OTI Nepal Program Evaluation, 2006-2009 For External Distribution r i l Octobe 2009 This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. It was prepared by Ann von Briesen Lew s, Emery Brusset, and Chandrakishore Jha on behalf of the QED Group, LLC, under task order 6 of the Program Development Quick y II (PDQ-II) IQC, contract number DOT-I-00-08-00017-00. Nepal Program Evaluation, 2006-2009 Prepared for the Office of Transition Initiatives Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance United States Agency for International Development Final Report On behalf of the QED Group, LLC Ann von Briesen Lewis (Team Leader) Emery Brusset Chandrakishore Jha This document has been prepared on behalf of the QED Group, LLC, and is commissioned by USAID/OTI. The material contained here is confidential and can be disseminated only on the condition of informing the evalua- tion team leader or QED. Please address all communications concerning the document to: Mrs Ann von Briesen Lewis avblewis@comcast.net 2006-2009 • Office of Transition Initiatives • Nepal Program Evaluation ii Table of Contents Abbreviations and Acronyms iv Executive Summary 1 1 BACKGROUND 1.1 OTI Mission and Approach 7 1.2 The Transition in Nepal 8 1.3 OTI Nepal’s Funding and Program Focus Timeline 1.4 Evaluation Approach and Methodology 13 2 MANAGEMENT 2.1 Appropriateness of OTI Focus and Structure 16 2.2 Media 18 2.3 Flexibility and Responsiveness 18 2.4 Some OTI Approach Limitations 20 3 PROGRAM IMPACT 3.1 Relevance of the Impact 23 3.2 Extent of the Impact 24 3.3 Duration/Timeliness of Impact 25 3.4 Conclusions on Impact 26 4 CONCLUSIONS 4.1 Lessons to be Learned 27 4.2 Recommendations 28 Annex A: List of Persons Met 31 Annex B: The Conflict Mapping Workshop Method 35 Annex C: OTI Mission Statement 38 Annex D: Scope of Work 39 Annex E: Conflict Mapping Workshop Results 43 Annex F: Concepts Behind Program Methodology 44 Annex G: Program Timeline 45 Annex H: Commonly Used Nepalese Words 48 Annex I: Sample Grants: Case Studies 49 Annex J: OTI/Nepal Final Evaluation Team Schedule 54 Annex K: Key Documents, Partial Bibliography 58 2006-2009 • Office of Transition Initiatives • Nepal Program Evaluation iii Abbreviations and Acronyms CA Constituent Assembly CCD Center for Constitutional Development CDF Community Development Fund CM Community Mobilizers COP Chief of Party CPA CPN-UML CR DCOP DDC DDR EC ESF FM GOCS GON INGO NA NC NGO NMCCC OFAC OTI PA PDO PLA PPR PS PSA SMT TI UN USAID VDC YCL YMC Comprehensive Peace Agreement United Marxist-Leninist party Country Representative Deputy Chief of Party District Development Center Demobilization, disarmament, reintegration Electoral Commission Economic Support Fund Fréquence Modulée (quality frequency radio) Grants Operations and Compliance Specialist Government of Nepal International NGO Nepali Army Nepali Congress Party Nongovernmental Organization National Monitoring Committee on Code of Conduct U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, oversees adherence to restrictions on commerce with Terrorist Groups (including Nepal￾ese Maoists) Office of Transition Initiatives OTI Program Assistant Program Development Officer People’s Liberation Army, Maoist forces Program Performance Review Procurement Specialist Public Service Announcements Senior Management Team Transitional Initiative funding United Nations United States Agency for International Development Village Development Center Young Communist League Youth Management Committees 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n iv EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Background Following an 11-year armed insurgency, Nepal has achieved a transition from a monarchy to a federal democratic republic. Despite a well-observed ceasefire, public security and rule of law are tenuous. New conflict has risen, driven by unresolved social exclusion, marginalization of ethnic groups, economic disparities, political fractionalization and lack of state services. The signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Nepal and the Maoists in 2006 created an opportunity for peace and reconciliation. An interim Constitution was promulgated and an interim parliament was elected. In the election, the Maoists won more seats than any other party, historically dominant parties suffered unexpected defeats, and new Madeshi parties (from the volatile southern region of Nepal) won significant representation. Nepal was de￾clared a republic. The Constituent Assembly (CA) was tasked with drafting Nepal’s new constitution while addressing significant social, economic, and political issues. However, constitution drafting, re-establishment of the rule of law, and the addressing of histori￾cal grievances have seriously lagged; very few elements of the CPA have been resolved, most urgent being the integration of the military under civilian control. The long-standing inequalities that fed the original Maoist insurgency have come to a head in central and eastern Terai districts, where Nepal’s landless poor and marginalized groups have long been denied equal access to social, economic, and political resources. Former cadres, new splintered political parties, and criminal gangs joined forces with disillusioned youth, inflaming historical grievances among frustrated groups in the Terai, and giving rise to a new wave of conflict in Nepal. OTI Intervention USAID Office of Transition Initiatives and its implementing partner, Chemonics International, commenced its three-year Nepal program in mid 2006, with the goal “to positively affect the current political transition in Nepal and help advance Nepal’s transition to peace and democracy.” The initial objectives were: • To increase information access and diversify public debate on issues critical to the political transition. • To increase effectiveness of key political transition institutions. At first, OTI focused on national-level support to the peace process, including support to the National Monitoring Commission for the Ceasefire Code of Conduct, the Electoral Commission, and the Ministry of Peace. In 2007, OTI opened a field office in Sunsari District to better understand local conflict dynamics, identify local organizations, and monitor activities. Following the 2008 CA elections, ethnic violence increased in the Terai, and the OTI program shifted focus to community￾level peace building and conflict mitigation. The second objective was replaced with a new objective that reflected this change in emphasis: • To increase local level engagement and participation in the peace process. Over the three-year program period, $20 million has been programmed in over 300 grants made in strategically identified sectors: community stabilization, media strengthening, key political institu￾tions strengthening, elections, and social inclusion, as a cross-cutting sector. To increase awareness of the peace process and constitutional issues, OTI supported a wide range of local-level initiatives 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 1 and media activities. Equipment and training for local radio networks supported vernacular language broadcasts on the political transition. Toll-free call-in talk shows with local officials were initiated, and CA members and their constituents took advantage of new opportunities to air grievances and discuss local issues. Responding to the changing political situation, OTI worked to cultivate positive productive roles and resources for youth leaders in small-scale community development activities (Community Development Fund) through grants to partner Nepalese NGOs. Youth-managed, small scale projects (school and clinic rehabilitation, road repairs, latrine construction) have reached over 400 Village Development Committees in the Eastern and Central Terai. The OTI Program will con￾tinue at a reduced funding level, subsumed within USAID Nepal for an additional two years through 09/2011. Excellent documentation of the OTI process and the Nepal program (maintained in the OTI Database) provides extensive reporting of the conduct of the program, adjustments made, and success stories. Internal reporting and documentation of program activities and outputs is thorough, extensive and timely. Reports of nine Quarterly Strategy Review Sessions and two Program Performance Reviews chronicle rolling assessments, critical events and ac￾tion items which tell the story of the flexible, dynamic, and responsive program which exemplified OTI Operating Principles and conducted an efficient, well-managed and creative program in Nepal. Background to the Evaluation This final evaluation was carried out in July 2009 by three independent consultants1 to address OTI Nepal’s effectiveness in adherence to OTI operating principles and review the outcomes and impact of the program in Nepal. The evaluation focused on broader, “so what?” questions of how the program impacts prospects for peaceful transition in Nepal. It also tested and applied evaluation methodologies that might strengthen OTI’s own internal monitoring capacities. Using Significance of Impact and other evaluation methodologies, the evaluation team analyzed the impact of the OTI program on key conflict drivers, to evaluate the alignment of the program with the reality of the tran￾sition. The report aims to guide other current OTI programs, serve as a planning tool and to inform the public on OTI’s work in Nepal. Assessment of OTI Management The OTI Nepal Program adhered closely to established OTI programming principles, as exempli￾fied by its principles of operation.2 1. Critical issues: The program identified issues critical to the direction and durability of the transition. For example, the credibility of the CPA and CA process rested in public aware￾ness and participation, so OTI empowered media to expand access to information and input in the peace processes. 1 Ann Lewis, Emery Brusset, Chandrakishore Jha. 2 As presented in the OTI Evaluation Powerpoint, June 10 2009, Washington DC. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 2 2. Transition, not development: While short-term, fast, and flexible, the program dovetailed with and piloted USAID Democracy and Governance development assistance to contribute to longer-term sustainable development. Following the OTI lead, the USAID Nepal Gov￾ernment Citizen Partnership Project (NGCPP) helps the Government of Nepal (GON) re￾establish legitimate and effective security and governance. The core objectives are to: (1) support strengthened governance to restore citizen confidence in public institutions; (2) im￾plement quick-impact activities that ensure the public reaps the peace dividend, encourage job creation, and assist with reintegration; and (3) ensure marginalized populations feel connected to the national-level peace process. 3. Support local capacities: The program supported existing capacities, making grants to 175 local Nepalese NGOs, many of them never funded before. Basing a field office in the Terai allowed the program to focus on local processes better than most other donors. The evidence of strengthening of partner capacity was clear and constitutes an asset that can be handed over to USAID programming. Yet because of reliance on a large number of partners requir￾ing management time, the program was less effective at cultivating community ownership, or reaching beyond the web of grantee NGOs to other parts of the polity: political parties, reli￾gious organizations and communities. Grantee NGOs tended to use tried and tested pro￾gram concepts which they rapidly adapted to the OTI approach, while communities were giv￾en limited options for action. As a consequence the OTI program struggled to become out￾ward-looking, tending instead to focus on output delivery, rather than on the critical relation￾ship between partners and population. 4. Process-driven, not sector-driven; impact defined in terms of attitudes, behaviors and perceptions. 3 Committed to effects and outcomes as well as outputs. Though commit￾ted to data gathering, monitoring, effects and outputs, the program was not fully able to ar￾ticulate outcomes and impact or adjust those in innovative ways in relation to the changes noted in the rolling assessments. The Media Impact assessment documented positive changes in attitudes and behaviors; the importance of contributions in other sectors is less clear. This is because between the outputs and the broad changes monitored by OTI, a mid￾dle level of outcomes and critical conflict issues is missing. 5. Get outside the capital, target local actors, move beyond ‘usual suspects,’ activate ex￾isting capacities: The program was uniquely and effectively able to get outside the capital and target local actors, and was frequently able to move beyond “usual suspects”. The ability to engage in local procurement filled critical gaps in a unique way amongst USAID and donor instruments. There was a tradeoff between extent of interface and expediency, the emphasis on the latter reducing activation of endogenous energies. Impact Assessment The evaluation team conducted five conflict mapping workshops in Kathmandu and the Terai with diverse language, ethnic, and socio-economic groups to identify events and trends which in￾creased the likelihood of, or negatively impacted, progress toward peace. The following key drivers (or critical issues) were elicited: • The signing and partial implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement • A widening disconnect between State and population • Increasing numbers of youth joining armed groups • Impunity, looting, kidnapping, and high-level complicity • Increasing use of violence for political or identity group purposes • Identity politics and sub-identity group tensions • Bandhs, closures, strikes, and disruption of normal life 3 OTI Operating Principles, OTI Evaluation Powerpoint, June 10 2009, Washington DC. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 3 All these issues have been presented in varying degrees in the OTI assessments and in other con￾flict analyses. The mapping, however, provided an independent validation, as well as a rudimentary chronology allowing older “drivers” to be taken into account at the time of the intervention. The evaluation team analyzed the alignment of OTI program outputs with these key drivers, as￾sessing their relevance, extent/quality and timeliness/duration to determine program impact. This analysis showed that the program’s outputs are clearly aligned to the key conflict drivers: • More effective institutions (the CA, EC) • More diffuse media, with better quality information (through radio, drama, TV) • Improved government/citizen linkages (through Citizens Charters, talk radio) • Increased debate and community stability (through CDF, Youth Management Com￾mittees) Early on, the program elaborated a strategy responsive to both foreign policy parameters and the situation in the country. Programmatic priorities have followed the evolution of the conflict (for example, the shift away from the CPA, Electoral Commission, towards a focus on the Terai conflict). Some programs were distinctive in their originality and creativity (Doko Radio, This I Believe, hu￾morous PSAs). U.S. foreign policy objectives have been served by providing a richer array of tools which the Embassy and USAID can deploy to respond to requests, and reflect new priorities in a timely manner. The strong relevance, scope, and timeliness of the influence of the OTI program have decreased as Nepal’s conflict has changed, beginning in 2008. The informal and opaque social dynamics that began to prevail in early 2008 are less-easily captured by existing procurement-driven monitoring, even when they are captured through strategic analysis. OTI responded to this by developing the community dimensions of the program, but the difficulty in tracking the relation between grantees and outcomes or community dynamics led to a lack of clarity in differentiating the nature of the gran￾tees, how they are perceived in the communities, how program outputs are used, and what strategies the local population deploys to increase stability and peace. Although the OTI Nepal program demonstrates an impressive understanding of overall dynam￾ics, its grant-management processes require a focus on grantees, who are the primary interlocutors of the program. This is reinforced by a monitoring mechanism that concentrates on grantee data. This leads to a dependency on the grantees to reach the population. OTI’s program performance was strong overall despite the possible hampering effects of this de￾pendence. While the focus on filling gaps between central institutions and between the central gov￾ernment and the population in the first stages was highly effective, over time the OTI wave of short projects led to a decreased ability to respond effectively to the dynamics of unstructured conflict. This is because: • There is a shortage of instruments to monitor local perceptions in the very diverse com￾munities, and to advise partners directly on ways of strengthening their impact. • The emergence of significant local interests linked to criminality and/or identity politics depends on greater contextual knowledge than is captured by present information￾gathering processes, which focus on activities. • This new context calls for coalitions and very local strategies that would have influence beyond the moment of program delivery. The current approach is more oriented to the 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 4 delivery of many individual initiatives. Although clearly OTI is not about long-term impact, impact does depend on applying the right influence for the right period of time in the right place. Having identified the place and the type of influence is not enough if this influence is exerted for a time too short to make a difference. For ex￾ample, supporting links to local government will require synergies with other local processes even during the delivery of outcomes (over the months of an activity, not the hours in which the partner is present on the ground). Addressing these dynamics requires a better understanding of stakeholders. While up to a third of grantees receive multiple rounds of funding, this tends to be considered rather in the same way as one-off projects. Conclusions and Recommendations The OTI Nepal program team demonstrated tremendous effort and dedication and deserves cre￾dit for the program’s overall success. The critical assets of the program, beyond its staff, are its communication and assessment systems, the rapid procurement capacity of its geographic teams, and a very responsive management style. The intervention has been successful in fulfilling its objectives, and achieving a significant impact on the drivers of peace and conflict. The match between resources and needs was appropriate to the scale of the country. This effectiveness has, however, slightly dropped from 2008, for reasons that make OTI vulnerable to situations that are less structured and led by identity politics and crime. The program is outward-looking in terms of its strategic orientation, and able to move close to the population. Paradoxically the programming remains to some extent inward looking as it tends to concentrate on the OTI partners, and not on the link between partners and population (which should be the direct targets). Most of the work gets absorbed in the management of the relation to grantees and not enough staff time can be dedicated to the community level of change and its connections to the accelerators of conflict. OTI’s monitoring and evaluation systems need to be altered to better acquaint the program with impact on key drivers of conflict. To achieve this, the program must look beyond its database for monitoring, since it offers no capacity for tracking outcomes. A middle level must be elaborated which includes the manner in which the population takes up the outputs, and the way in which this influences key issues in the conflict. This should be accompanied by an increasing level of staff time spent monitoring, which inevitably leads to higher operational costs – an inevitable requirement to maintain quality in fragile environments. Since the process of grantee selection is nearly as important as outputs achieved by grantees, a more diversified approach at the grantee level would facilitate a more effective response to the rapidly changing conflict. OTI would benefit from a greater focus on grantees, and an increased use of grants (to complement in-kind donations) of more variable duration, amount, and outputs. OTI oc￾casionally uses sub-grantees in some countries, and this allows it to tap into local dynamics and coali￾tions in a more discerning way than using more than a hundred direct grantees. Transparency, some use of open competition, and grants to and through “umbrella” organizations and NGO coalitions which include broad political and ethnic representation could be used more frequently. Finally, OTI should review its personnel policies to maintain its professional corps and build on local staff strengths. –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 5 –––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 6 1 BACKGROUND 1.1 OTI Mission and Approach Since 1994, the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) has provided rapid, flexible, short-term as￾sistance to countries in political transition. The decision to intervene is based on the response to the following questions: 1. Is the country important to US national interest? 2. Is there a window of opportunity? 3. Can OTI’s involvement significantly increase chances for success? 4. Is the operating environment sufficiently stable? As part of the US Agency for International Development, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, OTI supports US foreign policy objectives by helping local partners ad￾vance peace and democracy. OTI targets key political transition and stabilization needs and increases the likelihood of peaceful transitions by creating or strengthening links between and among people at the right time and in the right way. To activate these goals, an in-country team of one to three OTI staff are supported by a contractor team that can manage a large number of small grants (averaging US$30,000), as required by the local situation. US Context: United States goals for Nepal to 2013 Department of State: Transformational Diplomacy Goal To help build and sustain a democratic, well-governed state that responds to the needs of its people, reduces widespread poverty and conducts itself responsibly in the international system. US Mission to Nepal Country Assistance Strategy: First goal for priority assistance Successful transition toward an effective, responsive and democratic constitutional government. United States Government Mission to Nepal: Strategic Vision for Nepal Measurable progress in expanding and deepening democracy, strengthening public and private institutions, and supporting policies to promote economic growth and poverty reduction. USAID Office of Transition Initiatives Mandate To support transition to democracy and to long term development in countries in crisis… in￾clude[ing] assistance to (1) develop, strengthen, or preserve democratic institutions and proc￾esses, (2) revitalize basic infrastructure, and (3) foster the peaceful resolution of conflict. OTI in Nepal: OTI contracted Chemonics International as the main implementing partner through a competitive bidding process at the request of, and in cooperation with the USAID Mission in Nepal. The program is housed separately from the USAID Mission, and staffed by 26 employees. A total of US$ 20 million has been spent since its launch in August 2006. The Approach: OTI maintains close operational and oversight control with its implementing partner, Chemonics International, in collaboration with Washington headquarters and field offices. Described as the ‘Four Corners’ or ‘One Team’ approach (an approach codified now for all OTI operations), communications are streamlined to flow along, but not traverse, the perimeter of a square that binds headquarters and the field of both OTI and the contractor. Application of this model reduces redundancy and confusion, and maintains authority lines. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 7 At the time of the evaluation, OTI is in transition to a USG Mission-wide One Country Ap￾proach, retaining some of the OTI staff within the Chemonics structure, with a scaled down budget. This smaller program will continue until August 2011 under the USAID Office of Democracy and Governance. It should be noted that during the 2006-2009 time frame, the USAID Mission to Nepal funded nearly $72 million in complementary and sustainable development programming under the Strategic Objectives of Governing Justly and Democratically, and Peace and Security. 1.2 The Transition in Nepal Despite a gradual move toward peace and democracy, Nepal’s current crisis arose from the same legacy of failed governance and development that spurred the Maoist war that preceded it. The leg￾acy includes insufficient and poorly distributed agricultural land, corruption, disenfranchisement of women and low castes, and non-existent or unresponsive local government structures and services to historically neglected areas. Much of Nepal’s population has long lived disenfranchised from Kath￾mandu governance. Genuine economic development has been minimal, and population pressures have led to environmental degradation, erosion, landslides, and flooding; the reduction of arable land and increased tilling of marginal lands; and reduced productivity. The resulting conflict is character￾ized by social fragmentation, a rise in identity politics, increased use of violence, interruption of eco￾nomic activity, polarization of social institutions, and widespread frustration at state withdrawal and impunity. During the Maoist insurgency, Nepal, and the Terai in particular, experienced rapid urbanization, combined with capital and foreign investment flight. Labor migration became a coping strategy, with considerable impact on social structures. Government resources were diverted to the military, small manufacturing industries and employment opportunities were lost, development activities were moribund, and deterioration of government capacities in the social sector included the reduction of health and education services. When the OTI program began in 2006, Nepal’s political situation was marred by a lack of gov￾ernment legitimacy; negotiation and disarmament commitments broken by both government and insurgents; fractured and disorganized political parties based on charismatic leadership rather than ideology; unfocused political debate; fragile civil society and media groups; weak security forces; and deteriorating rule of law. A Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed in November 2006, as the Maoist Party and their cadres sued for peace and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) joined cantonments. Suc￾cessful Constituent Assembly (CA) elections in April 2008 radically changed the country’s political environment and power structure. The Maoists unexpectedly won more seats than any other party, although not an outright majority. Nepal’s historically dominant parties, Nepali Congress and CPN￾United Marxist Leninist (UML), suffered unexpected defeats, and new Madheshi parties won signifi￾cant representation. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 8 At the first sitting of the CA on May 28, 2008, Nepal was declared a republic. King Gyanendra was reduced in status from royal to general Nepali citizen. The CA was tasked with drafting Nepal’s new constitution while addressing the country’s significant social and political issues. A variety of groups with political and economic interests in the agriculturally and industrially crucial Terai region exploited the new opportunities to gain power. The Terai’s underrepresented groups turned to ef￾fective Maoist tactics such as disruption of trade and bandhs (strikes and blockages), inflaming the general sense of grievance to pressure the nascent government to accede to political demands, includ￾ing quotas, paid compensation for land, reparations, autonomy, and independence. With competing parochial interests and transport bottlenecks in Nepal’s southern bread-basket, new stakes for the transition were raised. Violent attacks increased daily; political and criminal inter￾ests converged, and “international interests,” often code for India, played significant, if obscure, roles. This devolution has been identified by the US Embassy as a danger to US interests, possibly creating a case of those “ungoverned spaces” increasingly framed as a foreign policy priority, with clear sub-regional implications for illicit activity and instability. 1.3 OTI Nepal’s Funding and Program Focus Timeline The OTI assessment team that visited Nepal in 2003 concluded that the parties to the Maoist conflict lacked the political will to negotiate a peace agreement: In the case of Nepal we are looking at a mid-conflict situation where there is no discernable democratic tran￾4 sition underway. Nor is there a plan for making the hard political choices that might help end the conflict. In 2006, however, after eleven years of armed insurgency, hope for peace and reconciliation in Nepal was marked by the November signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Nepal and the Maoists, the promulgation of an interim constitution, and the formation of an interim parliament including Maoists. OTI Nepal’s Intervention In early 2006, a second OTI assessment team, noting the fragile nature of these efforts towards transition to peace and democracy, recommended the establishment of a small initial OTI program in Nepal with $2 million of Transition Initiative (TI) funds to support government communication, media support and civil society￾focused programming. Although USAID Nepal had programs that could address longer-term develop￾ment issues, they lacked OTI’s capac￾ity for quick response. An OTI pro￾gram, on the other hand, could offer: • A fast, flexible and decidedly political implementing mecha￾nism to capitalize on unanticipated open￾ings and network ex￾isting programs 4 OTI 2003 assessment. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 9 • Sufficient staff to actively engage Nepalis to develop quick response interventions • Sufficient funds to quickly address the scope, scale, and pace of peace, democracy and stability activities. The recommended OTI program would pay special attention to local governance, be imple￾mented in twenty locations in the Terai, the security sector, DDR and Peace Implementations, and use Quick Impact Projects designed “with good community participation to provide tangible deliver￾ables and facilitate government citi￾zen connectivity.” Within weeks of the 2006 as￾sessment, a senior management team consisting of an experienced OTI Country Representative and Deputy and a Chemonics Chief of Party and Deputy were on the ground in Nepal. The first grant was signed in June 2006. OTI opened its Nepal program with the goal “to positively affect the current political transition in Nepal and help advance Nepal’s transition to peace and democracy. “Program objectives were to: • Increase access to information and diversify public debate on issues critical to the po￾litical transition • Increase effectiveness of key political transition institutions. Through the provision of small grants (average $37,000) to Nepalese organizations, primarily lo￾cal NGOs, OTI would allow local organizations to promote a more stable and peaceful transition, on the basis of continual assessment. Grants focused on the following sectors: • Social inclusion (including issues of ethnic tension), • Elections, • Key political transition agreements and processes, • Community stabilization, • Media strengthening (both training and equipment grants). Funding OTI successfully attracted and leveraged funding from several sources beyond initial TI funds. Additional support from the Economic Support Fund (ESF) more than matched the TI resources available in the 2009 fiscal year, and further very small funds from USAID and Department of De￾fense (1207) came in both initially and in 2008, when the program adjusted to the Terai. Program funding sources are detailed as follows5 : Approx. Fiscal Year FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 Total AID-WID $130,000 $130,000 ESF $3,050,000 $3,050,000 5 Source: Chemonics Kathmandu 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 10 1207 $500,000 $500,000 USAID $256,000 $256,000 TI $1,775,000 $7,385,000 $5,470,000 $2,300,000 $16,930,000 Total $20,866,000 The table total includes the contractor’s operational costs of $6,625,732, leaving total program funds spent at $14,009,865. To date, OTI Nepal has made over 300 grants, combining TI funding with USAID Mission funding and other US Government support. The Defense arrangement is worth noting as it shows that joint resources can be used by both OTI and USAID conflict pro￾gramming (where the bulk of the budget line was used) to fund related but distinct security-related operations. Program Focus History June 2006 to August 2006 OTI supported the immediate needs of the newly formed National Monitoring Committee on Code of Conduct, then the Ministry of Peace, a proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and other national level institutions. Activities included technical support, rental of facilities, voter regis￾tration, and information dissemination. The program focused on filling gaps critical to the function￾ing of government institutions, and supporting informal peace process mediation. August 2006 to January 2007 Preparations for upcoming national elections prompted OTI to adjust its strategy to a multi￾pronged, media-focused approach. The program provided technical and training supports to both Kathmandu-based and local media, aimed to expand the evolving national dialogue and encourage a better-informed and engaged population. February 2007 to August 2007 In early 2007 instability remained centered in the areas most affected by the Maoist conflict, as shown in this map compiled by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance: 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 11 Events in the Terai created pressure to focus on local-level dynamics of national politics, a depar￾ture from the program’s originally more Kathmandu-centered objectives. Program funding shifted from central government elements of the peace process to local media and social inclusion grants. Assessments by OTI staff in May and August 2007 pointed to the need to establish an office in the Terai, where few other donors had field presence, playing to OTI’s strengths. August 2007 to January 2008 By early 2008 an Itahari OTI office and a Birgunj annex were rapidly staffed and functioning. Koshi River flooding forced a move from Itahari to Janakpur. Elections remained the principal pro￾grammatic focus, and new funding from the Department of Defense and USAID helped prepare for new forms of political engagement. OTI Nepal’s center of gravity continued to shift away from Kathmandu. There was consensus among program staff that despite the importance of key institutions and the will for democratic change among political leaders, they remained outside the sphere of influence of the program. Civil society and an informed citizenry, however, could play important roles in promoting accountability. The program’s second objective, to increase effectiveness of key political transition institutions, was reformulated accordingly. Program objectives now were: • to increase access to information and diversify public debate on issues critical to the political transition • to increase local-level engagement and participation in the peace process. February 2008 to July 2008 The perception that Nepal was entering a new phase of conflict crystallized around January 2008.The evolving shape of the new conflict commanded programmatic focus as elections passed and progress in national level key institutions stalled. The January 2008 Strategy Review Session con￾sidered an overall revision of strategy and objectives, and an interest in “re-starting the three-year OTI clock” in light of the new conflict. OTI Washington expressed concern that the program might become involved in protracted development issues better addressed through USAID programming beyond the three-year timeframe. The review led to increased emphasis on monitoring through local staff, and the deployment of Community Mobilizers. OTI Nepal’s initial central strategic elements, elections and transition institutions, began to receive less funding than inclusive media and, particu￾larly, social activities. August 2008 to January 2009 Portfolio management continued with renewed emphasis on local media. The possibility of phas￾ing out the Terai office and handing over the whole program to USAID’s development programs was reviewed, while the launch of a related USAID program in the Terai was delayed. February 2009 to August 2009 The final phase of the program was shaped by the national rise of identity politics and the emer￾gence of new political parties, while security incidents of unknown origin, often uncontrolled by any of the signatories of the CPA, continued. Bandhs and blockages effected performance. Program￾ming focused on community education to improve popular understanding of the political transition, and on providing information to political leaders and local government officials about community concerns. This led to continued emphasis on media, but a predominance of community stabilization work. The following graph plots the allotment of grants to OTI Nepal’s five focus sectors over the course of the program: 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 12 It denotes in particular the gradual decrease of support to central level transition agreements and connections between state and society, to more focus on actual community dynamics, a shift that informs the performance of the program over time. 1.4 Evaluation Approach and Methodology Under PDQ II task Order #6, The QED Group, LLC and American University recruited and con￾tracted a team of three independent evaluators who shared responsibility for carrying out a final eval￾uation of the OTI Program in Nepal, 2006-2009. Two members of the team travelled to Washington DC on June 10, 11, 12 for briefings at OTI, train￾ing in the OTI database and introductory meetings with OTI/W staff, Chemonics, and American University staff. The OTI and Chemonics field Missions provided background documents for the team. The team met in Nepal from July 5 to 31, 2009. A calendar is attached, as well as the list of persons met and some key documents referenced in this study. The team reviewed the nature of the OTI mandate and documented accomplishments and lessons learned for the use of both USAID and the general public. This report guides other current OTI pro￾grams, serves as a planning tool, and informs the public on OTI’s work in Nepal. Significantly, it also tests and applies various evaluation methodologies for OTI to consider adapting to strengthen moni￾toring and evaluation capacities within OTI. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 13 In Nepal the team employed evaluation methods appropriate for the time, participants, and the chal￾lenges of evaluating impact in a fluid conflict environment. The team conducted key informant inter￾views, visited sites and project areas (Kathmandu for national programs, others in the Terai, inter￾viewed some 18 grantee organizations), consulted US Embassy and USAID personnel, appropriate GON officials, other donor agencies active in peace building and reconciliation, other international NGOs, local VDC members, representatives of the media, and a sample of beneficiary NGOs and their stakeholders. Care was taken not to carry out the same sampling as the program reviews, but instead to spend time with the indirect beneficiaries: the population. While considerable information existed about the grantees, it was felt that more insight into the population’s perspective was needed, which required seeing fewer grantees and spending more time in each location to go beyond the standard reporting discourse. For impact, the team used the Significance of Impact methodology. Tracking the significance of the impact of OTI has to start from the conflict and tests the programmatic contribution drivers of the conflict (positive or negative). The five conflict mapping workshops identified seven key drivers to the present conflict: • CPA signing and implementation • State and population disconnect • Youth in armed groups • Impunity, looting, kidnapping • Increased use of violence • Sub-identity group tension • Bandhs, closures and strikes The focus of this evaluation is the connections between the drivers and the following the identifica￾tion of the key drivers of the conflict and the OTI program outcomes. The significance of the contribution made by OTI to the Nepal situation is defined by the interaction of the outcomes and the critical elements of the conflict. Outcomes: What is the uptake of the activities carried out by OTI? Do people use the products? What effect are the products having on their lives? Critical issues: what changes occurred? In particular: what are the drivers of the conflict and in what ways have they changed? Which ones are in OTI’s sphere of influence? The Impact of OTI: effect of outcomes on the key drivers of conflict. We ask: How relevant was it? Was it extensive enough? Did it last long enough? 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 14 To measure the contribution of the Program to the transition, we must ask: were the outputs relevant (aimed and focused at the right drivers), were they extensive enough (enough money, enough staff, enough coverage, and enough sectors) and were they of sufficient duration (starting at the right time, lasting long enough, ending when complete). Five Conflict Mapping Workshops were conducted by the team to identify the critical issues, three in the Terai and two in Kathmandu. The results are summarized in Annex B. Case studies were under￾taken with grants representing “cases”, from each of the major program areas and sectors. A Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) workshop method was used with Com￾munity Mobilizers in the field. Documentation of the OTI process from the initial assessments, through quarterly reports, the data￾base, nine Strategic Review Sessions, two internal Program Performance Reviews, trips notes, and special reports on monitoring and evaluation, media, the situation in the Terai, provide extensive and thorough reporting of the conduct of the program, challenges faced, changes made, success stories. Rather than condense and reiterate the excellent work of others, this team has gone beyond what is known, and focused on the broader “so what?” questions of impact of the program on the prospects for peaceful transition in Nepal. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 15 2 MANAGEMENT 2.1 Appropriateness of OTI Focus and Structure The OTI intervention was proportionate in scale and scope to the goal and objectives it identi￾fied. Nepal was fertile ground for successful OTI programming, given its unpredictable but con￾tinuous transition, mature civil society, population of 20 million people, and complex combination of cultures and remote geographical regions. Until now the program remained relatively geographically-focused at national-level institutions and programming in the Terai. Exceptions include Doko Radio, Humla Radio, the national tour of “Frames of War” and “People’s War”, and journalists’ exchanges. In the Terai, programming has focused in 10 districts. With the opening of the USAID/ARD program based in Biratnagar, OTI has discussed greater concentration in the Central Terai, with ARD focusing on the East, location of the Terai’s major funded districts. At the end of the phase evaluated, there has been increasing need to take into account new areas and new dynamics of instability, including reports of flare-ups of seces￾sionist and identity politics in the Hills. OTI’s selection of grantees deliberately sought to avoid the caste or ethnic bias that predominates much of the international donor funding in Nepal. To move quickly and efficiently, OTI primarily selected established NGOs with strong links to communities and a track record of successful devel￾opment programming, and also worked with a number of promising newly formed NGOs. The short duration of the grants and relatively small initial amounts allowed OTI to spread the risk of non-performance, while identifying and supporting some new and fragile institutions. OTI did well to step out of Kathmandu and engage with grantees that had never in the past received donor funds. A review of the funding intensity shows that although some grantees received more than two grants, there is no pattern of larger grants at any point in time, indicating a good control of the selec￾tion process. Those grantees that did receive greater funding are national institutions, media organi￾zations, and NGOs, which are in line with capacity considerations. This review highlights, however, that some of the NGOs enjoy a lead status in terms of partnership with OTI, which is not fully re￾flected or acknowledged in the reporting, and tends to ‘flatten’ grantee profiles. The top 30 grantees (defined here in terms of repeat funding of more than two grants) have received a third of the total disbursed. Most of these also receive funds from other sources, which are a point of interface with other donor programs. This is rarely acknowledged by OTI reporting or by the grantees themselves who tend to project a dedication to a single donor and project. Lead multiple grantees are: Grantee # of Grants Amount in $ 1 Antenna Foundation Nepal 10 586,280 2 Election Commission 10 544,086 3 Nepal-aya 7 572,639 4 Communication Corner 7 273,697 5 MaHa Sanchar 7 500,600 6 National Monitoring Committee on the Code of 7 48,413 Conduct for the Ceasefire 7 Equal Access 6 130,367 8 Democracy and Elections Alliance 4 115,482 9 B. FM 4 27,508 10 Freedom Forum 4 85,606 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 16 Over the past three years, the OTI Nepal Program has made appropriate and timely adjustments to the program in response to the new and fluid conflict that arose predominately in the southern (Terai) region along the border with India. The number and skill sets of the professional staff, who demonstrated high commitment and mo￾rale throughout the three years, a close collaborative style, and low turn-over (in spite of concerns about the potential phasing out in 20096 ) in what has been an intense learning and team-development process was clearly an invaluable asset to the program. The close working relationships between and among the USAID, OTI and Chemonics offices are a credit to the professionalism of the individuals involved. The OTI/implementing partner mode of operation differs from standard USAID practice because of the “One Team” approach, and this was fully practiced by all over the program cycle. Meetings, both within OTI and at the Embassy, often included representation of personnel from all agencies, illustrating the recognition of mutual interests and shared objectives. Although administratively heavy, information systems are proportionate to the requirements of the program. They include content oversight,7 in-kind procurement and distribution, regular political reporting, and rolling assessments. The evident confidence of the senior USAID and Embassy teams exemplified the success of the OTI principle of rapid response and making things happen. OTI Nepal sectors were selected and amended through a collaborative “rolling assessment” and strategic program review process, which encourages participation and debate by all the geographically focused three-person Chemonics teams. Program emphasis and funding allocations shifted away from “key political agreements and processes” as progress stalled, and shifted toward community stabilization (and cross-cutting social inclusion), as the conflict in the Terai threatened national stabil￾ity. The decision in early 2007 to establish a field office in the Terai was a significant and distinctive change from the approach of other donors, most of whom remained focused on national-level insti￾tutions from Kathmandu-based offices. The strength of the field presence for program profile and credibility cannot be overstated. It allowed the staff to increase their access to situational informa￾tion, and gave the organization a good degree of credibility in the wider donor community. US Am￾bassador Nancy Powell cited this move as “pioneering’ and provided “pilot” programming for USA￾ID and others to emulate. Excellent international and Nepali staff contributed continuous updates as identity politics, the use of obstruction, and violence expanded. The move to Janakpur following the Koshi River flood￾ing was a practical one which ensured continued access for the program, while the Birgunj branch office brought procurement procedures closer to local communities and sped up the already efficient process. Embassy-level coordination regularly increased over time as OTI became recognized as a dynamic instrument and was able to leverage and secure funding from non-TI sources including USAID/DG, WID, ESF (150 account), 1207, as well as TI funds -- another indicator of the confi￾dence placed in OTI management. 6 It appears at the time of writing the evaluation that the entire national Chemonics team will be retained, while most of the internationally-recruited personnel of OTI and Chemonics will change. 7 This process includes the translation into English of the content of all media messages and publications, and the vetting of the participation of public figures in shows, to ensure balance and neutrality. Although it represented hours of work for many of the staff, it ensures a good monitoring tool. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 17 2.2 Media The program developed a very sophisticated media outcome, well-known and respected among Nepal elites (in the capital, but also in Districts). The TV component is not able to penetrate the general population, which remains focused on radio, and OTI has consequently used radio and street plays to compensate. OTI contracted with New Era/MACRO, a respected Nepalese development consulting firm, to undertake a comprehensive Media Impact Assessment. Their draft report of July 2009 reports, “The effects of the new OTI programming and format changes have been overwhelmingly positive and effective” with “more robust effects than intended—helping shift the media environment to more outlets, greater interest in political and community programming, and new formats.” Using focus groups, surveys, sampling and interviews, the team found that OTI programming created new chan￾nels for citizens’ political discourse. Although the New Era team was unable to find evidence that citizen’s behavior changed as a re￾sult of the popular programs, they reported a new self-awareness; not only for the general citizenry, but also for the marginalized and disadvantaged groups whose issues were highlighted in the new programs:“These new (communication) channels, including call in shows and the inclusion of uncen￾sored citizen commentary in news programs, have created a new optimism and courage for a public which had apparently been too frightened to speak its mind during the reign of the monarchy.” A striking effect of this new self-awareness is evident in reports of women having lost the fear of discussing politics with one another or even of openly disagreeing with their husbands. Increased self-awareness and improved self-confidence were also reported in marginalized groups, albeit to a lesser degree. Respondents of lower castes, for example, reported that teachers have begun introduc￾ing new social values against traditional attitudes by teaching children that “there isn’t such thing as difference or untouchables.” Some comments from marginalized groups expressed a “fatalistic dis￾dain for politics or any of the encouraging rhetoric. Their needs were more immediate and basic (i.e., the need for food, education, and safety) than political capacity.” Respondents appreciated programs in which politicians are brought into direct contact with citizens (e.g., face-to-face interviews with them and call-in shows, in which listeners can directly pose their questions to politicians). This cre￾ated a new sense of accountability in politicians. The impact study recommended that OTI programs continue, and that they encourage new forms of political participation, such as running for public office, or the creation of civil society or￾ganizations. It also advised that OTI increase management training to counter the negative effects of poorly-managed stations. 2.3 Flexibility and Responsiveness This section discusses whether the program was appropriately flexible and responsive to shifting political and contextual issues. The answer is paradoxical: while extremely adaptive and sensitive to the evolution of the situation, OTI did not give itself all the instruments it would have required to achieve the most significant impact. OTI increases the likelihood of a peaceful transition by creating or strengthening links between and among people and institutions, filling critical gaps at the right time and in the right way. Appro￾priate to this approach, the initial program focus was limited and centrally targeted at national-level organizations and institutions. As the focus shifted to the Terai, there was a risk of unbalancing the entire process. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 18 OTI’s identification of links and gaps was premised on a central frame of reference of the nature of the evolution of the transition, and its central elements. By the end of 2007, the political land￾scape had fractured, and the OTI program became more reactive to outside proposals and responsive to requests than proactive in pursuing new linkages. Early innovative programming such as Doko Radio and call-in shows with community radio were especially effective. New sectors added over time (social inclusion) stretched the professional exper￾tise of the staff. OTI Nepal was able to call on an OTI Media expert in-country available to provide technical assistance in large national programs (CA Media center, etc). However, the ability to engage in truly participatory processes on the ground was more limited, due to constraints of time (high number of grantees and short-term time horizons). By late 2008, programming had lost some of its original focus and tended toward repeat grants to known partners to continue what they had been doing, with some new elements. Rising issues of federalism, identity politics, and the conflation of criminal and political activities called for a better understanding than was available through the standard instruments of OTI, which, by the September 2008 Program Performance Review, was focusing on an exit strategy. With the benefit of hindsight and the analysis provided by the conflict mapping, it is clear to the evaluation team that the nature of the conflict had changed into a kaleidoscope of aggrieved groups, organizing along ethnic and caste lines, loosely or closely affiliated with a similarly changing constella￾tion of political parties. The program staff has identified these issues, and has been carrying out rapid assessments into new areas, speaking to new partners. But in the absence of a sufficiently large field presence (and the capacity for such a presence) the translation of these assessments into actual objec￾tives and grants is very difficult. In the Terai, community level OTI/Chemonics processes allow for the identification of key ac￾tors with established programs. This has advantages in terms of expediency, speed and confidence of proven programmatic ability. However, the targeted selection of grantees without a transparent, open process carries the risk of perceived favoritism in a politicized atmosphere where all NGOs have covert or overt allegiances to political parties. There is also a risk that grantees will reflect precisely the strategies that hasty donors will seek: “The most able and well-connected of the (Nepali) graduates in the workforce joined nongovernmental organizations, coining slogans that could attract foreign funds. … The catchphrases of today are ‘social inclusion’ and ‘conflict resolution’…The international donors heard what they wanted to hear, and paid up.”8 The evaluation team heard many presentations that were clearly rapid adaptations of similar presentations made to other donor representatives. Although the program demonstrated an impressive ability to understand and adjust to the overall dynamics, it was decreasingly able to be responsive to the new dynamics of unstructured conflict be￾cause of its grant management processes and dependency on grantees to reach the population. 8 Thapa, M., “Forget Kathmandu: An Elegy for Democracy”, p. 114 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 19 2.4 Some OTI Approach Limitations This section examines whether the analysis carried out to respond to locally-identified needs and the short-term, participatory style of activities were the most appropriate within OTI Nepal’s strate￾gic framework and overarching objectives. The program deployed multiple assessment methods and a rolling program development and funding process. This created a responsive, context-driven strategy, clearly situated within the broad original objectives. The program structure is based on changes and events in the Nepalese situation, and aligned to its external environment. As a result, the foreign policy objectives of the US Gov￾ernment have been served with a richer palette of tools that can be called upon as necessary. It could be argued that the ratio of number of staff to money spent is excessive, but this should instead be considered a strength, as it is precisely the intensity of the interaction with grantees and the close oversight achieved by the integrated three-person regional teams that affords the quality and timeliness of OTI outputs. Should more of these staff be deployed for monitoring, the program could gain considerably in strength. There is, however, room for a broader range of intervention types, and a more diversified ap￾proach to recent events. This is due to two factors: • monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems do not enable OTI to achieve a good understand￾ing of interactions between grantee and society • resource-driven delivery – predominantly activity driven contributions that require a constant flow of proposals reflecting a few standardized approaches – could be more open to adjust￾ment and more tailored to very local situations. Limitations of Monitoring and Evaluation Practices The current M&E system creates vulnerability in terms of its limited outcome information role, and its weakness in providing notions of impact. OTI’s primary interface with Nepalese society is through its national staff and is therefore both privileged and limited. Chemonics staff are neither sufficiently trained, nor given the time to undertake tracking of those key indicators situated beyond program outputs. There is a risk that narrative rolling assessments become repeats of previous dis￾course, and serve a pre-existing program intervention strategy (for example CDFs, where this may not always be relevant). OTI’s difficulty in gathering impact information is demonstrated at multiple levels of its opera￾tion. Interviews show that local staff believe that for Chemonics to have more direct access to indi￾rect beneficiaries and to reduce reliance on grantee reporting, they would need to spend more of their time in field visits than their present administrative workload allows Similarly, field report forms from staff, running from the Program Progress Reviews to the Community Mobilizers (a key group be￾cause they are tasked to review the link to the population, beyond the direct beneficiaries) show that their efforts to identify changes in a community before and after a grant are dogged by the persis￾tence of the issues which the programs should address. These forms reveal that in spite of almost uniformly positive ratings given to grants, in the communities tensions, marginalization and incom￾prehension remain. Grantees’ reports, on the other hand, tend to concentrate on the physical as￾pects of rehabilitation, or the holding of meetings and training sessions. Very few are able to step away from the actual output and demonstrate community impact. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 20 There is clearly a reporting disconnect between program outputs and program impact, and a con￾siderable difficulty in relating the two. The prevalence of the database in OTI’s monitoring is partly the cause of this disconnect. The worldwide database – with each grant coded and entered with monitoring data, field notes, reports, and success stories – is scrupulously maintained by in-country staff, and accessible to Washington DC staff with minimum time lag. Entries are extensive, detailed, in English (occasionally a complication), and form a repository of grant history and activity. While this constitutes an excellent reference for the activities being carried out, and a reliable support of internal communication, it contains no outcome tracking. The minute level of detail serves as a thor￾ough recording of outputs -- one randomly selected grant printed out at 14 pages in small font -- but is of very limited utility to address the more global issues of program direction and impact. Limitations of Resource-Driven Delivery Practices The second vulnerability of OTI Nepal’s practices is a focus on delivery that leads to a multiplica￾tion of short interactions with grantees. The program’s application of standard program approaches is not conducive to maximize flexibility and local adaptation. Its administrative procedure reduces the exchange of information with partners, given the limited number of staff, and in effect creates a top-down mode of operation. In Nepal the program operates through a web of social enterprises – NGOs – that use classical development methodologies to deliver interventions in as wide a range of sectors as there are donors. In this situation, a grant may distort some of the work of an organization for the duration of the grant; for example, a micro-finance organization led by women may claim to work to isolate youth from armed groups in order to attract funds. Furthermore, a long range dialogue with local partners is very difficult to have. A third of the funding goes to grantees that get repeat grants, and some OTI/Chemonics staff have moved on to create NGOs. OTI has deliberately avoided formulating its activities to be actor focused. This means that knowledge of grantees– their modes of operation, affiliations, contacts – is slightly out of focus, to the benefit of the speed and outreach of the outputs. Yet actors and the ability to reach sensitive issues are precisely the most important for the current drivers of conflict. One option for better grasping program impact is to reconfigure program focus based on the ac￾tual types of changes which activities create. Such categorization would be based on program out￾puts, grouped into the following four outcome areas9 : 1. Key national-level institutions function better through support to the Electoral Commis￾sion (materials production and distribution), technology support for voter registration, Con￾stituent Assembly Media Center support, press briefing room, and closed-circuit TV in chamber. 2. Publications and media inform the right groups through technology, training, and con￾tent support to twenty-three FM community radio stations. Mobile Community Radio (“Do￾ko”-basket Radio) reached remote areas of Nepal with programming regarding the CA and citizens rights and responsibilities. Nepalis of all ages, ethnicities, and regions shared their stories on the radio show “This I Believe” show, highlighting commonalities. Journalists were trained in ethical principles and responsible journalism. A remarkable photo exhibit about the conflict toured the country, stirring dedication to peace, and becoming a book and 9 The proposed categories have been discussed and tested with program staff and are recognized by them as being valid, even though not represented in the reporting. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 21 a video. Animated figures and beloved comedians were used on TV public service an￾nouncements to encourage non-violent conflict resolution, and inform citizens of the CPA and the CA responsibilities. 3. Government and citizens are linked through new ties. Local level government officials and citizens’ groups studied and re-drafted Citizens’ Charters, outlining their respective rights and responsibilities in the interest of transparency, cooperation, and reduced suspicion and corruption. Copies of the Citizens’ Charters and Interim Constitution were distributed and discussed. Community groups leveraged funds with VDC development funds for priority small infrastructure projects. CA members took part in Nepal’s first live call-in radio shows to answer questions about the constitutional process. 4. Local-level participation and debate is increased. Chemonics hired Community Mobiliz￾ers, youth facilitators and youth leaders were identified in each of the program area wards and, following training, led Youth Committees to assess local needs, identify priority projects, leverage other funds where possible and propose projects for the Community Development Fund. Small-scale projects such as school painting, latrine repair, road repair, and beautifica￾tion were supported though in-kind contributions of materials. Youth peace groups were trained to encourage debate and non-violence at the community level. Visible practical im￾provements at the local level encouraged youth to become involved in civic improvements, and gave war-weary communities tangible symbols of hope. While these outcome areas may resemble existing program descriptions, they present the advan￾tage of being more verifiable, and achievable through a number of types of grants. For example, increasing participation and debate can be promoted through media, social inclusion, or public par￾ticipation grants, and progress can be verified independently of the actual grant, without requiring a baseline. Explanation of impact assessment continues in the following section. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 22 3 PROGRAM IMPACT This chapter examines the significance of OTI program impact on Nepal’s transition from con￾flict to peace. As outlined in 1.4 (Evaluation Methodology), Significance of Impact analysis tests the connection of program outputs and activities to the most important trends and events of the present transition. Evaluation research identified seven key drivers of peace or conflict in Nepal’s current situation, suggesting four outcome categories that would indicate improved peace in the country. The program’s impact on the transition was measured by examining the relevance, extent, and dura￾tion of its contributions to these outcomes. The figure below summarizes these connections, with outcomes on the right, and transition driv￾ers on the left. These can be seen chronologically, with older outcomes and drivers at the top, and subsequent ones unrolling over the years. 3.1 Relevance of the Impact Were program outputs aimed and focused at the right drivers? Program relevance was high in terms of the following drivers of the conflict: • Youth tending to join criminal and politically-linked armed groups: the program provided numerous tangible projects and community-based opportunities for youth, countering the strong pull of greed and grievance of political parties and armed groups. • Impunity: the program improved information, accountability, and access to justice through as￾sistance to Village and District Development Centers (VDC/DDC) and Citizen’s’ Charters. A VDC Secretary reported his satisfaction with the Citizens’ Charter on his wall: it better en￾abled him to explain both the limitations and possibilities of local government services. A Saferworld study on perceptions of security in Nepal showed that a large proportion of peo￾ple will turn to the VDC for justice and security concerns. OTI’s focus on these institutions is highly appropriate, particularly as police and judiciary remain outside its sphere of influ￾ence. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 23 Relevance was bolstered by the program’s strategic revision of focus areas in light of changes in Nepal. For example, social inclusion was added as a cross-cutting issue in all sectors in 2008, rather than a stand-alone sector. Initial program support to some key institutions (Ministry of Peace, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, NMCCC) was modified when OTI was asked to respond to include immediate needs at the Electoral Commission, without which CA elections may not have taken place. OTI procurement of technical assistance was of a nature and quantity that few other donors could have provided; the ability to quickly import equipment and print and disseminate information for the elections proved particularly helpful. Relevance continued as programmatic priorities followed the evolution of the conflict in the Terai. The program’s media assistance also demonstrated relevance. Media messages were timely, well￾targeted, professionally prepared, and diverse, from film, TV, photographs, and vernacular print me￾dia, to community radio and street drama. Media use proved both well-selected in relation to key drivers, and culturally appropriate for targeted populations, who identified easily with the characters and messages. The popular claymation figures, the clever use of a celebrity comic, mobile Doko ra￾dio, and “A People’s War” and “Frames of War” programs stand out as excellent examples. 3.2 Extent of the Impact Were program outputs allotted enough money, staff, coverage, and sectors to affect large parts of the critical groups, or the right people? The extent of program impact was limited by the amount of funding and personnel, and com￾parative advantage and coordination of other donors. The program began with nationwide coverage, focusing on key institutions, the peace agreement, and then national media. Participants of the con￾flict mapping workshops in the Terai, however, made little or no mention of the Peace Agreement, national elections, or the Constituent Assembly when identifying the most important events of the current transition10. The program’s strategic geographic focus was an asset, especially on events in the Terai region. Both senior US Government officials and International Crisis Groups reports have noted the security threat presented by the region’s instability. Withdrawal of government services, unresolved demobilization and integration of Maoist soldiers and a rise in lawlessness and impunity in the Terai threatens a stranglehold on Nepal’s economy, and creates the potential for a power vacuum, even an “ungoverned space,” along the open India-Nepal border. Situated amidst the complex dynamics of Pakistani, Indian, Chinese, and Tibetan relations, rumors of movements by drug and arms cartels further increase the relevance of the Terai region for US foreign policy. The program made commendable efforts to seek out and support new NGOs and those who have not previously received donor funding. OTI reports that of 151 of its grantees (which includes some repeats), eighty-eight have not worked with other donors directly. However, many prominent and repeat grantees are known development actors, or are newly-created off-shoots supported with salaries, materials, training, and in-kind contributions to carry out program activities for a short period of time. The OTI approach favors expediency over the capacity-building dimension of the work, which it considers a welcome secondary or by-product, rather than central to the program. This makes monitoring and understanding impacts at the level of the relationship between community and grantee very limited. 10 Recorded in notes and photos from conflict mapping workshops, July 16, 17, and 18, 2009. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 24 Although OTI is proud of its reach into communities, there is a wariness of political parties, a distrust of local government, limited interaction with religious groups and a propensity to establish a dialogue with certain partners and respondents only – often those originating from those classes and professions best prepared to talk to donors. Chemonics framed this as a “strategic decision that [they] do not need to prop up a highly corrupt local government system or legitimize the power of parties to control everything at the local level”11. Furthermore, some administrative restrictions (par￾ticularly OFAC, the counter-terrorism guidance of the US Government) prohibit outreach to non￾elected Maoists. The resulting approach excludes some key actors and organizations (political party leaders, local government leaders, religious leaders), reduces OTI’s access to information and under￾standing of the social and political dynamics of the transition, and ultimately limits the program’s effectiveness. It leaves program outcomes overly dependent on grantees, and their assumptions about the program’s objectives and theory of change. 3.3 Duration/Timeliness of Impact Were program outputs sufficiently durable? Was the decision to establish an OTI program in Nepal made at the right time? Was three years long enough to support the transition, and is the continuation of OTI support within the USAID DG office for two more years sufficient? The commencement of the program was based on thorough assessments and was well-timed to critical events. Early interventions, especially with regards the electoral commission, were very time￾ly, and sound decisions were made rapidly in the media sector. From 2008, however, the program’s relevance and extent were higher than its duration, for three reasons: 1. The choice of grantees is by definition hasty, and not always based on proven thematic strengths. 2. Grantees become essentially instrumental: they implement the OTI program for the duration of the grant, but do not necessarily capture, internalize, maintain or carry on program messages after the funding period. For example: what impact can one expect from a three-day training in conflict mitigation, when existing communities rely on religious authorities and group media￾tion? 3. OTI’s adherence to a standard timeframe (now three years) for transitions creates a reluctance to change at the end of the period, aligned neither with OTI’s principal of flexibility nor the specific needs of Nepal. The decision to continue support through the USAID DG program is a sound one, given the changing conflict dynamics in Nepal. In the early phase of the intervention, OTI assisted conflict protagonists in securing the key mile￾stones that have so far enshrined the peace process: the NMCC and Peace Commission, the CPA and its attendant elements (such as the Code of Conduct for demobilization), the elections and the Con￾stituent Assembly. These were by no means assured, and the support of OTI enabled the whole country to benefit for many years (this could be understood as the sustainability of OTI’s outcomes, even though this is not particularly sought by OTI). Later on, shifts in the conflict environment were identified, but this was not fully reflected in programmatic shifts, which remained defined by four to five basic formulas. Assessments remained strong, even though in some cases subtleties of very local distinction and links between political and criminal activity were not well accounted for in political reporting, and political dimensions of pro￾11 OTI/Chemonics Comments on draft evaluation report. August, 2009. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 25 tests and violence may have been overlooked or dismissed as criminality. Some good programs (Peace Volunteers) are today at risk of being replicated and extended into new districts without care￾ful attention to changing local circumstances, in particular the changing attitude to local state authori￾ties that arose alongside a broad (and ill defined) aspiration to federalism. More importantly, however, as the shift to community programs became stronger, the connec￾tions (and occasional disconnects) between grantees and population, were neither fully grasped nor fully bridged. For evaluation and assessment purposes, OTI receives images of communities painted by grantees, who have a clear interest in portraying success and gaining future grants, and tend to consider outputs. Field monitoring mechanisms such as Community Mobilizers exist, but are under￾utilized for real ground-up information and participation. Such a situation creates distance between donors and NGOs, NGOs and the population, and amongst different NGOs, which can become an issue at a time when more sensitivity is required in community dynamics. This distance could be reduced by giving preference to grantees who propose to work cooperatively in network structures, with broad change objectives defined by grantees and their affiliates themselves. It should be noted that this might require greater use of cash grants than has been the case in the program. Several such NGO coalitions and networks were supported by OTI Nepal, but more might have been encouraged. 3.4 Conclusions on Impact OTI’s Nepal intervention was well-targeted to the majority of the critical drivers of the transition, and avoided waste or dissipation of resources. Its selection of a geographic focus is a significant strength, but the breadth of its influence on the population is limited by an incomplete knowledge of the role, stature, and reputation of grantees within their communities. The lasting impact of the in￾tervention is good, but partly limited by the speed of turnaround of grants and a lack of focus on capacity. Overall, however, the impact of the program is significant, and the reservations expressed should not obviate its contribution to the transition, especially until the beginning of 2008. In terms of impact the program has met the goals set for it. Yet program impact could have been greater had a new orientation been taken at the end of 2007, when new dynamics began to overshadow the previous Maoist-state conflict in national impor￾tance. While the previous conflict is by no means over, there are a number of donors engaged in the kinds of long-term state-focused issues for which OTI does not have a comparative advantage. It is precisely more recent trends and events (increase in violence, sub-identity politics, bandhs, and strikes) that call for the versatile, targeted interventions for which OTI is known. Far from with￾drawing, OTI should continuously review its role in Nepal to support a peaceful and unfinished tran￾sition. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 26 4 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4.1 Lessons to be Learned This section identifies strengths and potential risks of the approach taken by OTI in Nepal. The program’s practice is to continually identify existing key players and actors and provide support, building up existing staff and structures by providing short-term salaries, training, materials, and oth￾er urgently-needed support (bikes, motorbikes, laptops, cell phones). The program is eminently adaptable and able to adjust the level of intervention in little time, allowing the US Government quick access to established community networks, media, and state institutions. However as the program shifted to a social focus, these strengths have come to limit performance. This could not have been addressed within the life of the program for the most part (albeit more could have been done on monitoring and review), as it relates to the OTI modus operandi, so the following conclusions are mostly aimed at future OTI programs, as well as the new phase of the program managed by Chemonics as it is handed over to USAID. Current practice has two major inherent risks. First, there is the risk that selection of grantees is perceived as opaque. While staff do recognize that “how we do it is more important than what we do,” there seems to be a need for better understanding of underlying perceptions which could reduce the impact of the program. Second, given that all NGOs are politically-aligned, there is a constant risk that OTI will unwittingly select grantees of predominantly one party or another. This risk is re￾duced by the good use of local staff, but it is not eliminated, especially as dynamics become increas￾ingly complex and activity focus (including in geographical terms) necessarily expands. Nepal’s development reality is that thousands of small NGOs have proliferated in response to donor priorities, often organized around a charismatic and dynamic leader (in the Terai, often a Brahmin), with agile flexibility in adopting their profile to fit the ‘cause du jour’ (human rights, micro￾credit, HIV/AIDS, women’s literacy). Some of these are very able partners who get the job done, but many lack connections to the grassroots. Connections at a grassroots level could be improved in two areas. First, in the present OTI Community Development Fund model, Community Mobilizers are paid staff. The grantee partners choose facilitators, who in turn select the members of the Youth Management Committee (YMC) that represent each ward. Community Mobilizers highlight YMCs as a key ingredient in successful projects, and can identify members selected through favoritism from those selected on merit. In terms of transparency and the flow of information, however, it would seem more promising to let facilitators be chosen as part of a consultative process within communities rather than hand-picked. Second, local impact can also be improved by strengthening social and civic institutions at the lowest level. In the absence of local government in Nepal’s rural regions, local NGOs, political par￾ties and religious groups are key organizations. OTI, in its avoidance of two of these three recog￾nized organizational structures, is not doing all it could to empower citizens and strengthen their rela￾tionship to local and national structures. A different lesson applies to OTI as both an organization and centre of a professional commu￾nity (of both national and international staff): capacity should be envisioned in a broader and longer￾term sense. While the quality and mobilization of the personnel deployed is clearly a central element of program success, few employees have clear long-term career paths with OTI or related operations. The program has defined the professional horizon, and staff retention has been exceptional, but there is no reason for OTI not to consider the needs of these persons after the handover – in effect a 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 27 broader Bull Pen12 -- to further enhance efficiency and effectiveness. This would include conse￾quently not just OTI personnel but also contractor personnel, complementing what is practiced there. OTI’s assets, and the corresponding risks can be captured as follows: 4.2 Recommendations The program has performed well. However, the following recommendations indicate possible ways of further improving performance: A. Keep aware of the effects, achievements and consequences of the program. Place the effects of the program in greater focus. Identify outcomes, results, and consequences as a mid level framework of analysis situated between the database that tracks outputs and the rolling and strategic assessments. Hone the assessment methodology by turning the rolling assessment me￾thod into a tracking tool to identify transition drivers (actors, areas, trends and events), anticipate new ones, and allocate resources to address them. This process would connect standard reporting tools with the database, deepening the program’s impact. Create a field-oriented M&E capacity: Consider establishing a roving team of “super” Commu￾nity Mobilizers empowered to track the relationship of partner to population, travelling to all loca￾tions to ensure cross-fertilization between programs, application of lessons learned, and rapid re￾sponse. The database currently tracks grantee outputs (e.g. 35,000 copies of the CC distributed), but such information needs to be translated into terms that allow a verification of how the population reacts to and uses the outputs. Outcomes should become the center of gravity of the program. Mo￾12 This expression is used to describe a standby mechanism to deploy experienced consultants who have frequently worked with OTI, operating on a retainer basis. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 28 bilizers could carry out outcome to conflict driver analysis, and report on the adequacy of the grant￾ees for the tasks. Look ahead to design M&E structures and capabilities that will synch with the USAID “F” process of common elements and indicators. Better document strategic-level aims and achievements to communicate and foster progress more clearly with all stakeholders. SRS reporting memos for example are very good at distilling de￾veloping strategic discussion; consider sharing them more widely and tracking critical issues in a short list for impact assessment. The success stories stored in the database and on the website are snap￾shots, not documentation, and tend to neglect the valuable learning from failure. Overall program objectives are too general, while the database is too activity-focused. A middle level of M&E is re￾quired. B. Modify the implementation modality – i.e. ways of doing business Strengthen field presence. Maintain the flexibility to multiply the Janakpur field office model as dictated by events (Far Eastern Nepal?) and in cooperation with USAID NGCCP and others. Re￾duce Kathmandu-based programming and procurement as the program shifts to a more local level. Consider adding a mobile team (GMS, PDO, and PS) which could deploy to hot spots for weeks at a time, when conflict and tension increase. Consider adopting a two-tier partner structure, as OTI has done elsewhere. Through some lim￾ited use of open competition (complemented by a targeted selection), identify several mature Nepal￾ese NGO implementing partners, and empower them to extend outreach further into communities. To an extent that needs to be defined on the merits of the case, organize sub-granting, re-granting, and pass-through organizations with adequate financial management capacity to take on grants man￾agement function and reduce OTI management units, freeing time for ground level monitoring. This could replicate sub-grant arrangements elsewhere, based on OTI Nepal experience with both RI￾COD and the Madheshi NGO Forum. Strengthened NGO partners would offer support and train￾ing to CBOs and newer, smaller partners, and allow for closer community-level contact. Increase oversight of the two tiers of local partners and allow for more latitude in grants and sub-grants, with emphasis on building NGO coalitions and umbrella organizations, in order to reduce the risk of ob￾scure partisanship and make the program more transparent and Nepalese.13 Continue to replicate key ingredients of the SWIFT model and the Nepal OTI program in other countries – elements such as the ‘four corners’ model of client-contractor communication, geo￾graphic teams, local procurement, field orientation, continual situation tracking. Chemonics’ geo￾graphically-focused, co-located three person teams (PDO, GMS, PS) are a particularly strong element in the effective management of the program. Review personnel policies (USAID, Chemonics). Personnel management should be given greater priority. Senior US Staff and Nepalese Staff both reported negative impacts of OTI contracting poli￾cies. Chemonics staff cited pay inequities and, particularly, frustration with the application of the USG SF 1420. This should be explained, addressed or changed; a real investment has been made that deserves to be captured to ensure more value for money. C. Maintain and improve the partner-driven focus of interventions Consider using a range of grant types, including cash grants where appropriate and feasible. Vary grant amounts and duration to enable longer or shorter term funding, continuing to promote imagi￾13 Though we acknowledge there are limitations on ESF funds and OFAC license restrictions. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 29 native and locally-defined proposals. Support more workshops for grantees to develop new activities with multi-ethnic or multi-party coalitions and umbrella organizations. Conduct open competition for some grants in some defined cases to reduce the perception of favoritism, while maintaining the capacity for targeted projects when rapid and selective interventions are needed. Ensure ethnic, language, geographic, religious, and gender diversity among grantees. Try existing, simplified procurement tools (Annual Program Statements). Keep in mind OTI’s operating principle that how things are done is as important as what is done. Continue and strengthen the Community Development Fund, which is the heart of the on￾going program. Structure means of allowing communities to nominate youth leaders in a consulta￾tive manner with a stronger Community Mobilizer system. Expand activities to include “camps” (not just trainings) of longer duration which build cooperation and allow for fun (sports, music, drama) as well as meaningful discussion and dialogue. OTI’s present CDF model has proven successful in car￾rying out very small, short term projects with available youth committee members: latrine building and repair, road repair, school painting. The small amount of money involved in these in-kind pro￾jects both limits size and scope and reduces the exposure of OTI/Chemonics to extortion, misap￾propriation and theft. At Nepalese Rupees 25,000 (approximately US$333), little can be accom￾plished without additional input from other donors or investors; this approach thus both positively involves community participation and leverage of funds, and negatively limits the scale and scope of what can be accomplished. Continue to promote more projects that involve teamwork and coalitions, not just delivery of goods. For example: environmental clean-up, sports facility improvement, childcare, first aid train￾ing, emergency preparedness, and skills training: entrepreneurial, computer, language, agricultural (4H-type). Consider the whole community: Reconsider the strategic decision to by-pass programming to and with political parties, local level government and religious organizations. Seek out and listen to alter￾native voices. Possibilities for cooperation will increase as the USAID ARD expands its program￾matic reach. Given the importance of political parties, especially in the Terai, and the imperative for strengthening and supporting local government, OTI should reach out and include these critical play￾ers in the community. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 30 Annex A: List of Persons Met Washington DC Josh Moga Program Director, Chemonics Kavita Sangani Program Manager, Chemonics Holly Flood SWIFT Director, Chemonics, Daniel Ver Schneider Associate, Chemonics Rick Swanson Program Officer Adam Reisman Monitoring and Evaluation, OTI Eleanor Bedford Bullpenner Stephen Lennon Asia Team Leader Justin Sherman Acting Director, OTI Kimberly Maynard Bullpenner Karen Kaplan Bullpenner, former Chemonics Chief of Party Other Donors Lars Peter Christensen Danida (HUGO) Stephanie Gauger German Development Center Larry Taman International Project Manager, (SPCBN) Larry Altre SAFERWorld Subindra Bogati SAFERWorld Aruna Pant UNDP Guy Banim UNDP Recovery Advisor Anjali Sherchan Pradhan UNICEF Nepal Other Ambika Shrestha, Kathmandu Business leader Bijay Rajbhandari President CE Construction Shyam Milan Shrestha CE Construction Magee Shah Community activist, TEWA Foundation, Kathmandu Bina Pradhan Economist, Researcher, Fulbright Scholar UC Berkeley Raghav Raj Regmi DECC Akhilesh Upadhayay Editor, Kathmandu Post Bhed Prakash Upreti Former GON Senior Official, Anthropologist Nick Langton Country Director, The Asia Foundation Sagar Prasai The Asia Foundation, Deputy Country Director, Nepal Sarah Levit-Shore The Carter Center Nepal Stephanie Gauger Advisor, DED Larry Attree Team Leader Asia, Saferworld Government of Nepal Manohar Bhattarai Act. Secretary General/Constituent Assembly Neel kantha Uprety Election Commissioner Mukunda Sharma Joint Secretary & spokesperson for the Parliament 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 31 Man Bahadur BK National Manager (CCD) Md Satar Manshur Village Development Committee Grantees Nirmal Rijal Equal Access Dil Bhushan Pathak Interface Dipendra Khaniya & Shikha Bhatti Radio Audio Narendra Kansakar MaHa Sushma Joshi and Daulat Jha PAILA and former staff Gopal Guragain Communication Corner Tara Nath Dahal Freedom Forum Kunda Dixit Himal Media Makwanpur, Parsa, Bara Partners Ram Hari Ghimire RICOD - Lalitpur Basu Dhakal SSK - Makwanpur Shambhu Singh Karki Radio Palung - Makwanpur Arjun Kushwaha Sahakarya - Parsa Om Prakash Thakur DEUC - Parsa Rajesh Jha RRPK - Sarlahi CDS - Siraha Meera Datta Janakpur Women’s Development Center Prem Mishra Janakpur Women’s Development Center Pavi Keshi Journalist ( PAILA) Deependra Khaniya Managing Director, (Radio Audio Pvt. Ltd.) Indradev Yadav MCDC Prabhu Narayan MCDC Ramlagan Mandal MCDC Sarwan Kumar Chaudhary MCDC Shyamkant Chaudhary MCDC Sumita Chaudhary MCDC Suraj Singh MCDC Ritesh Tripathi Member NGO Federation, Parsa Shunil Malik MINAP Daulat Jha PAILA (Former Chemonics Staff) Sushma Joshi PAI'LA Former Chemonics Staff Shikha Sharma Program Coordinator, (Radio Audio Pvt. Ltd.) Dharmendra Jha Radio Janakpur Dipnarayan Yadav Radio Janakpur Gunja Rai Radio Janakpur Navin Mishra Radio Janakpur Sangita Shrestha Radio Janakpur Sital Shah Radio Janakpur Manohar Dhakal Radio Palung 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 32 Sambhu Singh Karki Radio Palung Ram Hari RICOD Chandra Narayan Chaudhary Samad Radio Jibachha Chaudhary Samad Radio Ramanand Chaudhary Samad Radio Sambhu Chaudhary Samad Radio Sant Chaudhary Samad Radio Satyanarayan Chaudhary Samad Radio Anu Gupta Youth Group Member, Sahakarya Nepal Madhu Acharya Antenna Foundation Shikha Prasai Director, Interface Upendra Aryal Equal Access Bindu Acharya Former Chemonics Staff Dilbhushan Pathak Interface Kunda Dixit Journalist and OTI grantee Madankrishna Shrestha MAHA Narendra Kansakar MAHA Arpan Sharma Nepal-aya Kiran Shrestha Nepal-aya Binaya Guragain Program Manager, Equal Access USAID/Chemonics/OTI Nepal Adam Kaplan Media Advisor, OTI Audra L. Dykman Chemonics Chief of Party Carolyn Coleman Acting Mission Director USAID Darlene Foote USAID Nepal Democracy and Governance Laila D Mehta former Central Terai Program Manager David Billings Director, Office of Democracy and Governance Denver Fleming III INL/USDOJ/ICITAP Senior Law Enforcement Officer Shankar Khagi USAID General Development Officer Sharada Jnawali USAID Nepal Democracy and Governance Amy Para USAID Nepal Program Officer Ted Glenn USAID Nepal, Democracy and Governance Sandra Mikel USAID, Acting Deputy Mission Director Melissa Rosser Country Representative OTI Sarah Oppenheim OTI Deputy Country Representative Shama Pande USAID Nepal OTI Ryan Smith Chief of Party, Chemonics Rebecca Talaga Deputy Chief of Party/Chemonics Thibault Marcesses Director OTI/Chemonics Janakpur Office Md Isha Rain Community Mobilizer Mithlesh Yadav Community Mobilizer Ram Ashish Yadav Community Mobilizer 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 33 Tabrej Ahmad Community Mobilizer, Birgunj Nilmani Pokhrel Procurement Specialist Chemonics Ali Saleem Consultant to Chemonics/OTI Brent Willey Former M & E Co-ordination adviser Raju Kandel Information Officer, Chemonics Sabita Pokharel Office Manager, Chemonics Nilu Basnyat Project development Officer, Chemonics Pramita Dhungana PDO Chemonics DB Sunwar Chemonics Grants management specialist Sanjay Gupta Program Development Officer OTI Janakpur Samsher Bahadur Gurung Chemonics Tek Lawati Chemonics Kathmandu Amb. Nancy Powell US Ambassador Jeffrey Moon Chargé d’Affaires 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 34 Annex B: Conflict Mapping The aims, method, sources, and outcome of the Conflict Mapping method are worth noting, since the method may be the least common of those used by the evaluation team. These workshops provided information that was instrumental in the intervention assessment, and could be useful for future internal monitoring and evaluation strategies of OTI or similar programs. The Conflict Mapping method aims to identify the events and trends that have played the most important roles in the transition to or away from peace. These most important events and trends, or “key drivers,” are those that either accelerate or impede the peace process. The method is as follows: A large area of paper is attached to a wall, and sticky notes in two colors are available. Workshop leaders ask participants to identify events and trends that have impacted the country’s history of conflict and peace. The group determines the time span of the conflict; one group began in 1715, but most focused on the period from 2002­ 2010. Each event or trend is recorded on a sticky note (events in one color, trends in an￾other) and posted on the area of paper on the wall in approximate chronological order. Next, participants are asked to identify connections between trends and events, and any trend or event that has influenced another is connected with a directional line/arrow. This aspect is dynamic, participatory and lively. Finally, the number of lines entering or exiting each trend or event is counted. The trends or events intersected with the most lines are thus identified as the most influential in the progress of the country’s transition. A step by step description follows. Thus the sources from which these key drivers are elicited are the workshop participants themselves. The five workshops conducted by the evaluation team, which ranged in size from seven to 30 participants, gained the perspec￾tives of 77 participants in total. Participants in￾cluded USAID and Chemonics program staffers, scholars, business actors, external stakeholders, mul￾tiple language and ethnic groups, and a mix of men and women. Three workshops were held in the Terai, and two in Kathmandu. Participants represented at least 6 language groups, and com￾ments were translated and written in Nepali, Maithili and English. The outcome of this method is a list that ranks numerically what workshop participants consider the most influential drivers of the transition to peace. The map itself is photographed, and left on the wall as a tool for further discussion. From this evaluation’s five workshops, seven events or trends were identified as key drivers in Nepal’s transition, listed on page 3 of this evaluation report. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 35 The tool is designed to enable users to efficiently capture a high degree of complexity, while at the same time deriving a manageable number of priority issues. It is an ideal tool for enabling busy man￾agers to grasp the fundamental dynamics of a situation and identify the priority drivers of conflict and instability, and incorporate priority issues into the decision-making process for designing community development programs. Unlike more static approaches, this tool examines conflict as a fluid, dynamic system of interrelating trends and events occurring over time, and projecting into the future. Hence, it is also an appropriate tool for monitoring the evolution of a situation and is highly compatible with a participatory public consultation process. When to use this tool In the design phase of community development interventions. It can also be useful for project evaluation purposes Time required 3 workshops of three hours each, with a different group of stakeholders, plus analysis of findings. Alternatively, all three workshops could be run consecutively in one space, with more facilitators. Who should participate Cross-functional team including technical staff and external stakeholders such as local community members, government or civil society Resources required • 1 overall facilitator who may need to be independent of the project team • 1 additional facilitator to focus on the participants and to check the analysis Material required • Meeting room with a wall you can stick large pieces of paper on • Approximately 8 large sheets of paper to stick on the wall • Post-it notes in two colors • Markers Notes on using the tool • Contact stakeholders personally using means appropriate to the context and convene a group of about ten people. • Define terminology used in the exercise: conflict – in a way which is relevant to the exercise; events–defined as something that happened in a short time frame (for example, within a few hours or a day) and trends–more long-term proc￾esses or sequences of events. Notes on Running the Exercise • Ask participants to state the first events that mark a conflict, or the fragility of a situation. This can be in general or specifically in relation to the extractive project/area in question. Facilitators should help participants focus on a recent period of relevance to the analysis where possible. The first half hour will usually generate a flow of events, with some trends beginning to appear. • Write down both events and trends onto individual post-it notes and stick these onto the sheets of paper on the wall. As the exercise develops, these should be arranged in chronological order from left to right. At some point it becomes useful to mark the years of events and trends at the top or bottom of the sheet. • Draw arrows between events and/or trends after roughly twenty minutes, once the new ideas are less forthcoming. The participants should specify what 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 36 those are, and the facilitators will only mark them when there is some degree of consensus. Each link represents the fact that a particular event or trend increases the probability of another event or trend to occur. • Ask participants to identify other events and trends that were overlooked at first. Different individuals, and the groups by consequence, will tend to focus in more detail on certain things. For example, while one group will have as a trend “escalation of acts of violence” another group will specify the key acts that trigger other events and trends. As there is no need to agree, and as the events and trends are generally well known to all, the exercise will move very swiftly to the present. • Encourage participants to continue identifying “potential events and trends” that will have plausible consequences in the future, such that the exercise can be used for predictive purpose. • Each “map” represents a unique analysis from a specific viewpoint and helps capture to a certain extent the viewpoint of each group. Many of these across workshops are related to the same event or trend but use different language to describe it or present it in a slightly different context. • Certain trends and events emerge as particularly significant “nodes,” indicated by a concentration of linking arrows. • These nodes are ranked on a separate sheet by the facilitators based on the number of links or arrows made to and from them, and using, as far as possi￾ble the words chosen by the participants. This helps to identify key issues as identified by each workshop, and behind them the actors that drive or will drive the dynamics of conflict and peace in the area. • In total over 30 different nodes can be identified in the workshops. The facili￾tators analyze the patterns emerging from the different “maps” to identify commonalities, to capture the unique perspectives emerging from the differ￾ent groups, and to locate the key issues to the conflict. • Only five to ten issues deserve analysis in terms of targeting, or relevance, to the objectives of any community development program aimed at reducing tension and seeking sustainable development. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 37 Annex C: OTI Mission Statement a) Did the program support U.S. foreign policy objectives? If yes, did it accomplish this by helping local partners advance peace and democracy? The program was a direct contribution to US foreign policy by helping secure a key element of this policy in Nepal, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and its implementation. It worked through like-minded local grantees in a broad variety of sectors, most particularly media. b) Did OTI work on the ground to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key political transition and stabilization needs? The program served in a rapid and highly responsive way to address the dynamics of the transi￾tion, addressed through an ongoing contextual assessment and a very strong grant management database. It did not achieve its full potential however when the conflict shifted to a more diffuse and unstructured dynamic, where criminal, sub-regional and political forces converged in a new configuration. This would have called for a better introduction in certain parts of civil society which OTI’s forceful grants management process did not allow. c) Did the program adapt, as necessary, to ongoing political developments/milestones relevant to the premises of the OTI program in Nepal? Put another way, did OTI’s pro￾gram seizing critical windows of opportunity? The evaluation would not use the expression ‘seizing windows’ but would state that the interven￾tions achieved a highly relevant impact, extensive in terms of the levels of intervention, although less durable than they could have been due to the changes in the dynamics. These were fully un￾derstood, but considerations about handover prevailed against a deeper adaptation to the new circumstances. d) Did the program, within 18 months of startup, that is, by December 2007, have a clear strategy and plan for continuation of activities/actors that were relevant to the specific objectives of the OTI program in Nepal? By December 2007 the program had grown and achieved sufficient maturity to advance into new areas (the Terai region, a linchpin of security and development, adjacent the Indian border), to re￾formulate its objectives, and to reach a high level of credibility and coordination with the US Embassy and USAID Mission. e) Does the evaluation find significant impact in strengthening democratic processes and/or increasing momentum for peaceful resolution of conflict? The answer to this question varies with the phases of the conflict and transition in Nepal. While the impact was strong in terms of its targeting the right issues, achieving a very broad change (given a US$20 million budget), and good sustainability of effects in the first phase, its perform￾ance dropped slightly in a later phase. This phase is characterized by greater complexity and the need for a more transparent and con￾sultative process, accompanied by capacity building. More importantly it required a clear conflict mapping and alignment of the drivers to the desired outcomes. The nature of Monitoring and Evaluation in OTI does not currently allow for this alignment to take place easily. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 38 Annex D: Scope of Work INTRODUCTION After eleven years of armed insurgency, a window of opportunity for peace and reconciliation opened in Nepal with the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between the Government of Nepal and the Maoists in November 2006; the promulgation of an interim constitution; and the formation of an interim parliament that includes the Maoists. Successful Constituent Assembly (CA) elections, which followed in April 2008, have radically changed the country’s political environment and power structure. The Maoists, for example, unexpectedly won more seats than any other party, although they did not secure an outright majority. The historically dominant parties, Nepali Congress and CPN-United Marxist Leninist (UML), suffered unexpected defeats, and the new Madheshi par￾ties won significant representation. At the first sitting of the CA on May 28, 2008 Nepal was de￾clared a republic and the status of then-King Gyanendra was reduced from a royal to a general Nepali citizen. The CA was then tasked with drafting Nepal’s new constitution while also addressing signifi￾cant social and political issues. BACKGROUND Although much progress has been made in implementing some components of the CPA over the last two years, the most contentious issues of the peace process are still unresolved and have the potential to reverse the gains made to date. Political consensus is elusive on integration of the People’s Libera￾tion Army into the state security services, the executive and federal structure of the New Nepal, local governance structures, return of land and transitional justice. Trust between the major political par￾ties is at an all time low, as illustrated by the recent collapse of the Maoist-led coalition government after just nine months in power. The coalition fell apart over the Maoists’ insistence that the Nepal Army’s Chief of Staff be dismissed, despite objections from its own coalition partners as well as the majority of CA parties to this action. The unilateral actions of the Maoists and the reaction from other power centers in the government, most notably the office of the President, created a constitutional crisis which is still unresolved at this moment. The fighting amongst the major political parties and the correlated inability to create an effective and stable national government has slowed the progress on drafting the new Constitution and also has impacted the progress of normalization and peace building at the local level. Rampant political interference in the administration of justice has created a culture of impunity that has dra￾matically decreased public security in many parts of the country. The Terai region in particular has been affected by a corrosive combination of crime, corruption, and identity politics that has crippled freedom of movement and threatens freedom of the press and the formal market economy. The state has essentially ceded control of the Terai, the most diverse and densely populated area of the country, to criminal gangs and their political patrons, creating the conditions for a failed state within Nepal. PURPOSE OTI’s program in Nepal started in June 2006, with the purpose of supporting the peace process and conflict mitigation in response to the political transition that began with the countrywide mass dem￾onstrations that led to the King stepping aside in favor of popular rule in April 2006, the reinstate￾ment of parliament, and a ceasefire between the Maoist rebels and the Government of Nepal. To accomplish this, OTI sought to: 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 39 • Increase access to information and diversify public debate on issues critical to the political transition. • Increase effectiveness of key political transition institutions. While initially focused on national-level support to the peace process, including support to key transi￾tion institutions such as the National Monitoring Commission for the Ceasefire Code of Conduct, the Peace Secretariat (and later the Peace Ministry), and the Election Commission, the OTI program began to shift its focus to community-level peace building and conflict mitigation in response to a deteriorating situation in the volatile Eastern and Central Terai region characterized by growing eth￾nic tension and violent protests by minority groups. In July 2007, OTI opened a field office in Sunsari District to better understand the local conflict dynamics, identify effective partners, and monitor activities. In June 2008, OTI formally changed its objectives to re￾flect this new emphasis on local level engagement in the Terai. The new objectives sought to: • Increase access to information and diversify public debate on issues critical to the political transition. • Increase local-level engagement and participation in the peace process. To meet these objectives, OTI has supported efforts to increase awareness of the CPA, the CA elec￾tions, and constitutional issues through local-level initiatives and wide-reaching radio and television programs and messaging targeting different groups of Nepali society. Media strengthening has also been an important area, with OTI supporting the establishment and growth of local radio station networks and local language programming with the aim of increasing the Nepali public’s access to information about the political transition, particularly in remote and underserved areas. For example, a key activity supports local radio stations in gathering public questions and input through toll-free, call-in programs and connecting communities with their local government officials, political party officials, civil society members, and Constituent Assembly representatives. These pro￾grams provide local communities with a peaceful outlet for concerns as well as a platform to engage in dialogues about the political transition and offer input into the process. Following the Constituent Assembly election in April 2008, the OTI Nepal program shifted to com￾munity stabilization activities in the volatile Eastern and Central Terai districts. This was in response to the rise of identity-based politics and lawlessness enticed increasing numbers of youth into violent and criminal activities. Field Office grants began focusing on programs to motivate youth to invest their time and energy in the development of their communities through small-scale projects. Strong community responses to the youth-managed activities resulted in substantive contributions of both funds and labor, and led OTI Nepal to expand this programming in the Terai. Youth-managed small-scale development projects have now reached 540 Village Development Committees (VDC). Activities include improvements to community libraries and early childhood development centers, and rehabilitation of roads and schools (repairing roofs, painting, etc). Now in its third year, the OTI program, implemented by Chemonics International, has awarded over 260 grants worth over $ 9million. The grants are spread across four sectors: media strengthening, elections, key political processes and agreements, and community stabilization. Chemonics contract was recently extended and will be handed over the USAID/Nepal to manage at the end of fiscal year 2009. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 40 OBJECTIVES The objectives of this task order are to conduct an independent evaluation of the Nepal program implemented between June 2006 and August 2009. The nature of OTI’s mandate, including its short-term objectives, shall be a driving factor in the evaluation. The evaluation shall document ac￾complishments and lessons learned for the use of both USAID staff and the general public. The final evaluation report shall assist the USAID Mission in Nepal as it intends to takes over parts of the program in September 2009, guide other current OTI country programs, serve as a tool for planning similar programming in Nepal and elsewhere, and inform the public on OTI’s work in Nepal. The evaluation should address the following questions: 1. Were areas of programmatic focus appropriate and effective for OTI? Below are a list of focus areas that should be addressed; however this question is not restricted to only these topics: Geographic, such as which regions, which locations within each region. Social strata, youth, nationwide audiences, Kathmandu vs. regions. Types of activities, such as civil society, information dissemination, promoting and diversify￾ing debate, Constituent Assembly, elections, and linking citizens with the government. Style of activities, i.e., short-term, participatory implementation, and locally identified needs. Strategic framework, assessing the overarching goal and objectives. 2. Was the program appropriately flexible and responsive to shifting political and contextual issues? 3. In the Terai, where numerous small-grant activities were supported over an extended period of time, is there evidence of a significant impact related to OTI’s overall aims and objectives in Ne￾pal? 4. Were media – public, private, alternative – activities used appropriately and effectively to further OTI’s overall goals and objectives? 5. What specific recommendations can the evaluation team offer about what elements of OTI’s strategy and methods - if any - can support or enhance the USAID/Nepal Mission’s ability to ef￾fectively design and implement future conflict-sensitive programming? In a brief annex, address the following questions concerning OTI’s Mission Statement and the Nepal Program. This annex of the final report should not repeat facts, observations, or findings from the first section. Rather it should specifically answer the questions and justify each answer with a sum￾mary, referring back to the main body of the report if necessary. The responses will be utilized in the compiling of OTI’s Annual Report and for other internal and external reporting needs. a) Did the program support U.S. foreign policy objectives? If yes, did it accomplish this by helping local partners advance peace and democracy? b) Did OTI work on the ground to provide fast, flexible, short-term assistance targeted at key politi￾cal transition and stabilization needs? c) Did the program adapt, as necessary, to ongoing political developments/milestones relevant to the premises of the OTI program in Nepal? Put another way, did OTI’s program seizing critical windows of opportunity? d) Did the program, within 18 months of startup, that is, by December 2007, have a clear strategy and plan for continuation of activities/actors that were relevant to the specific objectives of the OTI program in Nepal? e) Does the evaluation find significant impact in strengthening democratic processes and/or in￾creasing momentum for peaceful resolution of conflict? 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 41 LEVEL OF EFFORT The evaluation team, under the direction of the Team Leader is responsible for the follow Level of Effort: 1. Develop, in coordination with OTI, an appropriate methodology (including questionnaires) for the evaluation. Training in OTI’s M&E methods/practices will be provided. 2. Evaluate the performance and impact of the Nepal program through: a. A literature review of documentation on the Nepal program. Relevant documentation and database access will be provided electronically by OTI; OTI will also provide database train￾ing; b. Interviews in Washington DC with current OTI staff, as well as staff from partner Chemon￾ics International, Inc.; c. A field review with interviews with OTI staff; USAID Mission Nepal staff; US Embassy and other USG personnel as needed; Government of Nepal representatives; implementing part￾ners; and program beneficiaries at project sites where feasible. 3. Provide an out-briefing to OTI in Nepal before departure from Nepal. 4. Provide a briefing to OTI in Washington upon completion of the field visit, but prior to drafting the report. DELIVERABLES The evaluation team, under the direction of the Team Leader is responsible for the following Deliv￾erables: 1. Provide a brief outline of methodological approach for assessments, including proposed itinerary, schedule for interviews, and identification of all logistical support needs. 2. Draft the evaluation report, not to exceed 25 pages single-sided with Arial 12 point (or equiva￾lent) font, plus additional annexes (report and annexes to be submitted electronically). Examples of past evaluations are available on the publications section of OTI’s website. The format of the report is flexible. However, the report shall include photographs (to be taken by the evaluators and/or to be selected from OTI and Implementing Partner’s photograph collections). The fol￾lowing sections are recommended for the final report: Table of Contents, Acronyms, Executive Summary, Background (OTI’s mission and general approach to programming, country context, evaluation objectives and methodology, overall observations, findings [answers to questions in scope], con￾clusions, recommendations. 3. All Deliverables that are to be delivered to OTI must be submitted to QED for review, com￾ment, and marking and branding. QED will make all submissions, draft and final, to OTI. 4. Submit the final evaluation report, deliverable no later than two weeks after receipt of all com￾ments from OTI on first draft. A total of 20 bound copies should be delivered to OTI in addi￾tion to an electronic copy in Microsoft Word format. 5. Present a final Power Point presentation electronically with the final report. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 42 Annex E. Conflict Mapping Workshop Results Conflict Mapping Workshops Kalaiya, Bara District, Mahuli Commu￾Center Bakadhu￾wab, Ma￾huli,Saptari Dis￾trict Women’s De￾velopment Center Janakpur, holders Kathmandu USAID/OTI/ Chemonics Kathmandu Ranking of key drivers of the con￾flict (num￾ber of ar￾rows linking event or trend) armed activity (7) impunity numbers of youth are joining armed (5) shops and busi￾ness closed by strikes/bandhs (4) people leaving because of vio￾lence nities for youth (4) Singh formed JMT (3) suppressions of madheshis by State (3) Terai armed groups form (3) extortion of money protects NGOs (9) strikes, road closures (5) anarchy (5) looting, criminal activ￾ity increase (4) kidnap￾ping, crime increase (4) tourism, visits drop (4) rise in in￾fluence of the political par￾ties (4) Maoists cities (4) houses visited by fe￾male cadres (4) Maoists move into Terai (7) Disconnect between rural population and center nity (6) signing of CPA (6) govt services not available (10) Terai in￾creasing armed group activity (8) rise of Tha￾ru, Limbu eth￾nic militia (7) CPA signed (6) increased ethnic tension in the Terai recourse to vio￾lence security sector reform increas￾Participant profile 30, 24 men, 6 women 7, 5 men, 2 wom￾en 16 women, including 4 language, eth￾nic groups 8 men, 2 women: donors, INGO, scholars, business 14 USAID, Chemonics, staffers Features 2006-09 2 distinct, uncon￾nected conflicts 2003-09: 2 con￾flicts now-no connection 2000-2009, nomic impact on Terai Focused on root causes from 1715 on Focus on Terai, not Maoist con￾flict nity Development External stake­ (8) increasing (5) increasing groups for money (4) Fewer opportu­ (3) community (3) increasing vio￾lence/ attacks move into the (7) rising impu­ (6) increasing (6) absence of ingly obvious focus on eco￾2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 43 Annex F: Concepts Behind Evaluation Methodology This evaluation aimed in part to assess the extent to which OTI program outputs have en￾abled impact. To identify verifiable indicators of impact requires defining the changes one is seeking to achieve, and to define changes one must define the chain of results. This report defined the different levels of program results in the following way: Outputs are the deliverables (products or services) provided by the program. A training workshop, a school, a road, a food delivery. Outcomes are the use made of the outputs by beneficiaries. Application of the skills learned at a training; the planting of distributed seeds. Impact is the consequence of outcomes in the environment of operation, either for the target group of the whole general population. Better management after using new skills; better access to food after planting. Outputs Outcomes Impacts This diagram shows how these levels of result link cause and effect. Output is the begin￾ning of the chain, leading to outcome, and impact is the further end of this chain. The activ￾ity carried out by OTI (for example the construction of the school, an output) then allows us to see the outcome (for example how much the school is used) which then leads to the im￾pact (the consequence for the people using the school in their lives). Impact can be almost immediate or can take years to take effect. The further one moves down the results chain, away from outputs, the less control OTI has, and the greater the influence of other factors becomes. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 44 Annex G: Program Timeline DATES CRITICAL EVENTS OTI PROGRAM MILESTONES 2005 Feb King Gyanendra assumes absolute power, dismisses parliament, limits freedoms Nov Maoists (CPN(M)) and Seven Party Alliance (SPA) sign 12 point agreement in New Delhi: joint commitment to multiparty democ￾racy 2006 Feb Failed municipal elections: seen as no confidence vote for Mon￾archy May Parliament curtails King’s powers, removes his authority over Army, and declares Nepal a secular state Bilateral peace talks: Ceasefire Code of Conduct signed OTI Nepal assessment team report OTI start up manager in place June Seven party alliance (SPA) and the Maoists sign 8 point agree￾ment Chemonics wins bid for Nepal Transition Initiative July OTI program commences, signs first grant Nov Ten-point Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) signed Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala and Maoist chairman Prachanda sign the accord bringing the decade-long armed insurgency to an end NMCCC dissolves OTI supports Peace Secretariat Dec First TBS is held, later renamed Strategy Review Ses￾sion (SRS) Decision to focus on media, discussion of OFAC implications (Maoist-Terrorist designation) Decision to contribute to peace process, not address￾ing long-help grievances 2007 Jan/Feb Interim (Draft) Constitution promulgated and Interim Parliament formed Violence erupts in Terai when a man from the Madheshi People’s Right Forum (MPRF) is killed by a Maoist cadre Madheshi Agi￾tation/Andolan I: violence in Terai Maoist leader Dahal (Prachanda) delivers his first public address in 25 years, promising a federal republican structure, a mixed￾economy, and radical land reforms March People’s Liberation Army in cantonment, YCL militias Strategy Review Session #2: use of rolling assessments to keep current Voter registration, possibility of opening field office April Government formed with the involvement of Maoists May Increased Young Communist League activities Voter registra￾tion begins Team decides to focus on youth activities Decision is made to open a field office in Itahari Management review team June PM’s comment that YCL was a “young criminal league” draws sharp reactions from the Maoists Strike in eastern Terai called by Madheshi Tigers Election Law passed Ministry of Peace and Reconstruction unveils a three-year relief, rehabilitation and re￾construction plan to mitigate effects of the decade-long conflict Maoist noncompliance with CPA Strategy Review Session #3 OTI new goal: support peaceful transition to democ￾racy, 2 objectives; public debate, key institutions Look to support local peace committees LPC OTI deter￾mined grants will be made in the following sectors: social inclusion (including issues of ethnic tension), elections, key political transition agreements and proc￾esses, community stabilization, media strengthening (both training and equipment grants July Itahari Terai office established August Rise in ethnic tensions; Limbuwan, Khumbuwan movements, increased violence in the Terai Strategy Review Session #4 : added staff; visioning exercise Sept OTI PPR review I 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 45 October Government postpones polls; Election Commission cancels all poll related activities UNMIN completes second round of arms registration and combatants verification in four of the canton￾ment sites USAID's Office of Food for Peace and OFDA pro￾vides $6 8 million to the UN World Food Programs operation to support the peace process and to provide food, aid and livelihood support to the conflict￾affected people in Nepal Nov Comprehensive Peace Agreements and monitoring agreements signed Dec Four Madheshi leaders, including senior NC party member Ma￾hanta Thakur, resigned from their parties and the Parliament, citing government indifference to Madheshi demands 2008 Jan Madheshi Andolan II (second Madheshi agitation in the Terai)In February, 16 days of strikes in the Terai cut off supply lines to Kathmandu Shortages of gasoline, diesel, kerosene, water, and other commodities became acute Nine people, including a police officer, were reported killed Allegations of state brutality and police excesses included reports of police attacks on protestors inside hospitals Government appointed special task forces in 8 Terai Districts-no mandate Increased youth gangs SRS#5: OTI begins to shift sector emphasis from key political transition agreements and processes to con￾flict mitigation and peace building Community Mobi￾lizers program planned Community Development Fund activity planned Itahari field office begins to pilot Community Devel￾opment Fund (CDF) activities focusing on youth Feb Madhesh-based parties continue with strike in Terai districts demanding the government to fulfill their demands of imple￾menting their 22-point demands SMT decision to hire Community Mobilizers in 10 key districts April Constituent Assembly Elections peacefully conducted nation￾wide. Final result CPN-M secured 220 and the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Communist Party of Nepal–United Marxist and Leninist (CPN-UML) secured 110 and 103, respectively The Madheshbased parties did better than expected, securing 83 seats from the Terai region, with the Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (MJF) winning a majority of those seats May May 28, first seating of CA, Republic declared June General lawlessness in the Terai has been punctuated by an alarming increase in extortions, kidnappings, shootings, and kill￾ings, and much of this activity is not being reported at the na￾tional level Armed groups operating in the Terai have prolifer￾ated and splintered and have targeted local business people, kid￾napped village officials, bombed government offices, and threat￾ened journalists and media outlets for reporting on the violence and broadcasting in Nepali Strategy Review Session #6 New objective#2: increase local level engagement and participation in the peace process OTI changes objective#2 to” increase local-level en￾gagements and participation in the peace process” July Yadav (Nepali Congress) becomes the first President of Nepal PM Koirala officially tenders his resignation to President Yadav Madheshi VP uses Hindi language during oath taking Protests sweep throughout the nation Scale-up Community Mobilizers Youth engagement To specifically address ethnic tensions among youth in the Terai, OTI provides parallel training to 20,000 Madheshi and Pahadi youth peer educators in conflict resolution and community peace building OTI’s youth mobilization committees are engaging youth to develop their Village Development Commit￾tees (village areas or VDCs) through the use of com￾munity development funds (CDFs) August Pushpa Dahal (Prachanda) – CPN (M) is elected PM with over￾whelming majority (464 of 577 votes) Constituent Assembly (CA) installed Koshi River in Eastern Nepal floods—more than 500,000 people displaced from their homes in the Sunsari District, where the OTI field office is located First CDFs grants with DOD 1207 funds cleared 4 grants covering 75 VDCs in Bara, 15 VDCs in Rau￾tahat, and 30 VDCs in Saptari for approximately $240,000 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 46 Sept OTI PPR review II OTI Nepal moves Terai field Office to Janakpur following Koshi floods The Bir￾gunj satellite office opens with one Procurement Spe￾cialist and a Procurement/Admin Assistant October OTI Annual Report submitted Nov Other Backward Class (OBC) Federation calls Terai strikes for four consecutive days, demanding the recognition of OBCs as ethnic groups CA regulations passed—new constitution to be written within 82 weeks through the formation of different CA committees Political party youth wings grow, lack of progress in security sector, esp integration USAID begins implementation of ARD program Strategy Review Session #7: participation by USAID DG, portfolio review, view to increase activities around CA progress, anticipation of continuation of OTI under Mission, review M and E activities Dec Continued insecurity, interruption on basic services, erosion of confidence in GON-corruption increase 2009 Jan UNMIN's term extended by an additional six months Increasing difference between the Defense Ministry and Nepal Army over the new recruitment drive of Nepal Army Special committee to address issues of army integration reconsti￾tuted with Prachanda (Dahal) heading the committee Increased attacks on Journalists in the Terai OTI Program Extension from September 09 through August 15, 2011 Government withdraws from administrative centers in four Terai districts March Tharu violent agitation in the Terai Supreme Court orders the government to reinstate army generals Increasing bandhs, strikes interrupt commerce Ongoing short￾ages Tharu, Muslim ethnic movements grow Industries closing some move to India Strategy Review Session #8: focus on ethnic identities and sub-groups Rolling assessment Departures of SMT announced, Smith to become COP USAID Action Memorandum Handover OTI to USA￾ID/DG: CO and COTR authorities transfer April Local government bodies to be formed based on a system of proportional votes - Seven major political parties in the CA reached a consensus to form local bodies based on a system of proportionate votes in the national elections Bi-election in 6 constituencies Strategy Review Session #9 Program receives a con￾tract modification with an n extension until August 15, 2011 Maximum ceiling is raised to $25 million and contract is obligation to $20 6 million April Govt seeks clarification from Army chief on issues related to recruitment in Nepal Army, retirement of generals and boycotting of National Games Nepali Congress and other major coalition partners oppose the move of Maoist-led government May PM Dahal (CPN-M) unilaterally sacks Army chief and replaces a second in commander—UML quits the government Demon￾strations in Kathmandu for and against this government decision President directs the army chief to remain in the position Following national political crises, Tharus pull off strike PM Dahal resigns to protest presidential move as unconstitu￾tional Except Maoists, 22 political parties support president’s move 22 parties out of 25 total CA parties support MK Nepal as a prime ministerial candidate—MK Nepal elected unopposed STTA:M and E consultant:YMCs STTA: Political analyst on Terai political assessment June USAID Mission Director Paige departs July UNMIN term extended by an additional six months COP Audra Dykman departs, Ryan Smith takes over as Chemonics COP, Final Evaluation team fielded US Ambassador Powell departs, August SRS , Final Evaluation Report September OTI transfer to USAID 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 47 Annex H: Commonly Used Nepalese words Bandh: Strike, closure, obstruction, cessation Andolan: Agitation or movement Madheshi: People from the lowlands, caste Hindus, some Muslims, many ethnicities Pahadi: Hill people, numerous ethnicities, caste Hindus and Newari Buddhists Tharu: A Nepalese ethnic group located along the southern border of Nepal Terai: The low-lying Deccan Plateau which spreads east-west along the border with India. Pre-1950-sparsely populated (Tharus), rich agricultural land and forests. Site of de￾mographic upheaval due to malarial eradication, industrialization and “colonization” policies of the Mahendra era.Now 50% of Nepali population resides in the Terai. Dalits: Low caste Hindus Zamindars: Large land-owner, holders of royal land-grants, usually Pahadis Khamaiyas: Indentured laborers 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 48 Annex I: A Sample of Grants included in the Case Studies Grantee Sector Purpose Amount 1 Antenna Foundation Nepal Key political transition agree￾ments and processes: Support to initiate live radio talk show and phone in program This radio program will promote democracy by bringing local and national voices to a single platform. $157,002 3 Antenna Foundation Nepal Media strengthening: Linking Humla's Remote Popula￾tion to the Transition Through Radio To establish a community FM radio station as a means to give Humla some voice in and influence on policy decisions at the center (Kathmandu). $48,500 4 Antenna Foundation Nepal Community stabilization: Mero Jindagi" - My Life: Articulating Core Values & Beliefs in Nepal To develop a multi-media cam￾paign called “Mero Jindagi” based on “This I Believe” that will en￾gage Nepalis in speaking, writing, sharing and discussing core values and beliefs that guide their daily lives. $130,400 5 Dalit Ethnic Upliftment Center (DEUC) Community stabilization: Youth for peace: Conflict resolution in central Terai to provide youth in Bara district with community peace building skills and conflict resolution skills to positively engage them in the peace process through trainings and dialogues. $18,518 6 Dalit Ethnic Upliftment Center (DEUC) Community stabilization: Ac￾tively Engaging Bara District Youth in Community Stabilization Train and mobilize youth in their respective communities to increase the awareness of their peers and other residents on the CPA and CA, constitution-making and local development processes, good governance, and conflict manage￾ment in 30 VDCs in Bara District. $74,911 7 Madhesi NGO Federation Community stabilization: Stronger Together: Improving Civil Society Organizations in the Terai Targets local organizations in need of advocacy and organizational management skills through a Train￾ing of Trainers program. The second activity will focus on or￾ganizations that use street dramas as a technique for dissemination of information. $46,212 8 MAHA Sanchar Key political transition agree￾ments and processes: Raising awareness to facilitate positive peace process through comedy Supports the production of twelve, 45-minute television episodes addressing a variety of post￾conflict and transition issues. $90,500 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 49 9 MAHA Sanchar Elections: Voter Education: Famous Comedians for Informa￾tion Dissemination The EC is coordinating with MA￾HA to disseminate critical elec￾tions-related information at the grassroots level $36,000 10 Mahuli Community Devel￾opment Center (MCDC) Community stabilization: En￾gaging Youth Positively: Youth Working to Stabilize their Com￾munities To train youth and mobilize them in their respective communities to increase the awareness of their peers and other residents on the CPA and CA, local development processes, good governance, and conflict management. $69,082 11 Nepal-aya Community stabilization Taking "A People War" on the Road To remind and educate the people of Nepal about the costs of war through a traveling exhibit of pho￾tographs taken by Nepali photog￾raphers from across the country. These photographs document the impact of the eleven-year conflict on the people, buildings and psy￾che of the country. $201,354 12 Nepal-aya Community stabilization Visual￾izing the Terai situation: A Docu￾mentary Film To produce an independent docu￾mentary film of the second phase of the photo exhibition “A People War” along with the political con￾text in the Terai. The film will be screened at film festivals, and pos￾sibly on television and theatres. $17,164 13 Nepal-aya Community stabilization A People War-Traveling Exhibit: Far West, Mid-West & West Regions To expand the traveling exhibit of photographs taken by Nepali pho￾tographers from across the country to ten locations in the regions of the Far West, Mid-West and West. $111,000 14 Nepal-aya Community stabilization Youth and the Pros: Kickoff for Peace Bara To re-introduce sports as a politi￾cally neutral medium to engage and attract youth of the country. A football (soccer) tour featuring a prominent national-level team will travel to eight locations around the country to play friendly matches with young people in those areas. $103,599 15 New Young Star Club Key political transition agree￾ments and processes: Peace Volunteers Democratizing the CPA in the Central Terai: Bara District Bara Training and support of commu￾nity-based “peace volunteers” in Bara District who can educate and encourage people within their own communities for informed partici￾pation in the CPA processes in￾cluding the CA elections. $23,566 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 50 16 New Young Star Club Community stabilization: Ac￾tively involving Central Terai This activity will build the capacity of youth through training, IEC $57,137 Youth in the Peace Process material, youth peace network & youth listener group, and public hearing. The target audience for this activity includes local youth, high school students, teachers, civil society members, and VDC and municipality residents. 17 Rastriya Rojgar Prabardhan Kendra (RRPK) Community stabilization: International Youth Day: Engag￾ing Youth for Peace and Devel￾opment. To organize a number of activities over two days to engage youth in community dialogue, foster youth participation at the community level and build on our grantees’ accomplishments to disseminate messages of peace and communal harmony. $7,681 18 Rural Institution for Com￾munity Development (RI￾COD) Key political transition agree￾ments and processes: CPA Training Awareness Building for Remote Villages in Lalitpur Lalitpur district focus on the dis￾tribution and explanation of the CPA to ensure that these constitu￾ents understand a key document. A three-day Training of the Trainer (TOT) session will be conducted for 23 participants from each of the VDCs. Following this orienta￾tion, these trainers will return to $10,675 their areas to train mobilizers at the VDC level. The training program will be organized in close coordina￾tion with district- and village-level government bodies thereby in￾creasing engagement between local government and communities. 19 Rural Institution for Com￾munity Development (RI￾COD) Key political transition agree￾ments and processes: Preparing Local NGOs to Educate on the CPA Kathmandu Conduct a five-day orientation for the five NGOs who will be con￾ducting a CPA awareness-raising campaign in five districts in the $1,895 central Terai. 20 Rural Institution for Com￾munity Development (RI￾COD) Community stabilization: Par￾ticipation Now! Promoting De￾mocratic Practices in Local Institu￾tions To facilitate transparency of local institutions and increase engage￾ment of rural people in local de￾velopment processes, the institu￾tions need to be trained in and $14,609 adopt democratic practices that involve all sections of society in their processes. 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 51 21 Sahakarya, Nepal Community stabilization Citizen’s Charters To bring all district-level officials and concerned stakeholders of Bara, Parsa, and Rautahat into a common forum, where they can identify, discuss, and revise their Citizen Charters. The CCs will then be made available to district￾line agencies, concerned stake￾holders, and communities through district-level orientations, training, orientations at the VDC level, advocacy campaigns, and mass information dissemination through posters. $37,377 22 Sahakarya, Nepal Community stabilization Engaging Urban Youth: Peace Building in the Central Terai. To train urban youth in two mu￾nicipalities of central Terai districts on conflict management and peace building to discourage youth from joining such groups, to educate them of peaceful ways to manage conflict and to create a network of peace volunteers who can be mobi￾lized as per the political context. This activity will train 33 peace volunteers to be mobilized in each of the municipal wards of Bara and Parsa Districts. The peace volun￾teers will, in turn, train 660 youth, who will also be engaged in “peace advocacy” campaigns and social work. $21,259 23 Sahakarya, Nepal Community stabilization Accessing Space for Sharing: In￾formation Centers in the central Terai Sahakarya aims to establish five Youth Information Centers (YICs) in Bara, Parsa, and Rautahat which will contain educational materials on the CA and local government services as well as newspapers and other information. The center can also be used as a venue where various community-level discus￾sions on community-based issues can be conducted. $54,019 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 52 24 Samad FM Community stabilization Youth Voices: Positive Engage￾ment through Community Radio To produce and broadcast two weekly radio programs - one re￾corded and one live - targeting youth in Siraha and Saptari districts to increase their awareness on the role and functions of the CA and on current political issues and to engage them positively in the peace process. All dialogues will be recorded, edited and combined with the recorded views of local political analysts, government officials, and civil society leaders. $10,949 25 Shanti Samaj Kendra Key political transition agree￾ments and processes: Democra￾tizing the CPA in the Central Terai To provide training and support to community-based “peace volun￾teers” in portions of Makwanpur District who can educate and en￾courage people within their own communities for informed partici￾pation in the CPA processes in￾cluding the CA elections. $13,975 26 Shanti Samaj Kendra Community stabilization: Youth Participation in the Peace and Reconciliation Process To provide youth in Makwanpur District with training on commu￾nity peace building and reconcilia￾tion processes, good governance and human rights to positively engage them in the peace process. The target audience for this activity includes local youth, youth clubs, high school students, teachers, street drama artists, civil society members, and VDC and munici￾pality residents. $49,190 2 0 0 6 - 2 0 0 9 • O f f i c e o f T r a n s i t i o n I n i t i a t i v e s • N e p a l P r o g r a m E v a l u a t i o n 53 ANNEX J: OTI/Nepal Final Evaluation Team Schedule July 5th – July 31st, 2009 Sunday, July 5 Arrival in Nepal Transfer to Radisson Hotel Monday, July 6 9:00 Meeting with OTI Nepal Team (Melissa Rosser, Sarah Oppenheim, and Shama Pande) at Embassy 10:00 Mission Management In-Brief Acting Mission Director, Carolyn Coleman and Acting Deputy Mis￾sion Director, Sandra Minkel 10:30 Meeting with OTI Media Advisor, Adam Kaplan Location: Room Number 3008 11:30 Depart Embassy to Chemonics (15 minutes) 11:45 Chemonics Team Meeting for introductions to staff and Lunch Location: Chemonics Conference Room 1:00p Depart Chemonics to Casa de Cass (45 minutes) 1:45p Meeting with Ali Saleem, Consultant and OTI STTA - confirmed 3:00p Depart to Dhokaima Café (Patan Dhoka) (15 minutes) 3:15p Meeting with Kunda Dixit, Journalist and OTI grantee – confirmed Contact No: 9802030525 Tuesday, July 7 All Day at Chemonics meeting with CII staff and interviews 8:30 Audra Dykman, Chief of Party 9:30 Rebecca Talaga, Deputy Chief of Party 10:30 Brent Willey, former M&E Coordination Advisor 11:30 Lunch – free time 1:00p Pramita Dhungana, Program Development Officer 2:00p Nilu Basnyat, Program Development Officer 3:00p Raju Kandel, Information Officer 4:00p Bindu Acharya, former Program Development Officer Wednesday, July 8 8:30 Meeting with OTI Nepal Contact: Shama Pande – 400-7200 x 4482 9:00 Meeting with US Ambassador and DCM Location: Ambassador’s Office 9:30 Meeting with USAID/Nepal Democracy and Governance (David Billings, Shanker Khadka, Bishnu Adhi￾kari, and Sharada Jnawali) 10:30 Meeting with US Embassy Political/Economics Officers 11:30 Meeting with USAID/Nepal 1207 funding partners (ODC, INL, GDO) - confirmed 12:30p Lunch: Afternoon meetings with Kathmandu-based grantees and partners 2:00p Antenna Foundation (Madhu Acharya, mobile: 98510-38035) \ 3:45p Nepa~laya (Kiran Shrestha and Arpan Sharma, mobile: 98510-26266) 5:00p Meeting with OTI/Nepal at Radisson Thursday, July 9 8:00 Meeting with USAID DG Officer Darlene Foote 9:00 Meeting with MAHA (Narendra Kansakar, mobile 98510-41567) Meeting with Bindu Acharya, former Chemonics staff 10:00 Meeting with PAILA (Daulat Jha and Sushma Joshi [former Chemonics staff members], mobiles: 9841­ 080185 and 9841-147656 respectively) 10:45 Depart Chemonics to ICC 11:30 Walk through briefing of CA Media Centre – accompanied by Mr. Mukunda Sharma, Joint Secretary and Spokeperson for the Parliament Tour led by Adam Kaplan, OTI Media Advisor - confirmed Location: International Convention Centre (ICC) Contact: Adam Kaplan – 9851107091 12:00n Depart ICC for lunch with Adam Kaplan. Melissa Rosser 2:30p Ann Visit to the Centre for Constitutional Dialogue and meeting with Larry Taman of UNDP – Location: CCD at Alpha Beta Complex Office of Transition Initiatives U S Agency for International Development 54 Contact No: 9851109975 Friday, July 10 9:00 Meeting with Audra at Chemonics 9:50 Depart BBC/WST to Communications Corner 10:00 Meeting with Communication Corner in Sanepa (Gopal Guragain, mobile 98510-25008) 11:00 Depart Communications Corner to Singha Durbar (30 minutes travel time) 11:30 Meeting with CA Secretariat Manohar Bhattari – confirmed Location: Singha Durbar 12:00n Lunch and travel to Chemonics’ office for afternoon meetings – 1:00p Chandra & Emery: Meeting with Radio Audio (Shikha, 4781571) 2:00p Chandra & Emery: Meeting with RICOD (Ram Hari, mobile 9841-304304) 3:00p Meeting with Interface (Dil Bhusan and Shikha, mobiles 98510-10710 and 98510-37701 respectively) 4:00p Whole team: Equal Access (Upendra Aryal, mobile 5013509) 5:00p Ann Lewis meets Sarah Levit-Shore at Carter Center Saturday, July 11 1:00p Lars Peter Christensen, Head of HUGO, Danish Human Rights and Governance program Sunday, July 12 10:00 Depart Radisson for the Election Commission 10:15 Meeting with Neel Uprety, Nepal Election Commission 4:00p Meeting with Guy Banim, Peace-Building and Recovery Advisor, UNDP Monday, July 13 9:20 Fly KTM to Simara - Buddha Air 551 9:35 Arrive in Simara 9:45 Drive to Hetauda (approximately 1 hour) 10:45 Meeting with SSK program staff and facilitators (Navaraj Thapa, mobile 98450-27443) 12:45p Meeting in Hetauda with Radio Palung (Shambhu Karki and Manohar Dhakal, mobiles 98450-70555 and 98450-72077 respectively) 2:00p Depart for Birgunj 5:00p Meet with NGO Coordinators tba Chandra Jha Overnight in Birgunj in Vishuwa Hotel (Ph number - 051-524065) Tuesday, July 14 8:00 Meeting with Tabrej Ahmad (community mobilizer) at Vishuwa Hotel (mobile 98450-59675) 9:15 Meeting with Mamata Chaudhary (procurement/admin specialist, Chemonics satellite office) at satellite office (mobile 98451-84863) 10:00 Meeting with Sahakarya Nepal (Arjun Kushwaha, mobile 98415-15616) 12:15p Drive to Kalaiya, Bara. Enroute stop at CDF activity sites for Motisar and Sishaniya VDCs, implemented by DEUC 1:45p Meet with DEUC program staff at DEUC office (Om Prakash, mobile 98451-89342) Workshop Participatory Conflict Mapping 5:15p Return to Birgunj, overnight at Hotel Vishuwa Wednesday, July 15 11:00 Follow-on Meeting with Tabrej Ahmad (community mobilizer) at Vishuwa Hotel (mobile 98450-59675) 11:00 Meeting with journalist, Janakpur radio station Drive from Birgunj to Bataura VDC Meetings with Satar Mansour, VDC Secretary, and community Drive/Overnight in Birgunj Thursday, July 16 Morning drive to Janakpur 12:30p Lunch with Ryan Smith, Thibaut RPM 2:30p Meet with DB Sunuwar, GMS, Sanjay Gupta, PDO, Nilmani Pokharel, PS 4:00p Ann Janakpur Women’s Development Center (JWDC), Manju Mahara, Overnight in Janakpur in Manaki Hotel (Ph number- 041-521540) 5:00p Meeting with Ryan Smith and Thibaud Marcesse (new RPM) Office of Transition Initiatives U S Agency for International Development 55 Friday, July 17 8:00 Drive to Saptari (3 hours from Janakpur) 11:00 Lunch 12:00n Visit MCDC CDFs (2 off of E-W highway), Shyamkant Chaudhary, Chairperson Workshop and stopover with community Overnight in Lahan, Siraha Saturday, July 18 Meetings in Lahan, Siraha 8:00 Radio Samad FM, Jibachha Chaudhary, Station Manager (9743015743, 033 – 561007) 9:30 Community Mobilizers, Md.Isha Rain (9741150018), Ram Asish Yadav (9842836333), Jitendra Mandal (9804700913), and Mithilesh Yadav (9842821920). (Isha and Ram Asish are based in Siraha and Jitendra and Mithilesh are based in Saptari districts) Drive to Siraha Municipality Overnight in Janakpur in Manaki Hotel (Ph number- 041-521540) Sunday, July 19 10:00 Depart Janakpur on first flight Monday, July 20 8:30 Review of notes, team meeting 3:30p Meeting with Melissa Rosser and Sarah Oppenheim Tuesday, July 21 8:30 Team Meeting in Dwarikas 9:30 Meeting with Melissa and Sarah at Chemonics office 10:30 Meetings with OTI staff: PS, Raju, PDO, etc… to be improvised based on availability of staff 4:00p Emery meeting with Barnaby Willitts-King, WFP VAM Wednesday, July 22 9:00 Team meeting, location tbd 12:00n Meeting with Mr Akhilesh Upadhaya, Editor, Katmandu Post, ex-NDI 1:00p Meeting with Johan Sorensen, Danish Embassy, Governance Advisor 5:00p Workshop on conflict analysis with external stakeholders Thursday, July 23 9:00 Emery meets with Larry Attree, Saferworld Asia Director 9:00 Chandra/Ann meeting with TAF/press in Kathmandu 11:00 Team Power point 2:00p Workshop on conflict analysis with Chemonics, OTI Friday, July 24 9:00 Emery- Raju; Ann-Ryan TBA Meeting with RoddyChalmers, Simon Arthy 0985 10 38 351, DFID Governance/conflict advisers, Win￾rock rep Darryl. Saturday, July 25 Free Day Sunday, July 26 8:30 Outbrief with OTI / Chemonics team at Melissa’s Monday, July 27 10:30 – 12:00n Outbrief with Acting Mission Director/Embassy Chargé d’affaires 2:00p Outbrief with Chemonics staff, at Chemonics 6:00p Emery Brusset departs Tuesday 28 July 11:00 Meeting with Dr. Bina Pradhan, Senior Economist, Fulbright Fellow UC-Berkeley 6:00p Meeting with UNICEF/Community initiatives, Anjali Sherchand Office of Transition Initiatives U S Agency for International Development 56 Wednesday 29 July 10:00 Meeting with Dr. Bhed Prakash Upreti, retired GON senior official , retired UNDP senior officer 2:00p Meeting with Dr. S. Prasai, The Asia Foundation, 6:00p Meeting with Magee Shah, TEWA Foundation Thursday,30 July 11:00 Meeting with USAID/ DG office 4:00p Meeting with Ambika Shrestha, Regional President, Business and Professional Womens Club Friday 31 July 9:00 Wrap up at Chemonics; staff comments 11:00 Ann Lewis departs Office of Transition Initiatives U S Agency for International Development 57 Annex K: Key Documents, Partial Bibliography USAID/OTI Media Impact Assessment in Nepal, (DRAFT) Report July 2009, New￾Era/MACRO “Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process” Asia Report No 163- 19 February 2009, International Crisis Group Miklian, Jason, “Nepal’s Terai: Constructing an Ethnic Conflict”, South Asia Briefing Paper #1, PRIO Paper, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) 20 July 2008 Dykman, Audra, Chemonics Chief of Party MEMORANDUM TO FILE, USAID/OTI Nepal Community Mobilizer and Assessment, February 6, 2008 Thapa, Majushree “Forget Kathmandu: An Elegy for Democracy” Penguin Books, New Delhi, 2005 Saleem, Ali for USAID/OTI , “Central and Eastern Terai Districts’ Trends Analysis: Opportuni￾ties & Challenges”A study of Bara, Parsa, Rautahat, Sarlahi, Mahottari, Dhanusha, Siraha, Saptari, Sunsari and Morang, December 2008 to May 2009 USAID OTI Transition InitiativesAnnual Summary Reports, 06-07, Oct 2007 – Sept 2008 Nepal Transition Initiatives, Quarterly Reports, Oct 06 - March 2009 OTI Nepal website: for reports, success stories: http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/crosscutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country/nepal/ nepal_rpt_index.html Aplon Jason, Kaplan, Adam, Hryshchyshyn, Michael USAID/DCHA/DG Nepal Transition Assessment, June 15, 2006 Weden, C., Maynard, K, Jones, R. USAID/OTI Nepal Program Performance Review, Septem￾ber 2008 Papillon, K., Werchick, L, Stukel, T, USAID/OTI Nepal Program Performance Review, Sep￾tember, 2007 Willey, Brent, Field Report-Sunsari and Morang Districts, Evaluation, YMCs, May, 2009 “Nepal’s Faltering Peace Process Asia Report No 163- 19” February 2009, International Crisis Group Nepal’s Terai: Constructing an Ethnic Conflict South Asia Briefing Paper #1 PRIO Paper, 20 July 2008, Jason Miklian International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) Dykman, Audra, MEMORANDUM TO FILE, USAID/OTI Nepal Community Mobilizer and Assessment, February 6, 2008 Majushree Thapa. “Forget Kathmandu: An Elegy for Democracy” Penguin Books, New Delhi, 2005 Office of Transition Initiatives U.S. Agency for International Development 58