OTI’s Integrated Governance
Response Program (IGRP)
April 2011
Final Evaluation by
Caroline Hartzell, Robert D. Lamb, Phillip McLean, and Johanna Mendelson Forman,
with Maria Cristina Olano
Chronology of Significant Events
• 2004-2006: President Uribe’s Plan Patriota reestablishes security around Bogotá, and
establishes a presence in some parts of the country held by the FARC
• 2007: Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos recognizes cannot consolidate state
presence in areas recently cleared of illegal groups without civilian institutions; Vice Minister
Sergio Jaramillo leads effort to conceptualize, design consolidation strategy and pilot project
• 2007: OTI creates Integrated Governance Response Program (IGRP) to help; goals are:
– strengthen credibility, legitimacy of Gov’t of Colombia (GoC) in post-conflict zones
– increase willingness, capacity of communities in transition to interact with government
– increase GoC capacity to respond (timely, credibly) to community-prioritized needs
• 2007: OTI helps GoC create Integrated Consolidation Plan of Macarena (PCIM) to establish
security presence, eradicate illicit funding source (coca), establish legitimate state presence
• 2009: PCIM becomes model for GoC’s National Consolidation Plan (PNC)
• 2009: U.S. Embassy launches Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) to
coordinate U.S. support to consolidation among all U.S. entities operating in Colombia
• 2010: Santos becomes president, Jaramillo national security adviser, prioritizes
consolidation, PNC into National Development Plan (PND), land restitution a new issue
Integrated Governance Response Program (IGRP)
• 2007-2011: pilot, IGRP, PCIM, PNC, CSDI, PND
– IGRP ends June 30, 2011; transition to USAID Mission
• Programs in Meta (PCIM), Tolima, Montes de Maria
– GoC Coordination—Acción Social, CCAI, RCCs
– Colombia Responde—infrastructure, community priorities
– Progreso—income-generation, agricultural inputs, small biz
– Post-Eradication Projects—associations, small farmers
• IGRP: financial, technical support from OTI
• Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) to
coordinate U.S. aid among all USG entities
Final Evaluation of OTI’s Colombia Programs (IGRP)
• Feb. 2011: Washington, Bogotá, 25+ project sites:
– Meta: Granada, La Macarena, Puerto Rico, San Juan de
Arama, Santo Domingo, Villavicencio, and Vista Hermosa
– Tolima: Ibagué, Chaparral, El Limón, and Rioblanco
– Montes de Maria: Cartagena and El Salado
• Documents, interviews: Did IGRP meet objectives?
– Help GoC meet its strategic objectives on consolidation?
– Project activities help achieve overall program objectives?
– Contribute to fulfillment of OTI’s mission?
• Review progress since 2009 mid-term evaluation
General Observations: Positives
• Team found improved security, new infrastructure,
growth of economic opportunities in all three regions
• Presence of project staff contributed to positive local
attitudes about the state, communities’ place in
Colombian society
• Positive comments on speed, flexibility, transparency
of projects supported by Acción Social, Colombia
Responde, and Progreso
General Observations: Negatives
• Serious concerns about transition, cost, sustainability
• Justice sector needs attention (e.g., prosecutors)
• Communities expressed concern consolidation
projects provided only short-term solutions
• Increased state presence raised community
expectations, possibly too high
• Caveat: some less secure, outlying areas could not
be evaluated directly (only document, survey review)
Main Findings: Overall Successful Program
• OTI helped GoC establish effective state presence.
– catalyzed GoC action: encouraged planning, coordination
– catalyzed USG action: demonstration effect, OTI approach
– catalyzed community action by encouraging participation
• OTI achieved program objectives.
– state present, more responsive, community interacting
– Colombia Responde, Progreso clear ongoing contribution
– less evidence on post-eradication projects (most in past)
• OTI’s support fast, flexible, accountable, anonymous.
– helped build capacity of GoC to take lead and credit
Lessons Learned and Recommendations
• Colombia program’s lessons relevant to:
– programming in other post-conflict and transition countries
– transition and future U.S. programs in Colombia
• Recommendations:
– coordinated transition planning: OTI and Mission
– recruit private-sector funding partners
– manage community expectations from the start
– let host-nation government take lead and credit
– emphasize self-sufficiency, e.g. renewable energy
– emphasize programs for women and elderly
Recommendations: Transition Planning
• Concerns about sustainability, hand-off from special
‘transition’ programs to ‘normal’ processes
– from OTI (with CCAI, Acción Social, Progreso, Responde)
– to Mission (with ministries, departmental & municipal gov’ts)
• Coordinated planning for transition needed on both
sides of hand-off as early in program as possible
– OTI and Mission: coordinate transition planning
• Hard-won gains to stability can be lost quickly
Recommendations: Private-Sector Funding
• Concerns about cost of consolidation,
sources of funding
• Improved security & infrastructure lowers costs,
opens opportunities to large enterprises in
consolidation zones;
– many already taking advantage of improvements, investing
– encourage major beneficiaries to become funding partners
• Caveat: Balance rights of small enterprises, farmers
• Fundación Semana, El Salado, Montes: linking
private-public for income projects, social services
Recommendations: Managing Expectations
• Expectation cycles normal part of development
• Consolidation programs meant to build trust, so
raising then dashing expectations self-defeating
• Program design, strategic communication plan both
need to include expectations management from start
• U.S. agencies should not over-promise to partners;
partners should not over-promise to communities
– engage communities in explicit discussions
– best defense: honest and modest in promises
Recommendations: Strat. Communication, Branding
• Point of consolidation is to build credibility of state
institutions, confidence in gov’t as service provider.
– letting host-nation government take lead builds its capacity
and its relationships with communities in consolidation zones
– creating Colombian brand for development projects helped
make the state visible in consolidation zones
– message of host-country ownership promoted U.S. foreign
policy goals more effectively than taking credit would have
• In some places, public U.S. role delegitimizes partner
– minimize U.S. brand in transition zones where U.S. role
would be questioned by communities or stigmatize partner
Recommendations: Fostering Self-Sufficiency
• Progreso and Colombia Responde laid a foundation
for greater community self-sufficiency
• Obstacles to sustaining self-sufficiency arose from:
– distance to municipal center (i.e., isolated outlying districts)
– ‘luck of the draw’ with mayors
– quality of infrastructure (e.g., access to roads, electric grid)
• Renewable energy an important option to consider
Recommendations: Women and Elderly
• Many households in consolidation zones headed by
single women with children
– focus on women is ‘force multiplier’ in development
– income-generating projects, vocational training, credit,
small-business support, child care
– greatest effect in outlying districts
• Few services currently available to elderly
– GoC’s social safety net did not reach them
– only some consolidation projects provided support
Recommendations to USAID Mission
• Take advantage of transition window
– for successful projects, no gaps in timing or resources
– smooth handoff of transition programs to Mission:
• seamless continuity of projects (and field staff if possible)
• lower risk of dashing recipients’ raised expectations
• Colombia today poses both an opportunity and a risk
– opportunity: successful OTI programming fostered state
legitimacy and helped Colombian state exercise control over
its territory—consistent with U.S. interests in Colombia
– risk: this hard-earned success is likely to be undermined if
projects go dark for many months—counter to U.S. interests
Recommendations to USAID Mission, cont.
• Link land titling and restitution to consolidation
• Continue supporting civil-sector projects to help GoC
(national, departmental, local) improve consolidation
– involve communities in prioritizing projects, contributing to
implementation, establishing producer associations,
connecting with state institutions
– manage community expectations
• Strengthen strategic communication in major cities to
maintain political support for consolidation
Recommendations to USAID Mission, cont.
• Emphasize municipal capacity and participation in
USAID projects in consolidation zones so that
communities see more of a local ‘face’ on projects
• Strengthen support to Regional Coordination Centers
as key link among national, departmental, and local
governments
• Continue integrated approach to post-eradication
efforts to minimize coca re-planting
– study sociocultural factors contributing to families’ desire to
stay in legal economy post-eradication
Conclusion
• U.S. interests are best served when consolidation
programs make smooth transition to long-term,
sustainable programs sponsored by host country
• Accomplishing this objective often requires host￾nation branding and a low U.S. profile in the field
Questions?

• The central plaza
being rebuilt in
El Limón, Tolima
• A Colombian
military officer
browses the stacks
at the municipal
library in Vista
Hermosa, Meta
• Children’s section
of Vista Hermosa
municipal library
• In Santo Domingo,
a clinic never
completed by the
FARC (top left)
• Below, the OTI￾funded clinic
stands nearby
• A young girl drinks
water at the Vista
Hermosa sewing
cooperative
• A security manager
for OTI implement￾ing partner Crea
Colombia stands at
the end of a newly
rehabilitated road
in Meta
• A staff member
from PCIM (left)
speaks with two
members of the
evaluation team in
Puerto Rico, Meta
• A sign on a small
store in Santo
Domingo reads
“Peace for
Colombia”