September 9, 2011 This publication was produced by Amex International and its Subcontractor, DevTech Systems Inc., for the United States Agency for International Development under Contract No. RAN-I-00-09-00008-00. EVALUATION USAID/Dominican Republic Tri-Project Performance Evaluation Integrated Report Integrated Performance Evaluation Including Theory of Change August 2011 By Kris Merschrod – AMEX TRI-Project Team Leader In reference to the following three evaluations: Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement Implementation Project (DR-CAFTA IP) by Phil Church with Cristian Rodriquez August 2011 Thi bli ti d d f i b th U it d St t A f I t ti l D l t It September 9 2011 This publication was produced by Amex International and its Subcontractor, DevTech Systems Inc., for the United States Agency for International Development under Contract No. RAN-I-00-09-00008-00. USAID/DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TRI-PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION INTEGRATED REPORT USAID/DR TRI-PROJECT EVALUATION: ECONOMIC GROWTH PROGRAM INTEGRATED REPORT DISCLAIMER: The contents of the following report are the responsibility of the authors and represent our best efforts to complete the SOW given. The opinions expressed herein are those of the authors only; we accept responsibility for their accuracy and in no way do these opinions represent the policy of USAID, The Department of State, or the Government of the United States of America. CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................ 1 I. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 8 A. Development Challenge Addressed by the Program and the Projects Evaluated ............................ 9 B. Program Background: Integration Theme .......................................................................................... 9 C. Geography of the Projects and the Evaluations .............................................................................. 14 D. Purpose of The Integrated Report ................................................................................................... 16 II. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................... 16 III. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS .................................................................................................. 17 A. Overall Accomplishments ................................................................................................................. 18 B. Critical Analysis ................................................................................................................................ 19 IV. OVERARCHING RECOMMENDATION: A STRATEGY FOR BUILDING THE BROAD CLUSTER ................................................................................................................................. 22 A. The Broad Cluster Concept: Part of a Solution ................................................................................ 23 B. Starting a Movement: Cluster Use and Definition In USAID Documentation .................................. 23 C. Facilitating the Movement: The Next Steps ..................................................................................... 24 V. USAID/DR ASSISTANCE MOST URGENTLY NEEDED .................................................... 25 A. Facilitation of the Broad Cluster Concept ........................................................................................ 25 B. The Probability of the Foundations’ Success ................................................................................... 26 C. Decision on the Fifth-Year Extensions ............................................................................................. 27 D. Monitoring and Evaluation: Studies And Research ......................................................................... 27 VI. BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED ................................................................ 29 VII. THE PROGRAM FIT WITH NEW USAID GCC AND FtF INITIATIVES ............................ 29 ANNEXES LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1 - The Projects of the USAID/DR Economic Growth Program, 1998-2011 .............................. 11 Figure 2 - Tariffs on Grains - 2005 through 2025 ................................................................................... 12 Figure 3 - Tariffs on Dairy Products - 2005 through 2025 ...................................................................... 13 Figure 4 - Tariffs on Meats - 2005 through 2025 ................................................................................... 13 Figure 5 - Tri-Project Locations Overlay on Sensitive Crops/Products .................................................. 15 ACRONYMS Abt Abt Associates (Implementing Partner for USAID/RED) AED Academy for Educational Development (Implementing Partner for USAID/DSTA) AMEX AMEX International DR-CAFTA Central American Free Trade Agreement (including the Dominican Republic) CBI Caribbean Basin Initiative CDCT Consejo Dominicano de Competitividad Turística CEDAF Centro para el Desarrollo Agropecuario y Forestal CIO Chief Information Officer CNC National Competitiveness Board (Consejo Nacional de Competitividad) CPP Dominican Republic Competitiveness and Policy Program CTO Cognizant Technical Officer (USAID) DICOEX Directorate of Foreign Trade (Acronym for the Spanish title) DR Dominican Republic DR-CAFTA IP Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Project DSTA Dominican Sustainable Tourism Alliance EEPA European Economic Partnership Alliance EPP Environmental Protection Program1 the IP is TNC EU European Union FIPA Investment Fund for Environmental Protection FtF Feed the Future GCCI Global Climate Change Initiative GEF Global Environmental Facility of the World Bank GIS Geographic Information System GSTA Global Sustainable Tourism (Also DSTA and USAID/DSTA) GODR Government of the Dominican Republic IDB Inter-American Development Bank INTEC Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo ISA Instituto Superior Agrícola JAD Junta Agroempresarial Dominicana MIS Management Information System M&E Monitoring and Evaluation OTCA Oficina de Tratados Agrícolas Comerciales (Commercial Agricultural Agreements Office) PATCA Proyecto Agrícola de Transición a la Competitividad (Transition to Competitive Agriculture Project) PBMS Performance Based Management System PIP Parameters Identification Paper PMP Performance Management Plan PRA-Peru Poverty Reduction and Alleviation Project 1 Environmental Protection Program Cooperative Agreement No. 517-A-00-09-00106-00. Program Refers to the USAID projects and programs from 1998 to present to carry out its Strategic Objective #1 RED Rural Economic Diversification Project REDDOM Dominican Rural Economic Diversification Foundation REDP Rural Economic Development Project SEMARANA Secretary of State for Environment and Natural Resources SOW Scope of Work STTA Short Term Technical Assistance TA Technical Assistance TNC The Nature Conservancy TNC-EPP The USAID-Funded Environmental Protection Program managed by TNC TRI-Project DR-CAFTA IP, USAID/RED, and USAID/DSTA USAID United States Agency for International Development USAID/DR United States Agency for International Development Mission in the Dominican Republic USAID/DSTA USAID-Funded Rural Economic Diversification Project USAID/RED USAID-Funded Dominican Sustainable Tourism Alliance USG United States Government 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This Integrated Report summarizes findings, conclusions and recommendations from the mid￾term performance evaluations of three USAID-sponsored projects implemented for the Mission’s Economic Growth (EG) Office. The purpose of the three projects is to contribute to achieving the USAID Strategic Objective of “Increased sustainable economic opportunities for the poor” by attaining the Intermediate Result “Improved conditions for a more competitive Dominican economy.”2 These projects and their primary areas of activity are:  Central America-Dominican Republic-United States Free Trade Agreement Implementation Project (DR-CAFTA IP): provides technical assistance, logistical support, and training for the organizational strengthening of the Dominican Directorate of Foreign Trade (DICOEX - Acronym in Spanish) and related GODR agencies responsible for implementing compliance with trade treaty commitments. 3  Dominican Sustainable Tourism Alliance (DSTA) Project: provides technical assistance, training, and grants to implement a cluster-based approach to developing small and community based enterprises for sustainable and diversified tourism, including nature or ecotourism. 4  Rural Economic Diversification Project (RED): provides technical assistance and training to diversify the agricultural sector utilizing a cluster-based approach to development. 5 The three projects build and expand on an earlier USAID Competition and Policy Project (CPP) implemented between 2004 and 2007. The three evaluated projects were launched in FY 2007 with termination dates—under their proposed five-year implementation periods toward the end of FY2012. In this report the term “Program” refers to the overarching EG Office program. The term “Project” refers to individual projects within the Program, in particular the DR-CAFTA IP, DSTA, and RED projects described above. The economic growth objective for the DR is increased investment and more competitive production that will in turn generate added employment and income particularly among the rural low-income populations of the country. The context for responding to this challenge is a global free trade paradigm of bi- and multilateral trade agreements such as, formerly, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and now the Central American Free Trade Agreement, including the DR (DR-CAFTA).6 This paradigm presents both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, global free trade opens new export markets. On the other hand, global free trade brings competition from goods and services that can now be imported free of tariffs and non-tariff barriers. To respond effectively to this new global paradigm, and meet its rising employment and income targets, the Dominican Republic must endeavor to change the structure and style of its economic governance and production. 2 From the USAID/DR 2003-2007 five-year Strategic Plan 3 Chemonics Contract No. EEM-I-00-07-00008, TO No. 1. 4 AED Leader Award No. EPP-A-00-06-00002-00 5 ABT Contract No. EDH-I00-05-00005-00 6 Globally, the trade treaty is known as the DR-CAFTA, but in the Dominican Republic and in USAID/DR documentation the treaty is written as DR-CAFTA. This evaluation adopts the latter Dominican acronym for the treaty. 2 This Integrated Report presents the major cross-cutting findings from evaluations of each of the three discrete projects that were conducted from June to August, 2011. 7 It also a) includes an examination of how the three projects have and can mutually reinforce each other; b) recommends possible adjustments during the last year of the projects’ implementation; and c) highlights overarching lessons learned and best practices to be applied to the projects and to other parts of the USAID/DR assistance portfolio. CROSS-CUTTING FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS The findings summarized in this Integrated Report are cross-cutting, applicable to the three projects, and have important implications for the Program. Other findings and conclusions are specific to each of the projects and can be found in their respective evaluation reports. In terms of achieving improved conditions for a more competitive Dominican economy, the USAID EG Program has continued, at least partially, the trajectory of prior interventions— among these the Competitiveness and Policy Program (CPP) and DR-Advantage, a public relations and media campaign to support the competitiveness of Dominican exports and tourism. The three projects in the current EG Program are contributing to strengthening vertical and horizontal links across the Dominican economy. The organizational development of clusters— under RED and DSTA as well as GODR trade treaty implementing institutions—under DR￾CAFTA IP are the hallmarks of the EG Program. In spite of some of the critiques of the technical aspects of the individual projects, they have raised awareness of the opportunities and competition that participation in DR-CAFTA involves. However, the extent of this success has been constrained by shortcomings in project design features and implementation procedures. Looking forward, to sustain the momentum and sustainability of progress toward the EG Office Program Objective, the three projects will require some adjustments in their current implementation paths and procedures. Finding 1: The DSTA and RED projects demonstrate that a cluster-based approach to improving conditions for a more competitive economy has been effective in the Dominican context. The current Program and projects are not the first to apply a cluster-based approach to building a competitive economy in the DR. The term cluster, as used commonly and in project documents, is synonymous with public-private partnerships in a defined geographic area and with a particular product or service focus. The cluster strategy for developing tourism and agricultural development down to the grass roots and throughout government agencies related to development has become widespread beyond USAID-funded projects. The current Program has continued to re-enforce this strategy which has been implemented for more than ten years. This is an advance over simple production (value) chain strategies that do not explicitly include supporting national government and local ‘civil society’ institutions and enabling policies and regulations. The evaluation concludes, however, that for greater effectiveness this cluster approach requires closer coordination and deeper integration of activities among the public and private sectors. This has not always been the case for selected clusters, with the result that trade opportunities emerging from DR-CAFTA participation are not being seized and the potential for competition from other treaty country suppliers is increased. 7 USAID contracted AMEX International (AMEX) and DevTech Systems, Inc. (DevTech) to conduct an evaluation of three economic growth projects in the Dominican Republic (DR) and prepare this integrated report. AMEX/RAN-I-00-07-00008/AID-517-TO-11- 00001. 3 Finding 2: Although USAID envisioned strong coordination between and among all three projects, in practice this coordination has occurred more sporadically than systematically. When the CPP closed and new contracts were awarded, USAID included references to coordination and collaboration across projects both in the requests for proposals and in the final awards. However, inter-project coordination has been spotty. The lack of coordination across projects in the Program has caused missed opportunities to identify new products and crops through research and development, to leverage producer and trade association capacity, and to enhance the collective impact of the three projects. Finding 3: Prolonged USAID and GODR approval procedures have delayed implementation at critical times with the result of disrupted project momentum. Implementers’ annual work plans were based on assumptions of prompt—not protracted—approval by USAID for ‘Option Year’ funding. Delays in USAID funding approval instead forced implementers to postpone contracting of facilities, engaging consultants or trainers, and recruiting to fill vacant technical staff positions to administer events in the new project implementation period. In the case of DSTA, protracted GODR procedures for the certification of small tourism cluster enterprises to operate concessions in or around protected areas delayed the issuing of operational grants as well as scheduled training and capacity building activities. Finding 4: The three projects are administering deficient monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems. The project implementers generally launched project M&E systems late, and their data storage and retrieval procedures make the sharing of performance indicator measures impossible except during quarterly and annual reporting periods; no central performance indicator database exists. Further, several activity-level indicators—e.g. number and hours of workshop events and number of event participants—have been used as “proxies” for measures of outcomes. These proxies, which include increased awareness, better management and technical skills and stronger institutions, are used without any steps taken to measure—through objective third-party event participant surveys—if indeed these changes have taken place and if so to what degree among various target beneficiary groups. As a result, progress toward achieving the EG Program objective is imperfectly documented. Finding 5: USAID branding that emphasizes USAID’s role instead of that of local organizations has impeded the development of local identity which is crucial for capacity building and project effectiveness. USAID FORWARD identifies local capacity building as a core principle. Each project evaluation found lost opportunities to raise the visibility and credibility of key local and GODR institutions to build capacity due to the strict requirements for branding. The application of the USAID branding guidelines—or the failure to seek more frequent adjustments to those guidelines—has crowded out the opportunity of the supported organizations to create their own identity (one of the Program goals). This has implications for sustainability of the foundations and institutions strengthened as part of the projects. Finding 6: While each Project is created to strengthen an organization and to ensure sustainability of project interventions after assistance terminates, this organizational development work is not yet completed. Additional time is required for capacity building activities so that these organizations will be strong enough to function without USAID and/or other donor support. The following table summarizes the achievement that each project has attained in its corresponding organizational strengthening work. 4 Project Dominican Organization Achievements DR-CAFTA IP DICOEX Awarded the independent ISO 9001 certification for the Directorate in late 2009. DSTA Consejo Dominicano de Competitividad Turística (CDCT) Fully-registered, legal Dominican entity with staff RED Dominican Rural Economic Diversification Foundation (REDDOM) Fully-registered, legal Dominican entity with staff. The strengthening of an organization to assume the responsibility for Project activities is a sound development practice, as is creating foundations in order to institutionalize a Program objective. USAID has done this in many countries when the given institutional capacity was weak or non-existent. However, in some successful cases one necessary, but not sufficient, determinant of success was a USAID-provided endowment. 8 Except for DICOEX, which is a GODR Ministry of Commerce and Trade Directorate, there is little evidence that CDCT or REDDOM are yet close to being financially self-sufficient. Likewise, it does not appear to be realistic for USAID/DR to establish an endowment due to anticipated limited future program￾funding levels and also because programs such as PL-480, the disposal of USAID property, or local currency surpluses do not exist in the DR. Therefore, in order to be sustainable in the longer run, CDCT and REDDCOM will require continued USAID support, most likely beyond the period of DSTA and RED implementation, until they have the capacity to solicit and attract funds from other sources. CROSS-CUTTING RECOMMENDATIONS Overall Program Recommendation: USAID/DR should continue to focus its economic growth program on organizational strengthening as well as agricultural and tourism development. However, now USAID should adopt a strengthening strategy of “learning by doing” in the context of new USAID GCC (Global Climate Change) and FtF (Feed the Future) initiatives. In terms of achieving improved conditions for a more competitive Dominican Economy, the Program is at a critical moment in DR-CAFTA implementation. Many of the tariffs and prices that are protecting Dominican agriculture have only been marginally decreased to date. The substantial decreases are still to come. The evaluations of the three projects that make up the Program provide no evidence that the Dominican economy is prepared to be competitive when the tariffs are further reduced/removed. The projects that are currently being implemented under the Program should continue, with some modifications to increase their effectiveness as outlined in this section. Furthermore, in the medium-term, USAID should continue its Economic Growth Program. The need for rural economic diversification—particularly in its agriculture and tourism sectors—is clear, and the need for policy reform to meet local development needs continues. This need will only increase when the tariff barriers are further reduced. Furthermore, USAID’s contributions can and do 8 The lead author was the COP for the establishment of ACORDE in Costa Rica and part of a PACT program funded by USAID to do similar work in Guatemala, Peru, Bolivia, and Bangladesh. The team leader of the RED evaluation was the COP in Sri Lanka where a similar effort was made and observed it in Ecuador. 5 continue to complement and mutually reinforce other donors programs (such as the World and Inter-American Development Bank). Recommendation 1: USAID should continue to strengthen its implementation of the cluster approach through better integration and coordination across clusters. The cluster approach should remain a strategic tool for USAID/DR to foster in the future. USAID should require that the projects (DSTA and RED) undertake a cluster-by-cluster review to identify the bottlenecks to be addressed for achieving cluster income, employment and sustainability targets. If there is both an agricultural and tourism cluster in the same geographic area, then the effort should be to bring the stakeholders from the two clusters together in the same sessions to enhance awareness of each other’s interests and to specifically search for synergies so that they know each other’s problems and potentials. Importantly, cluster reviews should include GODR personnel to enhance the flow of information for cluster support needs from the public sector, such as more streamlined approval processes for operations. Recommendation 2: The three projects should develop and utilize opportunities to collaborate more effectively. The projects should make efforts to improve coordination and collaboration at the levels of public policy and public awareness. In the past, the DR Advantage campaign provided high level coordination of efforts to strengthen the Dominican economy and sought to raise the public’s awareness of these efforts. Utilizing DR Advantage as a reference point, USAID/DR should convoke the ministries, DICOEX, civil society, local cluster governance, the for-profit sector and business cooperative organizations to reflect on the accomplishments of the last five years in this area and determine priority areas for improving Dominican competitiveness in the coming years. The projects should take advantage of opportunities through trade groups and professional associations to collaborate across projects and communicate with other constituencies. The projects should continue to coordinate the Global Environmental Facility of the World Bank (GEF) and the IDB Proyecto Agrícola de Transición a la Competitividad (PACTA). The identification of common indicators to which two or more of the projects contribute is another mechanism for fostering coordination of activities at both the local and national levels. Recommendation 3: Build realistic timelines for USAID and GODR approvals into project design and annual implementation work plans. At USAID/DR, staffing should be increased and existing staff equipped to better respond to implementing partners’ requests for approvals at the technical levels. When projects have grant funds, the Mission should assess project capabilities to approve disbursements in comparison with the advance periods for funds. Avoidance of “option years” in future Mission contracting is also warranted to minimize disruption to implementation momentum. Resources might also be programmed to address areas where greater efficiencies in GODR approvals are required. Recommendation 4: Strengthen USAID/DR Technical Capabilities. USAID/DR should reinforce its staff with agricultural production, marketing professionals, and M&E expertise. An experienced development sociologist would greatly enhance program capabilities by providing insight into the overall socio-economic challenge faced by the Mission. Recommendation 5: M&E on future projects should have greater USAID guidance and support. As noted in the findings, the lack of strong monitoring and evaluation systems at the project level has diminished the ability to show change over time in outcomes. There are a variety of opportunities to improve this capacity in the future: 6  Utilize USAID/DR’s participation in the Chief Information Officer’s (CIO) Mission Portfolio Management System (MPMS) pilot project for building Mission technical skills and for appropriate M&E systems in funded projects.9  Require as a deliverable a system for data entry, analysis and reporting, concurrent with the project’s Performance Management Plan (PMP), into which field staff, trainers, and project managers can enter data.  Support implementing partners in connecting data to geographic information systems (GIS).  Build into project design sufficient resources for contracting externally—e.g., LAPOP survey so that a specific set of questions could be used to measure both citizen knowledge of and the results of the Program.10 Recommendation 6: USAID/DR should amend the projects’ branding plans to support the development of local identities which are important for sustainability and local capacity building. The USAID Branding rules and regulations provide examples of how to structure marking so that it does not take away from a development objective. An immediate action that can be taken when exercising the option years is to amend the branding implementation plan for each project. For example, if funding is provided for a tourist complex, the sign placed to announce the project should have some utility value other than saying it was funded by USAID. Commercial advertising and promotion strategies can be employed, and exceptions should be included in the revised branding implementation plans. In addition, as the projects enter their final year, books, pamphlets, and any printed matter should become products of the organization, and the USAID identity should be placed discretely so that the organization releasing the publication builds its own brand. Recommendation 7: USAID must reassess its strategy of establishing the foundations and identify specific and actionable plans for sustainability of the three primary project counterparts (DICOEX, CDCT, and REDDOM). Specific strategies for developing each organization are included in the individual evaluation reports. Generally, there are actions that USAID can consider immediately in order to increase the probability of success in the future of the CDCT and REDDOM foundations and the Ministry of Commerce’s DICOEX. USAID/DR should recognize that the CDCT and REDDOM foundations will not be able to do the considerable work that needs to be done to develop their respective clusters and simultaneously become financially independent in the remaining 12 or so months of DSTA and RED implementation. Both foundations need at least two to three years of organizational development to have adequate capabilities for fundraising and generating other revenue streams, e.g., membership dues and service fees. While organizational development assistance should continue through the fifth year of the projects’ implementation, USAID/DR should now put mechanisms in place for continuing support to CDCT, REDDOM and the clusters’ movement during the next USAID/DR 2013-2017 strategic planning period and to prepare the DSTA and RED projects for that transition. 9 USAID - Agency-wide, IT Transition 184-15-01-01-01-2022-00. “This would provide for development of interfaces between business systems and/or new tools that utilize data from one or more independent systems.” 10 The next LAPOP survey is planed for the first calendar quarter of 2012. (correspondence with Mitch Seligson, founder and director of LAPOP, July 2011) 7 Fortunately, USAID/DR will have access to funding that can be used to engage CDCT and REDDOM beyond the life of the current DSTA and RED projects. For example, anticipated GCC Initiative funds for “sustainable landscape” activities in the DR offer one such opportunity for USAID/DR to engage the CDCT as an implementing partner—and thus continue to build its organizational capacity—in support of nature tourism clusters around or in protected areas of vulnerable habitat where biodiversity is threatened. This effort should be carefully coordinated with the USAID-funded TNC-implemented Environmental Protection Program.11 In fact, the DR, with its clusters approach to sustainable (nature-based) tourism, can offer unique experiences to the GCC “sustainable landscapes” strategy. Similarly, USAID/DR can channel part or all of its Feed the Future (FtF) Initiative funding through REDDOM as an implementing partner to support development of producer clusters in low-income rural areas to improve their food security. In both cases, GCC and FtT funding can be used to launch the CDTC and REDDOM foundations on a self-sustaining trajectory by engaging them as implementing partners who will be “learning by doing.” 11 Environmental Protection Program Cooperative Agreement No. 517-A-00-09-00106-00. 8 I. INTRODUCTION The USAID/DR Tri-Project Evaluation is similar to other Agency multi-project evaluations that assess the performance of ongoing projects, review them as a program—in this case the Mission’s Economic Growth Office Program—and to make recommendations for future Mission Strategic Planning to advance EG Program goals. This genre of evaluation makes reference to a constellation of three projects12 forming the EG Program’s Strategic Objective (SO-1): “Increased sustainable economic opportunities for the poor by achieving improved conditions for a more competitive Dominican economy.” The three specific Project evaluations are presented in separate reports:  DR-CAFTA IP, implemented by Chemonics International, has as its goal strengthening GODR institutional capacity—particularly that of the Directorate of Foreign Trade and Trade Agreements Administration (DICOEX) in the Ministry of Industry and Commerce— to implement compliance under the trade treaty and to raise private sector awareness of its scope for changing the way of doing business under an open trade regime.  DSTA, implemented by the Academy for Educational Development (AED), has as its goal promoting sustainable tourism by support for the diversification of tourism offerings by clusters of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and community based organizations (CBOs) in and around rural protected areas using the cluster strategy with support from a new project-sponsored foundation, the Consejo Dominicano de Competitividad Turística (CDCT).  RED, implemented by Abt Associates, focuses on rural economic diversification using cluster strategy for area development. It too has an organizational development goal of a foundation, which is called the Dominican Rural Economic Diversification Foundation (REDDOM). Three projects made up the preceding EG Program:  Competitiveness Strategies for the Dominican Republic (1998-2000), which supported ongoing private sector initiatives in the DR.  Policies to Improve Competitiveness in the DR (June 2001-May 2003) was instrumental in the creation of the National Competitiveness Council (CNC for its Spanish name Consejo Nacional de Competitividad).  Competitiveness and Policy Project (CPP), which developed clusters in tourism and agriculture, and continued with the policy work begun under the task orders. Concurrently, the Environmental Protection Project (EPP) being implemented by The Nature Conservancy (TNC) is included in the evaluation report because it is a major EG Office Program component even though it was split off from the DSTA project. It works on issues of relevance both at the community and policy level for the program. The EPP was not evaluated, per se, but its scope of work, PMP, reports, and reported activities were studied as part of the integration or inter-project coordination theme. 12 Even though one or more of the implementing partners had a contract that was called a “Program”, in the text we refer to them as “Projects.” 9 A. DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE ADDRESSED BY THE PROGRAM AND THE PROJECTS EVALUATED The Economic Growth Program has been focused on assisting the public and private sectors of the DR to increase competitiveness by first taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) to export, and then to meet the increased competition with other nations as the DR-CAFTA is being implemented. USAID/DR concluded that assisting the DR in meeting these challenges required technical assistance in policy and regulation reform, strategies to diversify both tourism and agriculture, and technical assistance in value chain development to meet the quality demands of the U.S. and European markets. The organizational strategy used to implement the Program to meet the challenges became an organizational development challenge as well. The strategy was chosen to foster cluster development in tourism and agriculture as well as organizational development of a new government directorate. Managerially, the challenge for USAID/DR was to integrate the multi￾project program so that synergies would be generated vertically between policy and production, and horizontally between sectors and value chains forming the clusters. In brief, the Economic Growth Program faced multiple levels of development challenges, and they will be addressed. The working hypotheses used by each of the three projects are described in their respective reports. The working hypothesis of the Mission’s EG program can be stated as such, “If the program is well integrated, then the development of private enterprise and community based clusters and the strengthening of GODR entities charged with trade agreement compliance will be accomplished, the technical assistance to tourism and agriculture will be delivered, and the Dominican Republic will fully benefit from a free market paradigm as implemented in the context of the CBI and DR-CAFTA.” B. PROGRAM BACKGROUND: INTEGRATION THEME 1. FOUR INTEGRATING FRAMEWORKS There are four integrating frameworks that structure this Project. These are outlined below: 1. The first integrating framework for the three projects evaluated—DR-CAFTA IP, RED, and DSTA—maintains the common goal of increasing Dominican competitiveness, particularly with economic opportunities for the poor and low-income regions of the country, under a new, open trade regime introduced by participation in the DR-CAFTA. 2. The second integrating framework is the Portman-Bingaman arrangement that addresses the concern—voiced by New Mexico Senator, Jeff Bingaman—that the impact of the DR-CAFTA agreement would negatively impact what were termed sensitive crops and agricultural products and hence affect the wellbeing of the population. 13 Accordingly, the United States Government (USG) decided to provide an earmark for USAID/DR with $10 million per year for five years (2007 to 2012) to support projects that would generate alternative rural employment. The three projects evaluated and presented in separate reports benefitted in part from that special funding.14 3. A third integrating theme is that of fomenting and stimulating a national movement for the implementation of DR-CAFTA that brings together the public and private sectors. Although not 13 USAID/LAC. June 24, 2008. Indicators for Tracking the Impact of the Portman-Bingaman “Earmark” for the Dominican Republic. 14 Letter between Rob Portman (Executive Office of the President) and Senator Jeff Bingaman, 20 JUN 2005. 10 specifically stated as such in the documentation from the projects, the effort to bring together the sectors for discussion of priorities and the use of clusters rather than a narrower production chain strategy for organization leads one toward the concept of a broad movement. We take the title of a CPP report to name this the DR Advantage, or broad cluster strategy. 4. The fourth point of reference is the USAID draft PIP.15 It refers to the need to align USG and the Government of the Dominican Republic (GODR) efforts and goals. The acceptance of DR￾CAFTA is a transformational move on the part of the GODR because its implementation means a change in various aspects such as the way that governance is conducted and funded,16 the interaction between the public and private sectors, and the terms of trade with the rest of the world. Alignment of USG and GODR goals, and corresponding efforts to achieve those goals, has been over ten years in the making. 2. UNDERSTANDING OF STRUCTURE AND STYLE OF MANAGEMENT Governance in the Dominican Republic is hierarchical, centralized, and top-down in structure, with authority and responsibility seldom delegated. One of the transitional challenges under DR￾CAFTA, if the DR wishes to be competitive, is the need to delegate authority and create agile, decentralized, quick decision-making to support economic endeavors. The one-stop window for incorporation was an example of this transition. The transition for increased competitiveness requires both a social movement aspect (in which all sectors buy into the goal of a national agenda such as the DR Advantage), and also a reconfiguration into an organic structure and style of management for society and the economy that facilitates interaction across levels of business and governance instead of centralized, hierarchical decision-making. Another issue is stove-piping. In the USAID context, stove-piping is the consequence of a mechanical approach as well as within-project fixation on checking off process indicators instead of having results indicators that reflect inter-project synergies. These challenges to both the Dominican system and also the USAID system of management are discussed in terms of integration, and there are recommendations for facilitating integration throughout this special report. 3. THE INTEGRATION QUESTION THROUGH THE DECADE OF THE USAID/DR PROGRAM As noted briefly above, the USAID/DR program covered in the TRI-Project Evaluation has substantial background dating to the CBI in the 1990s. Two task orders under USAID’s Rural and Agricultural Incomes with a Sustainable Environment mechanism lead to the Competitiveness and Policy Program (CPP), and from the CPP’s three major components came the three programs evaluated. Because of the decade-long effort, a comprehensive description of the evolution of the USAID program is necessary to understand the complexity of an integrated approach to management and also the potential for synergies between the projects. The first Task Order (TO), Competitiveness Strategies for the Dominican Republic (1998-2000), supported ongoing private sector initiatives in the DR. The second TO, Policies to Improve Competitiveness in the DR (June 2001-May 2003), was instrumental in the creation of the 15 USAID preliminary draft July 2011. Parameters Identification Paper (PIP): USAID/Dominican Republic Country Development Cooperation Strategy 16 When the tariffs are reduced, aside from the loss of protection for the private sector, the public sector losses substantial funding. That loss of funding reduces the budgetary strength for health and education. Health and education have been and are substantial USAID commitments and continue to be so in the present draft PIP. From this perspective, in the short run, the USAID effort behind DR-CAFTA IP runs contrary to the USAID efforts for increased GODR effort in health and education. 11 National Competitiveness Council (CNC for its Spanish name Consejo Nacional de Competitividad). Work on these TOs formed some of the nation’s first cluster-based assessments of the sector needs and strategies that could be used to increase their competitiveness in preparation for the implementation of DR-CAFTA IP. Importantly, the analysis and the mobilization of the interested parties in the public and private sectors provided a framework for USAID/DR to use in the design of the CPP which developed clusters17 in tourism and agriculture and continued with the policy work. The findings in the final report18 on the CPP laid out the framework and objectives for the three projects evaluated: DR-CAFTA IP, DSTA, and RED. Figure 1 shows the chronology of these USAID efforts, including the foundations being developed at the time of this TRI-Project Evaluation. It also shows the changing structure and protracted nature of coordination for USAID/DR. The foundations will be discussed later. Figure 1: The Projects of the USAID/DR Economic Growth Program, 1998-2011 4. TIME HORIZON: TARIFFS AND SENSITIVE CROPS/PRODUCTS Because the DR-CAFTA and resulting USAID funding for the three projects was the basis for the program evaluated, evaluators expect that the original Bingaman concerns and the transition toward maximizing the opportunities and mitigating the challenges of the free trade agreement will take another decade to achieve its intended outcomes (e.g., improved livelihoods and employment opportunities in the rural areas as well as the diversification of agriculture and tourism for increased export earnings). 17 The CPP helped create six clusters in tourism (Romana-Bayahibe, Puerto Plata, Barahona, La Vega/Constanza, Samaná, and La Altagracia) and three in agriculture (La Vega horticulture, Jarabacoa coffee, and mangos in Baní and nationally). p. 2 Final CPP Report. 18 Chemonics. Promoting Competitiveness and Equity Dominican Republic Competitiveness and Policy Program: Final Report, USAID Contract No. 517-C-00-03-00110-00 December 2007. CNC IDB RED (2007-2012) Abt DSTA (2007-2012) AED CDCT DR-CAFTA IP (2007-2012) (Chemonics) Observatory Trade Dialogue REDDOM CAFTA TOURISM AGRI TNC – EPP (2008-2012) 1998 2011 USAID/Competitive Policy Program (2004-2007) 12 The following three graphs19 show the timeline from 2005 to 2025 to include the signing of DR￾CAFTA in 2007, the program LOE from 2007 to present, and 2025—when it is expected that the last protective tariffs on the sensitive crops/products will end.20 Figure 2: Tariffs on Grains - 2005 through 2025 19 The data was taken from Rubén D. Núñez, Ph.D. and Danilo Cruz De Paula. Feb 2007. DR-CAFTA: The Day After, A Layman’s Guide of What the Trade Agreement Means for the Dominican Republic. Chemonics International Inc. under Contract No. 517-C-00- 03-00110-00. Graphs by the author - Merschrod 20 It should be noted that a number of factors limit the timeliness of the information on these graphs – as there may have been more definitive studies since the work of Nuñez et al (2007), negotiations may have taken place, and tariff rate quotas that set limits to imports. TARIFFS - GRAINS 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 YEAR 1 = 2005 PERCENT Rice Beans Chickpea Project LEO 13 Figure 3: Tariffs on Dairy Products - 2005 through 2025 Figure 4: Tariffs on Meats - 2005 through 2025 The transition from the first competitiveness task order to the present three projects21 meant going from a single and relatively simple managerial task with one implementing partner and a 21 There are actually four projects when the TNC EPP is included. TARIFFS - DAIRY PRODUCTS 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 YEAR 1 = 2005 PERCENT Powdered Milk milk&Butter Cheese Project LEO MEAT TARIFF 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 YEAR PERCENT Beef Pork Cuts Chicken whole Project LEO 14 project officer to multiple implementing partners that required multiple-CTO oversight. At each stage the work to facilitate interaction and synergies between projects increased as did the technical expertise to assure relevant content. The envisioned transitions that will arrange for the non-profit organizations (CDCT and REDDOM) to carry on the projects will make the integration task even more difficult. As shown in figures 2–4 above, tariff protection has declined in varying amounts for some crops/products, and in others the pressure has not begun. Nevertheless, the pressure will continue, and the rationale for the Program is as relevant in 2011 as it was during the decade of USAID/DR programs, if not more so. The needed effort toward diversification of crops of export￾worthy quality has only begun. In the tourist area, the effort toward diversification and expansion of the tourist options from the major coastal and all-inclusive centers has also just begun. In summary, although DR-CAFTA has been signed, its full implementation still has a long time to play out.22 Follow-through is recommended in all three TRI-Project Evaluations, and in each project evaluation there are detailed recommendations for both short- and long-term efforts. C. GEOGRAPHY OF THE PROJECTS AND THE EVALUATIONS One of the important themes of the Program was the focus on populations and areas dependent on sensitive crops and agricultural products for their livelihoods. The RED project had produced a map of rice areas. The evaluation team had a GIS consultant add corn, bean and dairy areas added to that map, then insert layers for each program (DICOEX, RED, USAID/DSTA), as well as symbols showing where the TRI-Project Evaluation team had made field visits. Figure 5 presents this information.23 22 The USAID Program began with a task order in 1998, followed by a second task order in 2001, then by a project (Chemonics CPP) from 2003 to 2007 and then by the three projects being evaluated and also the TNC-EPP (2008). 23 The base map and all layers, including power point versions, were left with RED and USAID/DR. Printed maps similar to Map 1 were left with the Mission and also RED for future use. 15 Figure 5: Tri-Project Locations Overlay on Sensitive Crops/Products 16 D. PURPOSE OF THE INTEGRATED REPORT The intended audience for the Evaluation is largely USAID/DR. This Integrated Report examines how the three projects noted above have and can mutually reinforce each other; proposes foundations for new interventions to address new GCC and FtF Presidential Initiatives while achieving the overall objective of competitive and (environmentally) sustainable economic opportunities and livelihoods for poverty eradication in the DR in the context of DR-CAFTA; and highlights overarching lessons learned and best practices that can be mutually shared among the three project implementers and counterparts as well as implementers and counterparts in other parts of the USAID/DR assistance portfolio. The scope of work in the RFTOP stated ten questions24 to be addressed by the TRI-Project Evaluation team. The last three questions, based on the work of the three evaluation teams and the Team Leader’s assessment and evaluation, are the focus of this special or overall report: 1. Overall, what have been the strengths (and the weaknesses) of the programs comprising these three projects? 2. Based on the experience of the three projects evaluated, in which areas is USAID assistance most urgently needed? 3. What opportunities are there for increased coordination of activities, initiatives, and collaboration across these three projects? Are there common activities across the three projects that would enhance the Economic Growth Program portfolio? Because the integration aspects inherent in the apparent hypothesis are a key concern, we will begin with a Program background analysis to answer all three questions. In addition, the purpose is to provide short-term advice for the fifth-year extensions and recommendations for preparing the new strategic plan. II. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY This is a Performance Evaluation as per the 2011 USAID evaluation guidelines and includes a substantial Theory of Change component. Through the evaluation, the evaluators reflect upon the Program’s original assumptions, strategies, working hypotheses, apparent working hypothesis, and implied theory. Substantive findings and recommendations are made to provide USAID/DR with options for the new Strategic Objective and the continuation of the Economic Growth Program. Each of the three projects was evaluated by a team consisting of an experienced leader in the field and a related specialist. The following methodologies were used to evaluate each project:  DR-CAFTA IP: Project and GODR documents were reviewed; interviews were conducted with key personnel in DICOEX and related GODR entities as well as the private sector; event participants’ evaluations were analyzed.  RED & DSTA: Clusters were sampled for geographic coverage and thematic coverage (e.g., types of tourism and agricultural clusters). In each cluster, key informants within and related to the clusters were interviewed, documentation was reviewed, and site visits were made to assess the project impacts in communities and associations. In all 24 Questions # 8, 9, and 10, p.7 of Attachment I “Statement of Work”. RFTOP-SOL-517-11-000002. 17 three evaluations, USAID and implementing partner personnel were interviewed multiple times. Information for this Integrated Report was collected in the following ways:  Preliminary and follow-up interviews with the implementing partners and their monitoring and evaluation (M&E) personnel;  A review of background documentation on all three projects in the Mission program, a current related project, previous projects, and task orders;25  Periodic debriefings with evaluation team members on their findings. Their presentations to the Mission, findings, and recommendations were reviewed and discussed;  Site visits to talk with implementers and participants;  Interviews with Contracting Officers Technical Representatives (COTRs)  Sharing drafts of this report with the team leaders for their critique and feedback. The design of this evaluation was the first deliverable to the Mission. After a review of the background documents and dialogue with mission personnel and project implementers, the design was presented and discussed with the Mission. The sampling and evaluation approach was then discussed with the implementers and sampling adjusted accordingly. III. ANALYSIS OF FINDINGS Figure 1 presented the organizational evolution of the program. It is a graphic representation of the steady course that the Mission held for over twelve years in its goal of increased opportunities, generation of employment, and support for the implementation of DR-CAFTA. It is a representation of both the evolving complexity faced by management in search of maximizing potential synergies between the projects as well as the scaling up of the program. In this chapter we will first present the overall accomplishment of the Program to highlight that it is a substantial, positive result of the decade-long Economic Growth Program of USAID/DR. Furthermore, although the findings are critical of the implementation of the program, they and the recommendations are made with the intent of being constructive and in support of the program. The second part provides the critical analysis behind the major findings. Both parts answer question 11 from the Tri-Project Evaluation Scope of Work: “What opportunities are there for increased coordination of activities, initiatives, and collaboration across these three projects? Are there common activities across the three projects that would enhance the Economic Growth Program portfolio?” This report examines the coordination between the three projects, the integration on the broad array of public sector and private sector institutions, and USAID efforts related to those linkages and the USAID goal of assuring alignment with the GODR’s National Development Strategy (NDS).26 Part of the analysis involves social organizational theory, most of which was espoused in project documents but not made explicit in them. These sections will make that explicit in 25 The original RFPs, the technical proposals, PMPs, quarterly and annual reports, grants manual, special reports and a RIF report. The complete list is in the reference annex. 26 National Development Strategy (NDS), 2010 Twenty year goals 18 order to provide the Mission with a framework that should be useful for the next Strategic Plan and also to provide a vision for integrated management of the program. A. OVERALL ACCOMPLISHMENTS 1. SCALING UP IN PERSPECTIVE From the initial task orders to the projected end of the three projects’ implementation periods in 2012, USAID has committed approximately $58.6 million. Related funding by the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is slightly less than three times that amount.27 One perspective is that the Program started off as a small and focused pilot project. Based on those pilot tests of the cluster concept, the EG Program was scaled up to become a national effort to support the changes that would help implement DR-CAFTA and the broad cluster movement. Another perspective is that, against the small and focused beginning, the context is DR-CAFTA. It is a framework that will restructure the economy and change the culture of business and governance. Although not stated in so many words in the documentation, restructuring should be seen in terms of new and changed multipliers in an input-output table of the economy. It should be expected that the econometric model of the Dominican Republic, if there were one, will have substantially different coefficients in the medium to long term. That is the goal—which represents a major task. The USAID/DR Economic Growth Program has been, in part, a demonstration effort, and also a practical change effort of processes toward the final goal of restructuring. Evidence in the scaling up is found in the expansion from the pilot clusters in 2000 to the few in the CPP, to nine tourism clusters in DSTA, and the 11 agricultural clusters in RED. In the policy area, the Mission continued with the CBI perspective of access to U.S. markets to support negotiating the chapters of the DR-CAFTA to organizational strengthening of agencies charged with implementing that regional trade agreement. The recommendations by the evaluators support continued scaling up through greater area coverage, organizational development, and specific technical assistance so that the public and private sectors are able to interact, implement, and thus take advantage of DR-CAFTA. 2. ACHIEVEMENTS COMPARED WITH TARGETS Each of the project evaluations assessed the achievements compared to the targets set in the PMPs to the extent possible with the data available from the projects. In general, the conclusions were that the project implementers did achieve those targets. The overarching or cross-cutting comment on monitoring and evaluation is that the indicators were mostly input and output indicators, and not results indicators in line with the working hypotheses of the projects and the organizational development of clusters or agencies. The individual evaluators reconstructed scales of organizational development or detailed assessments of each cluster in order to describe those achievements. 27 The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) is financing several programs to improve the business environment, foster diversification and enhance competitiveness in the Caribbean. Since 2006, the IDB has approved US$180 million in policy-based loans in the Dominican Republic, which support measures to improve the country’s macroeconomic and fiscal stability, improve the business climate, promote the development of productive sectors and foster greater innovation and investment in research and development. (BIBA, Improving the business climate in the Caribbean, Wed. Mar 30, 2011). “The Santiago regional and cluster projects are intended to serve as pilot projects that could be used to promote regional and cluster development in the DR.” Antonio Rodriguez Mansfield. 2000, p.1 19 The development of the agencies in the case of DICOEX and the clusters in the case of DSTA and RED is best described as a work in progress and a substantial advancement, and has built a foundation worthy of continuation. The remainder of this chapter refers to the first finding that integration and mutual reinforcement has been negligible. The conclusion is that there has been vertical discontinuity , stove-piping, and disintegration when compared to the previous stage of the USAID/DR program. There are five sections of analysis to support the finding. B. CRITICAL ANALYSIS 1. LOST VISION The Evaluation found that the vision of the social and economic organization of the future was the broad integrated cluster concept symbolized by the DR-Advantage. However, along the way, as the Program was implemented through individual project contracts, this vision was lost. In spite of the contractual obligations, the projects were not integrated and, with notable exceptions, project personnel did not coordinate activities so that geographical overlap would provide synergies to bring about greater local multipliers. For example, in the case of RED, coordination with relevant organizations previously supported by USAID/DR were not involved, e.g. Junta Agroempresarial Dominicana (JAD) and Centro para el Desarrollo Agropecuario y Forestal (CEDAF). RED had policy-related problems, with an example being the formation of rural organizations. DSTA had policy-related issues with the Environment Ministry (e.g., the formation of associations and protected area concessions), but they were not dealt with until TNC split off from DSTA to create the TNC-EPP. The evaluation of DR-CAFTA IP found that DICOEX and the DR-CAFTA IP did not take advantage of the network of producer and trade associations’ capacity to reach a large and interested population. The significance of this capacity lies in the associations’ specific means of communication— meetings, trade newsletters, and workshops. It is also in their solidarity and ability to discuss issues and then to mobilize around their interests. In order for the Program to support the broad cluster vision, the projects need to establish the linkages between these associations horizontally and with the government agencies vertically. 2. DISINTEGRATION Disintegration most clearly manifested in the AED-administered DSTA project, where the Mission, in its effort to cope with the dysfunctional DSTA management, encountered the following issues:  TNC (a consortium member of DSTA) split off with a five-year, $12million cooperative agreement (TNC-EPP)28 that effectively ended TNC’s input and coordination with DSTA on the crucial task of community based tourism and protected areas. The tourism development plans29 and environmental concerns were left to DSTA to implement instead of following through with each community.  Another consortium member, SOLIMA, was frustrated with the dysfunctional consortium and USAID/DR agreed with their departure. Unfortunately, SOLIMAR’s role was supposed to be marketing, and a replacement for that role was never found. 28 Cooperative Agreement No. 517-A-00-09-00106-00 Environmental Protection Program (TNC-EPP) 29 TNC. Nov/Dic. 2009 Reporte de Seguimiento Ambiental a los Proyectos Destinos. Programa USAID-DSTA, Componente Conservación y Ambiente. And Interview with Eddy Silva of TNC July 2011. 20  The Mission, as a strategy for “Dominicanizing” the Program for the future, also supported the formation of a new foundation, CDCT, which would become one of the products of the DSTA cooperative agreement (similar to REDDOM in the case of RED). That effort split the DSTA team into antagonistic groups, and although the establishment of the CDCT became part of the DSTA workplan, it was not met with enthusiasm on the part of AED. Disintegration reinforced the stove-piping within the projects as each consortium pursued its own interests and focused on achieving its particular contracted benchmarks. 3. VERTICAL DISCONTINUITY DR-CAFTA IP was truncated by a USAID administrative misunderstanding by RED and DSTA. That is, it was clearly stated that RED and DSTA should not be involved in policy as some project leaders did not believe that it was part of the SOW.30 Nevertheless, the needs of the participants in the two latter projects could have been used by the projects through DR-CAFTA IP to inform policy and regulation changes. Yet, neither project linked the policy aspects in spite of the fact that coordination was in their SOW, as will be shown below. The DR-CAFTA IP evaluators found that when it came to the implementation of the chapters of DR-CAFTA, the public-private dialogue seemed to be one-way—DICOEX and other agencies were telling the private sector the way things should be and not getting feedback on what the private sector needed in order to function effectively under a new set of domestic rules generated by DR￾CAFTA IP compliance. A solution to this one-way street is offered in the recommendations section. 4. COORDINATION: A KNOWN MISSION CHALLENGE The final CPP report indicates that the Mission had asked for suggestions for the post-2007 Strategic Objective. That report suggested the division of what was previously three CPP components into three projects. When the Mission accepted this approach, they created the need for integration mechanisms because, whereas before there had been one contractor managing the three areas under CPP, now the Mission had to coordinate and facilitate the integration of three contractors. The need to coordinate was not lost on the Mission as shown by the following examples. 1. In the RFTOP for the project that became RED, the Mission had integration expectations: The project is expected to work in tandem with the ongoing and planned USAID development activities to the maximum extent possible, particularly the DR-CAFTA IP and the DSTA Project as well as all other rural economic diversification projects financed by the GODR and other donors, especially the SEA-IDB-funded Proyecto Agrícola de Transición a la Competitividad (PATCA)31 Project and the CNC-IDB Competitiveness Project. 32 30 Interviews with RED CEO and DSTA personnel, July 2011. 31This project will be funded through the Foreign Assistance Objective Economic Growth under the Program Area of Agriculture. The subsequent Program Element that will be addressed is Agricultural Productivity. The Foreign Assistance Framework can be found online at: http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/79748.pdf. More information regarding the Foreign Assistance Reform, Framework and Objective, Program Areas, Program Elements and Sub Element definitions can be found at: http://www.state.gov/f/reform/ 32 USAID Request for Task Order Proposal Number: 517-07-007 SEP 2007, p.2, 3) 21 2. The SOW for DR-CAFTA mentioned an Inter-Institutional Project Steering Committee33 to give key public and private sector partners a true voice in guiding the project, and expressed that “close coordination with stakeholders, donors, and other USAID programs will be a hallmark of this project.” 34 3. RED: “USAID may identify potential coordination activities as part of its responsibilities in this area; however, the Contractor shall explore opportunities to coordinate with other donor projects and suggest to USAID potential areas for collaboration.”35 “This Task Order comprises a range of activities, counterparts and participants and therefore requires significant coordination and organization to ensure coherence and consistency.”36 4. DSTA Award: Recognizing the inherent interrelatedness of and anticipated synergy with the forthcoming Rural Economic Growth Program (REDP), the GSTA/DR Team (Global Sustainable Tourism Alliance) will actively seek to coordinate all program activities and initiatives. As such, the GSTA will propose convening quarterly meetings (at a minimum or perhaps more frequently at the outset) with representatives of the REDP staff and USAID/DR personnel to ensure effective coordination, reduce redundancy of efforts, and maximize development impact. The GSTA staff will also routinely coordinate efforts with the staff of the Investment Fund for Environmental Protection (FIPA) until the end of FY 2008.37 Mirroring the coordination efforts with the REDP mentioned above, the GSTA/DR Team will establish a similar working relationship with the future contractor for the DR-CAFTA Environmental Policy initiative, given the considerable impact that continued development and likely expansion of nature-based tourism will have on the Dominican environment.38 This last quotation brings us back to the Vertical Discontinuity section above, i.e., the truncated implementation-policy linkage. Interviews with key personnel in USAID/DR and affiliated with the projects confirmed that, aside from a few early meetings and some intensive attempts to facilitate coordination between the members of the DSTA partners as it was disintegrating, neither the implementing partners nor the USAID CTOs facilitated coordination. 5. MISSED OPPORTUNITIES As is pointed out in the separate RED evaluation, the go-it-alone approach led to a lack of research and development to identify new products that could be competitively grown by 33 SOW for DR-CAFTA IP, Sec. C.4. Task 1 34 TASK Order EEM-I-00-07-000. Section C. Objectives 35 USAID Request for Task Order Proposal (RFTOP) Number: 517-07-007 Under the Plus Indefinite Quantity Contract, 2007 RAISE. p.14 36 USAID Request for Task Order Proposal (RFTOP) Number: 517-07-007 Under the RAISE Plus Indefinite Quantity Contract, 2007. p. 3 of Attachment II. 37 GSTA Award No. 517-A-00-07-00105-00, Sep. 2007. sec. 7 of part I under F. Cross-cutting Issues and Key Considerations. 38 GSTA Award No. 517-A-00-07-00105-00, Sep. 2007 sec. 8 of part I under F. Cross-cutting Issues and Key Considerations, 22 farmers in sensitive crop areas, e.g., bitter orange or Hass avocados in the Lomas de Cabrera￾Dajabon region, and shitake mushrooms in the pine/oak forested areas in the center of the island. The DR-CAFTA IP evaluation also noted analogous missed opportunities, and described them as leveraging producer and trade association capacity: Trade association representatives interviewed indicated their dismay that DICOEX—and the project, by implication—did not recognize the information sources—meetings, trade newsletters, workshops etc.—that could be venues for the inclusion of a “unit”—a two￾hour, half-day, or full-day—that addresses DR-CAFTA IP concerns of particular interest to their membership. Trade and producer association representatives claimed willingness to make their communications organs and meeting venues available for sharing relevant DR-CAFTA IP information. All of the findings stated above point toward a major cross-cutting theme—horizontal and vertical linkages. The next section examines this theme in greater detail. IV. OVERARCHING RECOMMENDATION: A STRATEGY FOR BUILDING THE BROAD CLUSTER Integration has been the main challenge for implementing the apparent development hypothesis of the program. Going forward, additional actions are necessary to overcome this challenge. Using the DR-Advantage (2007) as a reference document, the Program should convoke the original parties and new actors to a review of the last five years. Methodology for such a convention or workshop should use the neutral table, that is, an objective third party to convoke the members of the broad cluster for a facilitated discussion of accomplishments and priorities for accomplishing the goals. It is suggested that ministries, DICOEX, civil society, local cluster governance, the for-profit sector from the RED and DSTA clusters, and the business and cooperative associations be represented by thought leaders and actively interested personnel. Techniques such as Appreciative Inquiry should be used to highlight accomplishments of the last five years and the priority areas for increasing DR capacity and competitiveness. In the meanwhile, cluster-by-cluster internal review and strategic planning should be conducted using, again, the neutral table format and Appreciative Inquiry as a style of conducting the review of accomplishments, and to identify the bottlenecks that need to be broken to achieve the goals of the cluster. The facilitators of the neutral table should keep in mind that the objective, aside from identifying the specific accomplishments and needs of the cluster, is to develop the linkages among cluster members and the organizational development of the cluster as an area organization. If the given cluster has periodic meetings, then this process should be built onto these meetings to reinforce the importance of the cluster. If both an agricultural cluster and a tourism cluster are operating in the same geographic area, then the effort should be to bring the two clusters together in the same sessions to increase awareness of each other’s interests and to search for specific synergies so that they know each other’s problems and potentials. People from the Ministry should be incorporated to enhance the vertical integration and flow of information. Program-wise, all four projects should be facilitating and participating in each of these processes; participation should be a project responsibility because the interaction will both inform planning and, importantly, build linkages between project personnel and also between 23 project personnel and cluster leaders. The Program should include ministry functionaries with the purpose of establishing important vertical linkages so that local issues can inform policy, and local personnel and leaders can know who to contact in the public and private sectors. The eyes of the Program should be focused on the broad cluster, DR Advantage vision. This whole approach should feed into the USAID/DR planning process for the medium-term and then inform the design of the follow-on projects that will make up the SO-1 program. In summary, the highlights of the social organizational theory, found in the original program documents, shaped a social and economic movement of public-private partnership by using participatory planning (be it WSR or the process for the DR Advantage) as a means to build horizontal and vertical linkages between sectors, agencies and organizations. The collective challenge and vision of opportunities was DR-CAFTA. Major components of the projects included capacity building in the technical sense to meet the challenges, and take advantage of the opportunities, in DR-CAFTA. This has been the theory of change aspect of this evaluation. This chapter will highlight the components of the theory of social action found in the Program as the means to program integration. A. THE BROAD CLUSTER CONCEPT: PART OF A SOLUTION The term cluster is used in both the DSTA and RED strategies; the previous project (CPP), which included most of the components of the three projects evaluated here, used the term cluster as synonymous with public-private partnerships. The concept was attributed to Michael Porter's work in the 1970s, and many development organizations (such as Chemonics International)39 used the term as an expansion of the production chain framework so that the public arena, such as public policy and regulation related to private production, would be explicit. Cluster application and the development of clusters also brought into play the concept and theory of social capital40 which, if not in name, goes back to the participatory development and planning techniques of the 1970s. The broad cluster term used in the title of this chapter can be understood from program documentation and field observations. B. STARTING A MOVEMENT: CLUSTER USE AND DEFINITION IN USAID DOCUMENTATION The creation of a movement and the cluster concept can be seen in the evolution of the USAID program from task orders in 199841 and 2001,42 as well as the CPP (2003 - 2007). The project implementer facilitated the integration of the central government policy role with two specific sectors (agriculture and tourism) as a strategy for adjusting to, and preparing for, opportunities afforded by the DR-CAFTA IP commitment. This is the broad cluster concept, i.e., combined public-private sector effort to achieve a national goal. In this case the goal is to be more competitive internationally. That goal was and is in alignment with the USAID/DR strategic objective. More importantly, the broad cluster concept includes the conscious social and economic mobilization of people and Dominican organizations of all types in a national agenda. The use of and comprehension of new vocabulary is necessary for mobilization; the cluster vocabulary is a small part of that and is an important result of the USAID/DR program to date. 39 Chemonics executed the CPP (2003-2007) and prior to that two task orders before assuming the DR-CAFTA IP project evaluated here. They used the production chain and cluster terminology in many other parts of the world. The author’s experience of their use of the concept includes Peru and Colombia. 40 “Social capital” consists of linkages, mechanism for discussion and contestation (pluralism), and the solidarity of the group, cluster, or nation. C.f. Merschrod (2008), A Sociology: the Dynamics of Collectivities 41Competitiveness Strategies for the Dominican Republic (1998-2000) 42Policies to Improve Competitiveness in the DR (June 2001-May 2003) 24 The Mission has consistently stated the goal of a comprehensive movement in various ways, e.g. in the description43 of The USAID Mission’s Strategic Objective No. 1 (SO1): Increase the Number of Policies Adopted that Promote Good Governance for Sustainable Economic Growth in the Dominican Republic, we find: Consensus building around the direction of reforms and enhanced citizen participation in the decision-making process will be vital to the successful implementation of new policies in a fully democratic system. This result will be supported by the reform of key economic policies and by changing public and private sector mindsets on economic and social policies. USAID will also support policy reform through workshops and seminars with civil society participation to refine policy reform proposals and build consensus for their approval. The Competitiveness Group, formed in 1997 as part of the USAID support for a national competitiveness strategy, held a series of workshops and in 1999 was described as follows: The Group’s slogan has been DR-Advantage and it has promoted a positive outlook of the country’s future and the belief that with vision and determination the Dominican Republic can become a net winner in the global economy. The concept of cluster was an interesting one to listen to among the people in communities, the producers and implementing project personnel, and was also interesting to read about in the project documents. One woman described it as a cooperative; the directress of a technical school said that any and all organizations with a common interest are members of a cluster (in that case a common interest in a river and waterfall); local business owners admitted that a cluster was like a chamber of commerce except that it had more focus; and another defined it as the unification of the people for a common good. As found in the documentation from 1998 onward, and as we heard in the field, the folk definition of clusters goes beyond the production chain focus and includes the role of civil society and government. The concept has been incorporated into the vernacular and that is an important accomplishment of the USAID program. The DR-CAFTA IP needs a popular understanding of the Broad Cluster concept as part of its comprehensive movement toward competitiveness and implementation. Keeping in mind the semantics of the broad cluster concept and the idea that both USAID/DR and the GODR in its NDS have been promoting a vision and a movement, we now turn to the finding and recommendation for fomenting that movement. It is necessary to take into account the evolution of the structure and management style mentioned previously because changing from a mechanically organized structure to a broad-based movement with ample participation requires facilitation with those organizational development concepts in mind as goals. C. FACILITATING THE MOVEMENT: THE NEXT STEPS The CPP final report (2007) indicated the need to have the broader cluster perspective that promoted public-private linkages and, more importantly, suggested the type of facilitation needed in the socio-political context: 43Policies to Improve Competitiveness in the Dominican Republic, 2006, p.1 25 Policy reform initiatives require local champions to provide follow through, from consultant studies to actual reforms. Identifying local champions prior to initiating activities ensures that there will be the necessary follow-up. CPP success in policy reform initiatives, such as many of the DR-CAFTA-related reforms, competition policy, and free zone reform, has been based on these partnerships. (p. 57) An independent, trusted institution is essential to broker and promote public￾private sector partnerships. 44 The CPP’s work of informing, growing, and developing cluster programs demonstrated the need for an independent, nongovernmental broker among stakeholders, including between the private sector and communities, and the private and public sectors, to resolve or soften their differences. A government institution may not always have the political space to assume this role.45 In the CPP’s case, cluster technicians took on this role, with leadership from the chief of party. The fact that the CPP was not a Dominican institution, and had no clear stake in particular outcomes, was often of considerable benefit. In the future, such an institution should be Dominican. And if so, it must be highly respected, led by senior Dominicans from the private sector and civil society, and deemed to be above the fray by cluster stakeholders. (p. 58) In closing, support of the broad cluster movement is necessary because it is and will be the enabling environment46 that can reasonably be expected to contribute to the USAID overall Economic Growth Objective. V. USAID/DR ASSISTANCE MOST URGENTLY NEEDED In this chapter we focus on the overarching recommendations that the Mission should address for the continuity of the Program and that will help prepare for the immediate future. This is in answer to evaluation question #9 in the SOW: “Based on the experience of the three projects evaluated, in which areas is USAID assistance most urgently needed?” A. FACILITATION OF THE BROAD CLUSTER CONCEPT It is urgent that the Mission focus on the organizational theory that it supported in the early projects and use the strategies and techniques that had been in use (as described in the section above Overarching Recommendation-A Strategy for Building the Broad Cluster) to pull the Program together. This would not only save the USAID/DR investment to date, but it would provide the details of the priorities that exist in the Dominican governance system and the clusters so that the new strategic plan will be aligned with those priorities and with the FtF and GCC priorities of USAID. 44 This is known as offering a “neutral table.” It is a style of facilitation. DAI used this in the Bangladesh Anti-corruption project that the author evaluated in 2011; it is used in conflict resolution contexts. C.f Pottebaum, David, Christopher Lee. 2007. In Control of Their Future; Community-led Reconciliation and Recovery. 16 April 2007. (Original version presented at the WIDER Conference on AID: Principles, Policies and Performance. 16-17 June 2006); and for Coastal Zone management involving public and private interests (Merschrod, K. In Search of a Strategy for Coastal Zone Management in the Third World: Notes from Ecuador, Coastal Management, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1988.) 45 This issue is described in the DR-CAFTA IP evaluation. DICOEX , as a Sub-secretariat was struggling because of its position in the hierarchy. It complained that it did not have the rank or stature to open the doors of ministers. 46 See Slocum and Merschrod (2002) for a discussion of enabling environments in the USAID context, http://www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNACQ156.pdf 26 Both policy and activity synergies should come from this facilitated convention (convocación). For example, REDDOM and clusters should bring policy and policy implementation issues from project participants to the table. The facilitation should identify the best Dominican policy dialogue group to take up the issue, and out of the meetings a strategic alliance or working group should form to solve the problem. CDCT and TNC-EPP have policy issues to work on with the Ministries. DR-CAFTA IP has an interesting structural, hierarchical problem that can be alleviated by a change in the style of management through a reaffirmation of the broad cluster during the facilitation of the workshop proposed. As pointed out in the DR-CAFTA IP evaluation: In too many cases--DICOEX in the MIC and OCTA in the MAG, for example— administrative levels are too far down the scale of authority to enable entities to make and keep commitments for mutual DR-CAFTA IP implementation support. For example, DICOEX can only encourage participation in critical training events and meetings regarding implementation of a particular DR-CAFTA IP chapter, but it cannot enforce involvement from other GODR entities. The strategy of the broad cluster workshop would be to facilitate vertical communication and to build support for the commitments so that DICOEX does not need the power to enforce involvement. Instead, the whole enabling structure of the broad cluster would pressure the system to make the needed changes. This may seem idealistic, but the power for enforcement through an extensive policing bureaucracy is both fiscally impossible and the antithesis of the decentralized enabling environment sought. B. THE PROBABILITY OF THE FOUNDATIONS’ SUCCESS In response to evaluation questions, strategies were recommended for the economic sustainability of REDDOM and CDCT, and a cautionary note was made with regard to other USAID foundation-creating efforts in other counties. The endowment strategy was held up as one of the needed components for building successful foundations. Here we will address an additional perspective—the professional and staffing needs for fundraising. When reviewing the foundations we did not find mention of this need. Although the goal of the program has been to create self-sustaining foundations to carry on the project functions and to pursue the project goals, it needs to be pointed out that, in doing so, the Mission is adding to each entity a responsibility that requires a skill set that is crucial and yet has not been part of the projects because it has been the responsibility of the consulting firm (AED, Abt, Chemonics). That is, fundraising, proposal writing, grantsmanship, networking to identify funding sources, and so forth all form what is sometimes called development or donor relations. In addition to the talent, it should be pointed out that consulting firms spend hundreds of thousands of dollars per year, sometimes per proposal, when responding to RFPs published by USAID. These functions are carried out by experienced and skilled staffs who constantly comb donor agencies worldwide seeking new business. In the local NGO world,47 when funds are low or projects are about to end, the whole team then takes time out from their activities to put together proposals. Usually, the director or the entrepreneurial person who created the organization is constantly watching for funding opportunities and networking to gather 47 The INGOs (international Non-profit, private, non-governmental organizations) operate and for all intents and purposes are structured similar to the for-profit consulting firms. That is, specialized fund-seeking staff. 27 information. In the absence of an endowment, these foundations will have to develop and staff the fundraising skills necessary for self-sustainability. Among the various recommendations by the RED evaluation team, it was noted that those fundraising strategies need a set of skills not found in the projects. In the case of CDCT those fundraisings skills were also needed. It is urgent that USAID/DR consider its options because it is not probable that the foundations will be able to do the considerable work that needs to be done to develop the clusters and, simultaneously, go through the organizational development needed to become independent from USAID funding and to generate new business in the next 18 months. They will, however, need at least two to three years of organizational development in fundraising and proposal writing to generate an income stream to support the work begun as projects. Can USAID fund that organizational development? If the Mission cannot fund the organizational development of these foundations, then it would be better to continue a goal entailing that the foundations be partners with local or international firms that will concern themselves with the competition for funds while DSTA and REDDOM focus on the technical services delivery in their respective cluster areas. That would be a model of partnership whereby international consulting firms, when bidding on USAID or other donor projects, include the foundations as partners. This is not uncommon and when doing so exclusive commitment is not practiced. Indeed, USAID missions have made it explicit that these partners can be included in responses to RFPs on a non-exclusive basis. Still, it is important and urgent that the strategy for sustainability be realistic and clearly part of the fifth-year extensions. C. DECISION ON THE FIFTH-YEAR EXTENSIONS From the initial mid-term briefings through the final drafts presented, all three project evaluators point out the urgency for a decision regarding an extension for the fifth year. The decision and the commitment for the fifth-year extensions are needed to avoid the loss of personnel and momentum. Uncertainty regarding the decision causes personnel loss and, without a commitment (contract and approved budget), the projects cannot promote and schedule the first activities that would be carried out during the new year. D. MONITORING AND EVALUATION: STUDIES AND RESEARCH Although studies and research will probably invoke a visceral reaction at this stage of the Program and in a context of urgency, the evaluators of the three projects have pointed out basic areas that need, and have needed, attention. This information need is presented here because this kind of research would provide immediate focus, as the evaluators of DR-CAFTA IP and RED have pointed out as noted below:  DR-CAFTA IP—It was noted that there were “Incompatibilities between DR-CAFTA IP compliance scheduling and USAID/DR development assistance programming. The schedule and structure—by industry and trade area—for DR-CAFTA IP compliance introduces for the DR-CAFTA IP a set of support priorities that differ from those priorities in the USAID Mission economic growth strategy.” The research called for would be to identify the order of compliance needs and to use that order to plan project support. The research called for is not esoteric and may be revealed as easily as an examination of the tariff figures presented in this report or the proposed broad cluster strategic planning. 28  RED—There is a need for searches for new agricultural crops that might be grown successfully to take advantage of the DR-privileged access to U.S. or European markets. Again, this is not a complex chore because actual imports by country are available to compare with DR ecological possibilities. The window markets are also known, and by linking to the brokers and exporters in both the DR and abroad, this information would be obtained. On future projects, USAID should provide greater guidance and support for monitoring and evaluation. The evaluators found that there was a general lack of strong monitoring and evaluation systems at the project level. This diminished the ability to show change over time in outcomes. There are several initiatives underway that may improve this capability in the future. USAID/DR has signed up to participate in the Chief Information Officer’s (CIO) Mission Portfolio Management System (MPMS) pilot project.48 This pilot project should increase the awareness of the need for in-Mission technical skills and for appropriate M&E systems in funded projects. Ideally, those systems should generate data for importation to the Mission MPMS. The Mission should require as a deliverable, at the same time as the project’s Performance Management Plan (PMP), a system for data entry, analysis and reporting into which field staff, trainers, and project managers can enter data. The draft Parameters Identification Paper (PIP) mentions the need for a geographic focus. Databases linked to a geographic information system (GIS) have been the standard in some USAID missions because, as in the case of the DR, the focus is on overlaying specific crops. The evaluations of the three projects developed a map (see Figure 5) that showed sensitive crops and the location of the three projects to illustrate the overlay of the projects and the crops of interest. This is the kind of geographic information that should be integral to M&E for USAID/DR. From a broader M&E scope, USAID should conduct a LAPOP survey49 so that a specific set of questions could be used to measure citizen knowledge of, and the results of, the Program. The sample design could include a rural and urban focus, and it should also have a geographic stratification related to the major areas of sensitive crops. Cluster area sampling might be too expensive but should be explored.50 The transition from the first competitiveness task order to the present three projects51 meant going from a single and relatively simple managerial task with one implementing partner and a project officer to multiple implementing partners that required multiple-CTO oversight. At each stage, the effort to facilitate interaction and synergies between projects increased, as did the technical expertise to assure relevant content. The envisioned transitions to the non-profit organizations (CDCT and REDDOM) to carry on the projects will make the integration task even more difficult. Nevertheless, these recommendations will help the Mission to re-establish momentum and guide the Program for the next five years. 48 USAID - Agency-wide, IT Transition 184-15-01-01-01-2022-00. “This would provide for development of interfaces between business systems and/or new tools that utilize data from one or more independent systems.” 49 The next LAPOP survey is planed for the first calendar quarter of 2012. (correspondence with Mitch Seligson, founder and director of LAPOP, July 2011) 50 It should be noted that once the sampling frame is designed, it generally, cannot be subdivided for inference to smaller area units such as by cluster unless the cluster area is contiguous with municipality and the sample design was for municipal inference (Based on sampling theory and also the author’s experience with LAPOP in Colombia.) 51 There are actually four projects when the TNC EPP is included 29 VI. BEST PRACTICES AND LESSONS LEARNED Overall, the cluster strategy was the best practice introduced during the CPP stage of the economic growth program because it encompassed both the production and policy aspects of the DR-CAFTA challenges and opportunities. The cluster strategy is an advance over production chain analysis because it brings into the analysis the enabling political and economic entities, and as described in the analysis, it lends itself to the start of a movement at both a local and national level. Also, as shown in the analysis and evolution of the program, the methods used for starting the Program come from a long history of participatory best practices. Within the cluster strategy the best practice of participatory planning was seen as a national￾level effort that produced the DR advantage. DSTA used the same method in their “whole sector in a room” (WSR) methodology for the tourism sector, and as part of DSTA, TNC used the same technique at the community level to assess the local community tourism assets and to establish community priorities for establishing or improving their tourism business. In each case, however, they used the concept of cluster to make the strategic planning process inclusive. Likewise, linking local needs with policy and regulatory change fits the cluster strategy well and comes out of the strategic planning methodology. It is a practice of facilitating public-private dialogue and collaboration in order to advocate for changes in policy and regulations so that local social and economic change can take place as well as be more efficient or competitive. One of the DR-CAFTA IP examples was streamlining the business start-up process that resulted in a much quicker timetable and fewer agencies to grant approval. An ongoing example from DSTA is the work that TNC has done with the environmental ministry to write regulations for qualification and fee structures so that non-governmental organizations can assume management or co-management positions in protected areas. The policy change that would enable these new regulations was being negotiated at the time of the evaluation. Finally, most of the projects in the Program strived for media attention, produced announcements, and tracked the coverage, but the best practice was DSTA’s effort to cultivate the media and actually strengthen media coverage of the tourism sector. The result was not only better and increased coverage, but an unexpected outcome was that the Dominican journalism society, in its annual awards for reporting, added an award for tourism coverage. VII. THE PROGRAM FIT WITH NEW USAID GCC AND FTF INITIATIVES In the scope of work the Mission requested that the evaluation “lay foundations for new interventions to address new Presidential Initiatives and achieve the overall objective of competitive and (environmentally) sustainable economic opportunities and livelihoods for poverty eradication in the Dominican Republic.” Two new Presidential initiatives are the Global Hunger (Feed the Future) and Global Climate Change Initiatives. In an April 24, 2010 press release USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah announced the 20 focus countries of the U.S. Government’s Global Hunger initiative—also known as the Feed the Future (FtF) initiative—which aims to reduce poverty, hunger, and undernutrition. The Dominican Republic is not one of the 20 focus countries, but has been allocated FtF funding to address food security needs in the poorest and at-risk regions of the country. The second new Presidential initiative, Global Climate Change Initiative, has included the Dominican Republic as a recipient of funding in FY 2012 for implementing its “sustainable landscapes” pillar programs. 30 The current projects in the Mission’s Economic Growth Program form a solid basis for advancing both FtF and GCC because they have poverty reduction, environmental protection, and conservation of natural resources as their goals. Further, in the case of the DSTA and RED projects, application of the clusters approach provides a unique Dominican experience to the implementation of these two initiatives, an approach that may have applicability beyond the DR. The development hypotheses of the three projects are as valid today under the new initiatives as they were when designed. The need for rural economic diversification—particularly of its agriculture and tourism sectors—is clear, and the need for policy reform to meet local development needs continues. USAID/DR can use GCC and FtF funding to engage CDCT and REDDOM beyond the life of the current DSTA and RED projects. For example, anticipated GCC Initiative funds for “sustainable landscape” activities in the DR offers one such opportunity for USAID/DR to engage the CDCT as an implementing partner—and thus continue to build its organizational capacity—in support of nature tourism clusters around or in protected areas of vulnerable habitat where biodiversity is threatened. In fact, the DR, with its clusters approach to sustainable (nature-based) tourism, can offer unique experiences to the GCC “sustainable landscapes” strategy. Similarly, USAID/DR can channel part or all of its FtF Initiative funding through REDDOM as an implementing partner to support development of producer clusters in low-income rural areas to improve their food security. In both cases, GCC and FtF funding can be used to launch the CDTC and REDDOM foundations on a self-sustaining trajectory by engaging them as implementing partners who will be “learning by doing.” The Mission, when defending its funding request for this Program, should point out potential synergies with other donor programs. Two examples are: 1) the continued reengineering of the Environment Ministry with WB GEF that has been so useful for the TNC-EPP effort for policy regarding co-administration of protected areas, and 2) the IDB has been a partner with USAID programs since the CPP and has an ongoing Sustainable Energy and Climate Change Initiative (SECCI). One strategy for the Mission’s defense of the Program would be to make the case, as we have throughout this report, that the effort to make DR-CAFTA a success has only begun, and that the need to succeed in the coming five years as the tariff barriers are reduced is as great as it was during the last five years, if not more so. Furthermore, the history of the Program as an investment should be invoked as an ongoing commitment to both mitigate the impact of the DR￾CAFTA on sensitive crops and products, and to help increase the competitiveness of the DR in order to take advantage of the DR-CAFTA trade opportunities. In conclusion, the evaluators recommend that the Mission should keep the focus of the Program on its original and valid rationale, that is, make DR-CAFTA a success for the Dominicans by diversifying agriculture and tourism while assisting in policy reform through DR-CAFTA implementation. ANNEXES ANNEX A: SCOPE OF WORK ....................................................................... i ANNEX B REFERENCES .......................................................................... xxi ANNEX C: CONTACTS ............................................................................. xxv i ANNEX A: SCOPE OF WORK ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi xii xiii xiv xv xvi xvii xviii xix xx xxi ANNEX B: REFERENCES Abt Associates. 2010. “1st Option Year Work Plan (October 1, 2010–September 30, 2011) ______. 2010. “Work Plan Narratives FY11 Final” ______. 2010. Work Plan Matriz FY11. ______. 2010. “Strategy for Cluster Development and Strengthening.” Post-RIG Audit Report No.1-517- 10-005-P March, 16, 2010. (Plus annexes A-F) ______. 2011. “Quarterly Progress Report: January to March 2011 ______. 2011. “Organization Chart May 2011.” REDDOM ______. 2011. “USAID-RED Project List of Activities as of June 15 2011 RevZB, a multi-sheet excel data base on RED activities – tracking for PMP. ______. 2011. “Proposed Approach for Transitioning USAID/RED to a Dominican Organization.” ______. No Date. “Borrador de Guía para presentación de la propuesta definitiva FONDER” ______. No Date. “Matriz De Evaluación De Proyectos Pre-Seleccionados” ______. No Date.” Matriz de evaluación perfil definitivo: Fondo Para La Diversificación Económica Rural (FONDER)” An Excel Sheet. ______. No Date.” Formulario de Control Ambiental. Barrera, Baruch, Penelopa Gjurcilova,Stacie Rabinowitz, Hiroki Suemori. 2007. “Tourism in the Dominican Republic.” MOC Project Paper. Brineman, Elena L., Mission Director. 2002.”USAID/Dominican Republic Strategic Plan: FY 2002 through FY 2007.” Santo Domingo Chemonics. 2007. Promoting Competitiveness and Equity Dominican Republic Competitiveness and Policy Program: Final Report, USAID Contract No. 517-C-00-03-00110-00 Dec. ______. 2007. Performance Monitoring Plan DR-CAFTA IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT. Santo Domingo. ______. 2007. Revised Performance Monitoring Plan. DR-CAFTA IP. ______. 2007. Final Bulletin. Competitiveness and Policy Program, Santo Domingo. ______. 2007. Final Report. Dominican Republic Competitiveness and Policy Program ______. 2010. ANNUAL PROGRESS REPORT OCTOBER 2009 – SEPTEMBER 2010. DR-CAFTA IP. ______. 2010. “PORTMAN – BINGAMAN INDICATORS FOR QUARTER ENDING DECEMBER 2010.” DR-CAFTA IP. xxii ______. 2011 DRAFT - Revised Performance Monitoring Plan, USAID DR-CAFTA IMPLEMENTATION PROJECT. Santo Domingo ______. 2011. El DR-CAFTA: Conocerlo, entenderlo y aprovecharlo. Proyecto de la Implementación de DR-CAFTA (DR-CAFTA IP). ______. 2010 (SEP). “Work Plan for the 1st Option Year of the Contract with Suggestions for Option Year Two.” DR-CAFTA IP. Corral, Julio César, Brad Weiss. 2008.Todos Bajo Un Mismo Techo: Por un Turismo Dominicano más Competitivo y Sostenible DSTA. Santiago de los Caballeros DSTA. Not dated. REPORTE FINAL: RECURSOS, TEMAS Y ACTORES PARA UN TURISMO SOSTENIBLE – Mapeo del Contexto Nacional DSTA. 2008. Draft Performance Monitoring Plan. _____. 2008. Draft 18 Month Program Implementation Plan: April 1, 2008 – September 30, 2009. _____. 2008. Annex A: USAID-DSTA Preliminary Life of Program Implementation Matrix _____. 2008. Annex B USAID-DSTA Monitoring and Evaluation Causal Model _____. Annual Work Plans (2009, 2010, 2011). _____. 2008 “Performance Monitoring Results: January - September 2008.” _____. 2009 “Performance Monitoring Results: October 2008 to June 2009.” _____. 2010 “Performance Monitoring Results: October 1, 2009 – April 30, 2010” _____. 2010 “USAID-DSTA Program PMP table FY11 Q1 Q2 - 5.31.11 FINAL- Excel File “SO 8 Performance Data Table- IR 8.1 of data from 2008 to 2010 _____. 2007 (Dec) – 2011(MAR) Quarterly Reports. Santo Domingo Hart, Donaldo Elka Scheker and Patricia Mejía. 2007. “BASELINE ASSESSMENT OF DOMINICAN INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY TO IMPLEMENT DR-CAFTA.” Chemonics International Inc. under Contract No. IQC # EEM-I-00-07-00008-00. Hilbruner, Roberta. Not Dated. “A Case Study of Development Communication Partnerships.” Power Point Presentation. IICA “Primer Taller sobre Herramientas de Análisis del Impacto Económico de la Política Sectorial Agropecuaria para Aprovechar el DR-CAFTA,” video-conferencia, Jun-Jul 2011, Santo Domingo Landmann, Robert S. and Elka Scheker. 2009. MID TERM ASSESSMENT OF DOMINICAN INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY TO IMPLEMENT DR-CAFTA. Chemonics International under the USAID DR-CAFTA Implementation Project. Contract No. EEM-I-00-07-00008-00-TO 01. Listín Diario. 2 Jul 11. “Actualizarán el régimen de las cooperativas,” Santo Domingo xxiii Merschrod, K. "In Search of a Strategy for Coastal Zone Management in the Third World: Notes from Ecuador," Coastal Management, Vol. 17, No. 1, 1988 Núñez, Rubén D. and Danilo Cruz De Paula. Feb 2007. DR-CAFTA: The Day After, A Layman’s Guide of What the Trade Agreement Means for the Dominican Republic. Chemonics International Inc. under Contract No. 517-C-00-03-00110-00. Overseas Cooperative Development Council (OCDC). Not Dated. Creating Clarity: Assessment, Analysis and Outreach for Cooperative Legal Reform Principles for Legal Reform, www.clarity.coop. Portman-Bingamen Letter. 20 June, 2005. This letter was correspondence between Rob Portman of the Executive Office of the President and Senator Jeff Bingamen in reference to the establishment of an earmark for the support of transition to and implementation of CAFTA and DR-CAFTA. Pottebaum, David, Christopher Lee. 2007. “In Control of Their Future; Community-led Reconciliation and Recovery.” 16 April 2007. (Original version presented at the WIDER Conference on AID: Principles, Policies and Performance. 16-17 June 2006) Rodríguez, Luís Ramón. 2008. “EL DR-CAFTA: IMPACTO EN EL SECTOR PRODUCTOR DE FRUTAS EN LA REPÚBLICA DOMINICANA.” Junta Agroempresarial Dominicana (JAD).Proyecto de la Implementación del DR-CAFTA. ______. Oct 2010. “OPORTUNIDADES DEL ACUERDO DE LIBRE COMERCIO ENTRE RD, CENTROAMERICA Y ESTADOS UNIDOS (DR-CAFTA) PARA INCREMENTAR LAS EXPORTACIONES AGROPECUARIAS. .” USAID-RED y Junta Agroempresarial Dominicana (JAD).Proyecto de la Implementación del DR-CAFTA. Proyecto de Baiguá, San Rafaelde Yuma Rodriguez Mansfield, Antonio. 2000. “Advantage DR. Final Report: National Strategy Project: Competitive Strategy for the Dominican Republic Santo Domingo. Chemonics. Slocum, G, K. Merschrod. 2002 ”Local organizations in development: background study and literature review,” Under contract for: Creative Associates International, Inc. (CAII) for the U.S. Agency for International Development, May, 2002. http://www.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNACQ156.pdf TLC 2005. TLC-EEUU DR-CAFTA General Definitions and Chapters 1-22 plus annexes. TNC. 2008 USAID Environmental Protection Program Cooperative Agreement No. 517-A-00-09-00106- 00 ______.Nov-Dic. 2009 Reporte de Seguimiento Ambiental a los Proyectos Destinos. Programa USAID￾DSTA, Componente Conservación y Ambiente. ______.2010. USAID Environmental Protection Program Quarterly and Annual Report (October 2009 - September 2010) No. 517-A-00-09-00106-00 ______. 2009. First Year Work Plan (2009-2010) ______. 2009 Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Plan –PMP. Environmental Protection Program Cooperative Agreement No. 517-A-00-09-00106-00 OCT ______. 2010. Annual Work Plan Fiscal Year 2011 (Oct. 2010 – Sept. 2011) ______. 2010. First Quarterly Report FY 2011 October – December 2010 xxiv Rodriguez Mansfield, Antonio. 2000. Final Report: National Strategy Project: Competitive Strategy for The Dominican Republic, USAID, Santo Domingo. USAID/LAC Bureau. June 24, 2008. Indicators for tracking the impact of the Portman-Bingaman “Earmark” for the Dominican Republic. Equitable Growth Best Practices Project, Washington, DC USAID/DR. 2001. Policies to Improve Competitiveness in the Dominican Republic. Apparently the scope of work for the Chemonics-CPP U:\EDTPUB\COMPTSTRAT-2001C-SOW.doc 5/23/01 12:23 PM (Advantage DR! is mentioned here) USAID/DR. JAN 2008. “Rural Economic Development Project” Contract EDH-I-00-05-0005-00 ______. 2009. Environmental Protection Program Cooperative Agreement No. 517-A-00-09-00106-00 Attachment B PROGRAM DESCRIPTION: Background. ______. 30 SEP 2010. DR-CAFTA Implementation Project, EEM-I-01-07-00008-00 Chemonics International & ATTACHMENT I: STATEMENT OF WORK. ______. 29 JUN 2007. RFA, “517-07-004” under Leader with Associates Award. ______. 10 September 2007. Dominican Sustainable Tourism Alliance Program Award. Associate Award No. 517-A-00-07-00105-00 Leader Award No.EPP-A-00-06-00002-00. USAID Regional Contracts Office. ______. Not Dated. “La Creación de un Entorno Favorable Principios para la reforma legal para el Desarrollo Cooperativo.” CLARITY iniciativa para la regulación y el derecho cooperativo. USAID/RIG. 2010. “Audit of USAID/Dominican Republic’s Rural Economic Diversification Project. Audit Report NO. 1-517-10-005-P. MARCH 16, 2010 Websites http://www.aed.org/Projects/DREnvPro.cfm Improved Policies for Environmental Protection in the Dominican Republic Dominican Sustainable Tourism Alliance http://www.chemonics.com/projects/submit_search_contracts.aspx?showBack=1&ckCurrent=1&selRegio n={6F03A3B3-F2AB-4851-A6D0-C728FBE87D14} Rural Economic Diversification Project (one page description) Policies to Improve Competitiveness, 2001-2003 (Task Order) Competitiveness Initiatives, 2003-2007 (Task Order) Strengthen Institutional Capacity for CAFTA-Dominican Republic Implementation, 2007-2011 (DR-CAFTA IP) www.clarity.coop Creating Clarity: Assessment, Analysis and Outreach for Cooperative Legal Reform Principles for Legal Reform. xxv ANNEX C: CONTACTS Contact List by Organization Name Organization Pérez, Jeffery Abt Associates – Cluster Coordinator de los Santos, Jesús Abt Associates – COP USAID/RED Baloum, Zahir Abt Associates – Director Operations & Finances Straub, Gordon Abt Associates - Principal Associate Aracena, Juan Abt Associates - CCP History Gil, Lissette AED CDCT Director Hendrickson, Meg AED DSTA, Director Hickman, Gary CADEF - Green House Cluster Expert from US Ledesma, Rafael CADEF - Partners Farmer TA González, Delio CADEF - Member, Owner Agrimar packing house Antonio Calabasa Community Male project member. Orlando Calabasa Community Male project member. Rosa Calabasa Community Woman's Club, Pres. Yanes, Patricia Chemonics DR-CAFTA IP HO Project Manager Soto, Wendy Chemonics DR-CAFTA IP M&E Batista, Lynette Chemonics, DR-CAFTA IP, COP Arias, Alvin Consultant, GIS sensitive crops Fadul, Haydeé DICOEX Regional Coordinator Santiago Marta Directress, Envronmental School Jarabacoa Suarez, Denis FedeCamera, Santiago El Español, Philipe Jarabacoa, Cluster Member bakery Eunice, Arq Jarabacoa, Cluster Pres.Contractor Ramirez, Victor Jarabacoa, Municipality Civil Eng. Katia Jarabacoa, Municipality, Assit. Mayoriss Anon La Angostura, Community Project 3 males Anon La Angostura, Community Project 4 males Seligson, Mitch LAPOP, Founder/Director Ramírez, Pilar REDDOM Foundation Silva, Eddy TNC NEPAssist de Jesus, Indira TNC-EPP Bermudez, Edith Tri-Project Consultant DSTA Evaluation Cirito, Luis Tri-Project Junior member RED Evaluation Vanegas, Manuel Tri-Project Leader DSTA Evaluation Flick, Robert Tri-Project Leader RED Evaluation Ceballo, Josué USAID/DR - ADMIN TRI-Evaluation Team Leader+A4 Gonzalez, Luís USAID/DR – COTR USAID/RED & DR-CAFTA IP Greene, Duty USAID/DR – Director, Office of Economic Growth Economic Policy Advisor xxvi Pérez, Odalís USAID/DR - Mission Environmental Officer ATOR DSTA Molina, Claudia USAID/DR Acq. & Assist. Spec. Regional Contracts Office. García, Conrado USAID/DR Mission Economist Designed projects Scott-Vargas, Susan USAID/DR Regional Contracting Officer i U.S. Agency for International Development 1300 Pennsylvania Ave., NW Washington, D.C. 20523 Tel: (202) 712-0000 Fax: (202) 216-3524 www.usaid.gov