SOUTHERN SUDAN TECHNICAL 
ADVISORS PROGRAM (SSTAP) 
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MOEST) 
8 AUGUST 2009
This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International 
Development. It was prepared by Management Systems International.
SOUTHERN SUDAN TECHNICAL 
ADVISORS PROGRAM (SSTAP) 
MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY (MOEST) 
Management Systems International
Corporate Offices
600 Water Street, SW
Washington, DC 20024
Contract No. DFD-I-00-05-00251-00, Task Order No. 2
Services under Program and Project Offices for Results Tracking (SUPPORT)
DISCLAIMER
The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for 
International Development or the United States Government.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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CONTENTS
Project Data Table ........................................................................................................................ iv
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................... vi
Project Location – Southern Sudan ...........................................................................................vii
Glossary .......................................................................................................................................viii
Acronyms....................................................................................................................................... xi
Executive Summary.................................................................................................................... xiv
Background...................................................................................................................... xiv
Recommendations............................................................................................................ xvi
Introduction.................................................................................................................................... 1
1.1 Context.......................................................................................................................... 1
1.2 Program Description: Phases 3 and 4 ........................................................................... 2
II. Purpose and Methodology........................................................................................................ 5
2.1 Purpose.......................................................................................................................... 5
2.2 Summary of the Methodology ...................................................................................... 5
III. Findings and Conclusions....................................................................................................... 7
3.1 TAP Management......................................................................................................... 7
3.2 Partnership .................................................................................................................. 14
3.3 Impact (Short Term Effects)....................................................................................... 19
3.4 Peace Dividend & Conflict Sensitive Analysis........................................................... 21
3.5 Capacity Enhancement Approach............................................................................... 23
3.6 Gender......................................................................................................................... 25
3.7 Risks & Unanticipated Negative External Developments .......................................... 26
3.8 Sustainability .............................................................................................................. 28
IV. Recommendations.................................................................................................................. 30
V. Lessons Learned...................................................................................................................... 32
Annex 1: Scope of Work.............................................................................................................. 33
Annex 2: Schedule of Consultations........................................................................................... 46
Annex 3: Expanded Discussion of the Methodology Approach............................................... 57
Annex 4: TAP Implementation Phases 2005-2011.................................................................... 61
Annex 5: Likhert Scale Scoring of TAP Implementing Principles (from 2007 PMP) ........... 62
Annex 6: Expanded Discussion on Risk Management ............................................................. 66
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Annex 7: MonitorING and Evaluation – Additional Information .......................................... 68
Annex 8: Options for Escalating Levels of Support.................................................................. 68
Annex 9: Case Study - Generating Income to Support the Operational Activities of 
the Western Equatoria State Ministry of Education, Southern Sudan................................... 70
Annex 10: TAP Case Study - Education Payroll System.......................................................... 73
Annex 11: Draft Content for MoE ST-SMoE Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU)........................................................................................................................................... 82
Annex 12: Other Equity Considerations.................................................................................... 84
Annex 13: Organizational Development Tracking and Planning Tool (Draft 2 
080109) .......................................................................................................................................... 86
Annex 14: Indicators.................................................................................................................. 102
Annex 15: Executive and Senior Management Staff Profile.................................................. 105
Annex 16: TAP Model Stakeholder Map................................................................................. 108
Annex 17: Upper Nile Most Significant Change Story........................................................... 109
Annex 18: Proposal Submission and Funding Request Tracking Form............................... 113
Annex 19: Ministry of Education Profiles by State ................................................................ 114
Annex 20: Bibliography............................................................................................................. 139
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LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1: Head Teachers Workshop In Yambio, Western Equatoria State. June 2009 ...................ii
Figure 2: Head Teachers Workshop in Yambio, Western Equatoria State. June 2009....................ii
Figure 3: “We listened to the Government when they told us we should send our 
children to school.” (Mary, a pastoralist and mother of four children - near 
Rumbek, Lakes State). July 2009................................................................................iii
Figure 4: Outdoor study session at home near Rumbek, Lakes State. None of the boys 
has a complete set of textbooks for his grade level.....................................................iii
Figure 5: Map of Southern Sudan (Source: United Nations Office for the Coordination 
of Humanitarian Affairs)............................................................................................vii
Figure 6: TAP Hub-Satellite Management Structure....................................................................... 4
Figure 7: AED TAP Mid-Term Evaluation Areas of Focus ............................................................ 5
Figure 8: TAP Implementation Phase 2005-2011.......................................................................... 61
Figure 9:Histogram representing overall scoring of Implementing Principles (from 2007 
PMP)........................................................................................................................... 62
Figure 10: Illustration of data discrepencies between reports........................................................ 68
Figure 11: Example table which could be used for M&E data. Organised by 
actual/target value, quarter, fiscal year and grouped by province, indicator.............. 65
Figure 12: Ms Nama R. Bullen Beshir, Director General-Western Equatoria State 
Ministry of Education, with Ministry cafeteria workers as they get ready to 
serve lunch. June 2009. (Photo by Valerie Haugen) .................................................. 72
Figure 13: Western Equatoria State Ministry of Education Conference Hall and home of 
the Ministry cafeteria. June, 2009. (Photo by Valerie Haugen) ................................. 72
Figure 14: There Is Positive Feedback From The Ground On The Transparency Of The 
New System – Wes Senior Management And Payroll Unit With The 
Smoe’s First Payroll On The New System. (Photo by Kathryn Johnston)................. 75
Figure 15: Correspondence between IDF and TAP Organizational Development 
Tracking & Planning Framework Categories............................................................. 86
Figure 16: Maturity score totals across all functional areas, by state. ......................................... 100
Figure 17: Maturity score totals across all states, by functional area .......................................... 100
Figure 18: Drilling down into Lakes State having the highest maturity score total across 
functional areas. ....................................................................................................... 101
Figure 19: Drilling down into Unity State having the lowest maturity score total across 
functional areas. ....................................................................................................... 101
Figure 20: Indicator 1 total number of administrators and officials trained. ............................... 102
Figure 21: Indicator 1 by sex. ...................................................................................................... 102
Figure 22: Indicator 5 total number of teachers/educators trained. ............................................. 103
Figure 23: Indicator 5 by sex. ...................................................................................................... 103
Figure 24: Indicator 9 total number of textbooks and other teaching and learning 
materials provided.................................................................................................... 104
Figure 25: Indictor 11 laws, policies, regulations and guidelines developed or modified........... 104
Figure 26:Average months in executive and senior management positions................................ 105
Figure 27:Number of executive and senior management staff by sex and state.......................... 105
Figure 28: Executive and senior management appointments by sex and state. ........................... 106
Figure 29: Gap between CV stated expertise and ToR required expertise. ................................. 106
Figure 30: DTA time on task. ...................................................................................................... 107
Figure 31:TAP model stakeholder map. ...................................................................................... 108
Figure 32: SMOe proposal submission and proposal success data form. .................................... 113
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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LIST OF TABLES
Table 1: Field Work Master Schedule, Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program 
(SSTAP): June 17 – July 31, 2009 ............................................................................. 46
Table 2: Interview Focus Areas & Target Group Emphasis.......................................................... 59
Table 3: Options for Escalating Levels of Support........................................................................ 68
Table 4: Payroll Run Data.............................................................................................................. 77
Table 5: Progress at a Glance......................................................................................................... 78
Table 6: Organizational Development Tracking & Planning Framework ..................................... 87
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
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FIGURE 1: HEAD TEACHERS WORKSHOP IN YAMBIO, WESTERN EQUATORIA STATE. 
JUNE 2009
FIGURE 2: HEAD TEACHERS WORKSHOP IN YAMBIO, WESTERN EQUATORIA STATE.
JUNE 2009
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
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FIGURE 3: “WE LISTENED TO THE GOVERNMENT WHEN THEY TOLD US WE SHOULD 
SEND OUR CHILDREN TO SCHOOL.” (MARY, A PASTORALIST AND MOTHER OF FOUR 
CHILDREN - NEAR RUMBEK, LAKES STATE). JULY 2009
FIGURE 4: OUTDOOR STUDY SESSION AT HOME NEAR RUMBEK, LAKES STATE. NONE 
OF THE BOYS HAS A COMPLETE SET OF TEXTBOOKS FOR HIS GRADE LEVEL.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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PROJECT DATA TABLE
Program Name South Sudan Technical Assistance Program to the Ministry of Education, 
Science and Technology
Region/Country Africa/Southern Sudan (Geographic Area 650)
Program Bi-lateral under Strategic Objective A12/A055
Government of Southern Sudan 
Counterpart 
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST)
Funder United States Agency for International Development (USAID)
Managing Contractor AED (Academy for Educational Development)
Agreement Information Leader Cooperative Agreement No. GDG-A-00-03-00008-00 (2005)
Associate Cooperative Agreement No. 650-A-00-07-00004-00 (August 6, 
2007)
Modification #01 Associate Cooperative Agreement No. 650-A-00-07-
00004-00 (June 18, 2007)
TAP Impact Evaluation Mission TBD
TAP Phase 2 Mid-Term Evaluation 
Mission June 21-July 11, 2009
TAP Phase 2 Award Period June 18, 2007 to September. 
17, 20111
SSTAP Phase 2 Design May 2007
Key Program Dates
SSTAP Phase 1 Implementation Period September, 2005 to June 17, 
2007
Total Contract Value (2005-
2011):
(As of March 2009):
(As of June 18, 2007):
(As of August 6, 2007):
(As of March 2006):
(As of September 2005):
US$17,624,752
US$17,624,752
US$8,499,534
US$7.999,534
US$1m
US$0.5m
Evaluation Provider MSI (Management Systems International)
MTE Team 
Members:
Dr. Valerie Haugen (External Evaluator/Team Leader)
Dr. Robert Gurevich (External Evaluator)
Mr. Hakim Monykuer (Executive Secretary, MoEST)
Mr. Pia Philip (Education Project Management Specialist, 
 
1 TAP documentation cites different starting and ending points for Phase 2. The USAID Associate Cooperative 
Agreement dated August 6, 2007 specifies the time period of June 18, 2007 to September 17, 2011 on the signature page, 
however page 17 of the ACA nominates July 1, 2007 to September 20, 2011.Other TAP documentation uses September, 
2007 as the start date.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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USAID)
Ms. Kathryn Johnston (Senior Education Specialist, 
USAID/MSI)
Mr. Peter Muyingo (Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, 
AED)
MTE Mission Site Visits Southern Sudan States of: Central Equatoria, Lakes States, Warrap, 
Western Bar El Ghazal, Western Equatoria 
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) Team would like to thank the personnel of the Government of Southern 
Sudan, in particular the many individuals in the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) and 
the State Ministries of Education (SMoE) who gave so generously of their time and who provided the Team 
with excellent and candid commentary. The Team would also like to extend its sincere thanks to the students, 
school personnel and community members who shared their perspectives on education in Southern Sudan. 
The feedback on SSTAP enabled the MTE Team to examine the felt changes resulting from the Program and 
to construct recommendations for the final two years of Program implementation. 
Special thanks are extended to personnel from the donor and development partner community whose views 
also helped to inform a more complete understanding of the context in which TAP is being implemented and 
the changes beginning to emerge because of TAP, particularly at the state level due to the work of TAP 
personnel from the Academy for Educational Development (AED). Without this professional and collegial 
assistance to the Team and willingness to participate in a collaborative manner in the conduct of the MTE, 
the effectiveness of the Team and the final product would have been reduced. 
The Team would like to thank the staff of Management Systems International (MSI) for their dependable and 
accommodating assistance with strategic guidance, administrative aspects and on-the-ground logistical 
assistance, especially Ms. Ami Henson (SUPPORT Chief of Party) and Ms. Ashley Wax (Planning, 
Monitoring and Evaluation Expert) for their excellent preparation work setting the parameters of the MTE 
prior to the full Team’s mobilization.
And, last, but most certainly not least, we would like to commend those colleagues who participated as full 
members of the Mid-Term Evaluation Team—Mr Hakim Monykuer (Executive Secretary, MoEST), Ms 
Kathryn Johnston (Senior Education Specialist, USAID/MSI), Mr Pia Philip (Education Project Management 
Specialist, USAID) and Mr Peter Muyingo (Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, AED TAP). The 
contributions of Ms Inez Andrews (Agreement Officer Technical Representative, USAID) and Dr Grace 
Akukwe (Chief of Party, AED TAP) were especially invaluable.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
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PROJECT LOCATION – SOUTHERN SUDAN
FIGURE 5: MAP OF SOUTHERN SUDAN (SOURCE: UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE 
COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS)
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GLOSSARY2
Term Definition
Capability The collective ability of a group or system to do something either inside or outside the system.3
Capacity The overall ability of organizations or systems to add value to others.4
Collaborative 
Evaluation
A collaborative evaluation “implies a varying level of involvement that considers the extent to 
which program staff and other stakeholders should be included as part of the evaluation team...is 
often empowering to participants...(and) enhances their understanding of evaluation so they gain 
new skills...promotes utilization of evaluation findings”5
Conflict 
Sensitivity
“…the ability of an organization to develop and use the sum of its human and organizational 
capital to minimize negative and maximize positive impacts on the conflict dynamics of the 
environt(s) where it works. This means and awareness of the causes of historical, actual or 
potential conflict, and the likelihood of further conflict, and its likely severity; and the capacity 
to work with all parties to minimize the risk of further conflict.6”
Counterpart 
Relationship
“A counterpart is an individual or a collectivity (e.g., a group or even and organization) who 
contributes to a relationship designed to exchange knowledge and support as part of a deliberate 
effort to induce development results in a partner country.”7
Effectiveness The extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or expected to be 
achieved, taking into account their relative importance—progress in achieving objectives, 
standard of outputs, extent of benefit to the target population.
Efficiency A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted to 
results—timeliness and appropriateness of preparation and implementation processes, including 
appraisal and peer review; standard of the contract and activity implementation by the contractor; 
strength of partner government support and the value of dialogue in country; USAID 
management including risk management and use of external expertise; activity monitoring and 
communication.
Endogenous 
Processes
Capacity processes that appear to be essentially internally-driven (by the organization), and not 
driven by the concerns of an external donor.
Evaluation A social science activity directed at collecting, analysing, interpreting and communicating 
information about the workings and effectiveness of social programs.
Gender Equality Gender equality means that women and men enjoy the same status. Gender equality means that 
women and men have equal conditions for realizing their full human rights and potential to 
contribute to national, political, economic, social and cultural development, and to benefit from 
 
2 A number of these definitions, including those for Effectiveness, Efficiency, Impact, Lessons Learned and
Sustainability, are taken from Ausguide, AusAID.
3 Baser, Heather and Morgan, Peter (2008)
4 Ibid.
5 O’Sullivan, Rita M. (2008)
6 Waqo, Halakhe and Onyango, Rachael (2008). Conflict Sensitive Programming. Kenya Humanitarian Forum, OCHA
7 Morgan, Peter (2008)
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
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Term Definition
the results. Gender equality is therefore the equal valuing by society of both the similarities and 
differences between women and men, and the varying roles that they play.8
Gender Equity Gender equity is the process of being fair to women and men. To ensure fairness, measures must 
often be available to compensate for historical and social disadvantages that prevent women and 
men from otherwise operating on a level playing field. Equity leads to equality.9
Impact Positive and negative, primary and secondary long-term effects produced by a development 
intervention, directly or indirectly, intended or unintended—inter alia, impacts may be economic, 
institutional, technological, environmental, socio-cultural, gender-related; measurement of extent 
of impacts (if possible, a cost-benefit analysis should be undertaken); effect on...development 
policies.
Institution Institutions are humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction. They are the ‘rules of 
the game’ in a society, the rules that facilitate human interaction and societal life. They are the 
arrangements human have made for governing their lives...They may be formal arrangements, 
such as legal systems and property rights, or informal arrangements, like moral standards. In 
some cases, they take the form of implicit work views or mental maps, i.e., cognitive 
frameworks for looking at the world around you. These arrangements or institutions operate at 
different levels, ranging from an international level (such as trade arrangements) to community 
and individual levels (for instance, the values that determine the way in which people interact 
with each other).10
Institutional 
Development
Institutional development is the processes by which institutions evolve and perish, i.e., ongoing 
endogenous and autonomous processes in society.11
Lessons Learned Generalizations based on evaluation experiences with activities, programs or policies that 
abstract from the specific circumstances to broader situations. Frequently lessons learned 
highlight strengths or weaknesses in preparation, design and implementation that affect 
performance, outcome and impact.
Organization(al)
Development
The practice of changing people and organizations for positive growth which can take on many 
forms including, but not exclusively, team-building, organizational assessments, career 
development, training, e-learning, coaching, innovation, leadership development, talent 
management, change management.12
Relevance The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with 
beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, global priorities and partners’ and donors’ policies—
relevance of the activity’s objectives (i.e., Were they clear, realistic and measurable?); adequacy 
of documented activity design to achieve objectives.
 
8 Status of Women-Canada (1996) Gender-Based Analysis: A Guide for Policy-Making.
9 Ibid.
10 European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) (no date provided). Institutional Development: 
Learning by Doing and Sharing. Maastricht, Netherlands: Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Poverty Policy and 
Institutional Development Division (DSI/AI).
11 Ibid. Also, for an excellent historical perspective on Organizational Development and Institutional Development, see 
van der Velden, Fons and Leenknegt, Anne-Marie (2006) Facilitation of Organizational Change: Beyond Organizational 
and Institutional Development. Contextuals No. 5 December. 
http://contextinternationalcooperation.files.wordpress.com/2007/12/contextuals-no-5.pdf Accessed from Lae, Papua 
New Guinea at 10:50am August 7, 2009. 
12 http://www.odportal.com/OD/whatisod.htm Accessed from Sydney, Australia at 9:00am July 16, 2009.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
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Term Definition
Sustainability The continuation of benefits from a development intervention after major development 
assistance has been completed—sustainability of benefits (technological, social, environmental, 
gender); sustainability of institutional capacity; maintenance of future recurrent budget (financial 
sustainability).
Workforce 
Development
Those activities that increase the competence of individual staff so that they can contribute 
effectively to the public service throughout their whole working life and which simultaneously 
increase the capacity of public service agencies to adopt high-performance work practices that 
support their staff to develop the full range of their potential skills and value.
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ACRONYMS
Acronym Description
ACA Associate Cooperative Award
AED Academy for Educational Development
AIR American Institutes of Research
AOTR Agreement Officer Technical Representative
AP Annual Plan
AQF Australian Qualifications Framework
AQTF Australian Qualifications Training Framework
AusAID Australian Agency for International Development
AWP Annual Work Plan
CA Cooperative Award
CBTF Capacity Building Trust Fund
CDC Community Development Center
CE Capacity Enhancement
CEC County Education Center
CEQ/CE Central Equatoria State
COP Chief of Party
COTR Contracting Officer Technical Representative
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSPM Conflict Sensitive Program Management
CV Curriculum Vitae
DC District of Columbia
DG Director General
DSTP Diaspora Skills Transfer Program
DTA Diaspora Technical Assistant
EDC Education Development Center
EEQ/EES Eastern Equatoria State
EMIS Education Management Information System
EQUIP Education Quality Improvement Program
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Acronym Description
ERDF Education Rehabilitation and Development Forum
ESP Education Strategic Plan
F/C/R Findings, Conclusions, Recommendations
F2F Face to Face
FBO Faith Based Organization
FGD Focus Group Discussions
FMIS Financial Management Information System
FMS Financial Management System
FTP Fast Track Teacher Education and Training Program
FY Fiscal Year
GBV Gender Based Violence
GEE Gender Equity through Education Project
GoSS Government of Southern Sudan
ICT Information and Communications Technology
ICT4D Information and Communication Technologies for Development
ICT4E Information and Communication Technologies for Education
ID Institutional Development
IDF Institutional Development Framework
IRC International Rescue Committee
IRI Interactive Radio Instruction
LLG Local Level Government
LTTA Long Term Technical Assistance
M&E Monitoring & Evaluation
MDG Millennium Development Goals
MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MoEST Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
MoFEP Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MoLPS Ministry of Labor and Public Service
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
MSI Management Systems International
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Acronym Description
MTE Mid-Term Evaluation
MTE Team Mid-Term Evaluation Team
NBeG Northern Bahr El Ghazal State
NGO Non Governmental Organization
OD Organizational Development
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PMP Program Monitoring Plan
PU Program Unit
RFP Request for Proposals
RTO Registered Training Organization
SAP State Advisors Program
SCF Save the Children
SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
SMoE State Ministry of Education
SOW Scope of Work/Statement of Work
SSTAP/TAP South Sudan Technical Assistance Program
STA Senior Technical Advisor/ State Technical Advisor
STTA Short-Tern Technical Assistance
TA Technical Assistance
TL Team Leader
TOR Terms of Reference
UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Education Fund
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USG United States Government
WBeG Western Bar el Ghazal State
WEQ/WE Western Equatoria State
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
BACKGROUND
Conflict, natural disasters, famine and policies and practices antithetical to development have severely 
affected Southern Sudan’s social, political and economic structures. Southern Sudan currently has the lowest 
Human Development Indicators in the world and 85-90 percent of the population cannot read or write. Since 
the mid-1990s, education (and other services) has been provided largely by international organizations. 
Currently, the drop in the number of organizations providing assistance, the shift from humanitarian relief to 
development assistance programs and the decrease in aid funding overall compound the new Government of 
Southern Sudan’s (GoSS) challenges to establish its core organizations and systems and operationalize a 
decentralized structure. At present, United States Government (USG) assistance places a strong emphasis on 
building peace dividends such as sustained and comprehensive improvements in social services (health and 
education), economic growth and democratic governance. At present, only USAID through the Southern 
Sudan Technical Advisors Program (TAP),13 UNICEF, and the SCF Alliance have technical and/or program 
personnel located in all or nearly all of the states. 
Methodology
A formative and collaborative Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) of TAP Phase 2 was conducted from June 21 to 
July 11, 2009. The MTE Team consisted of two external evaluators, Dr Valerie Haugen (Team Leader) and 
Dr Robert Gurevich, as well as Mr Hakim Monykuer (Executive Secretary, Ministry of Education, Science 
and Technology - MoEST)), Mr Pia Philip (Education Project Management Specialist, USAID), Ms Kathryn 
Johnston (Senior Education Specialist, MSI for USAID) and Mr Peter Muyingo (Monitoring and Evaluation 
Specialist, AED TAP). The Team visited five states, Central Equatoria (CE), Lakes, Warrap, Western Bar El 
Ghazal (WBeG) and Western Equatoria (WE), and met with nearly 180 stakeholders from the GoSS 
Parliament, MoEST, State Ministries of Education (SMoE at state and local government levels), students and 
community members and development partner organizations. The Team also reviewed a range of GoSS and 
United States Government (USG), TAP and international primary and secondary source documentation. A 
range of qualitative and quantitative data collection methods using customized instruments as well as Focus 
Group Discussions (FGD), Mini-Focus Group Discussions (MFGD) and Key Participant Interviews were 
used.
Program Description
In September, 2005, USAID established the EQUIP2 Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (TAP) 
to build the capacity of the newly created Ministry of Education, Science and Technology in priority areas of 
policy development and implementation, planning and budgeting, and program implementation. The 
Academy for Educational Development (AED) and its partners, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) 
and (until 2008) the American Institutes for Research (AIR), are the TAP implementing agencies. TAP Phases 
1 and 2 are best described as four phases. Phases 1 and 2 (2005-May 2007) focused on establishing the 
“machinery of government” necessary for the newly-created central level Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology, primarily through short-term technical assistance (STTA). Phases 3 and 4 represent a shift to 
long-term technical assistance (LTTA) working to build capacity at the sub-national level in State Ministries 
of Education headquarters (HQ) and county development/education centers (CDCs/CECs). Phase 3 (June 
2007-May 2008) is best described as the “1 STA: 2 SMoE Model” and consisted of four AED-contracted 
 
13 TAP is variously referred to in documentation and by stakeholders as “TAP”, “SSTAP”, “SAP” (State Advisors 
Program). For the purposes of the MTE Report, “TAP” will be used.
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Senior Technical Advisors14 (STAs--one of whom functioned as Chief of Party), two MoEST-contracted 
STAs financed out of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF), and a small number of administrative personnel. 
Phase 4 (June 2008-September 2011), the “2 LTTA: 1 SMoE Model”, currently consists of pairs of LTTAs 
co-located in each state. Staffing overall consists of the LTTAs--11 STAs of whom eight are AED-contracted 
and three are MoEST-contracted and 10 Diaspora Technical Assistants (DTAs)--and several administrative 
staff in Juba and some states, for a total of 33 personnel.
Embedded within the design of Phases 3 and 4 (formerly Phase 2) was a critical assumption that the Fast 
Track Teacher Education and Training Program (FTP)15 pilot would be scaled up and rolled out. Wide-scale 
FTP implementation would – it was assumed – contribute to the specific development impacts of improving 
access to basic education and improving the quality of education services to help achieve the GoSS target of 
providing basic education to 55 percent of children by 2011. TAP’s funding has increased since 2005 and is 
now just over US$17m, of which $8m is allocated to Phase 2. TAP is scheduled to end on September 17, 
2011.
Most Significant Findings, Conclusions and Impact
AED has done a commendable job fulfilling the terms of its contract, working with MoEST and 
development partners and increasingly with SMoEs, and has contributed significantly to the development of 
the education sector, particularly at the central level. To date, AED has met or exceeded its targets for all 
indicators, with the exception of gender (see figures in Annex 14: Indicators) As of July 2009, all but two (one 
STA to be contracted by MoEST and one DTA to be contracted by AED) of the 21 TA personnel have been 
recruited and are established in their respective SMoEs. Management systems to support these personnel 
have been established and are being refined. The TAP management structure itself has evolved into a highly 
decentralized model consisting of a “hub” (the TAP head office in two separate administrative locations in 
Juba and 11 ‘satellites’ (distinct implementation locations in 10 states and the central MoEST in Juba). This 
expansion was accomplished largely during a change in Chief of Party (COP) personnel. It is to the credit of 
the incumbent COP that she managed to oversee the TAP scale-up just as she was taking up the COP role.
The AED team has demonstrated an ability to adapt to the rapidly changing environment of Southern Sudan. 
There is clear evidence that at the state level TAP has generated a great deal of excitement and good will and 
that the Program is filling a large gap in expertise. The Program is having a catalytic effect on as well as 
assisting SMoEs to: (i) increase the professionalism of SMoEs generally, (ii) take a leadership role with 
development partners, and (iii) increase the productivity of those partner government personnel who interact 
most consistently with STAs and DTAs. Benefits accruing include increased capacity in planning, 
understanding and using education data, using the new payroll system, working collaboratively with colleagues 
and development partners, using computers and the Internet, and “self-management”.
A number of factors appear to have combined to reduce the potential impact of TAP Phases 3 and 4 and the 
related peace dividend being derived from the Program. They include: 
1. The negative outcome of a critical project design assumption that had (incorrectly, as it turned out) 
anticipated external funding becoming available to leverage MDTF resources needed to scale-up and 
roll out the FTP. There does not appear to have been adequate risk mitigation solutions (having a 
“Plan B” on hand) to respond quickly to this important development. On the other hand – and to 
their credit – USAID and AED have demonstrated a solid collective capacity for adaptive 
management by recognizing this development in Modification 03 of Associate Cooperative 
Agreement (650-A-00-07-00004-00). It is not clear if the mitigating approach articulated in 
 
14 Senior Technical Advisors are variously referred to in documentation as State Advisors (SA). For the purposes of the 
MTE Report, the terms, “Senior Technical Advisor/STA”, will be used.
15 The FTP incorporated both formal and non-formal (Alternative) education teacher training.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
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Modification Three will be sufficient to meet the challenge of the critical design assumption not 
manifesting, but it is an important step in the right direction and TAP does appear to be finding its 
feet in terms of a revised strategic approach;
2. The initiation of Phase 4 only a very short time after Phase 3 had begun. This required a nearly 
quadrupling of TA personnel (from six to 21 STAs and DTAs) in a limited time frame and captured 
the time and effort of the COP at an operational level; 
3. The inability of MoEST to mobilize programs and disburse funds under the MDTF Phase 1. 
Without the MDTF funds and programs, SMoE personnel have little opportunity to manage any 
aspect of education except salaries (and even this is problematic) and no way to “learn by doing” 
except through the occasional opportunity provided by development partners to be involved in 
implementation of their respective programs. This situation has also affected the TAP design logic--
capacity enhancement in education management and program management through the FTP pilot 
structure and instruments; and 
4. Emphasis on “one-on-one” coaching rather than more current capacity enhancement directions that 
“share the TA wealth” more broadly.
While some of these factors were not within TAP’s sphere of management control and some were 
unavoidable, nonetheless, they provide clear illustrations of some of the contextual challenges.
AED TAP has 28 months remaining to ensure that the benefits derived through the Program will be 
sustained. The incumbent COP is now turning her attention toward the strategic dimension and putting in 
place processes and structures to help TA personnel ensure that capacity of individuals at the state and 
county levels is enhanced and that a common core of critical functions, systems and processes are established 
across all SMoEs. In the immediate future, TAP needs to address several management issues related to work 
conditions (including some contractual concerns, particularly with regard to the DTA contract and DTA 
recruitment and retention and rest and relaxation conditions) and TA personnel inputs sacrificed due to area 
insecurity considerations. TAP also, at a minimum, needs to demonstrate progress on several strategic issues 
including: (i) gender equity; (ii) conflict sensitivity; (iii) the role TAP will play in assisting SMoEs to manage 
and leverage development partner funds, programs and opportunities, especially given the absence of GoSS 
monies and programs; (iv) the role TAP will play in helping SMoEs cope with a potentially overwhelming 
infusion of funds and programs once the MDTF becomes functional; and (v) monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E). The MTE Team has some concerns about the value for money/rate of return derived from using 
LTTA personnel to address the more ‘mundane’ capacity enhancement competencies (such as time 
management, meeting behaviors, managing one’s work, computer literacy, etc.).16
RECOMMENDATIONS
Strategy
Recommendation 1: Request AED TAP to review and refine the draft Memorandum of Understanding 
(see Annex 11: Draft Content for MoE ST-SMoE Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU)) clearly articulating expected roles and responsibilities and agreed strategies 
to resolve issues and to present it to MoEST, state governors and SMoEs for 
consideration as a concept and potential action.
Recommendation 2: Request AED TAP to articulate its approach (including an action plan) to 
progressing the anticipated partnerships between State Ministries of Education and 
donor/development partners and between TAP and other USAID nominated 
 
16 Please refer to a separate document, the Addendum to the Mid-Term Evaluation, for further details on this issue. 
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
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xvii
activities (BRIDGE, GEE and IRI) and ensure that TA personnel and SMoE 
personnel are familiar with and supportive of the directions proposed. 
Human Resources
Recommendation 3: Request AED TAP-Washington to re-assess the level of TAP Hub (central program 
office) resourcing and to specifically ‘uncouple’ the Chief of Party (COP) role from 
the Senior Technical Advisor role with both becoming separately staffed, full-time 
positions. The MoEST Senior Technical Advisor position should only be staffed 
once Recommendation 6: has been accomplished. 
Recommendation 4: Request AED TAP to resolve outstanding personnel well-being and contractual 
issues, including re-visiting and refining position descriptions. 
Recommendation 5: Request AED TAP to identify and implement a strategy to support current TA 
personnel on the job including, at a minimum Option 1 and considering Options 2 
and 3 (see Annex 8: Options for Escalating Levels of Support), particularly if 
additional financing becomes available.
Recommendation 6: Request AED TAP to discuss fielding a short-term technical expert to provide 
advice to MoEST on a strategic approach to ensure the identification, recruitment, 
utilization and management of TA that fits with the evolving needs of both the 
MoEST and the GoSS Parliamentary Committee for Education. 
Impact
Recommendation 7: Request AED TAP to immediately draft: (i) a sustainability and exit strategy taking 
into account TAP’s ending date of September 2011 as well as the long-term 
considerations associated with a realistic capacity building time frame 
(conservatively 10-20 years) and (ii) a standard risk management matrix. 
Recommendation 8: Request AED TAP to incorporate conflict sensitive analysis into its programming, 
utilizing one of the many tools available and to report on the cumulative amount of 
time TA personnel are kept off or are limited on the job due to insecurity since this 
factor has significant implications for TAP impact.
Recommendation 9: Request AED TAP to introduce a Program Logical Framework or Results 
Framework that grounds qualitative findings in empirical data and sound research 
methods and improves monitoring and evaluation to take into account: (i) a clear 
M&E approach (and ideally a framework)17 and (ii) analyses and meta-analyses of 
data and inclusion of these findings in reports.
Recommendation 10: Request AED TAP to articulate a gender and development support strategy in 
collaboration with GEE that is informed by the work being undertaken by GoSS 
bodies, other development partners, and projects. 
 
17 For an example of a comprehensive Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, see Annex 7: MonitorING and 
Evaluation – Additional Information
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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INTRODUCTION
1.1 CONTEXT 
Sudan is the largest country in Africa and is classified as a ‘rebuilding country’ under the United States 
Government’s (USG) current strategic framework. Historically Sudan has been divided into the North, with 
its close ties to Egypt and it’s predominantly Arab and Muslim population, and the South, with its 
predominantly black, Christian and Animist population. From 1898 to 1954, the two parts of the region were 
administered separately by a British-Egyptian pact in which ‘no-go’ zones between North and South were 
imposed. The administrative situation and the no-go zones both served to exacerbate the separateness of the 
North and South. The First Sudanese War began shortly before independence in 1956 and lasted for 17 years 
followed by a 10-year period of peace. The Second Sudanese War began in 1983 and ended some two 
decades later on January 9, 2005 with the official signing of the Nairobi Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA). Of Sudan’s 54 years of nationhood, 38 years have been consumed by war. The Nairobi CPA grants a
six year interim period of autonomy to Southern Sudan and an internationally monitored referendum in 2011 
to determine its future direction; sharing of common wealth; and resolution of the Abyei conflict through 
self-determination.
Southern Sudan’s population is estimated at 9 -12 million18 people along with an additional four million 
people who are living as Displaced Persons in Northern Sudan or as refugees elsewhere. It is estimated that 
around 95 percent of Southern Sudan’s population was displaced due to the Second Sudanese War, and 
generations of Sudanese have been born into or lived during decades of violent conflict. Along with natural 
disasters, famine and policies and practices antithetical to development, conflict has severely affected the 
South’s social, political and economic structures. Southern Sudan currently has the lowest Human 
Development Indicators in the world and 85-90 percent of the population cannot read or write. 
Since the mid-1990s, education (and other services) have been provided largely by international organizations. 
Currently, the drop in the number of organizations providing assistance, the shift from humanitarian relief to 
development assistance programs, and the decrease in aid funding overall compound the new Government of 
Southern Sudan’s (GoSS) challenges to establish its core organizations and systems and operationalize a 
decentralized structure. At present, United States Government (USG) assistance places a strong emphasis on 
building peace dividends such as sustained and comprehensive improvements in social services (health and 
education), economic growth and democratic governance. At present, only USAID through the Southern 
Sudan Technical Advisors Program (TAP),19 UNICEF, and the SCF Alliance have technical and/or program 
personnel located in all or nearly all of the states. USG assistance places a strong emphasis on building peace 
dividends such as sustained and comprehensive improvements in social services (i.e., health and education), 
economic growth and democratic governance. 
State Ministry of Education (SMoE) funding for education is provided almost exclusively by GoSS through 
the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) or the Ministry of Education, Science and 
Technology (MoEST). The national primary education budget has been in decline since the CPA went into 
effect with current per student expenditure at around US$45 per annum. It is estimated that around 95 
percent of the GoSS education budget is spent on salaries, with the remaining five percent going to 
administrative costs. There is little evidence of operational funds except through the funding of proposals 
submitted occasionally to development partners by SMoEs. 
The Sudanese place a high value on education. But the 2008 education census (with a commendably high 
compliance rate across the South) data show the magnitude of the challenges facing the Government. As of 
 
18 The current census estimates the figure around 10 million; however, some disagreement remains.
19 TAP is variously referred to in documentation and by stakeholders as “TAP”, “SSTAP”, “SAP” (State Advisors 
Program). For the purposes of the MTE Report, “TAP” will be used.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
2
April 2008, primary school enrolment was estimated to be between 1.7 and 2.1 million students with ever￾increasing numbers of students (particularly over-age students who comprise 90 percent of the primary 
education student population) enrolling in and attending makeshift schools. For example, the primary 
education pupil:teacher ratio averages 50:1, but some state averages are much higher (for example, 170:1). 
Gender equity is steadily improving in primary grades 1-4 with three girls for every five boys on average 
although some states are doing better while others are doing worse. The pupil:textbook ratio has improved on 
average, albeit slowly, but learning materials are still inadequate by almost any standard. Over 65 percent of 
primary school teachers have had little or no training20 with only seven per cent having had at least one year 
of training. An estimated 90 percent of teachers are competent in Sudanese Arabic, but only about 20-30 per 
cent of teachers have even rudimentary English language skills.21 Despite this language deficit, GoSS policy 
now makes English the medium of instruction from grade 4 onwards. Some education statistics are much 
better in the secondary education sub-sector, but this is probably largely due to the sub-sector’s small student 
population. As the primary education completion rates improve, secondary education will likely come under 
stress. 
Although the Sudanese People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) Secretariat of Education went to great efforts 
to create and implement a strategy for providing basic education and life skills training during the past war, in 
this immediate post-conflict period, the education sector is still in a formative state both in terms of the 
capacity to manage education service delivery to the current primary education student population and to 
expand the provision of quality education to any Southern Sudanese interested in learning. Since the signing 
of the CPA, the fundamental building blocks of the sector have been put in place, specifically, the: (i) 
establishment and staffing of the newly-established Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and the 
State Ministries of Education; (ii) development of a number of necessary legislative, policy and other 
documents including the draft Southern Sudan Education Act (2008); (iii) establishment of the “educational 
cycle or ladder” of eight years of primary (basic) education for learners aged six to thirteen (but also including 
Non-Formal Education), four years of secondary education and four years of tertiary education; and (iv) the 
establishment of sector planning and development mechanisms such as the Education Rehabilitation and 
Development Framework meetings and thematic working groups. 
SMoE personnel from the state and local level government (LLG) offices tend to have little involvement with 
schools, not because of a lack of interest, but largely because they lack transport and/or are unsure of their 
roles as administrators and managers. Most education officers and head teachers do not have even minimum 
academic and professional qualifications or experience. While there is evidence of strong leadership in the 
education sector in some states, these leaders also tend to be vulnerable to the changing political scene 
including wide-scale, sweeping changes of administrators in some SMoEs. These displacements create 
significant challenges to building the strength of the sector. The upcoming general elections in February, 
2010, may result in a further disruption of key education management personnel. Until recently, many 
development partners have largely provided their own stand-alone solutions to education service delivery, at 
best only informing SMoEs of their activities and at worst bypassing the Government altogether. This 
scenario exacerbates the already daunting challenges facing the new ministries. In addition, formal or informal 
access by education managers to technical expertise is increasingly limited as development partners withdraw. 
1.2 PROGRAM DESCRIPTION: PHASES 3 AND 4
In September, 2005, USAID established the EQUIP2 Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (TAP) 
to build the capacity of the newly created Ministry of Education, Science and Technology in priority areas of 
policy development and implementation, planning and budgeting, and program implementation. An 
Associate Cooperative Agreement (650-A-00-07-00004-00) was signed on August 6, 2007, by USAID and the 
Academy for Educational Development (AED), and Modification 01 (signed May 8, 2008) was established to 
 
20 These education statistics are taken from an untitled synopsis provided by the AED EMIS advisor and based on 2008 
education census data derived from the education database developed with UNICEF support. 
21 MSI. (2008) Mid-Term Evaluation of the USAID-funded Interactive Radio Instruction Project.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
3
support decentralization and systems development through capacity enhancement in six (initially) SMoEs, 
specifically building state level personnel’s skills in: (i) planning and budgeting, (ii) establishing and managing 
a financial management system, (iii) implementing, and (iv) monitoring and evaluating the activities associated 
with teacher education and training.22
TAP is located under USAID’s ‘Investing in People’ objective which supports the delivery of critical social 
services, including education and health, and builds institutional capacity. TAP also aligns with USAID’s 
Fragile State Strategy with its four inter-related priorities to: (i) enhance stability, (ii) improve security, (iii) 
encourage reform, and (iv) develop the capacity of institutions. TAP also aligns with Government of 
Southern Sudan directions articulated in the 2005 Interim Constitution and the MoEST Policy Framework 
(2006-2007). The Interim Constitution includes statements on education (33.1-2), individuals with special 
needs (34.1-2), women (20.1-5), English and Arabic as the official working languages of Government and 
higher education (6.2) and on decentralization (Chapter 3, especially 52.1-2 on inter-governmental linkages). 
The MoEST Policy Framework presents a vision, mission, and goals, principles and strategies for developing 
the education sector, including enhancing educational planning systems and improving education 
management systems. 
Under the Associate Cooperative Agreement, AED provides management oversight for TAP and ensures the 
overall technical and financial integrity and adherence to the terms of the Cooperative Agreement. AED 
fields all long term technical assistance (LTTA) personnel and is the official conduit for communications 
between TAP and USAID. AED’s TAP partners, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) and (until late 
2008) the American Institutes for Research (AIR) provide most of the targeted short-term technical assistance 
(STTA) personnel in the areas of teacher in-service education and curriculum development and gender 
respectively. In Phases 1, 2 and 3, there was a good deal of interaction between AED and IRC (and AIR) in 
the fielding and management of STTA. IRC is funding one STA position and the IRC representative attended 
the July 6-9, 2009 Quarterly Workshop in Juba. 
TAP Phases 1 and 2 are best described as four phases. 23 Phases 1 and 2 (2005-May 2007) focused on 
establishing the “machinery of government” necessary for the newly-created central level Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) primarily through short-term technical assistance (STTA). 
Phases 3 and 4, the subject of the MTE, represent a shift to LTTA working to build capacity at the sub￾national level in State Ministries of Education (SMoE) headquarters (HQ) and county 
development/education centers (CDCs/CECs). As TAP’s implementation profile has expanded, so has its 
budget. The Program’s initial budget in 2005 was US$.5m and this has increased to US$17.6m for the
October 2005 to September 2011 time frame. US$8m (just under half of the total funding envelope of TAP) 
or around US$2m per annum is currently being disbursed under Phases 3 and 4. 
Phase 3 (June 2007-May 2008) is best described as the “1 STA:2 SMoE Model” of four AED-contracted 
Senior Technical Advisors (STAs)24 (one of whom functioned as the Chief of Party), two MoEST-contracted 
STAs financed out of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) and a small number of administrative personnel. 
Phase 3 has been described as a ‘lynchpin program in ensuring that educational services more rapidly reach 
the local level throughout Southern Sudan”. It continued activities in the areas of education policy, planning, 
budgeting and management and also introduced a focus on policy implementation over policy development 
and building a “common core” of capacity in planning, logistic, financial and monitoring and evaluation 
systems specifically associated with teacher development programming. 
 
22 While the ACA itself is not specific about teacher education and training, the AED Associate Award Application 
makes it very clear that the provision of TA is intended to strengthen the teacher education and training system and the 
targeted common core functions are located under this umbrella.
23 In order to make the dynamic evolution of the Program more explicit the Mid-Term Evaluation Team has re-classified 
TAP into four phases (see Figure 8: TAP Implementation Phase 2005-2011). This re-classification will be used for the 
purposes of this MTE Report.
24 Senior Technical Advisors are variously referred to in documentation as State Advisors (SA). For the purposes of the 
MTE Report, the terms, “Senior Technical Advisor/STA”, will be used.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
4
Phase 4 (June 2008-September 2011), the “2 LTTA:1 SMoE Model”, consists of pairs of STAs and DTAs 
that are co-located in each SMoE. Personnel consist of 11 STAs (eight AED-contracted and three MoEST￾contracted), 10 Diaspora Technical Assistants (DTAs) and a number of administrative staff based in Juba and 
some states bringing the total to 33 personnel. The majority of TAP TA personnel (18 including the 
COP/MoEST STA) are funded through USAID development assistance funds and three STA positions are 
contracted through MoEST and financed under the World Bank-administered Multi-Donor Trust Fund
(MDTF). This arrangement is discussed in greater detail in section 3.2 Partnership. AED provides technical 
oversight for all TA personnel. Phase 4 therefore represents an even greater intensification of the sub￾national focus.25
Under Phase 4, the TAP management structure has evolved into a highly decentralized model consisting of a 
“hub” (the TAP head office in two separate locations for administration and for Technical Assistance to 
MOEST in Juba), and 11 ‘satellites’ (distinct implementation locations in 10 states and the central MoEST in 
Juba). (See Figure 6 below.)
FIGURE 6: TAP HUB-SATELLITE MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
The Chief of Party (COP) supervises and evaluates all staff, prepares reports (written and oral) for and liaises 
with USAID, AED Headquarters (AED HQ) in Washington DC, development partners and other GoSS 
ministries (such as the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning-MoFEP) and undertakes any additional 
responsibilities necessary for the successful implementation of TAP. The TAP Hub: (i) provides technical 
guidance to the Program, (ii) provides oversight of the activities of the TA personnel through review of 
written and oral reports and field visits, (iii) identifies and recommends personnel for AED/HQ, USAID and 
GoSS approval, (iv) reports to USAID and other donors, (v) maintains financial records and reports, (vi) 
provides orientations and training to field staff, (vii) supervises Juba Hub office activities, and (viii) 
undertakes any other necessary activity management functions. Four AED HQ staff provide varying levels of 
support on financial, programmatic and technical contractual and administrative matters. The US-based staff 
coordinates reporting to USAID.
 
25 This situation is discussed in greater depth in section 3.7 Risks & Unanticipated Negative External Developments and 
Annex 6: Expanded Discussion on Risk Management
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
5
II. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1 PURPOSE
The purpose of the mission was to conduct a review of TAP experience to date. Two aims of the MTE 
findings, conclusions and recommendations were to provide input to: (i) improve and enhance the 
implementation of TAP and (ii) help ensure the greatest positive impact with the strongest likelihood of the 
sustainability over time of the benefits derived from the Program. Specific areas of investigation requested by 
USAID Sudan are found in Figure 7 (below). In addition, the findings have been used to suggest avenues for 
Program alteration and/or additional support, should funding become available from USG.
FIGURE 7: AED TAP MID-TERM EVALUATION AREAS OF FOCUS
The MTE Team was asked to address 14 evaluation questions under three focus areas: (i) project design, (ii) 
project implementation, and (iii) project impact to date. For a consolidated list of the evaluation questions, 
please refer to Annex 1: Scope of Work. The outcomes of the MTE mission were presented in a series of 
informal de-briefings for Government and TAP personnel and in a formal de-briefing to GoSS and USG 
stakeholders and other interested parties on July 9, 2009 at MoEST in Juba. A draft Mid-Term Evaluation 
Report was submitted for comments to GoSS, USAID and AED through MSI on July 20 with the final 
report submitted March 2010.
2.2 SUMMARY OF THE METHODOLOGY26
A formative and collaborative Mid-Term Evaluation (MTE) of TAP was conducted from June 21 to July 11, 
2009. The MTE Team consisted of two external evaluators, Dr. Valerie Haugen (Team Leader) and Dr. 
Robert Gurevich as well as Mr. Hakim Monykuer (Executive Secretary, MoEST), Mr. Pia Philip (Education 
Project Management Specialist, USAID), Ms. Kathryn Johnston (Senior Education Specialist, MSI for 
USAID) and Mr. Peter Muyingo (Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist, AED TAP). The Team visited five 
states, Central Equatoria (CE), Lakes, Warrap, Western Bar El Ghazal (WBeG) and Western Equatoria (WE), 
and met with nearly 180 stakeholders from the GoSS Parliament, MoEST, SMoEs (state and local 
government levels), students and community members and development partner organizations27 A range of 
qualitative and quantitative data collection methods using customized instruments as well as Focus Group 
Discussions (FGD), Mini-Focus Group Discussions (MFGD) and Key Participant Interviews were used. 
Primary and secondary sources were reviewed, most notably, GoSS and USG documentation, TAP reports 
and reference material on capacity building, education in conflict-affected contexts, conflict sensitive analysis 
and technical assistance as a form of aid (see Annex 20: Bibliography) Analyses of the data were undertaken 
 
26 See Annex 3: Expanded Discussion of the Methodology Approach.
27 Annex 3 provides a complete list of participant groups and the evaluation areas explored with each group. The Matrix 
of Areas of Focus by Participant Group was developed in close consultation with USAID, GoSS and AED.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
6
in an iterative manner throughout the field work with a Team workshop to draft preliminary Findings, 
Conclusions and Recommendations.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
7
III. FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
3.1 TAP MANAGEMENT
3.1.1 Program Office
Findings: TAP overall has grown rapidly since October 2005. During TAP Phases 3 and 4, staff increased 
from 6 STAs to 21 STAs/DTAs, requiring commensurate scaling up of supervisory and administrative 
requirements, including management of 11 separate imprest accounts. The Program has just recently (and for 
the first time) achieved a near full (barring one STA yet to be contracted by MoEST) complement of TA 
personnel. The highly-decentralized “Hub-11 Satellites” management model (13 locations including two Hub 
offices, MoEST and 10 SMoE sites), while appropriate to the Program needs, presents particular challenges 
given the lack of infrastructure in and distances between sites. In consequence, communications, travel and 
ongoing face-to-face contact with and between TAP personnel are constrained. For most of the period, the 
TAP Hub has been housed in very cramped office space on the campus of the MoEST, where working 
conditions were abysmal. To address this situation, TAP management recently rented additional office space, 
meaning that the COP will be dividing her time between both sites. 
TAP-Hub personnel put in long work weeks in order to keep up with the demands of the Program. Both the 
COP and the Operations Manager put in up to 30 hours of overtime per week on a regular basis. The COP 
spends 70 percent of her time on TAP management and 30 percent on MoEST advisory support. The 
increasing management load has been flagged a number of times by AED in quarterly and annual reports. 
Despite the long work weeks, the current COP is not well-known among many SMoE personnel interviewed 
and they viewed the lack of visibility as a deficit. TA personnel also were eager for more contact and several 
TA personnel who have been placed in precarious positions professionally and personally also felt a greater 
management presence would be of benefit. Discussions with TAP Hub and AED HQ personnel and a review 
of AED documentation indicate that AED is aware of the need for additional support and has responded to 
the increased workload by staffing three additional FTE positions, including creating an Operations Manager 
position to relieve some of the administrative pressure on the COP. AED also may begin quarterly visits to 
Juba. 
Conclusions: Clearly, the management and administrative personnel involved in TAP since 2005 are highly 
competent and the willingness to ‘go the extra mile’ to ensure the Program is functional is commendable. The 
hands-on TAP experience of Dr Akukwe, the incumbent COP, as the STA for Western Bahr El Ghazal and 
Northern Bahr El Ghazal SMoEs is a definite advantage. The rapid expansion of TAP required a COP who 
could ‘hit the ground running’, which Dr. Akukwe was able to do. However, while AED has been proactive 
identifying solutions to the TAP Hub management challenges, the levels of staffing and support are still not 
adequate, with management and administrative personnel being overworked. In addition, the requirement 
that the COP perform two demanding roles has negatively affected the visibility of the COP and TAP itself 
across a wide range of stakeholders, including all SMoE Headquarters (HQ) officials and staff, State 
Parliament Education Committee members and development partners within the states. It is an important 
aspect of TAP implementation. The regular presence of the COP can also provide a measure of protection 
for TA personnel who may occasionally be placed in precarious or undesirable situations and can be an 
effective tool for protecting the aid investment and for motivating stakeholders to take equal if not greater 
measures to ensure TAP’s success. Although AED has tried to alleviate the workspace limitations, inadequate 
Program facilities have certainly hampered implementation and while the procurement of a second office 
premises alleviates space issues somewhat, it also introduces the burden of working between two Hub 
locations.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
8
3.1.2 Human Resource Management 
Fit of Personnel Backgrounds to Position Descriptions
Finding: On the basis of in-depth interviews with 11 of the TA and other TAP personnel, as well as 
observations of TA personnel during field work, TA personnel on the whole appear to be competent, highly￾motivated, and committed professionals. Two external stakeholders noted that the quality of TA personnel 
has been improving. The TAP Hub is having good success attracting interested Southern Sudanese from the 
diaspora (albeit primarily male) for DTA positions and females for STA positions. 
The qualifications and experience cited in the Associate Cooperative Agreement (ACA) and those contained 
in the AED TAP advertisement and position descriptions and in the curriculum vitae (CVs) of a number of 
TA personnel display discrepancies. The ACA is much more explicit about the types of specialization 
expected (a graduate degree specializing in general education or education planning or related fields such as 
statistics, administration and finance or related fields such as economics; or curriculum development or 
related fields such as teacher training and 5+ years in policy development in the education sector or related 
experience) whereas the TAP advertisement and position description is less so (particular skills and 
experience in an area such as educational planning, finance and budgeting, teacher professional development, 
curriculum development, or monitoring and evaluation). In large part, the STA and DTA position 
descriptions are identical except that: (i) the DTA is being supervised and the STA is supervising and (ii) the
DTA position does not require an advanced (master’s or doctorate) degree. Again, there are differences 
between the ACA Modification #01 and the TAP position descriptions for DTAs. 
A review of the biographical sketches of potential state advisor candidates listed in the ACA Application (pp. 
12-13) shows that the four individuals listed all have qualifications and practitioner experience in education 
administration/management and match very closely the ACA requirements. A gap analysis was undertaken of 
the targeted knowledge, skills, experience and qualifications28 in various TAP-related documentation and 
those that can be easily extracted from the CVs of most of the current STAs and DTAs.29 This was 
supplemented by interviews with half of the STAs and DTAs (see Figure 29, Annex 15: Executive and Senior 
Management Staff Profile). The analysis indicates that few of the STAs have qualifications in education 
administration and management and/or in-line practitioner experience as administrators or managers in 
education systems. Most STAs do not have qualifications or in-depth practitioner experience in capacity 
development (CE) and/or organizational development (OD)30 as a field of endeavor or in monitoring and 
evaluation (M&E). Several STAs have experience in teacher training (although not necessarily in teacher 
education systems development) and curriculum development or have other skills relevant to the education 
sector more broadly (e.g., gender and child/human rights).
The nine current DTAs are Sudanese nationals who have spent significant periods of time abroad and who 
bring work experiences gained in a number of countries. At a minimum, DTAs have a bachelor’s degree, and 
in some cases a master’s degree, in a range of fields, although not usually in education. Since it was initiated in 
August 2008, the DTA initiative has seen a good deal of personnel turn-over. Several individuals interviewed 
noted that even though DTAs are assumed to have the language, and socio-cultural skills to enable them to 
quickly integrate into and communicate with counterparts as well as the community at large, they often need 
support transitioning to work and life in Southern Sudan.
Every GoSS staff person interviewed indicated that the need and demand for external knowledge and 
assistance is enormous. Two development partner representatives interviewed indicated that they had 
 
28 In reviewing the CVs, the Team looked for evidence of academic qualifications or targeted training in specific fields as 
well as evidence of solid experience in the relevant fields. The Team gave credit for qualifications and/or experience 
even when the evidence was quite limited and, if anything, erred on the side of generosity and caution in the event that 
the CVs were not able to accurately portray academic and professional backgrounds.
29 Not all CVs were provided to the MTE Team.
30 One STA has an advanced degree in OD and significant levels of professional experience in this field in a range of 
contexts and should be put to great use in a broader advisory and support capacity for other TA personnel.
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Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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provided feedback that the Scope of Work was too broad and that a pool of individuals with particular 
specialist skills (e.g., in financial management systems) was needed in addition to the STA/DTA pool. 
Conclusions: TAP has an opportunity to put the motivation, commitment and experience of its current TA 
personnel to good use to develop a sound implementation model appropriate for this early stage of TA to all 
SMoEs. Introducing TA personnel to, training them in, and supporting the use of excellent CE, OD and ID 
practices and resource materials could significantly benefit TA personnel (and SMoEs) who may not have a 
great deal of experience in these areas.31 For a more extensive discussion of CE and additional support 
options, please refer to 3.5 Capacity Enhancement Approach (p. 47) and Annex 8: Options for Escalating 
Levels of Support.
Recruitment of TA with the same skills elaborated in the ACA is difficult because of the context of Southern 
Sudan (as verified by several individuals interviewed). Accordingly, AED could have flagged the risk and 
articulated risk mitigation strategies to ensure that all or a majority of STA personnel recruited had profiles 
similar to those individuals included in the ACA Application and that DTAs whose profiles more closely 
matched the skills identified in the position description were recruited.32 Alternatively, USAID could have 
been notified and consulted regarding the difficulties in finding individuals with the appropriate background 
and experience once the recruitment program got underway and the problem became apparent. As Figure 29
in Annex 15: Executive and Senior Management Staff Profile shows, the qualifications and experience of the 
TA personnel in the core fields of greatest need with respect to TAP Phase 4 are lacking. A number of both 
STA and DTA personnel have experience in teacher training, which was the designated area of focus under 
TAP Phase 3. However, with the stalling and eventual elimination of the Fast Track Program (FTP including 
Alternative Education Systems development) as a TAP focus, this experience base is no longer as important.
In the medium term, given the complex challenges of capacity enhancement, organizational development and
institutional development over time, there will likely be a demand from SMoEs for individuals with strong 
professional and academic backgrounds in specific technical areas, especially administration/management of 
education systems (including strategic planning and education finance), statistics, education research, and 
monitoring and evaluation (as a field of expertise, not just as an activity). This shift will be increasingly 
important as SMoEs mature and enter into medium- and long-term vision-setting and education budgets 
expand.
Work Conditions
Findings: Sudan is classified as a hardship post. STAs and DTAs work in very difficult environments, often 
with extremely limited basic necessities and support systems, in a context itself places heavy demands on TA 
personnel. According to one DTA, “Everyone wants a piece of me!” 33 TAP makes a good effort to address 
these challenges, for example by helping STAs to find the most secure housing available. AED has hired a 
security consultant to develop a security plan and, with USAID’s agreement, is hiring a security manager as 
well. The COP also makes occasional visits to each state and has accompanied many TA personnel to their 
respective sites and introduced them formally to the Minister and their counterparts in the SMoEs. TA 
personnel come to Juba for quarterly meetings and this opportunity is welcomed and appreciated. 
Occasionally TA personnel are grounded in Juba or the state capital due to insecurity issues. When this 
happens, TAP management has acted proactively to ensure that they contribute to other work, for example, 
drafting the Education Act. Nonetheless, and despite these efforts, isolation, insecurity, the limited time
 
31 See, for example, the European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) (no date provided) 
“Institutional Development: Learning by Doing and Sharing”. Maastricht, Netherlands: Netherlands Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Poverty Policy and Institutional Development Division (DSI/AI).
32 The MTE Team in no way wishes to imply that current TA personnel are deficient as professionals. The point being 
stressed is a potential mismatch in qualifications and experience between those required to develop an organization’s 
capacity to perform and those possessed by current TA personnel and what steps need to be taken to ensure a positive 
outcome all around.
33 MTE Team field notes.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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allocation for rest and relaxation34 were consistent issues for all TA personnel interviewed. AED has raised 
the issue of extra leave with USAID, requesting 10 additional leave days in order to take full advantage of the 
four rest and relaxation trips provided by AED annually. However, to date, USAID grants four travel days 
per year. 
AED utilizes two different contracting modalities for STAs and DTAs (even though the position descriptions 
are almost identical, as noted above). STAs (including the COP) work under a formal contract of unlimited 
employment with AED, with AED providing written notification to overseas personnel regarding their 
activity end date. The DTA element has its origins in the Diaspora Skills Transfer Program (DSTP) and was 
incorporated into TAP at the request of MoEST. Several individuals interviewed believe that the TAP DTA 
element is based on the same underlying purpose as the DSTP--to encourage Diaspora individuals to return 
and assist in the development of Southern Sudan. DTAs work under a consultant agreement with AED for 
six-month periods with a rolling option that is renewable at AED’s discretion. DTAs interviewed had a 
number of concerns about the terms of their contracts. They are concerned about being paid in Sudanese 
pounds instead of dollars, as many still have families overseas and payment in local currency impairs their 
ability to provide them adequate financial support. They feel that the title, “Assistant”, makes their work 
appear to have less value and some refer to themselves as ‘consultant’ rather than ‘assistant’. They feel they 
have no leverage to negotiate with AED for what they consider to be more equitable terms of service and are 
uncertain about the way in which their work is evaluated. Several STAs and DTAs felt uncomfortable raising 
concerns about their contractual arrangements with TAP management. TAP management, including the 
current COP, has endeavored to address DTAs concerns about the currency of payment. AED HQ is also 
looking into a different contracting mechanism for DTAs, including contracting them as employees. TAP￾Juba is constrained by both Sudanese labor laws and AED regulations. 
STAs submit monthly and quarterly summary reports. DTAs submit bi-weekly reports and monthly work 
plans to the COP after sign-off by the STA. Performance of DTAs in particular is based on documentation. 
The incumbent COP developed a performance assessment protocol for the DTAs that was unable to be used 
since, contractually, the DTAs are consultants not employees. The COP has a set of internal metrics that she 
uses to evaluate DTA performance including the quality of the work, the enthusiasm of the individual, and 
his/her motivation to be mentored. Several STAs and DTAs felt STAs had a great deal of power in DTA 
performance evaluation and felt a DTA could be “here today and gone tomorrow”. The COP conducts a 
formal annual performance evaluation of each STA. At least 12 individuals interviewed, including SMoE 
personnel, suggested that the SMoE should also have a role in contributing to the monitoring and evaluation 
of TA personnel performance.
TAP personnel interviewed have different views on the STA-DTA relationship. The MTE Team could not 
locate any particular documentation that explains the capacity enhancement (CE) approach for DTAs, but 
AED HQ stated that the intention has been to phase out STAs overtime and have the DTAs take over that
role. Some personnel consider the STAs and DTAs as professional equals. STAs and DTAs work hand-in￾glove, learning from and supporting each other. Others note that the STA and DTA each concentrates on 
his/her own work but that the DTA gets a stamp of approval from the STA on reports and work plans. Still 
others feel the STA is the technical expert and supervisor to whom the DTA defers.35 In several SMoEs, the 
DTA received little mention. Many personnel said they were aware that there was a new face around, but they 
 
34 For example, the maximum time allowed between DTA contract end dates and contract renewal is ten days. DTAs are 
concerned about the inflexibility of this policy. One DTA had to return to work while still recovering from a health 
problem that had both physical, psychological and emotional aspects in order to not lose the contract.
35 For example, according to one DTA, “X (the STA) checks that our work plans align and reports to AED whether I 
have done the work. Now, I see X (the STA) as my boss. I always have to go to X (the STA) if I want to do anything.” 
In addition, in some cases, the arrival of an STA after long periods of the DTA operating autonomously has resulted in 
the marginalization and loss of face of the DTA. One DTA said, “Prior to Y (the STA) coming in, I was doing AED’s 
work at the Ministry and when Y (the STA) came in, the Ministry was confused and thought I’d been demoted. I had 
been working with the Director General and then suddenly the Director General was going to Y (the STA) and leaving 
me out.”
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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thought the DTA was a new staff member and they were not sure what the individual was doing. In two 
states, the DTA was well-known and the STA was seldom mentioned.
Conclusions: Southern Sudan’s classification as a hardship post is appropriate. The challenging conditions 
exacerbate task of providing ongoing and on-site technical assistance. TAP management has shown due 
diligence in its attempts to resolve many of the contractual concerns through the orientation process and 
subsequent face-to-face and email discussions. But for whatever reasons, most TA personnel interviewed are 
still not clear or are unhappy about a variety of these issues, which is having a negative impact on attitudes. 
The intention to provide additional opportunities for personnel interaction is mentioned in TAP 
documentation, but this has not occurred to date. Better utilization of personnel skills and knowledge across 
the Program has significant implications not only for working conditions and morale but also for staff 
development, building professional networks between personnel and minimizing redundancies in work 
outputs. These aspects all in turn have a tremendous influence on the quality of the services delivered and the 
overall impact of TAP. AED’s stated intention to phase out the STA positions by shifting responsibility to 
provide high quality skills and knowledge to the DTAs has serious implications for DTA capacity 
enhancement. In addition, the turn-over of DTA personnel needs further investigation and action to ensure 
that appropriate personnel are both recruited and retained. Disruption in staffing means a loss of aid 
investment and potential negative repercussions for SMoEs. 
Clearly discriminating between the roles and expectations of the STA and DTA positions and using 
transparent and appropriate performance evaluation processes should resolve most of the issues mentioned 
above. The question of DTA Capacity Enhancement (and to what end) needs to be resolved. If DTA CE is 
to be provided, a clear strategy for enabling CE in an effective and efficient manner needs to be introduced. 
DTA CE and supervision should not be the responsibility of the STAs given the already heavy demands on 
their time.
3.1.3 Deliverables
Findings: According to the quantitative data reported and on a purely numerical basis, AED is demonstrating 
more than adequate or adequate progress. Of the five indicators that TAP has monitored since 2005 to 
March 2009, 36 the outputs delivered consist of the following:
Indicator 1: 292 (63 females) administrators or officials trained.
Indicator 5: 1,967 (278 females) teachers/educators trained.
Indicator 9: 1,747 textbooks and teaching and learning materials developed and provided.
Indicator 11: 77 laws, policies, regulations, guidelines developed or modified to improve equitable 
access to quality of education services.
Indicator 10 (education systems/policy reform): evidence consists of narratives of activities being 
undertaken and these narratives demonstrate that there is a good deal of work being undertaken.
Custom Indicator 1: 497 hours of one-on-one contact time.
Custom Indicator 2: 2 out of 11 sets of results from Institutional Development Framework 
administration.
The quality of the technical, resource, reference and training documents produced for Government purposes 
and for TAP capacity enhancement is high (for example, materials produced for the July meeting were 
exceptionally well done) and TAP documentation provided to USAID is generally professionally presented, 
comprehensive, and delivered on time. Despite limited funds, group training is being undertaken. TAP is 
 
36 Please refer to Figure 18- Figure 22, Annex 14: Indicators for a chronological visual representation of outputs 
including disaggregation by sex.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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frank about its successes and failures in delivery and critically analyzes the potential contributing factors. The 
MTE Team reviewed a number of the capacity enhancement materials and found that a near-native level of 
reading proficiency would be required to understand the materials. Based on a thorough review of TAP 
reports, which is supported by TA personnel interview data, there appears to be duplication of the types of 
documents being produced and, in some cases, a replication of documents that are already held by the 
MoEST that were developed under prior STTA or LTTA (see 3.5 Capacity Enhancement Approach for a 
more detailed discussion). There are some issues with consistency of data (see 3.1.4 Monitoring and 
Evaluation).
Conclusions: As far as meeting the annual deliverable target numbers, TAP is clearly doing its job and the 
quality overall of deliverables is high. For example, the Lessons Learned (QR 2 2009) are especially good. 
Female targets is an issue (please refer to 3.6 Gender) and there should be further examination of critical 
documents, particularly policies (that can have a significant potential for good or harm).37 Some training 
methods and materials may not reflect sound adult education theory and practice38 or require advanced 
reading skills, thus limiting wide accessibility. Given that only some of the TA personnel have backgrounds in 
adult education, TAP may wish to monitor training programs being provided more closely for quality and to 
ensure content does not overlap that of other development partners. 
3.1.4 Monitoring and Evaluation
Findings: The AED approach to monitoring and evaluation of TAP is articulated in the 2007 Program 
Monitoring Plan (PMP) -- which is currently being revised -- and the 2008 Annual Report. Some indicators 
have been dropped due to circumstances deemed beyond TAP’s control or added in an effort to identify data 
that will enable more effective capture and representation of TAP achievements. Since June 2007, TAP has 
introduced several quality assurance measures including: (i) fielding an STTA M&E specialist to examine TAP 
data quality, storage, etc.; (ii) refining the source data quality instruments to be used across all TAP sites in 
Quarter 2 2009; (iii) adopting and adapting the Institutional Development Framework; (iv) developing an 
Individual Capacity Assessment (ICA); developing administration protocols for the IDF and ICA; and (v) 
establishing a full-time M&E specialist position. AED has made a good and consistent effort to provide: (i) 
both tabular and prose accounts of progress against the indicators, (ii) a clear rationale for indicator changes, 
and (iii) a comprehensive lists of activities undertaken and documents and materials produced. AED also 
shows evidence of a desire to improve M&E. For example, it introduced a benchmarking scale for TA 
personnel to use to rate progress and a summary table of the outputs achieved in a given year of 
implementation. 
TAP has documented a number of M&E issues including: (i) the disjuncture between the data used as 
evidence of progress and the attribution of outcomes/results in SMoEs and MoEST on the basis of this 
evidence; (ii) the lack of fit between USAID’s requirements for accounting for training provided and TAP’s 
approach to capacity enhancement; and (iii) holding AED accountable for outputs that are dependent on 
other stakeholders. In general, the manner in which progress is reported varies somewhat from document to 
document. Apparently, there have been changes in USAID reporting requirements and AED has attempted 
to respond accordingly. 
The various TAP documents nominate a number of areas to monitor and evaluate ranging from USAID 
outputs-based indicators (1, 5, 9, 11), to a set of working principles, to ‘results’ (that are in effect more a set of 
tasks for TA personnel than development results), to development outcomes/impact. However, it is only the 
quantitative output indicators (1, 5, 9, and 11) that are consistently reported against based on valid and 
reliable data. Indicator 10 (education systems/policy reform including progress against any mission level 
outcome or impact indicators) is addressed through description or narrative in periodic reports but without 
 
37 For example, the introduction of a policy placing a per capita fee placed on students by one SMoE and a policy 
introducing English at a different grade level than the Education Act indicates were both developed with TAP TA 
assistance and both different from GoSS policy.
38 Also referred to as “andragogy.”
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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any clear qualitative analytical methodology underpinning the narrative. The MTE Team could not locate 
documentation or data that showed that results statements are derived from sound qualitative research 
methods.39 TAP uses proxy indicators (apparently output-based indicators) such as TA personnel time spent 
coaching SMoE officials and on dealing with Internet connectivity as evidence of the expected result, 
“facilitate communication and information exchange...”40 Anecdotally, several individuals interviewed said 
they ‘felt’ communications had improved; however, the Team did not have time to collect empirical data that 
could have been used to triangulate the interview data.41 Although the ACA and the PMP42 note that TAP 
will contribute to development impact, to date there is no evidence of data being targeted and analyzed to 
attempt to substantiate a link between TAP inputs and outputs and the targeted development impact. For 
example, the statement is made that “The Technical Assistance Program develops policy documents, 
research, frameworks and guidelines that are incorporated into GoSS-MoEST policy or SMoE plans and have 
had an impact on improving equitable access to or the quality of education services (emphasis added)”. 
Some areas nominated for TAP to report on have not yet been addressed in documentation. The ACA (p. 16) 
states that, “In addition to standard reporting requirements...the grantee will undertake a longitudinal study
(emphasis added) to track the impact of the program on Technical Assistance (sic) to MoEST” and the 2007 
PMP (p. 3) states that, “TAP will be monitored for the success of following (several key programming 
principles) and a narrative with back-up evidence will be provided to assess whether the TAP has used these 
principles as guides to program implementation”. The longitudinal study has not been undertaken and the key 
programming principles are not listed and reported against consistently.
There is currently little evidence of any depth of analysis. For example, a comprehensive table (QR 2 2009, p. 
13) records data on one-on-one contact time, but there is no analysis of these data. An analysis would have 
shown that about one-quarter (or 120 hours) of 474 hours of one-on-one contact time was spent with only 
two individuals. There are numerous discrepancies in the figures reported against the quantitative indicators.43
The outputs of only one or two TA personnel can meet the targets for a given indicator. For example of the 
31 outputs targeted for Indicator 11 (number of laws, policies, regulations or guidelines) for FY2009, half (15) 
have already been produced by one STA with another 10 produced by a second STA.
Conclusions: On the basis of interviews with several personnel, there is clearly a great deal of effort being put 
into data collection, and AED has made efforts to ensure the quality of its M&E processes and data. 
Personnel also put a great deal of time into reporting and TAP is making an effort to provide comprehensive 
reporting on implementation and progress against indicator targets to USAID. AED has also pointed out a 
number of issues associated with the M&E approach and USAID requirements and has attempted to find 
 
39 Qualitative description would be based on qualitative data and analyses of these data using standard qualitative 
methods. 
40 The 2009 Annual Plan states that, “In the last year, since the State Advisors have been in place, there is a noticeable 
improvement in communications although they (sic) are still very weak.”
41 Given that improved communication is an assumed result, the link between the input of TA personnel (time spent 
addressing Internet connectivity and time spent coaching), the output (number of SMoE personnel coached and 
demonstrating competence) and the expected result (SMoE personnel increasing their efficiency and communication 
between education personnel increasing), not only do the inputs need to be tracked, but the outputs need to be 
identified (x number of personnel for y number of hours) and the results/outcomes need to be substantiated by some 
type of evidence base (for example, through surveys, tallies of email traffic over a given period, etc.). Without this chain 
of logic in data, the narrative about results is predominantly based on assumptions and feelings. For most of the results 
or implementation principles to be validated, there are specific indicators that could be identified and there is not 
necessarily a need to use proxy indicators. Regardless of whether TAP has control over the outcomes, evidence of 
effectiveness of the inputs and outputs is found in the outcomes being realized and these can be monitored and 
evaluated. Therefore, although the view that inputs and outputs are proxy indicators is valid, increased efforts to 
investigate outcomes/results empirically would not go astray.
42 “TAP activities and results will be monitored and evaluated according to whether the activities planned above have 
been completed, whether the quality has been of a high standard and whether there has been an impact on equitable 
access to education and improvement of quality of education.” (2007 PMP, p. 8)
43 See Annex 7: MonitorING and Evaluation – Additional Information
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
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solutions to mitigate the problems. For example, TAP is attempting to address correlation and attribution 
through custom indicators such as the One-on-One Contact Time and the revised IDF. Although TAP has 
dropped two indicators, reports note that data on the indicators will continue to be collected. This is 
sensible. If TA personnel are able to play a pivotal role in assisting SMoEs to lead strategically, harmonize 
resource envelopes, and ensure state-wide coverage through development partners, there is no reason why 
TAP could not claim development partner quantitative data as its own (flagging the development partner, of 
course) since benefits derived have come about because of TA personnel inputs.
Unfortunately, despite the effort being made, M&E overall is still in a nascent state as a tool for Program 
planning and management. This situation may be attributed in part to fact that the overall USAID program 
and, therefore TAP, is transitioning from humanitarian to development assistance. Issues may also be 
attributed to the excessive demands on management and administrative personnel since Phase 3 began, the 
absence of a staff person with M&E expertise, and the evolving nature of TAP itself. Nonetheless, as M&E 
reporting currently stands, it is difficult to get a clear picture of where consistent progress is being made 
across the Program. The benchmarking scale and table (for example, in the 2008 Annual Report and the 2009 
January-March Quarterly Report) is a step in the right direction, but it does not go far enough and is difficult 
to interpret with respect to results over time within a particular state and across states. The descriptions of the 
points on the benchmarking scale do not allow easy and objective discrimination between the respective 
points. If the benchmarking scale does continue to be used, it might be useful to consider the payroll system 
reporting table developed by Booz Allen (see Annex 10: TAP Case Study - Education Payroll System) in 
order to make improvements. However, if the MTE Team’s proposed revision of the IDF which now 
includes a more discriminating benchmarking scale (as suggested by the) is adopted, the TAP benchmarking 
scale may not be needed. Lastly, there is also a real danger to capacity enhancement in all 10 SMoEs when the 
work of only a few TA personnel can be equated with all the designated program deliverables/targets being 
met for that area. A good quality M&E approach could help reveal such issues.
3.2 PARTNERSHIP
The partners with which TAP is expected to collaborate are numerous and varied (see Figure 31in Annex 16). 
The various development organization stakeholders and the relationship bases range from strategic (USAID 
and MoEST) to technical (MoEST) to operational (USAID projects, MoEST-MDTF, CBTF) to a 
combination thereof (IRC, SMoEs, UNICEF, NGO Partners).44 Indeed, some partnerships are multi-faceted, 
as in the case of MoEST. Some partnerships are more advanced and others are being established. 
3.2.1 TAP-MoEST Partnership
Findings: The TAP-MoEST partnership is well-advanced. In all phases, but particularly in 1, 2 and 3, there 
has been significant strategic, technical and operational collaboration in order to establish MoEST structures, 
systems and documentation (such as the drafting the Education Act in Phase 3). On a technical and 
operational level, the development and implementation of the FTP pilot in all 10 states and Abyei during 
Phase 2 was particularly notable. Phase 4 strategic and technical collaboration has included the MoEST STA 
(who is the COP for TAP) working with the Director of Human Resources to develop a proposal for a 
graduate diploma program in education management. MoEST leadership has responded to TAP management 
concerns and put a process in place that should enable the MoEST STA to access and work with targeted 
personnel. MoEST identified a new MDTF manager, who has established a good working relationship with 
the COP/STA. Most recently, MoEST ensured that an Executive Secretary, Mr Hakim Monykuer, 
participated on a full-time basis on the MTE mission. TAP continues to extend invitations to MoEST 
personnel for SMoE site visits and strategic workshops, but to date MoEST personnel have not taken up the 
opportunities.
 
44 The contractual relationship between AED/TAP and USAID is discussed in an earlier section.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
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These interactions aside, it was unclear to the MTE team how the Terms of Reference for support provided 
by the Senior Technical Assistant to MoEST differed from other central level TA (which, typically, also has 
capacity enhancement orientation) and, consequently, what specific benefits were derived from the TAP TA. 
The collaboration between TAP/USAID and MDTF/MoEST on shared funding for the STA positions was 
intentional, with USAID funding seven and MDTF/MoEST funding three (in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei and 
Lakes). However, as of now, only two MDTF/MoEST-funded positions have been filled, and the 
partnership progress has been disappointing. There have been many difficulties, including delays in recruiting 
and fielding STAs once contracted; delays in STA payments (which has curtailed STA effectiveness, and even 
their presence in their respective states); and the STA precedence (perceived or actual) of MoEST tasks over 
their contractual obligations to the states. Major tensions have been created because, while administratively 
obligated to MoEST, MDTF/MoEST-funded STA are technically obligated to TAP and therefore are 
expected to take technical supervision from the TAP COP. Ultimately, however, TAP has had very little 
influence on these STAs.45 In addition, the MDTF/MoEST STA contract has different terms from the AED 
contract, which further complicates matters. For example, MDTF/MoEST-contracted STAs do not have 
access to vehicles or drivers. Neither do they have training stipends. Accordingly, TAP pays for these items 
in order to level the playing field. In interviews with the MTE team, Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei and Lakes 
SMoE personnel expressed frustration because they feel their states are being “punished” or penalized by 
weak MoEST leadership in the matter of STAs. 
Conclusions: Collaboration on MoEST-specific tasks has been strong across all TAP phases. It is clear that 
MoEST respects and appreciates TAP and its personnel and that (with the exception of the MDTF/MoEST 
TA positions) a good working relationship has been established. Nevertheless dependence upon other actors 
– especially during the last two phases of TAP -- has had a deleterious impact on TAP’s ability to undertake 
activities and ensure the quality of the program. MoEST’s failure to appoint someone to manage its three 
STA positions has exacerbated tensions between the states and MoEST, introduced an unintended aspect of 
favoritism into the Program, and, ultimately, compromised the sustainability of TAP benefits in three states. 
Clearly, the effort to harmonize investments and responsibilities is not working as successfully as required to 
promote uniform capacity enhancement. TAP and MoEST will need to address and resolve these issues 
expeditiously if TAP is to stay on track.
The failure to scale-up and roll-out the FTP and introduce a graduate diploma in education management (also 
an MDTF/MoEST effort managed by the latter) have definitely limited the potential impact of TAP. The 
FTP was particularly important because of the impact it had on the overall design of TAP Phases 3 and 4 as 
well as the anticipated implementation of the Phases. Teacher education (via the FTP processes piloted and 
refined under Phase 2) was to form the foundation of Phases 3 and 4.46 The “failure to launch” of the 
MDTF-financed successor project undermined the critical programmatic assumption and derailed TAP’s 
strategic approach. As this situation has come to light, TAP and USAID have begun to adopt management 
approaches to adjust to this reality. 
Finally, the lack of a clear strategy for effectively using the MoEST Senior Technical Advisor is liability. It 
may be the case that, under TAP’s descriptive umbrella as a ‘capacity enhancement’ activity, the TOR should 
be revised to focus on facilitating and monitoring strengthening of systems vertically (as in the case of the 
payroll system and the EMIS) with the TA playing a strategic organizational development role by assisting 
MoEST to identify areas where specific technical expertise is required.
 
45 This was clearly demonstrated by the noticeable absence of one of the MoEST-contracted STA from the foundational 
intensive four-day workshop for STAs, DTAs and Directors of Planning in Juba at the beginning of July, 2009.
46 AED Associate Award Application (May 29, 2007), p. 11. In fact, the primary MoEST-related task of the COP was to 
“provide technical coordination of the teacher development core component of the Program” and the Program 
Implementation component of Phases 3 and 4 focused on teacher education.
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Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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3.2.2 AED TAP-USAID Project Partnerships47
BRIDGE (Building Responsibility for the Delivery of Government Services) 
BRIDGE a very new program, having only begun this year. It is being implemented in Northern Bar El 
Ghazal, Unity, Upper Nile and Warrap States. It is an integrated program that aims to strengthen state and 
local governments in their efforts to decentralize and deliver basic services, provide tangible peace dividends,
and increase economic opportunities. Specifically mandated to collaborate closely with MoEST at the GoSS, 
state, county, and payam levels, BRIDGE focuses efforts at the county level and currently works in two 
counties in each state. BRIDGE is also expected to work closely with development programs, whether 
supported by USAID or other donors. It has a Juba-based Education Coordinator, tasked with overseeing 
these responsibilities. Specific BRIDGE activities include: SMoE personnel training in management, gender 
and English; in-service teacher training, school curriculum rollout, textbook distribution, expansion of the 
USAID-supported interactive radio instruction programs, Parent-Teacher Associations and Boards of 
Governors training and support and activities to make schools ‘girl-friendly’ schools to reduce the incidence 
of gender-based violence (GBV) in schools.
GEE (Gender Equity through Education) 
GEE is implemented throughout the GoSS ten states and the Three Areas. Its goal is to reduce financial, 
socio-cultural and institutional barriers to gender equity in education. This goal is being accomplished by 
reducing financial, infrastructure, social and institutional barriers that prevent females from attending 
secondary schools and becoming teachers with scholarships at the core of the project. During FY08 USAID 
placed two technical advisors in the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) Gender Equity 
and Social Change Directorate to build capacity to: (i) increase the number of female teachers, (ii) raise 
awareness of and support for girls’ education at central and sub-national levels, (iii) design and implement 
appropriate policies, and (iv) integrate gender into all aspects of education planning and program 
implementation. GEE focuses on advocacy, community mobilization and training for MoEST staff as well as 
leadership training at the state level.
Findings: There are commonalities of focus and intention between TAP and BRIDGE education and gender 
activities and, now that there is a consistent STA and DTA presence in each of the BRIDGE states, 
increasing levels of interaction are being realized. Initial misunderstandings over the primary focus of TAP 
support (at the state level) and BRIDGE (at county levels and below), have been worked out in a 
collaborative manner and appear to be working on the ground. TAP’s focus on basic education aligns well 
with the GEE focus on secondary education. TA support at central and state levels is mutually reinforcing 
and, as far as the MTE Team was able to establish, well-coordinated. The respective COPs of TAP and GEE 
are in close touch over matters of mutual concern and share material and approaches (such as the IDF) 
across the two programs. TAP documentation focuses on girls and female teachers, as does GEE
documentation.
Conclusions: BRIDGE and GEE both include a “bottom-up” focus while TAP mainly works from the top 
down. The orientation to different ends of the development spectrum can be used to good effect if 
collaboration is strategic, carefully planned, and well-executed. The presence of BRIDGE and TAP personnel 
on the ground in three states should enable significant synergies to be identified and built into 
implementation approaches. In addition, BRIDGE has the operational funds that TAP lacks, making the 
collaboration all the more important for TAP. For those states in which BRIDGE does not operate, other 
opportunities for collaboration and development must be found. As noted, GEE also has advisors in 
MoEST. If GEE, through its central level TA, is able to articulate particular systems, strategies and processes 
for dissemination and embedding at the sub-national level, TAP TA personnel could be of great assistance in 
 
47 Other USAID education projects include HEAR (Health and Education Reconciliation Program), which operates in 
the Three Area -- and perforce has little direct interaction with TAP -- and SSIRI (Southern Sudan Interactive Radio 
Instruction.) Of all these the closest linkages appeared to be with BRIDGE and GEE. Nevertheless, time constraints 
prevented an in-depth exploration, so the depth of findings and conclusions is limited.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
17
much the same way that they have been to the Booz Allen payroll systems roll-out and the UNICEF EMIS 
roll-out. TAP assistance to help SMoEs operationalize BRIDGE and GEE activities should mean that TAP 
can claim and report on some of the successes and results, especially related to teacher training and 
curriculum and textbook distribution (that correspond to two of TAP’s previous indicators).
3.2.3 AED TAP-Donor Partnerships 
Capacity Building Trust Fund (CBTF)
Findings: The collaboration between Booz Allen and TAP in the roll-out and institutionalization of the 
payroll system financed under the Capacity Building Trust Fund follows a structured approach48. In brief, the 
Booz Allen consultant briefs all TAP TA personnel prior to their mobilization to their respective state and 
made a PowerPoint presentation detailing specific ways and means for TA personnel to support the payroll 
system roll-out and institutionalization on both a strategic and an operational level. TA personnel have also 
participated in state-level training sessions and subsequently used this knowledge to support the SMoEs on an 
ongoing basis. The MTE Team found solid evidence that a number of TA personnel are devoting significant 
amounts of time to supporting the new payroll system in the states. According to several individuals 
interviewed, there has been a gradual move towards payroll in terms of the tasking of the TA personnel by 
TAP. There is, however, evidence that TA personnel are taking on more than support roles. For example, 
according to one STA, “In my SMoE, two people were trained in payroll and one disappeared. Now people 
come to me.”
Conclusions: The collaboration between TAP and Booz Allen is an excellent model (provided the inherent 
risks are mitigated) and shows how SMoE TA personnel can be play a very practical and extremely important 
role in helping to ‘institutionalize’ new systems, processes and procedures. The payroll system dissemination 
and capacity enhancement process itself provides an exemplary model for how vertical systems integration 
can be undertaken. Given TAP’s familiarity with the model, the approach may be able to be utilized for 
introducing other innovations coming either from the center or from one state to all other states. 
UNICEF
At the central level, UNICEF has been designated as the lead development partner in the education sector 
and has played a key role in establishment of 11 technical working groups. The groundwork is being laid for a 
sector-wide approach in education (or at least a sub-sector wide approach in general education). This 
direction is being reflected at the state level where UNICEF undertakes an annual micro-planning process 
with each state and county that is also supposed to involve all development partners in order to produce state 
and county level Annual Work Plans. While these Work Plans at present only designate SMoE and UNICEF 
funding envelopes, they do cover both organizational development/capacity enhancement types of activities 
as well as education development projects. Some TA personnel have found that SMoEs are not accessing the 
approximately US$100k available annually under the Work Plan and TA personnel are increasingly playing a 
role in helping SMoEs to request the funds.
Although to date TAP has not attempted to build on UNICEF state- and county-level efforts through the TA 
personnel in a more formalized manner, UNICEF occupied a prominent place in the July 6-9, 2009 Quarterly 
Workshop conducted by TAP. A number of plausible avenues for increased collaboration were identified, 
including building from the Annual Work Plans (AWPs) developed by UNICEF with SMoE personnel 
already operational in the states and counties. Most TA personnel are already assisting SMoEs in the micro￾planning process and are also introducing departmental and individual planning, so building from the AWPs 
would be a logical next step in strengthening and imbedding planning processes. 
 
48 See Annex 10: TAP Case Study - Education Payroll System for an in-depth description of the payroll system roll-out 
and institutionalization process. 
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The EMIS activity has been ongoing for some time with USAID, and subsequently UNICEF, funding. 49 The 
annual Education Census implementation was shifted to UNICEF during TAP Phase 2. In 2008, the AED￾UNICEF EMIS team trained designated SMoE personnel as EMIS focal points and provided two computers 
per state for processing and analyzing EMIS data. Now there is solid evidence of some TA personnel 
supporting the use of the EMIS and assisting in the preparation for and conduct of the annual Education 
Census. For example, a number of SMoE personnel from across the five SMoEs visited by the MTE Team 
emphasized the important role that TAP TA personnel are playing in helping some SMoE personnel to use 
data effectively. Many SMoE personnel mentioned how proud they are that they can present their own 
statistics on their states to MoEST and other SMoES and that this development came about largely due to the 
help of the TA personnel. Indeed, the July 6, 2009, presentations prepared for and presented to the MTE 
Team bear out the statements made to the Team in the field. Other development partners also have remarked 
on the changes in the SMoEs with respect to data, and some of these changes can be attributed to TA 
personnel. For example, one development partner from Lakes State noted that, “Things have improved so 
much in the last year (2008-2009). I remember when I wasn’t able to get data from the Ministry. Now, since 
last year, I am able to get data. Right now, with a phone call to the Director General, I can get accurate 
information. And some people are starting to use computers very effectively.”
Conclusions: The collaboration between TAP and UNICEF has been very productive to date and the 
relationship is likely to grow even stronger, which will certainly be a boon to the SMoEs. TAP and UNICEF 
are in the process of establishing a more strategic and practical partnership with respect to activities at the 
state level. This bodes well for the states since UNICEF is currently the major source of non-governmental 
funding at that level. UNICEF is also apparently going to use SMoE Annual Work Plans (that, under TAP 
assistance, should begin to reflect all development partner activities and funding) rather than the more 
restricted plans developed during annual micro-planning meetings.
3.2.4 TAP-NGO Partnerships
Findings: TAP collaborates at an operational level with a variety of NGO partners as TA personnel are 
increasingly instrumental in helping to make coordination between the SMoEs and development partners a 
reality. All TA personnel are supporting the SMoEs to take an active leadership position rather than a passive 
recipient role in harmonizing and rationalizing various development organizations’ education sector activities, 
initially through mapping the inputs and program targets. For example, Save the Children-Sweden in Lakes 
State noted that since the TA personnel were fielded, the collaboration between the SMoE and the 
development organizations in the State has improved. Coordination meetings are now held and systems and 
processes are beginning to be harmonized. As a result of the Lakes State Education Sector Working Group 
meeting, the Catholic Diocese is now using the Government’s examinations instead of administering its own 
tests. NGO partners in two other states also attributed noticeable positive changes in coordination to the 
presence of the TA personnel, particularly with respect to ensuring that the agreed quarterly meetings occur 
and in helping to increase the professionalism of SMoE staff. TAP documentation also details a number of 
instances of collaboration on a state level with NGOs. Specific noteworthy efforts include the collaboration 
in WBeG State between TAP, Intermon and Oxfam on gender.
A major pillar of the ACA Application was the strategic role that TA personnel were to play in helping 
SMoEs to rationalize and harmonize the in-service teacher education program with MoEST leadership and 
noted that “The present system is largely ad hoc and run by NGOs. MoEST will have to collect data 
systematically on the teacher in-service activities of the NGOs, evaluate the quantity and quality of programs, 
and integrate all existing in-service into a MoEST and state-ministry led comprehensive South Sudan-wide 
program” (p.6). Given that MoEST teacher education activity has stalled, it is not clear what role TAP TA 
personnel are now to play regarding NGOs generally, aside from ensuring that coordination meetings are 
ongoing. The Application also notes that “as new staff are hired, trained and placed in schools by the states, 
 
49 The USAID Sudan Basic Education Program implemented by CARE developed the precursor to the EMIS, which 
was called the Annual Education Census. Later, AED developed the EMIS with UNICEF funding.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
19
NGOs will gradually shift their role from service provider to capacity builder. EQUIP2 can help facilitate this 
transition at the central and state levels...” (p 5); however, it is not clear in subsequent TAP documentation 
whether NGOs themselves have this view or how, in light of the shift away from teacher development, TAP 
will now play a role. 
There is some evidence that, with respect to in-service teacher education/training, TAP may be proliferating 
rather than rationalizing efforts as was originally intended in the TAP design. TAP documentation and 
interviews with some TA personnel indicate that TA personnel have been developing teacher training and 
teacher resource materials and have been involved in teacher training (particularly of head teachers). The data 
indicate that these efforts are not necessarily being undertaken in collaboration with NGOs that already may 
be undertaking similar endeavors. TAP collaboration to date also appears to be limited to international 
NGOs. There is no mention in documentation of engagement with local NGOs.
Conclusions: The requirement in the Cooperative Agreement for TAP to collaborate with a complex mix of 
organizations and activities (USAID and otherwise) places additional responsibilities on a Program that is 
already administratively demanding. However, this requirement also provides benefits and opportunities 
which, if managed well, could expand the impact of TAP on the ground. While synergies are increasingly 
being identified and built upon, a more systematic approach to managing collaboration is needed so that 
SMoEs are not overwhelmed by a capacity enhancement “tug-of-war”. TA personnel could play a critical role 
helping SMoEs to manage the interests of various development partners in building sub-national capacity. 
3.3 IMPACT (SHORT TERM EFFECTS)50
Findings: The MTE Team used the following51 as evidence of short-term impact.52
Changes in awareness, knowledge and attitudes of SMoE personnel
Increased feelings of confidence, competence, pride and accomplishment. For example, SMoE 
leadership feel competent at the ‘national’ level and with development partners.
Raised levels of excitement among many SMoE HQ personnel about their jobs.
Changes in the interests and stated intentions of SMoE personnel
Many SMoE HQ personnel are showing an increased interest in what other staff are doing. Upper 
Nile SMoE has introduced bi-weekly staff meetings (see Annex 17: Upper Nile Most Significant 
Change Story).
Beginning to ‘think’ as an organization (through the analysis, self-reflection and sharing of viewpoints 
in a constructive fashion that are part and parcel of the application of the IDF).
Some personnel are starting to challenge ‘silos’, information-guarding and top-down decision￾making. 
At least two (and likely more) personnel per SMoE have gained and are using basic computer literacy 
skills. 
Some SMoE personnel are saying they intend to be more like the TA personnel with respect to work 
habits, knowledge and general professionalism.
 
50 Please also see Annex 5: Likhert Scale Scoring of TAP Implementing Principles (from 2007 PMP).
51 Online source: http://www.talkingquality.gov/docs/section5/5_2.htm, accessed June 22, 2009 10:00pm Juba, 
Southern Sudan.
52 Specific areas of change were mentioned frequently by those individuals who have had one-on-one involvement with 
TA personnel.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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Changes in short-term or intermediate behavior of SMoE personnel
Improved work habits. In several SMoEs, personnel noted that staff are now coming to work on 
time and staying the whole day. One SMoE has instituted a sign-in/sign-out process. Staff are also 
working more systematically and productively due to individual and departmental work plans.
Improved writing skills (i.e., reports and proposals). Personnel who have access to and have been 
supported in using technology are continuing to use technology on the job. 
Improved understanding of planning (at the individual, departmental and organizational levels) and 
use of this understanding to make plans.
Improved response to MoEST requirements. According to His Excellency (HE) Undersecretary 
William Ater, for the first time in five years, all SMoEs submitted their Annual Plans to MoEST on 
time. According to one SMoE, “Microplans used to be done mid-year. Now we plan early and this 
change is due to TAP.”
Improved communication with MoEST through TAP TA personnel as information conduits and 
also as a result of TA personnel attention to Internet connectivity issues.
Improved development partner cooperation and coordination. While there has always been the 
expectation that SMoEs will have regular coordination meetings, in most SMoEs, this did not 
become a reality until TA personnel began to assist SMoEs to take a leadership role. One STA 
created a Development Partner Profile pro forma that has been used in at least two other SMoEs as 
part of a development assistance mapping exercise. 
On an organizational level, the outcomes include the following:
Improved efficiency. For example, one Examinations Department Director has cut back his 
examinations preparation time from one month to one week. Last year, TA personnel helped him to 
use technology on the job; this year, he has been able to go it alone.
Improved communication. 
Improved organizational learning and behavior. In the two SMoEs where it has been used, the IDF 
has been a catalyst for helping personnel think critically about the SMoE.
Improved credibility of SMoEs among education stakeholders (national and international).
There is evidence in all SMoEs that the strengthening of some systems at the headquarters level is beginning 
to be realized. For example, the vertical roll-outs of the payroll system (see Annex 10: TAP Case Study -
Education Payroll System), the teacher head count, the education census and the EMIS and their impact is 
attested to by all SMoEs. There is evidence in all SMoEs of systems strengthening on a horizontal level, for 
example, all SMoEs stress the positive effects of the focus on departmental and individual work plans, 
computer literacy, coordination and sector meetings). Other focus areas can be characterized more as 
“pockets of progress” (gender, strategic planning, and systematic development partner collaboration) where it 
is not possible to substantiate broad gains across all SMoEs.
There is a great deal of demand for opportunities to engage with the TA personnel; however in the five 
SMoEs visited, TA personnel tended to engage regularly with only a small number of personnel, typically 
directorate heads. Engagement with deputy directors was less frequent and with other personnel it was 
infrequent, even though much of the CE content is generic enough to benefit most if not all HQ and county 
personnel. For example, all SMoE personnel interviewed indicated that each person is responsible for 
planning and budgeting as well as program implementation—it was only the scale of the responsibility that 
varied. A number of SMoE personnel are disgruntled at not having the same opportunities other colleagues 
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
21
have had and nearly half of the SMoE HQ personnel53 interviewed do not believe that TAP has had any 
significant impact on the SMoE or on they themselves. 
Conclusions: Without a doubt, the presence of TA personnel has had a catalytic and motivational effect on 
the SMoEs, and there are certainly success stories highlighting the positive short-term effects of TAP 
(particularly on individuals). There are also indications that TAP is having an impact on the SMoE as an 
organization. For example, the payroll system and teacher head count processes and the uptake of EMIS 
appear to be quite strong and look like they will be sustained (provided additional staff are trained). Part of 
the success can be attributed to TAP TA personnel. Other successes are primarily focused at the individual 
(SMoE HQ personnel) level, but it is not possible to make generalizations about the individual personnel 
benefiting except to say that some directors, but not all and not necessarily those in the same positions across 
SMoEs, are benefiting or benefiting to the same degree. This situation is not necessarily surprising for reasons 
addressed earlier in the Report. It was difficult to get a sense of whether TAP’s catalytic effect will continue as 
SMoEs become used to TA personnel. On the basis of international experience in organizational and 
institutional development, TA personnel will need to build the commitment to and momentum for change 
early on so that they do not become the de facto prime movers.
The ACA states that at the end of the four years it is expected that the ‘basic functions of the departments in 
which TA is provided will be established”, but the failure to roll out the FTP has left this objective unclear. 
One could extrapolate from the list of TA expected results, but not everything on that list is necessarily a 
basic function of a particular department. Increasing the access by greater numbers of SMoE personnel to 
structured sessions on areas of widespread interest and need (with small group work and one-on-one follow￾up) will enhance the short-term effects of TAP and increase the likelihood of sustainability. The challenge will 
be to clearly identify and ensure consistent, broad-based development of new core areas (not necessarily 
those targeted in the FTP roll-out) in all SMoEs. Despite challenges, in the past year, TAP has nonetheless 
demonstrated an admirable capacity to adapt to this post-FTP reality.
3.4 PEACE DIVIDEND54 & CONFLICT SENSITIVE ANALYSIS
Findings: All SMoE personnel interviewed point to the increasing demand for schooling. These findings back 
up public opinion polls conducted by USAID. SMoE personnel are eager to train and support in-service 
teachers, construct schools and provide teaching and learning materials for classrooms. There is evidence that 
a small amount of funding is available from NGO partners and TAP is beginning to pay greater attention to 
partnerships in order to overcome these deficits55. Education funding across the states is not systematic or 
uniform and it was obvious to AED TAP management early on in Phase 3 that the lack of operational and 
development funds in SMoEs severely limited the amount of assistance that TA personnel could provide to 
their respective SMoEs, particularly in extending the benefits of the TA beyond SMoE HQ to local levels of 
government. 56
Consequently, AED in consultation with USAID earmarked an annual discretionary fund of around $30,000 
per SMoE for TA personnel to use to support TAP interventions, in particular, formal training at the local 
government levels. No other regular, predictable funds are available under TAP. The ACA Application notes 
that TA personnel would assist SMoEs to submit successful proposals to external funding bodies, in order to 
“leverage funding”. The view was that financial and other resources to support teacher development could be 
captured. The MTE Team attempted to collect data from all TA personnel on proposals submitted and 
 
53 SMoE HQ personnel are those personnel who are working at the state level as opposed to the county level and below.
54 The ‘peace dividend’ is included in the Scope of Work under impact assessment; however, since it is such a critical 
area, it has been addressed in its own section rather than being included in the ‘Impact-Short-Term Effects’ section.
55 See 3.2 Partnership, for a discussion of collaborative efforts at the county and payam levels between USAID 
BRIDGE and TAP in some states. 
56 This issue has been raised consistently in numerous AED reports. For example, Quarterly Report January-March 2008 
notes that, “The SMoEs’ programs have been reduced to a hand-to-mouth operation, with no money for any other 
expenses beyond staff salaries”.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
22
funded (see Annex 18: Proposal Submission and Funding Request Tracking Form), particularly with TAP 
assistance. While the return rate was low (two SMoEs), on the basis of the returned forms, a review of TAP 
documentation, and interviews with personnel from the five SMoEs, the fund-raising element has not been 
realized to any significant extent. At this point in time, there is no evidence to indicate that TAP is using a 
strategic approach to help all SMoEs ‘unlock’ existing financial or other resources in the sector. Proposal 
development as a means of leveraging funding is more or less ad hoc and not systematic across the SMoEs as 
well.
There are stirrings of interest in good governance that could be attributed to TAP. Many SMoE personnel 
across all states feel, and anecdotal evidence from other stakeholders indicates, that the mere presence of the 
TA personnel has had an impact on contributing to the notion of what it means to be a civil servant. TA 
personnel in general are seen as role models for good professional behavior. The introduction of the 
Institutional Development Framework (revised by AED) in several SMoEs is seen as a big step forward 
because the IDF self-assessment requires personnel to think critically about the SMoE, break through work 
silos and function as a learning organization. The development of job descriptions and individual and 
departmental work plans has helped personnel understand their areas of responsibility and accountability and 
to have a sense of purpose. As noted earlier, some TA personnel have invested significant amounts of time 
on payroll issues, including the teacher head count. Several SMoE personnel stated that the head count 
innovations from TA personnel and assistance with the payroll system was increasing transparency and 
accountability. The Warrap State STA has begun to engage with Parliamentarians, which is a first for TAP at 
the state level. However, several TA personnel interviewed feel ill-equipped to deal with issues of poor 
governance such as nepotism, lack of transparency in acquitting development partner funds, and 
appropriation and misuse of equipment provided by donors. At least two TA personnel have been placed in 
delicate situations. 
There are instances where SMoEs are providing services effectively and with TA personnel assistance (such 
as getting books into schools.) But, according to some SMoE personnel interviewed, the SMoE rarely if ever 
gets the credit, in large part due to the branding requirements of (non-TAP) development partners. 
Furthermore, several stakeholders interviewed believe that the type of external assistance provided to 
Southern Sudan for so many years has eroded the notion of self-sufficiency and created a dependency 
syndrome. They believe the challenge now is to re-invigorate the community’s belief in the state and 
community action. 57 Community development is an area of focus on TAP’s 2009 work plan.
AED TAP documentation gives no indication that a conflict-sensitive lens or analysis has or is being applied 
to TAP programming decisions or implementation. Southern Sudan is still a conflict-affected context and 
there are also numerous areas in various states that suffer from “insecurity”.58 TAP documentation details 
(although not systematically and cumulatively) a number of instances where insecurity has resulted in 
personnel being evacuated, kept away from their state, or restricted in their movements. This documentation 
is backed up by interviews with TAP personnel. Many states have one or more counties that are insecure. In 
Western Equatoria State, for example, TA personnel cannot go beyond a four-mile radius of Yambio.59
A major constraint to realizing a peace dividend is the impact that the payment (or lack thereof) of salaries is 
having on teacher (and administrator) motivation and commitment. The problem has become so severe that 
 
57 For example, His Excellency (HE) MoEST Undersecretary William Ater noted that before the war, “Parents and 
communities were responsible for 85 percent of the costs of education. They built the classrooms, they paid the teachers 
in-kind by farming the teacher’s land or collecting sorghum and they made sure the kids were in school. We used cow
skins as blackboards and local materials as chalk. Then -- (name deleted intentionally) came in with its assistance and 
people’s mindset began to change.”
58 “Insecurity” can mean anything from inter-ethnic conflicts among pastoralists to cross-border incursions by militant 
groups from other countries to ongoing conflict in the North-South border areas to the garden variety of crime (break￾ins, muggings, etc.).
59 Interestingly, TAP documentation on the FTP pilot noted successful delivery in Abyei, a chronically conflict-affected 
area. There may be particular lessons to be learned from this experience.
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Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
23
teachers have gone or are on strike in a number of states and in some places violence has resulted in 
individuals being killed. At a minimum, striking teachers are not in their classrooms. Students are left without 
teachers, and parents are feeling the frustration of promised services not delivered. This, along with 
insufficient funding for operating costs and new investments, is beyond TAP control. 
Conclusion: Because the Government is failing to provide adequate resources (not compensated for by 
funding from other sources, most particularly the MDTF), TAP is at risk of not contributing as fully as it 
might towards achievement of the peace dividends. TAP’s contribution to “durable stability”, decentralization 
and development impact are compromised by the lack of funds to undertake the anticipated teacher 
education and training programs and the lack of political will to roll out the FTP (see 3.7 Risks & 
Unanticipated Negative External Developments ). At this point in time, and until additional funds start to 
flow or collaboration between SMoEs and development partners becomes more strategic, TAP is in effect in 
a period of “arrested implementation.” TAP is able to make important contributions by on advising the 
central level and the state level, but it cannot make linkages to lower levels of the system and there are few 
chances for SMoE personnel to test out new capacities and demonstrate their ability to perform (which is an 
accepted proxy indicator for capacity development). New teachers are not being trained in sufficient numbers 
to have an impact on access to education, and this presents a disconnect in delivering the anticipated peace 
dividend. Furthermore, existing teachers are not upgrading their skills, so the quality of education has little 
chance of improving. In light of the current resource-constrained environment, TA personnel must treat 
leveraging of funds and facilitating of CE opportunities for SMoE personnel with greater urgency and 
systematization. Furthermore, Southern Sudan has a mixture of contexts—from former garrison towns to 
pockets of insecurity to peaceful areas--in which education services need to be delivered. This contextual 
complexity makes the task of the SMoE even more challenging and it needs to be highlighted, understood,
and planned for appropriately and strategically. Certainly many SMoE personnel and a number of TA 
personnel have had experience with education delivery in conflict-affected contexts, either directly or through 
interactions with development agencies and community members have memories of self-sufficiency and 
community-managed education. Given the grim international statistic that 40 to 50 per cent of peace 
agreements collapse within five to 10 years of being signed with the subsequent return of war60, these 
experiences need to feed into how TAP operates.61
3.5 CAPACITY ENHANCEMENT APPROACH
Findings: The capacity enhancement (development) approach promoted is primarily one-on-one through 
informal mentoring and/or coaching. However, TA personnel also engage in limited formal training of 
groups, particularly personnel from the county, payam (education managers and inspectors) and even school 
levels (head teachers). Unfortunately, the learning by doing on-the-job (OTJ) training that was to accompany 
the FTP scale-up using already trialed processes and systems has not been undertaken for reasons detailed 
previously. Data collected by the MTE Team and documented in TAP reports show that SMoE personnel at 
all levels are eager for opportunities to learn. In the words of one STA, “The work plan development 
workshop...was very well-attended and the content of the training well-received. ...SMoE staff are ready and 
‘starving’ for such learning opportunities. The workshop was six hours long excluding one hour for lunch. 
No incentives were provided, yet there was highly impressive participation by ministry staff members”.62 The 
Phase 4 Model is enabling STAs to have a greater influence on the respective SMoE through continuity, 
follow-up and timeliness and in allowing STAs and DTAs to work more strategically together. 
 
60 International Alert. (2008) Building a Peace Economy in Northern Uganda: Conflict Sensitive Approaches to 
Recovery and Growth. International Alert Investing in Peace Briefing paper Issue No. 1, Sept 2008.
61 A possible source of funding is the Sudan Recovery Fund which is described as, a fund to “accelerate recovery in 
Southern Sudan through high-impact, quickly disbursed projects. The Fund focuses on four key areas: a) consolidating 
peace and security; b) delivering basic services; c) stabilizing livelihoods; and d) building capacity for decentralized and 
democratic governance”. (Taken from Allocation Proposal Sudan Recovery Fund Round III June 2009)
62 TAP Quarterly Report, January-March 2008, p. 14.
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Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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AED HQ supports TA personnel with reference materials and TAP Juba places materials that have been 
created by the TA personnel on a web site that is specifically for TAP personnel. The Education Management 
Toolkit developed by MoEST under the USAID Sudan Basic Education Program (SBEP) is used by TAP in 
an effort to “rein in all the disparate capacity building education management materials and use a common 
core. It is used for group trainings. The Toolkit doesn’t provide templates and this is a big, gaping hole”. 63
According to all STAs and DTAs interviewed, each creates her/his own materials from scratch or by adapting 
reference materials and there is little sharing back and forth of materials created or opportunities to share 
problems and solutions. All interviewees have a view similar to those of two TA personnel who said, “We 
should have a standard strategy for the materials—you can’t just be dealing with things randomly and all of us 
developing our own materials. There is no consistency...It seems we are having a ‘cafeteria-style’ program”; “I 
have written (X) policies. I haven’t seen anyone else’s policies and I don’t know if they have seen mine”; and, 
“We are inventing and creating on the spot...we were trained on how to report on the USAID format. We 
were not given any formal training on how to do the work of AED in the field”.64 TAP management believes 
that TA personnel are not duplicating efforts but are adapting resources already developed by TAP personnel. 
Furthermore, TA personnel interviewed tended to have varying descriptions of their roles. Some are more 
complete and accurate than others. The ACA Application (p. 4) states that, “...TAP will need to continue to 
strike a balance between being responsive to multiple requests to assist daily operations of MoEST and 
accomplishing program objectives and deliverables (emphases sic).The program must be responsive to ad hoc
requests within MoEST and the state ministries, but this cannot eclipse the basic work and goals of the 
program” (emphasis added). There is some evidence of increasing tendency for TA personnel to be placed in 
a vulnerable position due to their desire to build relationships, establish themselves as credible actors within 
and advocates for the SMoE and to step into the breach because they want to help. A number of TA 
personnel and other stakeholders note that TA personnel are being pulled in many directions and are being 
used as “walking ‘in-boxes’” for central to state level communications, in-line personnel, typists and editors
among others.65 (See Figure 30 in Annex 15: Executive and Senior Management Staff Profile.)
All TA personnel interviewed believe there should be more formal and informal opportunities to interact as a 
group as well as in STA-specific and DTA-specific fora. TAP management believes that most TA personnel 
use and adapt materials developed during the various TAP Phases, including the current one. TAP 
documentation was reviewed and an analysis was undertaken of the extent to which TAP (and other Sudan￾based) materials that have been produced are being taken up both vertically and horizontally. The analysis 
shows that while there is some evidence of interface vertically, it is limited. Horizontal interface is even more 
limited. 
The opportunity to learn to use computers is extremely popular and has resulted in significant benefits for 
some individuals (and to SMoEs more generally), as has support provided in resolving Internet connectivity 
issues. However, the cost of the one-on-one approach for particular skills (such as computer literacy) is high. 
For example, assuming that the 25 hours of one-on-one computer training provided to six males during 
January to March 2009 was provided by STAs, then basing a calculation on the annual STA financial package, 
the 25 hours of training for six individuals was provided at a cost of US$4,250 in total or US$708 per 
participant.66 However, computer literacy is fairly easy to teach and lends itself to group learning, so holding 
classes is likely far more cost effective.
 
63 MTE Team field notes.
64 Ibid.
65 Morgan (2008) notes that in smaller organizations it is not uncommon for TA to become general purpose providers 
and this is especially the case when the assistance being provided is for more general and less specific tasks.
66 TAP management believes that the computer training is conducted for groups, however, three TA personnel and the 
Quarterly Report 2 2009 (p. 8) described the computer training being provided as one-on-one with one person noting 
that the lack of computers makes this necessary.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
25
Conclusions: The intention underpinning the co-location of technical personnel at the sub-national level as a 
CE strategy is sensible as there is clearly a need and a high demand for external technical assistance in the 
states (as well as at the center). While TAP’s identified deliverable targets are being met, there is a good deal 
of time spent responding to ad hoc requests and/or on areas in which TA personnel have particular expertise,
while the ‘central core’ (particular functions and systems) is only beginning to be addressed in a strategic and 
focused manner. 67 In addition, TA personnel and the SMoEs do not believe that the TA personnel should be 
associated with particular departments (as the CA implies). These constraints need to be dealt with and the 
COP is beginning to take things in hand. It may be necessary to establish some type of 70:20:10 rule (70 
percent of time spent working with SMoEs on a targeted core of functions addressed in common by all 
SMoEs, 20 percent of time on needs unique to the specific SMoE and 10 percent of time responding to ad hoc
requests). 
Supporting the counterpart relationship at all levels and encouraging TA personnel to be conscious of and 
generate efficiencies (whether through a reduction in duplication of efforts or an expansion of learning 
opportunities to a wider group68) places an additional requirement on the Hub personnel. They must be well￾informed about the current literature and effective practices surrounding capacity enhancement 
(development), organizational development and institutional development and the monitoring and evaluation 
of such and be able to turn this knowledge into viable support. More successful TA programs have begun to 
move beyond the traditional ‘one-on-one’ model to more complex team-based and even network 
approaches.69 These approaches ‘spread the wealth’ (i.e., have a multiplier effect) and have a greater likelihood 
of benefits being sustained. 
3.6 GENDER 
Findings: Two aspects of gender have been taken into consideration in the MTE: AED’s internal treatment 
of gender, and the treatment of gender within the Southern Sudanese context. Regarding the former, among 
TA and AED HQ personnel associated with TAP, 50 percent are female (12 out of 24). In addition, the last 
three COPs (from Phases 2, 3 and 4) have been women. Five out of nine STAs and two out of nine DTAs 
are female. AED is aware of the potential for gender-based violence (GBV) and has taken measures to ensure 
that all personnel are protected. To date there have been two known incidences of gender-based harassment 
or violence. In one instance, AED reacted appropriately; however in the other instance, there was a view 
expressed that the response was not adequate. Some TA personnel feel that female TA personnel experience 
more challenges in the workplace.
TAP documentation indicates that the Program will address gender equity and will support the Directorates 
of Gender Equity and Social Change and one of the key programming principles is “Encouraging the access 
and success of girls in school and female teachers as education professionals will cut across all programs” 
(2007 PMP, p. 3). A number of the Program reports mention specific activities related to gender and 
development in some of the states. For example, in Unity State, TA personnel worked with the SMoE on the 
recruitment of qualified teachers, with female teachers being given priority. TAP was also instrumental in 
ensuring that gender was addressed in the (pending) Education Act. TAP also collaborates with NGOs and 
 
67 The following findings may also be of interest to TAP. In a recent in-depth study of extensive provision of TA 
personnel and counterpart relationships in Papua New Guinea, Morgan (2008) found that “TA in general and 
counterpart relationship had difficulty in addressing capacity development effectively even at the level of individuals. 
Simply put, they were frequently unclear about how to bring about the evolution of complex institutional and 
organizational change (emphasis added). The evidence about the contribution of counterpart relationships to bigger 
systems change in the public sector in PNG remains mixed at best...(the) more typical pattern (is) pockets of progress 
overshadowed by a lack of consolidated progress (emphasis added) in health service delivery outcomes.”
68 For example, a greater return on investment may come from TA personnel locating and negotiating a deal with 
Internet cafes where there is a bank of computers that could potentially be rented for a part of each day in order to 
enable more staff to learn and even do some of their work provided they had access to a flash drive which is portable 
and relatively inexpensive.
69 Morgan, Peter (2008)
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
26
USAID’s GEE and BRIDGE projects (see 3.2 Partnership). Because TAP no longer has a major formal role 
in teacher education, the responsibility for keeping gender equity front and center falls exclusively on GEE. 
While a consistent effort is made to disaggregate data by sex and targets have been set, there is no written 
gender strategy in place that consistently guides and shapes TAP efforts. According to TAP documentation, 
targets for female participation under the respective outputs-based indicators are not being met (see Annex 
14: Indicators) and the access of SMoE females to TA personnel is limited. For example, out of 474 one-on￾one contact hours between TA personnel and SMoE personnel, at best nine hours (just over 1 percent) and at 
worst 4 hours (under 1 percent) was devoted to women. Put another way, out of 172 individual staff 
benefiting from the one-on-one contact time, only six (or 3 percent of) individuals were women (Quarterly 
Report 2 January-March 2009). 
Conclusions: AED is clearly aware of gender issues and has taken steps to ensure that females are represented 
among TAP personnel and that female personnel are safe. TAP’s staffing profile is gender-balanced overall. 
There is an imbalance in the DTA group and the reasons for this as well as potential solutions need to be 
identified. TAP’s position on gender-based harassment or violence and its responses to any such incidents 
should also be reviewed and revised if necessary. Examination of any special challenges faced by female TA 
personnel in the workplace may need further investigation and a course of action as well.
While there is evidence of some attention to gender by TA personnel in some SMoEs, the emphasis has been 
somewhat spotty and lacks a clear agenda.70 MoEST and SMoEs are facing difficulties bringing females into 
ministry positions, teaching and PTAs and bringing girls into classrooms. For example, executive or 
management positions that are held by women are almost exclusively in the Directorates of Gender Equity 
and Social Change and Preschool/Early Childhood Education71 (see Annex 14: Indicators. These are 
directorates that tend not to be targeted by TAP personnel, according to information provided by both TA 
and SMoE personnel interviewed during the five SMoE site visits. TAP needs a focused strategy to break 
through the barriers to achieving gender equality, especially in those states that do not have GEE and/or 
BRIDGE activities but that may have NGOs implementing gender activities. TAP needs to broaden the 
scope of gender considerations to women in decision-making positions and helping SMoEs achieve the 25 
percent target.
3.7 RISKS & UNANTICIPATED NEGATIVE EXTERNAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
3.7.1 Risks
Findings: Although TAP documentation does identify or at least imply some critical assumptions in the 
Program design, there is no formal, standard, regularly updated risk management matrix that grades risks for 
likelihood of occurrence and identifies mitigation responses. The Lessons Learned (QR 2 2009, p. 10) are 
actually more significant risks, from which lessons learned could be derived. The critical design assumption 
of the Program -- that GoSS/MDTF funding for teacher training and textbooks would materialize -- was 
actually flagged in the ACA Application (p. 5) and has been raised consistently in documentation since mid￾2007. The collapse of the FTP occurred early in TAP Phase 3 implementation and, while indicators have been 
adjusted with USAID concurrence, the larger picture for TAP design has not yet been resolved. 
There are other significant risks, not only to TAP implementation, impact and sustainability, but to the 
stability of Southern Sudan itself. Paramount among these are the upcoming February 2010 general elections 
and the 2011 referendum.
 
70 As noted in Quarterly Report 2 2009, p. 10.
71 Out of the ten states, one (Warrap) has a female minister of education and one (Western Equatoria State) has a female 
director general. There is greater representation of women in the lower tiers of the organization in some SMoEs, for 
example in the inspector ranks, although incomplete data do not allow a conclusive statement across the SMoEs in this 
regard.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
27
Conclusions: The lack of a formal risk management matrix may be a liability to Program implementation and 
results. It is also clear that risk mitigation strategies associated with TAP’s most critical assumption are
proving to be inadequate. For example, AED cannot continue to subsidize the on-the-ground TAP training 
provided by TAP personnel in collaboration with some SMoE personnel nor can TAP be held accountable 
for system strengthening with no practical way to test out the extent to which systems have been 
strengthened. 
While the effects of the general elections may be able to be mitigated to some extent by a sound sustainability 
strategy, there is little that TAP can do to quell the uneasiness surrounding the referendum. TAP could be 
instrumental in helping SMoEs establish some quick and visible wins so that confidence of the general public 
in the Government is increased and firmly establish some of the key functional areas. However, the larger 
issue of providing increased access to improved education services is clearly beyond the mandate of TAP. It 
may also be beyond the capacity of the states themselves and rest with GoSS. 
3.7.2 Unanticipated Negative Developments
Findings: At the central level, the genesis of Phases 3 and 4 appears to have been demand-driven, with a great 
deal of interaction between MoEST, USAID and TAP Phase 2. However, at the state level, TAP has been a 
supply-driven modality, with SMoEs being consulted about what their needs are and then informed through 
written materials and presentations about TAP Phases 3 and 4. There is some evidence that the interplay 
between TA personnel and SMoEs fluctuates between a supply-driven and a demand-driven approach, and 
that this has been the case with the MoEST –TAP relationship to a certain extent as well. Several TA 
personnel noted that there has been a gradual shift in the SMoE personnel-TA personnel relationship with 
SMoE personnel becoming more proactive. One STA noted, “I’m beginning to see the culture of the 
Ministry changing. Now people, instead of saying, ‘What should we do?’ are saying, ‘This is what we would 
like to do. What do you think?’ “72
The requirement that TAP demonstrate its effectiveness by ensuring that the GoSS produces policies is 
emerging as a liability. TA personnel, for the most part, are not specialists in public policy development 
(including the policy development cycle). There have been instances where TA personnel input has resulted 
in the development of policy that is contrary to or deviates from national policy. There is no evidence that: (i)
policies being put forth are produced as initial drafts and then revised on the basis of specialist input or (ii) 
identification of policies to be developed is fully tested against related policies at the national or sub-national 
levels. Finally, there is also no evidence of any mechanisms for monitoring the implementation and effects of 
these policies.
Conclusions: The shift toward greater proactivity and direction-setting by SMoE personnel is desirable and 
should be encouraged by TA personnel. However, involvement of TA personnel in policy development at 
the state level (especially when this requires a specialized area of expertise) is not advisable due to the 
potential for negative consequences if policies are of poor quality and/or do not consider all potential 
implications. The repercussions for reversing a bad policy decision include compromising the credibility of 
the SMoE and TA personnel and violating the public’s trust in the SMoE. The repercussions for putting in 
motion a policy that is contrary to GoSS policy with TA personnel assistance also may be significant. The 
GoSS Interim Constitution emphasizes the expectation that different levels of government will work to 
support each other. Establishing ‘renegade’ policies goes contrary to this expectation and subverts in a 
destructive manner the decentralization agenda. While the push by many states to move ahead on setting 
policies where GoSS efforts have been weak or delayed is understandable, However, TAP has to proceed 
cautiously to balance state-level demands with the bigger picture. 
 
72 MTE Team field notes.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
28
3.8 SUSTAINABILITY
Findings: TAP’s partnership efforts are extensive and the benefits of the processes for engagement are 
starting to bear fruit. Attention is now being given to the uptake of the Institutional Development 
Framework across SMoEs as a tool to guide TA personnel support and as an instrument SMoEs can utilize 
over time for organizational development analysis and planning. 
TAP Phases 3 and 4 will run for four years. International literature urges donors to set time frames of not less 
than 10 years and more realistically, 15-20 years as the time frames for capacity enhancement initiatives. 
Realistically, although Phase 3 began in June 2007, full-scale (or nearly full-scale) implementation will only be 
possible for 28 months (June 2009 to mid-September 2011) under the current time frame. It is only very 
recently (mid-2009) that the TA pool has a near-full complement (minus one GoSS-contracted STA) of 
personnel. Moreover, since the first SMoE STAs and DTAs were fielded in October 2007, many of the 
states have had inconsistent TA inputs. The reasons include: (i) numerous TAP personnel changes 
(particularly in the DTA ranks); (ii) shift from the Phase 3 to the Phase 4 Model (and changes in TAP 
coverage and staffing ratios); (iii) issues with GoSS management of GoSS/MDTF STAs; and (iv) insecurity. 
TAP management recently began to work on an exit strategy. However, there is no mention in the 
documentation of a sustainability strategy.73
Sweeping changes in SMoE personnel have occurred in some states (for example, Western Bahr el Ghazal), 
during the tenure of TA personnel. In other states there has a stable core of personnel for lengthy periods of 
time (see Annex 15: Executive and Senior Management Staff Profile). The available quantitative data do not 
show any consistent patterns or trends except that there may be a tendency to retain personnel through lateral 
transfers or promotions.
Conclusions: TAP’s challenge, in the very short implementation time remaining, will be to ensure that the 
processes for guiding systems’ vertical integration (both downwards from the center, but also upwards from 
the state) are sufficiently embedded within MoEST departments so that the linkages between the center and 
the sub-national levels continue to be realized as new systems, approaches and processes are developed. 
TAP’s challenge at the sub-national level is to sufficiently embed SMoE processes that will enable systems’: (i) 
vertical integration; (ii) horizontal integration (across a given SMoE); and (iii) horizontal integration between 
SMoEs. 
Ideally, a sustainability and exit strategy should be fleshed out that can inform an activity’s design so that it is 
clear what needs to be put into motion at the beginning, the middle and the end of implementation to 
maximize sustainability. There is no recognized and binding agreement between the states and the central 
level regarding roles and responsibilities with respect to TAP implementation and post-TAP sustainability of 
benefits.74 International and MTE Team experience with technical assistance as a form of aid repeatedly 
reveals the loss of benefits following the departure of TA personnel. A sustainability strategy would help 
safeguard against this possibility. 
Although SMoE personnel may be shifted from one position to another, personnel may not necessarily be 
lost to the sector or even SMoE headquarters. Such cases are a boon to the sustainability of benefits. 
However, there is also the need for expanding access to TA personnel under a ‘sharing the wealth’ approach 
 
73 An exit strategy typically would deal with how equipment and other materials will be handed over and how the activity 
will be closed down. A sustainability strategy typically would present a vision and a practical plan for ensuring 
sustainability of benefits and, in the case of TA, an approach for ‘weaning’ organizations off of the TA.
74 The Ministry of National Education (MONE) in Indonesia uses these types of agreements between itself and the 
governor of the province or district in which MONE itself or MONE with development partners are investing in 
education development, for example, in school construction. When the governor does not ensure that the terms of the 
agreement are being honored, MONE sends a representative to explore the situation and attempt to resolve it and if the 
governor does not remedy the situation, MONE institutes financial penalties by withholding central level funds that 
should be flowing to the province or district. This approach works very well and very few governors re-neg on their 
agreements.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
29
versus the current one-on-one principle. Under an expanded access approach, even if individual SMoE 
personnel are moved or removed, a critical mass of individuals will remain within the organization.75 A 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), similar to the example given in Understanding betwween MoEST 
and a respective state government and some could help protect the aid investment during implementation 
and potentially after TAP.
Given the constraints listed above, one of two things needs to happen—either the TAP time frame needs to 
be extended to enable the Program to have come chance of realizing its ambitious aims or the expectations of 
what TAP can contribute in the current time frame need to be modified. In either case, a set of clear 
organizational development targets — the ‘common core’ --needs to be specified along with the manner in 
which these core targets will be achieved. The Organizational Development Tracking and Planning 
Instrument76 (refer to Annex 13: Organizational Development Tracking and Planning Tool and the TAP July 
2009 workshop session on the IDF should have a positive impact on both TAP implementation as well as the
post-TAP phase.
 
75 This would be further enhanced if combined with assistance for succession planning in SMoEs.
76 The “OD (Organizational Tracking and Planning Instrument” is the name given to the IDF revision by the MTE 
Team.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
30
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Strategy
Recommendation 1: Request AED TAP to review and refine the draft Memorandum of Understanding 
(see Annex 11: Draft Content for MoE ST-SMoE Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU)) and to present it to MoEST, state governors and SMoEs for consideration 
as a concept and potential action.
Recommendation 2: Request AED TAP to articulate its approach (including an action plan) to 
progressing the anticipated partnerships between State Ministries of Education and 
donor/development partners and between TAP and other USAID nominated 
activities (BRIDGE, GEE and IRI) and ensure that TA personnel and SMoE 
personnel are familiar with and supportive of the directions proposed. 
Human Resources
Recommendation 3: Request AED TAP-Washington to re-assess the level of TAP Hub (central program 
office) resourcing and to specifically ‘uncouple’ the Chief of Party (COP) role from 
the Senior Technical Advisor role with both becoming separately staffed, full-time 
positions. The MoEST Senior Technical Advisor position should only be staffed 
once Recommendation 6: has been accomplished. 
Recommendation 4: Request AED TAP to resolve outstanding personnel well-being and contractual 
issues, including re-visiting and refining position descriptions. 
Recommendation 5: Request AED TAP to identify and implement a strategy to support current TA 
personnel on the job including, at a minimum Option 1 and considering Options 2 
and 3 (see Annex 8: Options for Escalating Levels of Support), particularly if 
additional financing becomes available.
Recommendation 6: Request AED TAP to discuss fielding a short-term technical expert to provide 
advice to MoEST on a strategic approach to ensure the identification, recruitment 
and utilization of TA that fits with the evolving needs of MoEST and the GoSS 
Parliamentary Committee for Education. 
Impact
Recommendation 7: Request AED TAP to immediately draft: a sustainability and exit strategy taking into 
account TAP’s ending date of September 2011 as well as the long-term 
considerations associated with a realistic capacity building time frame 
(conservatively 10-20 years); and, a standard risk management matrix. 
Recommendation 8: Request AED TAP to incorporate conflict sensitive analysis into its programming, 
utilizing one of the many tools available and to report on the cumulative amount of 
time TA personnel are kept off or are limited on the job due to insecurity since this 
factor has significant implications for TAP impact.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
31
Recommendation 9: Request AED TAP to introduce a Program Logical Framework or Results 
Framework that grounds qualitative findings in empirical data and sound research 
methods and improves monitoring and evaluation to take into account: (i) a clear 
M&E approach (and ideally a framework)77 and (ii) analyses and meta-analyses of 
data and inclusion of these findings in reports.
Recommendation 10: Request AED TAP to articulate a gender and development support strategy in 
collaboration with GEE that is informed by the work being undertaken by GoSS 
bodies, other development partners, and projects. 
 
77 For an example of a comprehensive Monitoring and Evaluation Framework, see Annex 7: MonitorING and 
Evaluation – Additional Information
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
32
V. LESSONS LEARNED 
 A hub-satellite program management/delivery model requires a strenuous effort to manage and 
should be resourced accordingly.
 A challenging living and working environment requires special management flexibility.
 The lack of a risk management matrix that commits the various stakeholders to agreed mitigation 
strategies is the most significant risk to activity implementation and impact.
 The absence of a sustainability and exit strategy that informs both the design and implementation 
stages of an activity heightens the risk that benefits will not be sustained. 
 A capacity enhancement program design should incorporate a medium to long term (at a minimum, 
10 to 20 years) time frame, given the current research on organizational development and change in 
developing countries. 
 A policy on gender is a necessary, but not sufficient, element for realizing gender equality. 
 Even limited learning and innovation opportunities in an environment affected by protracted conflict 
can lead to big results and have a significant multiplier effect78. 
 Capacity enhancement needs to be embedded within a Theory of Change/systems thinking paradigm 
to affect real change at the individual and organizational levels and to influence the enabling 
environment.
 Reinforcing strengths works--it empowers, motivates and taps into creativity.
 The natural tension faced by TA personnel to serve a variety of purposes -- including general 
supervision, gate keeping, gap filling and task accomplishment – complicates achievement of 
intended program results.79
 
78 See Annex 9: Case Study - Generating Income to Support the Operational Activities of the Western Equatoria State 
Ministry of Education, Southern Sudan.
79 Morgan, Peter (2008) Improving Counterpart Relationships in Papua New Guinea: A Study for the Governments of 
Papua New Guinea and Australia. Canberra, Australia: AusAID.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
33
ANNEX 1: SCOPE OF WORK
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
34
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
35
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
36
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
37
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
38
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
39
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
40
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
41
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
42
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
43
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
44
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
45
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
46
ANNEX 2: SCHEDULE OF CONSULTATIONS
TABLE 1: FIELD WORK MASTER SCHEDULE, SOUTHERN SUDAN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM (SSTAP): JUNE 17 
– JULY 31, 2009
DATE NAME/DETAILS ORGANIZATON/POSITION FOCUS AREAS LOCATION
Wednesday – Sunday: June 17-21
Val/Bob MTE Team External Personnel Preparation and Travel Home Base & 
International
Sunday: June 21
AM Val/Bob MTE Team External Personnel
Travel to Juba, Southern Sudan 
(Arrive 11am, June 21)
Travel
PM Val/Bob/Ami/Ashle
y
MTE Team External Personnel
MSI Sudan Personnel
TPM Day 1
Briefing by MSI
Preparation for TPM Day 2
Jebel Lodge (Juba)
Monday: June 22
9:00 – 12:00
Val/Bob/Ami/Ashle
y/Grace/Hakim/Kat
ie/Inez/Peter/Pia
MTE Team External
Internal Personnel
MSI Sudan Personnel 
TPM Day 2
Review work tasks
Review document outline (drafts)
Agree on approach to field work
Products developed—Report Outline, Getting 
to Answers, Work Plans (master and 
individual)
MSI (Juba Office)
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
47
DATE NAME/DETAILS ORGANIZATON/POSITION FOCUS AREAS LOCATION
1:00 – 4:30 Val/Bob/Ami/Ashle
y
MTE Team External
Internal Personnel
MSI Sudan Personnel
AED Washington teleconference MSI (Juba Office)
Tuesday: June 23
9:45-1:15
Val/Bob/Ami/Ashle
y/Grace/Hakim/Kat
ie/Peter/Pia 
MTE Team External
Internal Personnel
MSI Sudan Personnel
TPM Day 3
Instrument development
Interviewees determined
Interview process and protocol developed 
and discussed
MSI (Juba Office)
Mr. Peter Malnak USAID Director
Ms. Casey Chu USAID 
Democratization/Governance TL
1:15-3:30
Ms. Ruth Buckley M&E Specialist and Bridges TL
Welcome by USAID Director
USAID directions in Southern Sudan
Exploration of Democratization and 
Governance directions and lessons learned in 
capacity development
Understanding of USAID M&E directions 
and expectations regarding the MTE
USAID Compound
(Juba)
Wednesday: June 24
9:30-4:30
Central Equatorial 
State Ministry of 
Education 
personnel 
Mr Kanju Yakuma, 
DTA
Mr Christopher 
Kenyi, STA
Central Equatoria State Ministry 
of Education Director General, 
Department Heads, Deputy 
Department Heads & Section 
Heads, Non-Managerial Staff
AED State Adviser
AED Diaspora Technical Assistant
Perspectives on TAP from receiving ministry 
side
Perspectives on TAP from TA personnel side
Central Equatoria 
State Ministry Of 
Education
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
48
DATE NAME/DETAILS ORGANIZATON/POSITION FOCUS AREAS LOCATION
4:30-5:30 Val/Bob/Hakim/Kat
ie/Peter/Pia MTE Team
De-brief CES interviews
Finalize paperwork and trip plans MSI (Juba Office)
Thursday: June 25
7:30-10:30 Val/Bob/Hakim/Kat
ie/Peter/Pia MTE Team Fly to Yambio, Western Equatoria State Juba Airport
10:00-4:00
Western Equatorial 
State Ministry of 
Education 
personnel
Dr Charles 
Kanyarusoke, STA
Ms Lucy Vivian 
Elipaza, DTA
Ultimate 
Beneficiaries
Western Equatoria State Ministry 
of Education Director General, 
Department Heads, Deputy 
Department Heads & Section 
Heads, Non-Managerial Staff
AED State Technical Adviser
AED Diaspora Technical Assistant
Perspectives on TAP from receiving ministry 
side
Perspectives on TAP from TA personnel side
Western Equatoria 
State Ministry Of 
Education (Yambio)
Friday: June 26
10:00-4:00
Western Equatorial 
State Ministry of 
Education 
personnel
Dr Charles 
Kanyarusoke, STA
Ms Lucy Vivian 
Elipaza, DTA
Ultimate 
Beneficiaries 
Western Equatoria State Ministry 
of Education Director General, 
Department Heads, Deputy 
Department Heads & Section 
Heads, Non-Managerial Staff
AED State Technical Adviser
AED Diaspora Technical Assistant
Ultimate Beneficiaries
Perspectives on TAP from receiving ministry 
side
Perspectives on TAP from TA personnel side
Western Equatoria 
State Ministry Of 
Education (Yambio)
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
49
DATE NAME/DETAILS ORGANIZATON/POSITION FOCUS AREAS LOCATION
4:00 Val/Bob/Hakim/Kat
ie/Peter/Pia MTE Team Return to Juba
Western Equatoria 
State Airport 
(Yambio)
Saturday: June 27
8:00-9:00 Val/Bob MTE Team External Personnel Desk Work Jebel Lodge (Juba)
Sunday: June 28
9:00 – 5:00 Val/Bob MTE Team External Personnel Desk Work (nominally day off; not in 
actuality) Jebel Lodge (Juba)
5:00-7:30
Dr Grace Akukwe
Ms Arushi Terway
AED TAP Chief of Party and 
GoSS MoEST STA
AED TAP Manager, Washington 
DC
Perspectives on TAP from management side Jebel Lodge (Juba)
Monday: June 29
8:00 – 10:00 Val/Bob/Hakim/Kat
ie/Peter/Pia 
MTE Team Fly to Lakes State Juba Airport
10:00-4:00
Lakes State 
Ministry of 
Education 
personnel
Mr Gol Ayie Jal, 
DTA
Ultimate 
Beneficiaries 
Lakes State Ministry of Education 
Director General, Department 
Heads, Deputy Department Heads 
& Section Heads, Non-Managerial 
Staff
AED State Technical Adviser
AED Diaspora Technical Assistant
Ultimate Beneficiaries
Perspectives on TAP from receiving ministry 
side
Perspectives on TAP from TA personnel side
Lakes State Ministry 
Of Education 
(Rumbek)
Counties/Schools
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
50
DATE NAME/DETAILS ORGANIZATON/POSITION FOCUS AREAS LOCATION
Tuesday: June 30
8:00 – 4:00
Lakes State 
Ministry of 
Education
personnel
Mr Belay Hagos, 
STA
Mr Gol Ayie Jal, 
DTA
Ultimate 
Beneficiaries 
Lakes State Ministry of Education 
Director General, Department 
Heads, Deputy Department Heads 
& Section Heads, Non-Managerial 
Staff
AED State Technical Adviser
AED Diaspora Technical Assistant
Ultimate Beneficiaries
Perspectives on TAP from receiving ministry 
side
Perspectives on TAP from TA personnel side
Lakes State Ministry 
Of Education 
(Rumbek)
Counties/Schools
4:30 Val/Bob/Hakim/Kat
ie/Peter/Pia MTE Team Travel to Airport Lakes Airport 
(Rumbek)
5:00 Val/Bob/Hakim/Kat
ie/Peter/Pia MTE Team Arrive in Wau, Western Bar el Ghazal Western Bar El 
Ghazal Airport (Wau)
Wednesday: July 1
8:00 – 4:00
Val (continues on to 
Juba with plane; rest of 
team carries out 
Western Bar El Ghazal
and Warrap field 
work)
Western Bar El 
Ghazal State 
Ministry of 
Education 
personnel
Ms Leila Bogoreth, 
STA
Mr Simon Amos 
Duku, DTA
Ultimate 
Beneficiaries 
Western Bar El Ghazal State 
Ministry of Education Director 
General, Department Heads, 
Deputy Department Heads & 
Section Heads, Non-Managerial 
Staff
AED State Technical Adviser
AED Diaspora Technical Assistant
Ultimate Beneficiaries
Perspectives on TAP from receiving ministry 
side
Perspectives on TAP from TA personnel side
Western Bar El 
Ghazal State Ministry 
Of Education (Wau)
Counties & Schools
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
51
DATE NAME/DETAILS ORGANIZATON/POSITION FOCUS AREAS LOCATION
Thursday: July 2
8:45 Bob/Hakim/Katie/P
eter/Pia MTE Team Travel to Airport
Western Bar El 
Ghazal State Airport 
(Wau)
9:00 Bob/Hakim/Katie/P
eter/Pia MTE Team Travel to Kuajok, Warrap State Warrap State 
(Kuajok)
10:00-4:00
Warrap State 
Ministry of 
Education 
personnel
Ms Heidi 
Eschenbacher
Mr Simon Deng
Ultimate 
Beneficiaries 
Warrap State Ministry of 
Education Director General, 
Department Heads, Deputy 
Department Heads & Section 
Heads, Non-Managerial Staff
AED State Technical Adviser
AED Diaspora Technical Assistant
Ultimate Beneficiaries
Perspectives on TAP from receiving ministry 
side
Perspectives on TAP from TA personnel side
Warrap State Ministry 
Of Education 
(Kuajok)
Counties & Schools
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
52
DATE NAME/DETAILS ORGANIZATON/POSITION FOCUS AREAS LOCATION
9:00 – 6:30
(Val’s meetings)
Mr Garang Akok
Mr Edward Kokole
Mr Vincent Damata
Ms Esther Akumu
Mr Fahim Akbar
Ms Joyce Yawa
Mr Charlie 
Goldsmith
Dr Grace Akukwe
Director, Human Resources 
(GOSS MOEST)
A/Director General, Quality 
Promotion and Innovation
MDTF Financial Management 
Specialist
MDTF Coordinator
UNICEF-funded AED EMIS 
Specialist
STA-Eastern Equatoria and 
Jonglei States, MDTF-funded
AED TAP Chief of Party and State 
Technical Adviser-GOSS MOEST
Perspectives on TAP from receiving ministry 
side
Perspectives on TAP from AED personnel 
side
Ministry Of 
Education, Science & 
Technology , Juba
Friday: July 3
9:30 – 4:00
Warrap State 
Ministry of 
Education 
personnel
Ms Heidi 
Eschenbacher
Mr Simon Deng
Ultimate 
Beneficiaries 
Warrap State Ministry of 
Education Director General, 
Department Heads, Deputy 
Department Heads & Section 
Heads, Non-Managerial Staff
AED State Technical Adviser
AED Diaspora Technical Assistant
Ultimate Beneficiaries
Perspectives on TAP from receiving ministry 
side
Perspectives on TAP from TA personnel side
Perspectives on MDTF and on MDTF-funded 
portions of TAP
Perspectives on CBTF (payroll)
Perspectives on EMIS and roll-out to states
Warrap State Ministry 
Of Education 
(Kuajok)
Counties & Schools
5:00 Bob/Hakim/Katie/P
eter/Pia MTE Team Travel to Wau, WESTERN BAR EL 
GHAZAL STATE
Western Bar El 
Ghazal State (Wau)
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
53
DATE NAME/DETAILS ORGANIZATON/POSITION FOCUS AREAS LOCATION
9:00 – 5:00
(Val’s Juba Meetings 
Schedule)
Dr Sibeso Lusawata
Honorable Nartisio
Mr Gerahun Gebru
UNICEF Chief of Education
Head of Education Committee￾Parliament
MDTF Officer
Perspectives on TAP from development 
partner side 
Perspectives on TAP from GOSS Parliament 
side
Perspectives on TAP collaboration with 
MDTF
Juba
Saturday: July 4
9:00 – 11:00 Val/Bob MTE Team
Desk Work
Prepare for STA/DTA/Directors of Planning 
Workshop
Jebel Lodge (Juba)
11:00 – 12:30 Ms Inez Andrews USAID TAP TL and COTR Informal debriefing on Findings, Conclusions 
and Recommendations USAID Compound
12:00 – 1:30 Dr. Charles 
Kanyarusoke
AED State Technical Adviser, 
Western Equatoria State Perspectives on TAP from TA personnel side Jebel Lodge (Juba)
1:30 – 5:00 Val/Bob MTE Team
Desk Work
Prepare for STA/DTA/Directors of Planning 
Workshop
Jebel Lodge (Juba)
Sunday: July 5
8:00 – 9:00 Val/Bob MTE Team Preparation Day (nominally a day off, but not 
in actuality) Jebel Lodge (Juba)
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
54
DATE NAME/DETAILS ORGANIZATON/POSITION FOCUS AREAS LOCATION
Monday: July 6
9:00 – 11:00
STAs, DTAs (32)
Directors of 
Planning (10)
AED TA Personnel
State Ministries of Education
Workshop to test out MTE Team’s data and 
initial conclusions on TAP with receiving 
ministry and TAP TA personnel
Supplementing data gathered during field 
work
New York Hotel 
(Juba)
12:00-5:00 Val/Bob/Hakim/Kat
ie/Peter/Pia MTE Team F/C/R Workshop MSI (Juba)
Tuesday: July 7
8:15 – 5:54 Val/Bob/Hakim/Kat
ie/Peter/Pia MTE Team F/C/R Workshop MSI (Juba)
6:00 – 9:00
Dr Grace Akukwe
Mr Jino 
AED TA Personnel Supplementing data gathered during field 
work Thongpiny (Juba)
Wednesday: July 8
9:00 – 5:45 Val/Bob MTE Team (External) Prepare for De-Briefing Meeting Jebel Lodge (Juba)
5:00 – 6:00 Directors of 
Planning (10) GoSS SMoEs De-briefing on Preliminary F/C/R New York Hotel 
(Juba)
6:00 – 7:30
AED management 
personnel
STAs
DTAs
AED Personnel De-briefing on Preliminary F/C/R New York Hotel 
(Juba)
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
55
DATE NAME/DETAILS ORGANIZATON/POSITION FOCUS AREAS LOCATION
Thursday: July 9
9:00 – 3:00 Val/Bob/Katie/Inez/
Ami/Ashley
MTE Team (External)
USAID Personnel
MSI Personnel
Prepare for De-Briefing Meeting MSI (Juba)
3:30 – 5:30
USAID
GOSS
DONORS/DEVEL
OPMENT 
PARTNERS
USAID
GOSS
DONORS/DEVELOPMENT 
PARTNERS
De-briefing of MTE Findings, Conclusions, 
Recommendations MoEST (Juba)
Friday: July 10
9:00 – 5:00 Val/Bob MTE Team (External) Prepare Draft Report Jebel Lodge (Juba)
Saturday: July 11
9:00 – 5:00 Val/Bob MTE Team (External) Prepare Draft Report Jebel Lodge (Juba)
Sunday:, July 12
Val/Bob MTE (External) Depart Juba (Travel Days) Juba Airport
Monday: July 13
Val/Bob MTE (External) (Travel Days)
Tuesday: July 14
Val/Bob MTE (External) (Travel Days)
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
56
DATE NAME/DETAILS ORGANIZATON/POSITION FOCUS AREAS LOCATION
Saturday: July 18
9:00 Val (1pm Sydney 
time) MTE Team (External) Send penultimate draft Report to Internal 
Team Sydney
Sunday: July 19
9:00 Hakim/Katie/Peter/
Pia MTE Team (Internal) Send comments on penultimate draft to Val 
& Bob by 1:00pm Juba time Juba
Monday: July 20
 (COB Juba time) Val/Bob MTE Team (External) Submit draft Report to MSI Sydney
Asheville
Wednesday: July 22
Inez Andrews USAID/Team Leader
Katie Johnston USAID/MSI Senior Education 
Specialist
Grace Akukwe, et 
al. AED Management
Provide comments on draft Report to MSI Juba
Friday: July 24
Ashley Wax MSI/Planning & M&E Adviser Provide consolidated comments on draft 
Report to Val and Bob Juba
Tuesday: July 28
Val MTE Team (External) Submit final Report to MSI Sydney
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
57
ANNEX 3: EXPANDED DISCUSSION OF THE METHODOLOGY 
APPROACH
The Mid-Term Evaluation was a formative evaluation study that utilized a collaborative approach80 guided by 
the two external evaluators with the input of representatives from the three key organizations involved in 
TAP: GoSS-MoEST, USG-USAID and AED. The collaborative nature of the evaluation was an intentional 
decision made on the basis of enhancing stakeholder understanding and ownership of the MTE findings and 
conclusions as well as commitment to implementing the proposed recommendations.
Participants
The Team canvassed a wide range of TAP stakeholders in the course of the MTE, predominantly in five 
states selected by USAID, GoSS and AED prior to the mobilization of the Team. The states’ selection was 
based on a range of considerations including (but not limited to) the stage of development of the SMoE, 
extent of TA inputs, and safety and travel concerns. Nearly 180 individuals representing numerous agencies, 
organizations and perspectives and holding a variety of positions were interviewed. From June 24 to July 7, 
2009, the Team spent one to two days with State Ministry of Education officials and staff, TAP personnel 
and other stakeholders in each of five states (Central Equatoria, Lakes, Western Bahr El Ghazal, Western 
Equatoria and Warrap). After the field visits, the Team had the opportunity to meet Directors of Planning, 
STAs and DTAs from all 10 states during the TAP Quarterly meeting which was held in Juba from July 6-9. 
The Team also met with senior officials from the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology and the 
head of the GOSS Parliamentary Education Committee. See the “Matrix of Areas of Focus by Participant 
Group” (below) which provides a complete list of participant groups and the evaluation areas explored with 
each group. This table was developed in close consultation with USAID, GoSS and AED.
Data Collection and Analysis
Qualitative and quantitative data were collected and analyzed. These data were gathered using a variety of 
research methods including Focus Group Discussions (FCG) with structured questionnaires and individual 
participant interviews using semi-structured questionnaires. Quantitative data were collected concerning 
length of service, rankings on extent of knowledge about TAP and extent of interaction with TAP personnel, 
proposals submitted to and/or financed by external funding bodies. Primary and secondary sources were also 
utilized, most notably, GoSS and USG documentation, AED-TAP reports and reference material capacity 
building, education in conflict-affected contexts, conflict sensitive analysis and technical assistance as a form 
of aid generated through Internet searches. A list of pertinent primary and secondary sources can be found in 
Annex 20: Bibliography. Care was taken to ensure that data were triangulated and discrepant cases identified 
and explored. Analysis of the data was undertaken in an iterative manner throughout the field work, 
culminating in a two-day Team workshop to agree on Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations (FCR).
Consultations were undertaken primarily in a face to face (F2F) mode with a few interviews conducted via 
telephone. During the un-structured and semi-structured individual interviews and the FGDs and mini￾FGDs, participants were asked to respond to a series of topical areas and the interviewers than followed up 
with open-ended probe questions.
 
80 A collaborative evaluation “implies a varying level of involvement that considers the extent to which program staff 
and other stakeholders should be included as part of the evaluation team...is often empowering to participants.. .(and) 
enhances their understanding of evaluation so they gain new skills...promotes utilization of evaluation findings”. 
(O’Sullivan, Rita G. 2004)
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
58
Integrity of the Data: Validity and Reliability
Data were captured in note form with strict attention paid to recording the informant’s speech exactly. Where 
the speech or the meaning was not clear, the Team sought clarification with non-leading, non- evaluative 
follow-up questions such as, “Could you explain in another way what you mean?” or “Did you mean X or Y 
or something else?” During mini-focus group and focus group interviews, the Team ensured that all 
informants had an equal share of time to provide their opinions. As the interviews progressed, the Team 
identified emerging themes or patterns and verbalized these, checking with the informant(s) for their 
agreement or disagreement. Data were triangulated to the greatest extent possible in order to address issues of 
data integrity so that the findings/patterns that emerged were not the views of isolated individuals.
The participation of the Managing Contractor during consultations did not affect the Team’s objectivity and 
the Team was sensitive to any indications from beneficiaries and stakeholders about an unwillingness to be 
frank in front of the Contractor representative. The external evaluators undertook the interviews of AED 
Senior Technical Advisors and Diaspora Technical Assistants, however, in order to ensure that these 
individuals were not compromised in any way.
Limitations of the Research
The determination of visit sites was made prior to the arrival of the external evaluators and without their 
input. While this was not ideal, the Team was obliged to use the locations that had been nominated. There do 
not appear to have been any negative repercussions resulting from this situation.
Time did not allow for the testing of any interview protocols or questionnaires before their use; however, care 
was taken to ensure that the interview protocols were progressively refined over the course of the field work 
while at the same time ensuring that the reliability and the validity of the data being collected were not 
compromised.
The Team also endeavored to ensure that the participant groups were consistent across the different sites; in 
most cases, it was not possible to guarantee that all targeted participants attended the FGD sessions or 
individual interviews.
A further limitation was the amount of time allocated to each site visit. This limitation had repercussions for 
the number of informants with whom the Team was able to consult and resulted in some un-evenness in the 
profile of the participants across sites. While the Team does not believe the inconsistencies in the pool of 
participants has had any significant negative impact on the findings, conclusions and recommendations, 
nonetheless, such a situation is not desirable and could have implications for the integrity of the data and the 
subsequent analysis.
Lastly, although recognized qualitative research methods were used to gather data, the analysis of the 
qualitative data was not a pure qualitative analysis in which a strict capture of the numbers of participants 
responding in the same manner was undertaken and results tallied and tabulated. Rather, the analysis was 
somewhat more relaxed as a result of the constraints of time and the newness of some Team members to 
rigorous research methodologies. Emerging patterns and trends were identified by individual team members 
and verified or discounted by other team members and data were continuously triangulated in an effort to 
counteract any laxity in rigor.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
59
TABLE 2: INTERVIEW FOCUS AREAS & TARGET GROUP EMPHASIS
Focus
USAID-TL Education
USAID-Peter TL DG,
GoSS-Parliament
GoSS-Finance & Public
Sector (central and state
levels)
GoSS-MoEST
(Counterparts)
GoSS-MoEST (Non￾counterparts)
GoSS-County
AED Management
Personnel
AED-TA Personnel
Partners-World Bank
(Collaborator), Winrock
(USAID) Oxfam (AED
Wau), EDC (USAID),
IRC (AED)
WB
Relations-UNICEF,
CBTF
Ultimate Beneficiaries
(Students, Parents,
Teachers, Administrators)
Alignment with 
Government (GoSS and 
USG)
XXX XXX XXX XXX X XX XX
Management￾Effectiveness XXX XX XXX XX XXX XXX XX XX XX
Management-Efficiency XXX XX XXX XX XXX XXX XX XX XX
Partnerships (USAID
GoSS-AED; MDTF; EDC; 
Winrock; Oxfam)
XXX XX XXX XX XXX XXX XXX
(Winrock) XX
Relationships (UNICEF) n/a XXX XX XXX XXX XXX X XXX XX
Quality 
(documentation/reporting, 
personnel, products,
M&E, ...)
XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XX
(CBTF) X
Inclusion (gender, 
disabilities, other equity 
considerations)
XXX XX n/a XXX n/a XXX XXX XX XX XXX
Peace Dividend/Conflict 
Sensitivity XXX XX XX XXX XX XX XX XX XX
Impact XXX X X XXX XXX X XXX XXX XX XXX XX
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
60
Focus
USAID-TL Education
USAID-Peter TL DG,
GoSS-Parliament
GoSS-Finance & Public
Sector (central and state
levels)
GoSS-MoEST
(Counterparts)
GoSS-MoEST (Non￾counterparts)
GoSS-County
AED Management
Personnel
AED-TA Personnel
Partners-World Bank
(Collaborator), Winrock
(USAID) Oxfam (AED
Wau), EDC (USAID),
IRC (AED)
WB
Relations-UNICEF,
CBTF
Ultimate Beneficiaries
(Students, Parents,
Teachers, Administrators)
Sustainability XXX XXX XXX XXX XX
TAP Approach (design 
integrity,
appropriateness/relevance)
XXX XX XXX XX XXX XXX XX XX/X XXX
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
61
ANNEX 4: TAP IMPLEMENTATION PHASES 2005-2011
FIGURE 8: TAP IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 2005-2011
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
62
ANNEX 5: LIKHERT SCALE SCORING OF TAP 
IMPLEMENTING PRINCIPLES (FROM 2007 PMP)
FIGURE 9:HISTOGRAM REPRESENTING OVERALL SCORING OF IMPLEMENTING 
PRINCIPLES (FROM 2007 PMP).
1. GoSS-MoEST leadership of Southern Sudan TAP will ensure integration, coordination and 
sustainability.
At this point in time (mid-way through the activity implementation), although the executive appreciates and 
works well with TAP management and the STA, there is no strong evidence that individuals and/or systems 
are being put in place that could ensure that TAP strategic approaches to capacity enhancement and 
organizational development vertically as well as horizontally are becoming embedded at the central level. A 
counterpart has not yet been nominated and TAP STA-MoEST does not interact closely with other MoEST
external TA.
2. The Southern Sudan TAP for 2007 will build, strengthen and expand on earlier 2006 
activities.
To a certain extent this is the case. TA personnel in all states are now consistently helping to progress the 
payroll system, to expand the understanding of and to embed sound planning processes, to extend the use of 
the EMIS for a range of purposes (including planning) and to strengthen coordination, collaboration and 
communication between and across levels of the education system and with development partners. A few TA 
personnel draw on prior documentation and instruments developed during Phases 1 and 2; however, many 
develop their own materials from scratch. The foundational element (the FTP) of TAP Phases 3 and 4, 
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
63
however, is defunct and TA personnel have therefore lost the tried and tested systems, processes and 
instruments that were meant to be rolled-out and scaled up across the 10 states.
3. TAP is primarily a capacity-building program. Capacity building is seen as being 
accomplished effectively through on-the-job training, or learning by doing, an effective 
approach to adult learning and a way of implementing programs immediately rather than 
delaying until formal training is completed.
The principle itself is commendable and TAP has made significant progress in implementing the principle 
with a limited number of individuals in each SMoE headquarters—an in-built restriction due to the emphasis 
on one-on-one coaching/mentoring as a key element of the on-the-job/learning by doing principle will limit 
the impact of TAP and will potentially affect sustainability of benefits. This principle assumes that capacity 
enhancement can and should be implemented through a focus on the individual; however, it does not take 
the development of the organization or the institutions that impact on the individuals and the organization 
into account. This is a liability and a risk.
4. Southern Sudan TAP will coordinate and collaborate with USAID and other donor- funded 
education in Southern Sudan.
Partnerships at the state level are becoming increasingly functional as TA personnel assist SMoE personnel to 
take a leadership role in harmonizing sector activities through: development partner registration, mapping 
development partner activities, ensuring that the scheduled routine meetings occur and that the SMoE leads 
the meetings, encouraging partners to get involved in annual planning, budget transparency, and dealing with 
underserved areas. Partnerships at the central level which have an impact vertically are increasingly becoming 
more strategic. The collaboration on payroll systems (Booz Allen), on EMIS, the education census and 
teacher head count (UNICEF) and combined USAID project (TAP, BRIDGE, GEE, SSIRI) leaders’ 
meetings to identify state level collaboration are noteworthy.
5. Technical assistance under Southern Sudan TAP must remain fluid and flexible given the 
fluid situation in Southern Sudan and the changing priorities of the ministry.
TAP has had to adapt quickly and flexibly to several changes in the enabling environment including USAID 
and GoSS decisions on Program directions and expansion and to a shift in the Phases 3 and 4 Program 
design logic due to central level issues in the utilization of the MDTF funds and program implementation. 
However, this principle should not be used by TAP as a rationale for uneven development of benefits and 
pockets of progress.
6. The Southern Sudan TAP will need to continue to strike a balance between being responsive 
to multiple requests to assist daily operations of MoEST and accomplishing program 
objectives and deliverables as agreed upon by MoEST, USAID and EQUIP 2.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
64
The reporting processes in place for determining exactly where TA personnel are putting their efforts are still 
in a formative state. On the basis of evidence available, it appears that a core focus on some common 
activities is beginning to emerge (planning, payroll system, EMIS, computer literacy); however, the number of 
individuals benefitting is limited and the relinquishment of two indicators from TAP means that something 
else should be filling the void. Interviews with TA personnel make it clear that there is a fair amount of ad 
hoc undertakings as well as TA personnel focusing on their own particular areas of interest and strength. This 
tendency runs the risk of TAP’s common core of activity(ies) being diluted.
7. The Southern Sudan TAP will continue to work to strengthen policy development, planning 
and administration, but with an increasing focus on the implementation of policies and 
plans (versus the earlier focus on policy and planning development and formulation).
This principle is in its early stages for several reasons including the lack of resources (TAP or SMoE as well as 
the lack of a consistent, strategic approach utilized in all SMoEs to capturing development partner resources 
in each state) for policy and program implementation and the absence of a clear “bottom line” negotiated 
with SMoEs that lays out the minimums that TAP will help all SMoEs accomplish. There is some evidence of 
a continuing emphasis on policy development; however, there is also evidence that policies already developed 
that relate specifically to organizational development (such as human resources policies, the organizational 
structure, etc.) are beginning to be implemented through TAP assistance. There are also discrepancies 
between what recent TAP documentation identifies as short-term aims for FY 2009 and what is detailed in 
USAID FY 2009 documentation and this can lead to confusion among stakeholders about the Program and 
in monitoring and evaluation.
8. Encouraging the access and success of girls in school and female teachers as education 
professional will cut across all programs.
TAP disaggregates data by sex and sets minimum targets for participation by females in Indicators 1 and 5.
TAP has not yet met the female participation targets and TAP personnel are not having much success 
ensuring that female SMoE personnel have access to them. There is some evidence that gender will be taken 
more seriously in FY 2009. However, this principle needs to be adjusted to focus on gender and development 
broadly, not only on girl children and female teachers. TA personnel can play a significant role in enabling 
state leadership to progress and promote policies, practices and programs that open the door for women to 
participate and a strategic approach to this in collaboration with USAID’s Gender Equity through Education 
Program which works closely with the Ministry for Gender Equity and Social Change is an obvious direction 
to pursue seriously.
9. Since implementation of funds are limited in TAP, the Program will work in a proactive and 
entrepreneurial way to leverage GoSS-MoEST and other donor funding, using these 
programs as capacity-building vehicles.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
65
This principle has also emerged as TAP’s most significant risk and the progress of TAP overall in this area is 
spotty. There is some evidence of some TA personnel assisting SMoEs to access one-off funding for small 
initiatives; however it is also evident that the approach overall and with individual SMoEs is ad hoc and not 
strategic and in a few cases, the lack of uptake of a proposal or the inability of TA personnel to follow￾through on promises made is having a negative impact on the perception of a number of SMoE about TAP’s 
viability and legitimacy.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
66
ANNEX 6: EXPANDED DISCUSSION ON RISK MANAGEMENT
Although TAP documentation does identify some risks, there is no formal, standard regularly updated risk 
management matrix that grades risks for likelihood of occurrence and identifies mitigation responses. A
“show stopping” risk—that GoSS and other donor funding for training would not be leveraged--materialized 
early on in TAP Phase 3 implementation and has continued since. This risk was actually flagged in the ACA 
Application (p. 5) and it has been raised consistently in documentation since mid-2007. It was not, however, 
part of a standard approach to risk treatment and the risk mitigation strategies that were identified were 
inadequate and not necessarily agreed to by stakeholders. The Application states that, “The proposed (TAP) 
budget has set aside a small amount of funds for each advisor to use when funding is delayed. However, the 
success of EQUIP 2 will depend on the ability to have access to other funding. If, for any reason, GoSS and 
other donor funding is not available, this may become a constraint on reaching program results (emphasis 
added) and USAID may need to consider increasing funds for training and other program costs.”
TAP funds to advisors now amount to approximately US$30,000 per SMoE to subsidize training activities, 
particularly at the county and payam levels. Although their job descriptions require that TA personnel assist 
SMoEs to develop proposals in order to increase the resource base of the education sector at the state level to 
implement programs (originally to implement the FTP in particular), the manner in which the TA personnel 
provide proposal development assistance is ad hoc and there is no monitoring of the success rate. It also 
appears that a number of TA personnel are not aware that assisting their SMoE to leverage MoEST and 
donor funding to carry out training outside SMoE HQ is a vital pillar of the TAP design for which they 
should be held accountable.
As it also turns out, resourcing of education at the state level is a major problem and consists of both a lack 
of resources (financial and otherwise) and the unpredictable and unreliable flow of resources from both GoSS 
and donors alike. Education financing has dropped from donor commitments of US$150m to US$50m and 
the Global Economic Crisis has had an impact on national funding. In many states, UNICEF is functioning 
as the de facto bankroller for the education sector providing the only relatively reliable and stable annual source 
of education finance for non-salary expenditures (at least in those states that make the effort to access the 
available funds).
This lack of financing affects not only TAP results but also the design of Phases 3 and 4, which is based on a 
strategy built around “teacher development. with a concrete set of tasks around which to begin building the 
capacity of the SMoESTSs (sic) and the County Education Offices to set up planning, logistic, financial and 
monitoring and evaluation systems (emphasis added) that will support activities to improve teaching and 
learning in schools”.81 TA personnel were to enable the development of the teacher education system by 
scaling up the Fast Track Program pilot using tried and tested instruments and processes. The inability to 
undertake the scale up means that TAP has lost the centerpiece of its strategic approach and must now 
establish a new direction. It also means that TAP now faces the challenge of “retro-fitting” a new direction 
and existing personnel to the changed context. The change in the context also means that the tried and tested 
TAP instruments, processes and systems associated with delivering in-service education/training are of little 
use at this point in time.
It is clear that the lack of a formal risk management matrix is a liability to program implementation and 
results. It is also clear that certain “show stopping” risks have eventuated and that the associated risk 
mitigation strategies identified are inadequate. For example, AED cannot continue to subsidize TAP training 
and TAP cannot be held accountable for system strengthening when there is no practical way to test out the 
extent to which the systems have been strengthened.
 
81 ACA Application, p. 6.
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It appears that since the demise of the Fast Track Program the TAP focus has shifted toward a broader focus 
on organizational development overall, although TAP documentation does not use this terminology or 
specifically articulate the shift in focus. While the core areas of education planning (which should now include 
strategic planning as well as the more concrete annual work plan development), education financial 
management (an area that should include budgeting, accounting, modeling, audit and control), education 
statistics and monitoring and evaluation (that should now include the organizational and sectoral level, not 
just at the activity implementation level) remain as areas of focus, they are no longer necessarily being 
addressed under and oriented specifically around teacher education/training systems development. The loss 
of the FTP and its associated instruments, processes and procedures means that TAP is essentially starting 
from scratch with respect to resources that have been tested out across the SMoEs that TA personnel can 
apply consistently. This current situation makes the collaboration with other partners who have tested 
instruments, processes and procedures especially important (please see section 3.2, Partnership and Annex 10: 
TAP Case Study – Education Payroll System). TAP must carefully manage this strategy “retro-fit” or there 
could be repercussions for the Program’s legitimacy. TAP should assess the extent to which current TA 
personnel can contribute on more than a rudimentary basis to organizational development and system 
strengthening and determine an efficient and effective means for supporting TA personnel in this changed 
role.
International literature on capacity development repeatedly stresses the importance of ‘performance’ (i.e., the 
practice of capacity) and, indeed, the AED design document assumes that SMoE personnel would have the 
opportunity to apply their new knowledge and skills. However, aside from a few centrally-driven 
initiatives,8270 application of capacity is nearly impossible in Southern Sudan at the present time given the 
limitations of education financing and provision of other resources.
 
82 The payroll system roll-out from the center to the sub-national levels and implementation at the sub-national level is 
working because there are resources for intensive and focused training, ongoing follow-up and oversight, and provision 
of equipment that is vital to the system’s implementation.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
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ANNEX 7: MONITORING AND EVALUATION – ADDITIONAL INFORMATION
FIGURE 10: ILLUSTRATION OF DATA DISCREPENCIES BETWEEN REPORTS
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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FIGURE 11: EXAMPLE TABLE WHICH COULD BE USED FOR M&E DATA. ORGANISED BY ACTUAL/TARGET VALUE, 
QUARTER, FISCAL YEAR AND GROUPED BY PROVINCE, INDICATOR.
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Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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ANNEX 8: OPTIONS FOR ESCALATING LEVELS OF SUPPORT
Any of the options for escalating levels of support or any pieces of the options can be taken up immediately, provided funds are available. In the MTE 
Team’s view, Option 3 is the most desirable since it provides an opportunity to engage with the MoEST and SMoEs as organizations and to address the 
development and demonstration of competencies at all levels of the organization, not just with individual staff within an SMoE (the current CE 
approach).
TABLE 3: OPTIONS FOR ESCALATING LEVELS OF SUPPORT
Considerations Option 1 Option 2 Options 3
Split the COP and MoEST STA role. Incorporate the changes recommended in Incorporate the changes recommended in
TA Staffing Fund the additional STA to bring total to 
10 (not 9).
Delay placing a new STA in MoEST until 
there is a clear and strategic approach to 
the use and management of TA inputs in 
MoEST.
Option 1
Take over contracting and management of the 
two current GoSS-contracted STAs. Provide 
an STA to work in a strategic ‘diagnostic’ 
advisory role across the levels of the system 
(Parliamentary Education
Options 1 & 2.
Make better use of current STA & DTA 
areas of specialization in the interests of 
benefitting all SMoEs.83
Committee to MoEST to SMoEs to CECs) in 
order enable the identification of and 
strategizing on bottlenecks in the sector.
Additional Elements  Incorporate regular vertical 
(personnel from various positions 
within a respective SMoE and across 
SMoEs) and horizontal slice 
workshops (for SMoE personnel in 
the same positions) according to the 
topic and the CE need. (Ensure that 
succession planning is taken into 
account in these workshops.)
 Incorporate changes recommended in 
Option 1.
 Orient TA personnel toward their areas of 
strength and field a small team of experts 
in the core TAP areas that works across all 
10 states on a rotating basis and that 
brings specialist skills to the states in 
support of the STAs and DTAs (similar to 
the CBTF model which has core experts 
 Incorporate changes recommended in 
Options 1 & 2.
 Undertake a Request for Proposals (use a 
faster procurement method) for a provider to 
introduce the Australian Qualifications 
Training Framework or another mechanism 
of similar quality and content that meets the 
needs of the context. This mechanism should 
be introduced at MoEST and selected higher-
 
83 This is not a new element. The Associate Cooperative Agreement Application and October 2006-September 2007 Annual Report (p. 11) both mention this 
intention. For example, the AP states that, “Although the advisors will be assigned primarily to one state ministry, they will have outreach responsibilities to ministries 
in neighboring states”.
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Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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 Provide targeted training and ongoing 
support for STAs & DTAs in the core 
TAP areas (education planning, 
education finance and budgeting, 
M&E, capacity enhancement).
 Recruit and field STTA in 
ICT4D/ICT4E in resource￾constrained contexts to develop an 
ICT strategy that can be used across 
SMoEs to address immediate and 
longer-term information and 
communications technology needs in 
a systematic, cost-effective and 
sustainable manner (obviously, it 
would be anticipated that the Strategy 
would be funded at some point).
 Ensure that SMoEs are accessing 
operational funds sufficient to enable 
them to progress TAP benefits and, if 
necessary, establish a TAP Program 
Development Fund with clear 
guidance on its use (approximately 
$70,000 per state per annum).
doing outreach and quality assurance on a 
regular basis).
 As per the Associate Award Application 
(p. 7), recruit and field short-term
 specialists with advanced qualifications 
and significant levels of experience that 
work with selected groups across all 
SMoEs in the areas of high importance 
(for example, capacity building, gender 
and other equity considerations, adult 
education, language education). The 
composition of this team can vary as 
needs change.
performing SMoEs initially, then expanded 
to other SMoEs based on lessons learned. 
(Please refer to Addendum to the Mid-Term 
Evaluation.)
Cost Implications Minor Medium Major
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ANNEX 9: CASE STUDY - GENERATING INCOME TO
SUPPORT THE OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES OF THE 
WESTERN EQUATORIA STATE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, 
SOUTHERN SUDAN
The Western Equatoria State Ministry of Education has successfully generated regular income through a 
series of innovations including: a) construction and subsequent rental of a conference hall; b) fitting out and 
operation of a cafeteria on the Ministry’s grounds for employees and conference attendees; and c) the 
production and sale of tamper-proof photo identity cards for Ministry employees.
The Context
A Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed on January 9, 2005, between the Sudanese People’s 
Liberation Army and the Khartoum-based Government of Sudan. The CPA includes (among other things) 
equal shares in oil, the revenue of which provides the bulk of the domestic financial resources for the 
Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). However, recently, oil revenue has fluctuated significantly in the 
global economic crisis and there has consequently been a sharp reduction in budgets for the GOSS national 
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MOEST-Juba) and for the State Ministries of Education 
(SMoEs). Beginning in June 2006, states have only been receiving fund transfers from GoSS for salaries 
(Chapter One expenses). No operational funds have been received for services and development activities 
(Chapter Two and Chapter Three expenses) which means there are no funds to build or repair schools, buy 
teaching and learning materials or cover transportation costs for school inspection or travel on official 
business. Rather than being held hostage to the funding crisis, the Western Equatoria State Ministry of 
Education (WES SMoE) took a proactive stance and developed its own supplementary sources of income.
The Solution: Income Generation Initiatives
In 2007, in an effort to deal with the severe and fluctuating budgetary resource constraints, the Western 
Equatoria State Ministry of Education began looking for ways to raise operational funds as well as to gently 
enforce the new government policy for an eight hour work day. The idea of generating income was proposed 
to the (then) State Minister of Education by the (then) Director for Administration and Finance. The 
Director suggested that the surplus that remained after all teachers’ salaries were paid should be used to 
construct a conference hall in preparation for the first Education Rehabilitation and Development Forum 
(ERDF) meeting in 2007. The hall was completed on time and the ERDF conference generated 2,934 
Sudanese pounds (USD 1,200).
The next income generation initiative was the construction of a cafeteria. Some of the funds from the ERDF 
conference were used to pay for construction and equipment. Currently, the cafeteria serves food prepared by 
four local women to 20 -30 customers five days per week. The cafeteria generates on average approximately 
1125 Sudanese pounds (US$432.69) gross per week and nets 906 Sudanese pounds (US$382) after the cost of 
the cooks’ salaries (210 Sudanese pounds per cook) and foodstuffs (around 9 Sudanese pounds/$US3 .46) is 
deducted.
Ministry identity cards are the third innovation. A diaspora SMoE employee brought the idea to the SMoE. A 
small amount of money was invested to buy the necessary equipment and now each card is sold for 30 
Sudanese pounds (US$11.53).
Benefits of the Innovations
Conference Hall. The Conference Hall is a free, comfortable and available venue for Ministry meetings, MTE 
interviews and staff formal or informal get-togethers. It also exposes other ministries to the Ministry of 
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Education and its personnel. Currently, the occasional rental of the conference hall generates 122.24 
Sudanese pounds (US$50) per day.
Cafeteria. In addition to the income generated, the on-site cafeteria has the additional advantage of reducing 
long lunch breaks and the frequent failure to return to work after having lunch away from the Ministry 
compound. In the past, most staff would leave for lunch at 1:00 pm and not return to work at 2:00 PM or at 
all during that day. Now there are very few problems with staff attrition.
Identity Cards. The identity cards are easy to carry, easy to replace and protect the SMoE staff person from 
having his/her identity stolen or used because each card has the individual’s employee id number and a 
photo.
Funds generated from these innovations enabled Ministry personnel to visit all schools and teachers as part of 
the recent teacher verification exercise.
Financial Controls
Money generated from the cafeteria, the sale of the identity cards and the rental of the conference hall is kept 
in the Ministry’s safe. Financial records are subject to both internal and external audit. The Director General 
is the only person with access to the safe and funds are removed only with the agreement of other senior 
managers.
Long-Term Prospects
This initiative began in mid-2007 and continues with difficulty. The cafeteria has served fewer customers this 
year than previously because of a downturn in the economy. Furthermore, Ministry personnel may be 
reluctant to spend money buying their lunch since they are not receiving their salaries on a regular basis. This 
situation will eventually have a direct impact on amount of income generated from the cafeteria.
Dissemination of the Innovation
All State Ministries of Education are faced with the same budgetary constraints. However, to date, no other 
SMoE has adopted income generation strategies of the type initiated by the Western Equatoria State Ministry 
of Education.
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FIGURE 12: MS NAMA R. BULLEN BESHIR, DIRECTOR GENERAL-WESTERN 
EQUATORIA STATE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION, WITH MINISTRY CAFETERIA 
WORKERS AS THEY GET READY TO SERVE LUNCH. JUNE 2009. (PHOTO BY VALERIE 
HAUGEN)
FIGURE 13: WESTERN EQUATORIA STATE MINISTRY OF EDUCATION CONFERENCE 
HALL AND HOME OF THE MINISTRY CAFETERIA. JUNE, 2009. (PHOTO BY VALERIE 
HAUGEN)
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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ANNEX 10: TAP CASE STUDY - EDUCATION PAYROLL 
SYSTEM
Introduction and Background
A key element in any public sector reform is ensuring a standardized and transparent payroll system. In 
Southern Sudan, under the previous, paper-based system, states submitted new pay sheets each month. This 
had multiple problems. It was difficult to spot changes to the rosters. Omissions were common and 
calculation errors could easily creep in. There was only one (paper) copy of paid pay sheets., and these were 
not always returned to MoEST. It was difficult to reconcile actual headcounts with the nominal roll data (i.e. 
individuals registered as education staff with the public service) and almost impossible for the Ministry of 
Labor and Public Service (MoLPS) and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP) to conduct 
audits
In 2007 – 2008, GoSS moved to reform its approach to payroll, beginning with the education sector. A 
proposal was put forth to the Capacity Building Trust Fund and, in February 2008, Booz and Company was 
hired to assist with the headcount process and development of a new computerized payroll system. Thus, 
MoEST became the pioneer in developing the new system, which has since been tested and rolled out to all 
10 states. This system is widely regarded as so successful that it is being adopted by other GoSS ministries.
Payroll System Development and Roll-out
In February-March 2008, MoEST undertook a headcount of teachers and education officials. The results of 
this exercise were used in setting conditional grants (direct transfers from GoSS to the states). In May 2008, 
MoEST began to trial a new excel-based computerized payroll system. A Payroll Unit was also established in 
MoEST in October, headed by a Deputy Director and staffed by three analysts. The purpose of this Unit was 
to support roll out and implementation of the new system in all ten states. This roll-out/implementation 
activity included both formal training for staff of SMoEs as well as periodic field visits by the MoEST Payroll 
Team to ensure the smooth functioning of the process. States are now required to report monthly and the 
Unit itself conducts frequent site visits and produces an update every week (Attachment 1).
The advantages of the new system are clear. First and foremost, it is more transparent and easy to administer 
than the previous approach. It is computerized and calculations are automated. Any changes are supported by 
a ‘change form’ so that any alterations can be analyzed using computerized matching. The same base data are 
used every month, so omissions are unlikely. All information is readily accessible and can be shared with 
multiple recipients by email. A continuous reconciliation between headcounts and nominal role data is 
possible. Paid pay sheets are signed in duplicate, allowing MoLPS and MoFEP to perform their audit 
function.
According to the implementers, the new payroll system has allowed MoEST greater visibility regarding how 
much the states are paying and to whom. It also has offered quick wins in terms of:
 Demonstrating transparency of government
 Speeding up the payment of staff
 Increasing confidence in government processes
 Freeing up staff time from payroll administration (which could consume 2 full weeks of every 
month)
 Presenting information in a format that facilitates screening and other reform activities.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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Finally, there has been considerable positive feedback from SMoEs that the new system is an improvement 
over the old one. This finding was reinforced during the MTE site visits.
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FIGURE 14: THERE IS POSITIVE FEEDBACK FROM THE GROUND ON THE
TRANSPARENCY OF THE NEW SYSTEM – WES SENIOR MANAGEMENT AND PAYROLL 
UNIT WITH THE SMOE’S FIRST PAYROLL ON THE NEW SYSTEM. (PHOTO BY 
KATHRYN JOHNSTON)
Role of TAP in the Implementation of the New Payroll System
It is clear that consistent support from top levels of Government, a strong Payroll Unit at the center, and 
well-trained staff at all levels are the sine qua non for development an effective payroll system. Staff need good 
computer and spreadsheet skills, experience working in accounts and payroll, the capacity to train, persuade, 
and mentor others, and the ability to be model the attitude and behavior of a qualified, motivated and honest 
civil servant for others.
Booz and Company has done a commendable job in establishing the architecture for the computerized 
system, providing formal training for staff in the use of the computerized system, assisting MoEST to follow 
up on the implementation of the payroll system and generally helping to institutionalize the process. But what 
has been the role of TAP in implementing the payroll system? This was a question the Mid-Term Evaluation 
team put to finance and accounting staff in several State Ministries of Education. Interviewees noted that 
STAs and DTAs attended the formal training course conducted by Booz and Company and developed a 
thorough understanding of processes and procedures. While in some SMoEs staffs are not turning to TAP 
advisors for technical help on payroll – seeking help instead from the Payroll Unit in MoEST--they have 
come to look to TAP advisors for other things, such as informal training, mentoring, and role modeling. In 
other SMoEs, because TA personnel participated in the training sessions provided at the state level, SMoE 
are looking to TA personnel for help. In one SMoE, due to the loss of one of the two SMoE personnel 
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
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trained in the payroll system, the TAP STA is being used as a stand-in. TA personnel have also provided an 
element of moral support for those trying to change outmoded – and easily corrupted – payroll practices. As 
‘outsiders working on the inside’, TA personnel have been able (albeit informally and unofficially) to add an 
element of independent oversight to adoption of the new process, thus reinforcing changes to both mindset 
and process.
New Payroll Process: Impact and Outcome
The Mid Term Evaluation reinforced the finding that SMoE finance and accounting staff prefer the new 
payroll system. They find it more streamlined and, in general, easier to use than the previous paper-based 
system. Some interviewees commented that the new payroll system has “put an end to corruption.” There 
have been problems with naming conventions, however, but these issues could be resolved with support 
from those working on EMIS. Also, the deductions that appear on the pay sheets are often confusing for 
staff members who themselves may not understand why the money has been subtracted from their salary and 
therefore cannot explain the reason to others. This in turn affects the credibility of the new system.
Of course, no discussion of the roll out of the payroll system would be complete without touching upon the 
broader issues of headcounts, the impact on the conditional grant process, and the timely and full payment of 
staff. Implementation of the education payroll system in the ten states revealed that SMoEs are paying 
roughly 24,000 teachers (not the 33,000 appearing on earlier rosters). In addition, there are roughly 3,000 
officials and 6,500 “unclassified.” No state is paying the number of teachers reported in the headcount; in 
percentage terms, Western Equatoria and Eastern Equatoria are the closest to paying the headcount figure. A 
number of states are paying materially fewer teachers than the number for which there was budgeting. Upper 
Nile, Unity, Western Bahr-el-Ghazal and Central Equatoria fall in this category. The implication here is that 
these states either over-reported on teacher numbers or are failing to get pay through to all teachers who 
should be paid. Although not fully substantiated, in Upper Nile, Unity, Western Bahr-el-Ghazal there appears 
to have been over- reporting, whereas in Central Equatoria it appears that there is a significant number of 
teachers who are working (i.e., in church schools), but who are not being paid.
It should be noted, furthermore, that all states are using significantly more of their budget to pay officials and 
‘unclassifieds’ than was intended or is desirable. It is estimated that 70% of salary funds are spent on teachers, 
20% on officials, and 10% on unclassified staff. This is one factor that has caused a number of states to pay a 
percentage of basic pay – among them two with relatively well- developed management processes (Lakes and 
Western Equatoria). Arguably, because of their honesty in the headcount process, these two states lost out in 
the 2009 allocation of conditional grants.
For obvious reasons, the implementation of the new payroll system has presented complex problems at the 
state level. Combined with the adverse impact of the Global Financial Crisis, the salary issue has become a 
real hot potato. Each State Ministry visited sought to address problems over payment of salaries in different 
ways. Some paid only a portion (65 – 90% in the States visited) and/or delayed payments (which were also 
received late from GoSS). Other SMoEs undertook to rid their roles of unclassified staff and rationalize the 
ranks of managerial and official staff by downgrading pay grades of teachers and other staff. Still others 
addressed budgetary shortfalls by shifting some of the financial burden to parents. One state visited
introduced a policy that requires families to pay 25 Sudanese pounds per student per academic year. Despite 
the creative (and, in some cases counterproductive strategies emerging, teachers and education managers 
across Southern Sudan are becoming increasingly frustrated over the salary issue and teacher strikes have 
been increasingly reported.
The following is an example of a weekly report provided to the MoEST Undersecretary. The format and the 
intention could be of use in helping AED TAP to systematize and scale up its assistance in critical areas of 
organizational development requiring the uptake and strengthening of systems vertically and horizontally. 
This type of tool could also be of great use to enhance the consistency of approach and treatment of the 
common core of areas to be addressed within each SMoE through TAP.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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TABLE 4: PAYROLL RUN DATA
Payroll unit weekly report number 29
Date 10/7/09
Period covered 23/6/09 to 10/7/09
Report prepared by HF, DJ, AM, MLL
Report approved by MLL
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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TABLE 5: PROGRESS AT A GLANCE
Existing pay
lists analyzed?
Tools set up for 
new system on 
agreed lists?
Counties briefed?
First month 
pay sheets
printed?
First
month
paid?
Summary Notes
CEQ
MLL, DJ and HF met with SMoE management on Fri 3/7. DG 
agreed that payroll should be implemented for June salaries 
(only April has been paid so far), that a test-run of pay sheets 
should be printed immediately and checked against personnel 
records. Printing of pay sheets to start this week (7/7).
EEQ
Successful visit by MLL resolved issue of 484 ‘volunteers’ 
recently screened by SMoE. SMoF have agreed that these staff 
should be added to the payroll.
Jonglei SMoE Directors briefed
Pay sheets printed for March but not April. Former Minister 
authorized use of new system but implementation is being 
blocked by the DG. MLL and DJ to travel to Bor to discuss this 
with new Minister.
Lakes
May salaries have been paid (on 1/7) but not using the payroll 
tool because Payroll Manager, Jibril Chol, was on leave during 
May. JC promises to use new system for June salaries!
NBeG
Reports from NBeG indicate that while all technical work has 
been completed, implementation of the new system (in which 
the pay sheets are actually used rather than just printed out!) has 
yet to take place. AM is visiting Aweil this week to investigate.
Unity
May salaries not yet paid because conditional grant still to be 
released. Pay sheets for May printed last week (2/7). April 
salaries paid through a committee organized by SMoF.
UNS
SL and AT visited Malakal to discuss delayed implementation 
of payroll system. AT also went to SMoF who agreed to release 
results of screening today (6/7). PU to follow rate of progress by 
telephone.
Warrap All 6 counties and headquarters on new system for May salaries. 
Successfully paid using new pay sheets.
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Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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WBeG
c.300 unproductive staff removed from the payroll, allowing 
SMoE to pay salaries at higher percentage. PIT also introduced 
at rate of 10%, leading overall to slight fall in take-home pay.
WEQ
May to be paid at 80% with “top-up” of 100k SDG from 
Governor’s office.
MoF audited education and rejected payroll system because 
they said it wasn’t done in proper accounts format. June is being 
prepared by hand!
MoEST May salaries paid.
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Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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Executive Summary
 Payroll Unit has visited a number of states during the period of this report.
 Eastern Equatoria SMoF agrees to add nearly 500 ‘volunteer’ teachers to the payroll.
 Upper Nile remains a serious concern as they are still yet to provide full details as to who is on the 
payroll. Implementation here is stalled.
 Jonglei State also behind in implementation but have agreed to make necessary progress to use new 
pay sheets for July salaries.
 Staff also visited NBeG, WBeG and Warrap resolving numerous small issues in the payroll 
implementation.
Eastern Equatoria
Martin Luther Lukudu, 25-26th June
 Martin Luther travelled to Torit to discuss outstanding issue of 484 ‘volunteer’ staff whose addition 
to the payroll had been refused by the SMoF.
 MLL met with DGs Education and Finance and obtained agreement that these staff should be added 
to the EEQ payroll with immediate effect.
Central Equatoria
 Full implementation in CEQ still progressing, but at an unacceptably slow pace.
 Having printed pay sheets with new system for March salaries, SMoE senior management chose to 
reverse recent successes in implementation and go back to previous ‘manual’ system for the April 
salaries, following a series of complaints that some names had been missed off the payroll. SMoE 
failed to notify the MoEST Payroll Unit of this decision until after the event.
 With this in mind, MLL, DJ and HF met with new DG, D/ Primary, D/ Admin & Finance, and D/ 
Accounts on Friday 3/7. After a lively discussion, in which D/ Accounts sought to blame GoSS staff 
for the confused state of affairs, DG conceded that it was up to his staff to resolve these problems, 
with support from the PU, and agreed to MLL’s suggested approach to fix current problems, which 
involved:
 Obtaining a copy of latest, cleaned payroll lists from Charles Adiya at CEQ MoFEP. Print 
these lists and cross-check against most recent personnel records. Identify any discrepancies 
and resolve so as to establish a final, agreed payroll list. D/ Accounts to be in charge of this 
process.
 Any corrections to be fed back into payroll tool, and printed on quadruplicate paper. June 
salaries to be paid using the Payroll Tool.
 As of morning of 8/7, PU/CEQ SMoE had obtained latest payroll lists and had printed these for 
cross-checking, led by D/ Accounts. Deadline set for completion of this process by end of this week 
(10/7).
Western Equatoria
 Reports have reached Payroll Unit staff that regression may be taking place, in which the WEQ 
SMoE senior management have decided to revert back to the old system.
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 SMoE claim that a team of auditors from SMoF has rejected the pay sheets and automated summary 
sheets. After repeated requests from PU for more information on this, SMoE have yet to provide a 
convincing explanation as to why they feel it is necessary to take this course of action when the 
payroll system is working well in other areas of South Sudan.
 H.E. Minister of Education, GoSS has been alerted to this situation and intends to call WEQ 
Minister of Education to express his concern at this state of affairs.
 PU to send a team, including MLL or AM, to Yambio at the earliest opportunity to resolve this 
problem. Upper Nile
Simon Lewis and Achire Tito, 27th June to 2nd July
 Implementation of new payroll system remains stalled. PU staff have now visited Malakal on a total 
of nine occasions – more than any other state
 AT and SL met with the DG, who claimed that the delays were result of SMoF failing to release 
results of recent screening. On previous visit by MLL, PU was provided with a full list of names but 
this was not differentiated by school, county, or payam so is of limited use.
 AT and SMoE D/ Planning & Budgeting went to SMoF who were promised release of this 
information by Monday 6/7 but as of Wednesday 8/7 no information has been released supposedly 
because the responsible official is away in Khartoum.
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Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
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ANNEX 11: DRAFT CONTENT FOR MOE ST-SMOE 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (MOU)
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding the Technical Advisors Program is an important 
element to consider as TAP progresses. The reasons for an MOU are several:
1. It will help ensure that AED is not put in the difficult roles of being watchdog and advocate.
2. It will help ensure that the responsibility for the success of a development assistance program 
ultimately rests with the receiving Government and its personnel.
3. It will help eliminate any lack of clarity or confusion regarding which organization is responsible for 
what.
4. It will allow for a clear pathway to identifying (and rectifying) any instances where one or another of 
the signatory organizations does not live up to its commitment(s).
5. It makes all parties’ responsibilities visible and clear.
GoSS-MoEST
 MoEST Undersecretary will have the primary responsibility for overseeing the implementation of the 
Technical Advisors Program.
MoEST Undersecretary will ensure that the SMoE is honoring its commitments under this MOU and, in the 
event that the State (Governor or SMoE) is not honoring its commitments, MoEST will confer with USAID 
regarding next steps.
 MoEST Undersecretary will identify and attend to any elements that put the Technical Advisors 
Program at risk, including any issues associated with the MoEST itself.
 MoEST Undersecretary will move toward incorporating the cost of the TA personnel into its own 
budget.
GoSS-SMoE
SMoE Minister and Director General will put a temporary freeze on personnel movement (particularly senior 
and middle managers) while the capacity enhancement investment is being undertaken and for a period of at 
least two years following the investment.
SMoE Minister and Director General will put in place and implement a succession-planning strategy so that 
opportunities for the future are made available to females, younger people and other groups.
 SMoE Director General will participate in the recruitment and selection of Senior Technical 
Advisors and Diaspora Technical Assistants.
 SMoE Director General will take the lead in supervising, reporting on the inputs and judging
the quality of the work of Senior Technical Advisors and Diaspora Technical Assistants.
SMoE Minister and Director General will ensure that SMoE personnel participate consistently and regularly 
in learning opportunities being provided through the Technical Advisors Program.
SMoE Minister and Director General will identify and attend to any elements that put the Technical Advisors 
Program at risk, including any issues associated with the SMoE, the MoEST or the broader enabling 
environment.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
83
 SMoE Minister and Director General will move toward incorporating the cost of the TA personnel 
into its own budget.
GoSS-State Governor and Parliament
 The Governor will ensure that the SMoE honors its commitments under this MOU.
 The Governor is ultimately responsible for the MOU on behalf of the State.
The Governor and the Education Committee of Parliament will identify and attend to any elements that put 
the Technical Advisors Program at risk, including any issues associated with the State, the SMoE, the MoEST 
or the enabling environment in general.
USG-USAID (through AED)
USAID through AED will continue to provide the services comprising the Technical Advisors Program on 
the understanding that Government of Southern Sudan organizations benefitting from the Program honor 
the commitments included in this MOU.
 USAID through AED will respond to any issues raised regarding the implementation of the 
Technical Advisors Program and resolve those issues with the appropriate parties.
Signatories
State Governor:
Undersecretary for Education: 
State Minister for Education: USAID Representative:
Date
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
84
ANNEX 12: OTHER EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS 
Ethnicity
Findings: While the MTE team was able to gather data on the general ethnic composition of each state, no 
data were available about the ethnic composition of education personnel or students. Anecdotally, the Team 
was told that ethnicity is a factor in the assignation of jobs and there is apparently a tendency in some states 
to favor individuals who have English language skills, even though both English and Arabic are considered to 
be languages of the workplace. For example, although the ACA stresses that advisors with dual language skills 
are preferred, most of the STAs are not fluent in Arabic. Western Bar El Ghazal represents an interesting 
case. When the incumbent COP began as an STA there, according to Quarterly Report (January – March 
2008, p. 12), “There is a heavy Arab influence in the state reflected in the use of Arabic as the preferred 
language of governance and educational instruction within the state. This is having a tremendously negative 
impact on education service delivery and other areas of educational management. Consequently, a greater 
effort is needed in WBG to facilitate the transition from GoS governance processes to that of GoSS”. 
Recently, the State Ministry of Education underwent a massive re-shuffling and has apparently largely 
replaced Arabic speakers in management positions with English language teachers.
Conclusions: Ethnicity and language are likely to be significant, yet inadequately understood variables and the 
dynamics associated with power and control can make or break the potential for development assistance to 
be effective.84 Assumptions regarding the ability of TA personnel to ‘hit the ground running’ may need to be 
tested and support provided as and where needed. Given that the GoSS Interim Constitution includes a clear 
message on official languages and on equity, it would also be sensible for TAP to help ensure that TA does 
not marginalize or reward one group(s) over another. This issue of privilege and decision-making power also 
has implications for a conflict-sensitive approach as well (see section 3.4, Peace Dividend & Conflict Sensitive 
Analysis).
Recommendation: Request AED TAP to identify ways and means of mitigating risks associated with ethnic, cultural and 
language differences between TA personnel and stakeholders/beneficiaries.
Findings: The laws on pension and retirement have yet to be enacted. While the team did not collect data on 
the ages of senior administrative staff, based on observations in the five states visited, older personnel (males 
predominantly) were well-represented, especially in the senior and middle management ranks of SMoEs. 
Apparently, many SMoE state and county level administrators are former head teachers or teachers. Younger 
people are under-represented in management positions. TA personnel are beginning to recognize that adults 
of different ages may need to be supported differently. For example, according to one DTA, “In Southern 
Sudan, it’s not very easy working here because of the lack of education. You just have to bring things down to 
the level where they are, especially the older staff. You have to take people step by step. But once they 
understand, then it is easy.”
Conclusions: Older personnel represent a unique resource to the administrative system because of their prior 
experience and previous training. Recognizing the different learning styles of adults of different ages. In 
addition, recognizing the organizational skills required to administer a school, for example, and highlighting 
the transfer of those skills to one’s work in the SMoE is important. Ensuring that younger personnel are 
incorporated into CE opportunities is also important.
 
84 Morgan, Peter (2008). A PNG study on technical assistance and counterpart relationships found that “many of the key 
GoPNG systems were informal...they did not lend themselves easily to TA understanding and support. Understanding 
how country systems actually did work and why could be a huge challenge for new TA staff. ...Many counterparts were 
frustrated by the lack of local knowledge of culture and systems of TA personnel and indicated that the first few months 
were often spent getting the TA personnel up to speed on GoPNG systems”.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
85
Recommendation: Request TAP to explore with SMoEs how best to utilize the cadre of experienced, older 
individuals before the pension and retirement laws are enacted and to explore the best avenue for working 
with SMoEs to introduce succession planning.
Individuals with Disabilities
Findings: Southern Sudan has been almost continuously at war for several decades and war takes its toll on a 
population. However, the MTE Team was not able to gather any substantive data on People With 
Disabilities. It should be noted, however, that based on findings from other conflict-affected contexts, the 
levels of psychological distress, including post-traumatic stress disorder which has a significant impact on the 
ability to learn and retain information, are typically much higher than those of the general population.
Conclusion: The Team could draw no conclusions with respect to services needed to support this population. 
This is an area that will require exploration.
Recommendation: As one possible step in the right direction, request AED TAP to liaise with the OECD to 
explore the potential for using the OECD ’s 10 question survey and methodology to determine levels of 
disability based on a sample of the population. There may be potential for this survey to be administered 
along with the education census.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
86
ANNEX 13: ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TRACKING 
AND PLANNING TOOL (DRAFT 2 080109)
FIGURE 15: CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN IDF AND TAP ORGANIZATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT TRACKING & PLANNING FRAMEWORK CATEGORIES
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
87
(Revision #2 of the Institutional Development Framework)
Maturity Rating Scale Key:
0 = Nothing Happening (No Maturity)
1 = Starting to Stir (Nascent Maturity)
2 = About Halfway There (Partial Maturity)
3 = Nearly There (Near Maturity) 4,5 = We've Made It! (Full Maturity)
TABLE 6: ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT TRACKING & PLANNING FRAMEWORK
SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional 
Maturity
Rating
(2009 
Baseline)
Evidence Quality
MANDATES & CORE FUNCTIONS
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
[MANDATES & CORE FUNCTIONS]
0 = Ministry has no apparent organizational 
structure
1 = Ministry has a mandated organizational 
structure, but it is not operational
2 = Ministry has an operational organizational 
structure that is limited in its completeness (i.e., 
half or less than half of the positions are filled
3 = Ministry has an operational organizational 
structure that is moderately complete (i.e., more 
than half, but not all positions are filled OR there 
are more positions than are mandated by GoSS 
MOEST)
4 = Ministry has a fully operational organizational 
structure (i.e., all mandated positions and only 
mandated positions are filled)
Hard and soft copy of the SMoE 
organogram
Organogram is visible to staff and 
visitors
 Does the organogram include all levels of state government 
in the general education sector (from Minister to lower 
levels at county and payam)?
 Does the Ministry have its organogram in a visible place?
 Does the Ministry update the organogram on a defined 
regular basis?
 Is there an employee who is responsible for updating and 
posting the organogram?
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
88
SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional 
Maturity
Rating
(2009 
Baseline)
Evidence Quality
SECTOR PLANNING
STRATEGIC PLAN
0 = Ministry has no Medium Term (3-5 year) 
Education Strategic Plan
1 = Ministry has a Medium Term Education 
Strategic Plan, but the Plan is not current
2 = Ministry has a Medium Term Education 
Strategic Plan
that is current, but it has not been prioritized and/or 
costed
3 = Ministry has a Medium Term (3-5 year) 
Education Strategic Plan
that is current but it is not widely understood or 
used across the Ministry
4 = Ministry has a current, prioritized, costed 
Medium Term Education Strategic Plan that it uses 
to guide annual planning
Hard and soft copies of past and 
current ESPs
Each department has hard and soft 
copies of the past and current 
ESP(s) in an accessible place
 Does the Ministry have a mission statement that guides 
strategic plans?
 Do all ministry staff know what a Medium-Term 
Education Strategic Plan is?
 Do all departments understand their responsibility to 
contribute to developing the ESP?
 Do all departments participate in developing the ESP?
 Does each department develop its contribution to the ESP 
based on the assessed need?
 Does the Ministry have and use a process for reviewing its 
progress on the implementation of the ESP?
 Are work plans developed every 3 to 5 years?
 Does the Ministry get assistance to do a quality check on 
the ESP to make sure it is a sound Plan?
 Does the Ministry submit its ESP to MoEST on time?
ANNUAL PLAN
0 = Ministry has no Annual Plan
1 = Ministry is using an Annual Plan, but it is not 
for
the current year
2 = Ministry is using a current Annual Plan, but it is 
not linked to the Medium-Term Strategic Plan
3 = Ministry is using a current Annual Plan that is 
Hard and soft copies past and 
present APs
Hard and soft copies of past and 
present department work plans and 
micro plans
Each department has a copy of the 
Ministry’s past and present APs and 
 Do all Ministry staff know what an Annual Plan is?
 Do all departments understand their responsibility to 
develop their own annual work plan and micro plans?
 Do all departments participate in developing the Annual 
Plan?
 Is the Annual Plan developed at the same time each year?
 Does each department develop its internal
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
89
SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional 
Maturity
Rating
(2009 
Baseline)
Evidence Quality
linked to the Medium-Term Strategic Plan, but it 
has not been costed
4 = Ministry is working from a current, costed
Annual Plan that is linked to the Medium-Term
Strategic Plan
the department’s own work plan in 
an accessible place  work plan based on the assessed need?
 Does the Ministry have and use a process for assessing the 
quality of the Ministry’s
 Annual Plan and the department work plans before they are 
implemented?
 Does the Ministry have and use a process for reviewing its 
progress on the implementation of the Annual Plan?
 Does the Ministry submit its AP to MoEST on time?
[DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES]
0 = All decision-making authority rests with the
Minister or Director General
1 = All decision-making rests with the Senior
Managers (Director level and above)
2 = Executive level and senior management level
delegate decision-making to the next level down
3 = Senior and middle managers involve other 
levels of personnel in decision-making, but
ultimately make all decisions themselves
4 = Decision-making authority is delegated to the 
appropriate levels across the institution
Documented process for judging the 
effectiveness of the delegated 
decision-making
Data on file providing evidence of 
the status of delegated decision￾making
 Does every Ministry employee know who to report to and 
who reports to her/him?
 Are decisions and actions based on the SMoE 
organizational structure?
 Is the ‘chain of command’ clearly understood and followed 
by all employees?
 Are decisions that are within an individual employee’s 
authority referred to her/him?
 Are directors empowered to make strategic decisions?
 Are important decisions made in a participatory manner?
MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
ADMINISTRATIVE/OPERATIONS MANUAL
[MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS]
0 = Ministry has no administrative or operations 
Administrative Manual is available 
in hard and soft copies in all 
departments
 Are all Ministry personnel familiar with the Administrative 
Manual and do they understand its role in their work?
 Has the Administrative Manual been tested and revised on 
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
90
SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional 
Maturity
Rating
(2009 
Baseline)
Evidence Quality
manual
1 = Ministry has an administrative or operations 
manual available, but it is not current or it is not 
being used
2 = Ministry has a current administrative or 
operations manual, but it is not being used
3 = Ministry has a current administrative or 
operations manual, but it is only used by some 
personnel
4 = Ministry has a current administrative or 
operations manual and it is being used widely by 
personnel
a regular and predictable basis?
 Does the Ministry have an approved data storage and data 
retrieval system?
 Is there a process in place to monitor and report on the use 
of the Internet to the Director General on a regular basis?
 Does the Internet function?
 Do all Ministry personnel have SMoE email addresses that 
they use?
COMMUNICATION [PUBLIC 
INFORMATION DISSEMINATION & 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION]85
0 = Ministry has no communication strategy
1 = Ministry has a communication strategy, but it is 
not current or it is not being used due to problems 
with information dissemination
2 = Ministry has a current communication strategy, 
but it is not being used due to problems with 
technology
3 = Ministry has a current communication strategy, 
and it is being used somewhat although problems 
with technology interfere with information 
Hard and soft copies of the SMoE 
and school budgets posted in public 
place
Radio broadcasts are heard
Other media are evident
Information and 
telecommunications equipment are 
available and in good condition
 Does the Ministry have a Communication Strategy and 
does it include opportunities for regular interaction with 
and input from all types of stakeholders, including 
children?
 Does the Ministry update the
 Communication Strategy and annually and monitor and 
evaluate the Strategy on a regular basis?
 Is the public provided with information regularly and 
efficiently?
 Are there formal procedures for obtaining public input?
 Is input from civil society and citizens incorporated into 
 
85 Since this category covers two of the IDF categories under one umbrella, for the purposes of reporting to USAID, this category should probably be weighted to be equivalent to a 
score of up
to 8.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
91
SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional 
Maturity
Rating
(2009 
Baseline)
Evidence Quality
dissemination
4 = Ministry has a current communication strategy 
and it is being used widely with few if any 
problems with technology
the SMoE’s activities?
 Are SMoE and school budgets posted in a public place?
FMS/FMIS [FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT￾BUDGETS]
0 = Ministry has no financial management system
(paper-based or computer-based)
1 = Ministry has a non-standard type of financial
management system in place, but it is not in use
2 = Ministry has a non-standard type of financial
management information system and it is in use
3 = Ministry has a standard type of financial
management system in place, but it is not in use
4 = Ministry uses a standard type of paper-based 
financial management system
5 = Ministry uses a best practice, industry-strength, 
computer-based financial management information 
system that is integrated with the GoSS MoEST
FMIS
Financial management processes 
are documented and available in 
hard and soft copies
Public information made available 
to the public by radio, signs and 
other means of communication
 Does the Ministry have a plan in place to generate income?
 Does the Ministry have an sound approach for making sure 
that effective budgets are put together for submitted 
proposals?
 Does the Ministry have and use a process for making sure 
the requirements are met for the budgets?
 Does the Ministry seek out available funders?
 Does the Ministry have a strategy for long-term operational 
sustainability and is it clear who takes on this 
responsibility?
 Does the Ministry have a plan in place for continuing 
programming?
 Does the Ministry have a clear picture of where the 
different funding sources for education are coming from?
 Are the actual ministry expenditures within 10% of the 
budget?
 Does the Ministry report to the public and the Parliament 
on its budget expenditures?
EMIS
0 = Ministry has no education management
information system or databases
1 = Ministry has an education management
Documentation on use of the
database is available in hard and 
soft copies
 Does the Ministry have an approved data storage and data 
retrieval system?
 Do most Ministry personnel understand and use the 
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
92
SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional 
Maturity
Rating
(2009 
Baseline)
Evidence Quality
information system or databases in place, but it is
not in use OR is not used effectively OR it is not
secure (backed up; protected)
2 = Ministry has an education management 
information system or databases in place that is 
secure, but it is only used by a few people at the 
state level
3 = Ministry has an education management 
information system or databases in place that is 
used by most personnel at the state level
4 = Ministry uses a best practice, industry-strength 
education management information system in place 
that is used by most personnel at the state level and 
education administrators and teachers at the county, 
payam and school levels
A number of individuals can
demonstrate effective use of the
EMIS and/or databases
education information database?
 Do all Ministry personnel have SMoE email addresses that 
they use?
 Is there a process in place to monitor and report on the use 
of the Internet to the Director General on a regular basis?
 Are issues with the EMIS resolved quickly and using 
appropriate practices?
ICT4E (Information & Communication 
Technologies for Education)
0 = Ministry has no ICT4E Policy and/or Strategy
1 = Ministry has an ICT4E Policy and/or Strategy, 
but it is not current AND/OR it is not operational
2 = Ministry has a current ICT4E Policy and/or 
Strategy, but it is not operational
3 = Ministry has a current ICT4E Policy and/or 
Strategy and it is operational in some parts of the 
State
4 = Ministry has a current ICT4E Policy and/or 
Strategy and it is operational across the State Final 
Draft
Hard and soft copies of the ICT4E 
Policy or Strategy available
Information and 
telecommunications equipment are 
available and in good condition
 Does the Ministry utilize multiple types of ICTs for 
administration, teaching and learning?
 Does the Ministry train a critical mass of individuals who 
understand how to produce and use materials for 
administration, teaching and learning using various ICTs?
 Does the Ministry put aside funds to ensure personnel (at 
all levels of the system) have ongoing access to the Internet 
or other technologies?
 Does the Internet function and do all Ministry state and 
local level administrators have SMoE email addresses that 
they use regularly?
 Is there a process in place to monitor and report on the use 
of the Internet to the Director General on a regular basis?
 Does the Ministry have and use an ICT equipment 
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
93
SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional 
Maturity
Rating
(2009 
Baseline)
Evidence Quality
maintenance budget and is the budget sufficient for the 
maintenance needs?
 Are ICT issues resolved quickly and appropriately?
 Does the Ministry have a sound plan and process in place 
for protecting ICT equipment (taking into account the 
harsh physical environment)?
 Does the Ministry have a process and an adequate budget 
in place for maintaining its
HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT
RECRUITMENT, SELECTION and
PERFORMANCE [HUMAN RESOURCES￾STAFF; HUMAN RESOURCES-SYSTEMS]86
0=Ministry has no transparent, merit-based process 
for recruitment, selection AND/OR performance 
assessment
1=Ministry has a transparent, merit-based process 
for recruitment, selection and an objective and
transparent performance assessment process, but in 
actuality, recruitment, selection and performance 
assessment are used rarely
2=Ministry has a transparent, merit-based process 
for recruitment, selection and an objective and
transparent performance assessment process that is 
used occasionally
Public information is available in 
hard and soft copies on recruitment, 
selection, performance assessment, 
GoSS labor law on employee rights 
and responsibilities
Job descriptions are found in the 
Administrative Manual in hard and 
soft copies
Each employee has a hard copy of 
her/his job description
Employee rights and responsibilities 
 Are hiring and promotion decisions are based on the 
approved MoEST structures?
 Are people hired or promoted based on the match of their 
skills, knowledge and demonstrated ability with the job
requirements?
 Is there a well-understood , transparent and fair process for 
assessing an employee’s performance?
 Do employees understand their rights and responsibilities 
under GoSS labor law?
 Is there a process in place to handle grievances?
 Do the positions within the SMoE structures have job 
descriptions and have those descriptions been shared with 
 
86 Since this category covers two of the IDF categories under one umbrella, for the purposes of reporting to USAID, this category should probably be weighted to be equivalent to a 
score of up to 8.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
94
SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional 
Maturity
Rating
(2009 
Baseline)
Evidence Quality
3=Ministry has a transparent, merit-based process 
for recruitment, selection and an objective and
transparent performance assessment process that is 
used in most cases
4=Ministry has a transparent, merit-based process 
for recruitment, selection and an objective and
transparent performance assessment process that is 
used in all cases
are found in the Administrative 
Manual in hard and soft copies
all staff?
 Are assigned tasks based on the job functions within the 
SMoE structures?
 Is personnel restructuring undertaken strategically to 
ensure that the Ministry runs efficiently?
 Do Ministry personnel have all the skills
needed to carry out their respective jobs?
SUCCESSION PLANNING
0=Ministry has no succession plan
1=Ministry has a succession plan, but it is not 
current AND/OR it is not in use
2=Ministry has a succession plan that is current, but
it is not in use
3=Ministry has a current succession plan and it is 
being used by limited parts of the Ministry
4=Ministry has a current succession plan and it is 
being followed across the entire Ministry
Public information (hard and soft 
copies) on capacity enhancement 
opportunities
Documented process (hard and soft 
copies) for implementing 
succession planning kept in the 
Administrative Manual
 Does every Ministry employee understand the concept of 
succession planning?
 Do decisions and actions about capacity enhancement 
opportunities clearly take into account succession 
planning?
 Is there a substantial increase over time in the types and 
numbers of employees able to participate in capacity 
enhancement activities?
 Are employees aware of capacity enhancement 
opportunities that are available to them?
DIVERSITY and EQUITY
GENDER [DIVERSTIY-WOMEN]
0 = Ministry shows no awareness of gender
mainstreaming and/or the obligations under the 
CPA regarding gender
1 = Ministry shows limited awareness of gender
mainstreaming and/or the obligations under the
Constitution regarding gender
2 = Ministry has a gender mainstreaming strategy in 
Hard and soft copies of the Gender 
Mainstreaming Strategy
Public posting of progress toward 
gender equity
 Does every Ministry employee understand the concept of 
gender equity and gender mainstreaming and the 
importance for the Ministry and for education development 
in Southern Sudan?
 Do decisions and actions about capacity enhancement 
opportunities clearly take into account gender equity?
 Is there a substantial increase over time in the number of 
female employees and female employees in middle and 
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
95
SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional 
Maturity
Rating
(2009 
Baseline)
Evidence Quality
place, but it is not operational
3 = Ministry has a gender mainstreaming strategy in
place and there is some evidence of
operationalization
4 = Ministry has prioritized gender mainstreaming
and is operationalizing the gender mainstreaming
strategy across the sector
senior management?
 Are the particular needs of women taken into account 
when planning capacity enhancement activities?
 Are leadership and skills development provided 
specifically for female employees?
INCLUSION [DIVERSITY ACROSS 
REGIONS]
0 = Ministry shows no awareness of inclusion 
(linguistic and ethnic differences, People With 
Disabilities, etc.)
1 = Ministry shows limited awareness of inclusion
2 = Ministry has an inclusion strategy in place, but 
it is not operational
3 = Ministry has an inclusion strategy in place and 
there is some evidence of operationalization
4 = Ministry has prioritized inclusion and is 
operationalizing the inclusion strategy across the 
sector
Hard and soft copies of the 
Inclusion Strategy
Public posting of progress toward 
an inclusive workplace
 Does every Ministry employee understand the concept of 
inclusion in the workplace?
 Do decisions and actions about capacity enhancement 
opportunities clearly take into account inclusion 
principles?
 Is there a substantial increase over time in the diversity of 
the Ministry personnel (from the Minister to teachers)?
 Are the particular needs of People With Disabilities and
people with different language backgrounds and skills and 
ethnic groups taken into account when planning capacity 
enhancement activities?
 Does the Ministry encourage the use of both English and 
Arabic in the workplace?
SECTOR SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION
HARMONIZATION WITH GoSS/MoEST
0 = Ministry personnel (state and local levels) show
no awareness of MoEST policy, legal and 
regulatory framework(s)
1 = Ministry personnel (state and local levels) are
aware of MoEST policy, legal and regulatory
Public information (hard and soft 
copies) on GoSS/MoEST policies, 
legislation
Documented process (hard and soft 
copies) for implementing
 Does every Ministry employee (from Minister to teachers) 
understand GoSS/MoEST policies and legislation and what 
these mean for the her/him on the job?
 Are all policies developed by the SMoE in line with 
GoSS/MoEST policies and legislation?
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
96
SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional 
Maturity
Rating
(2009 
Baseline)
Evidence Quality
frameworks but they do not put them into action
2 = Ministry personnel (state and local levels) are 
aware of MoEST policy and legal frameworks and 
try to put a few of the policies and legal 
frameworks into action
3 = Ministry personnel (state and local levels) are 
aware of MoEST policy and legal frameworks and 
most people abide by them
4 = Ministry personnel (state and local levels) are 
able to operationalize (put into intentional action)
MOEST policy, legal and regulatory frameworks
succession planning kept in the
Administrative Manual
HARMONIZATION WITH 
COUNTIES/SCHOOLS
0 = Local level education personnel show no
awareness of MoEST and SMoE policy, legal and 
regulatory framework(s)
1 = Local level education personnel are aware of
MoEST and SMoE policy, legal and regulatory
frameworks but they do not put them into action
2 = Local level education administrators are aware 
of MOEST and SMOE policy, legal and regulatory 
frameworks and they put a few of them into action
3 = Local level education administrators are aware 
of MOEST and SMOE policy and legal frameworks 
and they put most of them into action
4 = Local level education administrators adhere to 
all MoEST and SMoE policy and legal frameworks 
and show strong evidence of putting them into 
practice
Public information (hard and soft 
copies) on GoSS/MoEST & SMoE 
policies, legislation in County 
Education Offices, Payam, Schools
GoSS/MoEST & some policies,
legislation in County Education 
Offices, Payam, Schools kept in 
Administrative Manual
 Does every Ministry employee (from Minister to teachers) 
understand GoSS/MoEST policies and legislation and what 
these mean for the her/him on the job?
 Are all policies developed by the SMoE in line with 
GoSS/MoEST policies and legislation?
 Does the Ministry have processes in place to monitor 
compliance with policy and legislation?
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
97
SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional 
Maturity
Rating
(2009 
Baseline)
Evidence Quality
HARMONIZATION OF PARTNERS
[NETWORKING WITH OTHER 
ORGANIZATIONS]
0 = Ministry is unaware of or not informed about all 
donor and development partner field activities
1 = Ministry is informed about all donor and 
development partner field activities but is a passive 
recipient
2 = Ministry registers all donor and development 
partner field activities
3 = Ministry maps all donor and development 
partner field activities and works to eliminate 
redundancy/overlap, under-saturation and over￾saturation
4 = Ministry brings all donor and development 
partner activities and resources (including financial) 
under one common plan and resourcing envelope 
(SWAp) and utilizes funding and programs 
available
Annual published schedule of 
SMoE-donor/development partner 
meetings
Hard and soft copies of 
development partner profiles and 
mapping are available in the 
Ministry and are distributed to 
development partners
Hard and soft copies of 
coordination meeting minutes are 
chronological and are available
 Does the Ministry require all donor and development 
partners to register and declare their programs including 
budgets?
 Does the Ministry have regular meetings with donor and 
development partners that are attended by the appropriate 
Ministry personnel regularly?
 Does the Ministry take the lead in sector planning?
 Does the Ministry work with donor and development 
partners to reduce or eliminate replication, build 
consistency in the types of materials used?
 Does the Ministry understand the strengths and weaknesses 
of different donor and development partners and task them 
to provide assistance according to their strengths?
INNOVATION
0 = Ministry shows no evidence or awareness of or
commitment to fostering innovation
1 = Ministry shows little evidence or awareness of
or commitment to fostering innovation (some talk, 
but no action)
2 = Ministry shows an emerging evidence of and
commitment to fostering innovation (a few
innovative ideas are put into practice and 
supported)
Hard and soft copies of
documentation on innovations 
proposed, rejected, supported
including financial records and
records on impact of the innovation 
against education indicators
Hard and soft copies of guidelines 
on how innovative ideas are 
selected, designed, implemented, 
 Does the Ministry have a process for identifying and 
promoting innovative ideas?
 Does the Ministry have a process for looking critically at 
innovative ideas and designing them carefully before any 
action is taken to implement the ideas?
 Does the Ministry have a process for monitoring and 
evaluating and learning from the successes and failures of 
innovative ideas?
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
98
SMoE Levels of Increasingly Functional 
Maturity
Rating
(2009 
Baseline)
Evidence Quality
3 = Ministry shows a firm commitment to fostering
innovation (several innovative ideas are put into
practice and supported)
4 = Ministry shows strong evidence of fostering
innovation and ensuring the dissemination of 
innovations (a number of innovative ideas are put 
into practice and supported and disseminated)
monitored and evaluated  Does the Ministry fund and/or otherwise support 
innovative ideas?
 Does the Ministry have a process for scaling up innovative 
ideas?
ACCOUNTABILITY [ANTI-CORRUPTION]
0 = Ministry has no accountability system
1 = Ministry has identified an accountability 
system, but it is not in line with GoSS instructions 
OR personnel do not use the system
2 = Ministry has an accountability system in place
that is in line with GoSS instructions and some
personnel at the state and county levels are familiar
with and use the system
3 = Ministry has an accountability system in place
that is in line with GoSS instructions and most
personnel at the state and county levels are familiar
with and use the system
4 = Ministry has an accountability system in place
that is in line with GoSS instructions, is used by all
personnel (from Minister to teachers) and is
monitored on a regular basis
Hard and soft copies of
accountability system available in 
each department
Hard and soft copies of annual
reports (past and present) on
accountability
Hard and soft copies of an Annual 
Communication Strategy
Public information (hard and soft 
copies and various media used) on 
accountability
Hard and soft copies of reports on 
follow-up actions taken in instances 
where accountability is in question
 Does the Ministry track financial resources to ensure that 
personnel are held accountable?
 Does the Ministry track its property and supplies?
 Does the Ministry have a legitimate internal audit process 
that is used on a regular basis?
 Does the Ministry have a legitimate external audit process 
that is used on a regular basis?
 Does the Ministry record and monitor its successes and 
failures?
 Does the Ministry have and use a process for anonymous 
reporting of suspected corrupt practices and does the 
Ministry follow up on these reports?
 Does the Ministry report regularly and widely to the public 
on its successes or failures in delivering services promised 
and also on its successes and failures with anticorruption?
NB: The data presented in these bar graphs are based on the cumulative scores given during a pilot test of the revised Institutional Development Framework in Juba in early July 
2009. The data are presented for illustration purposes only and are not to be quoted. These data are also not to and are not to be taken as a true or accurate accounting of the 
organizational development profiles of the MoEST or the SMoEs. It is expected that AED TAP should be able to provide these types of metrics and visualizations of baseline data 
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
99
and progress in the MoEST and the SMoEs. Once the profiles provide a closer reflection of reality, at a glance, GoSS, USAID and AED should be able to see which SMoEs are 
doing outstanding work and in what areas and which SMoEs may be lagging behind.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
100
FIGURE 16: MATURITY SCORE TOTALS ACROSS ALL FUNCTIONAL AREAS, BY STATE.
FIGURE 17: MATURITY SCORE TOTALS ACROSS ALL STATES, BY FUNCTIONAL AREA
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
101
FIGURE 18: DRILLING DOWN INTO LAKES STATE HAVING THE HIGHEST MATURITY 
SCORE TOTAL ACROSS FUNCTIONAL AREAS.
FIGURE 19: DRILLING DOWN INTO UNITY STATE HAVING THE LOWEST MATURITY 
SCORE TOTAL ACROSS FUNCTIONAL AREAS.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
102
ANNEX 14: INDICATORS
FIGURE 20: INDICATOR 1 TOTAL NUMBER OF ADMINISTRATORS AND OFFICIALS 
TRAINED.
FIGURE 21: INDICATOR 1 BY SEX.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
103
FIGURE 22: INDICATOR 5 TOTAL NUMBER OF TEACHERS/EDUCATORS TRAINED.
FIGURE 23: INDICATOR 5 BY SEX.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
104
FIGURE 24: INDICATOR 9 TOTAL NUMBER OF TEXTBOOKS AND OTHER TEACHING 
AND LEARNING MATERIALS PROVIDED.
FIGURE 25: INDICTOR 11 LAWS, POLICIES, REGULATIONS AND GUIDELINES 
DEVELOPED OR MODIFIED.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
105
ANNEX 15: EXECUTIVE AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT STAFF 
PROFILE
FIGURE 26:AVERAGE MONTHS IN EXECUTIVE AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT 
POSITIONS.
FIGURE 27:NUMBER OF EXECUTIVE AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT STAFF BY SEX AND 
STATE.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
106
FIGURE 28: EXECUTIVE AND SENIOR MANAGEMENT APPOINTMENTS BY SEX AND 
STATE.87
FIGURE 29: GAP BETWEEN CV STATED EXPERTISE AND TOR REQUIRED EXPERTISE.
 
87 Thanks go to Ms. Kathryn Johnston (MSI Senior Education Specialist for USAID) for her work on Figure 28.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
107
FIGURE 30: DTA TIME ON TASK.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
108
ANNEX 16: TAP MODEL STAKEHOLDER MAP
FIGURE 31:TAP MODEL STAKEHOLDER MAP88.
 
88 Thanks go to Ms Kathryn Johnston for conceptualizing this visual representation of relationships.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
109
ANNEX 17: UPPER NILE MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGE 
STORY
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
110
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
111
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
112
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
113
ANNEX 18: PROPOSAL SUBMISSION AND FUNDING 
REQUEST TRACKING FORM
FIGURE 32: SMOE PROPOSAL SUBMISSION AND PROPOSAL SUCCESS DATA FORM.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
114
ANNEX 19: MINISTRY OF EDUCATION PROFILES BY STATE
1. Central Equatoria
Capital City: Juba
Population: 1,103,592 (2008 population and housing Census)
Major Ethnic Groups: Bari (90%), Kakwa, Kuku, Mundari, Pojulu and Yangbara. These groups speak 
similar languages.
Education Statistics
Category Male % Female %
Primary School 51,801 56 40,705 44
Secondary School 5,170 66 2,712 34
Alternative Education 4,593 48 4,975 52
Background Information on State
Central Equatoria State has an area of 22,956 km2. It was formerly named Bahr al Jabal (River of the Mountains) 
for the tributary of the White Nile that flows through the state.
Special Education Factors to Consider
(No information provided.)
Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender89
Name Gender Position Title Position Start Total
Months
Stephen Lemi M Minister ??? ???
David Lowela L. Modi M Director General 2009 1
Juma Lupai Lemi M Acting Director, Administration and Finance 2008 15
Satimon El Hag M Director, Alternative Education Systems 2008 19
Wani Ladu Lobuju M Director, Examinations 2005 48
Elizabeth Philip F Director, Girls Education 2009 1
Monoah A. Mila M Director, Planning and Budgeting 2009 1
Sarah Epiphanio F Director, Pre-School Education and Early 
Childhood Development
2004 60
Isidoro Asok M Director, Primary Education 2005 48
 
89 Data on Deputy Director and other SMoE Headquarters positions were not able to be obtained from the TAP TA.
Southern Sudan Technical Advisors Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
115
Ramadan Ali B M Director, Private Education 2009 1
Abukato Kenyi M Director, Publication Bureau 2009 2
Moses Joseph Kiri M Director, Secondary Education 2004 60
James Pitia M Director, Special Needs Education 2005 48 1
Sebit Lomoro M Director, Vocational Education 2009
AED Project Support
2008 2009
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6
STA x x x x x x x x x x x x X X
DTA X X X X X X X X X X X
x = Time on the job is divided between two states beginning in October 2007. X = Time on the job is full time in 
one state only.
Salary Status
Unknown
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
116
2. Eastern Equatoria
Capital City:
Population: 906,126 (465,365 Male and 440,761 Female) as per the 2008 population and housing census
Major Ethnic Groups: EES has 15 major ethnic groups, as follow: Lotuko, Madi, Acholi, Lokoya, Pari, 
Tenet, Lopit, lango, Dongothono, Logir, Buya, Didinga, Toposa, Gie, Anyangathom, Imotong, Lokwa, and 
Kachipo.
Education Statistics
Category Number Gender Pupils Teachers
M 64216 61% 2536 88%
F 40549 39% 358 12%
Primary 297
Total 104765 100% 2894 100%
M 2555 80% 117 80%
F 958 20% 29 20%
Secondary 11
Total 3513 100% 146 100%
M 5354 68 202 80
F 2575 32 49 20
Alternative 55
Total 7929 100% 151 100%
Background Information on State
Eastern Equatoria state covers an area of about 82540 KM square in the south eastern corner of southern 
Sudan. Eastern Equatoria borders Kenya, Uganda and Ethiopia. Internally, EES borders Jongolei state in the 
north and Central Equatoria state in the west.
Economically, most tribes in EES are agriculturists practicing mixed farming. However, the tribes of the 
greater Kapoeta are pastoralists. Animals kept include, cattle, goats, sheep, donkeys. The state also has 
potential minerals such as gold, petroleum, iron and cement reserves.
Special Education Factors to Consider 
(No information provided.)
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
117
Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender
Name Gender Position Title Position
Start
Total
Months
HE Francis Ben Ataba M Minister 2006 43
James Amoko James M Director General 2006 43
Ceasar Ongworo M Dir. Admin & Fin 2006 43
Vitale Oyaha Odemi M Dir Budget &Plan 2007 31
Elizabeth Aliardo F Dir Gender &Soc 2006 43
Bertino Obiala M D/Private Schools 2006 43
Frederick Pasquale O. M D/General Education 2008 19
Allirdo Allamson M D/Teachers Affairs 2006 43
AED Project Support
2008 2009
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
STA x x x x x x x x x x x
DTA X X X X X X X X X X X
x = Time on the job is divided between two states beginning in October 2007. X = Time on the job is full time in 
one state only.
Salary Status
Unknown
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
118
3. Jonglei
Capital City: Bor
Population: 1,358,602 (2008 Census)
Major Ethnic Groups: Nuer, Dinka, Murle, Anyuak, Kachipo, Jie Education Statistics
Category Male % Females %
Early Childhood Development 982 45 1,218 55
Primary School 94,339 65 50,643 35
Secondary School 1,884 76 592 24
Alternative Education N/A N/A N/A N/A
Tertiary Education/ Vocational 220 79 60 21
Background Information
Jonglei is the largest of the ten states of Southern Sudan with an area of 122,479 Sq. Kilometers. The state 
borders: Upper Nile to the North, Unity State to North West, Lakes State, to the west, Central Equatoria to 
the South, Eastern Equatoria State to the South East and the republic of Ethiopia lies to the East of Jonglei 
State.
Special Educational Factors to Consider
There is a significant shortage of schools and materials. Children attend school under trees in overcrowded 
conditions as enrollments increase.
Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender
Name Gender Position Title Position
Start
Total
Months
Mr. John Matien Kuol M State Minister of Educ. June 2009 1
Mr. Aquila Kelei Madol M Director General Jan. 2007 30
Majak Nhial Nyuon M Director of Administration and Finance Jan. 2007 30
Fatumah Musa Aljak F A/Director Gender and Social Change July 2007 24
Matthew Poul Ruot Kueth M A/Director for General Education Dec. 2008 7
Paul Bul Yiyieth M Director Planning & Budgeting Jan. 2006 42
David Dhil Chuol M Director Quality Promotion & Innovation Oct.2006 33
Pajok Gai Ruei M Deputy Director, Administration and 
Establishment
June 2006 36
Rekeboam Kun de Nay M Deputy Director, Human Resources June 2006 36
Peter Nyieth Guer M Deputy Director, Examaminations June 2006 36
Garang Alier Cuor M Deputy Director, Gender Equity & Social July 2007 24
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
119
Name Gender Position Title Position
Start
Total
Months
Mr. John Matien Kuol M State Minister of Educ. June 2009 1
Mr. Aquila Kelei Madol M Director General Jan. 2007 30
Majak Nhial Nyuon M Director of Administration and Finance Jan. 2007 30
Fatumah Musa Aljak F A/Director Gender and Social Change July 2007 24
Matthew Poul Ruot Kueth M A/Director for General Education Dec. 2008 7
Paul Bul Yiyieth M Director Planning & Budgeting Jan. 2006 42
Change
Deng Jeroboam Machur M Deputy Director, Planning & Budgeting June 2006 36
Grace Joshua Dau F Deputy Director, Preschool and Early 
Childhood Education
Aug. 2006 34
John Gor Gatluak Deng M Deputy Director, Primary Education June 2006 36
Mach Ayak Lual M Deputy Director, Secondary Education Jan. 2006 42
Dau Atem Bior M Deputy Director, Standards June 2006 36
Pajok Puok Kachuol M Deputy Director, Statistics and Data 
Collection June 2006 36
Kwer Dau Ngiwei M Deputy Director, Teacher Education and 
Training June 2006 36
AED Project Support
2008 2009
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
STA x x x x x x x x x x
DTA X X X X X X X
x = Time on the job is divided between two states beginning in October 2007. X = Time on the job is full time in 
one state only.
Salary Status
State
Name
Salary Paid
– Yes/No
Percent of
Salary Paid
No. of 
Months 
Salary in 
Arrears
Personnel
on Strike –
Yes/No
Remarks
Jonglei Y 100% 0 No The State covered the
deficit with State funds
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
120
4. Lakes
Capital City: Rumbek
Population: 695,730
Major Ethnic Groups: Dinka Agar, Gok, Pakam, Apak, Atuote, Aliap, Ciech and Jur Bele Education 
Statistics
Category Males Females Total
Schools 283
Teachers 2,400
Students 81,552 32,401
Background Information
Lakes State borders six States in Southern Sudan; Jonglei to the west, Central Equatoria to the Southwest, 
Western Equatoria to the South, and Warrap and Unity to the North. .
The Dinka of Lakes State are among several closely related peoples living in Southern Sudan along both sides 
of the White Nile The Dinka maintain the traditional pastoral activities, but have added agriculture in some 
areas, growing grains, peanuts, beans, corn (maize) and other crops. Women perform most agricultural 
activities, although men clear forest for the gardening sites. There are usually two plantings per year The 
Dinka culture incorporates strategies for dealing with the annual cycle of one long dry season and one long 
rainy season.
Polygamy is the ideal for the Dinka, although many men may have only one wife. The Dinka marry outside 
their clan (exogamy), which promotes more cohesion across the broader Dinka group.
Special Educational Factors to Consider
The State Ministry of Education is temporarily housed in a building that is owned by the Rumbek Secondary 
School. It was used as a Headmaster’s resident prior to the war. When war broke out in 1983; the building 
was deserted, In 2006, after the CPA, the building was assigned to the State Ministry of Education until a new 
Ministry headquarters building is constructed.
Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender
Name Gender Position Title Position
Start
Total
Months
Gordon Maker Abol M Minister 2007 32
Daniel Makur Dol M Director General 2006 42
Akuchwel Magot Ater M Director, Administration and Finance 2006 42
Marial Manesseh Makoi M Director, Examinations 2006 42
Rachel Yahasa Tombe F Director, Gender Equity and Social 
Change 2006 42
James Magok Ater M Director, General Education/Acting 
Director General 2006 42
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
121
Martin Manyang Mamur M Director, Planning and Budgeting 2006 42
Jacob Wel Majak M Director, Quality Promotion and 
Innovation 2006 42
AED Project Support
2008 2009
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
STA x x x x x x x x x x
DTA X X X X X X X X X X X X
x = Time on the job is divided between two states beginning in October 2007. X = Time on the job is full time in 
one state only.
Salary Status
State
Name
Salary
Paid –
Yes/No
Percent of
Salary
Paid
No. of 
Months 
Salary in 
Arrears
Personnel
on Strike –
Yes/No
Remarks
Lakes State Y 80% 1 No Teachers’ salary was increased 
from 75% of salary last year to 
80%.
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
122
5. Northern Bahr El Ghazal
Capital: Aweil
Population: 3,500,000 and 720,898 by the 1983 and 2008 Population Census Ethnic Groups: Dinka and 
Luo
Education Statistics
As of May 2009, 150,124 students (108,164 boys and 41,846 girls) were enrolled in Pre-primary, Primary, 
Alternative Education System Centers and Secondary Schools in the State.
Enrolment
Level No. of Schools
Male Female Total
Pre-primary 15 2,532 1,410 3,942
Primary 314 75,733 33,782 109,515
Alternative Educ. System 250 28,000 6,654 34,654
Secondary 17 1,899 114 2,013
Total 596 108,164 41,960 150,124
Background Information on State
The Dinka are the largest ethnic group and are nomadic pastoralists and also practice limited subsistence 
agriculture. The Luo practice subsistence agriculture. During the wet season (May to September) the Dinka 
graze their livestock close to their permanent homes. During the dry season (December to April) they travel 
great distances from their permanent homes seeking good pastures and water. Northern Bahr El Ghazal has 
experienced a series of long droughts which have had a significant impact on the population.
Two decades of war, unfavorable climate, cultural values and the lifestyle of the people present unique 
challenges to the overall development of the State, and specifically to the delivery of social services, including 
education.
Special Educational Factors to Consider
During the past two decades of war, the provision of education in Northern Bahr El Ghazal State 
deteriorated and many schools closed. The 2008 Southern Sudan Education Census generated data from 305 
out of 325 Primary Schools. Of these, 275 classes were conducted in permanent classrooms, 374 were in 
semi-permanent classrooms, 70 were conducted in tents, 180 were in shelters with a roof only and 653 classes 
were conducted under trees. Most of the permanent and semi-permanent structures are dilapidated. In many 
upper primary classrooms, six or more pupils share one textbook and sometimes there are no textbooks at all. 
Teachers lack reference books and teacher’s guides including syllabus and curriculum guides for the classes 
they teach.
Out of the 49 personnel at the SMoE headquarters, 44 are male and 5 are female. None of the females are in 
senior or middle management positions; however, several are in inspector positions.
Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender
Name Gender Position title Total Months
Stephen Chol Ajongo M Minister of Education 12
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
123
Peter Lual Aleu M Deputy Director, Personnel 24
Kerubino Garang Akuei M Deputy Director, Primary Education 14
Akuar Gamar Ujiith Deputy Director, Private Schools 3
Johnson Bol Dut M Director General 12
Sabrino Majok Majok M Director, Administration and Finance 12
Daniel Akol Diing Deng M Director, Alternative Educ. System 39
Caesar Atem Biajo M Director, General Education 11
David Kon Martin M Director, Higher Education 42
Mawien Goktung Mawien M Director, Quality and Innovation 5
Victorino Ken Akoon M Director, Planning and Budgeting 12
Bol Angua M Deputy Director, Accounts 42
Peter Deng Mabior M Deputy Director, Alternative Education 
Systems 15
Bendeto Joseph Ubu M Deputy Director, Curriculum 180
Pasquale Apin Apin M Deputy Director, Early Childhood 
Education 4
Ruay Dut Akol M Deputy Director, EMIS 7
Jakuar Garang Aweech M Deputy Director, Gender Equity and Social 
Change 24
Santino Garang Amol M Deputy Director, Human Resource 
Management 276
Fastino Deng Apai M Deputy Director, National Languages 24
Peter Lual Aleu M Deputy Director, Personnel 24
Kerubino Garang Akuei M Deputy Director, Primary Education 14
Akuar Gamar Ujiith M Deputy Director, Private Schools 4
Nicola Bazilo M Deputy Director, Secondary Education 0
Adam Garang Wol M Deputy Director, Teacher Education 26
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
124
AED Project Support
2008 2009
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
STA x x x x x x x X X X X
DTA X X X X X X
x = Time on the job is divided between two states beginning in November 2007. X = Time on the job is full time in 
one state only.
Salary Status
State
Name
Salary
Paid –
Yes/No
Percent of
Salary
Paid
No. of 
Months 
Salary in 
Arrears
Personnel
on Strike –
Yes/No
Remarks
Northern Bar El
Ghazal Y 80 2 No
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
125
6. Unity
Capital City: Bentiu Population: 853,000
Major Ethnic Groups: Nuer, Dinka
Education Statistics
Gender Percentage
Male 65
Female 35
Background Information
Unity State has an area of 35, 956 square kilometers. Unity State borders North Sudan. Most inhabitants are 
pastoralists, with a small percentage of Afro-Arab traders. While the tribes are primarily pastoralists, they also 
grow subsistence crops in small quantities for domestic consumption.
The main ethnic tribes of this State are Nuers and Dinkas, along with small business communities from 
Darfur and Afro-Arabs tribes who live in the State’s urban centers.
Unity State is one of the richest in South Sudan because of its oil reserves. Special Educational Factors to 
Consider
The overall numbers of primary schools is 66, although the estimated number is contained in the EMIS 
report is 120.
Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender
Name Gender Position Title Position
Start
Total
Months
?? M Minister ?? ??
Peter Dak Gatluak M Director General 10-2007 20
Robert Chuol M Director, Administration and Finance 6-2009 1
Aisha Shuleman Yasin F Director, Gender Equity and Social 
Change 6-2009 1
Wiyai Dak M Director, General Education 6-2009 1
Joseph Arok Malual M Director, Planning and Budgeting 6-2009 1
El Tahib Awad M Director, Quality Promotion and 
Innovation
6-2009 1
Kawai Baboth M Deputy Director, Administration and 
Finance
6-2009 1
James Bol M Deputy Director, Gender Equity and 
Social Change
6-2009 1
Yoanis Ganyang M Deputy Director, General Education 6-2009 1
Ramadan Thooaak M Deputy Director, General Education 6-2009 1
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
126
Name Gender Position Title Position
Start
Total
Months
?? M Minister ?? ??
Peter Dak Gatluak M Director General 10-2007 20
Robert Chuol M Director, Administration and Finance 6-2009 1
Aisha Shuleman Yasin F Director, Gender Equity and Social 
Change 6-2009 1
Wiyai Dak M Director, General Education 6-2009 1
Joseph Arok Malual M Director, Planning and Budgeting 6-2009 1
Mathok Gasuwa M Deputy Director, Planning and 
Budgeting
6-2009 1
Daniel Manong M Deputy Director, Quality Promotion and 
Innovation 6-2009 1
Abdel Gadir Manuel M Deputy Director, Standards and School 
Instruction (Planning and Budgeting) 6-2009 1
AED Project Support
2008 2009
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
STA x* x x x x x (X) (X)
DTA X X X X X X X X X
x = Time on the job is divided between two states. *Previous STA spent most time in other state X = Full time in 
one state only
Salary Status:
State Name Salary
Paid –
Yes/No
Percent of
Salary
Paid
No. of 
Months 
Salary in 
Arrears
Personnel
on Strike
– Yes/No
Remarks
Unity Y 100% 0 No
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
127
7. Upper Nile
Capital City: Malakal
Population: 1,924,000
Major Ethnic Groups: Nuer, Shilluk, Dinka, Maban, Others (Arabs) 
Background Information
Malakal lies close to the border between north and south, and has had one of the more fragile security 
situations since the 2005 peace agreement brought an end to the civil war.
Education Statistics
Number of Students by Gender
County No. of
Schools
No. of
Teachers
No. of
Workers Male Female Total
Malakal 33 518 192 8163 8003 16166
Manyo 20 234 68 4772 3258 8030
Renk 38 391 112 9909 8837 18746
Bailet 13 63 31 3798 2312 6110
Ulang 24 28 70 4473 2068 6541
Panyikango 21 214 151 4855 3243 8098
Fashoda 16 92 102 4303 2417 6720
Nasir 61 145 114 25144 13274 38418
Maluth 14 142 25 3785 3132 6917
Maban 25 64 23 5382 4897 10279
Maiwut 18 61 20 7313 4842 12155
Longuchuck 8 60 24 3639 1908 5547
Total 294 2,012 561 85,536 58,185 143,727
School enrolment data for the 2008 academic year indicates an increase of 20% over the previous year. All 
counties have shown an increase in enrolment. Malakal, Naser and Renk counties are highest while Baliet, 
Ulang and Panikiyang trail far behind. The most disadvantaged areas are Ulang, Balietlet, Longchuck, 
Fashoda and, Maluth in part because they are among the most inaccessible areas during the rainy season. 
These areas also contain the largest number of IDP returnee settlers from the North as well as from 
neighboring countries.
Special Education Factors to Consider
The educational environment in Upper Nile State is characterized by clear signs of negligence and 
marginalization, wide geographic and gender disparities, dilapidated learning spaces, and a high percentage of 
unqualified teachers. During the war, major settlement centers were converted into military garrisons. The 
education sector and its institutions were hit hard during this time. Schools were converted into military 
barracks and residences for the army. Learning spaces were neglected with no repair or maintenance.
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
128
Since January 2005, the demand for education in the state has greatly increased surpassing the delivery 
capacity of the State Ministry of Education. In addition to the peace dividend following the comprehensive 
agreement, several factors have contributed to this increasing demand. The “Go To School Campaigns”
and the influxes of large number of IDP refugee returnees are among the key factors that drive the school 
enrolment. Although school enrolment has shown significant increases, the availability of physical 
infrastructure has been insufficient to match demand. This has resulted in a high student classroom ratio of 
between 70 - 120 pupils per class.
Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender
Name Gender Position Title Start Date Total
Months
H.E. Minister Mujkwan 
Kak Ajang Adung
M Minister 2006
(January)
31
William Gwang Deng Yor M Director General 2008 17
Charles John M Executive Director 2007 31
Omac James (Patrick) M Secretary to the Minister 2007 32
Oyath Ayul Lual Ayik M Director, Administration and 
Finance
2009 1
Ernest Ajak M Director , Examinations 2008 16
Priscilla Kur Deng F Director, Gender Equity & Social 
Change
2007 31
Peter Oyiejo Martin 
Nyawello
M Director , General Education 2008 17
Anthony Ajak Ajawin DengM Director, Planning & Budgeting 2008 17
Lul Ruoi Dhol Dew M Director, Quality Promotion and 
Innovation
2008 17
Lual Yiec Deng Mat M Deputy Director, Accounts 
(Seconded from MoF)
2009 6
Oyath Ayul Lual Ayik M Deputy Director, Alternative 
Education Systems
2006 41
Gwang Simon Aban 
Acobek
M Deputy Director, Basic Education 2008 17
Chan Dak Padiet Kwathker M Deputy Director, Basic Education 2008 17
Mary Adwok Ayik Acient F Deputy Director, Civic and Peace 
Education
2008 13
Biel Ningkel M Deputy Director, Curriculum 2008 17
Aban Padiet Jago Jebor M Deputy Director, Data & Statistics 2009 7
James Ojwok Okich Yor M Deputy Director, Development 
Partners
2008 17
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
129
Rapahael Ocam Aban 
Angong
M Deputy Director, Education 
Analysis
2008 16
Okac Jam Padilong Ajing M Deputy Director, Examinations 2008 16
Odolo Ojulo Okoth Adkom F Deputy Director, Gender Equity & 
Social Change
2008 17
Jacinta Adwok Akurkwac 
Aguret
F Deputy Director, Girls’ Education 2008 15
Rebecca Odhok Akoch 
Agyew
F Deputy Director, Pre- Education and 
Early Childhood Development
2008 17
Elia Bwono Cirino Adiang M Deputy Director, Planning and 
Budgeting
2008 18
Othum Odhong Ayoker 
Deng
M Deputy Director, Quality Promotion 
and Innovation
Before
CPA
77
Ahmed Sami M Deputy Director, Quality Promotion 
and Innovation- Inspection
2008 16
Orach Laa Matjok Nujkako M Deputy Director , ??? 2008 16
Joseph Francis M Deputy Director, Personnel 2008 15
Abdala Jago Deng Nyibong M Deputy Director, Secondary 
Education
2008 16
Olany Ayik Akol Bashay F Deputy Director, Special Needs 2008 15
Wanh Opun M Deputy Director, Technical 
Education
2008 15
Aban Raphael Repi Kudit M Deputy Director, World Food 
Program
2008 17
AED Project Support
2008 2009
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
STA x x x x x x x x x x x x X X
DTA x x
x = Time on the job is divided between two states beginning October 2007 funded through MDTF. X = Time on the 
job is full time in one state only.
Salary Status
Salary Paid Percent of Salary
Paid
Number of Months Salary
Payments in Arrears
Personnel
on Strike
Other Remarks
Yes 80 2 No
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
130
8. Warrap
Capital City: Kwajok
Population: 972,000 in 2008 Census
Major Ethnic Groups: Dinka, Lou, Rek (est. 95%) 
Education Statistics
Category Number of
Schools Male Female Total
Enrollment
Pupil –
Teacher Ratio
Primary School 330 104,427 38,818 143,245
Teachers 2,211 171 2,382
Pupil – Teacher Ratio 1:60
Background Information on State
Founded in 1994, Warrap State is one of the newer states in South Sudan. It is the home of the President of 
South Sudan, Salva Kir. Previously Warrap State was part of Bahr El Ghazal (with its capital in Wau). Since it 
became the capital of Warrap State in 2006, Kuajok, has been growing rapidly.
Special Educational Factors to Consider
The Ministry of Education underwent major personnel realignments at the end of May 2009. The number of 
personnel were reduced and many were also reduced in grade at the headquarters, counties, payams and 
school levels. This action was undertaken after the State Minister of Education toured all counties during 
March and April 2009.
The Minister is the only female State Minister of Education. She assumed her position in July 2008.
The State Ministry is currently housed in trailers and has only 4 computers to meet its operational needs.
Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender
Name Gender Position Title Position
Start
Total
Months
Nyandeng Malek M Minister July 2008 12
Lino Angok Kuec M Director General March 2009 5
Majok Ayii Mawien M Director, Accounts July 2008 12
Hassan Haroun Madeni M Director, Administration and 
Finance
March 2009 4
Kornelio Kang Lang M Director, Alternative Education 
Systems
??? ???
Joseph Modesto Mahol Reng M Director, Establishment of 
Workforce
??? ???
Dhang Chol Atem (former 
Director of Secondary Education)
M Director, Examinations May 2009 3
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
131
Mary Poni Zachariah F Director, Gender Equity and 
Social Change
??? ???
Gardensio Gum (former Director 
General)
M Director, General Education May 2009 3
Achuil Madut Mayen M Director, Local Languages May 2009 3
Martin Madut Mourwel M Director, Planning and 
Budgeting
May 2009 1
Maria Achok Deng F Director, Preschool Education 
and Early Childhood 
Development
May 2009 3
Inyasio Mathuc Mabany M Director, Quality Promotion and 
Innovation
March 2009 5
Andriano Kiir Ayuel (former Dir. 
Planning & Budgeting)
M Director, Secondary Education May 2009 3
Antony Akuein Deng M Director, Teacher Training May 2009
(new post)
3
Wol Mayar Deng M Deputy Director, Administration 
and Finance
March 2009 1
Pasquale Reng Poul M Deputy Director, 
Establishment Workforce 
(now Associate Director)
(long time) 36
Alawwia El-Nour Adam F Deputy Director, Gender Equity 
and Social Change
May 2009 3
Marchello Longar Deng M Deputy Director, General 
Education
May 2009 3
AED Support
2008 2009
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
STA X X X X
DTA X X X X X X X X X X X X
x = Time on the job is divided between two states. X = Time on the job is full time in one state only. 
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
132
Salary Status
State Name Salary Paid
– Yes/No
Percent of
Salary Paid
No. of 
Months 
Salary in 
Arrears
Personnel
on Strike –
Yes/No
Remarks
Warrap State Y 100% 1 No
Teachers are calm but
worried about the low pay at
the lower salary grades
(grade 15).
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
133
9. Western Bar El Ghazal
Capital City: Wau
Population: 333,000 in 2008 Census 
Major Ethnic Groups: Dinka, Fartit, Luo 
Education Statistics
Category Number
Primary Schools 175
Males Enrolled 44,514
Females Enrolled 26,505
Total Enrollment 71,019
Teacher:Student Ratio 1:60
Background Information
Western Bahr el Ghazal State consists of three counties: Wau County, Jur River County and Raja County. 
There are 175 Basic Schools and 14 Secondary Schools (11 in Wau County and 3 in Raja County).
Special Educational Factors to Consider
The Ministry of Education is transitioning from Arabic to English as the language of instruction and the 
official language of the workplace in schools and offices. To effect this change, all senior staff of the Ministry 
of Education were replaced approximately three months ago with individuals who were former English 
teachers.
14 (26%) out of the 53 professional staff at headquarters level are female. Four out of 23 senior personnel 
(below) are female.
Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender
Name Gender Position Title Position
Start
Total
Months
Valentino Yak Kon M Minister July 2005 48
Abdallai Ali Abdallah M Director General Jan 2009 7
Joseph Gabriel Yak M Director, Planning and 
Budgeting
Jan 2009 7
Pasquina Mario M Deputy Director, Accounts May 2005 50
John Gonyo Ali M Director, Admin & Finance May 2005 50
Anthony Toka Abdallah M Director, Admin & Finance Aug. 2008 11
Elias Eneriko Wandu M Director, Alternative Education 
Systems
2005 54
Donato Ugali M Director, Basic Education Jul 2005 48
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
134
Pasquale Richard M Director, Establishment of 
Workforce
Jan 2009 7
Adam Jalal el Din M Director, Examinations and 
Curriculum
May 2005 50
Elizabeth Madena Simon F Director, Gender Equity and 
Social Change
April 2009 4
Alawia al Majeed F Director, Preschool and Early 
Childhood
Education
May 2005 50
Clement Mayar M Director, Private Schools Jul 2005 28
Mario Guma Gessi M Director, Quality Promotion and 
Innovation
March 2009 5
Lewis Sabah el Kheir M Director, Secondary Education Jan 2009 7
Peter Sebario M Director , Accounts January
2008
19
Alberto Akwai M Deputy Director, Administration 
and Finance
June 2009 2
Simon Paul M Deputy Director, Alternative 
Education Systems
January
2008
19
Christina Avodio Rakhi F Deputy Director, Gender Equity 
and Social Change
July 2007 24
Lewis Sabah el Kheir M Deputy Director, General 
Education (also Director, 
Secondary Education)
Jan 2009 7
Mario Alex M Deputy Director, Planning & 
Budgeting
2005 54
Santo Wurukel M Deputy Director, Quality 
Promotion and Innovation
Jan 2009 7
Elizabeth Daniel F Deputy Director, Private Schools April 2009 4
AED Project Support
2008 2009
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
STA x x x x x x x x X X X X
DTA X X X X X X X X X X
x = Time on the job is divided between two states beginning November 2007. X = Time on the job is full time in 
one state only.
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
135
Salary Status
State Name Salary Paid
– Yes/No
Percent of
Salary Paid
No. of 
Months 
Salary in 
Arrears
Personnel on 
Strike –
Yes/No
Remarks
Western Bar El
Ghazal State Y 95% 1 No
Teachers are not currently on
strike. However, in 2007 both 
teachers and students
demonstrated and destroyed
property at the State Ministry
of Education.
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
136
10. Western Equatoria
Capital City: Yambio
Population: 619,029
Major Ethnic Groups: Avokaya, Baka, Balanda, Mondo, Moru, Zande 
Education Statistics
Category Sex Number Trained
Students Male 44,326
Female 35,247
Teachers Male 1,850
Female 323
30%
Schools 350
Background Information
Western Equatoria State lies to the Western part of the Greater Equatoria Region and to the South of the 
Greater Bahr Al Ghazal Region. It shares borders with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to the 
South, the Republic of Central Africa to the west and to the Lakes State to the north.
The population of Western Equatoria is 619,029 (2008 Census). The six major ethnic groups in the State 
include: Avokaya, Baka, Mondo, Moru, Zande and Balanda.
Nearly all the inhabitants of Western Equatoria are engaged in the agriculture sector, producing various food 
crops such as sweet potatoes, cassava, maize, rice, beans, etc.
Before the war, some commercial farming involving the growing and processing of cotton and teak was 
practiced. The successive national governments of the Sudan in Khartoum did not attempt to establish any 
small-scale agricultural industries in Zande land despite its richness in fruits and agricultural crops.
Special Educational Factors to Consider
WES is one of the first two states to adopt the new payroll system and the EMIS system has been set up and 
is being used to provide educational data. The State also has the highest number of schools (350) in Southern 
Sudan. Unfortunately most these schools are makeshift and operate under trees or in dilapidated structures. 
Education activities are hampered by the insurgence of the rebels of the Lord’s Resistance Army. TAP travel 
is currently limited to a 4-mile radius around Yambio.
Ministry of Education Senior Personnel by Length of Service in Position and Gender
Name Gender Position/Title Start Date Tot.
Months
Not provided M Minister July 2009 0
Nama R. Bullen Beshir F Director General August 2007 23
Not provided M Director, Administration and 
Finance
July 2009 0
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
137
William A. Baabe M Director, Alternative. Education 
Systems
August 2007 23
Wayo Hezekiah M Director, Basic Education August 2006 42
Victor Kanga M Director, Examinations August 2007 23
Gabriel Makana B. M Director, Planning and Budgeting August 2007 23
Kunguru Stanley M Director, Quality Promotion & 
Innovation
September
2006
33
Stanley Diisi Enosa M Director, Secondary Education August 2007 23
Richard Sereberani M Director, Sports and Physical 
Education
August 2007 23
Stewart Timon G. M Director, Vocational Training July 2007 24
Yunis Aziza Yoramu M Deputy Director, Accounts May 2004 72
John Wajo Larya M Deputy Director, Administration 
& Finance
January 2005 60
Francis Amuda M Deputy Director,
Alternative Education Systems
August 2007 23
Dominic A. Ngbidig M Deputy Director, Examinations November
2006
32
Rhoda Elisa Tata F Deputy Director, Gender & 
Social Change
August 2007 23
Daniel Warija M Deputy Director, Planning and
Budgeting
August 2007 23
Mbembe Rukokau Paisayo M Deputy Director, Quality 
Promotion & Innovation
August 2007 23
William Bangafu M Deputy Director, Secondary 
Education
June 2007 23
Joseph A. Sume M Deputy Director, Sports and 
Phys. Ed.
August 2007 23
Zerufa Philip Ngaiyo F Deputy Director, Vocational 
Training
August 2007 23
AED Project Support
2008 2009
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
STA x x x x x x x x x x x x x X
DTA X X X X X X X X X X
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
138
x = Time on the job is divided between two states and began in October 2007 X = Time on the job is full time in one 
state only.
Salary Status
State Name Salary Paid
– Yes/No
Percent of
Salary Paid
No. of 
Months 
Salary in 
Arrears
Personnel
on Strike –
Yes/No
Remarks
Western Equatoria Y 80% 3 months
in arrears
Yes 80% of salary is being paid.
However teachers claim 16
months of arrears must be paid 
before they return to classes
Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
139
ANNEX 20: BIBLIOGRAPHY
The following publications and papers served as the major documents reviewed by the evaluation team in 
preparation for conducting the evaluation of the Academy for Educational Development’s Technical 
Assistance Program.
1. Academy for Education Development. Annual Report 2006-September 2007
2. Academy for Education Development. Annual Report October 2007-Sept 2008
3. Academy for Education Development. Annual Work plan April-Dec 2006
4. Academy for Education Development. Annual Work plan October 2006-September 2007
5. Academy for Education Development. Annual Work plan September 2007-September 2008
6. Academy for Education Development. Annual Work plan October 2008-Sept 2009
7. Academy for Education Development. EQUIP 2 Sudan SoE White Paper: Phase 2 Planning March 
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8. Academy for Education Development. Program Monitoring Plan (PMP) 2007
9. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: October 2005- December 2005
10. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: January-March 2006
11. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: April-June 2006
12. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: July-Sept 2006
13. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: October-December 2006
14. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: January-March 2007
15. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: March-June 2007
16. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: July-Sept 2007
17. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: Oct-Dec 2007
18. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: Jan – March 2008
19. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: April-June 2008
20. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: July-Sept 2008
21. Academy for Education Development. Quarterly Report: Oct 2008-Dec 2008
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Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
140
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Southern Sudan Technical Assistance Program (SSTAP) 
Ministry Of Education, Science And Technology (MOEST) 
141
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