June 2010
This publication was prepared by Weidemann Associates, Inc. for review by the United States Agency for 
International Development. 
Lessons for
Future 
Programming
USAID/Peru’s
Alternative
Development
Program
LESSONS FOR FUTURE 
PROGRAMMING 
USAID/PERU‘S ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT 
PROGRAM 
Submitted to: 
USAID/Peru 
Submitted by: 
Weidemann Associates, Inc. 
Under Contract No.: 
Raise Plus IQC Task Order No. AEG-I-28-04-00010-00
Period of Performance: 
February–June 2010
DISCLAIMER
The authors‘ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States 
Agency for International Development or the United States Government. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Weidemann Associates, Inc. appreciates the extensive support and cooperation of all who 
participated and assisted in this assessment of USAID/Peru‘s Alternative Development 
Program (ADP). 
We note the contribution of the many producers, associations, community leaders, private 
sector companies, and local, regional and national government leaders in Peru who gave of 
their time to explain their relationships with the ADP program, thus improving our 
understanding of how the program has affected their lives and work and how it has served to 
further the goals of the Governments of Peru and the United States of America. We thank 
these persons for their contributions.
We would like to thank the USAID/Peru staff for sharing with the assessment team their 
experience and knowledge of the Peruvian social, economic and political context and for their 
assistance in obtaining information needed to conduct this evaluation. In particular, we 
recognize the contribution of Donato Peña, who assisted us in gathering documents and 
information, for his thoughtful guidance throughout this assessment. 
Our sincere appreciation to the dedicated staff of those projects included in this assessment 
who willingly offered their time, experience and learning to team members, and especially to 
those who made extra effort to provide the data required for this evaluation.
Arvin R. Bunker 
Roberto Castro
Oswaldo Medina
Josefa Nolte 
Alfredo Mendívil 
Alberto Troilo 
Ana Toledo 
Jose Panta 
Table of Contents 
ACRONYMS.................................................................................................................................... i
INTRODUCTION............................................................................................................................ 1
SECTION I: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................... 2
I.1 Results in San Martin & Lessons for Future Programming ................................................... 2
I.1.1 Learning from Tocache ................................................................................................... 4
I.1.2 Recommendations for Aguaytia-Huipoca: ...................................................................... 6
I.1.3 Long-Term Sustainability of Achievements in Northern San Martin and Pucallpa ........ 7
I.2 Findings and Conclusions ...................................................................................................... 9
I.2.1 Social Capital................................................................................................................. 19
I.3 Lessons Learned .................................................................................................................. 20
Section II: applying the Tocache experience to interventions in Aguaytia-Huipoca ... 25
II.1 Why Producers Joined ADP ............................................................................................... 25
II.1.1 Remove violence and terrorism: Improved Quality of Life........................................... 26
II.1.2 Adequate and Reliable Income .................................................................................... 27
II.1.3 Infrastructure and Social Investments.......................................................................... 29
II.1.4 Why Neighbors Did Not Join ADP Groups .................................................................. 30
II.2 Why Producers Continued in ADP...................................................................................... 30
II.2.1 Inherent Strengths of Cooperatives in the Value Chain: ............................................. 32
II.3 Activities with Good and with Limited Results in Tocache ................................................. 32
II.3.1 Strategies Generating Good Results ........................................................................... 33
II.3.2 Activities that Produced Limited Results...................................................................... 39
II.4 External Factors in Tocache ............................................................................................... 41
II.4.1 Favorable Factors ........................................................................................................ 41
II.4.2 Negative Factors .......................................................................................................... 42
II.5 Implementing ADP in Aguaytia-Huipoca............................................................................. 43
II.5.1 Utilize Programmed Eradication .................................................................................. 44
II.5.2 An Integrated Approach Focusing on Community Development ................................ 45
II.5.3 Concentrate Production Support on Key Products ...................................................... 46
II.5.4 Communication Strategy .............................................................................................. 47
II.5.5 Infrastructure ................................................................................................................ 49
II.5.6 Selected Recommended Practices for Key Products.................................................. 50
II.5.7 Establish a Technology Transfer Plan ......................................................................... 51
II.5.8 Seek Political Support - Proceed Regardless of Response ........................................ 51
II.6 Aguaytia‘s Return to Coca Cultivation ................................................................................ 52
II.6.1 Market Signals Favor Coca .......................................................................................... 52
II.6.2 New Immigrants............................................................................................................ 53
II.6.3 ADP Program in Aguaytia ............................................................................................ 54
II.6.4 Identify Incentives to Remove Small Coca Plots ......................................................... 54
II.6.5 Media Influence ............................................................................................................ 55
II.7 Gender Considerations ....................................................................................................... 56
II.7.1 Women as Change Agents .......................................................................................... 56
II.7.2 Gender Program Components in Aguaytia-Huipoca ................................................... 60
Section III: supporting Long-term Sustainability in Northern San Martin ..................... 60
III.1 What Interventions Are Still Needed? ................................................................................ 61
III.2 Community Development and Governance....................................................................... 62
III.3 Training and Technical Assistance to Producers .............................................................. 63
III.3.1 Community Promoters................................................................................................. 64
III.3.2 Which Community Needs Training? ........................................................................... 67
III.4 Local Post Harvest Handling.............................................................................................. 71
III.4.1 Cacao .......................................................................................................................... 71
III.4.2 Coffee .......................................................................................................................... 72
III.4.3 Palm Oil ....................................................................................................................... 72
III.5 Infrastructure Investments ................................................................................................. 74
III.6 Processing and Marketing Institutions ............................................................................... 74
III.6.1 Cacao .......................................................................................................................... 74
III.6.2 Coffee .......................................................................................................................... 75
III.6.3 Palm Oil ....................................................................................................................... 76
III.7 Staffing by Office and Duties ............................................................................................. 76
III.8 Supporting Agricultural Sector Services ............................................................................ 78
III.9 Donor Coordination in San Martin and Pucallpa ............................................................... 78
III.9.1 Other Donor Activities that Support Licit Crops .......................................................... 79
Appendix 1 Statement of Work ............................................................................................... 81
Appendix 2 Itinerary.................................................................................................................. 85
Appendix 3 Contact List ........................................................................................................... 94
Appendix 4 Tables ................................................................................................................... 115
Appendix 5 Description of Producer Organizations......................................................... 138
Appendix 6 Materials Reviewed............................................................................................ 147
Appendix 7 Annotated Bibliography.................................................................................... 149
i 
ACRONYMS 
AASAR Asociación de Agricultores Santa Rosa
ACEPAT Asociación Central de Palmicultores de Tocache 
ADP or AD Alternative Development Program (In Spanish: Programa de Desarrollo 
Alternativo)
APTAA Asociación de Plataneros Tecnificados de Aguaytía
APROCAPP Asociación de Productores de Cacao de la Provincia de Picota
APTAA Asociación Plataneros Tecnificados Aguaytía
APTRA Asociación Plataneros Tradicionales Rio Abajo
APTRA Asociación de Plataneros Tecnificados de Rio Abad
ASPASH Asociación de Palmicultores de Shambillo
CAPTACY Consorcio Agrario de Primavera y Centro Yurac
CIOOY Consorcio de Productores de Plátano
CN Counter Narcotics
COCEPU Central Committee of Palm Oil Producers of Ucayali (In Spanish: Comité 
Central de Palmicultores de Ucayali)
COFIDE Corporación Financiera d Desarrollo, S.A.
COPALGSA Cooperativa Agraria "La Gran Saposoa"
COPAMON Comité de Productores Agropecuarios de Montevideo 
COP Chief of Party
COTR Contracting Officer‘s Technical Representative
COPPU Consorcio de Productores de Plátano de Ucayali
CORAH Control and Reduction of Coca Leaf in Upper Huallaga
DEVIDA Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo y Vida sin Drogas
ESAN Escuela de Administración de Negocios
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization
FFS Farmer Field Schools
FOB Free on Board
FY Fiscal Year
GOP Government of Peru
ICT Institute of Tropical Crops (In Spanish: Instituto de Cultivos Tropicales)
IDB Inter American Development Bank
IESTP-H Institución Educativa Superior Tecnológica Pública - Huallaga
INIA National Institution for Agrarian Innovation (In Spanish: Instituto Nacional de 
Innovación Agraria)
INRA National Agrarian Reform Institute (In Spanish: Instituto Nacional de Reforma 
Agraria)
IR Intermediate Result
ii
KfW Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau (German government-owned development 
bank)
LOE Level of Effort
Naranjillo Cooperativa Agraria Industrial Naranjillo (CoopAIN)
NGO or ONG Non-government organization (In Spanish: Organización No Gobierno)
NUODD United Nations Office of Drug and Crime Prevention (In Spanish Naciones 
Unidas, Oficina contra las Drogas y el Deleito
OLAMSA Oleaginosas Amazónica S.A.
OLPASA Oleaginosas Padre Abad S.A.
OLPESA Oleaginosas del Perú S.A.
PRA Poverty Reduction and Alleviation
RAISE Rural and Agricultural Incomes with a Sustainable Environment
RNPM Red Nacional de Promoción de Mujeres
Sol Naciente Agricultores Sta. Rosa Sol Naciente
SOW Scope of Work
SUNAT Superintendencia Nacional de Administración Tributaria
T/TA Training/Technical Assistance
UN United Nations and its agencies FAO, UNDP, etc.
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USG United States Government
VRAE River Apurímac and River Ene Valley
1 
INTRODUCTION 
Favorable outcomes for USAID/Peru‘s Alternative Development Program (ADP) are being 
demonstrated by the thousands of Peruvian households that have chosen to enjoy a preferable 
lifestyle by rejecting coca leaf production for licit crops, thus creating a safe and family-friendly 
community and beginning the process of long-term wealth creation through production of 
legitimate crops. 
This evaluation had two primary objectives, which are: 
1. Identify the lessons learned from the programmed eradication in Tocache and suggest 
which of those lessons can improve future interventions in the region of Aguaytia￾Huipoca.
2. In the Northern San Martin region identify and recommend program interventions that 
best continue agricultural sector development for a coca free environment. 
Section I contains the Executive Summary, Findings and Conclusions, and Lessons Learned. 
Section II applies the learning from programmed eradication in Tocache to the upcoming 
eradication in areas in Aguaytia-Huipoca. 
Section III assesses how to support the long-term sustainability of the accomplishments of ADP 
in Northern San Martin. 
2 
SECTION I: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
I.1 RESULTS IN SAN MARTIN & LESSONS FOR FUTURE 
PROGRAMMING 
Success of the Alternative Development Program in reducing coca production in the San Martin 
Region is evidenced by the density of coca in 1996 (Figure 1) as compared to 2008 (Figure 2). 
In these figures red represents a high density of coca production; orange, medium; and yellow, 
low density of production. The area of coca production in San Martin was reduced from 22,000 
hectares in 1996 to less than 2000 hectares in 2008. 1
Voluntary eradication was the approach for most of the eradication in San Martin. Programmed 
eradication was utilized in Tocache Province beginning in 2006. Both programs were 
successful. 
To identify lessons learned and to respond to the two primary evaluation objectives, the 
Weidemann Associates team visited sites in all of the principal areas of implementation of ADP, 
including Northern San Martin, Tocache, Tingo Maria, Aguaytia, Pucallpa, and surrounding 
areas. Team members interviewed key stakeholders in U.S. Government offices, ADP staff, 
staffs of institutions that are subcontractors to ADP, agribusinesses supplying inputs and 
purchasing products from participating producers, public officials in the Government of Peru 
(GOP), Regional Governments, Municipal Governments, specialists in counter narcotics policies 
and programs, other donors, and households/producers in coca production regions. More than 
100 institutions were contacted with more than 800 persons participating in interviews with team 
members. 
Nearly all project activities depend on the ADP first selling an intangible: hope. The hope the 
communities are buying is removal of violence and terrorism, a family friendly community with a 
future, and adequate and reliable income sufficient to meet basic needs and to provide 
economic growth and wealth creation for households and therefore their communities. 
Households that join the program are asked to make significant sacrifices that include: lower 
income from the new crops that will replace coca and major reduction in income until 
replacement crops begin production—3 years to first production and 5 to 6 years before full 
production. During the period between the eradication of coca and income generated from tree 
crops, the project provided limited help for the family to grow licit crops to sell in local markets. 
In many households the men left to find work elsewhere, and women remained to operate the 
farm. 
Selling hope is not remarkable; donors have sold hope to rural dwellers many times over. What 
is remarkable is that the ADP program has been engaged in this for eight years on a large 
scale. If ADP were not delivering results in keeping with what the communities and households 
have been led to expect, this approach would not have endured. 
 
1
 Source of data: USAID, DEVIDA, United Nations. 
3 
Figure 2: 2008 
The two sections below summarize important results of this investigation organized around the 
two principal objectives in the Statement of Work (SOW).
Figure 1: 1996
Colors represent hectares of coca production per square kilometer as follows: Yellow, from 0.1 to 1.0; 
orange, from 1.1 to 4.0; and red, 4.1 and more. 
Source: USAID/Peru
COCA PRODUCTION DENSITY IN SAN MARTIN REGION 1996 AND 2008
4 
I.1.1 Learning from Tocache 
Tocache participated in voluntary eradication for many years. Programmed eradication went so 
well that nearly all persons in the ADP staff in that office recommend programmed eradication 
as the approach for other locations. When compared to voluntary eradication, programmed 
eradication in Tocache required less time for communities to decide to participate in ADP and 
fewer ADP resources consumed. 
Coca-producing households associated violence and terrorism with the production of coca. In 
nearly every interview women first mentioned improving the quality of life by removing violence 
and terrorism from their community as their reason for joining ADP and for encouraging men to 
join ADP. 
When responding to the question of why they joined ADP, most men first mentioned that the 
potential income from replacement crops was adequate and reliable to sustain their families. 
Women also frequently mentioned the potential for adequate and reliable income as a 
secondary reason for joining ADP, and men also frequently mentioned improving the quality of 
life by removing violence and terrorism from the community as a secondary reason for joining 
ADP. 
Both women and men responded that the infrastructure and social investment offered by ADP 
were also critical incentives to join. These investments predominately remove barriers that 
restrict effective participation of households in markets for licit products, such as improved roads 
or electrical power to the community. A few investments improved other community services or 
provided additional income opportunities.
Thus the three pillars of hope that induce communities to join ADP are: 
1. Improve the quality of life by removing the violence and terrorism from the community,
2. The potential income from replacement crops was adequate and reliable to sustain their 
households, and 
3. Infrastructure and social investments removed barriers of access to markets and 
provided additional to in infrastructure
Hope is sustained over time by the capacity of ADP to deliver on the promised support to the 
satisfaction of the communities in terms of investment in the community, crops and 
infrastructure. 
Producers reported that they continue their participation in ADP because of the improved quality 
of life in the community: safety, sufficient income with replacement crops, support for producer 
associations that provide improved marketing services for their products, and completion of the 
improvements ADP agreed to make in the community. The principal replacement crops 
supported by ADP are cacao, palm oil, and coffee. 
The evaluation team found that the ADP program has gained respect for its delivery on the 
promise to bring tranquility and safety to communities; fulfill their promised investments in 
seeds, planting materials, training and technical assistance for replacement crops; and execute 
their infrastructure investments. In effect, ADP has established a measure of social capital that 
5 
motivates communities to voluntarily sacrifice income over an extended period for the promise 
of an improved lifestyle without violence. 
When the evaluation team asked participants about the reasons their neighbors gave for not 
participating, the most frequent response was that neighbors said they did not believe the offer 
presented by ADP, followed by the lack of roads and access to their parcels, and the expense of 
establishing new crops.
Removing coca production from a community is a complex process, unique for every 
community. A key objective of the community, removal of violence, was accomplished by the 
actions of community members. While ADP helped start and motivate actions, it had little direct 
involvement in the process that removed the violence. It was community members that stood 
before the pro-coca interests and stated that they would no longer grow coca. ADP‘s role was to 
offer a reliable path to sustainable income without coca and intensive support to the community 
as households motivated new leaders to emerge and pro-coca leaders to depart. In Tocache, 
an intensive period of ADP support in the community began about three months after 
programmed eradication began and lasted for a period of 18 months, depending on the needs 
of the community. Experience demonstrates that once new leadership is installed and 
functioning and the replacement crops and infrastructure investments are underway, the need 
for community development support is reduced. 
A communication campaign encouraged communities to sign the ―convenio marco.‖ The 
intensive campaign partly conducted by CORAH (Control and Reduction of Coca Leaf in Upper 
Huallaga) and partly by ADP, was helpful before, during and immediately after the programmed 
eradication. 
According to producers, the most useful activities implemented by ADP were technical 
assistance, Farmer Field Schools (FFS), study tours, and installation of new infrastructure. 
Many community households want to remove the remaining small pockets of coca that are 
produced in the community. Other than persuasion they have few tools or support. The 
evaluation identified no GOP or regional 
or local government programs to 
support communities that wish to 
remove remaining pockets of coca, 
although the ADP can remove support if 
a community does not comply with the 
terms of the agreements signed by the 
community and DEVIDA. 
Income alternatives in Tocache were 
adequate and reliable, supported in part 
by GOP and United Nations 
investments many years earlier that 
resulted in palm oil and cacao trees in 
production. Because of these earlier 
eradications in the zone, there were ex￾coca producers who could verify 
Figure 3 Typical terrains in the region
Source: Weidemann´s Team
6 
favorable results for these crops. Study tours were effective in convincing newly eradicating 
producers of the veracity of the data presented by ADP staff. 
Toache‘s favorable soil, terrain, and climate conditions supported the establishment of new 
crops, allowing households to grow their own food and sell the surplus as income until the 
primary crops began producing. Finally, road improvements, partially project supported, reduced 
transport cost to major markets.
The three primary crops (cacao, palm oil, coffee) all currently boast favorable worldwide 
demand and prices, which is fortunate given that ADP‘s strength is not in market development. 
A challenge was the lack of state presence, especially in distant communities, which weakens 
the position of households that want a licit lifestyle. 
I.1.2 Recommendations for Aguaytia-Huipoca:
The five principal components of the strategy for reduction of coca in Aguaytia-Huipoca as 
recommended by the evaluation team are: 
1. Utilize programmed eradication. 
2. Use an integrated approach, with community development as the central focus, 
supported by productive activities that result in reliable income sufficient to support the 
hope that households eradicating coca can have a prosperous lifestyle. 
3. Prepare an adequately funded communication strategy that supports rural households 
and communities as they change the direction of their communities and their leadership 
and counters false or misleading statements by pro-coca interests. 
4. Work with new community leaders to identify the critical barriers restraining economic 
growth in the community, and identify how to remove those barriers. Often this step 
requires infrastructure investments. Improved infrastructure not only reduces production 
costs and opens previously unavailable markets, but also captures the hearts and minds 
of people who can then build coalitions for change. 
5. Deliver on the program interventions as agreed between the project and the 
communities. When interventions encounter unanticipated barriers and require 
modification, ensure that new approaches are transparent for all stakeholders. 
An important factor contributing to Aguaytia‘s return to coca cultivation are the market signals 
that favor coca production. At current prices, growing coca is profitable, there are ready buyers, 
and there are few negative consequences for coca growers. Even participants in ADP are 
growing coca, which they justify as a means to gain resources to expand their palm oil or cacao 
plantations. In addition, new immigrants, mostly from Huánuco, are experienced coca producers 
who rarely integrate themselves into the local community, making it difficult for the community to 
control new plantations of coca. Yet another factor is the strong support of public media and 
many local political leaders for increased coca production. Resources to counter these pro-coca 
messages are limited. At the same time, the ADP staff in Aguaytía is struggling to establish a 
7 
vision for how to achieve a successful economic development program that removes existing 
coca and discourages new plantings. 
In the view of many ADP staff and of the evaluation team, women are active change agents, 
pushing to sign the agreements with DEVIDA (Comisión Nacional para el Desarrollo y Vida Sin 
Drogas) in both the voluntary and programmed eradication phases. They cited concerns for the 
safety of their families, especially children, and how the sudden influxes of money from coca 
leaf had been wasted on drinking and other non-productive activities. Children, they reported, 
had little interest in schooling, and many had no long-term plans to develop productive skills. 
Insecure and unsafe environments reduced incentives to work for a better future and induced 
households to live day to day. Women continue to defend the new community lifestyle that has 
resulted from the removal of coca production.
Support for women in ADP activities has been noteworthy in several ways. Women‘s 
participation in the Farmer Field Schools has strengthened women‘s participation in key family 
decisions. In team interviews, women often participated as actively as their husbands and they 
credited the FFS for giving them the confidence to participate as equal partners in farm 
production and marketing decisions. It was noted that when extra labor is needed, it is often 
women filling the role (such as at harvest time) and that women often predominate in certain 
tasks such as grafting cacao seedlings. After forced eradication and when seeding the first plots 
of replacement crops, women have often taken charge of agricultural production while many of 
the men are away seeking work to maintain family income. 
A network of regidoras (women members of a municipal or regional council) has formed in 
Tocache and Northern San Martin with the purpose of mutual support and exchange of 
experience, which assists them in focusing their actions to create and formalize regulations and 
ordnances of importance to women. The women interviewed say they feel supported to have 
the backing of an organization that facilitates cooperation on public issues. 
Gender awareness within the prime contractor is a work in progress. All personnel now receive 
gender awareness training upon hiring. The work of the subcontractor that supports gender 
issues has been is hampered by the long periods of interruption without contracts, even though 
some gender advisors continued working. 
Communication campaigns for this region should include inclusive language, assuring that 
messages equally address women‘s and men‘s concerns, and especially address quality of life 
issues and the benefits of a licit lifestyle. ADP should continue the incorporation of women as 
equal partners in the FFS so that women have equal opportunities for learning. Funding of small 
projects is another way to support women‘s development, when the resources and skills of the 
participating women are sufficient to anticipate successful outcomes.
I.1.3 Long-Term Sustainability of Achievements in Northern San Martin and 
Pucallpa 
The Statement of Work referred to the graduation of communities in Northern San Martin and 
Pucallpa. While the word ―graduate‖ has multiple meanings, based on statements by and 
8 
conversations with USAID/Peru personnel and the use of the word ―consolidate‖ in the sub 
question, the evaluation team has understood ―graduate‖ as used in the question to mean ―to 
arrange in grades or gradations.‖ Thus the evaluation focuses on the mix of tasks remaining for 
ADP to continue supporting the success achieved in the regions. 
The label ―miracle‖ applied the work in San Martin does not reflect the real story, which is: 
USAID/Peru through ADP and other US programs and Peruvian government 
activities, and with help from selected Peruvian institutions, provided sufficient 
support so that ordinary citizens in the region decided to stand up and declare they 
would no longer produce coca, which resulted in the narco-traffickers and pro-coca 
interests leaving the region. The financial sacrifice of those ordinary citizens was 
significant; in exchange, they gained a preferred lifestyle with a future. 
Northern San Martin, Tocache and Pucallpa are all on a path to minimize coca production in the 
region, though much remains to make that change sustainable. 
About half of the producers that have eradicated coca in the San Martin and Tocache regions 
have less than four years of experience in growing the new crops. Producers in many of these 
communities will need continued support to achieve sustainability of their licit crops. ADP can 
assist by continuing its process of sub-contracting training and technical assistance to local 
institutions. Many of the sub-contracted institutions are producer-owned associations or 
cooperatives that also purchase farm output. 
While buyers of farm output may seem like a logical choice for trainers, that is not always the 
case. Most businesses that focus on marketing and processing are not especially proficient as 
training institutions. While the current basic training gets high marks from producers, the 
evaluation team questions whether the process is sustainable beyond program support. None of 
the institutions receiving large subcontracts for training indicated it would continue to provide 
basic training without subsidies. Smaller associations and cooperatives showed more interest in 
training and appear to be doing it well, but cannot offer basic training without subsidies. 
After eight years, ADP is adept at organizing trainings but did not demonstrate to the team a 
viable methodology for transferring or ―consolidating‖ local institutions in the training and 
technical assistance market. 
The PRA (Poverty Reduction and Alleviation) project provides a model for private sector 
institutions as trainers for agricultural production. As these institutions also require government 
or donor payments to conduct training, they likewise are not sustainable without subsidies. 
Including them in the mix of potential training providers would inject competition into selection of 
training providers; facilitate sharing the costs of basic training by other funding institutions, and 
reducing the number of producer marketing/processing associations that formed with the initial 
task to train producers. These associations will need of ongoing ADP support over many years 
to reach sustainability. ADP may want to consider a modified approach that invites institutions 
specialized in training to respond to a request for proposals to provide training and technical 
assistance services. 
While many municipal and regional governments that once favored coca production are now 
favoring licit crops, few of these possess the technical skills to effectively promote a licit 
9 
agricultural sector and agribusiness development. Support by ADP can help these institutions 
establish a favorable agricultural sector investment environment and attract funding for licit crop 
production. The number of ADP personnel dedicated to such a service needn‘t be large; the role 
of staff would be primarily to identify needs, together with these governments, and identify 
sources of support. A few municipal and regional governments in San Martin and Ucayali are 
now supporting ADP like activities, primarily helping prior coca producers adopt licit crops. 
Currently, a total of 533 ADP and subcontractor personnel are supporting establishment of licit 
crops and related community and business development. Sixty-eight percent are technical 
specialists; 20 percent, administrative and monitoring personnel; and 12 percent, directors and 
coordinators. Of these, 226 are employees of the prime contractor and 308 are employees of 
subcontractors. 
The allocation of personnel by region is as follows: Aguaytia–11 percent, San Martin–28 
percent, Tocache–19 percent, Tingo Maria–12 percent, Ucayali–22 percent, and Lima–9 
percent. San Martin and Tocache combined account for 47 percent of personnel. Declining coca 
production in that region suggests the possibility of managing activities in San Martin and 
Tocache with fewer personnel. 
Cooperation with other donors has been limited but important. The United Nations established 
plantations of palm oil and cacao in San Martin and Ucayali Regions in the late 1990s and early 
2000s, and ADP adapted much of that technology into its training packages. USAID also 
assumed some of the promised interventions of the UN when its funding declined, and currently 
uses the UN to deliver training and technical assistance to producers. That relationship has 
been fruitful and should continue. Spanish and German cooperation has also provided small but 
important contributions to development of licit crops in the region. German efforts (using 
approximately the same technology as ADP) continue and are coordinated with ADP; each 
works in different areas. 
I.2 FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The following are conclusions and recommendations that in the team‘s view would contribute to 
a successful alternative development program in Peru. The order of presentation does not 
necessarily denote the relative importance of a finding or conclusion. 
1. Delivery of services by ADP begins with the marketing of an intangible: hope. Until a 
community buys ―hope,‖ ADP has little to do. That hope must sustain a community through 
the turbulent transition from a violence prone community that was led by coca interests to a 
tranquil community with newly selected leadership, and during the next several years of 
reduced income until the three primary crops that ADP promotes generate adequate and 
reliable income, making licit crops a sustainable lifestyle. 
Conclusion: While ADP has been successful in selling hope, ongoing refinement of the 
processes and skills of personnel to sell intangibles is a critical component of success. 
2. Selling hope is a specialized skill; most technical specialists ADP uses such as agricultural 
production, business development and infrastructure specialists will have little training or 
skills in selling intangibles. 
10
Conclusion: Leading the presentations to the communities considering joining ADP should 
be persons skilled in selling intangibles. Technical specialists that will be carrying out the 
work should participate in the selling process, to build trust and rapport with members of the 
community. 
3. The decision of a community to participate in ADP involves many variables. In the 
perception of the team, the most important is the desire for a community free of violence and 
terrorism. This is a desired result that the opposition cannot satisfy. Women more often than 
men mention this first as the reason for participating in ADP. 
Conclusion: For the period of community discussion regarding how to respond to 
eradication, ADP should design messages to address how ADP supports the community in 
removing violence and terrorism. For more impact, design messages that speak to women. 
4. Nearly as important as a safe community in choosing a licit lifestyle is the ability to generate 
adequate and reliable income with replacement crops. This income can be less than the 
household earned with coca, but must be sufficient to meet basic needs and provide a 
surplus for investment in their farm toward creating long-term wealth. Men more than women 
spoke about adequate and reliable income. In communities that had replacement crops in 
production, both men and women were pleased with the generation of wealth. 
Conclusion: Selling hope requires reliable estimates on likely income from replacement 
crops. Design communication messages that address both income and wealth, and have 
those messages speak to women and men. 
5. In naming factors in choosing licit crops, after removal of violence and assurances of 
adequate and reliable income, community members next mentioned infrastructure and 
social investments that support the community as it passes through the phases of leaving 
behind illicit products and beginning production of licit products. 
Conclusion: Design the communication with community members to address these high 
priority issues. Target audiences 
include men and women.
6. The timing between post eradication 
and ADP intervention should be long 
enough to avoid the perception of 
linkages between CORAH and ADP. 
Conclusion: The experience in 
Tocache suggests that three or more 
repetitions of coca eradication are 
needed before most communities are 
convinced that coca production is not 
the future for that area, that 
communities have removed or reduced 
the effectiveness of the pro-coca 
leadership, and that ADP can 
effectively support the changeover to 
Figure 4 Crossing the Huallaga River
Source: Weidemann´s Team
11
production of licit commodities. 
It is possible that future eradications by CORAH can point to the experience of Tocache to 
help persuade coca growers not to replant, which if successful would reduce the share of 
producers that replant coca for a second or third time. In this case, ADP may be able to 
enter the zone sooner than was feasible for Tocache. 
Other major community changes also influence the timing of a decision to abandon coca for 
licit crops—for example, the departure of coca interests from the community that allows new 
leadership to emerge.
7. ADP intervention continues to focus on three crops: palm oil, cocoa and coffee. These crops 
have established market channels that can absorb large numbers of new entrants and have 
track records of success that encourage other communities to start the transformation 
process. 
Conclusion: Focus income alternatives on these crops. Other crops should be added as 
primary crops only after there is clear evidence that ready and willing buyers are available, 
that the markets can accommodate many new entrants, that tested and proven production 
packages are available, that prior producers can verify ADP claims of potential success, and 
that the crops are suited for the growing conditions of the area. 
8. Favorable market signals for oil palm, cacao and coffee and proven production technology 
packages developed by the United Nations and prior production in Peru facilitated the 
acceptance of these crops as viable alternatives to coca leaf production. 
Conclusion: A nice break for ADP—Projections of world demand and prices for the 
products from these crops continue to be favorable. All crops have cycles of attractive and 
less attractive markets and prices. While significant downturns are not currently anticipated, 
ADP may want to encourage Peruvian institutions to establish support systems to maintain 
industries for these crops through any downturns.
9. Programmed eradication reduces the time necessary for communities to decide to 
participate in ADP and results in the need for fewer ADP resources to support communities 
in focusing on licit crops.
Conclusion: When possible, programmed eradication should first remove coca from the 
communities. Once the coca is gone, development efforts can help communities select 
wisely those economic activities that will best provide for their social and economic 
development. 
10. Correct timing by ADP in approaching the community greatly increases the ability of ADP 
staff to find households that accept the hope they are selling. 
Conclusion: ADP staff should be especially alert to messages from communities living 
through programmed eradication and be ready to respond immediately to signs that 
community members want information on crops to replace coca. When possible, 
establishing communication links with the community before programmed eradication will 
facilitate communication during the critical eradication and transition period. 
12
11. Fertilization is a critical factor in maintaining and/or increasing yields in palm oil and cacao 
plantations. There is a source of dolomite in the Huánuco region that could be 
complemented by other inputs bought at wholesale prices. The fertilization requirements will 
differ between regions and crops based on soil characteristics, which leads to different 
fertilizer formulations. 
For cacao, to maintain organic certification and improve yields, it is advisable to consider a 
bio fertilizer plant using as key ingredients ―escobajo,‖ a by-product of palm oil processing, 
and rice hulls, both available in large quantities in the region.
Conclusion: To address the issues of low-cost fertilizer availability, a business plan for 
establishing one or more fertilizer mixing plants in the area should be prepared. 
12. The United Nations has been a valuable partner in the development of palm oil and cacao 
production technology and continues to facilitate important multi-donor cooperation for ADP 
as well as training and technical assistance to growers. 
Conclusion: Given the expertise of the United Nations in palm oil production, ADP should 
consider continuing the partnership with this institution for the provision of technical 
assistance to producers.
13. The prestige of Peruvian cacao is determined by the quality of the cacao bean. How the 
product is harvested and handled during post harvest is critical to achieving premium quality 
beans. It is difficult to maintain optimal post harvest handling by many small farmers; this 
can best be achieved through local institutions, such as farmer associations, cooperatives or 
other local commercial buyers. These institutions also have a comparative advantage in 
selling farm inputs to producers. 
A number of these associations and cooperatives stated that they want to be exporters; 
some say they want their own cacao bean processing facilities. Few of these institutions will 
become effective exporters of cacao beans or further processors of cacao during the next 
five years. There are several established cooperatives that do have the capacity to process 
and export cacao. 
Conclusion: ADP should continue support to local institutions, many of which are 
cooperatives and producer associations, to help them focus on increasing their technical 
and administrative capacity to effectively and efficiently assist in first-stage post harvest 
handling and marketing and to sell inputs to farmers. While local institutions have a 
comparative advantage in these activities, they are at a comparative disadvantage in 
exporting and further processing of products. 
14. For long-term success for each crop, agricultural research needs to be addressed. Without 
research, Peru production technologies will lag behind other countries and producers will 
gradually lose market competitiveness. At present, there is a need for research on the mix of 
cacao plants for resistance to disease and yield and production of high quality beans. The 
same issues hold true for palm oil plant varieties to achieve high yielding plants resistant to 
disease and adaptable to a variety of soil and climate conditions.
13
Local universities and ICT (Institute of Tropical Crops) are desirable institutions to involve in 
applied research to address production, processing and marketing problems. Businesses 
will primarily fund research that is needed to resolve processing and marketing issues. More 
difficult is the funding of research to resolve production issues. In this context, there is a role 
for the ―Mesas Técnicas‖ in supporting effective coordination among the institutions and 
organizations supporting and promoting each product. This is important to assure that 
appropriate varieties are available for the range of soils and climate conditions in the areas 
where these crops will be planted as replacements for coca.
Many competitor countries benefit from research funded by governments and private 
businesses and funding available to producer groups. In Peru there have been prior ―check￾off‖ programs that discount a small amount of payments to producers from sales to 
commercial buyers, which funds are then used to support research to benefit producers. 2
Typically producer groups are the primary but not the only decision-makers to determine 
how these funds are used.
Conclusion: ADP should support ongoing 
and emerging efforts to form technical 
groups, federations or institutions that 
support production of palm oil and cacao. 
ADP should also ensure that 
representatives of the private sector are
represented in these advisory groups as 
active participants. The role of ADP should 
be to promote this concept and provide 
technical assistance. Direct ADP financial 
support should be limited. The GOP, 
regional and local governments, national 
research institutions, producers and 
processors are the primary beneficiaries 
and should provide the funding.
15. OLPASA (Oleaginosas Padre Abad 
S.A., the palm oil processing plant near 
Aguaytia) is promoting the creation of a 
―Fondo Palmero‖ that would be available to 
fund expansion of palm oil plantations by 
making available credit for longer periods 
than commercial financial institutions are 
willing to lend. This fund would receive 
some of the ―earnings‖ of OLPASA and also 
 
2
 ―Check-offs‖ are programs that discount by a small percent or amount payments to producers. The 
funds generated support promotion of markets for the products, improvement of production technologies, 
lobbying for an improved production environment, and other activities that benefit the sector. Producers 
vote to select their representatives that guide the ―check-off‖ programs. 
Figure 5 Young producing oil palm trees in 
Shambillo Valley
Source: Weidemann´s Team
14
solicit funding from various levels of Peruvian government and from donors. 3
 
Conclusion: Depending on how the fund is structured, ADP should support the initiative to 
create a ―Fondo Palmero‖ with revenues from OLPASA, which might then be in a position to 
leverage additional resources from USAID and/or COFIDE (Corporación Financiera d 
Desarrollo, S.A.). Subsidized operating costs and interest rates should be avoided. Support 
by donors for this fund may be greater if other farmer-owned palm oil processing plants in 
the region participate.
16. As the number of producers increases, the effectiveness of direct extension agent-to￾producer assistance declines as the time between visits grows longer and longer. One 
relatively new ADP approach is selection and training of producers to become agricultural 
promoters. These promoters are trained producers who can respond to many of the 
questions that new producers have. The extension agents supervise their work and provide 
to promoters continuous training to keep them updated with improved cultural practices. 
Many institutions in Peru use promoters; most are unpaid, although they may receive 
benefits in kind and other recognition. ADP promoters are called on frequently to help other 
producers resolve production problems that preserve or increase their income. For 
sustainability, these promoters should be paid, at first by ADP but eventually by the 
producers they serve. 
Conclusion: ADP should expand as quickly as possible alternatives to the current practice 
of face-to-face extension agent-to-producer technical assistance by using skilled producers 
in the community or in a nearby community to improve service to newer growers. These 
local promoters would work under the direction of ADP supported extension agents. The 
local promoters should be compensated for their services, with all or nearly all of that 
compensation paid by beneficiaries. 
A title other than ―promoter‖ would better distinguish their skills and the work of these 
persons to increase producer income compared to the activities of most other promoters in 
the village. 
17. The presence of the GOP in the production areas where ADP works is minimal. Reduced 
budgets to local municipalities minimize their participation in community development. 
Regional governments now appear to have some funds that can be made available for 
additional support to economic and business development activities. They are beginning to 
use some of these funds to support activities parallel to ADP and to support infrastructure 
improvement in rural areas. While most local and regional political officials praised the 
concept of decentralization, many considered the process of participatory budgeting 
(presupuesto participativo) a futile exercise. 
Conclusion: ADP should continue supporting regional and local governments in those 
areas with the capacity to support alternative development program goals. Decisions 
 
3
 Earnings of OLPASA are paid as dividends to the Association (ASPASH) and individual investors and 
are used in part to support technical assistance to producers and to provide inputs to growers. 
15
regarding the type and time length of support should be made on a case-by-case basis. 
Mostly this support by ADP would consist of short -term technical assistance. 
18. Current interdiction of chemical inputs for coca leaf processing does not appear to be 
effective in some areas. Some specialists interviewed suggested that perhaps two to four 
percent of these inputs are interdicted. It could make a difference in reducing coca 
cultivation if interdiction is increased. Several coca producers interviewed by the team were 
coca producers during the time that President Fujimori increased interdiction, causing the 
price of coca leaf to fall below profitable levels, effectively reducing coca production. These 
producers said that if the same were to happen today they would stop growing coca.
Conclusion: Continue to encourage the GOP to aggressively interdict chemical inputs for 
coca leaf processing, which would support ADP activities by reducing the economic 
incentive for coca production. 
19. Many farmers under the ―voluntary eradication‖ strategy retain small areas of coca leaf 
production. Coca serves as a source of ―caja chica,‖ to cover urgent cash needs and the 
expansion of licit crops. 
Conclusion: ADP should consider increasing consultations with communities, municipal 
and regional governments, and GOP representatives to identify policies or processes that 
would provide incentives to communities to reduce the number of small plots of coca. Many 
local communities would welcome this support.
20. The strengthening of producer associations and cooperatives will require a review of current 
tax regulations that have been designed with urban institutions in mind. The distortions 
created by these regulations are creating inefficiencies in operations. Some business 
transactions are made at night to avoid SUNAT (Superintendencia Nacional de 
Administración Tributaria) efforts to track taxable activities. 
Conclusion: Work with policy specialists to assess the impact of current tax administration 
policies and processes on rural and small town businesses that service agricultural 
producers and make recommendations.
21. Credit available for crop expansion is a limiting factor for most producers in the regions 
supported by ADP. For producers new to licit crops, credit is unavailable from commercial 
financial institutions. For producers with farms with tree crops of three or more years, 
production credit is beginning to become available. Financial institutions are making credit 
available based on expected production, often through producer associations and with the 
support of companies that are buying the product. 
Values for land that produces palm oil, cacao or coffee trees appear to be sufficient in many 
areas to serve as collateral for mortgage-backed loans for households with land titles. The 
team was informed by specialists that income streams from cacao and palm oil is sufficient 
to make payments on loans to producers that are large enough to extend production by 
several hectares. 
Palm oil producers with excellent credit histories should soon enjoy offers of credit from area 
financial institutions for crop expansion. Producers with trees more than three years old and 
16
that are reaching expected yields have net incomes and properties valued sufficiently to 
acquire loans to expand production by two to four hectares with a payback period of two to 
three years. Palm producers are more concentrated by location and will likely be the first to 
enjoy credit availability. Cacao producers have equally attractive income prospects and 
property values as palm producers, but are more dispersed, which increases loan 
management costs and increases risk. Lending institutions will go first to the areas where 
earning potential is the greatest.
Producers willing to sign delivery agreements with processing plants may be able to 
facilitate loan access by a full or partial guarantee for the loan. Plant guarantees in palm oil 
production areas are simpler because the cost to deliver product to alternate buyers reduces 
opportunities to sell product outside the terms of the loan agreement.
However, credit guaranteed by a processing plant will only be extended to expand delivery 
of product to that plant. Most growers prefer credit from providers that allow them greater 
flexibility in how they can use the funds, such as purchasing labor-saving equipment or non￾product-specific farm improvements. If markets and farm income continue to perform as 
expected, these credits should become available over the next few years. 
Credit is also needed for modernizing and expanding processing facilities, especially those 
that reduce the cost of delivering farm inputs and post harvest handling and farm to market 
collections. 
Conclusion: ADP should continue its work encouraging financial institutions to extend credit 
to those producers with trees of three or more years since planting and other ADP 
supported producers that demonstrate adequate collateral, income and credit history data. 
22. The ―Mesas Técnicas‖ are moving in the right direction to address the needs of each key 
crop. They are gathering data on alternative technical approaches to production and 
attempting to provide coordinated and reliable information to producers on best practices for 
production and post harvest handling of crops. Mesas Técnicas need to be strengthened by 
incorporating representatives of the private sector. 
4
Conclusion: Continue to support the role of ―Mesas Técnicas‖ in maintaining high quality of 
technical assistance to producers. Avoid making these groups regulatory in effect; rather, 
their role should be supportive, to help technical assistance providers deliver high quality 
advice. 
23. The success in coca leaf eradication in San Martin was labeled a ―Miracle‖ by a newspaper 
reporter. Subsequently the term became a common label in USAID/Peru to succinctly 
describe the success of ADP in the region. However, this miracle is actually the result of a 
coordinated effort between regional authorities and international donors, the latter playing a 
dominate role, especially in the early years. Support of regional authorities for licit crops 
began about five years ago.
 
4
 Mesas Tecnicas are informal groups of crop production specialists that meet to establish high standards 
for technical assistance provided to growers of ADP supported crops and to encourage providers to follow 
these standards. ADP is providing technical assistance to these groups. 
17
Conclusion: Rather than perpetuating the ―miracle‖ label, which is a nice sound bite but not 
true, focus on telling the real story of the region: USAID/Peru (through ADP and other 
programs and U.S. and Peruvian government activities, and with help from certain Peruvian 
institutions) provided key support that empowered ordinary citizens in the region to stand up 
and refuse to grow coca, thus driving the narco-traffickers and pro-coca interests from their 
communities. Their financial sacrifice was significant; in exchange, they gained a preferred 
lifestyle with a future.
24. The term ―graduate‖ has multiple meanings and may confuse more than clarify 
USAID/Peru‘s objectives for alternative development in San Martin and Pucallpa. 
Conclusion: Considering comments by and conversations with USAID/Peru personnel, the 
evaluation team suggests a focus on ―strengthening‖ local institutions to continue 
agricultural and rural development rather than on ―graduating.‖ The evaluation team 
understands ―graduate‖ as used in the question in the SOW to mean ―to arrange in grades 
or gradations.‖ Thus some producers and associations and cooperatives need assistance 
for several years and some can continue with minimal assistance. How to determine the 
appropriate level of assistance and how to deliver that assistance are critical questions for 
all program stakeholders. 
25. One factor that contributed to the success of Tocache`s programmed eradication was the 
continuous eradication that took place from 2002 onward, which demonstrated to 
communities in the area considering replacement options the viability of replacement crops 
supported by ADP and the reduction of violence that follows. 
Conclusion: Likewise, in some areas of Aguaytia ADP can demonstrate positive results of 
income from replacement crops from prior voluntary eradication and the reduction in 
violence in participating communities. Other areas in Aguaytia have little or no prior 
eradication history to demonstrate positive results. In these areas examples of positive 
results will come from other areas in Aguaytia, or Tocache or Pucallpa. 
26. Some producers reason thus: High coca prices provide incentives to produce. The GOP 
could lower coca prices by interdiction of precursors as it did during the administration of 
President Fujimori. Because interdiction does not occur, the GOP actually favors (ultimately) 
increased production of coca. Producers in the Aguaytia area were more likely to express 
the above logic than producers in other regions visited by the team. 
Conclusion: Actions by the GOP that demonstrate a commitment to sustained coca 
reduction will enhance results for ADP.
27. GOP support for the construction of the highway linking San Martin with the coastal region 
of Peru and a number of electrification projects have contributed to the region`s overall 
development, making it the main supplier of rice in the country, and second in cacao and 
palmito production. 
Conclusion: Continue to encourage and support GOP efforts to improve roads from the 
region to consumption centers in Peru. 
28. The number of communities with coca in the northern San Martin area is declining. 
18
Conclusion: A new strategy and new mechanisms of implementation should take place in 
the San Martin region. This new strategy should focus on strengthening local institutions or 
developing institutions and subcontracting with them for support in community development, 
democracy and governance, production support, and other activities needed for 
consolidation. Eventually only a small ADP staff should remain in this region, with its primary 
tasks to maintain the technical quality of services, to identify and strengthen local institutions 
to take on the funding of these services, and to train or retrain local service providers as
needed. 
29. Some associations and cooperatives supported by ADP focus more on meeting donor 
needs than producer needs.
Conclusion: When organizing or working with new associations and cooperatives, producer 
owners need to clearly define why the association is needed, how much they are willing to 
invest in their institution, and how that investment will occur. Assure that the institution 
management focuses first on meeting customer needs. 
30. The team noted the apparent assumption by some ADP personnel that marketing and 
processing institutions will continue the training of new producers when in fact these 
practices might not survive the end of subsidies for new producer training. 
Advanced training and technical assistance may be provided by commercial buying and 
selling institutions. 
Conclusion: For training producers, who are eliminating coca, expand consideration of 
potential training institutions beyond associations and cooperatives. Including other training 
institutions in the mix of options will facilitate the transfer to Peruvian institutions of the 
training and technical assistance functions of ADP. However, like commercial buyers, other 
training institutions will likewise cease training when funds are exhausted. Encourage 
regional and municipal governments to support and help fund training in their areas. 
Program budgets should include sufficient funds for at least basic training for new producers 
of licit crops and TA (technical assistance) until they have products to sell. Once producers 
are selling product, ongoing technical assistance may be needed as well as partial subsidies 
for some crops, especially those for which selling outside the contract is difficult to control. 
31. The staff of the actual ADP main implementer Chemonics and its subcontractors totals 533 
persons. Technical specialists account for 68 percent of the total, directors and 
coordinators–12 percent, and administration and monitoring–20 percent. Personnel in San 
Martin and Tocache account for 47 percent of personnel. 
Conclusion: The share of personnel in San Martin and Tocache may reflect past program 
activities but may not reflect current program priorities, suggesting the need for a plan to 
decrease and reposition personnel 
19
I.2.1 Social Capital 
Social capital has multiple definitions and uses. This evaluation used the term as defined by 
Robert Putnam: ―Social capital refers to the features of social organizations such as networks, 
norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual trust.‖ 5
 
Thus social capital here refers to the members of a society that have learned to trust others, 
resulting in cooperation in the formation of new groups and associations, and through this 
cooperation, execute mutual activities for the development of the society. Mahyar Arefi identifies 
this consensus building as a direct positive indicator of social capital. Consensus implies 
―shared interest‖ and agreement among various actors and stakeholders to induce collective 
action. Collective action is thus an indicator 
of increased social capital.6
 
ADP has generated social capital. People 
and communities listen to the presentations 
of ADP and make decisions to change their 
behavior. That change is based on a 
determination that the information presented 
by ADP is likely true and that the promised 
results will conform to their goals and hopes 
as a community. Communities investigate 
the claims by ADP of past performance and 
assess whether ADP can deliver what they 
are promising. Learning of the experience of 
producers in nearby areas is an important 
means of verifying the claims by ADP and 
building trust in the process of conversion to 
licit crops. 
In the area of northern San Martin, cacao is 
contributing to the strengthening of social 
networks including of institutions and political 
networks that were debilitated by narco-trafficking. ADP provided a vision of what the 
community could be, offering an integrated program, a pillar of which was adequate and reliable 
income to replace coca. To that were added investments to remove physical barriers to an 
improved economy. ADP efforts to strengthen community leadership and to promote group 
action through meetings, discussions, farmer field schools, shared investments in local 
cooperatives for training, technical assistance and post harvest and marketing activities have 
increased the ability of communities to work toward shared values. In the process, ADP 
developed social capital, as demonstrated by the trust communities demonstrated in following 
the path offered by ADP for improved communities. As the first instance of measurable 
 
5
 Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: America‘s Declining Social Capital, Journey of Democracy, The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1995. 
6 Wikipedia, ―Social Capital‖ – http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_capital.
Community Members Stand Up to Narco￾Traffickers - Motivate their Departure
In an interview in a town in the Province of 
Mariscal Caceres an official stated that ADP 
entered and drove the narco-traffickers out of 
their community.
How did ADP do that, asked a team member? 
ADP personnel came without police, without 
firearms, and usually came one to two at a time. 
Exactly, what did ADP do to drive out the narco￾traffickers.
After a few seconds reflection, the official 
recognized that community members were the 
change agents that drove the narco-traffickers 
from communities. They did that by agreeing as a 
group to end coca production and sticking with 
that agreement, despite significant reduction in 
their immediate income, long-term reduction in 
income and threats to their livelihoods and 
sometimes threats of physical violence. ADP‘s 
role was secondary; supporting the hope that the
promised results justified their sacrifices. 
20
collective action, community members rejected existing leadership and selected economic 
activities they hoped would produce greater personal, family and community satisfaction and 
adequate economic benefits over the long term. These decisions required intermediate-term 
sacrifice of income in exchange for the hope for a better community environment several years 
later. 
Other evidence of social capital generated by ADP includes the investments of community 
members in associations and cooperatives to improve training, acquisition of production inputs, 
and improved and value added post harvest and marketing activities of their products. 
Interviews by the team with producers demonstrate a strong perception of positive outcomes 
associated with these cooperative activities. 
Conclusion: Hundreds of communities have listened to how ADP can help reduce violence and 
terrorism in their communities and provide adequate long-term income after coca eradication. 
After verifying ADP‘s claims, most communities decide to undertake collective actions 
recommended by ADP and that they believe will produce positive results. They understand that 
household income will be significantly less during the period that replacement crops are 
immature and that when replacement crops are mature, projected income may still be less than 
anticipated income from coca. This is the evidence that ADP has acquired social capital. 
The actions that the communities take require sacrifice of part of their household income in the 
short-term, increased uncertainty of economic outcomes, a change in community leadership 
and increased personal physical risk during the period of transition, and long-term behavior 
change to prosper within the licit economy. 
The hoped for outcome is a tranquil and safe community, adequate household income, 
intermediate- and long-term wealth creation, and a place of honor in the community. Because of 
the improved stability and business environment that results from production of licit crops, 
household investments have increased potential to generate long-term wealth. 
I.3 LESSONS LEARNED 
Below are the significant lessons learned that can serve to improve future interventions. The 
order of presentation does not indicate the level of importance to successful or challenged 
implementations in other locations. Some lessons are documented with empirical data, some 
but not all of which is presented in this document. Other lessons learned arise from thoughtful 
consideration of the team, and stakeholder experience, comments and recommendations. 
1. The critical first step for any ADP intervention in productive activities arises from selling an 
intangible to communities in the target areas—hope that the departure of pro-coca interests 
will reduce violence and terrorism in the community, hope that the new crops proposed by 
ADP will provide adequate and reliable income, hope that households will have sufficient 
food and resources until the new tree crops most often proposed by ADP generate 
substantial income, and finally hope in the promised infrastructure investments, production 
training and technical assistance, community development support, and that the promised 
changes in quality of life will actually occur. 
21
On the other side are well financed pro-coca interests that are persistent in their efforts to 
destroy the hope being offered by ADP, DEVIDA, and the United States and Peruvian 
governments. Supporting ADP, they argue, requires an unreasonable sacrifice of your right 
to a prosperous life; you are producing what the market wants. Also they say, ―Consider the 
many times the government promised and failed to end your poverty. It is foolish to believe 
them now.‖ 
That many communities select the option offered by ADP demonstrates that social capital 
has been created over eight years of program implementation. Communities or groups of 
producers voluntarily select actions that require sacrifice and greater risk that they believe 
will be to their long-term benefit. 
2. Community Development should be the overall ADP focus, not income. The hope that most 
drives change is a desire for a more family friendly community environment. That hope is 
driven more by women than by men. A violence-free community is a strongly desired result, 
which the competition (pro-coca interests) cannot deliver. 
Focusing on income allows the competition to claim that they offer superior results. 
Furthermore, putting income first when promoting ADP may reduce the attractiveness of 
ADP‘s offer to that portion of the community that most wants violence and terrorism to end—
the women. 
3. After assurances of a new community environment, adequate and reliable income becomes 
the next big question for a community considering leaving illicit crops. Crops proposed by 
ADP to replace coca have to sustain the hope that the household and community can 
survive the change, that their sacrifices will be recompensed with long-term economic 
growth. If ADP cannot adequately answer the second question the hope will rapidly 
diminish. 
4. Identifying key market signals and trends helps to design effective interventions, are much 
less costly to implement, and tend to produce superior results. The principal ADP crops of 
cacao, palm oil, and coffee all enjoy attractive market prices and international demand. 
Given the scale of change caused by eradicating 10,000 hectares per year, ADP should 
only promote proven crops that can absorb production by 500 or more producers.
None of the ―minor‖ crops promoted by ADP, such as pineapple, platano, livestock and 
pastures, palmito, small animals or any of the others, provided hope for change as well as 
did the three primary crops. The evaluation team considered more than a dozen minor crops 
and livestock products, none of which meet the requirements to be added to the list of the 
three primary crops promoted by ADP. 
Households value security and a peaceful way of living more than the superior monetary 
income coming from coca leaf production. Alternative crops that yield incomes per hectare 
less than coca have replaced coca. Farm income from replacement crops must be sufficient 
to sustain a family‘s basic needs plus a surplus large enough for the family to plan for 
economic growth. 
22
5. Infrastructure investments are effective to build and sustain hope for two reasons. First they 
remove barriers to production, processing and marketing of new crops. Second, they 
motivate a community to become and remain coca free. 
Investments in productive activities and infrastructure are key bargaining components. Many 
a community was ―pushed over the top‖ and decided to enter ADP because of the offered 
investments in productive activities and infrastructure, ―fixing‖ frustrating limitations the 
community had lived with for years, and sometimes a few community members able to 
initiate a desired small project. 
A few communities may request infrastructure investments that have a stronger social than 
productive objective. Examples of requests for social investments include community 
centers, sports fields, education and health facilities. While ADP personnel strongly 
encourage communities to select investments that increase income, social investments may 
advance program objectives by motivating removal of illicit and planting of licit crops. 
6. Programmed eradication motivates communities towards change, speeds community 
decision-making and reduces level of effort (LOE) and investment costs by ADP. The 
transition period from coca to new crops is compressed into fewer days. During the 
transition there are heavy demands for information, many discussions with community 
members, and sometimes heightened risk for ADP personnel. The benefit, however, is 
earlier departure from the community of pro-coca interests, faster change in community 
leadership, earlier decisions to change course, and enhanced commitment to live without 
coca. There are fewer alternatives for participating communities to consider and fewer 
opportunities for the opposition to create uncertainty in households. 
7. Alliances with local authorities are desirable to speed up the process of adoption of new 
crops, especially after post eradication. In most communities with dense coca production, 
the political system will not be favorable. But an unfavorable political environment does not 
necessarily block ADP success. 
In the Peru environment with 
relatively open and competitive 
elections, the political leadership will 
change with the changing positions 
of community members. Political 
leadership in San Martin and Ucayali 
and many of the municipalities is now 
favorable to licit crops. These two 
regional governments are now 
partners with ADP in training 
producers, improving infrastructure, 
and attempting to establish more 
favorable rural and agricultural 
development policies. 
One ADP strategy is to divide tasks 
according to the interests of local 
Figure 6 Young cacao tree in Tocache area
Source: Weidemann´s Team
23
institutions. Regional and local governments may be tasked with establishing policies that 
foster an enabling environment for agricultural production and agribusiness growth and 
attracting investment into the region. These same governments often will invest in new or 
refurbished infrastructure.7
 ADP can focus on selling hope to communities, transferring 
modern technological packages to producers, and providing additional infrastructure that 
governments cannot fund. 
8. To enhance effectiveness in post eradication areas, ADP technicians must differentiate 
themselves from CORAH. Working in close proximity to CORAH creates the impression 
among many residents that ADP and CORAH are linked. When ADP has worked close to 
CORAH operations, some residents concluded that ADP personnel were serving as 
informants for CORAH. 
The boundaries established by CORAH for eradication may not coincide with community 
boundaries. So while CORAH may have moved their base of operations to another 
community, they may still be eradicating coca within the boundaries of a prior community. 
Timing ADP‘s entry into a community is important. Entering too soon may reduce 
effectiveness of ADP activities with increased risk to personnel. Wait too long and ADP is 
not present when their skills are most needed by the community. In Tocache, continuous 
eradications for at least three months were required before ADP could effectively work in the 
area.
9. Support for establishing local producer associations or cooperatives have been popular 
interventions with producers. Many producers of coffee and cacao deliver farm output to 
their local associations, even though some for-profit buyers offer higher prices. Producers 
believe that a farmer-owned association will generate higher margins and better control over 
the marketing of their production in the intermediate- to long-term.8
 
In that belief they are correct. Producer-owned and -controlled cooperatives and 
associations in many countries achieve high market shares for sales of farm inputs, 
including credit, collection and first stage post harvest handling of farm outputs. 9
 Serving 
that market is their strength. Selling branded consumer products is not their strength; few 
cooperatives achieve high market shares in that market segment. 
10. Seldom did livestock work as a desirable alternative for coca leaf production. Lack of 
experience in managing livestock led to decreased soil fertility, less nutrition available from 
pastures and increased deforestation. 
 
7
 With the decentralization process the regional governments now have disposable funds to make these 
investments while municipal governments receive less funding from decentralization and have limited 
capacity for new investments. 
8
 Most producer-owned cooperatives and associations will require ten or more years of support by donors 
before they become sustainable. 
9
 Cooperatives and associations have a high market share for delivery of credit to producers in the US 
and some European countries. In the US, producer-owned cooperatives and associations enjoy implied 
government support for funding of producer credit. 
24
11. In addition to the differences in climate and soils between Tocache and Aguaytia, the 
introduction of technological packages must take into account the place where migrants are 
coming from. Producers in Tocache usually came from the northern ―sierra,‖ while migrants 
to Aguaytia are mostly from the central ―sierra‖ (Huanuco, Junin, Ayacucho). Farmers from 
each ―sierra‖ have different values, traditions and agricultural production experience that are 
transferred into the areas to which they move. The former are more experienced in livestock 
while the later tend to give more attention to crop production. 
12. It is feasible to recover soils degraded by continuous coca cultivation through adequate 
fertilization and organic matter replenishing. Kudzu and dolomite available in the region 
contribute to this process. 
25
SECTION II: APPLYING THE TOCACHE EXPERIENCE TO 
INTERVENTIONS IN AGUAYTIA-HUIPOCA 
Favorable outcomes for the Alternative Development Program are demonstrated by the 
hundreds of Peruvian households that have rejected coca leaf production for an improved 
community environment and preferred lifestyles, with adequate and reliable income from 
legitimate crops supporting long-term wealth creation. 
Following voluntary eradication of coca in Tocache for more 
than half a decade, programmed eradication began in mid 
2006 After the first eradication of the zone, a majority of 
producers replanted their coca, not realizing that as part of the 
new approach being implemented, CORAH, the Peruvian 
Government agency carrying out the eradication, would return 
and remove replanted coca. Only after the third pass by CORAH through the eradication zone 
did a significant majority of producers realize that coca eradication would be repeated until the 
crop was eradicated. Repeated eradications in the zone continued for about five months. 
Three years later there is very little coca in the zone, and replacement crops supported by ADP 
(palm oil, cacao and coffee) are beginning to generate sufficient income to motivate private 
sector investment to expand the hectares in production. Communities in rural areas have 
returned to their traditional peaceful and family-friendly lifestyles. Political leaders that previously 
supported illicit crops have changed their allegiance to licit crops or have been replaced, and 
interest in and support for agricultural and rural development is beginning to emerge. Private 
sector investors, including producers, are now investing in post harvest handling and processing 
and marketing businesses related to the crops supported by ADP. Producers invest with the 
hope of increased returns from improved efficiencies in post harvest handling, improved 
marketing power, and reduced costs of production inputs. Businesses invest to expand their 
capacity to process and market crops, to improve operations efficiency, and to expand their 
marketing capacity. 
II.1 WHY PRODUCERS JOINED ADP 
The evaluation team utilized stakeholder and focus group interviews to learn why producers had 
joined ADP and why they continue their participation in ADP. A discussion guide was prepared 
to help insure that key issues were raised in each interview. While the initial questions asked 
were consistent, the way interviewees responded suggests their priorities, the reasons behind 
those priorities, and the processes that occurred during the period when communities were 
deciding whether to participate with ADP. Follow-up questions allowed the team to probe more 
deeply into the reasons why ADP was successful in Tocache. 
Three dominant motivating factors emerged as the reasons communities selected to participate 
with ADP, as follows: 
1. A desire to remove violence and terrorism from the community, 
―With coca we had cash, but 
little wealth.‖
A prior coca producer, now 
an ADP supported producer.
26
2. ADP‘s promise that adequate and reliable income would result from the proposed crops 
to replace coca, and 
3. The benefits from infrastructure and social investments offered by ADP to facilitate the 
transition to a licit economy.10
Tocache communities participating in programmed eradication had one additional frequent 
comment: ―What else can we do?‖ This comment reflects the accelerated decision-making 
process precipitated by the sudden and complete elimination of income from coca production. 
Some producers required three or more eradications of their replanted coca before 
comprehension settled in that coca growing would truly no longer be tolerated. 
In the process of deciding to join ADP, communities first considered the two above-described 
factors. Women most frequently cited the first, and nearly always it was the first mentioned, and 
in the judgment of the team, their most strongly expressed reason to eradicate coca. 
To the same question, men more frequently mentioned the second factor, which was nearly 
always their first response. 
Considering the frequency and passion in the responses of the interviewees, it is the opinion of 
the evaluation team that these two factors were the first considerations and decisive, with 
women as key change agents. 
II.1.1 Remove violence and terrorism: Improved Quality of Life 
Community members participating in the team‘s interviews clearly associated the violence and 
terrorism in their communities with coca leaf production. When coca was the dominate crop, 
decisions in their communities were dominated by those persons that were trafficking in drugs 
along with cooperating coca producers. The entry of ADP, with their subcontractors, DEVIDA 
and others, offered sufficient hope for those members of the community who preferred a 
violence-free environment to raise their voices and precipitate discussions that previously had 
 
10 One of the principal approaches for this evaluation was key stakeholder interviews and including focus 
groups when the situation was appropriate. Because of their dynamic structure stakeholder interviews 
capture additional information from respondents that was not anticipated prior to the interview and 
measure subjectively the intensity with which certain opinions and viewpoints are held. This is an effective 
approach to identify the reasons why persons engaged in specific behavior. 
Because the team separated into several groups to reach a wider group of stakeholders interview 
discussion guides were prepared. These discussion guides focused on the questions contained in the 
Statement of Work. The questions were open-ended and designed to draw out stakeholder views, 
opinions and recommendations related to the ADP program. As interviews progressed evaluation team 
members probed deeper into specific issues as needed to clearly comprehend the actions of the 
stakeholders as they participated in or observed the actions of the ADP program and to capture their 
recommendations. 
Team members met frequently and reviewed responses from stakeholders, referring to notes taken 
during the interviews. Those notes recorded stakeholder opinions, actions and reactions to events, data 
on inputs and outcomes of the program and occasionally specific comments by stakeholders. This 
discussion process included data on the frequency of the most strongly held response by each 
community. 
27
been seldom tolerated. As these discussions progressed, more and more households opted to 
attempt building a coca free community. 
Selling an intangible such as hope is a skill distinct from all other program operations of ADP. 
Getting a community to join ADP is ―selling an intangible.‖ A few principles apply. 
People purchase intangibles from persons they trust. Trust is built by the seller first 
understanding well the needs (desired end results) of the buyers, or households in the 
community. The seller and his or her team must be transparent. The ADP team must do the 
right thing for households in the community. 
Some things that ADP is doing help make the hope it is selling more tangible, such as 
documentation of results of like communities, testimonials from like households using the 
service (study tours), and collaboration with the community in building some infrastructures 
partly with local labor and materials. 
Most agronomists, business development, communication or governance specialists, or 
program administrators would have little training or experience in selling intangibles. However, 
those persons that will be delivering the actual services should be in the room when the 
intangibles are being offered and discussed. In the environment surrounding the work of ADP 
face time with the buyers is critical. And ADP has learned that the seller, the person that gained 
the trust of the community has to remain attached to the project, with periodic visits and be 
available when needed for problem solving or when planned services to the community need to 
be changed in any way. 
Persons selling insurance, financial investments, image creation services in mass media, 
product promotion campaigns, and similar sectors will likely have training and skills in selling 
intangibles. 
II.1.2 Adequate and Reliable Income 
The three principal crops offered by ADP 
(cacao, palm oil and coffee) demonstrated 
adequate and reliable income, even if that 
income mostly appeared over the medium- and 
long-term. For those with trees in production the 
income was adequate and reliable. This 
comment was made by producers with 
producing but young trees, of 4 or 5 years old. 
In addition, ADP had value chain models that worked including farm inputs, technical assistance 
to growers, a reliable production technology within the existing or acquirable skills of community 
households, support for post harvest handling of crops and first stage processing by producer 
groups, buyers including exporters, and in many cases, manufacturing and product 
“We are respected members of our 
community; we can approach and talk to 
anyone. As a coca producer, if I saw the 
police on the road ahead, I would slip into 
the forest and hide until they were gone.”
A producer selling product to the 
Cooperativa Agroindustrial de Tocache
28
transformation. Fortunately for ADP, the need for market development for the three key crops 
was limited; eager buyers already existed for those crops.11
 
Income projections for producers are generated by the potential yields of replacement crops and 
the markets for farm inputs and outputs. Prices are dictated by the market. USAID can vary the 
potential returns to producers by inserting improved technology that reduces costs and/or 
increases yields and/or quality of products harvested, or promise subsidies. Of course, 
sustainable interventions are preferable. 
A less frequent but important reason for joining ADP mentioned by households was payments 
for labor for eliminating coca, building roads, and other infrastructure projects. 
Households with children at home mentioned education for children as an important secondary 
consideration. As anticipated, females mentioned education more frequently than males. 
However, the comments about education were seldom linked to school improvements by ADP. 
More common was the comment that children could now attend school because of reduced 
violence. A related benefit was that children were now more frequently given tasks to help with 
food production and household chores, a less utilized ―education‖ technique when the 
household was primarily a coca producer. 
Every producer that was asked responded that they earned less cash income now than they did 
producing coca. 
The offer by ADP for study tours ―pasantias‖ to other communities was well received and 
allowed households to confirm the statements of results by ADP and helped to sustain the hope 
that life beyond coca was feasible and preferable. 
How to survive during the three to four years before the primary crops would produce significant 
income preoccupied households in all communities. In Tocache, common short-term crops were 
maize or rice for the first year and platano in the second to the fourth or fifth year. Platano also 
provided shade to young cacao trees.
During voluntary eradication, ADP provided seeds or plants for these short-term crops along 
with technical assistance. In Tocache it was learned that producers already knew how to 
acquire the planting material and how to produce these short-term crops. Additional assistance 
from ADP was seldom needed for these crops. In areas with good agricultural production 
potential, experienced producers and relatively easy access to markets as existed in Tocache, 
ADP can focus on getting producers to adopt best practices in the production and post harvest 
handling of primary crops. In other areas with less productive agricultural resources, that are 
more distant from markets or have poorly trained producers or immigrant producers not familiar 
with agricultural crops in the region, support for short-term crops planted for temporary 
subsistence and income may still be required. 
To mitigate risk, every producer strives to have two or more cash crops or products to sell. For 
this second economic activity producers in Tocache grew a variety of crops or animal products 
 
11 Many of the eager buyers of producers output were institutions that USAID/Peru, GOP and other 
donors helped to establish and supported. These institutions were selling to local and foreign buyers. 
During the existence of ADP, world markets for these three crops had attractive prices with many buyers 
seeking additional sources of supply. 
29
that are sold in local markets. It was not necessary for ADP to provide the second cash crop, 
neither in Tocache nor in Northern San Martin. It appears that a focus on the primary crop is 
sufficient and that producers in all regions will identify and plant a second or more income crops 
on their own initiative. 
Once communities decided that the hope generated by ADP‘s presentations was valid, the 
discussions progressed to exactly how the transition would occur, adding issues of 
infrastructure and social investments to the discussions and determining exactly when and how 
those activities would occur. Primarily ADP offered infrastructure and social investments to 
remove barriers to production and marketing of licit crops. Some investments by ASP 
responded to specific requests by the community for improved services, infrastructure or 
funding to establish crops or livestock products other than the primary crops supported by 
ADP.12
 
II.1.3 Infrastructure and Social Investments 
Satisfied with the reduction in violence and income projections, community members next 
considered infrastructure improvements that were offered to enhance production and post 
harvest handling and marketing. More than a few communities mentioned that negotiations on 
investments provided an important incentive to join ADP. Nearly every community first 
mentioned roads and bridges as the key infrastructure investment that persuaded community 
families to joint ADP. Electrical service was mentioned occasionally. 
Infrastructure and social investments served two purposes. The first was to remove barriers that 
create inefficiencies in the value chain. Nearly all communities need significant investments to 
improve access to markets, or to improve post harvest handling and marketing that is best done 
at or close to the production sites.
The second purpose was to ―complete the buy-in‖ by offering those items especially desired by 
the community. This might include additional technical assistance for other crops or small 
animals, help with short-term food crops, a refurbished school or medical services, or 
assistance in establishing a producer association to facilitate post harvest handling, for 
example. 
The ability of ADP to counsel communities to select wisely the investments that can best 
support their economic development is an important skill. Likewise the flexibility to deliver a wide 
range of investments is an important program element. 
Investments in schools, medical posts, and community structures were seldom mentioned as 
benefits in interviews with the team in Tocache. In fact, during programmed eradication in 
Tocache, there were few investments in these areas. Because these investments were reported 
 
12 Proposing to completely change a community‘s primary source of income is asking them to make a 
gigantic, life changing decision. A decision of such magnitude generates strong emotions and is always 
complex with fluid decision-making processes. The simplified processes described above reflect the 
team‘s efforts to identify the primary reasons and processes leading to a decision to join ADP. 
30
in prior evaluations as appreciated components in voluntary eradication programs, team 
members began asking about them if they were not mentioned voluntarily by interviewees. 
When this happened, in most communities one or a few members of the group remembered 
that there had been investments in health, education and other community projects. Whether 
those investments were physically located within the community the team was interviewing or in 
a nearby community was seldom clarified in the stakeholder interviews. 
Much of the investments in health and education are directed at Provinces, Regions or GOP 
institutions, and consequently they may or may not be perceived by community members as a 
part of ADP. 
II.1.4 Why Neighbors Did Not Join ADP Groups 
The evaluation team asked those participating in the ADP program what reasons their 
neighbors gave for not participating. The most frequent response was that they did not believe 
the offer presented by ADP, followed by the lack of roads and access to their parcels, and that 
establishing new crops is expensive. In their presentations ADP offered to put in roads or other 
infrastructure as needed by the community, and subsidies were offered for establishing the first 
one or two hectares. Non joiners either did not comprehend what was contained in these offers 
by the ADP or chose not to believe they would occur. 
Team members purposefully structured the community interviews to take respondents mentally 
back to the period when they were deciding whether or not to join ADP. In this environment 
there likely were significant numbers of pro-coca participants in the discussions. Many of the 
pro-coca interests may have presented their views to neighbors more to promote a pro-coca 
decision than to defend their personal decision. 
A second common response for not joining ADP was a concern for the threats of physical and 
economic reprisals coming from pro-coca interests that would accompany a decision to join. 
Threats by coca interests were experienced by both those that joined and those that did not join. 
In most of the interviews with communities participating in ADP, the issue of threats surfaced. It 
may be that households that did not join with ADP took the threats more seriously. 
II.2 WHY PRODUCERS CONTINUED IN ADP 
The three most important reasons given for continued participation by interviewed producers 
are:
1. The improved quality of life in the community, both in terms of safety and sufficient 
income with replacement crops, 
2. The support for producer associations that provides improved marketing services for their 
products, and 
3. Completion of the items offered by ADP to the community. 
Women reported that the departure of violence improved the environment for child-rearing 
including improved behavior by children, better attention to parental guidance and greater 
31
interest in school. The training provided to improve production skills, on-farm technical 
assistance, and the observed results gave men and women greater confidence in their future 
and confirmed their self-worth; they were producing crops demanded by licit consumers, both in 
Peru and other countries. The technical support was helping them in becoming better 
producers. For producers with trees yielding harvests, their yields and income were beginning to 
increase compared to the income during the transition period. Households now perceived that 
they were or would soon be making economic progress, something few claimed they were doing 
when producing coca. While cash income was easier to earn with coca, household wealth did 
not increase, and desired outcomes such as education of children was not achieved. ―We do not 
need coca to sustain our family. We now have funds for motos (both two- and three-wheeled 
motorcycles) and tools for reducing labor for production and for household tasks,‖ said a 
producer of palm oil in Shambillo. 
ADP has gained credibility with many communities because of its record of completion of the 
items or projects they agree to do. Most communities indicated to the team that community 
members were completely satisfied. Some communities mentioned that the final deliveries 
differed from the original agreement, but that ADP had informed them of the change and worked 
to resolve any issues to the satisfaction of the community. Even in cases where ADP did not do 
everything it had originally agreed to (possibly because of budget issues), the community was 
satisfied with what was carried out. 
A few households, mostly younger producers, mentioned that the replacement crops ―provide 
income to send my children to university.‖ Others, mostly older producers, said the crops ―will 
assure my retirement income.‖ Increased wealth was noted by a number of households, 
primarily in the form of increased land values. 
Support to producer associations was a popular 
benefit offered by ADP. By participating in their 
association, producers felt they were entering the 
processing and marketing chain for their product, 
which would eventually yield them more control 
over their income source and create greater income 
for their product. Whether that will actually occur is 
too early to tell for most associations. A few of the 
more mature institutions, such as the cooperatives 
Naranjillo (Cooperativa Agraria Industrial Naranjillo) 
and ACOPAGRO, are beginning to demonstrate that they can be sustainable and that they can 
achieve the goal of the producers to have greater involvement in post harvest activities for their 
products.13
 
 
13 It is not yet apparent that producers are receiving increased income for their participation in 
associations and the sale of their production to cooperatives. In the few locations we were able to gather 
reliable estimates the associations and cooperatives generally pay slightly less than corporate buyers for 
the same product. When including the later payments to growers after the crop is sold (―reintrego‖) by 
cooperatives, the resulting total payments was sometimes less and sometimes more than that paid by 
buyers of investor-owned companies. 
―I have been selling my coffee to a reliable 
buyer in Lima for eight years. He pays a 
price slightly higher than the local coffee 
producers association. Nevertheless, I now 
sell about 20 percent of my production to 
the association as an investment to help 
them become established in the market.‖
Quote from a producer in the community 
Nuevo Belen/Montecristo
32
II.2.1 Inherent Strengths of Cooperatives in the Value Chain:
14
 
The inherent strengths of producer-owned and -controlled private sector cooperatives worldwide 
are related to serving producers. Cooperatives‘ market share is largest in those market 
segments that deal directly with producers; selling of farm inputs to producers; providing 
services to producers such as product storage, harvesting services, soil testing, technical 
assistance, market analysis, and others; and purchasing and/or handling farm output from 
producers. 
Usually at the farm level there are many sellers 
and few buyers. In this environment, producers 
everywhere seldom trust private sector buyers, 
citing prior failure to honor purchase 
agreements, lack of transparency in the 
business relationship, excessive margins 
earned by buyers or sellers, and abrupt entry 
and departure from the business. Producers 
often turn to cooperatives to offset these 
perceived market imperfections. A second 
important reason that producers cite in forming 
their own cooperatives is that they believe the 
margins their cooperative will earn will be 
passed to the producers as higher prices for their output, or increased dividends paid to 
owners.15
 
All of the cooperatives and associations interviewed by the team are involved in supporting post 
harvest handling and/or processing of farm products. Many are also involved in the supply of 
farm inputs to producers. With these activities they are providing the services/products they are 
best positioned to accomplish well. They are focusing on their strengths. 
II.3 ACTIVITIES WITH GOOD AND WITH LIMITED RESULTS IN 
TOCACHE 
ADP is presently working in more than 1,000 communities, 85 percent of which joined ADP 
under voluntary eradication and 15 percent under programmed eradication. 
 
14 In this section the word cooperatives is used to indicate both cooperatives and producer-owned 
associations that are involved in post harvest handling/processing and/or marketing of farm inputs and 
outputs. Most cooperatives supported by ADP are involved in post harvest handling and/or marketing. 
15 As agricultural products move up the value chain, market shares of cooperatives worldwide become 
smaller very quickly. Only a few cooperatives achieve significant market share in consumer-level 
products. The strength for most cooperatives is the first stage collection and processing of farm output, 
and the last stage delivery of farm inputs to producers. For most cooperatives the manufacture and 
delivery of branded consumer products is a weakness. 
Figure 7 Oil palm plant nursery in Pucallpa
Source: United Nations
33
The Province of Tocache is home to about 72,000 people, of which 60 percent are rural 
residents. There ADP is working in about 127 communities with about 3,800 households, 
approximately 30 households per community. 
USAID/Peru and other institutions have successfully replaced production of coca with licit crops 
in Tocache. The programmed eradication of coca began in 2006, and by 2009 the coca removal 
process was complete. Nearly all of the communities visited by the team in 2010 reported that 
the coca promoters were seldom seen in the community and that most producers had 
eradicated their coca. 
In the judgment of ADP staff the programmed eradication and the following economic 
development efforts of ADP accelerated community decision-making, quickened the 
changeover to licit crops and reduced overall LOE compared to what was required in northern 
San Martin. 
II.3.1 Strategies Generating Good Results 
Programmed Eradication: 
The ADP program in Tocache ―sold‖ to community members hope that after replacing their coca 
they would have a safer and tranquil community, that they could produce other crops that 
returned an adequate and reliable income, that production of the new crops was within their 
skills and capabilities with ADP‘s support, and that investments by ADP would remove 
infrastructure and other limitations to access markets for licit crops. With available program 
resources producers could afford the high costs of materials to establish these crops. 
After programmed eradication, households in Tocache had an additional motivation to join the 
program. ―What else could we do?‖ they said. 
Programmed eradication speeded the departure of pro-coca people from the communities, 
quickly strengthening the position of the remaining community members to say no to pro-coca 
interests and proposed activities. This rejection of pro-coca interests and activities facilitated 
open and frank discussions on the activities that would be best for the community, and helped to 
rebuild trust among community members. These discussions were not always peaceful and 
respectful. Many comments described expressions of strong opinions, threats to existing 
livelihoods, threats of physical violence, past histories of broken promises, departing 
businesses, and personal verbal attacks. High levels of uncertainty, high stress, and disruption 
of household routines were experienced by many. Despite the intensity of these experiences, 
decisions to proceed without coca were often the result. With programmed eradication, these 
decisions were made sooner and with reduced LOE by ADP. 
Post eradication established a modified negotiation strategy of ADP with affected communities, 
which included less infrastructure investment, fewer subsidies, and more sharing of 
responsibilities and costs for investments. The post eradication environment facilitated 
establishing a win-win relationship with ADP and communities, allowing program benefits to 
focus more on income replacement activities and less on other investments and subsidies. The 
result was more quickly negotiated win-win agreements with income generation as the primary 
34
focus and a secondary focus on other social areas like community leadership development, 
governability, and improvements in education, health and the environment, all of which are 
components in building a sense of security, prosperity, inclusion and equity.16
 
A top objective of the community, removal of violence, was accomplished by the actions of 
community members; ADP helped to start and motivate the actions of community members in 
standing up to pro coca interests but had little direct involvement in that process. ADP‘s role 
was to offer a reliable path to sustainable income without coca. 
Nearly all ADP staff that have worked with programmed eradication prefer programmed to 
voluntary eradication. The evaluation team concurs that programmed eradication yields superior 
post eradication results.17
 
Adequate and Reliable Income: 
The offers of income from cacao, palm oil and coffee worked well in Tocache. In this area many 
producers were already familiar with these crops and understood the potential for income 
generation. In the area were old plantations for palm oil owned by state industries, and newer 
plantations of private investors that were yielding fruit. Soil and climate conditions were 
favorable for the three principal crops promoted by ADP. 
Convincing producers to switch was easier in Tocache than it was in Northern San Martin, 
because coca had been eliminated as an alternative crop to produce household income through 
programmed eradication. 
Another important innovation started in Tocache was the decision to support small farmers (ex￾cocaleros) to install more than one hectare (usually two) of trees instead of one. This change 
improved potential income when crops began to yield fruit and improved the speed at which 
additional area can be brought into production, further increasing prospects for household 
income. 
Infrastructure Improvements: 
For many families and communities, ADP‘s offers to improve infrastructure to support the 
production and marketing of alternative crops was crucial in rejecting the arguments of pro-coca 
interests. Assurances of additional investments that would bring additional benefits was the 
variable that kept open the dialog between the communities and ADP and helped to establish 
confidence in the community that ―we can make a change‖ and make that change permanent. 
 
16 Fewer investments in Tocache in non-income generating activities do not imply these other 
investments are not necessary or helpful; they are. In the Tocache environment, with relatively favorable 
agricultural income prospects and coca income eliminated, communities focused on reducing violence 
and replacing income. Other communities with less promising prospects for agricultural income may 
require a higher degree of other investments. Compared to the experience with voluntary eradication, the 
team anticipates that programmed eradication will reduce but not eliminate community requests for 
health, education and other services. 
17 In a meeting with about 10 of the ADP personnel of Tocache in attendance, two persons favored 
voluntary eradication over programmed eradication. 
35
Completing Activities as Agreed with the Communities: 
One of the most important components in sustaining hope is prompt implementation by ADP of 
the agreements the communities signed with DEVIDA. When asked why neighbors did not join 
the ADP assisted group, the most frequent response to the evaluation team was that the non 
joiners did not believe the promises of ADP staff on the assistance with new crops and that 
infrastructure building would occur. 
The ADP focus on integrated community development is critical to establish and sustain hope. 
In the judgment of the evaluation team, if only income from new crops had been promised by 
ADP, fewer communities would have signed up for assistance. While the infrastructure 
investments are critical to persuading the communities to participate, the many benefits (and 
costs) of the various interventions that were offered during the early stages of implementation of 
voluntary eradication are not needed with programmed eradication. What is required is a focus 
on those interventions that support the hope that the rising community leaders can 
communicate to households and which motivates a change in attitudes and actions of 
community members. 
To establish hope, interventions in each community must be selected through community 
consultations, and the wishes and voices of the community must be taken into account. Offering 
a ―one-size fits all‖ community development package does not meet this requirement. Therefore 
the amount of funds available for income and community development cannot be rigidly 
determined by the area of coca eradicated, the number of members in the community, number 
of hectares of new crops, or other such indices. Guidelines on how to take these factors into 
account to arrive at approximate amounts to invest in the community are appropriate.
Communication in Tocache: 
Communication in Tocache under voluntary eradication were designed to motivate communities 
to sign the ―convenio marco,‖ which announced the community decision to replace coca 
production with licit crops. DEVIDA also signed the agreement on behalf of the GOP, and 
established written moral and political obligations to support to the communities through their 
transition. That support was mostly provided by ADP through a variety of activities. The GOP 
joined in that additional support for extending services such as schools, medical facilities and 
supplies, judicial services, roads and other services. Occasionally regional and local 
governments provided support for selected activities. With increased funding, regional 
governments in San Martin and Ucayali are now actively supporting interventions that support 
agricultural and rural development. Many municipal governments also now support agricultural 
and rural development but dedicate few funds to those activities.
The communication program promoted the benefits of a lifestyle that is economically supported 
by licit products. To assist delivery of these messages the communication program trained 162 
persons to advocate for a licit lifestyle. These community spokespersons (―voceros 
comunitarios‖) used community bulletin boards and community loudspeakers to disseminate 
information among community members. ADP supported sporting events between communities, 
called ―caravans for development,‖ which attracted entire families and provided an opportunity 
to hand out pro-licit lifestyle promotional material. 
36
To support programmed eradication, an aggressive communication campaign was implemented 
before, during, and after the actual eradication by CORAH. Messages such as ―Acabemos con 
las drogas antes que las drogas acabe con nosotros‖ (―We end our relationship with drugs 
before drugs end our lives.‖) were broadcasted intensively. While programmed eradication was 
taking place the program was broadcasting offers of products such as cacao, palm, pigs, 
banana, and coffee. After a four-month intensive communication campaign, 48 communities had 
signed the agreement to not grow coca and plant licit crops. The communication specialists in 
ADP/Tocache believe that communication activities were instrumental in shaping public opinion 
at large and were important factors for the success in establishing licit crops. 
As the proportion of communities that signed the ―convenio marco‖ or ―acta de entendimiento‖ 
(in the case of programmed eradication) increased, the communication program began the 
process of transferring to local media the responsibility of maintaining positive messages of the 
benefits of a licit lifestyle. Those messages continue according to ADP, though not with the 
intensity or frequency of the ADP communication program. 
Only personal opinion data was presented to the team regarding the success of the 
communication program in Tocache; as expected no hard data was available. The team does 
concur with the need for intense support that includes public and program communication 
before, during, and after the period that communities are deciding on a licit lifestyle. 
The team was informed that ADP is currently embarking on a program to support Community 
Development Plans, through an agreement with CARITAS. It is too soon to determine the 
ultimate results of this activity. The evaluation team considers that the ADP supported 
communities already have an economic development plan, which is to establish the planned 
crops and to expand their area according to the resources available to each household. 
Households were intensely implementing that plan. 
Short-Term Income: 
In Tocache, the intermediate and short-term income needs of families before the new crops 
began producing income were mostly resolved by producers, existing providers of inputs, 
existing buyers of farm output and existing local institutions. Seldom was ADP input needed and 
offers by ADP to support short-term food crops were discontinued during the Tocache 
campaign. The evaluation team concurs with this decision. 
Tocache is an agricultural production region with good soil, adequate rainfall, and terrain 
suitable for intensive production. Yields of crops are higher than in some other regions. While 
ADP did not need to offer assistance with these short-term crops in Tocache, it might be 
necessary to offer support for short-term crops in other areas where yields are less and market 
prices do not generate sufficient household income to sustain households adequately. 
37
Focus on Key Long-Term Crops: 
Each of the three crops that consistently yielded acceptable results in all regions served by ADP 
for coca replacement—cacao, coffee, and palm oil—currently enjoy favorable prices, sufficient 
product demand in international markets so that buyers are motivated to seek new sources of 
supply, current market demand that can absorb the products from large numbers of new 
producers, and satisfactory production when planting sites are well chosen and producers follow 
cultural recommendations. ADP has well established and tested technologies for production and 
post harvest handling. Post harvest marketing services and facilities are provided by private 
sector companies, cooperatives and producer 
associations. Many of the cooperatives and 
producer associations in the region are 
supported by ADP. 
Support for Cooperatives and 
Associations: 
Increased production in distant areas required 
ADP to support efforts to deliver inputs to 
producers and to bring farm production to 
market. Each product has its own set of 
issues to resolve. For cacao, which was a 
new product for many communities, ADP 
embarked on a process of establishing 
producer-owned associations to assist in 
gathering cacao beans, fermenting, drying 
and making them available to buyers. 
In situations of many producers and few 
buyers, producers worldwide prefer to deliver 
their output to a producer-owned institution, 
usually an association or cooperative, rather 
than an investor-owned buyer. This 
preference is apparent in the regions in Peru 
where ADP operates. Despite there being 
multiple potential buyers for cacao, ADP 
responds to requests from producers and 
assists in organizing local producer 
associations or cooperatives. The principal 
service of these companies is to gather daily the cacao harvested by producers, ferment the 
product to maintain high quality, dry it and sell it to other companies and transport it to 
processing centers. 
Most of these associations or cooperatives are new, still very small, and require support from 
ADP to survive. Most will require support over the next five to ten or years before they have a 
reasonable chance to remain sustainable.
Figure 8 Scene near Santa Rosa kilometer 200, 
Ucayali, winner of the 2009 Selva Ganadora 
Prize
Source: USAID/Peru
38
As a model, a few associations or cooperatives that were organized more than five years ago 
are now important producer-owned marketing and processing companies. They provide a 
valuable service to the ADP program through purchase of farm output, providing training and 
technical assistance to growers, and confirming to new coca eradicators that life with cacao is 
possible and attractive. 
This model of post harvest processing and initial stages of marketing support was part of the 
successful strategy to convince Tocache communities to adopt licit crops.18
 
Nearly every producer association or cooperative announced to the team and to their members 
that one of their principal goals was to become a direct exporter of consumer products. When 
the team questioned why, most explained that producers would benefit from the greater margins 
that they believed existed in those later stages of product processing and marketing. 
Few of these institutions will ever deliver significant quantities of their product as branded 
consumer products. The Cooperativa Agraria Industrial Naranjillo (COOPAIN, usually called 
Naranjillo), one of the most successful and advanced cooperatives in the region, said their 
branded consumer cacao products accounted for between 5 and 7 percent of their total sales. 
Meanwhile, all cooperatives and associations in that region collect less than 25 percent of cacao 
production in the region. It appears to the team that this successful business is focusing its 
administrative efforts on expanding sales in an area that generates very limited sales and that 
most would consider an inherent weakness. It could, however, focus its administrative efforts on 
those activities that directly impact its ability to more efficiently source additional product and in 
an activity that most analysts would consider its inherent strength. Larger margins on 95 percent 
of the business, even though the percentage increase in margins may be small, will likely 
contribute more to profits than increased margins on 5 percent of sales, even though the 
percentage increase in margins may be large. 
The evaluation team suggests that ADP continue their support to these institutions, specifically 
to help them excel in their strengths of supplying farmer inputs and buying the farm output at the 
best possible price. Assisting these farmer-owned institutions to excel in their areas of strength 
will result in greater satisfaction to growers and improved results for ADP and the Alternative 
Development program than providing help them toward exporting branded consumer products. 
Early Donor and Peru Government Support: 
The United Nations began introducing cacao and palm oil into the region served by the ADP in 
the late 1980s and continuing until the late 1990s. Their work established successful small￾holder plots of trees and initial investments for processing plants for palm oil, and small farmer 
plots of cacao. When implemented correctly, their technology generated good yields and 
adequate producer income at prices that encouraged families to replace coca with palm oil and 
cacao plantings. 
 
18 The long gestation period to achieve sustainability carries program risk for USAID/Peru because of the 
implicit commitment to keep these companies viable. Failure of an association or cooperative that 
provides post harvest handling and marketing for many producers could negatively impact the selling of 
―hope‖ to future eradicators. 
39
Because of the UN actions, in the early 2000s, ADP was able to demonstrate to producers 
eradicating coca that within three years, cacao and palm oil trees would produce small amounts 
of product, and by year five or six, income from a few hectares of these crops would generate 
income sufficient to motivate producers to eradicate their coca. The results of the United 
Nations project in cacao and palm oil helped ADP persuade producers in San Martin and 
Ucayali Regions to accept voluntary eradication of their crops. 
As United Nations funding declined, USAID increased funding so that the United Nations could 
continue its producer support programs, which has worked well for the ADP. 
Study Tours (Pasantias): 
Early in the life of ADP the existence of the UN program provided a rich opportunity for ADP to 
organize study tours of producers who were eradicating their coca to visit with other producers 
and to learn from their peers how the crops of palm oil and cacao promise income adequate to 
support the family after the elimination of coca. Later ADP added other communities that had 
successfully converted to palm oil, cacao and coffee and that were willing to receive producers 
from areas just entering into life without coca. These study tours were often cited by producers 
as an important component in verifying the messages of ADP production specialists. 
Remove Remaining Pockets of Coca Production: 
A persistent issue of contention within communities, called a ―cancer in the society‖ by many 
interviewees, are the remaining pockets of coca production. This is not a Tocache issue, but is 
nearly universal. Some areas were more successful than others in removing all of the 
production. Some communities described significant efforts to persuade producers to remove 
their coca, bringing community pressure to bear on producers reluctant to eradicate. Other 
communities appeared to have given up the effort to remove all of the coca production until 
additional tools and policies are available to support the effort. The perception of the evaluation 
team is that in San Martin they have been more successful in eradicating remaining small plots 
of coca. Aguaytia has been less successful in persuading producers to remove their remaining 
plots of coca, even after palm oil or cacao trees are in the second or later year of production. 
In no area did the team identify support from national, regional or local governments that 
focused on the removal of small coca plots.
II.3.2 Activities that Produced Limited Results 
Minor crops:
Crops other than cacao, coffee and palm oil contributed less to household income, yet created 
hope for a coca free environment in a limited number of communities. 19 Their promotion 
motivated some communities to join ADP, a positive contribution. However, their contribution to 
the overall success of ADP was limited. 
 
19 The other crops and animal products are referred to in this document as minor commodities. 
40
These less utilized crops included platano (several types), pineapple, palmito, papaya, cattle 
and pastures, chickens, small animals, and other products. The evaluation team reviewed these 
and other products with specialists from ADP and other institutions with the goal of 
strengthening the ability of ADP to persuade coca producers to adopt licit products. With 
additional viable crop and animal options, ADP could recommend crop options to producers with 
a wider variety of climate and soil types, thereby attracting more producers to licit crops. 
The data presented to the evaluation team did not demonstrate significant net income gains 
from other crops compared to cacao, coffee and palm oil, nor did they offer benefits for these 
crops that are sufficient to persuade large numbers of producers to participate with ADP. Except 
for palmito, the principal market for all of these crops is domestic consumption. Even when a 
favorable domestic market exists, a few hundred hectares of additional production may 
generate oversupply and lower prices. 
Preparing packages for successful production and marketing of minor crops and maintenance of 
skills of technical specialists likely consumed significant program resources with little 
contribution to achieving overall program objectives. 
Some communities claimed benefits of improved food security because households grew a 
greater portion of their food needs. Some communities effectively sold surplus crops and animal 
products in local markets at attractive prices. Both results are positive. Nevertheless, many 
producers growing any of these crops will require ADP to allocate significant resources to 
market development. 
Despite these limitations, supporting minor commodities serves a program objective, to 
persuade communities to join ADP. Near the end of the community discussions to adopt licit 
crops, offering an additional benefit such as technical assistance for a minor crop or another 
product can ―tip the scale‖ and persuade the community to adopt licit crops. However, program 
risk increases with such a decision because of the higher rates of failure for these crops. 
Premature Entry of ADP during Eradication 
ADP entered into some communities to promote alternative crops as early as three months after 
CORAH had begun eradication in the area. While the coca had been eradicated in the 
communities approached by ADP, some ADP personnel report that entry was too soon because 
CORAH was still eradicating coca from other communities in the area.20 As a consequence, 
ADP personnel were accused of being connected with and/or informants for CORAH. ADP 
personnel reported that they felt increased risk of working in the area and reduced effectiveness 
in working with the communities. They recommend waiting until CORAH had completed 
eradication in the area before attempting the intense efforts that are part of the process of 
community development - perhaps more accurately characterized as community rebuilding. 
Nearly all field personnel in Tocache cautioned against premature entry into communities while 
CORAH was still eradicating in the area. In instances where entry was premature, ADP 
programs were linked to CORAH programs, which was a very negative association for ADP. 
 
20 CORAH eradicates coca in areas that they select. These areas may or may not coincide with 
community boundaries. Furthermore, some community boundaries are poorly defined. 
41
Programmed eradication, which is strongly associated with violence, intolerance and impunity, 
should never be officially linked with alternative development; once this association is made it is 
almost impossible to remove and ADP then has to function with this handicap. 
II.4 EXTERNAL FACTORS IN TOCACHE 
Some external factors enhanced results in Tocache and some reduced results as follows. 
II.4.1 Favorable Factors 
Two of the most favorable external factors were worldwide demand and relatively high prices for 
the three primary crops promoted by ADP. Most important to Tocache were palm oil and cacao. 
The second was improved roads that 
significantly lowered transport costs. 
Problems of cacao production in other 
Latin American and African countries 
have helped to maintain favorable 
prices for Peruvian producers. Cacao 
prices are expected to remain 
favorable over the next few years. 
Much of Peruvian cacao and coffee is 
sold as organic and/or fair trade 
products, which brings higher prices. 
During the beginning months of the 
recent global recession (first half of 
2009), however, the price for premium 
(organic or fair trade) cacao declined, 
resulting in little or no price premium 
for these products.21 This caused 
temporary declines in prices for most 
Peruvian producers. The margin for 
premium cacao has since returned to 
more normal levels. 
The palm oil produced in Peru 
replaces imported palm oil. 
Nevertheless, the price for palm oil 
also reflects the use of palm oil as 
biodiesel, and therefore is influenced 
by the world price of petroleum. 
 
21 One cacao marketing institution reported that during the recent world economic slowdown, prices for 
organic cacao were very close to prices for regular cacao for several months. 
Figure 9 Picturesque terrains in coca production 
areas
Source: Weidemann´s Team
42
Another favorable factor were road improvements that reduced transit time (and cost) and 
reliability of transport of products from Tocache to other markets, the most important market 
being Lima.22 Lima is the export location for most Peruvian cacao. Factories refining crude palm 
oil are located in Lima and in other major cities. 
While roads are mentioned here as an external factor, USAID had a hand in both major road 
improvements as well as local feeder road improvements. Major road improvements were 
funded mostly by GOP and other donors; USAID supported feasibility studies and planning. 
Many feeder roads were primarily funded by ADP, most resulting from requests from 
communities agreeing to eradicate their coca. Feeder roads are a lasting and frequent reminder 
to the rural residents that ADP changed their lives by lowering transport costs. With 
decentralization bringing more funding to regional governments, these entities are increasing 
their funding for construction, often serving rural areas. 
Another important external factor were efforts by the United Nations to establish technical 
processes and skills in the production and post harvest handling of cacao and palm oil. This 
work, begun in the middle 1980s, established technical processes for production of these crops 
and trained workers in the area, in northern San Martin, Tocache, Tingo Maria, Aguaytia, 
Pucallpa, and in VRAE. Some of these plantations were mature stands while some were just 
coming into production when the first ADP program began in 2002. ADP offered study tours for 
members of communities eradicating coca to observe production by mature trees and young 
trees and to receive assurances from their peer producers that a sufficient and reliable income 
is possible. 
The United Nations also established three palm oil processing plants in Tocache, Aguaytia and 
Pucallpa (Campo Verde). When United Nations program funding declined, USAID provided 
support to finish the last plant in Aguaytia and to support start-up operations. 
II.4.2 Negative Factors 
Perhaps the most important negative factor restraining replacement of coca by licit crops is the 
lack of state presence in distant rural areas. This is evident in the poor infrastructure in roads, 
education, health services, electrification, and limited police and judicial services. Public sector 
agricultural production support is for the most part non-existent and there is little public or 
private sector research on genetic material and agricultural practices appropriate for different 
ecological zones. Public policies give little attention to the rural economy; land titling is limited, 
taxation policies and processes reflect business processes in urban areas, finance policies and 
regulations likewise serve urban areas but do not enable financing for rural agricultural 
production. The government-operated Agrobanco provides very limited funding for small- and 
medium-sized producers, and loan policies and processes mirror rural credit practices that were 
long ago discredited in many countries as poor and non-sustainable practices. 
 
22 The road is improved from Tarapoto to Tingo Maria. Tarapoto to Juanjui is mostly asphalted. The road 
from Juanjui is still gravel, but improved in recent years with USAID support. There were frequent 
statements by people in the area that hard surfacing the road from Tocache to Tingo Maria would begin in 
2010 or 2011. The team did not attempt to verify these dates for road improvements. 
43
With decentralization and additional funding, regional governments in San Martin and Ucayali 
are beginning to respond to the needs of commercial agricultural in their regions and are 
initiating funding of technical assistance and training for small- and medium-sized producers. 
That technical assistance and training is planned to be conducted directly by employees of the 
regional governments, which are searching for technically skilled personnel to implement this
training.23
 
The lack of a state presence can also be seen in the minimal efforts in some areas of 
interdiction of products used in processing of coca leaf. Persons in these zones report that 
these products are widely available and that efforts to control this traffic appear to be limited and 
ineffective. 
This limited state presence weakens the efforts of those families that want a coca free 
community and encourages other producers to maintain or expand coca production. Several 
producers interviewed stated that it is acceptable to replant coca in the Aguaytia region because 
no national, regional or local government agency is taking actions to finish the task of 
establishing coca free communities, even though those communities agreed to remove their 
coca in exchange for economic development. From conversations with producer groups, the 
team members believe a majority of ADP supported producers in the Aguaytia region maintain 
small plots of coca. 
II.5 IMPLEMENTING ADP IN AGUAYTIA-HUIPOCA 
The San Martin and Tocache eradications and prior voluntary eradication in Aguaytia-Huipoca 
provide important learning than can be applied to a programmed eradication in the area of 
Aguaytia-Huipoca. Capturing lessons learned from prior eradication in Aguaytia-Huipoca is 
reduced because of ADP staff turnover.24 Similarities as well as differences between the two 
regions and even between the several zones in Aguaytia-Huipoca because of terrain, soil types, 
existing infrastructure, climate and residents‘ preferences suggest the need for careful planning 
and flexibility to react to unforeseen challenges. 
Key elements of an approach for Aguaytia-Huipoca as recommended by the evaluation team 
include:
1. Utilize programmed eradication. 
2. Use an integrated approach, with community development as the central focus, 
supported by productive activities that exhibit sufficient and reliable income to build hope 
that households eradicating coca can have a prosperous lifestyle. 
 
23 The reality of low public sector remuneration and frequent changes in personnel when administrations 
change complicates the hiring and retaining of skilled agricultural technical specialists. 
24 Unfortunately the team was not able to travel into Huipoca, save passing by the zone on the road 
between Aguaytia and Pucallpa. While in the area, the team inquired of specialists in the region to gain 
information on terrain, soil types, existing crop production and animal products, markets for these 
products, and existing infrastructure in the area. 
44
3. Prepare a communication strategy that is adequately funded to counter false or 
misleading statements by pro-coca interests and that supports rural households and 
communities as they change the direction of their communities and their leadership. 
4. Work with new community leaders to identify those critical barriers that restrain 
economic growth for the community, and identify how to remove those barriers. This 
step requires infrastructure and social investments. Offers of improved infrastructure not 
only remove barriers, they also capture the hearts and minds of people and help build 
coalitions for change. 
5. Maintain acquired social capital by delivering on the program interventions that are 
agreed to with communities. When planned interventions experience unforeseen barriers 
and need modification, ensure that processes are transparent.
Each task above contains multiple components; the most important of these are discussed 
below. Most of these are known and have been utilized in prior coca leaf production eradication 
interventions. Identifying the environmental and market signals that point to which interventions 
might be most effective and implementing those interventions with the correct timing is not 
simple. When done well the result is rewarding, with results that some believed were beyond the 
possible in San Martin and Tocache. The success of the USAID/ADP and GOP programs 
benefit the households that learn to live well without coca.
II.5.1 Utilize Programmed Eradication 
As reviewed above, programmed eradication worked well in Tocache, reducing ADP expenses 
and speeding the processes within communities that result in a new vision for the community‘s 
economic future with fresh community leadership to reflect the new community development 
plan. The immediate and complete departure of coca production is extremely disruptive, even 
when households know the day will eventually come. The experience in San Martin and in 
Tocache suggests that a majority of community residents will eventually support the change to a 
licit lifestyle. Those that are married to production of illicit crops leave the community; the 
transformation to a more traditional and enduring lifestyle begins. 
Timing Entry by ADP: 
In Tocache the process of a community deciding for a licit lifestyle was reported to take as few 
as three months for some communities and up to a year or more for other communities. The 
timeframe in Aguaytia-Huipoca will most likely be similar for Ucayali. If, however, residents in 
Aguaytia-Huipoca grasp the finality of the CORAH eradication in Tocache, change in community 
leadership and the decision to change to a licit lifestyle could happen sooner. 
ADP efforts will be more effective and results improved if the field staff can keep abreast of 
emerging community transformations and are ready to provide residents with specific and 
reliable information on life without coca, what interventions are possible to change the 
community environment, what alternatives are available to generate licit income, and what are 
the processes for obtaining help. ADP/Tocache personnel reported that with programmed 
eradication communities sometimes sent representatives to the ADP offices to gather more 
45
information, a clear indicator that community change is eminent or, more likely, already in 
process. However, by the time the community inquires at the ADP office community residents 
may have already asked ―someone else‖ what to do, increasing the likelihood of delivery of 
wrong information and increased LOE to reverse early impressions. 
More effective is finding a way to monitor signals from community residents that groups of 
households are beginning to realize that coca will not remain in the community, are now 
considering how to sustain their households, and that the frequency of these discussions is 
increasing. At this early stage of coca eradication, ADP personnel may not yet be able to enter a 
community and must rely on pre-established channels of information to convey to the 
community ADP‘s capability and desire to support community change. While public media can 
penetrate communities and convey messages of support, hope is best transmitted and 
sustained by personal contact with reliable people. 
Determining the appropriate steps and best timing for ADP to enter a community remains an art, 
not a science. 
II.5.2 An Integrated Approach Focusing on Community Development 
The team recommends an integrated approach, with community development as the central 
focus, supported by the following key components: 
1. Productive activities that exhibit sufficient and reliable income to producers to sustain 
hope of economic improvement using licit products. 
2. Strengthen community leadership: Intense support to communities working through 
the process of changing community vision and leadership and building human and social 
capital, followed by less intense but continuing support according to the community 
issues that arise. This intense support can include identification and training of potential 
community leaders that can motivate producers in coca areas to enter the ADP program, 
to organize producer training, and to build cooperation and sharing within the 
community, support for infrastructure improvements, and more transparent decision￾making. In time some of these potential leaders will begin serving as community political 
and technical leaders, business leaders, youth leaders and some may become technical 
support specialists for the productive activities introduced by ADP. 
3. Support for local and regional political leaders should be offered when they are 
ready. This may require many months as support for coca dwindles and is replaced by 
support for licit and sustainable economic development. 
4. Introduce infrastructure improvements that focus on removing barriers to effective and 
efficient productive and social activities and that can gain the support and confidence of 
community households. 
A surprise to some members of the team was that the replacement crops of palm oil and cacao 
performed well on the soils degraded by coca production. ADP personnel learned that a 
recovery period for the soil after coca was removed was not necessary before planting of palm 
46
oil or cacao trees.25 Using recommended cultural practices, the new trees took root and 
achieved normal growth rates. Whether planted on normal or degraded soils, achieving high 
yields required appropriate levels of fertilization when the trees began to yield fruit. 
All three crops (cacao, palm oil and coffee) provided improved ground cover and reduced soil 
erosion compared to coca production. Cacao trees require partial shade during development. In 
most cases platano provided the needed shade as well as food and cash income during the 
growth period of the replacement crops.
Because the replacement crops were the new permanent source of income, they usually 
received priority care by households. In areas that trees were producing, the team observed that 
farm improvements were appearing, such as improved trails, bridges over streams or wetlands, 
agricultural production tools, home improvements and a few gasoline-powered implements and 
motorcycles. 
II.5.3 Concentrate Production Support on Key Products 
ADP has technically reliable production packages for cacao, palm oil and coffee. The transition 
period from coca to licit crops may be difficult, but households that follow the recipe survive and 
thrive. Before introducing new products ADP should consider carefully the criteria listed below. 
Of all the other products (beside cacao, palm oil and coffee) that were suggested by local 
technicians and interested observers to replace coca, none meet those four conditions at this 
time. 
1. Can absorb the entry of a large number of new producers. 
2. Have established markets and 
value chains with private sector 
companies, including cooperatives 
that are working in the area, with 
export markets large enough to 
absorb production from thousands 
of new producers without saturating 
that market. 
3. Have prior successful producers 
who are willing to share their 
experience of removing coca from 
their communities and now have 
increasing incomes from their new 
crops. 
4. Have proven technical packages 
for production and post harvest 
 
25 Soil types, conditions and slopes in some areas of Aguaytia-Huipoca may be sufficiently different to 
require cultural practices that vary from those that were necessary in Tocache. 
Figure 10 Loading a truck with platano for transport 
from Aguaytia to Lima
Source: USAID/Peru
47
handling by small and inexperienced agricultural producers. 
Developing production and marketing packages to meet the above criteria takes time and 
resources. The cost to develop a new product that can serve as an income replacement for 
coca is about the same, regardless of the crop. If the new crop cannot absorb at least 500 new 
producers it is likely not a cost effective alternative for ADP. The production packages for palm 
oil and cacao by the United Nations took nearly a decade to develop, implement and document. 
Palmito was reported by several specialists as having a large market in nearby Brazil and 
satisfying numbers one, two and four of the above criteria. However, the team was not 
presented with evidence that Peru can effectively penetrate that market. 
A forestry product would serve ADP needs because much of the coca to be eradicated is 
produced in areas normally dedicated to forestry production. However, much work remains to 
be done to satisfy the above-mentioned criteria two, three and four. While there are some 
forestry development projects in Peru that were reported to have exhibited satisfactory 
production results, the team was not presented any that were ready for large-scale 
implementation by small holders. Nor was there available an analysis of policy and legal issues 
that often complicate forestry investments by private investors. 
II.5.4 Communication Strategy 
Create a top level communication strategy that establishes overall ADP objectives and guides a 
second level strategy that supports specific objectives for each area of intervention. 
The overall communication strategy will need to support both overall ADP objectives and 
specific objectives for each area of intervention while addressing broader issues such as public 
relations, institutional image, press releases and responses to press inquiries, and public 
opinion. The overall strategy should be aimed at designing and implementing medium-term 
processes rather than short campaigns. Detailed materials for the broader issues should be 
prepared as needed. 
A separate strategy for each area of intervention addresses issues specific to the area and the 
intervention. Areas of intervention may be defined by geographic location, by the target 
audience including ADP staff, a specific issue or other situation. Examples include geographic 
areas of program operations, community transition support, production technology, product 
marketing, and responding to local issues that develop. Messages needed to support ADP in 
upper Shambillo may be quite different than those needed to support activities in Huipoca, and 
message delivery methods may greatly differ. 
Communication is a cross-cutting activity affecting all levels of ADP activities. A communication 
strategy should be designed to cope with a specific reality. Strategies for specific realities 
should be consistent with and contribute to the overall strategy. Included in the design should be 
when and how to evaluate results. While strategies for areas of intervention work best when 
developed for medium-term activities, some program activities may require short-term 
strategies, such as the intensive information campaigns needed with programmed eradication 
48
as the communities transition from an illicit to licit economy or to counter negative messages by 
coca interests when they threaten to derail program implementations. 
An intensive campaign before, during and immediately after programmed eradication is 
essential for several reasons:
1. To respond to public statements by pro-coca interests. Often these statements are 
incorrect or misleading and if not responded to will be believed as fact.
2. To promote the benefits of a licit lifestyle. 
3. To convey information about ADP programs that provide support to communities that 
wish to switch from a coca led economy to a licit crops led economy. 
4. To publicize results from producers and communities that have travelled the road from 
coca to licit crops. 
In Aguaytia-Huipoca communication may consume an important share of financial resources 
because of the anticipated intensive pro-coca public campaigns. Because the only radio station 
and only newspaper now reflect pro-coca messages, those resources will likely not be available 
to support ADP programs. It would be worth considering the benefits and costs of installing a 
mass media transmitter (radio, for instance) to broadcast pro-licit lifestyle messages, at least 
during the intensive period during and immediately after programmed eradications for some 
areas.
In the experience of the evaluation team, the communication budget is a critical portion of the 
general program. During the initial intense period of an eradication, the proportion of the budget 
used for communication should not be less than 10 to 13 percent of the program investment, 
decreasing to 5 to 7 percent when communities have accepted ADP and are on track. 
This communication plan must be flexible. While communication specialists and ADP staff may 
anticipate what many of the needed messages will be, there will always be surprises and an 
urgent need to craft new messages or new delivery processes. 
In Aguaytia 85 percent of the population has migrated from other regions, mainly from Huánuco. 
Many of these immigrants are experienced coca growers. Preparation of the messages for 
programmed eradication should take into account the specific messages that have greater 
potential to appeal to these immigrant households given their backgrounds as well as their 
needs and interests. 
When the intensive stage of the communication campaign is phased out, the above messages 
will still be needed, but much less frequently. 
As the program moves from supporting decision-making by communities to actual delivery of 
agreed upon benefits, the communication program takes on two additional tasks:
1. Supporting extension services by preparing printed and other materials that serve to 
―extend‖ the knowledge delivered by the extension agent beyond his training or technical 
assistance visit. 
49
2. Document those activities, stories and accomplishments that can strengthen the 
communication campaign for the next area to be eradicated, including the gathering of 
multimedia material associated with those activities, and stories and accomplishments 
that are likely to be effective in a future campaign. The evaluation team heard many 
touching histories of how households suffered yet survived the transition from coca to 
licit crops and the subsequent rewards for their courage. Sharing these stories with 
households confronting a future without coca can support their hope for a better future. 
II.5.5 Infrastructure 
Rare is the community governed by pro-coca interests over an extended period that has 
adequate infrastructure for licit economic development. In some communities that infrastructure 
never existed, especially in communities born from coca production. The evaluation team heard 
numerous stories of destruction of infrastructure in coca producing areas, such as burning of 
transport vehicles and intentional destruction of highways and roads. Poor roads and lack of 
bridges appear to be the most frequent obstacles to legitimate crop production and were the 
most frequently mentioned infrastructure improvements desired and received by nearly every 
community visited by the team. 
Decisions on which constraints to address through infrastructure investments are made by 
community leaders after informed discussions with ADP specialists. While communities are able 
to elaborate on what infrastructure improvements are needed, they may have little 
understanding of the issues to be resolved in order to install those improvements and the cost. 
Communities do ask for non productive investments such as community centers, soccer 
stadiums, school improvements, medical services upgrades, and so forth. In the team members‘ 
experience, communities that receive non-productive investments are ultimately disappointed 
when their incomes remain the same. ADP has long experience counseling community leaders 
on decisions about infrastructure that improve farm productivity and market access, and ADP 
social investment specialists strive to support communities to make wise selections.26 With the 
guidance and direction by USAID/Peru, ADP staff appears to be adequately informed to reorient 
these requests toward productive investments.
Once decided, prompt and effective action to install the infrastructure builds program social 
capital with that community and facilitates resolution of future issues or conflicts that are sure to 
arise. 
 
26 Recently USAID/Bolivia Alternative Development program used infrastructure improvements to 
successfully win over the local population. Communities that requested and received non-productive 
investments soon discovered that even though they had a beautiful square, for example, their income 
remained unchanged. Future requests for infrastructure improvements focused on improving productive 
capacity. 
50
II.5.6 Selected Recommended Practices for Key Products 
Within the above approach there are several recommended practices that have yielded good 
results in prior areas of San Martin including Tocache and in Pucallpa. 
1. Promote Farmer Field Schools (FFS) using the participating producers‘ farms as an 
effective training methodology. Today the name FFS is applied to a wide range of 
methodologies. The technology adopted by ADP should deliver training on participating 
producers‘ farms, with hands-on training a part of every session. 
ADP might consider preparing more advanced training for existing producers of palm oil, 
which might motivate and help producers to take the necessary steps to increase yields 
of existing plantations. The evaluation team was only shown a basic FFS course for 
each crop; apparently no crop has an advanced course, even though in many 
communities nearly half of the producers have cacao, coffee and palm oil trees planted 
more than 4 years ago. These producers could use advanced training on specific tasks. 
One frequent question was how to lower the cost of fertilization for their crops. Organic 
certified crops, in particular, had fewer alternatives for low cost fertilizer. 
2. Increase the efficiency of technical assistance through a network of extension agents 
and community agricultural promoters. Provide training to both groups through FFS and 
study tours (pasantias) to successful farms in the region. Agricultural promoters could 
receive in-kind benefits, privileges of additional training and technical assistance, and 
special recognition for their service. Eventually promoters must be paid if their service is 
to endure. Within a short time the value they can add would likely be such that other 
producers would be willing to contribute a small amount for their services in training or 
technical assistance. 
3. Promote working linkages between extension agents and agricultural research 
institutions such as local universities, INIA (Instituto Nacional de Innovación Agraria) and 
ICT. Help producers to understand that a publically funded, or partially public funded 
institution will help keep their industry competitive in world markets. Producers may need 
help in actions to promote their industry to political authorities. 
4. Assist producer associations and local and regional governments to identify priority 
projects to support ADP, as well as in the preparation of proposals (―expedientes 
tecnicos‖) to obtain financial resources from the GOP or other financing institutions.
5. Assist district and provincial municipalities to improve their administrative and financial 
operations when that support converts to political support for the ADP agenda and 
methodology. 
6. Focus a portion of communication resources on ―selling hope‖ to coca leaf producers 
through stories of successful farmers who switch from coca to AD crops. 
7. Support women‘s groups‘ efforts to engage in productive community improvement 
activities.
8. Strengthen producer associations and processing plants through training and support to 
the managers, directors and key employees. 
51
9. Strengthen ―Mesas Técnicas‖ for key products to address research and extension needs 
as well as other constraints on the value chain. The purpose of ―Mesas Técnicas‖ is to 
improve the production packages that are available to producers. 
II.5.7 Establish a Technology Transfer Plan 
Resources are insufficient for ADP to train directly and provide ongoing technical assistance to 
all producers. Likewise the United Nations cannot directly provide these services. Clearly 
resources are insufficient to provide these services over many years. ADP has taken steps to 
deliver training and technical assistance through local cooperatives and associations that are 
participating in the value chain for their products. The larger cooperatives are beginning to 
provide technical assistance for producers who are selling their production to the cooperative. 
Training and technical assistance to new producers, however, is beyond their financial 
capabilities. From the beginning the training and technical assistance plan should include how 
and when to transfer those services to local institutions. This issue is discussed in greater detail 
in Section III.
II.5.8 Seek Political Support - Proceed Regardless of Response 
The evaluation team interviewed 15 municipal, district and regional governments with about 35 
persons participating in these interviews. 27 All of these units interviewed were enthused about 
the work of ADP in their jurisdictions and pledged their continued support. ADP personnel 
reported that very few of these 
governments were supportive of 
ADP at the beginning; some at least 
were polite. Most opposed vocally 
or quietly opposed ADP‘s actions. 
While political opposition created 
implementation challenges, it did 
not derail ADP programs with 
community development. As the 
communities demonstrated their 
commitment to licit crops and 
changed their own leadership, the 
local and regional leadership also 
changed. Political leadership is 
desired but not essential to ADP 
success. 
 
27 In the many interviews there were certainly other political leaders who identified themselves as 
representatives of other institutions or their association with governments was not disclosed or recorded. 
Figure 11 Flowers adorn a community homestead
Source: Weidemann´s Team
52
As ADP won over communities to a licit lifestyle the political leadership either changed their 
position to favor a licit economy or they were gradually removed from office. Nearly all 
mentioned the need for improved infrastructure in rural areas; only a few had sufficient funds for 
substantial investments. Both regional governments were planning to initiate training programs 
for agricultural production including for the same principal crops that ADP support. Coordination 
with ADP was claimed but at this early stage of program development appeared to be more 
distant than close. 
Both regional and several district and municipal governments recognize the need to promote 
economic development and some have installed personnel to these positions. As anticipated 
the experience level in these governments is limited and their staff needs support in multiple 
areas. Creating an enabling environment to attract investments in commercial business is an 
unfamiliar exercise for many in these governments. 
Nevertheless, these governments are enthusiastic that coca is leaving the region and new licit 
crops are taking hold on the economy. Now they say wealth is being created, investments by 
private companies increasing, new companies are arriving to do business, and the area is 
peaceful. Now ―we can see the light,‖ said one representative. They described the prior coca 
driven economy as disruptive, driving out production and processing of licit products, inviting 
violence and terrorism and weakening local government authorities. 
All governments requested continuing support from ADP, both the training for agricultural 
producers, infrastructure improvements and support for their own economic development. 
II.6 AGUAYTIA’S RETURN TO COCA CULTIVATION 
Despite USIAD‘s high level of investment in this area since 2002 there has been a growing 
production of coca in recent years. This section discusses the factors contributing to this 
increase.
II.6.1 Market Signals Favor Coca 
Economic development is much more effective when interventions work in keeping with market 
signals. That is not happening in Aguaytia. As one producer, a participant in ADP, told the team, 
―[In Aguaytia] the market is telling me to grow coca; the price is high, yields are good, and ready 
buyers exist. If the price would fall, as it did during Fujimori‘s [administration], we would not grow 
coca.‖ His comments highlight the lack of negative consequences for being a coca producer in 
Aguaytia. CORAH has not had a presence in these areas for several years. 
Virtually all community efforts to remove coca from their communities in Aguaytia have stopped; 
persuasion no longer works – producers are not listening and communities have no other tools 
to utilize. In the team‘s assessment, a majority of producers in the region likely still grow coca, 
even among ADP participants. 
Among the factors that contributed to the return to coca cultivation in Aguaytia is the lack of 
negative incentives for coca producers, especially small-scale producers. Some producers in 
53
Shambillo recalled the violence and terrorism that previously existed in the Shambillo area. But 
their children and younger producers professed few or no problems for small-scale coca 
growers, mostly from one-fourth to one-half hectare per household. 
Under the voluntary eradication strategy, a number of ADP producers continue to produce coca 
not only for ―social/personal consumption‖ as is usually argued, but also for financing expansion 
of licit crops. In fact, COCEPU (Comité Central de Palmicultores de Ucayal) palm producers 
recognized that in the absence of credit for new palm areas, coca leaf had become the source 
for financing an expansion of this crop. Some cacao producers in the Aguaytia area also stated 
that coca helps them to subsist during the waiting period from planting to production. 
Even though there are many small plots of coca, most of the new production in Aguaytia￾Huipoca comes from areas beyond the reach of roads and where the evaluation team did not 
enter. In short, there are areas in the region that are successfully implementing alternate crops, 
even though many producers retain small coca plots. Other nearby areas have experienced 
significant increases in coca production and account for most of the increase in the region over 
the past few years.
II.6.2 New Immigrants 
Most immigrants to the Aguaytia 
area are from the Huánuco sierra 
region looking for a quick means 
of making money to bring back 
home. Coca is a crop that meets 
their expectations. Producers 
work long enough to plant coca, 
go back to their home in the 
sierra, and return after three to 
four months to harvest and sell 
their coca leaf production. 
It is difficult for communities to 
influence these immigrants. In 
most cases their interaction with 
the community is limited, few 
community members know the 
immigrants or where their distant 
coca plots are located, the 
community has little or no legal 
authority to take any action to 
remove the coca production, and police or Peruvian officials appear to have little interest or 
capability to assist with any attempts to remove the coca. Removing the coca might be in the 
best interests of the community, but it is risky. The immigrants live and act with little of the social 
restraints normally associated with households living in communities. 
Figure 12 Platano from the Consorcio de Productores 
de Plátano (COPPU) transferring from canoes to truck 
for shipment to Lima
Source: Weidemann´s Team 
54
II.6.3 ADP Program in Aguaytia 
It appears to the evaluation team that the ADP staff is struggling to find a vision of how to 
achieve a successful community and economic development program. Most of the staff were 
hired just a few months ago and have not yet defined an effective approach to their goals nor 
have they determined which interventions they believe will be most successful. 
Upon the arrival of the evaluation team, the staff produced prior studies that a variety of crops 
could be successfully produced in the region and that a market existed for their production. For 
example, platano from the Consorcio de Productores de Platano (COPPU) was presented as a 
major success, purchased directly by buyers in Lima. When the producers were asked if they 
could increase their production by 300 hectares, they responded ―that would be a problem.‖
Later the team learned that the buyers for their platano were banana chip processors in Lima 
and that the processors had sufficient raw material supply to meet their production schedule. On 
the day the team visited the loading dock in Aguaytia for platano, the community‘s sales agent 
told the team that the buyer ordered a half truck load of platano. During the winter months, the 
team learned, less than full truck loads were frequently requested by the buyers. 
The platano group of producers cannot expand their production until additional buyers for their 
product are located. ADP staff is challenged to locate new buyers in Peru for products for which 
there is ample supply from competing producing communities. 
The Aguaytia staff also suggested pineapple as a viable crop to replace coca. In the field the 
team heard negative feedback from producers about the prospects for pineapple; the crop had 
been attempted in the zone and failed. 
The Regional Office was recently moved to Aguaytia; now is an opportunity to change attitudes, 
implement new strategies and boost morale. 
II.6.4 Identify Incentives to Remove Small Coca Plots 
The team did not identify any USAID, ADP, GOP or regional or municipal government policies 
or programs that support removal of remaining small plots of coca. Under programmed 
eradication most of these small plots will be removed, and removed multiple times over a 
several-month period until producers learn that coca production is ended and they must leave or 
grow another crop. One can understand that community members and leaders who once had 
their lives threatened, and many of whom lost family members to violence and terrorism, want 
all coca removed. In their minds coca invites the return of violence and terrorism. Some are 
frustrated with a system that promised them a coca free community and then looks away as 
coca production slowly returns to their communities. 
The team recommends that ADP identify and test policies and practices that provide negative 
incentives to producers that replant or retain small coca plots and/or positive incentives for 
communities that achieve coca free status over a period of time. To be sustainable, most of the 
negative or positive incentives must come from the GOP, or regional governments working 
together with other local and regional governments. 
55
CORAH could reenter the zone to take out the remaining small plots of coca, though this might 
be more disruptive than beneficial. Incentives to remove the existing coca plots might involve 
local police, or perhaps specialized CORAH units that work with communities to help them 
remove the small plots. As local community plots are identified, trained police might visit a 
parcel‘s owner and request that the coca be removed; otherwise sanctions would be imposed. 
Sanctions could be simple and limited. Most growers that now are producing palm oil, cacao or 
coffee will likely select removal of coca rather than risk losing income from licit crops. 
On a temporary basis ADP incentives might be withheld for growers with small plots, or 
expanded for non-coca growers. For example, an advanced FFS dealing with key issues on 
how to improve yields might be made available only to growers who demonstrated no coca 
production in their parcels in the community, or on other parcels they operated in or nearby the 
community. Alternately, a restriction or amplification of technical assistance benefits or 
production inputs that are available through the association might be effective as incentives to 
palm oil producers to remove coca production. 
In the Shambillo area, even many producers that had palm oil in production still cultivated coca. 
They told the team that they would end coca production when they had planted enough palm oil 
trees, but gave no specific dates for that event. 
II.6.5 Media Influence 
The communication strategy in Aguaytia is similar to that in Northern San Martin, and less so to 
that applied in Tocache. In Aguaytia the communication strategy is not a significant factor in 
promoting a desire in favor of a licit lifestyle, nor does it generate intensive support to achieve 
the strategic results expected by ADP. 
The Aguaytia media is, in general, manipulated by pseudo journalists that sympathize with the 
pro-coca interests. Local journalists encourage communal peasants, especially the ones coming 
from Huánuco as field workers for legal cultivation, to cultivate coca and produce narcotics. 
Many of these field workers already have experience with coca production. 
The Federation in Defense of Cocaleros, for instance, issued the destabilizing message: ―From 
ten dollars that ADP receives, nine remains in the pocket of the employees.‖ That was a clear 
counter message to ―From ten coca leaves, nine are going to narcotics traffic.‖ Aguaytia ADP 
office does not have the resources to counter the barrage of messages from media outlets. 
As a zonal office Aguaytia does not have the decision-making ability or the resources to mount 
first-rate messages to shape public opinion. Hope exists that the conversion to a regional office 
will bring greater resources and increased awareness of the need for public outreach. The 
intensive communication required during a programmed eradication are not incorporated into 
the strategy for Aguaytia. Furthermore, some of the messages utilized in Tocache may not work 
well in Aguaytia-Huipoca because of the different migration patterns and available agricultural 
production resources. The recent experience in Paraiso might offer more lessons than Tocache 
about communication strategies that may be appropriate for Aguaytia. 
56
II.7 GENDER CONSIDERATIONS 
To incorporate gender issues into the ADP program Chemonics International sub-contracted 
with Development Training Service (DTS) in 2008. To support gender activities and changes in 
attitudes of personnel, DTC engaged the National Network of Promotion of Women (RNPM).28
That first contract was for the period from May to September. In 2009 the contract covered the 
period April to October. For 2010 the contract has yet to be signed. Despite these non-paid 
periods most of the gender coordinators continue their services to the program.
Training of all personnel, from senior executive to field workers, occurred in 2009. Incorporating 
gender awareness is a work in progress. The most significant achievements to date are the 
inclusion of women in the Farmer Field Schools, improved comprehension of the potential role 
of women in the domestic and farm business roles of the rural household, the incorporation of 
inclusive language in program activities, the organizations of networks of women regidoras 
(women elected to a municipal or regional council), and support for some economic 
undertakings headed by women. 
ADP has adopted inclusive language and there appears to be a concern for the participation 
(number) of women at all levels, to comply with the goal of incorporating gender as a cross￾cutting issue. Incoming ADP personnel receive gender information during the induction period in 
Lima; no follow-up training was reported. 
Activities of Gender Coordinators vary by region. Coordinators function as subcontractors. The 
specific tasks they implement depend on their personalities and the acceptance of their ideas by 
the team leader of each office. In one region the Gender Coordinator reported that the Regional 
Program Coordinator had declared explicitly not to share for personal reasons the viewpoint of 
the gender specialist. In another region the coordinator has an office at another site, which 
contributed to, in the words of the coordinator, a ―distant‖ relationship with the Regional 
Coordinator. 
The ADP program is a large program with many diverse activities. The gender coordinators are 
buried deep within the administrative structure making makes it difficult to establish a consistent 
application of gender issues throughout the organization (red arrow in Figure 13). 
ADP provides scholarships for regidoras to take classes at the Escuela de Administraciòn de 
Negocios (ESAN) in Lima. Some regidoras can take e-courses, which reduces costs as they 
must only pay transportation and hotel costs when they come to Lima once per month. 
II.7.1 Women as Change Agents 
When the team asked producers why they had decided to join ADP, women more frequently 
than men cited the improved quality of life that would come about through reduced violence and 
terrorism associated with coca production. They cited concerns for the safety of their families, 
 
28 In Spanish, the Red Nacional de Promoción de la Mujer.
57
especially children, and sudden influxes of money from coca leaf that were wasted in drinking 
and other non-productive activities. Children, they reported, had little interest in schooling and 
many had no long-term plans to develop productive skills. Insecure and unsafe environments 
reduced incentives to work for a better future and induced households to live day-by-day. 
As explained during team interviews with ADP personnel and with women participants, women 
were first to take the initiative to select a licit lifestyle and a better community, and pressured 
their spouses to sign the agreements with DEVIDA. Women more than men now openly reaffirm 
their decision regarding coca production, citing the evidence of reduced violence, improved 
security and the potential to create wealth in intermediate- to long-term periods. Children, they 
reported, had resumed their interest and participation in schooling. 
In the view of many ADP staff and of the team, women are active change agents, pushing for 
the ―convenio marco‖ to be signed during both the voluntary and programmed eradication 
phases. And they continue to defend the new community that has resulted from the removal of 
coca production. After forced eradication and when seeding the first plots of replacement crops, 
women took on a critical role by taking charge of the agricultural production while many of the 
men were away seeking work to maintain family income. 
Participation of women in the Farmer Field Schools has been a decisive step to empowerment 
of women. Today men in many households consider women equal in their capacity to 
understand technical information, and hence the farm production decisions can be shared. 
Interviews with women in Palmiche, de Chazuta in San Martin and in Nueva Esperanza in 
Tocache expressed the reality of these changes. The ―Technical Encounters‖ in Tocache have 
effectively allowed women to participate as equals with men in sharing their learning.
The women have learned the technical processes for the management of the plantations and 
they typically implement some tasks with greater dexterity than the men, for example, cutting 
and grafting of cacao. Except for physical tasks that require lifting heavy objects, many women 
told the team that they are active participants in the field work. While they are not in the field as 
often or for as long as the men, some women are primary providers of labor on certain tasks, 
such as cutting and grafting of cacao plants, and they are a much needed source of additional 
labor when needed, especially for harvesting and post harvest handling. Women can dedicate 
more time in the field when their children are in school. 
Because they now have learned the technical information they are also involved in management 
and investment decisions for their farms. In the view of the team, a great benefit is that many 
women say that they now participate regularly in farm management and production decisions, 
that they can more quickly capture the benefits and costs of household production decisions, 
and more accurately project household revenue from farm sales. 
ADP staff in general recognizes that the inclusion of women in training provided through the 
FFS has empowered women, which is a positive outcome. Before, they report, women were 
listeners only, whereas now they are full participants. Several women asserted that the 
certificate of completion is confirmation that they are qualified to participate with men in making 
household production decisions. 
58
The training workshops for leaders have developed and fortified their individual capacities, and 
the establishment of women leader networks has contributed to the promotion of women‘s rights 
and their position in the households and communities. The women feel strengthened by the 
endorsement of an organization, which also fosters cooperation among them in promoting 
public issues, an important contribution to the sustainability of a tranquil and safe community.
Figure 13 Organizational Chart of ADP 
Source: Chemonics 
As regidoras in the regional governments, women have received training to better carry out their 
duties. A network of regidoras has formed in Tocache and San Martin with the purpose of 
supporting each other and to exchange experiences, which helps them to focus their actions to 
create and formalize regulation and ordnances of importance to women. Maintaining contacts 
with this network helps them negotiate with other institutions actions to improve living conditions 
of women. In Tocache, a regidora had an important role in developing public policy and 
managed to enact several ordnances that benefit women including the donation of a parcel of 
land for the use of women. The network of women regidoras earned social capital when they 
59
took on important issues for women, such as violence against women, support for literacy 
programs, more comprehensive health services, and identity cards for women (the cards are 
required for land titles). 
Two cooperatives participating with USAID have instituted actions designed to strengthen the 
participation of women in their activities. In ACOPAGRO the participation of women is 
increasing, as is the share of employees that are women. Oro Verde has created a Women‘s 
Committee, in part because of the desire of the manager, and also because it is required to 
receive the Fair Wages (Comercio Justo) certification. 
A few other associations and cooperatives have formed women‘s committees or assigned an 
executive the responsibility 
to promote women‘s 
issues. Most likely there 
are other institutions taking 
steps to support women 
that did not come to the 
awareness of the team. 
Nevertheless, the team 
considers that most of the 
associations supported by 
ADP are in the start-up 
phase and have yet to 
address women‘s issues 
specifically. 
One example of a women￾directed institution is the 
Association of Productive Women, which has opened a restaurant featuring the transformation 
of pork into jerky and sausage. Several ADP funded horticulture economic initiatives were 
developed by women in Tingo Maria and Aguaytia.
In Ucayali in 2009 the association DICASAP (Dinamarca, Catalina and San Pedro) was 
organized by three communities in Campo Verde to develop and jointly market byproducts of 
yucca. ADP is helping with market analysis, especially in export markets. The National Institute 
of Agricultural Innovation (INIA) is providing technical assistance to improve production 
processes and product quality. The Ministry of Production provided training in product quality 
management, including packaging requirements and regulations to use the Ministry for Women 
and Social Development (MIMDES) seal ―Made by Women.‖ ADP is providing continuing on 
improving business processes and the legalization of the company statues. In Aguaytia-Huipoca 
the Association of Coffee Producers Santa Rosa is an important institution in the Santa Rosa 
community and is led by a woman. This community is a model for licit lifestyle as evidenced by 
winning the competition for the Selva Ganadora.29
 
 
29 A competition sponsored by ADP in which communities competed to determine those that best 
demonstrate a licit lifestyle. 
Figure 14 Directors of the Association DICASAP in Campo Verde
Source: Weidemann´s Team 
60
II.7.2 Gender Program Components in Aguaytia-Huipoca 
Given the limited progress on gender issues within the implementation staff, the team 
recommends that especially in this office the Chemonics leadership periodically assess the 
need for follow-up activities or training in gender issues. 
Communication campaigns should include inclusive language and ensure that messages 
equally address women‘s and men‘s concerns, and especially address quality of life issues and 
the benefits of a licit lifestyle. In particular, area specific communication during the period of 
change-over from coca to licit crops should target women as important change agents. 
ADP should continue the incorporation of women as equal partners in the FFS so that women 
have equal opportunities for learning cultural practices for crops selected in that community. The 
―Technical Encounters‖ that were provided in Tocache should also be continued to reinforce and 
amplify the learning provided by the FFS. The study tours should also include women and 
specific arrangements made for the women in both communities to share their experiences. 
During these study tours, women, and especially women that are serving in leadership 
positions, should be given the opportunity to share their learning with potential leaders in the 
newly eradicated communities. These contacts will help to inspire women in the newly 
eradicated communities to be active participants in community decision-making, resulting in 
decisions that incorporate women‘s views and needs and are more family-friendly. 
Funding of small projects can also be a way to support women‘s development, when the 
resources and skills of the participating women are sufficient to anticipate a successful outcome. 
Because some areas of Aguaytia-Huipoca may be less suitable for the primary crops supported 
by ADP, there may be a greater number of requests for small projects. Just as the FFS 
incorporated women into the training, small projects should also incorporate women into their 
planning and implementation. 
Prior efforts to identify and support women leaders have been useful and should continue as 
part of the program in Aguaytia-Huipoca. Networks of women leaders in this area should also be 
supported to visit similar networks in Tocache to share learning and resources. 
SECTION III: SUPPORTING LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY IN 
NORTHERN SAN MARTIN 
The SOW contained the phrase, ―To what extent is it possible to graduate AD Communities in 
Northern San Martin and Pucallpa?‖ When used as a verb with an object the word ―graduate‖
has four distinct meanings, two of which are relevant to this discussion:
1. ―To confer a degree upon, or to grant a diploma to, at the close of a course of study, as 
in a university, college, or school.‖
2. ―To arrange in grades or gradations; establish gradation in.‖
61
Based on statements of and conversations with USAID/Peru personnel and use of the word 
―consolidate‖ in the SOW, the evaluation team believes item two above most closely reflects the 
purpose of the stated question. 
Furthermore, in the environment in which this question is asked, a follow-on question will 
certainly be, ―what happens after graduation.‖ Absent the presence of ADP personnel the 
answer to this follow-on question will most likely be determined by the beneficiaries. Within the 
controlled environment of USAID/Peru and development partners the answer to follow-on 
question can be controlled. When used with larger groups or in public communication, however 
the message that the recipient may insert may be difficult to control and determine. 
In the view of the evaluation team the answer to the issues addressed in this section requires 
additional data, analysis, stakeholder and evaluation team comments, opinions, and 
recommendations that can serve to guide decisions on future interventions by ADP to build the 
capacity of Peruvian institutions to extend the sustainable development of licit economies in the 
areas served by ADP. 
A new strategy and new mechanisms of implementation should take place in the San Martin 
region. This new strategy should focus on strengthening local institutions or development 
institutions and subcontracting them for support in community development, democracy and 
governance, production support and other activities needed for consolidation. 
III.1 WHAT INTERVENTIONS ARE STILL NEEDED? 
Individuals, households, and institutions of all kinds participate in ADP. 30
 Some of these entities 
have been associated with the program for eight years or more (e.g., CEDRO), and some are 
just entering. New entrants need intensive support, save a few that are well-established 
institutions or individuals and households that are larger and experienced in agricultural 
production. For most entrants there is much knowledge to acquire, a wide range of tasks and 
learning to master, and policies and programs to put in place to establish and sustain the 
agricultural sector. Principal interventions that should continue include: 
1. Community development and governance, 
2. Training and technical assistance to agricultural producers, 
3. Establishing local, first-stage post harvest handling and processing institutions, 
4. Implementing infrastructure investments, including helping communities make wise 
selections and supervising design, installation and training, 
5. Supporting institutions buying, processing and marketing agricultural products, and selling 
farm inputs, 
 
30 Institutions include communities, producer-/member-owned cooperatives and associations; private 
sector investor-owned companies; non-governmental organizations (NGO); other donors; national, 
municipal and regional governments; and public and private sector support institutions such as 
universities and research and training institutions. 
62
6. Supporting agricultural sector 
services such as financing, 
research, sector business 
development, training and other 
information dissemination, and 
sector policies and regulations. 
While all of these interventions are 
needed, the intensity and frequency 
of interventions will be much 
reduced. Community development 
and governance support, for 
example, is sporadic after the 
intense transformation period 
throwing of pro-coca leadership. 
Each of these principal interventions 
is discussed below.
III.2 COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT AND GOVERNANCE 
As described in Section I, communities undergoing eradication of coca undergo an intense 
period of conflict as the decision to produce licit crops is finalized. Community members need 
assurances that:
1. Program support is available at any time, 
2. ADP is acting in the best interests of the community, 
3. The information they are receiving reflects the reality of their environment and is 
reliable, and
4. Agreements between communities and DEVIDA/ADP will be honored. 
In the view of the evaluation team, support during this intensive period is best managed by and 
funded through ADP. Producer training, infrastructure building, community support and other 
activities may be subcontracted to local institutions.
After the coca is eradicated and training and technical assistance for production of licit crops is 
underway and infrastructure projects are in construction, the need for community development 
support by ADP begins to subside. Within a year, in most cases, community support visits can 
be intermittent, the interval between visits determined by the stability of the community and their 
progress in establishing licit crops. Visits should not be entirely discontinued, however, until the 
licit crops are installed and producing income, the infrastructure is completed and the 
community appears stable. For most communities this is three to five years after eradication of 
coca. During this period ADP or their partner institutions may respond to emergencies and 
events that may threaten the sustainability of licit crops and the stability of the community. 
As the political leadership and political institutions begin to change toward support for licit crops 
municipal and regional governments may be receptive to cooperation with ADP. Often these 
Figure 15 A remarkable family; the first to adopt 
Voluntary Eradication in Shambillo
Source: USAID/Peru
63
governments have limited experience in how to establish an environment friendly to economic 
growth of the agricultural and agribusiness sector.
Regional and municipal governments that are ready to move to support licit crops should be 
supported. Short-term support in technical areas is the greatest need. Seldom should ADP 
support come in the form of a full-time advisor within the political unit. ADP may provide short￾term support directly if staff with the technical skills is available. Preferable in San Martin and 
Pucallpa is that ADP subcontract with a provider of these skills, monitoring performance and 
results. 
As the number of communities with coca in the northern San Martin and Pucallpa areas 
decreases, the ADP staff will also decrease. Strengthening local institutions and subcontracting 
with them to provide the community development, democracy and governance, production 
support, and other activities should be a priority. Eventually only a small ADP staff should 
remain in this region, with the primary task to maintain the technical quality of services, to 
identify and strengthen local institutions to take on the funding of these services, and to train or 
retrain local service providers when needed. 
III.3 TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO PRODUCERS 
One of the most important ADP activities is support for production of the new principal crop, 
including training in management of the new crop, technical assistance to resolve technical 
issues that arise, and the provision of selected inputs sufficient to plant two to 5 hectares in the 
case of coffee and caco, and 5 to 10 hectares in the case of palm oil. 
ADP may deliver this training and technical assistance directly or through subcontractors. Most 
training subcontractors are the associations and cooperatives to which many of the producers 
may eventually be selling their production. There is no obligation for the producers to sell their 
production to the institution that is providing the training. 
Nearly all training and much of the TA is delivered through FFS, which appears to be working 
well. Most producers gave the training provider and ADP high marks for the quality of the 
training. The basic training is a set of farmer field schools that meet once per month for about 12 
sessions. These sessions cover the basic training needed by producers. Other than this basic 
course, no additional training in advanced or refresher courses was presented to the evaluation 
team, for any crop. 
As presented below a large share of producers have already received the basic course in 
production and post-harvest handling. Periodic refresher workshops may be needed, and some 
advanced training may help resolve specific production problems. The number of basic training 
courses will decline. There will, however always be new producers to be trained. 
Training and technical assistance can be subcontracted to local institutions. The task of 
supervising these training providers should gradually be transferred to local institutions with 
local sources of funding. Regardless of the training provider, ADP‘s role is to intervene as 
needed to maintain the quality of the training and to verify with community members that they 
are satisfied with the results.
64
Ongoing support to producer association and cooperatives is needed. As their leadership 
becomes more experienced and effective in their administration and decision-making the levels 
of program support can be reduced but not eliminated, at least for the intermediate term. 
There appears to be an assumption by some program implementing personnel that the 
companies, including cooperatives and associations buying the product, will pick up the training 
task when ADP funding is reduced for the San Martin area. The team is not convinced that 
these companies will respond as assumed. ADP supported cooperatives visited by the team 
had mixed views of providing training to new producers. Some indicated they would consider 
providing technical assistance to producers that were already trained and delivering product to 
the company. Several expressed reservations about providing training for beginning producers. 
Their management teams were much more animated when discussing their plans for buying, 
processing and selling of product. Those institutions providing training to many producers also 
had relatively large subcontracts with ADP. With the possible exception of the palm oil 
processing plants, no institution claimed to be directing large amounts of their own funds to 
training. Some smaller cooperatives appeared excited to be providing training; probably ADP 
funding is a larger share of their revenue. 
The current ADP training model is not broken; it delivers training that producers like. After eight 
years, however, there is still not a viable plan for leaving that training in the hands of local 
institutions. The institutions favored by ADP to carry on the training will likely do little training for 
new entrants into production of licit crops beyond what is funded by donors.
With proper promotion, new local training institutions can provide basic training for new 
producers as effectively as the associations, cooperatives and other agribusinesses can. 
Utilizing specialized training institutions allows for competitive selection of training providers, 
and may reduce the propensity to organize local associations and cooperatives. 
An advantage of this model is that those institutions that decide to excel in training have an 
opportunity to learn updated technology and strengthen their training capacity. 
In this model eligible institutions for training include NGOs, universities, consulting companies, 
governments, associations and cooperatives, and private sector companies, including suppliers 
of inputs to farmers and buyers of their product. 
III.3.1 Community Promoters 
One training support technology mentioned often to the team was community promoters for 
specific crops. Promoters are producers who have: excelled during the training for a crop, 
acquired additional information on their own initiative, demonstrated production practices 
consistent with the training, and who are willing to share that information with other producers in 
the community. Once selected, promoters may receive additional training, minor tools or inputs 
that facilitate their instruction to other producers, and recognition at community and other 
events. 
There are many ―promoters‖ in Peru working with many institutions on many different tasks. The 
evaluation team suggests selecting a different title, one more descriptive of the work the 
65
individual is expected to undertake and the preparation needed. Furthermore, promoters are 
generally unpaid, so most households will expect promoters supporting ADP programs to be 
unpaid. A ―technician‖ or ―specialist‖ or other such title would more closely reflect the work 
expected of these persons. Nevertheless, for the discussion here we will employ the word 
―promoter‖ for consistency with the current terminology of ADP. 
For sustained service they must be paid either partially by ADP or other funding source, by 
producer contributions, or shared by multiple sources. If initially subsidized, over time 
community members should pay an increasing share of the promoter‘s training cost. The role of 
the promoter is to provide as much of the technical assistance to community members as they 
can, calling upon the specialists of the training provider to resolve more difficult questions. 
While promoters increase the availability of technical support to producers and reduce costs, 
they are still assistants. Professional extension personnel who are trained in production 
technologies and adult education direct the training program, mentor the promoters, and monitor 
the quality of training and technical assistance delivered to producers. 
As part of the process of transferring the training and technical assistance functions to Peruvian 
institutions, ADP should solicit national, regional and local governments to share in funding the 
training provider. Table 1 provides some reasonable estimates of training costs, the sharing of 
funding by multiple institutions, and an estimate of revenue for the training institutions and the 
trainers. 
In the training options discussed below, some trainees would be expected to contribute a 
portion of the cost of training. For producers entering after eradication, the contribution would be 
small to nothing. Producers with more experience or with income-producing crops would pay a 
higher portion of training costs. With time ADP would need only a small staff in San Martin and 
Pucallpa to supervise the training and technical assistance provided by the associations and 
cooperatives and professional training institutions. 
Table 1 provides options for funding training by Farmer Field Schools through third party 
providers. This is a desktop example; the assumptions on costs and willingness of funding 
sources to participate need to be verified against actual experience by ADP. This assumes that 
continued producer training in the region will be primarily by FFS with an average of 25 students 
each training. Producers with less than 4 years‘ experience since planting their new crop would 
receive the basic training with 12 sessions, at an average cost of US$8 per student per session. 
Producers with 4-5 years since planting their crop would receive intermediate training at a cost 
of US$10 per student per session, and a 10-session class. Producers with more than 5 years 
would be offered a training of 6 sessions at a cost of US$14 per student per session. 
66
With these assumptions one basic course would cost a total of US$2,400. The training provider 
would retain 15 percent of the revenue for overhead expenses. The trainer would receive 85 
percent of the revenue for delivering the training. The trainer would cover his or her own social 
benefits and transport costs.
Funding for the training can be shared by multiple institutions; in this example funding is shared 
by ADP, regional governments and a buyer of farm product.31 Few buyers will share the costs of 
basic training. Some may be persuaded to share the cost of intermediate or advanced training 
or technical assistance where producers have product to deliver. 
Table 2 uses the costs and co-funding data presented in Table 1 to estimate the costs to 
funding agencies if producers were provided training in San Martin North and Tocache regions. 
There are a total of 17,660 producers in the two regions, of which 7,303 are at less than four 
years from their first plantings, 2,355 producers with 4-5 years since plantings, and 8,002 
producers with more than 5 years of experience since first planting. Given the assumptions in 
 
31 The Regional Director of San Martin wants to establish a Center of Excellence for Cacao in his 
departmentHe would likely be supportive of sharing funding of training and be able to interest training 
providers to respond to a request for proposals. 
Table 1 Illustrative Options for Funding Training by Farmer Field Schools in San Martin and 
Pucallpa through Third Party Providers
Years since first planting for producers to be 
trained
Less than 4 
years 4-5 years
More than 5 
years
Farmer Field Schools (FFS) (20 to 30 producers)
Cost per student per session with materials 
($US) 8.00 10.00 14.00
Sessions per class 12 8 6
Fixed share for overhead to provider institution 15.0% 17.0% 20.0%
Fixed share to trainer, technical assistance 
provider 85.0% 83.0% 80.0%
Cost to program for one FFS with 25 
students 25 2,400 25 2,000 25 2,100 
Payments to Training Provider Share $US Share $US Share $US
Share to provider for overhead 15% 360 17% 300 20% 315 
Share to trainer or technical assistance provider 85% 2,040 83% 1,700 80% 1,785 
 Total 2,400 2,000 2,100 
Funding Source per Class
For Producers 0% 0 30% 600 40% 840 
For ADP 80% 1,920 45% 900 5% 105 
For Regional Government 20% 480 20% 400 5% 105 
For DEVIDA 0% 0 0 0 
For Municipal Government 0% 0 0 0 
For Buyer of Product 0% 0 5% 100 50% 1,050 
For Other Donor 0% 0 0 0 
 Total 100% 2,400 100% 2,000 100% 2,100 
67
Table 1, training costs for ADP would total US$611,663 if 100 percent of the new producers 
were trained, 50 percent of producers with 4-5 years were given intermediate training, and 25 
percent of producers with more than 5 years were given advanced training. This also assumes 
the sharing of costs among funding institutions as presented in Table 1. 32
 
The objective of tables 1 and 2 is not to precisely estimate training costs, but rather to suggest a 
model for USAID/Peru through ADP to provide leadership and a reasonable plan that 
incorporates local institutions into training and technical assistance and transfers appropriate 
technology to them for sharing with producers. This model facilitates inclusion of governments in 
San Martin and Ucayali in funding business development activities. Training and TA providers 
may continue to be associations and cooperatives or professional training institutions, 
whichever best meets the needs of producers eradicating their coca. Sharing costs may 
facilitate participation by multiple funding institutions. Using associations, cooperatives or 
specialized training institutions and having those institutions establish and support one or more 
promoters for each community will improve service to producers and reduce costs. 
III.3.2 Which Community Needs Training? 
Basic training is nearly always accomplished during the first year a new producer is in the 
program. Basic training will always need full or partial subsidy from governments or donors. The 
team identified no near-term prospect of the subsidy becoming available from the GOP. 
Currently donors and regional governments are the only available funding sources for this 
subsidy. 
Producers that have five or more years of production experience need limited training, mostly in 
specific topics, such as combating disease and pests, reducing production costs, increasing 
yields, reducing fertilizer costs, and adopting promising new technologies. Commercial 
enterprises may also be a source of funding for this training. Governments and donors may 
consider supporting preparation of the training curriculum and materials. In some sectors 
commercial enterprises may be able to contribute to the cost of delivering this level of training to 
producers. Where there are few buyers in a local area, such as in palm oil, there is greater 
potential for commercial enterprises to fund training through discounts in payments to 
producers. Only in palm oil did commercial enterprises hint that they might contribute to training 
of producers not yet delivering product to their plants. With other commodities where there are 
many buyers, such as coffee, the ability of commercial enterprises to fund training is limited. 
Producer- and/or industry-approved discounting programs that mandate a unit or value tax on 
product can be used to finance training. The same program could also fund research and 
market development programs. These types of programs have been used before in Peru, but 
none now existence for cacao, coffee or palm oil. 
Producers with four to five years of experience have received the basic training but may need 
refresher training to confirm their knowledge and convert that knowledge into practice. These 
 
32 Tables 1 and 2 are very rough estimates of training costs for the primary crops promoted by ADP to the 
communities served by ADP. Training costs for other crops, animal products or communities may be quite 
different. 
68
producers are just beginning to generate sufficient income from their new products to allow 
them to begin expansion of production and to invest in improved production practices. Training 
is an opportunity to review post harvest best practices and prepare them to manage wisely the 
phase of expansion of production. 
Governments and donors will need to fund a large portion of the cost of this training. At the very 
least, governments and donors will need to subsidize preparation of training curriculums and 
materials. While these producers now have some income from their new crops, for most, 
spending it on training will be a lower priority than expansion of production or in meeting 
postponed investment or even consumption needs. Some regional governments are initiating 
training in agricultural production, and their focus appears to be on the basic training 
component. 
New entrants into ADP arrive by community so training is delivered to groups. For most 
communities only one crop is selected to be supported by ADP. 
ADP provided the team with data on the number of years since the first planting of cacao or 
coffee. In northern San Martin, ADP is working with 346 communities, for which 198 (57 
percent) are at less than four years since their first planting of product (see Table 3 and 
Appendix 4, Table 1). These 198 communities, with 6,022 producers, are in the phase of 
receiving basic training for production. Producers in some of these communities will have 
completed their series of 12 sessions of basic training and have practical experience with 
planting and maintenance of trees. Only a few will have practical experience with post harvest 
activities or on how fertilization impacts income. 
Communities with more than five years of experience total 117 (34 percent) of all communities. 
Many of these communities can acquire training and technical assistance from commercial 
companies that are providing inputs or purchasing farm output. Only limited support is needed 
from outside sources. 
Local leadership in the implementing institution indicated to team members that they are 
planning for how to manage this technology transfer to commercial enterprises and incorporate 
regional governments into the process. There was little evidence that this activity has 
progressed beyond the design phase. 
In Tocache there are a total of 128 communities participating in ADP, of which 53 (41 percent) 
have less than four years of experience (see Table 3 and Appendix 4, Table 2). These 
communities contain 1,281 producers. Communities with more than five years of experience 
total 66 (52 percent), and serve 2,502 producers. There are 9 communities with four or five 
years of experience (9 percent), with 186 producers. 
In Pucallpa there are a total of 175 communities participating in ADP, of which 101 (58 percent) 
have less than four years‘ experience (see Table 3 and Appendix 4, Table 3). 
69
Table 2 Estimating Sharing of Costs for Training in San Martin North and Tocache by Funding Institutions
Less than 4 years 4-5 years More than 5 years Total
Item Percent of 
Participants 
Trained
Number 
of 
Producer
s to Train
Amount of 
Funding by 
Group US$
Number of 
Producers 
to Train
Amount of 
Funding by 
Group US$
Number of 
Producers 
to Train
Amount of 
Funding by 
Group US$
Number of 
Producers 
to Train
Amount of 
Funding by 
Group US$
Number of 
Producers
100% 7,303 2,355 8,002 17,660
75% 5,477 1,766 6,002 13,245
50% 3,652 1,178 4,001 8,830
25% 1,826 589 2,001 4,415
For 
Producers
100% 7,303 0 2,355 56,520 8,002 268,867 17,660 325,387
75% 5,477 0 1,766 42,390 6,002 201,650 13,245 244,040
50% 3,652 0 1,178 28,260 4,001 134,434 8,830 162,694
25% 1,826 0 589 14,130 2,001 67,217 4,415 81,347
For ADP 100% 7,303 560,870 2,355 84,780 8,002 33,608 17,660 679,259
75% 5,477 420,653 1,766 63,585 6,002 25,206 13,245 509,444
50% 3,652 280,435 1,178 42,390 4,001 16,804 8,830 339,629
25% 1,826 140,218 589 21,195 2,001 8,402 4,415 169,815
611,663
For 
Regional 
Govern￾ments
100% 7,303 0 2,355 37,680 8,002 33,608 17,660 71,288
75% 5,477 0 1,766 28,260 6,002 25,206 13,245 53,466
50% 3,652 0 1,178 18,840 4,001 16,804 8,830 35,644
25% 1,826 0 589 9,420 2,001 8,402 4,415 17,822
For Buyer 
of Product 
or Input 
Supplier
100% 7,303 0 2,355 9,420 8,002 336,084 17,660 345,504
75% 5,477 0 1,766 7,065 6,002 252,063 13,245 259,128
50% 3,652 0 1,178 4,710 4,001 168,042 8,830 172,752
25% 1,826 0 589 2,355 2,001 84,021 4,415 86,376
The source for number of producers with number of years since first planting of cacao or coffee in their community is ADP. 
70
Table 3 Years Since First Planting of Cacao or Coffee by Community
Number of Participating Producers 
and Communities
February 2010 Total Less than 
4 years
4 - 5 
years
More than 
5 years
Region North San Martin
Total number of producers 13,691 6,022 2,169 5,500
Percent 100% 44% 16% 40%
Number of communities 475 241 74 160
Percent 100% 51% 16% 34%
Region Tocache
Total number of producers 3,969 1,281 186 2,502
Percent 100% 32% 5% 63%
Number of communities 128 53 9 66
Percent 100% 41% 7% 52%
North San Martin and Tocache
Total number of producers 17,660 7,303 2,355 8,002
Percent 100% 33% 7% 60%
Number of communities 603 294 83 226
Percent 100% 49% 14% 37%
Region Pucallpa
Total number of producers 4,328 2,064 979 1,285
Percent 100% 48% 23% 30%
Number of communities 175 101 37 37
Percent 100% 58% 21% 21%
All Regions San Martin, Tocache, Pucallpa
Total number of producers 21,988 9,367 3,334 9,287
Percent 100% 43% 15% 42%
Number of communities 778 295 120 263
Percent 100% 42% 42% 17%
It is clear from Appendix 4, Tables 1, 2 and 3 that communities within a district tend to be within 
one group or another. However, this tendency to group by district is less pronounced in Tocache 
than in northern San Martin. Perhaps this results from Tocache and Mariscal Caceres being 
provinces where both voluntary and programmed eradications have occurred. Programmed 
eradication may result in a surge in the demand for basic training. 
In both San Martin North and Tocache, ADP is working with 17,660 producers, 7,303 producers 
of whom have less than four years of experience. Many of these producers will still need basic 
training and more intensive technical support. These producers are located in 294 communities, 
about half of the total number of communities served by ADP. Much of this training will need 
continued subsidy. 
For the producers in the 37 percent of the communities with more than five years of experience, 
the training needs are more limited and could be partially financed by buying or input supplying 
institutions, by producers, and by small contributions by ADP and regional governments. Few of 
71
the palm oil producers in this group, for example, will need subsidized training. Coffee growers 
may find that buyers are reluctant to provide training because of the presence of competitors 
that do not have training expenses and as a consequence may offer better prices. 
The data in Appendix 4 tables one, two and three give a preliminary approximation of the 
unfinished training needs. A more detailed community-by-community analysis is needed to 
determine the training needs of each community. 
ADP needs to ensure that no community is left without access to technical assistance and 
training. The route that ADP takes to make that training and TA available or the route that 
producers may take to request support may not be the same for all communities. 
III.4 LOCAL POST HARVEST HANDLING 
Local associations and cooperatives are popular with producers when they are organized by the 
producers, are owned by the producers, or at least eventually to be owned by the producers, 
and function to serve a defined economic need of the producers. Associations and cooperatives 
visited by the team appear to meet these criteria, or should mature to meet these criteria. 
As with support to producers of new crops, the support to local first-stage handling institutions is 
labor intensive, and can be capital intensive. The type and amount of support differs depending 
on the crop. In this discussion three crops are assessed. 
III.4.1 Cacao 
Cacao must be fermented and dried immediately. Fermentation should begin within 24 hours of 
harvesting and continue for about a week or more, depending on the potential quality of the 
cacao bean. Then the bean must be dried and packaged. Without experienced and dedicated 
attention to the processes and without instrumentation it is difficult to consistently yield premium 
quality cacao beans. Few of the small producers supported by ADP have the ability to achieve 
consistent high quality post harvest handling of cacao beans. Fermentation and drying is best 
accomplished by a nearby facility. 
It is impractical for multiple buyers to build fermentation and drying facilities in a local production 
area. Private sector investors that build local fermentation and drying plants often struggle to 
persuade growers that the investors are not extracting excessive margins in the purchase of 
their harvest. A workable solution is often a producer-owned facility. ADP has established a 
number of these facilities. 
Most of these local associations/cooperatives focus on their primary task, to build sufficient 
capacity and to train their personnel to receive from producers their cacao grains and to 
ferment, dry and sell them to buyers. A few have realized that there are additional potential 
income-generating activities such as selling farm inputs to growers, and marketing coffee and 
other commodities of producers in the area they serve. 
Support for start-up of associations/cooperatives will require substantial ADP support, most 
likely weekly visits and a significant time commitment to help the institution prepare the business 
72
plan, organize, attract members, acquire productive assets, arrange and manage financing, 
select and train management and workers, and operate the institution. 
Recommendation for Cacao: Continue technical assistance to the associations and 
cooperatives started by ADP. The intensity and duration of this support should be determined 
institution by institution, declining as the institution matures. The technical assistance should 
focus on improving the administrative capacity of directors, administrators and workers, and in 
helping obtain financing for plant and equipment improvement/expansion and for working 
capital. 
III.4.2 Coffee 
Nearly all producers harvest the beans and perform first-stage post harvest processing, 
including removing the pulp, drying the beans and packaging them in burlap sacks for delivery 
to buyers. There are many coffee buyers and processors in the region where ADP works. 
During the year some of these buyers provide technical assistance, some provide inputs. During 
harvest season these buyers send vehicles to collect harvested coffee beans. 
Because of the long history of coffee production in Peru and the presence of many buyers, the 
level of support from ADP for coffee marketing and processing cooperatives is limited. One 
cooperative, Cooperativa La Divisora, has received ADP support to improve its quality control 
activities and strengthen its administration. 
Recommendation for Coffee: Ongoing support to coffee associations and cooperatives should 
be limited to special needs, most importantly finding buyers for the coffee grown producers in 
communities eradicating coca. Support for Cooperative La Divisora should be phased out for 
most marketing and processing operations. Support to associations and cooperatives should 
continue only in the case of producers that have recently eradicated coca and have selected 
coffee as the replacement crop and need training. 
III.4.3 Palm Oil 
As part of the UN‘s development program in the 1990s, two palm oil processing plants were 
established to handle the extraction of oil from palm fruit. A third plant was established in March 
of 2009 in the Tocache region. In the early 2000s, the UN funding declined, and USAID/Peru 
agreed to support the completion of some of the plants and to provide technical and needed 
funding support until the production in the region reached sufficient volume for the plant to 
become sustainable. The OLAMSA plant is considered by the team to be sustainable. OLPESA 
in Tocache is very new and will need support for several years. OLPASA in Shambillo likewise 
will need support for several more years. 
73
However, all of the plants are being asked by USAID/Peru and other donors to continue to train 
and provide technical assistance to producers who have recently or will soon be eradicating 
coca and becoming palm producers. Beginning producers will have meaningful amounts of palm 
fruit bunches to sell in about four 
years. Financing training and technical 
assistance for new growers on the 
scale desired by USAID and other 
donors is difficult for these plants, who 
are struggling to finance their own 
needs for increased plant capacity and 
working capital. 
Equity capital from producers who are 
the owners is difficult to acquire; 
producers have their own capital 
needs to increase area of production. 
Loan capital is limited by the limited 
value of physical assets that are 
available to pledge as collateral, the 
few years of financial records available 
to demonstrate sufficient cash flow to 
meet debt payments, and limited data 
available in Peru of similar operations 
that financial institutions use to set 
feasible loan repayment plans. 
All three plants market most of their oil 
through members of the Sociedad 
Nacional de Industrias. Some plants 
market a small portion of their 
production locally. The purchase price 
is determined by the FOB (free on 
board) price in Indonesia plus costs of transport and nationalization in Peru. 
High yields for palm oil requires fertilization. In Peru chemical fertilizers are expensive; most 
ingredients are imported. Proposals exist for formulating fertilizers in Peru with varying 
proportions of local ingredients. The evaluation team did not attempt to identify whether these 
proposals are feasible. To help increase yields and lower costs, ADP should consider 
supporting feasibility studies for production of fertilizers from local ingredients. (Some of the 
cacao producers need fertilizers suitable for organic cacao.) 
Recommendation for Palm Oil: Limited support is needed for the palm oil processing plants. 
The team considers OLAMSA as sustainable and may need help only in exceptional 
circumstances. Others, such as OLPESA, OLPASA, and INDUPALSA need continued support 
for 4 to 5 years more, the level of support declining over time. This support should focus on 
increasing throughput in the plants (currently at 40 to 50 percent of capacity), improving 
administrative capacity including relationships with growers, facilitating delivery of inputs to 
Figure 16 La Ducha del Diablo near Pucallpa
Source: Weidemann´s Team 
74
growers, guiding research to achieve increased yields and labor saving production practices, 
and improving marketing of output. 
For any of these plants and their related producer associations, the large number of incoming 
palm oil producers as a result of coca eradication will create the need for continued support to 
these institutions for training and technical assistance until the new producers enter the 
production phase. At that time the palm oil processing plants should be capable of covering the 
cost of training and technical assistance to producers from which they purchase raw materials. 
III.5 INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENTS 
ADP is the primary negotiator with the communities when the decisions are made as to which 
infrastructure investments best serve the needs of the community. Therefore, ADP is best 
positioned to supervise the process of design, approvals and installation of these investments. 
The actual implementation of the design, approvals and implementation can be accomplished 
by working through subcontractors. Working through subcontractors may be less costly and 
facilitate technology transfer to Peru. 
The process of determining alternative infrastructure investments and the wise selection of 
these investments is in itself a valuable training exercise for community leaders. The 
community‘s involvement in the planning and decision-making processes and in the actual 
implementation of the investment creates buy-in for the investment and helps to ensure support 
for maintenance of the investment. 
III.6 PROCESSING AND MARKETING INSTITUTIONS
III.6.1 Cacao 
Several cooperatives provide processing and marketing services both to cacao growers and to 
first-stage handling associations and cooperatives; ACOPAGRO, Oro Verde, Naranjillo, and La 
Divisora being the largest and most experienced.33 In the team‘s estimation, three of these can 
be considered sustainable, able to continue operations without additional ADP assistance.34
These are ACOPAGRO, Naranjillo and La Divisora. Oro Verde is still in a consolidation phase 
and may need up to two more years of technical assistance before attaining sustainability. 
Each of these institutions plays an important role in the ADP program, providing services of 
marketing and processing for producers that are eradicating coca. Surely USAID, and other 
donors, will be asking them to increase buying from producers participating in ADP. This would 
mean incurring extra costs in training, member support, increasing processing capacity, and 
finding markets for additional product. Fortunately in the present marketing environment, costs 
 
33 The full names are Cooperativa Agraria Cacaotera, Cooperative Oro Verde, Cooperative Agraria 
Industrial ―Naranjillo‖ (COOPAIN), and Cooperativa La Divisora. 
34 Sustainable to the team means that the company could remain viable for five years or more without 
additional donor assistance. 
75
for indentifying additional markets are minimal. However, costs for plant expansion and training 
are significant. To allow some institutions to expand operations rapidly so that additional 
producers have a place to sell their production, USAID may consider providing credit 
guarantees for plant expansion and increased working capital.
Multiple private sector for-profit buyers for cacao operate in the region served by ADP. Most pay 
growers prices very similar to that offered by associations and cooperatives. Some now 
advertize that they offer credit and technical assistance to growers. 
Naranjillo publishes the prices they pay for cacao beans that qualify as premium quality. Price 
offers from for-profit buyers to producers were often reported to the evaluation team by 
producers as about S/ .20 to S/ 0.35 more than the published price by Naranjillo. Cooperatives 
often pay an additional return to producers (reintrego) after the entire crop is sold and final 
earnings established, which adds a few cents to the final price received by the producer. Adding 
in the reintrego may result in a final price to producers from the cooperative that is higher or 
lower than paid by for-profit buyers. It appeared to the team, and Naranjillo personnel claimed, 
that the price published by Naranjillo establishes a regional reference price for cacao. 
Recommendation for Cacao: USAID/Peru should continue providing technical assistance to 
Oro Verde over the next one to two years. In addition, USAID/Peru should consider funding 
ongoing training, technical assistance and inputs to all of these institutions when they provide 
services to new producers that are planting cacao as a replacement for coca. The amount of 
funding for assistance can be determined on a case-by-case basis, or (as presented above) as 
a fixed amount per producer per training series. USAID/Peru may also consider support to 
selected cooperatives and associations to improve collection of product from producers and 
provision of farm inputs. 
Assistance may also be needed to increase plant processing capacity as a result of increasing 
production by these new coca eradicators. The team considers that for new eradicators in 2010 
that are planting cocoa, the need for assistance from USAID/Peru should be minimal; three 
years from now as the production from new planting begin to arrive the processors should be 
sufficiently established to seek commercial capital to finance expansion. 
III.6.2 Coffee 
Technical assistance is needed by La Divisora with the purpose of strengthening the support it 
provides to ADP activities, primarily training of new producers. 
Recommendation for Coffee: Assistance needed for internal operations and marketing is 
limited. Assistance will be needed if La Divisora is asked to train and the many new coffee 
producers eradicating coca in the years to come. 
76
III.6.3 Palm Oil 
The three institutions discussed above are both first stage post harvest handling institutions and 
processors and marketing institutions. The discussion and recommendations are contained in 
the section above. 
In Pongo de Caynarachi there is a processing plant for palm oil, not supported by ADP, but 
which contributes to the sustainability of palm oil in the region. 
III.7 STAFFING BY OFFICE AND DUTIES 
The ADP-Chemonics reported a total of 226 staff personnel as of mid March. Table 4 indicates 
the number of personnel by location of assignment and by type of activities. Twenty-one percent 
of this ADP personnel are located in Lima. 
Production specialists are engaged in 
helping producers grow licit crops. Much of 
their work is with subcontractors that are 
the delivery mechanism for most of the 
training for producers. Other specialists 
include community development, 
governability, social capital, value chain, 
and others. On ADP‘s staff for every 
productive specialist, there are 1.8 other 
specialists. 
The administrative staff accounts for 27 
percent of the total number of personnel 
and includes monitoring and evaluation 
personnel as well as chauffeurs and 
messengers and cleaning personnel for 
some offices. After Lima, the greatest 
number of personnel is in San Martin, 
followed closely by Ucayali. San Martin 
and Tocache combined account for 37 
percent of ADP personnel; Ucayali, 
including Aguaytia, for 30 percent. 
Subcontractors provide most of the training and technical assistance and use a total of 308 
persons (Table 5). A total of 190 (62 percent) of those are extension agents, 49 (16 percent) are 
promoters, 34 (11 percent) are administrative staff, and 34 (11 percent) are coordinators or 
directors. Promoters are producers that also provide technical assistance to other community 
members 167 of whom (54 percent) are located in San Martin or Tocache. 
For ADP-Chemonics there are about four specialists for each director or coordinator. For 
subcontractors there are more than seven specialists and promoters for each director or 
coordinator. 
Table 4 Number of ADP (Chemonics) Personnel by 
Location and Activities
Office
Director, 
Coordinator
Production 
Specialist
Other 
Specialists*
Administrative
Total
Aguaytia 2 4 10 7 23
San Martin 6 9 19 12 46
Tocache 5 9 12 11 37
Tingo María 4 6 13 6 29
Ucayali 5 9 15 15 44
Sub Total 22 37 69 51 179
Lima 9 2 17 19 47
Total 31 39 86 70 226
Source: ADP-Chemonics. Data does not include 
Chemonics International personnel assigned to the 
project.
* Other specialists include community development, 
governability, social capital, value chain, and others.
77
Combined, the staff of ADP￾Chemonics and subcontractors totals 
533 persons working out of the 
following locations (Table 6):
 Aguaytia, 57 (11 percent) 
 San Martin, 150 (28 percent)
 Tocache, 99 (19 percent) 
 Tingo Maria, 65 (12 percent) 
 Ucayali, 115 (22 percent)
 Lima, 47 (9 percent) 
Combined, San Martin and Tocache 
have 249 workers, or 47 percent of 
the total. The share of personnel in 
these regions may have reflected 
past program priorities, but it does 
not appear to reflect anticipated 
program priorities. 
Technical specialists, extension agents and 
promoters total 364 persons, or 68 percent, 
administrative support including monitoring and 
evaluation total 104 persons (20 percent), and 
directors and coordinators total 47 (12 percent). 
Directors and coordinators play mixed technical 
and administrative roles. 
Thirty nine subcontracts are active or were 
recently ended (see Appendix 1, Table 3). Thirty 
six are with associations, foundations, or 
cooperatives; three are with investor-owned 
companies. Thirty five subcontracts are classified 
as in the consolidation phase, four as in post 
eradication phases. In the four post eradication 
phase subcontracts, 21 persons are working. 
Table 5 Number of Subcontractor Personnel by 
Location and Activities
Office
Director, 
Coordinator
Extension Agent
Promoter
Administrative
Total
Aguaytia 4 16 8 6 34
San Martin 10 70 16 8 105
Tocache 8 42 2 10 62
Tingo Maria 5 26 1 4 36
Ucayali 7 36 22 6 71
Total 34 190 49 34 308
Source: ADP-Chemonics
Table 6 Combined Number of Personnel by 
Location and Activities
Office
Director, 
Coordinator
Technical 
Specialist
Administrative
Total
Aguaytia 6 38 13 57
San Martin 16 114 20 150
Tocache 13 65 21 99
Tingo Maria 9 46 10 65
Ucayali 12 82 21 115
Sub Total 56 345 85 486
Lima 9 19 19 47
Total 65 364 104 533
Source: ADP-Chemonics
78
III.8 SUPPORTING 
AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
SERVICES 
Support for agricultural services includes 
finance, research in production technologies, 
market development, infrastructure 
development, policies and regulations, and 
natural resources management. 
The ADP has provided extensive infrastructure 
development, especially in rural areas. 
Improved roads and bridges and electrical 
service are major contributors to the viability of 
licit crops. Commitments to infrastructure 
investments occur when communities sign 
agreements to end coca production and begin 
establishment of licit crops. The team did not attempt to catalog outstanding infrastructure 
commitments in the San Martin, Tocache or Pucallpa regions. 
ADP‘s attempts to persuade financial institutions to provide credit to producers served by the 
program met with limited success. The future is brighter for those producers that now have trees 
yielding product for sale. In particular palm oil growers should soon find that commercial 
financial institutions will begin offering financial products with acceptable terms for small 
producers. This should speed planting of additional area to palm oil. 
III.9 DONOR COORDINATION IN SAN MARTIN AND PUCALLPA 
ADP built on the previous work of the United Nations (UN), both in the San Martin Region and 
Pucallpa. USAID/Peru continues to fund UN units to provide training and technical assistance to 
producers. Germany Cooperation also supported installation of 5,800 hectares of palm oil trees 
in the area of ACEPAT (Asociación Central de Palmicultores de Tocache) and OLPESA 
(Oleaginosas del Peru S.A., a palm oil processing plant), later supported by ADP. To this extent, 
there was and is donor coordination with the Germans and the UN. 
The UN introduced palm oil trees, cacao and palmito in the Northern San Martin Region in the 
last years of the ‘90s. Its strategy was to support producer organizations to take on the role of 
intermediaries in the processing of these crops. Thus, the UN financed processing plants for 
palm oil, organized the associations of ACOPAGRO and Oro Verde to process cacao in the San 
Martin Region, assisted in targeting specialized European markets for high flavor cacao and 
also supported the palmito plant of APROPAL, ALIANZA, S.A. As part of its strategy for 
strengthening these associations, the UN provided experienced managers to each association 
and paid their salaries for two years. These managers have remained in these associations 
playing an important role in their growth. 
Table 7 Combined Share of Personnel by 
Location and Activities
Office
Director, 
Coordinator
Technical 
Specialist
Administrative
Total
Aguaytia 1% 7% 2% 11%
San Martin 3% 21% 4% 28%
Tocache 2% 12% 4% 19%
Tingo Maria 2% 9% 2% 12%
Ucayali 2% 15% 4% 22%
Sub Total 11% 65% 16% 91%
Lima 2% 4% 4% 9%
Total 12% 68% 20% 100%
Source: ADP-Chemonics
79
In Pucallpa, the UN introduced palm oil as a replacement crop for coca in 1992, establishing a 
plant nursery in 1993. The initial production did not have a market because processing facilities 
were lacking in the area. This led to the creation of COCEPU, a five-hundred-family palm 
producer association that took the lead in financing the OLAMSA palm processing plant, with 
COCEPU as the main stockholder. As one producer stated, ―The palm oil has allowed us to 
leave behind the darkness, making it possible for us to live in the open and interact with 
authorities and regular people.‖ ―Liberty, tranquility and transparency are the qualities of life 
resulting from palm oil,‖ said another. 
OLAMSA, (Empresa de Oleaginosas del Amazonas, S.A.) started by processing 6 TM/hr., 
increasing its capacity recently to 12 TM/hr. By October, the plant will have the capacity to 
process 24 TM/hr. However, with new areas coming into production, COCEPU is negotiating 
with the Banco de Credito a line of credit to build a second processing plant in Campo Verde. 
Through the ―aval‖ (guarantee) of OLAMSA (Oleaginosas Amazonica S.A.), members of 
COCEPU (Comité Central del Pamicultores de Ucayali) are credit recipients for production, 
fertilization and maintenance of plantations; they do not have credit for expanding new areas. 
However, some members are credit card holders.
COCEPU has used earnings from OLAMSA‘s operations for funding a palm nursery to provide 
plants for an additional 3,000 hectares in the process of being planted. Most of these new areas 
are financed by the producers themselves. OLAMSA pays bi-weekly to its members about 
US$200,000. Its sales exceed one million dollars monthly. 
III.9.1 Other Donor Activities that Support Licit Crops 
The United Nations established a palmito plant in Santa Lucía (Uchiza). Spanish assistance 
made possible the establishment of a palmito plant in Pongo de Caynarachi, Alianza (called ―La 
Orquidea‖), as well as a chocolate plant in Tarapoto. There was no indication of coordination 
with ADP in establishing these plants. 
German cooperation began in a small valley of the River Chontayacu in the Tocache area 
supporting alternative crops. With additional funding from KfW (Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau) , 
the area of attention expanded considerably. This project has been coordinating activities with 
ADP. The early phases of this project have ended and another phase is under negotiation with 
UN. 
PRONATEA, a Swiss group, is currently coordinating with ADP in Campo Verde in creating a 
working capital fund for S/.136,000 for a community in the area. 
In Pucallpa, the UN strategy introduced palm, cacao and palmito crops, promoted producers 
associations and funded the OLPASA palm processing plant. The UN also funded a small 
palmito processing plant in Aguaytia that is not operating at present. 
There is another palmito processing plant in Sungaroyacu, (Puerto Inca) that is not operating at 
present but could be restarted when conditions are appropriate. 
80
In summary, there is not strong evidence of effective donor coordination in either the San Martin 
or Pucallpa regions. Donors have been present at different periods and have implemented 
projects based on their agendas, which have been similar to the agenda of USAID/Peru—to 
establish licit crops that generate sufficient and reliable income to motivate rural residents to 
select that lifestyle. 
The most related and coordinated efforts have been with the UN. This donor, while funding 
lasted, was able to establish a basis for later ADP successes in the Northern San Martin 
Region. The introduction of palm oil, cacao and palmito in the region, the grouping of producers 
in associations and the establishment of processing plants with managerial assistance, were 
instrumental interventions in ensuring that these associations to have a business orientation. 
ADP intervention benefitted from the work of the UN, and as coca eradication progressed in the 
zone, ADP was able to successfully join efforts with regional and municipal governments in 
support of licit crops. Today in the region, licit crops are the dominate source of agricultural 
income. 
Conclusion: Based on the UN presence in the region, the team recommends continuing the 
relationship between USAID/Peru and the UN, with UN‘s primary role to train producers 
eradicating coca and to enhance the capacity and performance of the oil palm industry. 
81
APPENDIX 1 STATEMENT OF WORK 
In the continuation is the statement of work provided by USAID/Peru for this evaluation. 
Evaluation of USAID/Peru's Alternative Development Program 
I. P U R P O S E 
The evaluation is an important tool to increase program presence and fortify gains made in the 
fragile areas of Aguaytia-Huipoca, Tingo Maria, and Tocache, areas which will likely be 
affected by the Government of Peru's ongoing eradication program in 2010 and 2011. The 
evaluation will review both successes and failures of the current USAID/Peru's Alternative 
Development (AD) Program, specifically recommending strategies for gradual redeployment of 
ADP resources from more secure areas in northern San Martin, and elsewhere, to areas 
where they are most likely needed in this fragile triangle (i.e., Aguaytia-Huipoca, Tingo Maria, 
and Tocache). To more easily identify promising interventions that can be applied in other 
post-programmed eradication zones, evaluators will pay particular attention to the AD program 
in Tocache, where measurable successes have been made within this former, hard-core coca 
growing area.
I I . B A C K G R O U N D 
USAID/Peru signed a five-year, $79 million contract with Chemonics International in September 
2007. The goals of the new Alternative Development (AD) Program are as follows: (1) to assist 
significant numbers of new communities and families to transition to a licit lifestyle after 
programmed eradication and (2) to ensure the sustainability of the licit development gains 
made to date in the 800 communities of the voluntary eradication program, taking place 
between 2002 and 2007.
As part of this strategy, USAID/Peru initiated a post-programmed, alternative development 
program that moved in behind the Government of Peru's (GoP) eradication program, focusing 
on investments in short-term labor, small animal husbandry, high-value crops, building social 
capital, and strengthening governability. The new Alternative Development contract was 
designed to consolidate voluntary eradication areas and post-programmed eradication 
alternative development areas. Targets and goals in the contract were defined to measure 
results towards the programs' objectives of new hectares of licit crops planted and the 
productivity of those crops, strengthening social capital and governability, and overall behavior 
change. 
This initiative was innovative and risky, but over the next several years the program had and 
continues to have great success. These cumulative program successes in both the voluntarily 
eradicated and program eradicated areas of San Martin have been termed by many the San 
Martin Model, and by some Peruvians, "the San Martin Miracle."
82
Alongside this program success in San Martin is a less sanguine development context in the 
region of Huánuco, where the AD program also operates. Intensified GoP military action in the 
Sendero Luminoso stronghold of the Valle del Rio Apurimac y Ene in south central Peru has 
caused the terrorist group to try to solidify its hold in the Huánuco region. As part of that 
increased activity, production has moved north towards the successful post-eradication 
alternative development program, threatening provincial and local mayors and even ADP 
program participants. It is clear that increased investments in this area are needed if the 
program is to hold its ground. 
At the same time, it is also apparent that the areas in and around Aguaytia, in the Ucayali 
region, are also suffering from a deteriorating security situation. Committed cocaleros (coca 
growers) have moved out of Tocache, following the government's eradication program, and 
migrated to other areas of the country in order to continue illicit activities. Unfortunately, one of 
the main destinations for these cocaleros has been Aguaytia-Huipoca and the outskirts of the 
Shambillo valley, where the USG has invested millions of dollars to date. Deteriorating 
circumstances in these areas have precipitated the need to "redouble" efforts, in order that 
investments and hard-won successes are not lost to the cocaleros and narco-traffickers.
Activity Summary: 
USAID/Peru's Alternative Development Program, a key component of the USG's 
comprehensive counter-narcotics strategy, operates in concert with other U.S. Government 
agencies, including the State Department's Narcotics Affairs Section and the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration, as well as the Government of Peru (GOP), to promote licit 
development in formerly coca growing areas and sustain coca reduction achieved with 
eradication programs. USAID works in close coordination with the Narcotics Affairs Section to 
identify potential communities where programmed eradication by the GOP has taken place. 
Those communities are offered the opportunity to sign "no replanting agreements" in which 
they commit to remaining coca free and USAID and the GOP commit to support their transition 
to a licit livelihood with a package of assistance tailored to each community's priorities and 
needs — thereby making programmed eradication sustainable. 
As the program expands into new areas in support of programmed eradication activities, 
USAID simultaneously continues to support the growth and sustainability of a licit economy 
and lifestyle in communities previously assisted by the program. USAID support to these 
communities has evolved to focus on the consolidation of the economic and social gains 
made in prior years, to make them sustainable for the long term. This means increasing the 
productivity of installed cacao, café, and oil palm, helping farmers in accessing credit to 
expand their crop production, strengthening producer associations and cooperatives to 
ensure optimum prices and access to local and international markets, and working closely 
with producers and communities to build their capacity for collective action and self-advocacy. 
Women's well-being and gender equity are also important components of the program, 
emphasizing creative, participatory approaches for inclusion of women in economic activities 
and overall consciousness-raising in communities, to ensure that both genders have equal 
access to program benefits.
83
 More than 15,117 hectares of illicit coca have been voluntarily eradicated by 
former coca growers, equivalent to approximately 80,000 kilos of annual cocaine 
production with a street value of $8 billion.
 The program has had a major development impact in communities that have been 
eradicated. Since 2002, the program has completed 660infrastructure works, including 
175 schools, 100 potable water systems, 15 health clinics, 139 community multi￾purpose buildings, 41 bridges, and 87 rehabilitated rural roads. Over 52,000 families 
have received assistance with licit crops, such as cacao, coffee, cotton, corn and palm 
oil and pijuayo for palmitos, on more than 67,000 hectares. In addition, the program 
invested nearly $30 million in rehabilitating 90 kms of a major thoroughfare between 
Juanjui and Tocache, eliminating a major bottleneck and connecting isolated jungle 
communities economically and socially to the rest of the country. 
 More than $10 million dollars in sales of cacao were reported in FY 2008, expected 
to triple in value by 2010. The equivalent of more than 2,500 jobs was created through 
farm labor in ADP communities. 
 More than 42 municipalities have been strengthened through training programs, 
management improvement, and technical assistance. The impact of this touches all 
citizens who benefit from improved local government in these remote rural areas. 
 New credit products have been designed that will link credit-worthy alternative 
development farmers to formal financial institutions for the first time. Through alliances 
with private banking institutions, program interventions made investments in credit 
feasible by lowering risk for banks through improved information and pre-vetted clients 
for revolving credit accounts for investments in crop expansion.
Principle Evaluation Questions for Program Evaluation: 
1. What are the factors that have contributed to the continual participation of 
program participants in Tocache? In answering this question, please differentiate 
between the initial reasons why participants entered the program and the underlying 
factors that have contributed to program retention.
2. What AD strategies worked in Tocache and what strategies failed to produce 
anticipated results? Why?
3. To what degree can external factors be credited or blamed for successes and 
failures of the AD program in Tocache (e.g., commodity prices, government or other 
donor interventions, economic conditions)? 
4. What AD strategies should be considered for Aguaytia-Huipoca, based on the 
Tocache experience and the particularities of Aguaytia-Huipoca? In answering this 
question, please also examine and make recommendations on the ADP office staffing 
pattern and composition that would be necessary to produce sustainable results in 
Aguaytia-Huipoca. 
5. What factors have contributed to Aguaytia's return to coca cultivation despite 
84
USAID's high level of investment in the area since 2002? In answering this questions, 
please make sure to substantively evaluate the AD communication strategy in Aguaytia 
for weakness and strengths.
6. What role, if any, has gender played as a cross-cutting issue to achieve results 
in Tocache? How should gender be treated and considered in terms of program 
design and implementation in Aguaytia-Huipoca. 
7. To what extent is it possible to graduate AD communities in northern San 
Martin and Pucallpa from direct USAID assistance? Additionally, what 
interventions are still needed to consolidate these communities and specifically 
which ones? In terms of sequencing, in what order should activities be phased out?
8. To what degree has donor coordination played a role in achieving AD successes 
in San Martin and Pucallpa? How might USAID enhance donor coordination to 
leverage successes moving forward?
I I I . M E T H O D O L O G Y 
The evaluation shall combine elements of both a desk review of available publications, 
reports, and proposals and field visits to ADP program areas, specifically, San Martin, 
Huanuco, and Ucayali. Relevant documents shall be distributed prior to commencement of 
entrance conference. Determination of specific site visits will be made in consultation with 
USAID. 
I V . L A N G U A G E 
All international consultants forming part of the evaluation team must be fluent in both 
English and Spanish.
V. P E R S O N N E L 
The team should be composed of between 3-4 members. At least one member should have a 
strong background in the use of gender analysis for program evaluation purposes. Also, to the 
extent possible, team members should have some familiarity with alternative development 
(inside or outside of Peru) and knowledge of the general Peruvian context.
Team Leader: Economist or specialist in agro-business. Should have a strong 
background in monitoring and evaluation, with expertise in both qualitative and 
quantitative evaluation techniques. Prior experience in evaluating agriculture and 
livelihood development programs will be helpful.
Deputy Team Leader: Sociologist, with emphasis on community-based 
development and social capital theory and detailed knowledge of Peru. 
Other Suggested Team Member: Agronomist or agriculture expert, preferably a 
specialist currently residing in Peru. 
85
APPENDIX 2 ITINERARY 
Agenda de Entrevistas por Weidemann Associates
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
Tuesday
16.02.2010
9:00 Meeting with Alternative Development Program Team
Location: USAID CR 131
15:00
Meeting with Charles Oberbeck (Director) and Lawrence Szott (Deputy 
Director),Chemonics. 
Location: Chemonics 
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
Tuesday
16.02.2010
9:00 Meeting with Alternative Development Program Team
Location: USAID CR 131
15:00
Meeting with Charles Oberbeck (Director) and Lawrence Szott (Deputy 
Director),Chemonics. 
Location: Chemonics 
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
Wednesday 
17.02.2010
8:30
Courtesy call with Andrew Herscowitz (Acting Mission Director) and 
Steve Olive (Acting Deputy Director)
Location: USAID
15:00 Meeting with Manuel Estela, ConsultAndes
Location: USAID CR 205
16:30 Reunion con Hugo Centuron (Director de Desarrollo Social)
Location: Chemonics
17:30 Reunion con Juan Jose Vega (Director de Comunicaciones)
Location: Chemonics
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
Thursday
18.02.2010
9:00
Meeting with Fernando Hurtado, DEVIDA‘s Alternative Development 
Chief. 
Location: Devida
11:00 Meeting with Abelardo Arias (NAS)
Location: American Embassy 
16:00
Reunion con Aaron Drayer (Director de Desarrollo Economico) y 
Equipo Jose Gamarra (Gerente de FCV), Hugo Palma (Gerente de 
Actividades Economicas), Jose Luis Lozano (Gerente de Accesso al 
Credito) y Pablo Pampa (Especialista en Proyecto Productivos) 
Location: Chemonics.
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
Friday
19.02.2010
8:30 Meeting with Jaime Garcia, ConsultAndes
Location: ConsultAndes
10:00 Meeting with Raul Salazar (Director) 
Location: Macroconsult
11:30 Meeting with Cristina Olive, Education Office Chief
Location: CR – 205 USAID
86
PROPUESTA Preliminar de AGENDA 
Visita de Comisión de Evaluadores a la Oficina Regional San Martin 
Tarapoto 22 - 25 de Febrero del 2010 
GRUPOS 1 y 2
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
13:30- 14:30 Refrigerio en Hotel "Rio Shilcayo"
Lunes 15:00-16:30 Reunión con el Presidente de Ia Región San Martin / Lic. Cesar Villanueva
16:45 – 18:00 Visita experiencia ICT — Ing. Enrique Arevalo Gardini y Equipo
22.02.2010 18:00- 19:30 Breve reunión con equipo PDA de San Martin
GRUPOS 1 y 2
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
Martes
23.02.2010
07:30 — 08:00 - Viaje de Tarapoto a Lamas
08:00 — 10:00 - Reunión con el Gerente de la CAC Oro Verde y Dialogo con 
agricultores participantes del PDA en café y cacao
10:00 — 10:30 - Retorno de Lamas a Tarapoto
GRUPO 01: VISITA A OZ TARAPOTO Y PONGO DE CAYNARACHI 
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
Martes
23.02.2010
10:30 — 12:00 - Viaje de Tarapoto a Pongo de Caynarachi
12:00 — 13:30 - Almuerzo en el Rest. Chino Tang
13.30 — 13:45 - Traslado a la comunidad de Yumbatos
13:45 — 15:00 Comunidad de Yumbatos:
- Reunión con autoridades y productores de cacao, participantes del PDA.
15.00 — 15.20 Traslado a la Planta Procesadora de Alianza SA
15.20 — 16.45
Reunion en Alianza SA
- Conversación con el Gerente de Alianza SA
- Reunión con agricultores que conducen palmitos
16:45 — 18:00 - Retorno a la ciudad de Tarapoto.
19:30 — 20:30 - Cena en Restaurante "Rincón Surer*"
- Descanso en el Hotel Rio Shilcayo.
Miercoles
24.02.2010
07:30 - 08:30 - Viaje de Tarapoto a Chazuta.
08:30 - 10:00 - Reunión con Alcalde y Regidores de la Municipalidad de Chazuta.
10:00 - 11:00 - Reunión con Presidente y Gerente de ALLIMA Cacao.
11:00 – 12:00
- Visita a la comunidad Banda de Chazuta: Reunión con 
autoridades y agricultores participantes.
12:30 - 13:30 - Almuerzo en Rest. Charito.
13:30 - 13:45 - Traslado a Ia comunidad de Ramón Castilla.
13:45 - 16:00 Comunidad de Ramón Castilla.
- Reunión con autoridades comunales y participantes.
7 16:00 - 17:30 - Retorno a Ia ciudad de Tarapoto
17.45 — 18-45 - Visita y entrevista con Gerente / trabajadores de Agro Industrias 
Mayo (empresa que produce los "Chocolates Orquídea"
19.00 - Cena en Restaurante "Café Do Mundo"
- Descanso en el Hotel Rio Shilcayo.
87
Jueves
25.02.2010
08:30 — 09.30 - Reunion c on funcionarios de DEVIDA/Pedro Talla y Equipo
- Reunion con representantes de la Mesa Monica de Cacao de Ia Region 
. San Martin. 
10:00 — 11.15
11:15 — 11:30 - Traslado al Aeropuerto.
12:30 - Retorno a la ciudad de Lima
GRUPO 02: Visita a las OZ Juanjui y Bellavista 
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
Martes
23.02.2010
10:30 – 12:45 - Viaje de Tarapoto a Juanjui
12:45 – 13:00 - Chequeo y registro en Hotel Capricornio
13:05 – 13:35 - Dialogo con personal de la Oficina Zonal de Juanjui del PDA
13:40 - 14:30 - Almuerzo Restaurant "La Selva"
14:30 - 15:30 - Traslado a la comunidad de Alto El Sol
15:30 - 17.30 Comunidad de Alto El So!:
- Dialogo con autoridades comunales, lideresas y participantes PDA
17.30 - 18.30 - Traslado a la ciudad de Juanjui
18:30 - Acondicionamiento y descanso Hotel Capricornio
20:00 - Cena Restaurant La Selva
Miercoles
24.02.2010
7:00 - 7:45 - Desayuno en Hotel "Capricornio"
7:45 - 08:30 - Viaje de Juanjui a Saposoa
08:30-10:00
Municipalidad Provincial de Huallaga: Dialogo con autoridades 
municipales:
- Fernando Grandes Veintemilla - Alcalde Municipalidad Provincial de 
Huallaga.
- Roberto Pacheco Armas — Gerente municipal - MP Huallaga
- Juan Delgado Tailed° - Alcalde Municipalidad Distrital de Piscoyacu.
- Rodolfo Ivan Bardales Aspajo - Regidor MD Piscoyacu
- Manuela Doza Perez - Regidora MD Piscoyacu 10:00 - 11:30 Municipalidad Provincial de Huallaga
- Dialogo con productores Ilderes y lideresas de cacao y café
11:30 - 12:30 Agencia Agraria - Saposoa
- Reunión con adores locales (Mesa Tecnica Provincial Cacao — Huallaga)
12:30 - 13:15 - Retomo a Juanjul
13:20 - 14:20 - Almuerzo Restaurant La Selva
14:25 - 14:50 - Acondicionamiento y descanso Hotel `Capricornio"
15.00 - 16.00
Municipalidad Provincial de Mariscal Caceres: Dialogo con autoridades
municipales:
- Leyla Del Aguila Ruiz — Alcalde(e ) Municipalidad Provincial de Mariscal
Caceres y Regidora de la Comisión de la Mujer y Desarrollo Humano
- Jose Gilberto Ydrogo Vera — Alcalde Municipalidad Distrital de Pajarillo
- Rodil Cachique Cappillo — Alcalde Municipalidad Distrital de Huicungo
- Rub& Ruiz Weninger— Alcalde Municipalidad Distrital de Pachiza
- Napoleon Seijas Valles — Gerente Municipalidad Distrital de Pajarillo
16.10 - 18.00
- Reunion con encargada de la Gerencia de ACOPAGRO — Srta. Luzmila 
Paredes, directivos y coordinador tacnico Proyecto Cacao.
Visita planta de procesamiento, laboratorio de calidad, almacenes.
18.10 - 19.30 - Reunion y dialogo con representantes de empresas privadas y con empresas 
acopiadoras de cacao en Juanjui.
20:00 - Cena Restaurant La Selva
Jueves
25.02.10
7:00 – 8:00 Viaje Juanjui - Bellavista Reunión con equipo PDA — Bellavista 
8:00 – 8:30 Reunion con agricultores de la Comunidad de Las Mercedes y otras
9:45 -10:30 Planta de Beneficio de Pucacaca
- Dialogo con productores lideres y lideresas de cacao y café
88
10:30 - 11:30 - Retorno a Tarapoto
11:30 -11:45 - Traslado al Aeropuerto
PROPUESTA DE AGENDA (03-03-2010) 
Visita de Comisión de Evaluadores a la Oficina Regional de Tocache
Tocache – 01 al 05 Marzo del 2010 
GRUPOS 1 Y 2.
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
Lunes
01-03-2010
7.00 – 14.00 Viaje delegación Tarapoto -- Tocache
14.00 –
17.00
Instalación delegación
17.15 –
18.45
Presentación del trabajo del PDA en la Oficina Regional de Tocache, 
participante Director Regional y Coordinadores Zonales, Especialistas 
transversales (M&E, Comunicaciones, Infraestructura, medio ambiente) y 
cadenas de valor
GRUPO 01: Visita OZ Uchiza 
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
Martes
02-03-2010
GRUPO 1: UCHIZA
07.00 –
08.15
- Viaje de Tocache a Uchiza
08.15 –
08.45
Uchiza
- Desayuno en el Restaurante Estela Maris – Uchiza.
08.45 –
09.30
Reunión con Alcalde Distrital y Gerente Municipal / Coordinador Zonal
- Sr. Segundo Emilio Núñez Pantoja Alcalde
- Sr. Andrés Tarazona Gerente Municipal
09.30 –
10.00
- Viaje de Uchiza a la comunidad de Valle Shunte
10.00 –
11.00
Comunidad de Valle Shunte y Los Angeles:
- Reunión con autoridades y productores(as) de cacao, participantes del PDA. 
Entrevista: En parcela de Abilio Espinoza Piñán y Honan Morales Sánchez.
11.00 –
11.10
- Traslado a la comunidad de Los Ángeles
11.10 –
12.00
Comunidad Los Angeles:
- Reunión con autoridades y productores(as) de cacao, participantes del PDA.
12.00 –
12.30
Traslado a Uchiza.
13.00 –
14.00
Uchiza
- Almuerzo en el Restaurante Estela Maris
14.00 –
15.30
Uchiza
- Reunión con directives / personal técnico – administrative de la Asociación 
de Productores de Cacao de Uchiza (APCU).
 Temas a converser
 - Implementación de proyectos productives (cacao)
 - Organización y vision empresarial de APCU
 - Visita a la planta de beneficio (en construcción)
15.30 –
16.30
Uchiza
- Reunión con Equipo Zonal de Uchiza
16.30 –
17.45
- Retorno de Uchiza a Tocache
89
GRUPO 02: Visita OZ – Pólvora y Tocache 
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
Martes
02-03-2010
06.30 – 9.00 Salida de Tocache – comunidades CEPESA – La Florida
09.15 –
10.30
Reunión con autoridades, líderes y agricultores de las comunidades Puerto 
Rico, Villa Los Ángeles, Cedro, La Florida y CEPESA (Distrito de Pólvora). 
Responsables Agente y Delegado de La Florida.
Lugar: Institución educative.
Visita de parcelas de cacao (Amada Guerra)
10.35 –
11.40
Traslado La Florida – Balsa Probana
11.45 –
13.15
Reunión con autoridades, líderes y agricultores de Balsa Probana
Responsables: Maria Pinedo (Agente Municipal), Reinaldo Jara (delegado) y 
Fílida Ruiz (Lideresa).
Lugar: Institución Educativa
Observación: Infraestructura: local communal, comedor popular, Puente 
Gramalote, sistema de agua. Módulos de cuyes (Tercero Valles y Clara 
Jamba)
13.20 –
13.30
Traslado Balsa Probana – Filadelfia
13.35 –
13.50
Observación / diálogo sobre módulos de piscigranjas (Pablo Mendoza)
13.50 –
14.00
Traslado Filadelfia – Tananta
14.00 –
14.30
Visita de parcelas de Palma. Aceitera.
Entrevista: Sr. Arellano Padilla Marcelo.
14.35 –
14.45
Traslado Tananta – Nuevo Bambamarca
14.50 –
15.10
Reunión con Alcaldesa de CP Nuevo Bambamarca
15.15 –
15.30
Reunión con representantes de la Empresa Amazon TRADING (cacao).
15.35 –
15.50
Reunión con representantes de la Organización de Productores ASPROC￾NBT (cacao).
15.50 –
16.20
Traslado Nuevo Bambamarca - Tocache
Miércoles
03-03-2010
07.00 –
08.30
Traslado Tocache – Nuevo Belén en distrito de Shunte.
08.30 –
09.30
Nuevo Belén:
Reunión con agricultores(as) cafetaleros(as)
Entrevista: Ceferino Pino Vera, Bonifacio Torres Hernández, Mario Margarin 
Alvarado
09.35 –
09.40
Traslado Nuevo Belén – Montecristo
09.45 –
10.45
Montecristo:
Reunión con agricultores(as) cafetaleros:
Entrevista: Néstor Quiroz Florez, Manuel Carranza Acosta y Segundo Flores 
López.
10.50 –
12.10
Traslado Montecristo – Tocache
90
15.30 –
17.00
Reunión de trabajo con la Municipalidad Provincial de Tocache
Entrevista a:
Alcalde Provincial y Gerente de Desarrollo Económico.
Temas:
El PDA en Tocache. Obras de Infrestructura. Proyecto Cacao.
Diagnóstico Mishollo. Fortalecimiento de Red de Regidoras.
Coordinación y trabajo con PDA.
Jueves
04-03-2010
07.15 –
07.25
Traslado Tocache – Almendras
07.30 –
09.30
Reunión con la Cooperativa Agroindustrial Tocache (Cacao)
Presidente, Gerente y Coordinador y Sub Coordinadores / equip técnico –
Lugar: Comité Sectorial de Almendras / Tocache.
10.00 –
11.00
Reunión con la Mesa Técnica de Cacao.
Entrevista a sus principales representantes y directivos.
Lugar: Oficina PDA
11.30 –
12.00
Reunión con ELECTRO TOCACHE
Entrevista: Gerente
Temas: Financiamiento de obras de electficación y trabajo conjunto con PDA.
Lugar: Oficina PDA.
15.50 –
17.00
Reuni‘on con ACEPAT-OLPESA: Tema de Palma aceitera. Situación actual, 
perspectivas.
Entrevista: Presidente Eli Ney Sánchez Ríos,
Gerente OLPESA Norberto Angulo García.
Presidente directorio OLPESA Sr. Néstor Sánchez Falcón
Director OLPESA Sr. José Fernández Vela
Lugar: Local de ACEPAT
17.15 –
18.30
Visita a grupo de mujeres ―La Fuerza del Mañana‖
Entrevista: Presidenta, Gladis Gamarra y socias.
Temas: Negocio de confecciones
Viernes
05-03-2010
Reunión con la CAC DIVISORIA (Café). El café en Tocache, situación actual 
y perspectivas.
Presidente, Gerente
Lugar: Local Divisoria en Tingo María
PROPUESTA Preliminar de AGENDA 
Visita de Comisión de Evaluadores 
a la Oficina Regional de Tingo María 
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
Viernes 05 
de Marzo 
del 2010
12.15-13.00 Refrigerio/ Almuerzo en Tocache
14.30 – 15.30
Reunión con la Asociación de Productores Juan Velasco Alvarado. 
Implementa proyecto cacao en paraíso.
Entrevista con Directivos, personal técnico, administrativo, Alcalde del 
Centro Poblado Menor de Paraíso y Equipo Técnico de PDA en Nuevo 
Progreso - Paraíso 
15.30-18.00 Viaje Nuevo Progreso – Tingo María. 
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
Sabado 6 de 
Marzo del 
2010
08.30-10.00 Reunion equipo PDA. 
Presentacion, dialogo y entrevista.
10:00-11:30
Traslado a CAC DIVISORIA
Reunion con Gerente y CD CAC Divisoria, Ing. Romulo Echegaray (no 
estará presente)
Se ha delegado a Administradora Katia Tito Pocori. 
Reunión con productores (as) de Café. (06 participantes) 
91
Comunidades de Margarita, Ugarteche y Hermilio Valdizan.
- Presentación de cooperativa y CD PDA
- Muestra de productos, citación y degustación de café
- Recorridillo de instalaciones.
11:40-1:30
Traslado a COOPAIN ( de Naranjillo a Afilador)
Reunión con Gerente y COOPAIN, Sr. Magno Cantaro. (No estará presente) 
Se ha delegado al Ing. Héctor Vera
- Presentación de cooperativa y CD PDA
- Muestra de productos, citación y degustación de café
- Recorridillo de instalaciones.
1:30-2:45
Almuerzo: Restaurante Campestre Las Lomas – Afilador
Almuerzo de trabajo con Jefe de Oficina desconcentrada de DEVIDA, 
Manuel Lambruschini Pardo
3:00 – 4:00
Reunión con productores(as) de Cacao (6 participantes) 
Comunidad de Huyhuantillo y Pendencia.
Lugar: sala de reuniones de PDA
4:00 – 5:00
Reunión directivos y participantes de AGROFLORA (6 participantes)
Lugar: sala de reuniones de PDA
Ing. Lancy Ponce Falcón
Ext. Napoleón Ponce Falcón
5:00-6:00
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
Domingo 7
de Marzo 
del 2010
(por definer 
entre Luis 
Ramos y 
Arvin Bunker)
Viaje a Tingo Maria – Aguaytia - Pucallpa
Llegada y registro en Pucallpa.
Nota. Definir Hotel (Recomendamos Hotel Foresta Inn) 
Propuesta de Agenda
Visita Empresa Weidemann Associates INC, Comisión Evaluadora del Programa, a la Oficina 
Regional Ucayali Pucallpa 08 de Marzo del 2010
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
Lunes
08.03.2010
7:00-7:45 Desayuno
8:00-9:00 Reunión con el Equipo de Ucayali 
Presentación del personal y dialogo con los trabajadores de la OR
9:00-10:00 Viaje de Pucallpa a Neshuya
10:00-11:00
Visita a la Planta de OLAMSA
Promoción del cultivo, Asociatividad, Fortalecimiento Organizacional/Dialogo 
con los representantes de COCEPU y OLAMSA
11:00-11:15 Viaje de Neshuya a Sauce del Alto Uruya
11:15-12:15
Visita a la Comunidad Sauce de Alto Uruya
Zona de producción, manejo técnico, asociatividad/Entrevistas con 
productores lideres 
12:15-13:00 Viaje de Sauce de Alto Uruya a Campo Verde 
13:00-14:00 Almuerzo – Campo Verde
14:00-14:30 Reunión con el Equipo Zonal Campo Verde
Presentación del personal y dialogo con los trabajadores de la OZ
14:30-15:30
Visite a la Municipalidad Distrial de Campo Verde
Promoción del Cultivo de Cacao, Trabajos de Desarrollo Social/Entrevista al 
Alcalde, Gerente de Desarrollo Económico y Gerente de Desarrollo Social 
15:30-15:45 Viaje de Campo Verde a Nueva Dinamarca
92
15:45-16:45
Visita a la Comunidad Nueva Dinamarca
Ampliación de áreas, manejo técnico, practicas asociativas y Fortalecimiento 
Organizacional/Entrevista a productores lideres, representantes del Comité 
de Productores Nueva Dinamarca y Directiva de la CAC Campo Verde
16:45-17:30 Viaje de Nueva Dinamarca a Pucallpa
17:30-18:30 Visita al Gobierno Regional de Ucayali
Dialogo con el Vicepresidente Regional y Gerencias Regionales
22:15-23:15 Retorno Pucallpa - Lima
Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo 
Programa de trabajo Evaluadores Empresa Weidemann 
Associates Inc. en OFICINA ZONAL AGUAYTIA 
(Aguaytiá del 09-11 de marzo 2010) 
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
Martes 09 
de Marzo
06.45-9.45 Viaje Pucallpa – Aguaytía
10.00-11.20 Reunión: Oficina Regional de Aguaytía
Equipo Oficina Regional
11.20-11.40 Traslado a Boquerón
11.40-13.00
Reunión Productores de Palma (Parcela Sr. Patricio Nolasco)
 Victoria Flores E.
 Patricio Nolasco
 Bravo Guerrero
 Guillermo Jhon
13.00-13.20 Traslado a Aquatía
13.20-13.00 Almuerzo
15.00-16.30 Reunión con representantes, directivos y personal técnico del Consorcio de 
Productores de Plátano (COPPU)
16.30-17.30
Reunión con representantes de la Sub Región del Gobierno Regional de 
Ucayli
Ing. Wilson Pinedo – Gerente Sub Región
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
Miércoles 
10 de 
Marzo
08.10-08.20 Traslado Aguaytía – Centro Yurac.
Visitar y entrevistar a productores de plátano.
08.20-10.00
Reunión 01: Parcela Teófilo Berrosti
Reunión con productores (as):
Marina Mera
Adela Falcón
Teofilo Berrosti
Alfonso Rodas
10.00-10.20 Translado de Centro Yurac a Boquerón
Visitar y entrevistar a productores de cacao
10.20-12.00
Reunión 02: Parcela de cacao de Atencio Rojas.
Reunión con productores:
Solózano Falcón Marina
Rodrígues Guerrero Igor
Eusebio Bustillos Máximo
Marcos Eusebio Bustillos
12.00-12.40 Traslado Aguaytía
12.40-13.30 Visitar y dialogo con comercializadores/productores de plátano en el Puerto 
93
Fluvial Aguytía. 
Coordina. Ing. Sandro Sandoval
13.30-15.00 Almuerzo/descano
15.00-16.00
Reunión 03: Oficina ORAG
Reunión con directivos y personal técnico de la Asociación de Productores 
Cacaoteros Tecnificados del Valle de Shambillo (APCTVSH).
16.00-16.10 Traslado a la Municipalidad Provincial Padre Abad
16.10-17.30
Reunión con Alcalde y representantes de la Municipalidad Provincial de Padre 
Abad. (MPP)
Sr. Luis Maguiña – Alcalde
Srta. Gricelda Solano Regidora
Sr. Junior Huaranga – Gerente General
17.30-18.30 Dirección de la Agencia Agraria de Padre Abad – Aguaytiá
Ing. Edgardo Miranda Ruiz
DIA HORA ACTIVIDAD
Jueves 11 
de Marzo
08.30-8.50 Traslado a Planta Agroindustrial de Oleaginosas Padre Abad SA (OLPASA)
08.50-10.20
Reunión 01 – Local OLPASA
Directiva, equipo técnico y productores de la Asociación de Palmicultores de 
Valle de Shambillo
10.20-11.20 Reunión 02
Gerente y directivos de OLPASA
11.20-11.40 Traslado a la Aguaytiá
11.40-13.00
Reunión 03
Reunión de coordinación final con Director Regional y Coordinador Zonal de 
PDA en Aguaytiá
13.00-14.00 Almuerzo
14.00-17.00 Traslado a Pucallpa
17:00- 18:00 Henry Centeno, DEVIDA Pucallpa
94
APPENDIX 3 CONTACT LIST 
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
USAID, Febrero 16
Loren O. Stoddard ADP Chief USAID-Perú
Donato Peña M & E Coordinator USAID-Perú
Tammy Palmer Program Officer USAID-Perú
Stela Coello Administration Program PDA USAID-Perú
Carla Queirolo Communications Assistant USAID-Perú
Jennifer Bernuy ADP Deputy Chief USAID-Perú
Machi Cárdenas Communications Specialist USAID-Perú
Chemonics, Febrero 16
Charles Oberbeck 
Director Programa de Desarrollo 
Alternativo Chemonics
Lawrence Szott
Subdirector Programa de Desarrollo
Alternativo Chemonics
USAID, Febrero 17
Andrew Herscowitz Acting Mission Director USAID-Perú
Steve Olive Acting Deputy Director USAID-Perú
Loren Szott
Director Programa de Desarrollo 
Alternativo USAID-Perú
Donato Peña M & E Coordinator USAID-Perú
Tammy Palmer Program Officer USAID-Perú
CONSULTANDES, Febrero 17
Manuel Estela Director CONSULTANDES
Chemonics, Febrero 17
Hugo Centurión Director de Desarrollo social Chemonics
Chemonics, Febrero 17
Juan José Vega Director de Comunicaciones Chemonics
DEVIDA, Febrero 18
Fernando Hurtado Jefe de Desarrollo Alternativo DEVIDA
Lucio Batállanos Medio Ambiente DEVIDA
NAS, Febrero 18
Abelardo Arias Director NAS-Perú
Chemonics, Febrero 18
Aaron Dryer Director de Desarrollo Económico Chemonics
Jose Gamarra Gerente de FVC Chemonics
95
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Hugo Palma Gerente de Actividades Económicas Chemonics
José Luis Lozano Gerente de Acceso al Crédito Chemonics
Mariela Rodríguez
Coord. Desarrollo Comunitario y 
Gobernabilidad Chemonics
Pablo Pampa Especialista en Proyectos Productivos Chemonics
CONSULTANDES, Febrero 19
Jaime Garcia Vice-Presidente Ejecutivo CONSULTANDES
MACROCONSULT, Febrero 19
Raúl Salazar Director MACROCONSULT
USAID, Febrero 19
Cristina Olive Education Office USAID Chiel USAID
Chemonics, Febrero 19
Carlos Diaz Director de Gestión Regional Chemonics
San Martin, Febrero 22
César Villanueva Presidente. Región San Martín. Tarapoto
Darwin del Águila Director Región San Martín. 
Chemonics. Tarapoto
Sergio Lopez Zapata Coordinador Zonal Tarapoto Tarapoto
Wagner García Tuesta Esp. Proyect Production Chemonics
Alvaro Mondragon Perez Esp. Fort. Cad de valor. Chemonics
Isabel Machaca Atauje Coordinadora Administrativa Chemonics
Milagros Mendoza Soltero Esp. D. Con & Gov Chemonics
Qeningu Cerro Anguila Esp. Comunicaciones Chemonics
Crox Alvarado San Martin Esp. M&E Chemonics
Jorge Mera Perez Esp. M&E Chemonics
Dennis Graus Arbildo Esp. I… Chemonics
Daniel Angulo Rojas Esp. RRNN y MA Chemonics
Instituto de Cultivos Tropicales (ICT), Febrero 22
Enrique Arévalo Director ICT. Tarapoto
Luis Zúñiga Sub Director ICT. Tarapoto
27 agricultores de Monzón Productores Training class in ICT
PDA, Juanjui, Febrero 23
Darwin del Águila Director Chemonics, Región San Martín
Luis Artemis Tangoa Pisco Extensionista Plaza Norte, Juanjui
Prudencio Piña Sangama Extensionista Shanao, Juanjui
Rafael Torres López Extensionista Shanao, Juanjui
Jose Antonio Lozano 
Macedo Extensionista Lamas, Juanjui
96
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Segundo A. Amasifuen 
Sinarahua Extensionista Cherieyacu, Juanjui
Jaciento Flores Guevara Extensionista Plaza Norte, Juanjui
Pastor Sangama Guerra Extensionista Misquiyaquillo, Juanjui
Mario del Aguila Sevan Extensionista Plaza Norte, Juanjui
Davit Aspajo Tangoa Extensionista Plaza Norte, Juanjui
Niger Gonzalez Guerra Extensionista Plaza Norte, Juanjui
Hernan del Aguila Collasos Extensionista Plaza Norte, Juanjui
Idelfonso Sangama 
Sangama Extensionista Shanao, Juanjui
Orlando Torre Saavedra Extensionista Shanao, Juanjui
Marg Ceopa Fasabi Extensionista Chacchaypampa, Juanjui
Gilda Chujutalli 
Chuquipiando Extensionista Shanao, Juanjui
Agustin Sanguma Sangama Extensionista Shanao, Juanjui
Wilder Diaz Anguly Extensionista Pinto Rocaelo, Juanjui
Roosveth Saboya Rodriguez Extensionista Chachaypampa, Juanjui
San Martin, Cooperativa Oro Verde, Febrero 23
Hilderico Bocángel Gerente. Cooperativa Oro Verde, Lamas
18 productores de café y 
cacao
Socios.
Cooperativa Oro Verde, Lamas
53 productores de cacao Miembros. CC de Yambatos, Pongo de 
Caynarachi
Sergio Herrera Presidente. . APROPAL, Pongo de Caynarachi
10 productores de palmito. Socios APROPAL, Pongo de Caynarachi
Alto El Sol, Febrero 23
Ramiro Saavedra Del 
Castillo
Socio de ACOPAGRO y administrador 
módulo de fermentación de cacao de 
origen
Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal 
Caceres
Julio César Chacón 
Tapullima Agente Municipal
Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal 
Caceres
Olivio Mozombite Ushiñahua Teniente Gobernador
Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal 
Caceres
Héctor Saavedra Del Castillo Socio de ACOPAGRO
Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal 
Caceres
Mardinio Quiñones Solano
Presidente Comité Central de 
ACOPAGRO
Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal 
Caceres
Esteban Gutierrez Gómez
Socio de ACOPAGRO, administrador 
módulo de fermentación de cacao y 
promotor comunitario
Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal 
Caceres
Fredy Gonzáles Paredes Presidente APAFA I.E. N° 0448
Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal 
Caceres
Tomasa Solano Acuña
Delegada del Comité Central de 
ACOPAGRO
Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal 
Caceres
Luis López Pinedo Socio Comité Sol Naciente de Romex
Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal 
Caceres
97
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Neptalí Silva Cárdenas Docente I.E. 0448 - nivel primario
Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal 
Caceres
Leoncio Tello Torres Agente Municipal
Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal 
Caceres
Asunción Shapiama Pinchi Presidenta Club de Madres
Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal 
Caceres
María Caballero Del Águila Lideresa
Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal 
Caceres
Daniel Díaz Cárdenas 
Ex Teniente Gobernador y promotor 
comunitario
Alto El Sol Pachiza - Mariscal 
Caceres
Allima Cacao, Pongo de Caynarachi, Productores de Cacao, Febrero 23
Sergio López Coordinador Zonal Chemonics
Daniel Vásquez Coordinador Pongo de Caynarachi Chemonics
Wilfredo Cenepa Panaifo Presidente Asociación Allima Cacao
Carlos Sangama Iahuiza Fiscal Asociación Allima Cacao
Cecilia Tangoa de Andoa Secretaria de Economía Asociación Allima Cacao
Renger I. Cabrera R. vicepresidente Asociación Allima Cacao
Yolanda Coral Guerra Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Pongo
Maria E. Rodriguez Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Pongo
Floriano Acho Cachique Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Beizaida Romero T. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Julio Lataya Huizo Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Hector Cachique Marichi Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Julio Tapullama A. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Nixon Shupingahua C. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Francisco Pashanasi I. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Gilder Sinarahua Isuiza Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Fernando Cachique A. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Walter Amasifuen Isuiza Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Eliseo Garcia González Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Angélica Pashanasi S. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Belisario Amasifuen Higalo Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Arquimedes Huansi Jaulin Productor de cacao Allima Cacaco. Metilluyoc
Marcelino Huamán Rios Productor de cacao Allima Cacaco. Metilluyoc
Sinecio Sinrahua Isuiz Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Rigoberto Romero Huansi Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Ramón Pashanasi T. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Formila Sangama A. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Mercith Sangama A. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Roger Amasifuen A. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Anita Iñapi Smupingahua Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Maria T. P. de Tapullima Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Noel Pinedo Amasifuen Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Esquivel Amasifuen T. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Ramón Sangama A. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Roberto Pérez Pozo Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
98
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Marlon Amasifuen P. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Próspero Amasifuen A. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Merlín Amasifuen A. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Arquimedes Amasifuen A. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Wilfredo Amasifuen A. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Bretin Tapullima P. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Wender Amasifuen A. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Segundo Amasifuen P. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Waldemar sinti Amasifuen Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. San Miguel 
Calvino Pinedo Tangoa Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Alen Amasifuen Pashanisi Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Shapajilla
Ginder Amasifuen C. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Hilmer Tapullima Bautista Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Aurora Tapullima A. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Marlene Tangoa Tapullima Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Alfredo Amasifuen Hidalgo Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Ancelmo Sangama A. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Marilú Guerrero Calderon Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Sildia Perez Vasquez Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Ludmith Cenepo Grandes Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Ismael Rafael Nuñez Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Yumbatos
Loimer Montenegnro C. Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Pongo
Cesar Torres Goicochea Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Pongo
Ivan Tuesca Reátegui Productor de cacao Allima Cacao. Pongo
Planta Alianza S.A. y Agricultores de Palmito (APROPAL), Febrero 23
Raúl Torres Talledo Gerente Planta Procesadora Alianza
Sergio Herrera Presidente APROPAL, Pongo de Caynarachi
xxx Secretaria APROPAL
Amadeo Guerra Hansi Agricultor Pongo Caynarachi
Ostin Shanchez Mori Socio, Agricultor Planta Alianza
Pablo de la Cruz Rangel Agricultor Pampa Hermosa
Asunción Pashanasi Acho Agricultor Pongo Caynarachi
Raúl Curitina Yuyarima Agricultor Pongo Caynarachi
Manuel Huiñapi Marichi Agricultor Pampa Hermosa
Orlando Amasifuen Huansi Agricultor Pongo Caynarachi
Maximandro Correa 
Córdova Agricultor Pongo Caynarachi
Fran Correa Córdova Agricultor Pongo Caynarachi
Josué Salas Lancha Socio, Agricultor Planta Alianza
Emanuel Guevara Chicoma Socio Agricultor Planta Alianza
Daniela I. Flores Chuquilen Socio Agricultor Planta Alianza
Raúl Hemeryth del Aguila Socio Agricultor Planta Alianza
Salvador Rubio Torrillo Agricultor Davicillo
Agricultor Pampa Hermosa
José Sergio Herrera 
Delgado Agricultor Bonilla
99
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Valentín Flores Abril Agricultor Bonilla
Emeterio Chiyutalli 
Cartagena Socio Agricultor Planta Alianza
Serapio López Calle Productor de palmito Alianza
David Samame Dávila Socio Agricultor Planta Alianza
Sandro Guevara Chicoma Socio Agricultor Planta Alianza
Felipe Cajo Ayala Socio Agricultor Planta Alianza
María del Pilar Ríos Trigozo Agricultor Pampa Hermosa
Mesa Ténica de Cacao, San Martin, Tarapoto, Febrero 23
Angel Pérez Director Técnico PDA
Zarita Zapata Vasquez Asesor Técnico Gobierno Regional
Américo Arévalo Ramirez Gerente Registro Agrobanco
Sidlia Torres A. Director Comercio Exterior Gobierno Regional
Andres Sixto Representante SENASA
Fernando Ramirez Representante DEVIDA
San Martin, Balsa Probana, Febrero 23
Reinaldo Javo Dominguez
Delegado PDA Pres.Junta Comunal 
Vecinal PDA, Balsa Probana
Maria Pinedo Orbe Agente Municipal Balsa Probana
Felix Ruben Salgero Director Centro Educativo Balsa Probana
Filida Ruiz Salazar Pres. Comité de Obras, Balsa Probana
Maria Jesus Diego Chutay Pdte.Vaso Leche Balsa Probana
David Vergara Colaborador Tnte.Gobernador Balsa Probana
Leovina Rodriguez Miembro Vaso de Leche Balsa Probana
Yolanda Ortega Florez Profesora, Secr.Junta Vecinal Balsa Probana
Erevista Orbe Cartagena Fundadora del Caserío Balsa Probana
Rosaura Orbe Pinedo Productora de cacao y de cuyes Balsa Probana
Zarela Vasquez SolSol Productora de cacao y de cuyes Balsa Probana
Rosana Cargagena Productora de cacao y de cuyes Balsa Probana
Maria Quiroz Vice Pdta.APAFA Primaria Balsa Probana
Belsia Rios Aguirre Vice Pdta. Vaso de Leche Balsa Probana
San Martin, Municipalidad Distrital de Chazuta, Febrero 24
María Rosario Tuanama Regidora. . Municipalidad Distrital de Chazuta
Leydy Torres Jefa de Desarrollo Económico Local
Municipalidad Distrital de Chazuta
Varlin Rengifo Administrador. Municipalidad Distrital de Chazuta
Maximo Pollar Saurin Pezo Imagen Institucional Municipalidad Distrital de Chazuta
4 regidores y 1 regidora Miembros Municipalidad Distrital de Chazuta
40 productores de cacao Socios Asociacion Allima Cacao, Chazuta
12 productores de cacao Miembros CC Ramón Castilla, Chazuta
Mesa Tecnica, Saposoa, Febrero 24
Manuel Cervantes Huamani Miembro Saposoa
100
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Martha Ramírez Vásquez Miembro Saposoa
Elena Meléndez Cárdenas Miembro Saposoa
Oscar Tantalean Cubas Miembro Saposoa
Rosa Pisco Sepúlveda Miembro Situlli
Juan Garcia Morales Miembro Montevideo
Antonio Panduro Miembro Situlli
Agencia Agraria, SAPOSOA, Febrero 24
Pascual Molina Alvarado Extensionista San Regis
Mario Medina Chacón Extensionista Nuevo Horizonte
Juan Garcia Morales Extensionista Montevideo
Walter Mondragon Llatas Extensionista Montevideo
Nito Sepúlveda Cárdenas Extensionista Shima
Rosa Pisco Sepúlveda Extensionista Situlli
Israel Cárdenas Pérez Extensionista San Regis
Lindes Caza La torre Extensionista Bagazan
Henry León Rafael Extensionista Pasarrayo
Oscar Tantalean Cubas Extensionista Coopalgsa
Walter Ludeña González Extensionista Piscoyacu
Orlando Meléndez 
Adrianzen Extensionista Nuevo Saconche
Julián Hernandez Diaz Extensionista Nueva Vida
Celso Arévalo Ruiz Extensionista Piscoyacu
Manuel Deza Pérez Extensionista Piscoyacu
Blanca Solsol Ruiz Extensionista Saposoa
Antonio Panduro Grandes Extensionista Saposoa
Elbelio Saavedra Murrieta Extensionista Saposoa
Auditorio Chari Allima Cacao, Febrero 24
James Arévalo Mori Agricultura Allima Cacao
Gilberto Rivera Campos Presidente Allima Cacao
Fabián Guerra Insupillo Productor de cacao Allima Cacao
Gino Luis Chujatalli Zambo Secretario de Actas Allima Cacao
Hernán Arévalo Shpiama Fiscal Allima Cacao
Crispol Torillo Parede Productor de cacao Allima Cacao
Regis Gómez Insapillo Productor de cacao Allima Cacao
Víctor Pizango Zapullima Productor de cacao Allima Cacao
Italo Ojanamo Panaico Productor de cacao Allima Cacao
Evangelisto Sangama T Productor de cacao Allima Cacao
Miguel A. Tapullima Guerra Productor de cacao Allima Cacao
Eulalia Chujatalli Cenepo Productor de cacao Allima Cacao
Víctor López Sowalaya Delegado Allima Cacao
Rodolfo Sangama Zumba Productor de cacao Allima Cacao
Isabel Tulumba Sangama Productor de cacao Allima Cacao
Efio Ishuiza Panajo Socia Allima Cacao
Edwin Tuanama 
Choshnamote Invitado Allima Cacao
101
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Dorita Ishuiza Tapulima Agricultor Allima Cacao
Pedro Cahuaz Guerra Agricultor Allima Cacao
Calichenia Parnaijo 
Sangama Agricultor Allima Cacao
Andrés Panifo Chujandrima Productor de cacao Casiyacu
Loyda Sangama Zumba Secretaria Aguana Meyuna
Ana Tuanama Topullima Productor de cacao Allima Cacao
Segundo Sánchez 
Fernández Productor de cacao Allima Cacao
Carlos Ságoma Ishuiza Fiscal Allima Cacao
Plácido Olanova Ganorifo Productor de cacao Allima Cacao
Edwin Gómez Shapinova Productor de cacao Aguana Meyuna
Wilter Gómez Shapinova Presidente Aguana Meyuna
José E. Sangama Productor de cacao Aguana Meyuna
Navio Panaigo Cenefon Productor de cacao Aguana Meyuna
Jerónimo Tulumba Productor de cacao Aguana Meyuna
Luis Panaijo Cur Productor de cacao Aguana Meyuna
Hilter Marichin Tomaito Productor de cacao Aguana Meyuna
Orlando Silda Chillanuela Productor de cacao Aguana Meyuna
Alejandro Tapullima López Productor de cacao Aguana Meyuna
Cecilia Gangoa de Andra Productor de cacao Ramón Castilla
Equipo Oficina Zonal Juanjui, Febrero 24
Tuesta Pinedo, Ángel Luis Especialista en Proyectos Productivos PDA Juanjui
Trujillo Valderrama, John 
Walter
Especialista en Desarrollo Comunitario 
& Gobernabilidad
PDA Juanjui
Trigozo Pezo, Keny Kevin Especialista en Desarrollo Comunitario 
& Gobernabilidad
PDA Juanjui
Torres Trigozo, Groder Especialista en Fortalecimiento de 
Cadenas de Valor
PDA Juanjui
Sandoval Cárdenas, Katty 
Joanne
Especialista en Proyectos Productivos PDA Juanjui
Delgado Mesía, José 
Enrique
Coordinador Zonal PDA Juanjui
Ramirez Valqui, Cenith Auxiliar de Oficina PDA Juanjui
Sánchez Flores, Carlos Chofer PDA Juanjui
Municipalidad Provincial Mariscal Castilla, Febrero 24
Leyla Del Aguila Ruiz Alcalde (e ) e Integrante de la Comisión 
de la Mujer y Desarrollo Humano
Municipalidad Provincial de 
Mariscal Cáceres
Rubén Ruiz Weninger Alcalde Municipalidad Distrital de Pachiza
Rodil Cachique Cappillo Alcalde Municipalidad Distrital de Huicungo
Napoleón Seijas Valles Gerente Municipalidad Distrital de Pajarillo
Victor Rolando E. Rodriguez 
Radas
Gerente Municipalidad Provincial de 
Mariscal Cáceres
Planta de Beneficio Cacao, Mesa Técnica del Cacao, Pucacaca, Febrero 24
Porfirio Tananta Ushiñahua Socio APROCAPP, Picota
102
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Alex Flores Perea Socio APROCAPP, Picota
Jorge Flores Paredes Socio APROCAPP, Picota
Elvis Tananta Tenazoa Socio APROCAPP, Picota
Gonzalo Garcia Tangoa Socio APROCAPP, Picota
Manuel Melendez Ramirez Socio APROCAPP, Picota
José Sister Grandez Armas Socio APROCAPP, Picota
Richard Murrieta Pinedo Socio APROCAPP, Picota
Ticardo Tello Upiachihua Socio APROCAPP, Picota
Warner Torres Tello Socio ACOPAGRO, Pucacaca
Felipe Figueredo Chavez Socio ACOPAGRO, Pucacaca
Joel Felipe Figueredo 
Escudero Socio ACOPAGRO, Pucacaca
Israel Davila Trigozo PRODUCTOR Pucacaca
Marleni Chavez Ramirez PRODUCTOR Pucacaca
Israel Shuña Flores Socio ACOPAGRO, Cedro Pampa
Israel Shuña Chujandama Socio ACOPAGRO, Cedro Pampa
Davis Curt Grandez Sinti Socio ACOPAGRO, Cedro Pampa
Camila Shuña Flores Socia ACOPAGRO, Cedro Pampa
Twiggie Damian Gronerth (*) socio ACOPAGRO
Rita Flores Tello SociaA ACOPAGRO, Cedro Pampa
Varlin Rengifo Administrador Municipalidad Distrital de Chazuta
4 regidores y 1 regidora Miembros Municipalidad Distrital de Chazuta
40 productores de cacao Socios. Asociacion Allima, Chazuta
12 productores de cacao Miembros CC Ramón Castilla, Chazuta
ACOPAGRO, Febrero 24
Vanguiman Ríos Pereira Presidente ACOPAGRO, Chambira
Edilberto Barrera Perdomo Presidente del Comité ACOPAGRO
Wagner Barrera Cerrón Directivo del Comité de Educación La Victoria
Américo Del Castillo 
Pizango
Delegado de Comité
ACOPAGRO
Roldán Rojas Paredes Encargado del Departamento de 
Organización ACOPAGRO
Luzmila Paredes Ortiz Asistente de Gerencia ACOPAGRO
Luis Pérez Ochoa Coordinador técnico del proyecto cacao ACOPAGRO
Municipalidad Provincial Mariscal Castilla, 24 de Febrero
Leyla Del Aguila Ruiz Alcaldesa e Integrante de la Comisión 
de la Mujer y Desarrollo Humano
Municipalidad Provincial de 
Mariscal Cáceres
Rubén Ruiz Weninger Alcalde Municipalidad Distrital de Pachiza
Rodil Cachique Cappillo Alcalde Municipalidad Distrital de Huicungo
Napoleón Seijas Valles Gerente Municipalidad Distrital de Pajarillo
Victor Rolando E. Rodriguez 
Radas
Gerente Municipalidad Provincial de 
Mariscal Cáceres
Equipo parcial de la Oficina Zonal, Bellavista, Febrero 25
Enrique Agreda Sánchez Coordinador Zonal PDA
103
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Herbert García Arévalo
Especialista en Proyectos 
Productivos PDA
Manfrend Coral Lozano Especialista en Desarrollo 
Comunitario Y Gobernabilidad PDA
Olga Trigoso Rivera Auxiliar de Oficina PDA
Municipalidad Provincia de Huallaga, Febrero 25
Fernando Grández 
Veintemilla Alcalde Municipalidad Provincial de Huallaga
Roberto Pacheco Armas Gerente Municipalidad Provincial de Huallaga
Juan Delgado Talledo Alcalde Municipalidad Distrital de Piscoyacu
Manuela Doza Pérez Regidora Municipalidad Distrital de Piscoyacu
Rodolfo Iván Bardales Aspajo Regidora Municipalidad Distrital de Piscoyacu
Productores en la reunión con la Agencia Agraria, Saposa, Febrero 25
Pascual Molina Alvarado Municipalidad Distrital de Chazuta ACOPAGRO. San Regis
Marín Chacon Medina Comité Nuevo Horizonte ACOPAGRO. Nuevo Horizonte
Juan Garcia Morales Copamon Copamon. Montevideo
Walter Mondragon Llatas Copamon Copamon. Montevideo
Nito Sepulveda Cardenas Productor Shima
RosaPisco Sepulveda Comité De Productores Situlle
Israel Cardenas Perez ACOPAGRO ACOPAGRO. San Regis
Linder Cara Yayoyin Coopalgsa Coopalgas. Bagazan
Hemly Leon Rafael Productor Pasarraya
Walter Ludeña Gonzales Productor Piscoyacu
Orlando Melendez A. Comité Cafetaleros Nuevo Sacanche Nuevo Sacanche
JuliánHernandez Diaz ACOPAGRO ACOPAGRO. Nueva Vida
Celso Arevalo Ruiz Productor Piscoyacu
Manuela Doza Perez Productora Piscoyacu
Blanca Solsol Ruiz Productora Saposoa
Antonio Panduro Grandes Productora Saposoa
Elbecio Saavedra Murrieta ACOPAGRO ACOPAGRO. Santa Fe
DEVIDA, Tarapoto, Febrero 26
Fernando Ramírez Coordinador DEVIDA. Tarapoto.
Mesa Técnica Provincial de Cacao, Huallaga, Febrero 25
Rosa Pisco Sepúlveda Tesorera Comité de Productores Situlli
Reynaldo Solsol Perez Funcionario Agencia Agraria SAPOSOA
Antonio Panduro Grandez Presidente Comité Central Saposoa ACOPAGRO
Martha Remirez Vasquez Directora LESTP-H
Elena Melendez Cardenas Extensionista ACOPAGRO
Manuel Cervantes Huamani Coordinador Del Equipo Técnico ACOPAGRO
Lorenzo Romero Mudarra Especialista en Proyectos Productivos PDA
Manfrend Coral Lozano Especialista en Desarrollo Comunitario 
y Gobernabilidad PDA
104
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Nadia Campos Valera Promotora Agencia Agraria SAPOSOA
Juan Garcia Morales Presidente Copamon
Oscar Tantalean Cubas Extensionista Copalgsa
Chemonics, Oficina Regional Tocache, Marzo 1
José Lazarte Director Región . Chemonics Tocache
Gloria Duenes Coordinadora Zona Chemonics Uchiza
César Pereyra Coordinador Zona Chemonics Uchiza
Julio Hinostroza Comunicaciones. Chemonics Tocache
Julio César González Coordinador Medio Ambiente. 
Chemonics
Tocache
Gonzalo Ramírez Chemonics Tocache
Augusto Soto Coordinador Pólvora. Chemonics Tocache
Equipo Zonal de Uchiza. Marzo 02
César Pereyra Lozano Coordinador Zonal PDA - Uchiza. Chemonics
Elmer Gevara Especialista en Proyectos productivos PDA - Uchiza. Chemonics
Luis Alberto Aliaga Especialista en Proyectos pecuarios PDA - Uchiza. Chemonics
Comunidad Valle de Shunté, Uchiza, Marzo 2
Abilio Espinoza Productor de cacao Valle de Shunté
Francisco Cuyayala Productor de cacao Valle de Shunté
Mario Espinoza Productor de cacao Valle de Shunté
Martín Carpio Productor de cacao Valle de Shunté
Nery González Productor de cacao Valle de Shunté
Alberto Apaza Productor de cacao Valle de Shunté
Frente de Defensa para el Desarrollo de Uchiza, Marzo 2
Modesto Páucar Presidente F.D.D. de Uchiza
Alcides Maldujano vicepresidente F.D.D. de Uchiza
Marco Oroya Chacón Coordinador PDA Uchiza, Chemonics
Comunidad Los Angeles, Uchiza, Marzo 2
Amorfo Fernández Productor de cacao Los Angeles
Hernán Sánchez Productor de cacao Los Angeles
Eutimio Vega Productor de cacao Los Angeles
Silverio Silva Productor de cacao Los Angeles
Miguel Santillán Productor de cacao Los Angeles
Municipalidad de Uchiza, Marzo 02
Segundo Núñez Pantoja Alcalde Municipalidad de Uchiza
Asociación de Productores de Cacao de Uchiza - APCU, Marzo 02
Antonieta González Productor de cacao APCU
105
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Subael Palacios Productor de cacao APCU
Raúl lapa Productor de cacao APCU
Isabel Fonseca Coordinadora de Asistencia Técnica PDA - Tocache. Chemonics
Damuel Rodríguez Coordinador Uchiza - Nuevo Progreso PDA - Tocache. Chemonics
Municipalidad de Nuevo Bambamarca, Marzo 02
Lola Acosta Alcaldesa Nuevo Bambamarca
3 miembros municipalidad Regidores Nuevo Bambamarca
Amazonas Trading. Marzo 02
Luis Linares Torres Gerente Amazonas Trading
Asociación Productores de Cacao, Nuevo Bambamarca, ASPROC-NBT, Marzo 2
XXXX Gerente (Ing. Agr.) ASPROC-NBT
XXXX Presidente ASPROC-NBT
Comunidad Nuevo Belén, Shunté, Tocache. Marzo 03
Ceferino Pina Productor de café Nuevo Belén
Bonifacio Tomás Productor de café Nuevo Belén
Mario Margarín Productor de café Nuevo Belén
Gloria Dueñas Coordinadora Zonal, Chemonics Tocache
Gidier Vásquez Extensionista PDA
Carlos Jáuregui Extensionista La Divisoria
Comunidad Montecristo, Shunté, Tocache, Marzo 03
Reiner Pérez Productor de café Montecristo
Carranza Quiroz Productor de café Montecristo
Municipalidad Provincial de Tocache. Marzo 03
José Enrique Muñoz R Teniente Alcalde M.P. de Tocache
Noemí Aura Moreno P. Regidora M.P. de Tocache
Ana Sánchez V. Gerenta de Infraestructura M.P. de Tocache
Carlos Espinoza P. Gerente Municipal M.P. de Tocache
Leticia Guevara R. Asistente del Alcalde M.P. de Tocache
José Lazarte Farfán Gerente Regional PDA - Chemonics. Tocache
Cooperativa Agroindustrial Tocache - CAT, Marzo 04
Raymundo Angulo Presidente CAT, Tocache
Antonio Barrios Jara Productor cacao CAT, Tocache
Rosel Acosta Pizango Presidente CAT, Tocache
Freider Sánchez Rios Vicepresidente CAT, Tocache
Gualberto Cruz Godos Coordinador Técnico CAT, Tocache
Rosa Tarazona Rengifo Gerente Desarrollo Social CAT, Tocache
Carlos Grandes Aguilar Productor Cacao CAT, Tocache
Mariana Coro Rivera Productor Cacao CAT, Tocache
106
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Maritza Trujillo Herrera Sub Coordinadora . CAT.
Samuel Rodriguez G. Sub Coordinador CAT.
Isbel Fonseca López Sub Coordinadora . CAT
Raúl Olivera Barrientos Coordinador Técnico CAT
Max Álvarez Pinedo Proyectos productivos PDA - Chemonics. Tocache
Electro Tocache, Marzo 04
Carlos Vela Director Electro Tocache
José de la Cruz Gerente de Operaciones Electro Tocache
Franklin Piña M. Jefe Unidad Control de Calidad Electro Tocache
DEVIDA - Tocache. Marzo 04 
César Reátegui Coordinador Regional Tocache
Mesa Tecnica del Cacao-Tocache. Marzo 04
Maria Mallma Presidenta Asoc. Product. de Cacao, Uchiza
Julio Pisco Rojas Jefe Departamento Técnico Asoc. Product. de Cacao, Uchiza
Subael Palacios Presidenta ASCROP-NBT, Bambamarca
Rocael Palermo Fiscal
Control prod. Coca, Nuevo 
Horizonte
Raymundo de la Vega Gerente de Operaciones Cooperativa de Tocache
Edino Guillen Gerente de Operaciones Asoc. Produc. Cacao, Bambamarca 
ACEPAT - OLPESA. Tocache, Marzo 04
Jefe Departamento Técnico Presidente de ACEPAT. ACEPAT
Norberto Angulo Gerente general. OLPESA. OLPESA
Ernesto Sanchez Falcon Presidente OLPESA
José Fernández Director. Tocache
Néstor Sánchez Director OLPESA
Reuniones San Martin, Marzo 04
Antonieta González Productora de cacao. Asociación de 
productores de Cacao Uchiza
Súbale Palacios Productor de cacao Uchiza
Raúl lapa Productor de cacao Uchiza
Isabel Fonseca Coordinadora de Asistencia técnica. 
Chemonics Tocache
Asocoiación "Fuerza del Mañana", Tocache, Marzo 04
Gladys Gamarra Presidenta Fuerza del Mañana
9 socias. Fuerza del Mañana
Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo, ONUDD, Tocache, Marzo 04
José Fernández Jefe Proyecto UNODC-Tocache
Roberto Gómez Especialista en cacao UNODC-Tocache
107
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Mesa Técnica del Cacao,Tocache, Marzo 04
Maria González Presidenta
Asociación de Productores de 
Cacao
Edinova Achagua Gerente
Asoc. Productores de Cacao en 
Nueva Cajamarca
Julio Pisco Rojas Jefe Departamento Técnico Asociación Productores de Cacao
Subael Palacios Presidente
Asoc. Productores de Cacao en 
Nueva Cajamarca
Raúl Lapa Fiscal
Asoc. Productores Cacao Nuevo 
Horizonte (Pólvora)
Raymundo de la Vega Gerente de Operaciones Cooperativa Agroindustrial Tocache
Edino Guillen Gerente de Operaciones
Assoc. Produc. Cacao 
Bambamarca
Raymundo Angulo Consejero Cooperativa Agroindustrial Tocache
Asoc. Prod. Agropecuarios Juan Velasco Alvarado, Paraíso, Tocache, Marzo 05
José de Arimatea Huaman 
Sánchez
Presidente. Asociación Juan Velazco 
Alvarado. AJVA, Paraíso
Nolberto Noreña Castillo Tesorero AJVA, Paraíso
Juan Ibarra Huaman Administrador AJVA, Paraíso
Jorge Cesare Coral Coordinador Técnico AJVA, Paraíso
Nuevo Progreso Paraíso, Tocache, Marzo 05
Gustavo Carcumo Lozano Coordinador Zonal AJVA, Paraíso
Oscar Hidalgo Cadenas de Valor Chemonics Nuevo Progreso. PDA
Marlith Tello Asistente contable Chemonics Nuevo Progreso. PDA
John R. Borja Gobernabilidad Chemonics, Nuevo Progreso. PDA
Richard Borja Ramón Especialista Desarrollo Comunitario Chemonics AJVA, Paraíso
Aldo Sánchez Vicente Proyectos Productivos. Chemonics AJVA. Paraíso
Artemio Miranda Dávila Alcalde Munic. Distrital, Paraíso
Gustavo Cárcamo Coordinador Zonal Nuevo Progreso. PDA
Oficina Regional Tingo María, PDA, Marzo 06
Luis Ramos Director Regional Tingo María. PDA
César Falcón Gobernabilidad Tingo María. PDA
Aldo Pereyra Coordinador Tingo María Tingo María. PDA
Walter Basurto Proyectos productivos Tingo María. PDA
Pavel Vila Monitoreo Tingo María. PDA
Jorge Caico Comunicaciones Tingo María. PDA
Hércules Córdova Cadenas de valor Tingo María. PDA
Cooperativa "La Divisoria", Tingo María, Marzo 06
Karina Escobar Administración Coop. La Divisoria
Rodriguez Pastor Gerente Coop. La Divisoria
Sara Ramírez Grandez CAC Divisoria
Stuerino Meriano Hidalgo CAC Divisoria
108
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Flor Angel Rivera Salazar H. Valolizan
Manuel Rodriguez Copicha Hermilio U. 
David Arostegui Lino Margontou
Hercules Cordova Torres PDA
Walter Barusto Fleves PDA
Luis Ramos Chone PDA
Aldo Pena Ramos PDA
Julian Aucera Echarre CAC Divisoria
Katia Trito Poccor Gerencia
Raydol Rodriguez Pascual Presidente
Maria del Rosario Rodriguez 
Pascual
Jorge Cayco Marquez
Cooperativa Agraria Industrial Naranjillo-COOPAIN, Tingo María, Marzo 06
Isaac Zúñiga Aguilar Gerente General COOPAIN
Horlando Herera Ramirez Directivo Coopian COOPAIN
Krupskayc Canalis Gorenga Contador General COOPAIN
Luis Ramos Chong PDA
Alfredo M.B Constructor
Mey A. Choy Paz J. Industrial
Mereoj Custre Wbila Sed. C. Ad. 
Aldo Pereyra Romo PDA
Jorge Cayeo Marquez PDA
Pabel Vila Galindo PDA
Cesar Falcon Mollqui PDA
Herculos Cordova Torres PDA
Erika Portocarrero Lumbre COOPAIN
Hector Vera Hernandez COOPAIN
Saldana Torres Kilder COOPAIN
Juan Guevara Ruiz COOPAIN
Comunidades Huayhuantillo y Pendencia, Tingo María, Marzo 06
Ramón Aguilar Productores de cacao y café Huayahuanitillo
Mario I. Enríquez Rodríguez Productores de cacao y café Huayahuanitillo
Clemencia Chávez Enríquez Productores de cacao y café Huayahuanitillo
Juan Francisco Enríquez 
Santamaría Productores de cacao y café Huayahuanitillo
Emilio Mayhua Ruiz Productores de cacao y café Bajo Pendencia
Lizardo Pamduro Armas Productores de cacao y café Pendencia
Asociación "Agroflora", Tingo María, Marzo 06
Lancy Ponce Falcon Presidenta, Productora de flores Provincia de Leoncio Prado
Efrain Castaneda Palacios Socio, Productor de flores Provincia de Leoncio Prado
Arturo Coma Diaz Socio, Productor de flores Provincia de Leoncio Prado
Victor Abarca Aquello Secretario, Productor de flores Provincia de Leoncio Prado
109
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Oficina Regional Ucayali, PDA, Pucallpa, Marzo 06
Tito Jaime Director (encargado) OR Pucallpa
Luis Miguel Fernández Especialista en Créditos Of. Zonal Campo Verde
Winiston Pinchi Contador OR Pucallpa
Narciso Vásquez Especialista en Medio Ambiente OR Pucallpa
Noemí Vásquez Análista Financiero OR Pucallpa
Carlos Vásquez Especialista en Infraestructura OR Pucallpa
COCEPU / OLAMSA, Neshuya, Marzo 08
Ronier Fernández Presidente COCEPU/OLAMSA
Lauter Tananta Director COCEPU/OLAMSA
Raúl Flores Secretario Técnico COCEPU/OLAMSA
Pedro Seijas Jefe Dep. Técnico COCEPU/OLAMSA
John Barbosa Extensionista OR Pucallpa
Parcela de Nixon Tamani (Palmicultores), Campo Verde, Marzo 08
Nixon Tamani Presidente
Comunidad Sauce de Alto Uruya, 
Campo Verde. Neshuya
7 productores Socios CC Sauce de Alto Uruya, Campo 
Verde Pucallpa
Oficina Zonal Campo Verde - PDA, Marzo 08
Tito Jaime Coordinador OZ Campo Verde. PDA
Narciso Vásquez Especialista en Medio Ambiente OZ Campo Verde. PDA
Karina Tapia
Esp.en Desarrollo Comunitario y 
Gobernabilidad OZ Campo Verde. PDA
Jeysi Bereca
Esp. en Desarrollo Comunitario y 
Gobernabilidad OZ Campo Verde. PDA
Julio García Esp.en Proyectos productivos OZ Campo Verde. PDA
David Beli Extensionista OZ Campo Verde. PDA
Luis Miguel Fernández Esp. En Cadenas de valor OZ Campo Verde. PDA
Carlos Gavidia Especialista Pecuario OZ Campo Verde. PDA
Municipalidad de Campo Verde, Marzo 08
William Amasifuén T. Alcalde Municipalidad de Campo Verde
15 personas entre 
Regidores y técnicos Miembros Municipalidad de Campo Verde
Parcela de Harrison Álvarez, Campo Verde, Marzo 08
Harrison Álvarez Productor de cacao Comunidad. Nueva Dinamarca
Erik Shapiana Presidente (cacao) Cooperativa Campo Verde (cacao)
Otros 4 agricultores de 
cacao Miembros Cooperativa Campo Verde
Región Ucayali, Pucallpa, Marzo 08
Mojalot Dávila Vicepresidente Región Ucayali
110
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Parcela de Guillermo Jhon, Palmicultor, Shambillo. Marzo 09
Guillermo Jhon Productor de palma Shambillo
Consorcio de Productores de Plátano de Ucayali, COPPU, Marzo 09
Marino Gavilán Presidente APTAA. Aguaytía
Teófilo Berrosi Presidente CAPTACY. Centro Yurac
Marina vera Productor plátano APTAA. Nuevo Paraíso
Adela falcón Productor plátano APTAA. Bellavista
Sub Región Padre Abad, Marzo 09
Segundo Mojaloc Dávila Representante Sub Región Padre Abad. Ucayali
Productores de Plátano, Parcela de Jorge Pinedo, Aguaytía, Marzo 09
Jorge Pinedo Productor de plátano APTAA. Aguaytía
Marino Gruilan Quintanilla Presidente, Productor de plátano APTAA. Aguaytía
Teófilo Berrosi Grablez Presidente, Productor de plátano CAPTACY. Centro Yurac
Marina Vera Damatt Productor plátano APTAA. Nuevo Paraíso
Adela Falcón Ramón Productor plátano APTAA. Bellavista
Parcela de Atencio Rojas, Aguaytía, Marzo 09
Atencio Rojas Productor de cacao Boquerón
Marina Solórzano Productora de cacao Boquerón
Olinda xxx Productora de cacao Boquerón
Marina Rodríguez Falcón Productora de cacao Boquerón
Marcos Eusebio Bustillos Productora de cacao Boquerón
Máximo Eusebio Bustillo Productora de cacao Boquerón
Productores de Palma Parcela Sr. Patricio Nolasco, Marzo 09
Victorio Fores E Productor de palma aceitera Shambillo Aguaytía
Patricio Nolasco Productor de palma aceitera Shambillo Aguaytía
Bravo Guerrero Productor de palma aceitera Shambillo Aguaytía
Guillermo John Productor de palma aceitera Shambillo Aguaytía
Trabajadores Aspash, Asoc. Palmarultores, Shambillo, Marzo 09
Melchor Hamilton Rosas Promotor Aspash
Alfredo Asenjo Fernández ADM-CD-091
voctprop Ch. Flores Estacio Promotor
Ladislao Viena Grandes Extensionista
Baltazr Peña Drivis Sig
Milson R. Salirrosas N. Coordinador
Edwin Solís Torres Tesorero ASPASH
Sandro Sandoval Silva Esp. FLV POA
111
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Julio Alberto Cárdenas 
Otoya Extensionista-Aspash Olpasa
Roy Porras Espinoza Extensionista Aspash PDA
Representantes de la Sub Región del Gobierno Regional de Ucayali, Marzo 09
Wilson Pinedo Gerente Sub Región Sub Región Ucayali
APCTVSH. Shambillo, Padre Abad, Marzo 10
Julio César Luna Pinchi Productor de cacao Asociación Shambillo
Eliseo Rodríguez Atalaya Productor de cacao Asociación Shambillo
Dionisio Santa Cruz A. Productor de cacao Asociación Shambillo
Municipalidad Provincial de Padre Abad, Aguaytía, Marzo 10
Luis Maguiña Alcalde Municipalidad Padre Abad
Luis Junior Gerente Municipal Municipalidad Padre Abad
Griselda Retis Regidora Municipalidad Padre Abad
Junior Huaranga Gerente General Municipalidad Padre Abad
Esther Ramírez
Gerenta de Desarrollo Social y Medio 
Ambiente Municipalidad Padre Abad
Agencia Agraria Aguaytía. Marzo 10
Edgardo Miranda Director Agencia Agraria Aguaytía
Carlos Zavaleta Extensionista Agencia Agraria Aguaytía
En Parcela de Sr. Teófilo Berrosti, Centro Yurac, Marzo 10
Marina Mera Productora de plátano Aguaytia
Adela Falcón Productora de plátano Aguaytia
Teófilo Berrosti Productora de plátano Aguaytia
Alfonso Rodas Productora de plátano Aguaytia
Parcela de Jonás Chaua. Shambillo, Marzo 11
Jonás Chaua Productor de palma aceitera Shambillo
Víctor Chaua Productor de Palma aceitera Shambillo
ASPASH y OLPASA, Shambillo, Marzo 11
Arturo Hoyos Gerente General OLPASA
Rómulo xxx Presidente ASPASH
Arturo Cárdenas Gerente ASPASH
Elmer xxx Productor de palma
Melitón Sal y Rosas Coord. Departamento Técnico ASPASH
Alfredo Atencio Productor de palma ASPASH
Roy Pires Extensionista ASPASH
Rodolfo Espinoza Productor de palma ASPASH
Julio Roberto Cardenaz Productor de palma ASPASH
112
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
L. Grande Productor de palma ASPASH
Milton Productor de palma ASPASH
Comunidad Tahuantisuyo. San Alejandro. Marzo 11
Nicanor Pineda Rodríguez Productor de cacao Tahuantisuyo, San Alejandro, 
Marcia Delgado Productora de cacao Nuevo Oriente
Paula Valverde Productora de cacao
Nueva Bellavista, San Alejandro, 
Pucallpa
2 agricultores Productores de cacao
Nueva Bellavista, San Alejandro, 
Pucallpa
COCEPASA. San Alejandro. Marzo 11
Juan Vicente Santa Cruz Gerente de planta
COCEPASA, San Alejandro, 
Pucallpa
Priscilia Cabrera Presidenta
COCEPASA, San Alejandro, 
Pucallpa
3 productores de cacao Socios
COCEPASA, San Alejandro, 
Pucallpa
DEVIDA. Pucallpa. Marzo 11
Henry Centeno Representante DEVIDA. Pucallpa
NN.UU. Lima. Marzo 15
Flavio Mirella Representante en Perú ONUDD
Hans Jochen Wiese Especialista en Palma, ATP-PDA Preu ONUDD
Entrevistas especialidades por Género, Josefa Nolte
Febrero 20
Yolanda Platón Asesora de educación Proyecto APRENDES y SUMA en 
zona de PDA
Carla Queirolo USAID
Febrero 21
Alarìa Agricultora de café Comunidad de PALMICHE
Licenia Agricultora de café Comunidad de PALMICHE
Emérita Ex tesorera del club de madres, 
tesorera del Vaso de Leche
Comunidad de PALMICHE
Leonila Titular de ACOPAGRO Comunidad de PALMICHE
Ofelia Presidenta del club de madres Comunidad de PALMICHE
Celina Agricultora de café Comunidad de PALMICHE
Judith Presidenta del Vaso de Leche Comunidad de PALMICHE
Isidora Agricultora de café y cacao Comunidad de PALMICHE 
Edwin Sangama Teniente Gobernador Comunidad de PALMICHE
Rodolfo Gil Extensionista Cooperativa Acopagro
Hiderico Bocangel Zavala Gerente Cooperativa Oro Verde
Alex Escudero Saldaña Coordinador APAE Grano de Oro
Febrero 22
113
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Luzmila Paredes Secretaria de Gerencia Cooperativa Acopagro
Tomasa Solana Cooperativa Acopagro
Edwin Sangama Sangama Presidente de Comité Cooperativa Acopagro
Madero Pérez Presidente del comité de Saposoa Cooperativa Acopagro
Glinda Pasco Tarazona Regidora Huicungo
Telma Falcón Pezo Regidora, Socia de Acopagro Pachiza
Libi Vanessa Pinchi 
Cárdenas
Regidora Juanjui
Leila del Águila Ruíz Regidora Juanjui
Marzo 25
Edita Herrera Coordinadora de Género Chemonics
Elvira Angulo Coordinadora de Género Red Nacional de Promoción de la 
mujer, San Martín
Marzo 25
Cecilia Hurtado Coordinadora de Género Red Nacional de Promoción de la 
mujer, Tocache
Julia Alvarado Coordinadora de Género Red Nacional de Promoción de la 
mujer, Tingo María
Marzo 3
Violeta Bustamante Coordinadora de Género Red Nacional de Promoción de la 
mujer, Pucallpa
Laura Imburgia InterPares Rural Development 
Consulting Group Consultora
Consultora
Cathyl Barrera Gerente (consultora) Barrera Consultores
Marzo 25
Raúl Olivares Coordinador APAE Cooperativa Agroindustrial Tocache
Elizabeth Alarcón Tenorio Comité de Desarrollo de la Mujer
Washington Hugo Saldaña extensionista Cooperativa Agroindustrial Tocache
Noemí Moreno Príncipe Regidora Municipalidad Tocache
Sonia Flores Hernández Secretaria de la Ronda Campesina de 
Bajo Limón, Ganadora del Mejor Cacao 
de la zona
Nueva Esperanza
Lucía Bendezù Presidenta de APROSAN, Agente 
Municipal Bajo Limón
Nueva Esperanza
Erika Viera Huatias Presidenta del Vaso de Leche Nueva Esperanza
Eulalia Laguna Briones Vocal de la Junta Vecinal de Nueva 
Libertad, Tesorera de la Asociación 
de Productores de cuyes, Vocal de la 
Piscigranja
Nueva Esperanza
Esterfilia Salvador García Teniente Gobernadora de Bajo Limón Nueva Esperanza
Yolanda Camasco Ramos Presidenta del Comité de 
Mantenimiento Vial y Caminos 
Vecinales de Nueva Esperanza, 
Presidenta del Comité Local de la 
Provincia para licitaciones públicas
Nueva Esperanza
Josefina Huamán Eugenia Presidenta del Vaso de Leche Nueva Esperanza
Marzo 3
Eva Falcón Tarazona Regidora Tingo María
114
Nombre y apellido Título o Cargo Comunidad y/o Asociación
Maximiliana Ponce Socia de la asociación de productoras 
cafetaleras Santa Rosa, ganadora de 
Selva Ganadora
Santa Rosa, Aguaytía
ACOPAGRO: Cooperativa Agraria Cacaotera "ACOPAGRO"
APROCAPP: Asociación de Productores de Cacao de la Provincia de Picota
APTAA Asociación Plataneros Tecnificados Aguaytía
APTRA Asociación Plataneros Tradicionales Rio Abajo
AASAR: Asociación de Agricultores Santa Rosa
CAPTACY: Consorcio Agrario de Primavera y Centro Yurac
CIOOY Consorcio Productores Plátano
COPALGSA: Cooperativa Agraria "La Gran Saposoa"
COPALGSA: Cooperativa Agraria "La Gran Saposoa"
COPAMON: Comité de Productores Agropecuarios de Montevideo 
COPAMON: Comité de Productores Agropecuarios de Montevideo 
IESTP-H: Institución Educativa Superior Tecnológica Pública - Huallaga
PDA: Programa de Desarrollo Alternativo
Sol Naciente: Agricultores Sta. Rosa Sol Naciente
115
APPENDIX 4 TABLES 
Appendix 4, Table 1 Years Since First Planting of Cacao or Coffee by Community, 
Northern San Martin
Office Region San Martin North Number of Participating Producers
February 2010 Age of First Planting Province District
Community Less than 
4 years 4 - 5 years
More than 
5 years
BELLAVISTA
ALTO BIAVO
ALTO YANAYACU 51
BARRANCA 15
CENTRO AMERICA 78
INCAICO 18
JOSE OLAYA 43
LOS ANGELES 22
MURALLA 17
NUEVO SAN MARTIN 26
NUEVO SAN MIGUEL 10
NUEVO TRUJILLO 23
PUERTO BERMUDEZ 57
Total 342 0 18
BELLAVISTA
BUENOS AIRES 61
HUACHO 68
LIMON 11
MERCEDES 96
MISHQUIYACU 29
NUEVA FLORIDA 56
Total 72 0 249
HUALLAGA
ALTO PAÑAZAPA 24
GRAN BRETAÑA 35
Total 59 0 0
SAN PABLO
CONSUELO 19
DOS DE MAYO 37
FAUSA LAMISTA 60
FAUSA SAPINA 67
HUINGOYACU 190
NUEVA ESPERANZA 53
RAMON CASTILLA 36
SHAMBOYACU 36
Total 195 0 303
EL 
DORAD
O AGUA 
BLANC
A
ALTO ALGARROBO 40
ALTO YURACYACU 31
AZANGIHUA 15
116
Total 86
0
0
SAN JOSE DE SISA
AMINIO 20
BANDA DE PISHUAYA
7
HUAJA 26
HUANCABAMBA 16
ISHICHIHUI 21
LAS PALMERAS 58
MIRAFLORES 30
NAUTA 27
SAN ISIDRO 15
SAN JUAN DE 
MIRAFLORES 38
SAN JUAN SALADO 13
SANTA CRUZ 35
Total 290
0 16
SAN MARTIN
ALFARO 10
ALTO ROQUE
9
BUENA VISTA 15
CONSTANCIA 28
FLOR DEL ORIENTE
9
NUEVO PORVENIR 14
PEBAS 10
REQUENA 20
SAN MARTIN
6
SANANGO 21
SINAMI 32
Total 153
0 21
SANTA ROSA
BARRANQUITA 30
CHANCHAMAYO 10
MACHU PICCHU 19
SANTA ELENA 39
SANTA MARTHA 16
SANTA ROSA 12
SHUCSHUYACU 23
Total 77
0 72
SHATOJA
ALTO SHATOJILLO
8
LA FLORIDA 28
LA UNION 11
NUEVO HUANCABAMBA 28
SAN PEDRO 19
SHATOJA 10
Total 21
0 83
HUALLAGA
ALTO 
SAPOSOA
NUEVA VIDA 40
PASARRAYA 129
YACUSISA 109
Total 0
0 278
PISCOY
ACU
HUACCHA 13
JOSE OLAYA 21
LA PEDRERA 12
117
LA PRIMAVERA 11
NUEVA ESPERANZA 11
NUEVO PISCOYACU 10
NUEVO SACANCHE 21
PISCOYACU 66
SAN LORENZO 14
Total 92
0 87
SACANCH
E
COLLPA 25
SACANCHE 101
Total 25
0 101
SAPOSOA
AHUIHUA 47
ALMENDRAS 30
ALTO PACHIZA 134
ALTO SITULLI 44
ARMANAYACU 19
BAGAZAN 27
CHAMBIRA 26
CHIQUINQUIRA 17
EL DORADO 48
INTIYACU DIAZ 20
LA DIVISORIA
5
LA PERLA 40
MONTEVIDEO 16
MURO 29
NUEVO HORIZONTE 48
NUEVO PERU 21
NUEVO SAN ANDRES 37
NUEVO SAN MARTIN 34
NUEVO TRIUNFO
8
PALTAICO 60
PINTILLO 31
QURICO 31
SAN ANDRES
SAN REGIS
SANTA FE
SANTA ROSA 26
SHIMA 61
SITULLE 29
TANGER 29
Total 89
0 828
LAMAS
ALONSO DE
ALVARADO
MIRADOR DE ALTO 
ROQUE 13
ROQUE 16
Total 29
0
0
B
A
R
R
A
N
QBARRANQUITA UI TA
44
118
GRAU 37
JORGE CHAVEZ 23
JUAN SANTOS 
ATAHUALPA 15
KUMAMOTO 11
LA UNION
5
LAS PALMAS 13 LAS PALMERAS 36
NARANJAL 22
NUEVO ALEGRIA 18
NUEVO LIBERTAD 11
PIÑAL 63
PUERTO PIZARRO 10
SAN JUAN DE 
PACHICILLA 36
SAN MARTIN 17
SANANGO 31
SANGAMAYOC 18
SANTA ELENA
3
SANTIAGO DE BORJA 19
VISTA ALEGRE 10
Total 442
0
0
CAYNARACHI
ALFONSO UGARTE 38
ALIANZA 189
BONILLA 89
CARACHAMAYOC 22
CONVENTO
8
COPAL 17
METILLUYOC 48
NARANJA
L 16
PINTOYACU 26
PINTOYAQUILLO 17
PONGO DE 
CAYNARACHI 84
SAN JUAN DE SHANUSI 33
SAN MIGUEL DE 
ACHINAMIZA 32
SAN MIGUEL DE 
SHANUSI
7
SANTA ROSA DE 
DAVICILLO 65
SANTA ROSA DE 
TIOYACU 17
SHAPAJILLA 28
YUMBATOS 94
Total 830
0
0
CUÑUMBU
QUI
ALTO ANDINO 77
Total
0
0 77
119
LAMAS
CHIRAPA 91
HUAPO 31
NARANJAL 29
PAMPAYACU 22
Total 173
0
0
PINTO RECODO
ALTO PALMICHE 37
BELLAVISTA 35
CHUMBAQUIHUI 32
CHURUZAPA
5
EL MIRADOR 29
MISHQUILLAQUILLO DE 
SHAPUNGA 28
MISHQUIYACU 13
MORILLO 24
PALMICHE 92
PAMPAMONTE 15
PINTO RECODO
9
Total 114 24 181
RUMIS
APA
PACCHILLA 39
Total
0
0 39
SAN ROQUE DE CUMBAZA
ALTO SHAMBOYACU 102
AUCALOMA 19
AVIACION 15
BOCA DE 
SHAMBOYACU 18
CHIRIKYACU 25
CHONTAL 36
CHUNCHIWI 29
PAMASHTO 126
SAN ROQUE DE 
CUMBAZA 30
URCUPATA 68
YURILAMAS 22
Total 454
0 36
SHANA
O
SHANAO 16
Total 16
0
0
TABALOSOS
ALTO PROGRESO DE 
ALMENDRILLO 32
ALTO UNGURAHUI 15
ANALLO 10
6
BARACASHA 48
CACHIPAMPA 32
CHACCHAYPAMPA 24
CUMBAQUIHUI 45
LEJIA 22
MACHINGAO 16
NAZARET 11
120
NUEVA AMERICA 20
NUEVA ESPERANZA 45
NUEVO SAN MARTIN 22
PANJUY 38
PLAZA NORTE 67
PORVENIR 24
PUCAYOC 23
PUEBLO NUEVO 34
RUMIYACU 40
SAN LUIS 34
SAN MIGUEL DE MAYO 82
URCO 37
Total 89
0 728
ZAPATERO
NUEVA ESPERANZA 22
NUEVO CELENDIN 12
SAN JUAN DE 
TALLIQUIHUI 65
Total
0
0 99
MARISCAL CACERES
CAMPANILLA
AUCARARCA 101
BALSAYACU 113
CAMPANILLA 21
CHALLUAYACU 46
CINCO UNIDOS 35
CUÑUMBUZA 29
MASHUYACU 76 NUEVO JUNIN 27
NUEVO PACASMAYO 28
PAMPA HERMOSA 67
PUERTO FRANCO 51
RAMON CASTILLA 62
SHUMANZA 175
Total 502 226 103
HUICUNGO
DOS DE MAYO 130
HUICUNGO 233
LA PRIMAVERA 51 MIRAFLORES 78
MOJARAS 53
NUEVA ESPERANZA 23
PIZARRO 68
PUCALLPILLO 50
SAN JUAN DE ABISEO 98
SANTA INES 60
SHEPTE 57
Total 233 288 380
JUANJUI
AGUA AZUL 16
CERRO AZUL
6
CHAMBIRA 45
CUNCHUHUILLO 
GRANDE
8
121
EL PORVENIR 52
JUANJUICILLO
5
LA CALERA 11
LA VICTORIA
7
PUCUNUCHO 13
SACANCHILLO 15
Total 104
6 68
PACHIZA
ALTO EL SOL 101
ATAHUALPA 
-
1 31
BAGAZAN 141
BELLO HORIZONTE 
-
1 54
GERVACIO 50
MAGDALENA 42
MARISOL 36
MONTERREY 48
NUEVO CHIMBOTE 76
PACHIZA 49
RICARDO PALMA 49
SAN JUAN DEL CAÑO 55
SAN RAMON 111
SANAMBO 38
SANCHIMA 28
SECTOR SORRAPA 27
Total 76 50 810
PAJARILLO
ARMAYARI 36
BAJO JUÑAO 36
CAPIRONA 77
CHURO 18
COSTA RICA 145
DOS UNIDOS 61
MARICHE 27
NUEVO PARAISO 22
PAJARILLO 26
PLAYA HERMOSA 39
PORVENIR 
-
1 26
RETAMA (VICTOR RAUL 
HAYA DE LA TORRE ) 21
SAN JOSE DE JUÑAO 32
SOLEDAD 51
ZANCUDO 37
Total 80 429 145
PICOTA
PICOTA
PICOTA 30
SANTA ROSILLO 16
Total 46
0
0
PILLUANA
MISHQUIYACU 43
PILLUANA 28
Total 28
0 43
P
U
C
A
C
ACEDROPAMPA CA
57
122
PUCACACA 57
SHIMBILLO 25
Total 139
0
0
SHAMBOYACU
ALFONSO UGARTE 38
CHAMBIRA 18
PAUCAR 20
SHAMBOYACU 38
SIMON BOLIVAR 27
VISTA ALEGRE 15
Total 138
0 18
TINGO DE 
PONASA
HUAÑIPO 29
LEONCIO PRADO 20
MARISCAL CASTILLA 27
NUEVA ESPERANZA 50
SAN ANTONIO 15
TINGO DE PONAZA 26
Total 167
0
0
TRES 
UNIDOS
BAÑOS 79
LA UNION 27
SAN JUAN 44
SAPOTILLO 25
Total
0
0 175
SAN MARTIN
ALBERT
O 
LEVEAU
CERRO SAN PABLO 10
Total 10
0
0
CHAZUTA
ACHINAMIZA 187
AGUANOMUYUNA 109
CALLANAYACU 56
CANAYO 68
CC.NN. MUSKU LLACTA 
CHIPAOTA 97
CURIYACU 89
LA BANDA DE CHAZUTA 265
LLUCANAYACU 51
RAMON CASTILLA 96
RICARDO PALMA 59
SHILCAYO 97
SIAMBAL 71
TUNUNTUNUMBA 99
TUPAC AMARU 25
Total
0 1146 223
CHIPURANA
NAVARRO 23
SAN PABLO DE 
TIPISHCA 36
YARINA 27
Total 86
0
0
EL 
POR
VENI
RPELEJO 20
PUERTO ALEGRE
2
123
SAN LUIS
5
Total 27
0
0
HUIMBAYOC
ALTO ATUN QUEBRADA 14
ATUN QUEBRADA 14
COROTOYAQUILLO 14
DOS DE MAYO 40
HUIMBAYOC 88
INAYUCA 27
IRAPAYO
4
JULIAN ALTO 17
JULIAN BAJO 14
MIRAFLORES 73
PARAISO 22
PONGO ISLA 37
PROGRESO 10
PUCALLPA 72
SAN JOSE DE 
SOLTERITOS 22
SAN JOSE DE 
YANAYACU 
(YANAYACU) 53
SANTA CECILIA
5
SANTA MARTHA 44
SANTA ROSILLO 45
SHUNGUYO 17
TIOYACU
8
UNION COROTOYACU 13
YANAYACU CHIMBANA
1
Total 654
0
0
LA BANDA 
DE 
SHILCAYO
ALTO POLISH 11
LA UNION DE PUCAYACU 25
PROGRESO
5
SAN FERNANDO DE PUCAYACU
2
Total 43
0
0
SAN 
ANTONIO
SAN ANTONIO 41
Total 41
0
0
SAUCE
ALTO SAUCE 21
LOS ANGELES DE CANOAYACU 22
NUEVA ESPERANZA 19
PRIMAVERA 67
PUCARARCA 103
SANTA ROSA DE HUAYALI 34
Total
0
0 266
SHAPAJA
ALTO SHATUYACU 14
NUEVO LAMAS 21
SANTA ROSA 18
Total
0
0 53
124
Office Region North San Martin Total
Total number of producers 13,691 6,022 2,169 5,500
Percent 100% 44% 16% 40%
Number of communities 475 241 74 160
Percent 100% 51% 16% 34%
Number of communities with more 
than 20 producers 300 141 36 123
Percent 100% 47% 12% 41%
125
Appendix 4, Table 2 Years Since First Planting of Cacao or Coffee by Community, 
Tocache
Office Region Tocache Number of Participating Producers
February 2010 Age of First Planting Province District
Community
Less than 
4 years 4 - 5 years
More than 
5 years
MARISCAL 
CACERES
CAMPANILLA
NUEVO JAEN 81
PERLAMAYO 63
SAN JUAN KM 33 31
Number of Producers 0 31 144
Number of Communities
TOCACHE
POLVORA
10 DE AGOSTO 24
BALSAYACU 61
BELLO ORIENTE 45
BOLIVAR 37
BUENOS AIRES - LA LOMA 48
CACHIYACU 18
CAÑUTO 7
CEDRO 47
CHALLUAYACU 10
CUSMAYACU 7
EL PORVENIR DE ALTO CAÑUTO
11
FLOR NACIENTE 10
HUASCAYACU 8
ISCOTE 12
JOSE CARLOS MARIATEGUI 54
KUWAIT 44
LA FLORIDA 27
LUIS SALAS 13
MANA HERMOSO 23
MIRAFLORES 16
NUEVA CHILIA 39
NUEVO CASMA 21
NUEVO HORIZONTE 155
NUEVO PARAISO 9
NUEVO PATAZ 13
NUEVO SAN ANTONIO 22
NUEVO SAN MARTIN
POLVORA 69
126
PRIMAVERA 17
PUERTO RICO 36
SAN JUAN DE CAÑUTILLO 
(CUEVACHUNCHI) 33
SAN LUIS
7
SAN MIGUEL DE NUEVO 
HORIZONTE 44
SECTOR 21
2
TAYSHAN 12
UNION NUEVA VICTORIA 20
VILLA LOS ANGELES 25
VILLA PALMA 27
Total District of Polvora 337 11 725
SHUNTE
LA VICTORIA 30
MARIPOSA 84
MONTE CRISTO 26
NUEVO BELEN 22
PAMPA HERMOSA 20
SHUNTE 28
Total District of Shunte
0
0 210
TOCACHE
ACCESO HUALLAGA
5
ALMENDRAS 29
ALTO BAMBAMARCA 56
ALTO LIMON 20
ALTO SARITA 14
ATUSPARIA 18
BAJO LIMON 20
BAJO TANANTA 49
BALSA PROBANA 96
BENTEJEBE 77
CARRICILLO 14
CEPESA 25
CERRO PORTEÑO 15
CHAN CHAN 14
CULEBRA 13
FILADELFIA 50
INDOAMERICA 24
ISHANGA 28
IV SECTOR LIMON 31
JORGE CHAVEZ DEL 
RIO ESPINO 19
LAS AMERICAS 23
MANTENCION 43
MIGUEL GRAU 20
NARANJAL 49
NUEVA ESPERANZA 43
NUEVA LIBERTAD
3
NUEVO AMANECER
2
NUEVO 30
127
BAMBAMARCA
NUEVO 
BAMBAMARCA 
SECTOR E
5
NUEVO 
BAMBAMARCA 
SECTOR PAPAYAL 49
NUEVO BELLAVISTA 12
NUEVO JORDAN 33
NUEVO SAN JUAN DE 
HUAYRANGA 48
PUCAYACU
2
PUERTO LOS OLIVOS 
(PELEJO) 24
SAN AGUSTIN DE 
HUAQUISHA 30
SAN MIGUEL DEL 
PORVENIR 54
SAN PEDRO DE ALTO 
CULEBRA 25
SANTA ROSA DE 
ALTO TANANTA 48
SANTO CRISTO 19
SHISHIYACU 58
SIN SIN 30
TANANTA 130
TIESTO 42
TOCACHE VIEJO 20
UNION ALEGRE 34
VIÑA DEL RIO 22
YACUSISA 39
Total District of Tocache 179
5 1370
UCHIZA
08 DE JULIO (ANEXO 
DE SHAPAJA) 14
ALTO HUAYNABE 18
BAJO PORONGO 31
BARRO BLANCO 17
BOLAYNA 11
BOMBONAJE
7
BUENOS AIRES 20
CAHUIDE 39
CAJATAMBO 10
CHONTAYAQUILLO 
(OSHITO) 38
CRUZ PAMPA 50
EL PORVENIR KM 9 57
FRAY MARTIN DE 
PORRES 34
JOSE. C. MARIATEGUI
8
KUNYAG
LA PARCELA
3
128
LOBOYACU 87
LOS ANGELES 35
NUEVA UNION 27
PAMPAYACU 21
PEZO 15
PUCAYACU 9
PUERTO HUICTE 28
RAMAL DE 
CACHIYACU 56
SAN CRISTOBAL 26
SAN JOSE KM 2 11
SAN JUAN DE 
OLLATES 32
SAN JUAN DE 
PORONGO 3
SAN JUAN KM 4 18
SANTA LUCIA 22
SANTA LUCIA -
ANEXO CERRO 
DULCE 29
SANTA ROSA DE 
SHAPAJA 117
SANTO DOMINGO 24
TINGO DE UCHIZA 7
VALLE SHUNTE 33
Total District of Uchiza 765 139 53
Number of Participating Producers
Age of First Planting
Region of Tocache Total
Less than 
4 years 4 - 5 years
More than 
5 years
Total number of producers 3,969 1,281 186 2,502
Percent 100% 32% 5% 63%
Number of communities 128 53 9 66
Percent 100% 41% 7% 52%
129
Appendix 4, Table 3 Number of Communities and Producers by Years since First 
Planting of Cacao or Coffee by Community, Pucallpa
Number of Participating Producers
Age of First Plantings 
Province
District
Community Total Less 
than 4 
years 
4 - 5 
years 
More 
than 5 
years 
CORONEL PORTILLO
CAMPOVERDE
10 DE JULIO 8 8
AGUA DULCE 7 7
AVEJAICO 65 65
CIUDAD DE LOS INCAS 5 5
CONDOR 21 21
HERMOZA SELVA 11 11
JUVENTUD 12 12
LA MERCED DE 
NESHUYA 61 61
LOS ANGELES 14 14
LOS VENCEDORES 10 10
NARANJILLO 18 18
NUEVA DINAMARCA 19 19
NUEVE DE FEBRERO 4 4
NUEVO PIURA 2 2
NUEVO SAN PEDRO 20 20
PUEBLO LIBRE 8 8
SAN ANDRES 16 16
SAN FRANCISCO DE 
NESHUYA 3 3
SAN MARTIN MOJARAL 8 8
Number of Producers 312 312 - -
Number of Communities 19 19 - -
NUEVA REQUENA
BAJO RAYAL 29 29
CEDRO ISLA 17 17
EL CARIBE 11 11
LA PERLA DE SANJA 
SECA 26 26
MIRAFLORES 6 6
NARANJAL 23 23
NUEVO PARAISO 14 14
NUEVO SAN JUAN DE 
SHESHEA 18 18
SAN PABLO DE JUANTIA 35 35
SANTA CLARA DE 
UCHUNYA 32 32
SARITA COLONIA 4 4
TRES ISLAS 17 17
UNION PROGRESO 21 21
130
Number of Producers 253 253
-
-
Number of Communities 13 13
-
-
PADRE ABAD
CURIMANA
16 DE NOVIEMBRE 13 13
AGUA DULCE 15 15
ANDRES AVELINO 
CACERES 10 10
BELLO HORIZONTE 28 28
DIEZ DE MARZO 27 27
DOS DE MAYO 17 17
FLOR DEL VALLE
2
2
LAS LOMAS, ANEXO 
CURIMANA 14 14
LAS MALVINAS 22 22
LAS MERCEDES 15 15
MARONAL 16 16
MONTE SINAI 22 22
NUEVA ALIANZA 43 43
NUEVA BELLAVISTA 
(CURIMANA) 35 35
NUEVA LIBERTAD 11 11
NUEVA MERIBA 48 48
NUEVO JERUSALEN 22 22
NUEVO PARAISO 10 10
NUEVO SAN JOSE 40 40
PUEBLO LIBRE 15 15
ROCA FUERTE 18 18
SAN JUAN DE TAHUAPOA 41 41
SOL NACIENTE
4
4
VISTA ALEGRE 25 25
ZONA PATRIA 26 26
ZORRILLOS 11 11
Number of Producers 550 411 97 42
Number of Communities 26 20
4
2
IRAZOLA
ALTO YANAYACU
2
2
ASUNCION DEL 
AGUAYTILLO 48 48
BAJO TAHUAYO 15 15
BAJO URUYA 14 14
BANDEJA POZA 42 42
BUENOS AIRES 
(IRAZOLA) 61 61
CANAAN DE PIEDRAS
7
7
CORAZON DE JESUS 57 57
EL MILAGRO 32 32
EL PORVENIR 46 46
EL TRIUNFO
3
3
JOSE DE SAN MARTIN DE 
CHIA 23 23
LA UNION Km. 75 
(IRAZOLA) 37 37
131
LAS PIEDRAS 
-ANEXO 
CPM VON HUMBOLTH 14 14
LIBERTAD DE 
PASARRAYA 12 12
LIBERTAD DE 
PASARRAYA ANEXO 
NUEVO JUANJUI
28 28
MANCO CAPAC 20 20
MAR DE PLATA 35 35
MARCO RAMIREZ 33 33
MIGUEL GRAU 35 35
MIRAFLORES 13 13
MONTE DE LOS OLIVOS 29 29
NORBERT ALTO URUYA 44 44
NUEVA ESPERANZA 20 20
NUEVA FLORIDA 79 79
NUEVA IRAZOLA 16 16
NUEVA PALESTINA 
(IRAZOLA) 11 11
NUEVA TIWINZA
1
1
NUEVA UNION 
(PALOMETA) 54 54
NUEVO BELLAVISTA 58 58
NUEVO HORIZONTE 24 24
NUEVO HUANUCO 16 16
NUEVO JERUSALEN DEL 
ALTO URUYA 14 14
NUEVO ORIENTE 29 29
NUEVO PROGRESO 11 11
NUEVO SAN ALEJANDRO
6
6
NUEVO SAN JUAN (KM 
69)
2
2
NUEVO SATIPO 
(IRAZOLA) 29 29
NUEVO TAHUANTINSUYO 78 78
NUEVO UCAYALI 60 60
PIJUAYO WINSTON 27 27
PRIMAVERA 24 24
PUEBLO NUEVO
9
9
PUERTO NUEVO 15 15
SAN JOSE 12 12
SAN JUAN (KM. 71) 
-
ANEXO NVO. ORIENTE 28 28
SAN JUAN BAUTISTA
8
8
SAN MARTIN 12 12
SAN PEDRO DE GUINEA 10 10
SANTA CRUZ 23 23
SANTA ROSA DE GUINEA 30 30
SAUCE DEL ALTO URUYA 31 31
SECTOR SANTA BEATRIZ
6
6
SHIRINGAL ALTO 50 50
132
SHIRINGAL BAJO 80 80
SINCHI ROCA 102 102
UNION CENTRO RAYA, 
ANEXO VILLACAMPO 28 28
VALLE SAGRADO 65 65
VICTOR RAUL 10 10
VILLA DEL CAMPO 18 18
VILLA EL SALVADOR 24 24
VILLA MERCEDES 36 36
VIRGEN DE FATIMA 23 23
VIRGEN DEL CARMEN 20 20
VISTA ALEGRE DE CHIA 52 52
Number of Producers 1,901 829 520 552
Number of Communities 65 31 21 13
PADRE ABAD
3 DE OCTUBRE 22 22
ALTO ORIENTAL 28 28
ALTO SHAMBILLO 17 17
ANDRES AVELINO 
CACERES 28 28
ASSPA 
- AGUAS VERDES
2
2
BAJO GUAYABAL
8
8
BAJO SHAMBILLO 85 85
BOQUERON 38 38
CENTRO YURA
C 37 37
CHANCADORA 18 18
DIVISORIA 52 52
EL PORVENIR
6
6
ERIKA 20 20
HORMIGA 34 34
HUACAMAYO
6
6
IDAYACU 36 36
INCA GARCILASO DE LA 
VEGA 14 14
JUAN VELASCO 
ALVARADO
5
5
LA LIBERTAD DE 
SAMIRIA 13 13
LIBERTAD
6
6
LOS OLIVOS 29 29
MARISCAL CACERES 42 42
MEBANAÑU 28 28
MEDIACION 27 27
MICAELA BASTIDAS
5
5
MIGUEL GRAU 
SEMINARIO 56 56
MINAS DE SAL 18 18
MIRAFLORES (ALTO)
4
4
MIRAFLORES (BAJO)
2
2
NUEVA ESPERANZA ( 
YAMINO ) 52 52
133
NUEVA PALESTINA 13 13
NUEVA PRIMAVERA 1 1
NUEVA UNION 39 39
NUEVO JORDAN 33 33
NUEVO MUNDO 35 35
NUEVO PARAISO 60 60
NUEVO PROGRESO 26 26
PAMPA HERMOSA 9 9
PREVISTO 35 35
PUERTO AZUL 36 36
RIO BLANCO 26 26
SANTA ROSA 75 75
SANTA ROSA KM 200 48 48
SECTOR ALTO 
CHAMBIRA - NUEVO 
PROGRESO
8 8
SECTOR COPAL-CCNN 
SANTA ROSA 1 1
SECTOR OTORONGO -
SIRENA 1 1
SECTOR SABALO￾TANGARANA 9 9
SECTOR YURAC YACU 
(BOQUERON) 8 8
SELVA TURISTICA 43 43
TARAHUACA 2 2
VALLE DE SION 35 35
ZONA RESERVADA -
BARRIO UNIDO 31 31
Number of Producers 1,312 259 362 691
Number of Communities 69 28 16 25
Number of Participating Producers
Age of First Plantings 
Region of Pucallpa
Total 
Less 
than 4 
years 
4 - 5 
years 
More 
than 5 
years 
Number of Producers 4,328 2,064 979 1,285
Percent 100% 48% 23% 30%
Number of Communities 175 101 37 37
Percent 100% 58% 21% 21%
134
Appendix 4, Table 4 Subcontracts for Training and Technical Assistance 
Etapa Oficina
Sub￾Proyecto
No. de personas trabajando 
en el sub-proyecto y su cargo
Nombre del 
Donatario
Consolidación
San 
Martin
Módulo 
porcinos, 
ganado 
vacuno y 
aves
01 coordinador, 09 
extensionistas, 01 asistente 
administrativo, 03 promotores
Fundación para el 
Desarrollo Agrario del 
Alto Mayo
Consolidación
San 
Martin Cacao
01 Coordinador, 8 
Extensionistas, 01 Asistente 
administrativo
Asociación de 
Productores Agrarios 
Ecológicos Grano de 
Oro
Consolidación Tocache Café 1 Extensionista
Cooperativa Agraria 
Cafetalera Divisoria 
Limitada
Consolidación
San 
Martin
Cacao, 
Café
- 01 coordinador
- 17 extensionistas
- 01 promotor 
- 01 asistente administrativo
Asociación de 
Productores Agrarios 
Ecológicos Grano de 
Oro
Consolidación
San 
Martin Cacao
01 Coordinador Técnico, 01 
Administrador, 12 
Extensionista, 10 Promotores 
Agrícolas 
Cooperativa Agraria 
Cacaotera -
ACOPAGRO
Consolidación
San 
Martin
Cacao, 
Café *
* 02 Coordinadores.
* 12 Extensionistas.
* 12 Promotores.
* 01 Administrador.
Cooperativa Agraria 
Cacaotera -
ACOPAGRO
Consolidación Tocache Cacao
1 extensionista agrícola, 1 
asistente administrativo
Cooperativa 
Agroindustrial 
Tocache Ltda.
Consolidación Ucayali Cacao
18 PERSONAS (1 Coordinador 
Técnico, 8 Extensionistas, 8 
promotores de campo y 1 
Administrador)
Cooperativa Agraria 
Industrial Naranjillo
Consolidación
Tingo 
Maria, 
Tocache Café
1 Coordinador técnico, 6 
extensionistas y 1 asistente 
administrativo 
Cooperativa Agraria
Cafetalera Divisoria 
Limitada
Consolidación
San 
Martin Palmito
01 Coordinador, 03 
extensionistas, 01 asistente 
administrativo Alianza S.A.
Consolidación Ucayali Cacao
01 Responsable Técnico, 01 
Responsable Administrativo, 03 
Facilitadores Extensionistas y 
03 promotores
Cooperativa Agraria 
Industrial Naranjillo
Consolidación Aguallita Café
01 coordinador
01 administrador 
02 extensionistas
02 promotores
Cooperativa Agraria 
Cafetalera Divisoria 
Limitada
135
Consolidación Aguaytia
Palma 
Aceitera
01 coordinador
01 administrador 
02 extensionistas
02 técnicos
04 promotores
Asociación de 
Palmicultores de 
Shambillo
Consolidación Aguaytia Cacao
01 coordinador
01 administrador 
03 extensionistas
02 técnicos
04 promotores
Cooperativa Agraria 
Industrial Naranjillo
Consolidación
San 
Martin
Modulo de 
ganado 
vacuno
- 01 extensionista - 01 asistente 
administrativo
Fundación para el 
Desarrollo Agrario del 
Alto Mayo
Consolidación
Tingo 
Maria Café
9 Extensionistas, 1 promotor, 1 
Coordinador Técnico, 1 
Asistente Admin.
Cooperativa Agraria 
Cafetalera Divisoria 
Limitada
Consolidación
Tingo 
Maria Cacao
5 Extensionistas, 1 Coordinador 
Técnico, 1 Asistente Admin.
Cooperativa Agraria 
Industrial Naranjillo
Consolidación Tocache
Palma 
Aceitera
1 extensionista y 1 asistente 
administrativo
Asociación Central de 
Palmicultores de la 
Provincia de Tocache
Consolidación Tocache
Módulo de 
Piscigranja
1 extensionista y 1 asistente 
administrativo
Asociación Provincial 
de Técnicos de 
Tocache (ASPROTT)
Consolidación
San 
Martin
Módulo 
porcinos y 
aves
- 01 extensionista 
- 01 asistente administrativo
Asociación de 
Productores Agrarios 
Ecológicos Grano de 
Oro
Consolidación Aguaytia Palmito
01 extensionista
01 asistente administrativo 
Consorcio de 
Productores de 
Plátanos de Ucayali￾COPPU - EN
PROCESO DE 
CIERRE
post￾erradicación Tocache Cacao
1 Coordinador Técnico, 5 
Extensionistas, 1 
Administradora y 2 Asistentes 
Administrativas.
Asociación de 
Productores de Cacao 
del Distrito de Uchiza
post￾erradicación Tocache Café 1 Extensionista
Cooperativa Agraria 
Cafetalera Divisoria 
Limitada
post￾erradicación Tocache Ganadería
1 Coordinador Técnico, 1 
Extensionistas y 1 
Administrador 
Asociación de 
Ganaderos del Distrito 
de Uchiza el Oriente -
AGDUO
Consolidación
San 
Martin
Animales 
Menores
01 Extensionista, 01 Promotor 
agropecuario, 01 Administrador 
a 1/4 tiempo
Fundación para el 
Desarrollo Agrario del 
Alto Mayo
Consolidación
San 
Martin
Modulo de 
ganado 
vacuno
01 Extensionista, 01 Promotor 
agropecuario, 01 Administrador 
a 1/4 tiempo
Fundación para el 
Desarrollo Agrario del 
Alto Mayo
136
post￾erradicación
Tingo 
Maria Cacao
06 Extensionistas, 1 
Coordinador Técnico, 1 
Administrador.
Asociación de 
Productores 
Agropecuarios Juan 
Velasco Alvarado
Consolidación Tocache
Módulo de 
cuyes, 
porcinos y 
aves
1 Coordinador técnico, 3 
extensionistas y 1 asistente 
administrativo
Asociación Provincial 
de Técnicos de 
Tocache (ASPROTT)
Consolidación Tocache
Módulo de 
Piscigranja
1 Coordinador técnico y 1 
extensionistas 
Asociación Provincial 
de Técnicos de 
Tocache (ASPROTT)
Consolidación Aguaytia Plátano
01 extensionista
01 administrador
Consorcio de 
Productores de 
Plátanos de Ucayali￾COPPU - EN 
PROCESO DE 
CIERRE
Consolidación Tocache Ganadería
1 Coordinador técnico, 1 
Asistente administrativo, y 5 
extensionistas. Desde Febrero 
2009 a Marzo 2010 trabajan un 
equipo de insumisión artificial 
conformado por 3 personas y 
una persona de servicio 
veterinario.
Fundación para el 
Desarrollo Agrario del 
Alto Mayo
Consolidación Ucayali
Palma 
Aceitera
1 Coordinador técnico, 1 
asistente administrativo, 3 
extensionistas, y 1 facilitador 
FOP
Comité Central de 
Palmicultores de 
Ucayali - COCEPU
Consolidación Aguaytia Pastos
01 coordinador
01 administrador 
03 extensionistas
Ecoselva Perú S.R.L. -
CERRADO
Consolidación Ucayali
Modulo de 
ganado 
vacuno
01 Responsable Técnico, 01 
Responsable Administrativo, 01 
Facilitador Extensionista
Empresa Comunal de 
Servicios 
Agropecuarios SRL 
―Unión y Trabajo‖
Consolidación
Tingo 
Maria, 
Tocache Cacao
1coordinador técnico, 3 sub 
coordinadores, 22 
extensionistas, 1 administrador, 
1 asistente técnico 
administrativo
Cooperativa 
Agroindustrial 
Tocache Ltda.
Consolidación Ucayali Cacao
1 Coordinador general, 2 sub 
coordinadores, 17 
extensionistas, 1 especialista 
en productividad, 5 promotores 
calificados, 4 promotores, 1 
administrador
Cooperativa Agraria 
Cafetalera Divisoria 
Limitada
Consolidación Ucayali
Modulo de 
ganado 
vacuno
05 PERSONAS (1 Coordinador 
Técnico, 3 Extensionistas, y 1 
Asistente Administrativo)
Central de 
Productores 
Agropecuarios 
Forestales de Monte 
Alegre
137
Post￾erradicación
Tingo 
Maria Ganadería 01 Coordinador
Asociación de 
Productores 
Agropecuarios Juan 
Velasco Alvarado
Consolidación
San 
Martin
Módulo de 
porcinos, 
gallinas y 
ganado 
vacuno
01 Coordinador Técnico, 01 
Administrador, 05 
Extensionista, 02 
Inseminadores 
Fundación para el 
Desarrollo Agrario del 
Alto Mayo
138
APPENDIX 5 DESCRIPTION OF PRODUCER 
ORGANIZATIONS 
Follows is a brief and informal description prepared by a member of the team for several 
producer associations and cooperatives that were visited by the team. 
Cooperativa Oro Verde 
Está localizada en Lamas.
Fundada En 1997 con apoyo de las NNUU y se inicia con 56 productores de café.
Objectives:
 Comercializar directamente los productos de sus asociados (originalmente café y 
hoy incluye el cacao).
 Elevar el nivel de vida de sus asociados.
 Implementar una organización referente de los productores: gremial y 
empresarial.
Solo manejó café hasta el 2005 y en la actualidad el cacao ya representa el 25% de sus 
valores de venta. 
El año 2005 comienza a recibir apoyo del ADP y ya cuenta con 1,200 socios, así como 
con una muy buena imagen. 
El principal apoyo que recibe del ADP es la asistencia técnica, pro debido al muy rápido 
crecimiento que ha tenido la Cooperativa, tiene aún muchos asociados que no han sido 
capacitados. 
Calificación de sus asociados:
1. Es el socio empresario y son 400 socios.
2. Están en proceso de estabilizarse. Son 300 asociados.
3. Son los que comienzan después de dejar la coca. Inician la rehabilitación de sus 
plantaciones de café y no están en plena producción. Son 500 productores. 
4. Se encuentran en eslabonamiento con la Cooperativa. No son aún asociados 
pero reciben asistencia técnica. Son 500 productores.
La mayoría de productores continúan trabajando café ―bola‖ y se está avanzando con el 
café lavado. 
Vende solo café orgánico, por lo que recibe un mejor precio. 
Cuenta con un Departamento Técnico y otro de Educación, así como un Comité de 
Mujeres (CODEMU).
Los productores presentes manifestaron la disposición de pagar por la asistencia 
técnica, aunque no con total convencimiento.
Requieren de capacitación gerencial con la finalidad de manejar mejor los costos.
El año 2009 vendió 15,000 qq de café y 150 TM de cacao.
Pretenden crecer hasta completar 1,500 á 1,800 asociados.
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Se notó falta de preparación de los cuadros empresariales de recambio cuando sea 
necesario.
Conclusiones
 La cooperativa está en franco proceso de consolidación, excepto por la falta de 
personal gerencial de recambio.
 Se le debe fortalecer empresarial y asociativamente durante uno o dos años, para 
dejar paulatinamente de prestarle apoyo en asistencia técnica, que deberá ser 
asumida por la cooperativa. 
Asociación de Productores de Palmito Alianza - APROPAL 
Está localizada en el Pongo de Caynarachi
Se fundó el año 1997, por gestión del Ministerio de Agricultura en 1996 frente a la 
Cooperación Española. Las siembras de Pijuayo (palmito) se iniciaron en 1997.
Existen 536 há. de Pijuayo instaladas en la zona, que llegarán a 800 há. por cuenta del 
ADP, además de otras 500-700 há. por cuenta de AECI. 
La Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional - AECI contribuyó con los equipos 
para procesamiento y el MINAGRI contribuyó con la infraestructura, asociando a los 
productores a través de esta planta de procesamiento como elemento para la 
eliminación del cultivo de coca. 
La planta pasó por un período de paralización debido al mal manejo gerencial que tuvo, 
acumulando deudas que están comenzando a ser pagadas. 
En la actualidad la planta procesa 15,000 a 17,000 tallos (―chontas‖) diariamente. Al 
inicio de la planta solo procesaban 4,000 talos por día. El primer contenedor se 
embarcará el 01-Mayo-2010.
Los productores consideran que el ADP es la organización más exitosa que se ha 
presentado en la zona.
Los equipos de la planta son ya muy antiguos (más de 10 años) y se necesita renovar la 
mayor parte de ellos, así como instalar el HACCP para garantizar la calidad del 
producto procesado.
El ADP tiene programado instalar 400 há. de Pijuayo el presente año. 
La calidad de palmito ha desmejorado por falta de fertilización adecuada. Sin embargo 
están vendiendo al Mercado Solidario al precio de US$ 20.00 por una caja con 12 
frascos. El precio convencional es de US$ 14.50 por cada caja de 12 frascos.
Conclusiones:
 Es necesario fortalecer la Asociación. 
 Es necesario fortalecer la asistencia técnica para levantar la producción, 
proponiendo tecnologías mejoradas de producción.
Para mejorar la fertilización se requiere de créditos promocionales que podrían ser 
negociados con AGROBANCO, aunque se demoren mucho en aprobarlos. Las tasa de 
AGROBANCO son de 1.5% mensual. CEPCO ofrece crédito al 4.5% mensual que es 
demasiado alto. 
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Asociación de Productores de Cacao – ALLIMA Cacao 
Se fundó el año 2003 a raíz de la EV y con ayuda del ADP y el Gobierno Regional, al 
notar los agricultores la necesidad de trabajar organizados. Cuenta con 475 asociados, 
en 14 comunidades con plantaciones de menos de 4 años de edad. 
Es una asociación aún incipiente, que el año 2009 vendió tan solo 12 TM de cacao de 
buena calidad. Su comprador fue Oro Verde, pero piensan que entre sus compradores 
potenciales están PRONATEC, Romero y Machu Picchu, entre otros.
Algunos agricultores que comenzaron con 1 hectáreas, ya tienen 2 y hasta 3 hectáreas 
muy jóvenes. 
El año 2010 tienen como meta vender 30 TM., aunque el año 2009 en la zona se 
produjo 250 TM. El ADP les proporcionó cajas de fermentación y bandejas para el 
secado. 
Conclusiones
 Es aún una organización incipiente que requiere de tiempo y asistencia para su 
consolidación. La zona es un potencial reducto de cocaleros y si se descuida podría 
llenarse de coca.
 No se le debe dejar aún pues requiere trabajos en asistencia técnica y 
fortalecimiento institucional.
Cooperativa Agroindustrial Tocache – CAT Tocache 
Fundada en 1990 con apoyo de las NNUU. 
Cuenta con 20 Comités Sectoriales y 490 asociados formalizados.
Sufrió una época de paralización por la situación socio-política en Tocache, y en la 
actualidad está en franco desarrollo. Recibe apoyo del ADP desde el año 2008 y le 
pagaron al Gerente durante 9 meses.
Está centralizando el acopio en ―baba‖ para uniformizar la fermentación y el secado. En 
la actualidad cuentan con 7 centros de acopio financiados por el ADP y las NNUU. La 
meta inmediata es completar 23 centros para atender la post-cosecha de 1,500 há. de 
sus asociados. 
Los asociados pagan una cuota de S/. 60.00 por año, además de S/. 10.00 por sepelio y 
otros S/. 20.00 por servicios de salud. Estos aportes son anuales.
Paralelamente reciben aportes monetarios extraordinarios voluntarios y en mano de 
obra para instalar los módulos de fermentación y secado.
Adicionalmente la CAT Tocache recibe aportaciones pagando 12% de interés anual, al 
igual que las financieras de la zona.
El año 2009 acopiaron y vendieron 360 TM de cacao orgánico de primera calidad, y la 
meta para 2010 es acopiar 650 TM, que es el 75% del total de cacao producido por sus 
socios. 
Un reclamo de los socios es que solo reciben cacao de primera calidad y se ven 
obligados a vender el resto a los acopiadores de firmas que operan en la provincia. En 
esta forma es posible que un determinado porcentaje adicional de la producción de los 
socios vaya también a manos de los acopiadores. Aparentemente esta discriminación 
en la recepción de solo el cacao de primera calidad responde a que se busca que todos 
los socios produzcan solo esta primera calidad, con lo que se beneficiarían.
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Algunos productores expresan que el precio pagado por la cooperativa y los 
acopiadores es el mismo, pero no mencionan que al final de la campaña la cooperativa 
les paga un reintegro de acuerdo con el resultado final. Esto no lo hacen los 
acopiadores.
Cuentan con un aporte de US$ 600,000.00 de una financiera holandesa con aval del 
comprador europeo con que cuentan, Los intereses que pagan son de 9% al año. 
ElADP financia a 22 extensionistas de campo y 6 coordinadores, que trabajan a través 
de la Cooperativa.
Su visión a largo plazo es contar con una planta procesadora de manteca, licor, cocoa y 
chocolates. 
Conclusiones
 La cooperativa está en un buen camino para consolidarse. 
 Su actividad es aún limitada, como lo demuestra que solo acopien 650 TM el 2010.
 Cuenta con productores que obtienen hasta 4,000 Kg/ha/año y les queda un largo 
camino por andar, ya que disponen de 1,500 hectáreas de cacao en diversas 
edades.
 Considero que no se debe aflojar el apoyo que recibe la CAT Tocache, pues es una 
forma gremial que debe servir de base para la consolidación rural de la región. 
 Es conveniente que desde el próximo contrato se establezca que la extensión debe 
ser pagada por los productores a través de la cooperativa. 
 Debe mejorarse la capacitación y la información a los socios. 
ACEPAT – OLPESA 
Cuenta con 14 asociaciones de base.
Por medio de la Cooperación Alemana se implantaron 5,800 hectáreas, en el valle, 
apoyados posteriormente por el ADP.
Inicialmente entregaban los frutos a Palma del Espino, que recibía volúmenes limitados, 
hasta que el año 2002 cerró la recepción en vista que su producción cubría la capacidad 
de la planta. En esta situación tuvieron que llevar los racimos a OLAMSA a 400 Km. de 
Tocache. 
Es en ese momento los productores muestran interés en instalar una planta. Para la 
ejecución del proyecto correspondiente contaron con ayuda de las NNUU. 
Para la compra de los equipos los palmicultores debieron hipotecar sus tierras a 
AGROBANCO por US$ 1,823,000.00 y AGROBANCO pidió que además los 
palmicultores aporten US$ 300,000.00 que finalmente se rebajó a US$ 75,000.00 que 
consiguieron con el apoyo de las NNUU, con lo que compraron los equipos. 
La instalación y el transporte de los equipos hasta Tocache fueron por cuenta de la 
empresa.
El accionariado de OLPESA es como sigue:
 54.65% Socios de ACEPAT
 15.75% Productores individuales
 10.60% Otros inversionistas 
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 19.00% Industrial Alpamayo 
La planta inició sus operaciones el 13-Dic-09 con una capacidad de producción de 10 
TM/hora. 
La planta sirve a alrededor de 1,500 familias que cuando cerró ENDEPALMA quedaron 
abandonadas y ahora se han vuelto a agrupar y están renovando las antiguas 
plantaciones que quedaron abandonadas por viejas. 
La planta otorga pequeños préstamos a sus asociados, para apoyar el cultivo y 
operaciones simples.
El año 2009 vendieron 13,300 TM de frutos, resultando en una utilidad neta de S/, 
600,000.00. La proyección para el 2010 es de 25,000 TM que representa una utilidad 
aproximada de S/. 1.2 millones. 
Tienen programado ir asumiendo paulatinamente la asistencia técnica y las 
necesidades de fertilizantes.
La producción de 1 TM de aceite rojo demanda 4.7 TM de frutos.
La planta de OLPESA está trabajando al 30% de su capacidad. 
Conclusiones
 Es destacable el esfuerzo y compromiso que han asumido los agricultores, 
demostrando que cuando se quiere hacer algo y se cuenta con el conocimiento 
necesario, se consigue.
 Se debe hacer hincapié en que no se debe dejar de contar con la asistencia técnica 
para evitar bajas de producción, conforme sucedió en Neshuya.
 La asistencia técnica debe ser transferida paulatinamente a los receptores de la 
misma, durante un período no menor a 2 años, en vista que las utilidades lo 
permiten. 
 El fortalecimiento de las organizaciones ACEPAT y OLPESA es de vital importancia.
 Debe programarse un crecimiento ordenado en la producción hasta cubrir 2.5 á 3 
turnos de trabajo de la planta.
Cooperativa La Divisoria 
Hace 14 años que las NNUU los orientó para formar una cooperativa, que ahora cuenta 
con 666 socios y 200 productores en proceso de asociación. 
Todos fueron cocaleros y luego de firmar con el ADP (DEVIDA) un convenio para la 
erradicación voluntaria eliminaron sus cocales, pues notaron que tenían amenazas de 
diversas fuentes. Manifiestan que actualmente tienen una vida tranquila, sin peligros y 
educando a sus hijos. 
Su principal producto es el café, y están comenzando a incursionar en cacao, que por el 
momento es de poco volumen, pero esperan incrementarlo en el mediano plazo, 
enfatizando en calidad de primera. 
Luego de la firma del convenio han recibido apoyo técnico del ADP mediante las ECAs 
y visitas a las chacras de café y cacao. Con el ADP están mejorando sus tecnología de 
producción y esperan que en otros 3-4 años puedan estar con una productividad 
promedio no menor a los 20 qq/ha de café de primera calidad. 
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No tienen problemas de vender toda su producción a la cooperativa pues les pagan 
mejores precios que los acopiadores, en vista que toda su producción de café y cacao 
es de primera calidad.
Muchos productores cultivan café desde hace más de 14 años y en la actualidad 
cuentan con una productividad de 15 qq/ha de café orgánico. 
Si bien acopian café y cacao hasta en Tocache, su mira es fortalecer la producción de 
su zona (La Divisoria), por lo cual no se han impuesto un límite de asociados como 
expresan en las Cooperativas Oro Verde y ACOPAGRO. Se proyectan a que el año 
2014 deban tener 1,000 asociados.
Por lo general cuentan con un premio adicional de US$ 10.00 por cada quintal, con lo 
que esperan que en el corto plazo puedan financiar la transferencia de tecnología y la 
asistencia técnica en general.
El año 2009 vendieron 350,000 Kg. de los cuales 60,000 fueron de calidad 87 puntos 
(muy alta), 200,000 Kg. de 84 puntos (alto +) y el resto de 78 puntos (alto). Por el café 
de más 80 puntos les pagan US$ 300.00 por quintal, y por los de menos de 80 reciben 
US$ 130.00 á 140.00 por quintal.
Cuentan con un laboratorio de control de calidad con los equipos donados por el ADP y 
un catador diplomado estable en el mismo. A los productores se les paga de acuerdo al 
grado de calidad del producto que entregan.
El proceso de premiación por el café entregado es como sigue: 
 El productor entrega su café y se le asigna un código, cuyo talón con nombre se 
deposita en un ánfora lacrada. 
 La hoja con la descripción va directamente al laboratorio
 El ánfora se abre cuando termina la campaña de ventas y se determina la calidad 
del café entregado por cada productor y se le asigna un premio por calidad. 
 Recién en ese momento se sabe de quién es cada lote entregado a la cooperativa.
En cacao han recibido el producto y pagado de acuerdo al aspecto físico del mismo, así 
sea orgánico o no. Este año 2010 ya tienen preparado un protocolo para pagarlo de 
acuerdo a la calidad analizada en laboratorio.
El año 2009 vendieron 150 TM a PRONATEC (Suiza).
Conclusiones
 Si bien es una cooperativa con pocos años de fundada, su proceso de consolidación 
es fuerte y bien avanzado. 
 Para fortalecer esta área sería conveniente continuar con la asistencia técnica por 
uno a dos años, pero pasando esa responsabilidad paulatinamente a la cooperativa, 
que ya ha manifestado su decisión de asumirla.
 El fortalecimiento empresarial es necesario continuarlo, pero también programando 
su término en el corto plazo. 
Cooperativa Agraria Industrial “Naranjillo” – COOPAIN 
Fundada en los años ‘70 la cooperativa cuenta con 2,934 agricultores asociados, 
productores de cacao y café. Sin embargo, el 65% de los agricultores de su zona de 
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influencia no están asociados a esta u otra cooperativa, comercializando su producción 
indistintamente a los acopiadores y a la COOPAIN o Cooperativa La Divisoria.
Están apuntando al desarrollo de productos para no quedarse en venta de materia 
prima o semi procesada. 
Cuentan con una planta procesadora de cacao que originalmente (1984) fue donada por 
las NNUU y posteriormente potenciada con algunos equipos más modernos adquiridos 
por la propia empresa.
Esta cooperativa tuvo una crisis generada por la convulsión terrorista y el narcotráfico 
en el Alto Huallaga, que la llevó a casi paralizar durante varios años. Sin embargo ya se 
ha recuperado y se puede decir que es la cooperativa con mayor grado de 
consolidación en la Región Selva, contando con una gerencia altamente calificada y un 
Directorio renovado con gente joven y mayor preparación que sus antecesores, 
aplicando un modelo de Gestión Estratégica.
Sus proyecciones para el mediano plazo son:
 El desarrollo de una o más marcas para los mercados externos y doméstico 
 Siendo sus columnas el cacao y el café, realizarán una investigación de mercados 
externos y doméstico para sus actuales productos manteca, licor y cocoa, además 
que están comenzando con la fabricación de chocolates. En la actualidad este rubro 
representa solo un 7% del total de sus ventas, pero esperan crecer en el corto plazo 
al vender al Comercio Justo.
 Sus productos con mayor valor agregado están siendo diseñados para los sectores 
de población A y B.
 Por lo pronto ya están exportando a Europa pequeñas cantidades de chocolates con 
la marca ―MECSA OSHA‖ con 55% de cocoa orgánica. 
 El café con logotipo de ―NARANJILLO‖ ya se exporta a USA.
 Consideran que una marca genera estabilidad en el largo plazo.
Dada su fortaleza la COOPAIN es quien fija el precio base del cacao en la zona. 
Habiendo acopiado algo más de 3,000 TM el año 2008, el 90% de sus ventas fueron en 
2008 para el mercado europeo y con compromisos a precios cerrados, pero muchos 
fueron cancelados debido a la crisis económica mundial. El año 2009 iniciaron la 
recuperación de esos compradores y esperan nivelarse en el presente año en base a 
calidad y a los productos orgánicos. 
Las principales ventajas que tienen los productores al entregar su producto a la 
COOPAIN son: 
 Control de la producción desde el campo.
 El asociado quiere a su empresa.
 El asociado cuenta con un precio base para el año y al final de la campaña recibe un 
reintegro de acuerdo a los resultados obtenidos.
 El asociado cuenta con un seguro médico familiar. 
 La COOPAIN les proporciona medicinas al 50% del precio en el mercado. 
Conclusiones
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 La COOPAIN se encuentra en un grado de consolidación muy avanzado y requerirá 
asumir durante el año 2010 las funciones que le está proveyendo el ADP. 
 Esto sería materia de discusión en el caso que la estrategia de intervención sea 
dirigida a Monzón y el Bolsón Cuchara, dada las características de estas zonas y su 
proximidad a la COOPAIN. 
Oleaginosas Amazonicas S.A. – OLAMSA 
Comité Central de Pamicultores de Ucayali - COCEPU
Industria fundada a fines de los ‘90 por gestión de las NNUU, quien les donó los 
primeros equipos para procesar palma aceitera, en la actualidad se encuentra en muy 
buena condición física, económica y financiera.
En la actualidad procesa 12 TM/hora y ya tienen programada una ampliación a 24 
TM/hora para entrar a operar en setiembre/octubre del presente año, en vista que las 
proyecciones de cosecha apuntan a que la planta será altamente insuficiente para 
procesar la oferta de frutos por parte de sus asociados a fines del presente año. 
Adicionalmente tienen programado para el año 2014 poner otra planta para procesar 
inicialmente 12 TM/hora en Campo Verde, para aprovechar la expansión del cultivo de 
palma en esta zona. Actualmente el Banco de Crédito esta evaluando este proyecto 
para decidir su financiación.
COCEPU es accionista mayoritario de OLAMSA y cada agricultor es asociado. Las 
utilidades se reparten en bienes como plantas nuevas, y no en efectivo.
El ADP está contribuyendo a instalar nuevas siembras de palma en coordinación con 
COCEPU, así como al fortalecimiento institucional y a la capacitación del personal 
técnico de campo.
El precio de venta del aceite rojo se establece de acuerdo al precio FOB en Indonesia 
más los costos de transporte y nacionalización en el Perú. 
Los compradores principales son socios de la Sociedad Nacional de Industrias (SIN), y 
frecuentemente tienen mejores ofertas pero prefieren mantenerse con los de la SIN 
para asegurar su mercado presente y futuro. Separan un 5% de su producción para el 
consumo local. 
La capitalización con palma aceitera genera que los bancos ofrecen tarjetas de crédito 
de consumo a los asociados de COCEPU.
CONCLUSIONES
 Tanto OLAMSA como COCEPU son organizaciones ya consolidadas y el ADP debe 
considerar que las funciones de apoyo que oferta a las mismas deben ser asumidas 
por ellas en el más corto plazo.
Asociación de Palmicultores de Shambillo – ASPASH
Oleaginosas de Palma S.A. – OLPASA 
OLPASA se formó el año 2004 en base a los socios de ASPASH y esta localizada en el 
valle de Shambillo, en Aguaytía. El 97.3% de las acciones pertenecen a ASPASH y el 
restante 2.7% a productores individuales.
Las primeras actividades para implantar palma en Shambillo se realizan el año 1999 
con apoyo de las NNUU como una actividad de desarrollo alternativo, pues hasta el año 
2000 la zona era de monocultivo de coca.
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El año 2001 se instalan dos viveros para instalar 1000 há. de palma con fondos de las 
NNUU y consecutivamente los años siguientes se instalan viveros para otras 1,500 há. 
con fondos del Gobierno Regional, USAID y el Ministerio de Agricultura. 
OLPASA inició sus operaciones en Enero de 2009 reportando ese año utilidades por 
US$ 240,000.00 que revirtieron a ASPASH en forma de plantones, fertilizantes, etc. 
En la actualidad la planta opera con 1.5 turnos diarios con 6 TM/hora, pero trabaja todos 
los días.. La proyección para 2010 es que terminará el año trabajando 2 turnos diarios, y 
a fines del año 2011 ya trabajará os 3 turnos correspondientes a su capacidad 
operativa.
Los compradores del aceite rojo de OLPASA son los asociados de la Sociedad Nacional 
de Industrias (ALICORP, Palmas del Espino e Industrias Alpamayo. 
El Perú tiene solo 40,000 há. de palma aceitera y requiere de por lo menos 80,000 há. 
para satisfacer sus necesidades actuales. 
CONCLUSIONES 
 OLPASA está muy bien encaminada para lograr su consolidación, que se espera 
será a fines del año 2011 o antes de la mitad de 2012. 
 Es conveniente seguir apoyándola en el fortalecimiento organizacional, así como 
con la asistencia técnica y transferencia de tecnología mejorada, pero con una 
proyección de que en el corto plazo asuma estos servicios.
 Se nota que la gerencia general no refleja que se estén preparando elementos de 
recambio para el futuro.
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APPENDIX 6 MATERIALS REVIEWED 
1. Acuerdo Nacional, Informe de Seguimiento 2006-2008, Auspiciado por Embajada de 
España en Perú, noviembre de 2009.
2. Convenio de Donación para el Objetivo Estratégico Integral Nº 511-0660. Carta de 
Implementación IL-043 (IL Nº 043). 
3. Connie Veillette, Analyst in Latin American Affairs. Foreign Affairs, Defence, and 
Trade Division. 
4. CRS Report for Congress, Drug Crop Eradication and Alternative Development in 
the Andes, November 2005.
5. DEVIDA, Programa de Desarrollo Alterntivo, Ttocache – Uchiza, julio de 2002. 
6. DEVIDA, Annual Survey, 2008 and 2009. 
7. DEVIDA, Verifications, 2008, 2009. 
8. Gobierno Regional de Ucayali, Convenio de cooperación interinstitucional entre el 
gobierno regional de Cucyali y Chemonics, SRL, various, febrero de 2009. 
9. Gobierno Regional de Ucayali, Plan de desarrollo regional concertado, 2004-2010, 
incluyendo el plan actualizado 2008-2010.
10. Haupt, Wolfgang, Prtoyecto ―Desarrollo Alternativo Tocache Uchiza‖ en el marco del 
Progrma Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo, GFA Terra Systems, Alemania, para 
Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau.
11. Industria del cacao y café Naranjillo, Organic Products. 
12. Macroconsult, Narcotráfico: Amenanza al crecimiento sostenible del Perú, Estudios 
sobre coca, cocaína, seguridad y desarrollo, 2008. 
13. PDA, Cesar Morocho Marchán, Estudio de la Cadena de Valor del Platanos en 
Aguaytia, enero de 2010. 
14. PDA, DEVIDA, Directorio de empresas exportadoras, Tingo María, Huánuco, Perú. 
15. PDA, DEVIDA, Conociendo más el programa de desarrollo alternativo. 
16. PDA, DEVIDA, PRISMA, Municipalidad Provincial de Leoncio Prado, Presupuesto 
Participativo, Actores y Roles.
17. PDA, DEVIDA, Programa de desarrollo alternativo, Una oportunidad para las 
comunidades que decidieron cambiar y optar por un desarrollo lícito y rentable. 
18. PDA, DEVIDA, Programa de desarrollo alternativo región Huánuco. 
19. PDA, Perspectivas para el plan de negocios – piña. 
20. PDA Tingo María, Mesa técnica de desarrollo del cacao y café de la región 
Huánuco, borrador, 2010.
21. PDA, Información propuestas sobre coca, post erradicación, y desarrollo sostenible 
en Aguaytia, enero de 2010. 
22. PDA, Aguaytia, Plan de Operaciones Anual de Comunicaciones Aguaytia 2010. 
23. PDA, Estratategia de comunicación del programa promoviendo el desarrollo integral. 
2008-2010. 
148
24. Program of Alternative Development, Annual and Quarterly Reports, 2006 to 2009, 
Chemonics. 
25. United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime. Alternative Development: A Global 
Thematic Evaluation. Final, Synthesis Report, Vienna, 2005. 
26. Universidad Nacional Agraria de la Selva, Tingo Maria, Análisis de suelos, 
septiembre de 2007. 
27. UNODC, Perú, Monitorio de Cultivos de Coca, junio 2009. 
28. UNODC, DEVIDA, Perú, Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca, junio 2009. 
29. USAID/Perú, Marco del Resultados de PDA 2008-2010.
30. USAID/ Perú, Marco Lógico del Programa de desarrollo Alternativo 2008-2012. 
31. USAID/Bolivia, Integrated Alternative Development Program Assessment, November 
2009.
32. Novak, Fabián, Jaime García, Sandra Namihas, Pablo Moscoso, El Problema del 
narcotráfico en la región Ucayali, Pontifica Universidad Católica de Perú. 
33. Ministerio de Agricultura, Fortalecimento de la cadena productiva de la piña en el 
valle de Aguaytia, provincia de Padre Abad. 
34. USAID, Marco de Resultados del PDA 2008 – 2010. 
35. USAID, Marco Lógico del Programa Desarrollo Alternativo en su Etapa 2008-2010.
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APPENDIX 7 ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. United Nations, Office on Drugs and Crime. Alternative Development: A Global 
Thematic Evaluation. Final, Synthesis Report, Vienna, 2005. 
This report is a comprehensive evaluation within available voluntary resources, for 
determining best practices in alternative development by assessing the impact of 
alternative development on both human development indicators and drug control 
objectives. Recent studies from South-East Asia (Lao People‘s Democratic Republic, 
Myanmar, Thailand, and Vietnam, and in the Andean region (Bolivia, Columbia and 
Peru) were reviewed. Twelve basic conclusions are presented. Three basic 
recommendations are: 
 A firm political commitment needs to be made to pursue alternative 
development in coordination with all stakeholders so that it is sustainable 
and has human development as the ultimate aim. 
 A global partnership should be established between development entities and 
national groups to make reducing the cultivation of illicit crops a cross￾cutting issue, thus maximizing the impact of efforts. 
 The elimination of illicit crops should be conditional on improvements in the 
lives and livelihoods of households. It should not be a prerequisite for 
development assistance.
2. Devida, Programa de Desarrollo Alterntivo, Tocache – Uchiza, julio de 2002. 
A preinvestment study for a program of Alternative Development in Tocache and 
Uchiza. A companion paper by Wolfgand Haupt of GFA Terra Systems is titled 
―Peru, Proyecto ‗Desarrollo Alternative Tocache Uchiza‘ en el marco del Programa 
Nacional de Desarrollo Alternativo, Informe de la misión de consultoría sobre la 
formulación del Proyecto.‖
3. Acuerdo Nacional, Informe de Seguimiento 2006-2008, Auspiciado por Embajada 
de España en Perú, noviembre de 2009.
Report on the actions taken to follow up on the ―Acuerdo Nacional‖ for the period 
2006-2008 in four areas: Democracy and Rights, Equality and Social Justice, 
Competitiveness of the Country, and the State of Efficiency, Transparency, and 
Decentralization in Peru. The last chapter discusses production and trafficking in 
illegal drugs with conclusions and recommendations.
4. Macroconsult, Narcotráfico: Amenanza al crecimiento sostenible del Perú, 2008. 
A collection of papers dealing with issues relating to coca production, cocaine, 
security and development by various authors. The papers support the development 
of a rational public policy to combat the undesirable impacts to Peru‘s development.
5. DEVIDA, 2009 Impact Report. (―Informe de Impacto 2009‖) 
The document presents the 2009 annual evaluation of the Alternative Development 
Program, which was carried out by the DEVIDA evaluation and sampling team in 
nine priority areas for USAID and DEVIDA. The Report gathers useful field 
information for decision-making of the institutions involved in the ADP. 
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The methodology used is a statistical design for an impact survey that was targeted 
to three types of ADP domains: domains defined as ADP 2002-2007, comprising 
communities signing the ―Convenio Marco‖ under the voluntary eradication strategy; 
domain defined by communities signing the ―Acta de Entendimiento‖ during the 
period 2005-2008 in the Tocache Province under the Programmed eradication; and 
domains comprising non-ADP communities that are within the intervention areas of 
ADPADP but that did not sign the ―Convenio Marco‖ or the ―Acta de Entendimiento.‖
These communities benefited, directly and indirectly, from ADPADP intervention 
during the period 1995-2002. 
6. IDEI, Catholic University of Peru, 2009. The Narcotraffic Map in Peru. (―El Mapa del 
Narcotráfico en el Perú‖). 
The report, presented by the Institute of International Studies of the Catholic 
University of Peru, compiles a number of articles by different authors dealing with the 
narco-traffic problem in Peru. The purpose is to analyze the problem‘s multiple 
dimensions and show how it became a menace to democracy, security and 
development in Peru. The report is divided in three parts. The first analyzes how 
narco-traffic is an international phenomenon and how it impacts various aspects of 
Peruvian life. The second part describes the social, economic and political impact of 
narco-traffic in the 12 regions of Peru where coca leaf cultivation is present: San 
Martin, Ucayali, Huánuco, Ayacucho, Cusco, Junín, Pasco, Loreto, La Libertad, 
Amazonas y Cajamarca. The third section is devoted to principal conclusions and 
recommendations that derive from the previous two sections. 
7. UNODC- DEVIDA, Commercial Performance of the Enterprises promoted by 
Alternative Development/2008. (―Desempeño Comercial de las Empresas 
Promovidas por el Desarrollo Alternativo/2008‖)
The report analyzes the commercial performance of the enterprises supported by 
Alternative Development projects of the United Nations Office against Drug and 
Crime (Oficina de las Naciones Unidas contra la Droga y el Delito,‖ UNODC). The 
analysis is based on sales in international and national markets. The report highlights 
the progress to date of enterprises of organized farmers and beneficiaries of the 
different programs of alternative development. Among them are the ―Central de 
Cooperativas Agrarias Cafetaleras‖ (COCLA) and ―Cooperativa Agraria Industrial 
Naranjillo,‖ both institutions supported at the beginning of the UNODC Cooperation. 
8. Chemonics International, Inc. Annual Report for October 2008 to September 
2009.
The report summarizes progress achieved during the second year of the Contract 
527-C-07-00002 with Chemonics International Inc. During this year, social unrest 
and insecurity affected negatively the program‘s work in the Aguaytia and Tingo 
Maria regions. Intense rains during the second quarter affected communication 
routes and the transport of personnel, grantees and products. In addition, the 
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international crisis resulted in decreased prices for coffee and cacao, two of the 
program‘s principal crops during the first half of 2009. In spite of the above, the 
program assisted the development of 27,351 hectares of alternative crops, 20,173 
families, created 9,862 jobs, produced $37.1 million in sales and helped strengthen 
42 local governments. 
The program‘s activities focused on agricultural production, value chain 
strengthening, credit, social development, community development, governance, 
gender, infrastructure, communication and monitoring and evaluation. 
9. Penny, Mary E., et al. Can Coca Leaves Contribute to Improving the Nutritional 
Status of the Andean Population?
The study assesses the nutritional potential of eight samples of coca leaves from 
different regions of Peru, examining the nutritional value of coca leaves that had a 
mystic and cultural importance in ancient Andean societies. Coca was originally 
restricted to ceremonial use by the ruling Inca. Spanish colonists were responsible 
for an increase in production and the extension of use of the leaf throughout the 
Andes. Since the 1970s and increasingly in past years, the consumption of coca 
leaves has been promoted in Peru and Bolivia for its supposed nutritional value. 
Because coca leaf is being promoted for consumption by an inherently vulnerable 
population at nutritional risk, it was necessary to undertake a more exhaustive study 
of its nutritional value.
The results of the study showed that 100 g. of dried coca leaves contained: protein, 
20.28 g with lysine as the limiting amino acid; B-carotene, 3.51; vitamin E, 16.72 mg; 
and trace amounts of vitamin D, calcium, iron, zinc and magnesium. Cocaine was 
the principal alkaloid, with a concentration of 0.56 g; other alkaloids were identified. 
These results were compared with those of other leaves that are normal constituents 
of the human diet in Peru and Bolivia. Overall, coca leaves show no significant 
advantage in terms of mineral content. Parsley, for instance, has more than three 
times as much iron as coca leaves, while bay, coriander and oregano have 50 
percent more iron. oregano has more than 50 percent higher calcium content and 70 
percent higher zinc content than coca leaves. 
The study concluded that two spoonfuls of coca leaf flour would satisfy less than 10 
percent of dietary needs for school children and adults for critical common 
deficiencies when eaten in the recommended quantities, and the presence of 
absorbable cocaine and other alkaloids may be potentially harmful; hence coca 
leaves cannot be recommended as a food.
10. Veillette, Connie and Carolina Navarrete-Frias. CRS Report to Congress, November 
18, 2005. Drug Crop Eradication and Alternative Development in the Andes.
The report discusses US support for drug crop eradication and alternative 
development programs in the Andes. The report states that Colombia, Bolivia and 
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Peru collectively produce nearly the entire global supply of cocaine. The US 
provides counternarcotics assistance through the Andean Counterdrug Initiative 
(ACI). This Program supports a number of US Missions, including interdiction of 
drug trafficking, illicit crop eradication, alternative development, and rule of law and 
democracy promotion. From FY 2000 through FY 2005, the US has provided a total 
of about $4.3 billion in ACI funds. Additionally, funding for the Andean region is 
provided through the Foreign Military Financing (FMF) program and the International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) program, both managed by the State 
Department. FMF assistance has the objective of establishing and strengthening 
national authority in remote areas that are prone to drug trafficking. Funding for the 
FMF and IMET programs from FY 2000 through FY 2006 amounted to $324.3 and 
$20.3 million, respectively. 
ACI funds support programs for eradication and interdiction, as well those focused 
on alternative development and democratic institution building. Providing alternatives 
to drug crops is believed to be crucial to achieving effective eradication. This often 
includes technical support for farmers, marketing assistance and strengthening the 
transportation structure in order to get crops to market. The US approach to support 
for alternative crops is to link that support to eradication of coca.