Assessment Report 
Assessment of the Government of Colombia Project: 
Plan de Consolidación Integral de la Macarena (PCIM) 
April 22, 2009 
Authors 
Peter DeShazo 
Phillip McLean 
Johanna Mendelson Forman 
CSIS Americas Program, April 2009 1 
ASSESSMENT REPORT 
Plan de Consolidación Integral de la Macarena (PCIM) 
April 22, 2009 
The Project 
This report is an assessment by the Americas Program of the Center for Strategic 
and International Studies (CSIS) of the Plan de Consolidación Integral de la Macarena 
(PCIM), a project that the government of Colombia is implementing in six municipalities 
of the Department of Meta through its Center for Coordination of Integrated Action 
(CCAI), an office of the Presidency of Colombia, and implemented through Acción
Social, the authority under which PCIM operates. The PCIM project is supported with 
funds from the government of Colombia and from international donors, specifically the 
Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Office of Transition Initiatives of the U.S. Agency 
for International Development. 
First organized in August 2007, the PCIM is now a year and a half old, although it 
was not fully implemented until late that year. The Plan arises from the lessons learned 
from previous, not fully successful, efforts by the Government of Colombia to 
consolidate legitimate state authority in areas formerly controlled by illegal armed 
groups, including by: 
• Creating a permanent state security presence in retaken zones 
• Developing a visible and robust civilian response alongside security operations in 
these areas 
• Timing and coordinating the work of the various actors in consolidating security, 
building a sustained state presence, and promoting economic development, and 
• Disrupting narcotics trafficking, which contributes to the strength of illegal 
groups in the zone 
The PCIM envisages a sequenced approach to consolidation, starting with securing 
municipal urban centers by the Colombian military and followed by the establishment of 
a police presence, freeing the military for further security consolidation in outlying rural 
areas. Once a sufficient degree of security is established, the eradication of coca 
production, either voluntarily or forced, takes place, facilitating the expansion of state 
presence and the rise of a legal economy. This approach requires greater civil-military 
cooperation than has prevailed in the past. A “fusion center,” established at a location 
within the Macarena region, is intended to facilitate coordination of the work of different 
government entities. 
CSIS Americas Program, April 2009 2 
Beyond the consolidation of security and coca eradication, PCIM activities are 
concentrated in five areas: institutional development, citizenship and governability; 
property rights and territorial order; infrastructure and connectivity; access to public 
goods and social services; and economic/business development. Since its launching, 
PCIM is undertaking projects in all six municipalities of the Macarena region. The goal is 
to demonstrate state presence beyond the military, police and narcotics eradication at the 
earliest possible moment through an injection of timely resources, even if on a modest 
scale. These quick impact projects are supplemented by two other nation-wide 
government programs: Familias en Acción and Familias Guardabosques, both of which 
are designed to provide conditional cash transfers to least advantaged groups. The first is 
designed to promote childhood health and education; the second to encourage local 
cooperation with drug eradication. 
The choice of the Macarena region was not coincidental in the development of the 
PCIM. The region, historically the central operations area of the Revolutionary Armed 
Forces of Colombia (FARC) and a major coca cultivation and cocaine production and 
trafficking zone, has long eluded meaningful state control. Only in the past few years has 
the Colombian military made significant inroads in wresting control of the Macarena 
from the FARC. Today there is a strong military presence in much of the region. This has 
opened the door to a growing police presence and to progress in coca eradication. With 
PCIM, a civilian presence is following in the wake of military advances. While a 
transition from FARC to state control is not assured given the Macarena region’s history, 
the end result could lead to the kind of agricultural development that is already occurring 
in the central and northern parts of the Meta department. 
The Assessment
CSIS was asked to conduct an assessment of the progress to date of the PCIM 
program, recognizing that it has been in operation for only about a year and a half. The 
CSIS team understood that it would be analyzing the importance of the PCIM program as 
a means for the government of Colombia to fill a gap in one of the most vexing problems 
of the internal conflict that still persists in that nation – the need to provide a visible state 
presence and control in a region once dominated by a outlaw adversary. The team was 
conscious that this attempt to combine security with development and governance is 
designed for much closer coordination of multiple Colombian government and private 
agencies as well as international donors than ever before. It is under review as a model 
for use elsewhere in the country. Finally, the team was asked to look at the potential for 
transition programming supported by the U.S. government in Colombia as an important 
component of a U.S. foreign assistance toolkit that seeks a comprehensive approach to 
state consolidation and socio-economic reconstruction. 
The CSIS Americas Program offers its conclusions and recommendations based on 
the considerable Colombia-specific and post-conflict experience of its team members, on 
the on-site consultations carried out by the team in Bogota, Villavicencio, and the 
Macarena region in March 2009, and on interviews and research prior to that visit. 
CSIS Americas Program, April 2009 3 
Although the PCIM plan is currently in mid-stream, the CSIS team is confident that an 
assessment at this time is useful in identifying key strengths and weaknesses that may 
assist policy-makers in both Colombia and the United States as they develop further 
initiatives. 
 
The Macarena Region
The PCIM area of operation encompasses in six of the twenty-nine municipalities 
of the Department of Meta: Macarena, Mesetas, Puerto Rico, San Juan de Arama, La 
Uribe, and Vista Hermosa. The area takes its name from the Serranía de la Macarena, a 
mountain range about 120 kilometers long and 30 km at its widest point that extends 
south-east from the Eastern Cordillera of the Andes. Except for the Serranía itself and the 
CSIS Americas Program, April 2009 4 
large piedmont and eastern slope of the cordillera to its west, most of the Macarena area 
is comprised of tropical lowland. Three national parks (La Macarena, Los Picachos and 
Tinigua) encompass a substantial portion of PCIM region. The PCIM municipalities have 
a total extension of some 34,000 square kilometers and a population of around 100,000. 
Approximately 25 per cent of the population resides in the six “urban centers” in each 
municipality, the town of Vista Hermosa with some 6,300 being the largest, with the bulk 
of the population either residing in very small towns or in rural areas. 
For nearly all of its history, the Macarena region has had little or no Colombian 
state presence. Colonizers from other departments entered the area to exploit local 
products (rubber, quinine, wood, animal skins) but there was no long-term occupation 
until the 1950s. By that time, illegally armed groups related to Colombia’s internal 
conflict La Violencia were active in this isolated area. The Marxist insurgent 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) since its founding in 1964 turned the 
Macarena region into its central base of operation in Colombia, constituting for decades a 
virtual state-within-a state in the region. Paramilitary presence in the Macarena region 
was limited to the northern and eastern extremities. The town of Vista Hermosa was 
briefly occupied by paramilitaries from eastern Meta before being expelled by the FARC 
in 1998. 
FARC control over the Macarena was consolidated that year when President 
Andrés Pastrana approved the establishment of a 42,000 square km demilitarized zone 
(“Zona de Despeje”) in Meta and Caquetá departments that encompassed all of Meta’s 
municipalities of Vista Hermosa, Mesetas, La Uribe and Macarena. The FARC used the 
Despeje as a key command and control center and hub of economic activity. 
Colombian troops began moving into the Macarena area following the dissolution 
of the Despeje in February 2002, but it remained a strongpoint of the FARC for several 
more years. Once the Government of Colombia (GOC) broke the FARC’s strength in 
Bogota and its surrounding countryside under Plan Patriota in 2003, it turned its 
attention to Meta and Caquetá departments using Joint Task Force Omega to roll back the 
FARC from the territory it had held the longest. Over time, the Colombian military has 
pushed the FARC farther away from the urban centers in the PCIM region, reducing the 
once-powerful FARC 27th Front located in the Serranía de la Macarena to a small force, 
still dangerous but capable only of squad-level operations. Large areas within the 
Macarena are now largely under GOC control, with others “in transition,” meaning that 
FARC fighters have been expelled but security is not yet fully consolidated, while still 
other areas, mainly in the south and north-west of the area – below Vista Hermosa and 
west of Uribe and La Julia—are considered to be unsafe. The Macarena region had a very 
heavy concentration of FARC support network personnel – the milicias, many of whom 
are still in place but are largely powerless because they are cut off from FARC protection. 
The economy of the Macarena region is in an early transition from coca and 
cocaine production to legitimate activity. During the “Despeje” small farmers were lured 
into the PCIM region to provide the FARC with profitable narcotics to export and food to 
support its fighters. As the government became aware of the heavy coca plantings it 
experimented with aerial eradication, including one field in the Macarena national park. 
CSIS Americas Program, April 2009 5 
Environmentalists in Colombia and abroad protested, and the national director of 
National Parks threatened to resign, The park is considered at once one of the richest in 
specie and most fragile tropical reserves. Thereafter, beginning in 2006 only manual 
eradication has been used in the PCIM area. While the size of the coca crop has been 
greatly reduced since its heyday during the Despeje, a minimum of 3-6,000 hectares of 
coca remain in the area, according to different sources. The trend continues to be 
positive, however, with limited replanting and lower levels of overall cocaine production 
and drug trafficking. 
The future of the Macarena region is largely tied to agriculture – although in some 
distant, more peaceful time eco-tourism may offer possibilities. Relatively near but over 
the high cordillera Bogota offers a mega-market for food products. Judging by the rapid 
expansion of agriculture in other parts of the Department of Meta, soil and climatic 
conditions appear promising, though the assessment team was told detailed studies need 
to be done. Major obstacles stand in the way of this potential, however, including poor 
road and communication infrastructure, lack of credit for regional farmers, and little land 
titling. Rights to the land are a core concern and cause of much of the historical conflict 
in Colombia’s eastern regions. Titled land can be a source of tax revenues local 
governments need to support public services and infrastructure development. For the 
farmer, titles can help secure credit and improve land values. The issue of land titling in 
the Macarena region does not seem to have been yet resolved, however. 
How PCIM Operates
The Plan de Consolidación Integral de la Macarena was conceived to address 
closely-related efforts (security, counter-drug, development) that had previously been 
carried out along separate tracks. Earlier experience in the Macarena region and in other 
areas of the countries – the Putumayo is a frequently-mentioned example -- highlighted 
the need for a coordinated and sequenced effort by military, police and civilian 
authorities to convince citizens in the affected areas that the transition to legitimate state 
presence was permanent. Determined to push the FARC out of its area of highest 
strategic and symbolic importance, the army moved into the Macarena but with little 
follow-up by civilian agencies. Aerial fumigation in the region came under strong 
criticism, mainly focused on concerns for environmental concerns stemming from the 
extensive national park area in the Macarena. The Colombian government subsequently 
moved to manual eradication, a more dangerous approach that has resulted in the deaths 
of dozens of eradicators but appears to be more effective in the case of the Macarena. 
 The coordinating body of PCIM is the Center for Coordinated Integral Action 
(CCAI), an inter-agency group established in 2004 under the authority of the Office of 
the Presidency of Colombia. CCAI brings together 15 GOC ministries and other agencies 
for the purpose of coordinating GOC efforts to introduce state presence to priority areas 
of the country where it had not existed or was weak. CCAI has no legal standing and is a 
coordinating, not an implementing agency with no funding of its own. Its Coordinator is a 
senior presidential advisor but also is a delegate of the presidential Agency for Social 
Action and International Cooperation (Acción Social), the Colombian entity charged with 
CSIS Americas Program, April 2009 6 
coordinating a broad array of social development programs, the manual eradication of 
coca crops, and international cooperation for GOC programs. Key PCIM civilian 
initiatives come under the supervision of Acción Social. 
The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) of USAID Colombia provided early 
assistance to Acción Social and to CCAI for the PCIM. An OTI grant was used to hire the 
civilian coordinator for PCIM in August 2007, and OTI integrated the activities of its 
“Colombia Responde” (for municipal and community development, education, health, 
infrastructure, technical training) and “Progreso” (agricultural development) projects into 
PCIM, as well as providing logistics and transport support for PCIM staff. In FY 2008, 
OTI’s support to PCIM totaled $8.6 million, with the figure for FY 09 still to be 
finalized. The Government of the Netherlands has also contributed or pledged upwards of 
$3.3 million in economic development and transition projects related to PCIM in 2008 
and 2009, the year their support ends. Total GOC levels of spending for PCIM-related 
projects are difficult to calculate because resources are spread among many ministries 
and agencies but total amounts are many times the level of international support. 
From the beginning, those who conceived of PCIM saw it as a new approach to 
the consolidation of state presence in Colombia. Aside from the inter-governmental 
orientation to planning and coordination of activities, PCIM moves the locus of activity 
away from Bogota and even the capital of Meta, Villavicencio, to the region itself. Under 
PCIM, civilian employees enter areas as soon as they are considered safe enough for 
preliminary contact with local populations for rounds of discussions (“consultas”) on the 
kinds of projects and activities most needed in each community. Programs carried out by 
Colombia Responde and Progreso require the signing of letter of reference agreements 
with local communities, co-signed by municipal mayors and representatives of Acción 
Social, that outline the scope of projects and local resources (often labor) to be dedicated 
to them. The aim is to obtain ”local buy-in” to projects. Several rounds of consultations 
with local communities are often needed before agreement can be reached and project 
funding commenced. A key architect of PCIM within the GOC described the goal as 
being “to spend small and fast” in order to build confidence and provide rural people in 
areas where coca cultivation previously dominated with a “ladder” with which to climb 
out of the illegal economy. Parallel to PCIM projects, Acción Social carries out its own 
social spending programs in the region, such as Familias en Acción, and the Familias 
Guardabosque. The assessment team was told the latter is used in the region to provide 
incentives to encourage people to move from national parks to bordering areas rather than 
voluntary eradication of coca and forest preservation as the program was initially 
designed. 
The establishment of a “fusion center” in the urban area of Vista Hermosa is 
intended for on-site coordination of PCIM activities. The assessment team was told that 
the fusion center has both symbolic and practical value and that since it was established 
early in 2009 it has been the site of several meetings, one with 40 participants. The fusion 
center itself is a modest collection of prefabricated structures, housing offices, a work 
space equipped with personal computers, and barracks to serve as temporary sleeping 
quarters. The one large PCIM coordinating meeting the assessment team observed took 
place in the departmental capital of Villavicencio. 
CSIS Americas Program, April 2009 7 
Program Assessment: 
Security 
In a real sense, PCIM is not a post-conflict program. It is as the “integral” part of 
its name suggests a combination of activities designed to bring an end to an on-going 
conflict. The six Macarena municipalities are provided security by the Joint Task Force 
Omega, headquartered at the Larandia Base in Caquetá. The Fourth Division based in 
Villavicencio gives support. The Colombian 12th Mobile Brigade attached to Omega is 
currently stationed in Vista Hermosa. 
Omega has been in operation for five years but its key gains have come in the past 
two. Once home to the 27th and 43rd FARC fronts, among the most numerous and best 
armed in Colombia, large areas of the Macarena region are now free from the threat of 
incursion by large FARC units. PCIM coordinators divide the region into three categories 
according to levels of security consolidation: “secure,” “in transition” and “not secure.” 
Five of the six municipal urban centers are secure. The town of Macarena is transitional. 
Moreover, there has been considerable progress extending the secure zone to outlying 
rural areas. Transition areas are concentrated to the east of Mesetas and to the south of 
Vista Hermosa municipality. The towns of Uribe and La Julia, once FARC strong points, 
are now considered transition zones. Non-secure zones are concentrated in the north-west 
corner of the PCIM zone toward the Eastern Cordillera and in the south-southeast of the 
region. Areas in transition are known to contain sizeable numbers of so-called FARC 
milicias, or non-combatant supporters, who are now largely cut off from the armed 
FARC units. The Colombian armed forces have opted to leave these elements alone, 
judging them not to be a threat to security. 
According to senior Omega officers and Ministry of Defense officials, the FARC 
presence in the Macarena region should continue to wane under pressure from Task 
Force Omega. Morale in the FARC ranks is low, desertions have increased, and the 
economic base of the FARC, predicated on drugs, has sharply deteriorated. FARC units 
are on the defensive and have increasingly come to rely on the use of landmines and 
booby traps to defend their turf. Morale on the Colombian military side is by all reports 
high and the Omega force is said to enjoy considerable support from citizens in the 
Macarena zone. The military, however, sees its mission as departing secured zones as 
soon as possible by turning security control over to the police. The Colombian military, 
from the Ministry of Defense on down, appear to be giving strong support the PCIM 
concept, saying they understand the value of establishing a government presence “that 
does not wear a uniform.” 
Police presence in the Macarena region is growing. Police detachments are 
present in the principal urban areas, including strategic towns, such as La Julia and, most 
recently, Uribe – both areas in transition. New police stations are due to be established in 
other small towns in the area in 2009. Carabinero units (police light infantry rural units) 
are assigned to towns in transition help to patrol rural areas. 
CSIS Americas Program, April 2009 8 
According to several sources however, Colombian police stationed in the 
Macarena area are not as well regarded by local citizenry as the military. This may be due 
in part to their relatively recent arrival, which has not allowed them to gain the 
confidence of people unaccustomed to their presence. Some local sources accused them 
of corruption, a frequent popular Colombian reaction to the police. Others said the police 
must break out of a “garrison mentality” and suggested a “community policing” 
approach. The police, of course, are more lightly armed than the military, and their work 
requires them to be more involved with the local populace in places where they have little 
back-up from judicial institutions. 
Counternarcotics 
The dismantling of the coca economy and its replacement by licit activity will be 
an essential factor in the consolidation of state control in the Macarena region, and as 
such is a key step in the PCIM sequence. Parts of the PCIM region, especially the 
municipalities of Vista Hermosa and Puerto Rico, were the site of some of the FARC’s 
most significant coca-growing areas. Rural towns in the region overflowed with drug 
money. The assessment team visited two small villages south of Vista Hermosa where it 
seemed clear bars and houses of prostitution had until recently proliferated. Significantly, 
neither of these population centers existed before the creation of the Despeje and the 
FARC’s promotion of coca cultivation. 
According to UN estimates, Vista Hermosa and Puerto Rico were the 
municipalities with the fourth and seventh largest coca crops, respectively, in Colombia 
in 2007. In 2008, according to various estimates, some 10-14,000 hectares of coca 
remained in the PCIM area, with an addition 6-8,000 hectares manually eradicated that 
year, leaving an estimated 2-6,000 (or more) hectares still planted. Replanting levels 
appear to be down, but authorities declined to estimate by how much. There are said to be 
few HCl labs capable of processing cocaine due to the larger military presence and the 
weakening of the FARC in the region, though most coca cultivators continue to reduce 
coca leaf to paste, the first stage in drug processing. 
Estimating coca and narcotics production is always difficult and the direct impact 
of PCIM cannot be measured with any precision. Authorities are confident from aerial 
observation and evidence in the towns that the FARC’s income from coca grown in the 
region has been disrupted. Coca has been pushed out of many of the remote villages 
where it had boomed before. This in turn has resulted in the out-migration of much of the 
floating population, including the raspachines (day laborers) who had come to harvest 
the coca crops. There has been a notable drop in the population of many of the small 
towns. It is logical that once local residents realize coca will not return the chances of 
transiting to legitimate crops and licit economic activity will improve. This, the 
assessment team was assured by multiple sources, is beginning to occur. 
CSIS Americas Program, April 2009 9 
Agriculture 
With improved security, large areas of the Macarena region (outside of the 
boundaries of the national parks) are likely to become zones for significant agricultural 
development. The assessment team was told that soil and climate will likely permit 
cultivation of a sugar cane, yucca, tropical fruits, bananas, African palm, rubber, cacao, 
rice, and vegetables, as well as cattle raising and milk production. Already land around 
the town of Vista Hermosa is now worth ten times what it was five years ago. Bogota is 
just 210 km from there, though over a high mountain pass. The connection will be over 
entirely paved road once the small stretch from San Juan de Arama to Vista Hermosa is 
paved. The problem, however, is getting crops from outlying parts of the municipio to the 
town itself. 
Private large scale investment in the Macarena region seems feasible, judging by 
the large-scale planting of African palm and other cash crops around the growing town of 
Granada to the north-east of San Juan de Arama. Yet in the short-term, which 
encompasses the timing of PCIM project goals, the challenge is to advance the 
empowerment and welfare of the small farmers in the region and those likely to come 
soon. The presence of PCIM-related agricultural projects has highlighted both the 
potential for and key bottlenecks to agricultural development in the region. In the latter 
category, four key problems stand out: 1) the need for tertiary roads to get cash crops into 
the market economy; 2) access to farm machinery (tractors, plows, harvesters) at 
affordable prices— even small farms in the region have a much larger size than in most 
other areas of Colombia and require machinery to work; 3) access to credit – a problem 
exacerbated by the fact that only a small percentage of farmers in the region have title to 
their lands to use as a loan guarantee; and 4) more technical assistance. PCIM projects 
can work around these bottlenecks only to a limited degree. They are long-term obstacles 
to developing the agricultural potential of the region. Most of the cash crops under 
cultivation such as cacao will take at least three years to deliver returns on investment. In 
the meantime, however, other types of plantings of food crops will continue to be 
essential to support the communities and market the excess. 
The land titling issue, historically controversial across all regions of Colombia, is 
exacerbated in the Macarena by the presence of large extensions of national park and 
special use zones in the region that strictly limit or prohibit agricultural production or 
private land holding. For years the government of Colombia has been struggling to reach 
consensus agreement on a new regime to provide for land titling. The Ministry of 
Agriculture, which is assigned a role of promoting commercial rather than small scale 
agriculture, appears to have been an obstacle to consensus. The parks and the 
environment were just one dimension of the debate, but important because of Colombia’s 
international obligations (viz. the 1994 UN Convention on Biodiversity) and its strong 
domestic environmental lobby. The Colombian Congress finally came up with a new law, 
but it was recently struck down by the Constitutional Court. Failure to resolve land titling 
jeopardizes the sustainability of any long-term program to use stabile land tenure as 
encouragements to peace and poverty alleviation. 
CSIS Americas Program, April 2009 10 
Infrastructure 
The need for tertiary roads is an impediment to development of rural areas of the 
Macarena region across the board. Where roads exist, they are incapable of transit by 
large trucks and are impassible for extended periods during the region’s 8-month rainy 
season. PCIM programs help local populations to maintain or repair tertiary roads – a 
useful and job-creating activity— and the Colombian military has built tertiary roads in 
the region under the PCIM umbrella. However, the construction of tertiary roads is 
normally the responsibility of municipalities in Colombia— an impossibility for the 
impoverished communities of the Macarena. Departments are responsible for secondary 
roads, of which there is also a scarcity in the region. PCIM efforts appear to be an 
effective lobby with the Department of Meta for greater funding for roadways. The 
assessment team was told more support is needed (for example to upgrade to secondary 
status the roads from Piñalito and Santo Domingo to Vista Hermosa), and PCIM says it 
will seek funding from a Ministry of Transportation fund for rural road development. 
Five of the six municipal population centers (la Macarena excluded) have 
electricity, but many of the rural areas are not connected to the grid. Several PCIM 
projects are oriented toward rural electricity but many more to improving water and 
sewage service in the zone. In general, rural areas are vastly underserved by utilities. 
There was much discussion of major long term infrastructure construction. One 
that seems to have high priority is a road to connect San Juan de Arama through Uribe 
over the cordillera to Huila. One high level official said the road will be completed in 18 
months. A project is under consideration to construct a dam in the Rio Güejar between 
Vista Hermosa and San Juan de Arama to generate 20 megawatts of hydro power that 
would allow electricity to be extended from Vista Hermosa to Piñalito and Macarena. 
Some mentioned the possible deepening of the Guavire River. All these projects face not 
just funding and engineering challenges but environmental as well. National parks and 
reserves - through which legally no road or electrical pylon right-of-way should pass – 
stretch from one side of the Macarena region to the other. 
Human Development 
An array of PCIM initiatives are intended to provide short-term economic and 
social support to populations in the Macarena region ahead of the establishment of more 
permanent public institutions. In some transitional areas where basic security control has 
only recently been established and where eradication of coca fields is ongoing, PCIM 
projects provide food assistance and cash subsidies for the neediest women and children, 
coupled with “family orchard” projects to raise fruit trees and plant gardens for additional 
food supply. Food assistance under PCIM is intended to last 4-6 months until longer-term 
projects kick in. The scope of this assistance remains very limited, however. Familias en 
Acción, the nation-wide program of conditional cash subsidies, comes into play when 
families can show they are fulfilling the children’s health and educational criteria of the 
program, but that requires access to the kind of facilities existing elsewhere in the 
country. 
CSIS Americas Program, April 2009 11 
Medical care in the Macarena region is rudimentary. “Level One” hospitals 
(limited to preventative care and basic services – but with doctors) are located in Puerto 
Rico and Mesetas, with “Health Centers” staffed by nurses in all six municipal centers. 
Outlying towns may have small health clinics, but they are not staffed. PCIM has few 
health-related projects, as health is an area that is the responsibility of the central 
government of Colombia. 
Education is better developed in the Macarena in terms of coverage. All six 
municipal urban cores provide public education through secondary school and most of 
the small towns have public schools. A large number of PCIM projects are aimed at 
enlarging, reconditioning, and equipping these schools. The quality of education provided 
is reportedly very modest but some PCIM projects are aimed at teacher training. 
PCIM, working with the National Training Service (SENA) of Colombia, carries 
out projects in the Macarena to provide technical training in a number of useful areas, 
including agriculture, fish farming, formation of cooperatives, information technology, 
and clothing manufacture. Projects teaching computer skills have been especially 
popular. SENA has donated tool kits, sewing machines, and computers to help this effort. 
The departmental director of SENA and her counterpart at Progreso have a productive 
working relationship. 
Governance 
All six municipalities in the region have elected mayors, in itself an 
accomplishment given the region’s long history outside state control. Municipal 
government is in very incipient stages, however, with little effective presence outside of 
the urban core. Municipalities in the Macarena have almost no tax base and few resources 
to apply to local needs, and scant human capital with experience in managing government 
at any level. Several PCIM projects are aimed at improving professional capability of 
municipal governments, especially in helping them leverage support from other 
Colombian government entities. Other PCIM programs support local civil society – 
community and neighborhood organizations. 
The access of local citizens to Colombia’s judicial system is very poor. The 
instruments of justice of the Colombian state in the Macarena region barely exist. Each 
municipality has a juez promiscuo municipal, the lowest-ranking authority in the national 
judicial system, but these officials cannot handle any criminal or complex cases and are 
confined to basic dispute resolution. State prosecutors (fiscales) are only occasionally 
present in the region. There is no jail in the Macarena area. Police sources say they feel 
cut off from their usual connection to the country’s justice system. 
CSIS Americas Program, April 2009 12 
Conclusions 
There are moments in transitional periods between conflict and peace when a 
window of opportunity is opened in which specific actions and programs can change the 
course of events. In the case of Colombia, the transitional process in the Macarena region 
may present such a moment and the Plan de Consolidación Integral de la Macarena [has 
the potential to be the needed agent of change. PCIM embodies what appears to be an 
important shift in the Government of Colombia’s hitherto not fully coordinated approach 
to establishing effective state presence in areas formerly controlled by illegal armed 
groups. As a strategy for consolidation of sustained state authority, PCIM’s emphasis on 
rapid and sequenced action coordinated on an inter-agency basis has much potential for 
success not only in the Macarena but as a pilot project for use in other areas of Colombia. 
Local Voices on PCIM 
The CSIS team met with community leaders in the Municipality of Vista Hermosa – 
Vista Hermosa itself – a secure area, and the small towns of La Cooperativa and 
Santo Domingo, both “transition” zones in terms of security. These meetings 
revealed some common themes that jibed with other observations. 
Most individuals the team spoke with expressed satisfaction that plans to develop the 
region are underway and there was praise for those projects already initiated. They 
also acknowledged improvements in security, although the situation in the town of 
Vista Hermosa was clearly more advanced than in the other two. When asked about 
specific needs for economic development, local residents agreed on a number of key 
points: 
• Lack of tertiary roads for access to larger towns and to get agricultural 
products to market is a disincentive to local agricultural development. 
• Untitled lands create the dual problem of agriculturalists not being able to get 
credit for their farming needs. 
• Access to higher-quality farm machinery is a major impediment to 
agriculture. The limited machinery available to date was either inadequate or 
inappropriate for the specific needs of the community. Local farms are too 
large to work effectively by hand. 
• Delayed delivery of seed prevented planting and missed market opportunities. 
• Lack of access to health facilities or the absence of a nurse practitioner was a 
concern in the more remote areas. 
• Gender-specific programming was also lacking according to women 
interviewed in the course of the visit. 
CSIS Americas Program, April 2009 13 
How long the transition window of opportunity in the Macarena region will 
remain open however is unclear, and that uncertainty drives the need for urgency in 
moving the PCIM forward. With the PCIM slated to end October 2010, it is essential that 
these transitional efforts be handed off to the government of Colombia and that progress 
achieved by PCIM be enhanced by considerably higher levels of government investment. 
In this regard, the next 18 months may prove critical to the sustainability and ultimate 
success of the transition process in the Macarena region. This appears to be an 
exceptional opportunity whose fulfillment, from what the assessment team observed, will 
depend on considerably more commitment from civilian agencies and senior levels of the 
government. In this regard, the Presidential Directive signed by President Uribe on March 
20, 2009 instructing GOC entities to fully cooperate in carrying out transitional efforts in 
key areas of the country is a positive step. 
From what the assessment team was able to observe, the PCIM program is 
managed by a strong team with a civilian coordinator with the right professional 
experience. There are representatives in each of the six municipalities in the region and 
five thematic coordinators. These positions are financed by the Colombian, Dutch and 
U.S. governments. Added to these are officials seconded from other programs, such as 
the very impressive teams of development specialists from Colombia Responde and 
Progreso. Beyond these team members, a host of GOC entities as well as the 
Government of Meta are represented in PCIM through seconded employees. Periodic 
inter-agency coordination meetings chaired by the PCIM civilian coordinator have 40 or 
more participants represented. These meetings take place on a frequent basis in 
Villavicencio or in the field. 
PCIM has a hands-on, field-oriented feel. Employees not assigned to the 
municipalities spend considerable time there, travelling by road or by a helicopter 
assigned to PCIM and operated by the Fourth Division of the Colombian army in 
Villavicencio. PCIM representatives work closely with community organizations in the 
urban centers, small towns and rural areas in secure and transition areas. They are well￾known to local populations and – by all appearances – are welcomed by them. PCIM 
does not promote itself as a separate entity but as a manifestation of Acción Social. 
 To date, PCIM has made progress in consolidating security over large areas of 
the Macarena region and a transition from a military presence to security provided by 
police is beginning in the urban centers of the region. Anti-narcotics efforts have 
produced some positive results but the team observed problems in the sequencing of 
eradication and economic support measures. PCIM productive programs are welcome, 
timely and effective. They are also relatively small-scale projects, appropriate at the 
earliest stages of the transition when speed of delivery is essential and where local 
capacity to absorb funds may be limited. Early on in the process, however, larger-scale 
investments from the Colombian government in higher cost areas such as infrastructure, 
agriculture, health and access to credit will be required. There are perceived differences 
between commitment levels among the various civilian entities in PCIM, ranging from 
enthusiastic to reluctant. 
CSIS Americas Program, April 2009 14 
Recommendations 
• PCIM needs stronger civilian leadership, demonstrated both by highly visible 
support by the country’s top political leaders and by day to day evidence civilian 
ministries give it high priority. PCIM began as part of a Colombian government 
strategy to win back the crucial center of the country. It has had strong Ministry of 
Defense backing. If the Macarena is geographically and symbolically important, 
the PCIM deserves a more convincing sign of political commitment and a 
commensurate injection of resources.
• One way of accomplishing this goal would be for the Government of Colombia to 
give oversight of PCIM and other similar consolidation projects to a presidential 
high commissioner or expanding the duties of the current High Commissioner for 
Peace. This individual should be given a dedicated budget as well as the authority 
to further leverage funding from other GOC ministries and agencies. 
• That high official should look at other peace making and post-conflict efforts 
going on around the country to see if a common template might be designed along 
the PCIM model, linking elements of the Ministry of Defense with quick reaction 
civilian public and private complementary, practical responses.
• Institutionalizing the model would, it is to be hoped, lead to a more realistic 
timeline for PCIM, which is due to expire in 18 months. The region needs to 
know that the government’s enhanced presence will not disappear before the 
effects have had a chance to take hold. 
• Particular emphasis should be placed on the transition between military and 
police-provided security in the Macarena. This will necessitate the timely transfer 
of police units to the region and efforts to win public confidence in the police 
force through the doctrine and practice of community policing. 
• Efforts to eradicate coca cultivation in the Macarena region should be 
accompanied by short-term food aid and cash subsidies and longer-term 
development inputs provided by the GOC. To a degree this is happening, but such 
efforts should be broadened and incorporated into a GOC strategic plan for post￾eradication support that will be applied outside the Macarena in other transitional 
areas. The sequencing of eradication and GOC economic support needs 
improvement. 
• A careful baseline study of coca cultivation should be carried out in the Macarena 
and in other areas where transitional projects are planned in order to measure the 
effectiveness of eradication and anti-narcotics efforts. 
• The justice system in the Macarena should be strengthened immediately. The 
region will not remain free of guerrilla or even more likely organized crime 
influence unless an expanding police presence is joined with the investigative 
skills of the Department of Administrative Security (DAS) and the Attorney 
General’s technical corps, plus minor courts to resolve civil and petty criminal 
cases. 
• Education and health facilities must be strengthened. Direct subsidy programs can 
lead to simple dependency unless tied to the life improvement coming from 
schools, training opportunities (e.g. SENA), hospitals and other care giving 
techniques, such as visiting physicians and nurses and the availability of access to 
medical call centers. Women and children’s health must have special importance. 
CSIS Americas Program, April 2009 15 
• Continued emphasis on agricultural development and extension services for the 
region is essential to take advantage of the potential that exists. However, unless 
the GOC invests in adequate infrastructure to bring products to market, 
investments in this sector will not be sustainable. 
• Land titling is a fundamental to the resolution of what ails the Macarena – not to 
mention much of Colombia. A national consensus on that key national issue is 
beyond the scope and length of the PCIM project, but PCIM teams should push to 
advance titling as much as possible under current law.