Outlawing Monopoly: A Programmatic Evaluation of
USAID’s ASEAN Competition and Consumer Protection
Program from a Development Perspective
William M Butterfield
Team Lead, Program Economist, USAID/Regional Development Mission for Asia
Chanyut Nitikitpaiboon  
Program Development Specialist, USAID/Regional Development Mission for Asia
Thuy Thi Bich Nguyen
Program Management Specialist, USAID/Vietnam
September 2011
Disclaimer:  
The authors’ views do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency
for International Development or the United States Government.
2 
“In theory, competition policy and law can be considered the Constitution of the
market economy. But in practice it only exists on paper and is dependent on
enforcement.”  ‐ Staff Attorney at the Vietnam Competition Authority (VCA).  
Executive Summary  
This paper evaluates the ASEAN Competition and Consumer Protection Program
(ACCP), which is managed by the US Agency for International Development (USAID)
through its Regional Development Mission to Asia (RDMA) and implemented by the
US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the US Department of Justice (DOJ) by
providing technical assistance to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
to develop sound Competition Policy and Law (CPL), consumer protection policies,
and associated enforcement capacity.  Overall, we find the ACCP to have been very
effective, especially in Vietnam, as the technical assistance (TA) provided by the
project was well received by institutions such as the Vietnam Competition Authority
(VCA) and the ASEAN Secretariat.  Particular strengths of the project included: (1)
The utilization of internal USG technical expertise by contracting with the FTC/DOJ;
(2) The method of using a regional approach, in this case by working through ASEAN
in order to institutionalize CPL as a key objective in that body and using that to
garner interest and create multilateral pressure for the adoption of international
best practices in CPL, ultimately shifting focus to an interested member country, in
this case Vietnam, on a demand‐driven basis; (3) the cost‐effective combination of
different technical assistance mechanisms such as resident advisors, trainings, and
workshops, as well as an internship/fellowship opportunity at the FTC, all of which
assisted the VCA and other ASEAN members to learn firsthand about foreign
investigation and litigation processes.   
From a donor perspective, providing technical assistance to develop effective CPL as
well as consumer protection in lesser developed countries is important because: 1)
CPL is an increasingly important aspect of “21st century trade agreements” because it
helps define the “rules of the game” for foreign investors and provides some
assurances that domestic CPL will not be used to punish successful businesses or
protect purely domestic interests, thereby lowering perceived risk; 2) The creation of
an independent and adequately funded CPL enforcement agency can signal a
commitment to continued liberalization by the government as well as provide a
quasi‐credible mechanism to enforce such a commitment both through legal means
and by creating an institutionalized competition advocate with the government
itself; and 3) At minimum, an adequately effective CPL Agency can prevent the worst
abuses of incumbent firms and set minimum standards for firm behavior,
significantly improving consumer welfare at the margin.   
However, the project experienced considerable frustration in attempts to generate
interest from Cambodia and Laos and was unable to move draft laws and policies
forward in these countries.  This is most likely because CPL may not be appropriate
for least developed countries (LDCs) given the underdevelopment of the private
sector and the presence of higher priority and higher return technical assistance
3 
opportunities.   Assisting with establishment and application of best practice CPL in
developing countries is a challenging undertaking because: 1) CPL cannot be
divorced from the political economy context in which it operates, meaning CPL
Agencies can be mere “paper tigers” or worse yet be used for anti‐competitive
purposes such as protecting incumbent firms; 2) The human capital requirements for
effective CPL enforcement are substantial, and most lesser developed countries
contain few individuals with advanced law and economics (industrial organization)
training and there is unlikely to exist a “culture of competition” among the populace
who understand the costs of monopoly; 3) The legal and historical background
surrounding the need to create “anti‐trust” law in the West vis‐à‐vis CPL in the
developing world are fundamentally different and thus TA is difficult to tailor to fit
unique legal, historical, and developmental contexts.     
Evidence of project impact is provided in part by the responses to an evaluation
survey of recipient institutions that gave the implementing partners very high marks.  
Higher level evidence of impact at the outcome level is provided by the World
Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitiveness Index (GCI), in which Vietnam
improved its rank for “Effectiveness of Anti‐Monopoly Policy” from 100th out of 131
countries in 2007‐2008 when the ACCP first began its focus there, to 58th out of 139
countries in the latest (2010‐2011) rankings.   However, other variables in which
effective anti‐monopoly policy should be expected to impact, including scores for
“intensity of local competition” and “extent of market dominance”, remained largely
unchanged and even worsened somewhat in Vietnam over that period.   We
hypothesize that the VCA, with assistance from the ACCP, successfully raised
awareness of the importance of competition among the local businesses that
respond to the WEF survey upon which the GCI rankings are based.  This then had
the effect of raising the standard for competition enforcement in the economy,
potentially causing related indicators to get worse before they get better.  
The evaluation recommends that the project begin to phase out its support for CPL
in Vietnam where the capacity it has built to date appears to be largely sustainable
given the increasing availability of domestic resources and the VCAs committed
engagement with ASEAN Experts Group on Competition (AEGC).  However, given the
rapidly growing staff at VCA, continued introductory/basic trainings by the FTC/DOJ
for new staff would be highly valued by the VCA and would not be resource
intensive. Continued limited technical support to the VCA for implementing more
complex areas of CPL may also be needed and appropriate in the future.  Given that
Vietnam just recently passed its Consumer Protection Law in 2010, there is need for
technical assistance in this area.  The ASEAN Secretariat is also largely meeting its
goals for CPL, but could potentially use support in the emerging area of regional
consumer protection issues.  Given that Malaysia just passed a new and
comprehensive CPL in 2010 and the Philippines appears set to pass one, the project
should explore cost‐effective opportunities there.  In order to ensure longer term
sustainability, human capital in the area of law and economics will need to be built
across the region.  Therefore, the project should look to engage local universities in
the development of an effective curriculum and also engage NGOs across the region
as part of an outreach strategy.    
4 
Introduction  
According to the Fundamental Welfare Theorem of Economics, competition is the
precondition to the achievement of an efficient allocation of resources in a market
economy.  In economic terms, competitive markets maximize consumer welfare by
promoting allocative efficiency (making the goods consumers want in the quantities
valued by society) and productive efficiency (producing goods at the lowest possible
costs), as well as giving rise to dynamic efficiency (stimulating innovation and
technological change) (Gelhorn, Kovacic and Calkins 2004).  However, established
firms have strong incentives to collude with each other in order to create market
power and individual firms already possessing market power to use their power to
harm competitors and drive them out of business.  Firms also engage in
“rentseeking” and collude either explicitly or implicitly with government in order to
create market power and legally prevent entry by competitors through tariffs,
regulations, exclusive contracts, and other means ( (Tullock, 1967) (Krueger, 1974)).   
These anti‐competitive practices tend to result in less production, lower product
quality and variety, lack of technology adoption, and higher prices for consumers
(see, for example, (Harberger, 1954); (Laitner, 1982), and (Parente & Prescott,
2005)).  Ultimately, monopoly power leads to persistent market inefficiency and
ultimately less development.  It may therefore be necessary to legislate against such
practices and explicitly prohibit the acquisition of undue market power as well as
protect consumers directly from the abusive practices of firms with market power    
through the enforcement of “competition laws”/”antitrust laws”/“antimonopoly
laws” or Competition Policy and Law (CPL)1, the term that will be mostly used
throughout this paper.   
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN) Competition and Consumer Protection (ACCP) Program in order to: (1)
identify what worked and what didn’t in the program and attempt to measure its
overall development impact for the resources expended; (2) Determine future
priorities for the program in terms of focus, method, and whether to scale up or
scale down investments; and (3) Using the ACCP as a reference point, generate
broadly applicable lessons on providing Official Development Assistance for
implementing and enforcing CLP in a developing country context.   This was done
through a series of interviews with project implementers at the FTC, project
beneficiaries in Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, and the ASEAN Secretariat
in Jakarta, as well as through an extensive literature review on experiences providing
technical assistance (TA) for CPL.   
Background  
 
1 Among CPL experts, the “policy” part of CPL usually refers to privatization, trade liberalization and 
deregulation policies. The FTC/DOJ CPL capacity building emphasized the role that a competition and 
consumer protection law enforcement authority can have as an advocate within the government and in 
society at large for such policies. 
5 
The ACCP was funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID)2,
managed by USAID’s Regional Development Mission to Asia (RDMA), and
implemented by the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the US Department of
Justice (DOJ).3  ACCP is a nine year program in two parts, Part I (2003‐2006) was a
$600,000 component which focused assistance on the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta
and Part II (2006‐2011) is a $1.44 million component which is focusing technical
assistance to help ASEAN’s members, with a particular focus on Vietnam, and a
lesser focus on Cambodia and Laos.  From summer 2002 through December 2004,
the FTC also provided technical assistance to Indonesia’s competition authority, the
Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha (KPPU), which was funded by USAID’s Bilateral
Mission in Jakarta.4    
The goal of the ACCP is to “encourage the further development of sound
competition and consumer protection policies and enforcement and to foster
regional cooperation.”  FTC/DOJ provides technical assistance by providing expert
commentary on draft laws and regulations, training enforcement authorities, and
helping to sustain a region‐wide networking forum that promotes: (1) independent
analysis and decisions based on sound legal and economic principles;  (2) timely and
efficient investigations that do not unduly burden private enterprises; (3) open and
transparent enforcement decisions; (4) support from the public and NGOs, and
understanding by the judiciary; and (5) regional convergence on competition and
consumer protection policy and law enforcement in order to facilitate regional
economic integration.   
At the time that the FTC and DOJ began work with ASEAN, only two of its members
had CPL and associated independent enforcement agencies, Indonesia and Thailand.  
Since then, Singapore, Vietnam, and Malaysia have passed competition laws.  The
Philippines continues to discuss reform of its laws which are scattered throughout
their legal code but are not enforced, yet the country appears set to finally pass a
law sometime in 2011‐12.  Laos and Cambodia are in the midst of drafting laws and
discussing enforcement institutions, but have not been willing to move forward
quickly in this area.  
Efforts at creating regional Consumer Protection standards are more recent and may
be regarded as the next step in regional cooperation for ASEAN.  At present, only
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam have principal
consumer protection acts. The remaining ASEAN Member States are planning or are
in the process of drafting their consumer protection policies and laws.  The ACCP has
undertaken only limited work in this area to date and discussion of consumer
protection in this evaluation is therefore limited.  However, as discussed below,
consumer protection could constitute the bulk of the work in any potential next
phase of the ACCP project.  
 
2 Specifically USAID/RDMA and USAID/Vietnam
3 In addition, beginning in 2008, the FTC supplemented USAID funds with its own resources after
receiving Congressional approval to do so.
4 Since this earlier component was not a part of the current ACCP, this evaluation does not focus
attention here. 
6 
Efforts at the Regional Level
At the region‐wide level, following on two years of resident advisors at the KPPU in
Jakarta, the FTC sent resident advisors for nine months to the ASEAN Secretariat in
Jakarta.  These advisors were able to continue on a part‐time basis to provide
bilateral assistance to the KPPU and participate in APEC and United National
Development Programme (UNDP) training programs in the region. The FTC/DOJ also
helped to sponsor and organize four regional programs for ASEAN.  
When the program began in 2004, ASEAN did not have competition on its agenda as
an issue to be addressed in its plans for economic integration.  The Secretariat
advised the ACCP that some members were not yet at a point where they would be
open to making competition a formal topic to be included in regional integration
discussions.  The ACCP therefore set out to raise the awareness of the members
through training programs in individual member countries.  Interest increased and
took on a regional dimension through the ASEAN Consultative Forum for
Competition (ACFC), an informal mechanism that the FTC/DOJ was instrumental in
creating for the purposes of training and networking on competition among the
ASEAN members.
In 2007, the project saw some major breakthroughs.  At the Cebu Summit in January
2007, ASEAN leaders agreed to take concrete steps towards building the second
pillar of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) – a highly competitive economic
region.  One of the action items under this pillar was “establishing a network of
competition authorities to serve as a forum for discussing and coordinating common
competition policies [and] developing a regional policy framework on competition
policy by 2010.”  At the instigation and recommendation of the ACFC and its
members, the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) established an ASEAN Experts
Group on Competition (AEGC) during the 39th AEM Meeting held in Makati, City,
Philippines on August 24, 2007.  This ensured that competition policy would be given
recognition and would receive resources and Secretariat support.  The AEGC was
tasked to study and, where appropriate, make recommendations for promoting and
protecting competition consistent with the goal of regional economic integration.  
To bring about this recognition for the need to address CPL enforcement issues and
to raise the capacity to address these issues, in 2007 the FTC/DOJ created a five‐
pronged strategy: (1) resident advisors living in the region; (2) training workshops for
individual countries; (3) region‐wide training workshops; (4) in‐depth assessments of
the competition policy and enforcement; and (5) an annual conference of the heads
of competition agencies/ministries from the ASEAN member countries. The initial
resident advisors lived in Jakarta and commuted once a month for a week to Hanoi.  
For twelve months, beginning in April 2006, the FTC sent two resident advisors to
Jakarta for six months to provide assistance to the ASEAN Secretariat and its
members.  They were also available to respond to requests for assistance from other
ASEAN members and to participate in Asia‐Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)
training programs in the region.  In both places they assisted the staff in analyzing
7 
matters under investigation, conducted classes for the staff and helped draft
procedural manuals.  FTC staff also traveled to the region to conduct short term
(usually one week) training programs for the staff of the agencies and ministries.   
In 2008‐2009, ASEAN began negotiating a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with the EU,
which in turn joined the Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI) and the U.S. in
working with the Secretariat to provide training for the ASEAN Experts Group on
Competition (AEGC).  The U.S. continued to be the main source of competition and
consumer protection assistance for ASEAN and its members.   
Vietnam
In December 2004, a Competition Law was passed by the National Assembly of
Vietnam and the Vietnam Competition Administration Department (VCAD) was set
up under the Ministry of Trade with functions similar to the FTC in the US, yet with
an initial staff of just seven people.  Consultants for the ACCP reviewed several drafts
of the law before it was passed and made comments, of which it was estimated that
one‐third were accepted and incorporated into the final law.  In 2007, the name of
the Agency was changed to the Vietnam Competition Agency (VCA) and it began
investigating its first anticompetitive case.  The Vietnam Competition Council (VCC)
was also set up as a separate judicial tribunal that decides cases brought to it by the
VCA and makes fines based on the VCA’s recommendation.     
In 2008, because of Vietnam’s serious commitment to building the VCA into a first
rate competition and consumer protection authority, the ACCP shifted its focus
there and directed more of its regional competition and consumer protection
resources to Vietnam than to any other single country in Southeast Asia.   In 2009,
the FTC resumed having a resident advisor in Southeast Asia after a two year hiatus,
this time residing in Hanoi, with his office in the VCA.  The advisor, Mr. Timothy
Hughes, spent about three‐quarters of his time servicing both the competition and
consumer protection needs of the VCA.  The remainder was used working on
competition matters with the ASEAN Secretariat, the Cambodians and the
Indonesians.  From September through December 2010, Cao Xuan Quang, an
attorney from the VCA, interned in the FTC’s Division of Anticompetitive Practices of
the Bureau of Competition as part of an exchange program.
In 2009, the VCA brought its first competition case, an action against a state‐owned
airport fueling monopoly for abuse of power.  In 2010, Vietnam brought its first
cartel case against several auto insurance companies, including four state‐owned
companies.  In the consumer protection area, it had been investigating some of the
largest and most powerful Vietnamese private retailers for deceptive advertising,
and had assisted in the drafting of a greatly expanded consumer protection law
which the Vietnamese National Assembly subsequently passed in 2010.   Much of
this drafting took place in 2009 and 2010 when the resident advisor was in Hanoi and
assisted with consultations and comments on draft provisions.  
8 
As of mid‐2011, the VCA had grown to almost 100 staff (with an average age of 28)
and its budget had increased from 7 billion VND (≈US$450,000) in 2007 to 19 billion
VND (≈US$925,000) in 2010.  Also in 2010, the VCA was investigating 28 “unfair
competition” cases and 1 “competition restriction” case and had received decisions
on 24 and 4 such cases respectively.  By 2015, the VCA hopes to have 200 employees
and 500 employees by 2020, while it expects its budget to continue to grow.    
Indonesia
While Vietnam replaced Indonesia as the country toward which FTC technical
assistance was directed around 2008, Indonesia and the other ASEAN member
countries continued to receive assistance as part of the project’s regional efforts to
bolster a culture of competition and lay the groundwork for regional economic
integration through the AEGC, the official competition entity within ASEAN.  After
enforcing its competition law against anticompetitive agreements and abuses of
dominance, in 2009 Indonesia began to enforce merger control.  The ACCP
participated in one program for the KPPU: over June 22‐24, 2009, Tim Hughes was
part of a three‐person team (the others were from Canada and Australia), who
conducted a workshop organized by the OECD on its “competition toolkit” which
sets out a program to review legislation and regulations for any impact on
competition.   
Cambodia and Laos
Working with the Cambodian government was a documented challenge for the
ACCP.  The resident advisor was able to have two productive sessions with the
Cambodian Ministry working on competition issues in 2009 and 2010 where he
zeroed in on some problems and afterwards provided written comments on the
draft competition law.   In order to raise the profile of competition policy in
Cambodia, the project scheduled an ASEAN Regional training program there in June
2010 and invited a large contingent of Cambodians.  Several Cambodians came, but
reportedly participated very poorly.  Laos also participated in the regional trainings
but did not show interest in pursuing CPL either.  
The project was left wondering if Cambodia and Laos are ready to adopt a
competition law given that they were not able to provide a few qualified staff to
work in the area.  Burma, of course, presents a different problem where severe
political repression and state‐control over the economy make it unlikely that efforts
at instituting CPL there would be of any use. Yet ASEAN still wants to proceed with
its desire for every member to have at least some basic competition law in place.   
The project continued to not see serious interest or progress in sending draft laws
forward to the Council of Ministers that it had been promised.  However, Cambodian
officials began working with the ADB as well as the UN in 2010 and there are
currently two new separate draft laws for which the FTC was asked to provide
comments.   It remains to be seen if the law will finally be voted on in 2011, and
9 
even if so, whether or not CPL is necessary and/or proper for a Least Developed
Country (LDC) such as Cambodia.   
Key Areas of Program Effectiveness   
Complementarity with broader USAID/RDMA regional integration and trade
facilitation efforts  
The ACCP fits well within RDMA’s broader objective of promoting the regional
economic integration of Southeast Asia through ASEAN, in large part by supporting
the goals of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) through their Technical
Assistance and Training Facility (TATF) project.  The goals of the AEC are to move
beyond the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA) which mostly focused on the
elimination of most formal tariffs.  This is because “21st century trade agreements”
are not about tariff preferences; they are about deep integration through the
liberalization of foreign investment, trade in services, and trade in technology, with
the ultimate purpose of making it easier to do business internationally.  From a
development perspective, the achievement of an AEC should ultimately result in
faster convergence of poorer member states to standards of living in richer ones as
well as raise the overall level of development in the region, which is ultimately in the
US interest for both political and economic reasons.5
To this end, regulatory integration is a critical component of AEC and other regional
integration goals, and RDMA’s TATF is focused on providing assistance in critical
areas to meet ASEAN’s expressed needs.  One increasingly important aspect of 21st
century trade agreements and deep integration is competition policy and consumer
protection, as most recent regional trade agreements have included provisions
addressing these areas, albeit to different degrees.6   A need for technical assistance
in these areas was therefore identified and the ACCP proved to be an effective
complement to the broader efforts of the TATF.   
Agreement on CPL principals is an important component of 21st Century trade
agreements for several reasons.  First, local competition agencies will always be
incentivized to protect their own domestic companies in the event of a dispute.  
Foreign investors want some institutionalized guarantee that existing laws will not
be used by domestic incumbent firms to punish them for taking some market share.  
The establishment of international best practice CPL also provides investors with a
signal of sorts that the government is committed to a liberal market structure. In the
 
5 See “Realizing the ASEAN Economic Community: A Comprehensive Assessment” (2009).  The
collected studies estimate that under a standard computational general equilibrium model, “ASEAN
economic welfare rise by 5.3%, or $69 billion relative to the baseline – more than six times the effect
estimated for AFTA, even under conservative assumptions.”   
6 The ASEAN‐EU FTA (which has been stalled since 2010) has an entire chapter on competition policy,
while the ASEAN‐Australia‐New Zealand FTA (completed in 2009) has a competition component, but
mostly just pledges more cooperation in technical assistance in this area.  The Trans‐Pacific
Partnership (TPP) between APEC Member Economies is considered by many to be the model 21st
Century trade agreement, and CPL is a required chapter. 
10 
case of Vietnam, the government wants to be recognized as a market economy and
saw the adoption of CPL as a signal of seriousness to continue to de‐monopolize its
formerly near completely state‐dominated economy.    
Second, CPL provides foreign investors some guarantee against abuse of dominance
by local incumbent firms that are important input suppliers to the investor.  For
example, the first abuse of dominance case that the VCA successfully brought was
against the state‐owned airline (Vietnam Airlines) which used its position as the
monopolist supplier of fuel to airlines in Vietnam to raise the price of this obviously
key input to punish its competitors.  Such potential for abuse could exist for a
number of key industry inputs in developing countries and investor fears are
understandable.  The creation of a CPL enforcement agency at least offers foreign
investors a quasi‐independent outlet to take complaints and possibly seek redress.    
Third, CPL lays down the “rules of the game” for foreign investors and firms.  That is,
CPL provides general guidelines for acceptable behavior in the local market so firms
know more what to expect before making business and investment decisions.   This
is also true in the area of consumer protection, since clear legal standards for firm
behavior toward their customers creates transparency and lowers perceived risk.  
Consumer protection standards are also becoming increasingly important for
international product recalls as well as cross‐border consumer redress.      
The importance of regional approaches        
The ACCP is an excellent example of using a regional approach to more effectively
further development objectives at an individual country level.   The ACCP was able to
work through a regional forum (ASEAN) to first attract interest in a new
development topic and then worked to institutionalize the issue through that forum,
both through assisting in the creation of the ACFC and then the AEGC along with the
insertion of formal CPL objectives into the broader AEC goals.  The achievement of
these regional objectives then generated further interest in the topic and created
pressure for conformance among ASEAN member states.  Vietnam officials, who had
participated in these regional activities supported by the project then made a
specific request for assistance to the FTC for the development of its brand new CPL
Agency.  Given this demand‐driven need, the ACCP switched its focus specifically to
Vietnam by providing more tailored technical assistance.    
From the FTC’s own assessment of its programs:
We encourage regional programs when that is feasible because they facilitate
transparency between similarly situated neighboring countries and
encourage the application of the same analytic principles to similar conduct.
Regional programs can also spawn regional networking and, eventually, co‐
operation. To facilitate these goals, we have begun a program of mentoring
at regional conferences, where more advanced nations that have already
benefited from U.S. assistance co‐host events with the U.S. and offer
approaches that are indigenous to conditions within a region. (FTC, 2009)
11 
In this particular case, the workshops sponsored by the project through the AEGC
were instrumental in gaining the support for CPL in Vietnam, which led to the
specific request to the FTC for support in 2007.   The AEGC also played a key role in
pressuring other countries such as Malaysia (which just passed their first formal CPL
in 2010) and the Philippines (which is likely to pass a law sometime in 2011‐12) to
move forward in this area.  In both these latter cases, key drafters of the law had
previously participated in regional trainings sponsored by the ACCP.        
These region‐wide programs are especially important for forming a harmonized
approach to CPL in the region.  While CPL needs to be tailored to individual country
needs and contexts, the basics of CPL are fairly standardized and are broadly
applicable.  For example, detecting price‐fixing and collusion is universally similar.  
However, topics such as vertical integration, horizontal mergers, bundling, resale
price maintenance, etc., are highly technical in nature and may need to be tailored
around individual preferences of member countries.    
Regional approaches also create the networks needed to share experiences on a
number of related issues in a complex technical field such as CPL.  Learning differing
foreign CPL systems through this network can also provide complementarity and
integration of international best practices.  The ASEAN regional networks between
Member Country competition agencies facilitated through the AEGC is a key factor
ensuring the sustainability of the ACCP’s efforts and promoting further development.  
According to VCA staff, these interactions with other agencies from the region help
ensure that they continue to adhere to best practices and provide a channel through
which they can feel comfortable directing their questions.   
Cost Effectiveness of Project Methodology
There is little doubt that the FTC/DOJ was the best choice of implementing partner
for this activity given their experience in providing technical assistance to
competition and consumer agencies in the developing world.  From the FTC’s own
evaluation:
“The comparative advantage of a program operated by the U.S. government
agencies is that it can draw on its own long‐term expertise in the
investigation, prosecution, and, in some cases, adjudication of competition
matters. The career legal and economic experts of the agencies are expert in
the practical and analytic skills that are most likely to be lacking in newly
formed competition agencies. The strength of the U.S. program is its ability to
provide human resources to strengthen the ability of new competition
agencies to investigate and resolve competition cases in a way that supports
the development of functioning market economies” (FTC, 2009).  
Overall, the FTC itself as well other studies (Nicholson, Sokol, & Stiegert, 2006) find
that the presence of long‐term technical advisors working within an agency is the
most cost effective form of TA for CPL.  Indeed, VCA staff that the evaluation team
12 
interviewed expressed nearly uniform consensus that having an expert in‐house was
highly valued.  The agency stressed the importance of learning practical application
of CPL rather than theory, and especially benefited from role‐playing/simulation in
mock trials.   Collecting evidence, which is key for guarding against political backlash,
was also cited as a critical area in which the project supported the VCA to improve its
effectiveness.  Other than TA that builds the effectiveness of a CPL agency to bring a
case forward, the ACCP realized that equally if not more important for a young
agency to learn is what cases not to bring.7        
Other forms of TA included short‐term trainings, study tours, and internships.  Short‐
term trainings and study tours on CPL involve relatively large amounts of resources
because representatives must be flown in from around the region and boarded at
hotels.  Given the highly technical nature of the subject matter, it is difficult to train
individuals in a meaningful way in such a short timeframe.  Representatives from the
recipient agencies that the evaluation team interviewed expressed similar views,
finding short‐term trainings and study tours to be the least effective form of TA
because there is never sufficient time to learn material in a non‐superficial manner.  
However, the real benefit of short‐term trainings may not be the actual practical
working knowledge gained by the participants, but rather the ability of the event
itself to attract interest in the topic and generate demand for more in‐depth and
specific TA on a bilateral basis.   
Longer‐term internships/fellowships are also a relatively expensive use of project
resources due to the need to commit travel, hotel and per diem, and work
accommodations.  Over a three month period in 2010, the FTC hosted Cao Xuan
Quang, an attorney from the VCA, as an intern, with the goal of giving the agency
hands‐on experience working in an advanced CPL agency such as the FTC.  According
to the VCA beneficiary of this internship, the major benefit was the ability to learn
foreign processes of initiating an investigation and following up through the court
system.  It was also highly valuable to learn foreign legal concepts, how they are
applied, and how they could be applied in a Vietnamese context.8   
However, the benefits of the internship program were admittedly more limited
because the beneficiary found little that was directly applicable to the Vietnam
context.  Given the vast differences in legal systems, opportunities to use the
beneficiary for “train the trainer” purposes (i.e. to share his experiences and impart
the knowledge gained with others in VCA) were more limited.  In the US, for
example, there is a vast legal precedence in CPL, whereas in Vietnam there is none
 
7 In Vietnam, for example, investigations against a private TV cable company, K+, were initially
launched on grounds of abuse of monopoly power.  The claim was based on some popular outrage
that the company had purchased exclusive rights to broadcast Champions League Football (soccer)
games and charged viewers on a subscription basis.  Such is very common and acceptable practice
world‐wide, however, as owners of major sporting leagues often auction off the rights to broadcast
their content.  The VCA, with input from the ACCP resident advisor, made what was most likely a
proper determination that no laws were violated and did not pursue the case. In doing so, the VCA
effectively resisted considerable public pressure to intervene where unnecessary.  
8 One example of this provided was the issue of “leniency” in which fines are reduced based on
mutual agreements between the CPL agency and the cooperation of the defendant.   
13 
and it is difficult to translate US experiences to a Vietnamese context.  Given this
vast difference in legal context, the beneficiary did not feel as if three months was
sufficient time to learn a completely different system of law.     
In this case as well, however, the benefits of the internship program might have
been more indirect.  According to interviews, the availability of a prestigious three
month long internship opportunity at the FTC sparked significant competition within
the VCA to “win the prize” and motivated effective job performance.  Using an
internship opportunity such as this can therefore be a very effective way to
incentivize and affect agency performance, over and above the direct benefits
gained through learning during the actual internship.  
In most cases, the ACCP made efforts to leverage project funding by coordinating
with other donors and CPL experts, most importantly the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Asian Development Bank Institute
(ADBI).  Legal restrictions on the use of USG foreign assistance funds made these
partnerships especially valuable.  For example, the FTC, using USAID funds, was able
to pay the transportation and lodging costs for USAID eligible countries for regional
training events while the OECD and ABDI were able to pay the transportation and
lodging costs for non‐eligible countries such as Burma and Thailand.
Constraints to Implementing Competition Policy and Law in a Developing Country
Context  
Political Commitment  
According to FTC/DOJ’s own account (USAID internal report ‐ 2010), “we fell short of
doing what we had hoped to do in Cambodia and Laos.  Generating interest from
Cambodia and Laos in competition has been difficult. The ADB funded a retired FTC
attorney to spend one month in Cambodia working with the government to draft a
competition law.  He returned to DC very frustrated.”  It is important to discuss
potential reasons why Cambodia, and to a lesser extent Laos (where the project did
not focus its resources but courted interest), lacked the will to move forward in this
area and whether or not CPL is even necessary or proper in the context of a Least
Developed Country (LDC).  It is also important to understand why some countries
with the capacity to move forward on developing CPL have chosen not to, and how
CPL agencies can become “paper tigers” if political will is not present to follow
through on competition promotion.   
Little is known about the medium to long run impact of competition law regimes on
the development of a market economy in low‐income countries.  However, it is clear
that a few preconditions need to be met in order for competition law to be effective;
the most important being that there must be political will to enforce such laws in a
manner that effectively promotes competition.  That is, the incentives of
government actors need to be compatible with even‐handed and transparent
enforcement of the law with the overriding objective of protecting and enhancing
consumer welfare.  Countries with entrenched interests of dominant firms (which in
14 
a LDC context normally mean State‐owned enterprises (SOEs)) and those without
independent and low‐corruption judiciaries are much less likely to see progress, and
efforts at promoting effective CPL are likely to be wasted.  In Cambodia, SOEs are still
dominant in most major sectors, corruption is pervasive, and the judiciary is not seen
as independent.  According to one report, “the executive branch usually dominates
the legislature and the judiciary.”9   When these conditions are present, a country
might not be ready for CPL, and even if they were implemented, could quickly
become “paper tigers” without any real enforcement powers.   
Some relatively advanced countries in the ASEAN region, such as Malaysia and
Singapore, eschewed the passage of comprehensive CPL until the 21st Century.  
Malaysia passed its first comprehensive CPL in 2010, 18 years after efforts to do so
were first begun.  This is because Malaysia was still committed to its industrial policy
and “managed competition” between SOEs and the private sector.  In Singapore as
well, where a comprehensive CPL was not passed until 2004, it may be said that the
government was honest with itself that it was not yet ready to commit to
competition as a formal policy.   
Governments can also establish what appear to be independent CPL agencies, yet at
the same time create built‐in institutional checks to protect its interests against
enforcement actions.  In Vietnam, for example, the government separates the
investigative and enforcement components of some CPL.  The VCA serves as the
investigative arm that brings formal collusion and abuse of dominance cases to the
Vietnam Competition Council (VCC), which is the separate council that conducts a
trial, renders judgment, and sets penalties.  A clear conflict of interest exists on the
VCC though, as its members are appointed by the President’s office.  A good
example is the 2009 VCA case against 16 auto insurance companies for price‐fixing,
four of which were SOEs.  While the VCC ultimately agreed with the VCA and ruled
against the insurance firms, the amount of the fine was relatively small.  This
possibly reflects that fact that the VCC was composed of a representative from the
Ministry of Finance, the ultimate owners of the SOEs.  Creating conflicts of interest
such as this whereby the government appoints the members of the enforcement
arm is one method the government can use to weaken the authority of the CPL
agency and protect its interests.   Ultimately, a diversified private sector is needed in
order to achieve a more perfectly competitive marketplace, and economies which
are dominated by SOEs such as Vietnam will need to continue with privatization
efforts in order to achieve sustainable outcomes.
Worse than impotent CPL agencies are CPL agencies that use the law in a perverse
manner that protects incumbent firms and ultimately works against competition and
a consumer‐friendly environment (i.e., the stated goal of CPL should always be “first,
do no harm”).   (McAfee & Vakkur, 2004) review seven ways in which anti‐trust laws
can and have been strategically abused in the US and elsewhere.  One of the main
ways that CPL can be abused is by punishing innovative and successful new entrants
 
9http://www.heritage.org/index/country/cambodia
15 
into the market at the behest of existing firms using older models.10  Such cases have
been brought in Indonesia, Thailand and even advanced economies such as Japan
(which still prohibits most large retailers), whereby the competition authority claims
that the lower prices offered by large retail shops by taking advantage of their
economies of scale represents an “unjust low price” (or “predatory pricing” as it is
more popularly called in the West). 11        
Such is a perfect example of the type of vague language/terms that are not good
practice in CPL.  Allowing CPL agencies wide discretion to determine what
constitutes business practices that are “unfair” opens the agency up to political
pressures, which in turn are normally up for capture by rent‐seekers, especially in
developing countries.   Without a mature enforcement and legal system and without
a relatively long history of cases providing legal precedence such as is enjoyed in the
US, it is often better for CPL to be more statutory and prescriptive, leaving less room
for discretion and thus less room for the law to be abused.   This potential for
political abuse is also a reason why the “abuse of dominance” and “mergers and
acquisitions” areas of CPL are better suited for more advanced economies (discussed
below) and why immature CPL Agencies should instead focus primarily on price
fixing and the prevention of cartels where much less technical expertise is needed
and costly mistakes are less likely. Also, given that it is impossible to write a
comprehensive CPL that covers all contingencies, especially for a newly promulgated
law, revisions are likely to be needed after the law becomes effective for a certain
initial period (e.g. 5 years).   
Ultimately however, if political will is indeed present, the establishment of CPL and
complementary enforcement institutions can be part of a quasi‐credible
commitment on the part of government to continued liberalization.  If a government
is able to institute best practice CPL and establish an enforcement agency that is
sufficiently independent and well‐resourced and has sufficient authority, it can make
changes at the margin that signal a broader change in the larger, economy‐wide
“rules of the game”, ultimately affecting behavior at a general level.  In general, the
effect of the establishment of CPL in a developing country will be marginal, but small
steps can be exactly what are needed in order to move a country forward.  This is
exactly what is hoped for in Vietnam through the VCA which has indeed showed
significant potential and progress through its willingness to take on SOEs and
challenge (to a limited extent) entrenched government interests.  In this sense, the
CPL agency needs to become an institutionalized “gadfly” within the government for
competition and liberalized markets.12   
 
10 The KPPU in Indonesia, for example, brought suit against Indomart, a  modern Seven‐Eleven type
retailer.  The emerging retailing giant was beginning to open up shops in Jakarta and elsewhere,
generally offering consumers lower prices on goods.  Due to apparent political pressure from “mom
and pop” stores that were losing market share, in 2001 the KPPU issued an order to Indomart to
cease expansion into traditional markets on the ground that such conduct violated Indonesia’s
prohibition against “unfair” competition.   
11 http://www.research.kobe‐u.ac.jp/gsics‐publication/jics/thanitcul_15‐3.pdf
12 According to the World Bank/OECD (1998):
. . . [C]ompetition may be lessened significantly by various public policies and institutional
arrangements as well. Indeed, private restrictive business practices are often facilitated by various
16 
Creating a “culture of competition” in society  
One of the keys to overcoming political economy constraints described above is
outreach and advocacy to the public.  Successful CPL Agencies must be able to
communicate the benefits of competition to the wider public with the aim of
educating consumers and instilling a “culture of competition” because the
government isn’t the only entity that needs to commit to competition as a goal.  
Explaining the role and benefits of competition to a society where it has historically
been absent can be just as challenging of explaining the benefits of trade to those
without any formal economics background.   Where there is no “culture of
competition” the populous will likely have many misconceptions about how effective
market economies operate.  If the breakup of local monopolies leads to short‐run
job losses, significant popular backlash can be expected and many can quickly come
to view competition as a threat to their existing benefits.   Negative reactions to
competition promotion have been common across the globe as public sector
employees feel their livelihoods threatened by the breakup of protected industries
and the private sector fears that CPL is merely an excuse for additional government
meddling and oversight.     
Outreach to the private sector, media, and the consumer are therefore critical
components of any CPL development strategy.  Indeed, the competition agencies
interviewed by the evaluation team all stressed outreach as one of the most critical
components to effective enforcement and the development of an outreach strategy
as one of their most pressing needs.   Competition agencies must therefore
constantly make decisions about how to allocate its scarce resources between its law
enforcement and advocacy functions. 13    
According to interviews with the VCA Director, the project, through the presence of
the resident advisor, provided critical assistance to the agency in dealing with the
press and raising issues with the public.  The ACCP also made attempts to involve the
private sector and academia through its workshops, but most activities were
specifically geared toward the government.  Tim Hughes, the resident FTC expert,
gave a speech to a local Vietnamese law school on CPL, and also attempted to recruit
private sector participation where possible, but ultimately project focus apart from
government officials was limited, in large part due to funding limitations.   
 
government interventions in the marketplace. Thus, the mandate of the competition office extends
beyond merely enforcing the competition law. It must also participate more broadly in the
formulation of its country’s economic policies, which may adversely affect competitive market
structure, business conduct, and economic performance. It must assume the role of competition
advocate, acting proactively to bring about government policies that lower barriers to entry, promote
deregulation and trade liberalization, and otherwise minimize unnecessary government intervention
in the marketplace.
13 In Vietnam, the VCA helped to establish the Competition Network of Vietnam in 2011, a monthly
forum held at various locations throughout the country.  Topics are selected at the request of the
Vietnamese business community and government, NGO, and academic sector actors are all
encouraged to attend and participate.   
17 
Given a larger budget, a more comprehensive approach to CPL TA project would
have included a separate private sector, academic, and media component which
focused on outreach and learning in an effort to shape and prepare the culture for
liberalization and competition.   However, the most important first step in creating
sustainable capacity for a CPL agency to conduct its outreach functions are to ensure
that it has the necessary credibility to do so, and this means focusing scarce
resources on the development of the new agency itself (VCA) was a wise use of
project resources.
Competition Policy’s Place in the Development Process  
Whether or not political incentives to institute effective CPL are present, perhaps a
more important question is whether or not CPL is appropriate in the Cambodian and
Laos context at all.  In Cambodia, agriculture accounts for over 70% of employment
and the informal sector is estimated to comprise over 80% of GDP and 95% of
employment.  The informal sector is made up mostly of unregistered farmers and
agricultural enterprises which are not registered with the Ministry of Commerce.14
When private sector activity is so largely agriculture based and informal, the need for
CPL lessens because neither sector is likely to become concentrated and single firms
are unlikely to become dominant.   Agriculture involves the production of
commodities which cannot be monopolized and are normally close to “perfectly
competitive” in markets.  Similarly, informal firms cannot become market dominant
because their operations are small in scale almost by definition (thus their ability to
avoid paying most formal taxes).  The benefits of CPL, therefore, are not at all clear
for a country such as Cambodia at its current stage of development.   
The sequencing of economic reforms matters and technical assistance priorities
need to be considered.  Competition law can be considered a second order issue
premised on a legal system that functions reasonably well.  The first order
requirements for an effective competition law system include secure property rights,
a contractual regime that functions and enforcement of these rights. According to
(Nicholson, Sokol, & Stiegert, 2006):  
…competition policy is not a stand‐alone, narrow technical area of law.  
Rather it is part of a much broader array of policy, legal, and economic issues
such as privatization, regulation, private property, contract, corporate
governance, foreign investment and trade, business licensing and
registration, etc.  The key question is where competition policy and law (CPL)
fits into this set of interconnected issues and how it will complement or
possibly detract from generalized efforts at economic reform.  
Clement, Gavil, Korsun and Kovacic (2001) outline the following conditions as
principal barriers to the successful implementation of competition policy:
limited government resources; history of excessive government regulation;
 
14
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/CAMBODIAEXTN/0,,
contentMDK:20771323~menuPK:293886~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:293856,00.html
18 
corruption; limited physical infrastructure (such as with underdeveloped
transportation or telecommunications capacity); lack of independent
judiciary; lack of expertise; and near absence of legal infrastructure necessary
to facilitate private sector growth. What has emerged is that competition
policy in a vacuum does not work. As Boner (1995) and Gal (2004) argue,
competition policy is just one piece of a larger puzzle, and at best it exists as a
complement to more structural reforms such as rule of law and the control of
corruption. The interrelationships between various market‐based policies,
from government procurement to antidumping enforcement to antitrust,
require many similar self‐enforcing mechanisms. The underlying culture to
support market‐based economies and a competitive environment is often a
fundamental requirement for support. The standard for interventionist
enforcement needs to be higher in countries that lack developed market
supporting institutions, although the risk of improper enforcement increases
in those regimes.
Implementation of CPL only matters if there is a need for such laws to begin with and
there exists the capacity for adequate enforcement of these rules.  The variables
associated with effective CPL outlined above are largely absent in Cambodia, Laos,
and other least‐developed countries.
Human Capital
Since market and economic impact analysis is highly complex and technical in
nature, a minimum level of human capital capacity within a country is necessary for
effective application of CPL.  The VCA reported that human capital was indeed their
biggest constraint to agency effectiveness.  While the practical applications learned
from the ACCP were important in terms of learning on the job processes, long‐term
sustainability will require a staff that has more formal academic training in law and
economics (industrial organization).   Other than enforcement agencies, it is critical
that the judiciary, including private lawyers, have sufficient knowledge and expertise
in this area.   Even if laws are well drafted, the interpretation of these laws into
guiding standards plays an important role.  Without well‐functioning application of
rules by the judiciary and without adequately trained lawyers to argue for their
clients and the government’s interests, CPL may be meaningless because of
uncertain and potentially contradictory outcomes.   
Given this constraint, the application of CPL often has to be broken up into phases
depending on the level of human capital development in the country and experience
with CPL (Hughes, 2004).  The first and most straight forward application of CPL is
the detection and enforcement against anti‐competitive agreements.  Collusion
among would‐be competitors in order to artificially raise/fix prices and drive other
competitors out of business is relatively easy to identify once detected, and most of
the time a CPL agency will simply “know it when they see it.”  That such agreements
are harmful to consumers and on net are harmful to society is one of the most basic
tenants of economics 101.    
19 
The second and more complex phase of CPL application is “abuse of dominance”
cases.  This area is more complicated because “abuse” and “dominance” are both
subjective terms.  First, one needs to be able to determine if the market share of a
particular firm is dominant, but this goes beyond a simple “Herfindahl index”15
calculation because some sectors are naturally more competitive than others and
multiple other market factors may be at play.  The third and most advanced phase of
CPL application is merger and acquisition (M&A) analysis.  Not only does this type of
analysis require knowledge of how to measure industry concentration, but also the
dynamic market effects of both horizontal as well as vertical combinations.  M&A
cases therefore require complex economic analysis and are very resource intensive;
Malaysia’s new CPL, for example, has no M&A component.  According to (FTC, 2009),
“All too often, a proposed acquisition is seen as a threat to incumbent firms or
employment, rather than something that might enhance efficiency and expand
output in the long run. Concerns about employment or the closing of antiquated
facilities may be a political reality, but we counsel the conduct of a sound
competitive analysis in all merger proposals being examined.”
Therefore, one of the most effective long‐term approaches to building capacity for
investigation and enforcement is supporting the development of educational
programs that focus on law and economics.  Also, a well conceptualized and
implemented commitment to continued technical assistance for young agencies
should serve to reduce regulatory and judicial uncertainty and assist agencies to
reach pragmatic goals.  Doing so in phases as a function of available human capital
normally makes sense.   
Legal Context
“Antitrust law” was first established in the US in the late 19th/early 20th Century
based on the perceived need to control the behavior of and/or break up private
sector monopolistic firms (or “business trusts”) such as Standard Oil.  But CPL is
fundamentally different from antitrust in that the historical and institutional context
in which it is being developed is completely different.  While antitrust largely focuses
on preventing abuse of dominance by private sector firms, competition policy in a
developing country context frequently aims at regulating the behavior of and/or
reducing the dominance of state‐owned enterprises and state‐backed private
incumbent firms.  While the Sherman Act aimed to prohibit "restraint of trade or
commerce", CPL is more often employed to enable and promote trade and
commerce where it did not previously exist.  
Translating and imparting the US experience in a developing country context is
therefore not an easy, and task and how to tailor competition law around specific
 
15 The Herfindahl index (also known as Herfindahl–Hirschman Index, or HHI) is a measure of the size
of firms in relation to the industry and one of the  indicators of the amount of competition among
them.  The major benefit of the Herfindahl index in relationship to such measures as the
concentration ratio is that it gives more weight to larger firms.
20 
social‐political conditions is perhaps the biggest challenge in providing TA for CPL.   
According to the FTC’s own report (FTC, 2009),  
Our program focuses on the development of sound competition policy
principles and institutions, taking account of distinctive national conditions.
We recognize that no single model of substantive commands and institutions
is suitable for all circumstances, and we give considerable attention to
establishing the institutional capacity that supports effective enforcement in
established antitrust systems.  Many countries use civil law systems, which
may require greater specificity than is characteristic of most U.S. antitrust
laws. For example, the FTC Act makes it unlawful to engage in “unfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce,” leaving to the agency and
the courts the delineation of such “methods.” A civil law country requires
more specificity, and we adjust our advice accordingly.  Likewise, we
encourage other nations to benefit from the views of others, particularly the
European nations that aspire to membership in the EU.
…We do not profess specific knowledge of conditions in foreign nations, and
we have no preconceived notions of what enforcement priorities should be
set. Nonetheless, our experience informs us in important ways that may have
value to our foreign counterparts.  
As noted above, some aspects of competition law are relatively easy to standardize,
while others require not only more human capital, but also more tailoring around
specific country realities.  This inability to perfectly map experiences onto differing
legal histories was apparent from the internship the program supported for the VCA
staff member, whereby the beneficiary admitted that while he learned valuable
lessons regarding procedures, processes, and concepts, he had difficulties finding
appropriate applications at home.      
Measuring Project Impact  
In terms of general feedback, the ACCP received very high marks on the survey
designed by the evaluation team (see Annex 1).16  Most everyone that responded
was very positive about the usefulness of the project and professionalism of the
implementers from the FTC.  Yet while positive anecdotal feedback and
programmatic indicators such as “number of people trained” are necessary to keep
track of short‐run inputs, in order for a project to be successful it must ultimately be
able to translate project inputs into measurable impacts and results.  To measure
impact, higher‐level outcome based indicators are needed.  While moving from input
based indicators to outcome based indicators is problematic in terms of establishing
 
16 One responder from the VCA wrote “…the technical assistance from US FTC under the financial
supports [sic] from USAID is one of the best projects that Vietnam Competition Authority has ever
received. The project assisted in building the capacity of the agency, enhancing the effectiveness of
law enforcement and improving the ability and knowledge of VCA’ staffs on competition issues.  One
of important thing is that the professional and friendship relations continue – a network established.”
21 
attributability between the two, we believe that it is necessary to at least look at
such indicators as one potential method of quantitatively measuring project impact.     
One of the most popular institutional indicators/rankings is the Global
Competitiveness Report (GCR) of the World Economic Forum.  In this annual
publication based on survey responses of private sector companies, one section of
indicators attempts to measure the extent of “market efficiency.”  Under this
category, there is a sub‐category for “competition” under which there are three
relevant indicators for competition policy and enforcement: “Intensity of local
competition”; “Extent of Market dominance”; and “Effectiveness of anti‐monopoly
policy.”17
We now take a close look at the evolution of these indicators over time where the
program’s resources were most focused: Vietnam.   The focus and resources of the
ACCP shifted to Vietnam beginning in 2008.   We therefore compare the indicator
rankings in 2007‐2008 to the most recent rankings.  As can be seen from Figure 1,
Vietnam saw highly significant improvement in its “Effectiveness of anti‐monopoly”
ranking in just three years, lending some support to the notion that the TA provided
was beneficial or at least not harmful.  Of course, the improvement of this high level
indicator cannot scientifically be attributed to the impact of the project.  The
direction of causality also runs from commitment to reform/improvement on the
part of Vietnam to demand for the services of the FTC and DOJ.18 Even so, it can be
claimed that the initial demand for assistance with CPL had its genesis in the initial
work that the ACCP did through ASEAN in helping to institutionalize CPL as a formal
goal under ASEAN’s economic pillar, which placed pressure on member states to
adopt international standards.  
 
17 All of the following questions asks executives to rank their country according to the following
statements:  (1) How would you assess the intensity of competition in the local markets in your
country? [1 = limited in most industries; 7 = intense in most industries]; (2) How would you
characterize corporate activity in your country? [1 = dominated by a few business groups; 7 = spread
among many firms]; and (3) To what extent does anti‐monopoly policy promote competition in your
country? [1 = does not promote competition; 7 = effectively promotes competition].  The countries
scores are then complied and they are ranked relative to other countries in the survey. Although
these measures are subjective, a number of studies have found them to be robust and very well
correlated with objective measures of institutional quality.  For this reason, they are used quite often
in the literature.   
22 
Figure 1 – Vietnam’s GCR rankings for “competition”  
Vietnam 2007‐2008 (out of 131
countries)
2010‐211
(out of 139 countries)
Effectiveness of anti‐
monopoly policy
100 58
Extent of Market
Dominance
41 48
Intensity of Local
Competition  
61 75
While Vietnam’s marks for the effectiveness of their CPL improved, the “intensity of
local competition” indicator worsened slightly and the “extent of market
dominance” stayed about the same.   We can view these latter two indicators as the
more “outcome” based, in that an effective CPL should lead to greater observed
intensity of local competition and less market dominance by individual firms.  This
then lends support to the idea that even though Vietnam has been successful in
launching competition enforcement and creating awareness of it, it has not yet been
able to translate that success into observable improvements in competition
outcomes on the ground.  One explanation for this is that the VCA has, with the
assistance of the ACCP, raised the standards and expectations of the businesses who
responded to the GCR survey through their education, publicity, and outreach efforts
between 2008 and 2010.  It may be that the Vietnamese government has not yet
matched those increased standards and expectations by reducing the power of the
incumbent SOEs.  It may also be that the increased awareness raised standards and
expectations among businesses, causing the other two indicators to get worse
before they potentially get better.  This type of phenomenon is actually quite
common.  For example, anti‐corruption campaigns can create increased awareness
of the issue which causes people to recognize the problem and assess it more
critically.     
If this assistance had not come from the US, it would likely have come from another
source, so there is really no “do nothing” counter‐factual to compare this outcome
against.  Even so, it cannot be certain that alternative assistance would have been as
high of quality, especially given FTC/DOJ’s considerable experience as the world’s
premier source of technical experts in this field.  According to the evaluation team’s
conversations with the VCA, if the FTC hadn’t been available to offer its assistance, it
would likely have hired a private contractor to assist them with their capacity
building.  But hiring a private contractor is not an ideal source of technical assistance
since it is not government‐to‐government sharing of experiences that creates a
sustainable working relationship amongst peers.  The potential for bias by private
sector contractors is ever present as well since profits and creating the continued
need for services can be an objective of consultants.   The diplomatic gains obtained
23 
through country to country peaceful exchange of ideas can also not be left out of the
measurement of project impact.   
In order to fully understand the impact of the ACCP, we would need a better
understanding of how markets, private firms, and the government in Vietnam will
react in the long run to the enforcement of competition laws.  Even though Vietnam
has managed to establish sound CPL and is now beginning to enforce it, this cannot
be expected to immediately affect the overarching political economy of the country,
which is characterized by the dominance of large, incumbent state‐owned
enterprises.  Progress towards further liberalization and privatization will likely take
time and this is reflected in the lack of progress in improving the intensity of local
competition.   Still, it is difficult to conclude that the improvement in anti‐
monopoly/competition laws isn’t a good first start for Vietnam as it continues what
appears to be a serious commitment towards further liberalization.  The successful
implementation in Vietnam may also encourage other ASEAN neighbors to join the
discussion and improve their laws, another potential spillover effect.   
In terms of ASEAN, the organization met its goals for competition policy and
consumer protection as measured by its bi‐annual “AEC Scorecard” in 2010.  Under
the “Competitive Economic Region” pillar, it had achieved 50% of its targets, and was
on pace for full achievement by 2015.  Currently, ASEAN is shifting its focus towards
consumer protection issues, particularly product recall and cross border consumer
redress.  
Assuring Project Sustainability – Next Steps
While the ACCP was scheduled to close out in September 2011, as of June 2011
there were still resources left in the project pipeline and the FTC was preparing to
file for an extension in order to conduct additional work with the VCA.  As of this
writing, USAID/Vietnam had committed to a one‐year extension of the project worth
$90,000 for additional work with the VCA (FTC was also going to commit some of its
own resources to the project now that it has gained the authority to spend money
overseas for foreign assistance purposes).   However, given recent general budget
pressures, resources are likely to be quite limited for the project going forward and
the impact of these limited resources will need to be maximized.  
For that reason and others, this evaluation recommends a phased withdrawal of
support to the VCA given the apparent sustainability of the capacity already built and
the increasing level of resources being dedicated to this new agency by the
Government of Vietnam.  However, the growing number of staff will create a need
for increased basic training in CPL.  Given additional resources, the project should
look to create a sustainable entry‐level training program for new VCA staff that
reviews the basics of CPL. 19  This should be done by assisting the VCA to create a
permanent internal budget for such trainings if none exists. As the VCA continues to
 
19 The VCA’s own priorities in order of preference are 1) Internships/fellowships; 2) Training for new
staff; and 3) long‐term (3 month) resident advisor.    
24 
develop, it will likely require technical assistance on the more sophisticated areas of
CPL such as vertical integration, horizontal mergers, bundling, resale price
maintenance, etc.. These are highly technical areas in nature and the VCA may need
assistance to translate US experiences in these areas to fit the Vietnamese context.
Given that Vietnam just passed its first comprehensive Consumer Protection Law in
2010, the VCA will need, and has requested, technical assistance in this relatively
new and emerging area of law, similar to the type of assistance it received in CPL.   
The project should look to create a system for measuring the direct impact of its
trainings, possibly by administering before and after tests designed to estimate the
gains in knowledge among trainees.   It would be interesting to compare training
formats to see which resulted in the most knowledge gains.  Such a system would
also allow the project to determine where potential exists and where it does not.  
For example, it was noted that the Cambodians “did not participate well” in some
trainings, so a more quantitative approach to measure this might help prioritize
assistance and identify problems (lack of interest) early on.
Continued engagement with the VCA is highly recommended as a means to ensure
sustainability of results, but additional long‐term resident advisors are no longer
needed and visits of shorter duration (2‐4 weeks) are more appropriate at this point.  
The project should also look to engage the VCC as well, as they apparently felt as if
they had been ignored by the project.  While engagement with the VCC could be
beneficial and help ensure sustainability, working with this group would be more
difficult than working with the VCA given its small, rotating, and politically
determined membership.   
ASEAN claims that its priority for assistance continues to be outreach and advocacy.  
It also requests assistance incorporating competition principals into the growing
number of free trade agreements (FTAs) it is cementing (e.g. the ASEAN‐China FTA,
the ASEAN‐Australia‐New Zealand FTA).  However, it appears that the AEGC is now
adequately resourced and capable and no longer in need of significant levels of TA
from USG sources.  If the project does continue, it will of course make sense to stay
engaged with ASEAN and work through them to the extent possible, through the
need for direct technical assistance on CPL is no longer apparent.  However, the
organization could use additional assistance on emerging consumer protection
issues, specifically product recall and cross boarder consumer redress.  If there are
opportunities to replicate the project’s successful work on regional CPL, the project
should explore engagement in these regional consumer protection areas.   
Given that the Philippines is on the verge of passing a comprehensive CPL, this is a
country that could potentially use FTC support going forward, especially since legal
structures there are similar to those in the US given past US influence.   The ACCP
should continue to explore potential opportunities there and make a formal
proposal given identified needs and demand.   
The project could achieve a high‐impact in the area of improving the human capital
levels for implementing CPL by assisting local universities with curriculum design for
law and economics (“industrial organization”) courses.  The lack of capacity at the
25 
university level was mentioned several times, and sustainable progress is unlikely if
countries cannot develop their own internal supply of experts in law and economics.
Equipping local universities with the capacity to teach in this area is especially
important because they can tailor the content to the specific legal context of the
country.   In terms of promoting outreach, which was the other key identified
constraint, the project might look to working with local NGOs to a greater extent.20     
Based in part on these recommendations, the project should create a formal plan for
sustainability in Vietnam and phase‐out as well as detail any proposals for
interventions in the Philippines or other countries.   
The ACCP’s efforts in Southeast Asia have largely been a success story and should be
shared among development practitioners.  Key to its successes were the use of a
regional approach, complementarity with ongoing development efforts, and
effective methodology of supplying government‐to‐government technical assistance
through a combination of resident advisors, study tours, and awards for fellowships.  
As the development community continues to learn about what constitutes effective
TA for CPL creation and enforcement, it must also continue to learn about the socio‐
political preconditions necessary for effective CPL and which factors are most likely
to lead to greater impacts of CPL at the outcome level of a well‐diversified private
sector based economy.  Because of the rising importance of CPL and consumer
protection in regional 21st Century trade agreements, such knowledge will become
increasingly valuable and further research on the role of these areas of law in the
development process will be needed.  
Works Cited
FTC. (2009). Charting the Future Course of International Technical Assistance at the 
FTC and DOJ. Washington, DC: FTC. 
Gelhorn, E., Kovacic, W. E. and Calkins, S. (2004). Antitrust Law and Economics in 
a Nutshell. St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co. 
Harberger, A. (1954). Monopoly and Resource Allocation. American Economic 
Review, 77-87. 
Hughes, T. (2004). Designing Competition Institutions for Different Stages of 
Institution Building. 4th APEC Training Program on Competition Policy. Ho 
Chi Minh City, Vietnam. 
Krueger, A. (1974). The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society. The 
American Economic Review, 291–303. 
Laitner, J. (1982). Monopoly and Long-Run Capital Accumulation. Bell Journal of 
Economics, 143-157. 
McAfee, R. P., & Vakkur, V. N. (2004). The Strategic Abuse of the Antitrust Laws . 
Journal of Strategic Management Education. 
 
20 The evaluation team met with one NGO, the Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS), that was
active at the local level in promoting consumer welfare.   
26 
Nicholson, M. W., Sokol, D. D., & Stiegert, K. W. (2006). Technical Assistance for 
Law and Economics: An Empirical Analysis in Antitrust/Competition Policy.
Social Science Research Network. 
Parente , S. L., & Prescott, E. C. (2005). A Unified Theory of the Evolution of 
International Income Levels. In P. A. Durlauf, Handbook of Economic Growth
(pp. 1371-1416 ). Elsevier. 
Tullock, G. (1967). The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft. Western 
Economic Journal , 224–232. 
  
27 
ANNEX 1 – Statement of Work
Program Evaluation of FTC/DOJ ASEAN Competition Policy and Consumer
Protection Program
I. Background
RDMA’s General Development Office (GDO) and USAID/Vietnam’s Office of
Economic Growth (OEG) intend to conduct a Program Evaluation of its ASAEN
Competition and Consumer Protection Policy Program (ACCPP), implemented by the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), from June 1‐
10, 2011, in the program focus countries of Vietnam, Malaysia, and Cambodia, as
well as in the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta.  The evaluation will assess program
performance and effectiveness against program goals and indicators, provide
recommendations to enhance program sustainability, and provide general lessons
learned that assist the Mission, USAID, and our development partners in deciding
future directions of similar programs.
ACCPP is a nine year program in two parts, Part I (2003‐2006) was a $600,000
component which focused assistance on the ASEAN Secretariat in Jakarta and Part II
(2007‐2011) is a $700,000 component which is focusing technical assistance to help
ASEAN’s members, in particular Vietnam, Malaysia, Laos and Cambodia, to develop
and implement sound competition and consumer protection policies and
enforcement mechanisms.  At the regional level of ASEAN, three new entities
emerged since the FTC/DOJ first began working with the Secretariat in 2004: the
ASEAN Consultative Forum for Competition (ACFC), the ASEAN Experts Group on
Competition (AEGC), and the ASEAN Coordinating Committee on Consumer
Protection (ACCCP).  ACCPP continued to support these regional entities and offered
some opportunities for shared region‐wide training to take place.   
In Vietnam, the technical assistance is largely directed to the Vietnam Competition
Authority (VCA), which enforces what the Vietnamese call their “Competition Law”
(approved in 2004), had specifically requested assistance in a project to redraft its
consumer protection law, which was approved in 2010.  ACCPP provided this
assistance and other specific requests as they arose.  In addition to working with the
VCA, ACCPP provided assistance to institutions that support the inculcation of
competition in the Vietnamese economy.  In Cambodia, technical assistance was to
be focused on ensuring that a newly instituted competition law promoted consumer
welfare and that the institutions created to enforce the law had the capacity to do
so.  However, despite support from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and UNDP,
the program encountered significant disinterest on the part of the Cambodians and
efforts to assist with the final drafting and implementation of a competition law
were frustrated.   
28 
The assistance is being delivered through a resident advisor, several short‐term
missions, and study visits to the U.S.  During Part I of the Project, the advisor resided
in Jakarta.  During Part II, the advisor resided in Hanoi for four months each of the
first two years of the program and planned to travel for a week each month to
Cambodia.   
II. Evaluation Objectives
The objectives of the evaluation include:
 To evaluate program performance and effectiveness against stated goals,
objectives, and performance targets, and to describe what program
actions worked well, needed improvement, should be discontinued in the
future, or should be replicated and/or scaled up;
 To provide recommendations for the design and implementation of a
possible follow‐on program; and
 To improve policies, programs, and projects by identifying and
disseminating the lessons learned from this program experience and by
making recommendations drawn from evaluation findings.
III. Scope of Evaluation and Key Questions
The final program evaluation will address six key areas and answer targeted
questions in each area:
 The relevance of the project’s objectives in relation to each partner country’s
needs and institutional priorities;  
 Its efficacy ― the extent to which the development objectives of sound
competition and consumer protection policies and enforcement have been
(or are expected to be) achieved;  
 Its efficiency ― the extent to which project objectives have been (or are
expected to be) achieved without using more resources than necessary;  
 The sustainability of the project ― the likelihood that its estimated net
benefits will be maintained or exceeded over the life of the project;  
 The institutional development impact ― the extent to which the project has
improved the ability of targeted countries to make better use of its own
resources; and   
 The performance of USAID and our host country partners (local competition
authorities), focusing on how good a job each partner has done at each stage
of the project cycle.
In assessing the program’s effectiveness and potential areas of improvement, the
evaluation team will seek answers to the following illustrative questions:  
 Was an initial assessment conducted for each project site?   
29 
 How involved were recipient Competition Authorities in the design and
implementation of the project’s TA?    
 How many draft laws/regulations has the project produced?  Where?   
 Why is regulatory convergence in the area of competition law important in SE
Asia? Is regulatory convergence or harmonization a good idea in this area?  
Don’t Competition policies need to be tailored around country‐specific
conditions?  
 What progress was made toward regional regulatory convergence or
harmonization in this area with FTC/DOJ support?  Have the goals of the
ACFC been adopted by ASEAN?  
 Explain what role, if any, the project had in the passage of the 2010
Consumer Protection Law in Vietnam.  
 What were some higher‐level indicators (other than number of people
trained) that the project was targeting?  i.e., how do we measure a pro‐
competitive environment?  From the Global Competitiveness Report
indicators –  
Vietnam –  
2008‐2009 (Out of 134 countries)
6.01 Intensity of local competition ......................................56 ........■
6.02 Extent of market dominance .......................................44 ........■
6.03 Effectiveness of anti‐monopoly policy.........................91 ........■
2010‐2011 (Out of 139 countries)
6.01 Intensity of local competition ..................................................75
6.02 Extent of market dominance...................................................48
6.03 Effectiveness of anti‐monopoly policy ....................................58
Is there any explanation for why over two years the anti‐monopoly law
indicator for Vietnam would have improved significantly while “intensity of
local competition law” would have declined so significantly?  Can the project
in any meaningful way claim some credit for the improvement in this high‐
level indicator?   
 Please describe how the project assisted the VCA to build its capacity and
how sustainable improvements to Vietnam’s competition policy are given the
country’s unreliable legal system.   
30 
 Explain the case against the Vietnamese insurance cartel that the FTC
attorney/resident advisor assisted the staff of the VCA to win.  
 What progress is being made in the Philippines for the passage of a
competition law?  What specific role is the project playing here?  
 What progress is being made in Malaysia for the passage of a competition
law?  What specific role is the project playing here?  
 Did the project focus at all at increasing the awareness of the public and the
private sector to the benefits of Competition Law and understanding how to
utilize such benefits?   
 It is well documented that quite often, especially in countries with relatively
less respect for free‐market institutions, anti‐monopoly and competition laws
can be either poorly enforced or strategically abused for anti‐competitive
purposes (i.e. either to punish non‐cooperative behavior and/or to protect
smaller firms by punishing larger and more efficient firms).  How did the
project take steps to ensure that these laws, once passed, would be
implemented and enforced in a positive manner that improves economic
efficiency?   
 How was a lack of a competition law determined to be a binding constraint to
growth in the project’s ASEAN focus countries?  Does one need competition
law in countries as underdeveloped as Laos and Cambodia where most large
sectors are dominated by state‐backed incumbents?  Are competition laws
even credible at this stage of development?   Doesn’t the binding constraint
to competition tend to be entry barriers and barriers to trade rather than
anti‐competitive practices by existing firms at lower levels of development?   
 Is sequencing important in legal development or can the imposition of
Competition law always be beneficial at the margin?   
 What were the specific reasons in your mind for the inability of generating
interest in competition law in Laos and Cambodia?   
 Given the complexity of market analysis and the application of antitrust rules,
are one‐off workshops worthwhile? How can donors ensure sustainability
and that the legal systems of developing economies have the requisite
capacity and knowledge to apply these rules effectively and efficiently
without funding continuing and long‐term education of implementers?
IV. Key Personnel and Activities  
Due to the small size of the ACCPP, hiring an independent external consultant would
make little sense given financial resource constraints as well as RDMA’s and
USAID/Vietnam’s more than adequate capacity to undertake this program
31 
evaluation.  Therefore, the evaluation team will be led by an internal RDMA and
USAID/Vietnam three‐person team including:  
 The RDMA Program Economist  
 The GDO Program Development Specialist
 The OEG Program Management Specialist
The RDMA Program Economist and the OEG Program Management specialist, while
not outside consultants, played no role and had zero involvement in the management
or anything related to the ACCPP project. We therefore believe that the potential for
conflict of interest in this evaluation is minimal.   
The USAID/Vietnam Economic Growth (EG) Office will provide in‐kind support for
this assessment in Vietnam, including helping to arrange meetings, hotel, and
transportation as well as translation assistance.  The Evaluation Team will review key
documentation prior to conducting field work (e.g. SOWs, Work Plans, Annual
Performance reports, etc.).  Field Work will include site visits to Vietnam (Hanoi),
Cambodia (Phnom Penh), the ASEAN Secretariat (Jakarta), and/or the Philippines
(Manila), Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur), and Lao PDR(Vientiane) where interviews will be
conducted which will likely include the following institutions:
1. The Vietnamese Competition Authority (VCA)  
2. The Vietnamese Competition Council (VCC)
3. The Cambodian Ministry of Commerce
4. The ASEAN Consultative Forum for Competition (ACFC)  
5. The ASEAN Experts Group on Competition (AEGC), and  
6. The ASEAN Coordinating Committee on Consumer Protection (ACCCP).   
V. Deliverables
The final document will be a 7‐10 page evaluation that summarizes findings and
outlines lessons learned for general consumption.  The document will be submitted
to the USAID/RDMA GDO Director and USAID/EGAT for their review and comment
prior to finalization of the evaluation.  The first draft of the document will be
completed no later than two weeks following the conclusion of field work.
  
32 
ANNEX 2 – List of Interviewees
   Interviews conducted between June 2 – 10, 2011
1. Mr. Bach Van Mung, Director General, Vietnam Competition Authority (VCA)
2. Mr. Trinh Anh Tuan, Head of International Cooperation Division, VCA
3. Mr. Nguyen Duc Minh, Deputy Head, Anti‐trust Investigation Division, VCA
  
4. Mr. Cao Xuan Quang, Deputy Head of Unfair Competition Division, VCA
5. Ms. Tran Thi Minh Phuong, Officer, International Cooperation Division, VCA
6. Dr. Tran Mai Hien, Director General, Vietnam Competition Council (VCC)
7. Mr. Manuel Rougeron, Executive Director, Vietnam Satellite Digital Television
Company Limited (KPLUS)  
8. Mr. Jean‐Michel Boudet, Deputy General Director, KPLUS  
9. Ms. Doan Thi Chien, Legal Director,  KPLUS  
10. Ms. Alice Pham, Director, Consumer Unity and Trust Society (CUTS) Hanoi
Resource Centre
11. Mr. Benny Irzanto, Technical Officer, Agreement and Compliance Unit, ASEAN
Secretariat
12. Ms.  Hasduna Putri, Technical Officer, Competition, Consumer Protection & IPR
Division, ASEAN Secretariat
13. Professor Dr. Ningrum Natasya Sirait, University of Sumatera, Indonesia
14. Mr. Soy Pardede, Chairman, ASEAN Competition Institute
15. Ms. Shila Dorai Raj, Chief Executive Officer, Malaysia Competition Commission
33 
ANNEX 3 – Evaluation Survey
ASEAN Competition and Consumer Protection (ACCP) Program Survey 
Please answer each of the following 9 questions using a 1-10 scale as indicated in 
each section. Please also feel free to offer any additional written comments below 
any question. The answers to these survey questions provide a quantitative measure 
of the effectiveness of the technical assistance program from the perspective of the 
recipient agencies. 
*The results of this Survey will NOT be shared with the technical assistance 
providers* 
Overall effectiveness 
1 = Very low; 10 = Very high; or NA (“Non-applicable”) 
1. The overall quality of technical assistance provided by the project. 
2. The overall quality of the advisers provided by the project. 
3. The overall impact of the project on the effectiveness of your Agency in fulfilling 
its mission or objectives. 
Agency operating effects 
1 = Very insignificant/negative; 10 = Very significant; or NA (“Non-applicable”) 
4. Resulting improvements in the skill levels of your staff. 
 
5. Resulting improvements in the operations of your Agency due to this project. 
6. Resulting improvements in your Agency’s ability to conduct competition advocacy 
due to this project. 
 Agency work product 
1 = Very insignificant/negative; 10 = Very significant; or NA (“Non-applicable”) 
7. Resulting improvements in the ability of your Agency staff to handle new types of 
cases or violations due to this project. 
8. Resulting improvements in the quality of decisions or recommendations rendered 
by your Agency due to this project. 
 
9. Resulting improvements in the enforcement of the law due to this project. 
34 
Appropriateness of technical assistance 
1 = Strongly Disagree; 10 = Strongly Agree; or NA (“Non-applicable”) 
10. The type of technical assistance provided to your Agency was appropriate to the 
needs and capacity of your Agency (i.e, the advisors had a good understanding of 
local conditions in your country and your Agency’s specific needs). 
11. The advisors established an appropriate professional rapport with the staff of your 
Agency and encouraged cooperation and mutual learning. 
12. On top of direct technical assistance to your Agency, the advisors worked with 
supporting institutions in your country such as other government agencies, the 
judiciary, academic institutions, and the private sector. 
Please use this section to provide any general comments that you may have regarding 
the technical assistance provided to your Agency.