:::J
m
.+
< ::;PJ
(1)
C
o
o
0 :3 :::J
_"
0
:::J
n" .+ PJ ::;
:::J (1)
tffGl
"D
0 C U
n" Tl
8
0-
0'
")
m
0-
C
n
0"
:::J
:::J
r=1-:
n3"
OJ
m
-C
(I') CI{E.\TIVE ASSOCL\TES II\'I'ERN \TION
In collaborotion with
CARE, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, AND GROUNDWORK
Basic Education and Policy Support (BEPS) Activity
Evaluation of the Global Food for Education Initiative in the
Dominican Republic
Prepared by:
Frank P. Dall, PhD.
Senior Education Advisor
Creative Associates International, Inc.
5301 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20015
Prepared for:
Basic Education and Policy Support Activity
US Agency for International Development
Contract no. HNE-I-00-00-00038-00
Creative Associates International, Inc., Prime Contractor
August 2004
The opinions expressed in this document are those ofthe writer and are not necessarily shared by the United States
. Agencyfor International Development
1
Map ofthe Dominican Republic
2
Table of Contents
Executive Summary 4
Acronyms and Abbreviations 9
Introduction and Background 10
Proposal Selection Process 10
Participating Institutions 11
A Brief History ofthe GFE Initiative 13
The USDA's Global Food for Education Initiative 13
GFEI Preliminary Results 13
The Uniqueness ofthe DR Program Approach 16
Evaluation Methodology and Constraints 17
Evaluatiol1 Ternls ofReference 17
Evaluation Methodology 18
The Evaluation Process and Schedule 18
DR Program Objectives and Accomplishments 20
Constraining Factors and Limitations 24
Logistical Support e•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 24
Availability ofParticipating NGOs 24
The School year 24
Findings and Conclusions 24
A. Successes and Constraints in School Refurbishment and Construction 25
B. Obstacles and Successes in the Attainment ofProgram Objectives 28
C. Strengths and Opportunities that pennitted Achievement ofUnintended Outcomes 31
D. Lessons learned from Program Management and Implementation 33
Recommendations 36
Some Pending Issues.....•..•••..•..•.•••.••...•.•.....•.••.••.............•••............•..•..••............•..•..................... 38
1. Change of Government 38
2. Economic decline 39
3. USAID's propos~d basic education strategy · 39
Conclusions 39
ANNEXES 41
Annex 1 - Persons interviewed for the GFEI Evaluation 42
Annex 2 - Profiles of Schools Visited 46
Annex 3 - Documents Reviewed 47
3
Executive Summary
History and Background ofthe GFEI
In July 2000, in Okinawa, Japan the United States Government committed $300 million in
resources to establish a school feeding program for developing countries, especially for countries
which had made a commitment to provide universal basic education for children at the EFA
Global Forum meeting in Dakar, Senegal, in 2000. The Global Food for Education Initiative
(GFEI) that resulted is administered by USDA and builds on the ideas promoted by Ambassador
Georges McGovern and former Senator Robert Dole. Under this progranl, USDA provides
surplus commodities and funds to cover transportation and distribution to the World Food
Program (WFP), 13 private voluntary PYas and one national government in the Dominican
Republic, for use in 48 school feeding programs in 38 countries.
The intention ofthe GFEI is to use school feeding programs to increase school enrollments under
the assumption that basic education can help provide an individual with the basic knowledge and
skills needed for selfsufficiency and an improved standard ofliving which in turn may help poor
na~ions improve their productivity and national development.
GFEI projects are selected using a set of criteria that include need, technical criteria, ability to
contribute matching resources, and govenlffient and host governments' commitment to
implement the primary education component ofthe Education for all Declaration made in Dakar,
Senegal.
To date, the GFEI program has reached 7 million children through school or pre-school feeding
programs. This includes about 5 million children through the WFP sponsored projects and 2
million more through pya projects, and this unique GODR run project. Out ofthe 25 school
feeding programs surveyed at the end of2003, 24 were conducted by PYas and one by the
government ofthe DR.
The USDA carried out a formal evaluation with cooperating sponsors in all GFEI countries using
a standardized survey questionnaire based on a modified version of a WFP developed survey
instrument containing 210 questions. The results ofthe survey which was carried out in 2003
show a measurable improvement in school enrolments and a significant increase in girls'
enrolments. However it is not clear whether these changes were a direct outcome ofthe school
feeding program, or ifthey may be related to other exogenous factors not measured by the
survey.
In poorer communities where food deprivation is a chronic factor undermining children's
participation in school activities, parents and teachers report that children display improved
concentration, greater energy, and more positive attitudes toward school work and learning.
However, because the GFEI lacks a clearly measurable set ofindicators, a correlation between
school feeding programs and an improvement in retention and achievement rates still remain
illusively difficult to demonstrate.
4
Likewise, this mainly quantitative assessment suggested that the GFEI program could be
impacting communities in unintended ways. These more difficult to measure qualitative program
benefits include stimulation ofthe local economy, civil society support for education, community
capacity building, stronger parental support for schools and stronger teacher-parent partnerships.
Evaluation Terms ofReference and Methodology
The Scope ofWork for the "Evaluation ofthe Dominican Republic's Global Food For Education
Initiative" was received by Creative Associate's International in Washington DC on the 28th of
June, 2004. The period assigned for carrYing out the evaluation was 20 days from July 17 -
August 16, ofwhich 10 days were spent in situ collecting information and conducting interviews
and field visits.
Time constraints, prior evaluation studies, logistics and budgetary constraints helped determine
the methodology and approach selected for this evaluation. Five qualitative research
methodologies seemed most appropriate for achieving tIns end and these included: 1) A review
ofselected background documents and project records; 2) In-depth interviews with selected key
actors; 3) Field visits with available NGO partners to a variety ofrandomly selected field sites;
4) Field-based focal group meetings with parents, teachers and project support staff; 5) Visits,
informal discussions and interviews with senior STP, SEE, USAID and USDA managers and
program administrators both in the DR, Washington, D.C., and Romania.
Thirty-eight project sites were visited, 27 schools seen, 6 focus groups convened and 121 persons
interviewed over the course of 10 days field work in 3 northeastern provinces and Santo
Domingo. The data collected and the qualitative analysis carried resulted in the following
principal conclusions.
Main Findings and Conclusions
• The Dominican Republic GFE initiative is the only government to government program
currently being implemented and has several unique features; 1) the host MOE assumed
responsibility for providing school meals leaving the USG donation free for
implementing community development and school construction activities; 2) an
independent Program Executive Council was set up to manage the program;
3) responsibility for NGO oversight was given to a government agency; 4) the DR
program was the only program to address access and retention issues beyond merely
delivering donated commodities; 5) the DR project was designed to be a three-year
developnlent process instead ofthe usual one-year pilot school feeding program.
• A comprehensive review ofsample reports, audit documents and interviews with field
staff and Directors from CRS, WV, MUDE, Alas de Igualdad, CEZOPAS, IODI and
IDAC led one to believe that despite initial delays and other administrative constraints,
most NGOs did a reasonable job of delivering what was specified under their contracts.
• The 27 schools visited supported the general claim that the DR GFEI program was strong
on construction but weak in showing measurable education achievements such as gains in
learning achievement, enrolment and retention levels linked specifically to the impact
being made by the school feeding program. The inability to see children and teachers in
5
an active classroom limited in understanding the impact made on teaching/learning
dimensions on participating schools.
• Ifthe DR's GFEI programs' success is to be measured in the number of construction
projects completed such as schools refurbished, toilets built, kitchens completed and
fences erected, then this would have to be rated as very good. In all 27 schools there was
ample evidence ofwork successfully carried out to provide all or most ofthe physical
infrastructure requirements for the schools listed.
• In 99% ofthe schools visited, newly established school libraries were bookless or only
had a set offour reference books. The reason given for the lack ofbooks was that the
books promised by the GFEI project had yet to be delivered by the government agency
responsible.
• School vegetable gardens seen1ed to be n10st successful where the NGO leading this
aspect had prior experience in horticulture, could field trained agricultural extension
workers and had the motivation to provide training and timely technical support.
• Highly visible community school construction projects provided the catalyst needed to
motivate dormant PTAs into committing time and resources for the improvement oflocal
schools.
• SEE provided the meals that were making a positive impact on children's health and
attendance, especially in poorer communities. There were some anomalies, though: meals
delivered were undercounted and had to be carefully checked by teachers on delivery;
meals were sometimes not delivered on time; meals were 110t delivered because offuel
shortages; and school meal programs were poorly monitored and supervised by local SEE
staf£
• NGOs with strong sectoral experience in health, nutrition or agriculture were able to use
this experience to successfully promote community outreach programs. Notable in this
respect were WV in health and community development; MUDE, CEZOPAS and CE￾Mujer in mobilizing women's support and in promoting home-based milk and egg
production and nutrition improvement; CRS-IDAC in promoting community health,
hygiene training and change in health behaviors; Alas de Igualdad in supporting
community production of vegetables and poultry in some ofthe poorest communities;
Only WV and CRS had had substantial prim7 experience doing educational programs,
which probably explained why many ofthe educational dimensions ofthe GFEI program
remained unresolved.
• The best locally produced nutrition and hygiene materials seen were those produced with
CRS in collaboration with IDAC, CEDECO, CE-Mujer, WV, MUDE and teachers from
20 participating rural schools. The materials seen were ofhigh quality and well produced.
A unifying environmental health and hygiene theme was used to bring together different
components in an integrated way.
Some Unintended Outcomes
• For many Batey communities learning to work together through the GFEI experience, in
what was essentially a highly dysfunctional and competitive social environment, was a
healing experience. The resulting community empowerment process spawned new
6
community initiatives and helped to trigger a spirit of cooperation, as was the case in
Altagracia and Villa La Construcci6n.
• International NGOs with prior experience working with donors or UN agencies were able
to bring to the program a wealth of experience and resources that helped smaller local
NGOs build capacities to deal with some ofthe more challenging aspects ofthe DR
GFEI.
• The addition ofnew classroom space seems to have stimulated a demand for more
teachers and at the next level (i.e., communities, where primary schools have expanded to
provide the full 8th grade elementary cycle, now want secondary schools).
• In sonle con1l11unities, NGO-sponsored training in the management ofWater and
Sanitation Services, led to the creation of voluntary village committees to deal with
.sewerage, garbage disposal, road drainage and other non-progranl related reconstruction
projects.
Lessons Learned
• Some NGOs selected were never in the position to take on the adnlinistrative and
financial management challenges of an internationally funded program. The GODR was
slow to recognize this and failed to carry out the training needed to bring NGOs up to par
on the basics ofsound management, especially financial management practices.
• The STP failed to understand the need for establishing norms and indicators for the work
being commissioned from NGOs. This meant that a lot ofthe work carried out was
poorly monitored and of variable quality.
• GODR and NGO nlanagers commented on the shortage oftime allowed to implement the
GFEI. The three years allotted were not enough to see the softer educationalachievement
and community development elements reach conclusion.
• A lack of clarity in accounting procedures, or an unwillingness on the part ofsome NGOs
to show their cost-sharing contribution, delayed the disbursement ofprogram funding at
critical moments in program implementation when external funding was needed to keep
program momentum going.
• The institutionalization of a community co-financing aspect in the GFEI was seldom
stressed and never included in the original project plan. The long-term success ofthis
kind ofintegrated community development approach will depend on implementing a
viable co-financing or community credit strategy that can be made to work for poor DR
communities.
• Membership in the CEP helped to forge the trust needed to build transparent management
practices and strengthen decision making processes between USAID, USDA, SEE and
the STP.
• USAID and USDA leamed that NGOs living and working within targeted communities
were better able to get the job done than NGOs supervising program implementation
from Santo Domingo.
• The DR GFEI was too diffuse and tried to do too nluch. Too much emphasis was given to
the water and sanitation and construction elements and not enough to the teacher training
and the learning dimensions ofthe program.
• The integrity, transparency leadership skills ofthe GFEI-STP coordinator, may have
contributed to the overall success ofthe DR-GFEI model.
7
• The external audit drew attention to the cumbersome bureaucratic financial management
systems operating within the STP and other government offices. STP management will
need to review and reform financial and other management protocols, should the program
be extended.
Recommendationsfor the Future ofthe Program
The high cost and the amount offunding available to support a continuation ofthe DR GFEI will
be critical determinants in any decision to extend the program. The high opportunity cost of
continuing the program in its present form and scope will be the challenge.
Therefore, anyone ofthe following three options can be recommended:
1. Continue the GFEI program as is, but with a smaller number ofparticipating NGOs
targeting a smaller better focused group ofdeserving communities with a clearer set of
community development guidelines and better defined educational objectives.
2. Radically modify the existing program, emphasizing only the most successful social and
educational aspects such as more support to PTAs, increase locally produced dietary
supplements, strengthen community outreach programs, etc. Where possible, encourage
communities and the local private sector to contribute toward the improvement ofbasic
services to meet locally identified education and community development priorities.
3. Discontinue USAID support for the GFEI integrated community development program
and replace it with a rural basic education quality improvement program focused on the
educational priorities proposed in the new USAID country strategy for basic education.
8
ALAS
CE-MUJER
CEZOPAS
CIAC
CPBP
CRS
DR
EERC
FAO
FAS
FUSABI
GFEI
GODR
IDAC
IDDI
MOA
MOB
MUDE
NGO
PAHO
PEC
PTA
PVO
SEE
STP
UNICEF
USAID
USDA
WATSAN
WFP
wv
Acronyms and Abbreviations
Wings ofEquality
Center for Solidarity for Women's Developnlent
Social Pastoral ofthe Central Zone
Center for Investigation and Cultural Support
Presidential Commission for Peri-Urban Communities
Catholic Relief Services
Dominican Republic
Educational Evaluation Research Consortium
Food and Agricultural Organization
Foreign Agricultural Service
Dominican Health and Wellbeing Foundation
Global Food Education Initiative
Government ofthe Dominican Republic
Dominican Institute for Community Action
Dominican Institute for Integrated Development
Ministry ofAgriculture
Ministry ofHealth
Women in Development
Non-Governmental Organization
Pan-American Health Organization
Program Executive Council
Parent Teacher Association
Private Voluntary Organization
Secretariat ofEducation
Technical Secretary ofthe Presidency
United Nations International Children's Enlergency Fund
United States Agency for International Development
United States Department ofAgriculture
Water and Sanitation
World Food Program
World Vision
9
Introduction and Background
On the 21 st ofJune, 2001 USAID Santo Domingo and the Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS) in
cooperation with the Government ofthe Dominican Republic (GODR) through the Technical
Secretariat to the Presidency (STP) and the Secretariat ofEducation (SEE) signed an agreement
GFE-517-2001/687-00 to carry out educationimprovement, community development and school
feeding programs in six Eastern Provinces ofthe island. The USDA managed Global Fund for
Education Initiative (GFEI) donated 50,000MT ofwheat and 12,200MT ofCrude Soybean Oil
which was sold locally for RD$238,800,OOO (Officially given at USDA GFEI closing
conference) including interest, or 12M US$. The proceeds were placed in a special account
managed by a Program Executive Council (PEC) specially constituted to include representatives
from USAID, FAS, STP and the SEE. The proceeds ofthis donation were then used to
implement school feeding and educational improvement programs in poor rural Bateyes, and
peri-urban communities. Local and international NGOs were encouraged to put forward
proposals to manage programs targeted at improving primary school enrollment, increasing
school retention, and improving learning achievement levels in children participating in the
program.
Proposal Selection Process
PEC was responsible for soliciting proposals through advertisements in the local press and the
mass media. After 69 proposals were received from local organizations, a four agency committee
of adjudicators was convened and criteria developed to guide the selection process, reduce bias
and prevent irregularities from interfering in the bidding process. To guide potential bidders a
manual and set ofinstructions for writing proposals was prepared and shared with interested
parties.
The committee's deliberations lasted 7 weeks before decisions were taken to choose proposals
submitted by 15 NGOs and the SEE. The 11 implementing organizations selected would be
responsible for caITYing out improvements to 360 schools benefiting about 48,000 students.
Winning organizations were allowed to implement programs in areas oftheir choice provided
they nlet criteria which included giving priority to the needs offamilies and children living in
areas most in need of essential basic services. General proposal objectives would need to include
specific activities for:
• Implementing model conlffiunity feeding programs in areas lacking such services.
• Improving school access and raise primary school retention rates giving special attention
to girls' enrolment.
• Improving child health and nutrition levels.
• Improving learning achievement levels.
• Insuring that matching funds from local comnlunities, the participating NGO or
government organization, should not be less than 20% ofthe total budget.
• Active community participation in the planning, implementation and evaluation of
programs must be clearly evident from the start.
• A record of good management, administrative and fiscal responsibility.
10
• The budget submitted should not be l~ss than US$300,OOO and not more than
US$750,OOO for each project, over the duration ofthe program.
Evidence gleaned from those involved in the selection process, suggested that a lot of care was
taken in choosing qualified and able NGOs. Proposals accepted included projects with
communities in Monte Plata, El Seibo, Hato Mayor, Samana, San Pedro de Macoris and two
communities within the Federal District ofSanto Domingo. NGO performance during the post
Hurricane Georges reconstruction program, financial management, technical expertise and
training experience were all carefully weighed up prior to making a final decision. Where
relatively unknown but potentially able local NGOs were involved, the decision to bring them
into the program was more complicated. Sonle untested local NGOs were urged to team up with
more experience international NGOs like Catholic Relief Services (CRS). However, the PEC
selection committee agreed to bring on other less experienced organizations like Alas de
Igualdad contingent on STP providing technical assistance, training and support to help them
cope with the administrative requirements needed to deal with large budgets and GODR
bureaucratic protocols.
Participating Institutions
Dominican Institute ofIntegrated
Development (IDDI)
Catholic Relief Series (CRS)
Center ofSolidarity for Women
Development (Ce-Mujer)
Repair school infrastructure; implement school
and family gardens; install school water and
sanitation systems, train health and nutrition
promoters; training ofteachers, parents, and
community leaders.
Repair deteriorated schools and build additional
classrooms; install school gardens and
community poultry production; build school
water and sanitation systems, provide teacher and
COmn1unity training in health and hygiene,
contribute fruit and vegetable production to
school lunch program, child de-worming
campaIgns.
Repair schools and build new classrooms, provide
locally produced rations to school lunch program,
build school and community water and sanitation
systems, provide training to PTAs and families in
health, hygiene, and nutrition.
Build school water and sanitation, train teachers
and parents in community development,
education and health. Stimulate improved
attendance through community organization.
Form student councils; and provide
health/nutrition education.
11
Social Pastoral ofCentral Zone
(CEZOPAS)
Center for Investigations and Cultural
Support (CIAC)
Wings ofEquality (Alas de Igualdad)
Dominican Health and Wellbeing
Foundation (FUSABI)
Secretariat ofEducation (SEE)
Women in Development (MUDE)
Commission Presidential
Build and repair school infrastructure and water
systems; train parents and community leaders in
community development, nutrition, and health.
Stimulate better health and nutrition through
family/student based agricultural production
activities and training.
Stimulate local agricul1ural production to be used
in school lunch program. Repair schools and
build new classrooms. Install water and
sanitation systems. Train community in health
and nutrition. Organize PTAs and provide
teacher training.
Organize and train PTAs to manage community
food production projects to deliver school lunch
program. Install kitchens and water systems at
schools. Train teachers, community leaders and
health promoters.
Organize and train community groups and
student's families in agricultural production
aimed at improving child nutrition and servicing
school lunch program. Provide community health
training, de-wonning campaigns, and pronl0te
good hygiene campaigns.
Implement school lunch program based on
preparation ofmeals from locally produced
foodstuffs. Organize and train communities to
prepare school lunches. Provide training to
teachers and PTAs in health and nutrition and de- . . wonnlng cam algns.
Provide health and sanitation training and
stimulate community participation to improve
child health and the school environment. Build
water and sanitation systems at schools. Fonn
student councils and work with parents to
increase student enrollment and attendance.
Repair schools and build additional classrooms.
Construct water and sanitation systems. Train
community leaders and promoters in health,
hygiene and nutrition. Organize PTAs and
involve arents in pre aration ofschool lunches.
The final shipment of donated food arrived in the DR on the 21st ofNovember 2001. The PEC
convened its first meeting with the NGOs on May 22, 2002. After the PEC approved the best 11
projects submitted, disbursement offunds began to participating organizations in late June and
early July ofthe same year.
12
A Brief History ofthe GFE Initiative
The USDA's Global Food for Education Initiative
In July 2000, at the G-8 meeting in Okinawa, Japan, the United States committed $300 million in
resources to establish a school feeding program for developing countries, especially for countries
which had made a commitment to provide universal basic education for children. Following the
Global Forum for Education for All Conference which took place in Dakar, Senegal, in 2000,
delegates estimated that over 120 million children around the world did not attend school. It was
discovered that this was partly due to hunger, malnutrition and poor health. Two-thirds ofthese
were out-of-school girls.
The corresponding Global Food for Education Initiative is administered by USDA and builds on
the ideas promoted by Ambassador Georges McGovern and fonner Senator Robert Dole. Under
this program USDA provides surplus commodities and funds to cover transportation and
distribution to the World Food Program (WFP), 13 private voluntary PVOs and one national
government in the Dominican Republic, for use in 48 school feeding projects in 38 countries.
USDA also provides some administrative and technical assistance and some monitoring and
evaluation inputs.
The intention ofthe GFEI is to use school feeding programs to increase enrollment, under the
assumption that basic education can help provide an individual with the basic knowledge and
skills needed for selfsufficiency and an improved standard ofliving which in tum helps poor
nations improve their productivity, the United States is committed to providing school meals to
low-income children both at home and abroad.
GFEI projects are selected using a set of criteria that included need, technical criteria, ability to
contribute matching resources by governments and host governments' commitment to implement
the primary education component ofthe Education for All Declaration made in Dakar, Senegal.
Each project proposal was subjected to scrutiny to insure that food donations made by the USG
would not distort local markets or disrupt the local commercial food production industry.
GFEI Preliminary Results
USDA carried out a fonnal evaluation with cooperating sponsorsin all GFEI countries using a
standardized survey questionnaire based on a modified version of a WFP developed survey
instrument. In the process selected FAS field staffreview projects and ensure that local monitors
collect baseline surveys using the standardized questionnaire. In addition, locally hired field staff
conducted targeted focus group interviews to gather information on perceptions barriers and
alternatives that aren't captured in the survey. The standardized questionnaire used for the USDA
survey contained 210 questions. However, much ofthe data collected was only as reliable as the
source and frequently hid difficult to measure variables like inflated school enrollment data,
falsified school attendance records and teacher absenteeism which was obscured by pupils who
filled in for absent teachers, etc.
13
The results ofthe survey which was carried out during 2003 show a measurable improvement in
school enrolments, and a significant increase in girls' enrolments. However, it isn't clear whether
these changes were/are directly correlated with the provision ofschool feeding programs, or if
they may be related to other factors not being measured in the survey.
In GFEI sponsored projects involving more than 4,000 participating schools, the WFP reports an
overall enrolment increase exceeding 10 percent, with an 11.7 percent increase in enrollment by
girls. Participating PVO programs reported only an overall enrolment increase of5.75 percent.
Without a clear set ofbaseline indicators, retention and achievement rates are more difficult to
measure. However, qualitative data gathered through interviews with parents and teachers
suggest that where school feeding programs are established, absenteeism seems to be on the
decline. In poorer communities where food deprivation is a chronic factor in undermining
children's participation in school activities, parents and teachers report that children display
improved concentration, greater energy, and more positive attitudes toward school work and
learning. Again, for lack of a clearly measurable set ofindicators, a correlation between school
feeding programs and improvement in retention and achievement rates will remain illusively
difficult to demonstrate.
To date, the GFEI program has reached 7 million children through school or pre-school feeding
programs. This includes about 5 million children through WFP sponsored projects and 2 million
more through PVO projects, and this unique GODR run project. Out of25 school feeding
programs surveyed at the end of2003, 24 were conducted by PVOs and one by the GODR. By
July 2004, five had completed two school years, nine had conlpleted just over one school year
and ten only one school year. USDA had gathered data on 165 schools through 11 PVO country
projects and WFP had gathered data on over 4,000 schools in 23 countries.
This mainly quantitative assessment demonstrated that the GFEI program maybe impacting
communities in unintended ways. These more difficult to assess program benefits included
stimulation ofthe local economy, civil society support for education, community capacity
building, revitalized and energized parental support ,for schools, and stronger teacher-parent
partnerships for school and community development.
14
WFP and PVO GFEI Global Enroillnent Gains
17.1% 16.8% 16.9%
1.1% 1.4% 1.2%
1.8% 2.4% 2.1%
5.5% 4.8% 5.1%
9.8% 8.4% 9.1%
0.9% 0.9% 0.9%
6.10/0 5.80/0 5.90/0
1.5% 3.6% 2.4%
6.7% 8.5% 7.5%
32.3% 32.3%
3.2% 2.9% 3.1%
3.80A» 11.8% 10.8%
16.1% 17.7% 16.7%
0.0% 0.3% 0.1%
8.5% 7.9% 8.2%
26.6% 26.2% 26.4%
9.7% 13.2% 11.2%
12.2°A» 13.1°A» 12.5%
9.00/0 10.4% 9.6%
17.0% 27.4% 20.5%
9.3% 12.5% 10.8% I
6.7% 15.4% 10.4%
10.5% 16.4% 12.80/0
8.0% 11.70/0 10.4%
15
5.5% 5.5% 5.50/0
7.1% 5.3% 6.1%
11.6% 13.8% 12.6%
17.4% 10.2% 13.3%
10.4% 8.7% 9.6%
-3.6% -4.3% -4.0%
-3.6% -4.3% -4.00/0
9.2% 12.1% 10.1%
5.2% 2.7% 3.8%
7.2% 7.4% 7.3%
9.5% 10.5% 10.4%
6.8% 8.2% 7.5%
8.2% 9.4% 8.9%
1.4% 3.9% 2.4%
15.3% -10.4% 2.5%
-4.7% -2.4% -3.8%
4.00/0 -3.0% 40.0%
6.7% 4.6% 5.8%
The Uniqueness ofthe DR Program Approach
The Dominican Republic GFE initiative is the only government to government program
currently being implemented. Several unique features have helped to distinguish the DR
approach from other GFEI projects, including the following innovatory practices:
1. Having the hosting Ministry ofEducation assume responsibility for providing school meals
to all GFEI schools leaving the USG donation free to be used to implement supporting
community development activities and programs. .
2. The setting up of an independent Program Executive Council (PEC) within the GODR to
manage to share decision making and oversight responsibilities between the four responsible
agencies; FAS, USAID, SEE and STP. .
3. Giving NGOs administrative, management and budget oversight and control responsibilities
to the STP, a GODR management-oversight function never before tried in the DR. (DR
16
government agencies do not normally work closely with the private sector, and least of all
withPVOs.)
4. The exceptional level of cooperation in progranl implementation and sharing between
USAID and USDA, in the DR may be considered a successful model for future collaboration,
for both agencies.
5. The DR progranl was the only program addressing access and retention issues beyond merely
delivering donated commodities. The DR approach prioritized the need to address supporting
community, infrastructure, health and sanitation issues as part ofthe process.
6. The DR project was designed to be a three-year development process instead of a normal
one-year pilot school feeding program.
Information shared by the principal actors interviewed, suggests that with some adjustments, this
model could be successfully replicated to improve GFEI implementation, elsewhere.
Evaluation Methodology and Constraints
Evaluation Terms of Reference
The Scope ofWork for the "Evaluation ofthe Dominican Republic Global Food for Education
Initiative" was drafted and sent to Creative Associates International Inc., on the June 28, 2004.
The period assigned for carrying out the evaluation was 20 days, ofwhich at least 10 days were
spent in situ collecting information conducting interviews and visiting project field sites.
The evaluatorwould be responsible for conceptualizing and writing a document that examines
the DR GFEI model with the view to assessing whether or not the main objectives ofthe
program have been met, from three perspectives:
1) To determine the constraints and obstacles that prevented full attainment ofprogram
objectives as stated in the agreement, as well as the strengths and opportunities that
permitted achievement of unexpected outcomes.
2) To layout the lessons learned from the program management and implementation points
ofview.
3) To provide an input in the design of a new model based on the two points above, with a
view to facilitating the replication of an improved version ofthe DR GFEI by USAID
and FAS elsewhere.
To achieve this, the evaluator would be expected to read background materials and to identify
and interview selected individuals who may have played a key role in the fonnation, design and
execution ofthe program. Specifically, the evaluator was expected to interview:
17
• The USAID Education specialist
• The USDA Program Manager
• The USDA Program Assistant
• The USAID Mission Director
• Key GODR Counterparts
• NGO Implementing Partners
The contractor was responsible for coordinating with the USAID Education Specialist as well as
the USDAIFAS/ICD Program Manager (or Program Assistant). A first draft was to be shared
with the USAID Education Specialist who will be responsible for circulating same among all
interested parties. Ten days were allowed from receiving the draft, for written conunents and
recommended changes to be fed back to the evaluator. Within five days, final additions or
changes were to be inserted in the final version prior to submitting a completed finished version
ofthe evaluation report.
Evaluation Methodology
Time constraints, prior evaluation studies, logistics and budgetary constraints helped to dictate
the methodology and approach selected for this evaluation. Since there already existed some
survey studies carried out by USDA and some NGOs highlighting the none educational
quantitative outcomes ofthe DR GFEI, the evaluator opted to focus the time available on using a
"gap filling" qualitative approach to address educational, community, training and other key
socio-economic variables.
Five qualitative research methodologies seenled most appropriate for achieving this end
involving:
1. A detailed review ofselected background documents and project records,
2. In-depth interviews with selected key actors,
3. Field visits with available NGO partners to a variety ofrandomly selected field sites,
4. Field based focal-group meetings with parents, teachers and project field support staff, and
5. Visits and informal discussions with senior STP, SEE, USAID and USDA managers and
senior program administrators both in the DR, Washington, D.C., and Bucharest, Romania.
The Evaluation Process and Schedule
Baseline information was received from USAID in Santo Domingo (SD) during the week
beginning Monday, July 12 and was carefully reviewed before traveling to the DR on the 1i h of
July.
After discussions with the Education specialist at the US Mission in SD, the tasks pertaining to
how time would be spent in the DR were allotted in the following way:
Phase I: The first two days were spent working alongside a visiting USDA Mission from
Washington, D.C. with the Assistant Secretary for US Department ofAgriculture and her
assistants, to attend an event hosted by the GODR and USG to celebrate the positive conclusion
18
ofthe first phase ofthe DR GFEI program which had officially ended on the 30th ofJune. Part of
the celebration also included a field trip two GFEI schools managed by a Cololnbian order of
Nuns working for CEZOPAS in the Southeastern Region ofthe Island. Travel with the official
USDA delegation provided ample opportunity to interview and speak with DC based USDA
administrators ofthe GFEI program.
Phase II: The second phase was dedicated to visiting field sites with selected NGOs to show the
evaluator the work that was being done. Thirty-seven sites were visited and 6 focal groups
convened during an intensive four-day period offield travel to three regions.
Phase III: After returning to Santo Donlingo a series ofinterviews were arranged with senior
technical and management stafffrom STP, SEE, USAID and USDA to discuss administrative,
organizational and NGO oversight aspects ofthe GFEI model. Time in Santo Domingo was also
used to collect more documents, review reports and generally fill gaps in the information already
gleaned from field visits and documentary sources.
Phase IV: On Thursday, July 29, the evaluator returned to the US to complete the data analysis
and write the first draft ofthe evaluation report which was sent to USAID, SD on the 15th of
August for review, and final comments.
Evaluation Activities Schedule
(07/17 - 07/29/04)
Saturday, 07/17/04 Washington, D.C. and Flight from D.C. on Frank Dall (FD)
Santo Domingo American Airlines via
Miami to Santo
Domingo
Sunday, 07/18/04 Sofitel, Santo Domingo Preparation, reading, Frank Dall, Neici Zeller,
coordinate meetings Paola Morales
with USAID and USDA
Monday AM, 07/19/04 Field Trip - Yamasa Visit CEZOPAS FD, NZ, PM & USDA
Area Schools in Yamasa Area Asst. Secretary Ellen
with USAID and USDA Terpstra and team.
Monday PM Hotel Santo Domingo Discussion with NGOs, FD, NZ, PM, IDDI,
USDA, USAID at Hotel ALAS, WU, CAlC,
to coordinate field trip. FUSABI, MUDE, Ce￾Mujer, CRS, IDAC
Tuesday AM, 07120/04 Hotel Santo Domingo Participate in USDA, FD, NZ, PM, and all
GODR, GFEI Closure NGOs, GODR and USG
Conference VIPs.
Tuesday PM Hotel Santo Domingo Interviews with GODR, USAID Director, Vice￾NGO and USG President DR, WV,
representatives IDDI, CRS, MUDE,
CAlC
Wednesday AM, San Pedro, Seibo Focus groups, parent FD, Luis Sanchez,
07/21/04 committees interviewed teachers, parents,
extension workers
Wednesday PM Hato Mayor, Mitches, Visits to schools, WV See and IDDI Field
Hicaco Blanco offices and IDDI district Directors
19
:S,I C"N'?
offices.
Thursday AM, 07/22/04 Mitches, Pedro Sanchez, Meet MUDE to visit Luis Sanchez, Silvia de
Las Canitas schools, PTAs, focus Fonseca, Dalmasio
groups, centers and Perez
WATSAN committee
Thursday PM Sabana del Mar, Hato Meet Ce Mujer to visit Juanito Velorio, Kenia
Mayor, San Pedro schools, dairy project, Bocid, parents, teachers
poultry unit, women's and farmers.
committee focus groups.
Friday AM, 07/23/04 San Pedro, Ingenio Visit bateyes in the CRS, IDPIC, Miosotis
Consuelo, La Guinea Consuelo area, focus Figueroa, Israelo Sorio,
groups, PTAs, teachers, teachers, PTAs,
farmers. mothers.
Friday PM Batey Altagracia, Batey Visit Bateyes and Alas De Iqualdad, Nesly
Las Pajas, Batey Don centers. Meet women, Julien, Virina Urena,
Juan teachers and farmers. PTAs, schools, farmers.
Saturday AM, 07124/04 Sofitel, Santo Domingo Meeting and debriefing FD,NZ
with Neici Zeller of
USAID.
PM Sofitel Meeting with Dani D. Roziewski
Roziewski ofCAlI
Sunday AM, 07/25/04 Sofitel Analyzing Data FD
Sunday PM Sofitel Preparing questions for FD
interviews
Monday AM, 07/26/04 Batey el Naranjo, Batey Visit peri-urban Bateyes PM USDA, Oleida
Los Barroas with CRS-CEDECO Acosta, Manuel Mejia
focus groups, PTAs
Monday PM Batey Mojarra, Santo Teachers, local leaders, USAID NZ, Joseph
Domingo directors ofschools Goodwin, Manuel Mejia
Tuesday AM, 07/27/04 Sofitel, Palacio del Interviews with FD
Gobierno Domingo Moreta, STP,
Omar De Leon, SEE
PM Palacio del Gobierno Ancel Shecker, SEE, FD
SEE (Ministry ofEduc.) Technical Staff, SEE
Wednesday AM, Palacio del Gobierno, Interview with Pedro FD, CEP/STP
07/28/04 SEE Guzman STP, Ing.
Morros Draiby, STP
Wednesday PM STP Rafael Hernandez Committee Members,
Sanchez, STP, Paola NZ, EB (Mission
Morales, USDA, Pedro Director)
Guzman, Elena
Brineman
Thursday AM, 07/29/04 USAID Reviewing documents, FD, NZ, Kelva Perez
Interviews at USAID (Health)
Thursday PM Airport Leave for airport, Joseph Goodwin (Econ)
Return to US David Losk (Health)
EB
DR Program Objectives and Accomplishments
To meet the GFEI's program goals laid out in the government to government agreement, the
PEe recommended that all participating institutions both private and public draw up activity
20
plans that would contribute toward the attainment ofthe following context specific objectives in
their proposals;
• Work with local NGOs to establish nlodel community food programs in poorer, least-served
areas.
• Work to strengthen parent-teacher organizations.
• Carry out school feeding programs for about 45,700 pre-primary and primary school children
and their teachers.
• Design and deliver training in health, nutrition, hygiene and improve teaching methodologies
for teachers and community workers.
• Improve and construct school water and sanitation facilities.
• Develop local food procurement programs and strengthen local production capacities to meet
procurement needs.
• Repair and construct educational infrastructure, including new schools, kitchens, classrooms,
doors, windows, fencing and libraries.
A review ofsample reports, audit documents and discussions with Field Program Directors from
CRS, WV, MUDE, Alas and CEZOPAS led one to believe that despite initial delays and other
administrative constraints, most NGOs did a reasonable job of delivering what was specified
under their contracts. The table below, which compares expected outcomes with end ofproject
achievements, suggests a high level of compliance in meeting more tangible and quantifiable
deliverables. However, the short time allowed for this evaluation did not pennit a nl0re
comprehensive survey of all schools impacted by the program, so a confinnation ofthe data and
numbers provided was not possible.
The random sample ofschools visited, supported the general claim that the DR GFEI program
was strong on construction and probably weaker in showing measurable education achievements
such as gains in learning achievement, enrolment and retention levels linked specifically to the
school feeding program. The inability to see children and teachers in an active classroom setting
limited the depth of assessing the teaching/learning dimension ofwhat was going on in the
random sample of GFEI schools seen.
DR GEEl Program Achievements
Beneficiaries
Participating schools
Daily rations served
New classrooms built
New kitchens built
New toilets built! repaired
School water systems
built!re aired
Teachers trained in new
methodologies
58,000
350
45,700
82
200
180
120
5,000
21
60,700
325
48,013
270
152
158
115
1,360
Students trained in self- N/A 37,056
esteem hygiene
Health promoters trained 450 488
Children de-wormed 32,000 33,004
Children receiving vitamin 1,100 25,811
supplement
School gardens 38 53
Family gardens 2,800 1,071
Daily egg production 1,015 8,537
Students benefiting from N/A 549
dairy production
Parents on PTAs organized 305 18,782
and trained
The more difficult to assess education impact variables were elusive to find. When the most
recent school enrolment data was requested on the 2th ofJuly from the STP, in Santo Domingo,
the evaluator was informed that they were still waiting for this and other infonnation to be
delivered as part of each NGO's project closing report and that only three NGOs had submitted
data so far. Some ofthe data requested was received on August the 10th and is shown in the table
below.
However, as in the case ofsimilar data gathered by the GFEI elsewhere, it is difficult to say with
any certainty ifthe enrolment gains recorded in the DR are a direct result ofthe impact made by
the school feeding program, or not. Exogenous factors like less opportunity for child
employment in the current economic situation, parental awareness that education holds a key to
future employment, and campaigns by the Church and other NGOs to encourage children to go
to school, may all be making a significant positive impact on the increase in student enrolments
which are shown here.
DR GFEI School Enrollment /Data for 2003 and 2004
Ce-Mu'er Los Hatillos 90 91 1
Ce-Mu'er Centro Educativo Mor uecho 88 91 3
Ce-Mu"er Centro Educativo EI Manchado 90 98 8
Ce-Mu'er Antolin Rosa Padilla 88 98 10
Ce-Mu'er EIMamon 91 92 1
Ce-Mu'er La China 91 95 4
Ce-Mu'er Vil1i1a 92 95 3
Ce-Mu'er Paso Cibao 88 92 4
Ce-M ."er Las Guajabas 92 98 6
Ce-Mu"er Sudadero 87 95 8
Ce-Mu'er Arro 0 Seco 87 98 11
Ce-Mu'er San Valerio 88 92 4
22
CAlC 76 92 16
CAlC 0 91
CAlC 85 93 8
CAlC 75 84 9
CAlC 86 92 6
CAlC 84 91 7
CAlC 87 92 5
CAlC 84 93 9
CAlC 87 80 -7
CAlC 90 93 3
CAlC 92 93 1
CAlC 84 86 2
CEZOPAS El Dean 43 30 -13
CEZOPAS Estrella Vie·a 71 100 29
CEZOPAS Francisc uito Aba·0 27 30 3
CEZOPAS Ho 0 de Pun 20 30 10
CEZOPAS La Caguaza 45 30 -15
CEZOPAS Lambedera 20 33 13
CEZOPAS Las Cabinnas 34 32 -2
CEZOPAS Las Taranas 66 70 4
CEZOPAS Los Arro os 88 76 -12
CEZOPAS Los Ma olos 51 44 -7
CEZOPAS Mata Seco 33 32 -1
CEZOPAS Plaza Caci ue 60 65 5
CEZOPAS Sabana Larga 27 25 -2
CEZOPAS Varade Ca a 16 40 24
CEZOPAS Villa Juana 73 56 -17
CEZOPAS Marcelino de Paula 81 104 23
CEZOPAS La Guardia 53 51 -2
CEZOPAS Los Morrones 37 28 -9
CEZOPAS El Consuelo 69 70 1
CEZOPAS El Mo ote 0 0
CEZOPAS LaJa ita 40 40 0
CEZOPAS Boca de Ma i a 77 74 -3
CEZOPAS Francisco Pena Gomez 68 81 13
CEZOPAS ElCa a 52 50 -2
CEZOPAS La Cuneta 100 103 3
CEZOPAS Los Almendros 47 46 -1
CEZOPAS Zambranita 68 81 13
CEZOPAS El Llano 45 55 10
CEZOPAS Mayi a Arriba 109 111 2
CEZOPAS Fernando Arturo Merino 39 47 8
CEZOPAS San Rafael 31 45 14
CEZOPAS Los Angelitos 0 81
23
Constraining Factors and Limitations
The principal constraints encountered carrying out the scope ofwork under this contract were:
Logistical Support
For a variety ofreasons, but mainly due to timing and a shortage of vehicles at USAID,
transportation to the field and between meetings in Santo Domingo depended on the good will of
participating NGOs and local taxis. That meant that valuable time was often wasted waiting on
public transportation, or transferring from one NGO vehicle to another during tightly plarined
field trips to provincial towns and rural communities. Efforts on the part of both USAID and
USDA GFEl managers sped up coordination between participating NGOs and helped ease the
situation.
Availability of Participating NGOs
All 11 participating NGOs were reached to try to coordinate visits to field sites. Ofthese, only 9
were willing to accompany the evaluator to program sites in the field. Two, FUSABl and CAlC,
out of 11 did not respond because they had already closed their GFEl offices. The delay in the
timing ofthe evaluation imposed significant limitations on how the evaluation could be carried
out.
The School Year
Another negative outcome ofthe "timing factor" was not being able to visit schools while they
were still in session. In the DR schools begin their long summer vacations in June and stay
closed till early September. This meant that the evaluator was unable to see teachers and students
interacting in normally functioning classroom situations. Most persons interviewed were either
PTA leaders and parents living near schools visited, or some teachers and a snlall but not very
representative group of children from neighboring homes. No classroom teaching or leanling
activities were observed and an important opportunity to assess the educational impact ofthe
GFEl program, was missed.
Findings and Conclusions
24
The following are conclusions emerging from an analysis ofinformation gathered after visiting
27 schools, and nleeting with 6 focus groups ofparents, teachers and community leaders in the
three regions visited. Where possible, PTA conunittees, school principals, District SEE officials
were individually interviewed to get the background information which was used to inform the
observations, recommendations and conclusions shared below. Otherwise, a lot ofthe general
information gathered resulted from the evaluator's participation in six informal focus groups
organized by the NGOs responsible for organizing an ambitious schedule offield visits to 38
different sites.
A. Successes and Constraints in School Refurbishment and Construction
Measurable Successes
1) Ifthe DR's GFEI programs' success is to be measured in the number of construction
projects completed such as schools refurbished, toilets built, completed kitchens and
fences erected, then this would have to be rated as very good. In all 27 schools seen,
there was ample evidence ofwork carried out to meet all or most ofthe physical
infrastructure requirements ofthe schools visited.
2) A quick but thorough inspection ofthe construction work carried out revealed, on the
whole, well-finished work ofprofessional quality.
3) There was clear evidence ofthe attention given to important practical details in most of
the school infrastructure inspected. Evidently, attention had been given to important
details like the safety of children in play areas, accessibility to school premises from busy
main roads, and school maintenance issues.
Water and Sanitation (WATSAN)
1) About 55% ofschools visited had no running water due to failure to pump water into
newly constructed school tanks because offrequent power outages. Pumps installed were
mostly electrically driven. Only in three cases were water pumps solar energy powered.
2) In schools where water and sanitation comniittees weren't functioning, or were poorly
organized and weakly led, there was evidence that newly constructed facilities were
already deteriorating due to lack ofsecurity and poor nlaintenance (i.e., vandalized toilet
seats and basins and stolen water taps, lack of cleanliness, etc.).
3) In three cases where the school water supply was dependent on a privately controlled
water source (i.e., in some Bateyes), schools weren't getting the water they needed to run
effective WATSAN facilities.
School Kitchens
1) The majority ofschools had newly installed kitchen facilities.
2) In about 50% ofthe schools, kitchens were not used for the preparation ofschool
meals. Some also lacked kitchen equipment.
3) About 100/0 ofthe schools visited had kitchens without access to running water.
4) Where schools had established a PTA sub-committee to organize a school feeding
program, kitchens seemed to be well organized and maintained.
25
Classrooms
1) The majority ofthe classrooms seen were clean, well lit and ventilated, and adequately
furnished.
2) The majority of classrooms seen had standard good quality desk-chairs, as opposed to
the older separate chair and desk combination.
3) In about 70% ofthe classrooms visited, a teacher's table and chair combination was
evident.
4) Some classrooms were better endowed with teaching aids, diagrams and other learning
materials than others. This most likely reflected individual teacher efforts to develop
teaching /leaming materials.
5) All classrooms visited had chalkboards. In the majority ofnew or refurbished
classrooms, boards were newly purchased. In some ofthe older larger rural schools
where GFEI had only done cosmetic improvements to classrooms, chalk-boards had
been refurbished.
6) In some new schools, the presence of older damaged school furniture suggested that
there was still a need to do a more thorough inventory ofnew schools to see iflocal
school construction had complied with standards set by the STP and SEE.
Libraries
1) There was a near 1000/0 awareness among the teachers, parents and NGOs interviewed
ofthe need for school libraries.
2) In 95% ofthe schools visited, a set ofshelves and area had been set aside to
accommodate this function.
3) In only three schools, a separate purposely built room had been set aside to
accommodate the school library.
4) In 99% ofthe schools seen, libraries were bookless, or only had a set offour reference
books. The reason given for the lack ofbooks was that the books promised by the GFEI
project had not arrived and that schools were still waiting for books to be delivered.
5) In one model school, E.B. Monte Cristy, o'ver 500 carefully catalogued and shelved
books attested to the presence ofthe only proper working library seen. Here, the
success ofthe library was reflected in the community's demand for access to the
facility during evenings and weekends when local university students and parents
frequently requested to use the school library.
6) After checking with the STP, the evaluator was shown a list of20 books which had
been ordered through an international supplier that will fonn the core of each schools
collection oflibrary books. This modest start will, hopefully, stimulate the kind of
. community supported response seen in EB Monte Cristy. However, no real progress
can be made getting school libraries started until the SEE or the STP begin training
teachers how to set up and run small school libraries.
Fencing, Doors and Windows
26
1) In the majority ofschools seen, care and attention had been given to installing quality
doors and adjustable aluminum-slat window shades. Most new doors inspected were
made ofsteel with built-in locks.
2) In all but four cases, schools were well fenced in with wide gauge steel mesh fencing,
about 1.5 to 2.0 meters high, supported by steel posts embedded in concrete. School
gates were made ofthe same materials. Nearly all were kept padlocked.
3) In two peri-urban schools, with a high incidence oflocal crime, school Principals
complained about fencing and lack ofsecurity.
4) In three schools, Principals had asked local SEE Directors for assistance to hire an
armed night-guard to protect school property that was being broken into. In only one
case was this request for help granted.
School Garden Plots
1) 80% ofthe schools visited had attempted to start, or were cultivating school gardens.
2) In the majority of cases, school gardens were used as demonstration plots, or for the
promotion ofbetter nutrition, or to promote new horticultural practices.
3) In 4 cases schools with little or no space for a garden plot were donated land by the
local community, or by a local land-owner.
4) Few gardens showed signs ofrecent cultivation. Informants claimed that this was
because ofthe school holidays, or because the heavy rains had iInpeded work on school
gardens.
5) The average size ofa school garden was between 5X15 meters and 8X20 meters-too
small to produce sufficient produce to supplement what was being provided through the
school feeding program.
6) In the majority of cases teacher-student committees were responsible for running
school gardens. In three cases, members ofthe PTA were hired to look after school
gardens.
7) The majority ofPTA members interviewed complained about the lack oftechnical
support and follow-up from NGOs in aspects ofschool gardening. Teachers, parents
and students were discouraged by their inability to purchase seeds, fertilizers or
insecticides in sufficient quantities or in time to make a positive impact on what they
were trying to grow on their school plots.
8) In the Mitches and Hato Mayor areas, garden plots in three schools had played a
significant demonstration role in getting local farmers and parents to begin cultivating
their own vegetable gardens. This unplanned spin-off effect attests to the positive
impact the project may be having in some areas, on local horticultural practice.
9) School gardens seemed to be most successful where the NGO leading this aspect had
prior experience in horticulture, could field trained agricultural extension workers and
the motivation to carry out training and to follow up training with support services and
frequent visits to the field.
10) Conversely, NGOs without experience, motivation or trained staffwere visibly unable
to demonstrate progress in this important area oftheir community outreach program.
World Vision, Ce-Mujer, Catholic ReliefServices, IDAC and Alas de Igualdad seemed
27
to be making an impact in this and the related animal husbandry, poultry and dairy cow
projects.
B. Obstacles and Successes in the Attainment of Program Objectives
1. Working with NGDs to Establish Model Community Feeding Programs in Poor Least￾Served Areas.
• This seems to be achieved successfully in poor communities where direct school feeding
programs are making a significant difference in the quality ofthe lives of participating
families and children. Where meals are being prepared by parents and commodities
supplied by the local community, or by a local producer, the twinning of economic with
nutritional benefits seem to have generated a stronger community response.
• NGGs working to organize mothers into PTA school feeding committees seem to have
created the best base for a long term sustainable school feeding program outcome.
• NGGs like Alas de Igualdad, IDAC, CE-Mujer and WV which are actively promoting
community involvement in the production ofmilk, eggs and vegetables have been more
successful in persuading communities to take on full responsibility for their school
feeding programs. Three PTAs proudly announced that iffood subsidies were withdrawn
they would be still be able to continue supporting their own school feeding programs.
This trend, ifit persists, bodes well for the sustainability ofthe program after
international support is withdrawn.
• In peri-urban communities where both parents were forced to go out to look for gainful
employment, the program may be in danger ofsuccumbing to local economic pressures
(i.e. reaching self-sufficiency in school feeding looks less likely in peri-urban areas than
in some rural areas, as the economy continues to decline).
2. Strengthening Parent-Teacher Associations
• There was ample evidence at nearly every site visited, where parents, teachers and the
community worked together with NGGs to construct or refurbish school buildings and
facilities, this joint effort has translated into a commitment by PTAs to continue
providing long-term support for the up-keep and improvement oftheir schools.
• Highly visible community school construction projects provided the catalyst needed to
motivate dormant PTAs into committing time and resources to the revitalization and
improvement oflocal schools.
• Work on communitywide services like WATSAN and garbage disposal, where
immediate and tangible benefits were an outcome, brought the quickest positive response
from the community.
• In the poorest Batey communities, where the links between poverty, seasonal
unemployment and family survival are critical variables, school feeding programs got
priority attention.
28
• Where NGOs were strongly committed to fonning WATSAN, school feeding, school
garden or health committees, there was a better chance that community participation may
be playing a positive role in the longer tenn success ofthe program.
• Well planned and delivered parent-teacher training seemed to be a necessary ingredient
for revitalizing strong PTAs, gaining credibility with local communities and obtaining
community inputs for school improvement.
• Where NGOs used modified versions ofprofessionally tested and produced training
materials obtained from FAG, PARO, UNICEF, the MOH and other quality sources,
demand for more training and technical support grew.
• However, feedback from focus groups indicated that where post training follow-up and
supervision is weak, training impact was poor and demand declined. Several PTAs
complained about lack offollow-up and support after receiving NGO-Ied training.
3. Carrying-out Direct Feeding Programsfor 45,700 Pre-Primary and Primary School
Children
• Lack of accurate data on the provision ofschool meals to the schools visited made it
difficult to assess the final outcome ofthe aspect ofthe program. The final total given in
the report presented by STP at the closing Conference in Santo Domingo was about
48,000 which exceeds the programmed number given above.
• Testimony from both parents, teachers and SEE officials interviewed indicated that where
parents had been properly organized into school feeding committees, children were
receiving school meals on a regular basis.
• The SEE supplied meals seemed to be making an equally important contribution,
especially in poorer communities. There were some anomalies though: The food
delivered by contractors was sometimes ofinferior quality; meals delivered were
undercounted and had to be carefully checked by teachers on delivery; meals were
sometimes not delivered on time; meals were not delivered due to lack of gasoline or
because transport was not available; Meal delivery programs are poorly managed and
monitored by local SEE officials.
4. Design and Deliver Training in Health, Nutrition, Hygiene and Improve Teaching
Methodologies.
Infonnation shared by NGOs, teachers, parents and community leaders indicated that:
• NGOs with strong sectoral experience in health, nutrition or agriculture were able to use
this experience to successfully promote community outreach programs. Notable in this
respect were WV in health and community development; MUDE, CEZOPAS and Ce￾Mujer in mobilizing women's support and in promoting home-based milk production and
nutrition education; CRS-IDAC in promoting conununity health, hygiene training and
behavioral change; Alas de Igualdad in supporting community production ofvegetables
and poultry in some ofthe poorest communities. Only WV and CRS had had some prior
experience doing educational projects, which likely explains why the educational
dimensions of GFEI in the DR rema~ned unattended.
29
• Where training was closely linked to the school and involves teachers and students
through a school based outreach program, as in the case ofCe-Mujer's home nutrition,
milk and egg production outreach programs, school-community linkages were re￾enforced by parents becoming fully involved in the process. There was, however, little or
no evidence to suggest that either the STP or the NGOs themselves had made any attempt
to assess the impact ofthis kind oftraining on beneficiaries.
• The FAO led "Mejorando la Nutricion a traves de Huertos y Granjas Familiares"
training program a good example ofthe synergies that can be brought to bear in support
of community targeted training. However, these seemed to lack attention to
organizational aspects like monitoring and evaluation, follow-up and technical assistance
elements. Here, in the future, there may be a need to re-enforce NGO experience and
capacities, by bringing in additional technical support from corresponding ministries like
agriculture and health.
• The impact made by WATSAN, health and hygiene training was noticeable in that in all
6 focus groups visited, health and hygiene training was the topic offrequent interest and
discussion. The lead agency in the area seemed to be CRS who helped pioneer health and
hygiene courses for teachers and community workers, through their well produced
"Manual de Capacitacion Para Professores en Cambios de Comportamientos en Higiene
y Salud." Parents were quick to link the availability of clean water to the decline in
illnesses like parasitosis, diarrhea and vomiting-all common symptoms of gastro￾intestinal infection, easily recognized in children, even by parents without a basic
education.
• Successful attempts to teach personal hygiene in the school curriculum seemed to have
had positive effects. There was evidence that the school hygiene les'sons learned in the
classroom were actually put into practice in daily school routines which emphasized the
need to wash hands after going to the toilet and especially before eating meals. Emphasis
on drinking boiled water from reliable water sources was re-enforced through the
provision ofschool drinking fountains, where previously these had not existed, etc.
• The best locally produced nutrition and hygiene materials seen were those produced with
CRS in collaboration with IDAC, Ce-Mujer, WV, MUDE and teachers from 20
participating rural schools. The materials seen were of high quality and well produced,
both in flip-chart and text-book forms. A unifYing environmental health and hygiene
theme was used to bring together all the components in an integrated way. Training
materials designed to teach teachers and extension workers how to use these materials
effectively with different target groups, were also evident. There was also some evidence
to suggest that these materials were being shared with other participating NGOs.
However, items such as reports and evaluations oftraining courses, and the number of
beneficiaries impacted, were not available.
• Unfortunately, no teaching/learning, or training sessions were observed by the evaluator.
5. Improve and Construct School Water and Sanitation Facilities
• Over 96% ofthe schools visited had benefited from improved school water and sanitation
facilities.
• The WATSAN element seems to have been one of GFEI's outstanding successes, but
there were anomalies that still need to be addressed. In 30% ofthe schools seen, taps and
30
other essential fittings had been removed, or vandalized; in over 50% ofschools where
school tanks are filled with electrically powered pumps, schools were without water due
to power outages; where sanitary facilities are not being cared for, deterioration in newly
installed facilities is already apparent; where school WATSAN facilities are linked to
community services, the program seems to be making a positive impact on community
health issues, yet this needs to be more systematically evaluated, in a separate study (see
the previous section on school construction for more details).
6. Develop Local School Procurement Programs and Strengthen Local Capacities to Meet
SchoolProcurementlVeeds
• Where school feeding programs were a locally shared responsibility between PTAs and
local producers, the synergy created between the community and local private small
businesses may have helped to create a better environment for program sustainability.
• The introduction ofsuccessful local nutrition enhancing programs like poultry units,
dairy cattle schemes and horticultural plots may be viable ifthey meet a real nutritional
need. However, innovations like these need to be closely supported and backed up with
training, technical support and with a flexible family credit program. Most ofthe
informants interviewed were adamant in stating that they would not be able to support
food production programs like the poultry or home-dairy schemes, without continued
financial and technical support.
• SEE contracted suppliers ofmilk, bread, fruit and the basket ofstaples which make up
the SEE school feeding program, were sometimes local private store owners, but the
majority seemed to be larger regional suppliers receiving generous compensation through
the program for services rendered. To maximize economic impact among participating
rural communities, SEE contracts should be placed, wherever possible, with locally￾owned community businesses so that benefits can impact jobs nearest to the schools
being served.
• SEE regional Directors should enforce a closer supervision of all school food supply
contracts to reduce corruption, petty theft and kick-backs to local officials and teachers.
c. Strengths and Opportunities that Permitted Achievement of Unintended
Outcomes
Interviews carried out with local beneficiaries, NGOs, local SEE officials, community leaders
and parents revealed the following unintended benefits and outcomes accruing from the DR
GFEI program in the three regions visited.
1. Community Participation
• The call to help in reconstruction helped parents, teachers, and private sector business
owners learn how to bury their differences and come together to produce something
tangible for the good ofthe community. For many Batey communities working together
in what is essentially a highly conflictive and competitive environment, has been a
healing experience. The resulting empowerment has spawned new community initiatives
and a spirit of cooperation, i.e., in Altagracia and Villa La Construccion.
31
• Re-building the local school helped tum schools into adult education and community
learning centers, as in the case ofthe Monte Cristy School library complex.
2. Sharing NGO Experiences.
• NGOs with prior experience working with donors or UN agencies were able to bring to
the program a wealth of experience and resources that helped smaller local NGOs build
capacities to deal with some ofthe more challenging training and extension aspects ofthe
GFEI program.
• NGOs, both international and national, that had lived through the Hurricane Georges
experience, found that much ofwhat was learned about DR communities then could be
adapted and used to strengthen and re-enforce community development strategies in the
GFEI program.
3. Improved Relations Between NGOs
• Prior to GFEI, many ofthe larger national and international NGOs were in competition
for contracts in areas where habitually each NGO carved out an exclusive territorial right
to provide services to local communities. Under GFEI and under the ameliorative
coordination ofthe STP, squabbles and petty rivalries were reduced and replaced by a
"spirit of cooperative teamwork."
4. Encouraging Community Action
• NGO provided training in the management ofWATSAN services, led to the creation of
voluntary village committees to deal with community sewerage, garbage disposal, road
drainage and reconstruction projects in a more organized manner.
• Parents who learned how to dig foundations and build schools transferred what they
learned to community improvement schemes, like church construction and home
improvement projects.
• The conception and completion ofschool WATSAN projects led commlmities in several
villages to expand the program to service the broader needs ofthe community, or
communities, i.e., the sewerage and water program expansion to all 18 homes in Villa
Construcci6n.
5. Growth in Demandfor More Education Services
• The creation of new schools and the expansion of existing ones by adding more or better
classrooms resulted in an unexpected demand for more education for children and adults.
• Schools adding classes now have a local demand for more teachers and for educational
facilities to the next level, i.e., communities where primary schools have expanded to
provide the full 8 grade elementary cycle, now want secondary schools. In some
communities where NGOs have used the school successfully as an adult training center,
32
adults and teachers have asked for more evening classes to satisfy the broader need for
comprehensive adult education.
• Where some schools have expanded their intake to take children from neighboring
communities, parents have pooled their resources to hire transportation to bring children
from outlying cotnlnunities to school every day.
• Where school feeding committees have empowered mothers to play an active role in
providing school meals, some mothers have pooled resources to bake bread, produce
cakes and coordinate their efforts to provide dietary supplements to enhance the school
feeding program.
• A growth in demand for better nutrition has encouraged small NGOs like Alas,
CEZOPAS and Ce-Mujer to be more innovative in their response for more and better
ways to improve nutrition and increase food production, i.e., the dairy cow project, the
home poultry unit project, community banking program and the earth-worm breeding
program.
D. Lessons learned from Program Management and Implementation
Interviews with principal GODR and USG actors on the management and program
implementation variables of GFEI in the DR were revealing in that what was shared seemed to
parallel experiences and lessons shared by some participating NGO institutions.
General Lessons Learned
• The institutional tensions which underlie a program ofthis sort are difficult to evaluate,
but several respondents alluded to differences in goal emphases as being an ongoing
source offrustration and constraint.
• USDA's main objective was to use food commodities to stimulate the US home market
while at the some time benefiting poor children in developing countries. By agreement,
the DR GFEI primarily emphasized school donstruction to improve access and school
enrolments; ttiis aspect received a significant proportion of all resources allocated to the
program.
• USAID, conversely, supported using the funds raised through the sale of commodities to
supplement and support a broader more educational set of goals which included
improving educational quality through learning achievement, teacher training and
community support for education in least serviced communities.
• The GODR's goal was always to try and use the resources emanating from the sale of
USDA commodities primarily to serve the needs ofthe public sector, especially since the
recent collapse ofthe economy had almost crippled GODR institutions. The GODR
would have preferred using all or most ofthe funds resulting from the monetization
program to run only their school feeding program and balked at the controls applied by
funding agencies through CEP, which had decision making oversight over how the GFEI
donation was used. The inclusion ofPVOs into the implementation equation also proved
an irritant not only because the GODR h~d little or no experience working directly with
local NGOs, but because resources that could have been freed for use by public sector
33
institutions were now tied to meeting the program implementation needs of PVOs
outside GODR control. The bureaucratic "heel dragging" that slowed down the
implementation ofthe program in the opening seven months, may have been, in part, due
to this divergence in program goal expectations.
• The GFEI program, as reflected in nearly all projects worldwide, was never intended to
be a cross-sectoral community led education program and so a number ofimportant
unintended effects were never fully encouraged or exploited by the lead GODR agency,
the STP.
• Some NGOs selected were never in the position to take on the administrative and
financial management challenges presented by the program. The GODR was slow to
recognize this and failed to carry out with determination the level oftraining needed to
bring NGOs up to par on the basics of good management, especially financial
management practices.
• Some NGOs exaggerated claims that they knew the communities and districts they had
chosen to work in and this had negative consequences for program start-up and for the
quality ofthe work they were able to achieve with communities.
• The STP failed to understand the need for establishing norms, standards and indicators
for the work being commissioned from NGOs. This meant that a lot ofthe work carried
out was of a variable quality and standard; a set of clearly defined guidelines for how and
what to do with commlmities would have focused the community development aspects on
priorities and would have helped NGOs identify objectives based on measurable
indicators.
• Slow GODR administrative procedures, like clearing and disbursing program funds, the
granting ofpermission for changes in activity plans, etc., all slowed down program
implementation.
• Both GODR managers and NGOs commented on the shortage oftime allowed to
implement the GFEI. The 2-3 years allowed were not enough to see the softer educational
achievement and community development elements, come to fruition. Project timelines
were geared mainly to the infrastructure development and construction aspects ofthe
program and failed to allow time or sufficient resources for the subtler social impact
dimensions.
• Unwillingness, or lack of clarity in reporting counterpart financial data, led to some
confusion over the amount of cost-sharing which was actually achieved. GODR
institutions were expected to make significant in-kind contributions (20% or more)
towards the achievement ofprogram objectives. This aspect was brought to the GODR's
attention by the independent audit.
• A similar lack of clarity in accounting procedures, or an unwillingness on the part of
some NGOs to show their cost-sharing contribution, delayed the disbursement of
program ftmding sometimes at critical moments in program implementation when
external funding was needed to keep the program moving. The audit signaled the need to
establish proper computerized accounting procedures since many NGOs, and SEE
departments, were still recording expenditures only on electronic spreadsheets.
• From inception, the DR GFEI tried to include inputs from the MOH. However, slow
response on the part ofthe MOR encouraged NGOs working on health promotion and
health training issues to turn to local health authorities where willingness to cooperate
and provide technical inputs existed. No similar attempt was made to involve the MOA in
34
program activities, but in isolated cases, NGDs did try to include local MDA staffin
program activities.
• The institutionalization ofthe community co-financing aspect in the GFEI was seldom
stressed and never included in the original project plan. The long term success ofthis
kind ofintegrated community development approach will depend on developing a viable
co-financing or community credit strategy that can work for DR rural communities. The
introduction of any co-financing program will need to be thought through and introduced
in a phased way, especially for poorer communities who have been and are, most affected
by the current national economic decline.
• The STP management and staffing structures were technically strong in the engineering
and agronomic fields, hence the failure to fully comprehend how best to manage the
softer community, health and educational dimension ofthe program. Too much
responsibility for the management ofthe community development aspects ofGFEI in the
DR was left solely with NGDs who, in some cases performed well, but in others, failed to
deliver what was expected.
Lessolls Learlled by tlte DOllor Agellcies
• Membership in CEP helped to'forge the trust needed between USAID, USDA, SEE and
STP to build transparent management and administrative processes and speed up decision
making. The technical managers eventually tasked with representing each agency were
able to build a strong management oversight team which had a positive effect on the way
the program was implemented.
• The experience gained in community development and reconstruction during Hurricane
Georges provided the foundation for a good working relationship between USAID,
USDA and the STP. In most cases, the teams representing each entity had worked on
rural development issues together, during the Hurricane Georges emergency.
• USAID and USDA learned that NGDs living and working within communities were
better at getting the job done than NGDs based in Santo Domingo, who sent technical
staffto the field to supervise the work being done by community extension workers.
• The GFEI seemed to have exceeded all expectations on the construction side, but still has
to prove that the less tangible community and educational aspects are making a
sustainable impact.
• STP, which took on the responsibility for keeping track ofwhat was being achieved by
participating NGDs, failed to keep an up to date accurate record ofwhat was being
achieved in the field. An accurate final accounting ofprogram achievements is still
pending because few NGDs have submitted final reports.
• Globally, GFEI projects have had difficulty collecting educational enrolment and access
data. No real attempt was made to collect achievement data since this aspect was never
included in the USDA survey instruments used to asses the impact ofthe GFEI.
• USDA may not be anxious to replicate the DR model, for reasons to do with amount of
time required for implementation and high management costs.
• USG partners recommend tighter guidelines for the educational and community
development aspects ofthe program and greater focus on the educational goals. The DR
GFEI became too diffuse and tried to do too much. Too much emphasis was given to the
35
WATSAN and health aspects and not enough to the teacher training and learning
dimensions ofthe program.
Lessons Learned by the GODR STP Team
• The integrity and transparency ofthe GFEI STP leadership, may have contributed to the
success ofthe DR GFEI model. This was principally due to the outstanding contribution
made by the team leader whose attention to detail and tireless energy helped to unite the
STP team around clearly defined program goals.
• Putting CEP in a neutral STP enviromnent and not in the SEE, meant that decision taken
by the CEP were acted on quickly, without the bureaucratic inertia associated with
decision making processes within the Ministry ofEducation.
• Giving the sponsoring donor agencies a day to day technical and managerial role through
the CEP helped to build confidence in the GODR STP's leadership.
• Politically appointed staffwere expected, like everyone else in theSTP team, to pull
equal weight on tasks assigned by the STP Director. All STP team members were
expected to adopt a work ethic that didn't allow for "sleeping on the job." This created a
strong team spirit, exceptional in the DR's current socio-political climate.
• Working in an open honest way with a clearly defined work ethic helped to ease the
transition needed to accommodate the new challenge ofworking with PVOs.
• The external audit drew attention to the cumbersome bureaucratic financial management
system operating within the STP. STP management will need to review and reform
financial and other management procedures, should the program be extended.
• Ifthe PEC had included an NGD representative, perhaps, some ofthe misunderstandings
and disagreements between the NOGs and the GODR could have been avoided.
• The technical staffrepresenting the SEE at PEC meetings was of a rank unable to take
important decisions on behalf ofthe Ministry ofEducation. This contributed,
considerably, to a slowing down ofthe PEC decision making process.
Recommendations
Next phase: Three recommended alternative options will be presented in this section. The choice
as to which option would be best suited for the USAID Mission in Santo Domingo to follow
rests with the Mission and will depend on a number ofvariables.
Obviously, cost and the amount offunding available to support this program are and will be
critical determinants. The additional donation in food commodities from USDA is a generous
and tempting example to follow. However, unless more funding becomes available for
education, the opportunity cost of continuing the present program with additional funding from
USAID, may be a real constraint.
The following are some recommended options:
1. Continue the GFEIprogram as is, but with a smaller number ofparticipating PVOs
targeting a smaller betterfocused group ofdeserving communities, with a clearerset of
36
community development guidelines and better defined education objectives. IfUSAID
would agree to add a matching $2 million to the USDA donation to give a total of$3-4
million over 18-24 months, this would allow enough time for the softer community
development and learning improvement aspects to get started. The reduced group of
NGOs would be asked to continue implementing the program, with defined community
development parameters, specifying clearer standards and measurable indicators. The
STP, SEE, USAID and USDA would continue to manage the day to day aspects ofthe
modified second phase using the same STP-PEC management structure, but with s~me
attempt at reforming financial, and other slow and inefficient management procedures.
Defining which will be the most deserving communities to include in the next phase will
need more attention.
The educational and social impact the GFEI is making in many ofthe Bateyes visited
would lead one to believe that the few resources available for a next phase would be more
profitably used helping those communities obtain the basic services they lack and
deserve. Since community construction projects seem to be plaYing an important
"catalytic" role in mobilizing community participation, some construction projects would
still need to be included. However, for the $3-4 million which is proposed, construction
projects would have to be limited to fewer projects, focused on clear and well defined
educational priorities. The outreach and community oversight aspects ofthis second
phase would benefit greatly from the addition ofa cadre ofPeace Corps volunteers to
monitor and evaluate the work being carried out by participating NGOs. Each volunteer
could be made responsible for overseeing X schools in Y communities, thus reinforcing
STPs supervisory function with the addition of a stronger field based hands-on training
and TA support element.
2. Radically modify the existing program, emphasizing only the most successful social
and educational aspects such as strong PTA supportfor education, community action
committees to mobilize resources and supportfor a better defined set ofbasic services
based on locally identified education and community development priorities. Here, the
socio-educational dimensions would be emppasized in communities already benefiting
from phase I ofthe GFEI. However, because ofresource limitations, school construction
projects would have to be replaced by a stronger emphasis on the educational aspects
which were poorly implemented in the first phase. Priority should be given to training the
remaining NGOs to carryout the educational dimensions ofthe program such as, teacher
training, improved quality pre-school education, the setting up and running of effective
school library services, a more effective monitoring oflearning outcomes, the production
of context relevant health, nutrition and hygiene education materials for use both at the
classroom level and in adult education and training. Since the schools selected for the
second phase would all have kitchens, a special effort would be made to persuade parents
in participating communities to provide cooked meals. This approach is favored, given
the successful contribution made to the school feeding program, through the PAE-REAL
program administered by the SEE.
Some schools, with the help ofthe NGOs and the SEE, could act as pilot "adult evening
centers" where school facilities would be used to provide adult education courses in topic
37
areas like small business management, account keeping, sewing, food processing,
horticulture, animal husbandry and construction skills, among other options to be would
be identified through a local needs assessment. Paralleling this thrust for improved
quality basic education in poor rural communities, would be a pilot project linking the
USAID monitoring and evaluation oflearning achievement program (EERC) to some, or
all, ofthe schools participating in the GFEI program.GFEI teachers, parents and school
principals would be induced into the learning achievement measurement project and
encouraged to provide support in their distinct, but complementary roles as parents,
teachers and school principals. This option would explore the probability of creating
productive SYnergies between a modified version ofthe GFEI and the quality
improvement initiatives which are being planned as part ofthe new USAID Country
Strategy for education.
3. Discontinue supportfor the GFE! integrated community development program, and
replace it witlt a rural basic education quality ilnprovement prograln focused on the
priorities proposed in the new country strategy for basic education. Here, the
assumption is that the opportunity cost ofusing scarce Mission resources would be too
high to entertain giving Mission support to Phase II ofthe GFEI. Another assumption is,
that the current school feeding program is merely cosmetic and will not have any long￾term impact on either the welfare or education achievement levels ofthe children
targeted. At best, by providing more classrooms and some new schools, the GFEI will
have made a positive contribution to school enrolments, especially in some ofthe poorer
rural communities where basic education services were lacking. However, given the
current economic situation, unless the same level ofinternational donor funding
materializes, it is unlikely that the next GODR administration will be in the position to
continue a school construction and feeding program ofthe same quality and breadth as
the existing one.
Some Pending Issues
There are three variables that may impact the decision to continue the GFEI in its current form,
or not. These are;
1. Change of Government
The incoming government led by the PLD, has yet to define its policy toward social and
educational development, especially rural development. Any radical change in the composition
ofthe staffing and structure oftechnical support units, like the STP, could have negative
consequences for the effectiveness ofthe current STP-GFEI program. The special mix of
experienced technical and administrative staffwhich contributed toward the effectiveness ofthe
DR's government to government GFEI model may be difficult to replicate ifthe new
government re-shuffles key members ofthe STP team to other ministries, or GODR institutions.
The new government may also not be in a position to continue the school feeding program, for
economic reasons.
38
2. Economic decline
The Dominican Economy shrank last year for the first time since 1990, contracting by nearly one
percentage point, and is expected to shrink about the same amountby the end of 2004. Then
country faces a financing gap estimated at $100 million to $200 million this year after the Peso
tumbled in value more than 100% since last year, settling in at around 45 Pesos to the dollar. The
country is now nearly $6 billion in foreign debt after the previous government borrowed heavily
during its first years in office, extending the dependence on foreign financing which had started
when the incoming government was previously in office. "Never before in this country was more
poverty created in such a short time span, less than a year," Said Miguel Ceara-Hatton, an
economist with UNDP, in Santo Domingo. (New York Times, 07/12/04)
3. USAID's proposed basic education strategy
USAID's proposed new education strategy mayor may not be able to accommodate the
objectives ofthe current GFEI program. The program proposed places a strong emphasis on
improving policies for educational quality, increasing parental and community participation in
selected schools and increasing private sector investment in public schools through school
sponsorship schemes. The DR GFEI which was designed to use USG agricultural commodities
principally to raise funding for school feeding programs to attract children to schools and to
increase primary school access and attendance rates. The less tangible and more difficult to
measure community, health and learning benefits emanating from what was essentially a highly
subsidized school construction and feeding program, may be better achieved using other more
focused educational strategies like those currently under review, in the USAID Mission.
Conclusions
The three-year DR GFEI tried to develop a rural school model that empowers school
communities to identify, prioritize and address their immediate needs. To the extent that the rural
communities visited were being supported in situ by well organized NGO programs and
technical assistance, some communities seen seemed to display the characteristics expected from
cotnlTIunities undergoing an active process of empowerment. They were visibly enthusiastic
about improving school access, involved in constructing local school infrastructure, and were
actively engaged in a plethora ofParent-Teacher Association committees convened to provide
tangible services like school meals, school gardens, school maintenance, health and hygiene and
better nutrition through the cultivation ofhome vegetable plots.
Less tangible and much more difficult to assess in the time period allowed for this evaluation
was the program's ability to meet some ofthe other more difficult to quantify objectives.
1) The establishment ofmodel community-based school feeding programs in under￾served poor communities, especially Bateyes, seemed on the surface to have been
successfully achieved ifwhat was being reported by informants was to be
believed. In nearly every Batey visited, regular school meals were being prepared
by a PTA school feeding committee made up ofmothers who were, on the whole,
39
motivated and enthusiastic about being able to play an active role in the local
school feeding program. Only time will tell ifthis initial level ofparental
enthusiasm will be sustainable beyond the life-span ofthe current USDA-funded
GFEI program.
2) The expansion of access to primary education, especially for girls in remote areas
was a little more difficult to assess in quantifiable terms because accurate up to
date enrolment data was not available in nearly all the schools visited. However, it
was clear that wherever the GFEI had constructed new classrooms or built a new
school, reports from parents and teachers indicated that the demand for school
places dramatically increased and enrolments were up. In about 10 cases, reports
were received about parents' concern for additional classes to accommodate the
growing cohort of children entering lower level classes. In three communities
visited, parents and teachers actively made a case for building a secondary school
in their village to accommodate the demand for education at the next level. A lack
ofrecent enrolment data, disaggregated by gender, prevented an accurate
assessment ofthe impact GFEI was making on girls' or boys' enrolments.
3) As to whether or not the GFEI was benefiting children's nutrition and health
status, this was difficult to establish for want ofharder data. However, judging by
what parents who were interviewed said about improvement in their children's
health the effects, specifically, of clean drinking water on stomach ailments
seemed to be significant. All six focus groups attested to a decline in diarrhea, a
reduction in parasitosis and a decline in vomiting in local children. In four
communities visited, where poultry and dairy cows had impacted family nutrition
levels, mothers attested to the positive effects ofimproved home feeding. In six
communities seen, parents and teachers spoke ofthe importance ofnew varieties
of vegetables and the impact these were making on household diets. However, no
objective data seemed to be available to support the nutritional impact made by
GFEI on children.
4) An improvement in learning achievement, or scholastic performance was
impossible to assess. Schools were closed, teachers and children were by and
large away on holiday, and the few parents and teachers interviewed couldn't
comment on the learning achievement dimensions oftheir children's education
beyond saying that they thought the school and teachers were doing a good job
and that they as parents were pleased with the education their children were
getting. Even the four Principals interviewed couldn't comment on learning
achievement beyond claiming that a significant number oftheir pupils went on to
the next education level. No current data on individual, class or school level
learning achievement was available.
40
ANNEXES
Annex 1 - Persons interviewed for the GFEI Evaluation
Annex 2 - Profiles of Schools Visited
Annex 3 - Documents reviewed
41
Annex 1 - Persons interviewed for the GFEI Evaluation
Dominican Republic, July 19-29, 2004
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Dr. Elena Brineman
Neici Zeller
David Losk
Danielle Roziewski
Kelva Perez,
Joseph Goodwin
USAID Director, Santo Domingo (SD)
Education Officer, USAID, SD
Team Leader, Health & Nutrition, USAID, SD
International Develo ment Consultant, CAlI
Manager Water and Sanitation Project, USAID, SD
Deputy Team Leader & Senior Economic Policy
Advisor, USAID, SD
7. Mark Holt
8. David Salmon
9. Ing. Paola Morales
10. Paul Tnlpo
11. Dra. Milagros Ortiz Bosch
12. Licda. Ancel Shecker
13. Ing. Rafael Hernandez
Sanchez
14. Ing. Leonardo Morros
Draiby
15. Ing. Domingo Moreta
16. Lic. Pedro Guzman
17. Lic. Omar De Leon
Deputy Director, DRD, USDA, Washington, D.C.
Agricultural Attache USDA, US Embassy, SD
Project Officer, USDA, SD
Project Manager, USAID-USDA, Bucharest
Vice-President ofthe Republic and Secretary ofState for
Education
National Director ofBasic Education
Administrative Affairs, Technical Secretariat ofthe
Presidency (STP)
Project Coordinator and Director, GFEI-STP
Programs Director, GFEI-STP
Resources Coordinator, STP
Director o~Student Welfare, Secretary of State for
Education (SEE)
23. Sor Leticia Escobar
24. Sor Flor de Maria Galan
Murillo
Executive Director, Orden de Hennanas Juanistas
Director ofProjects and Rural Development, Orden de
Hennanas Juanistas
42
25. lng. Luis Sanchez
26. Lie. Nilba Perez
27. Severa Peverino
28. Guillermina Guerrero
29. Bellguira Valdez
35. Lie. Nesly Julien
36. Lie. Virina Urena
37. lng. RaYmundo Calderon
Valenzuela
WV Program Director
WV Public Relations Coordinator
Community Health Promoter
Supervisor
Health Technician
President
Projects Director
Extension Agronomist
41. Yuberki Concepcion Roj as
42. Andrea Martinez
43. Michel Jose Eria
44. Juan Martinez Calzado
45. Marina Antonia Roj a
46. Carmella Bojui
47. Marina Milo
48. Sonia Ruben
49. Anita Calizo
50. Alida Leni
51. Violeta Felipe
52. Jineth Pies
53. Gloria Lima
54. Reneta Delice
55. Sofia Sanchez
56. Alej andrina Medina
57. Isabel Martinez Mojica
58. Gladis Berroa
School Teacher
PTA Treasurer
Parent
Parent
Parent
Parent
Parent
Parent
Parent
Parent
Parent
Parent
Parent
Parent
Parent
Parent
Parent
Parent
43
No.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
Name
Gladis Mercedes Fabian
Elias Corzo
Reina Isabel Reyes
Santa Castillo reyes
Dionisio Fabian Rojas
Position
Parent
Parent
School Teacher
Parent
Parent
67. Keydi Leonardo
68. Juanito Ve1orio
69. Kenia Bocio
70. Nuris Valrio
71. Eunice Menegazo
72. Juliana Diaz
73. Aria Cabiulalinez
74. Nieve Castro De la Cruz
75. Soraya Diaz
76. Belkis Jimenez
77. Elena Aurora Santana
78. Jose Manuel Morla Aponte
Santa Alade
Tirsis Rodriguez
Cecilia Abreu
Calmen L6 ez
86. Daisy Eusebio
87. Miriam Vasquez
88. Patricia Toribio
89. Francisca Ruiz
90. Alicia Suriel
91. MedeIin Organelo
92. Margarita Pacheco
93. Juan De la Cruz
94. Ismael Sanchez
95. Francisco Roj as
Secretary
Coordinator
Group Leader
Extension Outreach Worker
Extension Outreach Worker
Outreach Worker
Outreach Worker
Outreach Worker
Outreach Worker
Parent
Parent
Parent
School Teacher
School Teacher
School Teacher
PTA Committee member
PTA Committee member
PTA Committee member
PTA Committee member
PTA Committee member
PTA Committee member
Committee President
Committee Member
Committee Member
Committee Member
Committee Member
44
No. Name Position
Small-holder farmer
Small-holder farmer
Small-holder farmer
Small-holder farmer
Small-holder farmer
Small-holder farmer
Small-holder farmer
Community Health Promoter
Small-holder farmer
Small-holder farmer
Agricultural Technician
Committee Member
Committee Secretary
Committee Treasurer
Committee Member
Manuel Elurroceque
Figueroa
Altagracia Moele
Bartolo Peguero
Bernerdo Lyn
Nelly Santana
98.
96.
97.
99.
102 Guillermo Pio
10 Victor Vasquez
10 Abelino Elurroceque
Figueroa
10 Raymundo Calderon
101 Manuel Antonio Reyes
10 Rafael Reyes
108 Rosa Elena Botitra
10 Silvio De los Reyes
10 Domingo Soto Rios
103 Carlos Hernandez
111 Eligio Cordero Small-holder farmer
112 Elia Borrayo Small-holder farmer
113 Gerardo Sosa Small-holder farmer
11 Roberto Ambrosio
11 Ramon Sosa
Alejandro Caraballo Nunez
Jose Mercedes Rodriguez
Isidro Morales Guerrero
Angelita Nolasco
12 Maria Fabin
121 Pedro Javier
Small-holder farmer
Small-holder farmer
Committee Coordinator
Committee Treasurer
Committee Advisor
Committee Secretary
Committee:Member
Committee Director
122 Maria Velorio Community Health Worker
45
Annex 2 - Profiles of Schools Visited
:;>:' ·······1···.... '.
.: ...:..•. " • ,. [. . A.. a .'-
y
; .
. N [I
1-6
...1
>
.....
103 y
.'
. . .. c<;',-
I}:"">::'';
I Zambranita E.S.
"T.
2 Magote E.S. 291 y 1-8 2 6 Shelves only 8 Y Y 4 Well -
3 Kilometer 5 E.S. 45 y 1-2 y 2 1 - 1 Y
Y I Aqueduct -
4 Batey 35 E.S. 65
N 1-4 y 2 2 - I Y Y 2 Aqueduct -
5 Pedro Sanchez E.S. 320
Y 1-8 - 2 Shelves only I Y Y 4 Well -
6 Los Franceses E.S. 274
Y 1-5 2 4 Shelves only 5 Y - 2 Aqueduct -
7 Cuatro Cominas E.S. Aqueduct -
8 Hicaco Blanco E.S. 216
Y 1-8 - 2 8 Shelves only 4 y 2 Roof/Tank -
9 La Gina E.S. 660
Y 1-8 - 2 9 Shelves only 16
Y 4+(2) Aqueduct 80X40
10 El Cabo E.S. 120
Y 1-8 - - 8 Shelves only 7 Y 6 Aqueduct 50X50
I I Lulobina Chala E.S. 124
Y 1-6 - 3 5 Shelves only 5 Y Y 2 Aqueduct 17X7
12 San Rafael E.S. 225
Y 1-8 - 2 8 Shelves only 6 Y
Y 6 Well 100X60
13 Juan Jiminez C.E. Closed/Saw children murals depicting child rights campaign
14 Manchado E.S. 217
Y 1-9 - - 8 Shelves only 7 Y
Y 4 Well 50X60
15 Paso Cibao E.S. Met Dairy Cow Focal Group
16 San Valerio E.S. 18 - 1-2
Y 2 2 Y 2 Well/Solar 40X30
17 Jagual E.S. 131
Y 1-8 4 2 6 5 Y 4 Well 70X20
18 Monte Cristi E.S. * 416
Y 1-9 - 2 5 Library 8 y Y 4 Aqueduct 50X40
19 Villa Construccion E.S. 19
Y 1-4
Y 2 Shelves only 2 Aqueduct
20 Montecoca E.S. 300
Y 1-8 - 2 7 Shelves only 6 Y Y 2 Well 15XI5
2 I Las Pantas E.S. 285
Y 1-8 - 2 5 Shelves only 6 Y
Y 4 Well 30X20
22 Altagracias E.S. 108
Y 1-4
Y 2 2
Y 2 Aqueduct
23 Laiagua
24 EI Naranjo E.S.
Visited Alas Poultry Unit / 200 Layers
404
Y 1-8
Y 2 5 Shelves only 10
Y
y 4 Aqueduct
25 Los Barroas E.S. 103
Y 1-7
Y 2 3 Shelves only 3 Y Y 4 Well 40X30
26 Cruz de Guerra E.S. 194
Y 1-5
Y 2 6 Shelves only 5 Y y 6 Aqueduct
27 La Grua E.S. 417
Y 1-7 - 2 5 Shelves only 5 Y 3 Well
* Model school receiving support from SEEINGO
46
Annex 3 - Documents Reviewed
A. Independent Audit Reports, submitted by Campusano and Associates, MRI, Santo
Domingo
1. A financial audit report for the New Strategies for Implementing PAE-REAL in Schools in Areas
Lacking Basic Services and for the Improved Services to Schools Transferring to the PAE-REAL
Program Situated in Socially Marginalized Communities, December, 2003, Santo Domingo.
2. A financial audit report for the PIGAE Program Agreement # OGSM: DFE-5I 7-200l/687-00
financed through Section 416 (b) ofthe USG Federal Agricultural Law, September 200I-June 30
2003, Santo Domingo.
3. A financial audit report for the School Rehabilitation Program for the Peri-Urban Municipalities of
Eastern Santo Domingo and Boca Chica ofthe CPADB, July 2002 -June 2003, Santo Domingo.
4. A financial audit report for the CLAC Basic Education for All projects, March 2004-May, 2004,
Santo Domingo.
5. A financial audit report for the CEZOPAS Model Community Basic School program, June-July,
2004, Santo Domingo.
6. A financial audit report for MUDE Community Water and Sanitation program for improving Child
Health Services, June-July, 2004, Santo Domingo.
7. A financial audit report for the FUSABI Monte Plata Public schools reconstruction and school
feeding program, May- June 2004, Santo Domingo.
8. A financial audit report for the CRS Community Education Empowerment and Right to Education
Program in the Yeguada and Construcci6n Communities, June, 2004, Santo Domingo.
9. A financial audit report for Improving the Quality ofGirls Basic Education Program, in Bayaguana
and Miches, April-March, 2004, Santo Domingo.
10. Audit Guidelines Manual, STP-SEE, Pedro Guzman, 2002, Santo Domingo.
11. Instructivo de Normas y Procedimientos Adiministrativos y Financieros para los Proyectos bajo el
Programa PIGAE, STP, Guzman y Cespedes, 2002, Santo Domingo.
12. Resoluci6n del CEP Para Fines de Auditoria, September, 2003, Santo Domingo.
B. Technical Secretariat ofthe Presidency and the Ministry ofEducation
13. Informe de Ejecuci6n PAE-REAL, Programa Iniciativa Global de Alimentos para la Educaci6n
PIGAE, Octubre, 2003, Santo Domingo.
14. Informe del Departamento Coordinador de Recursos Externos: Estados Financieros, Junio 2004,
PIGAE-SEE, Santo Domingo.
15. Manual Instructivo para la Elaboraci6n de Propuestas por parte de las Futuras Instituciones
Ejecutoras, Iniciativa Global de Alimentos para la Educaci6n, Secretariado de la PresidenciaJ SEE,
Santo Domingo, 2001.
16. Various CEP Minutes highlighting decisions taken by the CEP concerning GFEI program
implementation matters, submitted to SEE, USDA, USAID and STP, Santo Domingo.
17. Numerous Letters to NGOs, USAID and USDA from the STP signed by lng. Domingo Moreta,
Coordinator ofthe STPIDCR Office, drawing attention to issues related to contract protocols and
program monitoring and implementation, 2003-2004, Santo Domingo.
18. STP Archives ofreports and letters from NGOs to the STP Coordinators Office concerning a range
ofissues and audit findings.
19. STP Technical trip reports submitted by STP technical supervisors.
20. SEE/ Direcci6n General de Bienestar Estudiantil y Docente, reports and archives submitted by
technical staff after field visits to various PIGAE program sites.
47
21. Logros del PIGAE, STP Power Point presentation, March 2003, Santo Domingo.
22. PIGAE, Lista de Escuelas Seleccionadas para la Linea Basal, STP, Santo Domingo.
23. Proyecto Escuela Multigrado Innovada, Informe Tecnico, Taller de Iniciaci6n, SEE, 2003, Santo
Domingo.
24. Total de Centros, Raciones y Costos por Modalidad, SEE, Direcci6n General de Bienestar
Estudiantil y Docente, STP-PIGAE, 2003-2004, Santo Domingo.
25. Programa de Alimentaci6n Escolar, PAE, STP- PIGAE, 2003, Santo Domingo.
26. Government to Government GFEI Program in the Dominican Republic, STP, 2003, Santo Domingo.
27. Proceso de Evaluaci6n de Propuestas PIGAE, 2002, CEP/STP, Santo Domingo.
28. Informe Ejecutivo PIGAE, Metas y Logros 2001-2003, STP, Santo Domingo.
29. Programa de Bibliotecas PIGAE, 2003-2004, STP Santo Domingo.
30. Plan Piloto Programa de Capacitaci6n en Nutrici6n y Seguridad Alimentaria PIGAE,
FAO/STPIUSAIDIUSDA, Octubre, 2003, Santo Domingo
31. Informe Final de Desarrollo del Programa Conecta-PIGAE-INTEC Sobre Promoci6n de la Salud y
Prevenci6n de SIDA en Promotores de Salud, 2004, INTEC, Santo Domingo.
32. Convenio entre el Gobiemo de los Estados Unidos de America y el Gobierno de la Republica
Dominicana para el Suministro de Productos Agricolas a traves de la Iniciativa Global de Alimentos
para la Educaci6n Conforme a la Secci6n 416(b). GODRlUSG, 2001, Santo Domingo.
C.USAIDIUSDA Documents and Memoranda
33. Informes de Viaje a Varios Lugares del Proyecto PIGAE, por Morros y Morales, USDA, Santo
Domingo.
34. Criteria used for Selection ofBaseline Sample, USDA, Dominican Republic, Government-to￾Government GFEI Program, 2003.
35. School Feeding Support Unit Baseline Survey Questionnaire, USDAIUSAID, 2003, Santo Domingo.
36. PENIUSDA-FAS Project Pictures from Site Visits to GFE Schools, 2003, Santo Domingo.
37. Technical Assistance to the Global Food for Education Program, Report on the Dominican Republic
Site Visit, July-August, 2003, USDA, Washington DC.
38. The Global Food for Education Pilot Program: A review ofProject Implementation and Impact,
USDA, 2002, Washington DC.
39. El Proyecto Piloto del Programa de Alimentaci6n Global para la Educaci6n: Infonne Final, USDA,
2004, Washington DC. '
40. Minutes to the CEP Meeting held at STP on November 5t
h, 2002, Santo Domingo.
41. USAID DR, Standard Form for End-Use Checks; letter to Mark Holt, USDA, from Elena Brineman
USAID Director, June 2004, Santo Domingo.
42. Various Memoranda and e mails from Neici Zeller USAID GFEI Program Coordinator to USDA,
participating NGOs and the STP.
43. USAID- Dominican Republic Health Program, USAID Health Section, Santo Domingo.
44. Politics ofthe Dominican Republic, Encyclopedia Article about the DR, July, 2004, Free
Dictonary.com.
45. CIA World Fact Book, Dominican Republic, May 2004, USG, Washington, DC.
46. United States Department of State, Background Note on the Dominican Republic, October, 2003,
USG, Washington, DC.
47. Development Resources Division Directory, FAS-Online, 2004, USG, Washington, DC.
48. Fact Sheet: McGovern- Dole International Food for Education and Child Nutrition Program, FAS￾Online, 2004, USG, Washington DC.
49. Fact Sheet: Global Food for Education Pilot Initiative, FAS-Online, USG, Washington, DC.
50. GFEI Country Reports, FAS-Online, USG, Washington, DC.
51. DR- GFEI Achievements tlrrough September 30, 2003, FAS-USDA, Santo Domingo.
48
52. DR- GFEI Progress Report through September 2002, FAS-USDA, Santo Domingo.
53. Dominican Republic, Mission Education Profile (Draft), July 2004, USAID, Santo Domingo.
54. Dominican Republic: The Global Food for Education Initiative briefing note, USAID, Santo
Domingo.
55. Improved Basic Education Through Community and Private Sector Participation, General Problem
Statement (Draft), July 2004, USAID, Santo Domingo.
56. Scope ofWork: Evaluation of Global Food for Education Initiative, June 2004, USAID, Santo
Domingo.
D. NGO Information and Training Materials
57. Bateyes del Estado, Encuesta Socioecon6mica y de Salud de la Poblaci6n Materno Infantil de los
Bateyes Agricolas del CEA, Deciembre 1999, USAID, Santo Domingo.
58. Manual de Capacitaci6n para Profesores, Mi Escuela Ideal, Cambios de Comportamiento en Higiene
y Salud- PIGAE, Catholic Relief Services, 2003, Santo Domingo.
59. Consulta sobre los Contenidos de Salud, Alimentaci6n y Nutrici6n en la Curricula Escolar,
Noviembre, FAG, 2002, Capella Beach Resort Juan Dolio, Republica Dominicana.
60. Mejorando la Nutrici6n a traves de Huertos y Granjas Familiares, Manual de Capacitaci6n para
Trabajadores de Campo en America Latina y el Caribe, FAG, 2000.
61. Guia de Saneamiento, USDN USAID/IDAC, 2004, Santo Domingo.
62. Boletin Informatico, Proyecto Alas de Igualdad, Numero 12, Santo Domingo.
63. Horizontes, Numero 1, Abril 2004, Visi6n Mundial, Santo Domingo.
64. Proyecto: Promoviendo el Derechoa la Educaci6n, CRS-IDAC, PIGAE, 2003, Santo Domingo.
65. Plan de Rehabilitaci6n de Escuelas de Localidades Perifericas de los Municipios Santo Domingo
Este y Boca Chica, 2003, GGDR-CPADB, Santo Domingo.
66. Sin Hambre se Aprende Mejor: Campafia Mundial del PMA de AHmentaci6n Mundial, 2000, FAG,
Rome Italy.
49
CREATIVE ASSOCIATES INTERNATIONAL~
530 I Wisconsin Avenue, NW Suite 700 . Washington, DC 20015
Tel: 202.966.5804 Fax: 202.363.4771 e-mail: creative@caii-dc.com