Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
July 2006
Impact of the
tsunami response
on local and
national capacities
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
This first ever multi-location, multi-country
joint evaluation of the impact of an
international humanitarian response on local
capacities – in this case in tsunami-affected
countries – found that most lives are saved
and the initial response made by the affected
communities and their neighbours
themselves. When the international
community – UN agencies and INGOs – joined
these efforts and facilitated local and national
efforts at recovery, the impact was
heartening. When the international
community bypassed or appropriated local
and national response, the impact was almost
always cost, effort and time ineffective.
This evaluation also found that recovery is
complex – early engagement with local actors
in the relief efforts is essential for success in
recovery and reconstruction efforts. In
addition, when the international community
engaged with local capacities (actors,
institutions and markets), social inequalities
and exclusions were better addressed. When
local capacities were ignored, social inclusion
of the most needy remained an often
unsuccessful effort. 
Recovery can take place in a context of war,
conflict, economic crisis and/or social
tension. In all contexts, international
assistance is productive when it is better
prepared to identify and work with local and
national capacities well before the crisis. The
tsunami evaluation found that when
international agencies are able to resist the
pressure to spend quickly and facilitate local
efforts for meaningful recovery, achievements
of the assistance becomes sustainable. The
evaluation concludes that such preparedness
and an enabling international environment
makes engaging with local capacities easier
and more promising for international
agencies.
The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) is a
multi-agency learning and accountability
initiative in the humanitarian sector. It was
established in February 2005 in the wake of
the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis of
26 December 2004. 
This evaluation of the impact of the tsunami
response on local and national capacities is
one of a series of five thematic evaluations
undertaken by the TEC in 2005/06. 
This evaluation was co-managed by the
Evaluation Office in UNDP, New York, and by
the All India Disaster Mitigation Institute
(AIDMI). It was guided by a Steering
Committee consisting of representatives from
ActionAid International, AIDMI, CordAid,
UNDP and UNICEF. Funding was provided by
ActionAid International, BMZ (Germany),
CordAid, MFA (France), NORAD (Norway),
Sida (Sweden), UNDP, UNICEF, OCHA and
USAID (United States).
Funded by
9 780850 038125
ISBN 0-85003-812-X
Impact of the tsunami response on local and national capacities
Capacities cover crc 1/8/06 2:38 pm Page 1
The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) is a multi-agency learning and
accountability initiative in the humanitarian sector. It was established in
February 2005 in the wake of the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis of 26
December 2004. 
The TEC is managed by a Core Management Group (CMG) of agencies and 
TEC staff are hosted by the ALNAP Secretariat. The CMG provides general
oversight and direction for the TEC on behalf of its wider membership. Since
February 2005 CMG members have included representatives from: Donors:
Danida, SDC and Sida; UN agencies: FAO, OCHA (Chair), UNDP, UNICEF and
WHO; NGOs/Red Cross: CARE International UK, AIDMI, IFRC and World 
Vision International; Networks/research institutes: the ALNAP Secretariat and
Groupe URD.
The TEC has three main aims:
1. To improve the quality of humanitarian action, including linkages to longer
term recovery and development.
2. To provide accountability to the donor and affected-country populations on
the overall tsunami response (from the point of view of TEC member
agencies).
3. To test the TEC approach as a possible model for future joint evaluation.
More information on the TEC can be found in the TEC’s Synthesis Report and
on the TEC’s website: www.tsunami-evaluation.org 
The TEC’s thematic evaluations
This evaluation is one of five thematic joint evaluations undertaken by the
TEC. The other four studies in the series comprise: the role of needs
assessment in the tsunami response; coordination of international
humanitarian assistance in tsunami-affected countries; the international
funding response to the tsunami, and links between relief, rehabilitation and
development (LRRD) in the tsunami response. 
This evaluation is published alongside these other four studies together with
the TEC’s Synthesis Report, making a set of six. The Synthesis Report draws
together learning and recommendations contained in these TEC studies as
well as over 170 additional reports.
Capacities cover crc 1/8/06 2:38 pm Page 2
Impact of the tsunami
response on local and
national capacities
Elisabeth Scheper, Arjuna Parakrama, Smruti Patel 
With contributions from Tony Vaux
Published by the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC)
Capacities Report crc 1/8/06 2:21 pm Page 1
Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
ISBN: 0 85003 812 X
© TEC 
London, July 2006
Suggested citation: Scheper B, A Parakrama and S Patel (2006) Impact of the
tsunami response on local and national capacities. London: Tsunami Evaluation
Coalition. 
Photocopies of all or part of this publication may be made providing the source is
acknowledged. ALNAP, which facilitates the TEC, would appreciate receiving
details of its use. Requests for commercial reproduction should be directed to
ALNAP. Contact: alnap@odi.org.uk
For further copies of this publication please contact:
ALNAP
c/o Overseas Development Institute
111 Westminster Bridge Road
London SE1 7JD, UK
Tel: +44(0)207 922 0300
Fax: +44(0)207 922 0399
Email: alnap@odi.org.uk
Website: www.alnap.org
This report represents the views of the authors only. They are not necessarily
those of the managing or funding agencies.
Overall series design by The Design Unit Ltd. www.thedesignunit.com
Management of the evaluation
This evaluation was co-managed by the Evaluation Office in UNDP, New York, and
by the All India Disaster Mitigation Institute (AIDMI). It was guided by a Steering
Committee consisting of representatives from ActionAid International, AIDMI,
CordAid, UNDP and UNICEF.
Financial contributions to the evaluation
This TEC evaluation was made possible through the financial support of ActionAid
International, BMZ (Germany), CordAid, MFA (France), NORAD (Norway), Sida
(Sweden), UNDP, UNICEF, OCHA and USAID (United States). 
Capacities Report crc 1/8/06 2:21 pm Page 2
Acknowledgements
The evaluation team was co-managed by the Evaluation Office, UNDP, New York and
the All India Disaster Mitigation Institute (AIDMI). The report has benefited from an
extensive review process, with a dedicated Steering Committee and wider Working
Group. The final report was edited by Tony Vaux, independent consultant, who also
provided quality assurance inputs. Substantive inputs from Paul Harvey (ODI) and
James Darcy (ODI) are gratefully acknowledged by the team. The team also
appreciates substantive and administrative inputs from the TEC core team, notably
John Cosgrave and Rachel Houghton, and from the TEC Core Management Group.
Funding was provided by ActionAid International, BMZ (Germany), CordAid, MFA
(France), NORAD (Norway), Sida (Sweden), UNDP, UNICEF, OCHA and USAID
(United States). 
The claim-holder surveys were loosely modelled on the work done by AIDMI, and
particularly on a modification of the 2001 Gujarat Earthquake Survey for the
Disasters Emergency Committee. The team is grateful to Mihir Bhatt of AIDMI for
sharing this draft report and for his expert advice on survey methodology.
All stakeholders were generous with their time and expertise in support of this
evaluation, in a context of heavy workloads, looming deadlines and evaluation fatigue.
The team gratefully acknowledges the contribution of national and local government
officers, bilateral and multilateral donors, and especially affected communities. Any
omissions and errors remain the responsibility of the evaluation team.
Capacities Report crc 1/8/06 2:21 pm Page 3
Contents
Acronyms and abbreviations
Executive summary 8
1 Introduction 15
1.1 Background 15
1.2 The capacities evaluation 16
1.3 Purpose and method 16
1.3.1 Beneficiary/claim-holder surveys 19
1.3.2 Biases and constraints 19
2 Impact of the disaster on national capacities 21
2.1 Capacities before the tsunami disaster 21
2.1.1 Indonesia 21
2.1.2 Maldives 22
2.1.3 Sri Lanka 22
2.1.4 Thailand 23
2.2 Impact of the tsunami disaster 23
2.2.1 Indonesia 23
2.2.2 Maldives 24
2.2.3 Sri Lanka 25
2.2.4 Thailand 25
2.3 National responses 25
2.3.1 Indonesia 26
2.3.2 Maldives 26
2.3.3 Sri Lanka 27
2.3.4 Thailand 27
2.4 Conclusions 27
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
3 Impact of the disaster at community level 29
3.1 Community perceptions of the response 29
3.2 Relationships between agencies and communities 30
3.3 Social inequality and exclusion 32
3.4 Impact on women 33
3.5 Conclusions 34
4 The interaction between international agencies 35
and local civil society
4.1 Practices and constraints of the international agencies 35
4.2 Problems of scaling up international assistance 36
4.3 Partnerships with civil society 37
4.4 Impact of conflict 38
4.5 Conclusions 38
5 Conclusions 39
5.1 The sequencing of capacities 39
5.2 Principles and practice in the humanitarian system 41
5.3 Conclusions on the tsunami response 43
5.4 Lessons from the tsunami response 44
6 Recommendations 46
6.1 Key messages 46
6.2 Recommendations 46
6.2.1 Overarching recommendation 47
6.2.2 Recommendation 1: Engagement with local and national 47
capacities
6.2.3 Recommendation 2: Attention to social inequalities, 47
exclusion and hierarchies
6.2.4 Recommendation 3: Contribution to an enabling 48
environment and context
References and bibliography 49
Annexes 
Annex 1: Terms of reference 54
Annex 2: Indonesia report – executive summary 67
Annex 3: Maldives report – executive summary 72
Annex 4: Sri Lanka report – executive summary 78
Annex 5: Thailand report – executive summary 86
Annex 6: Indonesia claim-holder survey – summary 93
Annex 7: Sri Lanka claim-holder survey – summary 99
Annex 8: Financial statement 117
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Acronyms and abbreviations
ADB Asian Development Bank
ADPC Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre, Thailand
AIDMI All India Disaster Mitigation Institute (formerly DMI)
ALNAP Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in
Humanitarian Action
BAKORNAS National Disaster Management Board, Indonesia
BAPPEDA District Planning Board, Indonesia
BAPPENAS Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional (Ministry of
Planning), Indonesia
BRR Aceh and Nias Rehabilitation and Reconstruction Agency
CBO community-based organisation
CFW cash for work
CMG Core Management Group (of the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition)
DAD Development Assistance Database
DDPM Department for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Thailand
DEC Disasters Emergency Committee (UK)
DMI Disaster Mitigation Institute (now AIDMI)
DSS Defence Security Service
EAC Evaluation Advisor and Coordinator (TEC)
GAM Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement)
GBV gender-based violence
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GHDI Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative
HRBA human-rights-based approaches
HRR Humanitarian Response Review
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
HQ Headquarters
IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee
IAWG Inter-Agency Working Group 
IDP internally displaced person
IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 
ILO International Labour Office
INGO international non-governmental organisation
IOM International Organisation for Migration
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
LTTE Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
NGO non-governmental organisation
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD-DAC Development Cooperation Directorate, Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development
MoU memorandum of understanding
RADA Reconstruction and Development Agency (Sri Lanka)
SDC Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation
Sida Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency
TAFOR Presidential Task Force for Relief (Sri Lanka)
TAFREN Presidential Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation (Sri Lanka)
TAP Transitional Accommodation Progress
TEC Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
TICA Thai International Cooperation Agency
TNI Tentara Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Army)
ToR terms of reference
TRO Tamil Rehabilitation Organisation
UNDAC UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination
UNDP UN Development Programme
UNFPA UN Population Fund
UNHCR (Office of the) UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
UNICEF UN Children’s Fund
UNIFEM UN Development Fund for Women
USAID United States Agency for International Development
WFP World Food Programme
WHO World Health Organisation
Capacities Report crc 1/8/06 2:21 pm Page 7
8
Executive summary
Introduction
The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC)
initiated five parallel evaluations of the
international response to the tsunami, of
which this is one. The purpose of this
evaluation was to determine the impact of
the tsunami response, primarily the role of
international actors, on local and national
capacities for relief and recovery, and risk
reduction. The ToR identified the following
six objectives.
• Assess how local and national
capacities changed as a result of the
tsunami response.
• Assess how well international actors
engaged with local and national
capacities in providing relief and
recovery assistance.
• Assess the intended and unintended
changes to local and national capacities
as a result of the tsunami response by
international actors.
• Assess the extent to which
transition/risk reduction/recovery
programming, planned and
implemented, is likely to influence local
and national capacities.
• Distil lessons learned for efforts to
strengthen local and national capacities
for future crisis response and recovery.
• Ensure that all the above assess and
highlight gender differences and the
varied experiences of women and men.
Fieldwork was undertaken between mid￾September and mid-November 2005 in four
of the affected countries – Indonesia, Sri
Lanka, the Maldives and Thailand. A team of
three international consultants studied the
four countries between them, with additional
international assistance for the Maldives.
National consultants supported the process
in Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Thailand while
staff from the Care Society supported the
study in the Maldives. Structured surveys of
claim-holder views were conducted in Aceh
(Indonesia) and Sri Lanka. 
For the purpose of this evaluation, the term
‘capacities’ has been taken in a broad
sense, i.e., to mean much more than
technical skills, also encompassing the
ability to access services and programmes,
to influence and set policies and longer
term recovery and reconstruction agendas,
and to open and use the space to hold
duty-bearers at all levels accountable. It
includes the processes by which these
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
outcomes are achieved, notably
participation, consultation and information
sharing. The evaluation does not attempt to
evaluate the performance of specific
agencies but to focus on the overall impact
and draw lessons from the response taken
as a whole. The Team recognises that there
is wide variety in performance and that
there are many examples that may be
exceptions to the general trends observed.
National and local
capacities
At the national level, Thailand was
successful in managing the response,
drawing on well-prepared structures and
plans. In Indonesia and Sri Lanka the
response was marred by lack of
coordination between government entities,
while in the Maldives there was a quick and
effective initial response, but then some
lack of representation of outlying
communities. In all four countries such
tendencies toward over-centralised control
caused difficulties in relation to the local
administration. National capacities for
future disaster preparedness have been
strengthened by the international agencies,
especially in Sri Lanka, the Maldives and
Thailand. In Indonesia the state has
initiated important developments in national
policy and capacity, which are yet to be
proven. Across the region, the international
community played a useful role in raising
states’ awareness about the rights and
entitlements of internally displaced persons,
although not always with the desired
results. But the interaction of local and
national government remains problematic.
The results are less positive at the
community level. The evaluation finds that
local ownership of the tsunami response
was undermined and some local capacities
were rendered more vulnerable by the
response to the disaster. The Sri Lanka
survey indicates that although there was a
generally positive rating for the response
initially, this declined over time. The
problem relating to capacities is
demonstrated by the finding that only
about 20 per cent of claim-holders were
satisfied with the way in which their skills
were used, while nearly half found this
engagement somewhat unsatisfactory or
worse. 
The surveys also indicate perceptions of
lack of fairness in the response. Women￾headed and poorer households were most
disadvantaged while those who were
more articulate received greater benefits.
This tendency seems to have increased
gradually. Aid was provided to marginal
groups during the relief phase but, being
less informed and organised about their
rights and less able to access common
services, they were overlooked in the
recovery and reconstruction phases.
Their special needs and constraints
required a more proactive and strategic
response.
Women registered a lower level of
satisfaction with the general response than
men (in Sri Lanka, at least). This may
reflect a lack of attention in the response to
issues of protection. There are some
notable successes in this field but
generally international agencies did less
than they should to protect women. The
most vulnerable were those who were
marginalised by several different factors at
once, especially conflict, and also women
in camps. Women with few assets before
the tsunami tended to receive less in
compensation than men who already had
many assets. This is particularly true in
the case of livelihood support. 
Underlying the problems at community
level is a lack of engagement at the earliest
stage with community-based and local non￾governmental organisations (CBOs and
NGOs). Many of these had played a major
role during the search-and-rescue phase
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
but were marginalised during the relief
process; relations had become strained, or
capacities weakened, by the time that
agencies sought their cooperation in the
recovery phase.
One of the most successful aspects of the
response was the use of cash transfers,
allowing communities and individuals a
greater degree of choice than with
distribution of materials. In the Aceh survey,
90 per cent of those surveyed felt that cash
was better than food or other relief items.
Among Sri Lankan respondents the majority
(53 per cent) preferred cash to goods, which
was supported by another 12 per cent who
felt that cash would enable them to buy
what they wanted.
Issues in the
international
response
Specific aspects of the response that have
undermined local capacity include
‘poaching’ of staff from other
organisations, especially local NGOs, and
burdensome requirements for reporting.
There was too much emphasis on speed
and profile, leading to unnecessary and
wasteful use of expatriate staff, many of
whom had little relevant experience and
were at a particular disadvantage in
addressing the highly complex social
structures of communities in the region.
Structurally, this reflects an
underestimation of local capacities, which
were generally coping with most of the
immediate problems. The findings in all
four countries show that most of the life￾saving activity was conducted by local
communities before the arrival of national
and international assistance. They needed
support to continue into the recovery
stage. 
These early mistakes in developing
supportive relationships compromised the
effectiveness and efficiency of international
assistance in the long term. By behaving as
if they were saving lives long after that
phase of the response was over,
international agencies undermined
recognition for local capacities and made
long-term recovery more difficult. It is hard
to find the right balance between delivering
immediate relief and engaging with local
capacities, but in this case the
international agencies were unduly
impetuous, possibly because of exceptional
pressures to spend money rapidly. 
Conclusions
Capacity cannot be separated from issues
of power. A society that effectively
manages its own issues of inequality and
marginalisation is likely to be able to cope
well with disasters. Local capacity is not
just a means for delivering relief but has
a long-term role in disaster mitigation.
But this is not a simple matter; in many of
the countries there were serious
problems of social division and even
conflict. Building capacity in such
societies is not simply about supporting
institutional structures but is a more
complex political process involving the
empowerment of poorer and more
excluded people so that when disaster
strikes they have a valid claim on their
community, local officials and national
government. From this perspective the tsunami
response must be assessed not only in
terms of delivery of goods and services
but also in terms of whether it supported
local capacities, especially among the
most marginalised groups. But this was
not always recorded and too often the
social effects of aid are unknown even to
the agencies that caused them. Capacity
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
strengthening should be better recognised
as an issue in itself. The importance of a
capacity strengthening type of
engagement is that it represents a more
sustainable approach to disaster
response. Its benefits come from the long￾term impact of mitigating and preventing
disaster as well as from addressing
immediate needs.
The importance of capacity strengthening is
recognised in the guiding principles for
humanitarian response, although not clearly
enough linked to disaster mitigation. This
evaluation highlights the disparity between
the stated policies of international
humanitarian actors and the operational
realities in terms of direct execution,
engagement with local capacity and
community participation. When the aid
system is under pressure in crisis
situations, the imperative to deliver services
is dominant – the tsunami response being
perhaps an extreme example.
Inevitably, there is strong pressure for
‘results’ from the headquarters of
international agencies. But even among
field staff there is a general tendency to
underestimate local capacity and give
excessive importance to the delivery of
external assistance. This is a process that
re-confirms itself. By ignoring local
capacity, the role of external aid is made
to seem all the more important. The more
external aid there is, the more that local
capacity is undermined. The hitch is that,
having started off in such a way,
relationships and strategies then fail to
develop more positively during the
recovery phase. The response stalls at
around the six-month mark, as it did in
the case of the tsunami disaster.
There is a need to rethink the end
goal of humanitarian assistance and
move from a service delivery
approach to a capacity empowering
framework, or in other words to
shift the emphasis from only
delivery to support and facilitation.
Key messages
The evaluation team identified three key
areas for the attention of international
actors. All of them relate to existing
international standards but on the basis of
this evaluation appear to be areas in which
the tsunami response has been weak in
practice. 
• Engagement with local and
national capacities. This includes
the ability to recognise and identify
local capacities and the need to include
local communities in planning and
decision-making through participation
and consultation, and commitment to
devolve decision-making as far as
possible. 
• Attention to social inequalities,
exclusion and hierarchies.
Capacity should be defined in relation
to not only skills and training but also
the empowerment of poorer and
marginalised groups. The capacity of a
community to resist disaster is
sensitive to this. It includes not simply
the identification of such groups but
ensuring that particularly their voices
are heard in decision-making.
• Contribution to an enabling
environment and context.
Marginalised groups need to improve
their position in relation to communities,
and communities in relation to district
and national authorities. The basis for
this process is empowerment through
the strategic management of
information, and strengthening
downward accountability. Advocacy is
also an important element but should be
based on enhanced local capacities
rather than external interventions. 
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12
Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities Recommendations For recommendations on specific countries,
please refer to the individual report
summaries presented in the Annexes. The key messages above translate into the
following general recommendations for
international agencies.
Overarching recommendation
Sector-wide discussions at the global level
should be initiated to address the need for
a fundamental re-orientation of the
humanitarian sector based on the principle
that the ownership of humanitarian
assistance should rest with claim-holders.
This implies a shift of emphasis from
delivery to support and facilitation. Such
discussions are expected to facilitate
implementation of the following
recommendations. Recommendation 1: Engagement with
local and national capacities • International agencies should prepare
in advance for the problems of scaling
up not simply by identifying resources
but also by making their systems and
practices suitable for maximum
participation by local people and
national governments.
• They should make plans to shift into
more collective ways of working during
‘mega-disasters’ in order to ensure that
they do not extend beyond their
competence but instead link with others
and share roles.
• They should have clear partnership
strategies and develop local
partnerships from the start in order to
achieve a smooth transition from relief
to recovery.
• They should institute procedures for
making grants for longer time periods
even from the outset of an intervention,
and should critically examine their
reporting requirements to ensure that
they do not discriminate against CBOs.
• Specific agreements and protocols
should be made to prevent ‘poaching’ of
staff, to ensure local capacity is not
undermined. 
Recommendation 2: Attention to
social inequalities, exclusion and
hierarchies • Strategies should be developed to
ensure that women and marginalised
groups have full access to information.
•Women claim-holders should be
represented in all decision-making
bodies affecting them.
• Planning should be based on the
assumption that aid is likely to reinforce
inequalities within the community unless
corrective action is taken.
• Planning should also take account of the
complexity of community structures
and the consequent need for
knowledgeable local intermediaries
with power to influence decisions.
• Inclusion of the most marginalised
people should be treated as a
fundamental principle or right,
regardless of costs.
• Aid should be given according to need
rather than being limited to a particular
disaster – in the case of the tsunami,
people affected by conflict should be
included in aid responses.
Recommendation 3: Contribution to
an enabling environment and context • Support communities to develop their
own contingency plans for disasters and
receive material support on the basis
that adequate provision must be made
for poorer and marginalised groups.
This should extend to a wide range of
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
civil-society organisations including
women’s groups.
• Support national governments in
disaster-prone countries to develop
comprehensive plans and procedures
for disaster management, including
the management of information in
order to ensure that communities are
kept fully informed at all stages of the
response.
• They should also support plans not only
for the establishment of a central body
to manage disaster responses but also
to enable cooperation between
departments and between the centre
and local government.
• Those responding to a disaster should
ensure that full information about their
activities is available to all those affected,
especially in local communities. This
might include public notices giving
financial information, and public audits.
• Agencies should strengthen watchdog
movements and support the mass
media to promote downward
accountability through better
understanding of the response and
opportunities for feedback and dialogue.
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
Countries affected by the tsunami
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1
Chapter one
15
Introduction
1.1 Background
On 26 December 2004, shifting tectonic plates in the Indian Ocean caused an
earthquake measuring 9.0 on the Richter scale. Within minutes, waves of up to 12
metres hit coastal communities along the west coast of northern Sumatra. The
massive upward movement in the seabed also caused tsunamis to strike coastal
communities in parts of western Thailand, Burma, Malaysia, Sri Lanka, eastern
India and the Maldives before reaching the coast of Africa. The tsunami triggered
an unprecedented global public response in the form of donations and concern
which, in turn, provided a unique opportunity for the humanitarian community to
demonstrate how effectively, efficiently, equitably and sustainably it could serve
affected populations without the usual financial constraints. 
With this unique opportunity came a heightened responsibility to account for the
quality of the tsunami response. To this end, the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
(TEC), a collective of bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, NGOs and
concerned institutions, initiated five parallel evaluations of the international
tsunami response, including this study on local and national capacities. Each
evaluation will provide lessons for strengthening ongoing activities and future
responses to emergencies. In addition, all five evaluations will produce learning
on the process of undertaking joint but parallel multi-agency evaluations within a
larger coalition. Specific evaluations take account of the fact that others may
focus in greater depth on certain issues and therefore give those issues rather
less attention. In the case of the current study, for example, needs assessments
are not considered in depth because they are the subject of another TEC
evaluation.
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
1.2 The capacities evaluation
The current evaluation was co-managed by the Evaluation Office in UNDP, New York,
and the All India Disaster Mitigation Institute (AIDMI), and guided by a Steering
Committee consisting of representatives of ActionAid International, AIDMI, CordAid,
UNDP and UNICEF, and quality assured by a wider working group. 
There were three core members of the evaluation team. Arjuna Parakrama, overall
team leader, was responsible for the inception report, leading the Sri Lanka field
study and for the claim-holder surveys. He is the primary author of the Sri Lanka
country report and contributed to the Indonesia country report. Elisabeth Scheper
was team leader for the Indonesia and Thailand field studies and participated in
the Sri Lanka field study. She is the primary author of the Thailand and Indonesia
country reports and contributed to the Sri Lanka country report. Smruti Patel
conducted the desk reviews and literature surveys for all countries. She was team
leader for the Maldives study and participated in the Indonesia and Thailand field
studies, contributing to those reports. She is the primary author of the Maldives
country report. All team members contributed to this regional report.
The evaluation process was supported by Janey Lawry White (UNDP consultant),
who was a team member for the Maldives field study, contributed to the Maldives
country report, and provided project management throughout. National
consultants were recruited in Indonesia (Abdur Rofi and Ms Arabiyani, a UNIFEM
programme officer who assisted with interviews with women’s groups in Aceh)
and Sri Lanka (Sudarshana Gunawardana). In Thailand, local UNDP consultants
assisted the team, and in the Maldives, staff from a local NGO, the Care Society,
arranged and accompanied the field trips, and facilitated community and island
level discussions. The final text was edited by Tony Vaux, an independent
consultant who was team leader of the DEC evaluation of the tsunami response. Tony Vaux also provided quality assurance inputs, notably to increase compliance
with the ALNAP Quality Proforma and TEC requirements. 
1.3 Purpose and method
The purpose of this evaluation is to determine the impact of the tsunami response,
primarily the role of international actors, on local and national capacities for relief
and recovery, and risk reduction (see Annex 1, Terms of Reference, for more
details). It is envisaged that the evaluation will provide lessons that serve to
strengthen ongoing activities and future responses, and also to hold international
actors accountable to their donors and, if possible, to the affected people
themselves. The following six objectives are identified in the Terms of Reference
(ToR). • Assess how local and national capacities changed as a result of the tsunami
response.
• Assess how well international actors engaged with local and national
capacities in providing relief and recovery assistance.
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
• Assess the intended and unintended changes to local and national capacities
as a result of the tsunami response by international actors.
• Assess the extent to which transition/risk reduction/recovery programming,
planned and implemented, is likely to influence local and national capacities.
•Distil lessons learned for efforts to strengthen local and national capacities for
future crisis response and recovery. 
• Ensure that all the above assess and highlight gender differences and the
varied experiences of women and men. 
The ToR emphasise the need to distinguish between different phases of the
response. The team used three notional phases: immediate emergency, early
recovery phase, and transition from recovery to development. But there is
considerable overlap between these phases and considerable variation between
sectors, locations and contexts. 
Fieldwork was undertaken between mid-September and mid-November 2005 in
four of the affected countries, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Thailand.
These were selected to illustrate a cross-section of situations reflecting factors
including: extent of tsunami damage and reconstruction needs; the response
capacity with regard to state as well as civil-society capacity; the level of
international support; and the local context, including pre-existing conflicts,
linked to addressing capacity needs and availability of evaluative evidence.
Summaries of the separate reports on the four case-study countries are
attached as annexes to this report (Annexes 2–5) and the full reports are
available separately. The absence of India perhaps needs some explanation.
Both Thailand and India were cautious in their response to international
humanitarian assistance, asking only for technical help. Of these two cases,
Thailand was selected for this study for practical reasons. 
For the purposes of this evaluation, the term ‘capacities’ is understood as the
interconnected set of skills and abilities to access services and programmes, to
influence and set policies and longer term recovery/reconstruction agendas, and
to open and use the space to hold duty-bearers at all levels accountable, and will
include the continuing processes through which these outcomes are achieved. The
assessment of changes in capacity requires a level of nuance and a depth of
analysis that differ substantively from evaluations of general efficiency and
timeliness of response. Capacity is the bridge between immediate responses and
longer term sustainability. Capacity is not just related to technical skills but also
to context: the issues are played out within a complex political economy mediated
by unequal power relations.
The importance of capacities is widely recognised in international principles
relating to disaster response, but there is considerable variation in interpreting
the term and in defining responsibilities. This evaluation provided an opportunity
to explore this and will hopefully lead toward a better understanding. In the
concluding sections below we examine the response to the tsunami disaster
against international principles and consider the relationship of participation,
consultation, capacity strengthening and rights. 
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
1 There are serious problems of definition in this table and it should only be taken as a rough guide.
2 In addition, there were meetings with headquarters staff of UN agencies and also with members of the
steering committee. 
3 This includes some community representatives in the case of Sri Lanka.
4 In the case of Indonesia, the desk review became available only after the visit.
18
The ToR required the team to consider capacities at all levels – national,
provincial, district, community and sub-community. This was done by dialogue
with a wide range of stakeholders. Full lists of interviewees are included in the
individual country reports, and Table 1.11 provides a summary.
Box 1.1 Capacities in humanitarian standards
We shall attempt to build disaster response on local capacities... All people and
communities – even in disaster – possess capacities as well as vulnerabilities. Where
possible, we will strengthen these capacities by employing local staff, purchasing local
materials and trading with local companies. (IFRC, 1994)
Disaster-affected populations must not be seen as helpless victims, and this includes
members of vulnerable groups. They possess, and acquire skills and capacities and
have structures to cope with and respond to a disaster situation that need to be
recognised and supported. (Sphere, 2004)
Location2 INGOs & Red UN Bilateral Government, Government, Local and national
Cross/Crescent national level (sub-) district level NGOs3
Indonesia 25 35 7 13 7 18 
Group meetings 23 10 2 1 0 7 
Sri Lanka 78 40 10 25 25 123 
Maldives 9 22 11 3 8 16 
Thailand 5 14 0 14 6 12 
Totals 140 121 30 55 46 176
Table 1.1 Distribution of meetings and discussions in the evaluation process
The evaluation team focused on capacities at the community level because these
capacities are often excluded from evaluations of humanitarian response and
recovery. Assessment of capacity at national and provincial/district levels is
easier and less time-consuming due to the greater accessibility, ease of
articulation and resources available. Based on feedback received from a
preliminary desk review4 and meetings, a list of issues was drawn up by the team
as a guide for further analysis and a schedule of field visits planned. In keeping
with the ToR and both HQ and in-country discussions, the country studies have a
twin sectoral and cross-cutting thematic focus. These were selected by
stakeholder consensus. The three sectors are: 
1 shelter (initial camps, temporary shelters and permanent housing)
2 livelihoods 
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
3psychosocial support.
The six themes are: 
1 land ownership, displacement and resettlement
2 ‘protection’ of women (and children) and women’s empowerment
3 multiple-marginalised and vulnerable groups, including the sick and elderly
4 (migrant) labour
5 strengthening local civil-society structures and downward accountability
6 national risk reduction and disaster preparedness plans (with local and media
components).
1.3.1 Beneficiary/claim-holder surveys
In Aceh (Indonesia) and Sri Lanka, claim-holder surveys were conducted using a
questionnaire in the local language to collect both quantitative and qualitative
feedback from a random sample of the affected population in the worst-hit districts.
Questions focused on:
• the relationship between efficiency and speed of delivery and enhancement of
local capacity
• the process of consultation
•modalities for ensuring that community hierarchies and elites do not capture
the benefits of the response.
The Aceh survey was a disappointing experience and much of the data has been
lost. What remains is presented in Annex 6. A summary of the Sri Lanka survey is
presented as Annex 7. The distribution of interviews in both surveys is
summarised in Table 1.2.
Evaluation findings were therefore based on field studies corroborated by a desk
review of secondary documents, as well as claim-holder surveys. Drafts of the
country reports were updated following comments by the Steering Committee and
Working Group, stakeholders and the wider TEC membership. These near-final
reports were then validated by stakeholders at exit stakeholder workshops in case
study countries (except Thailand).
1.3.2 Biases and constraints
The relevant background of the team members is as follows.
Professor Arjuna Parakrama currently teaches cultural studies and
discourse analysis at the University of Peradeniya in Sri Lanka. He has worked for
the past 14 years as a consultant in the community development sector,
specialising in capacity strengthening and working on conflict, notably with Oxfam
Australia, and has been UNDP Peace & Development Advisor in Nepal. He has
participated in evaluations of UNDP programmes in the Philippines, Macedonia,
Sri Lanka and Indonesia.
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
5 This includes 100 respondents from Vaharai and Thirayamadu, where a special impact study was
conducted.
6 While it was planned that 200 families would be interviewed from each district in Sri Lanka, the
actual numbers varied considerably as indicated in the final count contained in this table.
Elisabeth Scheper headed the East and South East Asia Bureau of Novib
(Oxfam Netherlands), covering the four countries in this evaluation. Since June
2005 she has been evaluating UNDP programmes for the Bureau of Conflict
Prevention and Recovery and the Evaluation Office.
Smruti Patel is an independent consultant without any current association with
the agencies being evaluated. She has carried out reviews of field programmes,
organisational capacity and community-based action. She has managed field
programmes in Thailand, Chechnya, Afghanistan and India, working for both
international and national NGOs. Her main focus is on disaster-risk management. 
The main overall constraint of the evaluation was lack of time in the field. The
three-month timeframe for the study of four countries was short, and, because of
ill health within the team, plans had to be further curtailed. In particular, the time
for fieldwork in the Maldives and Thailand evaluations had to be reduced to 10
days for each, considerably shorter than originally planned. There were also a
number of contextual constraints such as the month of Ramadan. Otherwise, the
team received support and active participation from all categories of stakeholders.
They were generous with their time and expertise in a context of heavy workloads,
looming deadlines and evaluation-fatigue. The team gratefully acknowledges the
contribution of national and local government officers, bilateral and multilateral
donors, and especially the affected communities, and emphasizes that any
omissions and errors remain their responsibility.
Table 1.2 Numbers of claim-holders and areas of claim-holders surveyed
Country and districts Number of interviews Location level and details of interviewees 
Indonesia
Banda Aceh 246
Pidi 250
Aceh Jaya 257
Aceh Besar 247
Sri Lanka
Batticaloa 2635
Jaffna 50
Amparai 206
Trincomalee 194
Matara 142
Galle 126
Hambantota 174 
Total 2,1556
Sub-district and sub-village claim-holders of different categories
Sub-district and sub-village claim-holders of different categories,
including multiple-marginalised (including women, children, the
aged) and most vulnerable sub-groups 
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2
Chapter two
Impact of the disaster on
national capacities
This section examines capacities before the disaster and its immediate impact on
each of the four countries.
2.1 Capacities before the tsunami
disaster
2.1.1 Indonesia
The National Disaster Management Board (BAKORNAS) had an ad hoc disaster
management structure in place, with special boards at provincial and district
levels, but no contingency plans. The protracted conflict between the government
and the armed separation movement (GAM) in Aceh and prolonged periods of
martial law had reduced the capacity of provincial authorities. Combined with
restrictions on the media and civil society, this had undermined public confidence
in the government. But at the time of the tsunami, there were already moves
toward peace. The Aceh Social Reconstruction Agenda, a cross-sector initiative
between government and civil society, had just commenced, and most of the people
displaced by the conflict had returned home (leaving 1,800 of the 130,000 originally
in camps (Global IDP, 2005)). Aceh is one of Indonesia’s poorest provinces7, despite
the offshore oil and gas exploitation, with an economy based on rural subsistence
farming and fishing. Informal community groups related to mosques helped to
build local self-sufficiency. Nias Island in Sumatra is one of the least developed
areas of the country. It has suffered long-term neglect, compounded by
geographical isolation and economic and political marginalisation of the island and
its predominantly Christian inhabitants.
7 Aceh is fifth in terms of income poverty out of Indonesia’s 33 provinces, with 29.8 per cent of the
population living below the national poverty line in 2002 (Indonesia Bureau of Statistics, 2004).
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Due to the conflict and resulting inaccessibility, very few international agencies
were present immediately before the tsunami. Some had previously worked in
Aceh, withdrawing with the re-imposition of martial law in 2003. A limited number
of local NGOs existed but were focused mainly on advocacy and human rights.
Effective NGOs were likely to be targeted by both the security forces and GAM.
Women in the east and central parts of Aceh suffered greatly from the conflict. 
2.1.2 Maldives 
The Maldives is a country of 1,200 islands. Economic development over the last
decades has been based primarily on international tourism but this is not well
integrated into the local economy and brings little benefit to local communities.
There has been real progress in terms of human development indicators but, at
the same time, growing disparities between the dispersed island populations. The
combination of a relatively small, young population and a lack of tertiary
education has contributed to out-migration and a shortage of skilled local capacity.
Almost everything, from basic food items to skilled labour, is imported.
There is a strongly centralised form of governance. In the past three years there
have been political protests over human-rights abuses. In response, the
government has initiated a process of political reforms, including legalising
opposition parties, but public opinion remains sceptical. Women are not subject to
restrictions of public movement but, especially on the islands, face cultural
constraints in leadership and employment, low participation in decision-making
(there are fewer than 5 per cent women in parliament) and wide public
acceptance of gender-based violence.8 At the time of the disaster, there was only a
very limited number of national NGOs, partly because of legal difficulties. Until
recently NGOs were registered under the same legislation as opposition parties. 
Five UN agencies were working in the Maldives before the tsunami, with a total
programme budget of around $20 million per annum. Neither UN employees, nor
those of the national NGOs, had any experience of humanitarian response. There is
a network of NGOs and CBOs working together, not only in service delivery but on
community mobilisation and advocacy issues. Some of these organisations have
experience with marginalised groups, squatter settlements and land dispute issues.
2.1.3 Sri Lanka
Two decades of conflict in Sri Lanka have seriously challenged capacities of both
state and non-state actors in the east and north, while strengthening certain
capacities (e.g. psychosocial response, coping mechanisms to face humanitarian
crises). Violence has continued despite a ceasefire agreement in 2002, and
increased when a LTTE breakaway faction formed in the east. There are a high
number of female-headed households in conflict zones. International agencies
8 See ‘Gender Based Violence in the Maldives’ – study conducted by the Ministry of Gender, Family
Development and Social Security supported by UNFPA and WHO, Sept 2004.
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have been involved in conflict-related relief and development work in Sri Lanka
for many years. Coordination mechanisms existed within government, within the
UN, among NGOs and among these three major organisational sectors but there
was no national disaster management plan or structure in place before the
tsunami.
2.1.4 Thailand 
Thailand is a middle-income country with a strong central government. After
several natural disasters, notably floods, landslides and typhoons, the Thai
government established the Department for Disaster Prevention and Mitigation
(DDPM) in the Interior Ministry in 2002 and was developing a national emergency
plan with the help of the Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre. The introduction of
powerful ‘CEO governors’ in the provinces, with ambitious economic targets to
meet, weakened the capacity of district and traditional authorities.
The nascent conflict between the state and marginal Muslim communities in the
south presented potential for violence, although not in the six Thai Andaman coast
provinces affected by the tsunami. These are characterised by international
tourism, economic boom-towns and poor fishing communities. Large numbers of
economic migrants from the northeast, and unregistered Burmese workers, have
moved into the area to work in the construction and tourism industries. This has
increased the pressures on land and resulted in further marginalisation of
indigenous people (notably the ‘sea gypsies’) and Muslim fisherfolk. Despite
improvements in educational status, women lagged behind in wages, job
opportunities and political participation (in the 2001 national elections, only 10 per
cent of the candidates were women). Violence against women has continued to
rise. Religious leaders and school teachers play an important role in community
representation, but the local NGO sector is relatively undeveloped and is largely
limited to service delivery. 
2.2 Impact of the tsunami disaster 
Differences between the four countries are shown in Table 2.1 (page 24).
2.2.1 Indonesia 
Some 4 per cent of the population of Aceh province was killed in the tsunami. An
estimated 60 senior leaders of civil society (interview with the director of
Transparency International Indonesia), 5,200 staff from local authorities and 3,000
civil servants died and another 2,275 were reported missing (BAPENAS, 2005).
Despite the scale of the disaster and loss of government leadership, communities
coped effectively on their own in the first days after the disaster. Survivors sought
refuge at higher altitudes and lived on fruits and coconuts in Aceh Jaya, or were
taken in by family and neighbours in urban settings in Aceh Besar. Depending on
the proximity to the capital and the scale of the destruction, it took aid workers
between one day (for Banda Aceh) and ten days (for Krueng Sabee) to reach the
affected communities. The Indonesian Marines provided immediate response to
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
9 Compiled by John Cosgrave of the TEC Secretariat. For Indonesia, data include the earthquake of 28
March 2005, for which the figure of 626 dead is too low. For instance, Indonesia Relief News of 21
April 2005, places the death toll at 839 with many still unaccounted for. Sources for this table include
USAID (2005), ‘Indian Ocean Earthquake and Tsunamis: Fact Sheet #38’ (6 May); and BRR & World
Bank (2005) ‘Rebuilding a Better Aceh and Nias: Stocktaking of the Reconstruction Effort’ (October). 
10 226,560 total loss.
11 Official current Government figures are 12,500 displaced and 82 dead. The figure under displaced in
the table represents the immediate post-tsunami context.
12 1,768,423 total (India highest).
13 Average for entire country.
Table 2.1 Overview of tsunami damage in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand and the Maldives
Impact of tsunami9 Indonesia Sri Lanka Thailand Maldives
Population loss10 (% of national population) 166,364 (0.1%) 35,262 (0.2%) 8,240 Less 108 Less than 
than (0.1%) (0.1%)11
Displaced people12 (% of national population) 566,898 (0.3%) 519,063 (2.7%) —- 21,663 (7.3%)
Total cost of damage (US$ million) 4,451m 1,454m 2,198m 603m
(2% of GDP) (7.6% of GDP) (1.4% of GDP) (83.6% GDP) 
Private/public (%) 71.2/28.8 72.9/27.1 97.2/2.8 62.1/37.9 
Housing damage (% of total) 31.4% 28.3% 1.0% 15.6% 
Physical infrastructure (% of total) 14.3% 18.8% 1.2% 20.4% 
Social sectors (% of total) 6.2% 5.7% 0.4% 5.4% 
Productive sectors (% of total) 7.9% 25.0% 20.5% 21.1% 
Impact on worst-affected province 97.0% 90.0% 8.0% 84.0%13
(cost as % of GDP)
remote Aceh Jaya district, which was cut off by road, while Special Operations
and TNI (Indonesian Army) reached Banda Aceh by road. 
The December tsunami was relatively mild on Nias island (resulting in 122 dead,
18 missing, and 2,300 people displaced). But on 28 March 2005 an earthquake left
839 people dead and over 6,279 injured; it also caused widespread fear, with
10,000–20,000 people leaving the island. Some 70,000 people were directly
affected and the rest of the population was indirectly affected. The earthquake
damaged homes, schools and places of worship, as well as roads, piers, bridges,
health facilities and other government buildings, crippling the local infrastructure
and administration and further undermining already weak local capacities. 
2.2.2 Maldives 
In the Maldives, there were 83 deaths and 25 missing, believed dead. Over 21,000
people were displaced and the cost of damage from the tsunami is estimated to
be equivalent to 83.6 per cent of GDP. The remoteness and isolation of some of the
worst-affected areas made it difficult to bring in help from outside, but local
communities were quick to respond to the immediate needs of those displaced.
Communities backed by island and atoll authorities used boats to rescue people
from islands that were no longer habitable, housing them with host families or in
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
community buildings. Affected families on islands where there was partial damage
were similarly re-housed. Food was provided from local shops until external help
arrived three to five days after the disaster.
2.2.3 Sri Lanka 
The damage in Sri Lanka was not as intense as in Aceh, but the disaster caused a
wider impact on the regional administration and national economy. With over 2.7
per cent of the population displaced and the loss of 7.6 per cent of GDP, it faced
major challenges in providing the necessary assistance. Neighbouring
communities assisted in the rescue and relief operations on the first day, and
relief supplies and services started arriving from all parts of the country on the
following day. This immediate assistance cut across religious, ethnic/cultural and
political boundaries, and within affected-communities people helped each other in
a number of ways. This was unprecedented in the context of mutual distrust and
sectarianism that had arisen during two decades of civil war. 
2.2.4 Thailand 
In Thailand, the impact was highly localised but the deaths of over 3,330 foreign
tourists meant that the impact in Thailand was the most highly publicised in
Western countries. Most fatalities occurred in three places – Kaolak/Ban Nam
Khem, Ban Ne Rhai and in Krabi Bay (Koh Pipi). Buddhist monasteries were used
as morgues with search-and-rescue teams augmented by the many Thai
volunteers who provided personal support, money and supplies. The Thai Red
Cross immediately established four relief centres and used support from the Thai
Air Forces to transport supplies and personnel. Families whose houses had been
destroyed were evacuated to camps where emergency shelter, food and health
services were provided. 
2.3 National responses
In all four case-study countries, the tsunami response was carried out in the
context of strongly centralised systems of governance with elements of unrest and
violence among the population. In Aceh, before the disaster, the government had
stringently controlled the presence of international NGOs and UN agencies.
Similarly in Sri Lanka, the government kept tight control over the activities of
international NGOs. In Thailand, government control is also tight. There was no
history of conflict in the affected areas but the influx of Burmese refugees had
created the potential for violence. In the Maldives, tensions between IDPs and host
communities have caused some episodes of violence. 
Military forces played a significant role in the immediate response in all the
countries, especially in Indonesia. In the immediate aftermath of the tsunami, the
Sri Lankan Government re-introduced Emergency Regulations, which increased
the military role in the relief phase. The armed forces of 43 nations assisted in the
first phase of the relief operations. In the Maldives, national and international
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
armed forces provided assistance. The National Security Services distributed
relief through island authorities assisted by the Indian, Bangladeshi and Pakistani
Navies. The British Navy also helped with restoring electricity and
communications. The US Navy played a key role in the supply of drinking water to
the more remote islands (with ship-borne reverse-osmosis plants producing
potable water). In Thailand, the forces played key roles in the initial search-and￾rescue efforts and assisted in building both temporary shelters and permanent
houses for affected communities. In terms of government structures to address
the disaster, there was considerable variation.
2.3.1 Indonesia 
In Indonesia, the pre-tsunami National Disaster Management Coordinating Board
had not been set up to deal with a calamity on this scale and, in the event, was not
given the major responsibility. The National Development Planning Agency played
a lead role in drawing up a master-plan for reconstruction, but the greatest
responsibility was given to the newly created Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
Agency (BRR). At the provincial level, BRR coordinated responses and
reconstruction with direct authority from the president. There was some tension
between this body and other central ministries, as well as with the Acehnese
provincial and district administrative structures. 
Because of years of conflict, the Indonesian armed forces had formerly taken a
dominant role in Aceh. The local administration had become weak, corrupt and
out of touch with the Acehnese population. The tsunami disaster severely
damaged public infrastructure in Aceh and decimated the local administration, so
that the central government had to deploy significant numbers of civil servants
from elsewhere. In August 2005 the peace agreement between the government
and GAM created an opportunity to rebuild a responsible, responsive and
accountable local administration. But the degree of local autonomy remains a
sensitive issue. Indonesia’s overall decentralisation policy focusing on the
districts creates the apprehension that the provincial level is less empowered.
Some commentators believe that under the special provisions for Aceh only a
strong provincial administration can be an effective counter-balance to the
central government. In terms of the wider political dynamics, the fact that the
tsunami response and the set-up of BRR largely bypass the provincial level is
problematic in terms of such perceptions.
2.3.2 Maldives 
In the Maldives, disaster preparedness before the tsunami was focused on rising
seawaters as a result of global warming, with no preparation for sudden-onset and
sudden-impact disasters. Despite this lack of previous experience, the government
immediately established an ad hoc Ministerial Task Force that, in turn, set up a
National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC) to coordinate the immediate relief.
The NDMC worked well in the first few weeks with staff drafted in from other
ministries. International funding for recovery and reconstruction was channelled
through the newly established Tsunami Relief and Reconstruction Fund. 
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
2.3.3 Sri Lanka 
In Sri Lanka, the Task Force to Rebuild the Nation (TAFREN, now reconstituted as
RADA) was created in response to the disaster to take overall charge of
coordinating the response, and its mandate has now been extended. But long￾standing government departments retained the responsibility for specific
functions. The Survey Department, for example, remains in charge of drawing and
approving all site plans. Moreover, there are other new government agencies
responsible for specific aspects of the response, such as Transitional
Accommodation Progress (TAP) for transitional shelter. There has been a notable
centralisation of functions, but there is still no overarching policy framework
within which all the actors must operate. Sri Lanka’s long years of debate about
devolution have not translated into effective results. While the district secretaries
have the greatest operational responsibility in practice, several of them expressed
frustration at the high degree of centralisation and the confusing array of
statistics, policy directives and decisions coming from the central authorities.
This has resulted in a shifting and piecemeal approach, as in the case of the
Coastal Buffer Zone. Originally, the area of exclusion was 400m from the coast but
this later came down to 100m, and a number of exceptions have been allowed.
Uncertainties have led to doubts about the real influences on government:
people’s commissions and advocacy groups have asserted that the government
and private sector are using the tsunami response to promote a Western-style
modernisation agenda, replacing ad hoc and ‘illegal’ structures along the coast
with commercial constructions. 
2.3.4 Thailand 
The Civil Defence Act allowed senior government staff to be deployed to disaster
areas and ensured immediate release of the necessary budgets. It also
established the roles of different line ministries under the central coordination of
the Interior Ministry. The Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation and
Civil Defence Committee set up international and domestic call centres to handle
information both about the disaster and about donations. The Ad Hoc Tsunami
Disaster Task Force (under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs) initially coordinated
foreign assistance and then this passed to the Thai International Cooperation
Agency (TICA), also under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Thai government
through TICA requested international technical assistance in only three priority
areas-alternative livelihoods, donor coordination and disaster preparedness.
2.4 Conclusions
Conflict has been a major factor in both Indonesia and Sri Lanka but with some
differences. In Aceh, the government has asserted a strong presence and been
able to reduce the role of the military. In Sri Lanka there is still dual control. In
the north the government has retained a skeleton administration but real
authority lies with the LTTE. In the east the situation is more fluid, with the
government, LTTE and a breakaway group of the LTTE all vying for influence and
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
control. In Aceh the conflict was has not been an impediment in the tsunami
response. By contrast, in Sri Lanka, although a ceasefire has been in place since
February 2002, no formal agreement could be reached between the government
and the LTTE about assistance to people in the tsunami-affected areas controlled
by the LTTE. This has soured the atmosphere, and may have contributed to
increasing pressures on the ceasefire in late 2005.
No country is likely to be fully prepared for a sudden-onset disaster of the scale of
this tsunami, but the Thai legal and institutional systems seem to have provided
the firmest foundation. The legal and institutional mechanisms that existed in
Indonesia left gaps and ambiguities, and did not include any meaningful
contingency fund or strategy in relation to local capacities. Sri Lanka’s draft
Disaster Management Bill had been under discussion for years, and there was an
array of disaster-response structures at central level, all of which proved
inadequate in addressing the disaster. While TAFREN and BRR are both agencies
created in response to the disaster, there are significant differences. BRR has a
clear geographical focus on a limited part of the Indonesian territory. The
proportion of national territory under TAFREN’s authority was much larger. This
led to different relationships between public-sector institutions in the two
countries.
All four countries have centralised modes of governance and there are tensions
both between different central institutions, and among the lower levels. In the
Maldives, the Atoll and Island administrations were all appointed by the central
authorities and therefore strongly loyal to the powers in the capital. They did not
appear as important players providing leadership in their own right. In Indonesia,
district authorities that had played a key role in the relief stage were later
sidelined by provincial and national authorities during the recovery phase. This
may change again with the rising role of BRR.
In general, there has been a tendency for international agencies to strengthen
centralist tendencies. In most cases their main concern was to secure an
agreement with the national authorities. They were less likely to make formal, or
even informal, arrangements at the local level, and therefore might not have been
able to recognise or respond to the subtle interplay of power that surrounded the
relief operation. 
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3
Chapter three
Impact of the disaster at
community level
3.1 Community perceptions of the
response
Inevitably the brunt of the disaster fell on local communities and they played the
major role in the initial response. Although it is widely observed that this was the
case and that many heroic deeds took place, much of the history has already been
lost – at least to the outside world. Such histories will have immense value in
helping local people to come to terms with their losses but they present problems
to the researcher because it is hard to generalise even from hundreds of separate
experiences. This analysis begins, therefore, a little after the disaster when outside
relief began to reach communities. In general, the level of satisfaction with this
assistance seems to have been highest at the start and then reduced over time, as
indicated by the survey in Sri Lanka (Figure 3.1). The survey was designed to elicit
both qualitative and quantitative feedback from a random sample of over 2,000 of
the affected population in the worst-affected areas in Sri Lanka and Indonesia.
Although the overall rating is fairly positive, the more detailed questions indicate
considerable dissatisfaction with the recognition and support given to local capacities.
The Sri Lanka survey indicates that only about 20 per cent of claim-holders were
satisfied with the way in which their skills were used in the response, while nearly
half found this engagement somewhat unsatisfactory or worse (Figure 3.2).
The use of cash as an alternative to more conventional forms of assistance was
particularly appreciated. This allowed people to use their skills and abilities in
their own way, and so bypassed the need for detailed assessment and discussion.
In the Aceh survey, Question 28 asks whether, in the first three months, cash
transfers would have been preferable to the supply of food and other relief items.
An overwhelming 90 per cent felt that cash in lieu of food and other relief items
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
would be better. Among Sri Lankan respondents, the clear majority (53 per cent)
preferred cash to goods, which was supported by another 12 per cent who felt that
cash would enable them to buy what they wanted.
3.2 Relationships between agencies
and communities
This lack of recognition for local skills and abilities arises from poor levels of
communication and consultation. The Aceh claim-holder survey indicates the
scale of this problem. Of the 1,000 respondents from four districts, 57 per cent
stated that they had never been consulted at all about their needs. Only 20 per
cent acknowledged that they had been asked, and since the survey was conducted
10 months after the tsunami, this is a matter of concern. In Sri Lanka 32 per cent
of 1,055 claimholders surveyed said they had never been consulted.
All four of the country studies include reports of affected people having little
information about the plans made for their recovery and resettlement. They were
Figure 3.1 Gendered assessment of the tsunami response, for different phases and overall
BSQ1: How well were your needs provided in the first week
after the tsunami?
BSQ2: How well were your needs provided in the first three
months after the tsunami?
BSQ3: How well were your needs provided in the next five
months after that?
BSQ16: In general, how do you rate the international
assistance to the tsunami?
Male
% 60
50
40
30
20
10
0
BSQ1 BSQ2 BSQ3 BSQ16
Female
Good
Somewhat satisfied
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
Somewhat dissatisfied
Bad
 Male Female Male Female Male Female
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
treated as passive recipients rather than active participants in the aid process.
This devaluing of local capacity and consequent lack of participation in planning
for recovery created a sense of distrust. IDPs in Laamu Atoll in the Maldives
refused to move into temporary housing because they were afraid that if they did
the government would not provide them with permanent housing. In some cases,
lack of adequate exchange of information led to decisions that were directly
damaging. In the Galle district of Sri Lanka, 150 people from poor fishing
communities were resettled 15km inland, without proper consultation, to a
transitional camp in a Walahanduwa tea plantation. There were no public
transportation facilities, schools or local employment opportunities. These
villagers now face difficulties in qualifying for permanent housing projects.
The low scores for consultation in the surveys may reflect a difference in
perception between what local communities regard as ‘consultation’ and its
meaning to international agencies. The agencies tend to underestimate the
complexity of local communities and the challenge of consultation. Communities
may be divided into many different groups, with differing needs, opinions and
modes of representation. A variety of forms of community association in north
Sumatra, for example, centre on the mosque. These include the avisan, mothers’
groups with special responsibilities for vulnerable people and funeral
arrangements, generating funds through a simple lottery system, the yasinan or
prayer recital groups and the magliyan masdi or youth groups. There is also a
historical tradition of community self-help, called gotong royong. 
In the affected areas of south Thailand, teachers and their schools, mosques and
Buddhist monasteries function as informal centres for meetings. In several
communities there are also savings and credit groups. On several islands in the
Maldives there are women’s development committees or parent–teacher
associations, as well as task-oriented community efforts that had persisted or
Bad – 23%
Somewhat 
satisfied – 13%
Somewhat 
dissatisfied – 25%
Neither satisfied nor 
dissatisfied – 24%
Good – 7%
No response – 8%
Figure 3.2: How well did the tsunami response use your skills and abilities?
(Sri Lanka claim-holder survey)
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
grown into modest community-based organisations with names and structures
(such as Tamiyyathul Saif and its offshoot, Youth Star on Ungufaroo Island).
Immediately after the tsunami, all this complex web of civil society was mobilised
in the local response, but was not properly recognised by the international
agencies. 
These circles of ‘capacities’ can be mobilised and built upon, and also include
informal leaders. But if community groups are ignored then their capacity and
potential may be undermined. Poor understanding about modes of representation
can easily lead to capture of aid by ‘elites’ – people who are not necessarily rich
by absolute standards but wealthy in relation to other local people. Elites are
likely to be those who have the greatest assets. It is tempting to limit aid to a
replacement of assets, and this process reinforces old power structures. Poorer
people may become more marginalised and more vulnerable in relation to future
disasters. 
Agencies often find themselves dealing with the formal leaders appointed by
government. But there are likely to be other informal leaders who come to the
fore at times of crisis, and new types of organisations begin to appear. Examples
are the ‘camp committees’ and ‘tsunami committees’ in Sri Lanka, or the ‘IDP
committees’ and ‘shelter recovery committees’ in the Maldives. In the Maldives,
island development and women’s development committees that existed before
the tsunami took on new roles and demonstrated new skills and capacities.
The reaction within the community to traditional leaders and new forms of
organisation may not always be positive. In the Maldives for example, there were
cases of strong opposition and rejection of island chiefs who are nominated by the
central government. They were perceived to be discriminatory or corrupt. The
survey in Sri Lanka also suggests considerable dissatisfaction with ‘community
leaders’. Reasons for this include unfair and unequal distributions, providing
wrong information and not paying heed to differing opinions. In Indonesia, some
village leaders acknowledged that they felt overwhelmed by the multitude of new
challenges, disputes and decisions to be made.
Especially where donor organisations are under pressure to spend funds rapidly,
they may be unable to address the complexity of such processes within the
community. And yet their aid can often have a significant effect on power
structures and can bring about long-term change for better or worse. In the worst
case, their actions could make communities more vulnerable to disasters in the
future. Accordingly, agencies need to take time in order to understand more of the
power structures and dynamics within communities, how these have been
sustained in the past and how a crisis can open opportunities for change. 
3.3 Social inequality and exclusion
The claim-holder survey in Aceh indicates that while 75 per cent of the
respondents considered assistance to have been fairly distributed, a significant
proportion (21 per cent) alleged that it was unfair. Nearly a third of those who felt it
was unfair alleged favouritism on the part of those responsible for the delivery of
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
goods. Among respondents in Sri Lanka, 35 per cent held that assistance was
provided fairly, while 32 per cent disagreed. While this would seem to indicate an
equal balance between these two views, most of the other main responses (totalling
nearly 25 per cent) indicated the perception that the delivery of goods and services
reflected favouritism and unfairness. Women-headed and poorer households were
most at a disadvantage while those who were more articulate received greater
benefits. This phenomenon may partly explain the gradual loss of confidence in the
tsunami response. Aid was provided to marginal groups during the relief phase.
Then however, being less informed and organised about their rights and less able
to access common services, these groups tended to be overlooked in the recovery
and reconstruction phases. Their special needs and constraints required a more
proactive and strategic response in order to correct this tendency.
3.4 Impact on women
The claim-holder survey in Sri Lanka (see Annex 7) indicates that women were
less satisfied with the tsunami response in all phases than were their male
counterparts. There are indications that one of the reasons for this may be
women’s greater concerns about protection. International agencies did less
than they should to protect women, especially in camps. For example, a group
of war widows in Pasie Lou village, on the East coast of Aceh, left the temporary
shelter of barracks to return home to their village to avoid violence in the
camps even though this meant that they would no longer receive any official
assistance. 
There are some notable exceptions. Gender-based violence in the Maldives had
once been considered a strictly private matter, and was only beginning to come to
wider public notice before the tsunami. Discussion of issues around gender and
child abuse under post-crisis stress situations has allowed an official recognition
of the problem, with the Ministry of Gender and Social Services taking the lead.
The country’s President spoke about the problem in his speech on International
Women’s Day. Further examples of good practice include UNIFEM’s work in Aceh
fostering women’s leadership, posting gender advisers in BRR, and forming a
working group, in collaboration with UNFPA, to monitor Shari’a law and develop a
code on violence against women.
Governments have not always recognised or advanced the property rights of
women. CBOs with a focus on women criticised inflexibility in relocation, housing
and livelihood strategies. The following are some examples.
•Widows could not opt to rebuild their houses near relatives under the ‘house
for a house’ policy, which provided for rebuilding on the prior location of the
house or in a designated location.
•Women remained at a disadvantage in accessing livelihood and other recovery
programmes.
• In the Maldives, women with small businesses often had no official registration
and because they could not prove that they had lost their livelihoods, they did
not qualify for assistance.
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•Women on a cash-for-work project in the Maldives were initially told to stop
work because they were said to be slower than men. (The INGO responsible
intervened in this case, and women were employed on other activities.)
•Many of the livelihood projects offered to women, such as mat-weaving and
snack-making, were criticised by female claim-holders as too small to provide
a living.
International agencies recognised many of these problems but the pressure to
spend was so great that much money went to easily dispensed items such as
fishing boats for men without corrective action to support women’s status. 
3.5 Conclusions
The claim-holder survey in Sri Lanka indicates that affected communities were
critical of their local leaders for failing to ensure equity and inclusion. This
suggests that international actors need to employ sophisticated forms of analysis
and consultation if they are to avoid mistakes that may lead to the marginalisation
of poorer people. They will need sensitive strategies even to maintain the status
quo, let alone to increase the level of social equality. Agencies that had a
sustained prior partnership at the community and sub-community level, or who
had clear partnership strategies, were likely to be at an advantage but the scale of
the disaster meant that even in such cases the agencies had to stretch themselves
into sectors and areas in which they had limited understanding. The danger was
to overlook the reality of ‘horizontal inequality’ and simply focus on vertical
processes of delivering aid. 
Considered collectively, the international tsunami response lost an opportunity to
link its humanitarian intervention with longer term structural development
concerns. Whether achieving this link is actually a valid objective remains a
matter of debate, at least in some quarters. Some argue that humanitarian aid is
purely about ‘saving lives’ and any wider consequences are not their
responsibility. This evaluation suggests that a ‘humanitarian’ response cannot be
separated from political and social considerations because it affects the ability to
deal with future disasters. Success is often measured in terms of numbers of
assets distributed and scale of funds disbursed. But this may not be conducive to
long-term recovery and mitigation of future disasters. Such a narrow
‘humanitarian’ approach will create dependency on international aid and weaken
the capacity to respond to disasters that do not hit the headlines.
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Chapter four
35
The interaction between
international agencies and
local civil society
4.1 Practices and constraints of the
international agencies
Many of the problems that emerged in the international response can be attributed
to lack of understanding on the part of staff in international agencies, especially
those not present in country before the disaster. The rapid arrival and departure of
many agencies made it difficult to engage closely with communities and delayed the
beginning of capacity strengthening. An estimated 300 international NGOs arrived
in Aceh in the first two months to assist in the tsunami relief effort. Dozens left
after a few months, considering that they had completed their work or lacking the
institutional resources to match the scale of the recovery operation. As of October
2005, 178 registered international NGOs remain in the country. Even in the case of
established agencies, the arrival of many new recruits, unfamiliar with the complex
and dynamic local contexts, made it difficult to abide by humanitarian principles.
The ad hoc hiring of international staff on short-term contracts is not only
expensive but also reduced the appropriateness of the response. 
Moreover, local agencies were sometimes undermined by the ‘poaching’ of their
staff by international agencies. This competitive practice, which may be defined as
making a direct offer to someone already in other employment regardless of the
consequences, occurred widely in the early stages of the response. Where agencies
started strengthening local capacity, this was often much later, after the damage
had been done. This was by no means always the case. Some international
agencies, notably in the Maldives, were successful in seconding international staff
to support public-sector institutions at an early stage. 
Agencies familiar with the country and with established local staff are likely to be
at an advantage. The engagement of international actors with local capacities was
most effective and efficient when it was built on sustained partnerships with local
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
actors that existed before the disaster. Agencies in such partnerships are able to
calibrate their understanding of the limits of international capacity, tailor their
response to take account of national realities, and better appreciate the extent and
nature of local capacity at the grassroots level. By the time of the evaluation, these
issues were widely recognised and some international NGOs had launched new
approaches to civil society. In Aceh, Oxfam’s NGO support network is a
noteworthy example. But there was an unsatisfactory period coinciding with the
shift from relief to recovery when local capacity was not given proper recognition;
this indicates a weak point in international humanitarian responses.
4.2 Problems of scaling up
international assistance
Human resource policy had an important impact on the effectiveness of the
response. The problem was not simply that agencies did not understand the need
for sustainable ways of working and longer term contracts for staff, but that their
systems did not allow for it. Short-term contracts persisted long into the recovery
phase under various rules for ‘disaster’ operations. In some cases the slow pace
of recruitment of long-term staff reflected poor preparation and strategic planning.
Pressure for quick results not only led to recruitment of inexperienced staff but
also put such pressure on the most experienced so that they too were drawn into
the result-oriented mode. All this reflected underlying problems of strategy. 
The unprecedented flow of resources into the international humanitarian sector
proved to be both a blessing and a challenge. There were few problems of funding
shortage but agencies, under pressure to spend, often worked outside their core
competencies. Lack of prior technical expertise and contextual experience was
very strongly felt in the housing sector. This has evoked the most complaints from
both claim-holders and stakeholders.
If pressure for quick results exceeds the ability of local organisations to scale up,
agencies become more operational, employing large numbers of staff from outside.
This was very much in evidence in the tsunami response. It created some
resentment among local NGOs and has been the subject of criticism by
governments, especially in Sri Lanka. According to the former Director General,
Ministry of Relief, Rehabilitation and Reconstruction, positions filled by foreign
personnel in the first phase included media and public relations officers,
documentation specialists and information technology personnel, many of which
could have been filled by qualified Sri Lankans. Agencies argue that it is essential
to have staff members who understand their own systems rather than the context.
But this raises the question of whether or not there has been enough preparation
to ensure that systems can be easily transferred to local staff, and responsibilities
delegated to local organisations. 
The overwhelming problem is that unprecedented resource flows led to a situation
where the key measurement for both donors and their partners became the ability
to spend money quickly. This issue began to affect the response even during the
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
relief phase. In the recovery phase it resulted in excessive focus on physical
targets and capital-intensive projects instead of on longer term capacity
development.
4.3 Partnerships with civil society
There are examples of successful partnerships between international agencies
and local civil society. In the Maldives for example, the Care Society in association
with an international agency formed a partnership with 25 island CBOs to
implement a joint tsunami-response programme. This added to the momentum
that led to the nation’s first Civil Society Conference and concluded with the
drafting of a Civil Society Charter for the first time in the country’s history. The
international agency providing support to this process was not present in the
Maldives before the disaster, but was able to develop a mature relationship
quickly because it had clear notions and policies about such partnerships, and a
strong commitment to capacity strengthening.
But such supportive action was much less widespread than it should have been. In
Indonesia, despite the devastation in Aceh, local CBO networks had helped to
sustain affected communities through a difficult civil conflict over the past decades
but were marginalised in the tsunami response. The need for careful, supportive
relationships with such CBOs was overlooked until at least the latter part of 2005.
This was a lost opportunity in terms of longer term recovery and future disaster
mitigation. It also had more immediate effects. Local organisations are particularly
good at identifying and reaching remote areas and marginalised groups. For
example, the NGOs Holi’a’na and LPAM in Indonesia were able to reach and work in
isolated earthquake-struck communities on the island of Nias such as Luaha Muzoi
when international NGOs were not. External support for capacity strengthening with
such organisations at an early stage might have enabled them to do much more. 
Even where international agencies gave grants to local organisations, local actors
have commonly criticised international agencies for rigid and over-demanding
procedures. In Aceh, NGOs criticised the limited grant size per project approval, the
short timeframe (maximum of three months) and the tedious monitoring processes
including monthly reporting. The local organisation was simply used to deliver a
service that had been decided upon by a donor organisation. This relationship was
often seen as ‘sub-contracting’ rather than genuine partnership. The relationship is
inevitably difficult because international actors, with limited local understanding,
control the resources while local actors may know much more but are dependent on
aid. Downward accountability and proactive use of information by the international
agency are necessary in order to establish trust and lead to deeper dialogue.
It may be said that there are double standards in the contrast between the
conditions imposed on local actors by international agencies and those that the
same agencies adopt to govern their own programmes. For example, there is often
a difference between the level of administrative overhead allowed to local actors
and the overheads of international agencies. As a rule, local actors are required to
be accountable at the district and sub-district levels, whereas international
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
agencies and national NGOs are not. Moreover, there are hardly any avenues
available to local actors for dialogue about these issues. There are very few
independent bodies to monitor and influence the process. Examples are
Transparency International and a local Anti-Corruption movement in Indonesia,
while in Sri Lanka, Aid Watch and two Citizens’ Commissions have just begun to
work. In Thailand, the mass media have highlighted some of these issues, while so
far there is no comparable initiative in the Maldives. 
4.4 Impact of conflict
The civil conflict in Sri Lanka and Indonesia made effective engagement with local
communities in the conflict zones more difficult. In Indonesia, there was less overlap
between conflict-affected and tsunami-affected populations than in Sri Lanka, where
conflict hampered independent decision making at all levels in the many districts
affected by both conflict and tsunami. In some areas, direct contact with claim￾holders could only take place through the LTTE. The Sri Lanka claim-holder survey
indicates that residents of the conflict areas, particularly ethnic minorities, were not
empowered to voice their dissatisfaction of the tsunami response and had no
significant recourse to redress when an injustice had taken place.
4.5 Conclusions
At the local level, pre-tsunami baseline capacities in the four countries varied
considerably. While there were notable exceptions and some instances of best
practice among international actors, in general there has been inadequate
recognition of the extensive and diverse local and national capacities that exist at
institutional and individual levels. The international response has not facilitated
local or national capacities in a systematic and sustainable manner. This has
made it harder to link humanitarian intervention with longer term structural
concerns, and in some cases has unintentionally exacerbated inequalities and
tensions. Even in the areas where both conflict and the tsunami seriously
debilitated local capacity, as in Aceh and war-affected areas of Sri Lanka, more
could have been made of this capacity by systematic mapping at an earlier stage
and a stronger focus on capacity strengthening.
International agencies have remained much longer than necessary in ‘emergency
response’ mode. It has taken until the recovery phase for most actors to re￾evaluate their practices and to begin to incorporate more consultative processes.
The underlying problem seems to be that international agencies were not clear
about making partnerships with local CBOs and NGOs from the outset. They saw
service delivery as the objective, and such partnerships were simply a means to
that end. This led to problems when it was necessary to change gear from relief
work to more developmental approaches in the recovery phase. By that stage,
local organisations had already been weakened, either by being starved of support
or pushed into a ‘sub-contracting’ mode. The loss of staff from these organisations
was a particularly severe problem. 
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Chapter five
39
Conclusions
5.1 The sequencing of capacities
In the classic view of disasters the immediate need is to deliver services; in the
medium-term the issue is to restore capacities at least to the pre-disaster level; the
longer term aim is to reduce risk and vulnerability by increasing capacity. Different
capacities will be called upon at different times. Table 5.1 lists just a few of the
many capacities and the sequence in which they might be needed.
Table 5.1 Capacities in different phases of disaster response
Phase Examples of relevant capacities
Rescue and relief Search and rescue, determination of death, burial of bodies
Damage and loss assessment, distinguishing between needs
Restoring basic access
Immediate relief materials
Providing information to affected people about search and rescue
National coordination 
Recovery Restoring infrastructure and services
Conducting participatory assessments
Delivering support for livelihoods, transitional shelter, etc.
Providing information to affected people on the recovery process
Formulating recovery policy 
Developing policies to address the interface between conflict and
disaster
Communities to take collective and equitable decisions
Ability to influence and hold accountable
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
While using local capacity is one thing, building local capacity so that it becomes
more and more effective through the different phases is something very different.
International agencies tended to exploit what capacity they could find in the relief
stage and then were surprised to find that this local capacity did not conveniently
transform itself into a suitable tool for recovery and reconstruction. Instead, local
capacity was undermined, issues of inequality and marginalisation became more
intractable and distrust developed. Agencies found themselves supporting elites
and unable to address the problems of marginalised groups.
A society that handles its own issues of inequality and marginalisation is likely to
be able to cope better with future disasters. It will ensure that vulnerable and
isolated groups are not forgotten or ignored. This means that building capacity
must include an element of social equality and responsibility. In many of the
country studies within this evaluation, there were serious problems of social
division and even conflict. 
Strengthening capacities is not simply about supporting institutional structures
but a more complex political process that involves the empowerment of poorer
and more excluded people so that when disaster strikes they have a valid claim on
their community, local officials and national government. From this perspective the tsunami response must be assessed not only in terms of
delivery of goods and services but also in terms of whether it enabled and
empowered local capacities, especially among the most marginalised groups, to
flourish. Too often the social effects of aid are unknown to the agencies that
caused them. The importance of a focus on capacity strengthening is that it
represents a more sustainable approach to disasters. 
A rather different approach to these issues begins with rights. This acknowledges
more explicitly that the vulnerabilities of certain individuals and groups may be
created and unfairly sustained by other actors in their local and/or national
environment. In this argument the responsibility for disaster response rests with
the state; the international panoply of direct disaster response undermines this
political responsibility. Capacity strengthening goes beyond issues of community
development to wider questions about the state and political representation. It leads
to social organisation and advocacy. Most international actors are uncomfortable
with this, although some have explored the ‘rights-based approach to disasters’. For
some the problem is workability; for others it is the question of legitimacy to
intervene in any way other than offering ‘apolitical’ humanitarian relief. For others
still, the problem lies in the weakness of many states and the important role of the
local community. But the thrust of all these arguments is that the process of relief is
not politically neutral. It has profound effects on issues such as inequality,
marginalisation, social organisation, and political rights. The international
humanitarian system is directed toward disasters that have overwhelmed local and
national capacities to cope. This involves provision of immediate relief, but it also
implies a responsibility to support the development of local and national
management capacity so that it will be better able to deal with future disasters.
The tsunami occurred mainly in an area of the world that is not characterised by
weak and fragile states, as in much of Africa. Political representation and
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
democracy are day-to-day issues in the lives of the people. Unfortunately,
humanitarian policy takes a limited view not only in relation to local capacities but
also in relation to national capacities, including the rights-based approaches and
political aspirations that help to develop accountable government. The fact that
both India and Thailand practically refused international assistance, and coped
rather well, is enough in itself to suggest that there is some re-thinking to do
about humanitarian aid. 
5.2 Principles and practice in the
humanitarian system
This evaluation highlights the disparity between the stated policies of
international humanitarian actors and the operational realities. The principles are
lofty, as in the case of participation (Box 5.1), but the practice is often very
different. When the aid system is under pressure in crisis situations, the
imperative to deliver services is given the highest priority. The tsunami response
is perhaps an extreme example of this overall trend.
To some extent this results from strong pressures for ‘results’ coming from the
HQs of international agencies. But it also reflects a more general tendency to
underestimate local capacity and give excessive importance to the delivery of
external assistance as if there were no local response at all. This is a myth that
re-confirms itself. By ignoring local capacity, the role of external aid seems all the
more important. New aid workers arrive on the scene assuming that there is no
local capacity to work with. The more external aid there is, the more local
capacity is undermined. The hitch is that, having started off in such a way,
relationships and strategies fail to develop during the recovery phase and long￾term disaster mitigation becomes impossible. The response stalls at around the
six-month mark, as it did in the case of the tsunami disaster. 
For more than 20 years, aid agencies have been seeking to refine and develop the
basic concepts of humanitarian response. Norms and standards, such as the Red
Cross Code and Sphere Common Standards, recognise the need to enhance local
capacity in humanitarian responses. There is considerable convergence in all
these documents about the basic principles. This is summarised as principle 8 in
The Principles and Good Practice of Humanitarian Donorship (2003), which urges
donors to:
Strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent,
prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that
governments and local communities are better able to meet their responsibilities and
co-ordinate effectively with humanitarian partners.
The key to all this projected involvement, support and capacity strengthening is
the relationship with local communities. Here too, there is a strong convergence of
views (Box 5.1). What seems to be lacking is the sense that this is more than a
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Box 5.1 Participation in international standards
IFRC (1994) The Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief – Article 7
“Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of relief aid.
Disaster response assistance should never be imposed upon the beneficiaries. Effective
relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved where the intended beneficiaries are
involved in the design, management and implementation of the assistance programme. We
will strive to achieve full community participation in our relief and rehabilitation
programmes.”
There are many good reasons to involve programme beneficiaries in the management
of aid, including the acknowledgement of respect and dignity of people, legitimating of
aid efforts, enhancing the efficiency of aid, and improving its knowledge base,
sustainability and learning capacity. 
The Sphere Project (2000): Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards
in Disaster Response: Common Standard 1: Participation (p28)
“The disaster-affected population actively participates in the assessment, design,
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the assistance programme. 
Key indicators: 
•Women and men of all ages from the disaster-affected and wider local populations,
including vulnerable groups, receive information about the assistance programme,
and are given the opportunity to comment to the assistance agency during all
stages of the project cycle
• Written assistance programme objectives and plans should reflect the needs,
concerns and values of disaster-affected people, particularly those belonging to
vulnerable groups and contribute to their protection
• Programming is designed to maximise the use of local skills and capacities.”
UN Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (1998)
Participation of IDPs:
“The authorities concerned shall endeavour to involve those affected, particularly
women, in the planning and management of the relocation” (Principle 7 (3) (d)). In the
distribution of humanitarian assistance, “Special efforts should be made to ensure the
full participation of women in the planning and distribution of these supplies” (Principle
18 (3)). “Special efforts should be made to ensure the full participation of IDPs in the
planning and management of their return or resettlement and reintegration” (Principle
28 (2)).
matter of politeness. Consultation does not need to occur because it would be
rude to do otherwise, but because it is essential for success – provided that
success is defined as long-term reduction in vulnerability. If success is defined in
terms of gratitude for aid received and the likelihood that more will be needed in
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
the next disaster, then consultation as a matter of politeness will be enough. The
question is whether the aim is to preserve the credibility of the humanitarian
system or to abolish vulnerability.14 And this question revolves around the issue of
capacity.
5.3 Conclusions on the tsunami
response
To a significant extent, local ownership of the tsunami response was undermined
by the actions of international agencies. In some cases, recognition and
engagement with local capacity was totally lacking, particularly where capacities
were not visible in the form recognised by international agencies. In other cases,
local capacities were rendered even more vulnerable by the response. CBOs and
NGOs became contracted organisations, corruption spread and inappropriate
forms of leadership were able to flourish. 
This failure to engage appropriately with local capacities compromised the
effectiveness and efficiency of the response in the long term. Success in the relief
phase cannot be determined solely in terms of delivery of necessary relief items
and services. The period of saving lives was practically over by the time the
international agencies arrived. So there was little justification for the focus on
delivery rather than capacity strengthening. And the fact that saving lives
depended almost entirely on local communities is a strong argument in favour of
long-term vulnerability reduction through capacity strengthening. 
In general, there has been a tendency for international agencies to strengthen
centralism, unless they took deliberate action otherwise. In most cases, the
agencies’ main concern was an agreement with the national authorities – and
without similar formal arrangements at local level, they might not recognise or
respond to the subtle interplay of power that surrounded the relief operation.
The international community has raised awareness about the rights and
entitlements of IDPs, at least in the Maldives, and has provided some
international guidance in that regard, although with uneven success. National
institutions for disaster preparedness were strengthened by the activities of
international agencies, and particularly the UN, in Sri Lanka, the Maldives and
Thailand. But the focus of activities in this area to date has tended to be at
national level, with less attention to provincial and district levels, and only in
limited ways at community level. Some of these changes may prove to be purely
bureaucratic, without support or buy-in from local communities, and therefore
unsustainable in the longer term.
14 A number of useful tools exist to support this process, notably Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment
and the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework.
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
5.4 Lessons from the tsunami
response
Some agencies were beginning to rectify the lack of attention to capacity
strengthening by the time of the evaluation. Capacity strengthening, with its
necessary processes of participation and consultation, is clearly recognised in
international humanitarian standards. But the way in which the humanitarian
sector is funded, by sudden inputs following public appeals, does not facilitate this
process in practice. Instead it encourages an emphasis on rapid service delivery, exaggeration of the agencies’ own importance and understatement of the role of
local people. It focuses on the short term rather than the long term, even though in
reality recovery will be a five- to ten-year process.
Although international aid inevitably involves some level of participation and
consultation simply as means to the goal of service delivery, capacity strengthening
of communities through information, transparency and accountability are lacking.
A fundamental re-orientation of the humanitarian sector is required to recognise
that the ownership of humanitarian assistance rests with the claim-holders – i.e.
that local capacities are the starting point, that long-term sustainable risk
reduction is the aim, and that the role of other players is to support. Only when
vulnerable people take control of their environment will they escape from
vulnerability. Otherwise they will simply be dependent on fickle Western public
responses and the reliability or otherwise of international aid.
There is a need to rethink the end goal of humanitarian assistance
and move from a service delivery approach to a capacity empowering
framework, or in other words to shift the emphasis from only
delivery to support and facilitation.
This is not an easy task. Communities as well as NGOs are subject to elite
capture and corruption. Intense pressures apply in favour of short-term results
that symbolise the orthodox view of the aid giver. But unless the attempt is made,
communities will never be secure against the threat of future disasters. Aid and
dependency will be perpetuated. Within the humanitarian system, the tsunami disaster demonstrates the problem of
the ‘mega-response’ from the Western public. The unprecedented level of global
public donations made the international NGO sector the key player in the
international tsunami response, both in absolute terms of size of country budgets
and in relative terms compared with the UN and bilateral agencies. With this new
role should have come a responsibility to strengthen partnerships with national and
local authorities and to join with others in creating new formal mechanisms for
collaboration and accountability. Information could have been handled far more
strategically, so that affected people were able to assert their needs and speak on
equal terms with aid givers. But INGOs were slow in adapting to this new reality,
and remained in competitive and target-driven mode until quite late in the response.
Considered collectively, the response was a lost opportunity. It could have linked
humanitarian intervention with longer term structural development concerns.
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
Some would argue that this is not a valid objective. The ‘humanitarian imperative’
is simply to deliver aid as fast as possible on the basis that immediate need
comes first. But where the potential clearly exists to address not only one disaster
but the whole phenomenon of disasters, it seems appropriate to say that
immediate needs may come first, but the list is a long one. This evaluation
indicates that, at least in the countries studied, the humanitarian response cannot
be separated from wider social and political considerations. Success cannot be
measured in numbers of assets distributed and scale of funds disbursed. High
numbers may imply distortions in local social structures and economies. These
will not be conducive to long-term recovery and mitigation of future disasters.
Under such a purely ‘humanitarian’ approach, structural discrimination and
dependency on international aid are likely to continue.
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6
Chapter six
Recommendations
6.1 Key messages
The evaluation team identified three key areas for the attention of international
actors. They all relate to existing international standards but on the basis of this
evaluation appear to be the areas in which the response has been weak.
• Engagement with local and national capacities. This includes the
ability to recognise and identify local capacities and the need to include local
communities in planning and decision-making through participation and
consultation, and commitment to devolve decision-making as far as possible. 
• Attention to social inequalities, exclusion and hierarchies. Capacity
should be defined in relation to not only skills and training, but also the
empowerment of poorer and marginalised groups. The capacity of a community
to resist disaster is particularly sensitive to this. It includes not simply
identification of such groups but ensuring that particularly their voices are
heard in decision-making.
• Contribution to an enabling environment and context. Marginalised
groups should improve their position in relation to communities, and
communities in relation to district and national authorities. The basis for this
process is empowerment through the strategic management of information, and
strengthening downward accountability. Advocacy is also an important element
but should be based on enhanced local capacities rather than external
interventions. 
6.2 Recommendations
For recommendations on specific countries please refer to the individual report
summaries presented in the Annexes. The key messages above translate into the
following general recommendations to international agencies.
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6.2.1 Overarching recommendation
Sector-wide discussions at the global level should be initiated to address the need
for a fundamental re-orientation of the humanitarian sector based on the principle
that the ownership of humanitarian assistance should rest with claim-holders.
This implies a shift of emphasis from delivery to support and facilitation. Such
discussions are expected to facilitate the implementation of the following
recommendations.
6.2.2 Recommendation 1: Engagement with local and
national capacities 
• International agencies should prepare in advance for the problems of scaling
up not simply by identifying resources but also by making their systems and
practices suitable for maximum participation by local people.
• They should also make plans to shift into more collective ways of working
during ‘mega-disasters’ in order to ensure that they do not extend beyond their
competence but instead link with others and share roles.
• They should have clear partnership strategies and develop local partnerships
from the start in order to avoid glitches during the transition to recovery.
•They should institute procedures for making grants for longer time periods
even from the outset of an intervention, and should critically examine reporting
requirements.
• Specific agreements and protocols should be made to limit ‘poaching’ of staff
particularly to ensure that local capacity is not undermined.
6.2.3 Recommendation 2: Attention to social
inequalities, exclusion and hierarchies
• Planning should be based on the assumption that aid is likely to reinforce
inequalities within the community unless corrective action is taken.
• Planning should also take account of the complexity of community structures
and the need, therefore, for knowledgeable local intermediaries with power to
influence decisions.
• Inclusion of the most marginalised should be treated as a fundamental
principle or right, regardless of costs.
• Aid should be given according to need rather than limited to a particular
disaster – in the case of the tsunami response, people affected by conflict
should be included in aid responses.
• Strategies should be developed to ensure that women and marginalised groups
have full access to information.
•Women claim-holders should be represented in all decision-making bodies
affecting them.
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6.2.4 Recommendation 3: Contribution to an enabling
environment and context • Support communities to develop their own contingency plans for disasters and
receive material support with the proviso that adequate provision must be
made for poorer and marginalised groups. This should extend to a wide range
of civil-society organisations including women’s groups.
• Support national governments in disaster-prone countries to develop
comprehensive plans and procedures for disaster management, including the
management of information in order to ensure that communities are kept fully
informed at all stages of the response.
• They should also support plans not only for the establishment of a central body
to manage disaster responses but also to enable cooperation between
departments and between the centre and local government.
• Those responding to a disaster should ensure that full information about their
activities is available to all those affected, especially in local communities. This
might include public notices giving financial information, and public audits.
• Agencies should strengthen watchdog movements and support the mass media
to promote better understanding of the response and opportunities for
feedback and dialogue.
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References and bibliography
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Indonesia
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Age, L (2005) ‘IDPs confined to Barracks in Aceh’ in Forced Migration Review (July), pp
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IOM/USAID (2005) ‘Settlement and Livelihoods Needs and Aspirations Assessment of
Disaster-Affected and Host-Communities in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam’. 
Nakamura, T (2005) ‘UNDP’s Initial Response to the Tsunami in Indonesia. End of
mission report Jan–March 2005’. BCPR with UNDP Indonesia
Oxfam International (2005) ‘Appropriate Responses and Lasting Solutions for Aceh’s
Tsunami Survivors’. Briefing note (11 February).
Republic of Indonesia (2005) ‘Master Plan for Rehabilitation and Reconstruction for the
Regions and People of the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam and Nias Island
of the Province of North Sumatra. Main book of Rehabilitation and Reconstruction
(April).’ 
Rodriguez, J (2005) ‘Microfinance Conference. Financial Services to Rebuild
Livelihoods in Aceh’ (30 June) (http://www.tsunamispecialenvoy.org/briefs/docs/
microfinreport.pdf).
TAPOL (2005) ‘Reconstruction in Aceh beset by Problems’ in TAPOL Bulletin 179 (July).
UNDP (2005) ‘Consolidated Update Report Aceh ERTR Programme’ (September)
Wall, I (2005) ‘“Where’s My House?” Improving Communications with Beneficiaries: an
Analysis of Information Flow to Tsunami Affected Populations in Aceh Province’ (23
August) (http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/sumatra/reference/assessments/doc/
other/UNDP-WhereMyHouseFinal.pdf).
Maldives
ActionAid (2005) Maldives Programme Summary (www.actionaid.org).
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
Asian Development Bank (2005) ‘Maldives. Progress of Implementation of Loan 2160-
MLD (SF)/Grant 001-MLD- Tsunami Emergency Assistance Project’ (as of June 30).
Asian Disaster Reduction Centre (2005) ‘Report on the Assessment of Early Warning
System in the Maldives’. UNDP (August). 
Brown, H (2005) ‘Lost Innocence: the Tsunami in the Maldives’ in Forced Migration
Review Special Issue, July, pp 48–50.
Care Society (2005) Quarterly Reports, March–September. 
Government of Maldives and UN (2005) ‘Post-Tsunami Lessons Learned and Best
Practices Workshop, 17–18 May: Report on Main Findings’. 
Hamilton, D (2005) ‘Disaster Risk Management Project Training Needs Assessment,
October 2005, Post-Review Workshop Report on the TNA Methodology, Findings and
Recommendations’. UNDP.
IFRC (2005) ‘The Beginning of a Red Crescent National Society in the Maldives’, Stacy
Winston (5 October).
Jones, E (2005) ‘Disaster Management Plan Tourism Sector’. UNDP (August). 
Maconick, R, A Shareef and N Ahmed (2005) ‘Mid-Term Review of UNDP Programmes
in Maldives’ (draft). UNDP. 
Republic of Maldives (2005) ‘National Recovery and Reconstruction Plan. Programmes
and Projects’ (March).
Risk Management Solutions India (2005) ‘Developing a Disaster Risk Profile for
Maldives’. UNDP (October).
UN (2005) ‘Report of the Joint OCHA/UNDGO/UNDP Mission to Sri Lanka, the Maldives
and Indonesia, 30 May – 8 June’.
UN Country Team in Maldives (2002) ‘UN Development Assistance Framework for
Republic of Maldives, 2003–2007’.
UNDP (2005) ‘Maldives Recovery Programme 2005: 6 Months Update’. 
UNDP-HABITAT (2005) ‘Programme for Post-Tsunami Recovery in the Shelter Sector
(the “Shelter Recovery Programme”), Objectives, Implementing Activities and
Progress’ (6 September). 
UNFPA (2005) ‘Assessment Mission to Tsunami Affected Islands in Thaa Atoll, Travel
Report’ (5 May). 
UNICEF (2005) ‘Documentation of UNICEF’s Response to the Tsunami Disaster in
South Asia: India, Sri Lanka and the Maldives’ (September).
UNOCHA (2005) ‘Maldives Plan’. 
World Bank, Asia Development Bank and UN (2005) ‘Joint Needs Assessment. Tsunami:
Impact and Recovery’ (February).
Sri Lanka
Asian Development Bank, Japan Bank for International Cooperation and World Bank
(2005) ‘Sri Lanka 2005 Post-Tsunami Recovery Program. Preliminary Damage and
Needs Assessment’ (February). 
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Byrne, L (2005) ‘HR Management Needs Assessment in Sri Lanka (25 August – 7
September)’. RedR/IHE.
Canadian International Development Agency (2005) ‘Sri Lanka Guiding Principles for Tsunami Recovery: Summary’.
Centre for Policy Alternatives (2005a) ‘Report of the Workshop on Post-Tsunami Reconstruction of Sri Lanka: Structures and processes’ (25 January). 
Centre for Policy Alternatives (2005b) ‘Land Issues Arising from the Ethnic Conflict
and the Tsunami Disaster’ (January).
Centre for Policy Alternatives (2005c) ‘From Disaster to Opportunity. Tsunami Relief as
a Study in the Devolution of Power’ (10 February). 
Centre for Policy Alternatives (2005d) ‘Consultations on the Proposed Coastal Zone.
Issues for Discussion’ (9 March).
Fernando, S (undated) ‘Justice to Tsunami Victims’. Colombo: Movement for Land and
Agricultural Reform (MONLAR).
Fraser, I (2005) ‘Small Fish Trampled in Post-Tsunami Stampede’ in Forced Migration Review, Special Issue, pp 39–40.
Government of Sri Lanka/ LTTE (2005) ‘Memorandum of Understanding for the
Establishment of a Post-Tsunami Operational Management Structure (P-TOMS)’.
Government of Sri Lanka/ UNDP Sri Lanka (2005) ‘National Lessons Learned and Best
Practices Workshop’.
Habitat International Coalition (2005) ‘Post-tsunami Relief and Rehabilitation: a Violation of Human Rights’ (August). 
Harris, S (2005) ‘Livelihoods in Post-Tsunami Sri Lanka’ in Forced Migration Review,
Special Issue, pp 34–35.
LTTE Planning and Development Secretariat (2005) ‘Post-Tsunami Reconstruction.
Needs Assessment for the Northeast (NENA)’.
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Target Conflict-affected IDPs’ (7 March) (www.internal-displacement.org).
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Programme. Guidelines for Housing Development in the Coastal Belt of Sri Lanka’.
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Thiagarajah, J (2005) ‘Evolving Role of the NGO Sector in Post-Tsunami Recovery of Sri
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Guidelines’ (http://www.odi.org.uk/ALNAP/tec/pdf/UNHCR_transitional_shelter_
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Migration Review, Special Issue, pp 30–31.
Thailand 
Amnesty International (2005) ‘Thailand: the Plight of Burmese Migrant Workers’ (June). 
Department of Disaster Prevention and Mitigation, Ministry of Interior (2005)
‘Earthquake/Tsunami Victims Relief Efforts, September 2005 Update’.
International Centre for Migration and Health (2005) ‘Impact of the Tsunami on
Healthcare Systems’ in Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine (September).
‘National Workshop and Tsunami, Lessons Learned and Best Practices in Thailand,
Report and Summary of Main Conclusions’, Bangkok, 30–31 May 2005 (http://www.
odi.org.uk/ALNAP/tec/pdf/lessons_thailand.pdf).
OCHA/UNDAC (2005) ‘Mission Report, Indian Ocean Tsunami, Thailand, 28 Dec – 12
Jan 2005’.
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UNDP (2005) ‘Thailand, Tsunami Update, June 2005’. 
UNDP/ World Bank/ FAO (2005) ‘Joint Assessment Mission, Livelihood Recovery &
Environment Rehabilitation, 4–8 January 2005’.
World Vision (2005) ‘Tsunami Response, 6 months on, World Vision Situation Report,
August/September 2005’.
Flint, M and H Goyder (2006) Funding the tsunami
response. London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
Christoplos, I (2006) Links between relief,
rehabilitation and development in the tsunami
response. London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
Scheper B, A Parakrama and S Patel (2006) Impact of 
the tsunami response on local and national capacities.
London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
Bennett, J, W Bertrand, C Harkin, S Samarasinghe and 
H Wickramatillake (2006) Coordination of international
humanitarian assistance in tsunami-affected
countries. London: Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
de Ville de Goyet, C and L Morinière (2006) The role of
needs assessment in the tsunami response. London:
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
The TEC’s thematic evaluations
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Report (2006) 
TEC LRRD Report (2006) 
TEC Capacities Report
(2006) 
TEC Coordination Report
(2006) 
TEC Needs Assessment
Report (2006) 
Reference in this report Full reference
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Annex 1: Terms of reference 
Evaluation of the impact of tsunami
response on local and national capacities
Background
On 26 December 2004, devastating earthquakes along the western coast of Northern
Sumatra, the Andaman Islands and Nicobar Islands caused tsunamis to sweep over South
and Southeast Asia, reaching as far as the shores of East Africa and producing one of the
worst natural disasters in modern history. Those countries worst affected were India,
Indonesia, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, with others including Myanmar and
Somalia also suffering damage and loss of life. Countries less severely affected by the
tsunami included Bangladesh, Kenya, Malaysia, the Seychelles and Tanzania. 
In total, more than 170,000 people are thought to have died. Overall, an estimated 2 million
people have been directly or indirectly affected, of whom 1.7 million are internally displaced.15
Damage and destruction to infrastructure has destroyed people’s livelihoods and left many
homeless and without adequate water, sanitation, food and healthcare facilities. 
Governments and people around the world responded with unprecedented generosity in
solidarity with the rescue and relief efforts of the affected communities and local and
national authorities. This has meant that considerable resources have been available for
relief and recovery activities by the international community. 
The actual extent of damage to infrastructure, state capacity and lives and livelihood varied
from country to country. Sri Lanka, with over 31,000 dead, nearly a million displaced and
intense damage to the livelihood capacities of fisheries and tourism sectors (total losses and
15 Figures for numbers dead and missing are taken from Guha-Sapir and Van Panhuis (2005).
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
16 The estimated figures for amount of damage are all based on the preliminary needs assessment
published by the World Bank, ADB and UNDP.
17 The other themes are: coordination (including civil-military issues), impact assessment, needs
assessment, linking relief, rehabilitation and development, and donor response, including an assessment
of the role of the media. For further details see www.alnap.org/tec. 
damage about US$1.5 billion), was the worst hit in terms of the proportionate damage to its
infrastructure and local government capacity to respond. In absolute terms, Indonesia
suffered the most in terms of life loss (over 128,000 killed), and extent of localised damage
to infrastructure and capacity in Aceh (estimated to be between US$4.5 and 5 billion). While
the human toll in the Maldives (81 dead and 21 missing) was not as great as in some
neighbouring countries, proportionate to its size and economy, nearly a third of the
population was affected and its economic capacity severely damaged (with estimated
damages and losses of about 62 per cent of GDP or US$450 million16). Thailand (with over
5,400 dead and 20,000 households affected) and India (human toll around 10,750, recovery
and reconstruction costs estimated at US$1.2 billion) suffered considerable damage in
absolute terms, yet in terms of the impact on local and national capacities, the damage was
not as significant as for Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Maldives. 
Pre-existing conflicts in Sri Lanka and Indonesia posed additional challenges and
opportunities for relief and recovery efforts, limiting both local and international capacities. 
The impact of the tsunami on different countries reflected not only the force with which it
struck, but also the individual country’s levels of disaster preparedness, and the local
infrastructure in terms of ability to respond to a disaster of such proportions. India and
Thailand showed a remarkable ability to respond to the crisis effectively, particularly in the
recovery phase. These two countries restricted the flow of external assistance to their
recovery efforts because they felt they could manage with less international assistance. In
Indonesia the military sector is well developed, and played a large part in the response. By
contrast, Somalia has no government and was therefore unable to mount more than a very
limited internal response.
Disasters offer unique opportunities for change. Relief efforts can serve not only to reverse
losses but also can set the direction for long-term sustainable recovery. If the transition
from relief to recovery is perceived essentially as a development activity, and local capacity
is engaged and enhanced throughout the process, the legacy of even a major disaster such
as the tsunami can be a tangible improvement in the quality of life for the survivors. 
The combination of such an opportunity to set the direction for development, and the
unprecedented level of international assistance, provide a chance to take stock and assess
the contributions of international actors undertaking relief and recovery efforts. 
Purpose, objectives and scope of this 
study 
This evaluation is one of five thematic evaluations being co-coordinated by the Tsunami
Evaluation Coalition (TEC), an informal grouping of donors, UN agencies, INGOs and the
Red Cross/Red Crescent movement, formed to develop a sector-wide approach to
evaluations of tsunami response, including multi-agency evaluations of those aspects of the
tsunami relief, recovery and rehabilitation activities which will benefit from joint
evaluation.17 In tandem with the other four studies, this evaluation will therefore serve as a
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
18 Including positive and negative policy spin-offs, such as environmental management, land-use
planning, and conflict transformation. For example, In Sri Lanka, the tsunami led to a bipartisan process
of taking stock of the current state of disaster-risk management in the country and identifying directions
for the future. This process itself is a positive spin-off that could be extended to other issues. 
19 Research has shown that significantly more women than men died as a result of the tsunami, which
has major implications for gender relations in the reconstruction phase. Throughout the evaluation,
disaggregated data on the capacities of women and men should be used, as an understanding of the
gender imbalance in the death toll is a major factor to be considered in preparedness plans and recovery
programmes, as well as in understanding the capacities of affected populations.
test case for undertaking joint but parallel multi-agency evaluations within a larger,
umbrella evaluation effort. 
Purpose
The purpose of the evaluation is to determine the impact of the tsunami response –
including the role of international actors – on local and national capacities for relief and
recovery, and risk reduction. That is, ‘What worked and why?’, and ‘What could have been
improved and how?’, and ‘What did not work and why?’ are questions that need addressing
in order to: (i) provide lessons for strengthening the ongoing activities18 as well as future
responses to emergencies, and (ii) hold international actors accountable to the individual,
institutional and country donors. 
Objectives
The objectives of the evaluation are to: 
1 assess how local and national capacities changed as a result of the tsunami response
2 assess how well international actors engaged with local and national capacities in
providing relief and recovery assistance 
3 assess the intended and unintended changes to local and national capacities as a result
of the tsunami response by international actors
4 assess the extent to which transition/ risk reduction/ recovery programming, planned
and implemented, is likely to influence local and national capacities 
5distil lessons learned for efforts to strengthen local and national capacities for future
crisis response and recovery
6 ensure that all of the above assess and highlight gender differences and the varied
experiences of women and men.19
Scope
The assessment will take into account the three phases of the tsunami assistance in the
first six months: (a) immediate emergency, (b) early recovery phase, (c) initiating the
transition from recovery to development. It is understood that the transition between these
phases is blurred between different sectors. Phases occurred in parallel and lasted for
different lengths of time in different sectors and at different locations. 
The evaluation will be based on in-depth field studies of three of the following: Sri Lanka,
Indonesia, the Maldives and Thailand. 
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
For each of these case studies the evaluation will consider intended and unintended
changes in local and national capacities among different sections of the population. The
core of the evaluation will be to consider the impact of the actions of international actors on
local and national capacities but, in order to understand the total impact of the response on
capacity, a ‘stocktaking’ of the impact of the national response will be included. The
assessment will also identify the contextual constraints and opportunities in which these
changes happened.
These capacities include: (a) capacity to respond to the disaster as shown by those
affected, NGOs, local women’s organisations, the private sector and local and national
government (including capacities of women, men and other vulnerable groups in affected
communities to participate in decision-making related to relief and recovery efforts, local
governance, resource mobilisation, planning and implementation, protection, advocacy,
training, and livelihoods recovery); and (b) Capacity of community members to access
services and markets (for labour as well as goods and services), including the capacities of
the private sector to recover and create livelihoods, and relief- and recovery-related
services of government. 
The evaluation will focus on communities, formal and informal civil-society institutions
(including NGOs), and local and national government, considering the different capacities
and experiences of women, men and other vulnerable groups at each level. The evaluation
will include an assessment of the baseline capacities in place at the time of the tsunami to
respond to the relief and recovery needs of the affected. 
Selection of case-study countries
The selection of countries for field studies has been made to illustrate a cross-section of
response situations based on the following:
1extent of tsunami damage and reconstruction needs
2 response capacity with regard to state as well as civil-society capacity 
3 level of international support
4 local context, including pre-existing conflict, linked to addressing capacity needs
5 availability of evaluative evidence
6 subject to time and budget, the inclusion of a ‘control’ variable country – that is, one in
which the response was largely handled internally.
The four following countries will be studied subject to the security situation: Sri Lanka,
Indonesia (Aceh), the Maldives and Thailand. 
Evaluation criteria
Performance will be evaluated using the DAC Principles for the Evaluation of Development
Assistance, OECD (1991): relevance/appropriateness, efficiency, effectiveness, impact and
sustainability/connectedness. Gender analysis and the protection of vulnerable groups will
be fully integrated at every stage and in all aspects of the evaluation.
Key questions for consideration 
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20 Membership of the ESC is open to other agencies/organisations who wish to be included. 
21 Scheduled for 7 and 8 September, in Geneva.
Key questions are to be addressed at local and national levels to assess whether
international actors did the right things and if they did things right. Different groups of
people have different capacities to cope with crises, as well as different vulnerabilities. In
addition, the capacities of one group of people may change over time. It should be noted,
therefore, that these questions are also posed to understand whether response activities
strengthened the capacities of the weak and vulnerable groups, particularly women,
children and the poor, and if the efforts strengthened local participation. 
With relevance to all the key questions, the team must identify as far as possible the
differential impact of relief and response activities on the capacities of vulnerable groups in
each situation. If it becomes apparent that some groups benefited very little from the
assistance, their views should be sought, as they may reveal problems with the targeting of
beneficiaries. 
Initial questions are included in Appendix B. These are to serve as a starting point. A
detailed list of questions to be covered in the evaluation will be discussed when the
evaluation team has been appointed. 
In the light of this study’s role as a test case for undertaking joint but parallel multi-agency
evaluations within a larger, umbrella evaluation effort, the report should also document what
has been learned through the process in terms of good practice in multi-agency evaluation. 
Management of the evaluation 
The two lead agencies (DMI and UNDP) will form a thematic Evaluation Steering
Committee20 (ESC) with the support of UNICEF, Action Aid and CordAid to manage the
evaluation. The ESC will be responsible for ensuring an inclusive process to finalise the
ToR, mobilise resources, identify the team members, and ensure quality throughout the
process. The theme management group will benefit from the advice of the TEC Evaluation
Adviser and Coordinator (EAC), who will provide guidance to the group to ensure coherence
among the evaluations of the five thematic areas. The ToR will be circulated to the relevant
UN agencies and Resident/Humanitarian Coordinators. 
A wider working group will also have input into the evaluation in terms of providing funding,
in-kind assistance at country level (for example, accessing key stakeholders including
beneficiaries, hosting workshops, providing documentary evidence for the desk reviews),
commenting on the ToR and final report, and assisting with follow-up in their own agencies. A
team of independent consultants will be recruited to carry out the evaluation. The UNDP
Evaluation Office will provide daily management and logistical support to the evaluation team.
Evaluation methodology and team
composition
All members of the team will participate in a joint inception workshop with all the
evaluation teams, to be held close to the start of the evaluation,21 during which the detailed
methodology will be agreed on, in consultation with the TEC Evaluation Adviser and
Coordinator (EAC) and the lead agencies. 
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It is envisaged that the approach will encompass a number of methods, including:
• desk reviews (including additional in-depth studies of countries not visited for case￾studies)
• stakeholder interviews (with male and female beneficiaries and vulnerable groups,
community and civil-society groups, local organisations, local and national government,
private institutions, international agencies and INGOs) based on a semi-structured
questionnaire that will gather both quantitative and qualitative information 
•timelines to identify key events and key decision-making points 
• focus-group discussions with male and female beneficiaries 
• semi-structured interviews with key policy makers
• a review of the results of previous studies of post-disaster recovery to see the extent to
which the findings of this evaluation are coherent with, reinforce or contradict previous
findings.
Analysis will be both qualitative and quantitative. Examples of good/best practice will be
noted and a comparative analysis made of relief and recovery efforts leading to positive
changes in capacities across communities, institutions and countries. Within any emergency
response it must be noted that different stakeholders may have different perceptions of relief
and response, and may not share common objectives, possibly even seeking contradictory
results. In order to minimise the bias of one group of stakeholders, different methodologies
that can serve to triangulate findings are important. The methodology must enable the
evaluation team to consider the differential impact of relief and response activities on the
capacities of different, vulnerable groups in all the situations considered. 
It is accepted that ‘Current thinking is that no evaluation can be “value-free”, and that values
should always be made explicit’ (ALNAP, 2004, p 28). The question of the value framework of
this evaluation needs to be part of the discussion around detailed methodology. 
In addition to the inception workshop, national workshops will be held for briefing and
debriefing at the start and end of each country study. These will seek to involve a broad
spectrum of female and male participants including stakeholders, beneficiaries and decision
makers in the government. These workshops in case-study countries will be conducted
jointly with other thematic evaluations and coordinated by the EAC to minimise duplication
of effort and disruption to stakeholders and beneficiaries.
The purpose of the initial in-country workshop is: (i) to introduce the evaluation to key
beneficiaries and stakeholders; (ii) to consult with the participants as part of the process of
refining the ToR; and (iii) to identify relevant civil-society networks, key informants and key
stakeholders for the evaluation. These should represent both women and men, and
vulnerable groups such as IDPs and people living in conflict areas. During these initial
workshops, an emphasis will be placed on promoting participation and ownership by local
stakeholders, male and female, during the case studies. Local views will be solicited on
capacity issues which beneficiaries and stakeholders consider to be important, as well as on
those groups, informants and government actors to be included in interviews. 
Finally, a debriefing workshop will be held at the end of each case study so that preliminary
findings, lessons learned, and recommendations can be thoroughly discussed with local
stakeholders, both male and female. It is important that information/feedback on the
evaluation process and its preliminary findings and recommendations are provided to the
district levels (operational level), and not to the national level only. This information will also
be posted on the TEC Online Forum so that other evaluations can benefit from the process. 
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22 See ALNAP Proforma (ALNAP, www.alnap.org).
23 Scheduling of fieldwork in Indonesia and the Maldives will need to take account of Ramadan, during
October.
Upon completing all the country studies, the team will meet and jointly agree on the
findings, key lessons and recommendations emerging. Based on this discussion, the team
leader will be responsible for preparing the draft evaluation report in close collaboration
with the other team members. The draft evaluation report will be available by end
November and findings and lessons presented and disseminated to all relevant
stakeholders. 
Key findings and recommendations from this final capacity report will be synthesised by
three authors: a lead synthesis writer, the EAC, and the researcher/deputy coordinator into
one synthesis report to be presented to, and discussed by, the TEC. 
The evaluation team will consist of an evaluation team leader and two team members, at
least one of which will be a national consultant for each of the country case studies. The
team will represent a balance of skills and experience, including: 
•substantial evaluation experience
•experience of humanitarian response and recovery programmes
• familiarity with the region 
•experience of working with government departments
•experience of working with local organisations (civil societies and NGOs)
•experience of capacity assessment and building
• gender balance and demonstrable experience in integrating gender considerations22
•experience in beneficiary consultation, surveys, and conducting focus groups
• excellent spoken and written communication skills in English
• sectoral technical expertise (for example, health, water, education, socioeconomics –
accepting that not all sectors can be covered).
It is hoped that, in addition to the national consultant for each case-study country, other
members of the team will come from the region. To the extent possible, the team will
have competence to ensure an approach sensitive to issues such as corruption, HIV/AIDS
and environmental issues whenever relevant. In addition to leading the capacity team, the
team leader will liaise with the other five thematic leads and the EAC, consulting with him
on methodological and timing/implementation issues.
The evaluation will start in early August 2005. The field studies will take place during
September and October,23 with the draft report produced by the end of November. The
project will be finalised by the end of December 2005.
Outputs
• An inception report of no more than 2,500 words outlining the team’s approach, due
three weeks after the start of the evaluation.
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• Interim status report (or PowerPoint presentation) per country of no more than 1,500
words reflecting the key issues identified by the team and prepared prior to departure
from the study country. The report will be presented at the debriefing workshop at the
end of each field study, to be organised by UNDP and DMI. This meeting should include
at minimum agencies that are members of the theme evaluation and relevant
government counterparts. 
Tentative time schedule
Date Activity
July 5–19 Post working ToR on the web, advertise for consultants 
July 22–25 Selection of consultants 
July 25–29 Initial briefing visit of team leader 
Aug 1–19 Desk review 
Aug 22 – Sept 2 Review of desk review 
Setting up appointments in case-study countries with stakeholders, initial HQ interviews in NY, Geneva and
Bangkok, preparation of national workshops in collaboration with EAC 
Sept 7–8 Joint inception workshop with other evaluation teams in Geneva 
Sept 9–Nov 4 Field studies:
3 weeks Sri Lanka (including national workshop)
3 weeks Aceh (including national workshop)
2 Weeks Maldives/Thailand (including national workshop) 
Nov 7–11 1 week team analysis and joint work 
Nov 14–Dec 2 Meeting for 6 team leaders with TEC EAC to consider the key issues and lessons learned before draft reports
prepared. Venue tbc 
Report writing 
Dec 2 Submission of draft report 
Dec 5–16 Review of report by steering group 
Dec 19–23 Formal debriefing of TL 
Early Jan Synthesis workshop (tentative), includes written comments on draft synthesis report 
Tentative time schedule
• A final report of no more than 20,000 words, excluding an executive summary of no
more than three pages and annexes. For further guidance for the report, see the ALNAP
Quality Proforma.
Use of the evaluation report
The final report will be a stand-alone report and will be discussed at relevant interagency
forums, such as the December ALNAP meeting and the February IASC meeting. The report
will also feed into the TEC synthesis report – planned to be available in draft form by late
December 2005. The draft and final report will be made available on the dedicated TEC
website the Online Forum, and disseminated through all appropriate channels.
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The recommendations made by the team should be discussed by the IASC, including a
working group on gender, and should be responded to by the concerned agencies. A
management response matrix will be prepared once the report has been finalised, involving
all commissioning agencies.
Appendix A: Roles of key groups and
individuals in the evaluation
Role of the thematic evaluation steering committee (ESC) 
(e.g. Capacities ESC)
A steering committee composed of a core group of participating agencies will be set up to
provide overall management guidance for each thematic evaluation. The ESC will be
chaired by the commissioning agency or agencies. The role of the steering committee is to: 
• ensure an inclusive process to finalise the ToR
• provide funding for the evaluation and assist in the mobilisation of resources (financial
and in-kind)
• participate in the selection of the evaluation team members (identifying the team, and
ensuring quality throughout the process)
• participate in teleconferences on key issues regarding this evaluation
• advise their own agencies and staff on this evaluation as well as coordinating agency￾internal substantive feedback back to the group
• ensure that field representatives are aware of the TEC and fully involved and available
to contribute to the evaluation
• participate in any workshop that may be planned once the draft report has been
received.
Role of the thematic working groups (e.g. Capacities Thematic
Working Group)
In addition, a number of agencies and donors have signed up to participate in this
evaluation. While not part of the ESC, these theme members are expected to provide
support to the thematic evaluations as follows:
• provide funding for this evaluation
• provide technical advice or staff on secondment
• provide comments on the inception report and on the draft report(s)
• ensure that field representatives are aware of the TEC and fully involved and available
to contribute to this evaluation and related workshops
• provide in-kind support at country level (that is, facilitate meetings, transport, contacts)
• advise their own agencies and staff on this evaluation as well as coordinating agency-
#internal substantive feedback back to the group
• if possible, participate in any workshops planned as part of the evaluation.
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Role of the TEC evaluation advisor and coordinator (EAC)
The EAC will provide methodological and substantive advice to the evaluation team through
the steering committee and the evaluation team leader. The EAC will promote connectivity
between this evaluation and the other evaluation exercises undertaken by the TEC, alerting
the evaluation team members to any additional information they may need for undertaking
their work (eg third-party evaluation reports, lessons-learned events, etc). The EAC will be
in regular contact with the evaluation team leader. Any joint workshops, in particular the
start-up workshops, would be organised and facilitated by the EAC in collaboration with the
evaluation team leaders. The EAC reports to the TEC Core Management Group.
Role of the TEC Core Management Group (CMG)
The CMG provides general guidance for the TEC and seeks to ensure complementarity and
connectivity between the various thematic evaluations. The CMG will be advised by the
EAC and will review and comment on any outputs produced by the thematic evaluation.
Responsibility for the quality and acceptance of the report rests with the commissioning
agency/ steering committee.
Role of the evaluation team leader
The evaluation team leader will report to the thematic ESC for the evaluation. S/he will be
in regular contact with the EAC, coordinate mission timing and key events with the EAC as
part of the TEC initiative and seek the EAC’s advice when needed. The team leader is
responsible for the team’s report(s) as well as for contributing inputs to the TEC synthesis
report. This will require participation in a synthesis workshop to be held in December 2005
,as well as providing written feedback on the draft synthesis report as it relates to this
theme.
Role of the Online Forum (www.tsunami-evaluation.org)
The Online Forum links thematic evaluations, posts all ToR, maps all evaluation and
lessons exercises, and provides an online forum for each thematic evaluation working
group.
Appendix B: Key questions to be used in
the evaluation
Background
• What is the ‘disaster history’ of each case-study country, particularly with respect to
the affected areas? 
• How much did international actors know of the historical processes that had shaped
and configured risk in each context?
•To what extent were local organisations experienced in managing disaster risks and in
recovery? 
•To what extent were local/national resources adequate to meet the needs of the
affected populations? (For example, what were the capacities of the local and national
actors to coordinate, plan and implement relief and recovery efforts, consult the
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affected population, differentiate between the needs of women, men, children and the
elderly, advocate among external partners, and train those affected to cope with the
disaster.)
Relevance/appropriateness
•To what extent was the response based on needs assessment for relief and recovery,
including an assessment of the needs of different groups in the community? Did the
needs assessments include an assessment of local response capacities, including the
different capacity of women, men and other vulnerable groups? If not, why? 
• How adequate are existing policies for engagement in differentiating between the needs
of different groups among affected populations?
• How did international actors determine their priorities for engagement with local and
national capacities? (Through agency mandates, consideration of vulnerable groups, etc.) 
•Were these priorities re-assessed at different phases of the response to remain relevant
in a fluid situation?
•To what extent did international actors’ perceptions of the affected areas correspond
with those of the local actors? Were there mechanisms in place to discuss these?
•To what extent did international actors have an understanding of organisation and
decision-making structures at government, local government and community level?
• Who did the international agencies engage with and why? Which individuals (women,
men, IDPs) and which organisations (including women’s organisations) were targeted?
•To what extent did the international efforts recognise the local context (existing
conflicts, tensions, inequalities, coping mechanisms of women and men, and
opportunistic capacities that surface in response to the urgency of the situation) and
existing indigenous capacities?
•What were the approaches used by international agencies?
• What attention did international agencies and national organisations pay to the gender
composition of their teams, and their capacity to address gender issues?
• How well did beneficiaries (women, men, boys, girls, the elderly) understand
international relief mechanisms and how to make best use of them?
• How well did international and national actors take into account the impact of their
assistance on local markets in their planning?
Efficiency
•To what extent had institutional and legislative arrangements been put in place to deal
with disaster response? 
• Given the local capacities of different individuals and groups when the tsunami struck,
how effectively did international engagement work to strengthen those capacities, given
the constraints of needing to deliver relief quickly to affected communities?
•To what extent did the international efforts leverage existing local and national
capacities, both at the level of accessing services and information, and also in terms of
providing necessary services and opportunities for relief and recovery? 
• How well did different actors plan and coordinate among their efforts? Was there
duplication of, or gaps in, capacity?
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24 For example, in Sri Lanka the National Disaster Management Centre (NDMC), set up by an earlier
UNDP capacity-building project, was completely sidelined by more powerful institutions such as the
Presidential Secretariat, partly because the NDMC lacked the capacity to match the scale of the disaster
but largely for political reasons. In the end, the NDMC, which should be a stable institution looking at all
aspects of disaster-risk management in the country, has emerged as a highly disempowered institution. 
•To what extent did local and international actors support each other to include
vulnerable groups, such as women, children and the poorest?
•Did international efforts utilise relevant past experience and evaluations of disaster
preparedness and response, including the different needs of women and men?
Effectiveness
• How was the performance of existing local institutions (government and non￾government) with a mandate to provide post-disaster relief?24
• What was the impact of previous capacity strengthening on the tsunami response and
recovery?
• How effective were international actors in meeting their own priorities for engaging with
different groups of local and national actors?
•Did the relief and recovery efforts utilise or displace local capacity among different
groups of the affected population? How was the impact of different groups assessed?
•Did international actors have the intention of building capacity during the relief phase?
Impact
• How did the capacities of different groups of beneficiaries change throughout the period
under review (in terms of both provision of services and ability to access them)
•To what extent did international efforts strengthen/weaken capacities of local and
national actors (differentiating between different groups of the affected population) to
deliver services and opportunities for relief, recovery and risk reduction? 
•To what extent did international efforts strengthen/weaken the capacities of local and
national actors (differentiating between different groups of the affected population) to
participate in, and own the relief and recovery efforts? 
•To what extent did international efforts strengthen/weaken the capacities of male and
female beneficiaries to access relief, rehabilitation and development services and
opportunities?
• What has been the different experience of women and men, and how have gender
relations, and women’s and men’s capacities, been affected (positively or negatively) by
tsunami assistance (both national and international assistance)?
•To what extent did the efforts aim to strengthen synergies between local and national
capacities to provide services?
• Did the response activities lessen or exacerbate existing conflicts, including domestic
violence, and thereby assist or weaken capacities to respond?
• Has the capacity of local and national actors to use international or national standards
for disaster response been enhanced?
• How were markets for affected and non-affected populations impacted by the influx of
relief goods and services? 
•What kinds of impacts did the efforts, launched prior to the tsunami, to build capacity
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in disaster-risk management have on the post-tsunami operations?
Sustainability/connectedness
•Was there local ownership of provision of relief and recovery efforts and access to these
services, and if so, by whom? To what extent did beneficiary groups, local organisations
and the state participate in the decision-making processes related to relief and
recovery efforts? Were women and men equally involved, and were their voices and
different concerns heard? Were all key groups, including women’s organisations,
included? 
•Drawing on the lessons learned from past emergencies, and evaluations of the
tsunami response already completed, how will current and planned activities in
tsunami-affected countries affect local capacity among different members of the
population? 
•Is a commitment to capacity strengthening among all sections of society explicit within
transition and recovery plans and programmes (for both national and international
players)? How well do these reflect local needs? What are the chances of their being
successful, in the light of the tsunami experience to date? 
Future planning and capacity strengthening 
The following questions should also be considered, in the light of lessons from responses to
the questions above.
•What lessons and good/best practice can be drawn from a comparison between those
countries where there had been a process of capacity strengthening in disaster-risk
management before the tsunami with those where this had not taken place?
• Are there more effective steps toward better preparedness to manage future disasters? 
• Could the international agencies have taken different steps to improve the effectiveness
of their efforts? 
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Annex 2: Indonesia report –
executive summary
• Are there identifiable benchmarks for positive changes in capacities to access and
deliver services?
• How can the different needs of women and men be identified and taken into account?
By Elisabeth Scheper with inputs from Smruti Patel and 
Arjuna Parakrama
The 26 December earthquake shifted the tectonic plates and pushed down the whole coastal
shelf of northern Sumatra, with dramatic consequences. It caused a series of tsunami waves,
measuring up to 12 metres high along the southern Aceh Jaya district, leading to massive
death and destruction in Aceh and North Sumatra provinces and elsewhere along the Indian
Ocean. Being closest to the earthquake epicentre, the devastation in Indonesia was the worst
of any affected country: 127,358 persons lost their lives, some 93,662 remain missing and
some 533,770 were displaced. The death toll In Indonesia amounts to nearly 80 per cent of all
tsunami victims, and 47 per cent of those internally displaced are also in Indonesia. Another
severe earthquake hit the region on 28 March 2005, resulting in additional extensive
structural damage on the islands off the Aceh coast, including Nias, and resulting in the loss
of a further 893 lives. 
The tsunami also had long-term consequences. Large stretches of coastal land were washed
away or sank, and are now flooded at high tide or even permanently. Rebuilding communities
and livelihoods in these locations is not feasible without complex coastal-protection
infrastructure, and entire communities need to be relocated. Approximately 40 per cent of
private-sector losses occurred in the housing sector. An estimated 25 per cent of the labour
force lost jobs in the tsunami aftermath, raising the total unemployment rate to over 30 per
cent in the disaster area. 
Capacities before the tsunami 
One of Indonesia’s poorest provinces, despite offshore oil and gas exploitation, Aceh has an
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economy based on rural subsistence farming and fishing. Informal community groups
related to mosques help to build local self-sufficiency. Nias Island is one of the least
developed regions in Indonesia. It has suffered long-term neglect, compounded by
geographical isolation and economic and political marginalisation of the island and its
predominantly Christian inhabitants. The protracted conflict between the government and
an armed separatist movement in Aceh, together with prolonged periods of martial law, had
reduced the capacity of provincial authorities before the tsunami. Combined with
restrictions on the media and civil society, this had undermined public confidence in the
government. At the time of the tsunami there was a developing momentum toward peace. 
Due to the conflict and resulting inaccessibility, very few international agencies were
present immediately before the tsunami . Some had previously worked in Aceh, but had
withdrawn after the re-imposition of martial law in 2003. The limited number of local non￾government organisations (NGOs) was focused mainly on advocacy and human rights, as
mobilising communities for development work was not permitted. Women in the east and
central parts of Aceh suffered greatly from the conflict. 
National and international capacity
The Indonesian national government was ill equipped to address the immediate relief
needs in Aceh and Nias effectively, because of remoteness, weak local government
capacity and the scale and scope of the tsunami. The National Disaster Management
Board (BAKORNAS) had an ad hoc disaster management structure in place with special
boards at provincial and district levels, but no contingency plans. It was unable to
provide the much-needed operational capacity and coordination for the national and
international responses. The official disaster management structures at provincial and
district levels were literally wiped out by the tsunami, while the national coordination
procedures were unclear to both national and international actors, making the initial
relief response ineffective. 
In the absence of national coordination capacity, on-the-ground international agencies were
left to initiate and coordinate their immediate relief response in Aceh and Nias, but most
international aid agencies had no prior work experience in Aceh and did not have
contextual knowledge and stakeholder networks. This made it difficult to assess capacities
of local stakeholders. Under severe pressure to deliver swift relief assistance to the
displaced survivors, the vast majority of international actors opted for operational
programmes and flew in large numbers of humanitarian-sector specialists to assess and
address the perceived immediate needs. While this decision facilitated a faster response in
the earliest phases, it proved an inappropriate and unsustainable approach in the
transition to recovery and reconstruction. 
The high staff turnover hampered the ability of international agencies to build institutional
memory, in terms of both contextual knowledge and relationships. To implement large
operational programmes, international agencies acquired contextual knowledge and local
language skills as they worked, by hiring Acehenese staff from local organisations attracted
by higher salaries and challenging programmes. This ‘brain drain’ weakened the capacity of
local organisation, which had already incurred dramatic human and physical losses in the
tsunami. This negatively affected the efficiency and ownership of recovery programmes and
slowed down the commencement of transition from the recovery phase to reconstruction
and development. In Nias, an additional cultural insensitivity was noted, as from the
majority of local staff of international agencies had Islamic backgrounds, and were
unfamiliar with the specific Christian cultural context of the island.
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
Local capacities 
Given the sheer scale of the disaster, the loss of leadership and the collapse of
government institutions, communities effectively coped on their own in the first days
after the disaster. In the wake of the tsunami, survivors sought refuge at higher altitudes
and lived on fruits and coconuts in Aceh Jaya, or were taken in by family and neighbours
in urban settings in Aceh Besar. Depending on the proximity to the capital and the scale
of the destruction, it took humanitarian workers between one (Banda Aceh) and ten days
(Krueng Sabee) to reach the affected communities. Villages and towns with strong
leadership initiated rescue and relief efforts before the arrival of external assistance,
aided by the Acehenese tradition of gotong royong (voluntary mutual assistance). While
relations with local government were strained, community cohesion and horizontal social
capital had remained strong.
With limited involvement in the planning of aid programmes, village leaders were
disempowered. In field visits to Aceh Jaya, Pidi, Aceh Besar and Nias, a general breakdown
of communication between international agencies and local communities was observed.
Overwhelmed by new obligations and responsibilities in the tsunami recovery process,
such as multiple land disputes and planning decisions, local leaders expressed an urgent
need to interact more with international agencies. This would strengthen their planning
capacities and help build horizontal and vertical social capital. More effective coordination
and a holistic approach to dealing with the problems of inaccessible and isolated
communities have been identified as key areas for improvement in the international
response.
Three vulnerable claim-holder categories can be identified as being particularly vulnerable:
remote communities with minimal service provision pre-tsunami, communities affected by
deadly conflict, and vulnerable women such as those in poor, female-headed households
and war widows. The emphasis on relief and recovery in the international response
generally left the needs of vulnerable people under-resourced in the first eight months. The
focus on formal housing and livelihoods tended to miss out the poorest households that do
not usually possess formal land titles to their homes and are self-employed. While these
vulnerable groups were provided for in camps or temporary shelters, not many recovery
projects had been initiated specifically for the informal sector and for squatter
communities. 
In remote underdeveloped coastal zones in Aceh and Nias, it proved hard to implement
large-scale reconstruction projects, as basic infrastructure was lacking even before the
tsunami and the population lived in small, dispersed coastal settlements. Many remote,
marginal fishing communities were without any form of assistance. To reach and rebuild
such deprived tsunami-affected communities, a more flexible approach based on
partnership agreements with CBOs is indispensable. Flexibility is needed in dealing with
conflict-affected communities, where it may be counter-productive to make distinctions in
terms of absolute need between the tsunami-affected coastal and conflict-affected inland
areas. The economies of these communities are interlinked, as goods produced in one area
are brought to markets in the other. Therefore, inland communities should also be
considered as being affected by the tsunami and should be included in the reconstruction
programming. Difference in standards and timelines between tsunami and conflict-recovery
programmes could, if not carefully managed, unintentionally exacerbate inequalities and
tensions.
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Quality and accountability
At the time the evaluation was conducted, the public accountability of the international
efforts towards intended beneficiaries appeared virtually non-existent. An indicator of this
is the difficulty the evaluation team encountered in obtaining project documents, budgets
and progress reports. Various initiatives may start to remedy this in the future. The UNDP
Development Assistance Database system is designed to document donor involvement in
the reconstruction phase although this was not operational at the time of the evaluation.
Also, BRR (the government agency in charge of recovery and reconstruction) is expected to
play a broker role in the planning and monitoring of the reconstruction process. This
should increase public transparency. International agencies have begun to consider
alternative forms of public accountability, commensurate with their current role.
The role of the media in advocacy for vulnerable groups is much less prominent in Aceh
and Nias, than in Sri Lanka and Thailand. Years of protracted conflict have restricted
freedom of expression and many affected districts are without newspapers and TV
coverage. To overcome the information and communication gap, more international
assistance should be provided to facilitate the flow of information, for example through the
rehabilitation of radio services, wall newspapers and news booths. National advocacy
NGOs play an increasingly prominent watchdog role to advocate for rights of women and of
vulnerable groups, especially related to issues such as land rights, forced relocation,
corruption and traditional interpretations of the Shari’a law. 
Conclusions
International tsunami assistance had a positive effect on the peace and governance
situation in Aceh province. This has not been entirely intended, and has not been
strategically exploited to the full, as yet. The international aid-agency presence exposes the
hitherto closed region to new participatory development approaches and good governance
concepts, which may have a positive impact on downward accountability and inclusive,
rights-based development processes in the new autonomous region of Aceh. The new
political space needs to be actively recognised and utilised by international agencies
involved in the tsunami response, as the window of opportunity is potentially narrow. 
Specific gender-based needs were identified in most assessments, yet few gender-sensitive
approaches were observed in the housing and livelihood-recovery programmes. However,
both international agencies and local NGOs with a specific women’s mandate have
developed interesting pilot initiatives that can serve as models for improved women’s
involvement in the reconstruction phase.
The need for mutually accountable partnerships between international and local actors was
increasingly acknowledged at the time of the evaluation. While the initial tsunami response
was highly appreciated, frustration and disappointment among civil-society organisations
and beneficiaries has grown during the recovery phase. Housing and livelihood projects
have been slow and there has been limited participation of local communities in recovery
programmes. To reach the most vulnerable communities, international actors need to rely
on and invest in local organisations, and to strengthen their capacity as key actors in a
sustainable development process. Hopefully, this will end the systematic exclusion of and
discrimination against marginal rural communities in the long term.
Lastly, the massive international tsunami response exposed structural weaknesses in the
humanitarian aid systems that provide valuable lessons for work in future disasters. More
creativity and flexibility is required to engage national and local capacities in the recovery
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
process, and in building skills for disaster-risk reduction. Given the vulnerability to natural
disasters of Aceh and Nias Island, the awareness and planning of both government and
international aid agencies for programming to reduce disaster risk was surprisingly low at
all levels. 
Recommendations to international agencies
1 Sustained and respectful engagement with local and national
capacities
•Recognise and validate national and local capacities in the local context at individual
and institutional level in the immediate recovery phase.
•Foster mutually beneficial partnerships and reduce the dependence on foreign experts
through enhancing skills to identify local and national capacities.
• Enhance contextual knowledge within international agencies and increase community
participation in accordance with international standards.
• Provide institutional support to CBOs including capacity strengthening to repair ‘brain￾drain’ damage, and apply fair grant-making standards. 
• Initiate preparatory work in advance of the crises in order to improve significantly the
quality of an emergency response at the local, national and international levels.
•Develop basic elements of an appropriate community-based, disaster-preparedness
plan in partnership with local communities, local and national governments to build
relevant local capacities to reduce vulnerability to future disasters.
2 Equity, inclusion and downward accountability 
•Reach vulnerable groups that are overlooked in the current programme of asset
replacement, especially in remote, under-resourced areas affected by the tsunami in
Nias, Aceh Jaya and east Aceh. 
• Incorporate valuable experiences of local pilot projects, the better to address specific
problems facing women, such as land ownership, inheritance and Shari’a
interpretations, and to support women affected by both conflict and tsunami, and
lacking access to information.
• Strengthen the role of the media as an independent monitor in Aceh and Nias. 
• Establish a system for public information and accountability, boosting the opportunities
for claim-holders to set their own agenda. 
3 Fostering an enabling policy framework and safe environment 
• Develop more creativity and flexibility in humanitarian relief systems to engage local
capacities of vulnerable groups and meet their specific needs. 
• Strategically utilise the new political space in Aceh province to strengthen indirectly the
peace and democratisation process.
•Improve cross-fertilisation of tsunami- and conflict-recovery programmes in order to
guarantee equal standards and timelines, and avoid tensions that could exacerbate
inequalities and endanger the peace process.
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Annex 3: Maldives report –
executive summary
By Smruti Patel with contributions from Janey Lawry White
Purpose of the review
The overall purpose of the evaluation is to determine the impact of the tsunami response,
notably the response of international actors, on local and national capacities for relief,
recovery and risk reduction. 
More specifically, this evaluation seeks to:
• assess how local and national capacities changed as a result of the tsunami response
• assess how well international actors engaged with local and national capacities in
providing relief and recovery assistance
• assess the intended and unintended changes to local and national capacities as a result
of the tsunami response by international actors
• assess the extent to which transition/recovery/risk reduction programming, planned and
implemented, is likely to influence local and national capacities
•distil lessons learned for efforts to strengthen local and national capacities for future
crisis response and recovery
• retain a gender perspective throughout and highlight the varied experiences and
perspectives of women and men.
The Maldives review
Within the capacities evaluation, Indonesia and Sri Lanka have been studied in more depth
than Thailand and the Maldives. Because of wider TEC deadlines, the Maldives field study
was limited to 10 days from 4 to 14 November 2005. This short time was all the more brief
because of the time taken to travel between the atolls and islands. The field visit furthermore
coincided with the end of Ramadan and other official holidays, while many interlocutors
were on leave. This report is presented as a reflective review rather than a comprehensive
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
25 Some stakeholders indicated that relief items remained in warehouses on a number of occasions
rather than being immediately distributed.
evaluation. Lack of time allowed for only qualitative methods. The key observations in this
report were presented in Male during a debriefing at the end of the field visit. 
The setting
The Maldives is made up of small islands, with a small but highly dispersed population and
a very specific geography. The shortage of domestic resources means that many items have
to be imported. The strong overall economic growth of the Maldives in recent decades has
been accompanied by growing regional disparities and by a lack of investment in diverse
skills and competencies for development. Skill shortages have often been met by foreign
labour. Prior to the tsunami, the ability to access services and opportunities was constrained
not only by geography, but also by a strongly centralised public administration. For women,
further constraints were imposed by social norms and the fact that there is a remarkably
high level of households that are headed by women. The ability to access information, to
demand quality services, and to hold to account was constrained by a centralised and top￾down style of governance. Atoll and island chiefs are nominated by the centre rather than
elected by the local population. There now appears to be a willingness to pursue political
reforms, partly as a result of the tsunami disaster, but this will inevitably be a slow process. 
The tsunami was the first major disaster to hit the Maldives. The Maldives suffered
relatively lowlosses in terms of human lives, but its national economy has been hit much
harder than that of any other affected country, and this will affect the country’s ability to
recover. Despite years of concern about the potential effects of climate change and the
rising level of the sea, there was no significant disaster preparedness at national or local
levels before the tsunami. There was no policy, no legal or institutional framework or
disaster-management expertise. There was also no Red Cross/Crescent society. There were
very few international assistance actors at the time of the tsunami, notably the UN
agencies, and with a focus on development rather than disasters. Very few Maldivian
organisations can count as NGOs with national reach, but there is a wide range of
community-based associations. Some of these have relevant experience and skills but few
has experience in designing or managing large projects. 
The relief phase
Were the relief programmes, from a capacity perspective, relevant, appropriate and
effective? It is not possible to answer such a question beyond reasonable doubt on the basis
of a 10-day visit some nine months after the event. Nevertheless there are some major
observations that can be made with reasonable confidence, supported both by documentary
sources and by the interviews conducted during the field visit.
1From a technical-logistical point of view, the relief operation seems to have been
reasonably successful. While the local population spontaneously responded to the
situation in the first few days, inter-island communications were quickly restored and
relief supplies started coming in.25 The assistance by several foreign navies seems to
have been relevant and effective. Although there are some indications that relief items
were not always appropriate, and that there might have been some discrimination and
possibly corruption, it does not appear that there were major gaps.
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities 2 The government acted very quickly to set up its Task Force and a National Disaster
Management Centre. The Tsunami Relief and Rehabilitation Fund seems to have been
relevant and well-functioning. Given the lack of in-house experience, international
support to strengthen the capacity of these institutions, and of the different line
ministries, seems relevant and appropriate. Some questions can legitimately be raised
about ‘cost-effectiveness’ of this support and its appropriateness in such unusual terrain. 
3 Assessments seem to have been more problematic. Although the point has been made
several times in the international humanitarian literature that a good assessment looks
at needs but also at capacities, and though there exist specific tools such as Vulnerabilities and Capacities Assessments, it appears that neither the national nor the
international actors paid much attention to existing capacities. Given that quite a
number of initial assessments were carried out through the existing public
administration infrastructure, with requests from the centre in Malé being replied to by
(overwhelmingly male) Atoll and Island chiefs, this is perhaps not too surprising. But
international agencies should have been quicker to pick up on this.
4Perhaps because the relief operation was largely carried out by military/security
personnel and through the public administration, there seems to have been very little
effort to provide information and to solicit and listen to peoples’ views, priorities,
concerns and complaints. 
Transition to recovery
A too-technical-logistical approach to relief delivery often sets a tone for the wider
attitudes, relationships and strategies during the reconstruction and recovery phase,
unless specific and concentrated efforts are made to reverse this. International aid
agencies are by and large not very good at this, and we see that such efforts have also been
slow and hesitant in the Maldives.
1For the first eight to nine months after the tsunami, international agencies have tended
to mirror the national set-up, i.e. highly centralised, top-down and dominated by a Malé
(and predominantly male) perspective. It is only eight to nine months after the disaster
that there is emerging recognition of the need to more directly engage with local level
structures and with the affected populations and intended beneficiaries. 
2There are still few systematic efforts to provide relevant, accurate and timely
information to the target groups, nor enough clear and effective mechanisms for them to
voice their views, concerns and complaints. Some agency staff expressed the belief that
people on the islands are passive, which does not correspond to the articulate and
critical people whom we encountered during our island visits.
3 There also seems to be a belief that there is little or no capacity at local level.
International agencies have sought to contain rather than solve the problem by
importing competencies, and by providing short and somewhat ad hoc training. If too
many trainees are from Malé this may only reinforce the already existing inequalities.
4There has been continued marginalisation of women and longer term displaced people
and perhaps a lack of attention to the perspectives of children and of youth.
5 A very positive contribution by the international assistance community has been the
raising of awareness about the rights and entitlements of IDPs and international
standards. But there remain major shortcomings in providing the IDPs with adequate
protection and adequate information. 
6The restoration of income and/or a regular livelihood is a top priority for disaster
affected people and a major means to reinforce their capacity to cope. Cash-for-work
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projects and investments in the fisheries sector are evidently very important for many
households but income generating activities of women have tended to get overlooked. 
7 Shelter programmes are progressing more slowly than originally planned. This is a
situation that requires concerted information and communication efforts. 
8Psycho-social support programmes could not be fully assessed but clearly there is a
need to focus on the long-term IDPs for whom the uncertainty and lack of information is
depressing. Some interlocutors suggested that more attention should be given to local
and traditional ways of coping.
9 A strategic approach to create a comprehensive multi-hazard risk management
capacity in the Maldives seems to be underway.
Overview
The destruction in the Maldives created a longer term development reversal rather than a
major humanitarian crisis. The need for relief was short-lived. The relief operation appears
to have gone reasonably well with relevant capacity-support to the national authorities.
Arguably more capacity support during the relief phase should have been provided to Atoll
and Island administrations and effective information mechanisms that reached the affected
populations should have been set up from the very beginning.
The performance of the subsequent international assistance for recovery and future disaster
preparedness needs to be appreciated against the pre-existing context: a governance style and
system that was centralised and top-down and did not encourage participatory approaches; a
lack of skilled people; and no effective disaster preparedness. In addition there were intense
pressures within the international community (donors, media, the donating public) to spend
and rebuild quickly. This created conflicting incentives. Transforming these situations does not
happen within the span of a year. It would therefore be unfair to criticise the aid community
and the national authorities for not having already made greater impact in this regard. Our
main criticism is that it has taken the international agencies much longer than was justified,
six to seven months at least, to move out of relief mode. This may be a global problem in
humanitarian response and not specific to performance in the Maldives.
The persistence of sectoral rather than more integrated or holistic approaches is one
indicator that programming is still not fully in developmental mode. While capacity￾strengthening has now come much more clearly on the agenda of the international
agencies, further thought should be given to the objectives and methods. Whose capacities
should be considered and for what? 
Recommendations to the international
agencies
1 Capacity strengthening of the public sector, civil society and
population should become an explicit programme with
emphasis on inclusion, equity and risk reduction.
• There is opportunity to link the tsunami recovery strategy to the wider national
development challenges. Issues such as regional inequalities, the roles and
responsibilities of the public and the private sector, the opportunity cost of investing
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
heavily in future tsunami preparedness, and the structural marginalisation of women
need to be considered. 
• Development debates about issues such as the Focus Island strategy should not be kept
within elite policy circles. International agencies have a role to play in encouraging
more public information and public participation. 
• There should be a shift from sectoral to more integrated developmental approaches.
•Civil society should be supported in a constructive manner. There is, for example,
interest among Maldivian organisations in the idea of creating a national federation of
NGOs. It should be clearly understood that government, non-governmental actors and
international agencies each have their strengths and can play complementary roles.
The current political reforms provide an opportunity but naturally create apprehensions
and resistances. The attitude of the international community in this regard could help
to reduce apprehensions in the government about allowing more space to non￾governmental actors.
•International actors could also support communication between civil society
organisations and the central government about the actual progress, impacts and
consequences of national recovery policies and strategies.
2 More strategic and comprehensive engagement of national
and local organisational capacities to provide an enabling
environment.
• Capacity strengthening efforts should continue to be broadened beyond the central
government to Atoll and Island administrations, development committees, women’s
development committees, IDP committees and community-based associations. This
should include opportunities for members of these various entities in different atolls of
the Maldives to meet, discuss and exchange experiences and also to meet up with
comparable entities in other affected countries.
• Learn more about local contexts and power dynamics. There may be a tendency to
depict the structures and dynamics of all atolls and islands as basically similar but this
is not necessarily the case. Each zone and location has its own smaller or bigger
history, and its own social, economic and political dynamics.26
• Such organisational capacity strengthening efforts should not be focused on project
administration competencies but on inclusive and participatory approaches and of
transparent and responsive approaches.27 
• Conduct a focused cross-agency review of ‘capacity-assessment’ and ‘capacity-building’
methods, strategies and their effectiveness.
•Focused reflection and possibly redefinition of the roles and responsibilities of technical
private sector contractors around the issue of participation.
26 UNDP, for example, is channeling funds for shelter and livelihood projects through Island
Development Committees. Women Development Committees are going to be involved in implementing
UNDP livelihood projects for women. Yet not infrequently it is again the island chiefs who dominate
these committees. Some island chiefs even seem to be members of Women Development Committees,
and in some instances the committee is chaired by the wife of the island chief or dominated by other
women from the local elite.
27 UNDP’s Atoll Development and Sustainable Livelihood Programme is one well suited framework for
this (Maconick 2005 p 4).
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
3 More vigorous support to affected and vulnerable people so
that they can assert their independence and ability to hold
others accountable.
•More emphasis on income generation and livelihood opportunities.
• Systematic and sustained information strategies targeted at affected people and
intended beneficiaries about the assistance programmes, their intent, criteria, progress
and delays. The Maldives media should also be considered a mechanism to encourage
wider and informed public debate.
•Focused efforts to actively engage women, children, youth, longer term displaced people
and poor households, and to build their knowledge and confidence to speak up.
•Active involvement of the long-term IDPs in the analysis and debates about return
and/or resettlement options and in the design of new settlements and services.
• Establish more structured mechanisms through which people can effectively transmit
their views, needs, concerns and complaints to duty-holders and decision-makers.
•Periodic reviews of programmes and policies involving the affected population and
intended beneficiaries along the lines of social audit. 
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Annex 4: Sri Lanka report –
executive summary
By Arjuna Parakrama with contributions from Elisabeth
Scheper and Sudarshana Gunawardena
Introduction
The December 2004 tsunami, triggered by a massive earthquake off the coast of
Sumatra, was the worst natural disaster in living memory in Sri Lanka. The
challenge of the relief, recovery and reconstruction remained enormous alongside
the most impressive show of human kindness and sharing demonstrated by local
people in the immediate aftermath. Vulnerable groups, such as poor fisherfolk living
close to the shore in simple houses and shelters, have borne the brunt of the
negative impacts. Coastal communities are comparatively poor in the Sri Lankan
context (25–33 per cent of the affected population lived below the poverty line) and
the tsunami compounded previously existing vulnerabilities. The northeast is the
region worst affected by the tsunami.
Just as the tsunami itself was without precedent, so too was the speed, breadth and
magnitude of international support for the survivors in Sri Lanka. This abundance,
even excess, of resources created a new experience for the international agencies
engaged in the tsunami response. International NGOs were able to obtain funds
directly from the (first-world) general public and, therefore, became less dependent
on traditional (bilateral) institutional donors. Here, then, was an unprecedented
opportunity to respond to this complex humanitarian emergency, without the usual
debilitating resource constraints. For once, international NGOs had the luxury of
designing and implementing programmes as they wished, which, coupled with the
learning from Rwanda and elsewhere, provided an opportunity to demonstrate best
practice in the humanitarian sector, thereby silencing critics of the international
system. Thus, very early on in the crisis, it became clear that the established
humanitarian relief system was being tested in the crucible of the Indian Ocean
tsunami response.
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However, with the increase in resources came an equivalent increase in profile and public
visibility. The Western members of the public wanted to know how their money was being
spent. The media followed up with detailed stories from the affected areas, including
assessments on the three-month and six-month anniversaries. Agencies faced pressure to
scale up immediately to include new sectors and geographical areas, and to adopt new
administrative regimes in order to spend the additional money received. These sectors
often transcended the agencies’ proven specialisations, the areas included some outside
the staffs’ ability to respond effectively, and the regimes included procedures that further
centralised decision-making in the name of speed and efficiency.
The Sri Lankan country study is one of four undertaken by the TEC local and national
capacities evaluation, which in turn is one of five evaluations undertaken by the Tsunami
Evaluation Coalition (TEC). The purpose of the evaluation is to ‘determine the impact of the
international tsunami response on local and national capacities for relief and recovery, and
risk reduction’. The international team consisted of Arjuna Parakrama and Elisabeth Scheper.
This evaluation is based not only on consultations with formal stakeholders in government
and aid agencies but also on a survey of more than a thousand claim-holders in affected
communities. For further background to the evaluation, see the regional report. A summary of
findings from the Sri Lanka survey of claim-holders is presented as Annex 7 below.
The capacities evaluation in Sri Lanka seeks to assess how the spectrum of international
actors and their national partners fared in engaging with local and national capacities to
deliver goods and services, in enhancing the access of affected populations to the relief and
recovery process, and in enabling them to hold duty-bearers accountable to claim-holders.
All this is mediated through the lens of local and national capacities. Capacities to deliver,
provide, address, absorb and articulate are well known, but capacities to recognise and
nurture are less well understood, and still less studied are those capacities which serve to
resist elite capture at all levels and among all stakeholders. Capacities are not sets of
abstract or context-independent aptitudes and skills that are reducible to technical criteria,
but, rather, can be seen to be played out within a complex political economy that is mediated
by unequal power relations. In summary, local capacities cannot be understood as neutral in
relation to context or culture, and require a safe environment for their articulation.
Findings
The overall finding of the claim-holder survey in Sri Lanka is declining satisfaction with the
tsunami response (Figure A4.1). 
In relation to the different actors, findings are:
International agencies
• Fund-raising appeals led to unprecedented donations for tsunami aid, but put high
pressure on delivery and capacity to scale up capacity. 
• Serious contradictions exist between the normal programming of aid agencies and their
tsunami response in terms of planning processes, community participation, gender￾sensitivity and targeting of marginal groups.
• Pressure to spend has favoured capital-intensive programmes to the potential
detriment of more sustainable livelihood initiatives and partnership opportunities with
local organisations. 
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
• Aid has not been distributed according to need: for example, more assistance for
fisheries sector over others; within the fishing sector, there was concentration on boats
not nets, boat-owners not wage labourers; and support was unevenly divided between
districts. 
• Inappropriate recruitment procedures with a focus on technical skills rather than
contextual knowledge.
• Problems in the transition from relief to recovery, with insufficient attention to
development issues.
•Tensions between imperatives to nurture participation in decision-making (including
abiding by decisions taken by national and local stakeholders) and international
standards (including those on building on local capacity, non-discrimination and gender
sensitivity) constrain the effectiveness of international agencies. 
National government
• National government had insufficient capacity, understanding and human resources to
deal with multi-agency response.
•Personal commitment was shown by local officials but they were disempowered by the
central level.
•Differences in resource allocation and policy implementation raised questions about
government intentions, particularly in conflict-sensitive areas. 
• Confusion and lack of transparency over key policy issues, such as the coastal buffer
zone, have debilitated both the relief and recovery phases.
• Major communication and information-sharing problems occurred between government
agencies and with the international community.
0
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
% 45
Good Bad
5
First 
week
Three 
months
Eight 
months
Overall
Figure A4.1: Assessment of tsunami response performance during the first
week, three months, eight months, and overall 
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
Local government
•Roles of national, provincial and district government in capacity strengthening need
streamlining and joint planning to make these efforts more sustainable. 
• Innovative and people-sensitive local officials need to be supported by the system, not
penalised or placed at risk, particularly in conflict areas.
•District government needs more structural capacity-building support to absorb new
personnel, fill positions and face new challenges.
• The lack of accurate data make planning, coordination and monitoring extremely
difficult, while existing data are insufficiently used.
• Separation between tsunami, conflict recovery and development funds and their
different timeframes, prevent strategic and holistic reconstruction programming.
• A comprehensive plan and funding is needed to resolve the land-acquisition issues that
have been slowing down the shelter programmes for the displaced.
•Awareness and planning for disaster-risk preparedness programming in tsunami
reconstruction is minimal at all levels.
Community leadership and community-based organisations
(CBOs)
• Empowered and articulate CBOs and their leaders are not treated with due respect by
some national and international agencies.
• There is a need to build accountable partnership relations, instead of sub-contracting.
• There was a lack of information-sharing, and basic consultation processes in
community programmes implemented by international agencies disempowered local
leaders.
• The continuation of cash-for-work programmes beyond the initial emergency phase
requires systematic analysis to determine their impact on the local economy and the
possibility of corruption.
• Changing conflict and political dynamics force changes in governance approach, from
control to participation and accountability, and vice versa.
•Faced by new obligations and responsibilities such as multiple land disputes, planning
decisions and the peace process, local leaders will need to interact more with
international agencies in the tsunami recovery process.
• There has been inadequate targeting of marginal groups within communities.
• The tsunami response has tended to exacerbate regional disparities and perceptions of
grievance among ethnic groups.
• Discrepancies in the treatment of conflict-affected and tsunami-affected communities
have resulted in a lost opportunity.
• International agencies could use this opportunity to build or strengthen civil society,
especially in the field of participatory community development and grassroots
mobilisation. 
• CBOs specialised in advocacy and peacebuilding, working in conflict zones mostly, are
drawn into community-based recovery programmes, outside their expertise and
experience, without adequate support and capacity enhancement. 
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• There is a huge unmet need for capacity strengthening and institutional development
with civil-society organisations due to vast increases in staff, change in structure and
approach and expansion into new areas.
• Three-month funding timeframes, monthly reporting, different formats per agency and
slow procedures are too cumbersome and hamper institutional development.
Claim-holders
• There is unintended bias toward richer people, and insufficient inclusion of the most
vulnerable, such as landless people, renters and the self-employed affected by the
tsunami.
• The TEC survey identified significant dissatisfaction among beneficiaries toward their
community leaders, with 28 per cent unhappy with their performance and only 6 per
cent happy with it. Reasons for this were found among the qualitative responses and
included failure to distribute assistance equally, unfair cash distribution, collection of
wrong information, and not recognising people with different opinions.
• Equity and asset-creation principles have been inadequately articulated and remain
exceptions even among agencies that implement them elsewhere, thereby marginalising
the poorest.
•Women have suffered most from both conflict and tsunami: livelihood programmes
should prioritise most vulnerable war and tsunami widows, and actively engage them in
the information loop.
• Conflict-affected and already marginalised districts are suffering from neglect in the
tsunami response.
• Lack of participatory policy affects communities adversely and leads to slow overall
progress of shelter and livelihood rehabilitation. 
Human resources
• In general, immediate efficiency and delivery were prioritised over sustainability and
longer term capacity strengthening.
• In the international agencies, problems included high staff turnover, inappropriate job
profiling, loss of institutional memory, marked disparity in remuneration, ‘poaching’ and
conspicuous isolationism through security-related frameworks.
•At the national/provincial level, disparities among national and local staff lead to
resentment.
•At the local level, the tsunami response indicated insensitivities to local traditions and
culture.
Unintended bias toward ‘richer’ people
• In the planning phase, the speed and size of programming reduced room for
participation of marginalised people. At best, procedures have replaced real
participatory processes.
• In the implementation phase, there has been a lack of flexibility to nuance projects to
the needs of most vulnerable groups (squatters, tenants, self-employed) and improve
their capacity to access services. 
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
•Within monitoring and evaluation, the appropriateness, relevance and effectiveness of
assistance to the most vulnerable and marginalised groups are not well monitored.
The need for more equal distribution of aid emerges strongly in the claim-holder survey
(Figure A4.2). 
Continue cash assistance
Asign INGO per area
Can’t say
% 30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Distribute aid equally to all
More livelihood programmes
Increase people’s participation
Figure A4.2: What aspects of the international and national tsunami
response would you like to see changed?
Conclusions
In general, there has been inadequate recognition of the extensive and diverse local and
national capacities that exist at both the institutional and individual levels. The
international response has not been able to facilitate nascent local capacities in a serious
and sustainable manner, nor national capacities beyond providing de-contextualised
technical support to engage with these issues, thereby not merely losing an opportunity to
link this humanitarian intervention with longer term structural concerns, but also, in some
cases, unintentionally exacerbating inequalities and tensions.
In Sri Lanka, the constant refrain of international NGOs and donor agencies was that
humanitarian response and sectoral capacity as well as post-disaster experience was
woefully lacking in country, necessitating the ad hoc hiring of international staff on short￾term contracts to perform immediate tasks. Yet, the time taken by these recruits to
become familiar with the complex and dynamic local contexts, as well as the costly
mistakes precipitated by such ignorance, was not accounted for, nor was the perfectly
reasonable alternative used of hiring local staff with appropriate contextual knowledge and
then training them in the relevant sectors. Moreover, there is very strong and persistent
evidence across the board on the question of ‘poaching’ within the UN system, across
international NGOs and between international NGOs and CBOs.
International agencies have gone far beyond their core mandate and competencies. This
has been a major obstacle to sustained engagement with local and national capacities. The
problem was worsened by an overestimation of international capacity to deliver, coupled
with an underestimation of delivery costs. Delays in permanent housing and livelihood
support have compounded this problem, even creating serious three-way tension among
claim-holders, government and donor agencies. 
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Considered collectively, the international tsunami response has not demonstrated the
capacity to address fundamental issues of equity and inclusion within and across sectors
and geographical areas, to utilise gender- and conflict-sensitive approaches, to integrate
poverty and marginalisation concerns, and, most importantly, to set in place transparent
mechanisms and modalities of accountability to beneficiaries. 
The majority of programmes have no specific targeting mechanism and seek to mainstream
a uniform response, which may in practice serve only to exclude the most vulnerable and
marginalised who are less able to access common services and/or have special needs and
constraints. While a few good initiatives have emerged, in general the tsunami response
framework in Sri Lanka serves the ‘lowest common denominator’ in the recovery phase, by
privileging house-owners and boat-owners. In general, the vulnerable position of women
has been acknowledged, but gender-sensitive programming has been inadequate. Often
women are the majority of participants, but their decision-making role remains unclear.
Gender-based violence is a serious concern throughout the region. The majority of
programmes have adopted a ‘gender-neutral’ or ‘gender-blind’ policy, whereas what is
required is specific targeting or affirmative action. 
The claim-holder survey indicates that systems of sharing accurate information in a timely
and user-friendly manner have not improved in the second and third phases of the tsunami
response, when they are even more urgently needed since long-term choices are at stake.
Downward accountability and transparency has been almost entirely lacking. International
agencies need to ensure accountability through basic practical mechanisms. No significant
change has taken place relating to either accountability or transparency in the recovery
and rehabilitation phases. The essential conditions for the empowerment of claim-holders
include comprehensive information-sharing and setting up appropriate contextually
sensitive communication strategies. These need to be addressed through the engagement
with and enhancement of local and national capacities to ensure that no unnecessary risks
and challenges are imposed on local communities. Recommendations to international agencies • Involve claim-holders in the design, planning, implementation, monitoring and
assessment of rehabilitation initiatives in general, but especially in the permanent
housing and livelihoods programmes.
• Establish guidelines or a code of conduct that would govern the procedures for
recruitment and working conditions of international NGO staff, both local and
international, which would include modalities to be adopted regarding employing staff
of other agencies and government.
• Adopt the principle of a ‘right to information’ and provide, proactively, accurate, timely
and user-friendly information (e.g. translated into the appropriate local language and
presented simply and clearly) on a regular basis to all claim-holders to enable them to
take informed decisions.
• Ensure transparent and mutually accountable partnerships between donors and local
organisations through sharing of budgets (including salaries and overhead costs) and
reports.
• Address poverty/equity and conflict/exclusion issues through providing livelihood and
housing options to the poorest and conflict-affected people, even if they are not directly
affected by the tsunami.
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• Address issues of intra-district and inter-district equality through better coordination
and greater flexibility of programmes.
• Identify (through participatory processes) the context- and phase-specific needs/rights
of vulnerable and marginal groups, including women, the aged and children, and
address these needs/rights as matters of the highest priority.
•Facilitate advocacy around issues and concerns of claim-holders, and ensure that their
voice is heard at the sub-national and national levels in order to influence policy
formulation.
• Adopt a rights-based approach in the humanitarian sector, and develop an agreed code
of conduct or guiding principles that incorporate the existing codes and standards.
• Jointly support independent watchdog movements and mechanisms of redressing
grievances, and provide them with complete access to all information. 
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Annex 5: Thailand report –
executive summary
By Elisabeth Scheper with inputs from Smruti Patel
Introduction
The December 2004 tsunami was the worst natural disaster in Thailand’s history, affecting
six provinces along the Andaman coastline: 5,395 people died, 2,817 people disappeared and
8,257 people were seriously injured; 3,302 houses were totally destroyed and 1,503 houses
partially damaged; more than 35,000 families lost their livelihoods. The damage was
localised and varied from scarcely visible in some areas to total destruction in others. 
Seven unique characteristics of the tsunami response in Thailand affected national and local
capacities: 
1 Thailand declined international financial assistance, but welcomed specific technical
assistance.
2 Because tsunami damage was localised, no large-scale infrastructural reconstruction
was required. 
3 Thailand activated the 1979 Civil Defence Act, rather than creating a new tsunami
coordination office. This freed resources and maximised the capacities of national and
local line ministries.
4 The Thai population responded generously with sizable public cash donations and
unprecedented donations in cash and kind from the private sector. 
5 International agencies providing technical assistance focused on their core mandates of
participatory planning, inclusion of vulnerable groups, child protection and disaster-risk
reduction.
6The loss of more than 3,330 foreign lives gave an international presence to the
humanitarian effort. 
7 The local and international media played an important role in helping beneficiaries
acquire more equal access to tsunami assistance and advocating for indigenous rights in
land disputes.
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This study reviews the impact of the international tsunami response on Thailand’s national
and local capacities. Because Thailand declined international financial assistance, the
review analyses only government coordination and private-sector response. Given these
special circumstances, the review team was reduced to two members, and the timeframe of
the mission was limited to 10 days. 
General conclusions
Capacity to deliver: The Thai government led an efficient immediate emergency and early￾recovery response, including prompt provision of health services, a major forensic
operation, construction of temporary shelter and permanent houses, use of military assets
to support the tsunami recovery, compensation to survivors, mobilisation of public funds
and attention to disaster management. 
Eight success factors were identified in interviews with the government, NGOs and UN
officials and confirmed by a UN workshop on Best Practices in May 2005: 
1 the use of existing systems, such as the Civil Defence Act
2 the central coordinating committees, with different line ministries taking the lead
3 the generosity of the general public and business sector
4 the international pressure on the government to perform well, in view of the large
number of foreign victims and displaced tourists
5 clear timeframes and budget lines
6 a strong national government that managed the emergency operation with one voice
7 support to disaster-preparedness capacities and review of environmental protection
policies
8 a long-term reconstruction focus on technical-skill development and ownership.
The national government activated its existing Civil Defence Act emergency system, which
successfully mobilised and directed human and financial resources of relevant line
ministries to the affected areas. Ad hoc central coordination mechanisms were therefore
unnecessary. This made the Thai tsunami response more appropriate than the others
reviewed, and added to the efficiency. 
In the first and second emergency phases, the strong national level coordination
temporarily bolstered the capacity of district authorities to deal with the search, recovery
and repatriation of tsunami victims and to provide compensation to the affected population.
However, the national tsunami response has not had a lasting impact on capacity. The role
of district authorities in the coordination and monitoring of the reconstruction phase is very
limited. It further failed to systematically include beneficiaries in the planning and
implementation of reconstruction programmes. 
The reconstruction and development phase will require a more participatory and rights￾based approach to reach the same levels of efficiency. Strong centralised control worked
well in the emergency phase, but tends to overlook the interest of poor communities. Some
key concerns in the reconstruction phase include:
• priorities of the medium-scale business community
• land disputes in local communities
• government-provided housing that is not suitable to the livelihoods of poor 
communities
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities • individuals affected by the tsunami and engaged in land disputes being dependent on
the generosity of NGOs and volunteers
• denial of transitional assistance to unregistered migrant workers.
International agencies efficiently provided technical support in coordination. Because they
were not involved in large-scale operational work, they continued to address sensitive
issues of community participation and the needs of vulnerable groups. The abundant
tsunami donations have given the international agencies a window of opportunity to pilot
alternative, sustainable development approaches with communities. However, this window
is of limited duration and agencies would do well to give greater emphasis to advocacy with
national government in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of tsunami
programmes. Some tensions exist among international NGOs, local NGOs and CBOs. Few
international agencies have operational programmes in Thailand and concerns about
presumed religious activities of international NGOs existed prior to the tsunami.
Capacity to access: The capacity of beneficiaries to access services at district and
community level is a complex issue requiring further study. Overall, most communities
managed to access services from government or other sources with the exception of
unregistered migrant workers, who were not entitled to official support and were afraid
of deportation. The national government provided temporary shelter within the first
month and construction of permanent houses commenced in the second. However,
conflicts over land have dominated the rehabilitation process and most government
support to affected districts and communities is poorly coordinated at district level. Some
communities claim that they have received no assistance, or not to the level of assistance
they are entitled. Complaints about corruption of village leaders, adding non-tsunami
affected families to the lists, were frequently heard. District offices are understaffed and
under-resourced to monitor assistance in the field and have limited insight into the
activities undertaken by line ministries. 
Capacity to ensure quality and accountability: The national tsunami response in
Thailand has paid insufficient attention to internal oversight and public accountability. Clear
information is lacking on private-sector donations, which are often awarded directly to
provinces. Private donations are not publicly accounted for, fuelling suspicions that funds were
‘liberally’ applied. UNDP has initiated a Development Assistance Database, which is expected
to make an important contribution to increased transparency of reconstruction and
development programmes in the affected areas, but the government and private sector
donations were not included in the system and it has not been translated into the Thai
language. The media and national human rights NGOs are playing an important role to
highlight the plight of the poor and advocate for the most vulnerable, but there is a still an
important need to incorporate lessons on exclusion and inequality in the tsunami
reconstruction effort. Ethnic and religious balance in the south is fragile and a major
contribution of the tsunami reconstruction is to show a new approach to sustainable
development. 
Conclusions in relation to core messages 
The review identified three cross cutting core messages in relation to international aid: 
Core message 1: Engage with national and local capacities 
The international tsunami response in Thailand focused on technical assistance in two
main areas: identification and repatriation of the deceased and assistance in recovery and
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reconstruction. The largest international forensic operation in history, involving 40 different
countries, proved difficult for the Thai government to manage; some teams were
unprepared to work in a coordinated fashion. But local forensic expertise has improved and
Japan is currently providing technical assistance to train professional search, rescue and
recovery teams in each of the six Andaman Coast provinces.
The Thai decision to request only technical assistance had several key aspects:
• provision of technical assistance is de facto aimed at strengthening national and local
capacities
• assistance was largely provided by agencies with a long pre-tsunami presence in￾country and a good comprehension of the local context, which improved efficiency and
connectedness
• technical assistance was in line with the agencies’ core business, which facilitated
better linking of contextual and sectoral knowledge
• the impact of the international technical assistance in Thailand is likely larger than
elsewhere, as inclusion, equality, accountability and local ownership issues have been
consistently addressed.
This assistance was adjusted appropriately to the shifting needs in the different emergency
phases. In the immediate relief phase, UN agencies provided technical and logistical
assistance to government authorities while international NGOs catered to the needs of
most vulnerable communities excluded from the official response. UNDP assisted in setting
up the international coordination committee; UNICEF helped provide immediate
immunisation, psychosocial support, repairs and reopening of schools. In the recovery
phase, international attention shifted to assessments and participatory planning for
reconstruction, safeguarding inclusion of most vulnerable groups. Most international NGOs
provided financial support to local NGO networks, while UN agencies addressed inclusion
and protection issues. 
The third phase of transition from recovery to reconstruction and development commenced
in April with a shift in coordinating agencies and sectoral focus. Bilateral agencies were
asked to assist in alternative livelihood development to diversify the region’s economic base
and to advise on environmental protection, disaster preparedness and risk reduction.
Additionally, the launching of the Development Assistance Database is aimed at assisting
the Thai authorities in the coordination of international development assistance and also to
increase accountability to donors and beneficiaries.
While the choices of the interventions in different stages were strategic, the cost
efficiency of some international assistance is questionable. Prior to the tsunami, most
international agencies with a presence in Bangkok had a regional mandate; their
national development programmes having ended or having been sharply reduced in the
late 1990s in response to Thailand’s development performance. While the international
tsunami assistance was effective in strengthening national and local capacities in the
relief and recovery stage, involvement in the longer term reconstruction by UN agencies
engaged in participatory planning projects at village level may not be the most efficient
use of resources as it will be hard to devote the same level of resources to these pilot
projects if they were to be implemented on a larger scale. At the same time, the
strategic partnerships developed with local NGOs through these pilot projects will be
valuable to advocate for change in policy frameworks and practices at provincial and
national levels.
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Core message 2: Pay attention to the closely inter-related
concerns of equity, inclusion and downward accountability
International assistance in Thailand prioritised inclusion of vulnerable groups and some
international NGOs assisted vulnerable communities to purchase of land for resettlement
near their original villages. International actors also lobbied for clemency and inclusion of
unregistered workers in the national recovery efforts. At the same time some vulnerable
groups’ interests could have been more effectively addressed. 
The special needs of women were included in international agencies’ project designs but
the mission did not encounter special efforts to strengthen the capacity of, and promote
opportunities for, Thai women in official decision-making structures. One UN agency
identified increased vulnerability of women and children in sexually risky behaviour to
compensate for lost livelihoods.
Although the Development Assistance Database system was intended to increase
accountability to beneficiaries, it did not resonate with national authorities due to lack of
on-line translation and inclusion of Thai government and private sector programmes. The
system is expected to do little to introduce downward accountability practices in Thailand. 
While the conflict among Buddhist and Muslim communities intensified in the neighbouring
provinces, international agencies did not include conflict considerations in their tsunami
work. Agencies could well devote more attention to the process of equitable inclusion of
marginal Muslim fisher communities as a means of learning good practices which could
then be applied in the recovery and peace building efforts in the three southern provinces.
The absence of clear documentation and monitoring of private sector donations in Thailand
raises key questions that require further study.
1 A clear definition of tsunami recovery funding is required to distinguish between
humanitarian assistance and charitable business engagement.
2As many private sector donations are made in the form of grants and soft loans to
restore livelihoods, more attention is needed to setting criteria for eligible candidates
and decision making procedures. Without proper monitoring, these funds could favour
medium size enterprises, and exclude communities with contested land titles, or worse,
promote commercial tourism development at the expense of indigenous communities,
thus exacerbating inequalities and tensions.
3Registration and monitoring of private sector donations to tsunami affected areas would
be a means of addressing rumours of corruption. 
Core message 3: Foster enabling policy conditions and safe
contexts
The international tsunami response in Thailand has emphasised inclusive policies for
vulnerable and marginalised communities. Media and national NGO networks played a
crucial watchdog role and add to the protection of rights of affected marginal communities.
However, by setting up partnerships between international and local actors, the
international community could do more to strengthen the capacity of community
organisations to advocate for basic rights and to implement an advocacy agenda. While the
tsunami response did put these issues on the agenda and created a mechanism that could
form the basis for accountable information sharing, further efforts are required to improve
public transparency and accountability. 
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Recommendations 
In relation to the core messages:
1 Sustained and respectful engagement with local and national
capacities
• There is a need at national level to recognise and value local capacities at individual
and community levels, and to adopt more participatory policy and practice
frameworks. 
• There is a need for transparent planning and monitoring of national and private
contributions to the tsunami reconstruction phase, especially in the livelihoods sector. 
•Information sharing with beneficiaries needs to be improved to create space for
increased participation, ownership and sustainability.
•To enhance local development, international agencies should play a more prominent
role in facilitating partnerships between Thai authorities and local NGOs in the
reconstruction and development process.
2 Equity, inclusion and bottom-up accountability
• Housing and resettlement programmes need to acknowledge indigenous land claims
and apply culturally appropriate planning solutions that incorporate indigenous life
styles. 
• International agencies have been targeting vulnerable groups to overcome exclusion and
inequality issues, but there needs to be more strategic policy advocacy to incorporate
valuable pilot experiences in development frameworks.
• There is an opportunity to integrate conflict and disaster prevention assistance.
Projects to increase participation and reduce inequality in service delivery to poor
Muslim communities could provide valuable models for peace-building in the south. 
• There is a need for more gender sensitive programming, especially in the areas of
women’s participation in public decision-making. There is a need to make relevant
information accessible to women.
• Systematic mechanisms of downward accountability and transparency are not in place.
International agencies could assist authorities to develop mechanisms to monitor the
reconstruction process and strengthen accountability at the community level. 
• The DAD system in its present form does not strengthen downward accountability. It
needs to be translated into the Thai language and include government and private
sector donations to the tsunami.
3 Fostering an enabling policy framework and safe environment 
• International assistance was appropriately geared towards enabling local capacities
and empowering beneficiaries. It included context-sensitive communication strategies
and sustainable disaster preparedness systems. However, the fostering of inclusive and
gender-sensitive governance modalities requires continued attention for a sustained
meaningful participation. 
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• Continued support to human rights NGOs and local NGO networks will be required over
the next years to develop and implement an advocacy agenda that has been set by
claimholders to address land disputes, child protection, political participation, anti
corruption, and transparency, and to promote independent watchdog movements.
• Mutually accountable partnerships between Thai authorities, CBOs and communities
need to be built and strengthened to enable meaningful and informed participation in
decision-making at all levels.
• Thailand made commendable headway to get disaster awareness and preparedness
systems in place at national, district and community level. It is now important to
incorporate globally accepted benchmarks on participation and inclusion of vulnerable
groups.
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28 ‘Beneficiary survey’ is the usual term for such an exercise in soliciting information and feedback from
affected communities on the delivery of goods and services by humanitarian agencies in the aftermath of a
natural disaster such as the tsunami. However, the term ‘beneficiary’ remains a vestige of the now￾unacceptable notion of people as passive recipients of charity. Particularly in an assessment of the
engagement with local and national capacities, such nomenclature has proven to be an obstacle. It has
therefore been replaced by the term ‘claim-holder’ in this TEC evaluation, reflecting a human-rights-based
approach (HRBA) and positing an active, principled partnership in the relief/recovery/rehabilitation process.
Annex 6: Indonesia claim￾holder survey – summary
Background and process
The Indonesia claim-holder or beneficiary survey28 was conceived and designed to seek
validation from affected communities of the detailed interviews and discussions held with a
cross-section of stakeholders relating to the international tsunami response in the country,
paying special attention to the engagement and responsiveness to local and national
capacities. In addition, the survey allowed participants to identify other issues and provide
both a phased and overall assessment of this response. 
The best instrument for such a survey was, therefore, a questionnaire that would elicit both
qualitative and quantitative data, to be administered in selected districts within the Aceh and
Nias provinces. However, lack of time and funds, coupled with the difficulty of finding an
appropriate partner to administer the questionnaires there, resulted in the removal of Nias
Island from the process. In Aceh, a similar situation led to the exclusion of Simeulu, leaving
only four districts to participate in the survey. Specific areas were selected on the basis of a
combination of factors, including stakeholder requests, the need to cover conflict-affected
and difficult-to-access areas, and the ability to find, at such short notice, suitable partners to
conduct the survey in chosen areas.
In adherence to the principle that ‘insiders’ from the various communities interviewed would
be in a much better position to elicit responses on politically and culturally sensitive issues,
it was determined that local community-based organisations (CBOs) or NGOs with
community roots be enlisted as partners to conduct the survey. Thus, Forum LSM, the largest
and most active NGO consortium working in Aceh Province was the obvious and ideal choice
for coordinating the entire exercise.
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The selection of appropriate questions to be included in the questionnaire was done on the
basis of initial discussions with stakeholders and the interviewers themselves. First, key areas
were identified and sample questions discussed, which provided the model for the other
questions. A number of pre-formed questions were modified or deleted and others added in
their stead, as a result of the feedback provided by these groups and the local consultant.
The claim-holder survey consisted of two parts. The first part contained 24 questions of a
relatively straightforward factual nature, and included basic information such as the nature
of the impact of the tsunami on the respondent, the types of assistance received and
demographic details. To facilitate a frank and unfettered response, the identity of the
respondents was protected, with individually distinctive features (such as name, house
number or national identity card number) not being recorded.
The second part of the questionnaire contained 20 descriptive questions, each of which was
structured in the form of a mini-dialogue or ‘conversation’ that would be triggered by the
preceding response within that question. Interviewers were trained in this technique, so
that they could use the written questions as a guide to eliciting information through a
structured dialogue rather than getting stock answers. 
The interview sample
Table A6.1 presents some basic information on the interviewers and the areas selected for
interview, and Table A6.2 contains demographic information about the survey respondents.
Constraints and limitations
Time and funding constraints, lack of access to certain ‘remote’ areas, the onset of
Ramadan during the data collection period, combined with logistical problems of
coordination and monitoring were the main difficulties encountered in undertaking the
claim-holder survey in Indonesia. These and other contextual constraints identified in the
introduction did not permit (a) administering the questionnaire in Simeulue within Aceh
Province, as well as on Nias Island, and (b) adequate cross-checking of data collection and
entry for accuracy and comprehensiveness.
Analysis of responses
This section provides a summary analysis of some key findings of the Indonesia claim￾holder survey. 
Question 26 in the survey relates to ‘whether in the first three months you received what you
needed (in terms of both goods and services) from the government, local organisations and
international organisations.’ While 57 per cent (of the 1,000 respondents) agreed that their
needs had been met, and another 9 per cent said they had received food and medicines, 11 per
cent, which is a significant proportion, answered that they had received ‘nothing’ (Figure A6.1).
This figure is unique to Indonesia, since in the other countries studied there was hardly
any legitimate claim-holder who had not been provided with any assistance in the first
three months. Note that this is not an assessment of adequate or appropriate assistance,
but, if the response has been made responsibly, it is a claim that nothing at all was
received. In other countries, a few families had fallen through the cracks of the system
altogether, and others had complaints that they were not provided with sufficient
assistance in a timely and equitable manner, but this scale of alleged exclusion is
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Yes, received food 
and medicine – 9%
Yes, it did meet my needs, 
no they didn’t vary – 11%
Yes, it did meet my needs, 
we got enough – 46%
Yes, it was different,
I don’t know – 5%
Nothing – 11%
Other – 18%
Figure A6.1: Assistance received in the first three months after the tsunami
(Question 26)
Table A6.1: The claim-holder survey in Indonesia
Number of interviewers 30 
Number of organisations (NGOs or CBOs) represented 8 
Period during which interviews were conducted October/November 2005 
Number of provinces 1 
Number of districts 4 
Number of sub-districts 36 
Number of villages 149 
Total number of interviews 1,000 
Number of interviews by district
Banda Aceh 246
Aceh Jaya 257
Aceh Besar 247
Pidi 250 
Table A6.2: Key demographic details of survey respondents in Indonesia 
Number of respondents 1,000 
Gender disaggregation of respondents Male 49.9%, female 45.1%, undisclosed 5.0% 
Religion of respondents Muslim 99.9%, undisclosed 0.1% 
First language of respondents Bahasa Aceh 95.0%, Bahasa Indonesia 4.3%, Bahasa Nias 0.1%,
Baiko 0.2%, undisclosed 0.4%
Educational attainment of respondents Islamic school 27.1%, diploma 26.5%, NAD 23.5%, postgraduate 6.2%,
boarding school 1.5%, unknown 15.2% 
Income level of respondents (self-categorisation) Poorest 12.6%, middle poor 30.4%, upwardly mobile poor 37.9%, 
middle class 14.6%, rich 2.3%, unknown 2.2%
unprecedented. This response is, however, reinforced by the field visit to Nias Island
(which was not surveyed), where the ‘more remote’ areas, badly affected by the March
earthquake, had also received little or no assistance. 
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Question 27 focuses on ‘when, if at all, were you asked what you needed, and by whom?’
and whether respondents felt that there were tangible results from these discussions.
Judging from the claim-holder responses, the consultative process appears to have been
less than satisfactory, with 57 per cent claiming that they had never been consulted about
their needs (Figure A6.2). Only 20 per cent reported being consulted, while another 4 per
cent said that the discussion had led nowhere. Since this survey was conducted in the
tenth month after the tsunami, such an absence of consultation is serious indeed.
Yes – 15%
Never/no – 57%
Yes, they came and asked 
but nothing given – 4%
Yes, not sure who they are – 5%
Other – 19%
Figure A6.2: Experience of consultation about assistance required (Question 27)
Easier 
for us – 69%
We like cash directly, 
I don’t know – 12%
Easier because we can 
start a new job – 4%
We like cash directly, no people 
don’t feel differently – 5%
Other – 10%
Figure A6.3: Preference for cash instead of food and other relief items
(Question 28)
Question 28 asks whether, in the first three months, cash transfers would have been
preferable to the supply of food and other relief items provided. An overwhelming 90 per
cent felt that cash in lieu of food and other relief items would be better (Figure A6.3). Had
the participatory decision-making process been working better, in deference to popular
consensus, cash grants could have been instituted on a much larger scale, at least in areas
with significant active local markets. As has been pointed out in the literature, cash grants
have the advantage of minimising administrative and overhead costs of donors, in addition
to supporting the local economy.
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
Question 29 refers to collective community-level discussions with local government,
Achenese NGOs, INGOs and others, and asks whether there was any visible coordination
among these agencies. The response is again mainly negative, with 62 per cent saying that
they had never participated or been informed of such discussions, and 28 per cent aware of
some meetings and/or discussions (Figure A6.4). The second part of the question relating to
duplication and waste was not addressed directly by the respondents.
Question 32 asks respondents whether women in the community have changed as a result
of the tsunami response, and whether these changes are considered to be good or bad. In
the first instance, there is symmetry between those who agree that there has been change,
and those who don’t (44 and 43 per cent, respectively). Of those who perceive changes, 20
per cent identify them as good, while 9 per cent state that both good and bad changes have
taken place (Figure A6.5). In the context of the less than positive scenario portrayed in the
pervious questions, the positive change in the role and function of women in a traditional
society is clearly a positive outcome of the tsunami response, which needs to be protected
No, they never 
discussed it – 62%
Yes, we had discussions – 3%
Yes, sometimes we 
have meetings – 3%
Yes – 22%
Other – 10%
Figure A6.4: Experience of community-level discussions with local
government and other agencies (Question 29) 
Other – 13%
Yes, there are many 
changes – 15%
Yes, there are 
good changes – 20%
Yes changes, both 
good and bad – 9%
No change – 43%
Figure A6.5: Perceptions of changes in the roles of women since the 
tsunami (Question 32) 
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
and nurtured in the post-tsunami return to ‘normality’, since experience elsewhere has
been that some of these fragile gains may be rolled back after the most serious
consequences of the natural disaster (or conflict) have been addressed.
Not fair, friends of 
coordinator get more – 6%
Other – 10%
Unfair – 15%
Fair – 75%
Figure A6.6: Perceptions of the fairness of distribution of goods and services
(Question 39) 
Question 39 considers whether everyone has benefited equally from the tsunami
assistance, and whether the distribution of goods and the provision of services were
implemented fairly and equitably. While 75 per cent of the responses indicated that the
benefits had been administered fairly, a significant proportion (21 per cent) felt that the
distribution was unfair. Of this group, 6 per cent went as far as to allege favouritism on the
part of coordinators (those responsible for the delivery of goods), which is a corruption
issue that needs to be addressed by all stakeholders as a matter of high priority. The
implication from this response is, of course, the need for greater accountability and
transparency at all levels, which includes the right to timely, accurate and user-friendly
information.
Conclusions
This claim-holder survey remains an important benchmark in the analysis of the tsunami
response since it provides a systematic and rigorous basis for validating more ad hoc
assessments. The number of interviews (1,000) and their distribution in three urban and
semi-urban districts and one conflict-affected and less accessible district makes this
survey crucial to future assessments as well. A further strength of this survey is that it was
conducted through partnership with organisations with roots and continuing engagement in
the areas surveyed, and that the survey questions and processes were streamlined in
consultation with these partners and their representatives who conducted the interviews.
This utilisation of ‘insiders’ to conduct the interviews was identified by the communities as
a key element in their ability to be open and frank in their responses. It should be noted
that this finding reinforces the comments made by many of those interviewed during the
field visits, even in areas where the survey was not conducted. 
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Annex 7: Sri Lanka claim￾holder survey – summary
Background and process
The Sri Lanka claim-holder survey29 was based on a questionnaire containing both
qualitative and quantitative data, administered in nine key districts within the worst￾affected southern and northeastern provinces. However, the deteriorating security
situation, monsoon conditions and problems relating to access, combined with the peculiar
dynamic created by the imminent presidential election, resulted in the exclusion from the
process of the Kilinochchi and Mullaitivu districts in the north. In addition, the
questionnaires from Jaffna district were not received in time for inclusion in this report.
Specific areas within the districts were selected on the basis of a combination of factors,
including stakeholder requests, the need to cover conflict-affected and difficult-to-access
areas, and the ability to find, at short notice, suitable partners to conduct the survey in
these areas. In this respect, common ground was found in the form of shared principles
between the surveys in Indonesia and Sri Lanka.
In adherence to the principle that people from the various communities interviewed would
be in a much better position to elicit responses on politically and culturally sensitive
issues, it was determined that local community-based organisations (CBOs) or NGOs with
community roots be enlisted as partners to conduct the survey. The selection of partner
organisations to participate in administering this survey was done with the assistance of
UNDP, supplementing its district-level presence with the support of member organisations
of the TEC steering committee. 
In order to ensure a foundation for comparison across the two countries, the same basic
questions used in Aceh were used in the Sri Lanka claim-holder survey, subject to
appropriate modification necessitated by contextual and cultural specifics. The broad
types of questions to be included in the questionnaire were discussed with stakeholders
29 Though ‘beneficiary survey’ is the usual terminology for such an exercise in soliciting information and
feedback from affected communities. The term ‘beneficiary’ implies a passive recipient of charity.
Particularly in an assessment of the engagement with local and national capacities, such nomenclature is
inappropriate.
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
30 Jaffna is not included here, as the data for that district were not available at the time of writing. 
and communities during field visits to affected areas. Training in administering the
questionnaire was conducted by the TEC team, and the local consultant undertook close
monitoring of the entire process.
The claim-holder survey was in three parts. The first part contained 25 questions on
basic issues such as the impact of the tsunami on the respondent, the types of assistance
received and demographic details. The second part of the questionnaire contained 20
descriptive questions, each of which was structured in the form of a mini-dialogue or
‘conversation’ that would be triggered by the preceding response within that question.
The third part of the questionnaire consisted of a set of 16 assessments for respondents
to make by choosing the most appropriate number from 1 (‘good’) to 5 (‘bad’).
The local consultant examined 10 per cent of the completed questionnaires for accuracy,
consistency and omissions. If there were recurrent problems the interviewer concerned
was advised and the problems remedied. In the southern province some of the
interviewers were met in the field and assisted with collecting information. Tabulation of
data was done from the original languages, Sinhala and Tamil, using the specialised
social-science software package for data analysis, SPSS, under the supervision of the
team leader. The dataset is now complete, with the exception of the questionnaires from
the Jaffna district, which had not been received by 20 January 2005, due to the prevailing
security concerns.
The interview sample
Table A7.1 presents some basic information on the interviewers and the areas selected
for interview, and Table A7.2 contains demographic information about the survey
respondents.
Table A7.1: The claim-holder survey in Sri Lanka
Number of interviewers 34 
Number of organisations (NGOs or CBOs) represented 13 
Period during which interviews were conducted November/December 2005 
Number of provinces 2 
Number of districts 630
Number of sub-districts (Divisional Secretary Divisions) 28 
Number of villages 68 
Total number of interviews 1,055 
Number of interviews by district
Hambantota 174
Galle 126
Matara 142
Ampara 206
Batticaloa 213
Trincomalee 194
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
Findings
The following is a presentation of the data in the simplest format and without
explanation. The full report, with explanations and commentary by Arjuna Parakrama
will be made available through TEC along with the full country reports.
1. General response
Table A7.2: Key demographic details of survey respondents in Sri Lanka 
Number of respondents 1,055 
Gender disaggregation of respondents Male 49.9%, female 50.8% 
Religion of respondents Buddhists 34.7%, Muslims 25.4%, Hindu 23.1%, Christian 13.0%, 
undisclosed 0.1% 
Educational attainment of respondents Illiterate (8.9%), primary (24.3%), GCE Ordinary Level (38.5%), GCE Advanced
Level (21.6%), university and equivalent (4.1%), unspecified 2.6% 
Income level of respondents (self-categorisation) Poorest (13.8%), middle poor (26.1%), upwardly mobile poor (22.8%), 
middle class (31.8%), rich (3.3%), unspecified 2.2%
Gendered assessment of the tsunami response, for different phases and overall
Male
% 60
50
40
30
20
10
0
BSQ1 BSQ2 BSQ3 BSQ16
Female
Good
Somewhat satisfied
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
Somewhat dissatisfied
Bad
 Male Female Male Female Male Female
BSQ1: How well were your needs provided in the first week after the tsunami?
BSQ2: How well were your needs provided in the first three months after the tsunami?
BSQ3: How well were your needs provided in the next five months after that?
BSQ16: In general, how do you rate the international assistance to the tsunami?
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
2. Access to support
Accessibility and responsiveness of government officials, international and local agencies, community 
leaders, and dependability of agencies working in village
% 35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
BSQ4 BSQ5 BSQ6 BSQ7 BSQ12
Good
Somewhat satisfied
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
Somewhat dissatisfied
Bad
The above graph represents responses to the questions:
BSQ 4: How accessible and responsive were government officials to your concerns?
BSQ 5: How accessible and responsive were international agencies to your concerns?
BSQ 6: How accessible and responsive were local agencies to your concerns?
BSQ 7: How accessible and responsive were community leaders to your concerns?
BSQ 12: How reliable/dependable were the agencies that worked in your village?
3. Access to justice
The following table presents the main claim-holder responses to the question ‘If there is an
injustice, how can you remedy it?’ The second column represents the options provided. The
responses have been disaggregated by province. This means that 16 per cent of the
Southern Province respondents and 5 per cent of those from the north-east felt that remedy
for injustice should be sought through the tsunami committees. 
Southern (%) North & east (%) Overall (%)
Question 38 Through tsunami committees 15 5 9
Inform HR organisations 2 11 7
Inform authorities 42 37 39
Organise protest 27 24 25
Accept anything without questioning 5 9 7
Put up with injustice in relief distribution 19 5 11
Note: Respondents were permitted more than one choice.
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
4. Using skills and capacities
Appropriateness of regulations, longer term impact of tsunami assistance and 
suitability of tsunami response at village level
35
% 40
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
BSQ8 BSQ9 BSQ13
Good
Somewhat satisfied
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
Somewhat dissatisfied
Bad
The graph above shows responses to the following questions:
BSQ 10: How well did the tsunami response use your skills and abilities?
BSQ 11: How would you assess the changes in capacities that took place as a result?
BSQ 14: How well did the tsunami response take into account women, children and most
vulnerable groups?
BSQ 15: How useful do you think were the consultations held at the community level
regarding providing you with goods and services, including housing?
5. Appropriateness of the response
5
4
3
2
Good 1
Mean
Bad
BSQ10 BSQ11 BSQ14 BSQ15
Use of local skills and abilities, changes in capacity, relating to vulnerable
groups and nature of community consultations 
(mean values, 1 = good and 5 = bad)
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
The graph on the previous page represents responses to the following questions:
BSQ 8: How appropriate were the rules/decisions that affected you after the tsunami?
BSQ 9: What is your view of the longer term impact of the tsunami assistance on you?
BSQ 13: How suitable was the response to the tsunami as it affected your village?
6. Ideas for improving the response
5
4
3
2
Good 1
Mean
Bad
BSQ10 BSQ11 BSQ14 BSQ15
What aspects of the international and national tsunami response would you like to see changed?
% 30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Continue cash 
assistance
Distribute aid
equally to all
Assign INGO
per area
More livelihood
programmes
Can’t say Increase people’s
participation
7. Spread of benefits
5
4
3
2
Good 1
Mean
Bad
BSQ10 BSQ11 BSQ14 BSQ15
Has everyone in your community benifited equally from tsunami assistance?
% 45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0 Equal 
assistance
Favouritism Assistance not
equal
Non-victims
received
Fraud
North and east Overall Southern
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8. Assessment of aid responses
Question 26 (multiple answers)
26. Please describe whether in the first three months after the tsunami you received what
you needed (in terms of both goods and services) from the government, local organisations
and international organisations. What main differences do you see in the approaches of
these organisations?
1 = Food items received were inadequate 
2 = Received too many unnecessary goods
3 = Did not receive anything from the government at all
4 = Local organisations provided, but we not did receive anything
5 = Received assistance from INGOs
6 = Received assistance from villagers, relatives and other people
7 = NGOs provided food items and other goods
8 = No assistance from government in first three months
9 = Assistance received from foreigners and tourists
10 = Immediate response and need fulfilment by local and overseas NGOs was satisfactory
12 = NGOs provided assistance in accordance with our requirements
13 = Problems arose due to the slowness of the government
14 = The government provided us with our requirements
7
15
17
5
21
% 25
20
15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 12 13 14
10
5
0
15
6
4
12
16
6
16
14
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
9. Consultation
Question 27 (multiple answers)
32
16
7 7
17
15
% 35
30
25
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 17
20
15
10
5
0
24
9
27. When, if at all, were you asked what you needed, and by whom? How and where did
these discussions take place? Do you feel that your ideas were listened to, and by whom?
What were the results, if any, of the ideas you expressed?
1 = No organisation or person enquired about it
2 = From the day of the disaster onwards we have been asked about our requirements
3 = Several NGO workers have asked for our ideas
4 = Our opinions were listened to only up to a certain level
5 = On the basis of the aid and cooperation received we can say that our opinions have
had results 
6 = The government enquired 
7 = There is still no response to our opinions
17 = NGOs collected data and distributed aid based on this
10. Aid preferences
28. In the first three months, instead of food and other items, if you had been given cash by
NGOs, would it have been easier or more difficult for you and your family? Now, what
would be the best way to receive assistance? Are there others in your area who may feel
differently? Explain.
1 = Food and other items are much more important than money 
2 = Cash is much more important
3 = The best way to assist is to find badly affected families and to offer them 
4 = If we have money we can buy what we require
5 = Receiving expired food items and non-preferred food items is a problem
6 = Receiving both cash and food items is the best
8 = Now our requirement is goods and services to build our daily lives
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11. Quality of discussions
Question 28 (multiple answers)
53
12 12
% 60
50
1234 5 6 8
40
30
20
10
0
11
9
29
6
Question 29 (multiple answers)
9
8
4
18
5
8
15
10
6
% 20
18
16
1 3 4 5 7 8 9 11 12 13 15 16 22 26
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
5
7
11
55
29. In your village or camp, did local NGOs, INGOs, government officers and others
collectively discuss with all of you what you needed most? How often did this happen, and
what form did it take? Did the different organisations and individuals working in your area
coordinate well, or did you feel any sense of confusion or duplication? Please explain with
specific examples.
1 = During the first few days no one discussed it 
3 = They did discuss
4 = Coordination was good
5 = Discussed once a month at the camp
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
12. Impact on individuals
Question 30 (multiple answers)
% 60
50
12 4 5 6 8 11 19
40
30
20
10
0
52
4 7 7 7
11
6 5
30. In what ways, if at all, have you and your family changed as a result of the tsunami
assistance? Are these changes good or bad? Why have these changes taken place? Are
these changes typical for your community?
1 = Nothing changed 
2 = There was no big change in the family
4 = There is anger shown against each other 
5 = (We) became dependents
6 = There were some changes in the family
8 = Became stronger with aid
11 = Aid is not delivered properly
19 = We live with mental stress
13. Community leaders
31. In what ways, if at all, have your community leaders changed as a result of the tsunami
assistance? Are these changes good or bad? Why have these changes taken place? Do you
think these changes will be permanent? Should they be? 
7 = Even though they discussed they were unsuccessful
8 = Coordination was weak
9 = I do not know whether they discussed or not
11 = No one discussed
12 = They discussed and gathered information but nothing worked out 
13 = Government and NGOs discussed individually
15 = NGOs discussed
16 = Discussions took place about once or twice a week
22 = Assistance was given after discussions
26 = NGOs discussed more than the government
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
Question 31 (multiple answers)
7
% 25
20
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 12 15 20
15
10
5
0
9
21
6
10
5
4
19
7
9
4
8
1 = Respect toward community leaders is gradually decreasing 
2 = They failed to distribute assistance properly
3 = Community leaders cheated the people and got the aid
4 = Do not know
5 = Nothing to say about it
6 = They earned good respect
7 = Community leaders helped in many ways
10 = Community leaders have not changed
11 = Earlier they helped us, but no more
12 = Some community leaders showed negative changes
15 = The changes are not good
20 = Public received adequate level of support from community leaders
14. Changes in the community
32. In what ways, if at all, have the women in your community changed as a result of the
tsunami assistance? Are these changes good or bad? Why have these changes taken place?
Do you think these changes will be permanent? Should they be?
1 = No differences were seen there 
2 = Women have begun income-generation activities
3 = Women try to live on donations
5 = Women move away from their families
6 = Women’s freedom has been reduced
7 = Women lost their self-respect
8 = Women are under mental pressure
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15. Government officers
33. In what ways, if at all, have government and NGO officers changed as a result of the
tsunami assistance? Are these changes good or bad? Why have these changes taken place?
Do you think these changes will be permanent? Should they be? 
1 = No changes 
2 = Could not even meet government officers as they are so busy
3 = There are problems with NGO officers
Question 33 (multiple answers)
15
23
5
7
12
8
23
5 5
9
17
5
% 25
20
15
1 234 58 11 12 14 15 17 21
10
5
0
Question 32 (multiple answers)
% 40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
123567 8
35
19
11
4
7
4 5
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
Question 34 (multiple answers)
18
6
% 20
18
16
1 2 3 4 5 7 9 18 19 21
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
5
14
5
6 6
10
15
5
4 = Government officers have not changed
5 = Aid was distributed unfairly
8 = Do not know
11 = Changes in the NGO officers were good
12 = There are good and bad changes in government officers
14 = Changes in government officers were bad
15 = Every officer worked well only during the first few months
17 = Every officer worked well
21 = NGO officers show both good and bad changes
16. Role of NGOs
34. In what ways, if at all, have government and NGOs as institutions and structures (not as
individuals or in special situations) changed as a result of the tsunami assistance? Are
these changes good or bad? Why have these changes taken place? Do you think these
changes will be permanent? Should they be?
1 = Organisations tend to deliver assistance 
2 = Both governmental and NGO organisations changed
3 = They have come down to the village level
4 = Changes in these organisations are for the better
5 = Changes in the government were no good
7 = They are too concerned about the development of their own organisations
9 = Organisations changed due to the assistance
18 = There were no changes
19 = I do not know
21 = NGOs really worked hard
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Question 37 (multiple answers)
% 30
25
20
1234 67 89 10 11 14 18 19 23 28
15
10
5
0
9
4
10
6
15
11
10 10
24
7
6
9
11
5
10
17. Changes in organisations
37. Are there important differences in the ways of working of organisations that were in
your area before the tsunami to those that came only after the tsunami? What, if any, are
these differences? There are also differences in the ways in which agencies work to provide
tsunami assistance. In your view, which are the best ways of working, and why?
1 = No changes 
2 = There were no organisations before the tsunami
3 = Organisations which were there before the tsunami worked for their financial 
benefit
4 = New organisations (after tsunami) provided free services
6 = Some organisations active before the tsunami became inactive after the tsunami
7 = Pre-tsunami organisations helped us well
8 = Post-tsunami organisations distributed aid even among unaffected families
9 = Pre-tsunami organisations are inactive
10 = There are some changes
11 = The best approach is to discuss with the public and identify their needs
14 = These organisations should work with village-based organisations
18 = Tsunami Operation Committees should be formed in every village to guide all work
19 = I do not know
23 = Post-tsunami organisations worked successfully
28 = The organising skills of both types of organisations need to be improved
18. Equality of benefits
39. Has everyone in your community benefited from the tsunami assistance equally? If not,
describe who has received more, and who has received less. Are there any people who
have been left out altogether? If so, why?
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3 = Families with women heads received very little assistance
19 = People who have the confidence to speak out got more assistance
20 = Poor people are highly affected
21 = People still looking for assistance are high in number
Question 39 (multiple answers)
% 40
35
Equal
assistance
Favouritism 3 Assistance
equal
Non-victims
received
19 20 21
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
35
8
4
32
8
5
6
4
19. Who was worst affected?
Question 40 (multiple answers)
% 45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1 3 4 5 6 19 22 26 31
41
13
8
11
4
15
17
13
6
40. In your view, which types or categories of people have been the worst affected by the
tsunami? Why? Which categories and types of people have been affected least by the
tsunami? 
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Question 43 (multiple answers)
% 30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1 2 3 4 57 8 9 13 17
10
7 7
21
7 5
17
11
25
8
1 = People in the coastal areas are highly affected 
3 = Women are highly affected
4 = Children are highly affected 
5 = People away from the coastal area are less affected
6 = Old people are highly affected
19 = The tsunami affected all people in the region equally
22 = Muslims are highly affected
26 = Tamils are highly affected
31 = Sinhalese are less affected than other communities
20. Accountability
43. Who are the agencies working on tsunami relief, etc accountable to? Who should they be
accountable to? How should this accountability be practised on the ground? What is the
best process of accountability, in your view? 
1 = The government should be responsible to the public 
2 = Community leaders should be responsible to villagers
3 = Be responsible to people in the area
4 = Government should be responsible to the international sector
5 = Cannot say
7 = Every organisation should be responsible to the government
8 = Agencies should be responsible to their head offices
9 = Do not know
13 = Responsibility can be achieved by working with a proper plan based on correct
research findings
17 = Even NGOs are not responsible
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22. Feedback on the questionnaire
45. Please identify any other issues or concerns that you would like to describe. Please also
make any comments you wish on this questionnaire.
1 = This information has been gathered many times 
2 = Answers for the questionnaire will soon be forgotten
3 = We need only relief assistance, nothing else
4 = Nothing to say
6 = Results of this questionnaire should be shared with the public
7 = If this survey took place earlier it would have been better
Question 44 (multiple answers)
% 30
25
20
15
10
5
0
12345 7 8 9 13 17
25
14
11
6
13
4 4
5
7
6
21. Issues for the people
44. What are the main issues (doubts, non-clarity, difficulty), if any, that you have with the
tsunami response, in terms of government policy and NGO practice? How can you
contribute to changing these issues? Are there any processes in place to do this? What is
the best process to follow to do this?
1 = No doubts 
2 = Not pleased about government performance
3 = Should work for everybody according to a proper policy and with responsibility
4 = Everyone should get together and exert pressure
5 = Unfair distribution of tsunami aid
7 = It is better if political involvements were not there
8 = Proper awareness-raising is needed
9 = Even though the objectives of NGOs are not clear, they served the society well
13 = Much interference can been seen from the GS [Grama Niladhari]
17 = Government should intervene responsibly and actively
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Impact of the Tsunami Response on Local and National Capacities
9 = Government should be more active
10 = This questionnaire is very good as it covers many aspects
11 = It is better to start counselling services
13 = If we are rehabilitated, we can stand on our own feet
14 = It is important to obtain public opinion
16 = It is better to force the government to act on this sort of information 
31 = Problems are very complex
Question 45 (multiple answers)
% 30
25
20
15
10
5
0
12346 7 9 10 11 13 14 16 31
7
4
22
7
13
6
27
4
8
5 5 4 5
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117
Annex 8: Financial
statement
Expenses US$
National consultant fees 5,319
International consultant fees 153,260
Beneficiary survey 12,814
Travel 69,305
DSA*/terminal allowances 54,372
Admin, communications etc 3,477
Management consultancy 62,400
Administration (8% UNOPS) 31,725
(* daily subsistence allowance)
Total US$392,672
Donors US$
Action Aid 4,500 
BMZ (Germany) 48,780
Cordaid 24,444
MFA (France) 15,384
NORAD 101,460
Sida 8,000
UNDP 100,000
UNICEF 50,000
UNOCHA 14,000
USAID 30,000
Pledged US$396,568
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Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
July 2006
Impact of the
tsunami response
on local and
national capacities
Tsunami Evaluation Coalition
This first ever multi-location, multi-country
joint evaluation of the impact of an
international humanitarian response on local
capacities – in this case in tsunami-affected
countries – found that most lives are saved
and the initial response made by the affected
communities and their neighbours
themselves. When the international
community – UN agencies and INGOs – joined
these efforts and facilitated local and national
efforts at recovery, the impact was
heartening. When the international
community bypassed or appropriated local
and national response, the impact was almost
always cost, effort and time ineffective.
This evaluation also found that recovery is
complex – early engagement with local actors
in the relief efforts is essential for success in
recovery and reconstruction efforts. In
addition, when the international community
engaged with local capacities (actors,
institutions and markets), social inequalities
and exclusions were better addressed. When
local capacities were ignored, social inclusion
of the most needy remained an often
unsuccessful effort. 
Recovery can take place in a context of war,
conflict, economic crisis and/or social
tension. In all contexts, international
assistance is productive when it is better
prepared to identify and work with local and
national capacities well before the crisis. The
tsunami evaluation found that when
international agencies are able to resist the
pressure to spend quickly and facilitate local
efforts for meaningful recovery, achievements
of the assistance becomes sustainable. The
evaluation concludes that such preparedness
and an enabling international environment
makes engaging with local capacities easier
and more promising for international
agencies.
The Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC) is a
multi-agency learning and accountability
initiative in the humanitarian sector. It was
established in February 2005 in the wake of
the Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunamis of
26 December 2004. 
This evaluation of the impact of the tsunami
response on local and national capacities is
one of a series of five thematic evaluations
undertaken by the TEC in 2005/06. 
This evaluation was co-managed by the
Evaluation Office in UNDP, New York, and by
the All India Disaster Mitigation Institute
(AIDMI). It was guided by a Steering
Committee consisting of representatives from
ActionAid International, AIDMI, CordAid,
UNDP and UNICEF. Funding was provided by
ActionAid International, BMZ (Germany),
CordAid, MFA (France), NORAD (Norway),
Sida (Sweden), UNDP, UNICEF, OCHA and
USAID (United States).
Funded by
9 780850 038125
ISBN 0-85003-812-X
Impact of the tsunami response on local and national capacities
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