Evaluation of the USAID/Pakistan 
Legislative Strengthening Project 
FINAL REPORT
January 2008 
This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International 
Development. It was prepared under Contract GS-10F-0425M, Order No. 391-M-00-08-01099. The 
report was authored by David Ogle, Team Leader, and Robert LaPorte. 
DISCLAIMER 
The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government.
Table of Contents 
Executive Summary............................................................................................................ 1 
1. Program Overview, Evaluation Team and Methodology ............................................... 4 
1.1 Overview of Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program (PLSP) .......................... 4 
1.2 USAID Evaluation Protocol ..................................................................................... 5 
1.3 Checchi Evaluation Team......................................................................................... 5 
1.4 Evaluation Methodology........................................................................................... 6 
2. The PLSP Program in a Historical and Political Context............................................... 8 
2.1 The Political Environment of Pakistan: The Beginning ......................................... 8 
2.2 The Role of Legislatures in Pakistan ...................................................................... 8 
2.3 Other Political Factors That Have Affected Parliamentary Development............ 17 
3. Evaluation of the PLSP Program, 2005-07................................................................... 20 
3.1 Project Administration and Organization ............................................................... 20 
3.2 PLSP Program Accomplishments........................................................................... 23 
3.3 Performance Measurement ..................................................................................... 27 
3.4 Problem Areas......................................................................................................... 28 
4. The PLSP Program beyond March 31, 2008 ................................................................ 32 
4.1 Extension of PLSP Program ................................................................................... 32 
4.2 Matters for Consideration in an Extended PLSP Program ..................................... 32 
4.3 Suggested Activities for an Extended PLSP Program ............................................ 35 
Appendix A – PLSP Project Organization Chart.............................................................. 42 
Appendix B – Documents Reviewed................................................................................ 43 
Appendix C – Individuals Interviewed............................................................................. 44 
Appendix D – Questionnaires Used In Interviews and Meetings..................................... 48
Appendix E -- Scope of Work …………………………………………………………..55 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 1 
Executive Summary 
The Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Project (PLSP) has been a 31-month initiative 
funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented 
under contract by Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) headquartered in Bethesda, 
Maryland. Counterpart institutions are the National Parliament and the Provincial 
Assemblies of the country’s four provinces. The PLSP project was begun in September 
2005 and is scheduled to conclude operations on March 31, 2008. It contributes to 
USAID’s Strategic Objective 4: “More participatory, representative, and accountable 
democracy in Pakistan” and its intermediate result 4.1: “Improved representation and 
responsiveness of national and provincial legislatures.” 
As the PLSP program approached its conclusion, USAID/Pakistan contracted with 
Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc. of Washington, DC to provide a two-person 
team to conduct an independent evaluation of the project and offer recommendations, 
based on its findings, for a possible extension of the program and, assuming so, for 
priority activities that it might undertake. The team was assisted by a local expert who 
scheduled meetings and helped in the compilation of data and information. The 
evaluation team was on location in Pakistan from November 20-December 14, 2007. 
During this time, it spent fourteen days in Islamabad and ten days making visits to each 
of Pakistan’s four provincial capitals. During the evaluation, the team spoke with more 
than two hundred legislators, Secretariat staff, civil servants, civil society representatives, 
journalists, and business and academic leaders. Despite obstacles caused by the country’s 
State of Emergency and the dissolution of, and pending elections for, five of the six 
legislative bodies in the PLSP program, the evaluation team was able to observe and 
analyze PLSP program activities in great depth and meet with a broad cross section of 
stakeholders and other individuals that, it feels confident, has enabled it to conduct a 
thorough and accurate assessment of the PLSP program. 
The evaluation team found the PLSP program to have been very well administered by its 
leadership and more thoroughly and more effectively organized than almost all of the 
other USAID projects previously examined by the team members. The Project Director 
(Chief of Party) has, in the opinion of the team and according to virtually everyone with 
whom the team met, done a superb job in running the program and in recruiting an 
outstanding group of local staff to fill its key positions. It was clear to the evaluation 
team that her leadership has been a major contributor to the program’s success. 
During its two and one-half years of operation, the PLSP program has provided an 
extremely impressive range of assistance activities that have addressed all areas covered 
in Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) that have been signed between USAID and the 
National Parliament and Provincial Assemblies. PLSP’s leaders told the evaluation team 
that the intent and goal of all program activities is to provide training and assistance that 
will comply with USAID’s requirement that legislative capacity-building programs be 
implemented that can be sustained beyond the life of the program. The team’s findings 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 2 
are that this requirement has been accorded paramount importance by the PLSP project 
leadership in all activities that were observed or examined. 
The evaluation team found the PLSP program to have amassed a large and extremely 
impressive array of accomplishments during its 31 months of operation. It found the 
degree of PLSP assistance to have well exceeded—in some cases significantly so—that 
provided through USAID assistance programs of considerably longer duration that the 
evaluation team members have observed in other countries. By comparison with other 
USAID programs that the evaluation team has examined or participated in, the number 
and percentage of member and staff participation in PLSP project activities is impressive, 
especially given the program’s relatively short duration. Almost half of the Senate 
membership (47%) has participated in at least one PLSP training activity. The figure for 
the 342-member National Assembly is somewhat lower (26%). Provincial Assembly 
participation ranges from a low of 20% in Punjab to a high of 40% in NWFP. PLSP 
places the percentage of Secretariat staff participation at 22%. Thirty five percent (35%) 
of parliamentarian and 6% of Secretariat participants have been women. Detailed 
analyses of PLSP program activities and of problem areas identified by the evaluation 
team are found in Section 3. 
Given the success of the PLSP program, and with Pakistan sitting at a potentially historic 
crossroads that is expected to bring in a new civilian government, a new National 
Assembly, and a new Provincial Assembly in each of the country’s four provinces, the 
evaluation team believes that it makes eminent sense for USAID/Pakistan to continue the 
program and build on the groundwork that it has provided toward parliamentary 
empowerment and parliamentary responsiveness to the Pakistani people. Representative 
of the overwhelming across-the-board support that the evaluation team found from 
legislators, Secretariat staff, government officials, and civil society and media 
representatives for additional capacity building activity in virtually every area are the 
results in the check list of options, shown to selected interviewees, in question 9 of the 
PLSP Program Questionnaire (Appendix D). 
Particularly because of the anticipated election of a number of new leaders and the likely 
influx of a large number of inexperienced first term legislators who will want and need 
immediate and extensive orientation and training, the evaluation team believes it of 
critical importance that USAID make a strong effort to assure that the PLSP program will 
not just continue, but continue with no break from the end of the current program to the 
commencement of the extension. The new parliamentary bodies will be the first in 
Pakistan’s history that will come into office with a successful on-going capacity building 
program in place, and a hiatus or gap of even short duration would be highly 
counterproductive to the momentum and interest that has been generated by the PLSP 
program during its 31 months of operation. 
It would be important that an extended PLSP program repeat and continue some of the 
activities that have been found to be most successful and useful during the current 
program, both for newly elected legislators and for returning members who were unable 
to participate in them when they were initially offered. Detailed findings concerning 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 3 
matters for consideration in an extended program, and suggestions for priority activities 
in such a program, are included in Section 4. 
To fully appreciate the political environment within which the PLSP project has operated 
over the past 31 months, it is necessary to understand the historical role that national and 
provincial legislatures have played in the political development of Pakistan. From the 
time of the country’s establishment as an independent nation at midnight on August 15, 
1947, legislatures at the national and provincial levels have been minor players in the 
political development of Pakistan. At no period of time over Pakistan’s sixty years of 
independence have its parliamentary bodies played major roles in public policy and 
governance. Throughout its relatively brief history, the country has spent considerable 
amounts of its resources on its military whose numbers currently exceed 600,000. In 
light of these conditions, it is not surprising that the National Parliament, the Provincial 
Assemblies, and their members and staffs, have regularly been shortchanged in terms of 
member and staff training and institutional support. A detailed analysis of the political 
and historical context in which the PLSP program should be viewed and evaluated is 
included in Section 2. 
Reacting to realities, United States aid to Pakistan for parliamentary capacity building 
represents a relatively recent assistance area. It was not until 1991—a full 37 years after 
the United States began providing assistance to Pakistan—that USAID became involved 
in training and capacity-building assistance for the country’s parliamentary bodies. Since 
1995, USAID has conducted three parliamentary strengthening projects, with the PLSP 
program being the most recent and, according to an overwhelming consensus of those 
with whom the evaluation team spoke, clearly the most successful. 
Within the scheme of United States aid projects to Pakistan, the PLSP program has been 
modest in terms of committed funding. The evaluation team believes that the program 
has proven to be been a very good and a very wise investment for the United States and 
for Pakistan in terms of its potential for helping the country to build the performance 
capacity of its National Parliament and Provincial Assemblies. In the words of a 
prominent member of the National Parliament: “The PLSP program has been a good will 
ambassador for the United States and USAID to Pakistan, and it has bridged the divide 
between all political parties when it comes to strengthening our country’s parliamentary 
bodies.” At a critical and potentially pivotal point in Pakistan’s history, an uninterrupted 
continuation of the PLSP program could be an important catalyst in helping the country 
to steer itself on a new course toward construction of a solid foundation that could 
provide for a sustainable democratic future. 
 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 4 
1. Program Overview, Evaluation Team and Methodology 
1.1 Overview of Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 
(PLSP) 
The Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Project (PLSP) has been a 31-month initiative 
funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented 
under contract by Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) headquartered in Bethesda, 
Maryland. DAI has been assisted by several local and international partners. Counterpart 
institutions are the legislative bodies of Pakistan: the National Assembly and Senate of 
Pakistan and the Provincial Assemblies of the Northwest Frontier Province, Balochistan, 
Sindh and Punjab. Beginning in the second year of the project, the Assembly of the 
autonomous region of AJK became an informal participant in a number of project 
activities. 
The PLSP project was begun in September 2005 and is scheduled to conclude operations 
at the end of March 2008. The project contributes to USAID’s Strategic Objective 4: 
“More participatory, representative, and accountable democracy in Pakistan” and its 
intermediate result 4.1: “Improved representation and responsiveness of national and 
provincial legislatures.” 
In conducting the PLSP project, DAI has been partnered with Social Impact, the National 
Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL), the International Roll Call Corporation, and 
the State University of New York, Albany, Center for Legislative Development. These 
partners have fielded legislative process and systems professionals on a number of short￾term technical assistance assignments. 
The PLSP team includes a Project Director (Chief of Party) who provides long-term 
technical assistance as a legislative processes advisor and provides legislative oversight 
support, a Deputy Project Director (Deputy Chief of Party) who provides direction for 
project implementation at the provincial level, five long-term technical staff, four 
provincial coordinators and an administrative staff to support the efforts outlined in this 
work plan. Pakistan-national professional personnel have also been engaged short-term 
for support in specific technical areas. 
Program activities in the six legislative bodies have focused on four general technical 
areas. PLSP says that, in implementing its activities, it has tried to tailor them to the 
specific needs of each assembly, but that it has also encouraged joint activities when 
issues have been considered relevant to more than one legislative house. The main task 
components of the PLSP include the provision of assistance in four basic areas: 
• Representation. Assisting the National Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies in 
providing information to the public and in the receipt of input from citizens. 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 5 
• Lawmaking. Improving the structures and mechanisms by which legislation is 
analyzed, debated, and passed. 
• Oversight/Accountability. Oversight of government operations, particularly in the 
area of budget formulation and implementation. 
• Management Infrastructure. Improving day-to-day management and operation of 
legislative processes. 
Each program area is subdivided into between one and four specific sub tasks. 
The main PLSP program office is located in Islamabad with a provincial coordinator and 
support staff in residence in each of the four Provincial Assemblies. Project technical 
staff address the main project components working together with counterparts at the 
National Assembly and Senate as well as coordinate and support the work with 
counterparts at the provincial level. Provincial coordinators manage the respective 
provincial programs, providing liaison with provincial assembly leadership and staff and 
tailoring activities to meet the specific provincial assembly needs. International 
specialists are engaged to address specific technical areas, providing a comparative 
context. 
At the outset of the PLSP project, USAID signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) with the National Parliament and with each Provincial Assembly. The MOUs 
specify that the PLSP program is intended to provide technical assistance and equipment 
to: “(1) strengthen the capacity of parliamentary [provincial assembly] partners (members 
and staff) to effectively undertake representative, law-making and oversight functions at 
the national [provincial] level; (2) enable effective use of research tools and the media by 
parliaments; (3) improve transparency and accountability in governance; and (4) 
improve avenues for civil society, including the media, to access and contribute to the 
parliamentary process. 
 
1.2 USAID Evaluation Protocol 
In the summer of 2007, USAID/Pakistan issued RFQ 391-07-026 proposing an 
independent evaluation of the PLSP project. In October 2007, the task order was 
awarded to Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc. The Scope of Work can be found in 
Appendix E. 
1.3 Checchi Evaluation Team 
The Checchi evaluation team included Senior Legislative Specialist and Team Leader 
David B. Ogle, who has more than four decades of domestic and international experience 
in legislative management and development; Senior Political Scientist Dr. Robert 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 6 
LaPorte, Professor Emeritus of Public Administration and Political Science, Pennsylvania 
State University, and an internationally recognized expert on Pakistan politics and 
government; and Zulfiqar Halepoto, a local specialist who served as a key member of the 
team that conducted a preceding USAID-sponsored legislative assistance program 
operated by World Vision. Team Leader David Ogle served as a short-term PLSP 
consultant on committee public hearing development in March 2007 and accompanied a 
delegation of parliamentarians and staff on a PLSP-sponsored study tour of the Canadian 
Parliament and the Ontario Legislative Assembly in May 2007. 
 
1.4 Evaluation Methodology 
Prior to their departure from the United States, the Senior Legislative Specialist and 
Senior Political Scientist reviewed a number of key documents provided by both Checchi 
and DAI. These included Checchi’s Task Order Proposal, DAI’s work plans and various 
quarterly reports, manuals, program descriptions and memoranda related to the PLSP 
project. The Senior Legislative Specialist and Senior Political Scientist also exchanged a 
number of reports and papers that they had previously written on Pakistan’s 
parliamentary bodies, the PLSP project, and the country’s government and politics. 
Also prior to departure, the team members developed draft questionnaires to be used in 
semi-structured in-country interviews and received two extensive program briefings in 
conference calls with DAI’s program coordinator in the firm’s Bethesda, Maryland home 
office. The questionnaires were subsequently revised with input from the 
USAID/Pakistan mission and the team’s local specialist and used for all legislator 
interviews and selectively in meetings with non-legislators. The questionnaires, 
including a compilation of responses to a checklist of possible activities for an extended 
PLSP program, are included as Appendix D. 
The team members arrived in Islamabad from the United States on November 20 and 
immediately made contact with the local specialist. After meetings with the CTO and 
Deputy CTO of the USAID mission staff and with DAI’s Chief of Party, a schedule for 
work in Islamabad and for visits to the four provincial capitals was agreed-upon. The 
schedule was as follows: 
November 20-26 – Islamabad (National Parliament) 
November 26-29 – Lahore (Punjab Provincial Assembly) 
November 30-December 1 – Quetta (Balochistan Provincial Assembly) 
December 1-4 – Karachi (Sindh Provincial Assembly) 
December 4-5 – Peshawar (Northwest Frontier Province Provincial Assembly) 
December 6-13 – Islamabad (Review of information compiled, draft of evaluation report, 
and USAID mission team debriefing) 
December 14 – Departure from Islamabad 
With assistance from USAID/Pakistan, PLSP staff, members and the local specialist, the 
team identified legislators, legislative staff, civil society representatives, and other donors 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 7 
with whom it should meet. It then arranged meetings with them in Islamabad and the four 
provincial capitals. The Senior Political Scientist was able to identify and locate 
additional worthwhile interviewees from his extensive previous activities in Pakistan. 
To get the fullest possible understanding of both the impact of the PLSP program and 
team members and activities that would be most productive if the program is continued 
beyond March 31, 2008, the team members felt it important to not limit meetings and 
discussions to members and Secretariat staff, but to tap a wider and more diverse 
audience by also talking with and receiving input from outside the parliamentary bodies. 
In this vein, substantial inputs were received from representatives of civil society, NGO 
and business leaders, government officials and international donors in other areas of 
Pakistan development. The restrictions placed on electronic journalists and reporters 
under the State of Emergency made contacts with its representatives somewhat sensitive 
and limited media input primarily, but not exclusively, to current and former print 
journalists. 
The evaluation team was able to attend several important PLSP project participant 
meetings. An all-day session of the National and Provincial Assemblies’ Secretaries in 
Lahore was particularly helpful in eliciting valuable information and feedback and in 
arranging meetings in the visits that were to follow to the other three provincial capitals. 
A guest visit to a joint meeting of five Rotary Clubs from Karachi also afforded the team 
with an opportunity to elicit extensive feedback from a broad cross section of the Sindh 
business and intellectual community 
The presidential State of Emergency that was in effect in the country during the 
evaluation period provided some impediments for the evaluation team. The dissolution 
of five of the six parliamentary bodies prior to the evaluation team’s arrival and the on￾set of the campaign period for the January 2008 election meant that sitting legislators 
were preoccupied with their re-election campaigns and, except in rare cases, not in their 
capital cities and/or their parliamentary facilities. The Senate—the one house that was not 
dissolved—did not sit during the evaluation period and almost all Senators had left 
Islamabad and returned to their provinces. In Balochistan and NWFP, the team was 
advised to remain in its hotel and limit outside travel to the Provincial Assembly 
facilities. 
Despite the obstacles presented by the state of emergency and the dissolution of the 
parliamentary bodies, the evaluation team was able to observe and analyze PLSP 
program activities in great depth and meet with a broad cross section of well over two 
hundred legislators, Secretariat staff, government officials, civil society and media 
representatives, and other donors and implementers, and it feels confident this has 
enabled it to conduct a thorough and accurate assessment of the PLSP program. 
A list of documents that were reviewed by the evaluation team is included as Appendix 
B, and a list of individuals with whom the team met or spoke with is included as 
Appendix C. 
 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 8 
2. The PLSP Program in a Historical and Political 
Context 
2.1 The Political Environment of Pakistan: The Beginning 
To fully understand and appreciate the political environment within which the PLSP 
project has operated over the past 31 months, it is necessary to undertake a brief 
examination of the historical role that national and provincial legislatures have played in 
the political development of Pakistan. To do this, one must go back to the country’s 
beginning that for all intents and purposes, took place on August 14, 1947, in the Sindh 
Assembly Hall. It was on that date and in that place that Great Britain transferred power 
from a partitioned part of the British Indian Empire to the new state of Pakistan. Lord 
Mountbatten as Governor-General and Viceroy, addressed the Assembly and Muhammad 
Ali Jinnah, the Quaid-I-Azam, gave a reply. Around the stroke of midnight on August 
15, 1947, Jinnah was sworn in as Governor-General. Jinnah’s decision to become 
Governor-General was critical since it set the tone of a strong central executive within a 
parliamentary framework. Shortly after, Nawabzada Liaquat Ali, Jinnah’s principal 
lieutenant, was sworn in as Prime Minister. 
The new nation of Pakistan consisted of two “wings” separated by a thousand miles of 
Indian territory. The eastern wing was a partitioned part of Bengal known as East 
Bengal. The western wing included a partitioned part of Punjab (referred to as Punjab), 
the province of Sindh, the North West Frontier Province and the territory of what is now 
the Province of Balochistan. Within both wings was a series of princely states that were 
eventually merged into the provinces where they were located. 
Jinnah’s assumption of the office of Governor-General and the inclusion of the most 
populous part of the Pakistan union, East Bengal (later East Pakistan) was the start of 
major political struggles. The latter was resolved when East Pakistan succeeded from the 
Pakistan union immediately after the Indo-Pakistan war of 1971. The political struggle 
between a strong central executive (the Governor-General/President) and an executive 
elected by the National Assembly (the Prime Minister) has been a continuous part of 
Pakistan’s political development. 
2.2 The Role of Legislatures in Pakistan 
From the beginning, legislatures at the national and provincial levels were minor players 
in the political development of Pakistan. At no period of time over Pakistan’s sixty years 
of independence have legislatures performed major roles in public policy and 
governance. 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 9 
2.2.1 The First Parliamentary Period, 1947-58. This period began slightly before 
August 14, 1947, and ended with the declaration of Martial Law by President Isakandar 
Mirza on October 7, 1958. (For an account of this politically turbulent period, see Keith 
Callard, Pakistan: A Political Study) On August 11, 1947 (three days before the transfer 
of power) Muhammad Ali Jinnah was elected President of the Constituent Assembly. In 
his first address to the Assembly, Jinnah gave Assembly members a mandate: 
“. . . The Constituent Assembly has got two main functions to perform. The first is the 
very onerous and responsible task of framing the future constitution of Pakistan and the 
second of functioning as a full and complete sovereign body as the Federal Legislature of 
Pakistan. . .” (Dawn, Independence Day Supplement, August 14, 1999.) 
In the same speech, he uttered, perhaps, his most quoted lines that outlined his vision of a 
secular state of Pakistan: 
“. . . You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are free to go to your mosques 
or any other place of worship in this State of Pakistan. You may belong to any religion 
or caste or creed; that has nothing to do with the business of the State. . .Now I think we 
should keep that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in the course of time 
Hindus would cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the 
religious sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political 
sense as citizens of the State.” (Ibid.) 
The First Constituent Assembly was unable to draft a constitution, function as a complete 
sovereign body, or establish a secular state. In fact, it spent most of its time debating East 
Bengal representation versus the four provinces in the west in the constitutionally based 
assembly it was trying to create. 
Meanwhile, Jinnah functioned as a Governor-General. He regularly by-passed his 
ministers, including Prime Mnister Liaquat Ali Khan, and dealt directly with the civil 
service and the military. At this point in Pakistan’s history, its leadership felt besieged by 
a hostile India and Afghanistan and considered the Constituent Assembly and its 
members to be nuisances that at most interfered with the governance of the country or at 
least did nothing but talk. 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah died on September 11, 1948, only thirteen months after his first 
speech to the Constituent Assembly. Liaquat Ali Khan remained as Prime Minister, with 
Khawaja Nazimuddin becoming Governor-General, but neither could fill the vacuum 
caused by the death of the Quaid. During the short period of Nazimuddin’s tenure as 
Governor-General, there was peace between him and Liaquat Ali Khan. But the struggle 
between the Governor-General and the Prime Minister was only in abeyance. 
On October 16, 1951, Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated. Nazimuddin stepped down as 
Governor-General and became Prime Minister and on October 19, 1951, Malik Ghulam 
Mohammed became Governor-General. Once again, the struggle for power between the 
governor-general and the prime minister began anew. 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 10 
Before a final draft of the constitution could be placed before the Assembly, Ghulam 
Mohammed dismissed the Constituent Assembly on October 24, 1954. Five months later 
(March 28, 1955), by Governor-General’s Order No. 12 of 1955, he “reconstituted” a 
Second Constituent Assembly by appointing the members. Although promoted by the 
executive, the Second Constituent Assembly passed a bill that merged the provinces in 
the west into one province (West Pakistan) and renamed East Bengal East Pakistan. The 
rationale was that the merger would promote administrative efficiency and save the costs 
of government. The not so hidden agenda was to achieve parity with East Bengal. The 
bill was passed on September 30, 1955. Ghulam Mohammed left office on October 5, 
1955. His replacement as Governor-General was Major General Isakandar Mirza. On 
October 14, 1955, the “One Unit Scheme” went into effect. It was during his 
administration that Pakistan received its first constitution. 
Although the Second Constituent Assembly met and debated, it did not draft the 
constitution. Instead, this task was assigned to the civil service. A draft was prepared, 
introduced into the Assembly on January 9, 1956, and passed by the Assembly on 
February 29, 1956. It was promulgated on March 23, 1956—sixteen years to the date to 
the Lahore Resolution that was adopted by the Muslim League, which called for a 
separate “Homeland for Muslims” in the subcontinent. This constitution (the 1956 
Constitution) gave the state a new name—the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. It instituted 
a parliamentary form of government with the prime minister as the principal power 
holder. It also included the One Unit Scheme giving equal representation to West and 
East Pakistan. The new constitution replaced the Government of India Act of 1935—the 
document under which Pakistan was governed from 1947 to 1956. On March 23, 1956, 
Mirza became the first President of Pakistan under the new constitution. His term of 
office was to be five years. 
Isakandar Mirza was known for his dislike of politicians and intolerance of Bengalis. He 
considered the civil service as the only institution capable of governance under his 
guidance. He also considered the people of Pakistan and its representative incapable of 
governing themselves. 
 
2.2.2 The First Military Intervention, 1958-1971. Before the elections scheduled for 
1959 under the new constitution were conducted, Mirza acted to prevent the first test of 
his leadership. On October 8, 1958, he abrogated the 1956 Constitution, dissolved the 
National and Provincial Assemblies, and declared Martial Law. He appointed General 
Mohammed Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, as Chief Marshal 
Law Administrator (CMLA). Later in October (October 27, 1958), General Ayub ousted 
Mirza. Earlier, as a member of the Cabinet of All Talent (Ayub served as Minister of 
Defence), Ayub wrote a brief memorandum to himself that outlined his plan for a new 
political system for Pakistan. It was to be a presidential system with the assemblies as 
rubber stamps for the executive (See: Herbert Feldman, Pakistan: Reform or 
Revolution?). He established over twenty commissions to implement his vision for 
Pakistan. The topics to be investigated by the commissions included the development of 
a new constitution and land reform. 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 11 
On March 1, 1962, Ayub promulgated his new constitution (the Constitution of 1962). 
This new document put in place a presidential form of government. It included the “One 
Unit Scheme”. The 1962 Constitution also included a new scheme called “Basic 
Democracy”, which altered the existing local government scheme and provided an 
electoral college for the election of both the President and the national and Provincial 
Assemblies. The continuation of the British-designed civil service was guaranteed by the 
constitution. 
Ayub’s Basic Democracy scheme worked as follows. Each province had forty thousand 
Basic Democrats that were the chairmen of the district councils. The members of the 
district councils who, in turn, were elected by the teshil (West Pakistan) or thana (East 
Pakistan) councils elected the chairman. It was a complicated indirect election scheme 
guaranteed to protect the sitting president (Ayub) and the members of the National and 
Provincial Assemblies from the masses. Ayub was on record as advocating “guided 
democracy”, which continued Mirza’s bias against direct participation by the people. 
“The people of Pakistan are not ready for direct democracy” according to Ayub. They 
had to be “guided”. 
The Government of Pakistan proclaimed the decade of the 1960s as the “Decade of 
Development”. As it was later revealed (by Mabubul Haq, Chief Economist, federal 
Planning Commission), the chief beneficiaries of Ayub’s economic development efforts 
were the famous (or infamous) “twenty families”—large-scale businessmen and 
industrialists who took advantage of the tax breaks, subsidies and protectionism (against 
foreign competition). Bengali leadership and economists charged that economic growth 
was facilitated by jute produced in East Pakistan and it was the Punjabis (who dominated 
business, the civil service and the military) who were the major beneficiaries of Ayub’s 
economic development policies. 
The National Assembly, dominated by Ayub’s Muslim League, and the West Pakistan 
Assembly, dominated by Punjabis, remained either silent or supported the regime in 
power. The East Pakistan Assembly was also a controlled (by the regime) body. 
Ayub’s style of governance was to use the civil service. Initially, the military played a 
role in administration of the country but Ayub returned them to the barracks. 
After the disastrous 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, charges of corruption involving his family 
members, a heart attack, and the disaffection of key members of his administration 
(Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in particular), Ayub had reached the end of his time in office. After 
a meeting of a group of his generals, Ayub stepped down and passed the baton to the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Aga Muhammed Yahya Khan on March 29, 
1969. 
Assuming the office of the presidency, Yahya declared Martial Law, abrogated the 1962 
Constitution, dismissed the National and Provincial Assemblies, scrapped the One Unit 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 12 
scheme and scheduled national elections based on adult franchise and “one-man one 
vote”. This election would be the first in Pakistan’s history based on population. 
The election took place with the Awami League, led by Sheik Mujibur Rahman, winning 
every seat in East Pakistan except one while the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), led by 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto who, among others, founded the PPP, securing a plurality of seats in 
the four western provinces. The election results meant that the Bengalis would hold the 
majority of seats in the Constituent Assembly that would draft a new constitution. 
However, before the Assembly met, General Yahya ordered a crack down in East 
Pakistan in March 1971 that resulted in civil war. 
After the defeat and surrender of 90,000 Pakistani soldiers in December 1971, General 
Yahya transferred of power to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto on December 20, 1971. Bhutto 
became President and the first civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator. 
2.2.3 The Second Parliamentary Period, 1971-1977. This period begins with seating of 
the Third Constituent Assembly on April 14, 1972, and ends with General Muhammad 
Zia-ul-Haq’s ouster of Bhutto on July 5, 1977. The first order of business (after releasing 
Sheik Mujib who had been incarcerated in the west) was the drafting of still another 
constitution. Compromises between the Punjab and the other provinces led to the 1973 
Constitution. This document reintroduced a parliamentary form of government with a 
strengthened role for the Prime Minister and a ceremonial role for the President. The 
constitution broke from the tradition of a unicameral to a bicameral or two-house 
National Parliament, with the creation of a Senate along side the National Assembly. The 
Senate was supposed to represent the provinces while the National Assembly represented 
the people. Unlike the National Assembly, the Senate could not be dismissed by the 
President. Bhutto ceased being President and became Prime Minister. 
As Prime Minister, Bhutto attempted to rein in the power of the military by retiring 
several senior generals and changing the title of the head of the army from Commander￾in-Chief to Chief of the Army Staff (COAS). Under the new constitution, the Prime 
Minister was the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. With regard to the civil 
service, Bhutto eliminated the constitutional guarantees that the civil service possessed 
under the two previous constitutions and eliminated civil service labels (the Civil Service 
of Pakistan, or CSP, was abolished). Bhutto also had enacted the Civil Service Reform 
Act of 1973 that opened up the services to lateral entrants. Over the next few years, 
Bhutto purged the civil service, resulting in over 4,000 dismissals. He also nationalized 
private companies and corporations, resulting in a vastly expanded role that government 
would play in virtually all sectors of the economy. Hundreds of public enterprises were 
created to absorb the nationalized private firms. He did not nationalize foreign-owned 
firms. All of the above was accomplished to ensure that neither the military, nor the civil 
service, nor the business/industrial class would challenge his rule. 
During this time, parliamentary bodies at the national and provincial levels continued to 
rubber stamp executive initiatives. They were virtually powerless and unable to 
challenge the executive. 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 13 
One major mistake that Bhutto made was to appoint, over the heads of twelve senior 
generals, General Muhammed Zia ul-Haq.as COAS. Bhutto vetted Zia thoroughly before 
appointing him. Zia was considered to be politically neutral, if not apolitical. He was 
viewed as the perfect general for Bhutto—not interested in politics—and a willing “yes” 
man to Bhutto’s quest for dominance in the governance of Pakistan. 
2.2.4 The Second Military Intervention, 1977-1988. After the 1977 elections in which 
a coalition of opposition parties charged wholesale fraud and took to the streets, General 
Zia led a military coup that ousted Bhutto. On July 5, 1977, he became the CMLA, 
suspended the 1973 Constitution and placed Bhutto under house arrest. He later released 
Bhutto only to re-arrest him and charge him with conspiracy to commit murder. Zia 
launched an accountability campaign that led to a series of white papers charging Bhutto 
with abusing and misusing his office and state institutions. With his takeover, Zia 
promised elections in 90 days. The 90 days turned into 90 months. Bhutto was tried in 
the Lahore High Court and convicted of ordering the murder of a political opponent. He 
was sentenced to death by hanging. The Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the High 
Court’s decision, and on April 4, 1979, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was executed. 
With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 25, 1979, Pakistan became the 
frontline state in the proxy war on communism that the United States was conducting. 
Earlier in the year, U.S. President Jimmy Carter cut off military and economic assistance 
to Pakistan, citing evidence that Pakistan had violated the Symington Amendment to the 
U.S. Foreign Assistance Act. This amendment mandated the suspension of U.S. 
assistance to any country constructing a nuclear device. For several years prior to 1979, 
Pakistan worked to create a nuclear bomb. In fact, a book published in India in the 1970s 
was entitled Pakistan’s Islamic Bomb. Immediately after the Soviet invasion, the Carter 
administration offered a multi-billion dollar aid package to Pakistan that was refused by 
Pakistan. When Ronald Reagan took the office as President in 1981, one of his first 
foreign policy acts was to offer Pakistan a $3.2 billion aid package—$1.6 billion in 
military assistance and $1.6 billion in economic and technical assistance. Pakistan once 
again became a partner of the U.S. in the Cold War and the supplier of military assistance 
to the Afghan mujahideen. The armaments were shipped to the rebels in National 
Logistic Cell (NLC) trucks—the NLC transports were managed by the Pakistani army. 
One major project in the USAID portion of the Reagan assistance package was the 
Development Support Training Project that had a large participant training component. 
The Pakistani participants were mostly civil servants who were sent to the United States 
for graduate studies and short-term training. Other funds in the DSTP were used to 
improve civil service training at the Pakistan Administrative Staff College, the National 
Institutes of Public Administration (NIPAs) in Lahore, Karachi and, later, Peshawar and 
Quetta. Aid was also provided to other civil service (and police) training institutions. No 
assistance was given to the National or Provincial Assemblies, their members, or their 
staff. Earlier, in the 1960s, USAID provided funds to support the development of civil 
service training institutions and for sending civil servants to the U.S. for graduate studies 
and short-term training. 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 14 
Zia created his own local government system, replacing Bhutto’s integrated rural 
development scheme. His major attempt to appease the politicians who were not in exile 
or under arrest was to hold non-party elections in 1985 for the National Assembly and the 
Provincial Assemblies. His choice for Prime Minister was Muhammed Junejo, a Sindh 
wadera, who had previously been a minister in the West Pakistan provincial government. 
To neutralize the religious right, he introduced “Islamization” which involved the 
prohibition of consumption, transport and sale of alcoholic beverages (although Muree 
Brewery continued to operate through out the Zia period), promulgated through 
ordinance the Islamic penalties for thievery and adultery, banned interest on bank 
transactions and attempted to enact zakat, a tax whose funds go to aid the poor. 
As a counter balance to rising political star of Benazir Bhutto who had assumed the reins 
of leadership of the PPP, Zia groomed a political unknown, Nawaz Sharif. During the 
1985 to 1988 period, as a result of the 1985 elections, Nawaz became Chief Minister of 
the Punjab. Along with Junejo, he revived the Muslim League (N) as a challenge to the 
PPP. Later, Nawaz split with Junejo, and the Muslim League came into being. 
Throughout this period, General Zia held the reins of power. He was President, chief of 
the army staff, and indirectly controlled the office of Prime Minister. Conflicts between 
Zia and Junejo caused Zia to dismiss the assemblies in 1988. The power sharing 
arrangement that emerged from this period can be likened to a three-legged stool. One 
leg was the President, the second the COAS and the third the Prime Minister. The 
National and Provincial Assemblies were not part of the power sharing arrangement. 
After he dismissed the National and Provincial Assemblies, Zia, along with the American 
Ambassador and several of his army generals, were killed when a bomb planted on their 
aircraft exploded on August 17, 1988. This event brought to an end the second military 
intervention. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, Chairman of the Senate, became Acting President and 
called for elections in November 1988. 
2.2.5 The Third Parliamentary Period, 1988-1999. This period begins with the 
November 30, 1988 seating of the National Assembly and ends with the military coup on 
October 12, 1999, bringing General Pervez Mushsharraf to power. 
The Benazir-led PPP achieved a plurality of seats in the new National Assembly. The 
PPP also achieved a majority in the Sindh Provincial Assembly and became the major 
opposition party in Punjab. The Nawaz-led Muslim League captured a majority of the 
seats in Punjab. 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan became President and asked Benazir to form a government. Nawaz 
became Chief Minister of the Punjab. Except as the stage for government-opposition 
conflict, the National Assembly accomplished little. During Benazir’s first 
administration, she narrowly defeated a “no confidence” vote but her record of 
achievements was meager. 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 15 
Using Article 58 (2) of the 1973 Constitution (as amended) Ghulam Ishaq Khan 
dismissed the National and Provincial Assemblies in 1990, charging both Benazir Bhutto 
and her husband with corruption and other crimes. Elections took place ninety days later, 
and Nawaz Sharif and the Muslim League secured a majority in the National Assembly. 
During his first administration, Nanas initiated the privatization of the firms that had been 
nationalized during the Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto period. But he also tried to amend the 
constitution to eliminate the 8th Amendment that had been passed during the Zia period. 
This amendment gave the President the power to dismiss the National and Provincial 
Assemblies. In turn, on May 26, 1992, using Article 58 (2) once again, Ghulam Ishaq 
Khan dismissed the National and Provincial Assemblies, this time charging Nawaz with 
corruption and misuse of the Prime Minister’s office. However, when Nawaz brought 
suit against the President in the Supreme Court , the court ruled against the President and 
ordered Nawaz’s reinstatement. The army intervened and both Ghulam Ishaq Khan and 
Nawaz Sharif resigned. Elections were held ninety days after the resignations. This 
time, Benazir Bhutto and the PPP secured a majority of the seats in the National 
Assembly, and Benazir became Prime Minister for a second time on October 10, 1993. 
The new President was Sadar Farooq Ahmed Leghari who took office on November 14, 
1993. Leghari was a former Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) officer. He was also a PPP 
supporter. He seemed to be the ideal partner for Benazir. During her second 
administration, Benazir’s record of achievement was once again below expectations and, 
on November 5, 1996, using Article 58 (2), Leghari dismissed the National and 
Provincial Assemblies, making Benazir once again an ex-Prime Minister. Elections were 
held ninety days later and, once again, Nawaz Sharif and his Muslim League party 
secured a majority of seats in the National Assembly. 
Nawaz’s second administration was filled with events. This time he was successful in 
neutralizing the power of the President. He selected what he believed would be a 
politically neutral chief of the army staff, General Pervez Mushsharraf. He tightly 
controlled the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies. During his 
administration, Pakistan exploded its first nuclear device, causing worldwide alarm, and 
the military fought a costly battle with the Indian army along the cease-fire line in 
Kashmir. In fact, by the end of Nawaz’s term, Pakistan’s Treasury was close to depleting 
its reserves of hard currency. By the summer of 1999, the question was not “if”, but 
“when”, the military would once again intervene. 
2.2.6 The Third Military Intervention, 1999-2008. The “straw” that “broke” Nawaz’s 
government occurred in early October 1999. A Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) 
flight from Sri Lanka carrying General Musharraf was informed not to land in Pakistan 
on orders of the Prime Minister. The order was disregarded, and the flight landed. 
General Musharraf immediately declared a State of Emergency, suspended the 
constitution, dismissed the National and provincial Assemblies, and sent Nawaz to a ten￾year exile in Saudi Arabia. Musharraf became Prime Minister and, later, President. 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 16 
Musharraf is the first muhajir (a Muslim who migrated from India and speaks Urdu) to be 
chief of the army staff. All others were Punjabis or Pushtuns. One of his first acts was to 
appoint General (retd.) Naqvi to head a local government reform unit. Naqvi ‘s new local 
government scheme was introduced in August 2001. It abolished divisions, reduced the 
powers of the deputy commissioners (they are now District Coordination Officers or 
DCOs), and established the Nazims (elected officials) as the major power in the districts. 
Nazims have limited police powers. 
General Musharraf took the office of the President on June 21, 2001. After forming his 
own political party (the Muslim League (Q)—the “Q” standing for Quaid-I-Azam— 
Musharraf held elections in 2002. In the absence of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif , 
the Muslim League (Q) secured a majority of the seats in the National Assembly and the 
Punjab Assembly, and went into coalition with the MQM (the muhajir party) in Sindh. 
The religious parties coalition, led by the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) secured a majority of the 
seats in the NWFP and Balochistan Provincial Assemblies. These parliamentary 
assemblies became the first ones in Pakistan’s history to complete a full five-year term. 
Before the most recent month of political crisis (November 2007), Benazir Bhutto 
returned to Pakistan on October 18. A bomb that killed and maimed several people 
marred her return. Several weeks earlier, on September 10, Nawaz Sharif had attempted 
to return to the country, only to be placed on a flight back to Saudi Arabia. He was later 
allowed to return on November 25. 
The current crisis began on November 3, 2007, when Musharraf declared a State of 
Emergency (the second one that he had declared since the October 1999 coup). On the 
same day, he issued the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) suspending the 
constitution. The Supreme Court, led by Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry, declared 
Musharraf’s actions to be “illegal and unconstitutional.” Both of Musharaff’s acts were 
in anticipation of an unfavorable ruling by the Supreme Court concerning his reelection 
to a new five-year term by the country’s sitting parliaments, all of which with the 
exception of the Senate, were nearing completion of their constitutional terms. 
Musharraf then removed Chief Justice Chaudhry from the bench. Judges and Justices 
who refused to take an oath under the PCO were also removed. Musharraf also closed 
several independent local news channels including Geo, ARY, and AajTV. In response 
to these actions, lawyers and journalists took to the streets. The police reacted strongly. 
In mid-November, Musharraf announced that elections would be held on January 8, 
2008. On November 27, he “took off his uniform” and passed the baton to General 
Ashfaq Kiyani who has become the new chief of the army staff. On November 28, 
Musharraf took the oath of office of President for a new five-year term. 
In early December, both Benazir and Nawaz claimed to be debating whether or not to 
boycott the January 2008 election. Their conditions for participation have involved 
lifting the President’s lifting of the State of Emergency, his voiding of the PCO, his 
reinstatement of the justices and judges who refused to take the oath under the PCO, and 
his lifting of the suspension on the independent local news channels. Both Nawaz and his 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 17 
brother Shabaz had their election tickets invalidated by the Election Commission (they 
were appealing as this evaluation was being completed). Bhutto announced that the PPP 
would participate conditionally but said that, if the elections appeared rigged, she would 
withdraw. In the meantime, candidates filed to run for seats in the National Assembly 
and the four Provincial Assemblies and campaign posters began to appear. As this 
evaluation was being completed in mid December, except for negative news reports on 
the performance of the Twelfth National Assembly, news about the National and 
Provincial Assemblies had pretty much disappeared from the mass media. All of that 
changed with the assassination of Benazir Bhutto on December 27. After a week of 
unrest and questions and accusations about who was responsible for the assassination and 
how it was carried out, the government announced on January 2 that the election date 
would be pushed back from January 8 to February 18. 
If the number of bills passed by the Twelfth National Assembly is used as the measure of 
its performance, it falls short of success. While it would appear difficult to present a 
strong argument to the contrary, as indicated in Section 3.3 (below), such quantitative 
measurements can sometimes be very misleading as a measure of performance by a 
legislative body. 
2.3 Other Political Factors That Have Affected Parliamentary 
Development 
2.3.1 The History of Executive Dominance. What would seem to be a legitimate 
quantitative measure of the dominance of the executive over the legislative branch 
throughout Pakistan’s sixty-year history can be derived from two simple numbers. Since 
1947, Pakistan has had twelve Governors-General/Presidents and two dozen Prime 
Ministers. The strong central executive has become ingrained in the political psyche of 
the people of Pakistan. The development of the National Parliament and the Provincial 
Assemblies through the current and an extended PLSP program could help to modify this 
condition. 
2.3.2 Pakistan’s External Environment. From its beginning as an independent nation 
in 1947, Pakistan has often been under a “state of siege.” As a result, leadership in 
Pakistan has often tended to take on a siege mentality. This condition has led to three 
wars with India (1948, 1965, and 1971) and numerous minor clashes along its eastern 
border, especially along the cease line in Azad Jammu Kashmir (AJK). In addition, since 
Afghanistan never accepted the Durand Line as the border between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, and given its occupation by the Soviet Union in the late 1970s and 1980s, 
Pakistan has viewed Afghanistan as a threat to its security. The terrorist attack on the 
United States on September 11, 2001 caused Pakistan to cooperate with the U.S. in the 
war on terrorism and once again Pakistan has come a frontline state. 
Given all of the above, Pakistan’s desire for modern weaponry and its interest in seeking 
external assistance to pay for and provide such weaponry is understandable. The country 
spends a considerable amount of its resources on its military whose numbers exceed 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 18 
600,000. In light of these conditions, it is not surprising that the National Parliament, the 
Provincial Assemblies, and their members and staff have regularly been shortchanged in 
terms of member and staff training and institutional support. 
2.3.3 The Role of External Assistance. Over its sixty-year existence, Pakistan has been 
a major recipient of foreign aid in terms of military hardware and economic and technical 
assistance. Multilateral aid has come from the World Bank, the Asian Development 
Bank, and the United Nations Development Program and other UN organizations, 
foundations such as the Aga Khan Foundation (currently) and, earlier, through the Ford 
Foundation and other private donors. Bilateral assistance has, and continues, to come 
from the United States, Great Britain, Canada, Japan, the Kuwait Fund, Sweden, Norway, 
as well as countries. Pakistan’s external assistance is often coordinated through the Aid 
to Pakistan Consortium. The largest donor has been the United States in terms of both 
economic and technical assistance and military assistance. 
The United States has had an aid presence in Pakistan from 1954 to 1979, 1981 to 1995, 
and 2001 to the present. Billions of U.S. dollars in grants and loans have poured into 
Pakistan to help stabilize the country’s economy, build its infrastructure, and develop its 
institutions. 
In response to needs articulated by the Pakistan’s government, USAID’s clientele was 
limited almost exclusively the public sector in general, and to the civil service in 
particular, for the first several decades of its assistance. During this time, thousands of 
Pakistani civil servants received USAID-sponsored education in the finest universities 
and colleges in the United States. In addition, thousands of civil servants received short￾term training to enhance their skills and knowledge in USAID-supported training courses 
and institutions, both in Pakistan and in the U.S. In one USAID project alone, over $80 
million was spent on educating and training Pakistani civil servants and supporting civil 
service training institutions in Pakistan. While USAID has been the largest provider of 
assistance, it has not been the only U.S. government organization involved in education 
and training of Pakistan’s civil servants. At various times, the U.S. Information Agency, 
the U.S. Department of Education and, recently, the U.S. Department of State have also 
been involved in assistance programs. 
During the first four decades that United States assistance and training was being 
provided to Pakistani civil servants, no program assistance was offered to the National 
Parliament or the Provincial Assemblies. It was not until 1991—a full 37 years after the 
United States began providing assistance to Pakistan—that USAID became involved in 
training and capacity building for Pakistan’s parliamentary bodies. Since 1995, USAID 
has conducted three parliamentary strengthening projects, with the PLSP program being 
the most recent and, according to an overwhelming consensus of those with whom the 
evaluation team spoke, clearly the most successful. 
Within the scheme of United States aid projects to Pakistan, the PLSP program has been 
modest in terms of committed funding. However, as Section 3 will show, the evaluation 
team believes that the program has been a very good and a very wise investment in terms 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 19 
of its potential for helping Pakistan to build the performance capacity of its National 
Parliament and Provincial Assemblies and, in so doing, help the country steer itself on a 
new course toward construction of a solid foundation that could provide for a sustainable 
democratic future. 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 20 
3. Evaluation of the PLSP Program, 2005-07 
3.1 Project Administration and Organization 
The evaluation team found the PLSP project to have been very well administered by its 
leadership and more thoroughly and more effectively organized than almost all of the 
other USAID projects previously examined by the evaluation team. 
3.1.1 Project Staff. Even by USAID’s high standards, PLSP has an exceptional staff. 
The Project Director, who oversees the entire program, and the Assistant Project 
Director, who focuses on coordination of Provincial Assembly activities, each have long 
successful records of international democracy and governance assistance experience. 
Unlike many other USAID Chiefs of Party who tend to focus primarily on project 
administration, the Project Director, who has headed the program from its outset, has 
always taken an active hands-on involvement in PLSP’s assistance activities. In the 
opinion of the evaluation team and according to virtually everyone with whom it spoke, 
she has done a superb job in running the program and in recruiting an outstanding staff. 
It was clear to the team that her leadership has been a major contributor to the program’s 
success. 
The quality of the key local staff—four subject matter coordinators and the training 
specialist in Islamabad and four provincial coordinators in the provincial capitals—is at 
least the equal of any local USAID program staff that the evaluation team has previously 
encountered. 
The program is further strengthened by knowledgeable and involved home office staff 
support. 
A PLSP organization chart is included as Appendix A. 
3.1.2 Legislative Development Steering Committees (LDSCs). The National 
Parliament and each of the Provincial Assemblies have a Legislative Development 
Steering Committee that is responsible for approving PLSP activities within their 
respective jurisdictions. The National Parliamentary LDSC is chaired by the Deputy 
Speaker of the National Assembly, with each provincial LDSC chaired by that 
Assembly’s Speaker. Membership includes representation from both the treasury bench 
and the opposition. The goal of the LDSCs is to have participatory and consultative input 
into PLSP activities, with LDSC decisions concerning such activities being binding. 
The evaluation team found strong satisfaction among both members and staff with the 
effectiveness of all five LDSCs, no expressions of dissatisfaction with this approach to 
project decision-making, and no suggestions of more preferable means of steering the 
PLSP program. All LDSC members that were interviewed expressed strong feelings that 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 21 
the committees have been effective, and non-members offered no preferable alternatives 
to activity coordination. 
3.1.3 Focal Persons. At the outset of the PLSP program, DAI and USAID concluded 
that program communication and decision-making—reportedly a rather serious problem 
during the preceding USAID parliamentary development program operated by World 
Vision—could be facilitated by having the leadership of each house designate a “mid￾level bureaucrat” in its Secretariat (a Joint Secretary, Deputy Secretary or Assistant 
Secretary) to serve as a focal person through whom the PLSP staff could channel 
program communications with each house’s top leadership, particularly with its Secretary 
and Speaker. 
While the concept of a focal person would seem to make sense, the results have been 
decidedly mixed. The only bodies in which the evaluation team found the focal persons 
to have proven significantly beneficial to the PLSP program were the Sindh and NWFP 
Provincial Assemblies. In the National Assembly, four different individuals filled the 
position during the two years of the project and this frequent turnover likely contributed 
to some difficulties experienced by PLSP in establishing a strong working relationship 
with the Assembly’s leadership (see Section 3.4.1, below). With regard to the Senate and 
the Punjab and Balochistan Provincial Assemblies, it did not appear that the focal persons 
have proven damaging to the program, but there was no evidence that they have 
contributed in any significant way to providing an enhanced communication link between 
PLSP staff and the top leadership. 
3.1.4 Working Groups. Beginning in its second year of operation, PLSP established 
eight working groups of Secretariat staff members from the National Parliament and 
Provincial Assemblies to focus on specific areas of legislative development, and to 
undertake in-depth examinations of possible interventions. The working groups have 
covered the areas of committee activities, research , parliamentary service, information 
technology, libraries, bill and amendment drafting, parliamentary public relations, and 
rules of procedure and codes of conduct. Each group’s membership is comprised of staff 
members who operate in the group’s area of focus. The groups meet three or four times 
each year in either Islamabad or one of the provincial capitals, with the members 
expected to spearhead interest in development of their focal areas among their colleagues 
in their respective bodies. 
Every working group member or working group meeting attendee with whom the 
evaluation team spoke felt that their experience as a member of the group has served to 
both enlighten them on the potential for development and expansion of their individual 
disciplines and to motivate them to encourage their fellow staff members to think in 
terms of how to improve the quality of service. All expressed a hope that the use of 
working groups will be continued if the PLSP program is extended and each also 
expressed a strong interest in being able to serve as a member the working group that 
concerns his or her area of responsibility. 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 22 
The evaluation team asked all working group members, non-member attendees, and 
legislators who were familiar with them whether they would be in favor of adding 
legislators as members of the groups. There was virtually no support for doing so. 
Negative responses indicated that legislators would probably be unable or unwilling to 
take time to spend on working group meetings, and that the subject matters of the groups 
focus on staff-support activities. 
3.1.5 Donor/Implementer Coordination. The PLSP project leadership says that it has 
made a concerted effort to coordinate with other donors and implementers, and all 
indications are that it has made a considerable effort to do so. 
The other major parliamentary assistance donor is the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP), which limits its activities to the National Parliament. There appear to 
be some areas of activity overlap in the Senate and National Assembly, specifically with 
regard to research and library services, committee outreach, and member training in rules 
of procedure. In each of these areas, PLSP appears to have been active in the area before 
UNDP, and the decision to undertake duplicate work appears to have been UNDP’s. The 
PLSP Project Director has taken the initiative in trying to establish better communication 
links with her UNDP counterpart to improve resource coordination and minimize 
unnecessary and unproductive activity duplication. 
Neither the National Democratic Institute (NDI) nor the International Republican 
Institute (IRI) is directly involved in parliamentary activities, but both their 
representatives and the PLSP Project Director indicate that they have established close 
communicative and cooperative working relationships with PLSP. DAI focuses on 
political party development and IRI’s activities include public opinion polling. At PLSP’s 
request, IRI included a question in its late summer 2007 quarterly survey concerning the 
public’s interest in live broadcasts of plenary sessions of the National Parliament and 
Provincial Assemblies. The survey results (See Section 4.3.1a) provided valuable 
feedback that encourages focus on this as an important activity area if the PLSP program 
is extended. 
In other areas, during the summer of 2007, PLSP brought in a short term international 
consultant to meet with representatives of the Asia Foundation, the United Kingdom 
Department for International Development (DFID) and United Nations representatives 
concerning the possibility of collaboration on the development of the Geographic 
Information System (GIS) linked information database. 
PLSP project leadership appears to have enjoyed a good working relationship with the 
United States Embassy, with the US Ambassador having traveled to each of the four 
provincial capitals to participate in the official openings of the provincial resource 
centers. PLSC’s leaders do express some frustration at not being regularly notified by the 
Embassy when Americans with congressional background are in the country on 
sponsored visits. 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 23 
3.2 PLSP Program Accomplishments 
During its two and one-half years of operation, the PLSP project has covered an 
extremely impressive range of assistance activities that have addressed all of the areas 
covered in the MOUs signed between USAID and the National Parliament and Provincial 
Assemblies (see Section 1.1). PLSP’s program leaders say that the intent and goal of all 
of its activities is to provide training and assistance that will comply with USAID’s 
requirement that legislative capacity-building programs be implemented that can be 
sustained beyond the life of the program. The evaluation team’s findings are that this 
requirement has been accorded paramount importance by the PLSP project leadership in 
all activities that were observed or examined. 
The degree of PLSP assistance has well exceeded—in some cases significantly so—that 
provided through USAID assistance programs of considerably longer duration that the 
evaluation team members have observed in other countries. By comparison with other 
USAID programs that the evaluation team has examined or participated in, the number 
and percentage of member and staff participation in PLSP program activities is 
impressive, especially given the program’s relatively short duration. Almost half of the 
Senate membership (47%) has participated in at least one PLSP training activity. The 
figure for the 342-member National Assembly is somewhat lower (26%). Provincial 
Assembly participation ranges from a low of 20% in Punjab to a high of 40% in NWFP. 
PLSP places the percentage of Secretariat staff participation at 22%. Thirty five percent 
(35%) of parliamentarian and 6% of Secretariat participants have been women. 
The following are what the evaluation team found to be PLSP’s most important 
accomplishments in each of its four activity areas. 
3.2.1 Representation. The evaluation team found the following to be PLSP’s most 
impressive accomplishments in the representation area: 
3.2.1a. Initiatives in the area of media relations and public outreach, including beginning 
exploration of the possibility and requirements required for live broadcasts of plenary 
sessions, with the effort being spearheaded by the Senate whose Finance Committee 
established a special subcommittee on telecasting, press gallery enhancements in all 
plenary chambers, budget process workshops for journalists in Punjab and NWFP, and a 
parliamentarian media relations manual (prepared by a member of the evaluation team). 
3.2.1b. Website development, including upgrading of existing National Assembly and 
Senate websites, the establishment of websites for three Senate committees, the 
establishment of a website for each Provincial Assembly, and staff training on website 
management and updating. 
3.2.2 Lawmaking. The lawmaking program area has involved the greatest amount of 
PLSP activity of the four program areas. The evaluation team found the following to be 
PLSP’s most impressive accomplishments: 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 24 
3.2.2a. The establishment of the Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Services (PIPS). 
The evaluation team concurs with the array of feedback that it received from 
parliamentary leaders, PLSP program leaders, and external stakeholders that the 
establishment of PIPS is the single most important accomplishment of the PLSP project, 
and the activity that figures to have the greatest impact on the future operations of 
Pakistan’s parliamentary bodies. 
PIPS existed in name only at the outset of the PLSP project. During the project term, 
PLSP served as the catalyst in bringing the idea to fruition, serving as a surrogate 
secretariat for the institute and playing a major advisory role in working out the details of 
its organization and infrastructure, all of which have been agreed upon by all stakeholders 
as the PLSP project nears it s conclusion. 
When fully operational, PIPS will be the country’s first permanent professional 
development training institute and research center devoted exclusively to providing 
support to the National Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies. It will operate from a 
building that will be constructed on a site not too distant from the National Parliament in 
Islamabad. USAID will fund the construction of the PIPS building, but the Parliament 
will be responsible for PIPS’ permanent operational costs. The operational costs of the 
interim PIPS facility will be borne by USAID until the end of current PLSP project. 
PIPS will be a semi-autonomous body, not under direct parliamentary control, but with a 
sixteen-member board of governors comprised of eight National Assembly members, 
four senators, and one member from each Provincial Assembly. The decision to make 
PIPS a semi-autonomous operation under the direction of a parliamentary board is a wise 
one that will protect against parliamentary interference in its professionalism and 
personnel administration, but also assure a close working relationship with the 
parliamentary bodies. 
At the time of this evaluation, two separate bills formally establishing PIPS await action 
in the Parliament—one introduced in the Senate by a member of the National 
Parliament’s LDSC, and one in the National Assembly submitted by the government. 
While awaiting passage of one of these bills, PLSP has continued to worked with PIPS to 
develop a roster of more than fifty Pakistani expert consultants from academia and civil 
society institutions who have declared their readiness to serve parliamentarians' 
information and research support needs and who can be tapped for assistance of a wide 
variety of policy issues. A short list of candidates to serve as PIPS’ Executive Director 
has been approved and it is anticipated that an appointment will be made before the 
convening of the new parliaments in early 2008. 
3.2.2b. The use of international consultants to provide Secretariat staff training in 
research and to train trainers in bill and amendment drafting. Research training was 
provided by experienced researchers from the United States Congressional Research 
Service (CRS) and the Canadian Parliamentary Library (see, also, Section 3.4.8). 
Primary drafting training was provided through a highly intensive two-week course 
conducted by the International Consortium for Law and Development (ICLAD), which is 
affiliated with the Boston University School of Law. The consortium has conducted 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 25 
similar workshops in a number of Central and South Asian parliaments. Secondary 
training was provided through what appears to have been a less successful long-distance 
Internet program. The theory and methodology of the ICLAD course is to emphasize the 
importance of research and information-gathering before beginning to draft a piece of 
legislation, an approach that the evaluation team found to be seldom used in Pakistan 
where proposed laws are often quickly drafted with insufficient or no advance 
consideration or research. Forty-two Secretariat staff members from the national and 
provincial parliaments took the two-week ICLAD course and, from this number, twelve 
staff members (including at least one in each province) have emerged as trainers capable 
of training other parliamentary and government ministries in this critical skill. Training 
activity, conducted by these trainers, of Secretariat and governmental staff was underway 
during the period of this evaluation. 
3.2.2c. Committee strengthening activities that have included the establishment of a 
Council of Committee Chairs to provide a platform for interaction among chairpersons 
and to establish a list of action items to improve and expand committee operations. Other 
activities included a series of workshops and roundtables for members of the National 
Parliament to address the role and activities of committees in an effective parliament, and 
how committee activities could become more transparent and participatory. In this 
regard, an international consultant (a member of the evaluation team) prepared a manual 
on how to prepare for, hold, and follow up on a committee public hearing and a citizens’ 
guide to participation in a public hearing. 
3.2.2d. A parliamentary internship program for recent university graduates and graduate 
students. Interns serve in both the national and provincial parliaments, with national 
interns serving mainly as committee staff and provincial interns in a variety of 
assignments including website and database development. As the PLSP program drew to 
a close, 98 interns had served in the program, 58 in the National Parliament and 40 in the 
four Provincial Assemblies. Awareness of the program and interest in it grew very 
rapidly during 2006 and 2007, resulting in huge increases in program applications. As a 
result, the program has become extremely competitive and selective, with only 21 of 412 
applicants selected for the most recent internships in the National Parliament, five of 97 
in NWFP, and similar percentages in the other three Provincial Assemblies. 
Perhaps PLSP’s single most impressive individual success story concerns an intern from 
rural Pakistan who, prior to his selection as an intern, had failed the country’s civil 
service entry exam and, after being selected for and serving as a parliamentary intern 
retook the exam and received the highest score attained by anyone in more than twenty 
years. The intern attributed his success to the experience and training that he gained 
through his service in the PLSP internship program. 
 
3.2.2e. Assistance to parliamentary libraries including facilitation of a merger of the 
Senate and National Assembly libraries, the purchase of new or upgraded equipment and 
software, a start on the digitization of old parliamentary records, and the beginning 
installation of a common library management (KOHA) system for use in both the 
national and provincial libraries. 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 26 
3.2.2f. Facilitation of several Senate committee, and at least one provincial committee, 
Policy Dialogues in which academic and civil society experts were invited to address 
committee members on a specific matter within the committee’s jurisdiction. In addition 
to providing the committee members with valuable expert input from outside the 
parliament, the Policy Dialogues served as a demonstration to committees of the value of 
public hearings which, if held, could increase both parliamentary transparency and 
linkage with the people. One internationally recognized Pakistani journalist and author 
whose books have been published worldwide and who was invited to address a 
committee at one of the dialogues remarked that it was the first time that the parliament 
or government had ever asked for his thoughts on a major policy issue. He said that he 
found the approach refreshing and offering promise for future openness of the 
parliamentary process. 
3.2.2g. Sponsorship of a conference of area study centers that brought together private 
and academic research groups and individuals to meet and talk with parliamentarians and 
staff concerning possible future collaboration in public policy review and development. 
 
3.2.3 Oversight/Accountability. The evaluation team found the following to be PLSP’s 
most impressive accomplishment in the oversight/accountability area: 
3.2.3a. Budget process and budget analysis training for members and staff, with 
workshops conducted in Islamabad for the Senate and National Assembly and in each of 
the provincial capitals for the Provincial Assemblies. 
3.2.4 Management/Infrastructure. The evaluation team found the following to be the 
most impressive PLSP accomplishments in the management/infrastructure area: 
3.2.4a. The establishment of a Parliamentary Information Technology Resource Center 
(PITRC) in each Provincial Assembly and the upgrading of the existing Parliament 
Resource Center (PRC) in Islamabad. After the establishment of PIPS, the creation and 
upgrade of these centers is arguably the most significant accomplishment of the PLSP 
program in terms of long-term sustainability. The purpose of the centers is to provide 
information resource assistance to parliamentary members and staff. PLSP’s excellent 
provincial coordinators operate out of their respective resource centers, with two PLSP￾supported staff persons providing coordination in the Islamabad center. Each center 
includes several computer terminals provided by PLSP with free Internet access. PLSP 
reports that member use of the centers is reportedly heavy and continually increasing, 
PLSP figures indicate that use of all five centers has steadily increased. Because of the 
dissolution of five of the six bodies and the ongoing preparations for the January election, 
it was impossible for the evaluation team to make an independent assessment of the 
extent of member use of these impressive facilities. 
3.2.4b. English language enhancement and information technology training courses for 
members and staff. The evaluation team was extremely impressed with an English 
language class for Balochistan Secretariat staff that it attended and observed in Quetta. 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 27 
3.2.4c. The provision of a vast array of equipment and software, including computer 
terminals, transcription, recording and printing equipment that can be used in creating 
and editing transcripts of plenary session debates and other important documentation, 
and the upgrading of some print shops and press galleries. PLSP has also assisted all four 
Provincial Assemblies in establishing permanent connections to high speed Internet. 
3.2.4d. Upgrading the recording and editing capacities of the reporting and audio sections 
of the Senate and National Assembly. 
 
3.2.4e. The design of information technology software for the NWFP Provincial 
Assembly, and the redesign of existing software in the Sindh and Balochistan Provincial 
Assemblies. 
 
3.2.5. Training Modules. In conjunction with its activities in the four assistance areas, 
PLSP has developed seven comprehensive permanent training modules that will be 
available for use by local trainers that have been and are being trained through the PLSP 
program. The modules cover the areas of effective committees, public hearings, budget 
process and review, question hour, media relations, legislative management, and 
parliamentary privileges. The evaluation team conducted cursory examinations of some 
of the modules and found them comprehensive and capable of utilization as effective 
training tools if administered by a qualified trainer. 
3.3 Performance Measurement 
Any meaningful measurement of PLSP program success must be undertaken within the 
context of the historical mindset, addressed in detail in Section 2, of strong executives 
and comparatively weak, and at times powerless, parliamentary bodies that has existed 
throughout Pakistan’s sixty years as an independent nation. 
A review of PLSP’s Performance Management Plan (PMP) and of its 2007 PMP 
Reporting Matrix indicates that the project achieved or exceeded most performance 
indicator levels, some by substantial margins. The few levels that were not achieved 
mostly related to the National Assembly and were missed by narrow margins, with most 
based on data from a unstructured legislator survey, the response to which was so small 
as to make the results somewhat suspect. (See, also, Section 3.4.1 concerning National 
Assembly response to the PLSP program.) 
In evaluating the success of a legislative capacity-building program, it is important to be 
mindful that quantitative measurements (such as how big an increase there has been in 
the number of bills passed) can often be misleading. Qualitative measurements, while 
inevitably subjective, can often prove more meaningful and accurate. For example if the 
National Parliament were in its next session to enact only two bills—a parliamentary 
service law and a budget process law (see Sections 4.3.3c and 4.3.4b)—the PLSP 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 28 
program could be deemed a huge success in terms of the parliament’s institutional 
empowerment and its establishment of independence from the government. 
3.4 Problem Areas 
The evaluation team found virtual universal praise from legislators, Secretariat staff and 
other stakeholders for all aspects of the PLSP program. By every standard, its activities 
appear outstanding in effectively addressing their intended purposes, a tribute to PLSP’s 
outstanding staff, thorough project organization, and careful preparation. Problem areas 
identified by the team fall primarily in the administrative area, with a few minor and 
easily correctable program matters. 
3.4.1 Access to National Parliament. PLSP has encountered some difficulty in gaining 
authorization for the automatic access to the National Parliament that it has been granted 
by all four Provincial Assemblies. The program staff has been required to go through a 
sometimes time-consuming process of calling the offices of the Senate or National 
Assembly Secretaries to request approval for building access every time that they have 
reason to come to the Parliament. The PLSP program leadership says that it has never 
been denied access, only that the procedure it has to go through is slow and cumbersome 
compared to the automatic access that their provincial coordinators have to Provincial 
Assembly facilities. 
PLSP’s inability to receive automatic access to the National Assembly may be 
symptomatic of a few other fairly minor problems that it has encountered with regard to 
the body. It is likely that these problems relate to the National Assembly’s being the 
legislative body closest to the federal government, which is not likely to be very 
enthusiastic about the thought of parliamentary empowerment (see, also, Section 2, 
above, and Section 3.4.6). Nevertheless, this situation appears to have been significantly 
alleviated by the recent retirement of a National Assembly Secretary who was not 
particularly cooperative with program officials and the appointment of a new Secretary 
who has demonstrated much stronger support for the program. 
The process required to gain access to Senate offices does not appear to have had any 
adverse impact on the PLSP program as the percentage of senators who have participated 
in at least one of its program activities is the highest of any of the six legislative bodies. 
3.4.2 Focal Persons. As indicated in Section 3.1.3, the designation of a focal person in 
each parliamentary house through whom PLSP project staff can channel program 
communications with the house’s top leadership has produced mixed results. The 
concept would seem to make good sense, particularly if the focal person has a good 
working relationship with PLSP staff and enjoys easy access to the Secretary of the 
house, something that clearly appears to be the case in the Sindh ad NWFP Provincial 
Assemblies. 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 29 
3.4.3 Selection of Activity Participants. All of the parliamentary houses insist on 
making final determinations concerning the selection of individual members and 
Secretariat staff who attend individual PLSP activities. This insistence appears to have 
on occasion prevented PLSP from including a particularly promising legislators or staff 
in an activity because the parliamentary leaders or the Secretary will not grant their 
approval. There are some indications that focal persons have used their positions to 
secure approval for personal friends on the Secretariat staff to attend an activity while 
preventing attendance by some staff that PLSP feel would benefit more from the activity 
and better use the training to contribute to building the performance capacity of their 
Secretariat. 
3.4.4 Lack of Institutional Identity among Secretariat Staff. Secretariat staff are 
treated as part of the Pakistan civil service and, as such, are subject to transfer or rotation 
from government ministries to the parliament and then back to a ministry. The 
evaluation team found that the civil service utilizes this rotation process with some 
frequency with regard to the Secretariat staff of the National Parliament. Such rotations 
appear to take place with considerably less frequency in the Provincial Assembly 
Secretariats. Particularly at the federal level, this situation serves to focus the institutional 
identity of Secretariat staff on the civil service system rather on the parliament, thereby 
hindering the development of a full parliamentary identity and an institutional loyalty 
among staff. Such rotations also hinder establishment of a vital institutional continuity 
that a parliamentary staff can provide as parliaments and their members come and go. 
This is a matter that could be addressed during an extended PLSP program (see Section 
4.3.4b). 
3.4.5 Balochistan Provincial Assembly TA/DA Support. The Balochistan Ministry of 
Finance has declined to cover TA/DA (transportation allowance/daily allowance) support 
for its Provincial Assembly members and staff to attend PLSP program activities in 
Islamabad and other provincial capitals. At the beginning of calendar year 2007, PLSP 
informed the leaders and Secretaries of all six parliamentary houses that, beginning on 
July 1, 2007, they would be expected to assume responsibility for TA/DA for their 
members and staff. All of the provinces except for Balochistan have done so. Secretariat 
staff in Balochistan, including the PLSP focal person, say that their province is poor, 
cannot get their finance ministry to agree to take responsibility for these expenses, and 
that PLSP should therefore continue to cover them. But these staff members also admit 
that their government covers out-of-country TA/DA for members and staff to attend 
meetings and programs of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA) that, 
unlike USAID, provides no capacity-building financial or technical support to the 
Provincial Assembly. While Balochistan is a poor province compared to Punjab and 
Sindh, the Assembly and government of NWFP—the province most similar to 
Balochistan—have accepted responsibility for the coverage of TA/DA for its members 
and staff after July 1, 2007. 
3.4.6 Lack of Full National Assembly Support of The PLSP Internship Program. 
Some Secretariat staff of the National Assembly have failed to fully embrace the PLSP 
internship program which, as indicated in Section 3.2.2 has become highly competitive 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 30 
and selective. Some of this attitude may be a legacy of the recently retired Secretary who 
was not as supportive of PLSP as is his successor. From meetings and discussions with 
the National Parliament interns and Secretariat staff and a review of intern work 
assignments and activities, the evaluation team believes that an underlying cause of this 
situation is probably Secretariat staff discomfort with the high quality and quantity of 
work done by the interns and a concern of how this may reflect on their own work 
products. 
3.4.7 Donor Coordination. Some communication problems that PLSP has encountered 
with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) program to assist the National 
Parliament were addressed in Section 3.1.5. As indicated in that section, the evaluation 
team did not find PLSP to be the responsible party for any of these problems. Rather, the 
PLSP Project Director is taking the lead in trying to establish better communication links 
with her UNDP counterpart (this was confirmed by the UNDP Project Director) to 
improve resource coordination and minimize unnecessary and unproductive activity 
duplication. 
3.4.8 Tailoring Workshop Training To Local Conditions. The evaluation team’s 
discussions with members and staff indicated that the PLSP budget training workshops 
were deemed among the program’s most helpful and valuable workshop programs. 
Those who attended them indicated that the workshops have generated an understanding 
of the constitutional power and authority of the national and provincial parliaments in the 
budget area and of the role that the parliament can play in budget formulation and review. 
There were a few expressions from the Provincial Assemblies of Balochistan and NWFP 
that the budget training they received may have been a bit too complex for their members 
and staff. Those expressing this view suggested it would have been helpful if the training 
in these two assemblies might have been presented with some minor variations on a 
slightly less sophisticated level than in the National Assembly and the Punjab and Sindh 
Assemblies. 
 
In a similar vein, there were also some expressions from a few participants in the 
research training workshops provided by a highly experienced two-person international 
team from the United States and Canada (see Section 3.2.2) that the training might have 
been more tailored to the particular conditions and circumstances of Pakistan’s 
parliamentary bodies. This could be addressed in the future by bringing the international 
consultants to the country for a week of orientation and meetings, and discussion before 
the commencement of training activity. 
3.4.9 Secretariat Staff and Parliamentary Intern Access to Parliamentary Libraries.
The evaluation team was surprised to learn that only legislators and Secretariat research 
staff are allowed to use the parliamentary libraries. While none of the libraries that were 
visited have large collections, the collections are nevertheless relevant to the work and 
activity engaged in by parliamentary interns and many other Secretariat staff. Limiting 
access to these collections to the very small number of researchers in each Secretariat is 
counterproductive to the goal of building each parliament’s internal capacity. 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 31 
3.4.10 Cultural Communication Issues. A couple of instances were brought to the 
attention of the evaluation team in which a lack of full appreciation of cultural differences 
created misunderstanding or confusion in sensitive communications between PLSP 
leadership and parliamentary officials. Such situations could be avoided through use of a 
respected senior local person such as PLSP’s Senior Technical Adviser, a former 
National Assembly Secretary, to assist in facilitating sensitive communications that have 
the potential for resulting in misunderstandings (see, also, Section 4.2.10). 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 32 
4. The PLSP Program beyond March 31, 2008 
4.1 Extension of PLSP Program 
As indicated in Section 3.2, the evaluation team believes that the PLSP program has 
amassed a large and extremely impressive array of accomplishments during its two and 
one-half years of operation. Given this record of success, and with Pakistan sitting at a 
potentially historic crossroads that is expected to bring in a new civilian government, a 
new National Assembly, and a new Provincial Assembly in each of the country’s four 
provinces, it makes eminent sense to continue the PLSP program and build on the 
groundwork that it has provided toward parliamentary empowerment and parliamentary 
responsiveness to the Pakistani people. Representative of the overwhelming across-the￾board support that the evaluation team found from legislators, Secretariat staff, 
government officials, and civil society and media representatives for additional capacity 
building activity in virtually every area are the results in the check list of options, shown 
to selected interviewees, in question 9 of the PLSP Program Questionnaire (Appendix D). 
Particularly because of the anticipated election of a number of new leaders and the likely 
influx of a large number of inexperienced first term legislators who will want and need 
immediate and extensive orientation and training, it is of critical importance that USAID 
make a strong effort to assure that the PLSP program will not just continue, but continue 
with no break from the end of the current program to the commencement of the 
extension. The new parliamentary bodies will be the first in Pakistan’s history that will 
come into office with a successful on-going capacity building program in place, and a 
hiatus or gap of even short duration would be highly counterproductive to the momentum 
and interest that has been generated by the PLSP program during its 31 months of 
operation. 
The evaluation team believes that it would be important for an extended PLSP program to 
repeat and continue some of the activities that have been found to be most successful and 
useful during the current program, both for newly elected legislators and for returning 
members who were unable to participate in them when they were initially offered. 
4.2 Matters for Consideration in an Extended PLSP Program 
The following are matters that the evaluation team believes important for consideration in 
an extended PLSP program. 
4.2.1 New Member Orientation. While some of the PLSP New Member Orientation 
Program will be conducted before project closedown if the parliamentary election is held, 
as currently re-scheduled, in mid February, at least some portions of it are certain to be 
uncompleted and would carry into an extended program. For reasons addressed in 
Section 4.3.2a, the evaluation team suggests that the tentative intention, based on member 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 33 
and staff requests, that separate orientation sessions be held for parliamentarians and 
Secretariats be reexamined. (See, also, Section 4.3.6) 
4.2.2 Parliamentary Commitment to Ownership of Capacity-Building. During an 
extended PLSP program, it would be important that parliamentary leaders demonstrate a 
commitment to assume ownership of capacity-building institutions and activities. This 
would include a willingness to provide adequate funding from parliamentary budgets to 
support the permanent operation of the Pakistan Institute or Parliamentary Studies (PIPS). 
USAID will provide interim support for PIPS until the conclusion of the current PLSP 
project, but a parliamentary commitment to permanent support is critical if PIPS is to 
become the sustainable parliamentary training and research institution that it is intended 
to be (see, also, Sections 3.2.2a and 4.3.2b). 
In the same vein, the National Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies must be 
demonstrate a willingness to gradually assume responsibility for payment of 
parliamentary intern stipends if this highly successful and valuable program is to become 
a permanent fixture. 
The unwillingness of the Balochistan Ministry of Finance to cover TA/DA for Provincial 
Assembly members and staff to attend PLSP programs in Islamabad and the other 
provincial capitals was addressed in Section 3.4.5. The evaluation team found it difficult 
to be sympathetic to the situation once it became clear that the Balochistan government 
liberally covers TA/DA for member and staff to attend Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association (CPA) meetings and other international activities. PLSP’s July 1-September 
30, 2007 quarterly report indicated that the Program Director has provided the 
Balochistan Assembly Secretariat with a wording formula that could be used to resubmit 
its request to the Ministry of Finance for approval for TA/DA reimbursement. It is hoped 
that this strategy would result in a commitment by the ministry in an extended PLSP 
program. 
4.2.3 Full Program Participation for The AJK Assembly. Beginning in the second 
year of the PLSP program, the Assembly of the autonomous region of AJK was accepted 
as an unofficial program participant. Since that time, it has covered TA/DA for its 
members and staff to attend and participate in PLSP training workshops. The Speaker and 
Secretary of the AJK Assembly have expressed a strong desire to be accepted as a full 
program participant in an extended PLSP program. They indicated to the evaluation team 
that they are prepared to cover TA/DA for member and staff program participation. 
4.2.4 Focal Persons. The mixed record of the use of focal persons in the six 
parliamentary bodies has been addressed in Sections 3.1.3 and 3.4.2. As previously 
indicated, the concept makes sense, with the alternative of PLSP project leaders having 
no means of access to the Secretary and top leaders other than through direct contact 
being highly risky. The evaluation team cannot offer a preferable alternative. In an 
extended program, PLSP’s project leaders should seek to have some input into the 
selection of focal persons, and should also seek commitments from the Secretaries and 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 34 
Speakers to relieve focal persons of some of their regular responsibilities to assure them 
adequate time to work with PLSP staff on program planning and administration. 
4.2.5 PLSP Access to National Parliament Building. The process that PLSP program 
leaders have to go through to gain access to the National Parliament Building in 
Islamabad was addressed in Section 3.4.1. At the outset of an extended program, the 
program leaders should try to address this problem by seeking authorization from the 
Senate Chairman, National Assembly Speaker and the two Secretaries for passes to the 
Parliament Building. 
4.2.6 A National Parliament Coordinator. In an extended program, PLSP project 
leaders might consider appointment of a National Parliament coordinator similar to those 
that PLSP now has in each Provincial Assembly. The Project Director has effectively 
filled this role for the past two and one-half years, with the Deputy Project Director 
coordinating the work of the provincial coordinators. A National Parliament coordinator 
could alleviate some of the enormous burden placed on the Project Director in overseeing 
and coordinating an extremely comprehensive and wide-ranging program. 
4.2.7 Procurement Officer. In an extended PLSP program, consideration might also be 
given to the appointment of a procurement officer to handle equipment needs and 
purchases. If an extended PLSP program were to proceed as indications are that it would, 
two major activities will be the provision of advice and assistance in the development of 
the new PIPS facility, and the likely installation in at least some, if not all, of the 
parliamentary plenary chambers of equipment to provide for live broadcasts of 
proceedings. These activities alone would figure to require special expertise and major 
commitments of time. When added to other project needs such as the assessment future 
parliamentary technology requirements and the importance of familiarity with licensing 
agreements and customs issues, a convincing case can be made for full time program 
officer with expertise in the procurement area. 
4.2.8 Parliamentarians Understanding Of Their Role and Authority. A recurring 
theme in the evaluation team’s discussions with members, staff, journalists, and civil 
society representatives was that members of both the National Parliament and the 
Provincial Assemblies need assistance in developing a clearer understanding the “role of 
a parliamentarian” and of their constitutional and legal authority. These matters have 
been touched upon in many PLSP program activities. In an extended program that is 
likely to include large numbers of inexperienced first-term members, this focus will be 
more important than ever. Sessions specifically addressing this issue should be included 
in the New Member Orientation agenda, and each member activity in an extended 
program should include this as a component. 
4.2.9 Donor/Implementer Coordination. The matter of donor coordination and some 
problems that PLSP’s project leaders have experienced with communication from the 
director of the UNDP assistance program to the National Parliament have been addressed 
in Sections 3.1.5 and 3.4.7 (see, also, Section 4.1.3e, below). In an extended PLSP, the 
program leaders should continue to take the lead and initiative currently being taken by 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 35 
PLSP’s Program Director in promoting full exchange and communication with UNDP’s 
program director to improve resource coordination and minimize unnecessary and 
unproductive activity duplication. 
4.2.10 Cultural Communication Issues. The potential for encountering difficulty in 
sensitive communications with parliamentary leaders due to cultural differences was 
addressed in Section 3.4.10. As suggested there, the leaders of an extended PLSP might 
consider drawing upon a respected senior local person such as PLSP’s current Senior 
Technical Adviser to assist in the facilitation of communications that it might consider 
particularly sensitive and subject to misunderstanding. 
4.2.11 Public Disconnect From The Parliament. Discussions with approximately fifty 
of Karachi’s leading business and intellectual leaders during the evaluation team’s 
attendance at a joint meeting of five of the city’s Rotary Clubs indicated a strong 
disconnect between these individuals and their national and provincial parliament. In 
2005, a decision was made by USAID to shift the focus of the PLSP program away from 
some apparently less than fully successful outreach activities that were a major 
component of the predecessor World Vision assistance program to internal activities that 
would enhance information resources and access for members and staff. The evaluation 
team agrees that this decision was probably an appropriate one in 2005, but believes that, 
if the program is extended to support newly elected parliaments in Islamabad and the 
provinces, public outreach activities should now become a priority program component. 
Because, in many countries, political parties often provide public outreach support for 
their members, an extended PLSP program should explore the possibility (suggested in 
Section 4.3.1c, below), of collaboration on some activities in this area with the National 
Democratic Institute (NDI) whose Pakistan program focuses on political party 
development 
4.3 Suggested Activities for an Extended PLSP Program 
While USAID and program leadership would be best able to determine specific activities 
of an extended PLSP program, the evaluation team, on the basis of its four-week 
examination of the program and discussions with well over two hundred individuals in 
Islamabad and the four provincial capitals, suggests consideration of the following as 
priority activities in PLSP’s four program areas. 
4.3.1 Representation. It is suggested that activity in the representation program area be 
significantly expanded if the PLSP program is extended, with the following to be targeted 
as priority activities. 
4.3.1a. Support for the establishment of live broadcasts of plenary sessions and possibly 
other official activities of the Senate, National Assembly and Provincial Assemblies. 
This is an area in which a recent public opinion poll indicates the Pakistani people have 
great interest. In response to a question that the International Republican Institute (IRI) 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 36 
placed on its most recent quarterly public survey of Pakistani public opinion at the 
request of PLSP, 81% of respondents said that they would be likely to watch live 
broadcasts of National Parliament sessions were they to be offered (by province, the 
figures were 69% in Balochistan, 63% in NWFP, 73% in Sindh, and 89% in Punjab). 
With such interest, it would be hoped that all six parliamentary bodies would be 
responsive to this strongly expressed public desire. 
At the time of this evaluation, the Senate Finance Committee special subcommittee on 
broadcasting has been established and has given indication of its readiness to begin 
serious examination of the matter of live broadcasts of Senate plenary sessions. Among 
areas in which PLSP assistance might be provided to the subcommittee and to the other 
legislative bodies if they indicate interest would be provision of international consultants 
to help in a decision of whether to have a dedicated C-Span type channel that would 
allow virtually unlimited coverage or to operate through existing commercial stations that 
would figure to mean more limited coverage, and additional consultant assistance in the 
development of telecast guidelines and in the identification of appropriate equipment and 
hardware. 
4.3.1b. Assistance in the expanded utilization of committee public hearings, building on 
the work begun during the current program. Additional PLSP-facilitated Policy 
Dialogues similar to those conducted on several occasions during 2007 would offer an 
ideal venue for jump-starting the expanded use of public hearings by continuing to 
demonstrate their value as a means of acquiring valuable expertise from outside the 
parliament and, just as importantly, establishing an all-important dialogue linkage 
between the parliament and those it represents and serves. As indicated in Section 4.2.11, 
public disconnect from its parliamentary bodies is a matter that needs to be addressed by 
all of Pakistan’s parliamentary houses. 
4.3.1c. Further addressing the matter of citizen disconnect from their parliaments through 
the provision of public outreach and communication training for members and staff, with 
the training to focus on such matters as how parliamentarians can develop positive 
working relationships with journalists and reporters, effective constituent relations 
including district constituent meetings, preparation and dissemination of newsletters, and 
the establishment of individual member websites. As suggested in Section 4.2.11, such 
training might be conducted cooperatively with the National Democratic Institute (NDI) 
in conjunction with its political party development program. 
4.3.1d. Continued parliamentary reporting and budget process training for journalists, 
with the addition of sessions on understanding the intricacies and nuances of the 
democratic parliamentary process. Discussions with virtually every journalist who had 
attended PLSP training in these areas included strong requests for their being repeated for 
colleagues who were previously unable to attend them 
A number of journalists with whom the evaluation team spoke indicated that they and 
their colleagues would benefit greatly from parliamentary process training. In a nation 
that, like Pakistan, has not experienced a long uninterrupted history of parliamentary 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 37 
democracy, reporters and journalists assigned to cover parliamentary activities will 
almost always lack an in-depth understanding of the complexities and intricacies of the 
parliamentary process. They may, for example, mistakenly see a lack of neatness in the 
process and the slow pace at which it often operates as evidence of an ineffective system. 
As journalists and reporters develop a more in-depth understanding and appreciation of 
the workings of the parliamentary process, it can be expected that the National Parliament 
and the Provincial Assemblies can expect to see a noticeable improvement in the quality 
and accuracy of their reports. 
4.3.1e. In Islamabad and in each of the provincial capitals, the evaluation team was asked 
by almost all women legislators with whom it met to suggest that an extended PLSP 
program include gender-focused programs for women legislators, addressing such topics 
as how to effectively advocate for gender issues, effective constituent service, and 
contacts with fellow women legislators from around the country and with women 
legislators from other countries. This has been an area in which the UNDP legislative 
assistance program has done some work in the National Parliament. But the UNDP 
program does not include assistance to Provincial Assemblies, meaning that any UNDP 
activity has not extended to women members of these bodies. The widespread interest 
that the evaluation team found among women legislators for PLSP inclusion of this area 
of assistance in an extended program would suggest that Provincial Assembly women 
legislator programs be included as a component of an extended program, and that PLSP 
leaders at least explore the possibility of some cooperative assistance programs in the 
National Parliament. 
4.3.2 Lawmaking. The following activities that fall under the lawmaking heading are 
suggested for an extended PLSP program. 
 
4.3.2a. Sponsorship and facilitation of New Member Orientation programs for the new 
parliaments scheduled that will take office in early 2008. If the election is held as 
scheduled in January 2008, PLSP plans to begin orientation activities during the final 
weeks of its program. It plans to hold sessions in Islamabad and in each provincial 
capital, with provincial sessions tailored to the specific circumstances and situation of the 
individual Provincial Assembly. PLSP has utilized a series of focus groups provide 
guidance in its determination of tentative agendas. Given the magnitude of this 
undertaking, it seems unlikely that the orientations could be completed before the 
project’s scheduled March 31 closedown. 
PLSP has received feedback that separate orientation sessions should be held for 
members and staff. The evaluation team believes that this would be a mistake. 
Parliamentarians, particularly newly elected ones, and staff need to see each other as a 
team that works together—with staff assisting members—in addressing problems on 
behalf of the people. Separating members and staff in an orientation session at the very 
outset of a new parliament sends the wrong message to both and can serve to discourage 
rather than encourage the development of cooperative working relationships. (See, also, 
Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.6 concerning the orientation of new members.) 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 38 
4.3.2b. Assistance in the development of PIPS as a permanent institution. PLSP 
activities might cover assistance to the PIPS board of governors in the development of 
guidelines on PIPS/Secretariat coordination and on how PIPS services will be provided to 
the Provincial Assemblies from its Islamabad headquarters, training of the PIPS staff that 
will become the permanent training unit for parliamentarians and staff, the identification 
of equipment for PIPS new headquarters building (the construction of which is to be 
funded by USAID), and at least a partial continuation of the Secretariat-type services that 
have been provided to PIPS by PLSP during 2006 and 2007 as the institute gradually 
builds and trains its staff. (See, also, Sections 3.2.2a and 4.2.2.) 
4.3.2c. Continuation of the parliamentary internship program, the interest in which has 
skyrocketed as Pakistani graduates become aware of it. Special consideration should be 
given to increasing the number of interns in the Provincial Assemblies, all of which 
indicate a strong interest in additional internship assistance. 
4.3.2d. While the reluctance of all six parliamentary bodies to commit sufficient of their 
Secretariat resources to committee staff support is a hindrance to expanded committee 
activity, committee development should, nevertheless, continue to be a major component 
of an extended PLSP program. Suggested priorities in this area should be support for 
expanded pubic hearings (Section 4.3.1b, above), chairperson training particularly for 
new committee chairs, and member awareness training on effective parliamentary 
committees. The PLSP program leadership has suggested the utilization of effective 
committee operations workshops for rank-and-file committee members as a possible 
means of pushing reluctant or passive chairpersons to action. 
4.3.2e. Continued Secretariat training in drafting and research, both of which are essential 
qualities for an effective independent parliament. 
The number of current researchers in each parliamentary body is inadequate, with the 
evaluation team told that there are a total of only seven in the Senate, five in the National 
Assembly, and comparable or fewer numbers in the Provincial Assemblies. As PIPS 
develops its staff, it can be expected to provide additional supplementary support. But in 
the meantime, training of existing research staff should be a priority. 
The importance for each of Pakistan’s parliamentary bodies to have an in-house 
capability to draft legislation and proposed amendments cannot be overemphasized. The 
internal capacity to draft legislation and amendments is an essential element for any 
parliamentary or legislative body that wants to have the capability to initiate public policy 
and programs and not be limited simply to ratification or rejection of government 
proposals. The twelve trainers that emerged from PLSP’s training program (see Section 
3.2.2) mark a promising start in this direction, a start that it would be important to build 
upon during an extended program. 
4.3.2f. With the inauguration of a new National Assembly in Islamabad and new 
assemblies in the four provinces, some and perhaps all of the bodies parliamentary bodies 
will have new leaders, and all will be required to adopt new rules of procedure soon after 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 39 
its members take their oaths of office. This would be an ideal time to offer assistance 
from international experts experienced in parliamentary and legislative rules of procedure 
in the writing new rules for the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies 
(because the Senate is a continuing body, it would not be adopting new rules, but 
consultant assistance could certainly be also offered to its leaders if they express an 
interest in revision of their house rules). 
4.3.3 Oversight/Accountability. With one exception, suggested priority activities in the 
oversight/accountability area involve basic continuation of successful activities 
undertaken during the program’s current phase. 
4.3.3a. Budget training for members and staff was frequently cited as the most 
worthwhile, important, and well-conducted PLSP training activity by those who attended 
the sessions. It was also frequently suggested as a priority activity for an extended 
program. 
As indicated in Section 3.4.8, the evaluation team suggests that budget workshops 
conducted during an extended PLSP program should be structured and presented on a 
slightly less sophisticated level for the Balochistan and NWFP Assemblies than for the 
National Parliament and the Punjab and Sindh Assemblies. 
4.3.3b. Closely related to budget training and equally important to it, but also distinct 
from it, would be member and staff training on parliamentary oversight of the 
government. 
The evaluation team feels it important that oversight training in an extended PLSP 
program emphasize to members and staff that effective parliamentary oversight involves 
more than just budget review—that a parliament’s approval of the government’s budget 
is only what might be termed its “before” role in the oversight process, its establishment 
of government spending priorities and its authorization of the means and methods of 
collecting revenue to cover these expenses. Oversight training must emphasize that the 
process also involves the “after” role—a look back by the parliament, often through its 
committees—at the activities, spending, and performance of government ministries to 
determine whether budget funds a) have been spent as the parliament intended, b) have 
been administered effectively, c) whether there has been waste, inefficiency, or 
corruption, and d) to generally determine what value and benefits the people have gotten 
from the funds and programs authorized by the parliament. 
4.3.3c. Compared to many other countries, the Pakistan Constitution rather severely 
limits the authority of the National Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies in the area 
of budget review. PLSP program staff have pointed out, however, that parliamentary 
enactment of national and provincial budget laws defining parliamentary authority within 
these constitutional parameters could serve to provide significant latitude that neither the 
national nor the provincial bodies do not now have. Should the leaders of the national 
and/or provincial assemblies express interest in the exploring the possible adoption of 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 40 
parliamentary budget laws, an extended PLSP program should be prepared to offer 
assistance in their design. 
To cite just one significant example of how a parliamentary budget law could allow for 
more extensive parliamentary budget review, Articles 80 and 120 of the Constitution 
provide that the federal and provincial governments must submit their annual budget 
statements to their parliaments for their consideration. But the Constitution does not 
specify dates by which the statements must be submitted. Government budget statements 
are, therefore, usually sent to the parliaments at such late dates as to allow only a very 
short timeframe (usually no more than a couple of weeks) for parliamentary examination 
before the onset of the new fiscal year. A parliamentary budget law could require that the 
budget statements be submitted to the parliament by specific dates that would allow for 
more meaningful examination than is currently possible. 
4.3.3d. If the members of the National Parliament and Provincial Assemblies are serious 
in their often-expressed desire to play a more significant role in budget formulation, and 
oversight, they will require professional staff in assistance in this area within their 
respective Secretariats. An extended PLSP program could provide assistance in 
development of this concept and in follow-up establishment of parliamentary budget 
offices. 
4.3.3e. PLSP’s question time training has been deemed almost as important and valuable 
as its budget training by those members who have attended its sessions. Question time 
has traditionally been the only area in which Pakistani parliamentarians have exercised 
any significant oversight of the government. As such, continued training in this area 
would be of paramount importance. 
4.3.4 Management/Infrastructure. The following are suggested priority activities in the 
management/infrastructure program area. 
4.3.4a. PLSP program leaders and Secretariat information technology staff feel strongly 
that an important focus of an extended program should be completion of the 
establishment of an interconnect of all six parliamentary information systems. A 
complete interconnect would enable such capacity-building activities as video 
conferencing and shared exchanges of information, and would facilitate live Internet 
coverage of plenary sessions and non-closed committee meetings. 
4.3.4b. The lack of a strong institutional identity and loyalty among Secretariat staff was 
addressed in Section 3.4.4. PLSP’s Parliamentary Service Working Group has examined 
the matter of adoption of a parliamentary service law, and the evaluation team believes 
that this examination should be continued in an extended PLSP program. 
The evaluation team did not find it widely understood by national parliamentarians or 
their Secretariat staff that Article 87 of the Pakistan Constitution provides that both the 
Senate and National Assembly “shall have a separate Secretariat” and that the Parliament 
“may by law regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 41 
the secretarial staff of either house.” The establishment of Senate and National Assembly 
Secretariats that will be independent of the civil service, that will be institutionally loyal 
to the Parliament, and that will assure institutional continuity and memory could 
therefore be addressed through the National Parliament’s enactment of a parliamentary 
service law that would clarify the full independence of the Parliament’s Secretariats. If 
the leaders of the Senate and National Assembly can be persuaded of the importance of 
such a law, an extended PLSP program should be prepared to offer assistance in its 
design. 
4.3.4c. The evaluation team received many requests, from Secretariat staff in particular, 
that an extended PLSP program provide them and their respective houses with additional 
equipment and hardware—computers, printers, photocopiers, fax machines, transcribers, 
and recorders. As indicated in Section 3.2.4c, the current program has provided large 
amounts of such items to all six parliamentary bodies. The provision of additional such 
items should certainly be a component of an extended program. But this is also an area in 
which Pakistan’s parliaments could begin to demonstrate acceptance of ownership of 
their own capacity-building efforts. At least until such time as PIPS has been able to 
grow and develop, they will not possess the technical expertise and assistance that only a 
USAID-sponsored program like an extended PLSP could provide. Hardware and 
equipment could, however, be supplied as easily by the parliaments as by USAID. This 
is not to suggest that hardware and equipment should be excluded from an extended 
PLSP program, only that this is a financial commitment area in which parliamentary 
leaders and Secretaries can, and should, begin to accept near-term responsibility. 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 42 
Appendix A – PLSP Project Organization Chart 
Chief of Party
Director of Operations
Deputy Chief of 
Party
David Aasen
USAID/PAKISTAN
Technical Staff Islamabad
Representation Advisor 
Oversight Advisor 
Legislative Capacity Advisor 
Training Specialist
IT Specialist 
Intern Program Coordinator
Technical Staff –Provincial 
Offices
Provincial Coordinator –
Balochistan –
Provincial Coordinator –NWFP
Provincial Coordinator –Punjab
Provincial Coordinator –Sindh
+4 Assistants
Administrative Office Staff
Office and Finance Manager
Research Program Associate
IT & Network Administrator
Program Assistant
Secretary 
Other Support Staff
International Short-term Technical 
Assistants
Comparative practices
Technical skills and process specialists
Pakistan National Short-term 
Technical Assistants
Legislative Processes Advisors 
Research & Professional Development 
Specialists
DAI HOME OFFICE 
SUPPORT
Senior Management Support￾Administrative Support 
Technical Support
LEGISLATIVE 
DEVELOPMENT STEERING 
COMMITTEES
USAID/PAKISTAN
PAKISTAN LEGISLATIVE STRENGTHENING PROJECT
Implemented by Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI)
PLSP – Pakistan Organizational Chart (July, ’07)
Deputy Chief of Party
Resource 
Center Staff
PRC Manager
Assistants
PILS (PIPS)
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
Training Logistics Manager
TRAINING, RESEARCH
INFORMATION SERVICES
Parliamentary 
Information 
Technology 
Resource 
Centers
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 43 
Appendix B – Documents Reviewed 
PLSP Task Order and DAI Contract 
Memorandum of Understanding Between USAID and Secretariats Of Parliaments Of 
Pakistan For A Program Of Technical Assistance To Strengthen The Parliament Of 
Pakistan (October 25, 2005) 
Constitution of Pakistan 
Rules of Procedure of Senate, National Assembly, and Provincial Assemblies 
DAI PLSP Year One Work Plan 
DAI PLSP Year Two Work Plan 
DAI PLSP No Cost Extension Work Plan 
DAI PLSP Quarterly Reports 
PLSP Performance Management Plan (PMP) and 2007 PMP Reporting Matrix 
PLSP program documents 
 -detailed terms of reference and descriptions of PLSP activities and results 
 -PowerPoint presentations of PLSP program activities 
-selected consultant reports, white papers, and memoranda 
-handbooks and manuals prepared by PLSP consultants and staff 
-selected meeting minutes of Legislative Development Steering 
 Committees (LDSC) and Working Groups 
Comparative Statement of Activities of the PLSP-USAID SPDP-UNDP 
International Republican Institute (IRI) Fifth Annual Survey of Pakistan Public Opinion 
Citizens Report: Performance of the 12th National Assembly of Pakistan, prepared 
by Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILAT), 
November 17,2007 
USAID Handbook on Legislative Strengthening 
USAID/Pakistan Strategic Plan, May 2003-Sepember 2006 
Daily newspaper reports and commentaries during in-country period 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 44 
Appendix C – Individuals Interviewed 
USAID/Pakistan 
• Saad Paracha, USAID Chief Technical Officer for the PLSP program 
• Humaira Ashraf, USAID Deputy Chief Technical Officer for the PLSP program 
PLSP Staff 
• Eleanor Valentine; PLSP Project Director (Chief of Party) 
• Christopher Shields, PLSP Deputy Project Director (Deputy Chief of Party) 
• Jeremy Kanthor, PLSP United States Coordinator 
• Aizaz Arif, PLSP Oversight Adviser 
• Daud Malik, PLSP Representation Adviser 
• Mudassar Alam, PLSP Intern Program Coordinator 
• Sher Shah Farooq, PLSP IT Specialist 
• Nadia Batool, PLSP Training Specialist 
• Junaid Alam, PLSP PLSP Finance and Office Manager 
• Arif Tabassum, PLSP Balochistan Coordinator 
• Asifa Khan, PLSP Punjab Provincial Coordinator 
• Huma Ikramullah, PLSP Sindh Coordinator 
• Ashfaq Khan, PLSP NWFP Coordinator 
• Khan Ahmed Goraya, former Secretary General of National Assembly, currently 
PLSP Chief Technical Adviser 
Islamabad 
• Raja Muhammad Ameen, Secretary, Senate 
• Karamat Hussein Niazi, Secretary, National Assembly 
• Syed Moshaid Hussain, member, Senate 
• Jamil A Qureshi, Joint Secretary, Senate 
• Muhammad Tahir Hanafi, Joint Secretary, National Assembly 
• Bushra Nazli, Coordinator, PLSP Resource National Parliament Resource Center 
• Nazeer Mahar, Research Officer, Senate 
• Hamad Kazi, Legislation Branch, National Assembly 
• Shaukat Aziz, former Prime Minister 
• Salmon Shah, caretaker Minister of Finance 
• Nasir Khosa, Secretary to caretaker Prime Minister 
• M. Ismail Khan, development specialist, journalist, and columnist 
• Fazalullah Qureshi, former Federal Secretary of Economic Affairs Division, 
Government of Pakistan 
• PLSP interns, Senate and National Assembly 
• Rehman Malik, political adviser to former prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, 
• Shahzad Sharjeel, Sr. External Affairs Officer, The World Bank, Islamabad, 
• Farhatullah Babar, former Senator 
• Ammara Durrani, former editor of political economy page of the NEWS, currently 
Development Outreach Communication Specialist, USAID 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 45 
• Pervaiz Ahmed , Program Manager Rural Development, Aga Khan Foundation, 
Islamabad 
• Ejaz Qureshi, Secretary, Environment Ministry, former Chief Secretary, Sindh, 
former Chief Secretary, NWFP 
• Marvi Sarmad, Country Director of UNDP Pakistan Parliament Project 
• Ejaz Rahim, Caretaker Federal Minister for Health, member, Pakistan Planning 
Commission, and former Federal Cabinet Secretary
• Sheila Fruman, County Director, National Democratic Institute/Pakistan (NDI)
• Malis Orban, Executive Coordinator, National Democratic Institute/Pakistan (NDI)
• Tariq Junaid, Program Manager International Republican Institute/Pakistan (IRI) 
• Glenn Cowan, Democracy International, USAID National Democratic 
Institute/Pakistan (NDI) Evaluation Team 
• Bill Gallery, Democracy International, USAID National Democratic 
Institute/Pakistan (NDI) Evaluation Team 
• Brian Katulis, Center for American Progress, USAID National Democratic 
Institute/Pakistan (NDI) Evaluation Team 
• Zia Rehman Action Against Hunger, USAID National Democratic Institute/Pakistan 
(NDI) Evaluation Team
Punjab 
• Anwar Bhinder, member, Senate 
• Samia Amjad, member, Punjab PA 
• Saeed Ahmed, Secretary, Punjab Assembly 
• Malik Aftab Maqbool Joya, Assistant Secretary, Punjab PA 
• Tariq Mehmood, Deputy Secretary, Library and IT Sections, Punjab PA 
• Raja Riaz, press gallery Punjab PA, Chief Reporter, The Post 
• Suleman Ghani, Chairman Planning and Development Board, Government of Punjab 
• Bashir A Khan, Professor of Finance at Foreman Christian College, Lahore,
Balochistan 
• Amanullah Karnani, Deputy Advocate General, Government of Balochistan, former 
Senator 
• Abdul Karim Gorazai, Deputy Secretary, Balochistan PA 
• Shamsuddin, Deputy Secretary, Balochistan PA
• Rehmatullah Jatak DS Committees 
• Nazeer Panazai, Public Relations Officer, Balochistan PA
• Mir Baz Kakar, Research Officer, Balochistan PA 
• Malik Muhammad Din, System Analyst, IT Wing, Balochistan PA 
• Illahi Bux Jatak, Chief of Debates, Recording and Documentation, Balochistan PA
• Abid Mehmood, Facilitator, PLSP Drafting Course
• Suhail Ansari, facilitator, PLSP Legislative Drafting Course, Balochistan PA 
• Instructor and participants, PLSP English Class, Balochistan PA 
• PLSP Balochistan PA Interns
• Ayub Tareen, BBC Urdu and Pashto service, press gallery, Balochistan PA 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 46 
• Syed Ali Shah, DAWN TV, press gallery, Balochistan PA 
• Zulfiqar Guramani, KTV and Kawish newspaper, press gallery, Balochistan PA 
• Javed Langha, Sindh TV, press gallery, Balochistan Assembly
• Syed M Hasan, free lance documentary expert, press gallery, Balochistan PA
• Abdul Raheem Ziaratwala, member Balochistan PA 
• Shafiq Ahmed Khan, member, Balochistan PA 
• Rahila Durrani, member Balochitstan PA 
Sindh 
• Javaid R Laghari, Senator, Chairman Szabist Institute (Karachi) 
• PLSP Legislative Drafting Course particiapants 
• Abdullah Channa, Additional District and Sessions Judge, posted as Deputy Secretary 
Regulation, Sindh PA 
• Kabir Leghari, Additional District and Sessions Judge, posted as Assistant Draftsmen 
Secretary, Law Department, Sindh PA 
• Professor Akmal Wasim, Associate Professor, Hamdard Law College (Karachi) 
• Hadi Bux Buriro, Secretary, Sindh PA 
• Syed Talib Imam, member, Sindh PA 
• Syeda Bano Siddiqui, member, Sindh PA 
• Humera Alwani, member, Sindh PA 
• Raheela Tiwana , Deputy Speaker, Sindh PA 
• Syed Muzaffar Hussain Shah, Speaker, Sindh PA 
• Mian Haji Muhammed Hasan Shah, Committee Branch, Sindh PA 
• Naila Inam, member, Sindh PA 
• Rehana Nasreen, member, Sindh PA 
• Kishwer Sultana, member, National Assembly 
• Nisar Ahmed Khuhro, Opposition Leader, Sindh PA 
• Anwar Ahmed Khan Mahar, member, Sindh PA, 
• Abdul Qadir Qureshi, Associated Press of Pakistan (Karachi) 
• Nadia Khalique, Muhammed Ali, PLSP interns, Sindh PA 
• Syed Mohammed Abbas, Assistant Secretary Budget, Sindh PA 
• Munazza Shakoor, Librarian, Sindh PA 
• Syed Sajid Ahmed, IT and Website Director, Sindh PA 
• Muhammed Atique, Chief Reporter, Sindh PA 
• Ghulam Anwar Memon, Publication Officer, Sindh PA 
Joint Meeting and Reception of Five Karachi (Sindh) Rotary Clubs 
• Badruddin Fakhri, President, Rotary Club of Karachi South 
• Arsalan Mahmood, President, Rotary Club of Karachi Bay 
• Jawed Siddique, President, Rotary Club of Karachi Gateway 
• Rana Zahid Habib, President, Rotary Club of Karachi Marina Gold 
• Mustansar Bandukwala, President, Rotary Club of Karachi Defense 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 47 
The joint clubs meeting was conducted by Khalid Ikramullah Khan, Co-Chairman of the 
Karachi Area Rotary Clubs District Committee. Approximately fifty members were in 
attendance and participated in a dialogue and discussion with the evaluation team. 
NWFP 
• Muhammad Mushtaq, Secretary, NWFP PA 
• Amanullah Khan, Senior Additional Secretary, NWFP PA 
• Attaullah Khan, Director Automation, NWFP PA 
• Moulana Asmatullah Khan, Former Minister for Revenue and Religious Affairs, 
Government of NWFP 
• Amanullah Khan, Deputy Secretary Administration, facilitator, PLSP drafting course, 
NWFP PA 
• Participants of PLSP drafting course, NWFP PA 
• PLSP NWFP PA interns 
• Javed Iqbal, Additional Chief Secretary FATA, Government of NWFP 
• Robert Traister, Senior Adviser, NASPAK, USA Embassy, NWFP, 
• David Levinson, USAID/Pakistan, NWFP 
• Siguard Hanson, former Chief of Party, USAID Pakistan parliamentary assistance 
program conducted by World Vision 
• Shahid Khan, Daily Express, President Press Gallery, NWFP PA 
• Abdul Rehman, Journalist, Secretary General Press Gallery, NWFP PA 
• Kashifuddin, Coordinator, Press Gallery, NWFP PA 
• Kifayatullah, Additional Secretary, NWFP PA 
• Shagufta, PLSP Senior Legal Drafting Expert, Law Ministry, Government of NWFP 
AJK Officials 
• Shah Ghulam Qadir, Speaker of AJK Legislative Asssembly and Caretaker President 
of AJK 
• Sardar Muhammad Azam Khan, Secretary, AJK Legislative Assembly 
• Amjad Abbassi, Deputy Secretary, AJK Legislative Assembly 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 48 
Appendix D – Questionnaires Used In Interviews and 
Meetings 
 PLSP Program Questionnaire 
Name (optional): ______________________________ 
Position: _____________________________________ 
National Parliament: ____Senate ____National Assembly 
Provincial Assembly (province)_______________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________
1. There has been a great deal of criticism of Pakistan’s parliamentary bodies in recent 
days. What is your opinion of the effectiveness with which they have performed their 
constitutional responsibilities over the past several years? 
2. From what you know of the PLSP program, what do you feel have been its greatest 
contribution(s) to strengthening the performance capacity of your parliamentary body (or 
of Pakistan’s parliamentary bodies, if not a member or staff member of one of them)? 
3. Are you aware of the PLSP’s Legislative Development Steering Committee (LDSC) 
in your parliament? _____Yes _____No 
If “yes”, do you think your parliament’s LDSC has had sufficient authority to approve 
PLSP activities? _____Yes _____No 
USAID’s goal in utilizing LDSCs has been to have participatory and consultative inputs 
into PLSP activities, with LDSC decisions concerning such activities to be binding. Do 
you feel that the approach has worked in your parliament? _____Yes _____No 
If “no”, do you have suggestions for how the approach could be restructured to achieve 
this goal? 
 
4. The infrastructure of the Pakistan Institute for Parliamentary Service (PIPS) that will 
provide institutional support for the National Parliament and the Provincial Assemblies 
has been agreed-upon. As PIPS begins to provide services to Senators, MNAs, and 
MPAs and their staffs over the next few years, what do you feel should be its top 
priorities in terms of the assistance that it provides? Capacity training for members and 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 49 
staff? Research for committees and members? Bill and amendment drafting? Scholarly 
white papers on important issues? Administrative support? Other? 
5. Are you familiar with the work of any of the PLSP Working Grups? 
 
___ Yes, I serve on a Working Group (Note: There is a separate questionnaire and set 
 of questions for those who serve/served as members of Working Groups.)
___ Yes, I am familiar with the Working Groups [If “Yes”, which one(s)?] 
___ No, I am unfamiliar with the Working Groups 
 
6. Are you aware of any specific changes or improvements made in the National 
Parliament or any of the Provincial Assemblies as a result of activity by any of the 
Working Groups? Please explain. 
7. If you attended one of the PLSP-facilitated Policy Dialogues, do you feel that your 
attendance significantly helped you to better understand the issue that it addressed? 
_______Yes ________No 
8. If you attended a Policy Dialogue, which do you feel was its most important and 
beneficial aspect(s)? 
 ____ It provided an ideal way for members to learn more about important issues 
 ____ It provided an opportunity for dialogue and discussion between MPs 
 and non-parliamentary experts and the news media 
 ____ They were equally beneficial and important 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 50 
9. If the PLSP project is extended, what degree of importance do you feel the program 
should accord to each of the following possible areas of focus: 
Respondent Breakdown: Legislators (44%); Secretariat Staff (31%); Civil Society 
Representatives (11%); Media Representatives (8%); Government Officials (6%) 
Activity Extremely 
Important
Somewhat 
Important 
Not 
Important 
Workshops and training for members on how to 
utilize their constitutional power and authority 
to make their body more independent and more 
Effective 
 97% 3% __ 
Workshops and training for members and staff 
on how to conduct effective parliamentary 
oversight of the government 
 83% 13% 4% 
Support and assistance in the review and 
possible revision of house rules of procedure 57% 37% 6% 
Workshops for top parliamentary leaders 
On the techniques of effective leadership 57% 13% 30% 
Workshops and training for members and staff 
on how committees can most effectively 
perform their responsibilities 
 
 94% 3% 3% 
Assistance in establishing parliamentary 
independence from the government over the 
size of its internal operating budget 
 62% 31% 7% 
Sponsorship and coordination of new member 
orientation programs following parliamentary 
elections 
 83% 17% __ 
Assistance in the day-to-day operation and 
Management of the parliamentary process 59% 38% 3% 
Assistance in development of committee rules 
of procedure 67% 27% 6% 
Support and guidance in the development of 
strategies to provide sue motto powers for all 
committees 
 
 44% 33% 23% 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 51 
Activity Extremely 
Important
Somewhat 
Important 
Not 
Important 
Support and assistance to committees in their 
expanded use of Policy Dialogues and/or public 
hearings 
 
 70% 27% 3% 
Assistance in the design of a parliamentary 
Service law that would assure that staff 
appointments/promotions are based on merit 
 67% 27% 6% 
Assistance in the development of parliamentary 
Services commissions to oversee staff hiring, 
Promotions, and other human resource activities
 
 84% 13% 3% 
Assistance in the development of a staff salary 
Schedule based on job importance, difficulty, 
And responsibility 
 40% 53% 7% 
Support and assistance in eliminating existing 
requirements that there be a separate committee 
for each government ministry
 47% 20% 33% 
Assistance and training for members and staff 
in the techniques of bill and amendment 
drafting 
 84% 13% 3% 
Assistance and training for members and staff 
in the budget process and techniques for 
effective review of government-proposed 
budgets 
 91% 9% __ 
Workshops and one-on-one job training for 
Parliamentary staff 71% 23% 6% 
Assistance and training for members and staff 
in the techniques of effective oversight of the 
government to make it more accountable to the 
parliament 
 84% 13% 3% 
Workshops and training on how question time 
can be used to hold the government accountable 
to the parliament 
 87% 13% __ 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 52 
Activity Extremely 
Important
Somewhat 
Important 
Not 
Important 
Workshops and training for committee chairs 
on effective committee leadership 81% 13% 6% 
Workshops and training for members and staff 
on how to develop good working relationships 
With the news media 78% 16% 6% 
Workshops for journalists and reporters who 
cover parliamentary activities to help them 
develop a better understanding of how a 
democratic parliamentary process works 
 80% 20% __ 
Assistance in improving legislative records 
Management, including software and hardware 87% 
 
 10% 3% 
Assistance in the upgrading or expansion of 
parliamentary websites 87% 10% 3% 
Roundtable discussions between members and 
Journalists and reporters to help each better 
Understand and appreciate the other’s role and 
responsibilities
 67% 30% 3% 
Assistance in the development of procedures 
and processes that will provide for live 
television coverage of parliamentary plenary 
sessions and other parliamentary activities 
 66% 31% 7% 
Assistance in expansion of parliamentary 
Libraries and in improvement of their services 80% 13% 7% 
Assistance in achieving more transparency in 
Plenary sessions, committee meetings, public 
Hearings, etc. 
 87% 10% 3% 
Computer skills training for members/staff 80% 17% 3% 
Constituent relations training for members/staff 68% 29% 3% 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 53 
Activity Extremely 
Important
Somewhat 
Important 
Not 
Important 
English language enhancement courses for 
members and staff 
 
 70% 30% __ 
 
Support for more direct exposure for members 
and staff with members and staff of other 
democratic parliaments 
 
 77% 23% __ 
10. Do you have any other thoughts or suggestions concerning the PLSP program 
(concerning either its first two years or its possible extension)? 
11. Do you have any suggestions for other knowledgeable individuals with whom we 
should meet concerning the PLSP program? 
Evaluation of USAID/Pakistan Legislative Strengthening Program 54 
 PLSP Working Group Questionnaire 
 (For Members of PLSP Working Groups) 
Name (optional): ________________________________________ 
Position: _______________________________________________ 
National Parliament: ___Senate ___National Assembly 
Provincial Assembly (province): ________________________ 
1. On which Working Group do you serve (or did you serve)? 
2. Has your service on your Working Group helped you to better perform your 
responsibilities? Please explain. 
3. Has the work of your Working Group contributed to any changes in your parliament? 
Please explain. 
4. If the PLSP program were extended, would you like to see your Working Group 
continued? 
5. If “Yes” to #4, what specific areas would you suggest that the Working Group address 
during the extended program? 
6. If your Working Group continues to operate, would you suggest any changes in its 
organization structure or operational format? 
7. If the PLSP program is extended, would you suggest the establishment o additional 
Working Groups? If so, what should be their areas of focus?