REPORT OF THE FAISONS ENSEMBLE EVALUATION MARCH 2011 Submitted to USAID/Guinea Robert Charlick, William Bradley, Steven Edminster, Mary Harvey, Elizabeth Kibour, with Anna Diallo 5/13/2011    i EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This report evaluates USAID’s Project “Faisons Ensemble (FE)” (Working Together) in terms of its achievements in furthering USAID/Guinea’s sole strategic objective and its intermediate results. Having attempted to assist Guinea in improving the basic health and education of its people with ever diminishing results in the early years of the new millennium, USAID came to the conclusion that only significant improvements in Guinea’s patterns of governance could make a difference. Without better governance Guinea was at risk of further political and economic decline, threatening stability at home and adding additional stress to a conflict torn region. It therefore framed its sole strategic objective as “Advancing Democratic Governance” with the expectation that doing so would “have a greater, longer lasting effect on its traditional sectors” (Annual Program Statement- APS). USAID’s approach to achieving this goal was a multi-sectoral project in which health, education, agriculture and natural resource management would be integrated into a common system of training and resource provision emphasizing “democratic governance” practices on the part of both government and civil society associations as well as technical training in procurement, financial management, conflict resolution, and greater gender equality. Responding to the APS, RTI (Research Triangle Institute) designed its Faisons Ensemble project. It was implemented through a cooperative agreement with RTI as the lead of a consortium consisting of four international and two national sub-grantees. Implementation of the March 2007 agreement began during the last quarter of 2007. During the next three years the FE project operated in a highly unstable and violent political environment. In December, 2008 following the death of president Conté the military staged a coup état. This triggered the suspension of most US Government assistance to Guinea, but a number of aspects of the project were able to continue under the exceptions to the suspension. 1 The scope of assistance was further restricted following the massacre in September 2009, when USAID/Guinea was instructed to discontinue any remaining support to the national government in health and education, although it was still allowed to work with employees of the national government at the local level. By October 2009, political instability dictated the evacuation of foreign aid personnel for six months. Desirous to understand what this multi-sectoral approach was able to yield, even in this difficult environment, USAID Guinea asked that a team be constituted to evaluate the project. The evaluation team—comprised of an independent team leader and four USG employees,                                                              1 The exceptions to the suspension were humanitarian assistance, electoral assistance, and assistance supporting “the political process.”  Humanitarian assistance was interpreted to cover all health and education programs, which were permitted to operate as before the coup, including work with the national government in these areas. Election programs were not affected by the suspension. Furthermore, it was determined that FE’s governance work with local governments (CRDs and CUs) with elected leaders (decentralized services) could continue  as it was “supporting the political process.” Work in the agricultural sector was suspended except for support for subsistence agriculture.  All natural resource management work was suspended.    ii supported by USAID Guinea’s Democracy Advisor, its acting Health and Nutrition officer and several other Guinean staff members—conducted documentary research, telephone and in person interviews with those responsibility for project implementation. In addition it conducted field work in all three areas where the project worked; the team interviewed local government officials, civil society leaders, independent radio station personnel, and beneficiaries of services. The assessment centered around two key and interrelated questions. First, “to what extent and how (did) these ‘integrative approaches’ help advance systemic democratic change. At the same time the assessment was to address “whether approaching health, education, and other sector development is most effective through democracy and governance-oriented interventions.” The overall finding of this assessment is that within the limits of the constraints under which it operated the multi-sectoral approach of Faisons Ensemble (FE) proved to be effective in producing intended governance and technical results at the local level. In fact, the integration of political reform and social service delivery proved to be mutually reinforcing. The evaluation team found that the FE Approach has had a significant effect on the local governments and civil society actors with which it has worked. The report cites ample evidence of changes in the way local government in Guinea functions in the project area even under governments largely elected under a non-competitive system and repressive regimes (Conté and the CNDD- Conseil national pour la démocratie et du développement). The project’s approach to improving governance centered around training and encouragement to apply existing legal codes, such as the Local Government Code (code des collectivités) which mandated that citizens have a greater role in participating in governmental decisions while encouraging elected and appointed officials to act in a more responsive and accountable manner. One result of this training that clearly emerged from field interviews was that elected local government officials were much more aware of the need to operate in a more transparent and accountable manner, holding open meetings and publicly posting budgets, fee schedules and minutes of meetings. While these changes are not yet institutionalized and have very little effect thus far on national politics they constitute a foundation for constructing a more democratic and better governed Guinea. The evaluation team recommended that USAID Guinea continue with this approach, and in an extension of the project find ways to broaden its impact by covering all of the local government units in the country and extend it to the national level as political conditions continue to allow democratic governance reforms to take root. At the same time governance reform has clearly contributed to the improvement of technical services critical to development. This has been particularly evident in the health sector where citizen participation and changing attitudes by health professionals have produced a far better environment for connecting communities to their social service providers. Positive results in the health sector were manifested by greater utilization of health services in general and increases in the number of Voluntary Counseling and Testing (VCT) sites and through outreach, the numbers of people coming into the sites for VCT services. Other documented results included greater use of local tax revenues for supporting health centers and schools. It was also clear that training health workers in “good governance” encouraged them to work in partnership with health committees (COGES- Comité de Gestion de Santé ,CSH- Comité de Santé d’Hygiene) and iii enabled them to work with the community and with other civil society groups to better mobilize resources to improve the operation of health centers. Similar if less pronounced results occurred in citizen support of education. A number of APEAEs (Parent-Teacher-Friends associations) were reinvigorated through the work of FE, and many local governments designated support to education as a major planning priority and allocated funds to repair and expand schools and to hire additional contractual staff. The impact of the project on the agricultural and natural resource management sector was very limited largely because the project had fewer resources to devote to these sectors, and because all activities in this area except for subsistence agriculture were suspended after December 2008. Nonetheless, there is evidence that the project did help strengthen some forest management groups and producer associations, principally in the Forest Region. The impact on civil society was also apparent. The team found evidence that the project improved the capacity of many community-based and civil society organizations in terms of their ability to participate in local government planning, to monitor the work of technical service providers, to articulate their demands at the local government level (plaidoyer) and to develop their own plans for small grant-funded projects. A major reason for these positive results cited by members of civil society groups interviewed during the evaluation and in a two-phase survey conducted by a Guinean university was that the project contributed to greater trust and satisfaction with local government. The FE project also worked with some intermediate civil society actors, such as unions and federations of producers and service monitoring committees (COGES, COGEF- Comité de Gestion de Forêts, APEAEs), adding to their capacity to function as interest groups. In terms of the 16 local NGOs that were chosen by the project as sub-grantees to implement many of its planned activities, these groups consistently stated that they had been strengthened by the project in terms of their internal organization and financial management. The evaluation did identify some limitations in the implementation of the FE that are the subject of the recommendations and lessons learned listed in the report. First, results were limited to some extent by the absence of strong commitment to democratic political reform or “pull” at the national government level. USAID needs to continue pushing for national political reform and the full implementation of decentralization, including the holding of competitive and open local elections, and helping local authorities find ways to finance local development and service provision. Budget authority at the local level cannot be underemphasized. More needs to be done as well to deepen the scope and nature of advocacy on the part of both civil society and local governments. In the short time that the project worked with these actors the scope of civil society advocacy tended to be limited to appeals for more resources within the existing system. It did, nonetheless, constitute a beginning to overcoming a culture of authoritarian rule and exclusion. Strengthening civil society should be deepened making us of knowledge of simplified extracts of existing legal codes has been by extending this training to cover all of Guinea’s local iv governmental units. This training should be complemented by further training in financial management. monitoring and basic auditing in order to provide citizens with the tools to more fully hold elected officials accountable and to discourage corruption, particularly in procurement. More needs to be done as well to strengthen intermediary civil society such as federations and unions of interest groups, particularly those that are revenue producing, such as agricultural and forest management groups, as well as embryonic apex or national level interest groups such as the Association of Elected Officials. FE’s strategy of allocating most resources to a limited number of already fairly well developed “champion” groups permitted those groups to make progress but did not affect a broader range of civil society critical to more effective interest￾based advocacy. Local NGO partners, while reinforced by their association with the project should be further strengthened by making fuller use of their existing strengths and by associating them more fully with the design and evolution of the project and assisting them to become more professional, thus moving them toward greater sustainability as development partners. The evaluation also makes recommendations regarding the management of Multi-Sectoral governance-centered projects such as FE. It notes that the use of earmarked funds, particularly from health accounts, proved to be manageable and produced some notable health benefits as well as governance benefits, including strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations such as the COGES and some of the Health Insurance Mutuals to monitor the work of health professionals and to be better and more democratically managed internally. Projects like this, however, would still benefit from a much greater percentage of their budget from Development Assistance to give them greater flexibility. Projects such as this which aim at altering deeply engrained patterns of authoritarian governance need to have longer time frames. For example the goal of the project to make anti￾corruption efforts more effective needs to be viewed in the context of broader governance reform and corruption is not likely to be reversed or reduced rapidly when national political will is weak. In the conditions that existed during the life of the project addressing and preventing corruption was shown to be best accomplished through the adaption of such good governance principles as budget and fee transparency at the local level backed by close monitoring, rather than through media and communication campaigns. Multi sectoral projects such as this also need to find methods of implementation that are not as cumbersome as the many layers of technical personnel and monitoring that this project featured, and need to promote the development of local partners who can take over many of these field management roles. To successfully undertake complex multi-sectoral assistance programs USAID must have professional managers at the mission level who are committed to an integrated approach that embodies governance reform across all activities. Discussions with mission staff during various phases of the project indicate that there was a remarkable level of commitment and coordination among technical staff prior to the coup. They also require strong leadership from USAID mission directors who are committed to the vision of the project. Fortunately, this was the case in Guinea. v TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY………………………………………. i LIST OF ACRONYMS ………………………………………….. vi I. Introduction ………………………………………………. 1 II. Background …………………………………………… 3 III. Methodology …………………………………………… 6 IV. Principal Findings ……………………………………. 8 A. Core Objectives …………………………………………… 9 B. DG Goals ……………………………………………… 11 C. Strategic Objective: Advance democratic Governance/ Advance Democratic Governance through multi-sectoral interventions in health, education, agricultural and natural resource management ………………………………………… 12 IR 1 Accountability and Transparency in Governance Improved 13 a. IR 1,1 (DG 1) Increased effectiveness of decentralized government and local service delivery………………… 13 b. IR 1.2 (DG2) Greater Visibility and Effectiveness of Anti￾Corruption Efforts…………………………………… 15 D. IR 2 Citizen Participation and Advocacy Strengthened …… 16 a. IR 2.1 (DG 3) Increased capacity and effectiveness of civil society and citizens’ organizations to participate and advocate for their interests in their demands for better service delivery and good governance ……….. 16 b. IR 2.2 (DG 4) ) Increased citizen access to more diverse sources and types of information…………… 21 V. Other Issues………. …………………………………………….. 22 VI. CONCLUSION: THE KEY QUESTION ………….…………………. 29 VII. Lessons Learned ……………………………………………… 30 ANNEX 1 DATA GATHERING FIELD GUIDE …………………………… 34 ANNEX 2 ORGANIZING THE DATA ............................................................ 40 ANNEX 3 SCOPE OF WORK ………………………………………………. 41 ANNEX 4 LIST OF PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS CONSULTED…… 52 ANNEX 5 REFERENCES ………………………………………………….. 64 vi LIST OF ACRONYMS ADIC     Association pour le Développement des Initiatives Communautaires AGUITEB     Association Guinéenne des Techniciens Biomédicaux ADIC     Association pour le Développement des Initiatives Communautaires ANLC       Agence Nationale de Lutte Contre la Corruption APIC     Association pour la promotion des Initiatives communautaires APEAE     Association of Parents, Teachers and Friends of the School APS       Annual Program Statement CBO    Community Based Organization CDL      Local Development Tax CDM     Cadre dé Developpement Municipal CENAFOD       Centre Africain de Formation pour le Développement CENI     Commission Electorale Nationale Indépendante de la Guinée Code des Collectivités    Local Government Framework Law COGEF     Comité de Gestion de Forets (Forest Management Committee) COGES     Comité de Gestion de Santé (Health Management Committee) CNOSCG       Conseil National des organisations de la Société Civile CNDD     Conseil national pour la démocratie et du développement   COP    Chief of Party CRD    Rural Development Commune CSH      Comité de Santé d’Hygiene CSO    Civil Society Organization DG       Democratic Governance   DHS    Demographic and Health Surveys DPS      Direction Préfectoral de la Santé E&F    Service de Eaux et Foret ERO    Evaluation Rapide Organisationnelle des Cibles GCSH     Global Child Survival and Health   GHCS     Global Health & Child Survival Account GNP       GNP     Gross National Product GoG     Government of Guinea GTZ      Gesellschaft fűr Technische Zusammenarbeit, German Technical          Cooperation IBGRN     Initiatives de Base pour la Gestion des Ressources Naturelles IR       Intermediate Result JHPIEGO     Johns Hopkins Program for International Education in Gynecology and Obstetrics MCH     Maternal and Child Health MOH     Ministry of Health NGO       Non‐Governmental Organization NRM     Natural Resource Management PMP     Performance Monitoring Plan ENSK     Ecole National de Santé de Kindia PACEEQ       Community Participation for Equitable and Quality Basic Education    PRISM        Project Management Sciences for Health PVO    Private Voluntary Organization IMR    Infant Mortality Rate vii PSI       Population Services International PUP    Parti de l’Unité et Progrès (Lansina Conté’s party) RPG    Rassemblement du Peuple Guinéen  (Alpha Condé’s party) REFMAP     Réseau des Femmes du Fleuve Mano Pour la Paix RTI       Research Triangle Institute SO       Strategic Objective SOW     Scope of Work UC       Urban Commune   UFDG     Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée VCT      Voluntary Counseling and Testing   VISFAD     Village Sans Frontière pour les Actions de Dèveloppement ZALY‐AC     Zaly Cole Animateurs Communautaires 1 I. INTRODUCTION In the early years of the new millennium it was apparent that the Republic of Guinea was a state in crisis. Richly endowed with mineral wealth, hydropower, and a natural environment capable of feeding its people and exporting a surplus, Guinea is today one of the poorest countries in the world and its people are among the most ill served. In 2009 Guinea’s economy sported some of the worst social and economic indicators in the world, ranking it 156th out of 177 countries on the United National Development Index. It’s under 5 infant mortality rate (IMR) of 163/1000 (DHS, 2005), a shocking high maternal mortality rate (847/100,000), and with less than 40% of its population literate it could be classified as one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world. Social services and physical infrastructure were actually deteriorating from an already very low level leading to unrest and discontent on the part of its citizens, especially its urban dwellers, labor unions and student groups. Compounding these problems was the fact that Guinea was in an unstable region with the highest concentration of conflicts anywhere in Africa leading to a massive refugee problem and on-going security threats first from Liberia and more recently from Cote d’Ivoire. These trends persisted in the face of USAID’s 15-year efforts to assist Guinea and help it achieve more acceptable levels of basic human services through its WAKILI project to train elected officials, and its PACEEQ and PRISM projects targeted at improving education and health care. USAID began to explore the question “where did the core problem lie?” Beginning in the late 1990s USAID authorized a series of studies (Wentling, Docking, Diallo) all of which pointed to the extreme vulnerability to conflict within the Guinean system. The 2005 Fragile State Assessment merely confirmed what was already clear—not only was Guinea a “fragile state,” it was well on the road to becoming a “failed state.” As the 2005 study concluded Guinea was a state characterized by authoritarian rule without order, ruled by an increasingly corrupt (kleptocratic) elite whose rapacious behavior and neglect of the needs of its people had reached proportions that threatened its very viability. U.S. foreign policy decision makers, moreover, believed that Guinea’s failure would not only be a humanitarian catastrophe, it would further weaken and destabilize an already turbulent sub-region. It was in this context that USAID formulated its new strategy for Guinea, recognizing that the main constraints on both political stability and on improving human services were to be found in its system of poor and authoritarian governance. Its response was to focus its aid program on the sole strategic objective of improving democratic governance. This led the issuance of the 2006 Annual Program Statement (APS) which for the first time attempted to integrate all of its prior strategic objectives into a single multi-sectoral program. According to the APS, “Improved governance is the transcending theme of the entire strategy.” But it also expected that “by increasing the GoG’s capacity, accountability and efficiency as well as strengthening civil society awareness of its rights and advocacy USAID Guinea will have a greater, longer lasting effect on its traditional sectors.” (APS). The focus of the new strategy then would clearly be on governance reform because “before USAID can have an impact on 2 improved service delivery or improved livelihoods it must address the governance constraints that impede development in these areas.” The result was the development of the multi-sectoral project that came to be known as Faisons Ensemble (Working Together). RTI applied and won the award in consortium with six other grantees, starting up its activities in the fourth quarter of 2007. It was initially scheduled to end in March 2010, but was extended for 18 months due in part to the extremely chaotic and difficult political and social context (detailed in the next section of this report) which included sanctions against the junta that took power in December 2008 and the six-month evacuation of most USAID personnel following the stadium massacre of September 2009. It is impossible to overestimate the importance of this new strategy and project for the future viability of Guinea. In the minds of many, Faisons Ensemble (FE) represented a bold new attempt to help save Guinea by designing a foreign aid program for a context such as this. At the heart of the new strategy and therefore of the project was a basic hypothesis: “that strategic interventions in the social sectors, primarily focused on strengthening citizen participation while increasing transparency and accountability of government institutions, could help advance broader DG goals, and that such interventions could also result in improvements in the social sectors,” (SOW-Scope of Work). USAID felt that given the importance of this project with its new approach it was vital to conduct an evaluation to learn its strengths and limitations as they might apply to future assistance programs in Guinea and potentially elsewhere. To this end USAID/Guinea commissioned this evaluation using an external team leader and four team members most of whom had been involved in some stage of the FE’s design and/or administration. The key question that this assessment was to address was “to what extent and how these ‘integrative approaches’ help advance systemic democratic change.” Could public support for democratic reforms in this case be advanced through tangible improvements in the social sectors (Health and Education for example). At the same time the assessment was to address “whether approaching health, education, and other sector development is most effective through democracy and governance-oriented interventions.” (SOW) The questions posed by this evaluation are complex and involve serious issues of establishing causality in an open system where several concurrent events and movements (see the next section) were going on. They also must confront the extremely short period in which the project was able to fully operate (May 2007 to December 2008) and the very unstable period that followed in which it could only operate at the local level. In conducting this evaluation the team had to confront two other important realities that condition somewhat its findings and conclusions. First, overall Guinea is still a fragile state in crisis. Crisis and the near total failure of the Guinean state persisted and worsened during the life of this project. As its newly elected President, Alpha Condé 3 indicated in a recent interview that Guinea’s economy was in tatters (BBC). The last military regime (CNDD) left the country totally bankrupt with an international debt equal to about 70% of its GNP, and with no agreed upon plan negotiated with the World Bank and International Monetary Fund to begin righting this situation. Second, despite some technical gains, particularly in HIV/AIDs counseling and testing and in utilization of some local health services, it is unlikely that Guinea’s economic and social indicators improved during the chaotic period following the initiation of this project.2 The economy is still experiencing inflation, with price instability for basic commodities, and with an extensive parallel market (“black market”) fostering both shortages and price gouging. On the ground, even within the project zone we still see terribly overcrowded schools, shortages of essential drugs, and unreliable electric service and water supply in the capital city, and virtually non-existent in rural Guinea. The selection of a new President who is committed to “change” in a generally acknowledged free election is a hopeful sign that this system can improve the lives of its people, but this is not yet apparent on the ground. The evaluation must therefore focus on the evidence for positive changes in governance in the very short time frame in which the project operated and examine whether these changes have the potential to “advance systemic democratic change.” II. BACKGROUND In order to understand the context and specific environment which led to Guinea’s classification as a “fragile state” and USAID’s decision to redo its strategic objective for Guinea as a single overarching objective (Advancing Democratic Governance), it is useful to review recent past political history. This analysis and time-line could well go back to the colonial period and to the rule of Ahmed Sekou Touré. However, for our purposes we will only highlight major events and trends since the 1990s and focus on those political events that took place during the life of the Faisons Ensemble project. Guinea has been undergoing an extremely volatile period of political upheaval and intervention by its security forces for at least 25 years. It is in this extremely difficult environment that the project Faisons Ensemble started up and confronted ever increasingly difficulties from late 2007 until the last days of 2010. The project was initially designed to expire after 31 months in March 2010 and was extended until September 2011 by agreement with USAID/Guinea. Political Environment of Guinea Chronic mutinies and interventions by the security forces Guinea has experienced repeated army mutinies and military interventions during the period 1985 to 2010 (notably in 1984, 1985, 1996, 2000-2001, 2008, and 2009). Many of these interventions were thought to be ethnic in origin. (the 1985 mutiny led by Malinké officers many of whom were subsequently purged from the army, the 1996 mutiny was thought to be a revolt against Sousou officers)                                                              2 The exact data for this observation will only be clear when the next DHS survey is conducted and reported. 4 Heightened Ethnic Tensions and Elections Ethnic tensions were heightened during the Conté rule, especially after the destruction of Kaporo les Rails, a largely Fulani neighborhood in Conakry (which displaced over 20,000 people). The Conté regime was seen as being biased toward the President’s own ethnic group and region (the Sousou of the Basse Côte). Elections were also seen through the lens of ethnic conflict as for example when during the 1993 election the government invalidated the results in Malinké strongholds. The 1998 Presidential election that installed Lansana Conté as a civilian elected president was bloody and rejected by the international community. This election intensified ethnic tensions with the largely Malinké opposition party (RPG) of Alpha Condé pitted against Conté’s PUP. Following the election Condé was arrested and imprisoned on a trumped up charge. Build up to the Demand for Political Change In the early years of the new millennium there were a number of strikes and protests led by particular groups in civil society with grievances against the regime. In February 2006 labor and civil society called a nationwide general strike and organized a national consultation held in March that called for change and a political transition. In April 2006 President Conté sacked a reformist Prime Minister and installed a hard line anti-reform cabinet engendering popular protest that transcended that of individual interest groups. In June 2006 the unions called a nine day strike over the regimes failure to respect the commitments it had made to end the February strike. Violence and street protests followed. In January and February 2007 popular discontent exploded into a virtual uprising of protests and over 200 people were killed. Following popular demands for change, unrest was quelled by the January 27 agreement which led to the appointment of Lansana Kouyaté as Prime Minister with limited powers and no constitutionally mandated role. In September 2007 an internal audit report was released regarding a number of ministerial departments and other branches of the administration. It found high levels of waste and corruption, including payments to over 13,000 fictitious or deceased civil servants. In May 2008 Kouyaté was dismissed and replaced by Ahmed Tidane Souaré, a close Conté ally. In December 2008 Conté died. His death was followed almost immediately by an army coup led by Moussa Dadis Camara with the establishment of the junta- the Conseil national pour la démocratie et développement (CNDD) 5 On September 28,2009, the army’s Red Berets led by Dadis’ aide de camp, Aboubacar Toumba Diakite , perpetrated a massacre of peaceful demonstrators, killing at least 160 people, wounding many others, and raping scores of women. In December 2009 Dadis Camara’s aide de camp attempted to assassinate the coup leader, resulting in Dadis’evacuation from the country for medical treatment. The CNDD then appointed Sekouba Konaté as interim president. In January 2010 Jean Marie Doré was named Prime Minister and de facto head of the transition government. Although the first round of presidential elections held in June 2010 was relatively peaceful and fair, the second round was marked by high ethnic tension. In November 2010 Alpha Condé and the RPG won the Presidential election in the second round. Several days of violence followed in the streets of Conakry and elsewhere with security forces attacking supporters of Cellou Diallo’s UFDG. At least 12 people were killed in Conakry. With the ruling by the Supreme Court, President Alpha Condé was inaugurated on December 21, 2010, with Cellou Diallo accepting defeat, although his party (UDFG) continues to argue that many of its votes were thrown out. Local Government Since the FE project focused on local governments for much of its existence, it is perhaps useful to review several elements of this program. Decentralization was mandated in 1985 by the newly installed Conté military regime. Nothing much happened until 1991 when local governments actually acquired legal status in the new constitution. Local elections for 303 urban and rural governments (now 303 rural and 38 urban communes) were held in 1992 and were dominated by Conté’s PUP party (Party for Unity and Progress). The constitution required that all local candidates be partisan (members of one political party) and that election of a slate of candidates meant that the winner took all. This effectively excluded the bulk of the population from participating in these governments. In 1999 the mandate of elected local government officials expired at which point the Conté government appointed new officials in violation of the constitution and then hurried attempted to legitimatize this act via a new law which was eventually rejected by the parliament. Elections were held for local government officials in June 2000 but were considered of dubious fairness. Elections were held again in 2005 still under the old rules. Under the new Constitution of 2010 some changes were supposed to take place including allowing independent candidates in local elections and setting maximum limits on the age of candidates. Both changes were reversed by the Committee National de la Transition (CNT) due to pressure from the political parties. The entire process of creating and ratifying the new constitution is in play as some political and civil society leaders have argued that it should have gone to a referendum. Supporters of the process 6 argue that the CNT functioned like a constitute assembly and was representative of the entire population. With the advent of FE a new approach has been attempted to democratize local governments and to link them more fully to the “deconcentrated” technical services￾essentially devolving the responsibility and management of local technical personnel to local governments, without transferring any new resources to them. The degree to which local governments are representative and inclusive, however, must be questioned given that the people who currently hold elective office were “elected” during the virtual monopoly of power by the Conté regime, under a voting rule which required that a single party’s list would be elected. In addition, the legal mandates of all these officials expired over a year ago. Many analysts and political actors believe the new multi-party elections for local councils and indirect elections for Mayors and CRD (Rural Development Communes) Presidents must take place in order for these governments to be considered legitimate and at least potentially more directly responsive to the whole community. III. METHODOLOGY THE TEAM The team brought together to evaluate this project consisted of Robert Charlick, independent consultant and Team Leader; (Haute Guinée team) William Bradley, Agriculture Officer USAID/Senegal; (N’Zérékoré team) Anna Diallo, Democracy and Governance Advisor USAID/Guinea, (Haute Guinée team) Danielle Nyirandutiye, Health and Nutrition Officer; USAID/Guinea(Urban Conakry team) Steve Edminster, Governance Division Chief, Office of Democracy and Governance, USAID/DCHA; (Urban Conakry team) Mary Harvey, USAID/AFR/SD-Health Officer; (Haute Guinée team) Elizabeth Kibour, African Regional Lead, Country Support Unit, USAID/Global Health. (N’Zérékoré team) The character of this team was unusual and reflected the multi-sector approach of the project with team members having specific sector skills and interests and bureaus within USAID. Apart from the team leader every member of the team was a USAID employee. A number had been involved in the design and management of the project at various times, including the current DG Advisor for USAID/Guinea, Anna Diallo. The principal methods employed in this evaluation were  Review of relevant USAID documents  Review of project documents including annual work plans and quarterly reports  Discussions by telephone with current and former RTI project managers (Steve Snook, EL Hadj Sow, Becky Gadell, and Dan Gerber).  Discussions in Guinea with current FE staff and COP, as well as with regional coordinators in two of the projects regions (Faranah-Dabola, and KanKan).  Discussions with USAID’s sector chiefs for Education and Health (Dr Baldé) and Democracy and Governance (team member Anna Diallo). 7 These methods were complemented by field work in Guinea consisting of interviews with national level Ministries (Health, Decentralization, and Audit and Financial Control, and ANLC (The National Anti-Corruption Agency) national NGOs, local NGO partners, FE consortium partners (CNOSCG, CENAFOD, World Education) and ultimate customers of the project in rural Guinea communities. In addition, the team split up into 3 sub-teams to conduct interviews in the project zones of urban Conakry, N’Zérékoré- the Forest Region, and Upper Guinea (Faranah and Kankan) as well as a visit to the Kindia School of Public Health (ENSK). These field trips lasted from four to seven days depending on distance to the sites and mode of transportation available. An effort was made to include in each team one specialist in Democracy and Governance and one or more members with technical specialties (Health, and Agriculture). For the N’Zérékoré team the members both represented technical fields (Health and Agriculture) but had some prior experience with participatory development efforts. Two of the teams were seconded by members of the mission staff who served as both translators and local experts (Oumar Kallo, Mme Keita). Teams interviewed local government officials (mayors, council presidents and staff) in both specially designated rural and urban communes (the “phares” or lighthouse communities and organizations), local NGO partners, staff and committee members of schools and health clinics and health mutuals, and members and heads of other civil society organizations. In addition in a few instances they interviewed administrative officials (Directors of regional technical services and sous-prefets). They also interviewed the heads of four radio stations that were involved with the project. Since the time available for interviewing was so compressed, the team could not get an in- depth understanding of each actor or verify their statements. It focused instead on their capacity, the relationship they had had with FE and its implementing partners, the types of training and other resources they had received, their capacity and actual exercise of advocacy, and their evaluation of the successes and weaknesses of the FE project. Where available, these interviews were complemented by reviewing documents that were posted (such as budgets, fees, local development plans, and investments). Preceding the field work, the team jointly prepared a common questionnaire guide that was used for all interviews. Following the field work team members were asked to organize the information gained on common data organization forms. (See Annex 1 and 2 for questionnaire and data organization form). Following the field work the team collectively reviewed the data gathered and formulated common findings based on the major questions posed by the Scope of Work. The team then discussed and formulated a series of Lessons Learned, Recommendations and suggested activities for the short and longer term. These were all presented to the mission management and staff on March 25, just prior to the departure of all the Washington and Senegal based team members. 8 IV. PRINCIPAL ISSUES AND FINDINGS A. What is the FE approach? The FE approach is a combination of things-  a consortium of international and national PVOs and NGOs combining a variety of skills and capabilities driven by sub-grants and funding;  integration of good governance practices into all the technical sectors, and the harmonization of methods and management in a single team;  partnership between government administration, technical services, local authorities, civil society actors, and the private sector;  introduction of good governance principles and behaviors via the improvement of knowledge of the law and the stimulation of demand for better governance and services both of local governments and civil society actors (demand driven or push change);  concentration of resources on better managed, more capable and more reform￾minded actors (the champion approach). The champions approach was supposed to be a method of spreading the reform and mobilizing support for it from below;  Initially, the project envisioned linking local and national reform through the selection and support of national champions. The link between national champions and local-level reform was supposed to constitute the “pull” or stimulation from the top. For a variety of political reasons, most notably the December 2008 coup d’état, this part of the FE approach was unable to be continued and will not be treated in this evaluation. The FE Project was designed to improve democratic governance in Guinea while achieving positive impacts on USAID’s traditional sectors—health, education, agriculture and natural resource management. With USAID’s agreement the FE management developed a set of activities designed to promote democratic governance through the two intermediate results (IRs) and the four democratic governance targets (DGs) and indicators to measure progress in these areas. Six additional activities (called the “Core” activities) were added to the cooperative agreement, however, at the outset of the project largely because much of the funding for this project derived from earmarked funds, particularly in Health and USAID was required to utilize these funds as per the intent of Congress. In interviews with FE’s project managers it was clear that they considered that these additional activities had been “pushed” on them and that they did not necessarily constitute key elements in achieving the overarching theme- advancing democratic governance. The project nonetheless attempted to reconcile these six core activities with the promotion of better governance implementing these activities through sub-grants and memoranda of understanding both with members of its consortium and with other USAID/Guinea contractors. After the coup état in December, 2008 a number of US Government assistance programs were suspended but all health and education activities were considered “humanitarian” and USAID/Guinea was permitted to continue working on these even with the national government. Following that September 2009 massacre the USG cut off all work with national government agencies even in health and education.The only “core activity” that the USG was able to continue under these rules was the HIV/AIDS prevention and testing program. Programs to achieve the four DG goals were able for the most part to continue working at the local level, apart from the activities to strengthen agricultural and NRM civil society associations 9 Because the “core activities” had some governance implications this evaluation will examine success not just in the technical outcomes that they were able to produce, but in their governance results as well. B. THE PROJECT’S ACCOMPLISHMENTS The reporting of targets and achievements are organized according to the various project targets stated as SO level, IR level, and sub-IR level goals. In all there are 4 major goals under two IRs. Since the time to ground truth these achievements in the field was very limited, this report relies heavily on the data provided by the FE staff in their reports, supplemented where possible by general impressions drawn from the field visits to the urban Communes (CU) and Rural Development Communes (CRD) targeted by the project (the “champion communities). Our observations therefore do not permit us to generalize conclusions outside the project area or in the local governments in regions not selected for treatment. a. CORE ACTIVITY INDICATORS FINDING 1 Apart from the HIV/AIDs program, the impact of the six core activities on the goal of improving governance has been very limited. In the six core activities the HIV Voluntary Counseling and Testing program stands out for having achieved good technical results while making important linkages to improving governance in the health centers and in connecting to the community. The technical and governance impacts of the other core programs (creating a new curriculum for civic education and training secondary schools to make good use of it; improving the national pharmaceutical supply system; improving the curriculum, recruitment, management and legal standing of the National School of Public Health at Kindia (ENSK)-particularly its midwifery program, and supporting the Family Planning program with supplies are more difficult to evaluate in technical terms given their short life, and the links to the SO and project goals of improving democratic governance in Guinea are less clear. 1. HIV/AIDS program reinforced The FE Chief of Party explicitly recognized in his Quarterly Reports that Health sector earmarked funds constituted the largest share of funding for the project and that it was therefore a high priority activity. For the most part the key indicators for this activity were quantitative input measures designed to indicate growing capacity, and intermediate results-- the number of labs capable of doing the test; and the number of people tested and counseled, and the number of people in targeted “champion” communities reached with behavioral change messages. These technical targets were exceeded for all measures. 10 There were significant governance results as well. Members of the Voluntary Counseling and Testing Centers (VCT) were trained in the good governance and management practices including more transparent inventory control and anti-corruption practices, and were encouraged to form closer relationships with the communities in which they worked. An important part of this program involved community outreach￾taking the professional staff of the centers out into the communities to educate most at risk populations about preventing HIV/AIDs, recruiting local leaders (champions) to assist in this work, and encouraging local people to use the health facilities and to be tested. An additional benefit of this program was that health centers where VCTs were located were generally upgraded and made more patient friendly, resulting in high levels of utilization and greater willingness of communities and local governments to support health facilities. These outcomes were supported by the team’s visit to the VCT of Urban Dabola and the Forest Region. 2. Civic education curriculum (2,3) FE Project managers listed education as their second largest source of funding and therefore placed high priority on three activities- —civic education in secondary schools, girls’ education, and adult literacy. All three were undertaken by consortium partner, World Education. In terms of achievements, the civic education curriculum was revised and teachers were trained to present it (although only about 10% of this target was met); the number of local governments implementing a civic education campaign increased; the number of people reached with civic education messages; and the number of literacy centers created and reinforced and number of adults who participated in their programs. According to FE Project documents the quantitative technical results of these programs in terms of numbers were impressive. The curriculum was developed. Nearly 3,000 secondary school teachers (about one-fourth of the target) were trained in it. Nearly 8,000 adults enrolled in project supported literacy courses. Over 4 million citizens were “reached in project targeted areas with civic education message(s).” The significance of these numbers and their link to improved governance, however, is mixed and at times problematic. No measures were reported, for example of the levels of literacy attained or of the material available to adult learners that could be significant in broadening political participation. Civic education messages involved messages about peaceful resolution of conflict and ethnic tolerance and in the 2009 a good deal of the program was devoted to encouraging voting. No outcome or results measures were provided, and the method of calculating the impact of the civic education messages (number reached) was based primarily on potential listening audience given transmitter with a specific range and not on actual listener surveys.3                                                              3 According to the FE Monitoring and Evaluation specialist this was supplemented by a household survey conducted by the NGO partner, however, this data was not available to us and apparently did not include any questions about the impact of the messages.  In addition the figure of 4,170,908 seems improbable given the total population of Guinea and the reach of radio. One recommendation of this study is that a detailed media study with impact measures be conducted. 11 4. Kindia Midwifery program and School Management FE summary project achievement tables do not discuss this aspect of the project. It is discussed in a recent FE accomplishments narrative (FE, 2011). According to this document the Project, via its partner Engender Health, provided technical assistance to the National School of Health in Kindia to assist it and specifically assist its midwifery department to improve its curriculum, internal organization and the integrity of its recruitment. The project also assisted the school in obtaining legal status. It also claims to have been responsible at least in part for the reduction of fraud in school exams and admissions. To the degree that this program was able to reduce fraud and corruption in recruitment and in grading it could be considered to have been part of a more visible anti-corruption program. 5. Central Pharmacy Supply Improved FE project achievement documents do not refer to this core activity or provide indicators for it. By the end of 2008 work on this core activity slowed because of poor results and ceased altogether after September, 2009. Its link to good governance could have been the reform of the drug distribution system and the reduction of corruption and fraud in this process. 6. Family Planning Program Supported￾This program was carried out through a memorandum of agreement with ESD (USAID’s Global Reproductive Health and Family Planning Project- Extending Service Delivery). It was to work through the National Health Ministry’s Division of Health. Work with the Ministry of Health on this and other programs was suspended after the September 2009 massacre but continued at the local level with the provision of some commodities.. A related program in Maternal and Child Health was carried out by PSI with the participation of JHPIECO. The main indicator for this activity was the number of people who completed training in maternal/newborn health or child health. The targets for this were exceeded. There does not appear to be any clear connection between these programs and improving governance performance or instilling democratic governance behaviors and norms. b. DG GOALS 1. SO LEVEL TARGETS Originally the SO level was stated as “Advance Democratic Governance.” As stated in the APS the focus of the new strategy then would be on governance reform because “before USAID can have an impact on improved service delivery or improved                                                                                                                                                                                                 12 livelihoods it must address the governance constraints that impede development in these areas.” (APS) It implied that governance patterns needed to be significantly improved through greater transparency and access to information; greater accountability of elected officials; more inclusive and broader citizen participation, and more meaningful citizen participation in decision processes in order for social service delivery to improve. RTI reformulated the SO somewhat in its technical proposal (RTI, 2006) as follows: This specified the areas where USAID would concentrate its reform efforts (APS,2006, 17) focusing on the democratization of social service delivery as well as governmental institutions (largely local government, especially after 2008). Although the objective was focused USAID/Guinea still posited that “strategic interventions in the social sectors…could help advance broader DG goals” possibly even contributing to “systemic democratic change.” (Scope of Work). The formulation of the SO and the project in these terms enabled USAID not only to focus it governance reform efforts more efficiently, but was probably a good way to promote political reform in a system that up to that point was non-competitive as the 2005 local government elections had taken place under the single party Conté regime. This dual set of objectives is reflected in the kinds of indicators and targets that FE and USAID employed at the SO level. On the one hand these indicators were of public perceptions of service delivery. On the other they were of indicators of governance change and specific indicators of democratization. In assessing changes in both of these dimensions it should be acknowledged that the evaluation team was able to visit only a small percentage of the local governments and civil society actors and could not determine how generalizable the impressions they got were. The fact that the only systematic effort to measure some of these changes, the University of Sonfonia survey, came up with different answers points to the need to incorporate into the monitoring and evaluation plan a professionally conducted regular survey that can compare results in the target communities to those outside of it. 13 FINDING 2 Public satisfaction with local government in the provision of social services improved somewhat in the targeted communities. Data from the two rounds of the University of Sonfonia survey indicate that satisfaction (favorable opinion) with performance of local government in social services improved, from 43.3% to 56.7% 2. IR 1 Accountability and Transparency in Governance Improved IR 1.1 (DG1) Increased effectiveness of decentralized government and local service delivery FINDING 3 The FE Project contributed significantly to the democratization and effectiveness of local governments through the training elected officials received in the core training package, particularly training in roles and responsibilities of elected officials, training on the requirements of the Code des Collectivités, training on financial management and resource mobilization. The targets that FE set for this activity were unrealistically high. Under the circumstances even modest improvements have had an impact on both citizens and elected officials. Both the data which FE systematically collected and the observations of the evaluation team confirm that local governments made strides in the following areas: Openness and Transparency: According to the University of Sonfonia survey more citizens polled believed that local government was open and transparent, and that they could get accurate information about the local government budget for public services. The change in opinion was a modest one—from 45% to 51%. The same survey found that only a tiny percentage of the population (4.5- 6.6%) reported that they had been consulted on community public service priorities, and that this percentage had not improved during the two year period covered by the two rounds of the survey. This data is difficult to understand given the information given by many civil society associations indicating that they were informed of local government meetings by radio and even through the personal invitation of council members. In our discussions with civil society actors and our observations of what information local governments publicly posted the three project areas confirmed the view that both local government and the technical services were more open to public involvement and to disclosing information about budgets. Elected officials in the urban and rural communities we visited affirmed that they had introduced new methods of sharing information with citizens such as hold open public meetings and forums and posting information about budgets and plans. In several of the communities the government had formed an informal advisory committee using the structure of the “cercle d’innovation” to help forge better relations between community and local government. 14 In the rural commune of Boola and urban communes of Faranah, Kankan, Nzérékoré, Beyla, and Matoto budgets and tax revenues were posted. Training in more transparent and competitive procurement seems to have varied and was not consistently done. In our field interviews we found that the urban communes of Kankan and Matoto (Conakry) and the CRD of Marella reported that they had received procurement training while the urban communes of Faranah and Dabola apparently did not. Accountability The training that FE provided to local governmental officials reportedly resulted in democratic elections of committee members in Health Committees (CSH) and Forest Management Committees (COGEF) giving the population greater control over these committee members. Some communities (Faranah commune) reported that the financial management training they received created new possibilities for monitoring and controlling expenditures. In some communities (Bissikrima) new mechanisms called citizens’ commissions, were created to monitor local government expenditures. In others, like urban Kaloum, the mayor and his staff resisted efforts to make his budget decisions public.4 Management Capacity Every local government that we observed reported that the training in planning and management enhanced their capacity to identify investment priorities and to formulate plans. According to FE’s data 89% of the treated local governments took measures to create a current development plan as prescribed in the local government code. In urban Conakry the commune of Ratoma reported that it was able to develop an investment plan for the first time. The urban commune of Matoto reported that due to the FE training it was able to develop a plan and budget more responsive to citizen needs. Revenue generation—The measure that FE reported is the percentage project supported local governments whose annual tax revenues increased. Over 82% of the local governments reported an increase. In our field interviews there were communities that reported increases of as much as 75% (urban Faranah and Nzérékoré ) while rural Marella reported about a 7% increase. Apart from urban Conakry our field observations in a small number of local governments confirmed the view that revenues did increase except for some during 2009 when the political conditions were particularly unstable. In Conakry neither Ratoma nor Dixiin were able to report their revenue. Inputs Delivered- several of the Project’s indicators for this are inputs—number of people trained in planning, procurement, leadership, management skills. These data do not show increased capacity and effectiveness but they suggest that the tools were given to do so. In some specific areas training exceeded the targeted numbers. Our discussions with local government authorities indicated that in general local governments were allocating a portion of their revenue to provide for services- usually health services where most reported knowledge of the norm that 15% of their budget                                                              4 It should be noted that the newly formed government headed by Alpha Condé dismissed the mayors and councils of three of Conakry’s commune including Kaloum. 15 should go for this service, and schools where classrooms and repairs are desperately needed. In urban Conakry all of the communes visited reported that they allocated nothing for the health centers. In Matoto , however, the commune allocated some funds for sanitation as a way of creating some employment for youth. Conflict Resolution—The President of the Bate N’Fadji CRD stated that the training he received in conflict resolution helped him resolve several internal personnel problems. The mayor of Faranah made use of these tools to deal with conflicts with appointed regional officials. In urban Conakry several of the communes stated that they were able to reduce violent protest by using the training in conflict resolution to improve communication with youths. In Nzérékoré some conflicts were mitigated during a period of rising tension and instability after the near fatal injury of Dadis Camara. Project stakeholders held a round table discussion to allow the issues to be debated in public coupled with a call for peaceful resolution. FINDING 4 For local government to achieve sustainable progress in its effectiveness and capability the national government will have to deepen the decentralization process, particularly in the areas of tax reform and income transfer to local level authorities Our observations and discussions with local government elected officials and with the Minister of Decentralization confirmed the view that there are serious constraints, both legal and financial on how far local government can take on responsibility for many of the tasks it is now expected to fulfill. The most serious immediate problems are the lack of implementing legislation (texts d’application) and a system of fairly allocating funding to the local level and sources of revenue to make up for the cancellation of the local development tax (CDL). IR 1.2 (DG2) Greater Visibility and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Efforts FINDING 5 The anti-corruption program achieved some impact mainly through its work at the local level with both governments and civil society organizations. It probably also raised public awareness of corruption, although it is impossible to judge what the impact of this awareness might have been. The targeted sub-goal of the Project to reduced corruption involved a number of activities, mainly designed to raise awareness of the public and governmental actors. FE provided assistance to the ANLC (Agence Nationale de Lutte Contre la Corruption) in several areas-legal and communication. ANLC’s nationwide communication program featured media announcements, community debates, and messages targeted at public officials. It generated a lot of activity and exceeded the targets both in training of members of civil society associations and governmental officials. FE also helped with the training of journalists in anti-corruption investigating and reporting. Since the national level activities with ANLC were interrupted by the suspension they were undertaken mainly in 2008 and it is difficult to assess their overall impact. 16 The project has measured activities in this area largely with reference to the number of people trained in “anti-corruption tools.” Here the data show that they exceeded their targets. This says something about the visibility but little about the effectiveness of these programs. For example, the training of journalists in anti-corruption reporting did not include any analysis of how many stories were written or broadcast as a result of the training, or of what their impact might have been. An important part of the anti-corruption program was the work that FE did with local governments, encouraging them to meet the requirements of the Code des Collectivités with regard to publishing local budgets, publishing accounts (expenditures and revenue), holding open meetings and allowing time for questions in those meetings, and posting fees for health and school services. FE’s targets for the results of these activities fell short of its highly ambitious goals set at 100% compliance. The levels of achievement of these goals observed by the team in particular sites in the field, could well have made a difference in corrupt practices at the local level. Training members of civil society associations, especially the health committees (COGES) and school committees (APEAE) probably did make a difference in the practice of posting fees and therefore of reducing demands for extra-legal payments. The Project also claims to have been responsible at least in part for the reduction of fraud in school exams and admissions (ENSK, for example). Evidence for this, however, is difficult to verify. No systematic time series survey was done of the perception of corruption in order to learn how citizens perceived levels of corruption, particularly in provision of public services. IR 2 Citizen Participation and Advocacy Strengthened IR 2.1 (DG 3) Increased capacity and effectiveness of civil society working through strong CSOs and CBOs that are well managed and participate, demand accountability and transparency in service delivery, and advocate for good governance. The DG goal was a statement of what FE intended to try to produce (better internal management, broadened participation, and improved advocacy capability), rather than a statement of only working with civil society associations that already possessed these characteristics. Given Guinea’s history of the suppression of civil society for over forty￾five years at the outset of the project there were very few civil society associations that had these characteristics. Prior U.S. supported projects such as PACEEQ and PRISM laid a foundation for improving citizen involvement in health and education that could be built upon but overall the level was very low. What FE was to add was the reinforcement and deepening of civil society capacity and more focus on citizenship training and advocacy. 17 FINDING 6 The project worked with a broad range of civil society and community based associations. In all, the project identified 2,943 civil society associations that were legally recognized and had bylaws. Of these FE worked with 902, distributed by type as shown in Table 1 TABLE 1 TYPES OF CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS WITH WHICH FE WORKED No Categories of Civil Society and Community￾Based Associations Conakry Faranah N’Zérékoré Kankan Total 1 COGEF (Forest Management 0 25 3 28 56 2 Other Producer Groups 29 114 25 102 270 3 Unions of producers 0 2 20 6 28 4 Federations of groups 0 0 1 3 4 5 COGES (Health Management Committees 11 23 34 33 101 6 Health Insurance Mutuals 2 18 12 9 41 7 APEAE￾Associations of Parents, Teachers and Friends of Schools 26 25 36 48 135 8 Federations of APEAE 6 12 16 13 47 9 Mothers of Students Associations 0 3 4 4 11 10 Equity Sub￾committees 2 2 5 3 12 11 Youth Associations 25 15 21 24 85 12 Chambers of Commerce 0 4 20 18 42 13 Local Alliances 0 3 4 4 11 18 14 Student Associations 14 11 16 18 59 TOTAL 115 257 217 313 902 FINDING 7 The FE Project had a significant impact on improving the organization and functioning of the CSOs and CBOs with whom it worked The FE Project provided a common core of training to the CSOs and CBOs with which it worked consisting of information on the local government law and good governance practices, improved internal management and financial management, and basic advocacy skills. Some of these associations got training in conflict resolution, but we found few that had gotten training in gender issues. In general the measures employed by the FE Project are input indicators- number of civil society associations and leaders trained in relevant legal codes, and in financial monitoring, and number of associations that received technical assistance and project funded sub-grants. While these activities could lay the foundation for increased capacity and effectiveness they do not demonstrate actual increases in capacity or the result of these trainings. The project did provide, however, several indicators that could be useful as outcome or results indicators, such as the number of civil society associations that actually “implemented elements of the Faisons Ensemble toolkit (regulatory statutes and legal registration, internal controls, regular election of leaders, accountability to members),” the number of CSOs/CBOs that have monitored local government budget processes, and the number of CSO/CBO leaders who lobbied local governments during their sessions for an issue of importance to their organization. By its own data the project fell far short of its targets in these areas. For example, FE’s monitoring data indicate that about two-thirds of the CSOs and CBOs with which the project worked “advocated during a CRD/CU government session on issues of importance to their organization.” Overall, according to its Monitoring and Evaluation System, FE affected the behavior of over 650 out of the 902 CSOs/CBOs with which it worked in at least some of these areas. Another important indicator that FE used is the number of CSO and CBO federations revitalized in the project area. The project started with very modest targets in this area but now claims that there were 23 such intermediary associations. Our analysis suggests that this one of the potentially most powerful ways to improve governance through the fostering of more powerful lobby/interest groups. The evaluation team supplemented these indicators with a series of observations and discussions with relevant actors in the three project areas. Its findings are illustrated below with a few of the examples noted. 19 Capacity The training given by FE through its NGO partners reinvigorated a number of APEAEs. For example the APEAE coordinating committee of Faranah stated that prior to FE they didn’t even know about their role. A number of COGES reported that they were reinvigorated and trained in management, finance, budget development, HIV/AIDS and now co-management of health centers in partnership with health center directors. All the CSOs that we interviewed in all three regions, such as the union of Farmers of Boola (Organisation Paysanne de Boola), stated that they benefited from an understanding of their roles and responsibilities and the management, financial and advocacy training. Civil society groups benefited from the training to be able to set priorities, formulate action plans, and apply for external grants. In some instances the newly reinvigorated associations, such as several of the APEAEs that the team visited, raised funds to take on expenses of paying part-time teachers and expanding school facilities to address the extreme overcrowding of classrooms. The groups that received mini grants as a result of their enhanced planning capacity were able to test and develop their management skills through a practical opportunity to manage a grant. Through its NGO partners, FE monitored this process and provided technical assistance where needed. FE’s training and grant supervision helped groups like in the Fish and Rice Producers association of N’Zérékoré mobilize additional resources from other donors. Most of the CSOs, like the COGEF of Marella, were able to get legal recognition through the support of the project after several years of frustration in achieving this. Most were able to establish bank accounts and manage their finances much better. Enhancing Accountability Because CSOs were trained on the Local Government Code they were able to better monitor the functioning of local government officials. Specifically, civil society groups in Marella were able to monitor the local government budget (CRD). The training that FE did with COGES enabled some, like the COGES of the CRD of Bissikrima, to more effectively monitor the supplies of drugs. The enhanced capacity was not always sufficient, however, as in some communities, like Baté N’fadji, the drug monitoring process was thwarted by the prolonged absence of a key health center official. 20 Participation The team noted that the governance training that was given to all civil society associations did result in a significant democratization of their internal governance. Members of the COGES and new CSHs reported that their members were now elected. With health committees this is mandated by national level decrees which require that one member of the committee be an official from the local government. In other groups, such as APEAEs and Community Forestry Groups (CEGEF) however, leaders are now routinely elected. CSO and CBOs report that they are able to participate much more fully in local governmental affairs because they are informed of the meetings and invited to attend. There are even instances, such as the CRD of Boola in the forest region, where local elected officials go out to the villages (district and sector level) to inform people of the meetings and to solicit their priorities participatory planning Advocacy All the civil society groups that we interviewed stated that they had gotten some training in basic advocacy strategies and tactics and had found it useful. The information that the evaluation team was able to gather indicated that a large number of civil society groups reportedly engaged in advocacy campaigns and had used the training they had received from the project in doing so. For example, FE assisted an agricultural producer group, the Organisation Paysanne de Boola, to improve its advocacy skills. There is some question, however, about the effectiveness of civil society advocacy. The data from the Sonfonia survey found that less than 10% of civil society associations supported by the project reported that their advocacy campaigns during the past year (2008) resulted in favorable policies decisions by any level of government. This is a very high threshold measure since the time frame was very short particularly during the highly disrupted year in question, and the translation of a lobbying effort into policy often difficult to achieve and can be slow. For its part, the evaluation team was somewhat surprised to hear of a number of instances where local level civil society associations, associations of CSOs and even local governmental officials attempted to influence decisions and policies, and some instances in which they had had a positive result. There is no indication, thus far, however, that these cases can be generalized or said to constitute the basis of systematic change. Some Limitations of the Civil Society Strengthening Program The impact on community-based associations (CSO and CBO) that received internal organizational training, Planning and Grant preparation training, legal status assistance, advocacy training and resource management training has been difficult to measure but seems to have been significant, especially in terms of encouraging links to local government and enhancing their capability and sustainability. 21 The most significant issue is strengthening a civil society that is the product of local needs and decisions. Over one-third of the associations considered to be “civil society” (such as the SCHs and the APEAEs) are the product of national level decrees, often as a result of international agreements such as the Bamako Initiative, rather than local initiatives. The project should continue to develop and support groups which are expressions of local needs and priorities, even if their self-defined objectives do not coincide with the service delivery objectives spelled out in the project. There is also an issue of the degree to which some of the associations that do work in technical sectors of interest to the project are able to participate meaningfully in the formulation of their actions. This seems to have been the case of forest management groups like the NGO- Forêt Communautaire de Orana (Boola), whose forest management convention with the government Forestry Service seems to have been based on a boiler￾plate form. On the other hand, where local civil society groups attempt to negotiate with powerful economic interests such as the mining companies (Valé and Rio Tinto), the project needs to offer professional advice to help guide the process both for CSOs and local governments. Another problem that is common to CSOs in many less developed societies is the over reliance on a single leader, making such groups vulnerable to control and collapse. Our observations point to the fact that this seems to have been the case of the Association des Jeunes et Amis de Kissidougou. The brother association in Beyla seems to have developed a much better and more democratic internal organization. The Project needs to encourage this kind of exchange and sharing of knowledge in an effort to strengthen civil society beyond the organizational training it has been giving them. Finally, FE did find several ways to enhance women’s economic participation through support to women’s food producer groups like the Groupement Feminin Wakila (Dabola) and through a micro financing program to help other women’s small businesses. Overall, however, gender training and the participation of women in decision making roles did not receive sufficient attention in the work that the Project did. IR 2.2 (DG4) Increased citizen access to more diverse sources and types of information FINDING 8 The multiplication of sources of media, particularly radio, has the potential to become a powerful force for awakening citizens and mobilizing them to advocate and act for better governance. The main vehicle for this aspect of the program was the encouragement of community and privately owned independent (non-governmental) radio stations. Over the life of the project eleven such stations, including Radio Communautaire de Bissikrima which we 22 visited, were supported, mainly with equipment. Three new stations went on the air as a result of project support (Radio Liberté, Horizon FM, and Radio Bambou-FM) Our field observations confirmed the potential importance of private and community radio. A number of CSO members told us that they got information about local government meetings from the radio. Elected officials in the urban commune of N’Zérékoré stated that radio was indispensable for disseminating information about meetings and for encouraging participation, the setting planning priorities and making budget decisions. Issues with Media Diversification The principal issues that we observed during our field visits were twofold. The media need to find ways to survive financially, and this may mean appealing to a wider audience with more diverse programs than the messages determined by donor projects. Radio Bissikrima, for example, has excellent equipment but lacks the funds to even run the generator needed to supply the electricity that the station requires to broadcast. At the same time private radio must find a balance between freely broadcasting what is topical and important to local people and exercising self-censorship when its ownership may judge certain programming to conflict with its commercial interests and with the interests of those in power. During our visit to Kankan we noted an instance in which the director of radio Horizon FM made a decision to cancel a program perhaps out of just such a consideration. While radio no doubt “reaches” many Guineans there is little evidence to date as to what its impact has been. We recommend that a serious study be conducted of the media in order to determine what the messages are and how they are received and acted upon. V. OTHER ISSUES RAISED IN THE SCOPE OF WORK ISSUE 1 What was the Impact of the FE Approach on Service Delivery in the Technical Sectors? Technical impact FINDING 9 Service delivery and technical outcomes improved during the life of the project in the Health Sector. Many of the technical indicators have been discussed above in the section on the Core Activities. Indicators of improved technical outcomes involve both statistical outcomes and behavioral changes. Overall, the Sonfonia survey indicates that the general level of satisfaction with health services seems to have improved somewhat over the two year period surveyed, which could well indicate that service delivery has improved at least in the health sector. 23 In terms of the technical targets for the HIV/AIDs program, these targets were met or exceeded (number of individuals tested and counseled in the VCT centers, number of laboratories capable of performing AIDs tests; number of people trained in VCT and in lab activities). In addition, where Voluntary AIDs Counseling and testing Centers were installed or upgraded by the project community outreach and awareness increased; and the utilization of other health services associated with the health centers increased. A number of local governments have increased their support for health by prioritizing these investments in their annual investment budget plans, and even undertaking some salary support to part-time school instructors and for maintenance work. In several cases the communes visited had added budget lines to finance, for example, the work of midwives in the clinics. None of the urban communes in Conakry, however, allocated funds to support health centers in their commune. Even so, most of the health centers visited including all but one in urban Conakry appeared to be functioning well, usually with the support of the COGES. Project support to Child Health programs for the eradication of polio and measles seems to be bearing fruit since no new outbreaks have been reported since the end of 2009. FE is now also supporting the training of the newly elected members of the Community Health and Hygiene Committees (CSH) which should link the public even more closely to the technical services. FINDING 10 There have been some technical results in the delivery of education, mainly through the civic education and literacy programs. The core activities in education were restricted to the development and promotion of the civic education curriculum, the extension of the adult literacy program, and the promotion of girls’ education. FE measured these results in terms of the number of teachers trained to present it, and the number of people “reached” by civic education messages. Largely because of lack of funding and lack of apparent results in the Project’s work with the Ministry of Education work in this area was greatly curtailed even prior to the September 2009 massacre. As a result assistance to the teaching of the civic education program fell far below the expected target. On the other hand FE’s measure of the number of local governments that supported civic education campaigns (74%) does seem to indicate a relationship between improved governance and the promotion of the civic education program. In addition, a number of communities made education a high level investment priority investing some of their revenues in expanding and repairing school facilities. FINDING 11 There has been very little measurable impact of the FE program on Agriculture and Natural Resource Management. FE does not report any indicators for this sector. The major activities planned were the retraining of the national agricultural extension service that had virtually ceased 24 to function (though EVW), and the experimental promotion of an improved variety of rice. The strengthening of the extension service ended abruptly with almost no achievement when assistance to agriculture, apart from subsistence agriculture, was suspended in December 2008. In addition, all natural resource management programs were suspended. A small agricultural activity involving food production- improving rice promotion, involved FE giving 6 tons of seed and 30 tons of fertilizer to 60 CBOs in the project area. This activity does not appear to have had any connection to the rest of the project and had no apparent governance implications Democratic Governance FINDING 12 The relationship between technical service providers and the local population has changed as a result of the FE Project Interventions. Some change has occurred in the behavior of “deconcentrated” technical services at the sous-prefectoral and perhaps prefectoral levels. This is particularly noticeable in the health centers. We noted a number of cases where Health Center Directors (CRD of Marsella) were working much more openly and collegially with health committees, and several cases where forestry agents (Eaux et Forêts) and Agriculture agents assisted community groups in producing technical results, often in association with their small grant projects. ISSUE 2 Is a different approach needed to be successful in producing the desired results in DG and Service Delivery in urban Conakry? FINDING 13 The FE Ensemble program was less successful in Conakry than elsewhere, but this because the political and economic context is so different. In terms of its goal of improving governance and introducing more democratic practices, the FE project met with mixed results in Conakry. The four (out of five) communes visited ranged from highly resistant to the FE approach (Kaloum) to very responsive and accepting of the need for more transparency and accountability mechanisms (Matoto). Conakry is a highly politicized environment vital to national decision makers. It is also different in its relationship to the technical services. In urban Conakry health centers are generally not considered part of the community and are not supported by communal budgets. COGESs are significant actors and in some communes they support the health centers. In others (COGES Boulbinet- Kaloum) political disputes around the election to the COGES seem to have limited its functioning. Another important factor involving Conakry is the political reality of youth crime and violence associated with unemployment and dissatisfaction with the government. In this environment communal governments may have to allocate more resources to creating 25 employment for youths thereby reducing motivation for violence and will therefore have fewer resources to invest in social service delivery. Given these differences, it is difficult to know whether the FE approach must be adapted to the realities of Conakry or whether support for democratization and an improved economic climate at the national level can render this approach more successful. ISSUE 3 To what degree has FE resulted in systemic changes in democratic governance and in the technical sectors? FINDING 14 The impact of FE thus far has been local. It is too early to judge whether it can serve as an effective demander (pusher) beyond There is clear evidence that the good governance training, especially through the use of the Law on Local Government (Code des Collectivités) produced significant changes in the behavior of many of the 113 local governments in the project area (see results section IR 1.1) including changes that promoted participation, transparency and accountability and citizen empowerment. Some changes in the behavior of local level service agents have occurred as well, as deconcentrated agents have had to integrate at the sous-prefectoral level. Beyond the local level the evidence for an impact of the FE approach is very limited. In the course of the field observations the team noted several cases where local government officials challenged administrative authorities at higher levels over specific issues (Baté Nafadji) and other cases in which the actions of local groups resulted in the changing of administrative and elected officials. There are also interesting cases within the project area where these challenges cannot be attributed to FE training (Federation of Growers of Rice for example). These may have had spread affects. FE’s plan to hold forums in 2011 designed to engage regional officials on policy, performance and services may intensify this process, but it is far from common or systemic at present. ISSUE 4. To what degree has FE facilitated or hindered local capacity development and the substantive involvement of local partners at all levels of programming? FINDING 15 Local NGO partners have been strengthened by the FE program but could be strengthened further to become direct grantees or contractors in the future Local NGO partners benefited from the organizational diagnosis (ERO￾Evaluation Rapide Organisationnelle) ) and from the targeted training they received. They were also strengthened in terms of their professionalism and advocacy capacity. NGO partners, however, were not fully involved in key aspects of the program such as policy, design, or sub-grant management. 26 We interviewed 8 of the 16 Local NGO Partners (4 in Upper Guinea, 2 in the Forest Region, and 2 in Conakry). Some were quite well developed and advanced in their experience. All had a particular area of specialization. All had had prior experience working with other donors on a variety of projects. Several (CJMAD, ZALY-AC) stated that the FE good governance training had helped democratize their internal management and become more transparent. All of the partner NGOs interviewed contended that they benefited from the organizational diagnosis and subsequent management and financial training. Through the efforts and training of FE several NGOs (INAASPO, for example) were able to receive legal recognition from the government of Guinea. Several of the NGOs interviewed contend that the FE training and experience helped them develop new or improved technical capabilities, including experience of working in a consortium (AGUITWB), a higher level of professionalism in dealing with other donors (ZALY-AC), and new areas of competence (CJMAD) in the field of anti￾corruption.5 Several of the NGO partners (AGUITEB, IBGRN) emphasized how they have been undertaking advocacy campaigns, or encouraging their members associations to make demands on local government using techniques they learned from the FE training. Another (ZALY-AC) is leading an effort to form an NGO forum in order to be more effective in their advocacy programs. While FE strengthened their local NGO partners in some ways it did not make full use of their existing strengths as full partners (IBGRN, ZALY-AC, VISFAD) in the design of training and other activities and in decisions about the management of sub￾grants. This stemmed in part from FE’s desire to “harmonize” evaluation and training approaches and to rely on its own staff and at times consortium partners like World Education6 to adapt them to local conditions. Given that some of these NGOs had been operating successfully for over 20 years and have intimate knowledge of the areas in which they work, more could be done to delegate decisions to them or to assist them in becoming direct partners in the project. ISSUE 5. Was the use of earmarked funds to achieve results both in the technical sectors (Health, Education, Agriculture and Forestry) and in achieving the four overarching DG goals an efficient choice? FINDING 16 The fact that most of the funds for the programs were earmarked did present management challenges to FE but these were manageable.                                                              5 This NGO stated that it was unusual for a donor to encourage a partner NGO to work in a field other than its initial area of expertise 6 Note that in an interview with World Education they contended that the FE project contracted with them to executive the program and did not allow them   27 Given political events in Guinea the use of earmarked funds from Health produced mutually advantageous outcomes. On the one hand, DG activities could continue in all four target goals of the project using Global Child Survival and Health (GCSH) funds, and important health activities could continue as locally oriented humanitarian activities. The FE Project combined funding from both the USAID Development Assistance fund (DA) and the Global Child Survival and Health (GCSH) accounts. The total life of Project Budget including the extension period was approximately $31,000,000 (28,927,938 obligated to date.) Of this amount $16,838,128 came from the GCSH account and $12,089,600 was from Development Assistance. Funds from the GCSH were utilized mainly for HIV/AIDS, maternal and child health (MCH), and Family Planning. Funds from, DA were mainly used for education and NRM with $1,427,137 from DG. In 2008 USAID allocated $500,000 of FY 2009 funds to FE to support outreach and awareness activities related to the upcoming elections. These funds were used to support the communication strategy of the National Electoral Commission (CENI) and to train journalists in the role of the media in elections. The bulk of FE’s local government and civil society activities in 2008 and 2009 was funded from GHCS (Global Health & Child Survival) account In 2009 , GHCS funds were able to be used for work at the local level in health enabling critical governance activities to continue in all of the technical sectors including DG. At the same time important results in health were achieved— increasing the number of Voluntary Counseling and Testing for HIV/AIDS sites from 17 to 31; improvements to health facilities associated with the VCTs such as the building of incinerators, and repairing rooms; and the revitalization and training of 101 of Guinea’s 400 health center management committees (COGES), the initiation of training for the new community based Health and Hygiene committees (CSH). ISSUE 6. Was the use of the Champion approach an effective way to achieve the major goals of the project? FINDING 17 The use of the “Champion approach” in the first two phases of the FE project has not contributed significantly to the results it has produced. The champion approach was based on two principles or assumptions—that it is a better use or resources to start with those actors most interested and ready to participate, and that the champions would inspire others by their example or by the natural drive of human beings to compete and be recognized as outstanding. Champions were defined simply as anyone or any organization committed to reform, making things better. The project advertised for champions at the national and local levels, combining recognizing outstanding individuals as well as groups and local governments. Candidates were solicited whose commitment to improve was limited to the four technical areas or other social services of concern to the project. Candidates were supposed to explain how they saw these activities improving good governance. They were also required to prepare a proposal for activities to be undertaken compatible with the goals of the project. Candidates at the local level were then selected by commissions appointed by regional 28 Governors that included representatives of government of civil society and the media, run by the Governor’s Chief of Staff. In the first phase of this project, scores on the rapid assessment tool (ERO) and the applications from local governments were so poor that none could be designated as “champions.” As a result FE accepted all of the CRDs and CU in the priority prefectures. This made the notion of champion completely moot. It also designated as champions individuals and departments within government ministries, including those such as the Health Ministry known from the audits conducted in 2007 to be highly corrupt. The idea here was to engage and support a core of reformers who could influence national level decisions and behavior. This proposition was largely abandoned even prior to the halting of all assistance to the national Ministry of Health in October 2009 because the results of working with the national ministry were so poor. The approach to getting results by working with individual “champions” even within corrupt ministries was not only disappointing, it was unsustainable because of its over reliance on particular people in particular positions. In the extension phase of the project more emphasis has been put on mobilizing communities as “champions” or peer-communicators, from among the more outstanding “Lighthouse” (Phare) communities. Again the assumption is that in modeling good governance and its technical benefits others would emulate. This approach seems to have been motivated both by efforts to reduce the costs of extension and by the belief that competition and trusting the opinions and experiences of others would spread the message more quickly. There is no data thus far on the results that this has produced. As for champions in civil society, often individuals were so designated, or CSOs that were essentially dependent on a single leader. This again raised the issue of sustainability. ISSUE 7. Time Frame-- Is the time frame an important factor? Do some interventions require more time than others? FINDING 18 Governance change, the issue at the heart of USAID’s SO and this Project needs to be programmed over a longer period of time. It is not amenable to quick technical fixes. It involves changes in long standing habits and attitudes. Changing these requires new mentalities and new motivations, as well as new legal and institutional structures. There are always strong interests in a society that resist change. If USAID is serious about affecting Guinea’s governance patterns it must be able to program for at least 5-10 years. 29 MANAGEMENT ISSUES ISSUE 8 What has the effect been of having the project organized as a big consortium? FINDING 19 The large and heterogeneous consortium led to management difficulties and difficulties harmonizing interests and approaches, overcome only by extraordinary leadership. The Faison Ensemble project was based on a cooperative agreement between a Prime (RTI) and six sub-grant partners including two Guinean partners (CENAFOD and REFMAP). This proved to be a difficult arrangement to manage. RTI’s method of “harmonizing” the approaches had the merit of being participatory among the partners, but it also took a lot of energy and time and engendered a great of conflict at the outset. People we interviewed were clear that it was only due to the extraordinary skills of the project’s first Chief of Party that the consortium was finally able to come together. Such skill is not always present. Subsequent changes of leadership (three additional COPs in 2 years) presented additional challenges. Finally, uneven capability and differing objectives within the consortium led to several of the partners being dropped in the 18 month extension phase, further weakening the overall effort in critical areas such as gender, conflict resolution and education. VI CONCLUSION: THE KEY QUESTIONS: A critical assumption underlay USAID/Guinea’s strategy, this project and this evaluation: that advancing democratic governance in Guinea could allow for development to proceed. A second critical question was whether and to what degree FE’s multi-sectoral approach could advance democratic governance in Guinea: OVERALL FINDING: The Multi-sectoral approach of Faisons Ensemble (FE) has proven to be effective in producing intended governance and technical results at the local level. The conclusion of this evaluation is that despite a very unfavorable national political environment, particularly in Conakry, and a very short time frame of effective implementation, the FE Approach has been able to have a significant effect on the local governments and civil society actors with which it has worked. There is ample evidence of changes in the way local government in Guinea functions in the project area even under governments largely elected under a non-competitive system and repressive regimes (Conté and the CNDD). While these changes are not yet institutionalized and have very little effect thus far on national politics they constitute a foundation for constructing a more democratic and better governed Guinea. At the same time, governance reform has clearly contributed to the improvement of technical services critical to development. Thus far we have only been able to see the 30 effects clearly in the health sector where citizen participation and changing attitudes by health professionals have produced a far better environment for connecting communities to their social service providers. The integration of political reform and social service delivery has proven to be mutually reinforcing, at least for this technical sector. This evaluation gives support to USAID/Guinea continuing with this approach, and hopefully being able to extend it to the national level as political conditions continue to allow democratic governance reforms to take root. This will require, however, a more development assistance (DA) to balance the funding from the earmarked health accounts. VII LESSONS LEARNED A. Strategic and Programmatic Lessons 1. Improving DG improves the legitimacy of local governance and its ability to provide technical service 2. Understanding and using Local Government Law (Code de Collectivités ) and the Forestry (Code de Forêts) is a good way to improve DG because it is grounded in law 3. Training of Civil Society organizations in good governance is a good way to enhance their ability to participate in the government 4. Good governance training of local government officers to accept and use communities’ input, improve financial management systems, improve transparency and oversight is an effective way to enhance the legitimacy and support for local government. 5. Training of service providers (e.g. Health workers) in governance provides an opportunity to mobilize resources, and seek partnerships. 6. Improving local governance needs to be complemented by the national level political will (e.g. Policy, directives, resources) 7. Success of a multi-sectoral project depends heavily on sectoral actors and partners focusing on a common objective with demonstrated leadership, good management, and democratic governance internally B. Management Lessons 1. The greater number of consortium partners (grantees), the more complex the management, and less control one has. 2. Multi actor consortia require clear reporting relationships to the prime. 3. Multiple layer consortia are less cost efficient 4. Multi sectoral programs require a closely integrated multi-sectoral management team at the USAID mission level 5. Multi sectoral programs require strong financial tracking system at USAID project level 31 6. Multi sector programs with a strong emphasis on improving democratic governance require more time to deliver results and should be programmed for at least 5 years. 32 ANNEX 1  DATA GATHERING FIELD GUIDE QUESTION SET FOR LOCAL LEVEL INVESTIGATION OF THE ACTIVITIES AND IMPACT OF THE FE PROJECT NOTE: Depending on the type of organization interviewed you will use only part of this questionnaire. You can use the same questionnaire for several different organizations. Just make sure each is labeled. I. Questions for the Technical Services I.A. Common Questions for Technical Services 1. Since this project began what changes, if any, have taken place in the way your service makes programmatic decisions and the way it provides services? 2. Did the support you received from the project help you improve the delivery of your services? How? 3. Did you personally or your service receive training in how to connect with the local population in a more participatory manner? 4. Did you find this training useful? How? 5. Did the approach of the FE project create difficulties for you or your service? How? 6. Do the CRDs and CUs work more closely with your technical service now? Do they provide financial support for some of your activities in their budget? What kind? 7. Did the training you received from the FE project help you to understand the organizational issues within your own service? Did your organization change at all due to this capacity for organizational diagnosis? How? 8. Did the training help you to reduce the incidence of HIV/AIDS? Improve maternal and child health. 9. How did your service work with the communities and organizations selected as “champions”? Did they help you improve the delivery of your services? If so how? 10. Did the training in leadership and management provided to your service through the FE Project lead to you doing an organizational diagnosis and the development of a PAPC? 11. Did this help improve the functioning of your service and improve the delivery of your services? 12. Does your service now publicly display service fees? I.B. TECHNICAL SECTOR SPECIFIC QUESTIONS --the ones listed here are in the current activities and indicators. We will need to develop some similar questions for education, agriculture and natural resource management. I.B.1 HEALTH 1. Did the use of the champions program help you change behavior relative to the prevention of HIV/AIDs. How did it help spread the message? 2. Did the FE Project help your service offer HIV testing and counseling? How? 33 3. Did it improve your delivery of maternal and newborn health care? How? 4. (Addressed to the Midwifery Department of ENSK). a. Did the FE Program Strengthen the Administrative Systems of your Department? How did this contribute to your being able to improve the delivery of these services? b. Did the training and administrative support offered to you improve your ability to deal with corruption in admissions and grade fraud and corruption? How? 5. Did your service participate in the organization and running of conferences with religious leaders and collectivities to promote community-based health services? How did these conferences affect your ability to deliver health care to the base-level? 6, Did any officials or employees of your health center receive training in anti corruption tools and practices with FE project support? Did this training result in a reduction of corruption at your level? Did this help your center deliver health services more effectively and fairly?. 7. Did members of the COGES associated with this center receive training in monitoring the use of public resources? I.B.2 EDUCATION 1. Questions on the Impact of support to Civic Education Programming on the broader effectiveness of schools to delivery education 2. Did the FE Project support or work with School Management Committees and APEAEs? What was the impact of this support? 3. Did the FE Project support or work with School Management Committees ? If so, what was the effect on the quality of education offered? I.B.3 ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT Questions on the use of Forest Management Committees and their relationship with Projects and with Eaux et Forêts (A Champion Service) II. QUESTIONS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, CSO LEADERS/Members, and CBO leader/members IIA.. LOCAL GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS AND IMPROVED DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE II.A. 1 QUESTIONS on Improving Governance Performance Through Improved Capacity To ask citizens and/or local level civil society members 1 What is your opinion of the performance of your local CRD/CU in health, education, agriculture and natural resource management in the past year? 2. Did the FE project provide training to your CRD/ CU? What Kind? 3. Did the training include methods for connecting with the local population in a more participatory manner? 4. Did you find this training useful? How? 34 5. Does your CRD/ CU work more closely with the technical services, such as the Health or Education Services now? 6. Does your CRD/CU allocate some of its local budget to provide technical services? What kind of services? Who identified this need? 7. Has the local government undertaken any projects within the past year that addressed community needs (roads, wells, school construction etc)? 8. Did the officials in your CRD/CU receive training in gender and conflict resolution? 9. Did they receive any training through the FE Project in management of the local government? 10. Specifically, did they receive any training in planning, budgeting, procurement, or monitoring? Which, if any? 11. Did this training result in any decisions considering the way local government functions in this collectivity? 12. Does the local government have any staff? How are they selected? Appointed by whom (ask specifically about the precepteur (tax collector) 13. Have the responsibilities of local government changed in the past 3-5 years??? Are these changes authorized in the law on decentralization? 14. Is your local government authorized to collect specific taxes for local use? Which ones? 15. What is the rate of recovery of national taxes, and local revenues in this CRD/CU? Has it changed in the past 3-5 years? 16. Has the local government undertaken any projects within the past year that addressed community needs (roads, wells, school construction etc)? To ask local government officials 17 Have officials in your CRD/CU been trained in Code des Collectivités, Code Foncier or Code Forestier? If so, has this led to changes in way local government deals with these issues (decentralization, land management, forest management?) 18 Has your local government undertaken any projects within the past year that addressed community needs (roads, wells, school construction etc)? 19 Have officials in your CRD/CU been trained in participatory diagnostics and planning methods? If so, what is anything has changed in the way local government plans and involves citizens? 20 Have officials in your CRD been trained in procurement of goods and services? If so, has this changed the way they award markets? 21 Have official in your CRD/CU been trained in leadership and management to improve the provision of basic public services?  If so, has this improved the provision of those services? 22 Has your CRD/CU undertaken a civic education campaign?   II.B. Questions on Improving Governance Through the Introduction of Democratic Governance Principles in Local Government 1. Since this project began what changes, if any, have taken place in the way your CRD or CU is managed? 2. Specifically, how are local councilors and Mayors selected? Do councilors represent all of the communities in the CRD? 35 3. Have the number of women councilors and Mayors increased in this CRD/ CU since the beginning of this project? (inclusion) 4. When was the last election at this level? Was there any competition for these positions? Did any of the office holders get replaced. (Competition) 5. Does your local government hold meetings that are open to the public? 6. Do representatives of CSOs including health and education committees attend these meetings? 7. Does the local government keep records of its meetings? Are they readily available for the public to see? 8. How does your local government construct its annual budget? Does it consult CBOs in the commune as to their needs? 9. Does the budget take these needs into consideration? How (inclusion and responsiveness) 10. Does your CRD/CU publicize its budget (publish it? Discuss it on local radio? Other means) (transparency). Has it begun doing this since the FE Project started? 11. Has the way the local government makes other programmatic decisions such as its expenditures changes since the FE project began? (empowered participation) 12. Have the revenues of your CRD/cu increased during the past year? 13.During the past year were you consulted by local government representatives about community public service delivery priorities in education, health, agriculture or natural resource management? 14 Have officials in your CRD/CU been trained in participatory diagnostics and planning methods? If so, what is anything has changed in the way local government plans and involves citizens? 1. Have officials in your CRD/CU been trained in anti-corruption tools and practices? If so, has this reduced the amount of corruption in local government? II.C Questions on Improving the Capacity and the Democratic Governance of Civil Society Actors II.C. 1 Capacity and Autonomy 1. Is your civil society association a voluntary and autonomous organization 2. Was it formed by government or by a project? 3. Does the government provide financial support or other forms of logistical support to the CSO? 4. Is this CSO legally recognized? By which Ministry? 5. Has the FE Project supported this CSO in improving and its internal management? If so how? (Board of Directors, regular and open meetings, regular financial reports? Dues paying members?, Women on the Board?) 6. Does your CSO have staff (paid, or voluntary), an office/ telephone or internet connection 7. Have members of your CSO/CBO received training on improving your internal governance and/or organization? 8. How did the internal organization and governance of your organization change as a result? 36 9. Did your organization request and receive training from the FE Project in financial management, civism, awareness of the law of local governments? 10. If so did this training or technical assistance result in the way your organization performed these functions? 11. Has your CSO received a grant from the FE Project or one of its partners? QUESTIONS 11-12: Particularly for particularly for youth and student associations, and women’s associations) 12. id your association receive training in civic education, conflict resolution, or HIV.AIDS prevention? 13. Did members or officials of your CSO receive training on the Code des Collectivités, Code Foncier, Code Forestier? 14. If so, did this training help them participate and influence the making or implementation of policies in these areas? II.C. 2 Advocacy Capacity 15Has the FE Project supported the CSO in improving its advocacy capacity? How specifically? 16. Has the CSO/ CBO met with officials from the deconcentrated services within the past six months to discuss a service or management issue? 17. Has your CSO advocated on an issue of importance to their organization at a CRD/CU meeting? 18. Has it undertaken an advocacy campaign in the past six months? What issues? What technique employed? What result? 19. Has it undertaken a mobilization or lobby campaign? How often? What issues? 20. Has it undertaken a collective activity with one or more other organizations (women’s groups, youth, APEAEs, COGES, local government, other local NGOs) 21 .Has your CSO monitored the budget process at the level of local government? 22. Has the FE Project supported a CSO or CBO federation in any area of interest to your organization? If so, has the lobbying capacity of this federation increased in the last several years? Additional Questions to be Asked at the Local Level Regarding Increased citizen access to diverse sources and types of information Capacity (To ask people in the media) 1. To your knowledge has the FE Project assisted in the opening or supported independent radio stations? 2. If so, do they help people understand and influence policies of importance to you? 37 3. Have you been trained in the concepts of good governance and improvement of delivery of public services? III. MEDIA IMPACT (Ask local level people or officials) 1. Have you heard media (radio?) broadcasts on good governance principles and on citizen obligations (voting, paying taxes) 2. Have you heard any broadcasts about improving local social services and using specific services (such as AIDs counseling and testing)? 3. Have you heard any broadcasts about corruption? 4. Have you heard any broadcasts about local government meetings? 5. If so, as a result of these broadcasts have you or your local government taken any steps to adopt the behavior being promoted on the radio? adopt democratic governance principles?    38 ANNEX 2 ORGANIZING THE DATA Instructions: Following your field work review your notes and organize the information on this form inserting all the relevant information for the particular question or issue posed in the Scope of Work. We will then synthesize this data into a set of findings supported by the field observations. I. Overall Issues: Assess FE’s multi-sectoral to advancing Dem Governance, while achieving changes in specific sector impacts Really three issues 1. What was the FE approach? 2. What evidence is there that FE approach helped advance democratic governance a. At level of local government units (CU CRD) b. At level of local civil society CSOs and COBs c. At level of methods of technical services (deconcentrated) d. Possibly at level of the Administration (prefets/ sous prefets) e. Evidence that FE helped change specific sector impacts (positively??) 3. To what degree did work at local level result in systematic democratic and sectoral changes in project area and possibly beyond? a. Is there any evidence that FE produced change beyond the local level? If so specify 4. To what degree did FE make progress in meeting deliverables as described in annual work plans, Which? 5. To what degree did FE help or hinder local capacity development and substantive involvement of local partners at all levels of programming Data from interviews with local NGO partners 6. Does DG approach work better in some sectors than others (health, education, agriculture, NRM?) Field evidence of how it worked in different sectors, including Governance (local government) 7. What was the impact of FE on civic participation, civic education Evidence of changes in way citizen relate to the governance process; 8. Was the use of the Champion approach efficient (how chosen, how effective? ) 39 ANNEX  3 SCOPE OF WORK REVISED 1/11/11 USAID GUINEA FAISONS ENSEMBLE   Project Performance Assessment and Lessons Learned* Scope of Work Summary   In 2005, USAID conducted a fragile states assessment in Guinea. The assessment revealed the country’s inherent fragility and identified poor governance as the principle cause of the development problems facing Guinea:  Endemic corruption, low economic‐growth rates, weak political and civil society institutions, and inability or unwillingness to deliver effective public goods and essential services. At the time of the assessment, USAID/Washington required Missions in countries that were considered fragile to design country strategies aimed at addressing the sources of fragility.  The Mission therefore embarked on a strategy and program design process focused on a single Mission objective, Advancing Democratic Governance, working not only through the Democracy and Governance (DG) sector, but also through the social sectors.   The assessment and country strategy discussions also led to the hypothesis that improvements in the governance setting could lead to improvements in the socioeconomic development of Guinea. The above two assumptions, that strategic interventions in the social sectors, primarily focused on strengthening citizen participation while increasing transparency and accountability of government institutions, could help advance broader DG goals, and that such interventions could also result in improvements in the social sectors, drove the innovative design of the Faisons Ensemble (Working Together) project.  The premise of the latter hypothesis is that through mechanisms of transparency, citizen participation in decision‐making, and improved local and other targeted government structures and systems, existing and supplemental resources will be used more efficiently leading to improved socioeconomic conditions.   The DG hypothesis was that with limited space in the national arena to advance democratic reforms, a long‐term approach of strengthening citizen participation and civic awareness, primarily by addressing transparency and poor governance through the social sectors, and promoting government accountability and transparency where feasible, were the most viable options for addressing fragility at that time in Guinea and laying the foundations for a more democratic society.   The Mission was also faced with the challenge that the majority of its funding was earmarked at that time.   The FE project has been cited in Thomas Carothers’ article, “The Elusive Synthesis” (October 2010) in which he calls Faisons Ensemble Project a good model of a new USAID “cross‐cutting program” focus.   Other members of the DG community have also recently been promoting the concept of collaboration with other development sectors in order to lay the seeds of democracy and good governance and achieve public support for democratic reforms through tangible improvements in the social sectors; however, it remains uncertain to what extent and how these ‘integrative approaches’ help advance systemic democratic change.  At the same time, there have been questions from the social sectors about whether approaching health, education, and other sector development is most effective  through                                                              * Note:  An Addendum follows the Faisons Ensemble SOW:  Democracy/Governance Follow‐On Assessment SOW.   A mini DG assessment would be geared heavily towards establishing programmatic recommendations that can be used by the Mission. 40 democracy and governance‐oriented interventionss. With three years of programming in Guinea, the time is right to assess the project by reviewing the assumptions that shaped its design, and evaluating what have been the sector‐specific and project‐wide impacts.  It is also hoped that the evaluation will also greatly contribute to the larger discussion of cross‐sectoral collaboration and integration. The implementation of the Faison Ensemble development approach has coincided with an incredibly dramatic and insecure period for Guinea.  The project began in March 2007, just two months after government security forces brutally repressed protesters in a general strike in January, resulting in at least 137 deaths and some 1,700 injured.  A military mutiny and clashes with the police force in May and June 2008 resulted in additional deaths and injuries, albeit not on the scale of January 2007.  These events were followed by a military coup in December 2008, a brutal massacre of pro‐democracy supporters in 2009 that shocked the country, and finally a transition to the first freely elected president in Guinea’s history in 2010. The political and security context has unavoidably affected the implementation of Faisons Ensemble  by changing the terms with which the partner was to interact with the Government of Guinea as well as simply through restricting movement and activities during times of unrest.  And after the December 2008 coup, in accordance with USG’s guidelines on suspending assistance in Guinea, USAID instructed the partner to halt all DG related assistance to the central government.  DG assistance to CRD’s and communes with locally elected officials was permitted to continue.  USG policy also permitted humanitarian assistance to continue.  This included work in the health and education sectors where the project was permitted to continue to engage the central government and support for subsistence agriculture.   The evaluation will validate FE’s approach to achieve both DG results as well as results in the social sectors. .  The evaluation will also analyze the Faisons Ensemble execution of the project, the impact of the political context in Guinea, and the lessons that can be learned from implementing a program with its new and different  approach. Introduction The Republic of Guinea is located on the West Coast of Africa and bordered by six countries, of which four (Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Liberia) have experienced periods of major instability and sometimes conflict in recent years. (Ivory Coast, Guinea’s neighbor to the south‐east is in chaos today, sending hundreds of refugees to Guinea.)     Guinea is a stark example of the impact of poor governance.  It is abundantly rich in natural resources, yet its people live in poverty.  Guinea possesses over one‐third of the world’s known reserves of bauxite, which is used to produce aluminum, and a considerable quantity of gold, diamonds, uranium and iron ore. In addition, Guinea’s soil, water and climatic conditions give the country enormous agricultural potential, yet barely a fifth is being exploited. Guinea’s population is estimated at 10 million, with 70% living on less than $1.26 per day. Life expectancy, literacy rates, and child and maternal mortality rates are among the worst in the world, Guinea ranks 160 out of 177 countries according to the United Nations Development Program’s Human Development Index. Access to primary education has improved markedly during the past ten years, but there exist significant shortfalls in children’s completion of primary school. The Guinean education system is increasingly unable to meet the growing demands of its population, and there are significant deficiencies in the quality of schools, and their gender equity. 2010 has been a year of remarkable political transition for Guinea. On September 28, 2009, a pro‐ democracy rally ended with the senseless massacre of more than 150 Guineans by soldiers of the 41 military government. In December, an attempt on the life of the coup leader removed him from an active role in Guinea, and a transition government emerged, spawning a hopeful political future for Guinea. This set the stage for presidential elections, which became the major focus of USG assistance to Guinea in 2010. While the conduct of the first round in June 2010 was less than perfect, the process garnered the stamp of approval from the international community. By the end of the fiscal year, efforts to organize the second round resulted in the successful election on November 7, 2010 of Guinea’s first democratically‐elected president in history, with the new President’s peaceful inauguration on December 21, 2010.   2010 ends with the prospect of democracy for the first time in Guinea’s 52 year post‐independence history. However, the new government, and Guinea, inherits a host of problems rooted in decades of poor governance and mismanagement: weak public institutions and little management of public finances, lack of accountability and transparency, widespread corruption and absence of the rule of law, and an army accustomed to operating without control and with its fingers in many aspects of the economy. These factors have hindered progress on decentralization of services, local governance and provision of adequate social services at the community level.   “Faisons Ensemble” Background In 2005, USAID conducted a fragile states assessment in Guinea. The assessment revealed the country’s inherent fragility, and cited poor governance as the principle cause of the development problems facing Guinea: endemic corruption, low economic-growth rates, weak political and civil society institutions, and inability or unwillingness to deliver effective public goods and essential services. Informed by the fragile state assessment and other findings, USAID/Guinea took a bold step of designing a strategy that had a single strategic objective (SO): “Advance Democratic Governance”. The strategy has four DG Goals, two per each of the two intermediate results: “Improved Effectiveness, Accountability and Transparency of Government of Guinea Institutions in the Productive and Social Sectors”, and “Strengthened Citizen Participation and Advocacy”. Under its new strategy, USAID used earmarks and social sector funding to advance democratic governance while meeting the goals of the other sectors. The Mission designed a multi-sector bilateral program, Faisons Ensemble, (“Working Together”) to implement its unique strategy. Faisons Ensemble is a seven-member consortium including two Guinean non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The cooperative grant agreement with Research Triangle Institute (RTI) is valued at $31.9 million and initiated activities in March 2007. The project currently ends in Sept 2011. The project was slightly delayed due to political instability in the country and to logistical challenges in getting the implementing partners onboard. The RTI consortium’s technical interventions support outcomes across targeted sectors (democracy and governance, health services, education and agriculture, and natural resources management (NRM)). USAID/Guinea’s four DG goals are: 1. Improved Effectiveness of Government Institutions and Decentralization and Local Service Delivery 2. Greater Visibility and Effectiveness of Anti-Corruption Efforts 42 3. Increased Capacity and Effectiveness of Civil Society, working through strong CSOs and CBOs that are well managed and participate, demand accountability and transparency in service delivery, and advocate for good governance. 4. Increased Citizen Access to More Diverse Sources and Types of Information The project targets the regions of greater Conakry, Upper Guinea and Forest Guinea and set out to directly impact 113 rural development committees, 620 civil society organizations (CSO) and more than 400 community-based organizations (CBOs), plus independent media within these jurisdictions. The program as designed also targeted 10 vanguard ministries or ministry services, national institutes, agencies and commissions and was expected to reach thousands of national, regional and local CSOs by working through CSO networks, coalitions, federations, and umbrella organizations. In 2009, the USG imposed restrictions on official development assistance to government ministries in reaction to the military coup of late 2008. In early 2009, the USG suspended all assistance to the Government of Guinea except for assistance supporting elections and the political process and humanitarian assistance. While it suspended all DG assistance other than elections assistance to the central government, USG suspension guidance permitted the Faisons Ensemble project to continue its DG work in CRDs and communes with locally elected leadership as it was deemed that this supported “the political process”. The USG interpreted “humanitarian assistance” to include assistance in the health and education sectors. Accordingly, USAID partners, including Faisons Ensemble, were permitted to continue to engage with the central government in these sectors, although work with the central government in these sectors was substantially scaled back in practice and ended (except for work with government employees of deconcentrated services at the local level) after the September 28 massacre. PURPOSE The purpose of this evaluation is to provide USAID/Guinea with sufficient information to make critical programmatic and budgetary decisions regarding the future strategic and programmatic direction of the Faisons Ensemble program. It also aims to identify the lessons learned of this cross-cutting/multi-sector approach for future Mission programming decisions. To achieve this, the evaluation will document progress achieved by Faisons Ensemble to the present, identify key lessons learned and make recommendations on the most effective and cost efficient path forward for future activities. The evaluation also will provide insights on the current strategic approach taken by the Mission and make recommendations for potential future directions. Finally, it is envisioned that the lessons learned from the Faisons Ensemble program may prove beneficial to other Missions interested in such approaches. The evaluation will be led by an external consultant with expertise in evaluation, democracy and governance, and cross￾sectoral programming, with participation from USAID representatives from different sectors. Objectives of the evaluation: 1. To assess Faisons Ensemble’s multi-sector approach to advance democratic governance, USAID/Guinea’s single strategic objective, while achieving changes in specific sector impacts. 43 2. To assess the extent to which local level and sector interventions may have resulted in systemic democratic and/or sectoral changes in the project areas and possibly outside those areas. 3. To assess the relevance/applicability of the Mission’s current strategic objective and vision under the current political realities with their inherent instability. Is this the best model for Guinea right now and in the near future? 4. To assess use of earmarked funds in achievement of results at both the sector level and the four overarching DG Goals. (This is particularly important with respect to the health account.) 5. Make recommendations for : a. Short term: identify strategic and programmatic adjustments that would improve performance in alignment of mission strategy and sector targets in the remaining period of the agreement. b. Long-term interventions and adjustments, particularly in relation to the relevance of the Mission’s strategic vision for Guinea under the political realities and deeply entrenched governance issues. 6. Identify key lessons learned in planning, implementation, monitoring, coordination, and managing an integrated and multi-sector program, with special attention to the operational models and mechanisms that were utilized (i.e., having one large mechanism with a consortium of members, selection of key personnel to manage the program, etc.). What are the challenges of a multi-sector integrated program? What are the benefits and opportunities? What are the sector budgetary implications? 7. To assess Faisons Ensemble progress to date in meeting the deliverables as described in the annual work plans and in the cooperative agreement. 8. To assess the extent to which the Faisons Ensemble model facilitated or hindered local capacity development and the substantive involvement of local partners at all levels of programming. This is important as the Mission is interested in exploring how to more directly and effectively engage with local partners in the future. 9. To make practical recommendations on future programming of Faisons Ensemble (or of a Faisons Ensemble-like program) for USAID/Guinea. ISSUES TO BE INVESTIGATED The following questions should assist to investigate specific issues to fulfill the assessment objectives: Strategic Issues 1. Project Design The fragility analysis of Guinea in 2005 identified poor governance as a blockage to the development of Guinea. This analysis led to the base assumption of Faisons Ensemble, improving governance should allow for development in Guinea to proceed. This central assumption has been tested for three years and should be an important component of the assessment. It is also critical to assess the extent to which the Faisons Ensemble approach helped to advance democratic governance. 44 2. Sectoral Impacts The Faisons Ensemble project targeted the sectors of democracy and governance, health, education, agriculture, and natural-resource management. Is there a difference in the impact of governance programming across these sectors? Are some sectors more suitable for such interventions than others? What were similar positive outcomes across sectors? What were similar challenges? 3. Connection Between Local and National Governance In what ways have democracy and governance activities conducted at the local level impacted democracy and governance issues currently at play at the national level or outside the target regions? Was there any sustainable change in the national government through programming prior to the imposition of aid restrictions? Did local governance programming impact national governance conditions? If not, did it lay the groundwork for governance improvements nationally and in the relationship between national and local governments? Was it possible to effectively organize local governance programming during Guinea’s political crisis and transition? Has the central Government of Guinea played a role in supporting local governance initiatives? 4. Impact of Civic Participation, Civic Education and Media Interventions How were civic participation and education activities integrated into social sector activities? What was the impact of these interventions? Did local level citizen participation and awareness raising interventions have reverberations at other levels of society? If so, how? What was the impact of the media component of Faisons Ensemble on advancing democratic governance and on achieving other sector results? 5. Funding Allocations An important reason for the design of the project was to have maximum impact and sector resources (especially earmarked funds) of the program on the ground. Was this programmatic choice an efficient use of sector-specific funds? What lessons can be learned from combining sector funds under one project? 6. Use of Select ‘Champion’ Examples Faisons Ensemble made a strategic decision to target ‘Champions’ within government and among target communities. How were the ‘champion communities’ and government ‘champions’ chosen and how well was this done? How effective has this approach been? Has the distribution of ‘Champions’ been done efficiently? Were resource limitations the principal reason for the use of champions rather than program design? What was the regional distribution of ‘champion communities’ and how did this choice affect programs? 7. Time Frame Is the time frame across the different strategic questions an important factor? Do some interventions require more long-term intervention than others? Is the three to four year project period a reasonable amount of time to achieve the anticipated change in democratic governance? Programmatic Issues 45 1. Political and Security Challenges Faisons Ensemble has been implemented in a time of tremendous uncertainty, political crisis, and instability in Guinea. To what extent has the programming been affected by the crisis? Is the impact limited to delayed activities or have there been more substantive changes to the project design due to conditions within the country? Are there lessons learned or risk mitigation measures that would be useful for a similar project in the future? 2. Program Flexibility How flexible was Faisons Ensemble in adapting to the shifting political reality? To what extent was the program able to effectively adapt to new political circumstances? What were the limitations and how could they be addressed through future programming? 3. Work Plan Has the program achieved set targets/output/outcomes as described in the USAID operational plan and PMP? What were the challenges and successes? Were the indicators appropriate for measuring sector impact? Do they reflect USAID OP indicators (e.g. no indicators for immunization coverage or for some of the cross-cutting indicators like youth, donor coordination, and gender). Management Issues 1. Implementing Partner Activities and Management Faisons Ensemble had a slow start-up period and has had several changes in management in Guinea. What has been the effect of these issues on the project? Are there lessons learned or risk mitigation measures that would be useful for a similar project in the future? 2. Implementing Partner Organization Was the use of multiple sub-grantees under one implementing partner a suitable mechanism for the program? How effective was local organizational capacity building through the Faisons Ensemble structure? To what extent were local partners able to substantively contribute to the program? Are there lessons learned that would be useful for a similar project in the future? What are the management structures in place within Faisons Ensemble and the Mission to manage this complex multi-sector program? Are they adequate? How did personnel decisions affect program implementation (i.e., targeting key personnel with specific professional backgrounds, etc.)? What measures has the Mission taken to manage the program (i.e., combined field visits, regular meetings across sectors)? METHODS AND PROCEDURES The evaluators should consider a range of possible methods and approaches for collecting and analyzing the information required to assess the evaluation objectives. The methodology will include, but not be limited to: document review, key informant interviews (including 46 USAID/Guinea staff, new GoG officials, and other Donors/International Agencies), participatory monitoring and evaluation techniques within the target communities, site visits, and observation. Existing Data Sources  Field Data: o Local budgetary information o Local medical system information o Other locally available data from government agencies related to health, education, agriculture (in lieu of a baseline analysis, this might help understand increased enrollment, clientele visits, etc.)  Guinea Fragile States Assessment and other assessment materials  Mission Strategy Paper 2006-2008  APS and FE proposal, 2006  Cooperative Agreement RTI  MSI 2006-2008 Baseline Survey for USAID Guinea Strategy of Advanced Democratic Governance  Faisons Ensemble annual work plans  Faisons Ensemble annual and quarterly reports  Faisons Ensemble monitoring and evaluation plan  Government of Guinea Transition Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (2010-2011) Data collections Key informant interviews will include but not limited to the following sources. Key Stakeholders in Field  Relevant local government officials in greater Conakry, Upper Guinea, and Forested Guinea  Local leaders (official and informal) of target communities, especially in ‘champion’ communities  Community members of target communities, especially in ‘champion’ communities  Local clinic, education, and other government services staff at the targeted community level  NGOs, CSOs, CBOs, and relevant informal organizations present at targeted community level  FE beneficiaries in target areas Faisons Ensemble-connected Sources o RTI program managers and sector specialists in the US o First RTI COP, Steve Snook (now at ARD) o MSI staff involved in the baseline assessment o USAID/Guinea senior management, USAID/Guinea technical team members, USAID/W staff familiar with the program in Guinea and/or the fragile states assessment that was conducted o RTI-cooperating local partner representatives 47 o GoG counterparts from health, education, NRM: Note: since FE has not worked with government agencies or local entities for nearly two years, and a new government will be in place soon, what is the utility of these contacts? o Staff from selected partner NGOs of FE (CENAFOD/MANORIVER) Other International Donors and Partners o Donors (World Bank, AFD, GTZ, Spain, UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, UNFPA) o Project directors for other USAID projects such as ESD, Engender health, Pathfinder, Jphiego, World Education, IFES, NDI, Search for Common Ground. IMPLEMENTATION Team Composition: The evaluation team will comprise a team leader with strong skills in evaluation, democracy and governance, and analysis of cross–sector development programs; a proven track record supervising teams in the field and producing high-quality and concise reports; and extensive experience working in Africa and similar fragile/post-conflict settings. At least an FSI-tested R￾3, S-3 level in French is required. Experience working in Guinea is very desirable. The team leader will:  Finalize and negotiate with USAID/Guinea the evaluation work plan;  Establish evaluation team roles, responsibilities and tasks;  Develop data collection instruments and questionnaire;  Facilitate all necessary meetings in the U.S. and in Guinea;  Ensure that the logistics arrangements in the field are complete;  Coordinate schedules to ensure timely production of deliverables;  Coordinate the process of assembling individual inputs and/findings for the evaluation report and finalizing the evaluation report;  Lead the oral and written preparation and presentation of key evaluation findings and recommendations to USAID/Guinea and USAID/Washington;  Local-hire logistics expert. Other members of the team will include USAID staff members from Washington, including two public health specialists, a democracy and governance specialist;; and an agriculture/ natural resources specialist. The team will include USAID/Guinea staff and, perhaps, depending on the status of the assistance restrictions, some GoG representatives. (Assume the USAID/Guinea staff will serve as the “local Guinea expert/s” or do we need to specifically bring on board a local expert? Also, we should discuss if GOG representatives should be involved in the actual evaluation or serving as key informants/interviewees.) Levels of effort and tasks to be completed 48 Tasks Duration Time for completion7 Initial preparation Review of documents, travel preparation, feedback on the PD, meetings in Washington, etc one week Feb 28-Mar 2, 2011 Travel to Guinea and field work Travel days, briefing with Mission, stakeholders, etc.. Mar 3-4, 2011 Field visit Data collection, analysis, briefing 2 weeks Mar 6-19 Drafting of document 4 days Mar 21-24 Briefing of Mission team and stakeholders 2 days Mar 25 & 28 Finalizing report 1 week Mar 28-Apr 1 Total days required 30 days (work days, including travel time) Scheduling and logistics: USAID/Guinea Assistance Objective Team office and/or local facilitation contractor will be responsible for arranging and providing logistical support to the team, including scheduling meetings and interviews, making copies of key documents and drafts, making travel plans, etc. If required, local enumerators will be hired to collect field level data. Involvement of Stakeholders Local NGOs, CSOs and CBOs, and possibly representatives of the new GoG (see previous comment) will participate in the evaluation. DELIVERABLES Work Plan (week one) Presentation of Findings to USAID (week four) Draft Report (week four) Final Report (week five) Reporting Requirements The format for the evaluation report is as follows: Executive Summary Table of Contents List of Acronyms Introduction Background                                                              7 Assume March start‐up (these dates subject to adjustment depending on schedules of personnel from USAID/Washington). This is the schedule set forth by the original drafter last year, but I think this is too tight.   49 Methodology Finding & Issues Conclusions Recommendations (to include recommendations on future programming directions) Lessons learned References Annexes List of people and organizations consulted 50    ANNEX 4 LIST OF PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS CONSULTED USAID Baldé, Maladho. Acting chief of Education and Democratic Governance Sector, USAID/Guinea Diallo, Anna. Acting Head of Democracy Sector Estes, Nancy. Mission Director Kallo, Oumar U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Fakan, Stephen. Deputy Chief of Mission, US Embassy, Guinea. Moller, Patricia, Ambassador, Embassy of the United States to the Republic of Guinea. Ofrecio, Albert. Political Officer, Human Rights and Justice, 67-10-43-22 INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Ackebo, Felix. Chef de Cabinet- UNICEF Diallo, Dr Ahmed Tidiane- Deputy Representative, UNICEF Yansane, Dr  Mohamed Lamine, Minister of Health and Public Hygiene Zitsamele‐Coddy, Renee. Health Specialist, WHO FAISONS ENSEMBLE CONSORTIUM PARTNERS World Education, Barry, Mamadou Saitou- Interim Director, Barry, Mme Sonaré Oumar Koultonmy, Filloi, Moise CENAFOD (Centre Africane de Formation Pour le Développement), Sylla, Aboubcar. Executive, Director. 224-60-29-98-44/ 64-40-47-16, Touré, Abamba Demba. Assistant Executive Secretary of CENAFOD) RTI- Steve Snook, former Chief of Party of FE; Becky Gadell, former chief of party and governance specialist FAISONS ENSEMBLE NATIONAL AND REGIONAL STAFF Diallo Ibrahima Sona Coordinateur, Dabola Barry Mamadou Lamine M&E , Dabola N'Diaye Sekou Democracy and Governance, Dabola Bah Alhassane Health Specialist, Dabola Sarah Lament Agricultural Specialist, Dabola Baldé, Mamadou Aliou- Faisons Ensemble- Regional M&E officer for Conakry Diallo, Ibrahima. Regional Coordinator of Faisons Ensemble for Faranah and Dabola. Gerber, Dan. Chief of Party, Faisons Ensemble Conakry. Sow, El Hadj. Chief of Section of Democratization. Faisons Ensemble. We met with the entire staff of FE in Kankan NATIONAL GOVERNMENT OF GUINEA Condé, Alhassan. Minister of Decentralization, Ministère de l’Administration du Territoire et de la Decentralisation 64-27-98-19, 60 72 15 79, 62 49 67 94 Koulibaly, Aboubacar. Minister of Audit, du Controle Economique et Financier. Yansane, Dr Mohamed Lamine, Minister of Health and Public Hygiene 51 Decentralized Administration NAME LOCATION POSITION Telephone Cardiné, Baijo. Bate Nafadji Sous-prefet Diallo, Djondjonba. Bissikrima Sous-prefet Lamine Tounkara Bissikrima Deputy Sous-prefet 65-28-35-11 Fode Moussa Toure Bissikrima DSSE 65-76-82-63 Seck Farba Samba Bissikrima Chief of Military Quarters 65-76-74-85 Diawara Karifa Bissikrima Deputy chief of Forestry Service 65-80-86-25 Alimou Barry Bissikrima Chief od Development Service (?) 65-64-23-81 Haba, Anglinr, Beyla Water and Forestry Service Keda N’aonanrdian Beyla Water and Forestry Service Haba, Anglinr, Beyla Water and Forestry Service Keda N’aonanrdian Beyla Water and Forestry Service LOCAL GOVERNMENT FARANAH URBAN COMMUNE Name Location Position Telephone # Alimou Barry C Commune Urbaine Mayor 60-28-84-80 Mamadou Ben Oulare Commune Urbaine 1st Vice Mayor 60-44-21-03 Sire S Oulare Commune Urbaine 2nd Vice mayor 60-35-62-07 Leno Jean Claude Commune Urbaine Secretary General 60-27-63-86 Mamadi Traore Commune Urbaine Councillor 60-26-25-03 Seybou Camara Commune Urbaine Councillor 64-30-90-99 Daouda Kourouma Commune Urbaine Councillor 60-35-62-54 Daouda Kourouma Commune Urbaine Councillor 66-38-56-26 Bangaly Conde Commune Urbaine Councillor 62-44-78-56 Hawa Keita Education D CEE 60-54-59-69 Sekou Keyra Member-cercle d’innovation 60-37-56-41 Alpha Bachiru Barry Commune urbaine Communal tax collector 67-36-23-13 Lancine Camara RENACOT Chief Trainer 60-58-49-26 Ansoumane Kouyate Commune urbaine C.S. Finance 60-46-86-59 Mamady Kaba Sire quartier President 60-58-14-36 Mamadou Camara Assatou quartier President Alhadj Sekou Kourouma Sirikila quartier President Elhadj. mamady Conde Tnkolonko quartier President 60-20-16-44 Ousmane Oulare Abattoire quartier President 64-35-45-82 Aminata diawara Sectary of the 60-36-28-33 52 AFF.S Issa Camara Abattoire quartier President Ibrahima Keita Bandaya quartier President 66-66-64-84 Karamo Oulare Mosque quartier President 66-68-64-84 Sayba Conde Market II quartier President Elhadj M'Bemba Dansoko Market I quartier President 60-57-44-79 Abdoulaye Cisse Chamber of Agriculture Member 64-24-37-79 Lancine Camara Chamber of Agriculture Member 60-63-94-36 Mory Conde Commune urbaine Civil Registrar 60-98-58-55 Sekou Douno Teacher Gnanea Douno Forestry Service Environmental guard 60-58-49-07 Fatoumata Kourouma Cercle d’innovation 60-27-65-54 URBAN COMMUNE OF DABOLA NAME INSTITUTION POSITION Cell Phone Lamine Morodou Diakite Mayor’s Office Secretarty General 64-44-70-48 Ibrahima Fofana Mayor’s Office 64-75-27-35 Alphadio Conde Mayor’s Office/ FONDENG 64-77-03-85 Elhadj Anssoumane Traore Heremakono quartier Quartier chief 64-09-99-60 Manma Barry Sincery quartier Quartier chief 60-36-21-50 Aboubacar Demba Sankhon Mayor’s Office Mayor 62-39-58-23 URBAN COMMUNE OF KANKAN \ Name Position Telephone Elh. Djenabou Mouss Diare Mayor 64-88-87-77 Ibrahima Fofana Calva Secretary General 60-57-07-92 Mamadi Kapo Kaba 1st Vice Maor 65-52-54-46 Amara Bayo Council member 62-42-44-13 Sidiki Keita Council member 60-30-64-35 Mamadou Djouldet Barry - Council member 67-48-00-27 Anssoumane Conde Council member 62-27-20-32 Assata Kante Council member 68-12-21-26 LOCAL GOVERNMENT URBAN COMMUNE OF BISSIKIRMA 53 Names POSITION Cell Phone Sidiki Traore Mayor CUD 65-70-79-67 Mamadou Aliou Diallo Council member 65-51-30-45 Madjou Bah President of the S/C 67-34-98-71 Souleymane Conde Council member 65-32-18-10 Lamine Bah Member civil society 65-65-48-30 Mamadou Saliou Diallo Manager Mutual 67-26-53-92 Fanta Batilou Kaba Council member CUD 65-66-40-57 URBAN COMMUNE OF BEYLA Name Position Bamy, Mamnoh Mayor Camara, Menidjon 1st Vice Mayor Kalisa, Mara. 2nd Vice Mayor Truama, Alphonse Council Member Sona, Jules Nema. Secretary General Haba, Albert Youth delegate Lamah, Fasson. Tax collector LOCAL GOVERNMENT OF Marella (CRD) Name Type of Group Position telephone Bandian Kourouma . Administration Assistant Sous prefet Fore Camara Administration Secretary 66-11-80-80 Abdoulaye Sow CRD Vice President Elhadj Boubacar Sow CRD Council member 66-16-14-33 Sadio Diakite CRD Council member Mamadou Cire Barry CRD Council member 24-70-82-4 Therno Ousmane Barry CRD Council member 64-27-84-74 Mamadou Doumbouya COGES COGES member 66-16-17-90 Fatoumata Mossou Camara Groupe S. Diakite Member Ousmane Barry Agricultural Group President 64-37-85-41 Mamadou Moussa Diakite Agricultural Group Treasurer 66-96-99-59 Mamadou Doumbouya COGES member 66-16-17-90 Amadou Doumbouya COGEF Secretary Ousmane Thiam Barry Sory Group member 66-16-15-27 Moussa Sidibe COGEF President 24-45-85-49 Therno Sanousy Barry GAF President 66-84-49-60 Fatoumate Conde COGEF Member 66-07-74-97 54 Alpha Kabala Keita CSO Member Mamadou Bhoye Barry Humanism Group Secretary 66-11-74-60 Mamadou Thiouto Sidibe Humanism Group President 24-73-07-29 LOCAL GOVERNMENT CRD OF BATE NAFADJI NAMES INSTITUTION POSITION TELEPHONE N'Faly Moba Kaba CRD PRESIDENT 68-27-05-81 Mohamed Naby Soumare CRD Secretary 62-39-97-86 Ibrahima Kalil Diane CRD Treasurer 68-89-40-89 Amara Kaba CRD Council Member Fanta Tounkara CBO Member Sire Tounkara CSO President Sadou Sanoh CSO Member 60-30-98-40 Moussa Kabine Toure COGES Secretary for Information 62-42-47-79 Kabine Ii Kaba COGES Treasurer 62-08-40-48 Sitan Alpha Kaba APEAE/College Vice President 62-39-46-98 Sayon Toure COGES Administrative Secretary 62-22-62-47 Conde Souleymane COGES Information Secretary 62-54-28-81 N'Faly Kaba Benkadi Group Member 62-54-37-19 Amadou Kaba Benkadi Group Member 62-21-25-63 Lancine Kaba CIGES/ CSH Member 62-69-42-04 Diaka Kaba Health Mutual Treasurer 62-94-66-58 Houmou Kaba CSO member Diakoussou Kaba CSO Vice President Ladji Kaba CSO member 62-54-30-02 Iya Madi Kaba Health Mutual President : BOOLA RURAL COMMUNE (CRD) NAME INSTITUTION POSITION Gbananian, Zaoro CRD President Kouracimas, Siamy Manradi CRD Sylla, Amadou- CRD Secretary General Diallo, Halassane Agricultural Service Chief of Agriculture Sector Madiou, Balde Mamadou- CRD Tax collector Keita, Lounceny CRD Treasurer LOCAL IMPLEMENTING PARTNER 55 AGUITEB (Association Guinéenne des Techniciens Biomédicaux) ,KANKAN Names POSITION Cell Phone Boubacar Biro Barry President 64-50-51-78 D'Issa Camara President 68-13-97-51 Laye Conde Animateur 62-29-28-94 Aliou Camara Animateur 64-44-73-32 Moussa Dioubate Animateur 63-10-34-24 M'Saran Doumbouya Secretaire Comptable 60-27-22-12 Mme. Sow Houssanatou suivi evaluation 67-30-55-28 Niouma Serge Leno Dr. Executive 68-71-23-33 Mamady Diakite AS 66-15-72-90 IBGRN (Initiatives de Base Pour la Gestion des Ressources, Faranah Name POSITION CelL Phone Macky diallo Coordinateur 62-44-37-98 Djba fofana Animateur 66-73-76-78 Hawa Barry Secretaire Comptable 68-10-59-94 Moussa Mosquee Camara Animateur 64-94-52-58 Ousmane Diallo Animateur 64-00-16-61 APIC (Association pour la Promotion des Initiatives Communautaires), Faranah NAMES POSITION Cell Phone Bangaly Oulare Stagaire 60-60-19-41 Mamady Conde Secretaire 64-84-49-76/60-92-35-20 Mamady Bintou Oulare President 60-27-65-69/68-28-50-60 Fadou Mara Vice President 60-40-53-96 Amadou Nala Kourouma Animateur 60-31-65-90 laye Oulare Animateur 60-32-38-20 Karifa Oulare External Affairs 60-32-38-36 Diallo Amadou Bailo A.S. 68-20-02-16/30-32-32-47 Baba Traore Secretaire Comptable 60-63-79-92 ADIC (Association pour la promotion des Initiatives Communautaire), KANKAN Names POSITION Cell Phone Nainy Conde Coordinateur 64-45-30-49 Mamady Kaba Vice President 62-43-12-01 Ibrahima Kourouma Animateur 67-24-87-86 Mamady Kaba Animateur 64-30-16-84 Aissatou Barry Animateur 62-40-25-40 Ansoumane Conde Animateur 64-64-65-79 Manty conde Animatrice 66-43-69-03 Fani Lama Animatrice 60-57-81-20/66-13-99-54 NGOS/ CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATION 56 National NGOs CNOSCG (Conseil National des Organisations de la Société Civile Guinéenne) Cissoko, Ibrahima Sory (Dr). President Diop, Aziz. Executive Secretary 224-62-40-44-26/ 64-35-84-75 Poirier, Rodolphe, Technical Assistant to CNOSCG. 62-90-73-23/ rodolphepoirier@LAPOSTE.NET (French Technical Assistant). CENAFOD (Centre Africane de Formation Pour le Développement) Sylla, Aboubcar. Executive Director. 224-60-29-98-44/ 64-40-47-16 Touré, Abamba Demba. Assistant Executive Secretary of CENAFOD) CSO COGEF (Forest Management Committee) Marella , Faranah Names POSITION Cell Phone Mamadou Bhouriya Diallo President Doumbouya amadou Secretaire Barry amadou Member 64-37-85-41 Thiwto Sidibe Member Doumbouya Seny Member OTHER COMMUNITY BASED GROUPS AT MARELLA. Name of the Group Groupement AGRICOLE BENKADI Groupement AGRICOLE DE FITABA AGROPASTORAL DARESSALAM HUMANISME FITABA COGEF COGES AGRICOLE BOUSSOURA KONKOBA AGRICOLE YENGUISSA Gardening Group SORY DIAKITE HEALTH MUTUAL MARELLA APEAE COORDINATION OF APEAEs, FARANAH Names POSITION Cell Phone Toure Doura President 60-32-33-55 Kande Mamourou Vice President 67-42-34-02 Dambele Mamadou Tresorier 60-58-79-91 Oulare Bakary Secretaire 60-79-43-81 Moussa Toure Secretaire Organisation 68-36-18-87 Sory Oulare Tresorier 60-32-31-03 COMMUNITY BASED ORGANIZATION 57 AJDEL/BISSIKIRMA Name POSITION Cell Phone Sory Conde President 67-66-72-53 Madjou Bah Membre 67-34-98-71 Balla Keita 2em Secretaire org. 65-84-77-02 Karamo Marigo 1er Secretaire org. 67-40-11-94 Tati Dioubate 65-32-17-03 AJAK- CSO- Beyla Name Guemou, Jean Loua, Thedor Guizima, Zouo Selemou, Marcer Camara, Cécé Sagno, Duo-Duo Sakouogui, Siné APEAE Beyla FUDRORIZ (Fédération des Unions des Producteurs de Riz) KANKAN Names POSITION Cell Phone Mamadi Kakoro President 64-32-38-53 Facamoudou Traore Coordinateur 62-15-36-47 Lansany Fofana Consultant 64-71-44-03 Djbril Diallo Stagiaire 64-93-55-97 Nmanian Doumbouya Stagiaire 67-49-05-10 Yaya Doumbouya Stagiaire 62-42-44-53 Denda Toure Comptable 65-33-41-54 HEALTH CENTER, HEALTH COMMITTES (COGES, CSH, HEALTH MUTUAL) OF BISSIKRIMA NAMES INSTITUTION POSITION Cell Phone Aguibou Diallo Mutuelle Ex. PCG 65-65-43-30 Lamine Bah Mutuielle Secretaire 65-65-48-30 Mamadou Saliou Diallo UPMS Manager Union 67-26-53-92 Ibrahima Konate CSH Vice President 65-60-45-01 Abdoulaye Keita AC President 65-70-80-74 Fode Kourouma AC 67-01-05-90 Souleymane Conde CSH President 67-01-05-90/65-32-18-10 Marck Ouamouno C.S.H. Tresorier 65-80-56-94 Pierre Leno P.E.V. Charge 67-72-95-65 Slain Guilavogui CCS 65-52-29-73 VOLUNTARY COUNSELING AND TESTING CENTER (CDV HEREMAKONO REGIONAL HOSPITAL , KANKAN Names POSITION Cell Phone 58 Dr. Issa Camara Responsible 68-13-97-51 Dr. Camara Mamoudou Laboratin 60-63-70-54 Mme. Gnamakoro Conde Conseiller 1 67-70-33-07 Mme. Marcel Seny Conseiller 2 68-97-89-06 Mme. Nan Djema Keita Conseiller 3 60-30-74-60 Ibrahima Diallo DGA 60-41-68-48 Mamadi Kourouma Head Doctor 60-58-05-07 DEPARTMENTAL HEALTH SERVICE (DPS), KANKAN NAMES INSTITUTION POSITION Cell Phone Dr. Daff Boubacar DPS Directeur 64-88-50-09 HEALTH CENTER, HEALTH COMMITTEES AND HEALTH MUTUAL OF KABADA, KANKAN Names INSTITUTION POSITION Cell Phone Mory Bamba Mutual President 67-00-67-49 Daouda Doumbouya Mutual S, Formation 62-03-02-49 Setiqui Conde Mutuak S. Organisation 63-18-93-74 Maimouna Camara Mutual S. Aff. Sociale Keita Balla COGES S/Admin. Kaba Conde COGES s/Organisation Mamadi Conde COGES President Cheick Conde CSH-Hygiene President Mariama Camara CSH-Hygiene Matronne Billy nankouman CSH-Hygiene Trearsuer Hawa Keita Mutual Tresorier 60-46-51-86 Karifa Tounkara Mutual 60-27-25-80 Adama Turpin CSH-Hygiene Laboratin 60-23-36-23 Fanta cherif CSH-Hygiene Midwife Maimouna Diallo CSH-Hygiene Pharmacienne 67-27-28-98 Doussou Kourouma CSH-Hygiene CPC 62-54-08-01 Fanta Diane CSH-Hygiene CPN 63-58-08-01 Sitan Camara CSN-Hygiene Injection 64-47-17-92 Naguoma Sidibe CSH-Hygiene accueille 62-28-71-31 Maimouna Traore CSH-Hygiene C. Souvi 63-18-95-35 Doussou Diawara Hygiene A/PEV 62-45-50-90 Fatoumata Kaba Hygiene C. Souvi 60-30-62-22 Djenabou Sow Hygiene C. Souvi 60-46-58-03 Rosaline Tonguiano Hygiene Accueille 66-04-01-21 CSO COGES, Health Mutual , Marella/Faranah Names INSTITUTION POSITION Cell Phone Moussa Sidibe COGES President 24-45-85-19 Sere Toure COGES Chef Centre 66-57-80-42 Oye Guilavogui COGES 66-70-73-89 Mamadou Doumbouya COGES Secretary 66-16-17-90 Bandian Kourouma COGES Adj. S/G 64-01-40-03 Kiya Cherif COGES Organisation 64-34-37-55 59 Fatoumata Conde COGES Information 66-07-74-97 Ansoumane Traore COGES Laborantin 64-85-86-93 Mamadou Yero Keita Mutuelle President Salioudjan Bah Mutuelle Organisation 66-29-28-99 Alphadio Diallo Mutuelle Membre Sousany Sonamou Midwife 66-11-84-53 Fanta Keita Midwife HEALTH CENTER, HEALTH COMMITTEES, HEALTH MUTUAL OF DABOLA Names INSTITUTION POSITION Cell Phone Ibrahima Fofana CSH-Comite d'hygene President 66-75-27-35 Mamadou Bilo Diakite Comite d'hygene 62-31-42-67 Fode Mamadou Kaba Comite d'hygene 64-81-07-65 Abdoul Aziz Diallo Comite d'hygene mobilisation 66-49-36-13 Elhadj Kabine Barry COGES Tresorie 65-31-22-18 Ramata Diakite Mutuelle mobilisation 62-04-05-76 Katherine Koulibaly Mutuelle 65-80-58-04 Baba Alimou Barry COGES President 64-62-63-70 Satala Balde COGES Vice President 60-36-21-91 VOLUNTARY COUNSELING AND TESTING CENTER, SALAMANIA, KANKAN NAMES POSITION Telephone Aissata Bah ATS 67-04-66-38 Sidiki Konate ATS 67-27-25-79 Dr. Laye Nabe Chief of Laboratory 63-73-56-78 CSO UGAD( UNION DES GROUPEMENTS DES AGRICULTEURS DE DABOLA Karfala Mara Sabary S. Administration 62-50-78-43/67- 36-31-68 Hawa Mara Sabary President 66-85-34-72 Noumousso Bamba Babiliya Treasurer 66-70-27-47 Mouctar Barry Horoya Vice President 64-57-39-85 Ibrahima Doumbouya Hankilimaya Hankilimaya Chief of Production 65-30-10-26 Daouda Toure BenKadi Social Affairs 64-09-99-17 Karamo diaby Benkadi watchman 64-36-96-45/62- 04-06-17 Safin Dabo Hamana Information Communication 64-04-25-07 Karamo Doumbouya Katiya Monitoring evaluation 64-36-24-47 Kounta Kaba Heremakonon Information communication 65-80-57-97 Bintou Conde Sabary Literacy 65-83-11-20 60 CBO WAKALI OF TINKISI, DABOLA Names POSITION Cell Phone Koumba Keita President 62-41-31-60 Saranba Mara C.C Fanta Camara Treasurer Gnama Camara Vice President Aye Camara Organization Nantenen Diakite Secretary 66-85-14-94 Aissatou Camara Member Fanta Sonkon Council member 13 other women AJEABSO-CSO Beyla Condé, N’Vakassama Kané, Firano Cone, Falinkou Koné, Abdoulaye Koné, Zoumana Koné, Mamdi Bintou RADIO STATIONS--- Station Name Person’s Name Position Telephone RADIO Communautaire de Bissikrima, Kalley Fatoumata Bamba Director 67-76-59-87/62- 87-23-35. RADIO Communautaire de BAMBOU FM Faranah Centre RADIO HORIZON FM KANKAN Elhadj Sarbou Keita Director RADIO HORIZON FM KANKAN Ibrahima Fofana Technical Director 67-58-41-90; RADIO HORIZON FM KANKAN Rosine Batchyli DAAF 62-39-83-75, RADIO HORIZON FM KANKAN Victor Faya Ifono Head of Programming 68-68-02-31 RADIO HORIZON FM KANKAN ; Fabou Koulibaly Chief writer 62-93-98-99, RADIO HORIZON FM KANKAN RADIO HORIZON FM KANKAN Balla Keita, Reporter 67-54-79-20 RADIO HORIZON FM KANKAN Michel Pir, Reporter 68-46-63-73 RADIO HORIZON FM KANKAN Lamine Dabo FM Reporter 62-46-43-43 RADIO LIBERTE FM, N’ZEREKORE RADIO Communautaire de Dabola Centre 61 62 ANNEX 5  REFERENCES BBC News. “Guinea Bankrupted by Junta- President Alpha Conde,” February 22, 2011. Diallo, Samba."Sources potential sources of conflict and instability in Guinea” USAID, May 2001 Direction Nationale de la Statistique (DNS) and ORC Macro. 2006. Demographic and Health Survey 2005: Docking,Tim , Dialogue et collaboration pour la mitigation des sources potentielles de conflits en Guinea. Washington, D.C. :Development Associates, December 1999 Faisons Ensemble, « Quelques Realisations Majeures Du Projet, mai 2007 – février 2011. » Conakry : 2011. Management Systems International (MSI) ”2006-2008 Baseline Survey For USAID Guinea Strategy Of Advanced Democratic Governance, Final Draft Report. Washington, D.C. MSI, March 2008. RTI International. “Revised Technical Application: Multi-Sectoral Interventions to Advance Democratic Governance in Guinea.” Research Triangle, N.C. February 23, 2007. University of Sonfonia (Guinea) Citizen Opinion Survey in Faisons Ensemble Project Zone: Conakry: University of Sonfonia, September 2008. University of Sonfonia. « Sondage d’Opinion des Citoyens de la Zone du Projet “Faisons Ensemble, » Conakry : University of Sonfonia, November, 2009. USAID/ Guinea. Strategy Statement, 2006-2008. USAID/ Guinea. Fragile State Assessment-Results and Recommendations. May, 2005. USAID/ Guinea. Annual Program Statement (Aps) Fy 2006-2008 Working Draft. Conakry: USAID Guinea, June 26, 2006. Wentling, Mark. Guinea: potential sources of conflict and instability., Washington: Development Associates, November 1998 World Education/ Guinea. Community Participation for Equity and Quality in Basic Education in Guinea (PACEEQ)- Final Report-2001-2007. Conakry: World Education, 2007. Yerkes, Maryanne.. “Observations and Recommendations for Justice and Security Sector Reform (JSSR) in Guinea,” Washington, D.C.:USAID DCHA/DG, nd (2010?).