December 20, 2012
This evaluation was produced by Rivera Cira Consulting,Inc. for the United States Agency for 
International Development under Purchase Order AID-520-O-13-00002.
 
USAID/GUATEMALA FINAL
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION FOR
THE PROJECT AGAINST VIOLENCE 
AND IMPUNITY (PAVI)
FINAL REPORT
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Acronyms ............................................................................................................................. iv
Executive Summary in English ............................................................................................... vi
Executive Summary in Spanish - RESUMEN EJECUTIVO ........................................................... x
I. Purpose of the Evaluation and Methodology ....................................................................... 1
1. Purpose ......................................................................................................................................1
2. The evaluation team ..................................................................................................................1
3. Methodology ..............................................................................................................................1
3.1. Pre-field work ................................................................................................................................. 1
3.2. Review of Work Plan with usaid, definition of persons to interview and organization of focus 
groups ...................................................................................................................................................2
3.3. Interviews of key persons and in-situ visits ...................................................................................2
3.4. Carry out five focus groups and administer questionnaires ..........................................................3
3.5. Collect statistical data on project indicators and results for comparative analysis ......................4
3.6. Preliminary debriefing to USAID and report drafting. ...................................................................4
3.7. Workshop to discuss findings and delivery of final report ............................................................4
3.8. Limitations to this evaluation.........................................................................................................5
II. Background on Development Problem and USAID Response .............................................. 5
1. The Context ...............................................................................................................................5
2. USAID Response .........................................................................................................................8
III. Principal Findings and conclusions on PAVI ....................................................................... 9
1. Pipeline ......................................................................................................................................9
2. PAVI’s Monitoring and Evaluation Final Report ...........................................................................9
3. Key contributions of PAVI to ROL and Justice Sector in Guatemala. ............................................12
4. Additional program areas where USAID should undertake activities to improve PAVI objective 
areas and ensure they are sustainable. .........................................................................................14
5. Donor Coordination of institutional strengthening efforts under PAVI and the GOG Role in this 
coordination. ...............................................................................................................................15
6. Improve Justice System capacity to prosecute and try serious crimes .........................................17
6.1. MP general preformance .............................................................................................................17
6.2. Support provided by PAVI to MP Analysis Unit and to the Crimes against Life Office ................18
6.3. Changes in the performance and caseload in the 24-hour courts – PAVI contribution to those 
outcomes ............................................................................................................................................21
6.4. PAVI activities in support of the implementation of the Law Against Organized Crime and/or 
other legislation ..................................................................................................................................23
7. Support to high-impact courts ..................................................................................................23
7.1. Remodeling of 14th Floor of Guatemala City Court Building ........................................................24
7.2. New security and protection protocols .......................................................................................24
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8. Mobilized justice sector and civil society to reduce and prevent violence ...................................24
8.1. Availability and quality of legal aid/victim’s services...................................................................24
8.2. PAVI contributions to improve protection of victims..................................................................25
9. Increase internal accountability and oversight within the Justice Sector .....................................27
9.1. PAVI’s progress on reforming recruitment, appointments, selection and promotion of judges 27
9.2. PAVI’s accomplishments regarding evaluation of public defenders............................................28
10. Strengthen justice capacity to combat illegal activities in Petén ...............................................29
10.1 PAVI efforts in Petén ...................................................................................................................29
10.2. PAVI’s effect on prosecution of crimes against the environment.............................................30
10.3. PAVI’S effect on prosecution of crimes against cultural heritage .............................................31
10.4. PAVI’s effect on prosecution of crimes against life ...................................................................31
IV. Recommendations for future programming .................................................................... 32
1. Improve justice system capacity to prosecute and try serious crimes .........................................33
1.1. Police............................................................................................................................................33
1.2 Judiciary ........................................................................................................................................33
1.3. Public Ministry (Attorney General Office) and INACIF ................................................................. 35
1.4. INACIF ...........................................................................................................................................35
1.5. IDPP ..............................................................................................................................................36
2. Mobilize justice sector and civil society to reduce and prevent violence .....................................36
2.1. Services for the protection and attention of Victims...................................................................36
2.2. Establishment of oral Hearings in Family, Child and Adolescents in conflict with 
 the Law courts ....................................................................................................................................37
2.3. Development of community Police pilot projects with a more integrated approach to citizens’ 
security ................................................................................................................................................37
2.4. Reduction in the availability and use of firearms ........................................................................40
2.5. Promotion of Change of culture in schools and family ................................................................41
2.6. Some ideas on how to work better with CSOs in Guatemala ......................................................42
3. Increase internal accountability and oversight within the Justice Sector .....................................43
3.1. Strengthen empirical, practical and applied research on Criminal Justice and Violence issues . 43
3.2. Improvement in the quality of human resources in the Justice Sector .......................................44
4. Strengthen justice capacity to combat illegal activities in Petén .................................................44
5. On Future Project Evaluations ..................................................................................................46
V. Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 47
ANNEX 1: PERSONS INTERVIEWED AND FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANTS (BY INSTITUTIONS) ... 52
Participants in focus groups ..........................................................................................................56
ANNEX 2: data collection analysis tools ................................................................................ 58
1.Guides of discussion for focus groups .........................................................................................58
2.Cuestionario de evaluación del proyecto PAVI de USAID ............................................................59
Annex 3: RCC FINAL WORK PLAN ......................................................................................... 64
iii
ANNEX 4: SCOPE OF WORK PROVIDED BY USAID PURCHASE ORDER .................................... 80
TABLE OF FIGURES 
Figure No. 1. Distribution of informants by PAVI areas ........................................................................2
Figure No. 2. Costs of Crime and Violence as Percentage of GDP ..........................................................5
Figure No .3. Geographic distribution of homicides in Guatemala (2010) .............................................6
Figure No. 4. Latin America- Criminal Justice Effectiveness Rankings ...................................................7
Figure No. 5. Guatemala’s ratings on Delivery of Justice ......................................................................7
Figure No. 6. RCC Usefulness Rating of PAVI Indicators .....................................................................11
Figure No. 7. Justice and Security Budget as a share of the GDP. ........................................................14
Figure No. 8. Cases brought to Court by MP Crimes Against Life Office ..............................................19
Figure No. 9. Guilty Verdicts vs. Not-Guilty Verdicts (2010-2012) MP Crimes against Life Unit ............20
Figure No. 10. MP Crimes against Life Unit Clearance Rates ...............................................................20
Figure No. 11. Judiciary clearance rates in selected Latin American Countries (2008) .........................22
Figure No. 12. New cases, resolved cases and clearance rates in 24-hour Courts in Guatemala ...........22
Figure No. 13. The Guatemala Future Reform Agenda - Fundamentals ..............................................32
TABLE OF BOXES 
Box 1. Characteristics of useful indicators.................................................................................................. 9
Box 2. Costa Rica’s “In Flagrante Delicto” Courts.....................................................................................34
Box 3. An integrated approach to citizen security in Bogota...................................................................39
Box 4. The “Arms Free Municipalities” Project in Ilopango and San Martin, El Salvador (2005-2007) ..40
Box 5. The Shop of Mr. Justice, a radio justice education campaign. ......................................................42
Box 6. Violence Observatory in honduras................................................................................................43
Box 7. Police Innovations in Brazil in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro .......................................................45
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ACRONYMS
ASIES Research and Social Studies Association (Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales)
CAGP
CARSI
Administrative Center for Criminal Cases (Centro Administrativo de Gestión Penal)
Central America Regional Security Initiative 
CAIMUS Integral Support Centers for Women Survivors of Violence (Centros de Apoyo Integral para 
Mujeres Sobrevivientes de Violencia)
CENADOJ National Judicial Information Center (Centro Nacional de Análisis y Documentación Judicial)
CICIG International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (Comisión Internacional contra la 
Impunidad en Guatemala)
CONAP National Counsel for Protected Areas (Consejo Nacional de Areas Protegidas)
COPREDEH Presidential Human Rights Policy Coordinating Commission (Comisión Presidencial 
Coordinadora de la Política del Ejecutivo en materia de Derechos Humanos)
CPC Criminal Procedures Code
CSOs Civil Society Organizations
CTO USAID Contract Technical Officer
DIGICRI General Directorate for Criminal Investigations (Dirección General de Investigaciones 
Criminales)
GAM Mutual Support Group of Guatemala (Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo de Guatemala)
GDP Gross Domestic Product
IADB Inter-American Development Bank
ICHR Inter-American Commission of Human Rights
IDHCA United Nations Report on Human Development for Central America
ICCPG Guatemalan Institute of Comparative Studies in Criminal Sciences (Instituto de Estudios 
Comparados en Ciencias Penales de Guatemala)
IDPP Criminal Public Defense Institute, (Instituto de Defensa Pública Penal)
IEPADES Sustainable Development Teaching Institute (Instituto de Enseñanza para el Desarrollo 
Sostenible) 
INACIF National Forensic Sciences Institute (Instituto Nacional de Ciencias Forenses)
IQC Indefinite Quantity Contract
JSCA Judicial Studies Center of the Americas
LAPOP Latin American Public Opinion Project, Vanderbilt University.
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation
MINUGUA United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (Misión de Verificación de Naciones Unidas 
en Guatemala)
MP Public Ministry (Attorney General Office) (Fiscalía General de la República)
NAS Narcotics Assistance Section at the US Embassy
NGO Non-government organization
ODHAG Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala (Oficina de Derechos Humanos del 
Arzobispado de Guatemala)
PAVI Project Against Violence and Impunity
PDH Ombudsperson Office for the Defense of Human Rights (Procuraduría de Derechos Humanos)
PGN Solicitor General (Procuraduría General de la Nación)
PNC National Civil Police, (Policía Nacional Civil)
PM Public Ministry (Attorney General Office) (Fiscalía General de la República)
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RBM Mayan Biosphere Reserve (Reserva de la Biosfera Maya)
RCC Rivera Cira Consulting, Inc.
ROL Rule of Law
SENABED National Seized Assets Administration Secretariat (Secretaría Nacional de Administración de 
Bienes de Extinción de Dominio) 
SICOMP Public Ministry Information System
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
UNAH National Autonomous University of Honduras (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de 
Honduras)
UN United Nations
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNIVALLE University of the Valley (Universidad del Valle)
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
US United States of America
USAID United States Agency for International Development
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY IN ENGLISH
In October 2012, Rivera Cira Consulting, Inc. (RCC) was contracted to carry out a performance evaluation 
of the USAID/Guatemala Project Against Violence and Impunity (PAVI) and to provide recommendations 
for future USAID programming in justice and security. PAVI was implemented by Tetra Tech DPK from 
September 2009 to June 2012. For this evaluation, the RCC team reached 115 persons in interviews and 
focus groups. 
1. BACKGROUND ON DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM AND USAID RESPONSE 
After diminishing in the years after the Peace Accords in 1996, crime and violence have recently 
returned to become the most important destabilizing factor in social, political, and economic life in 
Guatemala. This time violence engulfs both rural and urban areas, and is driven not only by persistent 
inequality and lack of opportunity, but by newer sources, such as narcotraffic, arms trafficking and 
criminal gangs. Crime and violence is now a central systemic problem in Guatemala, with multiple 
manifestations affecting several Departments and different demographic groups and income levels. 
While 2010 and 2011 both saw declines that lowered the murder rate from 46 to 38.6 per 100,000, this 
change may be attributable only to the population increase, but not necessarily to any deep decline in 
the number of homicides. 
Development Objective One of the USAID Strategy for Guatemala 2011-2015 is aimed to help create 
greater Security and Justice for citizens. The PAVI project started before the USAID/ Guatemala Strategy 
was concluded, but was focused on some areas later reflected in the Mission strategy, mainly: a) the 
strengthening of prosecution and trial of homicides and other serious crimes, b) improvement of 
management and coordination systems among justice sector institutions, including support for the 
design and implementation of merit-based personnel hiring and promotion systems, and, c) the 
targeting of Petén as a region in need of special attention where an integrated approach was required. 
2. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ON PAVI
PAVI was a bridge project, designed to address justice sector issues between the end of the 2004-2009 
USAID/Guatemala Rule of Law Project and the start of the current USAID/Guatemala Justice and 
Security Project. PAVI was funded at $7,133,526. Based on its research and fieldwork, RCC has 
concluded that PAVI’s most important contributions to the Rule of Law in Guatemala were: 
 Increasing and improving the prosecution of crimes against life. During the life of the project the 
number of cases prosecuted by the Public Ministry (MP) with guilty verdicts for crimes against life 
increased from 38% in 2010 to 51% in 2012, for an average increase in efficiency of 13%. There was 
also a 4.7% increase in such cases brought to trial by MP prosecutors. PAVI’s main achievement was 
to establish an integrated working methodology between the Public Ministry’s Analysis Unit and the 
Crimes against Life Prosecutors Unit, reflected in establishment of “Criminal Prosecution Working 
Groups” with members from both offices. The strengthening of the Crimes against Life Unit was 
also due to factors beyond PAVI, such as: a) implementation of a new wiretap authorization law, 
supported by NAS, that has allowed discovery of organized crime groups and detection of justice 
system corruption; b) use of new authority in the Organized Crime Law of cooperating co￾defendants’ testimony (“colaboradores eficaces”); and, c) the group of police investigators of crimes 
against life, formed by the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation, that has been an 
invaluable help to the Crimes against Life Unit; and, d) MP establishment of two anti-gang groups, 
one for Mara 13 and one for Mara 18, that achieved prosecutions and imprisonment of the main 
leaders of both groups. 
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 Improving the installations and the security of the High Impact Courts. This activity was financed 
with NAS funds. The High Impact Courts received strong approval from all persons interviewed, who 
deemed them a major improvement in the criminal system’s ability to fight impunity. According to 
CENADOJ, since their 2009 opening, they have issued final verdicts in 83 cases, with a minimum of 
three defendants per case and several cases with many more. However, numbers of cases resolved 
is not the best indicator of their impact, but rather numbers of defendants sentenced and the 
complexity and difficulty of the cases. PAVI also contributed to design security and protection 
protocols for the High Impact Courts to assure a secure and fair trial. These protocols, according to 
the interviewed judges, have been only partially implemented, and security for the judges and the 
parties involved remains limited outside of the fortified Court Building. 
 Making the 24-hour Courts less expensive to manage. The new less costly model based on PAVI’s 
assessment and recommendations was accepted and implemented by the Supreme Court in new 
governing regulations. A notable result of these courts has been a substantial drop in the use of 
provisional detention, said by the EU representative to be a 65% reduction, because when the 
ordinary courts are closed, the 24-hour judges decide immediately if an accused must be imprisoned 
or may leave the court. These courts also have facilitated issuance of arrest and search warrants at 
times out of the courts’ regular hours. Nevertheless, though these courts operate continuously 
from 3:30 p.m. to 8:00 a.m., they have only a limited mandate to resolve cases and their clearance 
rate is very low (22.6%), since they do not operate as fully functioning ordinary courts. 
 The design of an annual evaluation system for 500 justices of the peace and 350 trial judges and 
the reorganization of the Judicial School. The annual evaluation system is ready for 
implementation and the judicial authorities seem to have the political will to implement. The 
Supreme Court has started an awareness campaign to socialize it among judges to avoid negative 
reactions to an annual evaluation, and the Judicial School has nearly completed the reorganization 
project. According to the Judicial School authorities, 90% of the PAVI studies and recommendations 
have been implemented. 
 Organization of a Civil Society Organizations group to provide services to increase protection to 
victims of crime and violence, particularly women. PAVI raised awareness of violence against 
women, and improved women’s access to justice, prompting them to go to courts and providing 
legal aid for their claims, mainly in support of domestic violence claims and child support. 
Nonetheless, there were no specific measures or indicators available to determine to what extent 
PAVI - supported services for attention to victims contributed to reduce or prevent violence, nor to 
determine the target population they actually reached. 
 Better prosecution of crimes against the environment in Petén. PAVI provided critical support to 
stakeholders in Petén by offering training and improving awareness among justice sector operators 
on environmental crimes. One of PAVI’s most important activities in Petén was providing support to 
the Foro de Justicia Ambiental (FORO), the key civil society coalition in the region defending the 
protection of the Mayan Biosphere Reserve. PAVI critically enhanced the FORO’s capacity to 
become a credible and legitimate interlocutor with the Justice Sector. According to FORO, these 
contributions led to improving the processing of environmental cases, resulting in 112 brought to 
Court, with 80% resulting in guilty verdicts during the term of PAVI. 
viii
After the completion of the project, all of the PAVI work areas still needed continuous support to 
preserve and consolidate the gains that had been made. 
During the PAVI project, donor coordination of institutional strengthening efforts to the MP and the 
Judiciary in criminal reform improved notably. On the donor side, this was due in significant part to the 
efforts of the PAVI Chief of Party, according to all donor officials interviewed. On the GOG side, the 
improvement was due mainly to the President of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court and the 
new Attorney General. Both had strategic vision, leadership and definite plans and policies to 
implement. The main donor coordination issue as of this evaluation concerns police reform efforts. As 
of November 2012, the Minister of Government had not decided who would coordinate donor inputs. 
There was a strong sense among most persons interviewed that it is very important that donors impose 
stronger conditions to donor contribution and condition further assistance to measurable results. 
3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMMING 
Recommendations for future USAID support based on RCC fieldwork are set out below by area and by 
priority order. 
3.1. Improve justice system capacity to prosecute and try serious crimes 
 Strengthen criminal case management, including improvement of statistical reporting and use of 
statistics for planning. Standard international judicial efficiency indicators should be used to 
measure progress. Special attention should be given to the establishment and consolidation of 
effective oral hearing systems. 
 Strengthening the High Impact Courts (improving security measures for judicial staff and witnesses; 
select and train a new set of high risk court judges and design an incentive system) 
 Support the Public Ministry with USAID long-term technical advisors working with prosecutors. Also, 
the Working Groups model and the systematization of best practices identified by PAVI in the 
Crimes Against Life Prosecutors Unit should be replicated in all prosecutor offices. 
 Support for the establishment of the Dirección General de Investigaciones Criminales (DIGICRI). 
 Support the implementation of the law that allows justice of the peace courts to judge crimes with 
less than 5 years imprisonment in coordination with the Justice Centers. 
 Support integration efforts between Police investigators and prosecutors. Joint training of police 
and prosecutors in investigation techniques and management should be conducted. 
 Strengthen the newly established Femicide Court in the MP and replicate the unit in other regions. 
 Strengthen working links between MP and INACIF. Interactive workshops between MP and INACIF 
officials on how to deal with crime scenes must continue. They promote better understanding 
between prosecutors and forensic staff and can help to measure and define expectations 
 Institutionalization of the MP training modules produced during 2004-2009 USAID ROL project. 
They need to be updated and incorporated into regular UNICAP training schedule. Training needs to 
reach prosecutors nationwide, and long distance and on-line training needs to be promoted. 
 Study the Attention of Rape Victims Centers financed by USAID/El Salvador that were opened at the 
Forensic Medicine Institute sites in San Salvador and in Santa Tecla due to the high number of sexual 
assault attended by INACIF. The initiative is worth consideration for replication in Guatemala. 
 Strengthen the IDPP Technical Support Department to enable it to carry out scientific analysis for 
defended persons. (INACIF does not provide forensic services to IDPP). In this area the psychological 
exams in cases of domestic violence are very important. 
ix
3.2. Mobilize justice sector and civil society to reduce and prevent violence 
 Improve protection of and attention to victims in Justice Sector Institutions. Promote the 
Metropolitan Derivation Network Model established by IDPP/ALG in collaboration with MP to deal 
with victims as the best tool to link and coordinate efforts of all justice system actors, health 
providers, social services and civil society. The model should be expanded to other departments. 
Moreover, strengthen CSOs with a long-term initiative to allow them to perfom within the networks. 
 Support the establishment of oral hearing-based Family, Children and Adolescents in Conflict with 
the Law Courts. 
 Support development of pilot police community projects with an integrated approach to citizens 
security (study Bogota, Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and El Salvador experiences) 
 Support initiatives aimed to reduce firearms availability and use (study El Salvador UNDP project) 
 Promote a change of culture in schools and family (Leadership training in conciliation and mediation 
for youth coupled with creation of formal conflict resolution by middle and secondary school 
students – see Puerto Rico and Argentina experiences and media campaigns. Work with church 
organizations). 
3.3. Increase internal accountability and oversight within the Justice Sector 
 Strengthen empirical, practical and applied research on criminal justice and violence issues. Award 
resources for regular periodic reports by civil society organizations on justice and security indicators 
with baseline data to measure progress, and for observatories on situations of violence and justice 
sector performance 
 Continue promotion of the new annual judge evaluation system produced with PAVI assistance and 
support to the Judicial School to implement the new organization. 
 Finish the IDPP evaluation and quality control system for contracted public defenders (abogados de 
oficio). 
 Promote the passage of the Public Ministry Law to give stability to this institution and continue the 
MP performance evaluation system. 
 Support IDPP to review its disciplinary procedures to make them more transparent. 
 Support efforts to aims to qualify for International Quality Assurance Norms (ISO norms) in IDPP and 
Judicial School transparent operation. 
3.4. Strengthen justice capacity to combat illegal activities in Petén 
 Provide technical assistance in-situ to the local MP Office with resident long term TA. Improvement 
of investigation capacity is urgently needed. Investigations are done badly, evidence is missing and 
investigations are usually very superficial. 
 Assist the courts in conditioning an additional new courtroom for oral hearings. 
 Support the revival of the Justice Center in the region to coordinate efforts among justice officials. 
 Develop a Petén Citizen Security pilot project with an integrated approach such as those carried out 
in Bogota, in Brazil or El Salvador with citizen involvement. An urgent dialogue between civil society 
and the GOG in the department must be encouraged and supported to build trust. 
 Support studies to understand the causes of violence against women and children in the region to 
define strategies on how to attack the problem. 
 Support the establishment of a local emergency telephone number and inform citizens about it. 
Currently, emergency number 122 is answered in Guatemala City and is of little help. 
 Provide technical support and finance public awareness campaigns on citizens’ rights and access to 
justice. Most citizens have no awareness of their rights or where to go for help. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY IN SPANISH - RESUMEN EJECUTIVO
 
En octubre 2012, la firma Rivera Cira Consulting, Inc. (RCC) fue contratada para realizar una evaluación 
del desempeño del Proyecto USAID/Guatemala contra la Violencia y la Impunidad (PAVI) y proporcionar 
recomendaciones para futuros proyectos de USAID en la justicia y la seguridad. PAVI fue implementado 
por Tetra Tech DPK entre septiembre de 2009 junio de 2012. El equipo de evaluación entrevistó y 
realizó grupos focales que abarcaron a 115 personas. 
1. CONTEXTO DEL PROBLEMA Y LA RESPUESTA DE USAID 
Luego de disminuir después de los Acuerdos de Paz in 1996, el crimen y la violencia han vuelto a 
convertirse en el factor desestabilizador más importante de la vida social, política y económica en 
Guatemala. Hoy, la violencia se extiende a zonas tanto rurales como urbanas y está impulsada, no sólo 
por la desigualdad persistente y la falta de oportunidades, sino por nuevas causas tales como el 
narcotráfico, el tráfico de armas y las pandillas criminales. La delincuencia y la violencia forman un 
problema sistémico en Guatemala con múltiples manifestaciones que afectan a varios departamentos y 
a diferentes grupos demográficos y de diversos niveles de ingreso. Si bien en 2010 y 2011 se redujo la 
tasa de homicidios de 46 a 38,6 por cada 100.000 habitantes, este cambio puede atribuirse sólo a un 
aumento de la población, pero no necesariamente a una disminución sustancial en el número de 
homicidios. 
Uno de los objetivos de desarrollo de la Estrategia de USAID para Guatemala 2011-2015 tiene como 
meta ayudar a crear una mayor seguridad y justicia para los guatemaltecos. El proyecto PAVI fue iniciado 
antes de finalizar la Estrategia de USAID, pero se centró en áreas que después se reflejaron en la 
estrategia de la Misión de USAID, principalmente: a) el fortalecimiento de la acción penal y el juicio de 
los homicidios y otros delitos graves, b) la mejora de los sistemas de gestión y coordinación entre las 
instituciones del sector de justicia, incluido el apoyo para el diseño e implementación de 
nombramientos basado en el mérito personal y los sistemas de promoción, y, c) la focalización de Petén 
como una región necesitada de una atención especial en el que se requiere un enfoque integrado. 
2. PRINCIPALES HALLAZGOS Y CONCLUSIONES SOBRE PAVI 
PAVI fue un proyecto puente, diseñado para abordar los problemas del sector justicia en el intervalo 
entre el final del 2004-2009 Proyecto de Estado de Derecho y el inicio del presente Proyecto de Justicia y 
Seguridad. PAVI tuvo un financiamiento de $ 7.133.526. Basado en el trabajo de campo, RCC encontró 
que las contribuciones más importantes de PAVI al Estado de Derecho en Guatemala fueron: 
 Aumentar y mejorar la persecución de los delitos contra la vida. Durante la vida del proyecto, el 
número de casos procesados con sentencias condenatorias por delitos contra la vida aumentó de 
38% en 2010 al 51% en 2012, para un aumento promedio de eficiencia del 13%. También hubo un 
aumento del 4,7% en esos casos elevados a juicio por la fiscalía. El principal logro de PAVI fue 
establecer una metodología de trabajo integrado entre la Unidad de Análisis del Ministerio Público y 
la Fiscalía de Delitos contra la Vida, que se reflejó en el establecimiento de "Grupos de Trabajo" de 
persecución criminal con miembros de ambas oficinas. El fortalecimiento de la Fiscalía de Delitos 
contra la Vida se debió también a otros factores externos, tales como: a) la aplicación de una ley que 
autorizó escuchas telefónicas, apoyada por NAS: b) el uso del testimonio de colaboradores eficaces 
autorizado por la nueva Ley contra la Delincuencia Organizada; c) el grupo de policías investigadores 
formados por la Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional,; y, d) el establecimiento en el MP 
xi
de dos grupos anti-pandillas, uno para la Mara 13 y otro para la Mara 18, que han logrado el 
procesamiento y encarcelamiento de los principales líderes de ambas organizaciones. 
 La mejora de las instalaciones y la seguridad de los Tribunales de Alto Riesgo. Esta actividad fue 
financiada con fondos de NAS. Los Tribunales de Alto Riesgo recibieron un fuerte respaldo de todas 
las personas entrevistadas, quienes los consideraron una mejora importante en sistema penal para 
combatir la impunidad. Según CENADOJ, desde 2009, estos tribunales han emitido sentencias 
definitivas en 83 casos, con un mínimo de tres acusados por caso1
. Además PAVI contribuyó con los 
nuevos protocolos de seguridad y protección de los tribunales de alto impacto. Sin embargo estos 
protocolos, según los jueces entrevistados, sólo se han aplicado parcialmente y seguridad para los 
jueces y las partes involucradas es muy limitada fuera de la Torre de Tribunales en la Ciudad de 
Guatemala. 
 Reducir el costo administrativo de los juzgados de turno. El nuevo modelo, resultante de la 
evaluación realizada por PAVI, es más económico. Las recomendaciones PAVI fueron aceptadas e 
implementadas por la Corte Suprema. Su principal logro ha sido una reducción del 65% de la 
detención provisional, según el representante de la Unión Europea, ya que cuando los tribunales 
ordinarios están cerradas, los jueces de turno deciden inmediatamente si el acusado debe ser 
encarcelado o puede ser liberado. Igualmente, estos juzgados han facilitado la emisión de órdenes 
de captura u órdenes de allanamiento fuera del horario regular de trabajo. Estos juzgados funcionan 
continuamente de 15:30-08:00 am pero sólo tienen una jurisdicción limitada para resolver los casos, 
por lo que su tasa de resolución es muy baja (22,6%). 
 El diseño de un sistema de evaluación anual para 500 jueces de paz y para 350 jueces de primera 
instancia y la reorganización de la Escuela Judicial. El sistema de evaluación anual apoyado por 
PAVI está listo para su implementación y las autoridades judiciales parecen tener la voluntad política 
para ponerlo a funcionar. La Corte Suprema ha comenzado una campaña interna de sensibilización 
para convencer a los jueces de las virtudes del nuevo sistema y evitar reacciones negativas al 
mismo. La Escuela Judicial también ha implementado su reorganización. Según las autoridades de la 
Escuela Judicial el 90% de las recomendaciones resultantes de PAVI ya han sido implementadas. 
 Organización de un grupo de organizaciones de la sociedad civil para prestar servicios para 
mejorar la protección y atención de víctimas de la violencia, en particular mujeres. PAVI mejoró el 
acceso de las mujeres a la justicia (principalmente en la prestación de ayuda legal para casos de 
violencia intrafamiliar y mantención de los hijos). Sin embargo, RCC no pudo encontrar información 
específica para establecer en qué medida el apoyo de PAVI a la atención de las víctimas contribuyó a 
reducir o prevenir la violencia, ni para determinar la población objetivo a la que llegó ese esfuerzo. 
 Un mejor procesamiento de los delitos contra el medio ambiente en Petén. PAVI prestó un apoyo 
fundamental en Petén en la formación y sensibilización de los operadores del sector justicia en 
delitos ambientales. Una de las actividades más importantes de PAVI en Petén fue fortalecer el Foro 
de Justicia Ambiental, una coalición clave de organizaciones de la sociedad civil para la defensa de la 
Reserva de la Biosfera Maya. PAVI ayudó a mejorar la capacidad del FORO para convertirse en un 
interlocutor creíble y legítimo frente al Sistema de Administración de Justicia. Estas contribuciones 
 
1
 Respeto de estos tribunales, el número de casos resueltos no pareciera ser el mejor indicador de su impacto, sino el número 
de acusados condenados y la complejidad y dificultad de los casos. 
xii
ayudaron a mejor procesamiento de casos ambientales. De acuerdo al Foro, durante la vigencia de 
PAVI, se procesaron 112 casos y se obtuvieron condenas en 80% de ellos. 
Después de la finalización del proyecto todos los ámbitos en que trabajó PAVI aún necesitaban apoyo 
continuo para preservar y consolidar los avances que se lograron. 
Durante el proyecto PAVI, la coordinación de los esfuerzos de los donantes para el Fortalecimiento 
Institucional para el MP y el Poder Judicial mejoró notablemente. Por el lado de los donantes, conforme 
a funcionarios entrevistados de los donantes internacionales, esto se debió en gran parte a los esfuerzos 
de la Directora de Proyecto de PAVI. Por el lado oficial guatemalteco, la mejora se debió principalmente 
al Presidente de la Cámara Penal de la Corte Suprema y a la Fiscal General. Ambas autoridades tienen 
un liderazgo definido, planes estratégicos y claridad en las políticas a implementar. El principal 
problema de coordinación entre donantes fue la reforma de la policía, pues aún hasta finales de 
noviembre 2012, el Ministro de Gobernación no había decidido quién va a coordinar las aportaciones de 
los donantes. 
 
Hubo un consenso fuerte entre los entrevistados en la alta importancia de que los donantes impongan 
condiciones más fuertes a sus contribuciones para apoyo de reformas de la Justicia y deben condicionar 
la ayuda a los resultados obtenidos. 
3. RECOMENDACIONES PARA LA FUTURA PROGRAMACIÓN 
Recomendaciones para USAID para futuros proyectos resultantes de entrevistas grupos focales y 
cuestionarios se detallan a continuación por área de programación y en cada una de ellas, por orden de 
prioridad. 
3.1. Mejorar la capacidad del sistema judicial para perseguir y juzgar los delitos graves 
 Fortalecer la gestión de los casos penales, incluyendo la mejora de la información estadística y el 
fomento del uso de las estadísticas para la planificación presupuestaria. Indicadores y estándares de 
desempeño judiciales internacionales deben ser usados para medir la eficiencia. Igualmente, se 
debe prestar especial atención al establecimiento de un sistema de manejo de las audiencias orales 
que evite postergaciones. 
 Fortalecer los Juzgados de Alto Impacto (mejora de las medidas de seguridad para el personal 
judicial y los testigos; selección y formación de nuevo grupo de jueces para estos tribunales; y, el 
diseño de un sistema de incentivos para tales jueces). 
 Apoyar al MP con asesores técnicos de largo plazo que trabajen in-situ con los fiscales. Además, 
replicar el modelo de los Grupos de Trabajo y la sistematización de las mejores prácticas 
identificadas por PAVI en la Fiscalía de Delitos contra la Vida. 
 Apoyar la creación de la Dirección General de Investigaciones Criminales (DIGICRI). 
 En coordinación con los Centros de Justicia, apoyar la implementación de la ley que permite a los 
juzgados de paz conocer de crímenes con pena de prisión inferior a 5 años. 
 Apoyar los esfuerzos de trabajo integrado entre los investigadores de la policía y los fiscales. La 
formación de la policía y los fiscales en investigación debe ser realizada conjuntamente. 
 Reforzar el Juzgado de Femicidio recientemente establecido en el MP y replicarlo en otras regiones. 
 Fortalecer los vínculos de trabajo entre MP e INACIF. Talleres conjuntos entre MP y funcionarios 
INACIF sobre cómo manejar la escena del crimen deben continuar. 
xiii
 Actualizar e institucionalizar los módulos de formación realizados y producidos durante el Proyecto 
de Estado de Derecho 2004-2009 para ser incorporados en el horario de capacitación de UNICAP. 
Fomentar la capacitación en línea y a distancia para permitir que llegue a todos los fiscales del país. 
 Estudiar los Centros de Atención a Víctimas de Violencia Sexual del Instituto de Medicina Forense en 
El Salvador apoyados por USAID/El Salvador para ver su replicabilidad en Guatemala. INACIF recibe 
una gran cantidad de víctimas por estas razones.
 Fortalecer el Departamento de Apoyo Técnico del IDPP para que puede realizar análisis científico 
más efectivo (INACIF no proporciona servicios forenses a IDPP). En este campo, los exámenes 
psicológicos en casos de violencia doméstica son muy importantes. 
3.2. Movilizar sector de la justicia y de la sociedad civil para reducir y prevenir la violencia 
 Mejorar la protección y atención a las víctimas en las instituciones del Sector Justicia. Promover el 
Modelo de Red Metropolitana de Derivación establecido por IDPP/ALC en colaboración con MP para 
atender a las víctimas. El trabajo en red parece ser la mejor herramienta para vincular y coordinar 
los esfuerzos de todos los actores del sistema de justicia, los proveedores de salud, los servicios 
sociales y la sociedad civil. El modelo debe ser ampliado a otros departamentos. Igualmente 
fortalecer las organizaciones de sociedad civil para funcionar dentro las redes. 
 Apoyar la creación de tribunales orales de familia, de niñez y de menores en conflicto con la ley. 
 Apoyar el desarrollo de proyectos comunitarios pilotos con enfoque integrado de la seguridad 
ciudadana (ver casos de Bogotá, Río de Janeiro, Sao Paulo y experiencia de El Salvador en el tema). 
 Apoyar las iniciativas encaminadas a reducir la disponibilidad y uso de armas de fuego (estudiar el 
proyecto del PNUD El Salvador en la materia). 
 Promover un cambio de cultura en las escuelas y la familia (formación de liderazgo en la conciliación 
y la mediación para la juventud junto con la creación de instancias de resolución de conflictos en 
escuelas primarias y secundarias. Estudiar las experiencias de Puerto Rico y Argentina. También 
promover campañas y trabajar con organizaciones de las iglesias). 
3.3. Aumentar la responsabilidad y supervisión interna dentro del Sector Justicia 
 Fortalecer la investigación empírica, práctica y aplicada en justicia penal y la seguridad. Promover 
informes periódicos sobre el estado de la justicia y la situación de la violencia con base a 
indicadores, al igual que para establecer observatorios y veedurías ciudadanas. 
 Apoyar la implementación del sistema de evaluación anual de jueces diseñado con la ayuda de PAVI 
y apoyar a la Escuela Judicial a implementar la nueva organización. 
 Completar el sistema de IDPP para la evaluación y control de calidad de defensores de oficio. La 
tarea se inició pero no terminó bajo PAVI. 
 Promover la aprobación de la Ley del Ministerio Público para dar estabilidad a esta institución y 
continuar fortaleciendo el sistema de evaluación de desempeño de los fiscales. 
 Apoyar al IDPP a revisar sus procedimientos disciplinarios para que sean más transparentes. 
 Apoyar los esfuerzos del IDPP para calificar procesos bajo Normas Internacionales de 
Aseguramiento de la Calidad (Normas ISO). 
3.4. Fortalecer la capacidad de la justicia para combatir las actividades ilegales en Petén 
 Proporcionar asistencia técnica in situ a la oficina local de MP con consultores de asistencia técnica a 
largo plazo. Mejora de la capacidad de investigación es una necesidad urgente. Las investigaciones 
se hacen mal, la evidencia se desaparece y las investigaciones suelen ser muy superficiales. 
 Ayudar a los tribunales en el acondicionamiento de una sala adicional nueva para las audiencias 
orales. 
xiv
 Revivir el Centro de Justicia en la región para coordinar esfuerzos entre los funcionarios de justicia.
 Desarrollar un proyecto piloto con un enfoque integrado de la seguridad ciudadana, tales como los 
hechos en Bogotá, en Brasil y El Salvador con la participación ciudadana. Hay que fomentar el 
diálogo entre la sociedad civil y el gobierno en el departamento. 
 Apoyar estudios para entender las causas de la violencia elevada contra mujeres y niños en la región 
para definir estrategias sobre la manera de atacar el problema. 
 Apoyar el establecimiento de un número de teléfono local de emergencia e informar a los 
ciudadanos acerca del mismo. En la actualidad, el número de emergencia 122 se contesta en la 
Ciudad de Guatemala y se tarda mucho tiempo para recibir ayuda. 
 Proporcionar apoyo técnico y financiero para campañas de educación legal ciudadana que informen 
como acceder a la justicia. Los ciudadanos no tienen conocimiento de sus derechos ni a dónde ir 
para obtener ayuda.
1
I. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION AND METHODOLOGY
1. PURPOSE
The purpose of the Purchase Order issued to Rivera Cira Consulting, Inc. (RCC) is to conduct a 
performance evaluation of the USAID/Guatemala PAVI Project implemented by Tetra Tech DPK from 
September 2009 to June 2012 and to provide recommendations for future USAID programming in justice 
and security. The evaluation addressed the following main questions: a) What have been the key 
contributions of PAVI to ROL and Justice Sector in Guatemala? b) In what additional program areas does 
USAID need to undertake activities to improve PAVI objective areas and ensure they are sustainable? c) 
How have institutional strengthening efforts between PAVI and other donors such as the European Union 
and Canada been coordinated overall? d) Has coordination been successful and what is the role of the 
Government of Guatemala in this coordination. The evaluation also responds to specific questions 
related to each PAVI objective area, as indicated in the Solicitation for Quotation SOL-520-12-000012. 
2. THE EVALUATION TEAM
The RCC evaluation team was composed of three seasoned Latin America Rule of Law experts and one 
local coordinator. All RCC consultants had strong experience in conducting interviews and focus groups 
related to the justice sector and were fluent Spanish speakers. Carl Cira was the Team Leader, Tirza 
Rivera-Cira, the Technical Director, and Olga Nazario, Senior Criminal Justice and Civil Society Specialist. 
Wolfgang Ochaeta, a Guatemalan consultant with experience in development projects, assisted with local 
coordination for the evaluation team, focus group management, and processing of statistical data and 
questionnaires, and in providing guidance on the country’s political context. 
Carl Cira and Tirza Rivera-Cira were in Guatemala for a total of 4 weeks in two visits, one three week visit 
to collect information (Oct. 28 - Nov. 16, 2012) and a second one week visit (Dec. 9-14, 2012) to organize 
and conduct the workshop to discuss the RCC findings. Olga Nazario was in country for a total of two 
weeks (Nov. 4-16), including the Petén fieldwork. 
3. METHODOLOGY
RCC followed a participatory approach seeking to engage persons who know about PAVI. RCC reached 
115 persons who were well informed on Guatemala’s security and justice situation or had a close relation 
with PAVI. Among the latter group were participants in training or awareness activities, those who have 
received direct technical support, those have been direct beneficiaries of project activities, those who 
had collaborated as consultants and USAID staff. To obtain information from these persons, the RCC 
consultants used different techniques, including direct interviews, focus groups and questionnaires. For 
this report, the RCC team employed the following methodology: 
3.1. PRE-FIELD WORK 
Before arrival in Guatemala, RCC reviewed the PAVI contract, the quarterly and final reports prepared by 
Tetra Tech DPK, as well as the Monitoring and Evaluation Report submitted by the contractor. RCC also 
reviewed the final report of December 17, 2009 on the USAID ROL Program that preceded PAVI. RCC also 
reviewed the LAPOP reports on “The Political Culture of Democracy in Guatemala” 2009 and 2010, the 
2
Judiciary and Public Ministry annual reports, as well as the State Department Human Rights Reports on 
Guatemala, among other sources. 
3.2. REVIEW OF WORK PLAN WITH USAID, DEFINITION OF PERSONS TO INTERVIEW AND 
ORGANIZATION OF FOCUS GROUPS 
Upon arrival in Guatemala, RCC met with USAID/Guatemala representatives to review the objectives of 
the assignment, the work plan, the methodology, and the list of persons and institutions to interview. 
RCC also met with Tetra Tech DPK officers for suggestions for possible interviewees or focus group 
participants. PAVI’s Chief of Party (COP) offered a list of possible persons to contact. Thereafter, RCC 
proceeded to schedule interviews and organize focus groups. The Judiciary and the MP authorities were 
very helpful in assisting RCC to schedule interviews or organize focus groups. The only difficult 
appointments to obtain were at the IDPP, where the clear impression was that PAVI had not been 
responsive enough; nevertheless, RCC eventually met the IDPP Director General and other officials. 
3.3. INTERVIEWS OF KEY PERSONS AND IN-SITU VISITS 
Of the list suggested by the PAVI COP, the RCC team was able to speak with 52 persons in direct 
interviews or focus groups. In addition, RCC on its own or by recommendations of other interviewees 
reached 62 additional persons. This broad outreach strategy resulted in a balanced group of 
Interviewees, with about half suggested by PAVI and the other half selected by RCC. The persons 
interviewed were selected according PAVI working areas or for their general knowledge of the subject. 
RCC used the general interview guide approach to ensure that the same general areas of information 
were collected by each interviewee but allowing a degree of freedom and adaptability in getting 
information from the interviewee. For each interview, RCC a) reviewed an advance profile of the person 
to be interviewed; b) his/her knowledge about the topic, c) his/her relation to PAVI and c) designed the 
Figure No. 1: Distribution of informants by PAVI areas 
38
18
15
17
5
22
Improvement of capacity to 
prosecute and try serious 
crimes, including support to 
High Impact Courts. Mobilization of justice sector 
and civil society to reduce and 
prevent violence. 
Increasing internal 
accountability and oversight 
within the Justice Sector. 
Strengthening of justice 
capacity to combat illegal 
activities in Petén
Other Donors
General knowledge
3
goal for the interview and a list of questions based on PAVI areas of intervention and the scope of work 
evaluation questions. This interview guide approach allowed RCC team members a more systematic 
approach to assure that all topics on the list were covered. At the end of these interviews, RCC team 
members also requested any useful document, research or quantitative information the interviewee may 
have mentioned. 
At the end of each day of interviews, the RCC team met to exchange notes and discuss information 
gathered, and to compare and contrast versions of facts, issues raised and areas for further inquiry with 
the next round of interviewees. This method of prompt analysis for interviews allowed us to gauge the 
reliability (how consistent the information was) and the validity (whether the person had good 
knowledge of the subject), of the information compiled. The field research process was enriched by the 
daily sharing of knowledge and information, and led to an increasing level of shared knowledge and 
insights, both on PAVI accomplishments and justice sector conditions, as the three in-country weeks 
proceeded. 
The list of interviewees appears in Annex No. 1 classified by institutions. RCC consultants also made in￾situ visits to the Public Ministry (Attorney General, Analysis Office, Crimes against Life Unit, Femicide 
Unit), INACIF, the new Labor Courts Center in Guatemala City, the new Metropolitan Child Protection 
Court in Guatemala City and the High Impact Courts in Guatemala City (known also as High Risk Courts). 
Two team members, Olga Nazario and Wolfgang Ochaeta, traveled to Petén for three days (November 12 
to November 14, 2012), interviewed 14 persons and carried out two focus groups, one with justice sector 
officials and civil society involved in PAVI activities and the other with victims of violence. They also 
visited the Petén MP Offices, including the Attention to Victims Unit, and the Judiciary Offices. 
RCC team members also attended a one-day (November 6, 2012) seminar organized by Interpeace (a 
local CSO working on security that worked on some issues for PAVI, including police reform) and IEPADES 
on the evaluation of donor assisted justice and security projects in Guatemala. 
3.4. CARRY OUT FIVE FOCUS GROUPS AND ADMINISTER QUESTIONNAIRES
RCC conducted five (5) focus groups with six (6) to eight (8) participants each, that reached 34 well 
informed persons (see Annex 1). They involved a mix of participants from among justice sector officials 
and civil society representatives. The focus groups covered: 
 Criminal Justice Reform, 24-hour courts and High Risk Courts: judges and Judiciary officials 
 Mobilization of Justice Sector and Civil Society to reduce and prevent violence: civil society 
organizations 
 Increased internal accountability and oversight in the Justice Sector: Judiciary officials, judges and 
UNIVALLE representatives 
 PAVI activities in Petén: Justice sector officials and civil society involved in PAVI activities 
 Violence in Petén and Services to Victims: victims of violence in Petén 
For the focus groups RCC used the tools for “consensus workshops”. RCC prepared a guide of questions 
(see focus groups guide questions in Annex No. 4) for each focus group and presented them to the group 
to brainstorm the topic. Then RCC directed the discussion to cluster ideas in order to seek consensus on 
the answers to each question. 
4
Apart from the group discussions, all focus group participants and a number of others were asked to 
complete a common short questionnaire (See Annex No. 4 - Sample Questionnaire). RCC received 26 
completed questionnaires, whose data was compiled using Survey Monkey. This is a very low sample to 
offer conclusive results, but helped to corroborate focus groups findings or identify other ideas and draw 
comments that did not arise in the discussions. 
3.5. COLLECT STATISTICAL DATA ON PROJECT INDICATORS AND RESULTS FOR COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
RCC also examined statistical data relevant to the PAVI Project and available from justice sector 
institutions or civil society organizations. On this subject, it is important to mention that serious 
information gaps and contradictions limited the scope of the analysis. High numbers of crimes seem to 
go unreported because of fear or lack of confidence in the relevant authorities, and criminal justice 
statistics are not always reliable and are often incomplete and contradictory. For RCC it was a surprise 
that, despite the technical and computational ability to do so, the Judiciary did not systematically 
produce or use basic efficiency indicators such as clearance rates, backlog rates, or case disposition times 
to measure system performance. Moreover, a recent investigative report revealed that the Judiciary’s 
Administrative Center for Criminal Cases (CAGP), charged with reception and assignment of all criminal 
cases, has become a badly mismanaged and frequently corrupt operation with a huge backlog of over 
300,000 unassigned criminal cases, some dating back to 1998.2
 
RCC also analyzed the PAVI Monitoring and Evaluation Reports done throughout the project by Partners 
for Democratic Change. 
3.6. PRELIMINARY DEBRIEFING TO USAID AND REPORT DRAFTING. 
At the end of the three weeks of fieldwork in Guatemala, RCC met again with the USAID team for a 
debriefing meeting (November 14, 2012) and provided a proposed draft of preliminary findings and 
recommendations for comments. A useful two -hour discussion ensued. With the USAID comments and 
once the data from the focus groups, key person interviews and questionnaires was collected and 
tabulated, RCC drafted the proposed final evaluation report. Quantitative techniques were used where 
appropriate and possible, but most analysis was qualitative. Nevertheless, the RCC team members tried 
to triangulate the information for each finding to avoid bias, using at least two methods (interviews, 
focus groups, secondary research, statistical data, and questionnaires) to confirm the finding. 
3.7. WORKSHOP TO DISCUSS FINDINGS AND DELIVERY OF FINAL REPORT 
While USAID was reviewing the draft final report, RCC, prepared two Power Point presentations in 
English and Spanish with the main findings and recommendations. Also, in close consultation with USAID, 
organized two workshops, the first one, held on December 11, 2012 with USAID and US Embassy officers 
and the second one with other international donors, civil society and GOG representatives. With the 
comments provided by USAID officers and those resulting from the two workshops, RCC reviewed the 
initial draft. RCC completed the final version of the report and submitted to USAID on December 20, 
2012. 
 
2
LA HORA, (November 28, 2012), “El Centro Administrativo de Gestión Penal es el primer eslabón del secuestro del sistema 
judicial” http://www.lahora.com.gt/index.php/nacional/guatemala/reportages-y-entrevistas/169401-el-centro-administrativo￾de-gestion-penal-es-el-primer-eslabon-del-secuestro-del-sistema-judicial 
5
3.8. LIMITATIONS TO THIS EVALUATION 
The principal limitations to this evaluation were: 
 The PAVI project was already terminated and the contractors’ offices were effectively closed with all 
files packed. The evaluators only had one day to meet with the Chief of Party, who kindly met RCC 
and briefed on the main issues of the project and provided a list of possible contacts to interview. 
The Chief of Party left Guatemala a few days later. 
 The original USAID CTO was no longer working in USAID/Guatemala and RCC met only with the CTO 
for the last six months of the project, who had limited information on earlier project activities. 
 Of the original group suggested by PAVI, RCC could not contact the former Supreme Court President, 
the Bar Association President and the former Police Reform Commissioner, who were out of the 
country during the RCC team’s stay in Guatemala. 
 With the justice sector agencies, for the most part, criminal justice statistics vary substantially in 
completeness and accuracy according to the source. There is no shared standard to generate or 
validate the statistical information produced by the responsible institutions, and RCC found that 
while the justice sector organizations do collect and publish statistics, they usually do not use 
statistical information to measure performance or to plan use of resources. Judiciary and MP officials 
were unwilling to provide information without review and authorization by superiors. Despite 
repeated RCC requests, information requested from the MP was only partially provided and the 
Judiciary information on the 24-hour courts provided by CENADOJ was incomplete. The Supreme 
Court Criminal Chamber did not authorize the Judiciary Information and Telecommunications Center 
to respond to an RCC request for further detailed analysis on case clearance rates. 
 RCC did not receive from USAID the scopes of work of other USAID projects under implementation 
related to the subject, such as the Transparency 
and the Prevention of Crime projects. 
II. BACKGROUND ON DEVELOPMENT 
PROBLEM AND USAID RESPONSE
1. THE CONTEXT
After diminishing in the years after the Peace 
Accords, crime and violence in recent times have 
returned to become the most important destabilizing 
factor in social, political, and economic life in 
Guatemala. This time, the drivers are different. The 
civil war that killed over 200,000 people between 
1960 and 1996 took place mostly during military 
regimes in rural areas, and was driven by internal 
factors related to deep inequality and social 
exclusion. Today’s violence has surged under a 
democratic regime, engulfs both rural and urban 
areas, and is driven not only by persistent inequality 
and lack of opportunity, but also by other newer sources such as narcotraffic, arms trafficking and 
criminal gangs. By all accounts, there has been an abrupt and serious decline in the democratic fabric in 
Guatemala in the past five years, caused by the sudden upsurge in crime and violence. 
Figure No. 2. Costs of Crime and Violence as 
Percentage of GDP
Source: WORLD BANK (2011), Crime and Violence in Central 
America. A Development Challenge, p.7 based on 2008 Carlos 
Acevedo study, Economic Costs of Violence in El Salvador.
4.3 6.1
3.9 4.5
1.5
1
1.5
2.6 1.7
1
1.6
1.8
1.9 2.3
0.7
0.8
1.4
1.2 1.5
0.4
7.7
10.8
9.6 10
3.6
Total 
Material costs
Private security
Institutional costs
Health costs
6
The costs of rising crime and violence are huge, estimated at US$ 2,291 million or 7.7% of GDP3
. In the 
past decade, Guatemala has placed among the world’s most violent nations, with alarming murder rates. 
Social and economic costs are enormous. Moreover, in the 2010-2011 Global Competitiveness Report 
comparing 139 countries, Guatemala was the country where the most people considered that crime and 
violence imposes a high cost on business. Not surprisingly then, crime and violence prevention is 
increasingly recognized as a major development issue for the country. 
Crime and violence has become a systemic problem in Guatemala with multiple manifestations affecting 
several Departments and different demographic groups and income levels. After a homicide rate 
decrease following the 1996 Peace Accords, Guatemala in 2000 began a decade of continuously
increasing homicide rates, rising from 24.2 per 100,000 in 1999 to 46.3 in 2009. While 2010 and 2011 
both saw declines that lowered the rate to 38.6 per 100,000, this change may be attributable only to the 
increase in population, but not necessarily to a deep decline in the number of homicides. According to 
the PNC, the number of homicides for 2010 was 5960, for 2011 it was 5681, and for 2012 the projection 
is 5300 homicides. Guatemala still has the seventh highest homicide rate in the world, the fifth highest in 
Latin America and the third highest in 
Central America. 
Homicides are concentrated in a relatively 
small number of departments4
 and 
municipalities. As illustrated in Figure No.2, 
homicides are clustered in two geographic 
areas. One, called the “corridor of 
violence” starts on the Atlantic coast, 
passes through the eastern part and the 
Metropolitan area around the capital and 
moves towards the Pacific coast to the 
Mexican border. The other high homicide 
area is the Petén Department. 
 
3
 WORLD BANK (July 2011) “Crime and Violence in Central America”, Vol. I, p.7 
4
 In 2012 there were nine (9) departments with homicide rates above the national average: Zacapa (73.99), Guatemala (71.35), 
Jutiapa (63.98), Santa Rosa (57.42), Chiquimula (57.16), Izabal (53.7), Jalapa (43.02), Petén (42.93) and Escuintla (38.6) 
Figure No.3. Geographic distribution of homicides in 
Guatemala (2010) 
Source: CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE GUATEMALA (September 2012) 
“Situación en Seguridad, Justicia y Derechos Humanos”
7
Figure No.4 Latin America- Criminal Justice Effectiveness Rankings
(The lower the number the better ranking)
Source: WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT (2012), “Rule of Law Index 2012”, p.46.
32
1
45 52 53 57 65 68 70 73 82 84 91 95 96 97
2
3 4 5
6 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
Global (97countries) L. America(16 countries)
Violence against women is 
another major problem in 
Guatemala. Despite legislative 
efforts to address this violence, 
there has been wide impunity for 
crimes against women.”5
.Rates of 
femicide and domestic violence 
both appear higher than in the 
rest of Latin America. With a 
population over 14 million, the 
country registered 720 femicides 
in 2009, 695 in 2010 to 705 in 
2011.6
 The domestic violence rate 
is also high. In 2009 it was 15.06 
victims per 100,000 people, but 
in the Southwest region the rate 
was 22.74 victims and 17.4 in the 
Northwest region. These high 
rates implied that violence against 
women is commonly and socially 
accepted in Guatemala. 
There is a clear connection 
between the weaknesses of 
Criminal Justice Institutions and 
the elevated levels of impunity. 
Widespread impunity erodes 
confidence in Justice Institutions 
and undermines the human rights 
of due process and access to 
justice, as fewer victims and 
witnesses feel willing or able to 
seek legal protection, report crimes 
or collaborate with criminal 
investigations, creating a vicious 
cycle. 
The Guatemalan judicial system 
often fails to punish criminals due 
to inefficiency, corruption, 
insufficient and poorly trained 
personnel, lack of funds, and 
 
5
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (January 2011)
6
IPSNEWS NET(January 31, 2012), “Guatemala Heeds the Cries of Femicide Victims”
http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/01/guatemala-heeds-the-cries-of-femicide-victims/ and GRUPO GUATEMALTECO DE MJUERES 
(May 2010), “Informe de Monitoreo de la Aplicación de la Ley contra el Femicidio y otras Formas de Violencia contra la Mujer”
and CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE GUATEMALA (September 2012), Situación en Seguridad y Justicia y Derechos Humanos, Power 
Point Presentation. 
Figure No. 5: Guatemala’s ratings on Delivery of Justice
Source: Source: WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT (2012), “Rule of Law Index 2012”, p.94.
8
intimidation of judges, prosecutors, and witnesses. Most serious crimes are not investigated or punished. 
Very few reported crimes of any kind are prosecuted, and fewer still result in convictions and 
punishment. According to the Rule of Law Index 2012 Guatemala places in the bottom half of Latin 
American countries in most dimensions of the rule of law. Its criminal justice systems rank eighty-fourth 
among 97 countries studied in the world and 12 among 16 studied Latin American countries. The report 
states that “country suffers from widespread crime and corruption”7
. Guatemala’s poor ratings on 
delivery of justice are shown in Figure 5. 
According to the Centro de Estudios de Guatemala, there is a 94% rate of impunity in crimes against life. 
Studies by the ICCPG and ASIES during the last decade have shown that Guatemalan Criminal Courts have 
an annual clearance rate of only around 7% and a congestion rate of 93%. An ICCPG study of criminal 
cases from 2000 to 2007 found the backlog increased by an average of 15% per year. During that period 
the system was only able to resolve an annual average of approximately 14,000 cases, leaving around 
180,187 cases unresolved.8
 The numbers show a criminal justice system that is completely unable to 
provide prompt and complete justice to citizens. 
2. USAID RESPONSE
Development Objective One of the USAID Strategy for Guatemala 2011-2015 is aimed to help create 
greater Security and Justice for Citizens. The DO1 hypothesizes that “increasing the demand for police 
and justice reform, strengthening national level government capacities to include administrative, 
financial and strategic planning, institutionalizing crime prevention strategies, targeting pilot projects in 
key areas with high homicide rates, strengthening local governments, and improving transparency and 
accountability of key institutions will lead to a reduction in crime and an increase in the number of 
prosecutions with final verdicts, thus breaking the vicious cycle of impunity”. 
The Project Against Violence and Impunity (PAVI) started before the USAID/ Guatemala strategy was 
concluded, but was focused on some areas that the mission later reflected in its strategy, mainly: a) the 
strengthening of prosecution and adjudication of homicides and other serious crimes, b) improvement of 
management and coordination systems among justice sector institutions, including the support for the 
design and implementation of merit-based personnel hiring and promotion systems, and, c) the targeting 
of Petén as a region in need of special attention where an integrated approach was required. 
It is worth mentioning that a primary stated aim of the USAID/Guatemala Strategy and of the new 
Security and Justice Project is to support the National Accord for the Advancement of Security and Justice 
signed in April 2009. 9
 At this date, this Accord appears to be defunct. Though the Accord was a good 
starting point, it was never implemented and it is not backed by the current government, whose 
president, a retired general elected in November 2011, has promised to govern with “mano dura”10
. 
 
7 WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT (2012), “Rule of Law Index 2012”, p.46 
8
 ICCPG (2007) “Observatorio de Justicia Penal, Primer Informe Guatemala”, IDRC-CRDI Canada, and The Netherlands 
Cooperation Agency, Guatemala. 
9
 Among the goals were to create a Ministry of Public Security, separating operational and administrative work of the Ministry of 
Government, the institutional strengthening of the National Civil Police and the creation of a police officer career law. 
Also contemplated were amendments to the Law of Amparo and Habeas Corpus, the Criminal Procedure Code, and Criminal 
Code, among others. 
10 EL MUNDO.ES (November 11, 2011), “Pérez Molina: 'mano dura no es represión sino un compromiso con el fin de la 
violencia’” http://www.elmundo.es/america/2011/09/11/noticias/1315741707.html
9
BOX 1: CHARACTERISTICS OF USEFUL INDICATORS
 Direct: Performance indicators should closely track the results they are intended to measure.
 Objective: Unambiguous about what is being measured.
 Useful for Management: Useful to USAID and Justice Sector Institutions for decision-making. 
 Practical: Cost effective.
 Attributable to Project Efforts: Measure changes clearly and reasonably attributable to the project.
 Adequate: Number of indicators should be limited to those necessary and cost effective for management 
and reporting purposes. 
 Precise: Data should be sufficiently precise to present a fair picture of performance and enable 
management decision-making at the appropriate levels. 
 Reliable: USAID should be confident that progress toward targets reflects real changes.
III. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ON PAVI
1. PIPELINE 
PAVI was a bridge project, designed to address justice sector issues in the interim between the 
termination of the 2004-2009 USAID/Guatemala Rule of Law Project implemented by Checchi and 
Company Consultants, Inc, and the current USAID/Guatemala Justice and Security Project, again 
implemented by Checchi. PAVI was a Task Order issued under an Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC), and 
planned to last one or two years, but delays in the adjudication of the Justice and Security Project, which 
began recently in late 2012, prompted extension of PAVI for a partial third year. The project was funded 
at $7,133,526, of which $900,000 came from NAS funding, used mainly to finance the establishment and 
construction costs of the High Impact Courts. According to PAVI’s Final (12th) Quarterly Report, at the 
end of the project $1,193,153 remained available, of which $267,285 were NAS funds remaining after the 
remodeling of the High Impact Courts. Originally, the establishment of the High Impact Courts was 
planned as a new construction, but the Judiciary later changed the idea and decided to remodel the top 
floors of the Court Building to establish these special courts. This decision made the activity less costly, 
resulting in the noted NAS funding savings. 
The remaining unspent balance in USAID funds started to accumulate from the beginning of the project. 
One of the main reasons according to the USAID CTO was the change to a less costly Deputy Chief of 
Party and this excess could only be partially used. USAID directed PAVI to use some of the initial 
accumulation balance to finance some unanticipated activities, such as the preliminary studies for the 
establishment of a Judicial Center in Cobán, during the first half of 2012, and several studies to support 
the Police Reform and Juvenile Justice Reform. In spite of the accumulated balance, according to the CTO 
the pipeline was not a problem because it allowed USAID to respond to non-contemplated initiatives. 
2. PAVI’S MONITORING AND EVALUATION FINAL REPORT
PAVI’s Monitoring and Evaluation Report was prepared by Partnership for Democratic Change (PDC) as a 
subcontractor to Tetra Tech DPK. The PDC document is well organized and well written, but the selected 
indicators to measure the project performance and impact in most cases seemed inadequate and lacked
characteristics of useful indicators (see Box 1). 
10
The PAVI project started with no indicators to measure progress or impact. In an effort to measure 
progress once the project was underway, a number of indicators were developed by agreement between 
Tetra Tech DPK and USAID/Guatemala. However, these seemed primarily focused to measure PAVI 
project outputs, mainly training sessions, and also to track certain increased outputs by agencies assisted 
by PAVI. Moreover, most of the items tracked in the latter case could not be directly attributed to PAVI 
interventions. RCC recognizes the considerable professional efforts by Partners for Democratic Change to 
produce a solid evaluation and monitoring methodology and to assist Tetra Tech DPK in M&E work 
throughout the PAVI LOP, but the identified indicators, in most cases, do not permit measurement of any 
precise and direct impacts of the USAID investment in the PAVI project. 
These are the most relevant observations with respect to PAVI indicators:
 Indicators on numbers of people participating in training or workshops are irrelevant to measure 
progress or impact. If USAID needs these numbers in general and divided by gender for reporting 
purposes, they should be provided but not as project impact indicators. 
 Indicators on participant levels of satisfaction with training activities are not relevant to measure 
training impact. Long experience shows that virtually all participants will answer that they found 
the activity good or very good. To measure actual training impact, learning outcomes 
methodologies should be applied. For example, participants could take a test at the beginning 
and at the end of the training on a case relevant to the subject and measure the improvement in 
knowledge at the end of the training. A more complicated but more adequate method would be
the examination of a sample of cases done by the trainees before and after the training. At a 
minimum, participants should be surveyed a few months after the training and asked whether 
and how they are using the knowledge or methods learned in their daily work. 
 “Number of participants with a positive perception of a model for institutional integrity” is an 
indicator that does not seek to measure whether the model was implemented or not. (In this 
case, it was not.) A more precise indicator would have been the number and type of actions 
taken to implement the model, based on a timetable indicating the actions to be taken and the 
milestones to be achieved. 
 “The number of cases brought to trial by prosecutors” or the “number of guilty verdicts issued by 
a particular court” are not the best indicators to measure prosecutorial or judicial efficiency or 
effectiveness. Some cases may have several defendants and should be rated better than cases 
with just one defendant, though there may be fewer of these. A more appropriate indicator is to 
account for “the number of defendants with guilty verdicts” for prosecutors and courts. This 
would be especially relevant in reference to the High Impact Courts where most cases have more 
than one defendant. 
 The indicator on number of victims who receive free legal aid in the country is not attributable to 
PAVI efforts alone or even in significant part. This indicator, as it is, reflects numbers of victims 
attended in all victim assistance organizations, and included the IDPP/ALG, which provided the 
bulk of help and did not receive support from PAVI. The indicator should have measured only the 
victims whose services were the product of PAVI grants or PAVI’s direct technical assistance. A 
similar comment is appropriate in reference to the number of guilty verdicts under the Law of 
Femicide, which cannot be attributable to PAVI efforts alone. 
11
 Measurement of the implementation of a protocol to protect witnesses in criminal trials by a 
survey of prosecutors does not seem the most adequate way to measure implementation. A 
survey of protected witnesses would have been necessary to complement the measure.
Figure No. 6. RCC Usefulness Rating of PAVI Indicators 
Useful Not 
only 
PAVI’
s 
result 
Irrelevant
1.Number of training /workshops/coordination meetings related 
to the prosecution and charge of guilty verdicts of high impact 
cases
X
2. Level of participant satisfaction in training and workshops X
3. Increase in crimes against Life and femicide brought to trial x x
 Department of Guatemala x x
 Femicides-Dept. of Guatemala x x
 Petén x x
 Femicides Petén x x
4.Increase in the number of guilty verdicts for Crimes against life x x
 Department of Guatemala x x
 Petén x x
5. Number of training/coordination meetings for institutions 
offering assistance to victims
X
6. Level of satisfaction in such meetings X
7. Protocol implementation for persons involved as witnesses in 
criminal trials (based on prosecutor survey, but witness opinions 
would have given meaningful information on impact)
x
(relevan
t only as 
output)
 x X
(irrelevant for 
impact w/out 
victim inputs)
8. Increase in the number of victims who receive free legal and 
other assistance 
 x x
9. Increase in the number of guilty verdicts under the Law Against 
Femicide 
 x x
 Department of Guatemala x x
 Petén x x
10. Number of units from different institutions that are currently 
implementing the Institutional Integrity Model (indicator only 
measured PAVI trainings - this is not implementation of a model)
 x x X
11. Number of participants in trainings and workshops on the 
implementation of institutional integrity model 
 X
 Level of satisfaction X
12. Participants positive perception of Institutional Integrity Model X
13. Number of high impact courts established (only 1 established?) x x
14. Number of cases processed by high impact courts
(but number of defendants with guilty verdicts and scale to 
determine difficulty of cases should also be used)
 x x
15. Number of Petén cases against environment brought to justice x x
12
3. KEY CONTRIBUTIONS OF PAVI TO ROL AND JUSTICE SECTOR IN GUATEMALA.
USAID has a long record of support to the Guatemala Justice Sector that began in the late 1980’s with the 
Central American Regional Justice Project that sought to respond to the problems identified by the 1984 
Kissinger Report on Central America11. After two and half decades of investment in the country’s justice 
institutions, USAID’s central contribution to the Rule of Law in Guatemala can be summed up in the 
major change of the juridical culture from its former adherence to a closed written process towards 
increasing use of oral and public hearing and trial procedures in criminal law and labor law, and which is 
advancing towards other areas of the law. In the past decade, USAID has made numerous important 
contributions in several other areas, including the establishment of the National Forensic Sciences 
Institute, a strengthened judicial career system, establishment and strengthening of Justice Centers, and 
the recent establishment and strengthening of the 24-hour Courts and the High Impact Courts. 
The interviews, focus groups and questionnaires administered indicated that PAVI’s most important 
contributions to the ROL in Guatemala were: 
 Increasing and improving the prosecution of crimes against life. During the life of the project the 
number of cases prosecuted with guilty verdicts for crimes against life increased from 38% in 2010 to 
51% in 2012, for an average increase in efficiency of 13 percentage points. There was also a 4.7% 
increase in such cases brought to trial by prosecutors. PAVI’s main achievement was to establish an 
integrated working methodology between the Public Ministry’s Analysis Unit and the Crimes against 
Life Prosecutors Unit, reflected in establishment of “Criminal Prosecution Working Groups” with 
members from both offices. The strengthening of the Crimes against Life Unit was also due to factors 
beyond PAVI, such as: a) implementation of a new wiretap authorization law that has allowed 
discovery of organized crime groups and detection of justice system corruption supported by NAS; b) 
use of new authority in the Organized Crime Law of cooperating co-defendants’ testimony
(“colaboradores eficaces”); c) the police group of crimes against life investigators, formed by the 
Spanish Agency for International Cooperation, has been an invaluable help to the Crimes against Life 
Unit; and, d) MP establishment of two anti-gang groups, one for Mara 13 and one for Mara 18, that 
has achieved prosecutions and imprisonment of the main leaders of both groups. 
 Improving the installations and the security of the High Impact Courts. This activity was financed 
with NAS funds. The High Impact Courts received strong approval from all persons interviewed, who 
deemed them a major improvement in the criminal system’s ability to fight impunity. According to 
CENADOJ, since their 2009 opening, they have issued final verdicts in 83 cases, with a minimum of 
three defendants per case and several cases with many more. However, number of cases resolved is 
not the best indicator of their impact, but rather numbers of defendants sentenced and the 
complexity and difficulty of the cases. PAVI also contributed to design security and protection 
protocols for the High Impact Courts to assure a fair trial. These protocols, according to the 
interviewed judges, have been only partially implemented, and security for the judges and the parties 
involved is limited outside of the fortified Court Building. 
 Making the 24-hour Courts less expensive to manage. The new less expensive model based on 
PAVI’s assessment and recommendations was accepted and implemented by the Supreme Court in 
new governing regulations. 24-hour Courts have been a notable improvement in Criminal Justice in 
 
11 The Report of the President’s National Bipartisan Commission on Central America, Macmillan and Company, 1984 
13
Guatemala. Their main achievement has been a 65% reduction of provisional detention, because 
when the ordinary courts are closed, they decide if the accused must be imprisoned or may be 
released. These courts also have facilitated capture or detention warrants at times out of the courts’
regular working hours. Nevertheless, although these courts operate continuously from 3:30 p.m. to 
8:00 a.m., they have only a limited mandate to decide to charge cases, thus the clearance rate of 
these courts is very low (22.6%) since they do not operate as fully functioning ordinary courts, as do 
the “In flagrante delicto” courts in Costa Rica. (See Box 1) 
 The design of an annual evaluation system for 500 justices of the peace and 350 trial judges and 
the reorganization of the Judicial School. The annual evaluation system is ready for implementation 
and the judicial authorities seem to have the political will to implement. The Supreme Court has 
started an awareness campaign to socialize it among judges to avoid negative reactions towards an 
annual evaluation, and the Judicial School has started the reorganization project. According to the 
Judicial School authorities, 90% of the PAVI studies and recommendations have been implemented. 
 Organization of a Civil Society Organizations group to provide services to increase protection to 
victims of crime and violence, particularly women. PAVI raised awareness of violence against 
women, and improved women’s access to justice - prompting them to go to courts and providing 
legal aid for their claims, mainly in support of domestic violence claims and child support. 
Nonetheless, there were no specific measures available to establish to what extent PAVI - supported 
services for attention of victims contributed to reduce or prevent violence, nor to determine the 
target population they reached. 
 Better prosecution of crimes against the environment in Petén. PAVI provided critical support to 
stakeholders in the Petén by offering training and awareness among justice sector operators on 
environmental crimes. One of PAVI’s most important activities in Petén was providing support to the 
Foro de Justicia Ambiental (FORO), the key civil society coalition in the region defending the 
protection of the Mayan Biosphere Reserve. PAVI critically enhanced the FORO’s capacity to become 
a credible and legitimate interlocutor with the Justice Sector. According to FORO, these contributions 
led to improving the processing of environmental cases, resulting in 112 brought to Court, resulting in 
80% guilty sentences during the term of PAVI 
Throughout the project, PAVI’s Tetra Tech DPK Team was able to establish very good relations with most 
of its Guatemalan stakeholders and beneficiaries. In general, PAVI’s team enjoyed a great reputation for 
coordination and communication among Guatemalan counterparts, and during the evaluation several of 
them praised the COP and particular members of the PAVI team for their dedication and commitment. 
The only key organization where the PAVI staff apparently had some clear misunderstandings was the 
Criminal Public Defense Institute (IDPP). PAVI started to work with the IDPP at the beginning of the 
project, but in the second quarter of 2010 the assistance was ended, according to Tetra Tech DPK 
Quarterly Reports Nos. 4 and 5. Curiously, Quarterly Report No. 4 sets out a detailed description of 
implementation plans for the activity in the upcoming quarter; however, in Quarterly Report No. 5 this 
contradictory statement is found: “This activity was completed during the previous reporting period”. In 
the meeting with RCC, the IDPP Director and the Coordinator for Contracted Defense Lawyers (abogados 
de oficio) stated that the PAVI activities with them were abruptly interrupted in early 2010 and never 
renewed or completed with no explanation given, despite IDPP requests. Nevertheless, in Quarterly 
Report No. 6, Tetra Tech DPK states, “The IDPP has a performance evaluation model in place for court 
appointed public defenders”. All of the remaining Quarterly Reports to the end of the project in June 
14
2012 state “This activity was completed.” Neither of these assertions appears accurate, and in fact, in 
the meeting with RCC, the IDPP Director confirmed that the activity was not completed and requested 
USAID assistance to complete the design and implementation of the evaluation system for contracted 
defense lawyers. 
RCC could not speak with the person who was USAID CTO at the time of the evident miscommunication 
because he is no longer in the country, and the CTO for the final six months of PAVI did not have detailed 
information on the subject. PAVI’s Chief of Party, who also was no longer in the country, very kindly 
answered RCC’s e-mailed questions on the subject and asserted that PAVI’s only commitment to the IDPP 
was the design of a proposal for evaluation and that this task was accomplished. 
At the time of the apparent PAVI suspension of assistance in 2010, the IDPP was involved in a lengthy and 
difficult legal and political process concerning the reappointment of the Director. We conclude that this 
situation likely affected USAID assistance to the IDPP. RCC found that IDPP relations with PAVI in fact 
were interrupted, and that USAID must be presumed to have agreed at the time, but the details of any 
such action were unknown to current USAID staff. Nevertheless, the events and their handling left an 
unfortunate precedent in the relations with an important and essential agency in the Guatemalan justice 
system, which ought to be repaired under the new USAID Security and Justice Project. 
4. ADDITIONAL PROGRAM AREAS WHERE USAID SHOULD UNDERTAKE ACTIVITIES TO 
IMPROVE PAVI OBJECTIVE AREAS AND ENSURE THEY ARE SUSTAINABLE.
PAVI covered four main activity areas: 1) Improvement of justice system capacity to prosecute and try 
serious crimes, including support to High Impact Courts; 2) Mobilization of justice sector and civil society 
to reduce and prevent violence; 3) Increasing internal accountability and oversight within the Justice 
Sector and 4) Strengthening of justice capacity to combat illegal activities in Petén 
After the completion of the project 
all these areas still needed 
continuous support to preserve 
and consolidate the gains that had 
been made. Compared to its 
Central America neighbors, 
Guatemala’s security and justice 
expenditure is the lowest in terms 
of GDP. In Central America, El 
Salvador spent 3.5% of its GDP 
compared to 2.3%, in Guatemala, 
2.5% in Costa Rica, 2.8% in 
Honduras, 2.9 in Panama and 3 % 
in Nicaragua12
Guatemala’s chronically low 
institutional investment has 
produced insufficient institutional 
strengthening and a lack of the 
 
12 UNDP (2011). “Análisis de los presupuestos públicos de seguridad y justicia en CA, p.4
Figure No. 7. Justice and Security Budget as a share of the GDP.
Source: UNDP (2011). “Análisis de los presupuestos públicos de seguridad y justicia en 
Cento América”
2.31 2.27 2.22 2.31 2.16
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Guatemala
Costa Rica
Honduras
Panama
Nicaragua
El Salvador
15
rigorous hiring standards and strong career systems to improve and motivate human resources that are 
vital elements to accompany the important criminal justice legal reforms that have been implemented. 
All international donors, particularly including the U.S., need to press Guatemala harder for fiscal reform 
to increase GOG tax revenues and make more national resources available for justice and security. 
According to the World Bank13
, Guatemala has the lowest taxation effort14 in Latin America, where only 
11% of GDP comes from taxes and where tax exemptions reached a value of around 8.1% of GDP (three 
quarters of the tax collections). 
In the last year, some additional resources to finance the Justice and Security Sector have started to 
come from the seizures under the Asset Forfeiture Law of 2011. As of November 6, 2012, according to 
the Attorney General, MP has been able to seize one billion quetzals (approximately US$143 million) in 
crime-generated financial assets. Once the Asset Forfeiture Court extinguishes their ownership, these 
are divided according to a formula in the law among justice and security institutions15. Nonetheless, these 
resources are restricted in their use and far from enough to support the criminal justice and security 
reforms. The Attorney General indicated that these resources could increase because the newly enacted 
Anti-corruption Law also provides for seizure by the state of assets acquired through corrupt 
mechanisms. 
5. DONOR COORDINATION OF INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING EFFORTS UNDER PAVI AND 
THE GOG ROLE IN THIS COORDINATION.
During the PAVI project, donor coordination of institutional strengthening aid to the MP and the Judiciary 
in criminal reform improved notably. On the donor side, this was due in significant part to the efforts of 
the PAVI COP, according to all of the other donor officials interviewed. On the GOG side, the 
improvement was due mainly to the President of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court and the 
new Attorney General. Both authorities had a strategic vision, leadership and definite plans and policies 
to implement. Both authorities meet periodically with donors to coordinate efforts and have developed 
a clear leadership role on behalf of the GOG in their areas of responsibility. In these two organizations, 
these authorities have been key to determine goals for each international donor. The Criminal Chamber 
emits an Annual Policy document that conforms to the Judiciary Strategic Plan that PAVI assisted to 
prepare. In the MP, the Attorney General bases her actions and policies on the MP Strategic Plan. 
In the Judiciary, the implementation of the overall Strategic Plan, supported by PAVI, depends on the will 
and interest of each Supreme Court Judge. Some believe in strategic planning, and others do not. 
 
13 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/guatemala/overview
14 Tax effort is the ratio between annual collections and tax capacity, where tax capacity is the maximum tax revenue obtainable 
based on a country’s economic, social, institutional and demographic characteristics. 
15 The law was heavily pushed by the USG and creates a National Seized Assets Administration Counsel (Consejo Nacional de 
Administración de Bienes de Extinción de Dominio) that includes the Vice President, Ministers of Government, Defense, and 
Finance, the Attorney General, the Solicitor General, and a Supreme Court Justice. The management and distribution of these 
assets is done by the National Seized Assets Administration Secretariat (Secretaría Nacional de Administración de Bienes de 
Extinción de Dominio) (SENABED), which is subordinate to the Counsel, but whose Secretary is named by the Vice President of 
the Republic for a three year term. Distribution is provided in the Law as follows: 20% for expenses of special investigation units 
created by the Organized Crime Law; 20% to the Public Ministry for witness protection programs and for enforcement and 
investigation under the Asset Forfeiture Law; 18% to the Ministry of Government for training and equipment and direct support 
to the Criminal Information Center of the National Civil Police; 15% to the Seized Assets Counsel for custodial and administrative 
expenses of seized assets until they are sold; 25% to the Judiciary; and 2% to the Solicitor General’s Office.
16
Nevertheless, in criminal reform efforts the current Supreme Court Judge in charge is a believer in the 
plan and has produced a defined Criminal Policy16
During PAVI and at the time of this evaluation, the main coordination problem among donors is support 
to strengthen efforts towards meaningful police reform. PAVI carried out some studies together with 
Interpeace. The Ministry of Government did not designate the person who will coordinate such efforts as 
happens today.17 . The Minister did not give clear indication of who was to lead, or what lines of reform 
had to move ahead. Some donors coordinated technical and financial assistance to the PCN with the 
Minister, others with the Vice-minister, others with the Commissioner for Police Reform, and still others 
with the Ministry’s planning authorities. 
During PAVI, the “Petite Comité” for Justice and Security, a donor coordination body, met regularly, and it 
continues today. Among donors it is agreed to have been successful during its six years of experience, 
but it only works at a technical level after donors have designed and launched their separate programs. 
Some persons interviewed complained that this mechanism is only used for information exchange, but is 
not a real advance coordination mechanism with an agreed coordination and decision-making function. 
During PAVI, the Coordination Instance for Justice Sector Modernization, created by the Peace Accords as 
the coordination mechanism for the Justice Sector reforms played no coordination role. The Coordination 
Instance was no longer fulfilling its role, and its importance decreased steadily during the Project. 
Nonetheless, the European Union (EU) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) will disburse 
significant new justice program funds using this entity, and are expecting it to exercise a stronger 
coordination role in the future. 
As of November 2012, the main donors to the Justice and Security Sector going forward will be the U.S. 
Embassy (NAS $3.5 million) , USAID’s Justice and Security Project (US$20 million), the European Union (20 
million Euros), and the Inter American Development Bank. The IDB has an approved loan (US$30 million) 
mainly devoted (80%) to fund construction of buildings for different justice sector institutions. USAID 
and the EU have projects with common areas of work (support to the criminal justice system, 
strengthening of criminal investigation and support to civil society) that clearly imply and will require 
close coordination efforts to avoid duplication of efforts and maximize results. 
As a conclusion, it is clear that donor coordination during PAVI was effective because of the leadership of 
PAVI’s COP and two high level officials leading individual Justice Sector Institutions. Nonetheless, there 
continues to be an absence of any GOG institutionalized mechanism for such a role. During the 
implementation of the next projects on Security and Justice, donors – primarily USAID and the EU - will 
 
16 In the Judiciary, the only criminal strengthening effort that has not been coordinated through the Criminal Chamber is the 
creation of the Femicide Courts. Another Judge, the former Supreme Court President, is coordinating these highly important 
new criminal courts. RCC recommends that this groundbreaking new area be closely coordinated and integrated with other 
criminal reform efforts. 
17 Currently, there is a Commissioner for Police Reform, whom all informants agree has no effective power and whose 
appointment was motivated by political commitments. Recently a new Vice-minister of Government was appointed and the 
intention appears to be to place him in charge of police reform. The CICIG is concerned and is promoting the appointment of a 
single person for such a role, mainly to assure the effective and efficient establishment of the newly approved General 
Directorate for Criminal Investigations (DIGICRI), a crucial agency that is lodged within the Ministry of Government, but which 
must closely collaborate with the MP in crime investigation. This new directorate is aimed to improve the professional and 
scientific crime investigation capacity of the country, and its operational regulation requires clearly established staff qualification 
profiles and strict hiring and training procedures to assure professionalism and personal integrity.
17
have to closely coordinate in spite of the lack of an overall GOG donor coordination policy. This will be 
especially crucial in assistance efforts to the Police and in encouraging and supporting any significant 
structural police reforms that do in fact develop. 
Finally, it is very important that donors impose stronger conditions to donor contributions. During the 
interviews, there were strong criticisms of international donors who have been providing assistance 
without requiring results. During the last decade, Guatemala has received more than four hundred 
million dollars annually in external cooperation funds, with significant sums devoted to justice, and in the 
view of most civil society representatives interviewed, the changes produced, mainly in the criminal 
justice system, have been very limited to justify such an investment. Many asserted that there has been 
a lot of waste and duplication of resources since the Peace Accords that donors must eliminate decisively. 
This is particularly urgent now that several European countries have ended programs and one of the 
most important donors, the Spanish International Development Cooperation Agency, will end its justice 
sector support by mid-2013 and does not envision more support in the near term due to Spain’s difficult 
financial situation.
6. IMPROVE JUSTICE SYSTEM CAPACITY TO PROSECUTE AND TRY SERIOUS CRIMES
Improving justice capacity to prosecute and try serious crimes was PAVI’s first working area. PAVI 
worked mainly with the MP Analysis Unit and the MP Crime Against Life Office and with the Judiciary 
with the 24-hour Courts and the High Impact Courts. 
6.1. MP GENERAL PREFORMANCE 
In general, during the last three years, the MP performance has started to show positive achievements. It 
has increased its clearance rate18 from 5% to 28%. The use of alternative mechanisms to solve minor 
cases has increased by 138%. Case dismissals (decisions not to prosecute) have increased from 10% to 
58%. The new policy is to devote the major efforts to solve the most serious crimes, thus 20% of the 
prosecutors are now directed to resolve 80% of the cases (non-serious) and 80% of the prosecutors have 
been refocused to resolve 20% of the cases (serious). Only 3% of the cases received by the MP are 
brought to court and 30% of them have been resolved via abbreviated procedures. Even so, the number 
of cases brought to court by the MP has increased 16%, from 13,649 in 2009 to 15,836 cases in 2011.19
 
CICIG support to the MP has been crucial in eradicating the idea that in Guatemala major crimes cannot 
be investigated. CICIG started to use scientific evidence to prosecute major crime and introduced the 
concepts of crime analysis and prosecutorial planning, and recently the CICIG Analysis Office was 
permanently transferred to the MP. It has also provided political support in crucial topics such as judicial 
independence, autonomy of the MP, non-intervention of the armed forces in police functions, formation 
of a scientific police investigative unit, and other key reforms. 
USAID has been very active and constant through PAVI and the previous ROL Project in this area of 
assistance, but it has not been the only donor. The Spanish Cooperation, UNDP and the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA) have also assisted in the MP strengthening process. Thus, the 
achievements and improvements in the MP are not attributable to PAVI alone. 
 
18 It is important to note that the Public Ministry statistics deem a case “resolved” and “cleared” when: a) it has been ended by 
alternative resolution, b) ended by an MP decision not to prosecute, or, c) it has been sent to court for trial, even though it has 
not been tried. Thus, MP official clearance rate statistics do not consider final judicial verdicts, although a guilty verdict is the 
universal hallmark of a successful prosecution. 
19
 According to information provided by the MP Policy Secretary and SICOMP, in November 2012 
18
6.2. SUPPORT PROVIDED BY PAVI TO MP ANALYSIS UNIT AND TO THE CRIMES AGAINST LIFE 
OFFICE. 
During the last two years, PAVI’s support to the MP’s Analysis Unit and the Crimes against Life 
Prosecutors Unit has been very important and has strengthened the collaborative relation between both 
Units to improve criminal case analysis and prosecution planning, assisting in the establishment of a 
permanent link unit between the two offices. The collaboration of both offices, for example, advanced 
the investigation of several murdered bus drivers in Guatemala City and led to the dismantling of six 
criminal gangs and the arrest of 65 of its members20
. 
PAVI’s main achievement has been to establish an integrated working methodology between the Analysis 
Unit and the Crimes against Life Prosecutors Office, reflected in the establishment of “Criminal 
Prosecution Working Groups” with representatives from both offices. These simple joint work methods 
focus specifically on formulation and advance of strategic criminal prosecution plans for complex cases 
against organized crime groups. These methods incorporate analysis, information management and 
organization, linking cases and underlying phenomena, along with the principles of successful teamwork 
to detect and define criminal patterns. The joint efforts produced, according to MP interviewed persons: 
 A concerted approach to investigate serious crime and criminal phenomena 
 A general understanding of the structure behind a number of the crime groups operating in 
various cities and regions of Guatemala 
 Priorities and incentives to form and work in intra- and inter-institutional teams 
 A focus on results-based investigation rather than a task-based piecemeal approach 
PAVI also contributed to provide the Analysis Unit with better tools. A state of the art Geographic 
Information System (GIS) has allowed a better location and mapping of areas where crimes are 
concentrated. This PAVI - donated tool has been complemented by a bio-forensic laboratory donated by 
the Canadians. Currently the working model developed between the Analysis Unit and the Crimes against 
Life Prosecutors Office has been expanded to another 13 prosecutorial offices around the country that 
now have a permanent link with the Analysis Unit in the MP headquarters. 
During PAVI the relations between INACIF (National Forensic Sciences Institute) and the Crimes against 
Life Prosecutors Office also were greatly improved. PAVI activities led to the establishment of an inter￾institutional agreement between INACIF and the MP to set up an Integrated Ballistics Information System 
(IBIS) to provide accurate data and relieve one of the most significant bottlenecks hampering criminal 
investigations. The agreement seeks to link ballistic information to otherwise unrelated criminal activity 
in various locations and at different points in time. The agreement was an important step in producing 
significant success for a strategic approach to investigating organized crime structures responsible for the 
most serious crimes. Now, INACIF carries out ballistic examinations of every firearm confiscated or shell 
casing found, even if the particular prosecutor has not requested it. The agreement is now a very useful 
tool in linking cases, confirming that most of the homicides in Guatemala are being perpetrated by 
criminal structures operating in Guatemala City, and it has become the cornerstone of a prosecution 
strategy against criminal gangs such as the M18 and M13. 
PAVI provided intensive training for the Crimes against Life Unit in crime investigation and litigation 
 
20
 US EMBASSY (November 2012), “Rule of Law Narratives. Performance Plan and Report Fiscal Year 2009-2011). Rule of Law 
and Human Rights” and interviews with MP Crimes Against Life Office in November 2012. 
19
techniques that also covered other prosecutors from other units (32 workshops for 140 prosecutors and 
assistant prosecutors). 
PAVI also assisted the Crimes against Life Unit to identify and systematize best practices. During the life 
of the project it became evident that prosecutors and their staff were quick to innovate and improve 
procedures in many aspects of their daily work. PAVI took advantage of these circumstances to increase 
ownership of best practices and leverage them into sustainable improvements for replication throughout 
Guatemala. PAVI helped the Office to set up a best practices data bank, including success stories as case 
studies on successful criminal prosecution. As a result, the MP can track best practices in investigation 
and litigation for replication in other prosecutor units and for use in the mentorship program as a way to 
ensure sustainability and long-term application. Also PAVI assisted in the compilation of best practices in 
investigating and litigating against criminal organizations. This document provides useful guidelines on 
the prosecution of organized crime and high impact cases21
. 
The strengthening of the Crimes against Life Unit is also due to other factors beyond PAVI, such as: 
 Implementation of new wiretap authorization law and practices has allowed discovery of 
organized crime groups and detection of corruption in the justice system. 
 Use of the new authority in the Law against Organized Crime of the testimony of cooperating co￾defendants (“colaboradores eficaces”) as witnesses. This 
new tool increasingly has produced better results in the 
investigation and trials of organized crime cases with 
multiple defendants. 
 The police group of investigators of crimes against life, 
formed by the Spanish Cooperation, and that has 
provided an invaluable assistance to prosecutors in the 
Crimes against Life Office. 
 Establishment of two anti-gang groups, one for Mara 13 
and one for Mara 18, that has achieved prosecutions 
and imprisonment of the main leaders of both groups 
and that MP believes has contributed to decrease the 
number of homicides per 100,000 from 46 in 2009 to 38 
in 2011. 

From 2010 to 2012, all the above elements have allowed the 
Crimes against Life Unit: 
 A 4.7% increase in cases brought to court. A monitoring exercise of cases resolved in 2009, showed 
only 3% of all cases were brought to court (297 of 9385 cases from 2006-2008). Currently an 
exercise from 2010 to 2012 found that 7.7% of cases were brought to court (842 of 11,068). 
 
21 Some tips from the document include information on: 
 Building up a strong case based on solid investigation prior to requesting an arrest warrant 
 Establishing specialized task forces in the Prosecution Unit and among other MP offices to get the big picture and ensure 
comprehensive analysis 
 Throughout the investigation and trial, coordinating carefully with the penitentiary system to handle and protect a 
defendant or informant who is turning state’s evidence (colaborador eficaz), 
 Recommendations for a training program for prosecutors and assistant prosecutors to disseminate best practices in 
investigating and litigating cases against organized crime groups 
Figure No. 8. Cases brought to Court by 
MP Crimes Against Life Office
Source: SICOMP 2, November 2012
3.48%
7.60%
2006-2008 2010-2012
20
 An increase of guilty 
verdicts from 38% in 
2010 to 51% in 2012. 
This percentage is still 
low compared to some 
Latin American 
countries but shows a 
positive increase of 
13%. Chilean
prosecutors have Latin 
America’s best record
with approximately 
80%-90% of guilty 
verdicts in cases 
brought to court. Costa 
Rica is around 70%. 
 The MP Crimes against 
Life Unit has a current 
clearance rate of 68% 
of cases received, 
compared to 36% 
during the period 2006-
2008. Fewer cases 
remained under 
investigation at the end 
of the year. The 
percentage has been 
reduced from 64% to 
42%. 
However, more than half 
(56%) of the 68% clearance 
rate is composed of cases 
dismissed (declined to prosecute) by the MP. According to a study carried out by Myrna Mack 
Foundation, 48% of the dismissed cases were incorrectly legally justified by the prosecutors as cases that 
are not a crime or that MP cannot proceed22. The MP stated that the agency is becoming more selective 
and devoting its main efforts to the most serious cases. RCC had no means to confirm the MP assertion 
and there are no case studies on the nature of the MP dismissed cases. From 2010 on, according to 
SICOMP 2 information, there is an increase in the use of plea bargaining (from 92 cases to 268), the use 
of abbreviated procedures (from 74 cases to 158) and the joining of individual cases together for one 
prosecution (from 0 to 958). 
In general, there are notable improvements in the Crimes against Life Unit. The Analysis Unit has become 
more effective in providing elements for better prosecutions. During the interviews, the main area of 
 
22 MYRNA MACK FOUNDATION (September 2012),”Informe de Monitoreo a la gestión de casos en el MP. Fiscalía de Delitos 
contra la Vida”, p.39.
Figure No. 9 - Guilty Verdicts vs. Not-Guilty Verdicts (2010-2012) MP 
Crimes against Life Unit
2010 2011 2012 Average
Total defendants 554 562 476 531
Guilty verdicts 211 210 241 221
Not-guilty verdicts 60 52 96 69
% of guilty verdicts 38% 37% 51% 42%
Source: SICOMP 2, November 2012
Figure No. 10 MP Crimes against Life Unit Clearance Rates
2006-2008 vs. 2010-2012
Cases 2006-2008 % 2010-2012 %
Resolved cases 3,368 36% 7,541 68%
Under Investigation 6,017 64% 3,527 32%
Total 9,385 100% 11,068 100%
Source: SICOMP2, November 2012
Note: MP classifies as “resolved” those cases: a) ended by alternative resolution, b) 
ended by MP decision not to prosecute, or, c) sent to court for trial, but not yet tried. 
3368
7541
6017
5527
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
8000
2006-2008 2010-2012
Resolved cases Under investigation
21
complaints again was the new MP management decision to divide prosecutors into investigation 
prosecutors and litigation prosecutors. Judges complained that litigation prosecutors appear before 
them without knowing the case because they have only recently received the investigative file. 
Prosecutors, judges and civil society representatives in Guatemala City and Petén complained vigorously 
about the new division system. 23
6.3. CHANGES IN THE PERFORMANCE AND CASELOAD IN THE 24-HOUR COURTS – PAVI 
CONTRIBUTION TO THOSE OUTCOMES 
At the beginning of 2010, PAVI performed a diagnostic study of the 24-hour courts (Juzgados de Turno 
Penales) in Mixco, Villa Nueva and Guatemala City (Torre de Tribunales). The review focused on 
operational variables: physical infrastructure, security, staff performance, operations and procedures, 
information management, prosecutorial and legal aspects controls (supervision and oversight). Based on 
the PAVI study findings the Supreme Court approved by mid-2010 a new model for replication with a 
multi-judge court that shares administrative services. The PAVI diagnostic recommended: 
 The replications of 24-hour courts should revert to the original model. 
 The establishment of a court coordinator (Secretary) as the focal point for the administrative 
model and to schedule all oral hearings for all judges in the court. 
 Reinforcement of all oral procedures to counteract certain cultural, structural, and procedural 
practices and issues that negatively affect the process 
 More control mechanisms to reduce opportunities for corruption (such as privately rearranging 
shifts or case assignments among judges, contravening decisions of the Court, or personally 
assigning hearing dates, among others). 
 Better organization of human resources and reductions in superfluous personnel. 
 All charged cases should be brought to and heard before the judge assigned to the Court during 
regular business hours (day shift). 
 Those judges assigned to work non-business hours (evening and night shifts) should merely issue 
rulings regarding suspects in custody or process urgent requests from the Public Ministry for 
investigation or evidence proceedings. 
Once the Supreme Court approved the new model, PAVI worked with the Judiciary Human Resources 
Office to set up procedures for the staff shifts assignments (12 hours on, 24 hours off) and to re-structure 
job descriptions to make better use of support staff in oral proceedings. The Judiciary was able to 
reassign 182 unnecessary personnel to other positions as a result of the reforms24. PAVI also worked
with the Judiciary Information and Telecommunications Center to assign four staff members to assist the 
courts’ administrative personnel with the use and applications of information technology. The 
implementation plan also included the participation of the Judicial Studies School. PAVI assisted the 
school to design and provide training for support staff, as well as to include litigation methods for oral 
proceedings without hampering the on-site in-service training provided by the courts themselves. 
Currently there are five 24-hour Courts in operation (Mixco, Villa Nueva, Guatemala City, Escuintla and 
Sacatepéquez). Two of them (Mixco and Guatemala City) are already implementing the new legislation 
(Law7-2011) that allows justices of the peace to hear lesser criminal cases with penalties of under five 
 
23 RCC raised the point directly with the Attorney General, .The AG appeared concerned and said she would look into the issue. 
24 LA PRENSA LIBRE (August 8, 2010),” CSJ Reubicará a 182 Empleados de Juzgados Penales de Turno”, 
http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/justicia/Juzgados_de_turno_0_313768853.html
22
years. This law has increased the number of judges available to resolve minor crimes, but now the 
affected justices of peace are overwhelmed with cases. 
All in all, 24-hour Courts have been a notable improvement in Criminal Justice in Guatemala. USAID has 
been their primary donor promoter, and the European Union also provided some technical assistance as 
well as important policy support with the Supreme Court. Their main achievement has been a reduction 
of provisional detention by as much as 65%25
, because when the ordinary courts are closed, the 24 – hour 
judges now decide immediately if the defendant must be imprisoned or can leave the court26. Also they 
have facilitated the issuing of arrest and search warrants in hours out of the courts’ regular schedule. 
Nevertheless, it is important to understand that although these courts operate continuously from 3:30 
p.m. to 8:00 a.m., they have only a limited 
mandate. They only can take the first 
statements from the parties and decide if the 
case is dismissed, conciliated, suspended or is 
charged and continues. The ordinary trial 
courts that open at 8:00 a.m. the following 
morning receive the charged cases. 
Therefore, the clearance rate of these 24-
hour Courts when operating during the 
evening and night shifts (3:30 p.m. to 8:00 
a.m.) is very low compared to international 
standards (see Figure No. 10), since they do 
not operate as fully functioning ordinary 
courts, as do the In Flagrante Delicto courts in 
Costa Rica. 
 According to the following table, the average 
clearance rate for these courts in 2011 and 2012 has been 22.6%, meaning they have resolved only that 
portion of all cases received. In a notable improvement, after the reorganization, clearance rates 
improved in 2012 by 10.43% for Justices of the Peace in the 24 – hour Courts. This increase may also be 
due in part to the application of Law 7-2011 allowing JP’s to hear minor criminal cases. In 24-hour Trial 
Courts from 2011 to 2012, the clearance rate rose 13.94%. 
Figure No. 12 - New cases, resolved cases and clearance rates in 24-hour Courts in Guatemala 
Courts New cases Resolved cases Clearance rates
2011 2012(*) Total 2011 2012(*) Total 2011 2012 Average
Justices of 
the Peace 6520 3537 10057 907 861 1768 13.91% 24.34% 19.13%
Trial Courts 5475 3165 8640 2022 1046 3068 19.11% 33.05% 26.08%
All cases 11995 6702 18697 2929 1907 4836 16.51% 28.70% 22.60%
 (*) Information to September 2012. Source: Created with information provided CENADOJ (National Judicial Analysis and 
Documentation Center) (Nov. 12, 2012) 
 
25
 This is very important in a country where pre-trial detainees 54.4% of the total population and where prison have an 
occupancy level of 184% according to the World Prison Brief produced by the International Centre for Prison Studies at the 
University of Essex, http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_country.php?country=81 
26 Information from European Union representative from evaluation of EU Justice Project that ended in 2010 (November 2012) 
Figure No. 11 - Judiciary clearance rates in selected Latin 
American Countries (2008)
Source: Judicial Studies Center of the Americas (2008-2009) “Reporte 
sobre el Estado de la Justicia en las Americas”, 
http://www.cejaamericas.org
104%
97%
96%
95%
95%
93%
92%
73%
Puerto Rico
Chile 
Panama
Mexico
Argentina (Federal Justice) 
Costa Rica
Colombia
Dominican Republic
23
As was mentioned earlier, the Guatemalan Judiciary does not have established performance indicators 
such as clearance rates, backlog rates, and case disposition times. As a consequence, RCC has compiled 
all the above information on clearance rates using numbers provided by CENADOJ. RCC also visited the 
Judiciary Information and Telecommunications Office which manages the computerized “Sistema de 
Gestión de Tribunales” and requested information on clearance rates and case disposition times in the 
24-hour Courts, but they informed us that although their system could produce such information, they 
did not track such indicators. RCC asked the Office to produce a report on these indicators, to which they 
agreed, but their results had to be checked against information registered manually in each court and 
could not be ready for the delivery deadline for this report. 
6.4. PAVI ACTIVITIES IN SUPPORT OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LAW AGAINST 
ORGANIZED CRIME AND/OR OTHER LEGISLATION 
PAVI provided important technical assistance to the MP to use the practical tools provided in the recently 
implemented Organized Crime Law and Asset Seizure and Forfeiture Law. PAVI s ac vi es focused on two 
key aspects: the use of the benefits of a cooperating defendant turning evidence over to the State 
(colaborador eficaz) and establishment of a specialized prosecution unit on asset forfeiture. 
PAVI assisted in production of overall guidelines and a frame of reference within which prosecutors could 
offer prosecutorial benefits, including witness protection and relocation, to defendants willing to turn 
State’s evidence. PAVI carried out 6 regional workshops for 122 prosecutors and assistant prosecutors. 
The training was instrumental in teaching the rational and ethical application of benefits, and was aimed 
to avoid abuse of this valuable investigative tool during prosecution. According to data from the MP 
Criminal Policy Secretariat, from 2010 t0 2011, the use of the “colaborador eficaz” mechanism increased 
from 4 to 15 benefits conferred. 
Regarding the implementation of the Law on Asset Seizure and Forfeiture (Extinción de Dominio), PAVI 
provided technical assistance to the MP to establish an Asset Seizure and Forfeiture group within the 
Asset and Money Laundering Prosecutor Unit. Renamed the Economic Crimes Prosecutors Unit, it is now 
fully operational with two prosecutors, six assistant prosecutors and an assistant assigned to the new 
office. According to information provided by the Attorney General during the meeting with RCC, this Unit 
has been able to seize 1 billion quetzals (approximately US$143 million) since January 2012. 
PAVI carried out four training workshops for prosecutors and assistant prosecutors working in the Units 
on Organized Crime, Drug Trafficking, Money and Asset Laundering, Economic Crimes, Crimes against 
Life, Anti-Corruption and personnel from the Criminal Policy Secretariat. The workshops were also 
replicated in the District Prosecutor Offices in Petén and Mixco for a total of 46 participants. PAVI also 
provided assistance to prepare guidelines on seizing assets at the border when individuals enter the 
country without a customs declaration or under false pretenses. The guidelines are based on 
standardized procedures for minimal investigation requirements prior to requesting a ruling on 
forfeiture. The guidelines also provide basic instructions to document and track the procedures. 
7. SUPPORT TO HIGH-IMPACT COURTS
This Special Activity was closely related to the implementation of the Law Against Organized Crime. The 
jurisdiction for high impact courts was officially established to: a) ensure prompt and effective 
administration of justice in those cases posing higher risks to the justice system and to justice operators; 
24
b) assure personal safety of judiciary personnel and defendants and: c) minimize the risks and 
operational costs of transporting individuals in custody determined to be extremely dangerous. 
7.1. REMODELING OF 14TH FLOOR OF GUATEMALA CITY COURT BUILDING 
PAVI financed and coordinated the remodeling of the 14th floor of the Guatemala City Court Building to 
house the multi-person judiciary facility for high impact courts. The facility contains a High Impact First 
Instance Court with two judges on the bench and a High Impact Sentencing Court with six judges on the 
bench. The courts are designed around shared administrative services under the management of a single 
Court Coordinator. This project complemented previous Judiciary renovation efforts on the 15th floor as 
part of the multi-person headquarters for the high impact courts. The remodeling included the purchase 
of audio and video equipment to facilitate and record oral hearing procedures. The remodeled courts 
provide separate entrances and restricted access areas to keep judiciary personnel separate from the 
general public, as well as to isolate defendants to ensure the safety and privacy of victims and other 
witnesses testifying in court. The high impact courts include videoconferencing facilities so that victims 
and other witnesses can testify while protecting their identity and avoid intimidation and threats. 
The High Impact Courts were strongly approved by several interviewees and by those who answered the 
questionnaires, who considered them an important improvement in the criminal system’s ability to fight 
impunity. Their impact should not be measured by numbers of cases resolved, but by numbers of 
defendants sentenced and complexity and difficulty of the cases resolved. Most cases heard by these 
courts have multiple defendants and multiple charges per defendant. According to CENADOJ, since their 
creation in 2009, these courts have produced 83 final resolutions, with at least 3 defendants per case. 
7.2. NEW SECURITY AND PROTECTION PROTOCOLS
New security and protection protocols for High Impact Courts, to which PAVI contributed, improved 
access to an impartial trial because they support better protection for judges involved in the cases so 
they may judge without fear of retaliation. However, all of the prescribed and required security 
measures have not been implemented and security is still very precarious for the judges and the parties 
involved outside of the fortified Central Court building (Torre de los Tribunales). 
Interviews with these judges indicated an urgent need to start selecting and training a new group of 
judges capable of dealing with these types of complex cases. These judicial positions are very stressful 
and dangerous and require better incentives. Currently, these judges’ salaries remain the same as their 
colleagues in ordinary criminal courts despite the added personal risks and the complexity of the cases. 
Moreover, the current judges feel that selection procedures need to be strengthened to assure selection 
of persons without links with organized crime. 
8. MOBILIZED JUSTICE SECTOR AND CIVIL SOCIETY TO REDUCE AND PREVENT VIOLENCE
PAVI’s efforts in this area were limited and mainly focused on support to attention of victims from civil 
society organizations and the Public Ministry Victims Assistance Office (OAV). 
8.1. AVAILABILITY AND QUALITY OF LEGAL AID/VICTIM’S SERVICES.
In Guatemala, in general, the quality and availability of services to victims of violence provided by GOG 
institutions is still very limited. In a number of cases, the GOG has transferred the responsibility to 
25
provide for such services to civil society organizations with limited resources. There are only five (5) 
shelters in the entire country for victims of violence. These are located in CAIMUS (Integral Support 
Centers for Women Survivors of Violence (Centros de Apoyo Integral para Mujeres Sobrevivientes de 
Violencia) and managed by Grupo Guatemalteco de Mujeres, an NGO. 
Victims still have great fear to make a formal complaint to the Police and MP. Procedures are slow and 
evidence is often poorly handled, and victims are not well treated. Victims usually receive initial 
immediate attention at the Police and MP, but there is no continued service or an integrated service with 
legal and psychological aid. The National Civil Police does not have an adequate victim services system 
and there is great systemic bias against women, particularly against those complaining against men. 
Police frequently inform the aggressor of claims presented against him before arresting him. The few 
PNC officers that have received gender bias training are often transferred to units that have nothing to 
do with their training and so the training is wasted. There is also great gender bias against women in the 
courts, particularly against indigenous women where this bias is also aggravated by the lack of 
interpreters in the Justice Sector in indigenous languages.27 Currently there is a 97-98% of impunity in 
violence against women cases28
. 
MP Offices for the Attention of Victims (OAV) have been an improvement, but the institution still seems 
to lack personnel that understand and are committed to provide legal aid to crime victims. This task is 
not a natural fit for a prosecution agency and is not seen as a high priority as compared to much more 
urgent prosecution tasks. 
Legal aid to violence victims unable to afford a lawyer is very limited. Civil society organizations have 
limited resources. Support from University law faculty legal clinics is often poor, and because the legal 
process is very slow, several students may be involved in the same case, because when one graduates, 
another student takes over, and with each change victims must tell their stories all over again. Some of 
the best services are provided by IDPP through the National Coordination of Legal Aid to Victims and 
Relatives. Through its semi-autonomous Office of Free Legal Assistance, (Asistencia Legal Gratuita –
ALG), IDPP/ALG has provided services to more than 70,000 cases of victims since the creation of ALG in 
2008. This office, in coordination with MP, has developed what seems to be the optimal approach to the 
problem of victims, through the creation of Derivation Services Networks, composed of NGO’s, public 
sector offices, and medical and social workers around the country. One of the best such networks 
operates in Guatemala City and the Model has been replicated in other areas. 
8.2. PAVI CONTRIBUTIONS TO IMPROVE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS 
PAVI’s work with civil society organizations was mainly focused on the protection of victims of violence. 
PAVI started preparing an assessment on the services and legal assistance available to victims of crime. 
The study covered 15 departments and included interviews carried out at 137 institutions to determine 
the array of services available. The study shows that only 43 organizations specifically provide services to 
crime victims (65 % are government institutions, 35 % CSOs). It also showed that the services are very 
limited and that sexual crimes and crimes of violence against women or domestic violence are those 
generating the greatest demand for services. A total of 78 % of the providers are assisting victims of child 
 
27 DEFENSORIA DE LA MUJER INDIGENA (2007), “El Acceso de las Mujeres Indígenas al Sistema de Justicia Oficial de 
Guatemala”, http://demi.gob.gt/paginas.asp?id=4254&clc=249
28 CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS DE GUATEMALA (September 2012), “Situación en Seguridad y Derechos Humanos. Guatemala”, Power 
Point Presentation
26
abuse followed by 76% that are providing services to victims of domestic violence, while 65 % of the 
service providers deal with cases of violence against women, particularly physical, psychological and 
sexual abuse. Regarding crimes against life, most of the cases requiring services are for assault (39 %).The 
study showed that 70% of the demand for services originates in the segment of the population of Maya 
origin and 30% originates from non- Maya origin. 29
After the assessment, PAVI selected a group of organizations working on the subject (Grupo 
Guatemalteco de Mujeres, FADS, Madres Angustiadas, GAM, Asociación de Justicia Alta Verapaz and 
Centro de Paz Barbara Ford, among others) and brought them to work together, giving grants to several. 
According to these organizations, PAVI organized eleven meetings to share problems and achievements, 
and provide technical and financial advice. The Tetra Tech DPK final M&E Report states that these 
meetings involved 132 persons in PAVI’s first year, 330 in the second year and 123 in the third year. 
The PAVI resources devoted to the protection of victims came from the grant fund ($300,000) and the 
regular budget. They were focused to: 
 Raise awareness of violence against women and empower women via better understanding of 
their legal rights under new laws, mainly the Law against Femicide and Other Forms of Violence 
against Women. 
 Provide legal aid in some judicial processes. 
 Provide violence sensitivity training to justice sector officials in Guatemala City and Petén. 
 Design tools for monitoring the Justice Sector from victims’ perspective (approved by the 
Supreme Court but not yet implemented). 
 Update GAM’s Manual for Reception of Human Rights Claims that includes the procedures to be 
followed to present a formal claim. The manual covers human rights violations and violence 
against women. It also establishes social auditing tools. PAVI also trained in use of the manual. 
 Coordinate efforts with the CSO Movimiento Pro Justicia (MPJ) to target the most powerful 
members of Congress and other key stakeholders to promote comprehensive legislation to 
register mobile phone devices30, regulate cell phones, and develop tools that are useful as 
deterrents and controls to combat the crime wave. 
PAVI also provided support to organize an international seminar on Quality Standards for Assistance to 
Crime Victims: Recent Progress and Future Outlook. The seminar was officially sponsored by the 
Judiciary, the MP, the Public Defense Institute, the Survivors Foundation (Fundación Sobrevivientes), and 
FADS. PAVI also organized four workshops to review the Protocol for Comprehensive Assistance to 
Victims Providing Testimony in Criminal Prosecution. The Protocol has been reviewed and approved by 
the MP Criminal Policy Secretariat and is currently awaiting the Attorney General’s approval. 
There are no specific measures available to establish to what extent PAVI services for attention of victims 
contributed to reduce or prevent violence nor to determine the target population they reached. All of 
the PAVI interventions and activities likely helped in this area, but there was no baseline data to measure 
improvement during the project, nor any way to attribute improvement to PAVI inputs. Numbers of 
victims attended by the Police, the MP, the IDPP/ALG and the Survivors Foundation as reflected in PAVI’s 
M&E final report (page 22) cannot be attributed to PAVI’s intervention. Moreover, the apparent most 
effective organization, the IDPP/ALG National Coordination of Legal Aid to Victims and Relatives, received 
no PAVI assistance, despite several requests for assistance, according to the ALG Office Director. 
 
29 TRETA TECH DPK, “Quarterly report No. 5”, pp.16-19
30 In Guatemala, cell phone theft is one of the most common and recurring crimes. Cell phones are also commonly used in 
extortion schemes. 
27
9. INCREASE INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT WITHIN THE JUSTICE SECTOR
PAVI’s main contribution to improve internal accountably in the Justice Sector was in the Judiciary. Here 
PAVI designed of a new Professional Development System that includes: a) an annual evaluation system 
for justices of the peace and trial judges and, b) the reorganization of the Judicial School to tailor training 
to job qualifications for judges and auxiliary personnel. 
9.1. PAVI’S PROGRESS ON REFORMING RECRUITMENT, APPOINTMENTS, SELECTION AND 
PROMOTION OF JUDGES 
Guatemala has a very limited Judicial Career system for the appointment and performance evaluation of 
judges. The Career Law, enacted 13 years ago (Law 41- 1999), only covers the justices of the peace and 
the trial judges who are named by the Judiciary for five year terms with possible reappointment based on 
performance. The National Congress appoints the 120 Appellate Judges and 13 Supreme Court Judges, 
who are not covered by the performance evaluation system, for five-year terms31. In practice, The 
“career” system is truncated, as Justices of the Peace can only aspire to move up to Trial Judgeships, and 
Trial Judges have very minimal prospects for elevation to an Appellate Judge position, unless they have 
political support in the Congress. This situation has produced a perverse system where the Appellate and 
Supreme Court judges all need active political ties to be appointed and retained. Moreover, the 
production of appellate jurisprudence in the country rests mainly in hands of these judges, who need not 
pass any legal knowledge test, have no obligatory judicial training, and whose work cannot be evaluated. 
According to the Judicial Career Secretary, of the 850 current justices of the peace and trial judges, 80% 
have been appointed through a selection process that includes an examination on legal subject matter 
and psychological tests, six (6) months of training at the judicial school and two (2) months of tutorships 
once appointed. Despite the Career Law being in effect for 13 years, there are still 20% of judges (185) 
who have been appointed outside the legal selection and training system32. There is a disciplinary system 
for justices of the peace and trial judges overseen by a board that received approximately 2,584
complaints from 2008-2010, of which only 520 (20%) were found justified and investigated. Very few 
(104) of these were sanctioned and only 3 judges were removed.33
Currently the only judicial performance evaluation comes in the final year of the five-year appointment 
term, which does not permit time to improve if the judge is found deficient in performance. Around 8% 
of the justices of peace and trial judges do not pass the fifth year evaluation and are discharged34
. 
PAVI designed of a new Professional Development System with an annual evaluation system for justices 
of the peace and trial judges and a supporting training system that included reorganization of the Judicial 
School. PAVI also assisted to develop a handbook encompassing 46 standardized job descriptions and 
qualifications for magistrates, judges, and auxiliary personnel including specific skills and general 
competencies for each role. Moreover, PAVI devoted significant efforts to create an Institutional 
Integrity System and a Positive Leadership Network that trained 247 Justice Sector Officials in mental 
 
31 At present, the National Congress is debating a set of constitutional reforms submitted by the Executive Branch that, among 
other matters, would place the appellate judges under the career system. During RCC interviews and focus groups, the general 
feeling was that Congress may approve eventually, but the reforms would not likely pass the subsequent public referendum. 
32 Interview with the Judicial Career Secretary, November, 2012. 
33
 ASIES (2011) “Desafíos Actuales de la Justicia Penal. Proceso de fortalecimiento del sistema de justicia, avances y 
debilidades”. November 2008 - Octubre 2011”, with information provided by the Judicial Disciplinary Board in June 2011, p.51
34 Interview with the Judicial Career Secretary, November, 2012. 
28
health, human relations and leadership. Nevertheless, these latter two areas seem to have expired with 
PAVI. Justice Sector authorities interviewed showed no interest and seem to have no resources for 
further development. 
For the development of the new Professional Development System, PAVI hired the Universidad del Valle, 
a higher education institution with a great reputation in professional development systems and ASIES, a 
reputable local civil society organization. This excellent choice created an unprecedented alliance 
between the Judiciary, a local university and a local CSO, which has continued beyond PAVI, and both 
organizations continue work with the Judiciary, mainly to complete the Judicial School reorganization. 
Currently, the Judiciary is starting an internal campaign to promote the new Professional Development 
System’s annual evaluation among judges to avoid possible negative reactions to the proposed new 
system. The campaign documents portray the annual evaluation as a necessary step for professional 
development and as a mechanism for the Judicial School to detect training needs that will allow the 
judges to improve during the following year. It is puzzling that this socialization process did not start 
until the new system was ready to roll out, rather than during the design of the evaluation system. 
In sum, PAVI’s work towards better judicial human resources obtained: a) an important new annual 
evaluation system for justices of the peace and trial judges that, while not yet implemented, appears 
likely to be; and, b) reorganization of the Judicial School, whose director states it is 90% completed. 
9.2. PAVI’S ACCOMPLISHMENTS REGARDING EVALUATION OF PUBLIC DEFENDERS 
The Criminal Public Defense Institute, (IDPP) has one of the public sector’s most efficient career systems 
for its full time personnel and the performance evaluation system for IDPP public defenders was done 
with technical and financial support from the Spanish International Cooperation Agency. One hundred 
eight (108) full time public defenders have been appointed going through the career system, through 
apprentice stages and exams. 
Under the PAVI project, support to IDPP was to be directed to provide technical assistance for design and 
implementation of an evaluation system to control the quality for IDPP contracted public defenders 
(abogados de oficio). These are not IDPP public sector employees, but rather private attorneys hired 
under contracts by IDPP to provide indigent defense services. The PAVI activity began in late 2009 and 
proceeded until mid-2010, when assistance was abruptly interrupted. RCC evaluators could not learn the 
reasons and the IDPP Director stated that no explanation was ever given. The last USAID CTO for PAVI 
had no information as she was CTO only for the final 6 months of the project. The former CTO was 
working in Mexico and the PAVI Chief of Party had already left Guatemala. Nevertheless, the PAVI COP
kindly answered RCC’s e-mailed questions and asserted that PAVI’s only commitment to the IDPP was the 
design of a proposal for evaluation and that this task was completed. 
As RCC stated at the beginning of this report, information on this from Tetra Tech DPK Quarterly Reports 
5 and 6 is contradictory, and the activity appeared clearly planned to continue through 2010, but was not 
finished. At the time of the apparent suspension of PAVI assistance in 2010, the IDPP was involved in a 
difficult political process concerning reappointment of the Director. This situation likely affected USAID 
assistance to the agency. Regardless of the actual reasons for suspension, an unfortunate negative 
impression was left with IDPP staff and leadership. 
29
10. STRENGTHEN JUSTICE CAPACITY TO COMBAT ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES IN PETÉN
10.1 PAVI EFFORTS IN PETÉN 
The Petén region reflects several critical Guatemalan issues. The region holds the Maya Biosphere 
Reserve (Reserva de la Biosfera Maya – RBM), a protected tropical forest that brings into conflict 
environmentalists and human rights defenders, who view the land tenure conflicts and rural farmer 
displacements common in the area from very different perspectives. The RBM has also become a locus 
of national and transnational organized crime operating in the region, particularly around the Laguna del 
Tigre, along the long border with Mexico. There is narcotrafficking, illegal logging, human trafficking, 
smuggling and more. The lack of state presence and active governance in the region facilitates the 
growth of illegal activities. Under current conditions, any attempt to support the judicial sector in the 
Petén department faces enormous and nearly insurmountable challenges. 
Under the PAVI project, USAID used an integral approach focused at the District Attorney Office, based 
on the very successful model tested in Quetzaltenango. The attempt to replicate the regional approach 
model in the Petén was less successful. In fact, the MP reorganization has been counterproductive. They 
removed the previous special prosecutors for environment, cultural heritage and others and combined all 
under one unit that works all cases without specialization. Also, the MP’s division of prosecutors into two 
groups, one in charge of investigations and the other responsible for litigation, has left citizens and 
judges, as well as prosecutors, dissatisfied. Litigating prosecutors often appear for the hearings before 
the judge without in-depth understanding of the case, easily making errors. Public defenders, who are 
generally better trained, are taking advantage of this situation and achieving easy acquittals or dismissals. 
In general, PAVI activities sought to improve the Petén MP office, but the constant rotation of personnel 
made training less productive. Moreover, informants in the region claim that the current Petén District 
Attorney is not fully attentive to the needs of the judicial processes. There is the impression that often, 
judges and MP prosecutors are sent to Petén as punishment for poor performance or problems in other 
districts. This in turn impacts the professionalism and competence of many justice operators in the 
region. Moreover, most current judges and prosecutors are very dispirited with current working 
conditions and live in fear of threats and reprisals from politically or economically powerful individuals or 
organized crime groups. 
During PAVI, the project tried to facilitate better communication and coordination among different 
justice operators within the Petén region and between local authorities, civil society and the Attorney 
General Office in Guatemala. These efforts were not sustainable after PAVI, and there are presently 
serious coordination issues. Since the demise of the Justice Centers (supported by USAID’s 2004-2009 
Rule of Law Project, but not under PAVI35), coordination among Petén justice sector institutions is rare 
and difficult. Justice officials in Petén apparently have not been served by the Coordination Instance for 
the Modernization of the Justice Sector, which was expected to take over support of the Centers from 
the prior USAID Rule of Law project. The Justice Centers had been very useful in providing coordination 
and facilitating contacts among institutions locally in Petén and with the justice sector agencies in 
Guatemala City. Now there is no local coordination between prosecutors and judges, and calling 
 
35 The centers have all but disappeared. By the end of the 2004 -2009 Rule of Law project, per Checchi’s final report of 
December 17, 2009, pp. i and 20, the 15 Justice Centers were “successfully transferred” to the Coordination Instance for the 
Modernization of the Justice Sector, but in the last three years, without external support, they have seriously declined. 
30
Guatemala City for advice or help is problematic and often futile. It often requires long waits on the 
phone to encounter little interest or ability to provide support. 
10.2. PAVI’S EFFECT ON PROSECUTION OF CRIMES AGAINST THE ENVIRONMENT 
 
PAVI provided critical support to stakeholders in the Petén by offering training on environmental and 
cultural heritage laws. It also raised awareness among justice sector operators on environmental crimes. 
The training allowed justice officials to be more effective in handling environmental cases. In fact, a 
judge who participated in PAVI environmental law training said that the training allowed her and her 
colleagues to convict suspects on violations that were previously disregarded. She also mentioned the 
importance of the training being provided in Petén rather than in Guatemala City. 
One of PAVI’s most important achievements in Petén was providing support to the Foro de Justicia 
Ambiental (FORO), the region’s key civil society coalition defending the Mayan Biosphere Reserve. PAVI 
greatly enhanced FORO’s capacity to become a credible and legitimate interlocutor with local and 
national government. As a result, FORO became a legally constituted and effective civil society entity. 
PAVI supported FORO in inviting the Attorney General and her staff to personally overfly and inspect the 
Maya Biosphere Reserve along with a group of local justice authorities, and see for herself that there still 
much to protect in the RBM. The tour allowed the AG to see some of the illegal activities going on in the 
region, including the illegal logging and building of landing strips for narcotrafficking, particularly around 
the Laguna del Tigre. FORO representatives claim this visit helped to change the Attorney General’s 
perceptions and to focus more attention on Petén. Prior to this trip, the Attorney General had accepted 
claims that the government was harassing the peasant farmers in the region. After the trip, she realized 
that it was the narco-related cattle ranches and illegal logging activities that threaten the region’s 
population and livelihood. 
As noted, PAVI also strengthened local MP and judicial authorities’ environmental law understanding. 
Also, taking local staff on helicopter flights over the RBM gave visual reaffirmation of the PAVI trainings. 
These contributions led to improved MP environmental case processing, resulting in 112 brought to 
Court, resulting in 80% guilty verdicts during PAVI. In the past, environmental crimes were ignored for 
lack of understanding of the laws. Also, the persistence of the National Council for Protected Areas 
(CONAP) in prosecuting these cases has helped change the situation. Generally, the CONAP brings cases 
to court. FORO also brings to the attention of the District Attorney cases or situations that should be 
investigated. The MP in Petén rarely takes the initiative on its own to investigate environmental cases. 
With the support of PAVI, the FORO conducted a broad public awareness campaign on environmental 
issues and cultural heritage protection through TV and 14 community radio stations. The campaigns are 
conducted in Quiché and Spanish. Despite the effort, there are still few claims from citizens regarding 
environmental violations. 
As of November 2012, FORO had presented 4 to 6 informal high impact complaints on land invasions to 
the MP for investigation. One led to having ranchers linked with narcotrafficking being evicted from the 
land. However, the MP in Petén has a backlog of 300 environmental cases. Promotion of environmental 
crimes awareness and prosecution was the area of most success for PAVI, though results remain limited. 
PAVI also provided funds to contract a consultant to prepare “A Strategy for Guidance on Monitoring 
Cattle Movements.” This was a sort of cattle census that set a baseline from which to measure cattle 
movements in the region. Cattle ranchers are powerful individuals often involved in deforestation and 
31
other illicit activities. They are displacing subsistence farming communities to clear the land. The 
baseline has increased CONAP’s ability to monitor cattle movements and bring cases to court.
10.3. PAVI’S EFFECT ON PROSECUTION OF CRIMES AGAINST CULTURAL HERITAGE 
The final PAVI M&E Report asserted that between January 2009 and December 2011, 298 cases on 
cultural heritage were prosecuted in Petén. However, RCC found that currently there are only eight such 
cases under MP investigation in Petén. With the claimed sharp rise of cases brought to trial in 2009, 
cultural heritage cases doubled from 91 to 187 in 2010, but declined again in 2011 to 20 cases and to 
eight cases in 2012. The M&E Report contains no information on whether there were any actual 
convictions in these cases36. As mentioned before, overall prosecutorial capacity in Petén is limited and 
has been negatively affected by the new MP reorganization. RCC concluded that PAVI’s effect on 
prosecution of crimes against cultural heritage was very limited. In spite of the numerous cases brought 
to court by the MP, there do not seem to have been any guilty verdicts in any case, and RCC could not 
find information on the status of the 298 cases prosecuted. FORO representatives argue that in part, the 
lack of prosecution on this type of cases is due to the negligence of the Ministry of Culture and Sports, 
which is responsible for the protection of cultural heritage, but unlike CONAP, it has shown little interest 
in prosecuting cases in its area of responsibility. 
10.4. PAVI’S EFFECT ON PROSECUTION OF CRIMES AGAINST LIFE 
PAVI provided technical assistance and equipment to the MP Office of Assistance to Victims (OAV) in San 
Benito, Petén. This assistance allowed the MP to prosecute and obtain a verdict of guilty in one case 
based on the Law on Femicide. According to the OAV, the MP may not have been able to achieve this 
result without the support of lawyers hired by PAVI. Another case involving the killing of a community 
leader, presented by FORO, is still under MP investigation. 
Currently, the Petén MP has over 600 domestic violence cases pending. Of these, the MP OAV is 
currently handling 325 cases, with only one person, a psychologist, to handle all such cases. Victims and 
some justice sector operators are unhappy with the new MP system of cases being litigated in court by a 
prosecutor who has not been involved in the investigation of the case. They complain that the litigation 
prosecutor sometimes receives the case from the investigating prosecutor only an hour earlier and must 
ask the judge for additional time. They agreed that the prior practice of a single prosecutor conducting 
the investigation and presenting the case in court was more effective for all. Victims also complained that 
there are very few judges in Petén, that cases take up to five years, and that justice officials are 
vulnerable to bribes and corruption. In San Benito, only one courtroom is available for oral hearings. 
Most of the persons interviewed by RCC in Petén expressed serious concerns over security for minors and 
women in the surrounding areas. Among a group of victims who met with RCC in San Benito, two cases 
were homicides of 7-year-old children, three were cases of sexual violence against children, and two 
were cases of violence against women. 
RCC concluded that in Petén, any PAVI effect on increased prosecution of crimes against life was quite 
limited, since only one guilty verdict was obtained in a single femicide case during the project. While the 
PAVI project made some early progress, with the MP bringing 18 cases to court from 2009 and 2010, 
 
36 TETRA TECH DPK (July 2012), Program against Violence and Impunity in Guatemala, Monitoring and Evaluation Final Report. 
(Partners for Democratic Change), p. 30. 
32
Figure No. 13. The Guatemala Future 
Reform Agenda - Fundamentals
crimes against life brought to trial declined to 9 in 201137, reflecting a general downward trend following 
a highly publicized massacre (Los Cocos) committed by a Mexican narcotrafficking criminal group (Los 
Zetas) in May of 201138 and the state of siege later declared. The generalized fears of citizens and justice 
officials alike for their personal safety appear to be the main reason. 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE 
PROGRAMMING 
Despite considerable real progress, Guatemala’s criminal 
justice reforms over the last two decades were only the 
beginning of a necessary long-term process, and these 
measures have remained insufficient to deal with the recent 
steep rise of crime and violence in the country. Past reform 
efforts focused on developing new legal frameworks, 
adversarial criminal procedures, and included some 
questionable “mano dura” legislation. The sum of these 
efforts has yet to prove capable of curtailing crime and 
violence, and have generally failed to produce a more 
efficient and effective Criminal Justice System that reduces 
impunity. To sustain the progress made, and continue 
reforms in the future will require continuous political will 
and greatly increased financing. More reforms are 
necessary and these will require: 
 The development and maintenance of a continuous national political commitment. Guatemala’s 
political and economic elites have so far been incapable of solidifying and sustaining such a 
commitment. Without the commitment by the country’s political and economic elites, further 
 The generation of appropriate and adequate national financial resources to sustain them. The role of 
external international donors has been decisive in the past reform phases, but future progress and 
sustainability will have to rely more and more on the consistent generation of sufficient local 
resources. 
 The establishment of effective linkages and coordination among justice sector institutions accustomed 
to working in isolation. Ensuring that all state institutions become committed to a common vision of 
citizen security is certainly a major undertaking.
 Balance between enforcement and prevention measures.
The challenge for the security and justice sector authorities is to develop a joint criminal policy and 
complete criminal justice reforms that contribute to curtail crime and violence, with due respect for 
human rights. The next round of reforms will require support from USAID but it should require the 
achievement of policy and enforcement benchmarks by GOG to measure project success and continue 
USAID’s support. 
 
37 TETRA TECH DPK (July 2012), Program against Violence and Impunity in Guatemala, Monitoring and Evaluation Final Report. 
(Partners for Democratic Change), p. 30. 
38 Time World (July 14, 2011), “Guatemala’s Kabiles: A Notorious Commando Unit Wrapped Up in Central America’s Drug 
War”, http://world.time.com/2011/07/14/guatemalas-kaibil-terror-from-dictators-to-drug-cartels/ and FOX NEWS LATINO (May 
17, 2011), “Guatemala President declares state of emergency in Petén”
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2011/05/17/guatemalan-president-declares-state-emergency-peten/ 
33
Set out below are recommendations for future USAID support based on RCC interviews, focus groups and 
questionnaires, as well as some examples of successful innovations from other Latin American nations.
RCC believes USAID can play a useful and important role to assist Guatemalan policy makers to learn 
what similar countries have implemented successfully to combat crime and violence. Review of these 
initiatives mainly requires drawing upon knowledge and experience already acquired in other countries, 
taking advantage of national and international experts with experience in a particular country and 
analyzing the initiative with Guatemalan national actors familiar with the local environment to see if the 
initiative could be adapted and replicated in Guatemala. 
1. IMPROVE JUSTICE SYSTEM CAPACITY TO PROSECUTE AND TRY SERIOUS CRIMES
This is an absolutely indispensible line of action that needs USAID continuous support to the main 
institutions involved: National Civil Police, Public Ministry, Judiciary and the IDPP. The recommendations 
are by area, by institution and within the institutions by descending order of priority 
1.1. POLICE 
Police reform is a priority but USAID must be careful in the selection of areas. PAVI produced a report on 
the subject that can provide guidance. The majority of persons interviewed agreed that the much-touted 
“Police Reform” plan has not shown the desired results as yet. Civil society organizations uniformly 
believe that there is no real political will to carry out a reform based on democratic principles. The CSO’s 
generally fear that any future “reforms” will produce a militarized police force, especially since the new 
GOG has placed numerous retired military officers in key positions in the Ministry of Government and the 
PNC. Nevertheless, support to Police Reform should be focused on elements aimed to improve the 
investigation capabilities of the institution. Informed observers interviewed by RCC believe that a key 
area of possible successful intervention is the establishment of a modern criminal investigation police 
(Dirección General de Investigaciones Criminales DIGICRI), based on the newly enacted law, to be 
established in the Ministry of Government, but functionally dependent on the MP. These observers 
considered that the international donor efforts for such an endeavor must be coordinated by a single 
entity within the Ministry or by the CICIG. If no single coordination entity is established from the 
beginning, it could be a very large and crucial investment with doubtful results. The priority task at this 
moment is the drafting of an operating regulation (reglamento) with appropriate educational and 
personal qualification profiles for staff, a task that should be a collaborative effort among the CICIG, MP, 
the Ministry of Interior and relevant CSOs (Forum of Social Organizations Specialized in Security - FOSS). 
1.2 JUDICIARY 
Since it has proven effective during PAVI, support to criminal courts should continue to be coordinated by 
the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court. The Criminal Chamber has a defined Criminal Judicial Policy 
that facilitates USAID contributions to Criminal Justice Reform. The caveat is that less than two years 
remain in the term of the present Supreme Court. Accordingly, USAID technical and financial support 
should be directed urgently to: 
 Strengthen criminal case management, including improvement of statistical reporting and use of 
statistics for planning and budgeting. This is particularly important relative to the 24-hour Courts 
because they are located in the population centers with high caseloads. Special attention should 
34
be given to the establishment of an effective hearing system. Currently around 46% of hearings 
are postponed and need to be rescheduled for different reasons.39
 Strengthening the High Impact Courts, improving security measures for judicial staff and 
witnesses. This activity also includes selection and training of a new set of high-risk court judges 
and the design of an incentive system for these judges that could include better salaries, academic 
scholarships and comparative legal study tours. It also requires full implementation of the 
Judiciary Internal Security System designed by UNDP and only partially implemented, which 
among other needs requires 30 armored cars and stricter selection of security personnel. Better 
security measures are required not only for High Impact Courts staff but also for other trial and 
sentencing judges that are handling more serious cases without additional protection measures 
 Support the implementation of two multi-judge criminal justice of the peace courts (Justice of the 
Peace Courts #1 & #5), as urged by the present Criminal Chamber President and support the 
implementation of the law that allows justice of the peace courts to judge crimes with less than 5 
years imprisonment in coordination with the Justice Centers. The support on this subject should 
be also extended to the MP and the IDPP so these institutions can provide the prosecutors and 
public defenders for these courts to function properly. 
 Study the possibility that the 24-hour Courts could be modified to be more efficient. Some models 
such as the ‘‘In flagrante delicto” courts in Costa Rica should be studied. 
 
39 According to a study by the Judiciary Information Systems and Telecommunications Office, approximately 50% of hearings are 
postponed because of the judges, 25% the MP is responsible, 10% the Public Defenders and 10% the Penitentiary System. See 
also, ASIES November 2011), “Desafíos Actuales de la Justicia Penal. Proceso de fortalecimiento del sistema de justicia, 
avances y debilidades. Noviembre 2008- Octubre 2011, p. 46.
BOX 2. COSTA RICA’S “IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO” COURTS
The “in flagrante delicto”‖courts were established by Costa Rica in September 2008 as a pilot project in San 
Jose to reduce criminal case disposition times. The pilot project was a success and five additional similar 
courts have been established in Alajuela, Cartago, Heredia, Limón and Puntarenas, and another six will be 
installed in San Carlos, Pococí, Corredores, Pérez Zeledón, Liberia and Santa Cruz.
These courts were established with only minor legal reforms and ensure respect of due process guarantees in 
simplified procedures to handle cases where the defendant is caught in the act of committing of a crime (in 
flagrante delicto). These courts remain open 24 hours a day, 365 days a year and operate around the clock 
with several shifts of judges, prosecutors and public defenders. The “in flagrante”‖cases are turned over 
immediately to the prosecutors, who may request an immediate hearing with the judge to analyze alternative 
mechanisms, such as summary judgment or the need for preventive detention. When the defendant and the 
public defender choose an expedited trial, it may take place immediately or can be set in a few days. 
During 2009, the pilot court received 1,111 cases and produced 560 final judgments, 91% of them with final 
judgments of guilty; 67% of the cases were resolved through expedited procedures, and only 14% went to 
trial; and of them, 30% were resolved by alternative mechanisms. The fastest final judicial resolution was 
produced in only 4 hours and the longest in 18 days (with oral and public debate). 
Source: SEGUNDO CIRCUITO JUDICIAL DE SAN JOSÉ (2009) http://www.poder￾judicial.go.cr/generalidadespj/informedelabores/2009//Archivos%20web/16-tribunalflagrancia.htm
35
1.3. PUBLIC MINISTRY (ATTORNEY GENERAL OFFICE) AND INACIF 
USAID should continue supporting efforts to install and upgrade modern investigation techniques and 
methodology, including modern investigative and analytical technology. 
 The MP officials highly praised the modality of USAID’s long-term technical advisors working 
alongside prosecutors. This facilitates training around daily workloads and easily identifies areas 
for improvement. Also, the Working Groups model established during PAVI should be 
institutionalized and replicated in all prosecutor offices. 
 Efforts need to be directed to closely integrate Police investigation with prosecutors. The Crime 
against Life Prosecutor Unit experience has been very successful and should be replicated. Joint 
training of police and prosecutors in investigation techniques should be conducted. 
 MP also requires support for the strengthening of the newly established Femicide Prosecutor’s 
Office in the MP and priority replication of the unit in other regions. 
 On training: a) The systematization of best practices identified by PAVI in Crimes against Life 
Prosecutors Unit needs to be replicated nationwide, and, b) update the MP Training Modules 
produced during the 2004-2009 USAID ROL Project. They are in CDs and need to be updated and 
incorporated into the MP’s UNICAP training schedule. Interviewed prosecutors felt that the best 
in-service training is of only one day. Longer events take too many prosecutors from daily duties. 
Training needs to be continuous due to high personnel turnover. Training modules need to go 
from basic to specialized to allow use of tools to prosecute organized crime. Training needs to 
reach prosecutors nationwide, so long distance and on-line training should be promoted. 
1.4. INACIF 
 Working links between MP and INACIF must be strengthened. This task started with PAVI. 
Interactive workshops between MP and INACIF officers on how to deal with crime scenes must 
continue. They allow a better understanding of prosecutors and forensic staff and to measure 
and define expectations. USAID was instrumental in establishing and equipping INACIF in prior 
ROL project, continued under PAVI, and should remain a strong support. 
 It is also important to study the Rape Victims Attention Centers financed by USAID/El Salvador 
that were opened at the Forensic Medicine Institute in San Salvador and in Santa Tecla.40
 
According to GAM, INACIF data shows that sexual aggression is almost as high as the levels of 
homicide in Guatemala. While girls are becoming increasing victims of aggression, sexual 
violence against boys remains more secretive, although it is also prevalent. The Salvadoran 
initiative is worth replication in Guatemala. These centers are two 24-hour Units for the 
Attention of Rape Victims installed at two Forensic Medicine Institute offices. These Units have 
two private rooms where victims are examined and can receive medical and psychological 
attention. The Units have psychologists and nurses that prepare victims for the physical 
examinations and for the interviews to start judicial proceedings.41 The preliminary information 
resulting from these units shows that 90% of rape victims are under 17 years old, and according 
 
40 FORENSIC MEDICINE INSTITUTE (July 15, 2011), “IML inaugura Unidad de Atención a Víctimas en Crisis”, 
http://www.csj.gob.sv/IML/NOTI_02.html and EL SALVADOR NOTICIAS.NET (March 8, 2012) “Corte Suprema inaugura oficina de 
atención a víctimas de abuso sexual”, http://www.elsalvadornoticias.net/2012/03/08/corte-suprema-de-justicia-inaugura￾oficina-de-atencion-a-victimas-de-abuso-sexual 
41 EL SALVADOR NOTICIAS.NET (March 8, 2012), “Corte Suprema inaugura oficina de atención a víctimas de abuso sexual”,
http://www.elsalvadornoticias.net/2012/03/08/corte-suprema-de-justicia-inaugura-oficina-de-atencion-a-victimas-de-abuso￾sexual
36
to studies by women’s organizations, it remains the case that only 3% of rape violations in El 
Salvador result in a guilty verdict for the perpetrator, a situation similar to Guatemala’s.
42
1.5. IDPP 
To promote a fair balance in criminal trials, and to expand attention to victims, USAID should restart its 
support to the IDPP. This is a crucially important institution that has always had USAID support and only 
under PAVI was it suspended for the past two and a half years. 
 IDPP requires strengthening of its Technical Support Department to carry out scientific analysis. 
(INACIF does not provide forensic services to IDPP). In this area the psychological exams in 
domestic violence cases are important. IDPP currently does them with very limited personnel. 
 IDPP also requires training of personnel in new legislation, using mainly long-distance and on-line 
modalities. 
2. MOBILIZE JUSTICE SECTOR AND CIVIL SOCIETY TO REDUCE AND PREVENT VIOLENCE
RCC research and fieldwork has confirmed that violence against women and children is enormous and 
endemic in Guatemala. USAID should urgently expand the scope of activities in this line of action and go 
beyond PAVI’s limited interventions. The recommended activities are descending order of priority: 
2.1. SERVICES FOR THE PROTECTION AND ATTENTION OF VICTIMS 
The Metropolitan Derivation Network Model established by IDPP/ALG in collaboration with MP to 
provide services to victims of violence is the best tool to link and coordinate efforts of all justice system 
actors, health providers, social services and civil society. The model should be supported and expanded 
to other departments. The protection of victims must be a GOG obligation where CSOs contribute, but 
not vice-versa. Accordingly, all civil society efforts should be coordinated with Justice Sector Institutions 
through existing Service Derivation Networks. On this subject, RCC again recommends that USAID study, 
support, and replicate the Guatemala Metropolitan Network in close coordination with the IDPP/ALG’s 
National Coordination of Legal Aid to Victims and Relatives. RCC urges USAID to devote efforts to assist 
each network in the areas where services are weaker, such as legal aid, and particularly in construction 
and staffing of shelters - a critical need throughout the country43. Several CSOs interviewed expressed 
that the definition of a victim is evolving and incorporating some surprising new areas. 
There is need for of research on women victims’ roles in the narcotrafficking and organized crime (forced 
extortion collectors, human traffickers, cover for hired killers). In organized crime, the Justice Sector 
treats some of these victims as criminal defendants, even when forced to participate. When they seek 
help from Justice officials, they wind up in jail as accomplices. Finally, some law reform projects 
supported under PAVI, such as the law for registration of cellular phones to prevent and combat crime - 
supported by FADS, and the Law for the Protection of Victims promoted by Madres Angustiadas, are still 
pending approval. USAID should see if they can be promoted under the new Justice and Security Project. 
 
42 Interview with USAID contractor Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc. representative, March 2012. 
43 Currently, for a population of 14 million persons, there are only six shelters for violence victims in the entire country 
(Guatemala City, Escuintla, Cobán, Quetzaltenango, Salama, and Mixco). 
37
2.2. ESTABLISHMENT OF ORAL HEARINGS IN FAMILY, CHILD AND ADOLESCENTS IN 
CONFLICT WITH THE LAW COURTS 
To promote social peace and reduce violence, USAID should carry over its promotion of oral procedures 
into Family Courts, Child Protection Courts and Adolescents in Conflict with the Law Courts. Family and 
child problems that are not properly resolved can easily develop into violence situations. RCC toured the 
recently opened oral hearing-based Metropolitan Child Protection Judicial Center in Guatemala City, a 
major advance whose model should be followed in Huehuetenango, Quiche, Zacapa and San Marcos. In 
this multi-judge court, child protection matters were separated from adolescents in conflict with the law 
matters. This center has well lit and attractive rooms where court psychologists interrogate children that 
communicate via audio with the courtroom for hearings. The center has a spacious waiting room with a 
large computer screen that displays the hearings taking place, a case admission unit and a child care unit. 
A similar model could be used for Family Courts and Adolescents in Conflict with the Law Courts (juvenile 
offenders). An extensive PAVI assessment on the latter should be used for any future juvenile justice 
activity. In several interviews, USAID was criticized for only focusing on Criminal Law, which applies after 
the harm is done and not devoting equal attention to the crime prevention. This initiative could help to 
balance the efforts between prevention of violence and crime and repression. It is backed by the 
President of the Supreme Court and the magistrates of the Supreme Court Civil Chamber. 
2.3. DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY POLICE PILOT PROJECTS WITH A MORE INTEGRATED 
APPROACH TO CITIZENS’ SECURITY
These programs are complex and difficult to establish, but when successfully implemented have proven 
one of the most effective mechanisms to pacify violent communities. The first step is to recognize local 
communities as active participants in fighting crime and reducing violence. 
There are some valuable examples to study carried out in Bogotá, Colombia (See Box 3) and the cities of 
San Paulo and Rio de Janeiro in Brazil (See Box 7). The United Nations and USAID have developed some 
valuable initiatives on this subject in El Salvador. UNDP from 2005 to 2010, developed a methodology in 
10 municipalities44, “the Peace and Citizen’s Security ABC”45, that has allowed these municipalities to 
diagnose their own crime and violence situation, define a peace and citizen’s security policy and a 
strategic plan with a defined monitoring system with indicators. Some of the 10 municipalities have 
started to implement, but there is no impact evaluation as yet. USAID has also developed Crime 
Prevention/Security Enforcement Action Plans in Nahuizalco, Sonsonate and Quezaltepeque. After one 
year, the results from these three pilot communities are very encouraging for two crime indicators: 
homicide and robberies. Overall there was a 25.13% reduction in homicides in the pilot communities46
. 
The above-mentioned programs have required close coordination and collaboration by police officers. 
Training officers in the particular community police methods is essential to change citizens’ low 
perception of the police. Involving communities in crime and violence prevention also yields positive 
outcomes. Several prior experiences in Brazil, Colombia, Chile and the Dominican Republic have reduced 
 
44 These municipalities are: San Martín, Ilopango, Santa Ana, Sonsonate, Acajutla, Sonzacate, Santa Tecla, Colón, Sacacoyo and 
San Salvador. They can easily be visited from Guatemala.
45 UNDP (2010), “Ciudades Seguras. El ABC de la Convivencia y la seguridad ciudadana". Herramientas para la gestión local, San 
Salvador, El Salvador.
46
 Interview with Chief of Party of USAID/Justice System Improvement Project in El Salvador in April 2012.
38
crime and violence and improved citizens’ perceptions on security and their relations with the police. All 
these projects are parallel to a deeper reform and professionalization of police. Some common elements 
must be: 
 Police - community meetings to identify problems and set crime fighting priorities. 
 Police-sponsored neighborhood or block watches, and business watches. 
 Community identification of local problems (via surveys, town or neighborhood meetings, etc.). 
 Crime prevention newsletters and other crime education programs for the public. 
 Small local police stations in the target neighborhoods.
 Promotion of civilian volunteer liaison with community police. 
 Police foot patrols and permanent assignment of officers to neighborhoods. 
 Special problem-solving task forces. 
 Increased education levels of police officers. 
 Municipal ordinances to reduce availability of arms and use of alcohol. 47
These community policing tactics increase police legitimacy and reduce abuses. To be fully successful, 
these programs must incorporate effective accountability mechanisms, including consistent application 
of international Human Rights standards. Implementing the community policing model involves changes 
such as: (1) expanding the traditional police mandate; (2) more emphasis on the preventive, rather than 
the reactive role of police; (3) inclusion of strategies for local action; and (4) mechanisms for cooperation 
between police, justice sector and political officials, public service providers, and community members.48
Lower crime rates have been a key achievement of successful community policing programs; 
nevertheless, community policing is not the solution to all problems. Without deeper institutional police 
changes, and sustained participation and coordination with other justice sector institutions, community 
policing programs can be reduced to novelties that only benefit a small group of people49
. 
RCC understands that initiatives in community police programs with an integrated approach to citizen’s 
security are already contemplated as part of the USAID/Guatemala project on crime prevention. 
 
47 Policies worth special consideration are those that reduce youths’ access to alcohol and so help keep young people from 
breaking the law. Options include increasing alcohol taxes, tightening sales restrictions, including controls on hours of 
operation, density and location of sales outlets, and a minimum age for purchasing alcohol. A key factor is the credibility of the 
threat of sanctions on merchants who violate regulations. The most effective sanctions include progressive penalties that begin 
with warnings, and escalate to fines, firing of employees selling to minors, closing outlets, and imprisonment of violators. Tax 
increases and sales restrictions should be implemented simultaneously to maximize impact on youth alcohol consumption. 
48 SMULOVITZ, Catalina (August 2002)
49
 For more on the subject see FRUHLING, Hugo ( 2004) 
39
BOX 3. AN INTEGRATED APPROACH TO CITIZEN SECURITY IN BOGOTA
The Bogotá violence reduction program had strong political support and continuity across successive municipal 
administrations. Initiated under Mayor Antanas Mockus (1994-1997), the program continued under the 
administrations of four mayors up to the present. In the 1993-2007 period, Bogota homicide rates per 100,000 
inhabitants plunged more than 77.5 % (from 80 in 1995 to only 18 in 2007); traffic accidents declined by 50 %; and 
detention rates increased by 400% with no increase in the police force size. The Bogotá success is closely related to 
consistent political commitment sustained across four different administrations. Preventing violence and increasing 
citizen security is a long-term process requiring top government priority. It takes time to build community 
infrastructure, increase institutional capacity, change perceptions of crime and violence among the public and 
attitudes and culture in the responsible institutions. Pivotal elements of this strategy were:
 Control of firearms circulation. Campaigns to promote citizen disarmament such as one that exchanged 
firearms for Christmas gift certificates were carried out. In 2001, around 6,500 firearms were voluntarily 
turned in to the police as a result of the Plan. 
 Control of alcohol consumption. Implementation of the Ley Zanahoria ending alcohol sales at 1:00 a.m. on 
weekends and holidays.
 Development of a good citizen’s culture. Through campaigns such as the massive distribution of citizen 
cards to approve (thumb up) or disapprove (thumb down) behaviors in public areas (parks, streets, etc) and 
the use of mimes to educate drivers to respect traffic signs and to allow citizens to cross streets safely. 
 Establishment of neighborhood crime-monitoring committees (Frentes de Seguridad) to encourage 
collaborative relationships between community police officers and local residents, which have reversed the 
levels of mistrust between police and community, and increase crime prevention efforts.
 Professionalization of the Police. Police reform and modernization came through a plan emphasizing 
results-based performance, and firing of corrupt individuals. An epidemiological approach was introduced 
to monitor crime and violence data, which allowed design of crime prevention actions. Training in 
preventive policing was seen as an efficient alternative to reduce violence and improve coexistence. Not 
surprisingly, the level of public confidence in the police forces rose from 20 % to 60%.
 Establishment of family police stations. These offices provide multiple services to domestic violence victims, 
like protection and conflict resolution (the latter particularly useful to prevent conflicts from turning into 
more serious violence against women and children). The offices provided free services like medical 
screening, psychological counseling, and legal aid. Specific indicators are tracked for gender and domestic 
violence, and are included in national information systems on crime and violence. Police officers are trained 
to handle domestic violence cases.
 Adoption of a unified system on violence and crime. The Sistema Unificado de Información de Violencia y 
Delincuencia (SUIVD) was created to facilitate data comparison with other sources such as the data from 
the Forensic Legal Institute and the Health System.
 Upgrading decayed urban spaces. Two of Bogotá’s most violent areas, Avenida Caracas and the Cartucho 
zone, underwent urban and transport infrastructure renewal. Crime and violence levels declined 
substantially after the infrastructure improvements. Youth cultural and sports programs in high crime areas 
were also implemented.
Source: ALDA, Erick, Buvinic Mayra and Lamas, Jorge (2005), and ACOSTA, Gino, (2007)
40
2.4. REDUCTION IN THE AVAILABILITY AND USE OF FIREARMS 
Youth and gang crime and violence have been increasingly linked with rises in lethal violence committed 
with firearms. Accordingly, USAID should promote measures and targets to reduce the availability of 
firearms. The more guns in circulation, the easier it is to obtain them. Limiting firearms supply reduces 
the number of deaths and injuries they cause. This can be done not only through laws against gun 
trafficking, but also through targeted enforcement to reduce the quantity of illegal firearms. The policies 
and implementation plans could involve patrolling in high crime neighborhoods to confiscate illegal guns, 
an approach that has shown some success in the U.S. In El Salvador the useful experiences on this came 
in Ilopango and San Martin, whose results have been measured by UNDP and brought a 40% reduction in 
firearms homicides in San Martin and in a 50% reduction in other crimes using firearms in Ilopango.50
 
50 UNDP (El Salvador, July 7, 2011), “Siguen las buenas experiencias con vedas de armas”. Press release and UNDP (2007), 
“Living without arms. Evaluation of the Arms-Free Municipalities Project. An Experience in Risk-Taking in a Risky Context” 
http://www.pnud.org.sv/2007/component/option,com_docman/task,cat_view/gid,19/Itemid,56/?mosmsg=Est%E1+intentando
+acceder+desde+un+dominio+no+autorizado.+%28www.google.com%29
BOX 4. THE “ARMS FREE MUNICIPALITIES” PROJECT IN ILOPANGO AND SAN MARTIN, EL SALVADOR 
(2005-2007)
Prohibiting the carrying of firearms can reduce violence. This was proven by an 18-month, US$ 360,000 pilot project in El 
Salvador. The project was implemented in the municipalities of San Martin and Ilopango, two cities north of San Salvador 
with high levels of violent crime. The pilot project purpose was to test the hypothesis that curbing private citizens’ ability to 
carry arms in public would have an impact on violent crime. By focusing on two municipalities, implementing agencies better 
tailored a location-specific approach, concentrated on effective enforcement, and measured impacts with greater accuracy.
Municipal governments played a major implementation role. City councils passed special ordinances that banned firearms 
from any public spaces in the municipality. The National Civil Police enforced the ban, administered fines and confiscated 
weapons. The project established a baseline data on violence statistics and public attitudes, which was used to measure 
project impact; particular attention was paid to its impact on homicide rates in the pilot municipalities. As well, a media 
campaign drew attention to the pilot project and promoted disarmament. The project proved effective in reducing armed 
violence and it has served as a compelling case for more municipalities to follow. 
Main results:
 Numbers of confiscated firearms increased 102% in Ilopango and 69% in San Martin, above the 20% increase goal.
 There was a 91% increase in the proportion of individuals who perceived arms as being dangerous in public places 
and 28% said that they have changed their opinion about the possession and carrying of arms. 
 In San Martín there was a 40% reduction in firearms homicides.
 In Ilopango there was a 50% decrease in other crimes using firearms during the project implementation. 
 The firearms ban was also used in another experience between April and July 2011 in 27 municipalities in El Salvador 
where carrying of arms was prohibited. The results were also positive. After two months, homicides dropped by 12% 
in the areas of prohibition. The number of gun injuries reported by the Police fell by 40% and robbery by 7.1%.
Source: UNDP (El Salvador, July 7, 2011), “Siguen las buenas experiencias con vedas de armas”. Press release and UNDP (2007), “Living 
without arms. Evaluation of the Arms-Free Municipalities Project. An Experience in Risk-Taking in a Risky Context”
http://www.pnud.org.sv/2007/component/option,com_docman/task,cat_view/gid,19/Itemid,56/?mosmsg=Est%E1+intentando+acceder+
desde+un+dominio+no+autorizado.+%28www.google.com%29
41
2.5. PROMOTION OF CHANGE OF CULTURE IN SCHOOLS AND FAMILY 
In Guatemala, international donors should promote a change of culture towards peaceful coexistence 
and non-violent solutions starting with children and family. Persistently high levels of violence in 
Guatemala should make violence prevention and the promotion of a culture of peace a primary target of 
intervention. The logic and the promise of an early start with children and youth in school and 
community settings to create dialogue habits and mastery of methods for conflict prevention, avoidance 
and resolution are compelling. Training courses and workshops in conflict resolution and dialogue among 
students themselves about solutions to their conflicts would be useful in any local initiative. Students 
would be prepared for more effective peace building in the community, taught about how conflicts arise 
and how citizens facing these problems can engage in violence prevention and intervention. 
Leadership training in conciliation and mediation for youth coupled with the creation of formal conflict 
resolution by middle and secondary school students has paid dividends in other countries. Successful 
initiatives have been carried out in Argentina, in Colombia, Puerto Rico and other Latin American 
countries. The possibility of launching such programs on a pilot basis may be easier in smaller towns 
working with public schools at that level. Private and church affiliated schools may be more receptive and 
more likely to afford the chance for early successes for the pilot methodology. There are capabilities in 
civil society to support GOG efforts on this subject (Grupo GAM and others). CSOs highly recommended 
that USAID work with churches. They have numerous followers and could be crucial in a change of 
culture towards peace. 
Media attention can be a powerful tool to curb violence. The public must be alerted to improper 
behaviors by criminal justice officials, or even by individual citizens and the mechanisms to denounce the 
questionable acts. Working with the media at local levels, while linking these endeavors at the regional 
and national levels, should go a long way to reduce violence. Programs must emphasize a change of 
cultural patterns. These programs must be closely coordinated among criminal justice authorities, 
universities, NGOS, and local communities and governments. They should use colloquial language, songs, 
posters and brochures, pre-recorded radio programs, and recorded jingles. Radio campaigns must be 
done in the main indigenous languages, too. RCC found three areas where CSOs considered that USAID 
should promote massive radio campaigns against: a) alcoholism because alcoholism seems to be the 
greatest promoter of violence against women; b) domestic violence; and, c) access to justice (description 
of human rights, criminal justice institutions and how to access justice services) 
National campaigns against violence have proven effective in some countries, but they also require inter￾institutional cooperation of Justice Sector institutions with specialized CSOs to respond to the citizens 
demands based on the campaigns. Therefore such campaigns not only include awareness-raising media 
messages to explain the problem and promote cultural changes, but also training of public officials 
(particularly police forces) to develop skills to understand and assist victims or citizens asking for services. 
42
2.6. SOME IDEAS ON HOW TO WORK BETTER WITH CSOS IN GUATEMALA 
During RCC interviews and focus group with civil society representatives, some ideas emerged on how 
USAID could work better with CSOs. These were: 
 Simplified procedures for CSOs to obtain donations. They are very complicated for grass root 
organizations, small NGOs or regional CSOs. 
 In order to reach broader regions, USAID could finance a main NGO (such as Interpeace, GAM 
and Foro Guatemala) that qualifies to administer USAID grants and could fund and help other 
smaller organizations to carry out projects. It is important to centralize and coordinate efforts 
from Guatemala City and to integrate regional efforts. 
 Strengthening regional and local CSOs is a long-term project that would need continuing funding 
for several years. Therefore, it would be important for USAID to develop a large multi-year grant 
to strengthen civil society organizations in the regions. USAID/Dominican Republic had a good 
experience in this subject where a major reputable university, with administrative capacity, was 
funded for several years to develop and strengthen regional and local NGOs. 
 USAID should canvass for good programs operating and supported in Guatemala by national and 
foreign philanthropic and faith-based groups and contribute to support and expand their services 
and reach to the extent legally possible. Many European and American private and non-profit 
groups work with women in empowerment and violence prevention programs. 
BOX 5. THE SHOP OF MR. JUSTICE, A RADIO JUSTICE EDUCATION CAMPAIGN.
Ten 30-minute radio programs and 15 catchy songs teach vulnerable groups all over Colombia about their 
rights, the available sources of justice to approach, and how to access justice services.
Using colloquial language, familiar slang and local jargon, songs were composed and recorded in a variety of 
typical Colombian musical styles. They described justice institutions such as Justice Houses, Municipal Family 
Offices, prosecutors’ offices, public defenders, police inspection offices, the Solicitor General’s local 
representatives, and how to access justice services. In addition, pre-recorded 30-minute radio programs, with 
dramatizations around “The Shop of Mr. Justice” (“La Tienda de Don Justo”) were produced and distributed on 
CDs to radio stations around the country, and covered topics such as:
General rights: access to justice and mechanisms for protection of fundamental constitutional rights.
a) Right to non-discrimination: the program, based on real cases, analyzes discrimination cases against 
Afro Colombians, indigenous people and how to validate their rights. 
b) Rights of displaced populations: examines the special legislation that protects these groups and 
promotes their inclusion in urban centers. 
c) Rights of young people: promotes the rights established by the new Childhood and Adolescence Code.
d) Women’s rights: programs analyze cases of domestic violence and how to fight against it and sources 
of protection against perpetrators.
The products of this campaign were distributed on CDs among NGOs, justice sector institutions, and Justice 
Houses, and are permanently available on various web-sites. The songs and programs became quite popular 
and were very well received for high technical quality, creativity and the clarity of their messages. The effort 
has caught the attention of thousands of Colombians, and continues to positively advance public knowledge 
and ability to access formal and alternative justice
Source: La TIenda de Don Justo, (Colombia Media Campaign) 
http://www.respondanet.com/index.php?option=com_docman&task=cat_view&gid=69&Itemid=109
43
3. INCREASE INTERNAL ACCOUNTABILITY AND OVERSIGHT WITHIN THE JUSTICE SECTOR
RCC recommends going beyond the scope of PAVIs activities and directly involve reputable Guatemalan 
CSO’s in monitoring the progress of future reform programs. Recommendations appear organized by 
descending order of priority. 
3.1. STRENGTHENING OF EMPIRICAL, PRACTICAL AND APPLIED RESEARCH ON CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE AND VIOLENCE ISSUES 
Guatemala Civil Society organizations and university law faculties are proven sources for practical studies 
in human rights and the criminal justice system, and development of proposals for reform. They can be 
marshaled and enlisted systematically to serve as a crucial resource in pressing the justice system for 
adequate protection of human rights, performing systematic oversight, and recommending operational 
changes and legal and regulatory reforms. CSO’s such as ACCDG, ASIES, Myrna Mack Foundation, ODHAG 
and many others have proven records in serious criminal justice research. 
Funding could be also directed to law faculties and CSO based research projects that would focus on 
criminal justice performance indicators and empirical analysis of judicial decisions to generate reform 
recommendations. Several assessments based on practical information are necessary to really measure 
the performance of the criminal system and its statistics must be better collected, analyzed and 
ultimately used for planning and budgeting. Case studies on the implementation of alternative 
mechanisms by prosecutors are top priority, as well as analysis on the disposition methods of criminal 
cases used by the PNC and MP. 
USAID should award grants for 
production of quarterly reports 
prepared by civil society 
organizations on justice and 
security indicators with baseline 
data to measure progress. 
The promotion of citizens’ oversight 
mechanisms is fundamental to 
strengthen justice sector 
institutions. Vigilant citizens are in 
the best position to monitor justice 
systems. Oversight projects 
focusing on specific aspects of 
justice system operations have 
proven a useful vehicle for 
detecting operational problems and 
pressuring criminal justice 
operators towards improved 
performance. Citizens’ oversight 
projects funded by USAID are an 
important trend starting to produce 
good results in several Latin 
BOX 6. VIOLENCE OBSERVATORY IN HONDURAS
The Observatory of Violence is an initiative of the Peace, Democracy and 
Security Institute (IUDPAS) of National Autonomous University of Honduras 
(UNAH), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Swedish 
International Development Agency (SIDA) that monitors deaths from non￾natural causes and injuries produced by violence acts (abused woman, 
abused child and injuries in general). The sources of the studies are data 
from the General Directorate of Criminal Investigation, the Forensic 
Medicine Institute and Teaching Hospital.
Among the deaths from external causes are homicides, suicides, deaths 
from traffic accidents and accidental deaths (falls, burns, shock, etc.). 
Homicides include all categories of murders and all crime categories defined 
by the criminal justice system when an assailant kills someone else. The 
Violence Observatory purges, classifies and analyzes the information from 
the above sources with a team of technical experts and produce periodic 
reports on its findings.
The Observatory seeks to promote awareness about violence and promote 
in-depth research on the topic. It also aims to provide reliable information 
for decision makers, leaders of public opinion, scholars, researchers, NGO’s, 
international donors and civil society in general.
UNDP: Observatorio de la Violencia, Honduras 
http://www.undp.un.hn/publicaciones_Observatorio_Violencia.htm
44
American countries.51
 Interviewees in Guatemala believed that citizens’ oversight projects in police 
detention centers could improve police behavior, as well as similar projects for juvenile and penitentiary 
centers. ODHAG, with UNICEF support, has carried out such initiatives on the rights of children and 
adolescents and USAID should continue promoting this type of efforts in Guatemala. 
3.2. IMPROVEMENT IN THE QUALITY OF HUMAN RESOURCES IN THE JUSTICE SECTOR 
In order to improve the quality of human resources in the Justice Sector, USAID should: 
 Continue to promote the implementation of the annual judicial evaluation system produced with 
PAVI assistance. Currently, the Judiciary is carrying out an internal campaign to promote it and 
needs relatively modest resources to finance it (US$26,000). Along the same line, support should 
be given to the Judicial School to fully implement the new organization and improvement plan 
(97 actions)). The new organization is based on professional judge profiles developed to respond 
to needs identified by performance evaluation system. 
 Finish the IDPP quality control system for contracted public defenders (abogados de oficio). The 
task was started but not finished under PAVI. In the IDPP, 
 Support IDPP to review its disciplinary procedures to make them more transparent. 
 Promote the passage of the Public Ministry Law to give stability to this institution and continue 
the MP performance evaluation system that now is integrated into SICOMP 2 and has been 
installed in 80% of the prosecution offices in the country. Need to incorporate this into human 
resources strengthening, since a law degree is still the only requisite for hiring (activity financed 
by the Spanish Cooperation but could not be concluded and will end by the end of 2012). 
 Support effort to qualify for International Quality Assurance Certification (ISO 9000) in IDPP and 
the Judicial School. 
4. STRENGTHEN JUSTICE CAPACITY TO COMBAT ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES IN PETÉN
Any future USAID effort in Petén should be accompanied by the commitment of Justice Sector Officials to 
maintain the gains and continue with the good practices developed during the project. PAVI was able to 
produce a limited impact mainly in prosecuting crimes against the environment but there is still a lot to 
achieve. CSOs in the area urged strongly that USAID not abandon Petén, asserting that leaving Petén 
would be a geostrategic mistake for the United States, because more resources will be needed if the 
whole department falls under the control of transnational organized crime. Some possible 
recommendations for the region are: 
 Provide technical assistance in-situ to the local MP Office with long term resident TA. Improvement 
of investigation capacity is urgently needed. Investigations are done badly, evidence is missing and 
investigations are usually very superficial. 
 Assist the courts in conditioning an additional new courtroom for oral hearings. 
 Revive the Justice Center in the region to coordinate efforts among justice officials. 
 Develop a pilot project with an integrated approach to citizen security such as those carried out in 
 
51 A manual (“Justicia para Todos y Todas: Guía práctica para ejercer veedurías en justicia) on how to establish, implement and 
monitor these projects was recently developed in Colombia and tested at Bogotá’s Municipal Family Welfare Offices (Comisarias 
de Familia), the Cartagena Attorney General Office and in Justice Houses. At the end of the oversight process, citizens 
recommended ways to improve attention in sexual abuse and violence against women and children, which were very well 
received by justice officials. A local prosecutor invited citizens to launch a joint campaign against sexual abuse in schools. 
45
Bogota, in Brazil or El Salvador with citizen involvement (see Boxes 3 and 7). Rule of law and 
governance are at serious risk throughout Petén and should be shored up and strengthened. An 
urgent dialogue between civil society and the government in the department must be encouraged 
and supported. Current antagonistic attitudes on both sides are counterproductive for the wellbeing 
of the region. Government needs a profound transformation in the region. It needs to strengthen 
public policy tools and build citizen trust. 
 Carry out studies to understand the causes of violence against women and children in the region to 
define strategies on how to attack the problem. 
 Support the establishment of a local emergency telephone number and inform citizens about it. 
Currently, emergency number 122 is answered in Guatemala City and it takes so long to get help that 
prepaid cell phone cards run out of time. 
 Provide technical support and finance public awareness campaigns informing citizens about their 
rights and how to access justice. Citizens have no awareness of their rights or where to go for help. 
BOX 7. POLICE INNOVATIONS IN BRAZIL IN SAO PAULO AND RIO DE JANEIRO
Sao Paulo
 Design and implementation of INFOCRIM, a geographical-reference crime report system. This is a computerized 
database of more than 300,000 photographs of people wanted by the police or convicted of crimes, including areas of 
action and modes of operation. 
 Creation of Police Homicide Division and Protection of Persons led to investigation and clarification of 60% of 
homicides. 
 Implementation of regulations to reduce the consumption of alcoholic beverages.
 Establishment of Municipal Secretaries of Public Safety to develop and implement Citizen Security Plans. 
Implementation of Community Police (currently there are 63 bases, each with a team of 24 policemen responsible for 
a radius of 2.5 km.). 
 Development of concurrent programs to improve socio-economic indicators: a) investments in health, education, 
culture and recreation - parks, plazas and transportation and, b) prevention programs aimed at reducing lethal 
violence. 
Rio de Janeiro
 Establishment of community policing program began in 2008 with the intent of retaking territory controlled by drug 
traffickers in the slums of Rio de Janeiro. 
 Today it is present in 13 communities through Peace Police Units (UPPS) with the following characteristics: a) 
concentrated in southern Rio de Janeiro; b) in slums with a population of 40,000 residents with limited public access; 
c) participating police have been carefully selected and trained and have a salary incentive; d) command and 
supervision takes place “in situ”, with police facilities in the communities; e) the Program has strong political support 
and, f) it has a marketing and communications strategy that has generated media support.
 This initiative has: a) broken the territorial control by drug traffickers, b) reduced homicide rates, c) improved citizens’ 
perceptions of security (people again can move freely through their communities and have access to transport and 
public services); d) allowed families to visit relatives living in communities formerly controlled by enemy gangs; e) 
increased property values and local economic activity, and, f) promoted among communities the use of legal means 
to resolve conflicts.
Source: FRUHLING, Hugo (September 29, 2010)
46
5. ON FUTURE PROJECT EVALUATIONS
For future projects, in order to facilitate evaluations, RCC recommends that USAID establish a clear set of 
performance and impact indicators from the very beginning of the project. These have to be clearly 
attributable to the project’s efforts and should have a solid baseline from which to measure progress and 
impact. RCC also recommends that future projects should include external mid-term evaluations to allow 
corrective measures when necessary. 
 
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V. BIBLIOGRAPHY
ACOSTA, Gino (2007), La ventana rota y otras formas de luchar contra el crimen, Instituto de Defensa 
Legal, and Open Society Institute, Lima. 
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FINAL DEL 2012”, http://ca-bi.com/blackbox/?p=7256
48
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Guatemala”, Power Point Presentation
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Rule of Law Program (September 2004 to September 2009)”
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Oficial de Guatemala”, http://demi.gob.gt/paginas.asp?id=4254&clc=249 
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con el fin de la violencia”, http://www.elmundo.es/america/2011/09/11/noticias/1315741707.html
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de abuso sexual”, http://www.elsalvadornoticias.net/2012/03/08/corte-suprema-de-justicia-inaugura￾oficina-de-atencion-a-victimas-de-abuso-sexual
FORENSIC MEDICINE INSTITUTE (July 15, 2011), “IML inaugura Unidad de Atención a Víctimas en Crisis”, 
http://www.csj.gob.sv/IML/NOTI_02.html 
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GAM (March 2011), “Linchamientos en Guatemala”, http://linchamientos.blogspot.com/
GAM, USAID, WORLD LUTHERAN FEDERACION (April 15, 2011), “ Recepción de Denuncias de Violaciones 
a los Derechos Humanos , Manual de Procedimientos”, Guatemala. 
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de Violencia contra las Mujeres”
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Denuncias de Violaciones a los Derechos Humanos , Manual de Procedimientos”, Guatemala. 
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Efficiency, Due Process and Access to Justice”.
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http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-2011/guatemala
ICCPG (2007) “Observatorio de Justicia Penal, Primer Informe Guatemala”, IDRC-CRDI Canadá, and The 
Netherlands Cooperation Agency, Guatemala. 
49
IACHR (December 29, 2003) ‘Justicia e inclusión social: Los desafíos de la democracia en Guatemala”,
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Guatemala2003sp/indice.htm
IPSNEWS.NET (January 31, 2012), “Guatemala Heeds the Cries of Femicide Victims”
http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/01/guatemala-heeds-the-cries-of-femicide-victims/ 
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http://www.prisonstudies.org/info/worldbrief/wpb_country.php?country=81
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America Report No. 39. 
KARP, Anne (2008). “Estimated firearms distribution in 27 Latin America and Caribbean countries 2007”. 
Unpublished background data. Geneva: Small Arms Survey 
KEPFER, Rodolfo and others (2007), “Análisis Criminálistico de los Homicidios de las Mujeres en Guatemala”, Centro de Análisis 
Forense y Ciencias Aplicadas, sponsored by OXFAM United Kingdom, http://www.sobrevivientes.org/.../Inf_Homicidios Mujeres 
Guatemala.pdf
LA HORA, (November 28, 2012), “El Centro Administrativo de Gestion Penal es el primer eslabón del 
secuestro del sistema judicial” http://www.lahora.com.gt/index.php/nacional/guatemala/reportages-y￾entrevistas/169401-el-centro-administrativo-de-gestion-penal-es-el-primer-eslabon-del-secuestro-del￾sistema-judicial
LA PRENSA LIBRE (August 8, 2010),” CSJ Reubicará a 182 Empleados de Juzgados Penales de Turno”, 
http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/justicia/Juzgados_de_turno_0_313768853.html
LA PRENSA LIBRE (February 9, 2011),”G-4 declina de continuar como garante del Acuerdo de 
Seguridad”, http://www.prensalibre.com/noticias/justicia/G-4-continuar-garantes-Acuerdo￾Seguridad_0_328167433.html
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Guatemala 2010, Americas Barometer. 
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Ministerio Publico, Fiscalía de delitos contra la vida”, UNDP, ICCO. 
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Suprema de Justicia. Periodo Octubre 2009 a Octubre 2012”, Guatemala.
50
PASARA, LUIS (September 2012),” International Support for Justice Reform in Latin America: 
Worthwhile or Worthless”, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. 
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Victimas”, Guatemala.
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PRESIDENCIA DE LA REPUBLICA, “Proyecto de Reforma de la Constitución Política de la República de 
Guatemala”.
 
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for Peace and Human Progress 
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Policies, Woodrow Wilson Center, Latin American Program, Citizen Security No. 6 
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 Report No. 2 - November to December 2009 
 Report No. 3 - January to March 2010 
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 Report No. 5 - July to September 2010 
 Report No. 6 - October to December 2010 
 Report No. 7 - January to March 2011 
 Report No. 8 - April to June 2011 
 Report No. 9 - July to Sept 2011 
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51
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58
ANNEX 2: DATA COLLECTION ANALYSIS TOOLS
1.GUIDES OF DISCUSSION FOR FOCUS GROUPS
GUIDE OF DISCUSSION FOCUS GROUP NO. 1: Criminal Justice Reform, 24-hour courts and High Risk 
Courts with judges and Judiciary officials 
I. 24-hour Courts 
1. Which are the main achievements of the 24-hour Courts? 
2. Which are the current challenges? 
3. What do you need to perform better? 
II. High Impact Courts 
4. Which are the main achievements of the High Impact Courts? 
5. Which are the current challenges? 
6. What do you need to perform better? 
III. Criminal Procedures Reform 
7. Has it made a difference? 
8. Which are the current challenges? 
9. How do you rate the Police performance? 
10. How do you rate the MP performance? 
11. Has the CICIG been useful? 
GUIDE OF DISCUSSION FOCUS GROUP NO. 2. Mobilization of Justice sector and Civil Society to reduce 
and prevent violence with civil society organizations 
1. Which are the main lines of work of your organization? 
2. What was your relation with PAVI? 
3. Which are the current main areas of concern among civil society organizations working in justice and 
security issues? 
4. In which type of initiative is your organization interested in participating? 
5. Which are the most effective ways international donors may support civil society organizations in 
justice reform and security issues? 
6. Are there relevant examples of grants provided to civil society organizations in justice and security 
reform that have produced successful results? 
7. Which are the main deficiencies in the Justice Sector that produce impunity? Have there been efforts 
from the Judiciary or the MP to improve the situation? 
8. Which is the role of civil society organizations in the protection of victims of violence? 
9. Are there any local initiatives to improve citizens’ security that have been successful? 
10. What is your position towards the Constitutional Reforms presented to Congress to change the 
appointment of appellate and Supreme Court Judges? 
GUIDE OF DISCUSSION FOCUS GROUP NO. 3: Increased internal accountability and oversight in the 
Justice Sector with Judiciary officials 
59
1. Which have been the main achievements of the current Judicial Career? Which are the main 
problems? 
2. Which are the main benefits of the annual performance evaluation designed with PAVI support? 
3. What were the main achievements of the reorganization of the Judicial School? 
4. What is your position towards the Constitutional Reforms presented to Congress to change the 
appointment of appellate and Supreme Court Judges? 
5. Do you know if the alternative proposal to the Constitutional Reforms presented by the Supreme 
Court was produced by consensus within the Judiciary? 
6. Do you know if the majority of the judges are in favor of the proposed reforms by the Court and 
the Executive? 
7. If the Constitutional Reforms are not approved, is there any other way to change the selection of 
appellate judges by an ordinary law? For example reforming the Judicial Career Law? 
8. Is there any way of promoting training of appellate judges? 
FOCUS GROUP NO 4. Justice sector officials and civil society in Petén involved in PAVI activities 
1. What are the main functions of your organization/office? 
2. What kind of support did you receive from PAVI? 
3. How would you rate that support? 
4. How did PAVI contribute to your initiatives? 
5. What is pending? 
6. What type of support from USAID would be of benefit to your organization/office? 
GUIDE OF DISCUSSION FOCUS GROUP NO. 5. Victims of violence in Petén 
1. Are you familiar with the PAVI program? 
2. Where did you go first to seek help? Why? 
3. How did you reach the MP Office of Assistance to Victims? 
4. What kind of services did you receive at the MP Office of Assistance to Victims? 
5. How would you rate that service? What did it mean to you? 
6. How familiar were you with your rights and the services available? 
7. How did your legal case proceed? 
8. How satisfied are you with your experience with the judicial system? 
9. What could be improved? 
2.CUESTIONARIO DE EVALUACION DEL PROYECTO PAVI DE USAID
1. Marque la institución a la que pertenece: 
___O. Judicial 
___M. Público 
___Instituto de la Defensa Pública Penal 
___INACIF 
___Sociedad Civil 
60
___Otro. Indicar_______________________ 
2. Cuál ha sido su relación con el Programa contra la Violencia e Impunidad en Guatemala, en adelante 
“PAVI”, financiado por USAID?
___Participante en eventos de capacitación 
___Participante en eventos de información 
___Receptor de asesoría técnica 
___Consultor 
___Otra.___________________________________________________________ 
3. En su opinión, de la siguiente lista, cuáles han sido las cinco principales contribuciones del PAVI al 
Estado de Derecho y Sector Justicia en Guatemala? Por favor enumerarlas en orden de importancia. 
Primero la más importante. 
___Mejorar institucional del MP para procesar crímenes serios, principalmente contra la vida 
___Apoyar en el establecimiento y funcionamiento de juzgados de 24 horas 
___Fortalecer el INACIP 
___Apoyar en la preparación e implementación de leyes contra el crimen organizado 
___Apoyar a que exista mayor disponibilidad y calidad de servicios gratuitos para 
 víctimas de delitos 
___Apoyar el establecimiento de Tribunales de Alto Impacto 
___Ayudar al MP a procesar crímenes contra el ambiente, la herencia cultura y contra la 
 vida en Petén 
___No sabe/No responde 
4. Conoce usted el trabajo que realiza la Oficina de Análisis del Ministerio Público? 
___Sí (pase a pregunta siguiente) 
___No (pase a la pregunta No. 6) 
___No sabe/No responde (pase a la pregunta No. 6) 
5. Si su respuesta es afirmativa, cree usted que la labor de esta Unidad: 
___Ayuda a esclarecer crímenes contra la vida (favor explique abajo) 
___No ayuda a esclarecer dichos crímenes. (favor explique abajo) 
Explicación _______________________________________________________________ 
6. Cómo es la disponibilidad y calidad de servicios de protección a víctimas en el Instituto de la Defensa 
Pública Penal? 
___Buena (favor explique abajo) 
___Mala (favor explique abajo) 
___Regular (favor explique abajo) 
___No sabe/No responde. 
Explicación_____________________ 
7. Cómo es la disponibilidad y calidad de servicios de protección a víctimas en el Ministerio Público? 
___Buena (favor explique abajo) 
___Mala (favor explique abajo) 
___Regular (favor explique abajo) 
___No sabe/No responde. 
Explicación_____________________ 
61
8. Cómo es la disponibilidad y calidad de servicios de protección a víctimas en la Policía Nacional Civil? 
___Buena (favor explique abajo) 
___Mala (favor explique abajo) 
___Regular (favor explique abajo) 
___No sabe/No responde. 
Explicación_____________________ 
9. Cree que el PAVI ayudó a mejorar la disponibilidad y calidad de los servicios de atención a víctimas de 
violencia? 
____Sí (favor explique abajo) 
____No (favor explique abajo) 
____No sabe/No responde. 
Explicación____________________________________________________________________ 
10. En que tres áreas debería USAID enfocar esfuerzos para futuros programas? Escoja de la lista 
siguiente por orden de importancia (1 es el área más prioritaria). Agregue otras áreas si sus tres 
prioridades no están reflejadas en la lista siguiente. 
___Mejorar la capacidad el sistema para procesar crímenes serios 
___Apoyar el establecimiento de Juzgados de 24 horas 
___Fortalecer al INACIP 
___Apoyar en la preparación e implementación de leyes contra el crimen organizado 
___Apoyar a que exista mayor disponibilidad y calidad de servicios gratuitos para víctimas 
___Apoyar el funcionamiento de los Tribunales de Alto Riesgo 
___Apoyare los centros de justicia 
___Ayudar al MP a procesar crímenes contra el ambiente, la herencia cultural y contra la vida en 
 Petén 
___Movilizar al Sector Justicia y a la sociedad civil a reducir y prevenir la violencia 
___Incrementar la transparencia del sector justicia, en cuanto a nombramiento, ascenso 
 y remoción de funcionarios. 
Otras___________________________________________________________________________ 
11. Conoce usted de otros donantes internacionales que estén apoyando al Sector? 
___Sí 
___No (pase a la pregunta No. 17) 
___No sabe/No responde (pase a la pregunta No. 17) 
12. Si su respuesta es afirmativa, cuáles tres programas de los donantes internacionales, incluyendo 
USAID, han sido, en los últimos los tres años, los más exitosos? Comience por el que considera más 
importante. 
1._____________________________________________________________________________ 
2.______________________________________________________________________________ 
3._____________________________________________________________________________ 
13. Cómo ha sido la coordinación entre donantes internacionales y USAID? 
___Buena 
___Mala (pasar a pregunta No. 15) 
___Regular (pasar a pregunta No. 15) 
62
___No sabe/No responde (pasar a pregunta No. 16) 
14. Si su respuesta fue “buena”, por qué cree que la coordinación entre donantes funcionó?
Explicación______________________________________________________________________ 
15. Si su respuesta es” mala” o “regular”, en qué forma puede mejorarse? Si su respuesta fue “buena” 
pasa a la pregunta siguiente. 
Explicación____________________________________________________________________ 
16. Cómo califica usted la labor de coordinación de donantes hecha por el Gobierno de Guatemala? 
Explicar su respuesta 
___Buena 
___Regular 
___Mala 
___No sabe/No responde. 
Explicación____________________________________________________________________ 
17. Desde 2009, cree usted que los sistemas de selección, nombramiento y promoción de jueces y de paz 
y primera instancia han mejorado? 
___Sí 
___No (pasar a pregunta No. 21) 
___No sabe/ no responde (pasar a pregunta No. 21). 
18. Desde 2009, cree usted que los sistemas de selección, nombramiento y promoción de defensores 
públicos han mejorado? 
___Sí 
___No (pasar a pregunta No. 21) 
___No sabe/ no responde (pasar a pregunta No. 21). 
19. Si su respuesta fue afirmativa respecto de los jueces, cuales fueron tres los principales logros en este 
campo respecto de los jueces ? Marcar por orden de importancia, (“1” es el más importante, etc.).
___Nombrar a personal más capacitado 
___Reducir las influencias ajenas en el nombramiento del personal 
___Evitar la corrupción 
___Promover la confianza en el sistema de justicia 
___Otros (enumerar)__________________________________________________________ 
20. Si su respuesta fue afirmativa respecto de los defensores públicos, cuales fueron tres los principales 
logros en este campo respecto de los jueces ? Marcar por orden de importancia, (“1” es el más 
importante, etc.). 
___Nombrar a personal más capacitado 
___Reducir las influencias ajenas en el nombramiento del personal 
___Evitar la corrupción 
___Promover la confianza en el sistema de justicia 
___Otros (enumerar)__________________________________________________________ 
63
21. Qué opinión tiene de los Tribunales de Competencia Ampliada, conocidos como “Tribunales de Alto 
Riesgo”? Marque los que considere pertinentes por orden de importancia, (“1” es lo más importante, 
etc.). 
____Han ayudado a procesar crímenes serios (crimen organizado, narcotráfico, pandillas, etc.) 
____Les falta mucho para ser efectivos 
___ Ofrecen mejor seguridad para funcionarios judiciales y partes del conflicto 
____Otra, indicar__________________________________________________________________ 
22. Conoce usted de los nuevos protocolos de seguridad y protección instalados en los Tribunales de Alto 
Riesgo”?
___Sí 
___No (pasar a pregunta No. 24) 
___No sabe no responde (pasar a pregunta No. 24) 
23. Si su respuesta fue afirmativa, cree usted que estos protocolos han contribuido a mejorar el acceso a 
un juicio justo? 
___Sí (favor explique abajo) 
___No (favor explique abajo) 
___No sabe/ No responde. 
 Explicación:_________________________________________________________________ 
24. Conoce usted de las actividades del PAVI en el Petén? 
___Sí 
___No (aquí finaliza su cuestionario) 
___No sabe/No responde (aquí finaliza su cuestionario) 
25. Cree usted que en Peten, PAVI ha ayudado a mejorar a enjuiciar los crímenes contra el ambiente? 
___Sí (favor explique ) 
 ___No (favor explique) 
___No sabe/ No responde. 
Explicación__________________________________________________________________ 
26. Cree usted que en Peten, PAVI ha ayudado a mejorar a enjuiciar los crímenes contra la herencia 
cultural? 
___Sí (favor explique abajo) 
 ___No (favor explique abajo) 
___No sabe/ No responde. 
Explicación__________________________________________________________________ 
27. Cree usted que en Peten, PAVI ha ayudado a mejorar a enjuiciar los crímenes contra la vida? 
___Sí (favor explique abajo) 
___No (favor explique) 
___No sabe/ No responde. 
Explicación____________________________________________________________________ 
64
ANNEX 3: RCC FINAL WORK PLAN
Work Plan submitted to USAID/Guatemala
for the Performance Evaluation of the 
Program against Violence and Impunity (PAVI)
SOL 520-12-000012 
 
Prepared by
Rivera-Cira Consulting, Inc. (RCC)
6227 30th Street N.W.
Washington, DC 20015
(202) 966-0618
DUNS # 36409295
CCR CAGE Code: 60H69
Contact Person: Carl A. Cira
cirarivera@yahoo.com
November 7, 2012
 
 
 
65
Table of Contents
A. Document review and entrance briefing meetings with USAID/Guatemala and Tetra Tech 
DPK .................................................................................................................................. 66
B. RCC evaluation team ..................................................................................................... 66
C. Persons to be interviewed ............................................................................................. 66
I. JUDICIARY ................................................................................................................................. 67
II. IDPP - Criminal Public Defense Institute .................................................................................... 67
III. PUBLIC MINISTRY ................................................................................................................... 67
IV. NATIONAL CIVILIAN POLICE ..................................................................................................... 68
V. CICIG ....................................................................................................................................... 68
VI. CIVIL SOCIETY......................................................................................................................... 68
Vii. INACIF ................................................................................................................................... 69
Viii. INTERNATIONAL DONORS ..................................................................................................... 69
IX. USAID Implementing CONTRACTORs ....................................................................................... 69
D. Focus groups ................................................................................................................ 69
E. Visit to Peten ................................................................................................................ 71
F. Collection of statistical data and any other documents relevant to the evaluation ......... 71
G. Presentation of preliminary findings ............................................................................. 72
H. Report preparation and deliverY ................................................................................... 72
I. Workshop For final discussion of findings ....................................................................... 72
J. Tentative Schedule ........................................................................................................ 73
ANNEX I- OVERALL RCC APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY ................................................. 76
66
According to the Purchase Order No.AID-520-O-13-00002 of October 23, 2012, RCC presents the 
following detailed Work Plan for USAID/Guatemala approval. 
A. DOCUMENT REVIEW AND ENTRANCE BRIEFING MEETINGS WITH 
USAID/GUATEMALA AND TETRA TECH DPK
During the week of October 22 to 26, 2012, RCC reviewed the documents submitted by 
USAID/Guatemala and other relevant background documents, including: 
 USAID/Guatemala Contract with Tetra Tech DPK, mainly scope of work 
 12 Quarterly reports submitted by DPK 
 PAVI Monitoring and Evaluation Reports by Partnership for Democratic Change for DPK 
 DPK PAVI Final Report 
 LAPOP Political Culture of Democracy in Guatemala 2010 
 Checchi Final Report on the Rule of Law Program 2004-2009 
On November 29, RCC had introductory briefing meetings with USAID and Tetra Tech DPK to 
review and detail the scope and methodology of the evaluation, an overview of PAVI, and get a 
more complete list of persons to be interviewed. 
The RCC Evaluation Methodology is attached to this Work plan as ANNEX I. 
B. RCC EVALUATION TEAM
RCC will carry out this evaluation using three seasoned Latin America Rule of Law experts, Carl A. 
Cira, Team Leader, Tirza Rivera-Cira, Technical Director, and Olga Nazario, Senior Criminal Justice 
and Civil Society Specialist. Wolfgang Ochaeta, a Guatemalan evaluation consultant with 
experience in development projects, will assist with local coordination for the evaluation team, 
focus group management, and processing of statistical data and questionnaires, and in providing 
guidance on the country’s political context. Cira and Rivera-Cira will be in Guatemala for a total 
of 4 weeks in two visits, one visit of three weeks to collect the information (Oct. 28 - Nov. 16) 
and one visit of one week (Dec. 9 -14) to organize and carry out the workshop to discuss 
findings. Nazario will be in the country for a total of three weeks and will make two visits. The 
first visit would be for two weeks (Nov. 4-16) and the second for the final workshop (Dec. 9 -14). 
C. PERSONS TO BE INTERVIEWED
After conversations with USAID/Guatemala and Tetra Tech DPK the following list of possible 
persons to be interviewed was prepared. Interviews will be carried out by RCC from October 30 
to November 16, 2012 and will be coordinated by RCC’s local consultant. 
67
I. JUDICIARY
JUDGES 
 Former and New Presidents of the Supreme Court (Thelma Esperanza Aldana and Gabriel 
Medrano) 
 Members of the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court (Cesar Barrientos, Gustavo 
Mendizabal, Hector Maldonado, Gustavo Bonilla) 
 Patricia Flores, Jazmin Galvez, Judges High-Impact Courts 
 Mynor Franco, Supreme Court Judge 
 Carlos Aguilar, President of the Judges Association 
TECHNICAL PERSONNEL 
 Manuel Garcia, Human Resources Manager 
 Yuri Búcaro, Judicial Career Council 
 Alvaro Dubón, General Manager 
 Marisa Sucely Moran Martinez, Judiciary, III Official, Hearings 
 Ericka López y López, Judiciary, Centro Nacional de Análisis y Documentación Judicial
 Benjamin Dominguez Hernandez, Judiciary, IT Center 
 Kelman Adalberto Martinez, Judiciary, Official, Performance Evaluation Unit 
 Reyna Elizabeth Solares Salazar, Judiciary, Technician, Performance Evaluation Unit 
 Ángela Consuelo Estrada Espino, Judiciary, Court Officer, Escuintla 
 Pablo Josue Estrada Letona, Judiciary, Performance Evaluation Unit 
 Claudia Zamora de Aguilar, Judiciary, Technical Support Unit, Criminal Chamber 
 Vladimir Aguilera, Director, Judicial School 
 Veronica Herrera, Academic Coordinator, Judicial School 
 II. IDPP - CRIMINAL PUBLIC DEFENSE INSTITUTE
 Blanca Aida Stalling, Director General 
 Sandra López (Attention to Victims) IDPP, Instituto Defensa Pública Penal 
 Aurora Aguilar, IDPP 
III. PUBLIC MINISTRY
PROSECUTORS 
 Claudia Paz y Paz, Attorney General and Head of the Public Ministry 
 Alejandro Rodriguez, Public Ministry Secretary of Criminal Policy 
 Hugo Rosales, Litigation Unit , Crimes against Life 
 Rubi Monzón, Crimes against Life 
 Arturo Aguilar, Quezaltenango Model prosecutor’s office
 Ricardo Guzman, General Secretariat, ex -Prosecutor of crimes against life 
 Francisco Solórzano, Director, Analysis Unit 
68
TECHNICAL PERSONNEL 
 Luis Ramirez, Criminal Policy Advisor 
 Ing. Carlos Quintana, Chief, SICOMP 
 Dinora Morales, Coordinator, Victim Assistance Referral Services 
 Ingrid Xuc, Analysis Unit, 
 Mario Garcia Morales, Analysis Unit 
 IV. NATIONAL CIVILIAN POLICE
 Adela Camacho de Torrebiarte, Commissioner, National Civilian Police Reform 
Commission 
 Ms. Tania Pineda, Director, OAV Coordination Department, PCN (Offices in El Progreso, 
Alta Verapaz, Petén and Chimaltenango) 
 Office of Victims’ Attention (OVA) in Petén
 Patricia Portillo, National Civilian Police, Victim Assistance Office 
 V. CICIG
 Francisco Dall’Anese, Commissioner 
 Aníbal Gutierrez, Political Advisor 
VI. CIVIL SOCIETY
 Pro-Justice Movement (Eleonora Muralles, Ana Maria Klein, Carmen Aida Ibarra, 
Veronica Godoy, Helen Mack) 
 Familiares y Amigos contra la Delincuencia y el Secuestro (FADS) (Margarita Castillo) 
 Mutual Support Group (GAM) Mario Polanco 
 Grupo Guatemalteco de Mujeres (Karla Lemus)
 Fundación Guatemala (Mobile Human Rights Units) (Maite Rodriguez)
 Fundación Sobrevivientes (Victims assistance) (Norma Cruz) 
 Barbara Ford Foundation (Virginia Searing) 
 Alta Verapaz Justice Association (María Elvira Yat) 
 Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales- ASIES- (Carmen María Colmenares) 
 Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales (Juan José Hernández) 
 Colegio de Abogados (Freddy Cabrera and Mayra Veliz) 
 Guatemaltecos Extraordinarios (Miguel Ángel Gálvez) 
 Balam Association, Petén
 Environmental Justice Forum, Petén 
 Group of Crime Victims – organized by Victims Attention Office, Ministerio Público, 
Petén 
 ACOPAF, Asociación de Comunidades Forestales de Peten
 Social Pastoral Office of the Apostolic Vicar in Petén
69
 Universidad del Valle, Depto. de Investigaciones (Claudia Maselli, Claudia Veliz, Mónica
Stein)
 Universidad Rafael Landivar, Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas and 
 Instituto de Transformación de Conflictos para la Construcción de la Paz
 Universidad Francisco Marroquín, Facultad de Derecho 
 Universidad de San Carlos, Facultad de Ciencias Jurídicas y Sociales 
 Instituto Centroamericano de Estudios para la Democracia Social –DEMOS. 
 VII. INACIF
 Jorge Cabrera Cabrera, Director 
 Ivonne Mata, International Cooperation 
 Dr. Rodas, Advisor 
VIII. INTERNATIONAL DONORS
 US Embassy Officers (CARSI GROUP) 
 European Union Representatives (Jennifer Echeverría- Yolanda Pérez Ruiz) 
 Spanish International Cooperation Representatives (David Montesinos, Vicky Godoy, 
Marlon García) 
 USAID officials related to PAVI; Marco Antonio Canteo, Brendan Halloran, Sara Werth, 
Cassandra Wheeler, Lucia Salazar, Thomas DiVincenzo) 
IX. USAID IMPLEMENTING CONTRACTORS
 Tetra Tech DPK, Chief of Party and other team members or consultants. (Alicia Warde) 
 Checchi and Company, Alvaro Ferrandino (Chief of Party, Justice and Security Project) 
D. FOCUS GROUPS 
After initial conversations with USAID/Guatemala and Tetra Tech DPK and taking into 
consideration time limitations of several justice officers, RCC redefined the focus groups as 
follows: (There may be additional names added to all focus groups) 
 Focus Group No. 1 - Support to High Impact Courts and 24 hour-Courts
Location: Guatemala City, Date: November 5 
Time: 9:30 a.m. to 11 a.m. 
Wendy Maldonado, Judiciary Advisor 
Miguel Angel Gálvez (High Impact Court Judge) 
Jazmín Barrios (High Impact Court Judge) 
Jorge Almengor, Judge 24-hour Court Mixco 
70
Gabriel García, Sentencing Court Mixco 
Cesar Ernesto Mazariegos, 24-hour Court Secretary 
Saúl Estuardo Pensamiento, Official, 24-hour Court, Mixco 
Darwin Porras, Judge 24-hour Court Villa Nueva 
Sergio Mena, Judge 24 hour Court Villa Nueva 
Claudia Zamora, Technical Unit, Criminal Chamber, Supreme Court 
 Focus Group No. 2: Improvement in capacity to prosecute serious crimes
Location: Guatemala City, Date: November 8 
Time: 8:00 p.m. to 10:00 a.m. 
Alejandro Rodriguez, Secretary of Criminal Policy, Public Ministry 
Hugo Rosales, Prosecutor, Litigation Unit, Crimes against Life 
Rubí Monzón, Prosecutor, Crimes against Life 
Dinora Morales, Victims Attention Office 
Arturo Aguilar, Quetzaltenango Judicial Center, Model Prosecutor’s Office
Ricardo Guzman, General Secretariat, ex-Prosecutor of crimes against life 
Francisco Solórzano, Director, Analysis Unit 
Ingrid Xuc, Analysis Unit 
Luis Ramirez, Advisor Public Ministry, Criminal Policy. 
 Focus Group No. 3 - Mobilization of justice sector and civil society to reduce and prevent 
violence. 
Location: Guatemala City, Date: November 7 
Time: 2:00 p.m. to 5 p.m. 
Pro-Justice Movement (Eleonora Muralles, Ana María Klein, Carmen Aida Ibarra, Verónica 
Godoy, Helen Mack) 
Familiares y Amigos contra la Delincuencia y el Secuestro (FADS) (Ana María de 
Mutual Support Group (GAM) Mario Polanco 
Grupo Guatemalteco de Mujeres (Karla Lemus) 
Fundación Guatemala (Mobile Human Rights Units) (Maite Rodriguez) 
Fundación Sobrevivientes (Victims assistance) (Norma Cruz) 
Barbara Ford Foundation (Virginia Searing) 
Alta Verapaz Justice Association (María Elvira Yat) 
Asociación de Investigación y Estudios Sociales- ASIES- (Carmen María Colmenares) 
Instituto de Estudios Comparados en Ciencias Penales (Juan José Hernández) 
Colegio de Abogados (Freddy Cabrera and Mayra Veliz) 
Guatemaltecos Extraordinarios (Miguel Ángel Gálvez) 
Sandra López (Attention to Victims) IDPP, Instituto Defensa Pública Penal 
Aurora Aguilar, IDPP 
 Focus Group No. 4 - Increased internal accountability and oversight in the Justice Sector. 
Location: Guatemala City, Date: November 9 
71
Time: 9:00 a.m. to 11:00 a.m. 
Mynor Franco, Supreme Court Judge, liaison with Judicial Career Council 
Yuri Búcaro, Consejo Carrera Judicial 
Manuel García, Human Resources Manager 
Giovanna Rodas, Human Resources, Positions and Salaries Unit. 
Vladimir Aguilar, Director, Judicial School 
Veronica Herrera, Academic Coordinator, Judicial School 
Reyna Elizabeth Solares Salazar, Judiciary, Technician, Performance Evaluation Unit 
Monica Stein, Dean, Education Faculty, Universidad del Valle 
Andres Galvez, Center for Education Research, Universidad del Valle 
Claudia Veliz, Center for Education Research, Universidad del Valle 
Claudia Masselli, Consultant, Center for Education Research, Universidad del Valle 
 Focus Group No. 5 - Strengthening justice capacity to combat illegal activities in Petén 
 Location: Ciudad Flores, Petén, Date: November 13 
 Time: 9 a.m. to 12 noon 
Sonia Toledo, Judge, Sentencing and Environmental Crimes Court 
Jaime Huinac, District Prosecutor, Public Ministry 
Lucia Ortiz, Public Ministry, Attention to Victims Office 
Pilar Montejo, Advisor National Council of Protected Areas 
Oscar Quisquinay, Petén Social Pastoral Office of the Apostolic Vicar 
Byron Castellanos, Balam Association 
Abel Santos Calas, Environmental Justice Forum 
Julio Morales Cancino, Environmental Justice Forum 
Representatives, ACOPAF, Asociación de Comunidades Forestales de Peten 
E. VISIT TO PETEN
RCC visit to Petén to interview persons and carry out the focus groups will take place from 
November 11 to November 14. Olga Nazario and our local consultant, Wolfgang Ochaeta will 
travel to Petén. 
F. COLLECTION OF STATISTICAL DATA AND ANY OTHER DOCUMENTS RELEVANT TO 
THE EVALUATION
During the three first weeks in Guatemala, the RCC team will collect all available numeric 
information and any other documents provided by the persons interviewed that could be 
relevant for this evaluation. This collection of information will include any relevant document 
prepared by civil society organizations. 
72
G. PRESENTATION OF PRELIMINARY FINDINGS
On November 14, RCC will send an executive summary of preliminary findings (3-4 pages with 
bullets) and discuss with USAID/Guatemala representatives on November 15. At this meeting 
RCC will also submit an outline for the report to be written (maximum 40 pages). The final report 
will be divided as follows: 
 Executive Summary in English and in Spanish 
 Background on Development Problem and USAID Response 
 Purpose of the Evaluation 
 Research Design and Methodology 
 Principal Findings on PAVI 
 Recommendations for future programming 
 Bibliography 
 Appendices (not included in page limit) Scope of work, final work plan, data collection 
analysis tools, list of persons interviewed and Focus Group participants, and, if necessary, a 
statement of any unresolved differences of opinion by USAID. 
H. REPORT PREPARATION AND DELIVERY
During the ensuing two weeks, RCC will analyze the compiled information and write a draft 
report to USAID/Guatemala to be delivered no later than November 30, 2012. USAID will have a 
five (5) business day minimum to review the document and present observations to RCC no later 
than December 7. Once USAID observations are received, RCC will incorporate them into the 
final document, which will be delivered no later than December 21, 2012. 
I. WORKSHOP FOR FINAL DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS
While USAID is reviewing RCC’s proposed final report, RCC will start preparations for the 
workshop for discussion of findings with USAID/Guatemala and US Embassy Guatemala 
representatives, as well as other international donors, justice sector authorities and civil society 
representatives. The workshop will take place in Guatemala City at a situs to be provided by 
USAID, on Thursday, December 13, 2012 in the afternoon. RCC will prepare a power point 
presentation for the event. Copies of the Power Point Presentation and an executive summary of 
the evaluation will be distributed among the participants prior USAID/Guatemala approval. On 
December 11, RCC consultants will request a meeting with USAID to review the presentation to 
be distributed as well as the executive summary. 
The persons to be invited to final workshop will be agreed with USAID. 
 
73
G. TENTATIVE SCHEDULE 
Task Place Responsible Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Week 7 Week 8 Week 9
Oct 22 
Oct 26
Oct 29
Nov 3
Nov 5
Nov 10
Nov 12-
Nov16
Nov 19 
Nov 23
Nov 26 
Nov 30
Dec 3 
Dec 7
Dec 10
Dec 14
Dec 17
Dec 21
1. Prepare final 
work plan DC
Cira & 
Rivera-Cira
2. Meetings with 
Tetra Tech DPK 
staff (Oct. 29-31) Guat
Cira & 
Rivera-Cira
2. Entrance 
Briefing (Nov. 1) Guat.
Cira, Rivera￾Cira, USAID
3. Review work 
plan with USAID 
(Nov. 1) Guat.
Cira, Rivera￾Cira, USAID
3. Document 
review
DC & 
Miami
Cira, Rivera￾Cira, 
Nazario
4. Review persons 
to be interviewed Guat.
Cira, Rivera￾Cira/ USAID
5. Select focus 
groups persons & 
obtain 
permissions to 
attend Guat.
Cira, Rivera￾Cira/USAID
6. Contact and 
schedule persons 
to be interviewed Guat. Ochaeta
7. Contact persons 
and schedule 
focus groups Guat. Ochaeta
74
9. Collect numeric 
data in Guatemala Guat
Cira, Rivera￾Cira, 
Nazario, 
Ochaeta
Task Place Responsible Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Week 7 Week 8 Week 9 Week 10
Oct 22 
Oct 26
Oct 29
Nov 3
Nov 5
Nov 10
Nov 12-
Nov 16
Nov 19 
Nov 23
Nov 26 
Nov 30
Dec 3 
Dec 7
Dec 10
Dec 14
Dec 17
Dec 21
10. Conduct focus 
groups in 
Guatemala City 
(Nov 5-9) Guat
Cira, Rivera￾Cira, 
Nazario
11. Interview key 
persons and carry 
out in-situ visits 
Guatemala City Guat
Cira, Rivera￾Cira, 
Nazario & 
Ochaeta
12. Visit Flores 
Petén - Interviews 
and focus group 
(Nov 12-14) Focus 
group on Nov. 12
Guat
Nazario￾Ochaeta
13. Prepare short 
summary of 
findings, deliver to 
USAID - Nov 14 Guat
Cira, Rivera￾Cira & 
Nazario
14. Debrief USAID 
on findings - Nov. 
15 Guat
Cira, Rivera￾Cira & 
Nazario
15. Analyze 
information 
Guat& 
DC
Cira & 
Rivera-Cira
16. Draft report DC
Cira & 
Rivera-Cira
75
17. Deliver report 
to USAID Nov. 30 DC
Cira & 
Rivera-Cira
18. USAID Review 
of report Nov-30-
Dec 7 Guat USAID
19. Add USAID 
recommendations DC
Cira & 
Rivera-Cira
Task Place Responsible Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Week 6 Week 7 Week 8 Week 9 Week 10
Oct 22 
Oct 26
Oct 29
Nov 3
Nov 5
Nov 10
Nov 12-
Nov 16
Nov 19 
Nov 23
Nov 26 
Nov 30
Dec 3 
Dec 7
Dec 10
Dec 14
Dec 17
Dec 21
20. Define invitees 
to workshop on 
final discussion of 
findings
DC
& 
Guat
Cira, Rivera￾Cira & 
USAID
21. Prepare 
workshop Guat Ochaeta
22. Carry out 
workshop 
(December 13) Guat
Cira , Rivera￾Cira, 
Nazario & 
Ochaeta
23. Deliver final 
report to USAID 
(December 21) DC
Cira & 
Rivera-Cira
76
ANNEX I TO WORK PLAN- OVERALL RCC APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY
RCC will follow a participatory approach as much as possible, seeking to engage persons that 
know about PAVI. RCC considers that all stakeholders in a project are experts to a certain 
extent, with important knowledge and perspectives to be considered. RCC will try to reach an 
important number of people that have known of PAVI as participants in training or awareness 
activities, who have received direct technical support, who have been direct beneficiaries of 
project activities, or who have collaborated as consultants. To obtain information from these 
persons, the RCC consultants will use different techniques, including direct interviews, focus 
groups and questionnaires. RCC will seek to examine all the statistical data available, but also 
to focus on the stories behind the numbers. As a preliminary exercise before the interviews 
and focus groups, RCC consultants will review all available documents on the project and 
related documents on the subject available through Internet or provided by USAID. RCC will 
follow the steps indicated below: 
1. REVIEW WORK PLAN, DEFINE INTERVIEWEES, ORGANIZE FOCUS GROUPS 
RCC, together with USAID/Guatemala, will review the objectives of the assignment, the work 
plan, the methodology, and the list of persons and institutions to interview. RCC will also meet 
with Tetra Tech DPK officers for suggestions for possible persons to be interviewed or to 
participate in the focus groups (see section 4.3). Once focus groups participants are agreed with 
USAID, RCC may require some initial assistance by USAID in approaching certain local 
authorities to obtain approval for proposed participants’ attendance. This would mean a letter 
or call to local authorities indicating that RCC is carrying out a performance evaluation for 
USAID and requesting their cooperation to authorize the selected persons for the focus groups 
to participate in these events. Based on discussions with USAID/Guatemala, RCC will finalize 
the methodological approach, including reviewing specific activities and methods proposed as 
well as analytical techniques for assessing the information gathered. 
2. DOCUMENT REVIEW - PRE-FIELD WORK 
RCC will review the PAVI contract and quarterly and final reports prepared by Tetra Tech DPK, 
the Checchi final report of December 17, 2009 on the ROL Program, the Latin America Public 
Opinion Project reports on “The Political Culture of Democracy in Guatemala” 2009 and 2010, 
the Judiciary and Public Ministry annual reports, the State Department Human Rights Reports, 
any other reports or documents provided by USAID, as well as relevant available reports 
prepared by NGOs and other civil society organizations. 
3. CARRY OUT FIVE FOCUS GROUPS AND ADMINISTER QUESTIONNAIRES 
77
RCC is proposing a seasoned consultant group, with strong experience in conduct of focus 
groups related to the justice sector. They are fluent Spanish speakers, good listeners, possess 
good interpersonal skills, and are very adaptable, qualities necessary to promote discussion and 
open interactive dialogue. RCC proposes to conduct five (5) focus groups with ten (10) 
participants each, to reach 50 informed persons. We would involve a mix of participants to be 
drawn from among judges, prosecutors, public defenders, lawyers and civil society 
representatives. The focus groups will target the five different PAVI objective areas. 
For the focus groups RCC will use the tools for “consensus workshops”. Consensus Workshop 
method is useful whenever a group of people need to speak, listen to each other, build on each 
other’s ideas, and reach well-considered conclusions that hold enough agreement to enable the 
whole group to reach conclusions together. The Consensus Workshop method has the following 
basic steps: Context, Brainstorm, Cluster, Name, and Resolve. 
 Set a context – Post a single open-ended focus question to help participants understand and 
explore the topic. 
 Brainstorm in layers – RCC experts will start with a silent individual brainstorming, ask the 
participants to write down an answer to the question and then ask participants to select 
their personal favorites to share in a small group of five. After, they will ask small groups to 
agree on a specified answer and print clearly onto large cards, one idea per card. Invite the 
small groups to share their answers with the whole group by gradually calling for the cards. 
RCC experts will read each card aloud and post it on the front wall. RCC will make sure to 
get equal numbers of cards from all the three small groups. 
 Cluster ideas – When all the cards are on the wall, RCC experts will ask the group to create 
pairs of cards with similar intent. After they will move cards with similar ideas together, 
first in pairs, then in larger groupings, or clusters until all the cards from all the groups are 
organized. 
 Name the clusters – After all the cards are placed on the wall in clusters or columns, give 
each cluster a 3-5 word title that answers the focus question. 
 Confirm the resolve – After naming all the clusters, review the titles to ensure clarity. 
Discuss the overall impact the ideas will have, and confirm that they represent the 
consensus of the whole group. 
Apart from the group discussions, all focus group participants will be asked to complete a 
common short questionnaire (See Annex 2- Example Questionnaire) to allow corroborating 
focus groups findings and identification of other ideas that did not arise in the discussions. 
RCC will coordinate the focus group scheduling with USAID. RCC will cover any travelling 
expenses for bringing focus group participants to the meeting places. RCC will conduct the 
focus groups, and organize and tabulate the data resulting from these activities. 
78
4. INTERVIEWS OF KEY PERSONS AND IN-SITU VISITS 
In addition to conducting focus group, RCC will identify and interview as many knowledgeable 
key persons as possible (at least 30). The questionnaire mentioned above will be used by the 
consultants as an interview guide. Selection of key persons will be done in coordination with 
USAID/Guatemala, identifying appropriate key individuals and organizations whose leaders 
qualify as key persons to be interviewed. USAID will assist RCC to obtain the appointments with 
these persons. 
RCC consultants will also carry out in-situ visits to the Public Ministry Analysis Office, INACIF, 
24-hour courts in Guatemala City, the high impact courts and Petén sites. 
5. COLLECT STATISTICAL DATA ON PROJECT INDICATORS AND RESULTS FOR COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS 
Depending upon the availability and quality of statistical information in the Judiciary, Public 
Ministry the Criminal Public Defense Institute and civil society organizations, RCC will seek to 
collect significant information that would indicate progress in as many of the following areas as 
possible: 
 Criminal case clearance rates for 24-hour courts and high-impact courts. 
 Criminal case backlogs for 24-hour courts and high-impact courts. 
 Total and average numbers of criminal hearings and trials held in comparison with criminal 
hearings and trials scheduled. 
 Criminal case disposition times for 24-hour courts and high-impact courts. 
 Application of alternative measures to resolve criminal cases in 24-hour courts. 
 Percentage of pre-trial detainees. 
 Services provided by the Criminal Public Defense Institute. 
 Type and numbers of services provided to victims. 
 Updated information on number of judges, prosecutors, and defenders, and number and 
percentage of persons included in judicial career status. 
 Others to be agreed with USAID/Guatemala. 
For this section, RCC will also take into consideration the PAVI Monitoring and Evaluation 
Reports done by Partners for Democratic Change throughout the project. 
6. ANALYZE INFORMATION 
Once the data from the focus groups and key person interviews is collected and tabulated, RCC 
will begin the analysis. While quantitative techniques will be used where appropriate, most of 
the analysis likely will be qualitative. 
79
7. DRAFT REPORT 
RCC will write a draft report in Washington after the field work in Guatemala (maximum 40 
pages). The final report will be divided into the following sections: 
 Executive Summary in English and in Spanish 
 Background on Development Problem and USAID Response 
 Purpose of the Evaluation 
 Research Design and Methodology 
 Principal Findings on PAVI 
 Recommendations for future programming 
 Bibliography
 Appendices (not included in page limit) Scope of work, final work plan, data collection 
analysis tools, list of persons interviewed and Focus Group participants, and, if 
necessary, a statement of any unresolved differences of opinion by USAID. 
 8. WORKSHOP TO DISCUSS FINDINGS AND DELIVERY OF FINAL REPORT 
While USAID is reviewing the draft report, RCC, in close consultation with USAID, will begin 
preparations for a workshop to discuss the findings with attendance of a list of participants 
from the US Embassy, other international donors and GOG representatives, PAVI personnel and 
civil society representatives (30 participants) in a conference space to be arranged by USAID. 
RCC will prepare a PowerPoint presentation in Spanish for this event and, if USAID considers 
appropriate, distribute copies of the executive summary in Spanish and English and the 
PowerPoint presentation. After USAID has reviewed and commented on the initial draft, RCC 
will complete the final version of the report for submission to the Mission by e-mail and in two 
hard copies. 
80
ANNEX 4 : SCOPE OF WORK PROVIDED BY USAID PURCHASE ORDER
Scope of Work (SOW) 
USAIDIProgram Against Violence and Impunity (PAVI) in Guatemala 
Implemented by Tetra Tech DPK 
Final Performance Evaluation 
I. Purpose of Evaluation 
SOL-520-12-000012 
Attachment No. I 
Page I ofl4 
USAID/Guatemala seeks to contract professional services to conduct a final performance evaluation of 
its Program Against Violence and Impunity (PAVI) scheduled for completion in December 2012. The 
evaluation will examine project implementation and PAVI's high-level results. The evaluation will not 
measure against a counterfactual, but it will require a design that ensures a robust, mixed-methods 
evaluation. The evaluation will be used to inform implementation of new USAID/Guatemala projects in 
the security and justice sectors, for example to identify the institutions that require more or less 
support from USAID. The findings from the exercise will be shared with other actors currently working 
in this area, including Government of Guatemala (GOG) personnel and other donors. 
fl. Background 
Fifteen years have passed since Guatemala's internal armed conflict ended with the signing ofthe 1996 
Peace Accords, but rule of law and security continue to be significant issues in Guatemala, impacting 
democracy, development and the overall economy. Guatemala is the most populous country in 
Central America, but has a Gross Domestic Product per capita roughly one-half of the average for Latin 
America and the Caribbean. According to the United Nation's Office for Drugs and Crime, Guatemala's 
per capita murder rate has more than doubled in the past decade, and in 2010 it was eight times that 
of the United States and nearly three times that of Mexico. 
The loss of government authority prompted former President Alvaro Colom to declare "states of siege" 
in the northern departments of Alta Vera paz and Peten in 2011. Newly elected President Otto Perez 
Molina discussed declaring "states of siege" in southwestern San Marcos Department (bordering 
Mexico) and western 5010la Department, as both areas plagued by conflicts between residents and 
police. 
Guatemala's proximity to Mexico makes the country a staging area for drug transport and increases 
the opportunity for money laundering and corruption. Even the Mexican Government's struggle 
against narco-trafficking is affecting Guatemala, as criminal activity has been pushed south, especially 
into the departments of Peten and Alta Verapaz. Local justice and security officials are often 
inexperienced, underpaid, and/or ill-equipped, and therefore struggle to respond to the deteriorating 
situation. 
Of major significance for this evaluation, in 1994 Guatemala became one of the first countries in Latin 
America to reform its criminal procedure code. The reform intended to introduce oral arguments and 
adversarial proceedings into a civil law system and set strict time limits on proceedings. The reforms 
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took over a decade to implement and many of the intended initiatives have only just occurred during 
the last few years. Guatemala has experienced some improvements in terms of homicide 
investigations and case processing, but the weak and politicized justice system still undermines the 
government's ability to ensure rule of law. Many key reforms still face significant challenges. 
111_ PAVIOverview 
In support of judicial sector reform and ending criminal impunity, since 2009 USAID/Guatemala 
provided assistance under PAVI to improve both the supply and demand sides of justice sector 
services. The program intended to improve the delivery of judicial and prosecutorial services at both 
the national and local levels, while also building civil sOciety's capacity to monitor and report on the 
performance of judicial actors. The program intended to strengthen a multitude of judicial institutions, 
including the Public Ministry Analysis Unit, the Model Criminal Trial Court, 24-hour courts and high￾impact courts, and the Prosecutor's Office of Crimes Against life. PAVI also mobilized the justice sector 
and civil society to prevent violence and improve victim's services, for example by developing a 
protocol for multiple GoG and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) to coordinate for better services to 
victims of crime. 
Prol<llctlmormation 
Proj<l!lct To Be Evaluated: Program Against Violence and Impunity (PAVI) 
A,reement fJ: DFD..J...(J:S-04-00173-00 
A~ Dates: July 2009 - December .2012 
Total Estimated Cost: $ 7,133.000 
Impillmllntinc Orpnization; Tetra Tech DPK 
Contractinc Officer's Rllpresantative: Cassandra Wheeler 
The five expected results under PAVI are: 
1. Improve justice system capacity to prosecute and try serious crimes - activities include 
training of the Public Ministry and support of 24-hour courts. 
2. Mobilize justice sector and civil society to reduce and prevent violence - including a small 
grants mechanism to support CSOs on victims' advocacy. 
3. Increase internal accountability and overSight within the justice sector - through 
institutional strengthening efforts in career paths and career evaluation. 
4. Support high impact courts - via improved procedures, protocols, and physical remodeling 
of court buildings. 
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5. Strengthen justice capacity to combat illegal activities in Peten - th rough establishment of a 
victim registry in Peten and victims' outreach with public prosecutors and local CSOs. 
For more information on the activities implemented under the results, please see the attached PAVI 
Scope of Work in Annex 2.1 
IV. PAVI Performance Evaluation 
This performance evaluation must focus on 1) the performance of PAVI since 2009 vis-a-vis the project 
goals, benchmarks, and associated deliverables; and 2) the high-level results achieved through the 
project, which affect the legal system and rule of law as a whole. The evaluation will need to use 
mixed methods to triangulate2 findings on the questions below. As no external baseline evaluation 
exists for PAVI, this will ensure a more rigorous evaluation. The evaluation will provide findings on 
technical and implementation issues, conclusions, and recommendations to maximize the 
effectiveness of USAID security and justice sector programs. This evaluation will otherwise comply 
with the 2011 USAID Evaluation Policy, available at http://www.usaid.gov/evaluation. 
The following project performance questions must be addressed: 
1. What have been the key contributions of PAVI to rule of law and the justice sector in 
Guatemala? Please include analysis and synthesis of project monitoring data in addition to any 
other data collected during the evaluation. 
2. In what additional program areas does USAID need to undertake activities to improve these five 
objective areas and ensure they are sustainable? 
3. How have institutional strengthening efforts between PAVI and other donors such as the 
European Union and Canada been coordinated overall? Has coordination been successful, and 
what is the role of the GOG in this coordination? 
The analysis shall also include, but not be limited to, the following evaluation questions, which fall 
under each of the five objective areas. For the purposes of attribution to PAVI, it will also be important 
to determine if other donors have contributed to the results and how those efforts interacted with 
PAVI. 
Improved justice system capacity to prosecute and try serious crimes 
1 A sixth result that appears in the P A VI SOW refers to promotion of Millennium Challenge Corporation indicators. This 
objective will not be considered in this evaluation. 
2 Triangulation should facilitate validation of data through cross verification from more than two sources. In particular, it 
refers to the application and combination of several research methodologies in the study of the same phenomenon. 
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Attachment No.1 
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4. How has the Public Ministry's (MP in Spanish) Analysis Unit supported the Crimes Against Life 
Office, also in the MP, and what has the Analysis Unit produced during the last 2 years? 
S. What changes have occurred in the performance, case load, and processing time of 24-hour 
courts? How did PAVI activities contribute to those outcomes, and what other factors 
contributed? 
6. To what extent have PAVI activities supported the implementation of the law Against 
Organized Crime and/or other legislation?3 
Mobilize justice sector and civil society to reduce and prevent violence 
7. What is the availability and quality of legal aid/victims' services? How does this compare to the 
situation before PAVI began work, and how did PAVI contribute? Have these services reduced 
or prevented violence? 
Increased internal accountability and oversight within the justice sector 
8. What progress did PAVI have on reforming recruitment, appOintments, selection and 
promotion of judges, judicial staff and public defenders? Specifically, what was accomplished 
with regard to evaluation of candidates in the judicial branch and the Public Defenders Institute 
(IDPP in Spanish)? Have changes increased accountability and oversight within the justice 
sector? 
Support high impact courts 
9. Have new security and protection protocols to which PAVI contributed improved access to an 
impartial trial? Why or why not? 
Strengthen justice capacity to combat illegal activities in Peten 
10. What effect has PAVI had on prosecution of crimes against the environment, crimes against 
cultural heritage, and crimes against life in Peten? 
The evaluation should utilize information from the following sources. The Offeror is encouraged to 
propose their own methods keeping with the size and cost of this performance evaluation, if they so 
choose. 
• Document review, including all relevant implementer reports such as M&E reports, work 
plans, quarterly performance reports, etc. Also to include any informative secondary 
literature, for example public surveys such as latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP), the report on 24-hour courts prepared by Checchi Consulting, strategic plans of 
3 Under the PA VI Task Order, these activjties are included under Objective Two. However, they may more logically fall 
under Objective One. 
SOL-520-12-0000 12 
Attachment No.1 
Page 5 of 14 
the MP and Supreme Court (OJ in Spanish), justice and security institution websites, and the 
Courts Security Sector Reform Assessment. USAID/Guatemala will provide project 
documents upon award of this Purchase Order. 
• Institutional data sources related to crime, case records, victim's assistance;organization 
coordination, and trainings and internal professional management as available on public 
websites and Memoriales de Labores Institucionales for the Ministries and offices 
mentioned below. Some Government offices may have data on these topics that is not 
public that may also be ofinterest for this evaluation, as will the PAVI project. 
• Site visits related to USAID rule of law programming, including the high-impact courts in 
Guatemala City, both the 24-hour courts and the prosecutors' offices in Mixco and Villa 
Nueva, and with justice and security sector actors in Peten. 
• Key informant interviews with PAVI personnel and sub-grantees, judicial sector officials and 
personnel, the MP, IDPP, OJ, National Civilian Police (PNC)4, groups that provide victims 
with legal aid, civil society and relevant CSOs5
, recipients oftraining and other beneficiaries 
of PAVI, the International Commission Against Impunity in Guatemala (CIClG), the National 
Institute of Forensic Sciences (INACIF), US Embassy personnel in Guatemala and the PAVI 
Contracting Officer's Representative (COR), and non-US donors (EU, Spain and Canada) in 
the rule of law sector. Most interviews will take place in Guatemala City, and others should 
take place during site visits to cities such as Mixco, Villa Nueva, and Santa Elena and San 
Benito in Peten. 
• Targeted focus groups of PAVI stakeholders, for example women, faith-based leaders, 
academics, community leaders, and those who have received victim's assistance. These 
focus groups will assess perceptions of accountability, security, judicial responsiveness, and 
transparency. 
The evaluation must analyze qualitative and quantitative data obtained during field work and 
secondary analysis. This may include using typology or content analysis, or simple descriptive 
statistics. The Offeror is expected to discuss the type of analysis that will best fit this performance 
evaluation in the evaluation proposal. 
v _ Deliverables 
Deliverable No.1: Work Plan The Evaluation Team shall submit a draft Evaluation Work Plan in English 
as part of the Offeror's proposal and a final Work Plan, also in English, to the USAID/Guatemala COR 
4 Offices within these institutions include MP-Fiscalia de Delitos Contra la Vida, Oficina de Atenci6n a la Victima, and 
Unidad de Amllisis; IDPP-Recursos Humanos; OJ-High-Impact Courts, Consejo de la Carrera Judicial, Escuela de 
Estudios Judiciales; and PNC-Oficina de Atencion a la Victima. 
5 esos include Asociacion Guatemalteca Extraordinaria, Familiares y Amigos contra la Delincuencia y el Secuestro (FADS), 
Madres Angustiadas, Movimiento Pro Justicia, Grupo de Apoyo Mutuo (GAM), Balam Association, and Pastoral Social. 
SOL-520-12-000012 
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for this evaluation within eight working days of award. The work plan shall describe all activities, 
including: 
• sequencing and timeframes, 
• research design and evaluation methods, 
• draft data collection instruments 
• a plan for quantitative and qualitative data analysis, and 
• a proposed schedule of key interviews and site visits including a description of the sampling plan 
and criteria for selecting key informants and sites (Le. random or purposive). 
The final work plan will be reviewed by relevant USAID staff who will provide written comments or 
approval no later than three days after submission. The draft work plan will also be shared with PAVI 
to inform the project of the planned activities and identify scheduling issues of which USAID may not 
be aware. USAID approval ofthe Work Plan is required before fieldwork can begin. 
Entrance Briefing The Evaluation Team shall provide an entrance briefing to the USAID/Guatemala 
Front Office, DG Office, and other interested Mission staff at the beginning of the evaluation field work 
to present to the Mission the Evaluation Team's objectives and methodology for the evaluation. 
Exit Briefing The Evaluation Team shall provide a formal exit briefing of its findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations to the USAID/Guatemala and Embassy Front Offices, DG Office, other interested 
Mission staff, and possibly Tetra Tech DPK not later than 45 days after the signature of the Purchase 
Order. The purpose of the exit briefing is to ensure the report adequately covers the evaluation 
questions and to allow USAID and other stakeholders to provide initial reactions to major findings and 
conclusions prior to finalizing the report. The Evaluation Team shall submit a summary of th1:!ir initial 
findings at least two days before that debriefing to facilitate the discussion. Written comments will be 
provided by the USAID/Guatemala COR to the Evaluation Team within three days of the exit briefing 
for incorporation into the final report. 
Deliverable No_ 2: Final Evaluation Report An Microsoft Word version of the evaluation report shall 
be submitted within one week following the receipt of comments from the USAID/Guatemala exit 
briefing. The final report shall not exceed 40 pages, including tables and charts. The report shall 
include an executive summary in Spanish and shall consider the written feedback from the exit 
briefing. If there are any issues that the Team did not incorporate in the report, within one week of 
receipt USAID/Guatemala will determine whether or not to include a Statement of Differences as an 
annex to the report (and will provide the implementing partner with a chance to do so as well). The 
Evaluation Team will be given an opportunity to respond if a Statement of Differences is included. At 
this point, the Evaluation Team will submit the final report to USAID/Guatemala by providing two 
hardcopies (in English, and with a Spanish Executive Summary) and an electronic report in Microsoft 
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Attachment No.1 
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Word. The final evaluation report shall be submitted not later than 60 days after signature of the 
Purchase Order 
The final report must comply with the USAID Evaluation Policy as it relates to performance evaluations, 
and should use the criteria for quality evaluation reports listed in Appendix I of the Evaluation Policy. 
In addition, these deliverables will include the following annexes that will not count against the total 
number of pages for the report: 
• a copy of this scope of work; 
• a copy of the final work plan including the written evaluation design; 
• any data collection or analysis tools used, such as questionnaires, checklists or focus group 
discussion guides; 
• all sources of information, including a list of those interviewed, properly identified and listed; 
and 
• if necessary, a statement of any unresolved differences of opinion by USAID, the implementing 
partner and/or members of the evaluation team. 
Any raw data used or developed during the course of this evaluation will also be submitted in a format 
deemed appropriate and agreed upon by the USAID COR. The final report should follow the general 
format: 
I. Executive Summary (1-2 pages) 
II. Background on Development Problem and USAID's Response (1-2 pages) 
III. Purpose of Evaluation (1 page) 
IV. Research Design and Assessment Methodology (5-7 pages) 
V. Findings and Conclusions (20-25 pages) 
VI. Recommendations for future activities (5-10 pages) 
The completed evaluation must be submitted by the Offeror to USAID's Development Experience 
Clearinghouse (DEC) at http://dec.usaid.gov within three months of the completion ofthe evaluation; 
Deliverable No_ 3: Discussion of Findings The evaluation team leader will organize and facilitate a 
discussion of the evaluation findings in Guatemala City. This discussion will include USAID/Guatemala, 
other relevant donors working on rule of law, and relevant GoG counterparts. USAID/Guatemala will 
provide a guest list of roughly 30 individuals whom the Offeror will need to contact and organize this 
meeting. In this meeting, the findings and recommendations of the report will be shared, while the 
report itself will not be. Therefore, this discussion can take place at any point following the exit 
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Attachment No.1 
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briefing with USAID/Guatemala on a date to be agreed upon in the work plan. USAID/Guatemala will 
provide a conference space for this discussion. 
VI. Personnel Requirements/Required Technical Qualifications 
USAID anticipates several individuals to comprise the evaluation team. In addition, one USAID 
personnel with extensive experience in rule of law and latin America may be part of the evaluation 
team, but would report to the team leader. This possibility will be further explored when the time 
table for this evaluation is set. 
The team leader should have strong team management skills, as well as S-10 years' experience 
evaluating development projects in the area of rule of law or justice sector reform. He/she should 
have at least a Master's degree in evaluation research methods, rule of law, criminal justice, or a 
related field. The team leader shall be fluent in both English and Spanish, with the ability to 
communicate technical information clearly and concisely, both orally and in writing for both languages. 
Experience with USAID projects is preferred, but not required. 
Other key team members must be fluent in Spanish, and those team members who will write-up the 
final evaluations need to be able to communicate in English for report-writing purposes. Other skills 
necessary for this evaluation include the following: 
• Rule of law expertise in latin America and Caribbean 
• At least ten years of experience in the fields of justice, crime, and rule of law 
• Five to ten years of experience designing and implementing project evaluations, preferably with 
experience conducting rule of law evaluations 
• If included in the proposal as part of the evaluation methodology, at least one member of the 
team should have expertise in designing and moderating focus groups as this is a specialized 
skill 
Each reference to expertise will not necessarily require its own expert; team members may be suited 
to address more than one of these topics. CV's for all proposed personnel shall be included in the 
Offeror's proposal as well as signed biographical data sheets. 
Refer to Section XII and Annex 1 for rules on conflicts of interest for key personnel. 
VII. Schedule of Work/Level of Effort 
This performance evaluation will be carried out over not more than 4S working days in September, 
October and November 2012. The level of effort will depend on the proposal, with the in-country 
evaluation, field visits, and exit debrief for USAID/Guatemala expected to occupy at least four weeks. 
It is anticipated that the bulk of the professional work will be carried out in Guatemala City, and field 
SOL-520-12-000012 
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trips outside are expected in the areas of Santa Elena and San Benito, Peten (for no more than 3 days), 
and in the cities of Mixco and Villa Nueva. Generally, a five-day work week will be approved under the 
resulting Purchase Order. However, a six-day work week will be allowed on a case by case basis as 
approved by the COR, but without premium pay and with the understanding that cost should be within 
the negotiated firm fixed price of the Purchase Order. 
Because the resulting award will be a firm fixed price Purchase Order, Offeror shall propose the level of 
effort they think necessary to submit the deliverables within the timeframe specified above. Although 
costs will not be an evaluation factor, costs will be analyzed for realism and reasonableness. 
VIII. Evaluation Criteria 
Offeror will be judged on expertise, past performance and strength of draft work plan/technical 
proposal presentation. The following are the evaluation criteria against which the proposals will be 
judged: 
• Draft work plan for performance evaluation (70%) 
o Proposed methods of data collection and analysis-including overall design, evaluation 
methods, plan for selecting interviewees and site visits, and description of analysis to be 
performed 
o Timeline of proposed activities 
• Education and Technical Expertise of Team Leader (15%) 
o The team leader should have strong team management skills 
o 5-10 years' experience evaluating development projects in the area of rule of law or 
justice sector reform. 
o At least a Master's degree in evaluation research methods, rule of law, criminal justice, 
or a related field. 
o Shall be fluent in both English and Spanish, with the ability to communicate technical 
information clearly and concisely, both orally and in writing for both languages. 
o Experience with USAID projects is preferred, but not required. 
• Past Performance (15%) 
o Successful experience conducting performance evaluations in the past 3 years 
NOTE: Cost will be taken into consideration even though no points are assigned. This award will be 
made on the basis of the lowest evaluated price of proposals meeting or exceeding the acceptability 
standards for non-cost factors. 
IX_ Payment Schedule 
30% upon approval of work plan - Deliverable No.1 
60% upon receipt of final report - Deliverable No.2 
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10% upon discussion of results with GoG and relevant donors and receipt of documents from 
discussion (e.g. agenda and PowerPoint presentation) - Deliverable No.3 
X_ Logistical Support 
The Evaluation Team shall be responsible for arranging all logistical support including but not limited to 
air travel, local ground transportation, and accommodation; and for providing computers, printers, cell 
phones, communications and other administrative, secretarial, or assistance services. The Evaluation 
Team will also be responsible for scheduling appointments and translation services. Implementing 
partners and USAID/Guatemala may provide assistance in arranging meetings with PAVI staff, GOG and 
State representatives, program beneficiaries, and other key stakeholders if necessary or politically 
sensitive. The Mission will make available all relevant documents upon award. 
XI. Technical Direction 
Technical direction during the performance of this Purchase Order shall be provided by the 
USAID/Guatemala COR or his/her designee. However, there will not be an employer/employee 
relationship with the contractor. 
The Offeror shall understand that only the USAID/Guatemala Contracting Officer is authorized to make 
changes to the terms and conditions of the resulting Purchase Order. In the event that the Offeror 
believes that he/she is required to perform activities outside the approved Purchase Order, he/she 
shall immediately contact/inform the USAID/Guatemala Contracting Officer before performing these 
tasks. The Offeror will not be paid any amount in excess of the firm/fixed price of the resulting 
Purchase Order. 
XII. Organizational Conflict of Interest 
PRECLUSION FROM FURNISHING CERTAIN SERVICES AND RESTRICTION ON USE OF INFORMATION 
(a) The resulting purchase order calls for the contractor to furnish important services in support of 
the evaluation of Project against Violence and Impunity, award number DFD-108-04-00173-00 
implemented by Tetra Tech DPK. In accordance with the Principles of FAR Subpart 9.5 and 
USAID policy, THE CONTRACTOR SHALL BE INELIGIBLE TO FURNISH, AS A PRIME OR 
SUBCONTRACTOR OR OTHERWISE, IMPLEMENTATION SERVICES UNDER ANY CONTRACT OR 
TASK ORDER THAT RESULTS IN RESPONSE TO FINDINGS, PROPOSALS, OR RECOMMENDATIONS 
IN AN EVALUATION REPORT WRITTEN BY THE CONTRACTOR. THIS PRECULSION WILL APPLY TO 
ANY SUCH AWARDS MADE WITHIN 18 MONTHS OF USAID ACCEPTING THE REPORT, unless the 
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Head of Contracting Activity, in consultation with USAID's Competitive Advocate, authorized a 
waiver (in accordance with FAR 9.503) determining that prelusion of the contractor from the 
implementation work would not be in the Government's interest. 
(b) In addition, BY ACCEPTING the resulting purchase order, THE CONTRACTOR AGREES THAT IT 
WILL NOT USE OR MAKE AVAILABLE ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED ABOUT ANOTHER 
ORGANIZATION UNDER THE CONTRACT IN THE PREPARATION OF PROPOSALS OR OTHER 
DOCUMENTS IN RESPONSE TO ANY SOLICITATION FOR A CONTRACT OR TASK ORDER. 
(c) If the contractor gains access to proprietary information of other company (ies) in performing 
this evaluation, the contractor must agree with the other company (ies) to protect that 
information from unauthorized use, not to disclose that information for as long as it remains 
proprietary, and to refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for 
which it was furnished. THE CONTRACTOR MUST PROVIDE A PROPERLY EXECUTED COPY OF ALL 
SUCH AGREEMENTS TO THE CONTRACTING OFFICER. 
In addition, the Offeror will refer to and sign Annex 1 on Disclosure of Real or Potential Conflicts of 
Interest and submit the signed form to the Agreement Officer 3 working days after signature of the 
purchase order. 
XIII. Environmental Compliance 
This activity falls under the Categorical Exclusion issued to those activities involving technical 
assistance, training, analyses, studies, workshops, document transfers, and others that will not have an 
impact on the environment, as stated in LAC-IEE-09-43. 
XIV. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE PROPOSAL 
The proposal shall, at a minimum, include the information identified above. The technical proposal 
should be submitted in electronic format to the point of contact in the USAID/Guatemala Office of 
Acquisitions and Assistance. The technical proposals should take into account the guidance below. 
Offeror shall submit a proposal in response to this solicitation that is specific, clear, and complete, and 
that responds to the instructions set forth in this Section. The proposal shall be written in English and 
typed on standard 8 1/2" x 11" paper, single spaced, 12 characters per inch with each page numbered 
consecutively. The proposal must be organized according to the Evaluation Criteria is Section VJII and 
shall include: 
Cover Page - Title, names of organization(s) submitting the quotation, contact person, telephone and 
fax numbers, addresses and emails. 
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Technical Proposal - The technical proposal shall not exceed 12 pages, excluding the cover page and 
annexes (resumes, charts, etc.). The annexes shall not exceed a total of 10 additional pages (this may 
be printed on one side or both sides), excluding resumes/curriculum vitae of proposed personnel. A 
technical proposal and all annexes that exceed these page limits will only be evaluated through page 
12 and 10 respectively and the remaining pages will not be evaluated. 
The technical proposal shall include the following: 
• Proposed methods of data collection and analysis 
• Timeline of proposed activities 
• Overall approach and methodology 
• Organizational structure of the assessment team, team members' roles in the assessment and 
their areas of expertise 
• Past performance 
Note: USAID reserves the right to contact all references to obtain verification or corroboration of past 
performance as follows: 
• How well the offeror (or proposed candidate) has performed 
• The relevancy of the program work 
• Instances of good performance 
• Instances of poor performance 
• Significant achievements 
• Significant problems, and 
• Any indications of excellent or exceptional performance in the most critical areas 
• Reliable and timely home office support 
• Information on past performance must be provided in accordance with the following table: 
Program Primary Term of Dollar 
Description location of performance Value 
summarv work 
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ANNEX 1: Disclosure of Real or Potential Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluations 
Evaluatians af USAID prajects will be undertaken sa that they are not subject to the perception or reality of 
biased measurement or reporting due to conflict of interest. 6 For external evaluations, all evaluation team 
members will provide a signed statement attesting to a lock of conflict of interest or describing an existing 
conflict of interest relotive to the project being evaluated. 7 
Evaluators of USAID projects have a responsibility to maintain independence so that opinions, conclusions, 
judgments, and recommendations will be impartial and will be viewed as impartial by third parties. Evaluators 
and evaluation team members are to disclose all relevant facts regarding real or potential conflicts of interest 
that could lead reasonable third parties with knowledge ofthe relevant facts and circumstances to conclude that 
the evaluator or evaluation team member is not able to maintain independence and, thus, is not capable of 
exercising objective and impartial judgment on all issues associated with conducting and reporting the work. 
Operating Unit leadership, in close consultation with the Contracting Officer, will determine whether the real or 
potential conflict of interest is one that should disqualify an individual from the evaluation team or require 
recusal by that individual from evaluating certain aspects of the project(s). 
In addition, if evaluation team members gain access to proprietary information of other companies in the 
process of conducting the evaluation, then they must agree with the other companies to protect their 
information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the 
information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished. 8 
Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to: 
1. Immediate family or close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the 
project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 
2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant/material though indirect, in the implementing 
organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 
3. Current or previous direct or significant/material though indirect experience with the project(s) being 
evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project. 
4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing 
the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 
5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor 
with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated. 
6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and 
organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation. 
6 USAID Evaluation Policy (p. 8); USAID Contract Information Bulletin 99-17; and Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) 
Part 9.5, Organizational Conflicts of Interest, and Subpart 3.10, Contractor Code of Business Ethics and Conduct. 
7 USAlD Evaluation Policy (p. 11) 
8 FAR 9.505-4(b) 
Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members 
Name 
Title 
Organization 
Evaluation Position? o Team Leader 
Evaluation Award Number (contract or other 
instrument) 
USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include praject 
name(s), implementer name(s) and award 
number(s), if applicable) 
I have real or potential conflicts of interest to DYes ONo 
disclose_ 
If yes answered above, I disclose the 
following facts: 
Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but ore not 
limited to: 
1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAJD 
operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the 
implementing organization(s) whose project(s) ore being 
evaluated. 
2. Financiol interest that is direct, or is significant though 
indirect in the implementing organization(s) whose projects 
are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation. 
3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect 
experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including 
involvement in the project design or previous iterations ot the 
project. 
4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment 
with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the 
implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being 
evaluated. 
5. Current or previous work experience with on organization that 
may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing 
organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluoted. 
6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, 
or objectives ot the particular projects and organizations 
being evaluated that could bios the evaluation. 
Deam member 
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Page 14 of 14 
I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this 
disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, 
then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and 
sr'1.,,;5;20-12-0000 12 
Annex 2 
Page i-of 12 
DPK Consulting 
Task Order No. DFD-I-08-04-00173-00 
Page 4 0146 
SECTION C - DESCRIPTION / SPECIFICATIONS/STATEMENT OF WORK 
C.1 PURPOSE 
This Statement of Work (SOW) outlines the selVices to be provided that will assist the 
Govemment of Guatemala (GOG) in combating impunity of violence and serious crime. 
This work will closely relate to other USAID governance activities, and should 
collaborate with other USG Guatemala Mission programs, particularly the Narcotics 
Affairs Section's programs to support law enforcement institutions. 
This Statement of Work will build upon results obtained in rule of law activities to date, 
such as improved homicide prosecution and the creation of 24-hour Courts, contributing 
to the objective of building a more responsive and transparent governance in 
Guatemala. It will also address recent developments, such as the passage of a Law 
against Organized Crime, the new Law against Femicide, the creation of the 
International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (Spanish acronym CICIG) and 
the creation of the National Forensic Institute (Spanish acronym INACIF). 
C.2 BACKGROUND 
1. Problem Statement: Fourteen years after the passage of the Criminal Procedures 
Code, Guatemalan justice sector institutions have undergone notable reforms. These 
reforms include the appointment of a Justice of the Peace in each municipality, the 
creation of an autonomous Public Ministry (prosecutors), an autonomous Public 
Defense Institute and a National Civilian Police (Spanish acronym PNC). 
One of the most significant reforms in recent years has been the opening of three 24-
hour courts which provide permanent criminal justice selVice to the Greater Guatemala 
City area, thanks to the close coordination among the four criminal justice institutions: 
the Judiciary, the Public Ministry (PM), the Defense Institute and the PNC. The PM has 
also undergone important changes and has begun to improve its prosecution of 
homicide cases in Guatemala City. 
In spite of these aClvances, authorities in Guatemala are overwhelmed by the extremely 
high levels of violence, crime and corruption. One of the principal problems facing all of 
the justice/security institutions are management structures that do not provide adequate 
supelVision, controls and accountability and oversight, leaving these institutions 
vulnerable to corruption, negligence and inefficiencies. While some have made more 
progress than others in addressing these institutional weaknesses, all of them suffer to 
different extents from the lack of basic checks, balances and supelVisory mechanisms. 
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These institutions also operate within a context charged with violence and fear. Fear 
can easily intimidate justice operators from doing their job and can also quickly turn law￾abiding citizens into supporters of arbitrary and violent dispute resolution, such as 
lynching and social cleansing. Important information about violence in Guatemala can 
be found in the UNDP statistical study on homicide: 
http://www.undp.org.gtlfrmPub.aspx 
The Program against Violence and Impunity will address both the institutional 
weaknesses and the relevant social variables that fuel and reinforce violence and other 
serious crimes as linked to institutional strengthening. 
2. Previous support to the Rule of Law in Guatemala: USAID assistance for the Rule of 
Law began in Guatemala in 1986, after the adoption of the new Constitution. Through 
the United Nations Latin American Institute for Crime Prevention (Spanish Acronym 
. ILANUD); technical assistance, training, diagnostic analysis and research and reference 
materials were provided. 
In 1987, another USAID-funded activity supported policy dialogue and the exploration of 
reforms through pilot courts. This was followed by a much larger, ambitious and 
complex bilateral program in 1988. Both were terminated before the scheduled 
completion dates, due to adverse conditions for their implementation. USAID 
inaugurated a revised program in 1993, focusing on preparing judicial system operators 
to implement the recently enacted Criminal Procedure Code that was due to go into 
effect in 1994. This program began implementing community justice centers and 
responded to the justice related Peace Accords commitments. A follow-on project, 
which began in 1999, specifically focused on the Peace Accords and the Justice Center 
Model and was completed in September of 2004. 
In October 2004, a five-year strategy for the Central America and Mexico (CAM) region 
came into effect. To achieve the objectives under this strategy, USAID launched its 
current Rule of Law Program (2004-2009) which so far has achieved, among other 
results, the creation and implementation of the 24-hour courts and the reorganization of 
the Prosecutor's Office of Crimes against Life, resulting in a higher rate of prosecution of 
homicides and a more efficient case management methodology. The current program 
is implementing a Model Trial Court in the city of Villa Nueva. In addition to USAID 
assistance, the U.S. Mission in Guatemala also provides support through the State 
Department's Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS http://www.nasgt.com.gtlenglish.htm). 
especially in the area of law enforcement. Related activities are also carried out 
through the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). USAID activities are coordinated closely 
with NAS, respecting the different institutional mandates and carrying out work in a 
cooperative/complementary manner. 
In the last three years, Guatemala, with the support of several donors, has seen the 
incipient implementation of additional key reforms that have not met their full potential 
and still face formidable challenges, or even the risk of reversal. These reforms are: 
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• The Model First Instance Criminal Court: housed in the 24 hour courts, provides 
for expanded service hours, oral pre-trial proceedings, only essential clerical staff, 
readily available statistical information and more efficient management of hearings. 
• The Model Criminal Trial Court: to be piloted in Guatemala City; it will provide for 
more efficient management of hearings, statistical information readily available and only 
essential clerical staff. 
• INACIF: is the autonomous institute that provides scientific evidence services to 
the justice sector institutions, combining forensic units that formerly belonged to the 
PNC and the Public Ministry, as well as the Morgue of the Judiciary. 
• CICIG is the UN temporary body with the mandate of assisting in the 
investigation and prosecution of clandestine security apparatus, parallel security forces, 
organized crime and impunity as it involves violent crime in general. 
• The Prosecutor's Office of Crimes against Life (POAl) is the PM unit with the 
mandate of investigating and prosecuting homicides in the department of Guatemala. 
The cities of Mixco and Villa Nueva have their own equivalents, but are much smaller. 
Collaboration, protection and services to witnesses and victims are fundamental for the 
POAl to achieve adequate efficiency. To date the witness protection program has been 
extremely weak and this has been a serious limitation in witnesses coming forward. 
• The law against Organized Crime: Passed in 2006 only recently the Public 
Ministry and the Police have created new and as yet untested units to conduct special 
criminal investigation methods, such as wiretapping, undercover agents and controlled 
deliveries which are authorized for the first time under this new legislation. 
While these initiatives represent viable. solutions to key problemslissues in the justice 
sector, it is important to recognize that there are real institutional limitations and threats 
to their successful implementation; including weak leadership, inefficient management, 
corruption and a lack of financial and human resources. They will require a sustained 
and determined effort on behalf of both the institutions and donors in order to be 
successful. 
The U.S. Congress recently approved the Merida Initiative (see 
htto://www.state.gov/documents/organization/1 03478.pdf) which will bring important 
financial resources for the strengthening of the Rule of law to Central America and 
Mexico. Apart from funding through USAID and the Department of State, the Merida 
Initiative calls for funding of the Department of Justice for assistance to prosecutors. 
The contract being competed under this Statement of Work will not necessarily receive 
funds from the Merida Initiative, but will be required to coordinate with other U.S. 
Mission programs in this regard. 
C.3 STATEMENT OF WORK 
The Contractor shall focus the USAID Program against Violence and Impunity ("the 
Program") on both the supply and demand sides of the Justice Sector. On the supply 
side, the Contractor shall work at both the national and local levels to improve the 
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delivery of judicial and prosecutorial services. At the national level, the Contractor shall 
work on institutional strengthening and improving inter-institutional planning and 
cooperation among the key justice sector institutions, including the Judicial Branch, the 
Public Ministry (PM, or Spanish acronym, MP), the Public Defense Institute (PDI), the 
National Civilian Police (Spanish acronym PNC), the Autonomous Forensic Institute 
(Spanish acronym, INACIF), and the International Commission against Impunity in 
Guatemala (Spanish acronym CICIG). At the operational level, the Contractor shall 
concentrate on the functioning of model courts and prosecutors offices, processing of 
priority cases, treatment of victims and witnesses and focus on issues in the 
Department of Peten. An overarching approach will be to improve coordination among 
justice sector institutions and positively impact MCC indicators. 
On the demand side, the Contractor shall work to build civil society's capacity to monitor 
and report on the performance of the conceming justice operators. The Contractor shall 
also engage NGOs that provide assistance for female and child victims of crime, and 
those that advocate for crime prevention policies and measures. 
Program strategies shall include, but shall not be limited to: 
• Increase use of data to manage performance 
• Use the Circle of Innovation methodology 
• Use the Institutional Integrity Models 
• Use the Juvenile Justice System Assessment Tool 
• Contemplate applicable international Law (i.e. the Convention on the Elimination of 
All forms of Discrimination against Women; and standards of protection of cultural 
heritage based on international treaties) 
• Focus on sustainability 
• Integrate gender equality as cross-cutting theme 
• Maintain effective coordination with other donors and other USG Agencies 
• Develop a sub-award program 
• Take advantage of windows of opportunity to advance national strategies for the 
reduction of Violence and Impunity, such as the National Agreement for the Security 
and Justice Sectors, and the Strategic Sector Plan to Transform Justice and Security. 
Sub Intermediate Results and Illustrative Activities 
Sub-IR 1: Improved Justice System Capacity to Prosecute and Try Serious Crime: 
The Contractor shall address challenges such as the following, in order to improve the 
investigation and prosecution of homicides and other serious crimes: (i) poor treatment 
and attention to victims and witnesses; (ii) inadequate management of information 
resources; (iii) inadequate inter-institutional coordination; (iv) lack of institutional 
planning and development; (v) lack of compliance with key legislation, such as the Law 
against Organized Crime; (vi) inadequate management causing undue delays in case 
processing. Lower Level Results (LLR) to address these challenges, include: 
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LLR 1.1 Sustainable Improvement in Prosecution of Homicides and other Serious 
Crimes Supported. Illustrative activities: 
• Support the design and implementation of an action plan (Serious Crimes 
Prosecution Improvement Plan) by an adequate working group that shall address, 
among other challenges, bottlenecks, weak implementation of legislation, poor inter￾institutional coordination and inadequate case processing. The plan shall include 
training, mentoring and other methods appropriate to address said challenges. 
• Develop pilot projects of innovative practices, which may include the creation of task 
forces; criminal incident mapping; analytical programs to identify patterns in serious 
crimes; and criminal investigation protocols as appropriate. 
• Mentoring of prosecutors in key issues such as case evaluation; creating theories of 
the crime; improving legal writing; developing investigative techniques; assessing 
witness threats and identifying procedures for their protection; promoting unification of 
criteria on presentation of evidence and interpretation of key laws; providing material 
support; promote the quality control of prosecutor's work. The Contractor will give 
particular attention to procedures for protection of witnesses, including long-term 
witness protection, extradition, distance testimony and videotaping. 
• Support the implementation of the Law against Organized Crime and other key 
legislation by providing assistance, training and limited equipment to the concerning 
justice operators, to apply successful international experiences against organized crime 
as appropriate, such as the use of tracking of financial assets, tax evasion statues, and 
laws on conspiracy such as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. 
• Promote adjustments in legislation or regulations to ensure that the legal framework 
provides for reasonable means to carry out investigations and prosecutions while 
respecting human rights. 
Associated deliverable: Serious Crimes Prosecution Improvement Plan. 
LLR 1.2 Efficient and effective Information Management Protocols in the Public Ministry 
in Place. Illustrative activities: 
• Develop effective and efficient information management protocols, involving 
activities to increase the availability of information, establish data driven management 
approaches and ensure the security and integrity of such information. 
• Develop detailed databases of incidence of serious crime and individuals accused 
and convicted of these crimes to develop geographic crime patterns and groups and 
even families associated with such crimes 
• Support the development of an information management strategy based on best 
practice models for public prosecution institutions. 
• Implement new data collection protocols by adjusting guidelines, manuals, forms 
and IT applications to support the collection of more robust data and then mentor staff 
on the use of these protocols. 
• Help improve public/external web site and develop private intranet site for the MP. 
The intra net portal should provide MP staff appropriate password-based access to 
internal applications such as databases, jurisprudence and legal content systems, and 
e-Iearning modules. 
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• SUpport the procurement of the software and hardware needed for these 
improvements, providing the needed connectivity, and assist in the drafting of manuals 
as needed. 
• Provide training and testing on new software and system maintenance. 
Associated deliverable: MP Information Management Strategic Plan 
LLR 1.3 Comprehensive Growth and Development Plans for Key MP Units in Place. 
Key units include, but are not limited to the Technical Coordination Secretariat; the 
Criminal Policy Secretariat; the Administration Secretariat; Special Units of Organized 
Crime and serious Crimes; and the Public Ministry Council. Illustrative. activities: 
• Implement planning processes within key units in the MP, taking into account each 
unit's critical role in the MP and broader justice system, public expectations of the MP 
and each unit, and develop goal statements for each unit. The Contractor shall mentor 
staff on topics such as strategic planning, performance standards, use of public surveys 
in planning, leadership and other requirements for effective justice planning and 
management. The Contractor shall then assist each unit in preparation of 
comprehensive 3-year development plans centered on performance standards with 
specific activities, timelines, resources, and monitoring mechanisms. 
• Support the implementation of adopted plans through study exchanges, support MP 
advocacy efforts to attain sufficient staff and other resources; provide limited commodity 
and equipment to address priority needs. 
• Provide customized training, technical assistance or equipment to the five key units 
mentioned above, to help them more effectively fulfill their mission and responsibilities. 
LLR 1.4 Smart Replication of the First Instance and Criminal Trial Court Models 
Supported. These models should be replicated in a way that is reasonably accelerated, 
but at the same time, takes into account needs for evaluation, adaptation and 
transformation. Illustrative activities include: 
• Analyze the models' operations and introduce any needed adjustments, including 
those related to staffing patterns, access issues, staff stress and turnover, grater focus 
on victim needs, and size of the population under their jurisdiction. 
• Provide ongoing technical assistance, training and mentoring to justice operators to 
achieve effective working systems, such as checklists, start-up training, performance 
standards and performance monitoring systems, operational manuals, mentoring 
programs, identify innovations, address bottlenecks, needs for remodeling, etc. 
• Support the expansion of the model to those jurisdictions where the model will have 
greater impact. 
Associated deliverables: A report on the analysis of adjustments needed; and one 
operational manual. 
Sub-lR 2: Mobilize justice sector and civil society to reduce and prevent violence: 
The Contractor shall address challenges such as the following: (i) inadequate or 
insufficient governmental and non-governmental legal services for victims of violent 
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crime, including domestic violence; (ii) insufficient coordination amongst governmental 
and non-governmental institutions that provide attention to victims of violent crime; (iii) 
insufficient violence prevention measures for the most vulnerable groups, such as 
women and children. Lower Level Results (LLR) to address these challenges, include: 
LLR 2.1: Availability of Effective Governmental and Non-Governmental Legal Aid 
Services for Victims Increased. Illustrative activities include: 
• Support the creation of networks of information and linkages among providers of 
attention for victims' services, and a survey of victims' services, identifying current 
service types, geographic coverage, best practice usage and accessibility for special 
populations. 
• Support the development of integrated and innovative approaches to the provision of 
services such as psychological assistance, vocational counseling, medical help, 
emergency and safe housing, hotlines, and care for children and other social services. 
• Develop and deliver training curriculum and programs, including training of trainers, 
with the assistance of specialized entities such as the U.S. National Center for Victims 
of Crime or the National Organization for Victim Assistance. Topics for training may 
include intake processes and procedures; psychological trauma; crisis intervention; 
counseling and advocacy; services for children, homicide, family violence, bias crimes 
and sexual assault victims; program standards and evaluation systems; human 
resource and organizational management; case management systems and practices; 
and supervision and debriefing. 
• Support the development of inter-institutional agreements among justice sector 
institutions (MP, INACIF, PNC, Judiciary, POI) on provision of services to victims of 
crimes and the roles and responsibilities of each; as well as developing the training 
necessary for the implementation of these agreements, including curricula and 
programs, and delivering the training, as appropriate. 
LLR 2.2: Coordination among Governmental and NGOs in Victim Services Improved. 
Illustrative activities include: 
• Support development of protocols and reporting to improve inter-agency cooperation 
and integrated response to victims among justice institutions, civil society organizations 
and legal practitioners. 
• Building appropriate inter-agency/NGO notification requirements, procedural 
manuals, training, and intake and case management processes and systerns. 
• Support enhanced program evaluation systems by supporting victim's assistance 
providers to carry out continuous monitoring and evaluation of services provided 
through mechanisms such as surveys, program evaluations and statistical systems. 
• Support training, information-sharing and referral systems through the 
institutionalization of regular inter-agency meetings, trainings and forums to improve 
inter-agency relations. IT technology will be also used to improve these systems, 
tanking the care of putting in place strong security elements to safeguard victims' 
personal data, privacy and safety. 
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LLR 2.3 Key Legislation to Reduce and Prevent Violence Implemented. Illustrative 
activities include: 
• Support the implementation of the Law against Femicide and other Forms of 
Violence against Women by, among other means, supporting the adoption of 
consensus goals and performance standards among the institutions involved (Le. 
Police, prosecutors and courts); supporting quarterly and annual statistical reporting 
systems with the involvement of relevant actors such as the National Statistics Institute, 
and encouraging public reactions to that reporting. 
• Support the establishment of specialized courts and/or prosecutors offices as 
appropriate, providing the necessary training, assistance in drafting manuals and 
regulations, adjusting forms and case management systems, all with customized 
methodologies in observation of the particular characteristics of these specialized 
entities in the Capital City and other regions. 
• Support the monitoring of criminal cases related with this key legislation, by civil 
society organizations. 
LLR 2.4 Complementary Legislation to Prevent Crime and Violence Implemented. 
Illustrative activities include: 
• Support the drafting of new laws addressing violence and impunity, and the 
appropriate planning of allocation of resources for their implementation. These laws 
may address key issues such as juvenile justice and effective oversight of the 
penitentiary system. 
• Support the completion of the roles and responsibilities that relevant institutions 
have in implementing existing legislation related to violence and impunity, agreements, 
and plans such as the Strategic Sector Plan to Transform Justice and Security, and 
applicable intemationallaw. 
• Provide technical assistance, training and mentoring for the Implementation of 
relevant laws. 
Associated deliverable for this Sub IR: Annual Report on Support for Victims Rights 
Sub IR 3: Increased internal Accountability and Oversight within the Justice 
Sector: The Contractor shall address challenges of the Justice Sector, such as the 
following: (i) lack of consolidation of financial management, lack of intemal audit 
controls, teams that have little managerial capacity/experience; (ii) the inexistence, 
incomplete implementation or inadequate enforcement of job descriptions, hierarchies 
and responsibilities; (iii) the lack of implementation of performance evaluation systems; 
and (iv) inadequate statistical reporting and analysis. Lower Level Results (LLR) to 
address these challenges, include: 
LLR 3.1: Implementation of the Public Defender Institute's (POI) Personnel 
Performance Evaluation Systems supported. Illustrative activities: 
• Support POI working committees to develop manageable and sustainable 
measurements of performance, determining the reasonable and appropriate levels of 
public defender productivity in different case types. Performance standards should 
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include quality/professionalism assessment, and account for appropriate activities for 
defenders, such as participation in training and other professional development 
activities. The Contractor shall take into account international best practices and 
analysis of workloads in development of standards and measurement of performance. 
• Ensure that key elements of the career system are in place, such as appropriate 
recruitment, selection, promotion, transfer, evaluations and discipline for personnel. 
These systems should be clear and transparent, and observant of applicable 
international practices and standards. 
• Support the implementation of monitoring systems and standards such as statistical 
reports on performance, related administrative regulations, and strengthen the POI's 
capacity to establish new regulations and review or change existing ones. 
LLR 3.2 Comprehensive Plan for the Oversight, Accountability, and Strategic 
Organization of the Prosecutors Offices Developed and Implemented. Illustrative 
activities include: 
• Promote strategic planning processes that are action and result-oriented, engaging 
the PM leadership and addressing issues such as service delivery; human resources; 
legislative, regulatory and financial infrastructure; and IT needs. The Contractor shall 
provide targeted support for plan implementation through systems and process 
reengineering, developing job descriptions, guidelines, training, and related assistance. 
• Training in the Institutional Integrity Model methodology and observational visits as 
appropriate, supporting the development of ethical conduct and procedures. 
LLR 3.3 Judiciary's Key Administrative, Supervisory and Career Plans and Procedures 
ensure Cost Efficiency, Quality Control, and Career Advancement for Judges and 
Administrative Workers. Illustrative activities include: 
• Promote reform of recruitment, selection and promotion systems in the judicial 
branch for judges and administrative personnel by, among other activities, creating 
working groups that will examine regional and international models in those areas. 
• Promote the incorporation of good practices in administrative and career processes, 
such as the integration of interpersonal skills evaluation as a selection or promotion 
factor; incorporate the development of specific skills in the Judicial School curricula; 
help support the advancement of women and other historically disadvantaged groups; 
and ensure greater involvement of civil society in monitoring a merit-based career 
system and key administrative processes. 
• Support the use of data sources for performance evaluation and appointment 
processes. The Contractor shall provide training, technical assistance and small 
commodity support as appropriate to support the use of technology-based proceedings, 
such as reviewing a random sampling of judicial decisions, reviewing attendance, and 
other methods aimed at improving judicial and administrative. performance. 
LLR 3.4 Network of Positive Leadership for Institutional Change Organized and 
Strengthened. Illustrative activities include: 
• Building a diverse network composed of potential and actual positive leaders who 
support the reform and modernization of the Guatemalan Justice System. 
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• Provide training and technical assistance, and organize mentoring, exchange and 
observational trips, and other activities as appropriate, to ensure the continuation of the 
network and its usefulness to provide mutual counsel, moral support and a sense of 
solidarity among its members. 
Associated deliverable for this Sub IR: Report on judicial Branch Recruitment, 
Selection, and Promotion Processes. 
Special Activities: In addition to the described Sub-IRs, the Contractor shall conduct 
the following special activities which are politically sensitive and strategically critical to 
achieve the impact that USAID desires. 
Special Activity 1: Supporting High Impact Courts. The goal of these courts is to focus 
on combating serious crimes such as organized crime, kidnapping, and drug and 
human trafficking cases, in a secure environment for judges, prosecutors, lawyers, 
witnesses, forensic experts, victims, defendants, evidence, etc. The Contractor shall 
support the implementation of these courts by conducting the following illustrative tasks: 
• Support the Judicial Branch, the PM and other relevant institutions, to undertake a 
design of the High Impact Court, providing appropriate training and technical assistance 
to develop protocols, regulations, security methods and measures, discussing 
jurisdiction, and any other relevant issue. 
• Provide resources and guidance for the design ad implementation of the Courts' 
facilities, security measures, construction andlor remodeling as appropriate. 
• Provide ongoing support to the Courts to make them fully operational and 
sustainable by supporting, among other measures, the development of organizational 
charts, job descriptions, manuals and bench books, training, case management, and 
reporting. 
Associated Deliverable: one high impact court is fully operational by the end of the base 
period of this Task Order. 
Special Activity 2: Strengthen Justice Capacity to Combat Illegal Activities in Peten. 
Peten is one of the main organized crime trafficking routes for drugs, money, arms and 
persons. Local courts and prosecutors are not capable of handling the serious type of 
cases that increasingly occur and appear on court dockets. The Contractor shall 
strengthen the Justice System's capacity to address these challenges by conducting the 
following illustrative tasks: 
• Conduct a gap analysis of the court and PM current practices, approaches and 
limitations in investigating and preparing cases in Peten. 
• Establish links to other project-supP9rted activities and institutions, such as the High 
Impact Courts for processing of more serious criminal matters. 
• Support training and seminars in the unique caseload issues related to Peten, 
addressing issues like the protection of cultural artifacts, preventing the theft and sale of 
protected heritage antiquities, and the depredation of the environment, and applying the 
relevant international law. 
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• Assist development of improved monitoring systems so that more detailed 
information on progress of results in Peten in addressing serious crimes, and protection 
of cultural sites and the environment. Where the monitoring shows areas of weakness, 
the Contractor shall provide targeted assistance to improve performance. 
Associated deliverable: Pet(m Criminal Justice Management Report 
Special Activity 3: Millennium Challenge Indicators Promoted. In order to improve 
stakeholder's awareness, understanding, and participation in the reporting of more 
accurate information on these indicators, the Contractor shall conduct the following 
illustrative activities: 
• Conduct periodic conferences for the media and others on the MCC rule of law and 
related indicators, with particular attention on the participation of justice institutions, civil 
society, business groups, rating institutions and other private sources such as 
foundations and donors. Other outreach material such as media articles and other 
forms of publicity will be used to build awareness of the types of activities CSOs and 
business can be engaged in to impact the indicators. 
• Support the development of action plans for different sectors, including the Justice 
Institutions, business, law enforcement, etc., to advance progress against the indicators. 
• Strengthen the accuracy of ratings by addressing the lack of consistent and accurate 
data and reporting on Guatemala. The Contractor shall publicize data collection and 
report best practices so that final reporting is more accurate. 
Associated deliverable: One action plan adopted. 
Note on Technical Assistance to police: 
The principal beneficiaries of the Program against Violence and Impunity are the 
Public Ministry, the Judiciary, and the Public Defense Institute. Civil society and 
the Autonomous Forensic Institute, INACIF also play an important role. As 
needed to achieve the described results, the Program may periodically require 
the participation of the National Civil Police or other law enforcement institutions. 
USAID assistance to police is restricted and governed by the USAID Police Policy 
which can be found in the following link 
http://www.usaid.gov/policvlads/200/updates/iu2-0702a.pdf. Congressional 
Notifications and human rights vetting is always required, and these processes 
can take several months before activities can commence. No activities with 
police will be undertaken without COTR approval and the completion of the 
necessary requirements. 
Detailed activities and other deliverables will be described in the annual work plans as 
appropriate. 
Gender Considerations 
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Gender diversity in justice sector operators, aside from the police, appears to be moving 
toward gender balance. Women are frequently appointed as judges, prosecutors or 
public defenders, and with less frequency, as magistrates of Appeal or Supreme courts. 
Women, however, have more difficulties accessing justice services as victims, 
witnesses or ordinary citizens, and often have less information and knowledge about 
their own rights, and the regulations of said services. The Contractor will consider 
women's needs and inequities in its offer, including femicide and sexual and domestic 
violence within the activities under the statement of work described above. However, 
USAID expects to see gender-sensitive approaches in this Program. 
END OF SECTION C