVANT IICEM ISSUES .................................................................................. 30
1. Certified Seed Production ............................................................................................. 30
2. Monitoring and Evaluation ........................................................................................... 32
VI. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................... 36
VII. OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................. 38
VIII. BEST PRACTICES ............................................................................................................ 39
ANNEXES .................................................................................................................................. 40
Annex I RFTOP (Original) Statement of Work
Annex II (Original) Work Plan: Timeline and Deliverables
Annex III Contacts and Interviewees
Annex IV Questionnaires and Interview Guides
Annex V (Revised) Methodology for the Second Phase
Annex VI Key Question and Synopsis of Approach
Annex VII Supporting Documents
i
LIST OF MAPS, FIGURES, AND TABLES 
LIST OF MAPS 
Map 1 FtF Focus Communes .......................................................................................................... 2
Map 2 Sorghum and Millet ............................................................................................................. 3
Map 3 Rice ...................................................................................................................................... 3
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 PIV ha by Sub-Region .................................................................................................... 11
Figure 2 PIV Area Cultivated per Smallholder (ha) ..................................................................... 11
Figure 3 PIV Production per Smallholder (MT) ........................................................................... 12
Figure 4 PIV Productivity T/ha..................................................................................................... 12
Figure 5 PIV Volume Marketed per Producer (MT) .................................................................... 13
Figure 6 PIV Value of Product Marketed per Smallholder (FCFA) ............................................. 13
Figure 7 PIV Percent of Production Marketed ............................................................................. 14
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1 Farmers' own perception of their livelihood with IICEM in Koro and Bankass ............. 15
Table 2 Perception of shorghum cooperatives in Bougouni of their livelihood with IICEM....... 17
Table 3 Perception of sorghum cooperatives in Sikasso of their livelihood with IICEM ............ 17
Table 4 Perception of sorghum cooperatives in Koutiala of their livelihood with IICEM ........... 18
Table 5 Lowland rice women OPs’ own assessment of their livelihoods .................................... 18
Table 6 PIV rice farmers’ own perception of their livelihoods with IICEM in Mopti and Djenne 
cercles ........................................................................................................................................... 19
Table 7 Evolution of cropping systems (use value chains)........................................................... 21
Table 8 Key Informant Interviews at Credit, Marketing, Input Supply Providers ....................... 22
Table 9 Characteristics of seed producing organizations in Mopti and Sikasso regions .............. 30
Table 10 IICEM’S support and interventions received as described by members of USCPMD 
and Barasoro in Koulikoro and Mopti regions ............................................................................. 30
ii
ACRONYMS 
AEG Accelerated Economic Growth
AMPRODE Projet de Développement de la Production Agricole au Mali (Project for the Development of 
Agricultural Production in Mali)
API Agence pour la Promotion des Investissements (Investment Promotion Agency)
BDA Baseline Data Appraisal 
BNDA Banque Nationale de Développement Agricole (National Bank for Agricultural Development) 
CMDT Compagnie Malienne de Developpement des Textiles (Malian Textile Development Company)
DNA Direction Nationale de l’Agriculture (National Department of Agriculture)
DRA Direction Régionale de l’Agriculture (Regional Directorate of Agriculture)
FCFA Francs de la Communauté Financière Africaine (African Financial Community Franc, or CFA 
Franc)
FtF Feed the Future
GMM Grands Moulins du Mali (The Great Millers of Mali)
GREFA Groupe de Recherche, d’Etude et de Formation en Agriculture et Arboriculture (Group for 
Agricultural Research, Surveys and Training) -
One of five IICEM implementing non-governmental organizations - Sikasso 
ha Hectares (equivalent to 2.471 acres)
HH Household
H/H Head of Household
IBTCI International Business & Technical Consultants, Inc.
IER Institut d’Economie Rurale (Institute of Rural Economy)
IF Innovation Fund (managed by IICEM)
IICEM Integrated Initiatives for Economic Growth in Mali
IRR Internal Rate of Return 
MDS Moulins du Sahel (Saharan Millers)
MNLA National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad
MPC Mali Protection de Cultures 
ODHD/LCPM Observatory for Sustainable Human Development and the Fight against Poverty in Mali
OP Organisation Paysanne (Producer/Farmer Organization)
OPAM Office des Produits Agricoles du Mali
Peenal A Fulani term meaning “Consciousness” or “Awaremess” One of five IICEM implementing 
non-governmental organizations – Bougouni
PIV Périmètre Irrigué Villageois (Irrigated Village Perimeter or Village Irrigated Area)
PMP Project Monitoring Plan
RBDA Rapid Baseline Data Appraisal
RFP Request for Proposal
RGA Recensement Général de l’Agriculture (General Agricultural Census)
RIG Regional Inspector General
SENESO Société Agricole de Recherche et de Dèveloppement (Society of Agricultural Research and 
Development)
SODEF Societe Doumbia et Fils (Doumbia and Sons)
USCPMD Union des Sociétés Coopératives de Producteurs de Maïs de Diédougou
(Union of Maize Producer Cooperatives of Diédougou) – Sikasso
WASA West Africa Seed Alliance
WFP Word Food Program (of the United Nations)
iii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The purpose of this evaluation of the last four years of Integrated Initiatives for Economic 
Growth in Mali (IICEM) program activities at the farmer group and agri-business levels is to 
provide USAID/Mali with an objective, third-party assessment of the program so that similar and 
future economic growth programs in the sector will be able to draw on the results of this value 
chain approach to development. The original intent was to do an impact evaluation, but upon 
completion of a rapid data base assessment, it was found that a satisfactory counterfactual could 
not be established. Accordingly, a revised methodology was prepared, but always with the focus 
on changes that could be related to IICEM activities along the value chains. 
Since January 2010, Abt Associates, through EDH-I-00-05-00005-03, has been implementing 
the second phase of the IICEM. During this period, two modifications have been made in the 
project. The first was a substantial change in geographic and cropping focus to meet the 2011 
“Feed the Future” strategy designed by USAID/Mali. The second modification was a one year 
extension through December of 2013. IBTCI, through a Task Order request under USAID’s 
Evaluation Services IQC, was contracted to conduct an evaluation from May to August of 2013. 
IBTCI partnered with SENESO, a Malian agricultural research and development organization 
that has been specializing in plant breeding and seed production. The objectives of the 
partnership were to add local expertise to the two IBTCI international consultants and to provide 
evaluation experience to SENESO so that a Malian firm would have evaluation experience 
meeting USAID standards. The combined team consisted of a team leader and a deputy team 
leader, the director of SENESO, two agricultural experts, and two other professionals with local 
evaluation and production development careers in Mali. This seven person team was 
complimented by six teams of interviewers that were mobilized with SENESO’s logistic support. 
IBTCI home office provided a senior technical advisor to supervise the rapid baseline data 
survey and the overall methodology for the evaluation. 
Field work was conducted in two phases between June and August. The first phase (Rapid Data 
Base Appraisal – RDBA) consisted of two teams, one for Mopti and the other for Sikasso, of six 
key personnel from IBTCI and SENESO and four interviewers to conduct an assessment of the 
databases and data quality to determine the appropriate research methods that could be used for 
this evaluation. Thirty-two extension agents, all employees of the five implementing non￾governmental partners, were interviewed about their indicator measurements, thirty-six non￾participating farmer groups were interviewed about the data that they maintained. Based on the 
findings from the RDBA, the evaluation methodology was changed and approved by the USAID 
Mission from a quantitative, strictly impact-type to a more performance-type1
evaluation using a 
qualitative approach focused on the services that IICEM provided to facilitate linkages between 
farmer groups and their respective value chain (Annex VI). Because a counterfactual group with 
time series data could not be found, an alternative strategy, reviewing either groups in similar 
programs that had ended or groups that had been deleted from IICEM, was employed to examine 
the sustainability question. For the purpose of this evaluation, value chains are defined by the 
 
1
These types are described in USAID, Bureau for Policy, Planning, and Learning. 2011, “USAID Evaluation 
Policy,” p. 4.
iv
crop being produced (irrigated rice, bas-fond rice2
, millet, and sorghum) and include producers, 
processors, traders, credit sources, and input suppliers. The second phase consisted of a sample 
of sixty farmer groups representing the work of all five implementing partners in Mopti and 
Sikasso, and interviews with ten key service providers – traders, credit sources, input suppliers, 
and processors. The qualitative methodology consisted of group interviews and discussions to 
gain the farmers’ assessment of the work that IICEM and its partners did to facilitate the linkages 
between the farmers and the service providers. 
The qualitative methodology included discussions about the impact of the military/political crisis 
of 2012. The farmer group findings were triangulated with the RDBA interviews with the non￾governmental extension agents as well as the key informant interviews with traders, credit 
agents, input suppliers, and processors. 
The question of sustainability of the facilitated linkages was handled by including two sets of 
farmer groups in the interviews: 1) Ten Corn, 6 Millet, and one union of 7 seed producing groups 
that had been dropped from the program in 2011 when the new Feed the Future (FtF) strategy 
was implemented; and 2) Farmer groups that had been involved in other, similar programs that 
had ended. The key question in those interviews was how these farmer groups had managed the 
credit, inputs, and the sales negotiations with traders/processors with the following cropping 
cycle (2012-2013). The rationale was that if these groups were able to maintain linkages after 
their participation in the IICEM or other program activities, then this would be an indication of 
sustainability of those linkages and improved value chains. 
In all, in spite of breaks for the elections, rainy season road conditions, and organizing work to 
the Ramadan rhythm, the field work was accomplished without any significant incident. The 
logistics for recruiting and mobilizing 50 people, including interviewers, key personnel, and 
drivers to the 60 groups and 100 group interviews involved approximately 170 vehicle days. 
The major findings and conclusions by key evaluation questions are: 
1. How have IICEM’s activities resulted in improved livelihoods for members of farming 
cooperatives and producer organizations? 
Families in all of the cropping systems attended by IICEM concluded that their families 
improved, compared with before the program, on 12 of 14 livelihood indicators. Scattered among 
the 60 groups sampled were some groups who did not experience improvements. It is important 
to point out the fact that IICEM selected customers likely to succeed; the project was not 
designed to support the lowest end (i.e. poorest) of the farmers. The two indicators that did not 
show general improvement were the length of the season that they experienced hunger (période 
de soudure) and overall health or freedom from disease. Although the latter indicator was not a 
direct intention of the program, the former was surprising and, although prominent in Bankass 
and Koro Cercles in Mopti region, it was also noted in some groups in Sikasso region. No 
poorest/neglected farmers benefited from the project.
 
2 Bas-Fond rice is based on a special geomorphological formation in southern Mali consisting of land that is a 
naturally shallow depression of land with a clay substrata that enables it to hold water as a seasonal pond watered 
by rainfall. These rice crops are managed by women’s groups and lend a special gender aspect to this program. 
v
2. Has IICEM succeeded in helping farmers and farming businesses become more organized, 
productive, and financially secure? 
There were multiple findings indicating that the impact of IICEM’s effort to develop the basic 
food grains value chain has been substantial. One of the pre-IICEM problems was that food 
grain production was considered too risky for the Banque Nationale de Développement Agricole 
(National Bank for Agricultural Development, BNDA) and for input suppliers to extend credit. 
IICEM turned that perception around with its mentoring and by linking the suppliers and 
creditors directly to the groups. Another area that was a bottleneck was access to quality seed. 
Although there were seed producers, the supply of improved and certified seed was limited when 
considering the magnitude of the targets of the FtF strategy. IICEM worked with seed producers 
and seed producing groups to increase the supply of improved seed. IICEM also promoted 
improved varieties with the result that demand for seeds increased providing value added for 
those producers. Even though direct measurement of financial security was not possible to 
define with the methodology used, none of the interviewees expressed any financial stress 
conditions. Financial security came more in the facilitation of advance contracts integrating both 
the grain buyers and input supply businesses. These links made it more secure for the farmer 
knowing that there would be a market and at what price, but it also increased the security for the 
buyers so that they could make purchasing routes more efficient to meet national and 
international demands. In addition, the input suppliers had more confidence that they would be 
paid back. Additionally, interviewees made it clear they would like to see IICEM to promote 
business expansion, but none expects financial assistance to bail out poor management or 
financial decisions. The level of organization as business entities among farmers and farming 
businesses was apparent from how they provided answers to question during the interviews and 
was further evidenced by the presence of accounting books and the use of computers to access 
data to answer questions. 
3. What are IICEM’s relative strengths and weaknesses of intervening along the entire rice, 
millet, and sorghum value chains, as opposed to targeting specific areas? 
The most important and overarching finding was that the integrated facilitation approach for 
interventions among all businesses along the chains, not just the weakest links, was key to 
building relationships and strengthening the value chains. IICEM’s strength was that field 
specialists and non-governmental extension agents gained the confidence of all businesses 
involved. Another of IICEM’s strengths was that it mobilized temporary access to credit from 
input suppliers when the banking system closed during the military-political crisis of 2012. One 
of the weaknesses of the IICEM project was in the failure to specifically target organizational 
development training to those OPs that could benefit from it. Basic managerial capacity had to be 
in place in order for any training to have impact and those OPs with poor or weak managerial 
capacity could not benefit from any trainings. Another weakness was in the problems 
encountered with group solidarity. IICEM could have addressed these two areas more directly. 
4. What is the relative value-added (monetary and non-monetary) of the integration of 
IICEM’s infrastructure with other productivity inputs?
Although a specific monetary value could not be assigned, such as changes in gross margins, 
there is ample evidence that infrastructure improvements created added value. The Irrigated 
Village Perimeters (PIV) producers were able to expand their area under production as a result of 
IICEM investments in water control, water flow, and pumps. The expansion of the area, in turn, 
led directly to increased production of crops and increased revenues. The slight increases in 
productivity of the PIV areas during the first year of involvement likely came from the combined 
vi 
technical inputs and water control. In the bas-fond rice production areas in Sikasso the case was 
similar in that, increases in productive land due to leveling and dyke infrastructures led to 
increased production and marketable surpluses. Moreover, the women OP members were able to 
leverage the increased revenues and enhanced organizational capacity to access loans to purchase 
processing equipment to further add value to their par-boiled rice product. Key informants 
indicated that the availability of warehouse space at OPs contributed to the efficacy of grouped 
selling by providing a staging area for sales, storage and delivery of millet and sorghum. It was 
not clear whether the infrastructure and the additional equipment acquired during the IICEM 
project cycle will be supported with a replacement fund. 
5. Will the relationship between farmers, processors (and/or cereal traders), and banks 
continue to function without the technical and financial support of IICEM?
This was one of the more difficult questions to assess, usually it is a hypothetical question, but 
aside from inferring from the importance that farmers and businesses alike placed on the issue, 
there were grain producer groups that had been discontinued a cropping cycle before the 
evaluation. A special version of the group questionnaires was used to see if and how they coped 
with credit, input supply and marketing in the cycle after IICEM support had been removed 
The evidence from our survey results is negative, at least in the short term. Groups that had 
worked with IICEM for a short time and then were dropped noted a similar set of continuing 
value chain challenges as a result. The loss of a facilitating organization to vouch-safe (IICEM) 
meant that BNDA was no longer interested in loaning these OPs money. That is, unless the OPs 
agreed to raise cotton and thus enter the CMDT (Compagnie Malienne de Developpement des 
Textiles) monitoring and facilitation sphere, BNDA did not have confidence in the OP. The 
OPs, with reduced credit, uniformly stated that they reduced the area cultivated to accommodate 
the reduced level of inputs available. Volume produced declined and group sales ceased. 
Individuals returned to selling small quantities to small collectors, forfeiting the advantage of 
economies of scale gained under IICEM. Organizational problems within the OPs were 
exacerbated. The presence of IICEM or an IICEM-like project will continue to be necessary 
until the requisite capacities can be built up in producer organizations to allow them to sustain 
the shock of standing alone. Evidence from the experiences of other OPs lends support that this 
can be done with the exception of the bas-fond rice OPs (described in number 4 above). 
6. How has the recent instability in the country affected IICEM stakeholder behavior? 
The instability of 2012 impacted stakeholders in ways relative to their geographic location. 
Nationally, disrupted credit was a bottle neck for obtaining timely inputs; the international 
boycott reduced the timely supply of inputs, however briefly. Most of that year was a time of 
uncertainty, i.e., increased perceived risk. Among the groups most impacted were the irrigating 
farmers using pumps, because fuel was expensive or not available. The problem at harvest time 
was the international relief agencies had been providing relief aid to the refugees from the north. 
Gao and Timbuktu are the major markets for the Mopti producers and the seizure of those cities 
by the rebels caused a collapse in the market. That being said, it appears that the crisis is over 
and that it has not caused permanent changes in stakeholder behavior. Overall, Abt Associates 
was able to scale up in the first two years and then make a radical change in the composition of 
the groups attended in response to the implementation of the FtF strategy. Fortunately the FtF 
strategy did not imply a change in the integrated value chain approach and most of the original 
input supply, credit and traders were a factor in the continuity of the program. By then IICEM 
had earned its positive reputation with producers and service providers alike. 
vii 
Overall Recommendations: 
 Although IICEM participating farmers have improved their livelihoods, especially 
farming cooperatives in the irrigated village rice perimeters, IICEM-like project activities 
need to continue as a means to maintain and strengthen the progress observed for PIV 
farmers on one hand, and boost growth and livelihood improvement for the lowland rice, 
millet and sorghum farmers on the other hand. The slow progress in the livelihood 
improvement of sorghum and millet farmers may be due to the fact that these two crops 
have low market value. These two crops are however strategic in Mali due to their 
adaptation to the local conditions, specifically drought and unreliable rainfall patterns, 
and are well adapted to the diet of the local populations. To boost the livelihood 
improvement of millet and sorghum farmers, focus should be on value-added traits such 
as early maturing varieties, grain quality, and consumer preference (taste and nutritional 
value). 
 The evaluation found that although a diversity of data is available, the data is scattered 
and inconsistent. It is usually destined for use in a specific monitoring context. USAID 
should mandate future projects to develop monitoring and evaluation systems that collect 
and analyze a uniform set of data. Moreover, the data generated should be uniformly 
useable; not only to a specific project or even to USAID. Agricultural data should meet 
Malian national monitoring and evaluation needs as well. 
 Producer Organizations are widespread in Mali. They are the obvious focus for the 
facilitation approach of the value chain model. However, OPs cohesion is often only 
based on the existence of a project, rather than their own internal dynamic. Nevertheless, 
several OPs in the IICEM project have evolved to become well-managed organizations – 
even nascent rural enterprises. Continued effort needs to be applied to replicating these 
successes and reinforcing the management and enterprise capacities of OPs so that they 
can eventually take over the marketing, credit, and input strategies that IICEM facilitated, 
as standard operating roles themselves. 
 The value chain is really a chain of business relationships. The acceptance of contracting 
by both OPs and their private sector partners is evidence enough of this. More effort 
needs to be made to put more OPs on the kind of firm, businesslike ground that will make 
them more attractive (and more competitive) partners for banks, traders and processors. 
 During the course of any subsequent project, emphasis should be put on mechanisms that 
would enhance the availability and accessibility of improved and certified seeds and other 
inputs for value-added, capacity building, improved technology dissemination. Such 
mechanisms include: 
o Building and maintaining linkages between farmers and all other stakeholders 
involved in the crops’ value-chain and 
o Sensitization of farmers to the importance of improved certified seeds in 
increasing production and productivity. 
 Subsequent value chain projects aimed at this population should be integrated with the 
FtF future investments in improved nutrition and social and behavior change so that all 
three efforts are focused on the same communes and also on the same groups especially if 
studies identify a relation between cultural consumption practices/beliefs and stunting 
and malnutrition. 
1
I. INTRODUCTION 
IICEM (Integrated Initiatives for Economic Growth in Mali) was designed in 2009 to confront 
the problem of poverty. In 2001, it was estimated that 55% of Malians could be classified as 
extremely poor living on less than a dollar/day (ODHD/LCPM, 2006). Rural households with 
livelihoods dependent on agriculture are the most vulnerable, especially in the regions of Mopti, 
and Sikasso3
. About 80% of the Malian population relies on agriculture as a means to reduce 
poverty, improve food security, and overall livelihood. 
The number of Malian poor and extremely poor, living on less than a dollar/day, was estimated 
at 68.3% and 55.1%, respectively (ODHD/LCPM, 2006).4
 Rural households living on 
agriculture are the most vulnerable, especially in the regions of Mopti and Sikasso. About 80% 
of the Malian population relies on agriculture as a means to reduce poverty, improve food 
security, and overall livelihood. Millet, sorghum, rice and maize are the main staple crops. 
Millet and sorghum are rain-fed crops, with the drylands of Mopti region being an important 
millet production belt and the Sikasso region, a sorghum production belt. Rice is produced all 
over the country in many different production systems including large scale irrigated perimeters, 
small scale irrigated village perimeters, controlled/uncontrolled flooding, highland systems, and 
lowland systems (bas-fond). 
These three staple crops are increasingly considered crops with potential to achieve food 
security, generate income and reduce poverty and unemployment, especially if they are improved 
along their value-chain, from production to processing and marketing, not forgetting the input 
and seed segments. Vegetables are also produced in Mali, either as a single crop, in intercropping 
or in rotation with cereals, to provide populations with fresh produce needed for cash income and 
improved nutrition and health. In fact, in Mali, vegetables, when available are used as ingredients 
in the sauces that accompany the main dishes made with millet, sorghum, rice and/or maize. 
Up to 42% of the expenses of Malian households are allocated to food security,5
leaving the 
population in precarious conditions for the other expenses (housing, health, clothing, labor, 
inputs, etc.). This is indicative of their livelihood status. To help vulnerable households in Mopti, 
Sikasso and Koulikoro regions improve their livelihoods, the “Integrated Initiatives for 
Economic Growth in Mali” (IICEM) project of USAID has invested in millet, sorghum and rice 
using a value-chain approach at the farmers’ cooperative level. Investments in the input segment, 
materials and equipment, and capacity building are expected to boost yield and production 
quantity and quality. Investments in irrigation infrastructures are in turn expected to overcome 
the constraints of drought, extend the length of the rainy season and provide opportunity for off￾season production of vegetables. IICEM’s efforts in linking farmers with banks, processors, and 
traders are expected to expand markets, increase sale volumes and farmers income 
IICEM I was a multi-year economic growth activity designed to reduce poverty through 
increasing agricultural productivity, employment, and incomes in Mali (start date August 17, 
 
3
 ODHD/LCPM, 2006 
4 ODHD/LCPM, 2006. Profil de pauvreté du Mali 2001. Ministère du Développement Social, de la Solidarité et des 
personnes âgées, PNUD/Mali, Bamako, Mali, p73.
5 Recensement général de l’agriculture (RGA 2004/2005). Ministère de l’agriculture, Ministère de l’élevage et de la 
pêche, Ministère du plan et de l’aménagement du territoire, coopération française, PROJET GCP/INT/903/FR, May 
2007, p8.
2
2007 - end date December 31, 2010). It consolidated the work done under three previous 
contracts initiated in 2003 and ended in August 2007. IICEM II started on January 1, 2010. 
In these areas IICEM II built-up a base of 442 producer groups covering almost 11,000 ha6
from 
Timbuktu to Sikasso. However, with the development of the Feed the Future strategy for Mali 
and its approval in 20117 millet, sorghum, and livestock 
were chosen for food security and poverty reduction 
while IICEM only tackles the first two. Rice was chosen 
for growth in household incomes as well as for food 
security. In addition, the geographic coverage was 
focused in fewer communes where poverty was known 
to be greater as shown in Map 1 of the FtF focus 
communes. 
The geographic focus in 2011 was reduced from 7 to 3 
regions (Timbuktu, Mopti, Sikasso) and 2 districts in 
Alatona where the MCC project was operating. Even 
though Timbuktu was not dropped from the project, the 
activity was stopped for much of 2012-13 because of the 
security crisis; the millet and sorghum area was reduced 
to approximately 5,000 ha from11000 ha, and of the 442 groups the FtF project started with 241. 
Nevertheless, IICEM was able to expand in that year to include 252 additional groups for a total 
of 493.8
The diagnosis of these staples9
indicated that a value chain approach was a logical strategy or 
theory of change to plan and guide activities to help vulnerable households in Mopti and Sikasso 
regions improve their livelihoods. It was determined that the value chains for these staples were 
relatively unstructured and that by working to build understanding and trust between the links in 
the value chain there would be more formal structures that would support confidence in credit, 
contracts, and between buyers and sellers. Because of the vast number of individual farm 
families, and because farmers were organized in cooperatives and irrigation districts, IICEM 
focused on farmer groups producing rice (Map 3) millet, and sorghum (Map 2) as the units of 
contact. Investments in irrigation infrastructures were planned to overcome the constraints of 
drought, expand the area under cultivation, extend the length of the rainy season and provide 
opportunity for off-season production of vegetables. At the same time investments in storage and 
post-harvest handling were planned to add value to the quality of the crops as well as reduce 
post-harvest losses. The main organizational effort was to facilitate linking farmer groups with 
banks, processors, and traders in order to expand markets, increase sales volumes, and farmers’ 
incomes. 
 
6
 IICEM, 2011, Second Annual Report, p. 2 
7
 USAID/Mali. 2011, April 28th “Feed The Future Multi-Year Strategy: 2011-2015, p. 6 
8
IICEM. 2012, Third Annual Report, p. 10 
9
IICEM. 2010, Etude sur le chaine de valeur mil/sorgho au Mali, initiatives integrees pour la croissance 
economique au Mali, Contract No.: EDH-I-13-00005-04.
Map 1 FtF Focus Communes
3
 
In Mali, the millet and sorghum complex is the source of the staple cereals consumed by the 
majority of families in Mali. Millet is the primary cereal consumed throughout the territory 
followed by rice and sorghum. Millet and sorghum cover nearly 60% of food consumption needs 
of the people of Mali in both rural and urban areas. 
The largest millet production areas are the regions of Mopti and Segou, and those of sorghum are 
the regions of Sikasso and Koulikoro. (Additionally, maize production is concentrated in the 
cotton zone around Sikasso and Koulikoro and around Kayes.) Although the agricultural 
production system based on millet and sorghum is the most dominant in terms food, the sector 
has been characterized by inappropriate management. In the past, staple cereal crop production 
has received very little support from the Government of Mali or projects and development 
programs in Mali. 
The IICEM project covers millet (Mopti) and sorghum (Sikasso) production areas and 
complemented by two rice production systems (PIV rice in Mopti and bas-fond rice in Sikasso). 
Nearly all IICEM supported millet and sorghum OPs are male organizations. However, the 
evaluation team interviewed one female OP in Koutiala that specializes in millet and sorghum 
production which appeared to the field interviewers to be one of the best organized and well 
managed OPs in their sample. 
In 2012 USAID/Mali requested proposals for a third-party evaluation of IICEM and 
subsequently made the award to IBTCI and SENESO, a Malian agricultural research and 
development organization, to evaluate the implementation of the theory of change as applied to 
the value-chains of millet, sorghum and rice and to specifically examine changes in the 
interconnectivity of farmer cooperatives, processors, and banks, and its overall effect on rural 
livelihoods. 
Through this evaluation, USAID/Mali sought to answer the following key questions:10
 
10 See Annex I for the Task Order and extended evaluation questions. The original extended questions included 
comparisons dependent upon counterfactuals, i.e., comparison groups or projects, but after the RDBA, a new 
approach was submitted to USAID/Mali taking into consideration the lack of data for counterfactuals or 
comparisons. In that methodology (Annex V) the focus was on qualitative assessments of before and after by the 
participating and dropped IICEM groups. Comparisons with non-IICEM groups or projects were dropped. Hence 
we list the key questions here and not the extended questions that depended upon counterfactuals. 
Map 2 Sorghum and Millet Map 3 Rice
4
1. How have IICEM’s activities resulted in improved livelihoods for members of farming 
cooperatives and producer organizations? 
2. Has IICEM succeeded in helping farmers and farming businesses become more 
organized, productive, and financially secure? 
3. What are IICEM’s relative strengths and weaknesses of intervening along the entire rice, 
millet, and sorghum value chains, as opposed to targeting specific areas? 
4. What is the relative value-added (monetary and non-monetary) of the integration of 
IICEM’s infrastructure with other productivity inputs? 
5. Will the relationship between farmers, processors (and/or cereal traders), and banks 
continue to function without the technical and financial support of IICEM? 
a. How are IICEM-supported farming cooperatives continuing to work with 
processors to create market opportunities? 
b. Will banks continue to provide credit to farming cooperatives? 
c. What variables factor into banks providing credit after IICEM’s intervention has 
finished? 
6. How has the recent instability in the country affected IICEM stakeholder behavior? 
a. Are farmers continuing to use IICEM inputs? 
b. Are farmers continuing the upkeep of IICEM infrastructure? 
c. Are banks continuing to lend credit to IICEM farmers and farming cooperatives? 
5
II. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
In response to the RFTOP, IBTCI partnered with SENESO, a Malian agricultural research and 
development organization that specializes in Plant Breeding and Seed. The objectives of the 
partnership were to add local expertise to the two IBTCI international consultants and to provide 
evaluation experience to SENESO so that a Malian firm would have evaluation experience 
meeting USAID standards. The combined team consisted of a team leader and a deputy team 
leader, both with agricultural and rural development evaluation experience, including in Mali11
and elsewhere, the director of SENESO with plant breeding and production experience, two 
agricultural experts (one with evaluation experience overseas), and two others with local 
evaluation and production development careers in Mali. This seven person team was 
complimented by six teams of interviewers that were mobilized by SENESO’s logistical support. 
IBTCI home office provided a project director to supervise the rapid baseline data survey and the 
overall methodology for the evaluation. 
This evaluation was conducted from May to August of 2013 and was designed to cover the 
second phase of IICEM from 2010 to 2013. 2013 was a no-cost extension of the second phase 
(ending in August 2012). Thus secondary data and interviews used in this report include the 
results of the 2012-2013 agricultural campaign. 
The design of the methodology applied to the evaluation went through three stages, each time 
with a presentation and discussion with the USAID Mission. 
The original design in response to the RFTOP
12 was based on USAID evaluation guidelines for 
an impact evaluation, that is, the use of a quantitative analysis of the impact with a strong 
counterfactual for comparison with similar, yet non-participating farmer groups, the use of 
baseline line data on 1,897 farmer groups, and current or final measurements of the expected 
results variables.13 The proposed statistical model was for a difference-in-differences 
methodology that would compare the percent change in dependent variables, e.g. productivity, 
gross margin of profit, from time one to time two of participants with non-participant farmer 
organizations. The second design was in response to the results of a preliminary assessment14 by 
IICEM of the data quality held by participating and non-participating farmer groups. The initial 
findings from the preliminary assessment by IICEM called into question the reliability and 
availability of the data on both types of the farmer groups. Accordingly, because of the tentative 
results of the IICEM data quality study, USAID asked that IBTCI conduct a Rapid Baseline Data 
Assessment (RBDA)15 before conducting the impact evaluation per se. A methodology for the 
RBDA was prepared and approved by USAID. In addition, upon arrival the evaluation team 
found that neither USAID nor IICEM had the baseline data on 1,897 participating and non￾participating groups as suggested in the request for proposal.16
 
11 The initial team leader was replaced by another team leader who had more extensive, but non-Malian experience 
evaluating USAID agricultural development projects. His background was also cropping and seed production. 
12 IBTCI, Technical Proposal to USAID/Mali “Evaluation of the Integrated Initiatives for Economic Development in 
Mali (IICEM) Project, SOL-688-12-000014” September 24, 2012. 
13 USAID/Mali. RFTOP SOL-688-12-000014, August 15, 2012, p.7 footnote 3. 
14 IICEM “Rapid Data Collection” undated approximately May, 2013. 
15 USAID/Mali, Task Order RAN-I-00-09-00016, 29 April 2013, p.8. 
16 Neither IICEM nor the USAID/Mali personnel were able to explain where the reference to a baseline survey came 
from in the RFP. The data did not exist and the original methodology proposed was no longer applicable. 
6
The RBDA was focused on the basic data used by IICEM in quarterly reports, i.e., productivity, 
area cropped, cost estimates, and pricing for the calculation of sales. The methodology for that 
survey consisted of interviews of a sample of non-governmental extension agents from all five 
implementing partners and a sample of non-participating farmer organizations in Sikasso and 
Mopti. RBDA survey17 findings were that the non-participating groups did not keep production 
and sales records and that doing a comparison of their production and productivity with member 
farmer groups would not be possible. In the case of the IICEM farmer groups it was found that 
they generally did not keep records and that the data that was recorded had been kept by the 
IICEM partner extension agents. Furthermore, it was found that the methods used by IICEM to 
measure productivity and sales were faulty and measurement error was too great to provide 
reliable data for statistical analysis. There was one exception to that conclusion; PIV rice groups 
in Mopti did have reliable records and their productivity was not based on samples, but, instead, 
on the whole harvest and dependably measured areas under irrigation. They also sold their 
harvest surplus as a group and had records that the local implementing partner (Peenal) reported. 
Due to a lack of baseline data and no accurate record of the indicators of interest, the design 
shifted to a qualitative approach (see Annex VI for the revised methodology) based on group 
interviews and their assessment of relative changes in productivity, access to market, prices, 
credit, and processors comparing before and with IICEM. The interest of the evaluators and of 
the Mission remained, however, on assessing the impact of the IICEM activities on the OPs. The 
key informant interviews18 of suppliers, credit, processors, and seed suppliers remained the same 
as originally planned, but the plan for the counterfactual using non-participants or other donors 
was dropped for the lack of data.19 The qualitative approach focused on the group assessments20
by farmers and spouses from a sample of all cropping systems and in all five areas managed by 
the implementing partners. The design matrix of the Key Evaluation Questions from the TO 
and the questionnaires and methods used to answer those questions is presented in Annex VI. 
In the case of the PIV rice groups both the qualitative methods described above and quantitative 
methods were used to assess changes in production, productivity, access to credit, marketing 
strategies, and access to inputs. The quantitative analysis was of the secondary information21
gathered by Peenal from the groups during the years of the project and, at the request of 
IBTCI/SENESO, they obtained 2009 data for use as the baseline against which to measure 
changes in productivity, percent of production marketed, and gross margin. In the revised 
methodology presented to USAID/Mali in July, it was proposed that the time series data from the 
PIV groups be used for trend analysis (including graphic presentation) and if the data available 
permitted, regression analysis would be used to compare the importance of the IICEM services 
(credit, input/technology, and marketing). As was found out in the surveys, these services were 
provided to all groups as an integrated package and hence could not be used as independent 
variables. In brief, all groups received the same treatment. Regression analysis was not possible. 
 
17 IBTCI Deliverable #1 Rapid Baseline Data Appraisal: Findings and Conclusions from Field Work in Mopti 
and Sikasso, 14-22 June 2013.
18 See list of key interviews in Annex III. 
19 This change did not eliminate the key questions, but it did make answering some of the sub-questions impossible 
as noted in Annex 1 Section C.3.2. Specific Evaluation Questions 
20 See Annex IV for the questionnaires 
21 SPSS file (This will be provided in a CD to the Mission) 
7
With the exception of the bas-fond22 rice groups, most (85%) of the members of the farmer 
groups were males. To ascertain the impact of the program on women who were not members of 
the bas-fond groups, yet were indirect participants as spouses of participating farmers, group 
discussions were held at each sampled group based on a special questionnaire.23 Generally, 
female interviewers conducted these group discussions separately from males to provide 
confidentiality, but in some cases the discussions were held by male and female interviewers. 
One of the key questions in the RFTOP concerned the sustainability of the linkages and systems 
established by the program. Originally the designed approach was to use the opinion of the key 
informants and the professional judgment of the evaluators to answer this question. However, 
with the reorientation of IICEM in 2011, certain types of crops and certain geographic areas were 
dropped from the program. Thus, at the time of the evaluation, substantial numbers of groups 
had gone through a cropping cycle without IICEM technical assistance and also assistance for 
input, credit, marketing and processing linkages. They offered an unexpected look at the 
continuity of the linkages without IICEM. A sample of dropped millet, sorghum, and corn 
groups was drawn and interviews conducted using questionnaires24 similar to those used with 
participating groups. The questions were more in the sense of “Since ending your relation with 
IICEM, how have you…?” whereas, with the IICEM participating groups the sense of the 
comparative questions was, “Before IICEM how… and since IICEM …” 
The Mission asked that the evaluation team ascertain the type and level of impact that the 
military collapse and coup of 2011 had on the participants in the program. This open-ended 
question25 was asked of the 32 extension agents selected from all five IICEM implementing 
partners as key informants during the RBDA, the business managers of the input supply, credit, 
and marketing firms, and of all 60 groups in the sample survey. 
The change from a statistical quantitative model to a qualitative approach provided the 
opportunity to use the resources and time available26 for a different sampling approach. The 
quantitative, difference-of-differences approach required a sample size to test statistical 
differences between groups and also over time. The sample size, given the number of groups 
and the desired confidence level, was to be based on standard formulas. In the case of the 
qualitative approach the question of “confidence” changes from a statistical reference to a more 
intuitive reference. At the same time, the objective is to arrive at a conclusion from a number of 
groups, e.g., dropped corn, PIV rice, bas-fond rice, etc., that are not large. In the end it was 
decided that if five or six groups were interviewed for each cropping system in each area the 
team would have confidence in the findings if there were consistent responses. As shown in 
Tables I and II in the Revised Methodology (Annex V), the groups from which samples were 
taken for the interviews were small, and the number of times that such groups were sampled 
offered replication. 
 
22 Bas-fond refers to rice that is produced in a low laying area that is flooded by rainfall and not a river-fed area in 
the South of Mali. It generally has a natural clay pan whereas the surrounding area is more porous and drains 
quicker and not suitable for flood irrigation. 
23 See Annex IV D Spouse Questionnaires. 
24 See Annex IV E Discontinued Groups. 
25 See the last page of the Group Interview Questionnaires in sub-Annex II of the Revised Methodology (Annex V). 
26 Please keep in mind that the RBDA was not in the original terms of reference when the design was planned. The 
RDBA consumed two weeks of LOE in country that had not been anticipated, but the length of time in country was 
not extended. 
8
The above approach provides sufficient precision for hypothesis testing in the present case. 
Moreover, it is important to point out that the question is not how much productivity has 
changed, but if the systems to enhance access to credit, inputs, markets, etc. have been put into 
practice and have been judged to be an improvement by farmer groups.27
In the initial RBDA survey, the key evaluation personnel in the proposal interviewed the 
extension agents employed by the five IICEM partners, and four experienced interviewers 
interviewed the non-participating groups. That team of ten prepared the interview questions, 
discussed the purpose of the questions, that is, the information desired, and then played the 
interviewer/interviewee roles. The instruments were not tested in the field before application. 
As the interviews were being conducted, the methods in which questions were asked were 
refined to increase the speed of the interviews and to find the facts about the measurement of 
productivity, value of crops, and the area under cultivation and the impact of the crisis. 
The four teams recruited for the more extensive group interviews included some of the key 
personnel and the interviewers from the RBDA as supervisors. Each team consisted of two men 
and two women so that the spouse and participant groups would be done simultaneously at each 
group. Again, the interviewers and the key personnel reviewed the questionnaires question-by￾question discussing the intention of the question and the vocabulary in both French and 
Bambara. A test of the instruments and logistics took the form of actual application with 
sampled groups in Sikasso for three days. Daily, the key personnel, supervisors, and 
interviewers reviewed the experience. Aside from a few editions the instruments and the 
methodology went smoothly. After the elections in August the teams were dispatched to both 
Mopti and Sikasso to implement the interview plan. 
The limitations to methodology reflect the changes in the design from a quantitative to 
qualitative methodology because of the type of data available put the full weight of the 
evaluation on primary qualitative data that needed to be gathered. Because the questions in the 
group discussions had to be in terms of the relative changes (better, the same, worse) in access to 
credit, inputs, processors, and markets, the findings cannot be stated in terms of absolute changes 
in prices, productivity, incomes or profits. The lack of absolute, quantitative data from both 
participating and non-participating groups made the use of the difference-in-differences methods 
originally proposed impossible. The inability to sample a counterfactual to compare participant 
or other agency groups with the IICEM groups meant that some of the sub-sections of the key 
questions in the TO could not be answered. Nevertheless, the methodology is still adequate to 
answer the basics of the six key questions posited in the TO, but not to answer the sub-questions 
that depended upon counterfactuals, comparison groups or time series. In the case of PIV rice 
the quantitative time series data is reliable and changes in yields and incomes can be 
demonstrated. 
The quantitative data from the 60 PIV rice producing groups in the Mopti region came from 
Peenal’s records or was gathered at our request from the three geographic areas (Djenne, Mopti 
and Youwarou) covered by IICEM. We partitioned the data by area to try to reduce the eco￾agricultural variation; the means of the groups were then compared over four cropping cycles 
and graphed. These quantitative findings were triangulated with the qualitative findings obtained 
 
27 As will be shown in the PIV system where there was reliable data, the annual fluctuation due to natural conditions 
and also the political crisis causes variation that cannot be controlled in a statistical sense. 
9
from the farmers in the PIV group discussions. The PIV groups all received the same types of 
technical packages and assistance such as credit and marketing effort. Those independent 
variables were not variable in the sense that they could be used as predictor variables for changes 
in the dependent variables. The original intent was to use regression analysis to show the 
relative importance of these IICEM inputs, but because of the consistency there was no
measureable variance. The aforementioned climatic variance also was beyond measure at the 
group level. In the end, trend analysis was conducted and presented in the form of graphs over 
time. 
To assess the sustainability of the program (Key Question #5) the questionnaires obtained from 
two sets of dropped groups were reviewed for each of the IICEM facilitations (credit, marketing, 
technology). In addition, the key informant interviews for credit, marketing, processing and seed 
production included questions related to sustainability. For sustainability of the seed production 
effort one comparative group that had been in a similar, USAID funded, seed program was 
interviewed in the same way as the dropped groups were, that is, how and what have they done 
since the program ended. 
The participating groups were analyzed in much the same way as the dropped groups except that 
the analysis was by cropping system in each area under each implementing partner to try to 
detect any variations between implementing partner or between Mopti and Sikasso regions. 
Variations, if notable are among the findings presented. 
The evaluation team and agricultural experts wrote up the analysis of the cropping systems seed 
production as stand-alone reports (provided to USAID/Mali). From these analyses the six 
chapters answering the key questions were prepared. Livelihoods analysis was based on the 
spouse questionnaires across cropping systems by region. 
The diversity of questionnaires and the number of different cropping systems and special cases 
provided information for a very comprehensive assessment of the IICEM’s value chain approach 
from the perspective of farmers, spouses, traders, processors, bankers, and input suppliers. In 
reality, this evaluation, in spite of the fact that the quantitative data was not available as assumed, 
provided a process and impact-oriented evaluation of the IICEM. 
The structure of this report is to treat each of the specific questions in the TO as a separate 
chapter with an introductory section for orientation followed by the findings, analysis and 
conclusion, and recommendations. However, before answering the key questions, we have 
chosen to present the Village Irrigated Perimeters (PIV) groups of Mopti region as an illustrative 
case because there was reliable quantitative data over four cropping cycles that included a 
baseline the year before IICEM started to which the qualitative methods used for the evaluation 
of all groups could be applied. Thus the triangulation of both quantitative and qualitative data 
provides a more robust set of findings and conclusions to address the key questions in the TO 
with respect to this cropping system. We are convinced that had we had similar quantitative data 
for all cropping systems the overall findings for IICEM would have been similar. That is, with 
regard to the development of the value chains by IICEM, similar results would be found with 
regard to the facilitation of varieties, technology, credit, processing, and marketing. The 
exceptions to this general conclusion will be pointed out. The trend analysis was related to the 
qualitative information and the recent historical events. Following the case of PIV the 
presentation will be by key question. 
10
III. QUANTITATIVE FINDINGS 
Introduction. The PIV (Irrigated Village Perimeters) have been an economic development 
feature in the Mopti area since at least the 1980s. They have been assisted by numerous projects 
and organizations over this time. As a result, most producers on the PIVs have developed a 
relative mastery of the technologies available to them. They know the correct doses for the 
application of fertilizers, they know the value of using improved seed varieties and they 
understand the importance of the timely acquisition and application of inputs. The problem in 
the PIVs, as we deduced from focus groups with producers, is that the absence of sustainable 
connections with the wider value chain has inhibited their ability to respond to market 
opportunities. 
A significant data base28 of reliable information on production, area cultivated and volumes 
marketed exists for the PIVs. We were able to exploit the data base to develop a trend analysis to 
better understand the impacts of IICEM interventions on farmers and producer organizations. A 
number of cross-cutting issues emerged from this analysis, and as a result, they will be treated as 
a separate section. Complementary data from focus group interviews is used in the findings to 
triangulate and explain the quantitative data used in the trends. The trend analysis shows 
consistent, positive progress with regard to the major variables: production, area cultivated, sales 
per farmer, and volumes marketed. A dip in the upward trend of these variables in 2012 is 
largely explained by the effects of the political and security crisis that occurred in Mali starting 
in March of 2012. 
Agro-ecological context. The three groups of PIVs (Djenne, Mopti, and Youwarou) come from 
three different hydrological regimes that impact productivity as will be shown. Djénne is above 
the Niger River on the Bani River and hence Djenne depends upon the rainfall in the Bani 
watershed for its irrigation water. If there is ample rain and early rain, then the river will rise and 
make irrigation more uniform. In the case of the PIV in Mopti, they draw on water that is at the 
confluence of the Niger and the Bani rivers. Accordingly, they have two watersheds for greater 
security. Youwarou PIVs are actually in the Lac Debo area of the Niger Delta further 
downstream from both Mopti and Djénne. Their soils have ample water for at least 5 months of 
the year. 
Land to Family Ratio. The establishment and improvement of the PIVs began in the 1970s and 
the settlement or allocation of PIV system land varied depending on historical population 
distributional factors. It is worth noting that as families subdivided land, land per family plot 
sizes varied among the three PIV groups, with Youwarou averaging .40 - .77 ha/family (the 
largest ratio), Mopti averaging .45 - .56 ha/family, and Djénne averaging .24 - .31 ha/family (the 
smallest average size holding among the three). 
The interaction of these two factors, land/family ratio and availability of water, explain the 
differences in the findings between the three areas as shown in the graphs below. 
Findings. The findings using trend analysis only lend themselves to conclusions if triangulated 
with the qualitative data from the group discussions because they show what the facts are, but do 
 
28 The data on the PIVs from 2009 to 2012 was obtained directly from Peenal the IICEM implementing partner in 
Mopti. Peenal obtained the data directly from the OPs. We did not use data from the IICEM Bamako office. There 
were differences in the figures; it was decided to use the office and personnel closest to the PIVs. 
11
not explain the trend. In this section we will treat the key questions of production, productivity, 
increased incomes as findings. They will be summarized in the conclusions section of this report 
based on the qualitative information. The method for this analysis is based on the trends 
triangulated with the information from group interviews as well as an understanding of the recent 
historical context. This is a traditional mixed-methods approach to evaluation where quasi￾experimental data is not available. 
If the quantitative data were available so that variations in the inputs, credit, prices and water 
flow had been available to predict production, productivity and sales, then a regression model 
would have been possible, or at least correlations between the inputs and outputs could have 
been generated, but, as explained above, this information was not available. Also, had some 
groups received credit facilitation but not marketing facilitation as an experimental design, then 
the relative importance of these inputs might have been measured. However, the program was 
not structured as an experiment and because the IICEM model or theory of change was that the 
integration of all facilitated services (credit, supplies, varieties, access to market) was necessary 
to provide the synergy for achieving the targets. Accordingly, it was found that the groups 
started using the same services at the same time. Moreover, the exogenous variables like climate 
and political events, as found in the qualitative data from group discussions, were overwhelming 
and crucial to understanding the trend patterns. In brief, a strictly quantitative analysis would not 
have been an objective method to test for changes due to IICEM inputs, and this case shows the 
importance of a mixed-methods approach for evaluating a value chain program. 
Groups Attended and Areas Covered. From 2009 to 2012 the number of OPs receiving IICEM 
services increased from 36 to 60, and the area cultivated on IICEM supported PIVs doubled from 
837 ha to 1,696 ha (Figure 1). This increase was made possible by IICEM investments in 
production infrastructures: irrigation canal cleaning, increased pumping capacity and 
rehabilitation, and expansion of existing poulders. The planting of the increased area was 
facilitated by increased access to credit for the inputs. This resulted in an increase in the 
land/holder ratio (Figure 2): 
Figure 1 PIV ha by Sub-Region Figure 2 PIV Area Cultivated per Smallholder (ha) 
 
Responses during focus groups with OPs once again indicate that this result is also due to 
producer response to better market and supply conditions fostered by the IICEM project. Both 
grain traders and producer organizations stated that the economies of scale engendered by 
IICEM’s facilitation approach were key to a more satisfactory relationship among the 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2009 2010 2011 2012
Djénne
Mopti
Youwarou
Overall
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
2009 2010 2011 2012
Djénne
Mopti
Youwarou
Overall
12
participants in the value chain. Grouped sales by OP members and negotiation of forward 
contracts through the Ateliers de Negotiation (“Negotiation Workshops”) were almost 
universally cited by focus group participants as key elements in establishing a basis of trust 
between producers and buyers. As noted above, this, plus the existence of a stable financial 
services platform enabled producers to risk investing resources in expanding areas cultivated 
with a view to a more stable market opportunity. 
The drop in area cultivated per OP in 2012 is explained by the effects of the political/security 
crisis. In both discussion groups and interviews with suppliers and traders explained that because 
inputs were limited, including fuel for pumps, the OPs did not plant some areas. Area cultivated 
declined in two of the three sectors covered by the data. It is worth noting that in Djenne, where, 
although the increase was smaller, the upward trend continued. It is the most southerly 
production zone, and consequently the farthest away from the area of insecurity. The reasons for 
decline noted above apply in this case also. In addition, most producers reduced the area 
cultivated to that necessary to accommodate household consumption needs. 
Production and Productivity. As shown in 
Figure 3, production per PIV member 
(smallholder) increased steadily under IICEM 
until the onset of the political/security crisis. 
Although productivity per ha remained 
relatively stable during the period of analysis 
(2009-2012), increases in production per 
member were achieved through increasing the 
area cultivated (Figure 4). This quantitative 
data was confirmed by declarations of OP 
members themselves during focus group 
sessions. Moreover, OP members attribute 
gains in production to the area that they could 
put into PIV production accompanied by the 
enhanced access to production inputs because 
of the financial services facilitated by IICEM and 
its sub-contractor Peenal. The improved water 
management facilities (pumps, canals and 
techniques) also brought more area into rice 
production. 
IICEM facilitation of improved relations with 
grain buyers was also cited by focus groups as a 
key element in providing a more stable 
environment for producers to respond to market 
signals. Indeed, the grouped marketing approach 
using pre-negotiated contracts was praised by 
both traders and producers as the key to increased 
marketing of paddy during the period of analysis. 
Focus group and key informant interviews 
0.000
0.500
1.000
1.500
2.000
2.500
3.000
3.500
4.000
4.500
5.000
2009 2010 2011 2012
Djénne
Mopti
Youwarou
Overall
Figure 3 PIV Production per Smallholder (MT)
0.00
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
2009 2010 2011 2012
Djénne
Mopti
Youwarou
Overall
Figure 4 PIV Productivity T/ha
13
uniformly confirmed that the drop in production in 2012 was due to the effects of the 
political/security crisis. The generalized insecurity in the area increased the perception of risk 
among all parties. Movement was restricted for market participants. Key informants confirmed 
that the main markets for grain produced in the Mopti area is to the North, in Timbuctu and Gao, 
both of which were seized by militants. Local markets were also flooded with grain from food 
aid to alleviate the refugee situation, thus driving prices lower, further reducing the incentives to 
produce. Inputs were much harder to get because of the near total absence of financial services 
due to closure of the BNDA in Mopti. Indeed, access to fertilizer was only possible due to the 
actions of IICEM to provide them to OPs working with the project. 
Marketing. Actions taken by IICEM and its sub-contractor to enhance market access and 
performance clearly helped provide the stimulus for the expanded production shown above. 
Volumes marketed by OPs producing rice on the PIVs increased in trends similar to production 
and area cultivated (Figure 5).
Although pre-financing for inputs has been available for a long time in one way or another to 
PIV producers, responses during focus group sessions clearly indicate that IICEM support for 
production credits was a key element in increased production. All ten of the OPs interviewed 
said they were either very satisfied (8) or satisfied (2) with the level of access to inputs under 
IICEM and all but one OP were either very satisfied (8) or satisfied with IICEM facilitation of 
input supply. The added confidence that producers had in a stabilized relationship with BNDA, 
as noted above, led directly to the production of a larger marketable surplus. 
The value of paddy sold per smallholder29 also increased until the crisis of 2012 (Figure 6).
 
 
 
29 The interaction between water regime and the size of holding is clearly shown with Youwarou having the highest 
average and Djénne the lowest. 
.000
.500
1.000
1.500
2.000
Djénne
Mopti
Youwaro
u
Overall 0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
2009
2010
2011
2012
Djénne
Mopti
Youwaro
u
Overall
Figure 5 PIV Volume Marketed per Producer 
(MT)
Figure 6 PIV Value of Product Marketed per 
Smallholder (FCFA)
14
IICEM’s strategy of working with traders and OPs to facilitate contacts improved the level of 
confidence on each side so that a durable marketing relationship could be established. All ten of 
the OPs interviewed agreed that both price and the volume of production available for market 
had increased as a result of IICEM actions to facilitate a more favorable market environment. 
Moreover, they also agreed that the key elements in fostering that environment were the use of 
forward contracting, grouped sales and negotiating prices as a group (OP) rather than as 
individuals (focus group declarations). 
An unexpected element that emerged from the trend analysis was an indication of a positive 
effect on lifestyles. We analysed the data to determine the per cent of the rice crop that was 
marketed. 
Figure 7 shows that the trend already 
started to level off or decline by 2011. 
This means that although farmers were 
marketing larger volumes of rice, they 
were still selling a relatively smaller 
proportion of the overall harvest. One 
implication that can be drawn from this 
is that households were keeping a larger 
share of production for home 
consumption. What we cannot explain 
is why the producers in Djénne, the 
smallest parcels and the least stable 
water supply, have tended to sell a 
greater proportion of their crops than 
the other areas where the holdings were 
larger and water conditions more stable. 
Conclusions. Actions taken by IICEM and its sub-contractor to enhance market access and 
performance clearly helped to provide the stimulus for expanded production of paddy on Village 
Irrigated Perimeters (PIV). 
 The production technology, varieties, water management, inputs offered by IICEM 
probably contributed to the noted increase in productivity from 2009 to 2010, but after 
that change productivity leveled off. 
 The decline in both quantity and value of marketed production in 2012 can be attributed 
directly to the political/security crisis. The major impacts of the crisis cited by focus 
group participants were: late or non-delivery of inputs due to closure of banks and 
consequent lack of credit (5 of 10 OPs interviewed) and the high price of diesel fuel for 
motorpumps (5 of ten). 
 Group sales by OP members and negotiation of forward contracts plus the existence of a 
stable financial services platform enabled PIV producers to risk investing resources in 
expanding areas cultivated with a view to a more stable market opportunity. 
 The production and marketing data on the Village Irrigated Perimeters represents an 
invaluable monitoring tool for future project management. It should be maintained and 
kept up to date, especially as it will be important to note if the trends observed from 2009 
to 2012 reappear as expected when the effects of the political/security crisis wane. 
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
2009 2010 2011 2012
Djénne
Mopti
Youwarou
Overall
Figure 7 PIV Percent of Production Marketed
15
IV. ANSWERS TO THE KEY EVALUATION QUESTIONS30
1. How have IICEM’s activities resulted in improved livelihoods for members of farming 
cooperatives and producer organizations? 
Introduction. For livelihood assessment female spouses of the members of the IICEM 
participating cooperatives were interviewed. In the case of bas-fond groups the women 
themselves were the farmers, and, accordingly, they were asked both the production and the 
livelihood questions. The choice of the female spouses for livelihood assessment was driven by 
the fact that women are the ones in charge of household chores, food processing and preparation 
and distribution of food among household members. Hence they are expected to be better aware 
of the changes that may have occurred in livelihood conditions as compared with men. 
Furthermore, to take into account gender considerations, the team of interviewers on the 
livelihood questionnaires (Annex IV D) was composed of two women in most cases. 
Key livelihood components that were assessed included, among others, levels of production, 
food security, the length of the hungry season (période de soudure), level of income, expenses, 
vegetable consumption, health and nutritional conditions, and overall economic prosperity. Data 
was entered into an excel sheet and analyzed qualitatively. 
Livelihood findings. 
Changes in livelihoods - millet cooperatives in Mopti region. In general, respondents of millet 
farming cooperatives in Bankass and Koro (Mopti) indicated that since involvement in IICEM 
key livelihood indicators have improved including levels of production and some food security. 
However, despite their positive assessment of food security, the millet farming cooperatives have 
complained that the length of the hungry season (période de soudure) has not been reduced. 
That is, they have not appreciably increased the amount of quality or quantity of reserves after 
harvest from before. Table 1 below indicates the assessments for all livelihood indicators in both 
Koro and Bankass. Other livelihood indicators that received positive assessments were the 
availability and consumption of vegetables, levels of income, expenses, and overall economic 
prosperity. Note that although millet farmers in Koro and Bankass indicated improved health 
conditions, there seems to be problems with the occurrence of diseases for all the sampled OPs 
and in both Koro and Bankass. 
Table 1 Farmers' own perception of their livelihood with IICEM in Koro and Bankass 
Villages and corresponding farming cooperatives in the cercle of Koro
BondoTéna Djidja Bolirou Tendely Patin Koro
Barassoro Amaga Dègoubèrè Maïrèbara Amakènè
Amaji￾guedioro
Level of Production 1 1 1 1 1 1
Length hungry season 2 2 2 2 2 2
Number of meals/day 1 1 1 1 1 1
Meal quantity/serving 1 1 1 1 1 1
 
30 As explained above, some of the sub-questions that depended upon counterfactuals and quantitative baselines. 
Thus we used the key questions as the titles. 
16
Sauce quantity per meal 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sauce quality per meal 1 1 1 1 1 1
Snacks/day children 1 1 1 1 1 1
Vegetable availability 1 1 1 1 0 1
vegetables consumption 1 1 1 1 0 1
Diseases/health 2 2 2 2 2 2
Overall food security 1 1 1 1 1 1
Level of income 1 1 1 1 1 1
Level of expenses 1 1 1 1 1 1
Overall prosperity 1 1 1 1 1 1
Villages and corresponding farming cooperatives in the cercle of Bankass
Logo Konsagou Tiembara 1 Sogoutou Ogossagou Dounde
Bodjinabara
Cooperati
ve des 
agriculteu
rs
Cooperative 
Merebara Amakene
Amako -
Kene Ambatiegue
Level of Production 1 1 1 1 1 1
Length hungry season 2 2 2 2 2 2
Number of meals/day 0 1 0 0 0 0
Meal quantity/serving 1 2 1 1 2 1
Sauce quantity per meal 1 2 1 1 2 1
Sauce quality per meal 1 1 1 1 1 1
Snacks/day children 1 1 1 1 1 1
Vegetable availability 0 1 0 1 1 1
vegetables consumption 1 1 1 1 1 1
Diseases/health 2 2 2 2 2 2
Overall food security 1 1 1 1 1 1
Level of income 1 1 1 1 1 1
Level of expenses 1 1 1 1 1 1
Overall prosperity 1 1 1 1 1 1
Legend: 0: no change, 1: improved since IICEM, 2: declined or no improvement 
Changes that occurred in the livelihood of sorghum cooperatives in Sikasso region. In the three 
cercles of Sikasso region (Bougouni, Sikasso, and Koutiala), the sampled sorghum cooperatives 
generally had a positive assessment of their livelihoods, especially the components production, 
food security, income, vegetable availability and consumption, and overall economic prosperity. 
Although there is variability between OPs in the region the majority of OPs had good perception 
of their livelihoods. However, the length of the hungry season is still a problem in the cercle of 
Sikasso where three OPs out of six and in Koutiala where two OPs out of six gave a bad 
perception of this livelihood component. Only one OP in Bougouni had a negative perception of 
the length of the hungry season (Tables 2-4). 
17
Table 2 Perception of shorghum cooperatives in Bougouni of their livelihood with IICEM 
Mamissa Kadiaka Fabougou Sola Djiguenina
Kouroulam
ini
Yereyiriwa
Seneyiriwa 
ton
CPC 
Fabougou
FassoDamb
e
CPC 
Djiguenina
CPC 
Madina
Level of Production 1 1 1 1 1 1
Length hungry season 1 1 1 2 1 1
Number of meals/day 1 1 0 0 1 1
Quantity of meal/serving 1 1 1 0 1 2
Sauce quantity per meal 1 1 1 0 1 2
Sauce quality per meal 1 1 1 1 1 1
Number of snacks/day 
children 1 1 0 0 1 1
Availability of vegetables 1 1 1 1 1 1
Consumption of vegetables 1 1 1 1 1 1
Diseases/health 0 0 2 0 0 2
Overall food security 1 1 1 1 1 1
Level of income 1 1 1 1 1 1
Level of expenses 1 1 2 0 1 2
Overall prosperity 1 1 1 1 1 1
Legend: 0: no change, 1: improved since IICEM, 2: declined or no improvement 
Table 3 Perception of sorghum cooperatives in Sikasso of their livelihood with IICEM 
Sougoula Makono N'Tchibougou Zérélani Djinikorola
Zanférébou
gou
Noupagagnon
CPC 
Makono
CPC 
N'Tchibougou Sinignèsigui Benkadi N'Kouala
Level of Production 1 1 1 1 1 1
Length hungry season 2 2 2 1 1 1
Number of meals/day 0 0 0 0 0 0
Quantity meal/serving 2 1 1 0 1 0
Sauce quantity per meal 2 1 1 0 1 0
Sauce quality per meal 1 0 1 0 2 2
Snacks/day children 1 0 1 1 0 0
Vegetable availability 1 0 0 2 0 1
Vegetable consumption 1 0 1 2 0 1
Diseases/health 2 2 2 1 1 1
Overall food security 1 1 1 1 1 2
Level of income 1 1 1 1 1 1
Level of expenses 1 0 0 2 1 1
Overall prosperity 1 1 1 1 1 1
Legend: 0: no change, 1: improved since IICEM, 2: declined or no improvement 
18
Table 4 Perception of sorghum cooperatives in Koutiala of their livelihood with IICEM 
Molobala Kapala ZanGasso Signe Niwansso Nanpossela
CPC PAM CPCV3
CPCV2 
Zangasso
CPCV 
designe
Yeredon￾Nidasso Jigisèmè
Level of Production 1 2 1 1 1 1
Length hungry season 2 0 1 2 0 1
Number of meals/day 0 0 0 0 0 0
Quantity meal/serving 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sauce quantity/ meal 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sauce quality/meal 1 0 1 2 2 1
Snacks/day children 2 0 0 0 0 1
Vegetable availability 1 0 1 2 1 1
Vegetable consumption 1 2 1 2 1 1
Diseases/health 1 2 1 1 1 1
Overall food security 1 0 1 1 1 1
Level of income 1 2 1 1 1 1
Level of expenses 1 2 1 1 2 1
Overall prosperity 1 2 1 1 1 1
Legend: 0: no change, 1: improved since IICEM, 2: declined or no improvement 
Changes that occurred in the livelihoods of the lowland rice cooperatives in Sikasso. Female 
farmers’ self-assessment of the livelihood components production, vegetable consumption, 
income, expenses, food security, and overall prosperity was positive for all the sampled OPs. 
However, the length of hungry season was still a problem for three OPs in terms of the quantity 
of meal/serving for one OP, quality of the sauce by one OP, and for health/diseases by two OPs. 
All other livelihood components were either rated as improved or no change (Table 5). 
Table 5 Lowland rice women OPs’ own assessment of their livelihoods 
Loutana Niena
Finkolo
Ganadougou M'Pegnesso Nantoumana
Zangaradou
gou
Fokaben COFRN Sabougnouma Benkadi Benkadi Benkadi
Level of Production 1 1 1 1 1 1
Length hungry season 1 2 1 2 2 1
Number of meals/day 0 0 0 0 0 0
Quantity of meal/serving 1 1 1 1 2 1
Sauce quantity/ meal 1 1 1 1 0 1
Sauce quality/ meal 2 1 1 1 1 1
Number of snacks/day 
children 0 1 0 1 0 1
Availability of vegetables 1 1 1 1 1 0
Consumption of 
vegetables 1 1 1 1 1 1
Diseases/health 1 1 1 0 2 2
Overall food security 1 1 1 1 1 1
19
Loutana Niena
Finkolo
Ganadougou M'Pegnesso Nantoumana
Zangaradou
gou
Fokaben COFRN Sabougnouma Benkadi Benkadi Benkadi
Level of income 1 1 1 1 1 1
Level of expenses 1 1 1 1 1 1
Overall prosperity 1 1 1 1 1 1
Legend: 0: no change, 1: improved since IICEM, 2: declined or no improvement 
Changes that occurred in the livelihoods of the PIV rice cooperatives. All the sampled rice 
farming cooperatives in the irrigated village perimeters of Djenne and Mopti cercles (Mopti 
region) rated as positive results on the entire list of key livelihood indicators including the length 
of the hungry season and occurrence of diseases which were found problematic with some OPs 
of the lowland rice, millet and sorghum value-chains (Table 6). 
Table 6 PIV rice farmers’ own perception of their livelihoods with IICEM in Mopti and Djenne cercles Sté Coop Sté Coop Sté coop Nacitjèssiriton Agro SilvoPastorale Kondolé2 Kondolé1 Coop Ag Kouana Sté Coop Ag
Sté Coop Ag
Level of Production 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Length hungry season 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Number of meals/day 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Quantity of meal/serving 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sauce quantity per meal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Sauce quality per meal 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Snacks/day children 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Vegetable availability 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Vegetable consumption 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Diseases/health 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Overall food security 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Level of income 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Level of expenses 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Overall prosperity 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Legend: 0: no change, 1: improved since IICEM, 2: declined or no improvement 
Key livelihood indicators have improved with IICEM for most farming cooperatives, especially 
in the irrigated village perimeters in Djenne and Mopti. Indeed, these farmers’ perceptions 
indicated that they are now better off for food security, income, length of the hungry season, 
diseases and health conditions, level of expenses, etc. For millet, sorghum, and lowland rice 
cropping systems in the targeted zones, although general food security and overall economic 
prosperity have improved, there is still need to reduce the length of the hungry season and 
20
improve health and diseases conditions. This, however, may be beyond the potential of a value 
chain approach if there are cultural eating and health care practices that do not change. 
2. Has IICEM succeeded in helping farmers and farming businesses become more 
organized, productive, and financially secure? 
It was not until 2010-2011 that the Government of Mali through its strategy of subsidizing 
agricultural inputs initiated a support program designed to improve access to agricultural inputs 
for cereals producers. This is done through the mini-doses (known locally as ''Bamanan Tiomi'') 
– a dose of 35 kg/ha of grain complex applied as post emersion side-dressing to cereals (millet 
and sorghum). The IICEM initiative has incorporated this technique, along with others, to assist 
farmers to increase production of basic grains. Beneficiary focus groups uniformly declared that 
IICEM’s intervention has been beneficial in all of the various areas of intervention and that the 
process, as well as the technology, is positively viewed not only by the direct beneficiaries (the 
producers), but also by the technical and extension services (non-governmental and 
governmental) that are charged with management of these areas, including the National 
Department of Agriculture (DNA), the Regional Directorate for Agriculture (DRA) and the 
Institute of Rural Economy (IER).
Even though direct measurement of financial security was not possible to define with the 
methodology used (external audits are usually the best means of measuring financial viability 
and security), none of the interviewees expressed any financial stress conditions. An indication 
of financial security came more in the facilitation of advance contracts integrating both the grain 
buyers and input supply businesses. These links made it more secure for the farmer knowing 
that there would be a market and at what price, but it also increased the security for the buyers so 
that they could make purchasing routes more efficient to meet national and international 
demands. In addition, the input suppliers had more confidence that they would be paid back. 
Additionally, interviewees made it clear they would like to see IICEM to promote business 
expansion, but none expects financial assistance to bail out poor management or financial 
decisions. 
The level of organization as business entities among farmers and farming businesses was 
apparent from how they provided answers to question during the interviews and was further 
evidenced by the presence of accounting books and the use of computers to access data to answer 
questions. 
Based on responses to field surveys (Annex IV A-D), all stakeholders interviewed are nearly 
unanimous on the effects and impacts of IICEM project. At the producer level these begin with 
the improvement of technical conditions of production (access to improved seeds, access to 
fertilizer, access to capacity enhancements for better cultural practices and cultural calendar for 
each value chain). Producers learned to better organize themselves and develop commercial 
relationships with other actors in the chain including grain traders and processors, leading, in 
turn, to more impact on productivity and production with improved revenue. 
Table 7 presents a summary of responses during focus group discussions conducted by the 
evaluation team in terms of production systems. Focus groups agreed that the IICEM project had 
positive effects and impacts on the level of production of millet and sorghum. 
21
Table 7 Evolution of cropping systems (use value chains) 
OP
Chaîne de valeur : mil/sorgho
Crop before 
IICEM
Crop after
IICEM
Change in area 
Cultivated
Change in
Production
Change in
Quality
Koutiala
Mil/Sorghu
m
Mil/Sorghum Increase Increase Increase
Sikasso
Mil/Sorghu
m
Mil/Sorghum Increase Increase Increase
Bougouni
Mil/Sorghu
m
Mil/Sorghum Increase Increase Increase
Moyenne
Mil/Sorghu
m
Mil/Sorghum Increase Increase Increase
Source: Données enquêtes équipe évaluation IICEM, juillet 2013 
It should be noted that the make-up of the cropping system remained virtually the same with and 
without IICEM. This is an entirely expected result, as millet and sorghum are still the main food 
crops grown by producers in all areas of IICEM intervention. However, farmers report increases 
in all of the major parameters for which IICEM provides support to producers to improve 
production and productivity in these production systems. 
Although the cropping patterns have remained the same, there have been several changes in the 
behavior of actors within the cropping systems. 
Changes have occurred in the areas actually planted to millet and sorghum. These changes are 
mainly expressed in terms of increases in areas cultivated. Even though consistent production 
data for millet and sorghum is lacking, farmers themselves report a trend in the intensification of 
these production systems with the greater access to agricultural inputs facilities (seeds and 
fertilizers) due to the support provided by the IICEM project. Moreover, with the development 
of markets for surplus production, IICEM beneficiaries also tend to increase production through 
increases in area cultivated. Some OPs report increases in area sown to millet and sorghum on 
the order of 20-40%.
We did not ask focus group participants to estimate yields of millet and sorghum, however some 
respondent’s volunteered information that in some cases millet yields increased from 800 kg/ha 
to 1250 kg/ha (approx. 39%). As for sorghum yields, the project reports an increase on the order 
of 800 kg/ha to 1100 kg/ha (approx. 38%). Table 7 indicates a change with the IICEM project. 
However, without more consistent measurement data for production, it is difficult to say whether 
this is more attributable to the technology used for production or to other IICEM interventions 
along the value chain that have increased incentives to produce (i.e. credit, marketing, etc). 
Beyond these changes, the quality of the product delivered has also been improved. This quality 
improvement is a composite indicator that incorporates other factors including the use of 
improved seeds, fertilizer use, compliance with the agricultural calendar, improved cultural 
practices, as well as the existence of an improved market for the sale of surplus production. 
The focus group survey attempted to determine changes in the use of production under IICEM. 
Before the IICEM project, millet and sorghum producers essentially used their production for 
household consumption. With the IICEM project, there has been a move to derive more value 
from the sale of products. OP members estimated that sales of millet and sorghum accounted for 
22
5-10% of production before IICEM. With the project, they estimate an increase to around 15% 
to 30% of production. Focus group respondents in Bankass stated that the commercial 
orientation supported by the IICEM project has even attracted neighboring non-project OPs to 
market their millet alongside project OPs. 
Before the project, farmers used a mixture of local and improved varieties of seed. Focus group 
participants affirmed that without the project they experienced fertilizer deficiencies and 
difficulties in access to finance. The IICEM project has provided support as to facilitate access 
to funding through the Agricultural Development Bank (BNDA) and also to improve the quality 
of seeds used by making available certified seed. Both of these initiatives received enthusiastic 
approval from focus group participants. 
3. What are IICEM’s relative strengths and weaknesses of intervening along the entire rice, 
millet, and sorghum value chains, as opposed to targeting specific areas? 
The most important and overarching finding was that the integrated facilitation approach for 
interventions among all businesses along the chains, not just the weakest links, was key to 
building relationships and strengthening the value chains. IICEM’s strength was that field 
specialists and non-governmental extension agents gained the confidence of all businesses 
involved. Another of IICEM’s strengths was that it mobilized temporary access to credit from 
input suppliers when the banking system closed during the military-political crisis of 2012. The 
IICEM project strategy has been based on interventions on every link of each of the targeted 
production chains31 in order to improve production, credit, market access, and livelihoods for 
project beneficiaries. The objective of this value chain approach is to develop relationships 
among producers, suppliers, financial services providers, and buyers that will lead to the 
identification of mutual interests and evolve into sustainable economic relationships. 
The evaluation team conducted focus groups with over 60 Producer Organizations (OP)32 in the 
IICEM program, conducting over 100 interviews. As shown in the table below, a series of 
interviews was also conducted with key informant owner/managers providing services to IICEM 
– supported OPs on the financial services, input supply and marketing side of the value chain. 
Table 8 Key Informant Interviews at Credit, Marketing, Input Supply Providers 
Contact Person 
Interviewed
Location Sector
BNDA Bamako Seydina Omar 
Diako
Bamako Financial Services
BNDA Sikasso OudjeriYaffa 
(Dir.)
Sikasso Financial Services
Association d’acheteurs de Produits 
Locaux de Sikasso
Zacharia Traore Sikasso Grain marketing
KoniDjiguine KalilouDiallo Sikasso Grain Marketing
Mali Protection de Cultures (MPC) Sekou Traore Sikasso Input Supply – Ag. 
chemicals
 
31 Presently the three chains are Rice, Millet and Sorghum, originally, prior to FtF realignment, the chains included 
Mangos, Shallots, Tomatoes, Potatoes, and aquaculture. 
32 See Annex IV C, D, and E for the questionnaires and interview guides used. 
23
Contact Person 
Interviewed
Location Sector
SocieteDoumbia et Fils (SODEF) DoumbiaBadjan Kotiala Grain Marketing
Sounkoro et Freres MoulayeSounkoro Mopti Grain Marketing
Planete Distribution Ousmane Alai 
Cisse
Sevare Processing – rice 
mill
Ets. Guindo et Freres MamoutoGuindo Mopti Grain Marketing
Union des SocietesCooperatives de 
Producteurs de Mais de Diedougou 
(USCPMD)
BallaTogola 
(Pres.) + 19 
members
Diedougou Input Supply –
Seeds
IICEM ties the upstream (supply) side of the value chain to the downstream (marketing and 
processing) side through the implication of grain traders within the input supply and credit 
process. It differs considerably from traditional extension programs, which target specific areas 
along the value chain. There is compelling evidence from the analysis of trends in the data from 
PIVs and from the declarations of members of millet, bas-fond rice, and sorghum producing OPs 
themselves that this approach produces significant incentives to produce more grain for sale and 
for home consumption. 
During the cropping season, IICEM facilitates marketing contracts (contrat d’achat or forward 
contract) between OPs and traders. This contract, along with the trader’s contract with a final 
purchaser (MDS for instance), is included as support documentation in OP loan applications and 
serves as a kind of collateral for the bank. The actual money is either paid to the fertilizer 
supplier or to the trader, who, in turn, purchases from the supplier and provides inputs to the OP. 
The trader then recoups his money by discounting the purchase price of grain at the end of the 
season. By this series of transactions, the OP takes responsibility for repayment of the loan, but 
never really sees the money. 
IICEM stepped in to partially subsidize inputs for millet producers when the BNDA branch in 
Mopti was closed during most of the security crisis, cutting off production credit for OPs. During 
the evaluation team’s visit to Mopti, the Director of Peenal delivered 40 dossiers for credit to the 
reopened BNDA. As of this writing, we have been informed by IICEM Mopti that financing for 
the next campaign is underway. These examples lead to the conclusion that the positive trends 
noted in production and marketing of PIV rice before 2012 will resume this year. 
The BNDA unequivocally admits that the process works primarily because of the close 
monitoring and facilitation at each stage by IICEM and its contractors. Indeed, the existence of 
this intensive monitoring and facilitation capacity is more important for bank approval of the 
loan than any guarantee funds. The BNDA routinely withdraws from financial support for 
Producer Organizations that have been dropped from the IICEM project, regardless of the 
reason, unless those OPs agree to raise cotton. CMDT then becomes the field monitoring 
guarantor the bank requires. 
It is important to note that the degree of managerial capacity among OPs varies greatly from 
those that are well organized to those that have very limited capacity. This diversity has 
frustrated organizational development training program efforts in the past. IICEM did include 
organizational development training as part of its program, however. However, although IICEM 
trained in breakeven analysis to help OPs estimate the appropriate pricing for crops, IICEM 
24
personnel, banks, and traders have observed that the impact of this training intervention was only 
used by the better organized OPs. OPs with poor or weak organizational capacity could not 
derive benefits from this type of training. For some groups, the managerial capacity of their OP 
is a weak link between the producer and the value chain. The weakness derives not from the 
training program itself but rather in ensuring organizational training is tailored and targeted to 
the appropriate audience, in this case the organizational capacity. Basic managerial capacity has 
to be in place before any given OP can benefit from this type of training. 
Additionally, key informant interviews revealed two important findings related to weaknesses in 
group solidarity. First, group solidarity or a sense of shared responsibility varies because of 
tensions between families that come together hoping for benefits from a development project, yet 
they do not fully assume total responsibility for the group obligation. Second, key informant 
interviewees expressed the sentiment (and sentiments the evaluators find common in other 
developing country contexts) that these groups are usually managed by the older leaders of the 
community and, compared with the relative progressive and spontaneous nature of young 
extension agents, the group elders usually do not make sudden or radical changes from one 
cropping system to another, this leads to frustrated project goals. The slow pace of change is 
frustrating, but it is in the survivalist nature of subsistence farmers to maximize the probability of 
survival from one year to the next being ever conscious of the période de soudure that haunts the 
family yearly to not take risks. The problem of group solidarity should have been given more 
attention with a relatively intense level of monitoring as a follow-up to facilitation efforts to 
forge the organizational link between farmers and the value chain.
The director of the BNDA branch in Sikasso stated, however, that there is one notable exception 
to the uneasy relationship between banks and OPs. That exception is women’s groups vs. men’s 
groups. Bas-fond rice and other women’s OPs have demonstrated exceptional financial 
management skills and have benefitted greatly from the training and assistance gained from the 
IICEM project. So much so, that the branch manager said that credit requests from women’s 
groups in the Sikasso region are almost automatically financed. The Sikasso manager of MPC, 
an agricultural chemical supplier, agrees. He says that many of the women’s rice co-ops 
supported by IICEM and GREFA now manage their own needs, develop their own loan 
applications and order in bulk, with one or two of them well on the way to becoming veritable 
rural enterprises. 
4. What is the relative value-added (monetary and non-monetary) of the integration of 
IICEM’s infrastructure with other productivity inputs? 
Although a specific monetary value could not be assigned, such as changes in gross margins, 
there is ample evidence that infrastructure improvements created added value. The Irrigated 
Village Perimeters (PIV) producers were able to expand their area under production as a result of 
IICEM investments in water control, water flow, and pumps. The expansion of the area, in turn, 
led directly to increased production of crops and increased revenues per family. 
IICEM’s largest infrastructure investments have been in water management. Considerable work 
has been done in rehabilitation, leveling, and expansion of polders in the PIV rice sector (see the 
section on PIVs above). In the bas-fond rice growing areas, the project has upgraded or built 
water retention structures and increased available cultivable area through leveling. A cost-benefit 
analysis of infrastructural improvement in bas-fond farming by USAID found an internal rate of 
return (IRR) on these areas of around 25%. We were unable to do IRR analysis of PIV data, but 
25
a similar return could be expected there. Moreover; the women Producer Organizations (OP) 
were able to leverage the increased revenues and enhanced organizational capacity to access 
loans to purchase processing equipment to further add value to their par-boiled rice product. 
The IICEM project has also made a significant contribution with the construction of warehouses 
and storage facilities for cereals (millet and sorghum) at the OP level. As mentioned elsewhere in 
this report, these structures not only provide a storage and staging area for grouped marketing, 
they also make available local storage space for buyers, reducing their transportation costs. There 
is also the potential for further growth through renting these facilities or using them for storage 
of bonded grain which can be used as loan collateral. Key informants indicated that the 
availability of warehouse space at OPs contributed to the efficacy of grouped sales by providing 
a staging area for production, storage and delivery of millet and sorghum. It was not clear 
whether the infrastructure and the additional equipment acquired during the IICEM project cycle 
will be supported with a replacement fund. 
It should be noted that the intervention of the IICEM project was limited in terms of access to 
medium-term credit and agricultural equipment. This can be explained by the fact that producers 
of millet and sorghum in the circles of Koutiala, Sikasso and Bougouni have for a long time been 
producing cotton and most have received some kind of support from the Malian Textile 
Development Company (CMDT) during the past 30 years. CMDT has developed an extensive 
network of small farm equipment manufacturers, and the equipment rate of farmers in this area 
was around 80% in the 1990s and 2000s. This leads to the presumption that the beneficiaries in 
these areas of the IICEM project are well equipped with animal traction and other small farm 
equipment. 
The results of field surveys confirm that most producers of millet and sorghum both before and 
during the project are equipped with a satisfactory array of farm equipment, including plows, 
carts, seeders, multi-coulters, and even some tractors. Most of this equipment is owned by 
individual producers with the exception of tractors which are often owned by the OP. Most of 
this individual equipment is generally purchased on the local market. Nevertheless, certain needs 
remain unmet, especially in terms of community infrastructures. Much of the equipment needs 
are in the area of post-harvest handling and quality control equipment, including millet and 
sorghum threshers, hullers, weighing and calibrating materiel. 
The project intervention in the area of infrastructure and, although not as significant, in the 
acquisition of equipment, is well received by the beneficiaries as expressed in the focus groups. 
The slight increases in productivity of the PIV areas during the first year of involvement likely 
came from the combined technical inputs and water control. In the bas-fond rice production 
areas in Sikasso the case was similar in that, increases in productive land due to leveling and 
dyke infrastructures led to increased production and marketable surpluses. 
However, focus groups also expressed the desire for further opportunities for access to rural 
infrastructure and agricultural equipment in the form of medium term credit. The main 
constraints identified by the beneficiaries of IICEM are usually financial. Given the price of 
agricultural equipment as well as the cost of investment in rural infrastructure, producers 
generally do not have sufficient resources to supply the market and investment especially in 
water management schemes. Given the tenuous nature of the relationship between the BNDA 
and producer organizations, this will pose a significant challenge to any follow up to IICEM. 
BNDA has just begun to offer production credits and some medium-term financing to larger 
26
farmers who have the capital base to provide collateral. It is unlikely that BNDA will venture 
into medium-term financing with cereals producing OPs without serious assurance of third-party 
monitoring on the ground. One prospect for near term may be equipment leasing and/or lease 
financing.
5. Will the relationship between farmers, processors (and/or cereal traders), and banks 
continue to function without the technical and financial support of IICEM? 
The overall strategy of IICEM’s value chain approach has been to work simultaneously with the 
financial services, grain traders and processors to integrate them and to build relationships of 
trust between them. Indeed, IICEM has been the first project that has worked systematically 
with grain buyers to improve the structure and efficiency of the coarse grains (millet and 
sorghum) market. In Mali relations with traders have long been characterized by mistrust. Some 
of it is politically motivated, and some deserved. The fact remains though, that traders are 
perhaps the most important link in the value chain. The logistical challenges of the value chain 
are typically handled by traders. It is the traders who have mastered the complexities of actually 
moving grain from the farm to the final consumer. Without grain traders, the value chain breaks 
down. The universal question is how and where to insert credit into the value chain so that it is 
timely and risk-free. Who will vouch-safe for the debts? 
Traders are generally very satisfied with IICEM interventions, especially in the area of 
facilitation of contracts. This applies both to market research by IICEM to negotiate contracts 
with new buyers like Moulins du Sahel (MDS) and to the facilitation of group sales and forward 
contracts with OPs. The traders we spoke with told us they prefer working with contracts, as it 
gives them better assurance as to the availability, price and quality of a product. It also allows 
them to eliminate many of the small middlemen, which often means better prices for both sides. 
Banks also are more likely to approve a loan application from an OP that has a sales contract 
with a buyer. 
Traders also said they do not have a problem with leveraging sales by organizing OPs to sell as a 
group. Grouped selling was in fact one of the advantages of working with the IICEM project 
pointed out by traders. For them, negotiating with a single OP is better than case-by-case 
negotiations with a plethora of individual sellers. The economies of scale are evident for them 
both in the area of transport and inventory management. It allows them to bid more successfully 
for large consignments for delivery to bulk buyers like Moulins du Sahel (MDS), Grands 
Moulins du Mali (GMM), Office des Produits Agricoles du Mali (OPAM) and the World Food 
Program (WFP). Once again, if a delivery contract from a buyer is included in an OP’s loan 
application, BNDA is more likely to approve the application.
Traders in both Sikasso and Mopti said that it is easier to work with OPs since IICEM because 
marketing is better organized. IICEM’s local sub-contractors work with OPs to facilitate the 
collection of grain. Prices are set by an auction-type arrangement (Ateliers de Negotiation de 
Prix) among several buyers that allows larger traders to deal directly with producers instead of 
going through smaller collectors. Contracts between buyers and OPs stipulate price and delivery 
conditions. If these are not respected, then the price can be changed. The OP warehouses built 
through IICEM assistance are also helpful because the company can now have the grain stored 
on-site until it is ready to transport. The quality of grain supplied by IICEM supported OPs is 
better according to the traders interviewed for this evaluation. This is testimony in favor of the 
27
IICEM efforts to encourage better varieties, postharvest handling (cleaning), and also attention to 
moisture content to meet buyer needs. 
Commercial relationships described above are slowly being built up. The linkage between bank 
financing for inputs and negotiated agreements for the purchase of farmers’ production are 
clearly a new key element in the system. However, BNDA officials at both the national and 
regional levels told us that the bank considered production credits to OPs specializing in millet 
and sorghum production to be too risky unless the OP was supported by a facilitating partner like 
IICEM. Nevertheless, in the case of rice producers, the developed relationship is more 
sustainable because of the more commercial nature of rice OPs. 
In general, with respect to sustainability, it is clear from the interviews with the groups and the 
key informants along the value chain that the integrated system that IICEM has promoted is 
currently working to the benefit of all, but without long-term sustainability. Once the IICEM 
facilitation ends, weak mistrustful linkages are not likely to remain and function. 
To get an idea of the impact of the withdrawal of such support, we interviewed 14 maize, millet, 
and sorghum producing OPs in the Sikasso region that had been dropped from IICEM when the 
project was re-oriented to the FtF program. 
The “dropped” OPs told us that they no longer received direct financing for inputs to be used for 
these cereal crops. Accordingly they reduced the areas cultivated. However, most of them said 
that they were still applying the same doses of fertilizers per ha and other inputs as they had with 
the IICEM project. The most logical explanation for this seeming contradiction is that these OPs 
are also raising cotton, and they are thus receiving support for financing inputs from CMDT, but 
for cotton only. We also encountered a small number of OPs elsewhere in the region that had 
amassed impressive financial resources, so auto-financing is not out of the question. This was 
particularly true of the seed production union of OPs. A somewhat more troubling finding was 
that these OPs were no longer contracting their product for group sale; their businesses are no 
longer sustainable. Most members had gone back to selling individually to small collectors 
rather than large traders with all the risks involved. Thus the sustainability of the marketing 
system is questionable if there isn’t a third party facilitator. 
One possible solution to this conundrum has emerged from other areas of experiences in the 
project. When bank financing for inputs was temporarily interrupted in Sikasso because of the 
political and security crisis, one trader agreed to provide 1000 sacks of fertilizer to IICEM 
supported OPs that he worked with to assure enough grain would be produced to meet the 
contract. In this case it is clear that the trader had confidence in the OPs that had been facilitated 
by IICEM. The OP agreed to reimburse the cost of the fertilizer in crop and at an agreed upon 
price. More investigation is necessary to determine if this kind of relationship (private grain 
trader/banker/OP) can be replicated and made more durable. 
Contrary to the BNDA policy for men’s groups producing millet and sorghum, the bank told us 
they are very willing to provide both production credit and medium term financing to women’s 
rice producing groups. Women’s groups in Sikasso have demonstrated excellent financial 
management capacity and solidarity in their loan reimbursements. They received bank financing 
to purchase rice-hulling equipment with the assistance of IICEM’s local contractor, GREFA. 
The financing enabled them to de-hull the rice with less damage than the former method of 
pounding, thus enhancing the quality of the par-boiled rice they had already been producing for 
sale on the Sikasso market. Some of these groups now put together their own loan applications 
28
and operate without substantial assistance from IICEM. This mechanism looks sustainable 
because of the expansion gained with IICEM. 
Other options which merit further examination have also emerged for providing financial and 
technical assistance to OPs from outside the traditional project paradigm. In Mopti, for example, 
IICEM assisted three small firms to get loans to invest in mini rice mills. One firm began buying 
rice and milled it into high-quality rice which was sold both retail and wholesale. The company 
was so successful in its first year that it was able to secure working capital from the BNDA on its 
own this year (2013). The company now buys rice from OPs in the IICEM project as well as 
those not supported by IICEM. It provides pre-financing for OPs not supported by IICEM by 
acting as the guarantor of loans for fertilizers. The company delivers the fertilizers and is 
reimbursed for the cost of the fertilizer by deducting it from the price it pays for paddy. During 
the last campaign the company paid 10-11,000 FCFA per 75 kg sack of grain rice for OPs it pre￾financed and 12,500 for others (including IICEM supported). It also provides pre-financing of 
fuel and rents motor-pumps to OPs working with the company. IICEM assists with negotiations 
for forward contracts for OPs working with the project, but prices are based on prevailing market 
prices. 
The analysis shows that IICEM has been successful in assisting producers, supply houses, 
traders, processors, and bankers to forge effective commercial relationships. However, the 
sustainability of these relationships depends upon a number of intervening variables. Financial 
services providers perceive agricultural production as high risk credit, especially millet and 
sorghum production. Crops like rice and cotton that are of commercial (and national) interest 
have generally been credit worthy. Seed producers also seem to be able to maintain credit lines. 
The dropped corn, millet and sorghum groups have not been able to maintain sustainable credit 
linkages for these crops because banks will only provide production credit for subsistence cereals 
crops if a project or other creditable entity is present to facilitate loan repayment. 
Commercial trade in cereals is seen by banks as highly credit worthy (and even profitable). 
Interventions designed to structure the coarse grains market by strengthening the relationships 
between producers and traders, i.e. forward contracting, bonded storage) tend to reduce the 
perception of risk. In certain cases where mutual interest is evident, grain marketers will even 
take on credit risk on behalf of producers. These positive experiences facilitated by IICEm bode 
well for sustainability. 
6. How has the recent instability in the country affected IICEM stakeholder behavior? 
Effects of the Crisis. On 21 March 2012, the democratic Government of Mali was overthrown in 
a military coup d'état, creating a political crisis in the capital, while at the same time that causes a 
rapid escalation of an internal conflict coffee in the North. From the time of the coup, for a 
period of approximately 10 months, the entire northern region of Mali was under the control of 
an alliance of rebel groups: the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), and 
the Islamic fundamentalist group Ansar Dine. Both groups have been involved in fights with the 
Malian military for control of the region, but, the collapse of the central government and the 
withdrawal of the military of the north led the way for the acquisition of the area by the MNLA 
and, Ansar Dine.
The crisis generated by the coup d'état and the presence of the insurgents in the north of Mali is 
perceived differently and generates differing behavior between northern and southern Mali. The 
general behavioral change that occurred in the North was to wait and see before moving again. 
29
Some of the groups located in the north of Mali reported that they were severely affected by the 
crisis; this is the case of the PIV/rice producers who have had difficulties to access credit after 
the closing of the banks and the high price of fuel used for irrigation as the main problems. These 
problems were compounded by the increase in expenses of the family with the arrival of the 
refugees and the delays in the acquisition of equipment and rural safety altogether. In addition, 
the IICEM staff was limited or pulled out of the region and markets also closed. The perceived 
impact by traders and processors is nearly unanimous: it is a bad period of Mali for the 
agricultural business. 
Those least affected were always groups in the South, growing millet and sorghum; in the city 
of Sikasso and Koutiala groups do not recognize the impact on their business. Because of the 
generally good rainfall that year 50% of the groups reported an increase in yields. They 
identified as negative impact the suspension of the activities of IICEM, the closure of the banks 
restricting the access to credit and the general slowdown in the supply of inputs needed to grow 
the crops as the recognizable main effects of the crisis. 
The impacts that were felt by the producers of lowland rice OPs were delays in the funding from 
BNDA which, in turn, affected the timely availability and application of fertilizer. In addition, 
the import and distribution rice food aid by humanitarian organizations caused prices to drop in 
local markets and a consequent reduction in demand for locally produced rice. 
The perception of the crisis among the dropped OPs was stronger and better articulated. 
Unanimously they defined the negative effects as: (i) the delay in the delivery, inadequacy of 
inputs, (ii) higher prices for fertilizers, (iii) the withdrawal of the IICEM partners that provide 
technical support, (iv) the lack of supply of inputs, and (v) the decline in prices. 
The organization of farmers (OPs) not only assure the infrastructure maintenance with the 
IICEM and the team, but the majority of the groups are making efficient use of the aid received 
for increasing yields and profits. The users of the ware houses and pumps are very happy and 
proud to have acquired the resilience to withstand the adversity. 
Farmers' organizations claim that with IICEM they became not only better producers capable of 
dealing with creditors and financial institutions, but also found in IICEM a partner willing to 
mentor the processes and a partner that provides the sense of security they need during the 
planning, implementation, and the sales of their agricultural products. 
30
V. OTHER RELEVANT IICEM ISSUES 
1. Certified Seed Production 
There are currently two seed producing OPs at present working with IICEM: 1) “Barasoro” 
cooperative in BondoTena village, cercle of Koro in Mopti region. This OP works on millet seed
under the supervision of IICEM sub-contractor AMPRODE Sahel and 2) “Union des Sociétés 
Cooperatives des Producteurs de Mais de Diedougou”or USCPMD, located in the cercle of 
Dioila, Koulikoro region (Table 9). They are under the responsibility of the regional IICEM 
office in Sikasso; they are not supervised by a sub-contractor. The project implementation and 
supervision are done by the technical agent of the union, with some financial support of IICEM. 
Although both OPs existed before IICEM, the members stated that they have been strengthened 
by the project. 
Table 9 Characteristics of seed producing organizations in Mopti and Sikasso regions 
Characteristics USCPMD1 Barasoro Cooperative
Region Koulikoro Mopti
Cercle Dioila Koro
Commune Dièdougou Dogouténé II
Village SeylaMissirila BondoTena
Sub-contractor None – directly by IICEM/Sikasso AMPRODE Sahel
Number of members 1900 (1000 men + 900 women) 104 (64 men + 40 women)
Value chains Millet/Sorghum Millet
Begin date with sub-contractor April 2008 2012
Begin date with IICEM April 2011 2010
Activities of the OP  Food grains
 Certified seeds
 Food grains
 Certified seeds
IICEM supported activities  Certified seeds  Certified seeds
1
: Union des sociétés coopératives de producteurs de maïs de Dièdougou. In the case of USCPMD, there is no sub￾contractor. The project is implemented by the technical agent of the Union, with financial support of IICEM and the 
Union
Members of both participating OPs have been trained by IICEM in seed production techniques 
and procedures for certification, quality assurance, and post-harvest handling of millet and 
sorghum to improve quality. However, in the case of Barasoro, only a few farmers were trained. 
IICEM also facilitated access to bank loans, supply of improved seeds, access to inputs, and 
building linkages with private sector business clients and suppliers (Table 10). 
Table 10 IICEM’S support and interventions received as described by members of USCPMD and Barasoro 
in Koulikoro and Mopti regions 
Beneficiary farmer organizations
Type of assistance USCPMD of Diedougou 
(Koulikoro region)
Barasoro of Bondo Tena 
(Mopti region)
Access to bank loan X X
Access to improved varieties X X
Access to input fertilizers X X
Access to pesticides X
Access to markets X X
Access to production equipment X
Access to processing equipment X
Irrigation infrastructures X
31
Beneficiary farmer organizations
Type of assistance USCPMD of Diedougou 
(Koulikoro region)
Barasoro of Bondo Tena 
(Mopti region)
Warehouses X X
Training in quality assurance X X
Training in post-harvest handling X X
Training in seed certification procedures X X
Two improved millet varieties (Toroniou and Sanioba) were introduced by IICEM and its public 
and private sector partner in Diedougou. In Barasoro only Toroniou was introduced. At least six 
sorghum varieties (Tiandougou, Tiandougoucoura, Soumba, Grinkan, Seguifa and Sewa) were 
introduced and promoted in Diedougou. 
USCPMD cooperative usually applies for loans twice a year with or without IICEM, hence they 
have applied 6 times during the past three years. Before IICEM, all the loan requests were 
approved, but not the total amount requested because of lack of guarantee. Under IICEM, the 
approved amount has increased. 
Barasoro cooperative members applied for a loan only once during the past three years and they 
believe if they had applied more times, it would have been approved. However, because it is a 
low value crop, they believe greater investment (cost) in this type of seed would not pay (return) 
in spite of the improvement in access to market and clients favored by IICEM because millet is a 
low value commercial crop and producers will not invest in better seed; they use grain from the 
prior year as seed. 
Both USCPMD and Barasoro Cooperatives have experienced increases in the areas planted for 
seed production. USCPMD, for instance, has increased from 2500 ha to 6000 ha planted to 
certified seed production by the 1900 members. Barasoro in turn has moved from 2-6 ha on 
average before IICEM to 20 ha at the time of the evaluation. These areas were confirmed with 
the key informant interviewees at the IICEM regional office in Mopti. 
Regarding planting technologies, the IICEM intervention has helped increase production per 
hectare for both OPs. Barasoro said that they have moved from using 5 kg/ha of millet seed to 7 
kg/ha because of technology disseminated by IICEM that helped reduce the spacing between 
plants from 100 cm before IICEM to 50 cm with IICEM thus increasing the number of plants/ha. 
The same was reported by the USCPMD for millet and sorghum. 
With the greater density and area planted, seed production also increased for Barasoro, from 1.5-
3 tons before IICEM to 15 tons with IICEM. The IICEM key informant interviewee said that the 
total was 16 tons of millet, confirming the large increase. 
Both Barasoro and USCPMD cooperative members described with ease the process of seed 
certification indicating that they have mastered the process as a result of trainings and practices 
with IICEM. Key informant interviews also revealed that the simplified seed certification 
procedure to enable the certification of farmers’ seed has been developed in partnership with the 
Investment Promotion Agency (API) and approved by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
An additional change that has occurred in seed certification was reported by Barasoro: before 
IICEM they were not receiving the monetary results of certification because the system was not 
functioning well. With IICEM Barasoro and USCPMD expanded their range of clients to 
include, in addition to farmers, NGOs, seed companies, local, national, and even regional 
markets (USCPMD). 
32
As described above, Barasoro and USCPMD were seed producers before IICEM and one would 
guess that they would continue their business after IICEM because they were not a solely 
dependent on IICEM nor did they depend upon IICEM for their business start-up. Nevertheless, 
it is difficult to estimate the sustainability of the seed producing enterprises of Barasoro and 
USCPMD after IICEM support. However in keeping with the evaluation’s strategy of trying to 
identify similar OPs that had either participated or had participated in other programs as 
examples of sustainability, there is an example in Mopti of an OP (Soromognon) that was 
involved in an earlier seed improvement and production program. Soromognon, village of 
Somadougou, cercle of Mopti, commune of Sio, is composed of 10 members, all seed producers 
of millet, rice, sorghum, cowpea, and/or groundnut. This OP participated in the WASA33 (West 
Africa Seed Alliance) seed project for two years from 2009 to 2011. After the closing of the 
WASA seed project in 2011, they have not received support from any other project for certified 
seed production. Nevertheless, their seed activities are still continuing and they have improved 
the quality and diversity of seed as indicated by the acquisition of Jacumbe (CSM 63E), an 
improved sorghum variety. Their planted areas also increased from 12 - 20 ha for rice under 
controlled flooding, 2-3 ha for millet and from 5-10 ha for sorghum. The relationships 
established with clients and suppliers are still functioning after closing of the project. This 
example bodes well for the OPs and also for the continuity of the increased production and 
varietal diversity technology that IICEM has also promoted. 
Recommendations 
Considering the FtF goal of increasing resilience and the considerable effort made by IICEM to 
strengthen certified and general seed producing cooperatives, the following recommendations are 
made for any follow-on programming: 
 Renew the effort to link the seed producing cooperatives with sources of tested, drought 
resistant, and low rainfall varieties and renew support to the local field trials that the 
cooperatives had been doing before being dropped from the IICEM. 
 Facilitate both the linkage of these seed producing OPs to intermediate seed distributors 
and also local cereal producing OPs, and linkages with sources of credit so that seed 
producing OPs have more working capital. 
 Considering the success of forward contracting for linking credit between producers, 
suppliers, and traders, a similar mechanism may be tried to enhance the supply of quality 
seed as well as the demand. 
 In keeping with seed certification and the goal of value added to those seeds, a relevant 
follow-on program should explore the value added that labeling and branding might bring 
to the seed industry. 
2. Monitoring and Evaluation 
Although none of the key questions posited in the TO was in reference to the quality of data and 
the M&E system, the existence and quality of data to evaluate the IICEM was a major issue from 
the beginning of the evaluation and necessitated the insertion of a RBDA into the TO in order to 
determine the best and appropriate methods to conduct the evaluation. Accordingly, in keeping 
 
33 WASA was a five year $61m alliance funded by USAID with five West African Governments and seed producers 
with the objective of creating an industry that will increase the supply and quality of seed for small-scale farmers.
33
with the general TO instruction to make recommendations for future programs, we present the 
following findings, conclusions and recommendations so that similar, future projects will meet 
USAID M&E and evaluation standards. 
The finding from the RBDA survey was that, with the exception of the PIV groups, there was not 
a systematic set of data from which to draw a sample or to simply use the data from the groups to 
answer the key questions, i.e., changes in productivity, household income, and accurately 
measure the actual gross margin. This was an unexpected finding when one considers that the 
project had been through two phases over 6 years and had been through the PMP process twice 
during the last four year phase. It was found that the annual report on production and 
productivity for each group was based on a questionable sampling method and was not a reliable 
measure of the productivity, production, and the actual sales of the groups. 
The IICEM M&E Manual of approximately August 2011, and annexes, was drafted as an 
internal manual for Abt Associates. It was not submitted to USAID for approval and USAID 
apparently did not request it as part of the M&E/PMP exercise that Missions usually do. It was 
not a deliverable. 
The Access-based system for the database mentioned in the manual was done by an outside 
consultant and IICEM began to enter data, but the 2011 change to the FtF indicators (about 
August 2011 according to the draft changes) made the data entry of the Access system 
inappropriate for the new indicators. The original consultant was either not available or not 
assigned to update the system. Hence Abt Associates opted for the use of Excel sheets, and that 
responsibility was delegated to the IT specialist who really did not have M&E or database 
management training. 
Because of the Excel sheet approach and the lack of a vision for a multi-year database, each year 
or cropping cycle became a new sheet of organizations that were carried over and new 
organizations added. Because of the separate sheets it was not a database that was suitable for 
comparative analysis or the tracking of organizations and their production from year to year. 
Four years of Excel sheets from the PIV groups were merged for the trends analysis, which 
required substantial manual effort to line up the groups and the variables over the four years, 
indicative of inadequate data management efforts. 
FtF indicators tend toward individual household data, but data on individuals in each producer 
group was not collected until the second quarter of FY 2013. This was the result of the RIG 
review of the supporting documents needed by IICEM to come up to standards of evidence for 
the reporting. These reports that extension agents have been asked to submit do not represent a 
thought through system. They were a response to the RIG audit of 2012 when it was 
recommended that data on the individual farmers and families be recorded. These paper forms 
are repetitious, duplicating names, group information, and other information that could be 
entered once into an iPad then linked (relational database is the appropriate concept) each time to 
a complete database without repeating the names and other information. The extension agents 
complained that they had to repetitiously, by hand, repeat the names of the participants on paper 
forms. In reality, the use of palm pilots, and now iPad, has been in the development project tool 
kit for over a decade to avoid the time consuming and error prone process of handwritten forms 
and then a transfer to an electronic database. 
One of the findings from the RBDA was that some cooperatives, the cotton cooperatives, did 
keep records on the cotton production, inputs, and sales. Some kept records on the commercial 
34
crops such as corn. In the case of the PIVs, they too seemed to have reliable records. The 
conclusion is that many of these groups are capable of record keeping at least on paper, and a 
few, e.g. PIV and the Union Diedougou were found to have computer records, but IICEM did not 
build upon or reinforce this capability. 
The bi-lingual model grant contract for implementing NGOs was reviewed with respect to M&E 
specifications. The closest section to mentioning M&E was 1.5 Technical Reporting and 
Evaluation (p.10). It is mentioned that “Technical Status Reports” were to be submitted on the 
same dates as the quarterly financial reports. The “Technical Status Reports” are not described 
nor is the M&E Manual and accompanying annexes. 
The overarching conclusion is that the IICEM project did not have an M&E system that was 
designed to follow the kinds of production and marketing data that the evaluation team sought. 
This is partially explained by the fact that the project was tasked to work with stakeholders along 
the value chain, and not specifically with producers. Nevertheless, this state of affairs could 
have been identified during a shakedown evaluation or a mid-term evaluation. Unfortunately, the 
issue of shortcomings in an effective M&E and data collection system for IICEM was not fully 
recognized or acknowledged by Mission staff or the IICEM implementing partner during project 
design and start-up and re-design. 
Recommendations 
 The terms of reference or contract between USAID and the contractor should have very 
specific and explicit terms on M&E systems that establish, as per a PMP, the indicators, 
the responsibility for collection and the establishment of a web-based data storage and 
analysis system to be established within 90 days of startup. Whenever possible the M&E 
should be a direct responsibility and key concern of the USAID Mission; possibly a 
delegated responsibility through a third independent party reporting directly to the 
Mission, dealing simultaneously with several projects. Otherwise, the contractor should 
have a full time database manager and an M&E specialist to make sure that not only can 
the contractor use the information for management and reporting, but also train and 
assure that the sub-contractors or implementers in each region can and will do the 
organizational development of the farmer groups so that they can keep records and, most 
appropriately, have their own, matching files for accounting purposes; in this case the 
USAID Mission should be able to regularly monitor by contract, what this M&E officer 
accomplishes.
 For a decade, palm-pilots have been used by NGOs, the present development of iPads 
and notebooks would probably be appropriate and cost effective equipment as part of the 
institutional strengthening of all farmer groups. 
 The system envisioned should be in keeping with many projects around the world that, 
for the last decade or more, have established comprehensive web-based systems that the 
NGOs use to enter data on the individual families and the farming groups so that 
tracking of both family and group interventions and progress has been possible. The term 
family or household (HH) will be a tricky subject to manage because, under the 
circumstances the HH is usually a multigenerational extended family where the “income” 
of the HH and its food security depend upon more than the basic crops that are targeted. 
Hence the relative importance and impact of the given crop may vary from substantial to 
insignificant, and the data system, in order to answer the livelihood questions, will have 
to track the other sources of food or income. 
35
 As described above with regard to the USAID/Contractor agreement, the M&E needs 
should be an integral and detailed part of all RFPs for sub-grant grantees so that the sub￾grantees know, beforehand, and can budget personnel and time to gather and maintain a 
compatible data base and link to a project-wide system. 
 If the Mission cannot field the skilled M&E staff to prepare the terms of reference for 
M&E systems and cannot mentor and guide contractors to develop appropriate systems, 
then an option could be a third-party contractor to work with the Mission from the design 
of the M&E requirements in RFTOPs through providing the contractors with the 
technical assistance to implement M&E systems, and, finally to assure that data is 
gathered for both performance and impact evaluations.
36
VI. OVERALL CONCLUSIONS 
The evaluation team conducted focus groups with over 60 Producer Organizations (OP) in the 
IICEM program, conducting over 100 interviews. Even though the current results of these 
meetings are unequivocally positive on multiple points, the overall conclusion hardly points to 
business sustainability. 
 The farmer organization is a weakest link between the individual farmer and the 
remainder of the value chain, as well as the link to the development program, the 
alternative of working directly with individuals is not an option when the target 
population is the mass of small holders. Although many OPs have built up significant 
managerial and even financial capacity under IICEM, the organizational component and 
BDS will need to be a robust component with a long time horizon to deal with persistent 
management problems at the level of the OP. The goals in PMPs will have to be realistic 
especially if many new groups will be incorporated, for example, IICEM doubled the 
number of new groups incorporated from 2011 to 2012. Systematic organizational 
diagnosis will be necessary for baselines and planning and intense monitoring and 
facilitation efforts will continue to be necessary in order to reinforce the value chain 
approach; 
 The demand of the banking/financial system to have the project presence to approve 
credit to Ops and Coops is an indicator of mistrust of the farmers and trader’s abilities 
performing business; this condition is mainly nursed when the IICEM replaced existing 
operational capitals to allow infrastructure expansions not fully warranted under their 
business path before the intervention of IICEM. The BNDA unequivocally admits that 
the process works primarily because of the close monitoring and facilitation at each stage 
by IICEM and its contractors; 
 Out of the visited organizations, none of them show to have a replacement fund to 
maintain and replace obsolete equipment; this situation is likely to re-create the need for 
additional external need once the equipment and the infrastructure mechanically fail. 
 Production of all target crops has increased, albeit slightly for some project participants, 
as confirmed by trend analysis of principal production parameters among OPs in the 
Village Irrigated Perimeters (PIV) and more so based on declarations of participants in 
focus groups for millet, sorghum and lowland rice producers; 
 The conditions for access to inputs, in particular fertilizer, have improved for nearly all 
OPs involved when the IICEM program intervenes (declarations of focus group 
participants); 
 Conditions for marketing of the products of the OPs have improved, including price, 
volume and quality (declarations of focus group participants); 
 Actions taken by IICEM and its sub-contractor to enhance market and credit access and 
performance clearly helped to provide the stimulus for expanded area of paddy on 
Village Irrigated Perimeters (PIV); 
 Even though the decline in both quantity and value of marketed production from PIVs in 
2012 can be attributed directly to the political/security crisis; no agronomic explanations 
were explored to explain the low yields in those places where IICEM provide the inputs 
and guarantee the access to credit, except that the available impact was low and timing 
later; 
37
 IICEM’s strategy of working with traders and OPs to facilitate contracts improved the 
level of confidence on each side so that a durable marketing relationship could be 
established; this strategy weakness is the limited scope and the limited number of 
partners involved; 
 IICEM facilitation of improved relations with grain buyers was cited by focus groups as a 
key element in providing a more stable environment for producers to respond to market 
signals. Indeed, the grouped marketing approach using pre-negotiated contracts was 
praised by both traders and producers as the key to increased marketing of all grains 
during the period of analysis; 
 Grouped sales by OP members and negotiation of forward contracts through the Ateliers 
de Negotiation plus the existence of a stable financial services platform enabled 
producers to risk investing resources in expanding areas cultivated with a view to a more 
stable market opportunity; Based on the findings, some key and no all livelihood 
components have improved with IICEM for most farming cooperatives, especially in the 
irrigated village perimeters in Djenne and Mopti. Indeed, these farmers’ perceptions 
indicated that they are now better off for food security, income, length of the hungry 
season, diseases and health conditions, level of expenses, etc. However, for millet, 
sorghum, and lowland rice cropping systems in the targeted zones, although general food 
security and overall economic prosperity have improved, there is still need to reduce the 
length of the hungry season and continue to improve health and diseases conditions; 
 There is compelling evidence from the analysis of trends in the data from PIVs and from 
the declarations of members of OPs themselves that this approach produces significant 
incentives to produce more grain for sale and for home consumption. These points to one 
final conclusion: under the special economic and safety conditions confronted during the 
IICEM, the value chain strategy used serve the farmers well. However, the model might 
be not be valid under other circumstances. 
38
VII. OVERALL RECOMMENDATIONS 
Although IICEM participating farmers have improved their livelihoods, especially farming 
cooperatives in the irrigated village rice perimeters, IICEM-like project activities need to 
continue as a means to maintain and strengthen the progress observed for PIV farmers on one 
hand, and boost growth and livelihood improvement for the lowland rice, millet and sorghum 
farmers on the other hand. The slow progress in the livelihood improvement of sorghum and 
millet farmers may be due to the fact that these two crops have low market value. These two 
crops are however strategic in Mali due to their adaptation to the local conditions, specifically 
drought and unreliable rainfall patterns, and are well adapted to the diet of the local populations. 
To boost the livelihood improvement of millet and sorghum farmers, focus should be on value￾added traits such as earliness, grain quality, and eating quality. 
The evaluation found that although a diversity of data is available, the data is scattered and 
inconsistent. It is usually destined for use in a specific monitoring context. USAID should 
mandate future projects to develop monitoring and evaluation systems that collect and analyze a 
uniform set of data. Moreover, the data generated should be uniformly useable; not only to a 
specific project or even to USAID. Agricultural data should meet Malian national monitoring 
and evaluation needs as well. 
Producer Organizations are widespread in Mali. They are the obvious focus for the facilitation 
approach of the value chain model. However, OP cohesion is often only based on the existence 
of a project, rather than their own internal dynamic. Nevertheless, several OPs in the IICEM 
project have evolved to become well-managed organizations – even nascent rural enterprises. 
Continued effort needs to be applied to replicating these successes and reinforcing the 
management and enterprise capacities of OPs so that they can eventually take over the 
marketing, credit, and input strategies that IICEM facilitated, as standard operating roles 
themselves. 
The value chain is really a chain of business relationships. The acceptance of contracting by 
both OPs and their private sector partners is evidence enough of this. More effort needs to be 
made to put more OPs on the kind of firm, businesslike ground that will make them more 
attractive (and more competitive) partners for banks, traders and processors. 
During the course of any subsequent project, emphasis should be put on mechanisms that would 
enhance the availability and accessibility of improved and certified seeds and other inputs for 
value-added, capacity building, improved technology dissemination. Such mechanisms include 
building and maintaining linkages between farmers and all other stakeholders involved in the 
crops’ value-chain, as well as sensitizing farmers to the importance of improved certified seeds 
in increasing production and productivity. 
39
VIII. BEST PRACTICES 
Promoting gender-equitable opportunities in value chain development. IICEM’s assistance to 
and support for women’s farming organizations has helped many women to exercise real 
entrepreneurial and managerial skills. The women’s bas-fond rice OPs are viewed by both banks 
and suppliers as viable rural enterprises. These OPs are increasingly weaving their own value 
chain networks and diminishing their reliance on support from projects and/or government. 
Improving production and productivity. The use of and working through breakeven analysis 
with the farmers so that they understand the cost of inputs and the labor that they put into 
production is perhaps the best practice for business attitude development in preparation for 
negotiating an appropriate price for crops. This is a crucial first step when going from selling 
surplus subsistence crops to systematically producing for a market. However, we did note that 
land value and the managerial or entrepreneurial factors of production were not included in the 
analysis. Nevertheless, this part of business training is often assumed and yet not part of the 
culture. 
Building capacity in value chain development. Support given for small and medium scale 
processing by IICEM adds value to production as well as developing local enterprises. The 
small rice mills in Mopti and the parboiling of rice by women bas-fond farmers are the best 
examples of this in the IICEM program. At the same time, IICEM investments in the 
rehabilitation of Irrigated Village Perimeters (PIV) and flood plains (bas-fond) are increasing 
productive capacity to meet these new demands. 
Marketing and transport facilitation. Building relationships between farmers and grain traders 
has created the incentives to produce more for market. The contracting and grouped selling has 
tapped economies of scale that aid traders and transporters to expand their market purview and 
better address the logistics of the value chain. 
Enhanced financial services. The BNDA has shown a willingness to provide the production 
credits needed for increasing cereals marketing. The next challenge in this process will be to 
build OP capacity to a point where the bank can have confidence enough to continue to risk 
financing after the withdrawal of the facilitating monitoring umbrella currently provided by 
IICEM and its sub-contractors. 
Supporting an enabling environment for agricultural trade and private sector development. 
IICEMs strategy of integrating private traders in to the value chain has been a crucial link. 
Besides helping to organize the market, IICEM has provided services directly to companies. 
Business Development Services (BDS) and training have helped them to improve management 
and access new information. The Special Activities Fund and Innovation Fund are providing 
incentives for these businesses to upgrade their infrastructures and equipment, especially in the 
area of quality control. 
The development of an appreciation for quality seed. In a mostly subsistence cropping system 
where seed is simply grain saved from the previous year, such as millet, quality seed is a key 
element so that productivity and quality would increase so that famers would increase their own 
food security as well as incomes also led to an important value added for farm businesses and 
groups producing seed instead of simply grain for feed or human consumption. This focus 
effectively created or at least strengthened a new link in the millet and sorghum value chains – 
the commercial seed industry. 
40
ANNEXES 
Annex I RFTOP (Original) Statement of Work 
Annex II (Original) Work Plan: Timeline and Deliverables 
Annex III Contacts and Interviewees 
Annex IV Questionnaires and Interview Guides 
Annex V (Revised) Methodology for the Second Phase 
Annex VI Key Question and Synopsis of Approach 
Annex VII Supporting Documents 
Annex I - 1
ANNEX I 
RFTOP (ORIGINAL) STATEMENT OF WORK
Annex I - 2
SECTION C – DESCRIPTION / SPECIFICATIONS / STATEMENT OF WORK 
C.1 INTRODUCTION
Integrated Initiatives for Economic Growth in Mali (IICEM) is a 4-year, $45m dollar project, managed 
by the Accelerated Economic Growth (AEG) team. The proposed evaluation of IICEM will consider 
millet, sorghum, and rice value chain activities in the Mopti and Sikasso regions of Mali, the 
interconnectivity of farmer cooperatives, processors, and banks, and its overall effect on rural 
livelihoods. 
C.2 BACKGROUND
IICEM is an agricultural value chain project implemented by Abt Associates. Its objective is to increase 
producers’ incomes in order to foster economic growth and substantially reduce poverty. The project 
started in January 2010 and was originally scheduled to end in December 2012. It has since been 
extended December 2013. 
IICEM focuses on the following areas within the value chains of millet, sorghum, and rice: (1) Improved 
Agricultural Productivity through the expansion/rehabilitation of irrigated perimeters and intensification 
of agricultural production in target areas; (2) Expanding Markets and Trade by enhancing access to 
finance; enhancing access to markets and trade; introducing, transferring, and applying improved 
technologies; (3) Increased investments in Agricultural and Nutrition Related Activities; and (4) 
Increased Employment opportunities in Targeted Value Chains. 
Through its integrated value chain approach, IICEM increases agricultural productivity, improves 
linkages to markets, and facilitates rural finance in Mali by developing local capacity. Through its 
partners (US and local NGOs), IICEM uses a comprehensive approach to improve efficiency in those 
value chains that have significant implications for food security, including rice, millet and sorghum. 
IICEM originally focused on a larger set of value chains, including mangos, rice, millet, sorghum, maize, 
wheat potatoes, fruits and high value horticultural products throughout the country. In April 2011, 
however, IICEM was modified to better align with Mali’s then recently approved Feed the Future 
strategy. It now only targets activities in the value chains of millet, sorghum and rice in the three selected 
regions of Mopti, Sikasso and Timbuktu for a total of 141 communes, and two communes in the Segou 
region. The evaluation will focus on the effects of IICEM interventions in 750 randomly selected 
cooperative farms in the 114 communes of Mopti and Sikasso that have received assistance since the 
outset of the project, as well as cooperative farms not involved with IICEM (as a control). 
On March 21, 2012, the democratic Government of Mali was overthrown in a military coup d’état, 
creating a political crisis in the capitol while simultaneously causing a rapid escalation of a brewing 
internal conflict in the North. From the time of coup, for a period of approximately 10 months, the entire 
northern region of Mali was under the control of Toureg rebels aligned with the National Movement for 
the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), and the Islamic fundamentalist group Ansar Dine. Both groups had 
been involved in prolonged fighting with the Malian military over control of the region, but the fall of 
the central government also meant the withdrawal of the military from the north, which in turn paved the 
way for a takeover of the area by the MNLA and Ansar Dine. On January 11, 2013, following southward 
movement of the extremists, the French Government intervened to help Malian and African forces repel 
the insurgents and regain occupied territory. Fighting continues in the north, and efforts are underway to 
strengthen the African forces that will continue to secure the territory and maintain peace. The 
transitional government has adopted a roadmap for conducting elections later this year. Significantly, 
USAID/Mali has undergone two evacuations in the past year, requiring the departure of many staff, and 
Annex I - 3
all dependents, and creating many work challenges. Recently, due to the French intervention, travel 
outside of Bamako has become easier, particularly to southern regions such as Sikasso. 
C.2.1 Theory of Change 
USAID/Mali believes that if IICEM strengthens value chains comprehensively, intervening at multiple 
levels, then economic growth will increase and farmers will ultimately have improved livelihoods. 
USAID will consider IICEM successful if34: 
 Farmers’ yields in rice, millet, and/or sorghum rise; 
 Farmers are able to sell cereals for more money;
 There are enduring market linkages between processors and/or cereal traders and farmers;
 Banks are providing credit to farmers; and
 The above four bullet points have core elements of sustainability that allows them to last past 
IICEM’s project cycle. 
C.2.2 Purpose and Use of the Evaluation 
USAID/Mali intends to use the findings from the IICEM Evaluation to inform future AEG programs, 
specifically those targeting rice, millet, and sorghum value-chains. A successful IICEM evaluation will 
help AEG better understand which activities under IICEM made sustainable gains in the agriculture 
sector, and which activities may not be as effective in future projects to achieve the desired results. A 
successful IICEM evaluation will help AEG and USAID/Mali better understand what growth in the 
agriculture sector can be attributed to IICEM, and what growth occurred outside the scope of IICEM’s 
influence. There is a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of IICEM’s irrigation activities currently underway, 
whose results, along with other assessments already conducted, will be expected to be incorporated into 
the IICEM Evaluation. During the evaluation, USAID/Mali will make sure the CBA, as well as all 
relevant documents, will be made available to the evaluator. 
In addition to measuring the impact of IICEM, USAID/Mali will use the IICEM Evaluation to better 
understand how farmers, bankers, and processors are reacting to the instability caused by both the coup 
d’état and the northern rebellion. While this will not be the prime focus of the evaluation, USAID/Mali 
will expect the Evaluation Team to provide qualitative data on possible behavior change taking place 
amongst IICEM’s stakeholders. 
C.3 WORK REQUIREMENTS 
C.3.1 General Evaluation Questions 
This evaluation will assist USAID/Mali by providing information to inform and respond to the following 
practical questions: 
1. How have IICEM’s activities resulted in improved livelihoods35 for members of farming 
cooperatives and producer organizations? 
2. Has IICEM succeeded in helping farmers and farming businesses become more organized, 
productive, and financially secure? 
3. What are IICEM’s relative strengths and weaknesses of intervening along the entire rice, millet, 
and sorghum value chains, as opposed to targeting specific facets? 
 
34 Desired minimum effect sizes for the following have not been established as of this draft.
35 Measured using more than one proxy, including but not limited to income, crop yields, and Food Security. 
Annex I - 4
4. What is the value-added (monetary and non-monetary) by the integration of IICEM’s 
infrastructure with other productivity inputs? 
5. Will the relationship between farmers, processors (and/or cereal traders), and banks continue to 
function without the technical and financial support of IICEM? 
6. How has the recent instability in the country affected IICEM stakeholder behavior? 
C.3.2 Specific Evaluation Questions 
To provide a basis for the evaluation to generate relevant findings, conclusions, and recommendations on 
these questions, the evaluation will address a number of more specific evaluation questions for each of 
the four topics. The following are guiding questions to help provide further context on what USAID/Mali 
wishes to learn. USAID/Mali encourages the Contractor to use these questions to help inform the 
proposed evaluation methodology. USAID/Mali expects all questions to be answered comprehensively 
and answers to be based on evidence. 
1. How have IICEM’s activities resulted in improved livelihoods for members of farming 
cooperatives and producer organizations? 
2. Has IICEM succeeded in helping farmers and farming businesses become more organized, 
productive, and financially secure? 
a. How well are IICEM-supported millet and sorghum farming cooperatives functioning, 
when compared to millet and sorghum farming cooperatives receiving no external 
support36? 
3. What are IICEM’s relative strengths and weaknesses of intervening along the entire rice, millet, 
and sorghum value chains, as opposed to targeting specific areas? 
a. When compared to external donor interventions targeting a specific step(s) in a value 
chain, is IICEM’s approach effective?37
4. What is the relative value-added (monetary and non-monetary) of the integration of IICEM’s 
infrastructure with other productivity inputs? 
a. What is the reaction of different populations [inside and outside the IICEM intervention] 
to IICEM’s package of infrastructure and productivity inputs?38
b. What are the advantages and disadvantages of IICEM’s infrastructure activities and its 
corresponding package of inputs when compared to alternative external donor 
approaches?39
5. Will the relationship between farmers, processors (and/or cereal traders), and banks continuing to 
function without the technical and financial support of IICEM? 
a. How are IICEM-supported farming cooperatives continuing to work with processors to 
create market opportunities? 
b. Will banks continue to provide credit to farming cooperatives? 
c. What variables factor into banks providing credit after IICEM’s intervention has 
finished? 
6. How has the recent instability in the country affected IICEM stakeholder behavior? 
a. Are farmers continuing to use IICEM inputs? 
b. Are farmers continuing the upkeep of IICEM infrastructure? 
 
36 This is quite common in Sikasso and Mopti, as USAID/Mali is one of the only donors working with millet and 
sorghum farming cooperatives. This question was answered by examining dropped groups when the FtF change 
was made. A counterfactual was not possible as noted in the report. 
37 With the revised methodology without a counterfactual this sub-question could not be answered. 
38 With the revised methodology without a counterfactual this sub-question could not be answered. 
39 With the revised methodology without a counterfactual this sub-question could not be answered. 
Annex I - 5
c. Are banks continuing to lend credit to IICEM farmers and farming cooperatives? 
C.3.3 Evaluation Methodology 
Based on the information provided within this Statement of Work, the Contractor is expected to submit a 
written description of (or approach for developing) the proposed methodology to carry out the evaluation 
in 750 randomly selected farmer producers in the regions Mopti and Sikasso40. USAID/Mali envisions a 
quasi-experimental impact evaluation with a well-established counterfactual, as well as the 
implementation of qualitative tools that can help provide lessons learned, specifically looking at rice, 
millet, and sorghum value chains. Qualitative tools to consider are key informant interviews, focus 
groups, and a broader, more rigorous survey41 that can capture a variety of populations both inside and 
outside IICEM’s intervention42. A rigorous survey will be one that accounts for biases such as attrition 
and selection, which is coded, with a sampling size large enough to derive statistically significant 
conclusions. The Evaluation Team’s survey tool will help USAID/Mali understand the impact of IICEM 
along the entire agricultural value chain43, as well as learn the effect of instability on IICEM stakeholder 
behavior. USAID/Mali expects more qualitative evidence for rice value chains and a more quantitative 
approach for millet and sorghum value chains; however, the finalized methodology will be left to the 
Contractor to design, based on baseline data that can be reconstructed in comparison farming 
cooperatives that have not received the IICEM intervention. 
In order to answer some of the questions presented in the Specific Evaluation Questions section of this 
Statement of Work, IICEM’s interventions will need to be compared to a rigorously defined 
counterfactual. These will include millet and sorghum farming cooperatives that have not received any 
outside interventions. USAID/Mali envisions an IICEM Evaluation closely comparing a sampling of 
IICEM beneficiaries to the counterfactual, examining potential differences between these groups, and 
expressing these differences using quantitative and qualitative methods. Intuitively, one may assume that 
a farming cooperative receiving higher quality inputs, and technical advice, will have larger yields than a 
farmer without these inputs. However, USAID/Mali wishes to learn how great the difference is between 
these two groups, and whether that difference was worth IICEM’s costs. Data from the cost-benefit 
analysis already conducted may help the Evaluator determine this. Because there was no randomization 
of the IICEM intervention during the project’s inception, a fully experimental impact evaluation will not 
be possible. In addition, baseline data was not collected for farming cooperatives outside of IICEM’s 
implementation. Thus, a rapid baseline reconstruction appraisal will be the first deliverable for the 
IICEM Evaluation, which will determine: 1) the utility of the original baseline of 1,897 cooperatives for 
identifying and sampling a counterfactual; 2) accessibility of cooperatives that can be used for a 
counterfactual; 3) the availability of farmer cooperative records on the crops and business for the 
baseline year and also the last (2012-2013) year; and, 4) in the absence of said records, the ability of the 
cooperative leadership to accurately recall the area planted and harvest, sales, consumption, and input 
data, and prices received. 
Based on the rapid appraisal, the level of confidence the Evaluator and USAID/Mali have in the rigor of 
the proposed quasi-experimental design will be assessed. This rapid appraisal will directly impact the 
scope and methodology of the quantitative evaluation components. In the case that a counterfactual 
 
40 The sample of 750 farming cooperatives is out of a total 1,897 farming cooperatives in 114 communes in Mopti 
and Sikasso, including 300 IICEM farmer cooperatives in Mopti and Sikasso, 300 matched control farming 
cooperatives, and 150 other farmer cooperatives. 
41 Quantitative if possible, so that broader generalizations may be made later on, as opposed to anecdotal evidence. 
42 Rice value chains lend themselves well to a more qualitative methodology; however, whenever possible 
quantitative analysis of rice value-chains is encouraged. 
43 Supported by quantitative data wherever possible. 
Annex I - 6
cannot be established, the Evaluator will propose an alternative, qualitative evaluation methodology to 
assess the impact of IICEM on the value chains. A rich set of baseline data was collected for farming 
cooperatives within IICEM which should allow for possible quasi-experimental designs such as pre/post, 
matching, simple difference, multivariate regression, and/or instrumental variables, if appropriate data 
can be reconstructed in comparison farming cooperatives. The Evaluator will also assess the reliability of 
this baseline data and subsequent records. If the data is not reliable, then methods for reconstruction will 
be tested. In the case that recall data, especially with reference to the 2011-2012 cropping cycle, is not 
reliable, then alternative, qualitative evaluation methodology to assess the impact of IICEM on the value 
chains will be proposed. 
As described above, the Contractor will make any necessary modifications to the evaluation 
methodology based on its initial rapid baseline reconstruction appraisal of both the non-participating and 
participating farming cooperatives. This modified (if necessary) evaluation methodology will be the 
Evaluator’s second deliverable. 
To carry out the evaluation, it is anticipated that the Evaluation Team will need to perform the following 
tasks: 
 Initial orientation meetings with USAID/Mali and its’ partners; 
 Review of project documentation and baseline data provided by the mission; 
 Detailed meetings with IICEM and sub-contractors to determine appropriate geographic areas 
for the evaluation, as well as sampling methodology; 
 Rapid baseline reconstruction appraisal; 
 Assessment of the baseline and subsequent records of the IICEM cooperatives; 
o Key informant interviews with control farms; 
o Analysis of available data from USAID/Mali partner organizations and other 
government and non-government agencies; 
o With USAID/Mali decide if the methodology needs modification and how; 
 Meetings with external donors44 in order to: 
o Learn their approaches to rice irrigation; 
 Collect relevant data on specific rice farming cooperatives that can be compared with or, 
matched, to IICEM’s rice farming cooperatives; 
 Site visits to implement quasi-experimental impact evaluation and qualitative tools in 
approximately 750 randomly selected farming cooperatives in Mopti and Sikasso communes, 
respectively; 
 Preparation of relevant summary tables, graphs, and annexes; 
 Drafting of evaluation narrative, including Executive Summary and other content; 
 Preparation of a PowerPoint presentation for Final Briefing; 
 Final Briefing that includes Evaluation’s findings, conclusions, and recommendations; 
 Revision of the Evaluation Report drafts to address comments and questions provided by 
 USAID/Mali; and 
 Submission of final Evaluation Report. 
The final Evaluation Report must differentiate between findings (the facts), conclusions (interpretation of 
the facts), and recommendations (judgments on what changes need to be made for future programming). 
The Evaluation Report must highlight best practices, pointing out what works and what does not, so as to 
thereby contribute to the more general field of tested experience from which future program designers 
and implementers can draw. 
 
44 Of particular relevance to this project is GIZ. 
Annex II - 1
ANNEX II 
(ORIGINAL) WORK PLAN: TIMELINE AND DELIVERABLES 
Task
July 9 - 13 Week 8 
Field
July 15 - 20 Weekend 
9 Field
July 22 - 27 weekend 
10 Field
July 29 - August 3 
Week 11 Field
August 5 - 10 Week 
12 Bamako
August 12 - 17 
weekend 13 Bamako
August 19 - 21 
weekend 14 
Bamako
August 26 - 30 
weekend 15
September 2 - 6 
weekend 16
September 9 - 13 
Week 17
Team members pilot tools and make 
necessary adjustments before going to the 
field based on appraisal results
Recruitment and training field survey staff X
Second phase methodology delivered to 
USAID
Key informing interviews -- Bamako X
Key informing interviews -- Sikasso and 
Mopti
X X
Site visits to farming communities to 
conduct
evaluation
X X
Data entry, cleaning and analysis X
Continuation of data analysis and begin 
developing the draft report and the 
presentation
X
Annex II - 2
Prepared under summary tables, graphs, and 
appendices & drafting of narrative 
assessment, including Executive Summary 
and other content.
X
Prepared a PowerPoint presentation - 3 days X
Deliver a final briefing (with PowerPoint) tb 
USAID/Mali and the Ministry of 
Agriculture we Evaluation's findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations
X
Discuss Mission comments on the 
evaluation -1 day; Wrap up draft and 
submission of Evaluation Reports and Final 
Briefing (1 day in Bamako)comments back 
to the Evaluation Team. TL and DTL return 
to home base
X X
USAID draft report review X X
Finalize and submit Final Evaluation Report X
Annex III - 1
ANNEX III 
CONTACTS AND INTERVIEWEES 
USAID/Mali Contacts
Baou Diane, Agricultural Project Management Specialist for IICEM, Bamako
Dennis Knecht, Private Enterprise Officer, Bamako
Gaoussou Traore, Contracts Officer, AEG, Bamako
Lee Cohen COTR, Bamako
Mamadou Coulibaly, Contact person with USAID/Mali during start-up.
Mamadou Augustine Dembele, Retired USAID/Mali Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, Bamako
Mary Norris, Director of AEG Office, Bamako
Michelle Corzine, M&E specialist, Bamako 
Oumarou Camara, Monitoring and Evaluation Accelerated Economic Growth Team
Timothy Stein 2nd COTR, Bamako 
List of IICEM staff and staff of the implementing partners interviewed in Bamako, Sikasso 
and Mopti 
1. Ed Keturakis, Home Office Project Director for Abt Associates, Inc 
2. Jean-Fracois Guay, COP, IICEM, Bamako 
3. Raven Smith, DCOP – Operations, IICEM, Bamako 
4. Ismaila Zorom. Data Base Manager, IICEM, Bamako 
5. Kadiatou Traore, Quality specialist, IICEM Bamako 
6. Moctar Traore, Business development officer, IICEM Bamako 
7. Zoumana Goita, Deputy Rehional coordinator, IICEM Mopti 
8. Djiguiba Kouyate, Regional coordinator, IICEM Mopti 
9. Ali Niangado, Regional Coordinator, Sikasso 
10. Oumar SIDIBE, Business development specialist, IICEM Mopti 
11. Ibrahim Konate, Coordinator, Subcontractor AIID, Koutiala 
12. Mamoutou Coulibaly, Coordinator, Subcontractor BEACIL, Bougouni 
13. Pierre Coulibaly, Coordinator, sub contractor GREFA 
14. Amadou Diop, Coordinator, Subcontractor, PEENAL, Mopti
15. Mamoutou Traore, Coordinator, Subcontractor, AMPRODE Mopti 
List Interviewees at the Mopti Regional Office of Ministry of Agriculture 
N° Name Position 
1 Oumar Maïga Directeur de la DRA Mopti 
2 Ibrahima Dicko Chef DLCP DRA Mopti 
3 Elhadji Mahamane Traoré Chef Section conseil vulgarisation; Point of 
Contact for IICEM in Mopti 
Annex III - 2
List Interviewees at the Sikasso Regional Offices 
Mahamadou Diaby, Governor of the Sikasso region 
Mr. Flatiè SANOGO, Counselor for Economic Affairs, 
Mr. Kamafilié Sissoko, Advisor Administrative Affairs, 
Mr. Sidi Konate, Chief of Staff to the Governor 
Mr. Yaya Diallo, Deputy Regional Director of Agriculture Sikasso 
Mr. Pière Traore, Deputy Coordinator of the Agricultural Market Observatory (OMA) 
BNDA: M.Yaffa and colleague 
MPC: Mr. Traore and colleague 
List of Key Informants from the credit, marketing and supply industry in Bamako, Sikasso 
and Mopti
Contact Person Interviewed Location Sector
BNDA Bamako Seydina Omar 
Diako
Bamako Financial 
Services
BNDA Sikasso Oudjeri Yaffa (Dir.) Sikasso Financial 
Services
Association d’acheteurs de Produits 
Locaux de Sikasso
Zacharia Traore Sikasso Grain marketing
Koni Djiguine Kalilou Diallo Sikasso Grain Marketing
Mali Protection de Cultures (MPC) Sekou Traore Sikasso Input Supply –
Ag. chemicals
Societe Doumbia et Fils (SODEF) Doumbia Badjan Kotiala Grain Marketing
Sounkoro et Freres Moulaye Sounkoro Mopti Grain Marketing
Planete Distribution Ousmane Alai Cisse Sevare Processing – rice 
mill
Ets. Guindo et Freres Mamouto Guindo Mopti Grain Marketing
Union des Societes Cooperatives de 
Producteurs de Mais de Diedougou 
(USCPMD)
Balla Togola (Pres.) 
+ 19 members
Diedougou Input Supply –
Seeds
Annex III - 3
Participant list, Focus group with the USCPMD of DIEDOUGOU (in Koulikoro 
region) (Union des Sociétés Coopératives des Producteurs de Maïs de Dièdougou 
USCPMD) 
1 Balla Togola President 
2 Solomane Diarra Secretary out reach 
3 Amadou Dirra Secretary supplya 
4 Ba Zoumana Coulibaly Deputy accountant 
5 Assana Coulibaly S. aux crédits 
6 Yaya Fomba Comité d’achats 
7 Chaka Sangaré Membres 
8 Chaka Togola Animateur 
9 Sinaly Diabaté Membre 
10 Bamoussa Fomba Membre 
11 Madou Diarra Adjoint au S. Approv. 
12 Alou Diabaté S. Conflit 
13 Membre Broulaye Traoré Membre 
14 Seydou Togola 
15 Dramane Tieta Membre 
16 Dramane Togola Membre 
17 Chaka Fomba 1 Membre 
18 Bouréma Fomba Membre 
19 Dramane Diabaté Directeur technique USCPMD 
List of Focus group Participants - OP de Bondo-Téna (Coopérative Barassoro Téna) 
1 Gabelou Togo Président de l’OP 
2 Amadou Togo Membre 
3 Hamidou Togo Organisateur 1 
4 Alaye Kéné Togo Organisateur 2 
5 Assa Enguimé Togo Membre 
6 Mamadou Togo 1 Trésorier 
7 Abdouramane Togo Membre 
8 Djibilirou Togo Membre 
9 Badjin Togo Membre 
10 Sidiki Togo Membre 
11 Mamadou Togo 2 Membre 
12 Djibilirou Enkougnon Togo Membre 
13 Arma Togo Membre 
14 Yousouf Togo Membre 
15 Badjin Togo Membre 
16 Boukari Togo Membre 
Annex III - 4
List of Focus Group Participants OP (SOROMOGNO) Somadougou ICRISAT/WASA 
N° Name Position 
1 Samba yalcouyé President 
2 Bakari traoré S. production 
3 Sidi Tangara Member 
4 Daouda Dembélé Organisateur 
5 Ali Goulaka Member 
Annex IV - 1
ANNEX IV 
QUESTIONNAIRES AND INTERVIEW GUIDES 
Annex IV-A: Interview guide – Suppliers and Traders 
Approach with and without IICEM 
 Supplier Name/Company: /__________________________/ 
 Number of the company or Number: /______________/ 
 Area of intervention on the market: 
 Marketing /______________/ 
 Supply inputs /______________/ 
 Transport /______________/ 
 Other (please specify) 
/______________________________________________________/ 
 Number of years of experience in the activity: /______________/ 
What are the products that you sell?
 Mil
 Sorghum
 But
 Rice:
 Cowpea
Without IICEM With IICEM
Turnover:
Volume of purchases / Sales:
Purchase Price:
Sales Price:
Who sets the price?
Period of the purchase/sale:
Who are your current customers and your potential 
customers;
Costs:
 Sacherie/twine + needle
 Transport
 Handling
 Costs of taring
 Cost of storage/conservation 
 Taxes related to transportation 
 Other (please specify) /______________/
 What are your constraints with transaction 
costs








What suggestions do you to alleviate the costs of 
Annex IV - 2
transactions, Etc.
Number of employees:
Do you have any contracts:
 OF purchase
 Of Delivery
 Autres__________________________
Describe the conditions of these contracts
Pre-financing --
 Inputs:
 Materials:
 Other:
 Comments and other:
Access to credits: Yes/No
 Credit to campaign
 Credit marketing
Conditions of access to loans
Difficulties of access to credits
Annex IV - 3
Annex IV-B: Interview guide - Banks and Financial Institutions 
Approach with and without IICEM 
 Institution Name: /______________/
 Type: 
 Bank: /______________/ 
 Institution of micro finance: /______________/ 
 Other: /______________/ 
 Credits Volume by sector:
Sector Without IICEM With IICEM
Trade
Industry
Transport
Export /Import
Agricultural Production
 Terms credits: (in proportion to the general portfolio) 
Before IICEM With IICEM
Short term
Medium term
Long-term
 Interest Rate: Before IICEM/______/ With IICEM /_________/
 Due Date: Before IICEM/______/ With IICEM /_________/
 Reimbursement Rates: Before IICEM/______/ With IICEM /_________/
 Guarantee Fund: Before IICEM/______/ With IICEM /_________/
 Status /______/ 
 IICEM /USAID /______/ 
 What has been the role of the guarantee fund in your strategy v. a v. the agricultural 
sector? 
Annex IV - 4
 Other banking products available for the actors: 
 Comments and other: 
Annex IV - 5
Annex IV-C: Producer Organizations - OPs 
Approach: With and without IICEM 
Region of: 
Circle of: 
Common: 
Village of: 
Name of the OP: Date of creation of your OP: 
Value Chain framed by IICEM: Rice (Bottom or PIV) Mil-------- -- -Sorghum--------- 
Date of interview: Many adherents of the OP:
Investigator Name (s): Number of years of partnership with 
IICEM: 
For the questions which are on the first column of the table below, please share with us your 
opinion by referring to the period before support IICEM and to the period with IICEM support. 
Annex IV - 6
QUESTIONS Period:
BEFORE IICEM
Period:
WITH IICEM
I. VALUE CHAINS OF THE OP:
 PIV Rice:
 Mil:
 Sorghum:
 Rice Low-funds:
- But
- Potato
- Cowpea
- Eshalot
- Cotton
II: USE OF AGRICULTURAL INPUTS
- What are the agricultural inputs that you 
use? (Seeds; engrais; ... )
DAP---------------
Improved seeds -----------
Certified seed -----------
NPK----------------
Pesticides ----------------
Other to clarify----------
DAP---------------
Improved seeds -----------
Certified seed -----------
NPK----------------
Pesticides ----------------
Other to clarify----------
Is this that you have seen some changes in 
the use of inputs since the beginning of the 
project:
0 No change
1 Increases
2 Decreased
- What are the doses of inputs that you use 
per hectare
DAP---------------
Improved seeds -----------
Certified seed -----------
NPK----------------
Pesticides ----------------
Other to clarify----------
- BEFORE IICEM WITH IICEM
- How is organized the supply of agricultural 
inputs?
- How you enjoy the use of agricultural 
inputs?
- How you enjoy the intervention of the 
IICEM in the facilitation of access to 
agricultural inputs?
- What are the difficulties you have in using 
the system of supply current?
- What are the opportunities that you have in 
the supply of agricultural inputs?
- Other (please specify)
III. USE OF EQUIPMENT AND 
AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT
BEFORE IICEM WITH IICEM
- What are the hardware and agricultural 
equipment that you use?
- What are the infrastructure (shops, biomes 
Annex IV - 7
QUESTIONS Period:
BEFORE IICEM
Period:
WITH IICEM
of bottom-funds, etc. ) that you use?
- How is organized the supply of hardware 
and agricultural equipment?
- How you enjoy the use of the materials and 
agricultural equipment?
- How you enjoy the intervention of the 
IICEM in access to the materials and 
agricultural equipment
- What are your difficulties in the supply of 
materials and agricultural equipment?
-
- What are the opportunities that you have in 
the supply of hardware and agricultural 
equipment?
-
- Other (please specify)
IV. ACCESS TO AGRICULTURAL 
CREDIT
- Source of agricultural credit (Bank,IMF, 
etc. )
Tontine village-------
Private - shopping
Private - supplier
Project
Bank-----------------
The institutions of micro￾finance- ---
Body OP---------------------
Other to clarify
Tontine village-------
Private - shopping
Private - supplier
Project
Bank-----------------
The institutions of micro￾finance- ---
Body OP---------------------
Other to clarify
- Credit to campaign : seed, fertilizer Tontine village-------
Private - shopping
Private - supplier
Project
Bank-----------------
The institutions of micro￾finance- ---
Body OP---------------------
Other to clarify
Tontine village-------
Private - shopping
Private - supplier
Project
Bank-----------------
The institutions of micro￾finance- ---
Body OP---------------------
Other to clarify
- Credit marketing Tontine village-------
Private - shopping
Private - supplier
Tontine village-------
Private - shopping
Private - supplier
Annex IV - 8
QUESTIONS Period:
BEFORE IICEM
Period:
WITH IICEM
Project
Bank-----------------
The institutions of micro￾finance- ---
Body OP---------------------
Other to clarify
Project
Bank-----------------
The institutions of micro￾finance- ---
Body OP---------------------
Other to clarify
- How you enjoy the intervention of the 
IICEM in the facilitation of access to credit
- Difficulties of access to credit
-
- Other (please specify)
V: AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION -
what has been the level of change as a result 
of your participation in the project:
0 No change
1 Increases
2 Decreased
- The cultivated areas have they increased?
- The production of different agricultural 
products has t-it increases:
- Improvement of the quality of products:
- What uses do you of your production Consumption-------------------
-----
Sale-------------------------
Other--------------------------
Consumption-------------------
-----
Sale-------------------------
Other--------------------------
- Difficulties related to the production:
- What are the opportunities for the 
production of your products?
- What appreciation do you of the 
intervention of IICEM at the production 
level?
- Other (please specify)
VI. PROCESSING OF PRODUCTS
- How is the transformation of your product? 
(It ságit culture framed by IICEM)-
- How to sell your products processed?
- What are the difficulties that you have in 
the transformation of your products?
- Is there a difference between the 
volume of sale of your products since you 
are working with IICEM
0 No change
1 Increases
2 Decreased
- Is there a difference between the quality 
of your products since you are working 
0 No change
1 Increases
Annex IV - 9
QUESTIONS Period:
BEFORE IICEM
Period:
WITH IICEM
with IICEM 2 Decreased
- What appreciation do you of the 
intervention of the IICEM in the processing 
of products?
- What are the opportunities for 
transformation of your products?
- Other (please specify)
VII. MARKETING OF PRODUCTS How is the marketing of your products?
- What appreciation do you of the 
intervention of the IICEM in the marketing 
of your products?
- BEFORE IICEM/NGOS WITH IICEM/NGOS
- What are the difficulties that you encounter 
in the marketing of your products?
- How negotiate -you the price of your 
products?
-
- Do you of contracts to purchase your 
products?
- Is there a difference in the selling price of 
your products since you are working with 
IICEM
0 No change
1 Increases
2 Decreased
- Is there a difference in the volume of sale 
of your products since you are working 
with IICEM
0 No change
1 Increases
2 Decreased
- What are the change opportunities 
for marketing your products?
- Other (please specify)
VIII. SUSTAINABILITY ACTION IICEM
The interventions of the IICEM in your OP will 
they continue after the IICEM?
What are your suggestions for ensuring the 
sustainability of interventions of IICEM
What impacts the political crisis has had on the 
development of your OP.
Other
Annex IV - 10
Annex IV-D: Questionnaire guides – “Spouses" 
Approach: With and without IICEM 
Region of:-------------------------------------------------- Circle of:------------------------------------------
---
Common:----------------------------------------- Village of:---------------------------------------------- 
Name of the OP: ----- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ --Date of creation of the OP: --------
--------------- 
Value Chain framed by IICEM: Rice PIV---- -----Rice fund Low--------Mil-------- -- -Sorghum---
------ 
Date of interview: ---------------------------------- Number of participants in the Focus group: -------
--------- 
Investigator Name (s): -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
------------------------------------- 
For the questions which are on the first column of the table below, please share with us your 
opinion by referring to the period before support IICEM and to the period with IICEM support. 
QUESTIONS
What has been the level of change as a result 
of your participation in the project:
= + -
I: How would you rate your living conditions in a 
general way?
0 No change
1 More interesting
2 Least interesting
- Production (Soro)
- Purchases/Sales (Sani fere)
- Food security (Dounkafa)
- The length of the period of weld
- The diseases
- Health
- Peace (hεrε)
- The image of the members of the OP in the 
community
II. What judgment do you of your conditions of daily 
work in the field?
0 No change -------------
1 More interesting-------------
2 Least interesting------------
- Quantity of Work
- How arduous the work
- Level of use of technology
- The level of mastery of technologies
Annex IV - 11
QUESTIONS
What has been the level of change as a result 
of your participation in the project:
= + -
-
- Other (please specify)
III. What judgment do you of your conditions of daily 
work at home
0 No change -------------
1 More interesting-------------
2 Least interesting------------
- Quantity of Work
- How arduous the work
- Participation in roscas
- Free Time
-
- Other (please specify)
IV: Food 0 No change -------------
1 More interesting-------------
2 Least interesting------------
- Number of meals per day
- Number of goûtterparjour /child
- Number of goûtterparjour /Adult
- Quantity of food per meal
- Quantity of the sauce of the main dish
- Quality of the sauce of the main dish
- Availability of vegetables
- Consumption of vegetables
- Meat Consumption
- Consumption of Pollet
- Other to clarify
V. Family Economy 0 No change -------------
1 More interesting-------------
2 Least interesting------------
- Level of sales (cereals, vegetables, etc. )
- Level of purchases
- Level of income of men
- Level of income of women
- Level of clothing children
- Level of clothing women
- Level of clothing men
- Level of prices on the market
- Economic prosperity in general of the family
-
-
- Other (please specify)
Annex IV - 12
Annex IV-E: Interview guide – Discontinued Groups 
Approach: With and without IICEM 
Region of: 
Circle of: 
Common: 
Village of: 
Name of the OP: Date of creation of your OP:
Value Chain framed by IICEM: Maiz------------ Mil-------- -- -Sorghum--------- 
Date of interview: Many adherents of the OP:
Investigator Name (s): Number of years of partnership with 
IICEM: 
For the questions which are on the first column of the table below, please share with us your 
opinion by referring to the period WITH support IICEM and to the period AFTER 
PHOTOS IICEM support. 
WE UNDERSTAND THAT YOU WERE INVOLVED WITH iicem (NGOS) IN PREVIOUS 
YEARS. We would like to know what changes if any took place in your way of producing, 
arranging credit, and marketing since then, that is, how did the OP operate during this last 
agricultural cycle after IICEM stopped working with you. 
Annex IV - 13
QUESTIONS Period:
WITH IICEM
Period:
AFTER IICEM
I. VALUE CHAINS OF THE OP:
- PIV Rice:
- Mil:
- Sorghum:
- Rice Low-funds:
- But
- Potato
- Cowpea
- Eshalot
- Cotton
II: USE OF AGRICULTURAL INPUTS
- What are the agricultural inputs that you 
use? (Seeds; engrais; ... )
DAP---------------
Improved seeds -----------
Certified seed -----------
NPK----------------
Pesticides ----------------
Other to clarify----------
DAP---------------
Improved seeds -----------
Certified seed -----------
NPK----------------
Pesticides ----------------
Other to clarify----------
Is this that you have seen changes after the 
departure of the project
0 No change
1 Increased
2 Reduced
- What are the doses of inputs that you 
currently use per hectare
DAP---------------
Improved seeds -----------
Certified seed -----------
NPK----------------
Pesticides ----------------
Other to clarify----------
- Period:
WITH IICEM
Period:
AFTER IICEM
- How is organized the supply of agricultural 
inputs?
- How you enjoy the use of agricultural 
inputs?
- How you enjoy the intervention of the 
IICEM in the facilitation of access to 
agricultural inputs?
- What are the difficulties that you have by 
using the supply system?
- What are the opportunities that you have in 
the supply of agricultural inputs?
- Other (please specify)
III. USE OF EQUIPMENT AND 
AGRICULTURAL EQUIPMENT
WITH IICEM/NGOS AFTER IICEM/NGOS
- What are the hardware and agricultural 
equipment that you use?
- What are the infrastructure (shops, biomes 
of bottom-funds, etc. ) that you use?
- How is organized the supply of hardware 
Annex IV - 14
QUESTIONS Period:
WITH IICEM
Period:
AFTER IICEM
and agricultural equipment?
- How you enjoy the use of the equipment 
and agricultural equipment?
- How you enjoy the intervention of the 
IICEM in access to the materials and 
agricultural equipment
- What are your difficulties in the supply of 
materials and agricultural equipment?
- What are the opportunities that you have in 
the supply of hardware and agricultural 
equipment?
- Other (please specify)
IV. ACCESS TO AGRICULTURAL 
CREDIT
- Credit to campaign : seed, fertilizer Tontine village-------
Private - shopping
Private - supplier
Project
Bank-----------------
The institutions of micro￾finance- ---
Body OP---------------------
Other to clarify
Tontine village-------
Private - shopping
Private supplier
Project
Bank-----------------
The institutions of micro￾finance- ---
Body OP----------------------
Other to clarify
- Credit marketing Tontine village-------
Project
Private - shopping
Private - supplier
Bank-----------------
The institutions of micro￾finance- ---
Body OP----------------------
Other to clarify
Tontine village-------
Project
Private - shopping
Private - supplier
Bank-----------------
The institutions of micro￾finance- ---
Body OP----------------------
Other to clarify
- How you enjoy the intervention of the 
IICEM in the facilitation of access to credit
- Difficulties of access to credit after the 
intervention of the IICEM
-
- Other (please specify)
V: AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION -
what has been the level of change after the 
participation in the project:
0 No change
1 Increases
2 Decreased
- The cultivated areas have they increased?
- The production of various agricultural 
products has t-it increases:
- Improvement of the quality of products:
- What uses do you of your production Consumption------------------------
Sale-------------------------
Annex IV - 15
QUESTIONS Period:
WITH IICEM
Period:
AFTER IICEM
Other--------------------------
- What are the difficulties related to the 
production:
- What appreciation do you of the 
intervention of IICEM at the production 
level?
- Other (please specify)
VI. PROCESSING OF PRODUCTS WITH IICEM/NGOS AFTER IICEM/NGOS
- Is this what you made of the transformation 
of your product
- How is the transformation of your product? 
(It ságit culture framed by IICEM)-
- How to sell your products processed?
- What are the difficulties that you have in 
the transformation of your products?
- Is there a difference between the 
volume of sale of your products after the 
departure of the IICEM project
0 No change
1 Increases
2 Decreased
 Is there a difference in the quality 
of your products after the 
departure of the IICEM project
0 No change
1 Increases
2 Decreased
- What appreciation do you of the 
intervention of the IICEM in the processing 
of products?
- Is there anyone that the changes made 
by IICEM have continued after the 
departure of the project? If not, explain
Yes No
- WITH IICEM/NGOS AFTER IICEM/NGOS
- What are the difficulties related to the 
processing of your products?
- Other (please specify)
VII. MARKETING OF PRODUCTS How is the marketing of your products?
 What appreciation do you of the 
intervention of the IICEM in the 
marketing of your products?
WITH IICEM/NGOS AFTER IICEM/NGOS
 What are the difficulties that you encounter 
in the marketing of your products?
 Is it that you negotiate the price of 
your products with multiple 
buyers?
 Do you of contracts to purchase 
your products?
Annex IV - 16
QUESTIONS Period:
WITH IICEM
Period:
AFTER IICEM
 Is there a difference in the selling 
price of your products after the 
departure of the IICEM project
0 No change
1 Increases
2 Decreased
 Is there a difference in the volume 
of sales of your products after the 
departure of the IICEM project
0 No change
1 1 Increased
2 Decreased
 What are the change opportunities 
for marketing your products after 
the departure of the IICEM 
project?
0 No change
1 More interesting
2 Least interesting
 Other (please specify)
What impacts the political crisis has had on the development of your OP? 
Other Comments on the situation after IICEEM depart? 
Annex V - 1
ANNEX V 
(REVISED) METHODOLOGY FOR THE SECOND PHASE 
(All references to annexes refer to the original) 
Presented by: IBTCI/SENESO 
16 JULY 2013 
During the Rapid Data Base Analysis conducted in June we found that there is sufficient data from the 
PIV rice program to permit a statistical analysis of the impact of the technical package in that production 
system. However, the same cannot be said for the sorghum/millet value chain. We know that the bulk of 
Millet and sorghum production in the IICEM project area is used to satisfy household consumption needs. 
An unknown portion of that production, however, does make it into the value chain. The data from the 
PIV Rice system will be analysed as a time series in a trend type analysis. The results of this analysis will 
be triangulated against more qualitative data gathered during a second phase field inquiry to assess the 
impact of IICEM on participants in the remaining value chains. 
Statistical analysis of the PIV data 
The data from the PIV rice production system in Mopti is reliable, that is small measurement error is 
expected and it is not based on small samples and projections. Accordingly, this data will be used for 
trend analysis. For example, we expect to be able to graph the productivity and the value of sales per 
hectare for the groups that have been producing for 4, 3 and 2 years to see if there are trends. Regression 
analysis will be used to determine correlations between the use of the technological package and the 
principal output indicators. The hypothesis is that with each year of technical assistance the productivity 
should increase and the return to participants from application of the skills learned, eg. better price 
negotiation, should also increase sales. Because most of the participating farmers received technical 
assistance , credit, and marketing assistance through Farmer’s Organizations (Organisations Paysannes or 
Ops),it should be possible to test the individual or interactive effects of these independent variables and 
their relative importance. 
Key Informant Interviews 
Individual interviews with the bankers, processors, traders and suppliers who are participants in the 
IICEM will be used to obtain their assessment of the program. At the same time, certain quantitative data 
will be asked of them concerning sales, employment generation and profitability. In the cases where the 
IICEM provided grants, credit, or other incentives/support, the importance of those supports to the overall 
business will be asked of the interviewees in order to determine the multiplier effect of IICEM funds and 
training. 
Participant Focus Groups 
In the revised technical proposal by IBTCI of March 201345 the need to shift to a mixed methods 
approach was anticipated in the case of participant self-assessment of the impact of project interventions: 
“ the impact evaluation will probably shift from a predominantly quantitative approach using 
numerical data from the 2009 base line, data files from each farming cooperative, and data that 
will be collected on comparative farming cooperatives, to a qualitative approach of process 
evaluation reviewing the IICEM inputs along a selected sample of value chains. This will require 
greater emphasis on the qualitative side of the evaluation involving two key qualitative areas: 1) 
 
45IBTCI, MAR 2013. Evaluation of the Integrated Initiatives for Economic Development in Mali (IICEM) Project; 
SOL-688-12-00001
Annex V - 2
the analysis of documents reporting the events or inputs for given farming cooperatives and 2) the 
surveys that will be conducted to ascertain the presence or absence of IICEM inputs. That effort 
will require interviews with farming cooperative leaders and the use of their opinions as to if and 
how services from IICEM and other similar programs began and their assessment of them.” 
The units of analysis, the farming groups and the managers of marketing, credit, and processing 
enterprises forming the value chains of the four types of crops remain the same as in the first phase 
assessment, but modifications will be made in the types of questions that will be asked, the manner in 
which they will be asked and the sampling frame. In addition, the sustainability question will be 
addressed by interviewing a sub- sample of farming groups that were dropped in the course of the 
modification of the program to fit the FtF framework in 2012-2013. The individual interviews with value 
chain businesses will serve as a control group for information gathered from farmer group interviews. 
For a sample (see Table 1, Annex1) of farmer organizations in each value chain, focus groups will be held 
with members of the group. The group discussion will be guided to focus on the question of what 
participation in the IICEM program means to them compared with the way they farmed, obtained credit, 
accessed inputs (both seeds and fertilizers), stored and graded quality of grains, and negotiated the 
marketing of crops, and water management before IICEM. In this way, we will obtain a farmer 
assessment of the specific components of the IICEM theory of change that should lead to increased 
production and to link farmers to the value chain. Their assessments would be rated as positive, neutral, or 
negative per group and relevant assessments by them used to illustrate the points as well as provide ideas 
for improving the program. 
A second section of the group discussions will focus on what the changes identified in the first section 
mean in terms of the livelihood of the families – changes in health, food security, education, savings, and 
material wellbeing if that is the case. This aspect will be addressed by weighting the sample of groups 
interviewed to include women’s groups. A limited sub-sample of spouses of interviewed OP members 
will be included when necessary. Questions on livelihoods will be limited to those specifically tied to the 
overarching technology issue in order to assure the continuity of information obtained. 
Sampling of the groups in the value chains 
Because we are using a focus group approach for the majority of interviews in this portion of the field 
work, the quality of the perceptions given is more important than the quantity. The sampling issue is 
therefore simplified (see Table 1, Annex 1). We will work with IICEM field personnel to select a limited 
number of groups to interview. This purposeful selection will be based primarily on OPs that are 
representative of the OPs within the IICEM system and accessibility. The information sought during the 
focus group stage is of a perceptual nature – that is, participants perceptions of the impacts of the 
technology promoted in the project. Therefore, we believe this method will meet criteria for providing 
the best information as well as being manageable with the resources available.
We anticipate interviews with at least 50 OPs – 30 from the Sikasso zone and 20 from the Mopti Zone. 
As indicated above, these samples will include sub-samples of women’s groups, groups dropped by 
IICEM and seed producer groups. Value chain participants (input suppliers, financial services providers 
and marketers) will be selected from among those who have or are currently working with IICEM. This 
simplified approach will allow us to carry out the field studies within a reasonable logistical framework. 
We anticipate recruiting and fielding around six two-person teams along with the appropriate vehicle and 
logistical support. 
The Sustainability question 
The sustainability of the Linkages that have been introduced to support the technological package (credit, 
marketing, access to supplies) will be evaluated from two angles. Because of the changes that came with 
the FtF policy, many producer groups that had been in the program for two or three years were dropped. 
The degree to which these groups were able to maintain the linkages with suppliers and buyers will serve 
Annex V - 3
as a proxy for information on IICEM’s capacity to build commercial relationships between producers and 
other actors in the value chain. A sub-sample of these groups will be interviewed to assess the 
sustainability of the IICEM approach by ascertaining how they coped with credit, suppliers and marketing 
during the cropping cycle since IICEM ended its assistance to them (see Table 2, Annex 1). Interviews 
with key informants in the value chain cited above will also include questions as to whether they intend to 
or are able to continue commercial relations with IICEM groups once the project has ended. 
In the case of traders, processors, bankers, and input suppliers the approach will be direct interviews 
about what the IICEM has meant to them in terms of their volume, profits, attention to quality, value 
added because of IICEM facilitated negotiations, guarantee fund, aggregation of producer crops and, if 
the case may be, the provision of equipment for better storage or transformation. 
Summary 
The evaluation of the IICEM project will take a two-prong approach. Where sufficient numerical data 
exist, as in the Mopti PIV rice production system, we will submit that data to statistical analysis in order 
to gauge the impact of the technological package on output. Where insufficient statistical data exist, our 
approach will allow an assessment of the impact on the participating farmers and businesses from their 
own perspective and within the terms stated in the TO evaluation question. The combination of 
quantitative and qualitative analysis outlined here is expected to provide rich feedback on the processes 
implemented by IICEM as well as ideas for improving this type of a program from an FtF perspective and 
a value chain development perspective. 
Summary of Types of Interviews (see Table 1, Annex 1) 
1. Focus groups of a sample of PO’s with specific questions: structured interviews; 
2. Focus groups with female groups of low land rice production PO’s; 
3. Focus groups with spouses of PO’s in specific livelihood questions; 
4. Focus groups with dropped out PO’s that were sufficiently in charge by IICEM. 
5. Individual interviews of a group of selected traders in the Sikasso area, the Mopti area but also a 
number of non-IICEM traders; 
6. Interviews with a number of NGO’s that also intervened in the program area for specific 
questions with the aim to compare; 
7. Statistics available from the SAP or EWS if available and reliable. 
Expected Responses 
1. Impact on production; 
2. Impact on marketing in general; 
3. Impact on sustainability; 
4. Impact on livelihood 
Annex V - 4
ANNEXES 
Annex 1 
Table I Universe of IICEM Groups that Experienced Two Cropping Cycles or More46
Region of Mopti Region of Sikasso
Value-chain NGO Cercle Two 
Cycles+
Sample NGO Cercle Two 
Cycles+
Sample
Sorghum/millet 
in Sikasso, only 
Millet in Mopti
AMPRODE Bankass 20+ 6 BEACIL Bougouni 80- 6
AMPRODE Koro 18+ 6 GREFA Sikasso 51- 6
- - AIDD Koutiala 23+ 6
Rice Lowland - GREFA Sikasso 18- 6
Rice PIV PEENAL Mopti,Ya
varou 
and 
Djenné
49 6
47
- -
Total 87 18 172 24
Table II Distribution of Dropped Groups by crop and NGO 
Mopti IICEM Program Sikasso IICEM Program
Value-chain NGO Universe Sample NGO/Uni
on
Cercle Universe Sample 
25%
Sorghum or 
millet 
Union 
Diedougo
u
48
Koulikoro 7 1union 
board 
group
AIID Koutiala 81 6
Potato** PEENAL 9 NA GREFA Sikasso 42 NA
RCGOP Tom* 13 NA
COFIGES Gao* 12 NA
Shallot** PEENAL 4 NA
RCGOP Tom* 11 NA
Corn GREFA Sikasso 13 5
BEACIL Bougouni 14 5
Sweet Pea** GREFA Sikasso 20 NA
Mango** GREFA Sikasso 12 NA
Rice PIV RCGOP Tom* 27 NA
COFIGES Gao* 13 NA
Sum 27
 
46 This data has to be gleaned from the data bases that IICEM has sent to the evaluation team. 
47 Because these Ops are the subject of the trends analysis, only 6 focus random groups for males and 6 for 
females are necessary to obtain an assessment of the IIEM facilitated linkages 
48 This case needs to be reviewed from a dropped perspective about all of the linkages to markets, AND see 
production. Coordination between H & Sokona timing. It is also a key group for the seed certification and 
production effort of IICEM 
Annex V - 5
(115)
Annex 2
Région de: 
Cercle de: 
Commune de: 
Village de: 
Nom de l'OP: Date de création de votre OP :
Date de l’interview : Nombre adhérents de l’OP :
Nom enquêteur (s): Nombre d’années de partenariat avec IICM :
QUESTIONS PERIODE:
SANS IICEM
PERIODE:
AVEC IICEM
I. CHAINES DE VALEUR DE L'OP:
 Riz PIV :
 Mil :
 Sorgho :
 Riz Bas-fonds :
 Autres (à préciser)
II: UTILISATION D'INTRANTS AGRICOLES
- Quels sont les intrants agricoles que vous 
utilisez? (semences; engrais;...)
- Quels sont les intrants agricoles que vous 
recevez de IICEM?
- Comment est organisé 
l'approvisionnement en intrants agricoles?
- Comment appréciez vous l'utilisation des 
intrants agricoles?
- Comment appréciez vous l'intervention de 
l'IICEM dans la facilitation de l'accès aux 
intrants agricoles?
- Quelles sont les contraintes que vous avez 
dans l'approvisionnement en intrants 
agricoles?
- Quelles sont les opportunités que vous 
avez dans l'approvisionnement en intrants 
agricoles?
- Autres (à préciser)
III. UTILISATION DU MATERIEL ET 
EQUIPEMENT AGRICOLES
- Quels sont les matériaux et équipements 
agricoles que vous utilisez?
- Quels sont les matériaux et équipements 
agricoles que vous recevez de IICEM?
Questionnaire Organisations des Producteurs (OP)
Annex V - 6
QUESTIONS PERIODE:
SANS IICEM
PERIODE:
AVEC IICEM
- Comment est organisé 
l'approvisionnement en matériaux et 
équipements agricoles?
- Comment appréciez vous l'utilisation du 
matériel et équipement agricole?
- Comment appréciez vous l'intervention de 
l'IICEM dans l'amélioration de l'accès aux 
matériaux et équipements agricoles
- Quelles sont vos contraintes dans 
l'approvisionnement en matériaux et 
équipements agricoles?
- Quelles sont les opportunités que vous 
avez dans l'approvisionnement en en 
matériaux et équipements agricoles?
- Autres (à préciser)
IV. ACCES AU CREDIT AGRICOLE
- Source de credit agricole (Banque,IMF, 
etc.)
- Crédit de campagne: semences, engrais
- Crédit de commercialisation
- Comment appréciez vous l'intervention de 
l'IICEM dans l'accès au crédit
- Contraintes d'accès au crédit
- Autres (à préciser)
V: PRODUCTION AGRICOLE
- Les superficies cultivées ont elles 
augmenté? 
- La production des différentes chaines de 
valeur a t-elle augmenté:
- Amélioration de la qualité des produits:
- Quelles utilisations faites vous de votre 
production 
- Contraintes liées à la production:
- Quelles sont les opportunités de la 
production de vos produits?
- Quelle appréciation faites vous de 
l'intervention de IICEM au niveau de la 
production?
- Autres (à préciser)
VI. TRANSFORMATION DES PRODUITS 
- Comment se fait la transformation de vos 
produits?
- Quels sont les produits transformés que 
vous avez?
- Comment se vendent vos produits 
transformés?
- Avez vous des contrats d'achat de vos 
produits transformés?
- Quelle appréciation faites vous de 
Annex V - 7
QUESTIONS PERIODE:
SANS IICEM
PERIODE:
AVEC IICEM
l'intervention de l'IICEM dans la 
transformation des produits?
- Quelles sont les contraintes que vous avez 
dans la transformation de vos produits?
- Quelles sont les opportunités de 
transformation de vos produits?
- Autres (à préciser)
VII. COMMERCIALISATION DES PRODUITS
- Comment se fait la commercialisation de 
vos produits? 
- Avez vous de contrats d'achat de vos 
produits?
- Comment se fixe le prix de vos produits?
- Quelle appréciation faites vous de 
l'intervention de l'IICEM dans la 
commercialisation de vos produits?
- Quelles sont les contraintes que vous 
rencontrez dans la commercialisation de 
vos produits?
- Quelles sont les opportunités de la 
commercialisation de vos produits?
- Autres (à préciser)
VIII. DURABILITE ACTION IICEM
- Les interventions de l'IICEM dans votre OP 
sont elles durables?
- Quelles sont vos appréciations générales 
des interventions de IICEM?
- Quelles sont vos suggestions pour assurer 
la durabilité des interventions de IICEM
- Autres (à préciser)
IX. BIEN ETRE
- Vos revenus ont-ils augmenté?
- Quelles utilisations faites vous de vos 
revenus?
- Comment appréciez vous votre bien être?
- Autres (à préciser)
Annex V - 8
Annex 3 
 Nom fournisseur/Entreprise:/__________________________/ 
 Numéro de l’entreprise ou Numéro :/______________/ 
 Domaine d’intervention sur le marché : 
 Commercialisation /______________/ 
 Approvisionnement intrants /______________/ 
 Transports /______________/ 
 Autres (à préciser) /______________________________________________________/ 
 Nombre d'années d'expérience dans l'activité: /______________/ 
Quelles sont les produits que vous commercialisez ?
 Mil 
 Sorgho
 Maïs
 Riz:
 Niébé
Sans IICEM Avec IICEM
Chiffre d’affaires :
Volume d’achats / Ventes :
Prix Achat :
Prix Vente :
Qui fixe les prix ?
Période de l’achat/vente :
Qui sont vos clients actuels et vos clients potentiel;
Couts :
 Sacherie/ficelle + aiguille 
 Transport
 Manutention 
 Frais de tarage
 Coût de stockage/conservation 
 Taxes liées au transport 
 Autres (à préciser) /______________/
 Quelles sont vos contraintes avec les coûts de 
transaction 








Guide de l’entretien – Fournisseurs, 
Commerçants
Approche sans et avec IICEM
Annex V - 9
Quelles suggestions faites vous pour alléger les coûts 
de transactions, Etc.
Nombre d’employés :
Faites-vous des contrats : 
 D’achat
 De livraison
 Autres__________________________
Décrire les conditions de ces contrats
Pre-financement --
 Intrants :
 Matériels :
 Autres : 
 Observations et autres : 
Accès aux crédits: Oui/Non
 Crédit de campagne
 Crédit de commercialisation 
Conditions d'accès aux crédits
Difficultés d'accès aux crédits
Annex V - 10
Annex 4 
 Nom Institution : /______________/
 Type : 
 Banque : /______________/ 
 Institution de micro finance : /______________/ 
 Autre : /______________/ 
 Volume crédits par secteur:
Secteur Sans IICEM Avec IICEM
Commerce
Industrie
Transport
Export /Import
Production Agricole
 Termes crédits : (en proportion du portefeuille général) 
Avant IICEM Avec IICEM
Court terme
Moyen terme
Longue terme
 Taux d’intérêt : Avant IICEM/______/ Avec IICEM /_________/
 Echéance: Avant IICEM/______/ Avec IICEM /_________/
 Taux de remboursement : Avant IICEM/______/ Avec IICEM /_________/
 Fonds de garantie : Avant IICEM/______/ Avec IICEM /_________/
 Etat /______/ 
Guide de l’entretien – Banques institutions 
financiers
Approche sans et avec IICEM
Annex V - 11
 IICEM /USAID /______/ 
 Quel a été le role du fonds de garantie dans votre strategie v. a v. le secteur agricole ? 
 Autres produits bancaires disponibles pour les acteurs : 
 Observations et autres :
Annex VI - 1 
ANNEX VI 
KEY QUESTIONS AND SYNOPSIS OF APPROACH
EVALUATION 
QUESTION 
TYPE OF 
ANSWER/ 
EVIDENCE 
REQUIRED
COLLECTION 
METHOD
SOURCE OF 
DATA
SAMPLING/ 
SELECTION
DATA 
ANALYSIS 
METHODS
1. How has IICEM’s activities resulted in improved livelihoods for members of farming cooperatives and producer 
organizations?
See Annex IV D 
Spouse 
Questionnaires
Assessment of 
participant of 
multiple 
health, food, 
income, etc 
before IICEM 
vs. After
Group/discussion 
Interviews
Spouses of 
Farmer Groups 
and Female Bas 
Fond group 
members
Approximately 
20% of the 
groups, but at 
least six groups 
by cropping 
system in each 
of the five 
implementing 
partner area
Tabulation of 
Spouse 
assessment of 
condition with 
IICEM 
compared with 
before
2. Has IICEM succeeded in helping farmers and farming businesses become more organized, productive, and 
financially secure?
See Annex IV A 
for Key 
Informant 
questionnaires 
for Businesses
Assessment 
with examples 
of the business 
before and 
after IICEM
Group/discussion 
Interviews
Key informants 
managing 
trading, input, 
credit and 
processing 
businesses
Not a sample –
universe of all 
businesses 
engaged in the 
IICEM value 
chains
Qualitative 
analysis of 
responses 
See Annex IV C & 
IV E for Farmer 
Group 
Questionnaires
Assessment 
with examples 
by the farmer 
group or 
cooperative 
before and 
after IICEM
Group/discussion 
Interviews
Groups of 
farmers from 
each cropping 
system in each 
of the five 
implementers 
areas
Approximately 
20% of the 
groups, but at 
least six groups 
by cropping 
system in each 
of the five 
implementing 
partner area
Tabulation of 
Groups 
assessment of 
condition with 
IICEM 
compared with 
before
2a. How well are IICEM-supported millet and sorghum farming cooperatives functioning, when compared to millet 
and sorghum farming cooperatives receiving no external support? Compare Annex C & D questionnaires
3. What are IICEM’s relative strengths and weaknesses of intervening along the entire rice, millet, and sorghum 
value chains, as opposed to targeting specific facets?
See Annex IV A Assessment Group/discussion Key informants Not a sample – Qualitative 
Annex VI - 2 
for Key 
Informant 
questionnaires 
for Businesses
with examples 
of the business 
before and 
after IICEM
Interviews managing 
trading, input, 
credit and 
processing 
businesses
universe of all 
businesses 
engaged in the 
IICEM value 
chains
analysis of 
responses and 
assessment of 
the integrated 
and interactive 
effect of the 
credit, input, 
marketing and 
processing 
facilitation
See Annex IV C & 
E for Farmer 
Group 
Questionnaires
Assessment 
with examples 
by the farmer 
group or 
cooperative 
before and 
after IICEM
Group/discussion 
Interviews
Groups of 
farmers from 
each cropping 
system in each 
of the five 
implementers 
areas
Approximately 
20% of the 
groups, but at 
least six groups 
by cropping 
system in each 
of the five 
implementing 
partner area
Logical analysis 
of the 
integrated and 
interactive 
effect of the 
credit, input, 
marketing and 
processing 
facilitation
3a. When compared to external donor interventions targeting a specific step(s) in a value chain, is IICEM’s 
approach cost-effective?
4. What is the relative value-added (monetary and non-monetary) of the integration of IICEM’s infrastructure with 
other productivity inputs?
Focus on the rice and other processing efforts that involved infrastructure 
4a. What is the reaction of different populations [inside and outside the IICEM intervention] to IICEM’s package of 
infrastructure and productivity inputs?
See Annex IV C & 
E for Farmer 
Group 
Questionnaires
Assessment 
with examples 
by the farmer 
group or 
cooperative 
before and 
after IICEM
Group/discussion 
Interviews
Groups of 
farmers from 
each cropping 
system in each 
of the five 
implementers 
areas
Approximately 
20% of the 
groups, but at 
least six groups 
by cropping 
system in each 
of the five 
implementing 
partner area
Logical analysis 
of the 
integrated and 
interactive 
effect of the 
credit, input, 
marketing and 
processing 
facilitation
For Non￾participating 
neighbors IV E
Knowldege of 
participating 
neighbors’ 
work and 
benefits with 
IICEM
informal 
discussions
Individual males 
and females 
Not a sample –
sporadic contact 
at the time of 
group interviews
Opinions noted
b. What are the advantages and disadvantages of IICEM’s infrastructure activities and its corresponding package of 
Annex VI - 3 
inputs when compared to alternative external donor approaches?
5. Will the relationship between farmers, processors (and/or cereal traders), and banks continue to function 
without the technical and financial support of IICEM?
5 a. How are IICEM-supported farming cooperatives continuing to work with processors to create market 
opportunities?
See Dropped 
Groups 
Questionnaire in 
Annex IV E and 
Key Informant 
interviews for 
processors, 
credit, inputs. 
Annex IV A & B
Group 
assessment 
about if and 
how they 
continued the 
credit, input, 
sales and 
processor 
relations 
facilitated by 
IICEM
Group discussion 
of Dropped 
groups, also during 
Key interviews ask 
about how they 
would continue 
when IICEM ends
Dropped Corn 
and Millet 
groups
Approximately 
20% of the 
dropped groups, 
but at least six 
groups by 
cropping system 
in each of the 
five 
implementing 
partner area
Qualitative 
analysis of 
before and 
after responses 
to the effect of 
the credit, 
input, 
marketing and 
processing 
facilitation 
ending in 2011
5 b. Will banks continue to provide credit to farming cooperatives?
See Key 
informant 
interview guide 
in AnnexIV B
Candid 
responses 
explaining the 
basis for the 
confidence in 
the groups or 
value chains
Individual 
managers at the 
national and 
regional offices
Credit providers Not a sample, 
but all credit 
providers
Logical 
conclusions or 
assessments of 
the responses 
for consistency 
and reasons
5 c. What variables factor into banks providing credit after IICEM’s intervention has finished? Combined 5 a and 5 
b above
How has the recent instability in the country affected IICEM stakeholder behavior? 
a. Are farmers continuing to use IICEM inputs? (Annex A, B C & E)
b. Are farmers continuing the upkeep of IICEM infrastructure? Annex A
c. Are banks continuing to lend credit to IICEM farmers and farming cooperatives? Annex B, C & E
First in the RDBA 
interviews with 
extension agents
Descriptions 
and examples 
of impact
One-on-one key 
informant 
interviews by 
Senior National 
and International 
Evaluators
Extension 
Agents
Sample of 32 
extension 
Agents 
representing all 
implementers
Categorize and 
list types of 
impact on the 
Implementer 
and on the 
credit, 
marketing and 
supply 
Annex VI - 4 
linakages
Second, as part 
of the Key 
interviews 
Annex IV A & B
Descriptions 
and examples 
of impact
One-on-one key 
informant 
interviews
Managers of 
credit, input, 
processing, and 
marketing 
businesses
Not a sample, 
but all 
businesses that 
were involved in 
the value chain
Categorize and 
list types of 
impact on the 
Implementer 
and on the 
credit, 
marketing and 
supply 
linakages
Third, as part of 
the Farmer 
Group 
Questionnaire 
Annex IV C,D, & E
Descriptions 
and examples 
of impact
Group/discussion 
Interviews
Groups of 
farmers from 
each cropping 
system in each 
of the five 
implementers 
areas
Approximately 
20% of the 
groups, but at 
least six groups 
by cropping 
system in each 
of the five 
implementing 
partner area
Tabulation of 
types of 
impacts in 
relation to 
linkages and 
other impacts.
Annex VII - 1 
ANNEX VII SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS 
1. Annual report: September 1, 2010 - august 31, 2011, integrated initiatives for economic 
growth in Mali. Contract: EDH-I-00-05-00005-03 
2. Cost/benefit analysis of iicem bas?fonds sites, draft report, Prepared by: Pamela Katic￾IWMI/West Africa, Regassa Namara - IWMI/West Africa, Jonathan Lautze - 
USAID/E3/W. May 2012 
3. Etude sur le chaine de valeur mil/sorgho au mali, initiatives integrees pour la croissance 
economique au Mali (IICEM). Contrat No.: EDH-I-13-00005-04
4. Global food security response Mali rice study, Micro report #158 
5. IICEM fiches de collecte de données 
6. IICEM fiches de collecte de données 2011-2012 organisation paysanne. Incomes and 
food security through integrated initiatives for economic growth in Mali (IICEM) 
7. IICEM maize value chain assessment - August 2010 
8. Integrated Initiatives for Economic Growth in Mali. Proposed Modifications to Indicators 
and Targets Resulting From Program Alignment with Feed the Future Strategy1 
9. Mali, FtF 2011 - 2015 Multiyear Strategy, USAID 
10. National plan of priority investment in the sector of agriculture (PNIP - SA) of Mali 
2011-2015 
11. Organisation de la coordination suivi evaluation. Incomes and food security through 
integrated initiatives for economic growth in Mali - IICEM 2011 
12. Performance monitoring plan January 2011 - December 2011 integrated initiatives for 
economic growth in Mali (IICEM) 
13. Performance monitoring plan January 2012 - December 2012 integrated initiatives for 
economic growth in Mali (IICEM) 
14. Performance monitoring plan, January 2013 - December 2013, integrated initiatives for 
economic growth in Mali (IICEM). Contract No. EDH-I-13-05-00005-08 
15. Plan de travail an 3 Septembre 2011 - Décembre 2012 integrated initiatives for economic 
growth in Mali (IICEM) 
16. Plan national d'investissement prioritaire dans le secteur agricole au Mali- 2011-2015 
(PNIP), Rapport PNIP-SA Rep. du Mali 
17. Questionnaire i for extension agents. Incomes and food security through integrated 
initiatives for economic growth in Mali (IICEM) 2013 
18. Republic of Mali: September 2010; National Plan of Priority Investment in "The Sector 
of Agriculture (PNIP-SA) of Mali, 2011-2015 
19. Superficies emblavees par campagne par membre de l'op incomes and food security 
through integrated initiatives for economic growth in Mali (IICEM) 
Annex VII - 2 
20. US AID_IICEM - EAT: Commercial Legal and Institutional Reform form Agricultural 
Value Chains in Mali, Agenda for Action February 2012 
21. US AID_IICEM: Avril 2011; Etude sur la Chaîne de Valeur MIL/SORGHO au Mali, 
Contrat: EDH-I-00-05-00005-04, par Abdoulaye FALL 
22. US AID_IICEM: avril 2011; Promotion de la Compétivité des Produits Agricoles 
Maliens, Processus de Plaidopyer pour la réduction de Coûts d'Approche des céréales au 
Marchés. 
23. US AID_IICEM: Avril 2011; Quarterly Report Mars-Mai 2010 
24. USAID cost/benefit analysis of IICEM bas-fonds sites - Sikasso, Mali. May 2012 
25. Work plan year 1 January 2010- august 2011 contract: edh-i-00-05-00005-03, to 13 
integrated initiatives for economic growth in Mali (IICEM) 
26. Year 4 work plan - proposed extension January 2013 - December 2013 improving farmer 
incomes and food security through integrated initiatives for economic growth in Mali 
(IICEM) 
27. USAID_IICEM: avril 2011; Etude sur la Chaîne de Valeur MIL/SORGHO au Mali, 
Contrat: EDH-I-00-05-00005-04, par Abdoulaye FALL 
28. USAID_IICEM: avril 2011; Promotion de la Compétivité des Produits Agricoles 
Maliens, Processus de Plaidopyer pour la réduction de Coûts d'Approche des céréales au 
Marchés. 
29. USAID_IICEM: Avril 2011; Quarterly Report Mars-Mai 2010 
30. USAID_IICEM: Avril 2011; Quarterly Report September-November 2010 
31. USAID_IICEM: Avril 2011; Quarterly Report November 2010- February 2011 
32. USAID_IICEM - EAT: Commercial Legal and Institutional Reform form Agricultural 
Value Chains in Mali, Agenda for Action February 2012 
33. Republic of Mali: September 2010; National Plan of Priority Investment in "The Sector 
of Agriculture (PNIP-SA) of Mali, 2011-2015