Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for Competitive Export TIPCEE Sibley International October 2008 Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for Competitive Export (TIPCEE) Prepared for USAID/Ghana by Tom Easterling James W. Fox Fenton B. Sands under Contract EEM-I-02-07-00003-02 issued to Sibley International October 2008 ACRONYMS i Acronym Meaning ADRA Adventist Development and Relief Agency BOG Bank of Ghana CAF Competitive Activities Fund CEPS Customs, Excise and Preventive Service CTO Cognizant Technical Officer DCA Development Credit Authority DFID Department for International Development EBD Export Business Development EE Enabling Environment EMQAP Export Marketing and Quality Awareness Project EPA Environmental Protection Agency ERP Effective Rate of Protection EU European Union FARA Fixed Amount Reimbursement Agreement FASDEP Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy FDI Foreign Direct Investment FINSSP Financial Sector Strategic Plan GAP Good Agricultural Practices GAVEX Ghana Association of Vegetable Exporters GDP Gross Domestic Product GIMPA Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration GIPC Ghana Investment Promotion Council GIS Global Information System GISPA Ghana Internet Service Providers Association GOG Government of Ghana GPRS Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy GSB Ghana Standards Board GTZ Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit – German Development Agency HACCP Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point HEII Horticulture Exports Industry Initiative IEHA Initiative to End Hunger in Africa ACRONYMS ii IFC International Finance Corporation ICT Information, Communications and Technology IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IFC International Finance Corporation ICRISAT International Crops Research Institute for Semi-arid Tropics LOP Life of Project M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MCC Millennium Challenge Compact MDAs Ministries, Departments, and Agencies MiDA Millennium Development Agency MOAP Market Oriented Agriculture Programme MSMEs Micro- Small, and Medium Enterprises MOFA Ministry of Food and Agriculture MOFEP Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning MOTIPSD/PSI Ministry of Trade, Industry, Private Sector Development and President’s Special Initiatives MOU Memorandum of Understanding NCA National Communications Authority NDPC National Development Planning Council NGO Non-government Organization NLC National Labor Commission NRGP Northern Region Growth Program PA Project Administration PMP project management plan PSDS Private Sector Development Strategy RAFiP Rural and Agricultural Finance Program RCB Rural/ Community Bank RFSP Rural Financial Services Project SPS Sanitary and Phytosanitary TIPCEE Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy TSSP Trade Sector Support Program UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program. ACRONYMS iii UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization USAID United States Agency for International Development VAT Value-added tax WBI World Bank Institute WTO World Trade Organization YiPoCoMa Yield, Post-harvest handling, Cost of production and Marketing TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Page Executive Summary ……………………………………………………………… i I. Introduction…………………………………………………………………….. 1 II. TIPCEE project overview……………………………………………………... 1 A. Background...…………………………………………………………... 1 B. Project components...…………………………………………………... 1 C. Changes in TIPCEE’s focus…………………………………………..... 3 D. Collaboration with other donors……………….……………………...... 3 III. TIPCEE project implementation…………………………………………….... 6 A. EBD Component...……………………………………………………... 6 B. EE Component...…………………………………………………........... 9 IV. Analysis of TIPCEE’s approach.…………………………………………...... 13 A. Export Business Development..………………………………………... 13 B. Enabling Environment…..………………………………………............ 16 C. Competitive Activities Fund.………………………………………........ 19 D. Poverty reduction…………………..………….……………………...... 20 E. Relations with government and donors….……………………............... 20 F. Sustainability…. ….……………………................................................. 21 V. TIPCEE’s accomplishments…. ….………………………………………….... 21 A. Meeting project deliverables and contract requirements...……………... 21 B. Potential problems related to completing the project……………........... 23 C. Ongoing activities that may require continued support...……………..... 24 D. TIPCEE’s notable achievements...…………….……………………...... 25 VI. After TIPCEE……………. …. …………………………………………….... 26 A. Possible strategic options……..………………………………………... 30 VII. Conclusions…………..…. …. …………………………………………….... 31 VIII. Recommendations…….. …. ……………………………………………..... 33 ANNEX Executive Summary 1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This assessment of the Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) was carried out by a team of three consultants who worked in Ghana for a four week period during September and October 2008. This assessment was the first of two tasks required of the consultants. The second task was to take an in-depth look at Ghana’s agricultural sector and to present reasonable concepts for USAID/Ghana to consider as it begins to prepare its future development strategy for Ghana. The goal of TIPCEE is similar to USAID/Ghana’s present Strategic Objective 6 (SO 6): to increase the competitiveness of Ghana’s private sector in world markets. This goal is consistent with Ghana’s Food and Agriculture Sector Development Policy, Ghana’s long￾term strategy for poverty reduction, and its goal of achieving middle-income status by 2015. The TIPCEE project has three main components: An Export Business Development (EBD) component, an Enabling Environment (EE) component, and project administration. The EBD component uses a transaction-based value-chain approach to help bring about increased exports of selected horticultural products. The EE component works closely with three key sectors - financial markets; trade and other private sector policies; and agriculture – to address problems that hamper business competitiveness. TIPCEE’s project administrators manage a US $3.5 million Competitive Activities Fund, and are also responsible for project monitoring and evaluation (M&E). Chemonics International is the company responsible for implementing the project. Almost 1-1/2 years after TIPCEE was initiated, USAID began using the Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA) as a funding source for the project. This required that TIPCEE initiate additional activities to enhance the production and marketing of food crops by small farmers as a means to reduce poverty. With this change, TIPCEE also assumed the obligation to meet optimistic targets for poverty reduction related to the number of small farmers trained and the number of rural households favorably impacted by the project. It is doubtful that TIPCEE will meet all its performance targets. First, the volume and value of exports will likely be below initial expectations. The reason is primarily because the export market for the Smooth Cayenne pineapple variety that has traditionally been exported from Ghana collapsed at about the same time TIPCEE was initiated, and the transition to the newer MD2 variety with high export demand has been slow and extremely costly to pineapple producers. Another reason is undoubtedly because the requirement to embark upon the production and marketing of food crops that are mostly consumed locally has detracted from the project’s ability to increase exports. A second shortfall in meeting performance targets will likely be in the number of small farmers trained, and in the number of rural households favorably impacted by TIPCEE’s interventions. The main reason for this likely underperformance is that the magnitude of the targets imposed by USAID for poverty reduction is, in the view of the evaluation team, completely unrealistic for all but the shallowest of interventions. Recommendations for future interventions by USAID/Ghana to support economic growth by Ghana’s agricultural sector are presented in considerable detail in the accompanying report to this assessment, “The Way Forward”. A framework of the recommended strategy is the following: Executive Summary 2 • Use value chain concepts to help create viable agro-industries from the production, transformation and marketing of targeted agricultural products. Work to reinforce the weak lengths of the value chains. Link small producers as suppliers of the targeted products with larger processors, exporters, and consolidators. • Work with small-scale producers of staples and food crops to help them improve their production efficiency and to link them with reliable markets for their excess production. • Similar to TIPCEE’s EE component, work to improve the regulatory, legislative and policy framework for agribusiness development. • Undertake different initiatives to improve rural credit, such as expanding the use of USAID’s Development Credit Authority (DCA); strengthening Apex banking for rural banks; training borrowers and lenders, and linking small grants with bank financing to rural entrepreneurs for small- and medium-scale investments. • Foreign direct investment should be encouraged as a means for stimulating economic growth in Ghana’s agricultural sector. • Help overcome Ghana’s business management gap through management and technical training. • Help to build Ghana’s future leaders through leadership training for mid- to senior-level managers and directors in both the private and public sectors. Conclusions 1. In light of its overall objectives, TIPCEE is an effective program and a good use of USAID/Ghana’s funding. 2. TIPCEE has developed highly creative, effective materials for farmer training, and it has developed innovative approaches to solving industry-wide problems. These activities directly support agricultural production and exports. 3. The Enabling Environment (EE) component is carried out in support of the project’s Export Business Development activity, and it has been instrumental in solving several major policy problems. Its use of embedded advisors within different government ministries and institutions is particularly effective. 4. There are numerous opportunities for agribusiness development, including agro￾processing in Ghana. Value chain concepts are be the most effective means for developing targeted agro-industries. 5. The shift in TIPCEE from a primarily focus on economic growth through export horticulture to a focus on poverty reduction through the production of food crops has had an adverse effect on the achievement of export goals. 6. TIPCEE has an excellent opportunity to collaborate with the Millennium Challenge Compact and with the International Fund for Agricultural Development within their respective operating areas to help increase rural incomes. Executive Summary 3 7. Notwithstanding TIPCEE’s involvement in the development of the private sector, government officials at MOFA as well as MOFEP believe that the project should be more forthcoming by providing more information and better coordination on project activities, and those relevant government officials should have greater involvement in the planning and design of future projects. Furthermore, other donors who are not working directly with TIPCEE also expressed their desire to have greater access to technical information generated by the project. Some of those interviewed suggested that the project's experience working on the front lines with the private sector should be shared more fully, to better inform everyone of the right kind of supportive role the public sector should be playing. Recommendations 1. That USAID/Ghana consider the possibility of extending the TIPCEE project for an additional year to consolidate its gains; to begin the process of collaborating with the Millennium Development Agency (MiDA) as well as IFAD’s Northern Rural Growth Program (NRGP) within their respective operating areas, and to provide overlap with possible new USAID interventions. 2. That USAID/Ghana and TIPCEE project management consider the possibility of consolidating the project’s EBD activities during its final year by focusing on its basic export products (mango, pineapple, papaya) and its basic food crops (maize, tomatoes, citrus) for greater impact and sustainability. 3. That USAID consider the options presented in the “After TIPCEE” section of this report as a starting point for planning its future economic growth program in Ghana. 4. That USAID and Chemonics International conclude an agreement on Chemonics’ proposed modifications to its Project Management Plan (PMP) for the TIPCEE project. 5. That TIPCEE undertake an initiative to improve its professional relations with key members of the relevant government ministries. In addition, the project should find ways to make technical data and information, as well as lessons learned more readily available to interested parties. Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 1 I. Introduction This assessment of the Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) was carried out by a team of three consultants who worked in Ghana for a four week period during October and November 2008. Their task was first, to evaluate the performance of TIPCEE to determine its effectiveness and to recommend any needed mid-course adjustments. Second, the team was tasked with reviewing USAID’s economic growth program in Ghana and to make recommendations on the composition and direction of future programs upon completion of the present Strategic Objective No. 6 (SO 6) in 2010. This report presents the consultant’s assessment, along with the Annex containing a number of supporting documents. Annex I provides responses to several questions posed by USAID/Ghana at the outset of the assessment. Annex II provides a summary of the project’s indicators, targets, and anticipated results to the end of the project. A list of technical reports under preparation by the project team is shown in Annex III. A comparison of budgeted and actual expenditures until the end of the project is included in Annex IV, and Annex V contains two success stories from the project. The consultants’ scope of work for this assessment is shown in Annex VI, while a list of people interviewed over the course of this study and their organizations is shown in Annex VII. II. TIPCEE project overview A. Background TIPCEE is carried out under USAID/Ghana’s SO 6: “Competitiveness of the Ghanaian Private Sector in World Markets Increased”, which was designed to link directly to the Government of Ghana’s (GOG’s) Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS II), particularly its private sector pillar. TIPCEE’s work also responds to GOG priorities as outlined in the Trade Sector Support Program (TSSP), Financial Sector Strategic Plan (FINSSP), and the Private Sector Development Strategy (PSDS). These activities also support the U.S. President’s Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA). The goal of TIPCEE is to increase the competitiveness of Ghana’s private sector in world markets through an improved enabling environment and a strengthened capacity of the private sector to respond to market demands. TIPCEE’s objectives can be grouped into four broad categories: 1) expanded market access, 2) more integrated industry/cluster activities, 3) improved performance of enterprises and smallholders, and 4) key policy and regulatory constraints addressed and solutions proposed. TIPCEE seeks to increase the performance, value, and innovation of Ghana’s export industries in world markets by (a) strengthening selected commodity supply chains from farm to market (and supermarket), and (b) working with policy makers and implementers, and private sector stakeholders to improve the legal and regulatory environment for private sector operation and investment. B. Project components The TIPCEE project has three main components: The Export Business Development (EBD) component, the Enabling Environment (EE) component, and project administration. Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 2 TIPCEE takes a transaction-based value-chain approach to export business development. It identifies and develops opportunities, and addresses challenges across the value chains for selected commodities with export and domestic market potential. Its implementation activities are focused on the value chains for the selected products. The EBD team designs and implements activities focused on the supply chains’ four major levels: 1) smallholder farmer, 2) nucleus export firm, 3) agro-industry and 4) linkages to available markets. The EBD component links smallholders to nucleus firms and processors via quality assurance programs, pooling efforts to consolidate volumes, and by supporting contractual mechanisms that ensure fair play. The EBD Component is comprised of a Marketing team, an Enterprise team, a Smallholder team, and a Business Development Services (BDS) team, all which support interventions along supply chains. In addition to these technical teams, there are also cross-cutting teams that focus on activities affecting different supply chains. These cross-cutting activity teams bring together experts from Marketing, Enterprise, Smallholder and BDS. The Enabling Environment (EE) component was designed to achieve results that improve the ability of the private sector to grow, attract private investment to Ghana, and compete in world markets. Through enhanced public-private dialogue, capacity building of key policy units, and improved policy analysis, formulation, implementation and monitoring, the EE component endeavors to achieve significant policy changes to improve the business environment within which the private sector operates. The EE component is focused primarily on three key sectors that are most critical to achieving TIPCEE’s goals and objectives: financial markets; trade and other private sector policies; and agriculture. In addition, specific projects have focused on macroeconomic, monetary and fiscal policy, and the energy, ICT, and labor sectors. The project’s focus on these areas is based on the overriding need to achieve and sustain macroeconomic stability through monetary and fiscal policy, improve the efficiency of factor markets – particularly financial, agricultural and labor markets – and improve the regulatory frameworks for key infrastructure sectors such as energy and ICT. Technical assistance, training, and public￾private dialogues are the principal tools used to achieve results Project administration is responsible for administering TIPCEE, including its financial management. This component manages a Competitive Activities Fund (CAF) and is also responsible for project Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E). The Competitive Activities Fund provides funding to demonstrate innovative practices and to advance creative ideas that support TIPCEE’s objectives. Its budget for the entire project life is US $3.5 million. The CAF is structured to provide flexibility in dealing with clients, including non-government organizations (NGOs), private business partners and farmer groups, as well as government agencies. Proposed CAF expenditures are submitted to an in-house technical review committee composed of the CAF Manager, technical advisors, and TIPCEE’s senior management. The CAF employs three mechanisms to disburse its funds: 1. Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with clients provide the framework for collaboration on a specific activity, or to provide equipment, supplies and services to Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 3 the client. In case of MOUs, matching contributions are required. The client contributes in-kind by providing equipment, personnel and other required needs depending on the type of activity. There is no hard and fast rule for minimum and maximum contributions; the amounts are decided on a case by case basis and are based on negotiations with the clients. TIPCEE contributes up to a maximum of 100 percent for activities such as travel to attend trade fairs and conferences, but for other activities TIPCEE normally provides around 50 percent of the expenditure. For these cases, the minimum amount provided by the client is around 15 percent. The amount of funding for MOUs depends on the needs of the client. 2. Fixed Price Subcontracts are often used to hire a firm to produce deliverables such as a survey, the planning and delivery of a workshop, or a technical study. A subcontract over the amount of $25,000 requires concurrence by USAID/Ghana’s Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO). Subcontracts are awarded based on competitive bids. Requests for proposals are often issued, which requires the bidders to articulate their strategy and cost for completion of the required work work. 3. Fixed Amount Reimbursement Agreements (FARAs) are is used exclusively to obtain special services from the Government of Ghana. USAID is directly involved in determining the amount and duration of FARAs. C. Changes in TIPCEE’s focus In April 2006, as a result of a change in USAID/Ghana’s funding sources from economic growth initiatives to poverty reduction efforts under IEHA, it became necessary for USAID/Ghana to change TIPCEE’s focus from that of a project dedicated primarily to export business development to a project with dual objectives: poverty reduction and export horticulture promotion products. Clearly, this change had a dramatic impact on the project’s focus, its work practices, and its targeted outputs. For example, with the added emphasis on poverty reduction, the target for the number of rural households benefiting from TIPCEE’s interventions over its life of project (LOP) increased from 15,000 to 100,000. Similarly, the target for the number of vulnerable households benefiting from TIPCEE’s interventions increased from 6,000 to 40,000. D. Collaboration with other donors EBD component TIPCEE’s EBD component has worked closely with several donors that are involved in Ghana’s horticulture sector. The most important of these are the following: MCC – The Millennium Challenge Compact’s (MCC’s) five-year Ghana economic development program is carried out by a recently-created agency of the Ghana government, the Millennium Development Agency (MiDA). Although the MCC program was officially launched in early 2007, due to its slow start it is only now beginning to actually work in Ghana’s rural sector. TIPCEE collaborated extensively with MiDA during the early stages of its program to help develop its strategy and program design, and also made available its entire smallholder training program materials for good agricultural and post-harvest practices, as well as EurepGAP certification under Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 4 option two. TIPCEE’s training program was fully incorporated into MiDA’s development strategy. MiDA operates within twenty-two of Ghana’s districts that, with the exception of two districts, overlap with TIPCEE. MiDA’s program involves the improvement of farm productivity, post-harvest handling and value chain services for the agricultural products within its operating area. Its targets include creating up to 600 farmer based organizations and training 60,000 farmers in good agricultural and post-harvest practices; facilitating rural finance through its US $25 million loan guarantee fund and purchasing of existing rural loans to increase rural financial sector liquidity; the construction or rehabilitation of 970 kilometers of tertiary roads and 230 kilometers of trunk roads; improving the national highway between Tema and Accra; improving Lake Volta ferry services; to improve rural community services by upgrading schools and public services, and to further build the capacity of the public sector in rural areas. A careful review of MCC’s agreement with Ghana reveals that its program is considerably weighted toward the production side of the value chain, with minimal support to marketing the farm products that are produced by its beneficiaries. This apparent lapse provides an opportunity for TIPCEE to collaborate with the MCC program by providing market linkages, market development, and applied research technology to MiDA’s beneficiaries. This would result in a considerable leveraging of TIPCEE’s efforts. The following map shows the locations where TIPCEE and MiDA overlap. Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 5 GTZ – Within Ghana’s horticultural sector, TIPCEE’s EBD component has developed a strong collaborative relationship with the Market Oriented Agriculture Programme (MOAP), which is funded by the Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ). This collaboration has resulted in a considerable number of successful industry events such as the Fruit Logistica trade fair in Berlin, the EurepGAP Option 2 pilot initiatives for pineapple, mango, papaya, and vegetable smallholders, and the development of a GIS database of citrus smallholder farms. These initiatives pave the way for deployment of barcode traceability and farm – pack house – port connectivity. Other specific, collaborative interventions between TIPCEE and GTZ are the following: • Within the citrus sector, TIPCEE is leading a program to develop a GIS database that will support strong supply chain linkages between recently established processing plants and the smallholder farmer supply base. An accurate database of existing orchards will inform sourcing strategies as well as farmer capacity building programs aimed at improving product quality and yield. This activity involves the coordination of the Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA), the Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA) and is conducted under the auspices of the citrus value chain committee supported by MOAP/GTZ. • TIPCEE is working with industry stakeholders and GTZ/MOAP’s citrus supply chain component to develop a comprehensive citrus industry plan. This work will be carried out under the guidance of the Citrus Value Chain Committee housed in MOFA and supported by the GTZ/MOAP program. • TIPCEE is collaborating with GTZ to develop leadership skills in the export horticulture sector through the Federation of Ghanaian Exporters (FAGE): The GTZ is supporting FAGE’s internal administration and information, communications and technology (ICT) systems, while TIPCEE is working to build capacity to transfer market information systems to FAGE. In collaboration with FAGE and GTZ, TIPCEE created the website, “Ghana Fresh Produce” that provides weekly market information on Ghana’s major export products. • TIPCEE worked closely with GEPC, GTZ, and FAGE to support the participation by Ghana’s stakeholders in the 2007 Fruit Logistica trade fair in Berlin, Germany. • The TIPCEE-GTZ partnership has worked seamlessly with additional partners in the horticulture sector, such as MOFA’s Horticulture Exports Industry Initiative (HEII), FAGE, and private processors and exporters IFAD - TIPCEE has collaborated with the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) for the design and initiation of the Northern Region Growth Program (NRGP). This is a seven-year, $50 million initiative targeting the agriculture sector in the Northern, Upper East, and Upper West Regions. Now that the NRGP program has started, several TIPCEE approaches involving drip irrigation, good agricultural practices, quality assurance, and supply chain networks are expected to be scaled up and applied throughout the three regions. The World Bank – TIPCEE’s EBD component collaborated extensively with the World Bank Institute (WBI) to design training programs to mainstream a competitiveness￾analysis curriculum based on private-sector initiatives adopted by local training Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 6 institutions at the undergraduate, graduate, and professional levels. These included the Ghana Institute of Management and Public Administration (GIMPA) and the University of Ghana, Legon. TIPCEE facilitated the attendance of these organizations at a conference organized by the World Bank Institute in Ouagadougou, which aimed to set the agenda for curriculum development, share knowledge, and promote training institutions to support the competitiveness of West African countries. TIPCEE’s staff also collaborates with the World Bank in the financial sector, specifically in the ongoing review of the long-term savings scheme, and with the launch of the Financial Sector Division of MOFEP as part of the FINSSP. For Financial Literacy Week held in September 2008, TIPCEE collaborated with numerous donors and programs, including the International Finance Corporation’s (IFC’s) leasing program. EE Component TIPCEE’s Enabling Environment component also collaborates with other donor programs. A summary of these activities is as follows: DFID - TIPCEE collaborated with the UK Department for International Development (DFID) to provide technical assistance to expedite the review process of the FASDEP. After the first draft was finalized, DFID focused on implementation strategy development while TIPCEE supported MOFA in drafting necessary legislative and administrative instruments, and conducting legislative reviews and sensitization sessions with parliamentarians. The World Bank – TIPCEE also collaborates with the World Bank in the financial sector, specifically in the ongoing review of the long-term savings scheme and with the launch of the Financial Sector Division of MOFEP. These tasks were carried out as part of the Financial Sector Strategic Plan (FINSSP). During the second year of the TIPCEE project, the Ministry of Communications faced a disruption of its ongoing work to liberalize ICT industry regulations due to a World Bank funding gap. TIPCEE stepped in to analyze pending legislation in four areas, provide input and feedback, and conduct public-private dialogues of draft legislation before its final presentation to Parliament. All relevant bills were passed by Parliament during the project’s third year. Donor working groups – Through USAID’s representation and TIPCEE’s participation in sector-specific donor working groups, project staff is kept informed of any changes in policy or new development priorities that can have an impact on TIPCEE’s activities. III. TIPCEE implementation A. EBD Component The EBD component of TIPCEE has identified six export horticulture products and product categories for international export markets and five food crops for domestic and regional markets. It supports the development of these products by means of targeted interventions along their respective value chains. In addition to interventions along a specific value chain such as farmer training to increase maize productivity, TIPCEE also Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 7 provides cross-cutting assistance such as helping groups of small fruit farmers to obtain GlobalGAP certification for their export crops. TIPCEE’s Priority Products Export Horticulture Products Products for Local and Regional Markets Fresh pineapple Tomato Mango Commercial maize Papaya Citrus Vegetables Processed pineapple Cashew Onion Medicinal plants TIPCEE has carried out numerous activities to strengthen the supply chains for its targeted products. Its most important activities are the following: 1. TIPCEE facilitates market linkages between small- and medium-scale producers of horticultural products and exporters of these products, and between producers and lead buyers for local and regional markets. 2. TIPCEE provides training and technical assistance to small farmers to facilitate GlobalGAP certification for their export products under option two procedures, as well as Fair Trade certification for exporters and farmers supplying these markets. 3. In collaboration with the Ghana Standards Board (GSB) and the different agro￾industry associations, TIPCEE has established norms and standards for numerous export commodities. Also in collaboration with these organizations, the project has established inspection procedures based on statistical sampling of export commodities at their respective packing sheds and at the wharf to determine the quality of fresh fruit exports. 4. For its entire range of targeted crops, TIPCEE has provided Global Information System (GIS) maps of all farms that produce these crops. This basic information is necessary for purposes of certification, production planning, and for obtaining crop credit. 5. For most crops, TIPCEE has provided training in good agricultural practices (GAP) to help the farmers to increase their crop yields and to improve product quality. This is generally done by producing simple, yet effective training materials on farming and post-harvest practices suitable for farmers and service providers with limited education. For food crops such as maize and tomatoes, the basis for the farmer training are farm demonstration plots that show the effects of the recommended agriculture practices including fertilization, pest and disease control, and irrigation. 6. TIPCEE has facilitated export market linkages for exporters of horticultural crops by sponsoring their attendance at the international trade fair in Germany. Furthermore, TIPCEE supported the establishment of a website to provide market information for the export horticulture industry. Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 8 Interventions for the targeted products can be summarized as follows: • Cashew - TIPCEE helped to provide quality norms and standards for cashew nuts; provided GIS mapping for over 1,000 cashew farms and trained more than 5,000 farmers in improved sorting and grading procedures. • Papaya – TIPCEE helped to introduce the new Golden variety through demonstration plots that established production protocols for best practices and introduced new technology such as drip irrigation. One smallholder association has received GlobalGAP certification; norms and standards were established for Golden and Sunrise Solo varieties, and exporters were linked to reliable producers of export papaya. • Medicinal plants – TIPCEE has trained 2,500 collectors of wild plants in good collection practices, and in collaboration with GSB, has established product standards for two herbal plants. • Citrus – TIPCEE, along with its partners, has mapped more than 5,000 citrus farms using GPS devices and computer software; it has helped to link small-scale citrus producers to a citrus processor; it has introduced GlobalGAP certification procedures to the industry, and by the use of demonstration plots it has provided training to smallholders in good agricultural practices. • Vegetables – through the use of farm plots demonstrating GAP and appropriate post￾harvest practices combined with farmer training using simple training materials, TIPCEE has proven that production yields and profitability of okra and chilies by small farmers can be increased dramatically. It has also tested new varieties and made trial shipments of okra and baby corn; it helped to test new varieties on onion, and trained farmers in good agricultural practices; it has worked to strengthen the Ghana Association of Vegetable Exporters (GAVEX), the industry association; it introduced new field crates for harvesting vegetables and established pooling sheds to consolidate shipments; it has helped GAVEX to achieve GlobalGAP certification, and it has worked to strengthen lead buyers and the vegetable exporter’s association. • Maize – TIPCEE has established numerous demonstration plots for commercial maize production under GAP; it has trained farmers in good farming and post-harvest practices along with basic business and marketing skills using a novel approach called YiPoCoMa (yield, post-harvest handling, cost of production and marketing); it has established market linkages between informal groups of farmers and maize processors; it has helped to introduce new maize varieties for animal feed, and it has piloted a trial SMS messaging supply chain management system between buyers and lead farmers. • Tomato – TIPCEE has established a number of demonstration plots for tomato production using improved varieties, drip irrigation, and good practices such as support stakes for tomato plants to ensure optimum yields. It has also provided training to tomato farmers on the improved practices; provided market linkage to processors and buyers for traditional market outlets; introduced an improved tomato Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 9 crate to reduce damage during transport, and is testing new crop varieties for dry season production. • Mango – TIPCEE pioneered the shipment of mangos from Ghana to Europe by ocean-going vessels, whereas previously all exports were shipped by air freight. Furthermore, TIPCEE has facilitated GlobalGAP certification for four associations of mango producers covering 162 farmers; it has provided training and technical assistance on GAP to 2,120 small farmers; in collaboration with GSB it has provided norms and standards to the industry for export mangos; it has provided GIS mapping of all commercial mango farms in Ghana, and with the GSB and industry associations it established a program of inspecting export mangos for purposes of quality assurance. • Pineapple – TIPCEE facilitated the establishment of pineapple plant nurseries to produce the new MD2 variety for small farmers; it assisted nine small-scale producer organizations to obtain GlobalGAP certification; it helped to provide norms and standards for export pineapples for the industry; it helped link smallholder groups to exporters and to pineapple processors; it provided GIS mapping for pineapple farms, and it helped to strengthen the Pineapple Exporters’ Association. • Onion – TIPCEE established a demonstration program for commercial onion production using new varieties with drip irrigation; developed training material, and trained onion producers and MOFA staff. • Other - TIPCEE provided support to Ghana horticultural companies, mostly pineapple producers, during their discussions with Chiquita Brands International to establish locally-owned banana farms whose output would be marketed by Chiquita. TIPCEE helped to identify the best producing zones s for banana production, and sponsored a national workshop to generate interest in banana production for international markets. B. EE Component The EE component seeks to improve the enabling environment for private sector growth. It provides assistance with policy development and implementation in trade, finance and agriculture sectors. It works closely with government ministries to identify problems; develop concept papers outlining policy issues; review best practices; facilitate public￾private dialogue; draft bills and regulations for circulation, and provides information and technical support to government for its review. Activities are carried out under the EE component to address both policy reform and institutional capacity building. The eight priority areas in the enabling environment program are as follows: 1. Improved trade regime with emphasis on consistent implementation of policies and improved custom services. 2. Improved policies relating to the agricultural sector; Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 10 3. Improved financial intermediation with emphasis on improved GOG debt management (government securities market), expanding access to credit and establishing sound policies and institutional structures in securities markets; 4. Better macroeconomic management with a focus on increasing GOG revenue and improving monetary management; 5. Removal of barriers that distort the labor market for the formal sector with focus on legislative reform and implementation of that new legislation. 6. Improved energy regulations for the natural gas sector 7. Improvements in telecommunications regulatory bodies. 8. Strengthened public-private sector policy dialogue including capacity building of business associations to better advocate for policy reform that broadly benefits interests of the Ghanaian private sector. The first three (trade, agriculture, and finance) were part of the original design for TIPCEE, and closely aligned with TIPCEE’s overarching goals. The next four (macro policy, labor, energy, and ICT) were picked up by TIPCEE as legacies from previous projects, and are mostly far afield from TIPCEEs core activities. The final area, public￾private dialogue, is a cross-cutting one included in the original project design. Activities in the eight areas are described below. Trade sector The trade policy reforms and projects that formed the base of TIPCEE activities were derived from the Government of Ghana Trade Policy document and its implementation framework, the Trade Sector Support Program (TSSP). TIPCEE consulted with the Minister and directors of the Ministry of Trade, Industry, Private Sector Development and President’s Special Initiatives (MOTIPSD/PSI) to prioritize activities that would enhance Ghana’s trade competitiveness. Policy reforms and projects agreed upon for collaboration were from two main thematic areas of the TSSP: import and export regime and trade facilitation. The goals of the policy reforms and activities under the import and export regime were to ensure a level playing field for all economic operators through effective and systematic application of a transparent tariff regime and also to ensure the operation of an efficiently managed incentives regime to facilitate increased domestic production, especially for onward exporting. With trade facilitation, the primary objectives were to ensure speedy and efficient goods clearance and thus reduce costs, and to provide modern storage and cold chains as well as competitive cargo-handling facilities at the airport and ports. TIPCEE also had consultations with Customs, Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS) to design policy reforms and projects that were outlined in the TSSP to reinforce CEPS’s role as a trade promoting institution rather than as a tax collecting agent for government. GOG was engaged through consultations at the ministerial level of MOTIPSD/PSI. TIPCEE also made presentations to private sector stakeholders and government officials alike, whose activities impinge on the TSSP policy reforms processes. TIPCEE Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 11 supported the private sector to dialogue with GOG and to make inputs into the implementation design to reinforce local ownership of the reform agenda. The consultative processes worked extremely well and ensured that all stakeholders, MOTIPSD/PSI, private sector agents, and other participating government officials felt that they owned the reform process and the policy agenda. The various stakeholders had the opportunity to make their views known and voices heard for effective compromises to be built. TIPCEE’s most important achievement is the role it played in supporting MOTIPSD/PSI to establish the Tariff Advisory Board/Ghana International Trade Commission. This support consisted of extensive technical support and significant capacity building. One significant collaborative project which supports this new Commission was the development of an effective rate of protection (ERP) template for the analysis of tariff levels for international competitiveness. Another tool under development is an economic benefits model to examine the contribution of various sectors in the economy. TIPCEE supported the drafting of legislation, legislative instruments, and rules and procedures. In the final year of the project extensive training will be done to build the independence and capacity of the technical secretariat to the Commission. The Ghana International Trade Commission will allow the private sector to exercise its rights under the World Trade Organization (WTO) in terms of trade contingency laws. It will also provide to MOTIPSD/PSI, MOFEP, and the Select Committee of Parliament high quality research and analysis needed for evidence based decision making. Agriculture policy TIPCEE was intimately involved with MOFA to revise the existing FASDEP document to remedy identified deficiencies, and TIPCEE offered technical assistance to support the Ministry. The project also undertook a number of studies based on requests received from both public and private institutions, including value-chain studies of bananas and pineapples, and the situation of agricultural credit. New pesticide regulations supported by the project will give support to the horticultural export sector when they are fully implemented. The regulations will allow pesticides already approved by the EU and the United States to automatically be approved by the Ghana Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) based on the equivalence determination provisions of the Agreements on Agriculture. Financial sector The project inherited several legacy activities from the Trade and Investment Reform Project including work on a Long-term Savings Act, a Venture Capital Trust Fund, a Non-bank Financial Institutions Bill, and review of a Draft Foreign Exchange Bill. In addition, TIPCEE undertook numerous additional activities in the areas of interest rate spreads, financial literacy, and several kinds of financial market legislation. Through its imbedded advisor at MOFEP, TIPCEE helped to create and strengthen two new technical units within the ministry: the Project and Financial Analysis Unit, and the Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 12 Financial Sector Division. It also completed numerous studies, analyses, and draft regulations for the Ministry, including the Foreign Exchange Act; Borrowers and Lenders Bill; Review of the Long-term Savings Act; Medium-term GOG debt strategy; Interest Rate Spread studies; Mergers and Takeover Code, and support to the Venture Capital Trust Fund. Macro sector TIPCEE was involved in two macroeconomic policy activities. The first was collaboration with National Development Planning Council (NDPC) on macroeconomic analyses and projections for GPRS II. The second, mentioned earlier in the section on trade policy, was a study on the appropriate exchange rate policy for a competitive export-led growth strategy. Also, for the first eighteen months of the project, TIPCEE funded an embedded advisor to the BOG. This advisor was subsequently made Deputy Governor of the Bank. In the first case, TIPCEE worked with NDPC in the analyses and projections for key macroeconomic variables that formed the basis of GPRS II, which is Ghana’s current blueprint for economic development. The exchange-rate study involved much more consultation throughout the government, and with the private sector. Preliminary meetings to discuss the proposed exchange rate research were held with the Bank of Ghana (BOG), MOTIPSD/PSI, and other government ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs). These meetings obtained stakeholders’ views and inputs into the policy process. Although BOG was very defensive of its turf with respect to the exchange rate study, the dialogue processes created the opportunity for private sector participants to tell BOG/GOG how the policies were impacting on their competitiveness. Energy sector This activity was requested by USAID to support the West African Pipeline project, a project that TIPCEE inherited from a previous USAID project. Work on the pipeline had been supported by USAID’s regional program. The pipeline is intended to provide cheap natural gas to Ghana and other West African countries, primarily for electric power generation. TIPCEE’s role was to work with the pipeline company, the Ministry of Energy and the Energy Commission to design necessary legislation related to the pipeline, particularly with respect to the regulatory environment for secondary users of natural gas. TIPCEE funded technical experts and a visit to natural gas institutions in Texas. Outputs from the activity included a roadmap for the development of a policy and regulatory framework for the secondary natural gas market in Ghana, the preparation of five sets of regulations and a tariff framework for pricing of natural gas in the secondary market. ICT sector Reforms in the ITC sector were chosen from a number of priorities suggested by the Ministry of Communications, the private sector (GISPA), and in close consultation with Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 13 the World Bank’s ICT team. One project came under USAID/Ghana’s Last Mile Initiative. The project drew on GOG involvement throughout, in the selection of reform areas and in the design of work plans for these reforms, in the selection of consultants to provide technical assistance, and in the review of outputs/deliverables from consultants. TIPCEE also facilitated dialogue and consultation between the Ministry of Communications, the Select Committee of Parliament on Communications, and GISPA on issues related to the reforms and on the deliverables of the consultants. A special orientation/capacity building session was held for members of the Select Committee of Parliament on Communications on developments in the ICT sector globally and in Ghana in particular, and implications for policy and regulatory regimes. Labor sector USAID/Ghana had supported development of a comprehensive labor law aimed at enhancing labor market competitiveness. With the passage Act 651, which went into effect in early 2004, old labor laws were purged, and new concepts were introduced into Ghana’s industrial relations. Because the implementation of Act 651 was delayed beyond TIRP, GOG in consultation with USAID/TIPCEE agreed to support implementation of the reforms. The National Labor Commission (NLC) and the Ministry of Manpower, Youth and Employment (MMYE) were the main channels for consultation with Government. TIPCEE/USAID met with officials of NLC and MMYE to discuss the policy actions and programs that were critical to the success of the implantation of the new labor law. TIPCEE assisted the MMYE and NLC to hold stakeholder workshops among trades unions, employers, and government including members of the Select Committee of Parliament and the judiciary. TIPCEE also sponsored a trip to Washington to visit with the National Labor Relations Board, and the Federal Mediation and Arbitration Service. These visits informed the approach of the NLC. TIPCEE considers the consultative processes to have worked extremely well, with the various stakeholders having the opportunity to make their views known and voices heard for effective compromises. This was thought to be especially so for the NLC, which had several dialogues with the most aggressive unions such as Ghana Medical Association Ghana National Association of Teachers. A revolving door at the highest levels of the MMYE was said to have led to a disappointing lack of take-up by the ministry on some aspects of the new labor code. TIPCEE also supported awareness creation seminars on legal dispute resolution, and funded posters, pamphlets and other informational material. TIPCEE argues that the new understanding of the legal requirements for both sides in labor disputes led to the government withholding salaries of striking workers, a practice not previously utilized. TIPCEE also developed an information management system for the NLC to track petitions and research cases. This is well-regarded by the NLC Board, and is likely to be a useful contribution to efficient operation of the NLC and the labor sector in general. Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 14 IV. Analysis of TIPCEEs’s approach A. Export Business Development TIPCEE was originally conceived as a traditional horticultural export project that was expected to make a substantial contribution to Ghana’s economic growth through its increased exports of high value agricultural products. Its strategy to achieve increased export quantities and values has been well tested in recent years: it uses a market driven, value chain approach1 1 A value chain includes all the steps, and defines the relationships of the different actors in the chain of events required to produce, transform, and market an agricultural product. Value chains operate by creating collaborative relationships and sharing information, costs and benefits along the chain by the different actors involved. to create viable agro-industries through the production, transformation, and export marketing of agricultural products that have considerable economic potential. At the outset, TIPCEE assembled a staff of agribusiness professionals and horticulture experts that quickly identified a number of promising export products including pineapple, mango, papaya and chili peppers, and then began a comprehensive effort to create export agro-industries based on these products. TIPCEE later expanded its targeted products to include exotic vegetable crops for ethnic markets primarily in the UK, including Asian vegetables, okra, and baby corn. In helping to create and/or strengthen the value chains for these products, TIPCEE’s supported the small- and medium-scale producers of these farm commodities. The project helped to provide market access for these producers by linking them to exporters, processors, and lead buyers. For the targeted crops, TIPCEE introduced a program to increase crop yields and improve product quality through better plant varieties, better agricultural practices and improved post-harvest practices. Its intent was to ensure that small and medium producers had the capability to produce farm products that meet export market standards. Another requirement for entering major fresh produce export markets in the EU is that all farmers producing export products must be certified as being compliant with international standards for good agricultural practices (i.e. GlobalGAP), and that all products received by EU wholesalers can be traced back to the individual farm where the product originated. To assist the small and medium producers of the targeted products meet these export requirements, TIPCEE collaborated with MOFA, other donor projects and the respective exporters’ associations to provide group training to small producers in GlobalGAP practices, and otherwise facilitated the certification process. To ensure the traceability of export products, TIPCEE also collaborated with these organizations to help locate all the farms where export products originated and to map their boundaries using Global Information Systems (GIS) mapping tools. Furthermore, TIPCEE introduced a bar-code labeling and identification system as a means to identify the source and to track the movements of pallet-loads of fresh horticulture products. These interventions enabled the project’s small-scale beneficiaries to ship their papaya, mango and pineapples to European markets through larger exporters. Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 15 Galloping horses When the evaluation team asked a previous TIPCEE COP what it was like to work to meet the poverty reduction goal of impacting 100,000 rural households as well as the goal for economic growth to export horticultural products valued at $75 million, his response was “it was something like being tied between two horses galloping in different directions”. Some seventeen months after the initiation of the TIPCEE project USAID/Ghana began using a new source of project funding: the Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA). Since IEHA’s mandate is poverty reduction, the use of IHEA funds required that TIPCEE modify its implementation strategy from that of economic growth through horticultural exports, to a dual strategy that also included rural poverty reduction through food crops production and marketing. With the change in project focus, there was an additional requirement to train 100,000 small farmers (up from the original amount of 15,000); to favorably impact 100,000 rural households (without a clear definition of what constitutes “impact”), and to favorably impact 40,000 vulnerable households. As a result of these changes, the raison d’être of the project shifted overnight from that of export horticulture with a supporting component for policy change to a project with dual strategies for economic growth and poverty reduction, with the policy change component primarily supporting economic growth. Under the food crops component, TIPCEE selected a number of small-farmer food crops for project interventions along their respective value chains. These crops include maize, tomato, citrus and onion. In addition, TIPCEE selected two medicinal plants - voacanga and griffonia - along with cashew as additional export products. These popular medicinal plants are collected in the wild by large numbers of rural residents, particularly in Ghana’s poorer northern areas. For these products, TIPCEE provides market linkage by aligning informal groups of farmers with lead buyers, processors, and marketing groups. These informal groups are centered on the lead farmers. TIPCEE’s implementation activities under poverty reduction have focused mainly on maize and tomatoes. As a result of its small framer training interventions, it has created an outstanding set of training materials in which it distills complex topics into easy-to￾understand brochures and posters describing best practices that are easily understood by farmers with limited education. The project has also helped leading farmers in numerous communities to establish demonstration plots for these two crops showing the production and marketing benefits of using recommended crop practices and improved seed. These plots for tomato smallholders demonstrate innovative gravity-fed drip irrigation systems along with proper staking techniques. Furthermore, for most crops, TIPCEE has mapped large numbers of smallholder farms to facilitate their identification and farm location. For the other food crops – citrus and onion – TIPCEE’s interventions have been much less intensive than those for maize and tomatoes. For example, TIPCEE has teamed with GTZ’s MOAP project to help create a citrus agro-industry. The projects are jointly supporting GIS mapping and the creation of a data base for the mapping information. Although TIPCEE has facilitated a limited amount of training through one citrus processor, all farmer training is presently on hold until problems of market access can be overcome. The common cry by small farmers is “there are no markets” available for their citrus production. Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 16 In a similar manner, with the exception of pineapple, mango and papaya, TIPCEE’s interventions for other, targeted export crops have also been limited. For example, TIPCEE’s interventions with medicinal plants has been limited to helping develop product standards, along with training 979 plant collectors in proper harvesting methods to achieve these standards. TIPCEE has not provided additional services to create a vibrant agro-industry based on export medicinal plants, such as seeking new markets, improved selection, drying and packaging, and other processing methods for greater value added. For baby corn and okra, TIPCEE helped to provide improved seed, training in agricultural practices, and facilitated trial shipments to UK markets, However, after the trial shipments, there has been little follow-up within these crops. By pointing out these weaknesses in project implementation there is no criticism by the evaluation team – implied or real – of TIPCEE’s staff. The team strongly believes that these shortcomings are the direct result of the change in project direction and the overlay of extremely large targets for poverty reduction on a management team that was geared toward horticultural exports. These are simply trade-offs that must be recognized as the result of the change in project focus. B. Enabling Environment TIPCEE’s work to assist in developing regulations and legislative instruments follows the government’s preferred process, which is described in the following table. The key elements of this approach are analysis, conceptualization, public-private dialogue, and preparing draft legislation. TIPCEE assists in all the steps of this process with the exception of steps 11 and 12, which fall outside its manageable interests. TIPCEE’s participation is carried out in partnership with the appropriate GOG ministry staff and the different outputs are subject to their review. This is a realistic and effective approach to regulatory and legislative change, and has provided good results. Process of Facilitating Regulatory and Legislative Change Step No. Activity Step No. Activity 1 Identify the problem 8 Hold public-private dialogue forum 2 Outline issues in a concept paper 9 Revise bill or regulation 3 Government review 10 Submit draft to Ministry 4 Hold public-private dialogue forum 11 Submit to Cabinet 5 Draft bill or regulation 12 Submit to Parliament 6 Best practice review of draft 13 Implementation 7 Revise bill or regulation The team’s assessment of the specific EE activities carried out within its priority areas are the following: Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 17 Trade sector The work under this area has generally been of high quality. The Tariff Advisory Board has been successfully established, and TIPCEE’s work, notably with a study tour to the United States, led to agreement on the draft of the bill establishing the Ghana International Trade Commission along the lines of the U.S. International Trade Commission. The involvement of the private sector in trade policy matters has been significantly increased, thanks to TIPCEE’s efforts at promoting effective public-private dialogue. The TIPCEE-sponsored study of the exchange rate may well prove to be an important catalyst for better understanding of the implications of exchange rate policy for national development. Prior to the study, the BOG had treated the exchange rate as only its province, and had, with moral support from the IMF, been using the exchange rate as a nominal anchor for the government’s anti-inflation policy. One consequence of this short-term approach was the penalizing of Ghanaian exports. This issue may well loom larger once significant earnings from oil, now expected to begin flowing in 2010, begin to appear. The public airing of “Dutch disease” issues through the exchange rate study have sensitized the public to the development implications of exchange rate overvaluation. The use of an embedded advisor in the Ministry of Trade, Industry, Private Sector Development and PSI (MOTIPSDSPI) has played a useful role in assuring close collaboration between the project and the ministry. Nevertheless, turnover in the ministry (three ministers in four years) has made consistency in collaboration difficult. There are numerous areas where TIPCEE’s efforts have so far produced few results, including addressing arrears in refunding firms eligible for duty drawback, consistency of CEPS fees with WTO obligations, and improvements in the Ghana Export Promotion Council. Agricultural policy The project has produced some notable achievements, including a much more focused FASDEP-II, the revision of pesticide regulations for automatic approval of EU and U.S.- approved pesticides, production of two slick, high-quality publications on Ghanaian horticulture for the EU buyer audience, and effective lobbying for the interim European Partnership Agreement. The failure to sign the EPA would have had a significant negative effect on exports of some horticultural products. Despite the achievements, the project was unable to build strengthened capabilities within MOFA. Poor leadership, frequent changes in the minister-in-charge, and a generally non-functional ministry at the center are weaknesses that have changed little since TIPCEE began. Financial sector The activities that had the best results were the initiatives that were undertaken at the request of MOFEP and overseen by the embedded advisor. The direct outputs, in laws, analysis and policies include: 1. Foreign Exchange Act 2. Borrowers and Lenders Bill Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 18 3. NonBank Financial Institutions Bill 4. Review of the Long-term Savings Act 5. Medium-Term GOG Debt Strategy 6. Unclaimed Assets Report 7. Interest Rate Spread studies 8. Financial Literacy Baseline Study 9. Unlisted Securities Market 10. Mergers and Takeover Code The TIPCEE embedded advisor in MOFEP was the key point of engagement for these activities. Clearly, this individual has been enormously successful in promoting the financial sector goals of TIPCEE and the TIRP legacy activities. Macro sector The work on the GPRS-II model appears to have been satisfactory. And, as noted previously, the exchange-rate study is one of those infrequent analytical works that captured a wide audience and productive debate over the appropriate exchange-rate policy for Ghana to follow. The success of the embedded advisor in the Bank of Ghana (BOG) is obvious. Energy sector Even though TIPCEE’s work in this sector is far afield from its main focus, it provided valuable results. A West African Pipeline official characterized what TIPCEE did – in part using Ghanaian academic consultants – as “perfect.” The creation of an efficient secondary natural gas market should significantly reduce the cost of industrial and commercial production and pose fewer risks to the environment. If the gas actually flows, it will improve Ghana’s international competitiveness. The gas was originally expected to start flowing in Mid-1997. The latest estimate – subject to what happens in Nigeria in the meantime – is now November 2009. ICT sector TIPCEE supported the drafting of four bills expected to be passed by Parliament before the end of 2008: a Telecommunications Bill, an Electronic Transactions Act, a National Communications Authority Bill, and a National Information Technology Agency Bill The evaluation team had neither the expertise nor the time to review the pieces of legislation generated through this activity. In principle, they appear to be valuable steps toward support for innovation and competition in this rapidly-changing area. As such, they may spur e-commerce, and other forms of financial transfers using mobile devices. If this is achieved, it will promote an improved competitive environment for Ghana. Labor sector The Board of the NLC valued the TIPCEE support highly. The NLC appears to be playing a significant role in addressing labor disputes, potentially offering a way to Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 19 reduce the very high incidence of strikes and lockouts. The Board was unwilling to assert that the law, and its influence, had led to a significant reduction in the incidence of such conflicts. Data on such trends from other sources was not found. Public-private dialogue This is a cross-cutting area, and one in which TIPCEE has clearly played a useful role in the various sectors discussed above. Public-private dialogues, as well as much inter￾ministerial consultation have been a frequent, and productive, contribution by the project to Ghanaian national development. Overall assessment of Enabling Environment Clearly, TIPCEE has achieved much in this area. The complementarities between the EE and EBD parts of the project did lead to some synergies, most notably with the complaints by horticultural exporters and associations about the exchange rate. This led to a high-quality study, and to a considerable public discussion about the role of the exchange rate in Ghanaian development strategy. Notwithstanding these successes, however, the team believes that future EE initiatives should consider the possibility of a separate project for policy change. While there has been some synergy between TIPCEE’s export horticulture development and its policy component, in effect they operate largely as two separate initiatives within the same project. This is largely because the EBD component deals primarily with private entities in agriculture and agribusiness, whereas the policy component relates to government officials whose mandate is much broader than agriculture. Furthermore, the required skills and experience for a policy expert is considerably different from those required for an agribusiness specialist. Since its beginning, the TIPCEE COP has rightly been an agribusiness/horticulture export development professional with the support of a strong policy specialist. However, an effective manager for policy change requires definite skills in personal and government relations (i.e. “schmoozing2 C. Competitive Activities Fund ”) that may be lacking in the more technical export horticulture specialist. In summary, even though TIPCEE has been successful in its EE activities, it is felt that the cost of this approach outweighs the benefits, and future initiatives should have an entirely separate activity for policy change. As a related issue, it is suggested that future work for policy improvement could be more closely aligned to the overall project objectives – in the case of TIPCEE, exporting more products and benefiting more small farmers. TIPCEE’s Competitive Activities Fund (CAF) is a highly flexible instrument that can quickly react to unexpected events and solve problems that affect project implementation. It can co-fund facilities and equipment through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with its partners and beneficiaries; it can contract for services with private firms, individuals and NGOs through its fixed-price subcontracts and it can obtain special 2 The Free Online Dictionary defines schmoozing as “to converse casually, especially in order to gain an advantage or make a social connection”. Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 20 services from Ghana government agencies through its Fixed Amount Reimbursement Agreements (FARAs). The CAF is highly effective and should be considered as a tool for future project interventions. D. Poverty reduction As mentioned previously, in TIPCEE’s second year of project implementation the source of project funding shifted to the Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA). This change in project funding brought a change in project focus to poverty reduction, and the introduction of highly optimistic targets for the numbers of small farmers trained, the number of rural households that benefit from TIPCEE’s interventions, as well as the number of vulnerable rural households that benefit. While TIPCEE may or may not achieve these targets over its project life, the effect will be virtually meaningless. First, there is no clear definition of what constitutes “impact”, nor a clear understanding of what has to take place for a farmer to be considered as “trained”. Second, the sheer magnitudes of the numerical targets that must be achieved preclude the required depth of intervention required to mane a substantive, lasting impact on rural poverty. These requirements are simply numerical games. The real, lasting impact on rural poverty will result from the improved incomes of those small farmers who have been linked to reliable markets and who can produce higher yields of marketable food products. This is the essence of TIPCEE’s food crops program. The true measure of poverty reduction should be the incremental amount of smallholder incomes that result from initiatives for economic growth, such as TIPCEE. E. Relations with government and donors TIPCEE is a private-sector development project and the focus of its EBD component is exclusively with private farmers, agribusinesses, and their associations. TIPCEE’s counterpart agency within GOG is the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, and there is close collaboration with MOFA within the agricultural Districts and Regions where TIPCEE operates. Relations between TIPCEE and MOFA’s field personnel are quite good. However, the situation is considerably different at central government in Accra. All government officials the team interviewed at MOFA and at MOFEP expressed their frustration of not being well informed about TIPCEE’s activities. They feel that TIPCEE is “doing its own thing” with little interaction with relevant government offices. While there is some involvement of MOAF and MOFEP’s staff at TIPCEE’s discussions of its annual work plans, they complain that once the work plan has been presented, they hear nothing else until it is time to discuss the following year’s work plan. They would also like to have the opportunity to participate in the planning and design stage of USAID/Ghana’s economic development projects, even if they are carried out directly with the private sector. These central government officials would like to ensure that their views are heard, and considered at the project design phase. This situation presents a dilemma for TIPCEE management, since MOFA, in particular, is widely recognized as being institutionally weak, misguided, inept, and severely hampered by poor leadership. Nevertheless, it is entirely possible to maintain good communications and coordination with even weak organizations. Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 21 Some staff members of the international donor organizations with whom the evaluation team met also complained that TIPCEE does not adequately communicate or interact with them. They were particularly concerned that TIPCEE seemed reluctant to share its technical reports. F. Sustainability TIPCEE is a private sector project, whose EBD component works closely with private agribusinesses, farmers, and private associations. To the extent that the business relationships facilitated by the project remain beneficial and profitable to all parties involved, these activities will be sustained long after the project ends. This is particularly true for the market linkages that TIPCEE helped to establish between the small-scale producers and processors, exporters, lead buyers, and local markets for the targeted products. What will likely be lost when the project ends, however, are the support services that are being provided through TIPCEE to maintain the momentum for continued strengthening of the different value chains. Industry associations such as FAGE, and to a lesser extent SPEG, tend to be institutionally weak with limited effectiveness; donor-driven, and hardly sustainable. TIPCEE’s implementation strategy does not consider a major initiative to strengthen agro-industry associations, nor does it create and strengthen farmer organizations. Consequently, there will no strong, supporting network in place to continue to serve the value chains after the TIPCEE project ends. V. TIPCEE’s accomplishments A. Meeting project deliverables and contract requirements Project Targets The EBD component’s goal is to increase export sales volume and value while facilitating the inclusion of rural households in the development of commercially focused value chains. The management of this dual objective requires analyzing all activities in terms of their impact on farmer outreach and volume/value of sales. The EE component is designed to achieve results that impact the ability of the private sector to grow and to attract private investment to Ghana. The expectation is that over the life of the project there will be significant, measurable improvements in policy and regulatory frameworks within the different areas where the EE component works. Chemonics International submitted its original project management plan (PMP) to USAID/Ghana within three months after the TIPCEE project began, and it was approved soon thereafter by USAID. In July 2008, Chemonics submitted a modified PMP to USAID/Ghana for its review and approval. Among other things, the new PMP aligned TIPCEE’s indicators with those of IEHA. Since IEHA provides a substantial part of project funds, project management must report on its indicators as well. Other changes to the PMP reflect TIPCEE’s current strategy and conditions on the ground, and will also facilitate the evaluation of the project’s impact upon its completion. USAID/Ghana’s approval of the new PMP is pending. Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 22 The table in Annex IIA compares the original life-of-project (LOP) indicators and targets with the new LOP indicators and targets proposed by Chemonics International. The table in Annex IIB compares the actual cumulative results with the cumulative targets reported as of the end of the 2007 fiscal year, using the indicators proposed by Chemonics in its revised PMP. The table also shows the cumulative results of the proposed indicators projected to the end of the project, and compare these projections with the revised LOP targets proposed by Chemonics. As shown by Annex IIA, Chemonics is proposing a reduction in the LOP targets for the volume and value of exports, under the justification that required change to the MD-2 pineapple variety and resulting loss of exports was not recognized before the project began. Chemonics also proposes to reduce the number of smallholders adopting new technologies from 25,000 to 11,300 over the LOP. Finally, the company proposes to drop the indicator “Cold chain throughput at Tema Port”, since the cold room is not yet operating. As shown in Annex IIB, Chemonics is currently projecting a 17 percent shortfall in the targeted value of export commodities, and a shortfall of 27 percent in the targeted volume of export commodities, by the end of the project. The targets for these two indicators are those proposed by Chemonics in its modified PMP. Furthermore, the current projection for the indicator “number of rural households benefiting directly from TIPCEE interventions” is projected to be 66,000 by the end of the project, which is a shortfall of 34 percent from the revised LOP target of 100,000. Similarly, the indicator “number of vulnerable rural households benefiting directly from TIPCEE interventions” is projected to be 32,000 by the end of the project, which is a shortfall of 20 percent from the revised LOP target of 44,000. Finally, the projected result for the indicator “number of assisted producer groups” is now projected to be 1,200 by the end of the project, whereas the targeted amount is 2,500. This represents a shortfall of 52 percent. Contract Requirements The contract between USAID/Ghana and Chemonics International specifies eight reporting requirements and deliverables that must be met: 1. Annual work plans: Chemonics has provided all the required work plans as specified in its contract with USAID. 2. Monitoring and evaluation plans: The first project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) plan was submitted by Chemonics within three months after the project began and subsequently approved by USAID as required by the contract. In July 2008, Chemonics submitted a modified project management plan (PMP) to USAID that aligned TIPCEE’s indicators with those of the Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA), which provides a substantial part of project funds. The changes to the PMP also reflect TIPCEE’s current strategy and conditions on the ground, and will also facilitate the evaluation of project impact at the end of the project. The modified PMP has not yet been approved by USAID/Ghana. 3. Research, studies and survey documentation: Chemonics is required to submit to USAID the economic analyses, assessments, studies, research, data, survey reports Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 23 and workshop summaries prepared in connection with this assignment. A list of pending studies and reports that are presently underway is shown in Annex III. The documents that are indicated as “Y” (yes) have already been submitted to USAID/Ghana, whereas the remaining documents are pending completion and submission. 4. Performance reports: The contractor is required to submit one semi-annual report and one annual report per year to USAID/Ghana. During the project’s first year, however, two semi-annual reports were submitted. Since the first semi-annual report covered the start-up phase of the project, the second semi-annual report was in effect an annual report. The contractor has satisfied this requirement. 5. Sustainability plan and exit strategy: Chemonics submitted to USAID/Ghana within the original TIPCEE proposal a Sustainability Plan for the private and public sectors to assume increasing responsibility for the project’s activities during the life of the program. The contract requirement for Chemonics to submit an updated Sustainability Plan during the third project year (2007) was waived by the USAID/Ghana Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO). The TIPCEE work plan for 2008 contains its Sustainability Plan along with an Exit Strategy that will be carried out during the last year of the program. This contract requirement will be satisfied when the 2008 work plan is submitted to USAID. 6. Final report: Chemonics will be required to submit a final Program Performance Report to USAID within 90 days following the completion date of the contract. The due date for this report will be February 28, 2010. 7. External evaluations: The contract states that USAID may hire independent consultants approximately half way through the Agreement period to conduct a mid￾term evaluation and during the last year of the period to conduct a final evaluation of the program. This consultant’s report corresponds to the mid-term evaluation. Budget projections Actual, cumulative TIPCEE project expenditures compared to cumulative budget amounts by line item as of the end of 2007 are shown in Table 1 of Annex IV. Also shown in Table 1 are projections of total project expenditures until the end of the project on November 30, 2009, compared with the budgeted project expenditures for the entire life-of-project. Table 2 of Annex IV shows similar comparisons of actual and projected expenditures with budget for the two major project components. B. Potential problems related to completing the project It is not clear how the December 2008 elections and the resulting changes in government will affect TIPCEE’s progress. However, the EE component team has chosen a set of activities for the project’s final year that will require relatively less participation by high￾level officials, who tend to be political appointees. As a result, it is anticipated that TIPCEE’s final year should proceed according to its work plan. For EBD, most of the final year’s activities will require scaling up the ongoing programs, which will involve several implementing partners. The main risks for completion will be Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 24 unexpected circumstances leading to the default of one of the partners. Default could result from any of the following circumstances: • Some of the private, lead firms that play a critical role in providing a market for small farmers’ crops could melt away due to operating difficulties, change in sourcing strategy, financial problems or changes in market prices. Critical firms are Aquafarm, Premium Foods and Ghananuts for maize and soya; HPW Fairtrade Co. and its associated firms for pineapple; Pinora and Coastal Groves for oranges; Blue Skies for pineapple and papaya; the Integrated Tamale Fruit Company (ITFC) and Volta River Estates, Ltd. (VREL) for mango; Ghana National Tomato Traders Association (tomato), the Ghana Agricultural Producers and Traders Organization (GAPTO ) for onions; the Ghana Association of Vegetable Exporters (GAVEX) for vegetables, and Olam International for cashew. These are stable partners for TIPCEE’s programs but changes in internal policies could reduce their resources available for project sponsored activities such as GlobalGAP certification, GIS and ICT based supply chain management, demo sites and training in best practices. • Similarly, the failure or changes in operating policies of institutions such as the Federation of Associations of Ghanaian Exporters (FAGE) and the National Horticulture Taskforce could create a vacuum for the take-up of the website www.ghanafreshproduce.org . • Delays in the transfer of the GIS databases to the identified recipients might occur, for reasons such as a shift in GTZ’s priorities for its MOAP project, or faltering interest by those institutions taking up the databases. This would hamper the transferal of responsibility for GIS database management. • During the final year as TIPCEE draws to a close, there may be a loss of staff in charge of value chain programs or technical support. Depending on the extent of personnel losses, it may not be possible for the remaining staff to fully assume the duties of the departing personnel. In this event, it would be necessary to employ short-term consultants to complete the project. • A delayed start of IFAD’s Northern Rural Growth Program (NRGP) would not permit a full transfer of skills from TIPCEE to their implementation team. While this would not affect TIPCEE, it would have a negative impact on NRGP. C. Ongoing activities that may require continued support Quite clearly, much work will remain to be done after the TIPCEE project ends. The project’s work plan for its final year indicates that considerable effort will be made to ensure sustainability of project achievements through a well-conceived exit strategy, and a transfer of responsibilities to ongoing development initiatives such as IFAD, GTZ, and Technoserve. However, there are two areas of intervention that merit special attention by USAID/Ghana to ensure that initial gains under TIPCEE continue in the future. Consideration should be given to providing continued support and monitoring to two value chains after TIPCEE’s ending date: • Continue to support the maize supply chain network, primarily by consolidating post harvest platforms, the development of buyer-farmer management systems and the Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 25 expansion and consolidation of input credit schemes. Interventions should focus on getting high-yield hybrids into Ghana on a commercial basis; developing a practical input credit scheme which involves both ends of the supply chain; swift and coordinated post harvest & logistics at community level; efficient contracting of production bases of large numbers of small farmers, and reliable and timely market information supporting supply contracts. Future initiatives for maize should expand into soybeans as well, since these two crops are highly complementary as raw materials for animal feed. • A similar effort should be made for continued support to improve the field productivity of small-scale tomato farmers, and to link them with reliable markets. These interventions should include entail farmer training in GAPs, improved seed varieties, and dissemination of drip irrigation equipment and technology. Similar arguments could be made for Ghana’s small-scale citrus farmers, but the team believes that insufficient progress will have been gained in this agro-industry by the end of the project to merit continued, extraordinary support. D. TIPCEE’s notable achievements TIPCEE has made a number of notable achievements thus far over its project life. These include the following: 1. GlobalGAP option 2 certification approach: The approach and accompanying documentation left by TIPCEE as well as the linkages created between GlobalGAP and Ghana’s exporters, exporters’ associations, smallholder leaders, MOFA and MCC should ensure its sustainability. Over the intermediate term this should result in increases in supplies of pineapple, mango, papaya and fresh vegetables provided by small farmers to exporters. 2. GIS and precision management: The introduction of GIS and the notion that management and monitoring based on precise data is feasible with smallholder and SME farms was another achievement. Until TIPCEE, most GIS work was based on satellite imagery and broad macro estimates. GIS has been brought into the agribusiness mainstream, as happened long ago within the US citrus industry. GIS will be used for traceability as well as for other purposes, such as the development of rural credit schemes. 3. Tools for training and information dissemination: TIPCEE provides training materials that capture the essence of complex issues and presents them as simple posters and brochures that are easily understood by small farmers. Other organizations - public, as well as private - have incorporated these concepts into their training materials. 4. Smallholder drip irrigation: The low pressure, small-scale drip irrigation system piloted by TIPCEE throughout Ghana was developed by the International Crops Research Institute for Semi-arid Tropics (ICRISAT), of Hyderabad, India. Its use is spread from TIPCEE to other groups and organizations. For example, it is being used papaya farmers who produce papaya for by Blue Skies, an exporter of packaged, pre￾cut tropical fruit. It is also planned for use by FIDA’s high value vegetable program, Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 26 which is part of NRGP. The associated training material has been provided to extension workers, farmer groups, equipment suppliers, and maintenance technicians. 5. Illustrated norms and standards and commercially focused inspection tools: TIPCEE collaborated with the Ghana Standards Board to pioneer the use of these export fruit inspection tools 6. The Ghanafreshproduce.org 7. The Ghana Fresh Produce logo: This provides strong brand identity to Ghana’s National Horticulture Taskforce and is a useful marketing promotion tool at international trade fairs, such as Fruit Logistica. website: This is an important public relations and marketing tool for the Federation of Associations of Ghanaian Exporters (FAGE). With the anticipated future support of Technoserve, the website should continue to develop as a high-quality market intelligence tool. 8. The supply chain approach applied to food crops marketing: TIPCEE’s maize program has shown that the production of food crops can be contracted to lead buyers under an integrated network for production and marketing. The associated demonstration sites, training material and small farmer training interventions for maize, as well as tomato, have proven to be a highly effective means for improving smallholder crop yields, reducing post-harvest losses, and increasing farm incomes. 9. EE component: This component has made a lasting contribution to Ghana’s policy environment through the following accomplishments: • Preparing the way for the Ghana International Trade Commission • Helped to create the Project and Financial Analysis Unit and the Financial Sector Division within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning • Supported the formulation of the Food and Agricultural Sector Development Policy (FASDEP II) • Helped to liberalize Ghana’s foreign exchange regime • Helped to improve the management processes at the National Labor Commission (NLC) and provided training to its Commissioners and mediators • Improved the policy and regulatory environment for ICT • Helped to develop regulations for Ghaha’s secondary natural gas market. VI. After TIPCEE The following is a summary of possible interventions that could be made solely by USAID/Ghana, or by working collaboratively with other donors to stimulate agribusiness development and economic growth within the agricultural sector. Poverty reduction would be a natural outcome of economic growth within this sector. These concepts are discussed in greater detail in the Strategy Framework of the accompanying report to this evaluation, “The Way Forward”. Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 27 1. Interventions to stimulate economic growth should be consistent with Ghana’s goal of achieving middle-income status by 2015. They would also support the goals and objectives of FASDEP-II. 2. The basis for agribusiness development would be to use a value chain approach to help create viable agro-industries from the production, transformation and marketing of targeted agricultural products. A value chain includes all the steps, and defines the relationships of the different actors in the chain of events required to produce, transform, and market an agricultural product. Value chains operate by creating collaborative relationships and sharing information, costs and benefits along the chain by the different actors involved. 3. USAID and its development partners would support the work along the entire value chain for each of the selected product to solve problems and remove constraints. This work would serve to reinforce the weak lengths of the value chain. The primary groups targeted for interventions would be the following: • Medium- and large-scale agribusiness producers, processors, and exporters: These could be either local or international investors, or a combination of the two. Larger agribusinesses play an important development role through their investments, employment generation, technology transfer, and outreach to local suppliers of goods and services. These companies not only stimulate economic growth but also set performance standards and generally serve as models of successful agribusinesses for others. USAID/Ghana’s relationship with these companies would be to support and encourage their investments in Ghana’s agriculture/agribusiness sector. • Small- and medium-scale producers of agricultural products: Interventions for this group of beneficiaries would be to link them as suppliers with larger processors, exporters, and consolidators to the targeted products. USAID-supported interventions would be to help this group become reliable suppliers of agricultural products to the larger buyers by helping them to improve product quality, production yield, and therefore, competitiveness. This would essentially be a continuation of TIPCEE’s approach through its farm-level interventions to improve crop yields and product quality. • Small-scale producers of staples and food crops: Interventions with this group would be carried out to help them improve their production efficiency and to link them with reliable markets for their excess production. This would also entail TIPCEE-like interventions at the farm level to improve production efficiency and post-harvest handling. It would also require strengthening the marketing “system” by facilitating stable, mutually-beneficial relationships between buyers and sellers. An essential element of these interventions would be to strengthen self￾help groups such as small-scale producer associations that would serve as a channel for information and assistance to their members; facilitate the consolidation of production output for greater marketing efficiency, and eventually, joint purchases of input supplies. These groups would be linked to potential buyers such as agro-processors, institutional buyers such as school Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 28 feeding programs, international buyers such as the World Food Program, regional markets, and local marketing groups. 4. Interventions to stimulate economic growth would be reinforced by several support programs. These are briefly described as follows: • Enabling agribusiness environment: Similar to the Enabling Environment component of the TIPCEE project, this activity would work to improve the regulatory, legislative and policy framework for agribusiness development in Ghana. In contrast to TIPCEE, however, its primary focus would be on agriculture and agribusiness and it would likely tackle issues such as overhauling Ghana’s seed law, facilitating the importation and use of effective agricultural chemicals not presently available in the country, and ensuring that the cold storage facility at the Tema wharf is put into service for exporters of horticultural products. Notwithstanding the primary focus on policies affecting agriculture and agribusiness, USAID/Ghana might also consider the possibility of incorporating the capability to quickly respond to larger issues that could indirectly affect agriculture and agribusiness, such as trade policy. In this regard, it would be desirable to have part of a Special Activities Fund (described in a later paragraph) available for general policy initiatives that could quickly respond to emerging problems. • In view of the severity of the credit constraint to agriculture, an important part of USAID/Ghana’s interventions in this sector should be to increase the availability of rural credit. One possible enhancement to Ghana’s agricultural loan prospects would be to expand the loan portfolio guarantee facility by USAID’s Development Credit Authority (DCA) beyond its present limited use by Ecobank. It may well be worthwhile to explore the possibility of expanding the DCA facility to a more progressive Apex bank or possibly consortia of rural banks. Another possible intervention would be to provide skills training to rural bankers and borrowers alike so that they better understand one another’s needs and acquire the skills to present, as well as to analyze, a bankable document for a potential investment. A third possibility would be to expand on IFAD’s approach to linking small grants to rural entrepreneurs with bank financing for small- and medium-scale rural investments. This refers to IFAD’s Rural and Agricultural Finance Program (RAFiP) that is now beginning implementation. Under IFAD’s approach, a fairly modest grant provided to an investor for an investment project will serve to drive the effective interest rate of a complementary bank loan to zero, or even less than zero. The grant serves as added assurance to the bank that the investment against which the loan is made is sound, and also serves as an inducement to the entrepreneur to enter the formal credit system. This initiative could be reinforced with skills training for bankers and borrowers described in the previous paragraph. Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 29 A related technique for facilitating rural credit to small farmers is to link the farmer, the lead buyer or processor, and the rural bank. Under this scenario the buyer contracts with the farmer to buy a farm commodity; the rural bank provides credit to the farmer, and the buyer provides the bank with a “comfort letter” stating that the buyer will retain the required amount from the farmer’s payment to repay the bank loan. Yet another approach would be to work to strengthen targeted banks that are already involved in rural credit. One likely candidate for this intervention would be the ARB Apex Bank. This bank serves as a mini-Central Bank in Ghana for some 125 Rural/ Community Banks (RCBs) throughout Ghana’s ten regions. ARB Apex Bank is financed mainly through the Rural Financial Services Project (RFSP), which is a Government of Ghana project to holistically address the operational bottlenecks of the rural financial sector with the aim of broadening and deepening financial intermediation in the rural areas. • Foreign direct investment: USAID/Ghana should consider the possibility of stimulating foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ghana’s agricultural sector. Interventions should be focused on foreign, as well as local investors and carried out through the Ghana Investment Promotion Council (GIPC). Furthermore, GIPC should be strengthened by helping to establish an in-house agribusiness promotion unit composed of skilled agribusiness professionals. • Special activities fund: Any future initiative by USAID/Ghana to stimulate economic growth in agriculture would be well advised to employ a tool such as a special activities fund, similar to the Competitive Activities Fund (CAF) used by TIPCEE. This fund makes it possible to react quickly to solve problems, as described earlier for policy interventions. It can also co-finance pilot initiatives and creative solutions to problems that constrain the production and marketing of the targeted products. • Management and technical training: The purpose of this activity would be to help overcome Ghana’s business management gap. Training would be composed of a series of weekend workshops and seminars, each covering a specific business topic, for mid-and senior level agribusiness managers and company owners. Training sessions would be held in the locations where the businesses operate. Trainers would include local business development service providers, local universities, expatriate business training specialists and US universities. • Leadership training: A severe limitation in Ghana’s social capital is weak professional and management skills for mid- to senior-level managers and directors in both the private and public sectors. USAID/Ghana is encouraged to consider the possibility of facilitating management and leadership training for Ghana’s present and future leaders. This could be done through university exchange programs in English-speaking African nations or in North America; through visiting professors brought to Ghana for specific training interventions, and through targeted interventions in curriculum development at Ghana’s leading universities. Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 30 • Relations with the Government of Ghana: Future interventions for economic strengthening should be designed and carried out with the full knowledge and support of central government. For example, program planning and design should be made in consultation with the appropriate government ministries and departments, and frequent feedback should be provided on implementation issues, problems, and results. One possibility would be to involve government officials in field days and when launching new initiatives, particularly where a favourable press is involved. • Public sector advisor services: The placement of embedded advisors in key ministries (where appropriate) has been very successful and highly appreciated by the recipients. Therefore, this is worth continuing with careful consideration for tailoring their terms of reference to make them effective within the context of each ministry. Furthermore, the provision of mid-level professional expertise to these same ministries is a good way to first, build needed institutional capacity and second, to address the public sector's desire for USAID to do more to empower and enable the public sector in the spirit of the Paris Declaration. A. Possible strategic options There are a considerable number of possible interventions by USAID/Ghana and its development partners that could have a dramatic impact on economic growth in agriculture and agribusiness. Some of these possibilities are the following: 1. Commercial maize production and marketing: Strengthen the maize production and marketing chain by working with small farmers to improve crop varieties, agricultural practices, post-harvest handling and storage, and as a result, crop yields and product quality. Link producers to existing markets such as animal feed processors, school feeding programs, World Food Program, regional buyers, and local markets. 2. Processing cassava flour for local and international markets: This would entail the establishment of additional privately-owned cassava flour manufacturing plants in Ghana, or conversely, exporting dried cassava chips to factories in neighbouring countries. There is a very large and increasing world demand for cassava flour as a raw material for food products, snack food, animal feed, and industrial uses such as starch and glue. 3. Animal feed manufacturing linked to aquaculture, poultry, and livestock production: All three of these product clusters have huge potential for Ghana, for import substitution and for export to regional markets. Ghana produces all the major components that are needed to manufacture animal, poultry, and fish feed, including maize, soybeans, cassava and fish meal. TIPCEE has successfully piloted the use of local maize as a component of poultry feed. 4. Small-scale producers of fruit and vegetable crops, linked to exporters: Export horticulture has enormous potential in European markets, and TIPCEE has shown that Ghana’s small farmers can successfully produce horticultural products for export by larger, private firms. For this intervention, TIPCEE-like initiatives would be required to ensure that small farmers can produce to meet export market standards in much Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 31 larger quantities, and that production yields would be sufficiently high to ensure profitable operations. TIPCEE-like initiatives would also be needed to ensure that smallholders are officially recognized as meeting the standards for GlobalGAP, organic, and Fair Trade certification that are a prerequisite for exports to different EU markets. 5. Smallholder crops for agro-processors: A prudent business strategy for agro￾processors is to fully control a base amount of raw materials to ensure the continuous operations of their factory. In many cases, this requires that agro-processors engage directly in farming operations. However, additional volumes of raw materials needed to fill new or expanding markets can be obtained by contracting with small farmers who serve as out growers for the factory, particularly during the major growing season when products are plentiful. TIPCEE has demonstrated the feasibility of using small farmers to supplement the base volumes of a processed fruit exporter, and a manufacturer of tomato paste for local markets. Establishing smallholders as contract farmers for agro-processors has good potential for Ghana. VII. Conclusions 1. In terms of its overall impact, TIPCEE has been an effective program and a good use of USAID/Ghana’s funding. However, it is not likely to meet all its major targets. 2. TIPCEE has developed highly creative, effective training materials that help train farmers in agricultural practices, post-harvest handling and compliance with international norms and standards, such as GlobalGAP. TIPCEE has managed to distill complex issues into simple manuals easily understood by semi-literate and illiterate users. 3. TIPCEE has developed innovative approaches to solving industry-wide problems in support of agricultural production and exports. These include GIS mapping to identify producer farms, and quality inspection and monitoring for Ghana’s pineapple exporters. 4. TIPCEE facilitates market linkages for small farmers by using lead buyers, such as Aqua Farms for maize and Afrique Link for processing tomatoes. This is a quick and effective way to establish market linkages for smallholders. However, there are downsides to this approach: a) If the lead buyer demands a product for which local markets do not exist (i.e. yellow corn) there is a possibility that a single-buyer monopoly will be created, at least in the short run, so that it is necessary to encourage competition from buyers. b) If the product demanded by the lead buyer is freely traded in local markets (i.e. tomatoes) there is danger that the small farmers will not deliver their contracted products to the buyer if the local market price exceeds the contract price. Given the difficulty of enforcing these producer contracts in Ghana, the solution is to build mutual trust over the long term between the two parties. 5. TIPCEE’s Enabling Environment (EE) component has supported its Export Business Development activity, and has been instrumental in solving major policy problems in Ghana. Its use of embedded advisors within different government ministries and institutions is particularly effective. However, primarily due to its requirement to complete some activities inherited from an earlier project, the EE net was cast too Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 32 wide and some of its activities were not closely related to export competitiveness and poverty reduction. 6. There are numerous opportunities for agribusiness development, including agro￾processing in Ghana. Value chain concepts will be the most effective means for developing targeted agro-industries. Some of the most promising agricultural products and groupings of products and services for local, regional and international markets are the following: • Fresh and processed fruit – banana, papaya, mango, pineapple, avocado • Vegetable crops – tomatoes; onions; Asian vegetables • Industrial crops – African palm; bio-diesel • Tree crops – rubber; shea trees; agro-forestry • Grain crops – corn; soybeans; cowpeas • Tubers – cassava; yams • Clusters – livestock/animal feed; aquaculture/fish feed; poultry/poultry feed 7. The April 2006 requirement to shift from a primarily focus on economic growth through export horticulture to a focus on poverty reduction through the production of food crops has had an adverse effect on the achievement of EBD export goals. There is simply not enough time or project resources available to truly achieve the highly optimistic targets for farmer training and that were imposed on the project. The requirement to benefit a huge number of rural households has resulted in a project implementation approach that is much less intensive and provides much less long￾term impact than would otherwise have been the case. This requirement appears to be the result of the development delusion that chasing big numbers equates to effective results. 8. The Millennium Challenge Compact (MCC) assists small holders in a number of Ghana’s provinces through its programs to support farming and post-harvest systems; the creation and strengthening of farmer-based organizations and industry associations, rural infrastructure, and rural credit. This provides an excellent opportunity for TIPCEE collaboration in the areas of marketing the output of MCC￾assisted farmers and technological developments through applied research in the targeted locations, in those locations where the two programs operate. 9. Similar opportunities exist for collaboration with IFAD’s Northern Rural Growth Program that is about to get underway. 10. There is a genuine need to encourage foreign direct investment (FDI) for agribusiness in Ghana. Foreign direct investment contributes to economic growth through capital inflows, job creation, and by stimulating technical progress. Furthermore, through outgrower arrangements such as contract farming, large numbers of small farmers can benefit directly from foreign investments in agriculture and agro-processing. 11. Notwithstanding TIPCEE’s involvement with the private sector, government officials at MOFA as well as MOFEP believe that the project should be more forthcoming by Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 33 providing more information and better coordination on project activities, and those relevant government officials should have a greater involvement in the planning and design for these projects. Furthermore, other donors who are not working directly with TIPCEE also expressed their desire to have greater access to technical information generated by the project. Some of those interviewed suggested that the project's experience working on the front lines with the private sector should be shared more fully, to better inform everyone of the right kind of supportive role the public sector should be playing. To the extent that the business relationships facilitated by TIPCEE remain beneficial and profitable to all parties involved, these activities will be sustained long after the project ends. What will likely be lost when the project ends, however, are the support services that are being provided through TIPCEE. The project’s implementation strategy does not include the strengthening of a supporting network that could continue to serve the value chains after the project ends. VIII. Recommendations 1. It is recommended that USAID consider the options presented in the previous section of this report entitled “After TIPCEE” as a starting point for planning its future economic growth program in Ghana. 2. It is recommended that USAID and Chemonics International finalize their discussions and conclude an agreement on Chemonics’ proposed modifications to its PMP for the TIPCEE project that was submitted earlier to USAID/Ghana for approval. 3. It is recommended that USAID/Ghana and TIPCEE project management consider the possibility of consolidating the project’s EBD activities during its final year to focus on its basic export products (mango, pineapple, papaya) and its basic food crops (maize, tomatoes, citrus) for greater impact and sustainability of these value chains. The team believes that the project is somewhat over-extended, and the contribution of many of its expansion crops to TIPCEE’s primary objectives is limited. 4. It is recommended that USAID/Ghana consider the possibility of extending the TIPCEE project for an additional year to consolidate its gains; to begin the process of collaborating with MiDA within its operating area and IFAD’s Northern Rural Growth Program (NRGP), and to provide overlap with possible new USAID interventions. Since most policy change occurs during the first few months of a new government administration that will begin in early 2008, TIPCEE’s EE component should also be extended to capitalize on this possible window of opportunity to improve Ghana’s business environment. However, the authors have been made aware of an issue involving the contract mechanism (MOBIS) used for Chemonics that apparently prohibits the Mission from extending its contract. This is highly unfortunate, and could have repercussions equally serious as the impact caused by the mid-course change in TIPCEE's activities described earlier. The Mission's program could lose vital momentum, and will surely miss the opportunity to retain first-class domestic and international project staff. This is also at the extremely critical time when the US President has recently launched a Global Food Security Response initiative to which TIPCEE is uniquely positioned to respond. Assessment of the Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 34 5. It is recommended that TIPCEE undertake an initiative to improve its professional relations with key members of the relevant government ministries. In addition, the project should find ways to make technical data and information, as well as lessons learned more readily available to interested parties. ANNEX I RESPONSES TO EVALUATION QUESTIONS Trade and Investment Program For a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) 1 EVALUATION QUESTIONS This Annex provides responses to a number of specific evaluation questions that were asked by USAID at the outset of this evaluation. The questions were forwarded to TIPCEE’s senior managers, including two of the project’s earlier Chiefs of Party (COPs), with the team’s request for their responses to the questions posed by USAID/Ghana. The responses from TIPCEE’s management team were reviewed, edited, and modified as the evaluation team deemed necessary, and the revised responses are presented in the following pages. The evaluation team is in agreement with the following responses. A. General Questions 1. What are some of the project achievements that are not easily quantified – particularly those not tracked by regular reporting and monitoring? a. Changes in individual, group, or sector behavior and thinking? • The horticulture industry now recognizes the critical impact of cooling and strict quality control on fruit quality and the lost incomes when these are missing. This recognition is the result of several activities, including TIPCEE’S quality inspection program and its support to the Sea-freight Pineapple Exporters of Ghana (SPEG) members in its price negotiations with the buyer, Fyffes, in 2006. This was a change from SPEG’s low quality, low price positioning of the 90’s and early 2000’s. • There have been changes in attitudes by private exporters regarding trade fairs such as Fruit Logistica. The previous approach by the former GOG/Ghana Export Promotion Council (GEPC) was government-focused rather than private sector￾focused. Exporters praise the “branded” and cohesive approach has been adopted with TIPCEE’s involvement. TIPCEE’s contribution to Fruit Logistica is subtle, and focused on the entire industry instead of individual companies. Contributions include the introduction of an industry logo, the design of an exporters’ directory, and introducing a filtering process to limit listings in the directory to relevant exporters. These approaches depart from the previous mentality whereby anyone wishing to export would do so as an individual entity. • In the papaya and vegetable agro-industries, some farmers are now expanding their drip irrigation systems. This indicates a change in outlook towards agriculture as a business and the recognition that investment in agriculture makes economic sense. Before TIPCEE, farmers simply used low-input or no-input, rain-fed farming. Although the impact of drip irrigation can be measured over a single crop, this does not capture an important shift in attitude that will continue beyond the project’s end. • In Ghana, successful approaches are often copied, but discretely, which makes their uptake hard to track. TIPCEE’s approaches to quality monitoring and logistics management have spread to others outside the project. For example, pineapple quality monitoring templates were adapted by the HPW group for their mango exports. HPW also implemented the GS1 bar code standard based on a TIPCEE’s technical training at four SPEG exporting locations. Similarly, Blue Skies is funding the extension of papaya drip systems by several farmers. A member of the Ghana Association of Vegetable EXporters (GAVEX) used TIPCEE-trained BDS providers to certify cassava growers supplying his frozen cassava plant. Following TIPCEE, GAVEX 2 members are attempting to source virus-resistant okra seed directly from India. The mango sea freight carton box introduced by TIPCEE is used by most mango exporters. • The EE approach to policy change supports “depth” over “breadth”: in other words, by pursing activities to build capacity and ensure sustainability. For example, a local firm might have been hired to do the tariff study but instead, MOTI’s staff in Accra and in its regional offices was trained to do this work with the support of TIPCEE staff. MOTO can now update the study without outside assistance. The skills and attitudes they learned through this exercise cannot be measured, but they are key factors in sustainability. b. Structural changes? • The HPW "platform" for pineapple is a novel approach that pools the production from four leading pineapple producers as well as a leading papaya producer. Since the medium-scale producers contracted to the Swiss-based importer, HPW, are not capable of managing a consolidation point and the logistics of delivering their products to a remote buyer, this company has established a local team to provide management support for export logistics. The HPW team oversees crop production by its contracted farms, provides quality control for its export products, and manages export logistics. HPW has supply contract with Bomarts, Milani, Georgefields and Jei River farms for pineapple, and has expressed its interest in sourcing papaya from Dansak farms and other producers. It also sources pre-cut pineapple from Blue Skies, which it markets under its own brand. Through its platform, HPW has secured a stable supply of pineapples for export. Its exports during 2009 are projected to be more than 18,000 tons. • The GlobalGAP option 2 certification approach will change exporter-outgrower relations. The approach has been taken up by all the major exporters, and GlobalGAP certification is now being used by MCC to screen loan applications by the horticulture export sector as a means of demonstrating group cohesiveness and credibility. GAVEX members are now actively collaborating to help its farmer groups become GlobalGAP certified, which is another structural change. c. Changes in relationships (e.g. between individuals, groups, firms) • A good example of changing relationships is what is now taking place between maize producers and buyers within the Aquafarm network: TIPCEE has facilitated contract farming and helped to create a marketing system and, in the future, plans to help organize tightly-monitored input credit program. These factors will influence the trading patterns of the maize agro-industry. Although this model is nascent, it holds great promise for future interventions • The case of the Southern mango associations is equally revealing: Some farmers who have occasionally exported their fruit are now on producing for an exporter under a fixed price contract, with an added profit sharing clause. Under this approach, farmers are willing to limit their involvement to what they know best – farming - and produce their crops under contracts with downstream partners. This 3 is a departure from a typical producer – trader buying scheme or a small-scale producer who sells his or her products at farmgate to a spot buyer. • The public-private dialogues supported by TIPCEE have encouraged the exchange of ideas between groups that often have difficulty in communicating on important issues, such as Customs (CEPS) and MOFEP. The exchange of views at project-sponsored forums has enlightened stakeholders on the complexity of the issues being addressed, and has provided enlightened policy outcomes. d. Breadth and depth of impact or influence? • Since its beginning, TIPCEE has collaborated with the GTZ/MOAP program. This has resulted in successful GlobalGAP pilot initiatives, as well as the participation by Ghana’s exporters in the Fruit Logistica trade fair. Currently, MOAP and TIPCEE are collaborating to integrate GIS within MOAP’s value chain programs for citrus in the Central Region, and for mango and cashew in the Brong Ahafo Region. The MCC compact has adopted TIPCEE’s approach in its work on supply chains, and by the use of TIPCEE’s training guides for its capacity building program. Furthermore, TIPCEE helped to design the NRGP program and was instrumental in modifying its strategy from a focus entirely on production to that of a value chain, market-led approach. • The dialogue that resulted from TIPCEE’s exchange rate studies was remarkable. As a result of the studies, the private sector was energized to challenge the Bank and present the realities they faced as exporters affected by an over-valued exchange rate. Their impact reached Parliament, the Bank of Ghana, and the National Development Planning Commission. 2. What were some of the most Anticipated achievements: profound anticipated and unanticipated achievements (those already reported, or from the list above) • TIPCEE designed its maize program from a similar initiative that was developed under USAID/Uganda’s IDEA/APEP program. The Uganda program reached large numbers of rural households and made significant improvements in farm incomes. It helped farmers improve their maize and sunflower yields through training based on demonstration sites and by linking lead farmers and their followers to secure, buyer led networks and agro￾processors. • For tomatoes, the market queens enthusiastically embraced the private-sector initiative to improve farm productivity, product quality and packaging that resulted in fewer losses. The input suppliers for tomato production endorsed the small-scale drip technology, and its ease of applying farm chemicals. • Mango norms and standards developed by TIPCEE were picked up by the Integrated Tamale Fruit Company (ITFC) in recognition of the need to raise standard of Ghanaian export mango. The company applied the standards to its own company operations, as well as to its 1,400 small-scale suppliers. 4 • The use of GIS mapping and GlobalGAP certification have served as means to enhance the creditworthiness of SME’s and small farmer groups. • GIS work points to a much lower cashew production base than what current statistics show. • Southern exporters have shown interest in drip irrigation technology demonstrated on the Northern sites as a means of irrigation in the dry season. • It is worthy of note that the strongest drivers for change, implementation and dissemination of these novel approaches have been individual private firms and leading farmers rather than FBO’s and trade associations. Once a particular approach has proven successful, these private entities are quick to adopt the innovation. • The EE strategy of working as much as possible within the strategic plans of the Ministries has shown to be the best way to ensure that TIPCEE’s work is demand-driven. • The practice of using foreign consultants as members of project teams that include local consultants put a Ghanaian face on the results and also helped to build local capacity. The cross-fertilization of ideas within the teams has produced superior results, and because local experts are involved there is a greater likelihood that the recommendations will be implemented. Unanticipated results: • Overall, the response by the food crops value chains to TIPCEE’s innovations surpassed the interest expressed within the horticulture value chains. • The enthusiasm with which private sector entities embraced GIS mapping was remarkable. Similarly, the interest and enthusiasm by farmers for direct participation in the mapping exercises was more widespread than initially anticipated. • In EE, the ascension of our embedded advisor at the Bank of Ghana to become Deputy Governor of the Bank – and later, the New Patriotic Party’s (NPP’s) candidate for Vice President – further increased the influence of a highly skilled advisor whose supported was provided through USAID/Ghana’s assistance. In general, the effectiveness of the embedded advisors surpassed the project team’s expectations. These outcomes were the direct result of their individual talents and expertise. a. Were there aspects of the project structure, management or external environment that limited achievement of greater success? • TIPCEE was conceived as an export development program. It was awarded as such; staffed to deliver those results, and targets were set accordingly. When the shift in emphasis to massive smallholder outreach began, resources had to be redirected; staff had to be replaced and momentum stalled for a short while. Although the new outreach targets were finalized in early 2006, the recruitment of new personnel, staff re-organization, identification of 5 marketing partners, and the importation of seed required several months to achieve. As a result, the tomato and maize programs were effectively launched in late 2006. • The project statement of work (SOW) broadly encompassed a full spectrum of policy EBD-type interventions. At the beginning, TIPCEE staff may have been pulled in too many directions. • While the breadth of the SOW offered unprecedented freedom to pursue activities within the targeted value chains, in the beginning the project tried to focus on too many activities carried over from the Trade and Investment Reform Project (TIRP) – specifically, BDS capacity building and association strengthening. Once these were relegated to secondary status, TIPCEE’s activities began to take off. Furthermore, the TIPCEE staff that came from TIRP was accustomed to providing general business advice and training, and it took a few months to re-orient them toward more specific interventions. Under TIPCEE, they focused sharply on the technical, financial, and management constraints at the firm and farm level, and on designing interventions to address these constraints in a cost effective, hands-on manner. • Having TIPCEE follow-up to TIRP’s policy issues made sense from USAID/Ghana’s perspective, but these requirements diverted attention from policy issues more closely tied to export agriculture. Furthermore, trade was a key sector for EE activities but TIPCEE’s interventions had to be delayed until the TSSP was put into place during the project’s second year. Furthermore, the absence of an effective strategic plan at MOFA made collaboration with this organization extremely difficult. Finally, the number of donors working with MOFA became a factor: Japanese, Canadians, German, and British provided embedded advisors within MOFA, who followed the agendas of their respective programs. 3. What type of monitoring and reporting would pick up these achievements in 1 and 2 above? • It would be necessary to rely on interviews and testimonials from appropriate stakeholders and expert panels. However, given the political atmosphere surrounding MOFA where “glory hogging” by USAID and TIPCEE is a common accusation, this information would have to be gathered in a sensitive manner. A similar approach would be required to obtain feedback from other donors. On a cautionary note, when interviewing private entities that receive TIPCEE assistance it should be recognized they often understate its benefits, since they want to describe their needs to other donors in the direst terms. • The full impact of many project interventions will require that private investments be made to scale-up the demonstration pilots to their full, commercial potential. Fully scaling-up the demonstrated practices will require several years after TIPCEE ends. For example, annual mango exports could easily reach five times their present value within two to three years after the project ends if additional producers apply TIPCEE’s recommended farming and handling practices described in its training materials. Similarly, 6 the result of TIPCEE’s policy assistance may take several years to materialize as new regulations and laws affecting the business environment. 4. What were some of the most a. Challenges in the public or private sectors profound anticipated and unanticipated challenges that were either overcome, or hindered achieving results? Unanticipated: • Pineapple – unwillingness of major private sector players (SPEG, without the presence of Golden Exotics) to aggressively pursue opportunities for export growth. Many of these key export firms preferred to wait for anticipated donor funds to pursue much-needed investments and expansion activities. • Banana – unwillingness of pineapple exporters to take advantage of an important investment opportunity for banana production with Chiquita Brands. This was understandable in the face of economic pressures arising from the Smooth Cayenne crisis and the requirement to change to MD2, but it nevertheless represents a huge opportunity lost. • Mango and papaya exporters were more risk averse than initially anticipated. • The extremely conservative investment outlook by producers and exporters was driven by attitudes that were not clearly recognized at the onset of the project. First, under the MCC compact, horticulture was placed in the limelight and exporters were poised to capture the maximum possible amount of donor resources, which detracted from normal investment and growth. Second, the unwillingness of locally-owned firms to enter into partnership agreements with external venture capital investors and commercial partners has limited overall investments in agriculture and agribusiness. This has also limited the scaling-up of innovative approaches introduced by TIPCEE. • Another important challenge has been the sourcing of improved seeds for crop varieties. Regulatory agencies and research programs tend to create barriers that constrain widespread access to foreign agricultural technology. They promote locally-developed planting material that can be sold on local markets to generate funds for the research institute that owns the intellectual capital, even though these may be inferior to imported planting material. This has constrained TIPCEE’s ability to promote improved planting material for its targeted crops, which are critical for productivity enhancements. • MOFA is reluctant to engage the private sector and tosupport commercial initiatives. TIPCEE’s private-sector orientation has often created tensions with Central MOFA management. The project has tended to by-pass the central Ministry and instead, directly engage MOFA’s regional and district offices. • An unanticipated challenge in working with the pubic sector has been the revolving door at the different Ministries where TIPCEE operates. By the end of the project, there will have been four different Trade Ministers. While their main focus has been on the TSSP, each has had different priorities which have showed 7 project implementation. There have been similar changes in key decision makers in energy, ICT, and labor, and most recently, at the MOFEP. Anticipated: • A major challenge to the project’s work in the public sector was the limited capacity by some Ministries to truly become equal partners. After considerable work in mentoring developing professional relationships, the Ministry of Finance, as well as the Ministry of Trade are perceived to be highly effective organizations. Unfortunately, the project could not identify suitable staff at MOFA for professional development. b. Challenges to markets, (e.g., regulatory issues and the change in market demand for products like pineapple and papaya) Anticipated: • EU demand for most horticultural products has continued to increase in recent years. However, this demand has primarily been met by large scale, integrated suppliers of fresh fruit and vegetables, with only limited supplies originating from small-scale exporters that are typical to Ghana. • The requirement for GlobalGAP certification to enable fresh produce to enter European markets was fully anticipated. Unanticipated: • The worldwide increase in the price of maize has provided incentives for farmers to increase their production, and for buyers to obtain maize from local sources. This has generated keen interest in TIPCEE’s maize program. • The sudden drop in demand for smooth cayenne pineapples in EU markets was unanticipated. A more progressive transition to MD2 was expected. • The recent adoption of the requirement for GlobalGAP certification by raw materials used in the manufacture of fresh fruit juice exported to the EU is a threat to farmers supplying juice exporters. • The establishment of a large, private orange juice processor as a means for diversification by a Brazilian/German concern was not anticipated. This has provided an impetus to support small-scale citrus farmers and to better structure citrus supplies. • On the policy side, TIPCEE did not anticipate the resistance to more flexible pesticide regulations, and the seed bill. c. Challenges from donor behavior? Anticipated: • There is a considerable overlap of donor programs in Ghana. In the horticulture sector, donor programs include EMQAP, MCC, and SNV Netherlands Development Organizations. In addition to TIPCEE, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) is working to improve norms and standards 8 for export crops. Many donor are unable reconcile poverty alleviation efforts with economic growth initiatives, whereas TIPCEE has attempted to achieve both. Unanticipated: • The combination of “pooled” donors (i.e., those providing budget support) and “aligned” donors (bilateral programs proving technical assistance) working on TSSP projects has been a difficult challenge to MOTIPSD/PSI. The Ministry continues to struggle through the procedures required to access pooled funds. Contrary to expectations, the Ministry seems to prefer working with TIPCEE because the end results are quick and effective. d. How were individuals and sectors able to address the challenges or adjust? • Maize importers are beginning to look seriously at domestic sourcing. • Blue Skies, HPW and Golden Exotics entered the pineapple sector in a big way, thereby relegating the previous smaller exporters to outgrower status. This appears to be an effective export model. • GlobalGAP is now accepted by SMEs and small farmers alike as a prerequisite for entering the fresh produce export trade. Furthermore, MCA established a precedent by requiring that groups applying for financing be certified as well. As a result of these factors, demand for GlobalGAP training is now very high. The simple approach developed by TIPCEE should facilitate the certification of the large orange producer base supplying the juice industry. • MCC and AfDB/IFAD have embraced many of the training materials developed by TIPCEE for their internal programming. This will leverage USAID’s investment and eventually should provide a considerably greater development impact. e. How well did the project recognize these challenges and what did the project do about them? • Since there are many donor-assisted commodity chains, TIPCEE was able to adjust the allocation of resources to the different chains in response to their actors’ level of motivation and desire for cost-sharing investments. • TIPCEE sought to develop a simple and sustainable approach for mainstreaming GlobalGAP certification under option 2, as well as the widespread dissemination of quality standards for horticultural exports and, through GIS mapping, ensure product traceability back to the small farmer. To avoid duplication with other programs, TIPCEE focused on training interventions to improve farm productivity and product quality. Actual training was provided by other donors, MOFA and the private sector. f. What program design attributes would have improved an ability to deal with these challenges (e.g., greater implementation flexibility or authority to adjust, more support from USAID, etc)? Were they beyond the project’s ability to address – or should not have been the project’s responsibility? 9 • The MOBIS contracting mechanism is very restrictive and limits the ability of the project to properly reward and retain staff. TIPCEE’s scope of work is well conceived and provides considerable flexibility to address constraints throughout the value chain. However, a clear project strategy for collaboration with MOFA in light of its institutional weaknesses might have improved project implementation from the outset. g. What is the probability these challenges will be overcome in the future and what effort would it take to meet them? • For EE, much will depend on the outcome of Ghana’s Presidential election and the length of time required for the new administration to become organized. The project team will be under considerable pressure to achieve results as the end of the project approaches. However, even during the expected post-election lull, those activities related to the TSSP and FINSSP will continue as planned. • In view of the difficulty in identifying local exporters who will serve as engines for further expansion and growth, future economic growth initiatives should foreign direct investments in agriculture, as well as capacity building for agribusiness managers and entrepreneurs. • TIPCEE was cautioned at the beginning of the project not to engage in activities to increase the supply of rural finance. However, a future capacity-building program to help financial institutions better understand the opportunities and risks of investments in agriculture – particularly export agriculture – would be extremely helpful. 5. Timing of activities and events a. Are there significant activities that either worked or didn’t work because the timing – e.g., activities that couldn’t be done because people or the industry weren’t ready? • TIPCEE began operating at an opportune time for its initial five horticulture commodity chains. Groundwork for this work had been laid by TIRP and HEII, and market trends were favorable. b. Were activities out of sync with reality or implementation should have been adjusted (e.g., delayed or started sooner)? • The launch of the maize and tomato programs in TIPCEE’s third year and the onion program in its fifth year has considerably shortened the time available for the project to develop these value chains. It is doubtful that in its final year the project will be able to develop robust supply networks for these food crops. The promotion of drip irrigation and improved vegetable farming practices will need longer term support so they become ingrained in farmer best practices. This can best be addressed through partnerships sought by TIPCEE with longer-term ventures such as NRGP, GTZ/MOAP and the MCC program. 6. For the future, what activities a. Are real winners and should be continued – and why? 10 • TIPCEE has been successful in improving farmer competitiveness through the introduction of new technologies for crop production and post- harvest handling, and encouraging linkages with downstream partners. Crop supply chains for small farmers that will benefit the most from these efforts include tomatoes for both fresh consumption as well as processing; maize and soybean for human and animal consumption; fresh irrigated papaya for export, certified oranges for the export processing industry, and certified fresh vegetables for export. Support should focus on the adoption of agricultural practices that increase the productivity of contracted production as a means to achieve a competitive unit cost for the buyer and to ensure stable revenue for the producer. The development and mainstreaming of linkage technologies should be pursued, such as the use of GIS databases in production planning and monitoring and the use of ICT, in particular mobile technology, in farm to buyer communications. The piloting of post harvest technologies and the training of buyers and farmers alike in systematic quality inspection of marketed produce, will gradually be ingrained in trading practices and improve marketed value. • On the EE side, the Ghana International Trade Commission has the potential to greatly impact the private, as well as the public sector. The Trade Commission will be launched before the project ends, but will require additional support to be truly effective. Furthermore, support for FINSSP II is critical to shaping the activities of the financial sector from 2010 to 2015. b. Should be dropped, and/or made less important – and why? • Existing mango and pineapple exporters and producers have received significant assistance and it is possible that other donors or private investors can take up the slack. However, to ensure Ghana fully captures the growth in the sector, it would be relevant to support an investment promotion initiative supporting strategic partnerships between local firms and foreign investment partners capable of providing new capital sources, technical resources and/or foreign markets. Currently, development assistance is targeting local producers whose ability to expand is limited. These efforts would benefit from the considerable amount of donor investment now being made in the horticulture sector. • Until MOFA has a clearer focus and better leadership, policy work with this organization will not be highly effective. c. Have real synergies with other programs or activities (USAID, GOG, or donor)? • TIPCEE has been providing the technical leadership in many areas and bears strong synergies with programs like NRGP, which welcomes the collaboration. The same holds true for the collaboration with GTZ/MOAP that has proven equally successful. Now that the value chain approach has been adopted by MOFA through the recent FASDEP-II, TIPCEE-type interventions will be able to develop stronger ties with GOG interventions in the agriculture sector. d. What are some of the management and funding constraints? Would a reallocation of level of effort or funding improve matters? 11 • A conversion of the payment mechanism for local professional services from a fixed daily rate to a multiplier formula would allow much-needed flexibility to provide incentives to reward and retain staff. A reallocation at this point may require a movement of project funds from materials to labor, but the amount could be easily determined e. Who are and will be the best partners among the donors, organizations, and businesses? B. Critical Issues a. Has growth and achievements justified USAID investment in terms of results, impact and GOG objectives? Were the results and indicators focused on the ‘right’ variables – e.g. did we adequately account for changes in sector and human behavior – and what can we learn from this for the next strategy? Horticultural Sector • The horticulture sector has been identified by all the major strategic plans of the GoG: GPRS II, TSSP, FASDEP-II, as the sector with the potential for providing export-led growth and employment opportunities. USAID programs should be credited with a large part of the export horticulture industry’s success to date, which has subsequently caught the interest of other donors such as MCC, the World Bank, the AfDB and IFAD – all which are currently implementing programs supporting the development of the sector. USAID has provided substantial support to the development of the knowledge base (GAPs, product quality norms, GlobalGAP food safety certification, GIS traceability) required for pineapple, mango, papaya and vegetable farmers to provide a competitive supply response with the adequate financial and scaling up support which is included in many of these follow-on programs. • However, it is clear that private investment in the sector has fallen short of expectations and that the skill base developed through TIPCEE has not been sufficiently leveraged. This should be corrected by promoting foreign direct investment (FDI) in the sector. It has been seen throughout the project that growth in the agricultural sector has come either from FDI or from a partnership between Ghanaian and foreign commercial firms. The Ghanaian business and government elite, as well as the general public are extremely protective of their autonomy and favor homegrown entrepreneurial arrangements that permit direct owner control rather than more complex corporate and partnership structures. Donor support to foreign investment will require a form of mentoring to ensure effective communications and that opportunities such as Chiquita Brands’ banana initiative are never missed again. b. Potential for future growth: Will growth justify USAID investment in terms of results, impact and GOG objectives? • The fresh pineapple market in the EU is projected to reach 1 million metric tons by 2010, with a CIF value of nearly US $1 billion at the current Euro exchange rate. Of this total, Ghana should be able to achieve, over time, a market share of around 20 percent. To reach this level will require the development of 10,000 12 hectares of pineapple farms, an investment of more than US $70 million and a direct labor force of 40,000 people. This level of employment would include a large number of skilled positions at all levels of the production/logistics chain. Ghana’s banana industry has similar potential. Other crops, such as mango, papaya, melons, and avocado could also have a substantial impact, given appropriate technical, commercial, and financial partnerships, although with more modest export levels. A rough estimate of the amount of private investment required to achieve Ghana’s true horticulture potential is 150 million dollars – an amount well beyond the capacity of local firms. Unfortunately, GIPC does not have the present capacity to provide the needed investor services and to encourage the level of investment required to achieve these targets. For example, with donor support, Senegal has successfully attracted around US $25 million in foreign investments from Spain, Morocco, France and Holland by creating an AgInvest unit within its investment promotion agency. c. What are the constraints not adequately addressed by USAID approach (e.g., in management, investment, finance, socio-cultural factors, business behavior, world changes, etc) – and are they within USAID’s manageable interest to address? Those that aren’t or can’t be addressed directly, how shall they be dealt with? • There are four major constraints to agribusiness development that have not been adequately addressed by projects funded by USAID/Ghana: 1) Limited infrastructure, including roads, irrigation, and electricity; 2) land issues, including land ownership, titling, transfers, and its use as loan collateral; 3) rural credit, and 4) the lack of technical and management skills. The first two constraints – infrastructure and land - are extremely costly, complex, and will take many, many years of intensive effort to resolve. Consequently, they are not within USAID’s manageable interest to address. USAID/Ghana’s best approach would be to support the efforts of other donors such as the World Bank for land titling and registration, and MCC and NRGP for irrigation infrastructure and management. The second two constraints – rural credit, and the lack of technical and management skills – can be, and should be addressed by USAID/Ghana in its future development initiatives. d. Should there be a different mix/concentration of horticultural products to achieve maximum impact on numbers of beneficiaries, incomes, poverty reduction, etc.? • It is clear that crops like citrus and cashew bear the strongest potential in terms of outreach to small farmers. However the larger farms that produce export crops including pineapple, banana and papaya will impact on rural employment and should not be overlooked. These agro-industries have the potential to provide high-quality jobs that do not presently exist in Ghana e. What direction are smallholder agriculture and commercial farming going and will they sustain themselves, complement each other, etc.? • With smallholder pineapple, mango and papaya farmer achieving GlobalGAP certification in a routine manner and with citrus farms becoming more visible and 13 accessible and improving the quality of their output, a new sourcing opportunity has indeed opened up and a response from buyers is anticipated. However this may be slower than expected, as a result of the investor caution described earlier. Clearly two or three Ivorian mango exporters becoming established in southern Ghana would do the mango industry a lot of good. Similarly, the installation of Brazilian papaya farms brands and establishing Chiquita-backed banana farms would be major stimuli to economic growth. Under the present circumstances, this will happen at a much slower pace than expected, if at all, through the expansion of existing firms such as Pinora, HPW or Blue Skies. f. Are there hidden dangers or risks in teaming up with certain commercial enterprises (i.e., do we really know them, what their plans are, are they consistent with USAID’s values/objectives, will we alienate small farmers, etc)? • In export horticulture, the GlobalGAP framework has gone a long way toward providing some form of ethical treatment of employees and suppliers, as well as improving environmental protection and the use of pesticides. FairTrade and other standards including the Rainforest Alliance, organic certification, along with basic due diligence of the supermarket chains have also encouraged corporate responsibility. Despite these safeguards, it is entirely possible that some of the nucleus firms dealing with small farmers may try to abuse their position of trust by mis-payments to smallholder suppliers. The solution to this potential problem is to stimulate increased competition among the nucleus firms. In this manner, the process will tend to become self-policing. g. Does Ghana really have a future in export-led agricultural growth (small farmer or commercial), given the barriers of Global Gap, APHIS, etc? • GlobalGAP is no longer an insurmountable barrier: the tools and skills whereby small farmers can achieve certification are readily available and have been fully field tested. APHIS is a strong non-tariff barrier for any country to gain access to fresh fruit and vegetable markets in the United States. However, since traditional suppliers in Mexican and Central American are much nearer to the United States, it is not likely that Ghana could enter these markets in the United States. Ghana definitely has a future as a horticultural exporting country, mainly in European markets. However, it will require that the country truly opens up to foreign investment and international partnering. a. Is the strategic move into supporting staple/cash crop production a viable, sustainable intervention? Other Sectors • The decision to expand the supply chain approach from horticulture to the food crops sector, instead of simply focusing on small farmer production unit is a logical approach and should be fully sustainable. This approach should be employed in all the food crops targeted by TIPCEE, as well as spin off crops such as soybean. Other possible crops for supply chain development include groundnut, sorghum, cowpea, and root crops. The potential for impacting a large base of farmers in vulnerable areas is huge. Government support though the 14 delivery of extension services covering agronomics, post harvest handling, and contract management would be helpful b. How does it compare to an emphasis on horticultural production • The development of staples and food crops through value chain concepts is a viable method for poverty alleviation since this has a direct impact on farm incomes of poor and vulnerable rural households. Horticulture crops have higher values, but they require higher investments, greater skills and better business skills than do food crops production. High-value horticulture production provides an opportunity to develop farmer businesses with better management capability, along with support services necessary to shift into commercial farming. c. What are some other high potential crops/sectors and should they become part of a USAID program • Oil palm and rubber estates with managed outgrower schemes present a big opportunity for Ghana, particularly under a s sustainable tree crops program. Other horticulture crops with good export potential include avocado, passion fruit, litchee fruit, and other Asian fruit. Animal feed manufacturing linked to aquaculture, poultry, and livestock production has huge potential for Ghana, as import substitution and for export to regional markets. Ghana produces all the major components that are needed to manufacture animal, poultry, and fish feed, including maize, soybeans, cassava, plantain, and fish meal. Processing cassava flour for local and international markets also has great potential as a raw material for food products, snack food, animal feed, and industrial uses such as glue. All these crops and product clusters have good potential to be developed into agribusinesses, and should be considered for a future USAID program. However, it would be necessary to analyze and prioritize each of these potential agro￾industries based on their economic potential. A constraint on the introduction of new crops in Ghana means some amount of applied research and field testing of new practices and foreign planting material. Currently, Ghana’s agricultural research system is not open to work as partners with foreign entities or even local private agribusiness. Any USAID/Ghana intervention aiming at supporting new programs must effectively address the constraint of insular, xenophobic institutional research and the introduction of new planting materials. d. Agro-processing – what support should given to this activity • Agro processing hinges on a well structured and defined production base capable of producing the raw material with acceptable characteristics at the lowest possible unit cost. When this is achieved, the farmer population benefiting from the new market outlet can be considerable. With regard to Ghana’s small- and medium-scale agro-processors, it is clear that these manufacturers operating in the juicing, drying and other processing industry would benefit from technical support in improving their productivity, marketing and branding strategies, as well as management training. The local market for 15 fresh juices is growing; it provides needed employment, and it is a good market outlet for local farmers. Large scale agro-processing for export markets is usually is usually composed of specialized firms capable of bringing in their own technical expertise. However, encouraging them to become established in Ghana should be part of a comprehensive program to encourage FDI in agriculture and agribusiness. a. Has the Econ Growth portfolio been too broad -- should USAID be more focused (e.g., limit enabling environment activities to those that are directly linked with enterprise development activities) Cross Cutting • It is true that in some cases ad hoc policy work by TIPCEE has had the effect of stretching its mandate and confusing GoG and other partners as to the program’s rationale. However, adopting a narrow focus, for example, strictly on agricultural trade related issues would limit the impact of the program and limit its ability to address broader issues of concern to the private sector as a whole. The right balance was reached in the approach adopted in support of the TSSP, with TIPCEE supporting specific actions aiming at the improvement of the trading policy environment. The definition of the policy elements of the Growth Portfolio could use same type of line item support to policy elements of FASDEP, FINSP and the Private Sector Development strategy, with private sector relevance as the main filtering criteria. b. Should there be a more explicit and strategic division of labor (as well as linkage) in enabling environment work done by programs like GSSP and TIPCEE? • The emphasis should be on linkages and synergies. However, one must take into account the very different orientation of the two programs. GSSP seems to have a more research orientation, while TIPCEE is focused on getting policy orientations taken up and implemented. c. Has the financial transaction part of value chains been adequately addressed? Is there need for and opportunity to support to the credit/banking sector for agribusiness (e.g. through Apex Banks)? • There is definitely a need for pragmatic, targeted support to the rural banking sector to encourage funding for commercial agriculture ventures. The focus of this support should be on general capacity building in setting up and rolling out adapted credit products and extending them into the rural sector. There is a need to further due-diligence skills by rural banks; to help develop databases providing farmer credit history; to diversify loan securization strategies by making the most of commercial contracts with credit-worthy traders, and to enhance the financial reporting and monitoring skills of all the parties to the transaction. This work should be carried out to strengthen targeted banks that are already involved in rural credit. One likely candidate for this intervention would be the ARB Apex Bank. This bank serves as a mini-Central Bank in Ghana for some 125 Rural/ Community Banks (RCBs) throughout Ghana’s ten regions. 16 d. Does the backward and forward agribusiness support sector need assistance – inputs, marketing, financing – and what type of assistance might this be? • There is a strong need to enhance the capacity of supply chain elements to deliver these services. TIPCEE has been successful in promoting an approach that included “line BDS” providers that are commercially involved in the actual chain of transactions, as well as “staff BDS” service providers that are focused on training and organizational development. TIPCEE-sponsored services includes training interventions for capacity building, the development and dissemination of training material, and the implementation and monitoring of demonstration sites. Teaming with these service providers created a win-win situation that provided market visibility to the partners as well as the opportunity to develop sustainable service delivery. e. Is the project having a significant (adequate?) impact on incomes and employment and what are the alternative approaches to have more of an impact? • Impact on farmer incomes will come from accessing new, reliable markets and by reducing direct production costs. Farmers are wary of adopting practices that require cash investment to achieve productivity gains unless there is an identified and tested market outlet for the increased production. TIPCEE’s impact has been on those supply chains where increases in value and volume were recognized by the end market. The impact of the program on smallholder income is therefore directly dependent on the number of secure buyer channels that have been either identified or enhanced by the project, and the increased crop yields the smallholders have gained through TIPCEE’s interventions. To help ensure stable market linkages, capacity building of downstream market partners is critical. f. How do we ‘smartly’ use/rely on GOG strategies and are they adequate for guidance (GPRS, FASDEP, FINSPP, National Dev Plan, etc). • As stated earlier, these strategies provide a valuable framework for results oriented policy support. On the EBD side, they can set the basis for the establishment of a good collaborative framework in the field. The new FASDEP￾II could be leveraged to facilitate the linkage of a program such as TIPCEE with regional and district level field extension services. g. What is USAID greatest comparative advantage and how do we ‘smartly’ use/rely on donor strategies (e.g. SWAPs) to dictate or complement the USAID program? Does USAID’s comparative advantage lie in projectized assistance (mainly TA) and introduction of new and better tools (GIS, modeling, etc)? • The ability to provide ongoing technical assistance and mentoring to local projects implemented by both the private and public sectors is USAID’s distinct comparative advantage. For enterprise development, the availability of short term technical assistance is sought after by programs such as NRGP that are implemented through government, with inherent difficulties in identifying and contracting technical assistance. The challenge will be to develop collaborative 17 frameworks in which USAID’s technical input is not seen as stifling the skills and approaches by the institutional and private sector partners. h. Is the embedded advisor approach working and is it a useful/viable means of providing assistance? • The use of an embedded advisor in the Ministry of Trade, Industry, Private Sector Development and PSI (MOTIPSDSPI) has played a useful role in ensuring close collaboration between the project and the ministry. The embedded advisor in MOFEP was the key point of engagement for TIPCEE’s policy support. This individual has been enormously successful in promoting the financial sector goals of TIPCEE and the TIRP legacy activities. The project also funded an embedded advisor to the Bank of Ghana, who was subsequently made Deputy Governor of the Bank. Clearly, the embedded advisor approach is working, and is it a useful means for providing assistance. i. How do we ‘smartly’ use/rely on the MCC strategy to complement the USAID program? • MCC is seen as having the means to expand technical knowledge piloted under TIPCEE to a much wider farmer population. TIPCEE was involved in developing the initial compact approach and always provided input to the technical teams in charge of designing the compact. Now that the program is ongoing, GIS databases could be used for further infrastructure investment planning. MiDA, the implementing agency for MCC, operates in twenty-two of Ghana’s districts that, with the exception of two districts, overlap with TIPCEE’s locations. This geographical overlap provides ample opportunity for collaboration between the two programs. In addition, MCC’s program is considerably weighted toward the production end of the value chain, with minimal support to marketing the farm products that are produced by its beneficiaries, or for the introduction of new agricultural technologies. This apparent weakness provides an opportunity for collaboration between the two organizations whereby TIPCEE could provide market linkages, market development, and applied research technology to MiDA’s beneficiaries. This would result in a considerable leveraging of TIPCEE’s efforts in these locations. j. How do we factor in the new food crisis program and other new world-order changes? In response, how flexible and nimble should a new strategy be to address unknown and rapid change? • These issues highlight the need for quick and strategic responses at a macro level and would require the availability of quick-response technical assistance for policy analysis and recommendations, reinforced by financial resources through a CAF. These technical and financial resources would be used inform the debate about best practices and help to avoid impulsive reactions by government and the private sector. In addition, technical assistance could be employed to help Ghana’s private sector to capitalize on the commercial opportunities provided by world-order changes. For example, the recent worldwide increases in food prices have provided an 18 opportunity for Ghana’s rural farmers to increase their incomes by producing greater quantities of food crops for import substitution, and for export to regional markets. This is the essence of TIPCEE’s assistance to the maize value chain. Future USAID/Ghana interventions should have the flexibility to respond to, as well as capitalize on rapid change. k. The importance of global warming and biofuels, for example? • USAID/Ghana could assist Ghana to combat global warming through carbon swap programs. The U.N. Kyoto Protocol allows rich nations to offset some of their greenhouse gas emissions if they pay for projects to reduce carbon dioxide releases in poorer countries. These can range from tree-planting to replacing polluting coal-fired power plants with cleaner alternatives. According to the European Commission, the European Union and the United Nations recently agreed to start swapping carbon trading permits in October 2008. This will allow European companies to gain a permit to pollute at home if they invest in projects that cut greenhouse gas emissions elsewhere in the world, such as Ghana. As a result, USAID/Ghana could support private-public partnerships for investments in agro-forestry projects in Ghana, largely financed by polluting companies in the EU. • Furthermore, USAID/Ghana could support initiatives to produce biofuels that can be produced from plants such as jathropha, under value chain concepts by projects such as TIPCEE. l. How do we factor in the probability of success in implementing a strategy and meeting objectives? • The best way to ensure success in the face of uncertainty is to have available different approaches that can be used in case of failure – plan “A”, plan “B”, and plan “C”. The development of a separate portfolio of beneficiaries has been TIPCEE’s way of hedging its support to the private sector. Within each sector, competing models are maintained and supported on the basis of merit. Cross￾fertilization of ideas is encouraged between partners. For example, this was the case for GlobalGAP option 2 certification where both exporter-led and farmer group-led models were supported concurrently, and eventually ended up partnering. In the maize program, the arrival of Premium Foods as an alternative sourcing model is seen as a positive development by Aquafarms, an agro￾processor, who recognizes the opportunity for collaboration between the two companies. m. What is the best balance/complementary relationship between direct TA, capacity building, commodities and analytical tools, use of local vs expat TA, etc.? • A resident team is essential for providing ongoing oversight of implementation activity by private sector (including farmers) and the public sector. This team should be capable of following up on short term technical assistance assignments focused on designing and evaluating the impact and next steps, using innovative tools and approaches. One requirement is that technical innovation must be backed by high quality training material that can be widely disseminated. In that 19 respect, significant resources should be allocated both in TA and in expenditures to ensure that these tools are effective and are able to effectively carry the message to their targeted audience. Expatriate resources should focus their work as much on mentoring a team of local resources as in completing a technical assignment. Short- term TA may be either expat or local, depending on skills availability -- but it should always focused on building the capacity of more permanent resources within the institutions, associations and enterprises supported by the program. n. Should/could the strategy make better use of the Diaspora in providing TA, attracting & targeting investment, creating joint-ventures, helping to change business behavior and attitudes, etc.? • Use should be made of Ghana’s diaspora, especially in the development of investment joint ventures and in bringing in sound managerial skills. Some form of promotion initiative should be used to attract these talented individuals. o. Could the future strategy include more involvement of the public sector – particularly MOFA in the expansion of activities – given their maturity and willingness/directives to change (e.g., more institutional reform)? • Yes, but project implementation and leadership should rest with the project. Project interventions, once defined and justified against the FASDEP-II framework, could be managed in a decentralized way and reported upon by MOFA regional directors themselves. In any event, future interventions should communicate better and coordinate more closely with MOFA. p. Should the next strategy have an explicit exit strategy and should sustainability be an explicit part of an implementer’s terms of reference? • Yes. This means that support should be catalytic in nature and the exit strategy an ongoing process associated with the various interventions as they are designed and implemented. This will occur only if interventions are based on true market opportunities. ANNEX II TIPCEE PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM Summary of Project Indicators, Targets and Results Trade and Investment Program For a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) Annex I-A. Comparison of Original Life-of-Project Targets with New Targets Proposed by Chemonics International 1 TIPCEE No in Revised PMP Original TIPCEE Indicators Unit Baseline Proposed Indicator in Revised PMP Notes Targets Actual Original LOP targets Targets as of revised 2008 PMP 1 Values of commodities exported by assisted firms $ 19,340,000 34,340,000 31,064,886 Values of commodities exported by assisted firms 94,340,000 71,800,000 Targets had not been reviewed and adjusted since 2005. Given the unexpected drop in demand for smooth cayenne pineapple, increases in exports were smaller than expected. In addition, a poriton of project resources were devoted to non-export crops beginning in 2007 (maize, tomato) in order to enable the program to reach a large smallholder farmer base (100,000 target), which was not factored into the original targets. 2 Volume of commodities exported by assisted firms MT 43,400 56,428 32,896 Volume of commodities exported by assisted firms 116,400 86,415 Given the unexpected drop in demand for smooth cayenne pineapple, increases in exports were smaller than expected. In addition, a poriton of project resources were devoted to non-export crops beginning in 2007 (maize, tomato) in order to enable the program to reach a large smallholder farmer base (100,000 target), which was not factored into the original targets. *Finally, when targets were set in 2005, we did not anticipate working in processed commodites such as juice, which exports in lower volumes. 3 MT Volume of fresh whole commodity equivalent exported by assisted firms 10,000 New indicator in revised PMP 4 Value of sales by assisted firms $ 19,930,000 35,590,682 32,094,924 Value of sales by assisted firms 98,580,000 82,200,000 Targets had not been reviewed and adjusted since 2005. Given the unexpected drop in demand for smooth cayenne pineapple, increases in sales were smaller than expected. In addition, a poriton of project resources were devoted to non-export crops beginning in 2007, which was not factored into original targets. 5 Volume of sales by assisted firms MT 50,300 66,588 38,651 Volume of sales by assisted firms 141,550 93,515 Same as explanation for 1 and 2 above. 6 Number of ICT market information products implemented # 0 25 37 Number of ICT market information products implemented 40 40 7 Number of business relationships formed with non￾Ghanaian enterprises # 0 35 40 Number of business relationships formed with non-Ghanaian enterprises 65 60 8 Value of sales by assisted producer group $ 9,846,124 9,846,124 Value of sales by assisted producer group 15,000,000 21,846,124 Change in defn from TIPCEE producer group sales only to purchases from smallholders in TIPCEE commodities resulted in the estimation of a new baseline in 2007 9 Volume of sales by assisted producer group MT 18,207 18,207 Volume of sales by assisted producer group 39,700 51,707 Baseline is 2007 10 Number of assisted firms meeting EurepGAP(now GlobalGAP) or other standards Number 24 40 41 Number of assisted firms meeting EurepGAP(now GlobalGAP) or other standards 60 60 TIPCEE will include all entities certified and the number of farms 11 Number of public-private partnerships formed involving assisted firms Number 0 25 19 Number of public-private partnerships formed 65 50 With the change in counting and what constitutes a PPP, TIPCEE has lowered targets. Now PPP for Firms and Associations in line with IEHA defintion. 12 Number of assisted firms purchasing from smallholders Number 33 50 45 Number of assisted firms purchasing from smallholders 70 70 13 Number of outgrowers working with assisted firms Number 997 5,000 3,043 Number of outgrowers working with assisted firms 7,000 7,000 With the golden jubilee program and tomato program, TIPCEE is likely to chive target Number of assisted firms using sustainable NRM practices Number 24 REMOVED 60 14 Number of persons trained from assisted firms Number 0 2,500 8,721 Training attendance of firms 5,000 5,000 TIPCEE is concentrating more on smallholders. Enterprise training will be on a lower scale Number of assisted firms Number REDUNDANT 90 15 Number of assisted agricultural-related firms Number 0 70 76 Number of assisted agricultural-related firms 80 90 Indicators Indicators 2007 Cummulative LOP Cummulative Have been removed from revised PMP Titles have changed Annex I-A. Comparison of Original Life-of-Project Targets with New Targets Proposed by Chemonics International 2 TIPCEE No in Revised PMP Original TIPCEE Indicators Unit Baseline Proposed Indicator in Revised PMP Notes Targets Actual Original LOP targets Targets as of revised 2008 PMP 16 Gross margins per unit of land for assisted commodities $ Gross margins per unit of land for assisted commodities Pineapple 1,226 1,326 Pineapple 4,356 1,462 4,500 Not possible to estimate at this juncture, as we cannot predict prices of agro inputs in the year ahead. This is too large a variable for this calculation Mango 1,334 1,443 1,450 Mango 1,591 1,591 Not possible to estimate at this juncture, as we cannot predict prices of agro inputs in the year ahead. This is too large a variable for this calculation. Papaya 1,272 1,376 1,400 Papaya 1,517 1,517 Not possible to estimate at this juncture, as we cannot predict prices of agro inputs in the year ahead. This is too large a variable for this calculation. Cashew 112 121 117 Cashew 134 134 Not possible to estimate at this juncture, as we cannot predict prices of agro inputs in the year ahead. This is too large a variable for this calculation. Vegetable (Pepper) 2,926 3,165 3,180 Vegetable (Pepper) 3,489 3,489 Not possible to estimate at this juncture, as we cannot predict prices of agro inputs in the year ahead. This is too large a variable for this calculation. Vegetable (Okra) 1,400 1,428 1,350 Vegetable (Okra) 1,515 1,515 Not possible to estimate at this juncture, as we cannot predict prices of agro inputs in the year ahead. This is too large a variable for this calculation. Maize Maize Estimation on-going Tomato Tomato Estimation on-going 17 Number of smallholders adopting new technologies Number 0 5,000 5,760 Number of smallholders adopting new technologies 25,000 11,300 Estimation to better report numbers adopting components or full tech packages 18 Share of total commodity area farmed using new technologies Percent 12% Share of total commodity area farmed using new technologies 15% 15% Estimation for 2008-on-going. IEHA requires us to report the total hectare cultivated MD2 0 6% 19% MD2 New Okra Variety 0 34% 70% New Okra Variety Tomato na Tomato Golden Papaya na 60% Golden Papaya Pruning Techniques in Mango na 90% Pruning Techniques in Mango Maize hybrid Seed (Mamaba)/Yellow Maize na 70% Maize hybrid Seed (Mamaba)/Yellow Maize Number of assisted producer groups using sustainable NRM practices Number REMOVED 250 19 Number of producers trained Number 0 27,000 18,706 Training attendance of producer group members 100,000 100,000 Collation for 2008 on-going. This is based on a projection by commodity of training attendance. Title changed Indicators Indicators 2007 Cummulative LOP Cummulative Have been removed from revised PMP Titles have changed Annex I-A. Comparison of Original Life-of-Project Targets with New Targets Proposed by Chemonics International 3 TIPCEE No in Revised PMP Original TIPCEE Indicators Unit Baseline Proposed Indicator in Revised PMP Notes Targets Actual Original LOP targets Targets as of revised 2008 PMP 20 Number of rural households benefiting directly from TIPCEE interventions Number 0 20,000 20,286 Number of rural households benefiting directly from TIPCEE interventions 100,000 100,000 Collation for 2008 on-going. This is based on a projection by commodity of training attendance. 21 Number of vulnerable rural households benefiting directly from TIPCEE interventions Number 0 6,000 8,266 Number of vulnerable rural households benefiting directly from TIPCEE interventions 40,000 40,000 (Note This is a subset of the number above, and as the projection has been reduced for the above, this follows accordingly.)This aligns TIPCEE's defintion with IEHA's and USAID's OP. At IEHA's request, TIPCEE has been collecting and reporting per the new title. 22 Number of smallholders linked to markets through enterprises Number 0 4,200 5,381 Number of smallholders linked to markets through enterprises 10,500 10,500 Number of assisted producer groups providing services to members Number 2,130 23 Number of assisted producer groups Number 0 500 421 Number of assisted producer groups 2,500 2,500 A lot of smallholder groups are now forming bigger associations and the potential numbers for TIPCEE to target have been reduced. Number of paid services delivered by services providers and associations Number REMOVED 8,300 24 Paid-up membership of assisted associations Number 97 189 417 Paid-up membership of assisted associations 238 238 25 Effectiveness of assisted associations Percent 35% 45% 50% Effectiveness of assisted associations 55% 55% 26 Number of assisted commodity associations Number 0 7 10 Number of assisted commodity associations 12 12 Number of public-private partnerships formed involving associations Number MERGED 50 Merged with PPP involving Assisted firms in Revised PMP 27 Number of assisted women's organizations Number 0 2 2 Number of assisted women's organizations 5 4 28 Number of assisted BDS providers serving smallholders Number 0 30 66 Number of assisted BDS providers 50 50 Includes BDS consultants. Title change in revised PMP 29 Number of client firms receiving services from assisted BDS providers Number 0 45 76 Number of client firms receiving services from assisted BDS providers 70 70 30 Number of agricultural-related technologies made available for transfer Number 0 50 88 Number of agricultural-related technologies made available for transfer 115 115 31 Quality of the enabling environment for private sector Score Impact of reforms on the enabling environmentfor the private sector (Qualitative) 0.45 Conversion of Expert panels to Survey. TIPCEE is preparing to carry this out in the final year of the project Indicators Indicators 2007 Cummulative LOP Cummulative Have been removed from revised PMP Titles have changed Annex I-A. Comparison of Original Life-of-Project Targets with New Targets Proposed by Chemonics International 4 TIPCEE No in Revised PMP Original TIPCEE Indicators Unit Baseline Proposed Indicator in Revised PMP Notes Targets Actual Original LOP targets Targets as of revised 2008 PMP 32 Progress toward reform of targeted policies matrix Matrix Progress toward reform of targeted policies ▲ ▲ Policy matrix Number of policy and regulatory reforms implemented Number REDUNDANT 28 Count in Matrix so removed 33 Quality of dialogue as viewed by stakeholders Score 0 1.30 1.26 Quality of dialogue as viewed by stakeholders 1.40 1.40 34 Number of private-public policy debates Number 0 28 60 Number of private-public policy debates 72 50 TIPCEE reported a lower figure at end of 2007. Added several debates that used and debated TIPCEE EE documents and where Policy Advisors played key roles Quality of dialogue Score QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT 0.50 35 Number of members of policy units trained Number 0 120 206 Training attendance of policy units 200 200 All MoFA Agents trained were removed after agreement on definition with IEHA 36 Number 0 8 12 Number of trade and investment diagnostics conducted 11 Was introduced by USAID operations report later in 2007 37 Effectiveness of assisted policy units Percent 41% 45% Effectiveness of assisted policy units 55% 55% Baseline was MoFEP Policy Analysis Unit, 2006. TIPCEE plans to carry out a PIVA assessment of 3 major policy organizations soon. NLC was 25% and TAB was 25% in 2007 38 Cold chain throughput at Accra airport MT 0 3,000 na Cold chain throughput at Accra airport 10,000 18,000 TIPCEE is collecting time series data on Air shipments and will report soon Cold chain throughput at Tema port MT 0 REMOVED 85,000 Indicators Indicators 2007 Cummulative LOP Cummulative Have been removed from revised PMP Titles have changed Annex I-B. Comparison of Actual Results and Targets at the End of 2007 and Comparison of Projected Results with Targets for the Life of Project, Using Chemonics International’s Proposed Indicators 1 TIPCEE No. TIPCEE Indicators Unit Baseline Notes Targets Actual Targets as of revised 2008 PMP LOP Projection 1 Values of commodities exported by assisted firms $ 19,340,000 34,340,000 31,064,886 71,800,000 59,340,000 Targets had not been reviewed and adjusted since 2005. Given the unexpected drop in demand for smooth cayenne pineapple, increases in exports were smaller than expected. In addition, a poriton of project resources were devoted to non-export crops beginning in 2007 (maize, tomato) in order to enable the program to reach a large smallholder farmer base (100,000 target), which was not factored into the original targets. 2 Volume of commodities exported by assisted firms MT 43,400 56,428 32,896 86,415 63,400 Given the unexpected drop in demand for smooth cayenne pineapple, increases in exports were smaller than expected. In addition, a poriton of project resources were devoted to non-export crops beginning in 2007 (maize, tomato) in order to enable the program to reach a large smallholder farmer base (100,000 target), which was not factored into the original targets. *Finally, when targets were set in 2005, we did not anticipate working in processed commodites such as juice, which exports in lower volumes. 3 Volume of fresh whole commodity equivalent exported by assisted firms MT 10,000 tbd New indicator in revised PMP 4 Value of sales by assisted firms $ 19,930,000 35,590,682 32,094,924 82,200,000 69,930,000 Targets had not been reviewed and adjusted since 2005. Given the unexpected drop in demand for smooth cayenne pineapple, increases in sales were smaller than expected. In addition, a poriton of project resources were devoted to non-export crops beginning in 2007, which was not factored into original targets. 5 Volume of sales by assisted firms MT 50,300 66,588 38,651 93,515 80,300 Same as explanation for 1 and 2 above. 6 Number of ICT market information products implemented # 0 25 37 40 45 7 Number of business relationships formed with non￾Ghanaian enterprises # 0 35 40 60 60 8 Value of sales by assisted producer group $ 9,846,124 9,846,124 21,846,124 25,000,000 Change in defn from TIPCEE producer group sales only to purchases from smallholders in TIPCEE commodities resulted in the estimation of a new baseline in 2007 9 Volume of sales by assisted producer group MT 18,207 18,207 51,707 55,000 Baseline is 2007 10 Number of assisted firms meeting EurepGAP(now GlobalGAP) or other standards Number 24 40 41 60 60 TIPCEE will include all entities certified and the number of farms 11 Number of public-private partnerships formed Number 0 25 19 50 45 With the change in counting and what constitutes a PPP, TIPCEE has lowered estimate. 12 Number of assisted firms purchasing from smallholders Number 33 50 45 70 60 13 Number of outgrowers working with assisted firms Number 997 5,000 3,043 7,000 7,000 With the golden jubilee program and tomato program, TIPCEE is likely to chive target 14 Training attendance of firms Number 0 2,500 8,721 5,000 9,000 TIPCEE is concentrating more on smallholders. Enterprise training will be on a lower scale 15 Number of assisted agricultural-related firms Number 0 70 76 90 90 2007 Cummulative LOP Cummulative Annex I-B. Comparison of Actual Results and Targets at the End of 2007 and Comparison of Projected Results with Targets for the Life of Project, Using Chemonics International’s Proposed Indicators 2 TIPCEE No. TIPCEE Indicators Unit Baseline Notes Targets Actual Targets as of revised 2008 PMP LOP Projection 16 Gross margins per unit of land for assisted commodities $ Pineapple 1,226 1,326 4,356 4,500 tbd Not possible to estimate at this juncture, as we cannot predict prices of agro inputs in the year ahead. This is too large a variable for this calculation. Mango 1,334 1,443 1,450 1,591 tbd Not possible to estimate at this juncture, as we cannot predict prices of agro inputs in the year ahead. This is too large a variable for this calculation. Papaya 1,272 1,376 1,400 1,517 tbd Not possible to estimate at this juncture, as we cannot predict prices of agro inputs in the year ahead. This is too large a variable for this calculation. Cashew 112 121 117 134 tbd Not possible to estimate at this juncture, as we cannot predict prices of agro inputs in the year ahead. This is too large a variable for this calculation. Vegetable (Pepper) 2,926 3,165 3,180 3,489 tbd Not possible to estimate at this juncture, as we cannot predict prices of agro inputs in the year ahead. This is too large a variable for this calculation. Vegetable (Okra) 1,400 1,428 1,350 1,515 tbd Not possible to estimate at this juncture, as we cannot predict prices of agro inputs in the year ahead. This is too large a variable for this calculation. Maize Estimation on-going Tomato Estimation on-going 17 Number of smallholders adopting new technologies Number 0 5,000 5,760 11,300 12,000 Estimation to better report numbers adopting components or full tech packages 18 Share of total commodity area farmed using new technologies Percent 12% 15% Estimation for 2008-on-going. IEHA requires us to report the total hectare cultivated MD2 0 6% 19% New Okra Variety 0 34% 70% Tomato na Golden Papaya na 60% Pruning Techniques in Mango na 90% Maize hybrid Seed (Mamaba)/Yellow Maize na 70% 19 Training attendance of producer group members Number 0 27,000 18,706 100,000 70,000 Collation for 2008 on-going. This is based on a projection by commodity of training attendance. 20 Number of rural households benefiting directly from TIPCEE interventions Number 0 20,000 20,286 100,000 66,000 Collation for 2008 on-going. This is based on a projection by commodity of training attendance. 21 Number of vulnerable rural households benefiting directly from TIPCEE interventions Number 0 6,000 8,266 40,000 32,000 (Note: This is a subset of the number above, and as the projection has been reduced for the above, this follows accordingly.)This aligns TIPCEE's defintion with IEHA's and USAID's OP. At IEHA's request, TIPCEE has been collecting and reporting per the new title. 22 Number of smallholders linked to markets through enterprises Number 0 4,200 5,381 23 Number of assisted producer groups Number 0 500 421 2,500 1,200 A lot of smallholder groups are now forming bigger associations and the potential numbers for TIPCEE to target have been reduced. 24 Paid-up membership of assisted associations Number 97 189 417 238 800 2007 Cummulative LOP Cummulative Annex I-B. Comparison of Actual Results and Targets at the End of 2007 and Comparison of Projected Results with Targets for the Life of Project, Using Chemonics International’s Proposed Indicators 3 TIPCEE No. TIPCEE Indicators Unit Baseline Notes Targets Actual Targets as of revised 2008 PMP LOP Projection 25 Effectiveness of assisted associations Percent 35% 45% 50% 55% 55% 26 Number of assisted commodity associations Number 0 7 10 12 15 27 Number of assisted women's organizations Number 0 2 2 4 3 28 Number of assisted BDS providers Number 0 30 66 50 70 Includes BDS consultants 29 Number of client firms receiving services from assisted BDS providers Number 0 45 76 70 80 30 Number of agricultural-related technologies made available for transfer Number 0 50 88 115 140 31 Impact of reforms on the enabling environmentfor the private sector (Qualitative) Survey Conversion of Expert panels to Survey. TIPCEE is preparing to carry this out in the final year of the project 32 Progress toward reform of targeted policies matrix Matrix Policy matrix 33 Quality of dialogue as viewed by stakeholders Score 0 1.30 1.26 1.40 1.40 34 Number of private-public policy debates Number 0 28 60 50 86 TIPCEE reported a lower figure at end of 2007. Added several debates that TIPCEE EE documents and where Policy Advisors played key roles 35 Training attendance of policy units Number 0 120 206 200 300 All MoFA Agents trained were removed after agreement on definition with IEHA 36 Number of trade and investment diagnostics conducted Number 0 8 12 11 14 Was introduced by USAID operations report later in 2007 42 Effectiveness of assisted policy units Percent 41% 45% 55% 55% Baseline was MoFEP Policy Analysis Unit, 2006. TIPCEE plans to carry out a PIVA assessment of 3 major policy organizations soon. NLC was 25% and TAB was 25% in 2007 45 Cold chain throughput at Accra airport MT 0 3,000 na 18,000 tbd TIPCEE is collecting time series data on Air shipments and will report soon Cold chain throughput at Tema port 0 2007 Cummulative LOP Cummulative ANNEX III TECHNICAL REPORTS TRACKER Trade and Investment Program For a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) Technical Reports Tracker 1 Last updated: Sept 30, 2008 Technical Reports Tracker for TIPCEE Ghana Document Title Received Enabling Environment AGRICULTURE Pesticide Regulations Report Y Pesticide Regulations Y Draft policy review or brief outlining proposed policy changes for FASDEP Y Final framework and building blocks for FASDEP revision Y Review of Agricultural Strategies and Policies in Ghana: 1984 - 2004 Y Final FASDEP report- FASDEPII Y Policy Affecting the Development of Ghana's Banana Export Sector Y The Laws of Bananas Y Mapping of agro-ecological variables in parts of southern Ghana Y Analysis of Agricultural Value Chain Financing Options Y ENERGY Compiled Comments on EC Regulations Y Natural Gas Roadmap Y Final policy document, proposed amendments to existing laws where appropriate, and proposed Y ICT Revised National Communications Authority Bill Y Revised Telecommunications Bill Y PowerPoint presentation on the revised Bills to Stakeholders Y PowerPoint presentation on the revised Bills to the Parliamentary select Committee Y Finalise the proposed ICT bills Y LABOR Operational Plan for the National Labour Commission Y Communication Strategy Y MACRO/FINANCE Assessment of Long Term Savings Scheme Y Takeovers and Mergers Code and Case Studies Y Over the Counter Market report Y Foreign Exchange Act: Review and Recommendations Y Study of the Exchange Rates Regimes in Ghana Interest Rate Study Y Microstructure Study Y Concept Paper on ““Accelerating Economic Growth: Challenges and the Way Forward” Y TRADE Mid-term report on trade data assignment Y Completion report on trade data assignment Y Evaluation report including recommendations for future efforts required Y Starting a Business in Ghana Survey Y Comparative Study of Export Promotion Agencies Y Roadmap for the Resumption of the Valuation and Classification Functions by Ghanaian Y Study on CEPS User Fee Y Study Tour Report Y Trade Facilitation Presentation Y Review of the Proposal for the Establishment of a Tariff Advisory Board Y TAB Final Framework Y Technical Reports Tracker 2 Last updated: Sept 30, 2008 Technical Reports Tracker for TIPCEE Ghana Document Title Received Export Business Development SUBSECTOR STUDIES Banana Banana Plan research findings Y Banana Plan Executive Summary Y Mango Report on the current production status of farms in the mango growing areas of Southern Ghana Y Report on strategy to develop production and post-harvest activities to increase output in mango Y Report on the status of pruning and spraying techniques imparted by local mango consultants on Y Report on adoption of harvest and post-harvest activities to increase quality and achievement of Y Report on post-harvest activities to increase mango output Y Report on the application of pruning and spraying techniques by farmers for the 2007 minor Y Report on the application of effective Good Agricultural Practices in mango cultivation Y Mango Training report Y A detailed curriculum for the training of mango field management and post harvest specialists Y A fieldsman’s handbook developed from the mango curriculum Y Mango Market survey Y A final Mango Document based on Mango Week Y Recap of mango field training Y Illustrated mango poster Report on Global GAP readiness training for 4 mango associations Cashew Updated cashew standards and inspection manual Y Illustrated norms for cashew Y Comparative matrix of the norms and standards criteria and tolerance levels as practiced in Updated cashew standards reflecting current trends in the industry Detailed testing and quality evaluation methodology and questionnaire to serve as the basis for Report on cashew appropriation workshops and recommendations/ timetable for the follow-up Guidelines developed for training materials Report on observations and recommendations from Cashew Standard Training Report on findings on efficiency and completness of equipment Report on Maintenance team training Develop Maintenance Manual Pineapple Illustrated Norms for Pineapple Y A report on technical guidelines for setting up pineapple lab Y Reports on monitoring visits and pre-audits for MD2 EurepGAP training Develop and present a generic financial model for pineapple industry Training and monitoring report on Global GAP readiness - Central and Volta regions Pineapple Inspections training manual Report on training packhouse staff Training and monitoring report on Global GAP readiness - Central and Volta regions Technical Reports Tracker 3 Last updated: Sept 30, 2008 Technical Reports Tracker for TIPCEE Ghana Document Title Received Export Business Development Papaya Golden Papaya Production manual Y Illustrative guide and best practices for Papaya shipment Report of papaya trial results and recommendations for further work Illustrated Norms for Papaya Y Network development methodology Lead farmer and site coordinator training modules Dissemination methodology and trainer guides Implementation monitoring framework Field scouting guide and curriculum Standard operating procedures and inventory managemnt system for papaya packhoue nad sea Recommendations on 3 key activities to increase papaya yield Okra Okra IPM technical specification sheet Y A comprehensive protocol on seed trials Manual and best practices for seed trial demonstrations Report of trial results and recommendations for further work Okra network development methodology Site coordinator training modules Technical Implementation monitoring farmework Dissemination methodology Illustrated Okra norms poster Y Medicinal Plants Inspections Manual for Voacanga Africana Y Illusrated Norms for Voacanga Africana Y Illustrated Norms for Griffonia Y Citrus Report on training of surveyors for GIS mapping Y Report on design, selection criteria, costing and database structure for establishing sentinel sites SOW on sebntinel site implementation desgn Field scouting guideand curriculum Key competitiveness matrix; 3 key activities to increase citus yield IRRIGATION Mission reports including technical observations and recommendations for the TIPCEE Y Technical design of the pilot irrigation facilities to be procured Y Technical guidebooks for each phase of the irrigation implementation process: overview of the Final recommendations and lessons learned on TIPCEE irrigation program Agricultural Research Centre (ARC) Comprehensive report including technical observations and Agricultural Research Centre (ARC) Quantities of the restoration work including the materials Agricultural Research Centre (ARC) Environmental impact assessment report Mission reports including technical observations and recommendations for the TIPCEE Technical Reports Tracker 4 Last updated: Sept 30, 2008 Technical Reports Tracker for TIPCEE Ghana Document Title Received Export Business Development FIRM LEVEL INTERVENTIONS Cashnut Report on findings of the completeness and suitability of the various equipments Cashnut Report on results of test running of the installed equipment and fine-turning Cashnut Report on observations on safety measurers in place to ensure the safety of the operators Cashnut Report on evaluation of the maintenance program in place Cashnut Report on hands-on orientation conducted for operating personnel and maintenance Cashnut Report on recommendations on mini-workshop to be established for maintenance team Cashnut Maintenance manual for the factory machinery Cashnut report on pre-audit conducted Cashnut Report on design on GMP and SSOP systems established and implementation plan Cashnut Report on the training program designed Cashnut Report on training conducted for the personnel to smooth manage the quality assurance Cashnut Identification and design of HACCP compliant in-factory signs and instruction posters Cashnut Post audit re-assessment report SOA hydrological survey Y Greenspan business plan Pentacom report on activities undertaken and progress of work as field manager Y Bomarts: Reports on EurepGAP and Fairtrade Training Y Bomarts: pre-audit assessment of the six (6) outgrowers’ farms Y Yiko Krobo Mango Association Business Plan Y Report on available finance options and requirements for each financial institution Templates for financial spreadsheets and business plans Database comprising financial ratios and operayional benchmarks Fruitfly facilitation COMPETITIVENESS DOCUMENTS Map of the Horticulture Industry in Ghana Cluster Monitoring Framework Multimedia DVD Presentation on horticultural industry in Ghana Cluster development strategy report SMALLHOLDER DEVELOPMENT Implementation Strategy for smallholder vegetable networks and outgrower schemes Y Technical guidebooks for smallholder vegetable networks and outgrower schemes Manuals for EurepGAP readiness including internal control checklist INDUSTRY DEVELOPMENT Pallet barcode tracking & tracing Y Business plan templates for pineapple, papaya, mango nad vegetables Assessmnet of pineapple, mango nad vegetable option 2 pilots and implentation for option 2 Farmer friendly QMS manuals and checklists TIPCEE TECHNICAL TRAINING MANUALS Eurostat Activity Manual Y Eurostat Reference Manual Y Eurostat Program Presentation Y Eurostat Market Intelligence Report Mango Training Manual Quality policy systems manual for mango EUREP-GAP Assessment Manual for Smallholders Irrigation installation and management guide Family drip installation and operations guide Organic mango production guide Goodlife of citrus poster Goodlife of maize poster Maize Yocopoma training kit Compost production poster Goodlife of Tomato poster Okra training kit ITFC mango training kit Northern Outreach Training in Association Capacity Building Report on technical study on plastic crate technology pilot GIS Report on GIS training of surveyors GIS Framework ANNEX IV BUDGETED AND ACTUAL EXPENDITURES Trade and Investment Program For a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) Comparisons of budget and actual expenditures 1 Table 1 TIPCEE Project Comparison of Actual and Budgeted Expenditures Project-to-Date and Life-of-Project Line Items: Major labor and ODC lines Project-to-Date Budgeted Expenditures to August 31, 2008 Project-to-Date Actual Expenditures to August 31, 2008 Life-of-Project Budget to November 30, 2009 Life-of-Project Expenditures Projected to November 30, 2009 LT Expats $3,807,609 $3,858,576 $4,781,009 $4,709,799 LT Locals $5,582,111 $5,383,348 $7,043,497 $6,971,177 HO Mgmt Support $940,815 $969,516 $1,009,973 $1,229,809 ST Expats $2,206,785 $2,311,450 $3,240,680 $2,999,721 ST Locals $1,699,088 $1,658,280 $2,219,900 $1,940,646 Total Labor $14,236,408 $14,181,172 $18,295,059 $17,851,152 ODCs $6,924,918 $6,911,643 $7,724,608 $9,121,348 CAF $981,907 $1,057,019 $3,500,000 $2,334,769 Total Materials $7,906,824 $7,968,662 $11,224,608 $11,604,509 G&A $388,442 $400,237 $561,230 $574,529 Grand Total $22,531,675 $22,550,071 $30,080,897 $30,030,191 Note: Life-of-project expenditures are projected to be $50,000 less than the life-of-project budget to allow a buffer for NICRA adjustments and other miscellaneous charges that normally arise during the final project year. Comparisons of budget and actual expenditures 2 Table 2 TIPCEE Project Comparison of Actual and Budgeted Expenditures Project-to-Date and Life-of-Project By Key Objectives Line Items: Major labor and ODC lines Project-to-Date Budgeted Expenditures to August 31, 2008 Life-of-Project Budget to November 30, 2009 Total EE EBD Total Total EE EBD Total LT Expats $3,807,609 $1,427,673 $2,430,903 $3,858,576 $4,781,009 $1,742,626 $2,967,174 $4,709,799 LT Locals $5,582,111 $1,991,839 $3,391,509 $5,383,348 $7,043,497 $2,579,336 $4,391,842 $6,971,177 HO Mgmt Support $940,815 $358,721 $610,795 $969,516 $1,009,973 $455,029 $774,780 $1,229,809 ST Expats $2,206,785 $855,237 $1,456,214 $2,311,450 $3,240,680 $1,109,897 $1,889,824 $2,999,721 ST Locals $1,699,088 $613,564 $1,044,717 $1,658,280 $2,219,900 $718,039 $1,222,607 $1,940,646 Total Labor $14,236,408 $5,247,034 $8,934,138 $14,181,172 $18,295,059 $6,604,926 $11,246,226 $17,851,152 ODCs $6,924,918 $2,557,308 $4,354,335 $6,911,643 $7,724,608 $3,374,899 $5,746,449 $9,121,348 CAF $981,907 $391,097 $665,922 $1,057,019 $3,500,000 $863,865 $1,470,905 $2,334,769 Total Materials $7,906,824 $2,948,405 $5,020,257 $7,968,662 $11,224,608 $4,293,668 $7,310,841 $11,604,509 G&A $388,442 $148,088 $252,149 $400,237 $561,230 $212,576 $361,954 $574,529 Grand Total $22,531,675 $8,343,526 $14,206,545 $22,550,071 $30,080,897 $11,111,170 $18,919,020 $30,030,191 Project Key Objectives: Enabling Environment (EE): Improved Enabling Environment for Private Sector Export Business Development (EBD): Strengthened Private Sector Capability to Compete Note: Life-of-project expenditures are projected to be $50,000 less than the life-of-project budget to allow a buffer for NICRA adjustments and other miscellaneous charges that normally arise during the final project year. Life-of-Project Expenditures by Key Objectives Projected to November 30, 2009 Project-to-Date Actual Expenditures by Key Objectives to August 31, 2008 ANNEX V SUCCESS STORIES Trade and Investment Program For a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) Success stories 1 Success stories 2 Success stories 3 ANNEX VI CONSULTANTS’ SCOPE OF WORK Trade and Investment Program For a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) Consultants’ Scope of Work 1 USAID Ghana Economic Growth Team (TAPS) Scope of Work for a Program Review and Design Expert Purpose: Evaluation and redesign of USAID/Ghana’s Economic Growth Program. USAID Ghana SO 6 began in 2005 and will finish in 2010. The Strategic Objective Statement is Increasing the Competitiveness of the Ghanaian Private Sector in World Markets. The SO Team manages an annual budget of approximately $8 Million. The SO has had up to 12 activities but there are five that make up the core of the SO program. One activity, Trade and Investment for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) which assists in the development of market oriented agriculture and improved enabling environment comprises approximately 80 % of the portfolio. The SO6 is implemented by USAID’s Trade Agriculture and Private Sector (TAPS) Office. This is also referred to as the Economic Growth Team. The SO is supported by funding earmarks from IEHA (app. $6/year) and AGCI and ($1M/year.). IEHA funding is also seen as a mechanism for advancing the CAADP agenda. The SO receives intermittently earmarked funds for bio-diversity. These have been in the range of four hundred thousand to two million per year. AID program planning has shifted away from reliance on country based strategic objective frameworks and is now driven by the Foreign Assistance Operational Plan (OP) which targets the following objectives for assistance to Ghana. Background • Increase Trade and Investment • Improve Economic Policy and the Business Environment • Improve Private Sector Competitiveness • Strengthen Financial Services Sector and Increase Access to Capital • Expand and Improve Access to Economic and Social Infrastructure • Increase Agric Sector Productivity • Improve Sustainable Management of Natural Resources/Biodiversity Conservation The existing activities and mechanisms developed under the SO6 framework are meeting the newly formulated indicators of the OP and the development needs of Ghana but they will be ending within the next two years. To continue meeting the OP indicators, new mechanisms will need to be in place by 2009/2010. The SO 6 Framework currently serves as the basis for the Agreement with the GOG. By 2009 the Mission may need to have re-defined the procedures and content for the assistance agreement with Ghana. The SO was articulated in 2004/2005. Since that time there have been major changes in approaches to Development Assistance and the development environment in Ghana which will affect the way in which programs are designed. The scope of this assignment is to address these changes and develop a program framework that identifies the key areas and types of mechanisms that will need to be developed over the next 2 years in order to (1) meet the objectives of USG/USAID Consultants’ Scope of Work 2 strategies, (2) “harmonize” USG efforts with GoG and other donor strategy frameworks, and (3) effectively meet the economic development needs of Ghana given USG budgetary constraints. o the USG strategy that guides USAID’s approach to providing assistance to Ghana Key tasks 1. Overview of the factors affecting USAID Assistance in Ghana To provide a basis for designing and prioritizing future USAID assistance the consultant will provide a review of the socio-economic environment in Ghana that includes Ghana’s public and private sector and the interaction of Donor programs with these Ghanaian sectors. This will include but is not limited to the points described below. Ghanaian Development Environment The consultant will conduct a general review of Ghana’s overall economic environment and the GOG’s strategies for fostering economic growth and poverty reduction. Ghana is considered to be on track to becoming a middle income country and is showing continued improvement in its performance as judged by the various internationally recognized indicator systems. It has developed and/or adhered to several strategies and frameworks for promoting equitable growth such as the Millenium Development Goals, the Ghanaian Poverty Reduction Strategy and NEPAD/CAADP. Within these frameworks it has developed various sector strategies. The consultant should review these frameworks and strategies to determine their status of implementation and the extent to which they are effective in fostering continued sustainable equitable economic growth. This review should contribute to understanding the constraints and opportunities for fostering continued economic growth and be used by the consultant in developing recommendations for USAID assistance. Within this context the prospects of significant oil generated revenue coming on stream in the medium term is an important factor for consideration. USAID and USG Strategies/Programs and Programming Procedures In order to develop recommendations the consultant will familiarize him/herself with the strategies, initiatives and focus areas (earmarks) that shape USAID funding and relate them to recommendations for new strategies and activities. These incude: o The OP framework and programming process o Initiatives and Earmarks such as IEHA, AGCI, Bio-Diversity o Support to CAADP NEPAD o Public/private partnerships (GDA’s). Additionally this review will include a review of other USG programs that provide support to Ghana such as the MCC, US Trade and US Treasury and the relationship of USAID activities to these programs. Consultants’ Scope of Work 3 Familiarization/Harmonization with GOG and Other Donor Progams and Operating Procedures An increasingly important factor in designing and implementing USAID programs are the principles agreed to by donors and recipient countries contained in the OECD “Paris Declaration”. These place an emphasis on increased donor harmonization and increased government ownership of assistance programs. A structured framework for implementation of these principles and guidelines has been put in place by the GOG and the donor community. These have important ramifications for the design of USAID activities and the assessment will need to address this framework and harmonized donor procedures in developing program design recommendations. The assessment will provide a list and brief description of other donor activities including those of lending institutions. The GOG has programs ongoing in, among other areas, agriculture extension and rural development. The assessment should analyze the possibility of giving direct support to government services and initiatives as opposed to designing more distinct project activities. 2. Review of SO 6 Activities The consultant will review the ongoing “SO6” activities, articulate lessons learned, provide opinions on effectiveness of the activities in meeting SO6 objective and document successes and results. These findings will be used to develop program recommendations for the period 2010-2015. The review will determine by what mechanisms the Mission can continue to provide support to successful approaches and activities. The review will place particular emphasis on the TIPCEE program to determine that it has met the requirements of the implementing contract and document results. This review will constitute an official performance review of the TIPCEE program. (More specific Terms of Reference for reviewing the TIPCEE program are found below). This program is considered to have numerous successful approaches to developing the privates sector and attention should be devoted to determining how these approaches can be sustained under subsequent programs. Some key issues for review of the TIPCEE program are as follows: 3. Assessment of the TIPCEE Program The Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) is a $30M, five-year program begun in December of 2004. It is implemented by Chemonics International, which has large subcontracts with CARE and Technoserve, as well as smaller contracts with the local private sector and partnering agreements with other donors and Government of Ghana Ministries and Agencies. The Program was designed to meet the Missions SO6 Objective of Increasing the Competitiveness of the Ghanaian Private Sector in World Markets. It is also the Mission’s major mechanism for meeting the Objectives of the Presidential Initiative to End Hunger in Africa and the African Growth and Competitiveness Initiative, both of which provide substantial earmarks to the Ghana Mission. (Ref Websites). The TIPCEE Program has two major components: Export Business Development (EBD) and Enabling Environment (EE). The EBD component targets improving supply chain Consultants’ Scope of Work 4 integration and overcoming production constraints to increasing horticultural exports. To respond to IEHA targets, the project’s scope has been expanded to assist small-holders to supply internal and regional markets. The EE component works on a set of policy, regulatory and related capacity building issues that target selected aspects of improving the enabling environment as a whole and is not limited solely to the agricultural sector. The agenda for this component has been defined by input from USAID, the Government of Ghana (Ministries of Finance, Trade, Agriculture, Labor) and Private Sector Trade Associations. The TIPCEE Program is the major activity for SO6 objective. This assessment comes at a key time as the Mission is shaping its future strategy and designing follow on mechanisms. Specifically the evaluation will: • Verify and document that contractual requirements have been satisfied; • Document success stories and lessons learned • Provide recommendations for design of follow on activities • Review budget, establish budget projections • Relate key objectives to budget and make projections for the remainder of the project • Articulate potential problems related to completing the project . • Identify ongoing activities that may merit special attention for continued support and monitoring after TIPCEE ends. The Evaluation Team will review the following key issues and provide findings and recommendations accordingly. 4. Develop a Prioritized Program Development Framework The OP provides the framework, areas of interest and defines funding levels for USAID Ghana. Within this framework the consultant will recommend the most effective activities and mechanisms for meeting the OP indicators, Ghana’s development needs and correspond to the operating principles of the Paris Declaration. Evolution of the Horticultural Sector Given the Mission’s long history of support to the Ghanaian horticultural sector it is necessary to assess how that sector has evolved and determine to what extent key actors in the Ghanaian private sector have matured in terms of independently accessing markets, technology, and skills necessary to competing in global markets. In turn these changes need to be related to potential changes in the nature of the support functions of donors and the government necessary to continued growth. Has the Ghanaian public sector evolved to play a supportive role in the development of the sector. Key to this assessment is determining what policy and public sector changes are necessary to transforming the agricultural sector to fulfill Ghana’s growth potential in general and the changes specific to the agricultural export sector in particular. Consultants’ Scope of Work 5 Based on the review of this issue the evaluation will make recommendations on the types of assistance that is needed at all levels of the private sector and the changes and needs for assistance to improve the enabling environment and improve public sector support to the sector. Additionally the discussion of this issue needs to relate Ghana’s progress and needs to anticipated changes in international market requirements. Overall the assessment should determine whether or not continued focus on this area will begin to yield diminishing returns or are there areas where major impact can be made either in technology transfer, trade capacity development or other areas of enabling environment. Expansion to Other Commodity Sectors In order to contribute more to meeting IEHA targets TIPCEE expanded its focus to commercial production of crops for local and regional markets and processors. The evaluation should review the experience to date and review the potential for further expansion of support to staple crops, oil crops, aquaculture and horticultural crops for local processing. This review should result in recommendations on sub-sectors to target in follow on projects and should be based on a general review of prices, demand and processing capacity and lay the groundwork for more detailed commodity chain analyses. Approaches to Enabling Environment and Policy Activities The review should include an analysis of the approaches to setting and implementing the agenda for enabling environment/policy analysis. This part of the evaluation should be done with knowledge of the Ghana Statistical Survey Program (GSSP) which is a policy analysis project implemented by IFPRI with support from the Economic Growth Office. This should contrast the approaches taken by TIPCEE and GSSP, discuss the advantages of the two different approaches, and examine the extent to which the two approaches converge and/or are complementary. The assessment should identify approaches to improving the enabling environment that can be used to create the EG Portfolio’s new agenda. These approaches should consider: (1) Government of Ghana “ownership” issues; (2) other donors’ agenda; and, (3) providing sufficient purpose and focus to result in meaningful changes in the enabling environment. Harmonization with other donor Activities To avoid duplication and identify potential partners, the review and recommendations for future activities should include an inventory of MCC, GOG and other donor activities. The review should be done in concert with the Agricultural Sector Donors group. The methodology for collecting information and vetting findings should be conceived to include this group from the outset by organizing meetings and presentations of what the review is intended to achieve and subsequent meetings to share findings. Within the context of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness the donor community and the Government of Ghana have developed sector strategies and performance matrices and procedures for performance monitoring. There is increasing expectations that donor assistance will shift to pooled donor funding and Sector Wide Approaches (SWAPs). The evaluation will analyze how USAID can conform to the prevailing donor assistance principles (this should be based on knowledge of the literature and best practices for SWAPs) and still achieve impact and meet indicators and performance targets. USAID Ghana’s Economic Growth Office places heavy emphasis on private sector development. Consultants’ Scope of Work 6 Pooled funding and SWAPs are generally recognized as being less effective for Private Sector Development. SWAPs do not preclude direct targeting of the private sector. Both TIPCEE and GSSP have played an important role in collaborating with other donors. Projects Such as BUSAC and NCRC have been done in collaboration with other donors. The assessment should document this collaboration and develop lessons learned that could be applied in future activity design The assessment will be used by the Mission as a mechanism to help position USAID assistance to the private sector within the context of Government of Ghana Sector strategies. Deliverables The appraisal team will produce two separate, but interrelated deliverables. 1. A report containing a General Overview and analysis of the Factors Affecting Economic Growth in Ghana, a description of key GOG and other donor policies, strategies and interventions, and Recommendations on Topical Areas, Geographical Areas, Approaches and Mechanisms for future programming. This report will address the issues and key tasks articulated above in sections one, two and four. Lessons learned from TIPCEE and GSSP will be an important source of information in responding to the broader analytical questions raised in these sections. Most importantly the report will recommend the key areas for development of new activities, interventions and partnerships for the Economic Growth Office and provide brief concept notes for new activities and interventions. 2. TIPCEE assessment report. This report will address the issues and key tasks articulated in section 3. This deliverable and the tasks associated with producing it will generate information to be used in the broader analysis provided in the first deliverable. This report will be specific to the TIPCEE project and will serve to document oversight of the project. It should provide a determination as to whether the contractual requirements were satisfied and provide a critique of the project concept, quality of implementation, successes and lessons learned. This report will also look more specifically at the issues related to USAID’s experience in developing agricultural value chains and identify opportunities for designing future interventions in this area. It will also assess the impact of the work done in the enabling environment area, assess the methods used to develop and implement this component of the project. Methodology Proposals for this task order should include a description of the methodology that would be used to perform the SOW. Following are some key factors for use in developing the methodology for implementing the assessment. To the extent possible the assessment should access information on-line The broader assessment (Deliverable 1) should be based on information from a wide ranging set of sources beyond those related directly to USAID activities. It should identify and include: Information Sources and Contacts Consultants’ Scope of Work 7 • a review of the OECD Paris Declaration on Harmonization and information such as strategies, results frameworks, indicator matrices and assessments that have been developed within this framework. • Discussions with other donors and lending institutions to gather information on their activities and their approaches to assistance and lessons learned. Not all donors are active members of the donor sector groups. The assessment team will need to compile a complete list of the major donors and thematic and geographic areas of intervention.. • Discussions with GOG officials. Key ministries to contact include but are not limited to the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, the Ministry of Food and Agriculture, and the Ministry of Trade and Private Sector Investment • Discussions with Private Sector Operators, Private Sector Associations and Farmers Organizations The sources of USAID information should include information from the following sources: • EG Strategy Description, • key activity documents; to include contracts, grants, work plans, technical and periodic progress reports and evaluation reports; • interviews of stakeholders and beneficiaries, Although much of the TIPCEE assessment can be completed through secondary sources of information , the methodology should allow for individual/spot check sampling of reported results and have time built in for stakeholder interviews. Assessment of The EG activities in general and TIPCEE should be structured in such a way that the report will reflect the pathway followed from definition of constraints/opportunities, to elaboration of approaches and interventions and the outcomes achieved as a result and draw lessons from that analysis. The key purpose of the report is to assist the Mission in prioritizing areas of intervention to achieve tangible results within in a five year framework by analyzing the complex set of factors that include not only potential impact on growth but take in to account other donor and GOG principles activities and strategies and USG/USAID activities, priorities, initiatives and earmarks. It is important that the assessment be conducted with full information to other donors so the methodology should include time for presentation to relevant donor sector groups (Agriculture, Private Sector). Level of Effort and Key Areas of Expertise Firms competing for this task order are encouraged to provide their own approaches to fulfilling this assignment based on the SOW. The estimated level of effort for completing this assignment is 65 person days. The suggested team composition is two to three people. Skills and experience should include extensive experience in the design and implementation and evaluation of agriculture production and agri-business, economic development and policy projects in developing countries. Experience in Public Consultants’ Scope of Work 8 Institutional development would also be useful. Academic training in agriculture, business, economics and management is preferred but candidates with other academic backgrounds should be considered based on their professional experience. Calendar and Schedule The evaluation should begin on or before May 1, 2008. The expected period for completing the evaluation is six weeks. A draft report must be submitted to the EG Office head at the end of the 5th week for comments and revision and a final draft submitted to the Mission before the Team Leader leaves the country. The team should schedule time for weekly briefings with the Economic Growth Office. Special Instructions The contractor will be required to handle all in country logistics. Office space, computers, telecommunications, expediting and transportation will be provided by the contractor. Access to USAID and USAID facilities is limited. Electronic devices (computers, cell phones, USB devices) cannot be brought in to the facility. Contractor will require an escort at all times when in USAID facilities. Criteria: Proposals for this task order will be evaluated on the basis of the following criteria: Team Composition and distribution of LOE (10 points) Firms should present their optimal scenario in terms of team size and LOE for each team member. Proposals will be judged on the rationale and management arrangements provided for this scenario. Team Member Experience (50 points) • Experience in review, implementation and design of USAID programs (20) • Experience in review, design, and implementation of agricultural business programs (10) • Experience in review, design and implementation of policy and enabling environment programs (10) • Experience with developing, implementing and verifying M&E systems (5) • Experience working in West African countries (5) Methodology (20 Points) This section of the proposal will be scored on the methods proposed for collecting and analyzing the data required to complete the scope of work. It should explain how it will collect information and verify secondary data and how it will structure the report and prioritize the tasks necessary to providing and supporting conclusions and recommendations. The methodology should demonstrate a clear understanding of the major issues to be resolved by the review; and an approach to prioritizing information collection and organizing the team to complete the task and meet the deadline. . Implementation Calendar (20 Points) Consultants’ Scope of Work 9 This assignment requires a tightly planned schedule of tasks. The proposal will be judged on the clarity, detail and credibility of the timetable provided. It must lead to delivery of final draft report before the team leaves Ghana. ANNEX VII PEOPLE MET DURING THE ASSESSMENT Trade and Investment Program For a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE) List of Persons Met and Contact Information 1 WASHINGTON, D.C. AND GHANA Persons Met While Conducting TIPCEE Evaluation September 3 – October 5, 2008 Persons Met Organization Mr. Jeff Hill, Mr. Tom Hobgood Mr. Brian Dusza, Private Enterprise Officer Dr. Jeanne Downing, Senior Enterprise Development Advisor Mr. Thomas A. Kennedy, Senior Financial Services Advisor US Agency for International Development, Washington, DC Richard Ody, Director, Africa Mr. William Kedrock, Director, TIPCEE Ms. Rebecca Cague, Manager, TIPCEE Chemonics International, Washington, DC C. Martin Webber, Executive Vice President and Partner J. E. Austin Associates, Arlington, VA Mr. Sam Mensah, Technical Advisor Mr. Yaw Okyere-Nyako, Chief Economics Officer Nana Juaben-Boaten Siriboe, Chief Director Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MOFEP), Accra, Ghana Dr. Gyiele Nurah, Chief Director Mr. Seth Evans Addo, Chief Director Ms. Lena Otoo, Deputy Director, Policy, Planning, and Analysis Unit Mr. Salome Danso, Director, Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit Mr. Lambert Abrisah, Deputy Director, Policy, Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Unit Ministry of Food and Agriculture (MOFA), Accra, Ghana Mr. Patrick Nemo, Trade Sector Strategic Plan (TSSP) Coordinator Ministry of Trade, Industry, Private Sector Development and PSI, Accra, Ghana Mr. W. A. Krofah, President Mr. Emmanuel Doni-Kwame, Head￾Marketing, Trade and Investment Promotion Ghana National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Accra, Ghana Dr. Ramatu M. Al-Hassan, Senior Lecturer University of Ghana, College of Agriculture and Consumer Sciences, Accra, Ghana Mr. Augustine Adongo, Lead Consultant Integrated Business Consulting (IBC), Accra, Ghana Ms. Lauren Ruth, Deputy Chief of Party Dr. Susan B. Hester, Enabling Environment Director Trade and Investment Program for a Competitive Export Economy (TIPCEE), Accra, Ghana List of Persons Met and Contact Information 2 Persons Met Organization Mr. Emmanuel Adjei, Business Development Manager Mr. Edwin Afari, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist Ms. Reiko Enomoto, Smallholder Training Specialist Mr. Walter Hevi, Smallholder Development Specialist Mr. Gordon Kotey, Smallholder Development Specialist Mr. Emmanuel Nene Mwangé, Smallholder Development Specialist Samuel Seddoh, Jr., Food Crops Specialist Ms. Agnes Otoo Yeboah, Operations Manager Dr. Charles D. Jebuni, Researcher Center for Policy Research (CEPA), Accra, Ghana Ms. Katherine S. Ntep, Deputy Resident Country Director Milleneum Challenge Compact, US Embassy, Accra, Ghana Mr. Matthew E. Armah, Chief Operating Officer Millennium Development Authority (MiDA), Accra, Ghana Dr. Christian Rogg, Senior Economic Advisor Mr. David Pedley, Governance Advisor Ms. Nana Frimpomaa Arhin, Private Sector Development Advisor Department for International Development (DFID), Accra, Ghana Mr. Chris Jackson, Economist Mr. William Steel, Consultant, Small Enterprise and Microfinance The World Bank, Ghana Country Office, Accra, Ghana Mr. Roy Lass, Commercial Manager Frigo Ghana Ltd., Accra, Ghana Dr. Charles D. Jebuni, Research Fellow Centre for Policy Analysis (CEPA), Accra, Ghana Nicholas H. Railston-Brown, Country Director Technoserve, Accra, Ghana Jean-Claude Gruner, Managing Director Golden Exotics Limited, Accra, Ghana Mrs. Angelina Mornah Domakyaareh, Member National Labour Commission, Accra, Ghana Ms. Ines Wiedemann, Agronomist , Sunyani Ms. Maria Geitzenauer, Agronomist, Central Region Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (DED), Market Oriented Agriculture Programme Mr. Robert Hellyer, Mission Director Mr. David Atteberry, Deputy Mission Director US Agency for International Development, Accra, Ghana List of Persons Met and Contact Information 3 Persons Met Organization Mr. John Mullenax, Advisor, IEHA, Economic Growth Office Mr. Fenton Sands, Consultant, Economic Growth Office Ms. Eline Okudzeto, Economist, Economic Growth Office Mr. George Pevill Meridian Port Services, Ltd., Economic Growth Office Dr Lothar Diehs, Programme Advisor Anna Jankowski, Economic Advisor German Technical Cooperation, Accra, Ghana Mr. Shashi Kolavalli, Senior Research Fellow International Food Policy Research Institiute, Development Strategy and Governance Division (DSGD) Dr. Feliz Ankomah Asante, Senior Research Fellow and Head, Economics Division Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER), University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana Mr. Fernando Monterrubio, Regional Controller, West Africa MSCA (Ghana) Limited, Tema, Ghana Mr. Olivier Mlakar, General Manager Tema Container Terminal, Ltd., Tema, Ghana Ms. Lydia Afoley Anum, National Coordinator Madam Agnes Adjelay Alama, Member Madam Rebeccah Ansaah, Member Madam Mary Amakour Karley, Member Ghana National Tomato Traders Association (GNTTA), Accra, Ghana Mr. Raja A. Najjar Owner, Aqua Farms, Ltd, Accra, Ghana Mr. Kwabena Adu-Gyama Partner, Afrique Link, Ltd., Accra, Ghana Mr. George Amoako-Adjei West Africa Pipeline Company, Accra, Ghana Mr. Lemuel Charles Mantey, President Mr. Akyea Larbi Michael, Pineapple Mr. Ben ONusu Addo, Pineapple farmer Adonten Pineapple Cooperative, Nsawam, Ghana Mr. Bernard Ainoo, citrus farmer Cape Coast District, Ghana Mr. Ernest Abloa, Manager Mr. Mark Azaglo, Agronomist Blue Sky Products Ghana Limited, Nsawam, Ghana Mr. Wallter Hevi, papaya farmer Mr. Enoch Cudjoe, papaya farmer New Akrede Township, Ghana