ACDI/VOCA WEST BANK FOOD SECURITY PROGRAM - Cooperative Agreement No. 294-A-00-06-00207-00 
Quarter 3, FY 08 
APPENDIX B 
Food Security Program Final Evaluation Report 
1 
 
WEST BANK FOOD SECURITY PROGRAM: 
Final Evaluation Report 
Submitted to:
Mr. Adnan Younis 
Chief of Party 
ACDI/VOCA West Bank and Gaza 
Prepared by:
Al-Sahel for Institutional Development and Communication 
Zeyad Haj Yasin Bldg. 
Apt. No. 3 
P.O. Box. 4177 
Al-Beireh – West Bank 
Cooperative Agreement No. 294-A-00-06-00207-00 
 September 2008
2 
Table of Contents 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................... 6 
A. Food Security in the oPt: A Brief Overview .................................................................................. 6 
B. Evaluation Objective and Methodology ......................................................................................... 7 
C. Evaluation Limitations .................................................................................................................. 8 
D. Report Structure ............................................................................................................................ 9 
CHAPTER TWO: THE WBFS PROGRAM AS DESIGNED AND ITS ASSESSMENT ................ 10 
A. Context at the Time of Design ...................................................................................................... 10 
B. Program Goal, Intermediate Results and Strategy Components ..................................................... 10 
B.1. Cooperative Agribusiness Growth ............................................................................ 12 
B.2. Rural Household Support.......................................................................................... 14 
C. Resources: Organizational Structure, Human Resources, and Funding ......................................... 15 
C.1. Organizational Structure and Human Resources ........................................................ 15 
C.2. Funding .................................................................................................................... 15 
D. Monitoring and Evaluation .......................................................................................................... 16 
E. Assessment of the Program Design and its Relevance .................................................................. 18 
CHAPTER THREE: THE SMALL RUMINANT DAIRY PRODUCTION COMPONENT ........... 20 
A. Overview and Performance Targets ............................................................................................. 20 
B. Assessment of Component Implementation ................................................................................. 22 
B.1. Project Start-up and Development ............................................................................. 22 
B.2. Effectiveness ............................................................................................................ 23 
B.3. Efficiency ................................................................................................................. 29 
B.4. Impact ...................................................................................................................... 35 
B.5. Sustainability ............................................................................................................ 37 
C. Overall Conclusions and Recommendations ................................................................................ 38 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE HORTICULTURE PRODUCTION & MARKETING COMPONENT .. 41 
A. Overview and Performance Targets ............................................................................................. 41 
B. Assessment of Component Implementation ................................................................................. 42 
B.1. Project Start-up and Development ............................................................................. 42 
B.2. Effectiveness ............................................................................................................ 43 
B.3. Efficiency ................................................................................................................. 51 
B.4. Impact ...................................................................................................................... 56 
B.5. Sustainability ............................................................................................................ 57 
C. Overall Conclusions and Recommendations ................................................................................ 57 
3 
CHAPTER FIVE: OLIVE OIL PRODUCTION, HARVESTING, PRESSING AND OIL 
STORAGE ........................................................................................................................................... 60 
A. Overview and Performance Targets ............................................................................................. 60 
B. Assessment of Component Implementation ................................................................................. 62 
B.1. Effectiveness ............................................................................................................ 62 
B.2. Efficiency ................................................................................................................. 66 
B.3. Impact ...................................................................................................................... 71 
B.5. Sustainability ............................................................................................................ 72 
C. Overall Conclusions and Recommendations ................................................................................ 73 
CHAPTER SIX: IMPROVED HOUSEHOLD VALUE ADDED PRODUCTS ................................ 75 
A. Overview and Performance Targets ............................................................................................. 75 
B. Assessment of Component Implementation ................................................................................. 76 
B.1. Effectiveness ............................................................................................................ 76 
B.2. Efficiency ................................................................................................................. 80 
B.4. Impact ...................................................................................................................... 84 
B.5. Sustainability ............................................................................................................ 85 
C. Overall Conclusions and Recommendations ................................................................................ 85 
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE RURAL HOUSEHOLD SUPPORT COMPONENT .............................. 87 
A. Overview and Performance Targets .............................................................................................. 87 
B. Assessment of Component Implementation .................................................................................. 88 
B.1. Effectiveness ............................................................................................................. 88 
B.2. Efficiency .................................................................................................................. 95 
B.3. Impact ..................................................................................................................... 100 
B.4. Sustainability........................................................................................................... 100 
C. Overall Conclusions and Recommendations ............................................................................... 101 
APPENDIX: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED ......................................................................... 102 
4 
List of Tables and Figures 
Tables
Table 1: Macroeconomic Indicators in the oPt for various years between 1999 and 2006............................................ 6 
Table 2: Indicative sample size using a stratified sampling process .............................................................................. 8 
Table 3: Expected Results: Improved agribusiness and cooperative management (IR-1.2) ....................................... 13 
Table 4: The WBFS Program budget (US$), by year .................................................................................................. 15 
Table 5: WBFS Program Indicator Performance Tracking Table (IPTT) ................................................................... 17 
Table 6: Specific objectives of the SRDP project implemented by PLCU (Phase I and II) ....................................... 20 
Table 7: Frequency of cleaning livestock farms, pre- and post-project compared (% farmers) .................................. 23 
Table 8: Use of disinfectant in cleaning farm tools, pre- and post-project compared (% farmers) ............................. 24 
Table 9: Use of disinfectant in cleaning sheep and goat udders, pre- and post-project compared (% of farmers) ...... 24 
Table 10: SRDP budget as planned and implemented ................................................................................................. 30 
Table 11: Socio-economic indicators for beneficiary selection under the SRDP project ............................................ 31 
Table 12: Distribution of the beneficiaries with respect to the percentage of milk produced sold through their 
respective cooperatives during the last season ............................................................................................................. 33 
Table 13: Planned vs. achieved performance target indicators .................................................................................... 34 
Table 14: Percentage distribution of beneficiaries who reported increased income with regard to level of increased 
income ......................................................................................................................................................................... 36 
Table 15: Number of new and rehabilitated greenhouses planned .............................................................................. 43 
Table 16: Total quantity and value of crops sold in local market ................................................................................ 45 
Table 17: HPM budget as planned and as discharged ................................................................................................. 52 
Table 18: Planned vs. achieved performance indicator targets under the HPM project .............................................. 55 
Table 19: Distribution of OHPOS project beneficiaries by cooperative ...................................................................... 61 
Table 20: Equipment and facilities provided to beneficiary olive producer cooperatives ........................................... 62 
Table 21: Description of olive press rehabilitation works ........................................................................................... 62 
Table 22: Beneficiaries management of Jool (% of farmers indicating practice) ........................................................ 64 
Table 23: Frequency cleaning of olive fruits (% of farmers indicating practice) ........................................................ 65 
Table 24: Tools used by the beneficiaries to pick the olive fruits (% of farmers indicating practice) ......................... 65 
Table 25: Percentage distribution of farmers according to type of containers they use to keep the harvested olives (% 
of farmers indicating practice) ..................................................................................................................................... 65 
Table 26: Frequency of olive pressing (% of farmers indicating practice) .................................................................. 66 
Table 27: OHPOS project budget and expenditures .................................................................................................... 67 
Table 28: Beneficiaries satisfaction with various aspects of project (% of farmers indicating response) ................... 69 
Table 29: Project Performance Indicators: Planned vs. Achieved ............................................................................... 70 
Table 30: Distribution of the beneficiaries with respect to their sales and prices of olive oil (through the 
cooperatives only)........................................................................................................................................................ 71 
Table 31: Average beneficiary self-reported income from the sale of food products through cooperatives ............... 79 
Table 32: OHPOS project budget and expenditures .................................................................................................... 81 
Table 33: Beneficiaries satisfaction with various aspects of project (% of farmers indicating response) ................... 83 
Table 34: Project Performance Indicators: Planned vs. Achieved ............................................................................... 84 
Table 35: Nature of use of home gardens according to the average area of land used (m2
) ....................................... 88 
Table 36: Total production from home gardens .......................................................................................................... 89 
Table 37: Total quantity and value of home garden crops sold by surveyed beneficiaries in local market, in kilogram, 
by crop type ................................................................................................................................................................. 91 
Table 38: Household monthly income (NIS), by income groups at baseline and at evaluation .................................. 92 
Table 39: Training courses conducted within the framework of the ILHFS project ................................................... 94 
5 
Table 40: ILHFS Project budget vs. actual expenditures ............................................................................................. 96 
Table 41: Socio-economic Indicators for Project Beneficiary Selection ..................................................................... 97 
Table 42: Beneficiaries satisfaction with various aspects of project (% of farmers indicating response) ................... 98 
Table 34: Project Performance Indicators: Planned vs. Achieved ............................................................................... 99 
Figures
Figure 1: WBFS Program Results Chain ..................................................................................................................... 11 
Figure 2: Percentage of farmers using farm records .................................................................................................... 25 
Figure 3: Beneficiaries opinion regarding the profitability of marketing fresh milk (% of farmers) .......................... 32 
Figure 4: Level of beneficiaries satisfaction with various aspects related to project implementation (% beneficiaries)
 ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 33 
Figure 5: Would you market fresh milk through the cooperative if the possibility arises again/continues? (% of 
farmers)........................................................................................................................................................................ 37 
Figure 6: Percentage of farmers utilizing various farm management techniques, before and after project compared 44 
Figure 7: Percentage of farmers utilizing various IPM/ICM techniques, before and after project compared ............. 45 
Figure 8: Level of beneficiaries satisfaction with various aspects related to project implementation ......................... 54 
Figure 9: Percentage of beneficiaries reporting sale of home garden produced cops, by service ................................ 89 
6 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
A. Food Security in the oPt: A Brief Overview 
The protracted political crisis in the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) which ensued after the breakout of the Al￾Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 has been consistently and progressively damaging the fragile Palestinian economy. 
Between 1999 and 2007, the restrictions of movement of people and commercial goods, the closure of the Israeli 
labor market to Palestinians, as well as the repeated destruction of physical assets during regular military incursions 
are key elements in the economic downturn in the oPt. During the period 1999-2007, punctuated by a very modest 
recovery during 2003-2005 driven by increased public spending, remittances and international aid, Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita declined by about one third as the modest growth in the GDP could not keep pace with the 
rapid population growth.1
 
The economic decline has been having adverse effects on the livelihood of Palestinian households, causing spiraling 
levels of unemployment, poverty and food insecurity. The2006 Comprehensive and Food Security and 
Vulnerability Assessment (CFSVA) conducted by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World 
Food Program (WFP) revealed that 34% (1,322,019) of the population of the WBGS is food secure, 20% (777,658) 
is marginally secure, 12% (466,595) is vulnerable to becoming food insecure and 34% (1,322,019) is food insecure. 
The CFSVA also concluded that economic access to food continues to be the most significant food security concern 
in oPt. Food price increases in the face of drastic reduction of livelihoods, cash income and consumers’ purchasing 
power have created a kind of “market-induced shock” to vulnerable households. Physical fragmentation of the West 
Bank, created by the construction of the Barrier Wall and internal closure systems, has resulted in a horizontal 
trisection—limiting the flow of commodities among north, central and southern regions—and a vertical bisection—
severing the agricultural productive Jordan Valley from its absorbing markets.2
 Clearly, many markets have closed 
or have been relocated, increasing transaction costs and restricting the access of some population groups to buy or 
sell products. 
Among the most severely affected by the adverse economic conditions are farmers’ households, whose incomes 
have substantially diminished due to their inability to market their products outside the oPt on the one hand, and 
their high production cost due to inefficient farming practices on the other. Equally affected, were poor rural 
households whose livelihoods have been traditionally dependent on access to employment opportunities inside 
Israel, most of whom, according to the CFSVA have exhausted their coping strategies and, as a result, find many 
food items beyond their reach. Among these, according to official statistics, women-headed households were worst￾off. Weak in capacity and resources, cooperatives and local charitable organizations have not been able to 
effectively help their members and constituents in coping with their difficult conditions. 
Table 1: Macroeconomic Indicators in the oPt for various years between 1999 and 2006 
Macroeconomic Indicators 1999 2002 2005 20063
Real GDP (millions, US$) 5,095 4,169.3 4,456.4 1,101.1 
GDP per capita in PT (US$) 1,687.3 1,203.4 1,268.2 305.5 
Population growth rate in (PT) (%) 4.2 5 4.5 4.4 
Inflation (%) 5.5 5.7 3.5 0.95 
Total Palestine workforce (PT) ,000 672 708 633 621 
in (WB) ,000 466 488 453 452 
in (GS) ,000 205 219 180 169 
 
1
 PCBS, National Accounts Data. 
2
 OCHA. (October 2006). Territorial Fragmentation of the West Bank – Map included in the CAP 2007. 
3
 Data for GDP, per capita GDP and the inflation rate are for the first quarter of 2006. Data on the workforce, unemployment rates and poverty 
rates are for the third quarter 2006. 
7 
Unemployment rate (PT) (%) 16.3 31 23.5 24.2 
in (WB) (%) 9.6 28.2 20.3 19.1 
in (GS) (%) 17 38 30.3 36.3 
Poverty rate (PT) 21 60 52 56 
in (WB) (%) n.a. 55 46 43 
in (GS) (%) n.a. 70 63 80 
Source: PCBS, Labor Force Survey, National Accounts (various issues), MAS Economic Monitor (various issues). 
Against this backdrop, ACDI/VOCA received a US$ 5 million grant from the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) to implement the West Bank Food Security (WBFS) Program, which was designed with the 
goal of promoting sustainable livelihoods and reducing food insecurity among 2,175 poor and marginalized 
smallholder households in the West Bank (15,225 beneficiaries) by improving agricultural production, processing 
and commercial farming and agribusiness. 
B. Evaluation Objective and Methodology 
With one month before the completion of USAID financing, ACDI/VOCA commissioned Al-Sahel for Institutional 
Development and Communication (Al-Sahel) to conduct a final evaluation of the Program. As stated in the 
evaluation terms of reference, the program is being evaluated during the last month prior to the completion of 
financing by the USAID. This final evaluation serves three purposes: 
1. To determine how well the WBFS Program sub-recipients achieved their goals and objectives in relation to 
the program; 
2. To assess the impact on the beneficiaries (cooperatives, cooperative members, and rural households); and, 
3. To assess the sustainability of the program activities. 
 
The evaluation purpose was pursued through a participatory quantitative and qualitative assessment that utilized the 
following tools and sources of information: 
1. A desk review: The consultants conducted a comprehensive and exhaustive review of the project’s 
documents. This included a review of, inter alia, the WBFS Program proposal submitted to USAID; the 
cooperative agreement between USAID and ACDI/VOCA; the sub-recipients proposals and progress 
reports; the quarterly progress reports prepared by ACDI/VOCA and submitted to USAID; project baseline 
survey reports and monitoring data; cooperative assessment reports; training materials; brochures; and, 
publications issued through the project. Several other reports and publications related to the general socio￾economic and food security conditions in the oPt were also reviewed by the consultants in preparation of 
and during the evaluation. 
2. Semi-Structured Interviews (SSIs): Several SSIs were conducted with project stakeholders to allow for 
validation of preliminary findings, and conversation and reciprocal transmission of information between the 
evaluators and the key informants being interviewed. SSIs were conducted with the WBFS Program Key 
Personnel, sub-recipient organizations staff, a sample of fifteen cooperatives targeted by the program and 
fifteen beneficiary households. In most SSIs, the evaluation team conducted a further review and analysis 
of project related documents, such as training materials, monitoring and management forms, procurement 
related documents, etc. 
3. Beneficiaries Survey: To facilitate the measurement of WBFS Program impact, a household survey of a 
stratified random sample of the Program beneficiary households was carried out. Five different 
questionnaires were developed for the five Program components on the basis of the questionnaires used in 
the baseline survey, with a focus on measuring the project-specific indicators and projects’ impact. The 
sampling frame on which basis the sample of respondents was selected comprised the individuals who 
benefitted from the Program’s different components (1,940 beneficiaries). The sample size will be 
8 
determined using a combination of a stratified sample process and a simple random sample process. The 
former was used for the four components where cooperatives were involved. The latter was used for the 
Rural Household Support component where there was no substantial involvement of cooperative. For the 
stratified sampling process, each stratum included the beneficiary cooperative members in each targeted 
cooperative under a specific component. While the stratified sampling process was slightly more time 
consuming and required surveying a greater number of people overall than a simple random sample 
process, it was deemed necessary for dissemination of results at the cooperative level. The following table 
provides the number of questionnaires completed with the program beneficiaries by component. 
Table 2: Indicative sample size using a stratified sampling process 
Component 
Total No
. of 
Beneficiaries 
Number of 
Completed 
Questionnaires Percentage 
#1: Small Ruminant Dairy Production… 165 114 69.1 
#2: Horticulture Production… 354 187 52.8 
#3: Improved Olive Oil Production… 455 196 43.1 
#4: Improved Household Value Added… 176 153 86.9 
#5: Rural Household Support 790 260 32.9 
Total 1,940 910 46.9 
4. Focus Group Meetings: Five small discussion groups were organized with beneficiaries of the different 
Program components. These Focus Groups were mainly utilized to assess strategies used and results 
achieved. Each Focus Group was organized with a group of 10-15 beneficiaries, selected in collaboration 
with the implementing partner organizations (sub-recipients) and local committees. 
C. Evaluation Limitations 
While several information and data collection techniques were used by the evaluation team, including the utilization 
of the baseline data and conducting a post-completion survey of the Program’s end beneficiaries, these techniques 
may have been –in some cases- too narrow to assess the full impact of the WBFS Program. While the interview 
coverage is quite substantial (54% of the total target cooperatives), the results emerging from these interviews may 
not be entirely conclusive. This is particularly true when it comes to the findings related to the satisfaction of 
cooperatives with the support extended to them by the program and the impact of this support on the way they 
conduct their business. This notwithstanding, the evaluation findings set forth in this report are believed to be 
representative of the general situation of cooperatives and end beneficiaries at the end of the project. 
Measuring the impact of the Program was another constraint. As we shall examine below, several extraneous 
factors have stood in the way of the Program from achieving its full potential by the end of Program activities. Add 
to this the fact that the period following the completion of several Program activities was too short to enable an 
accurate and objective measurement of the full impact of the project. Accordingly, when reading the sections on 
impact (and to a lesser degree on effectiveness), it would be very helpful for the reader to keep this in mind. 
Conducting the evaluation one year after the completion of all Program activities, may be more useful in 
ascertaining a more accurate measurement of its impact. 
The fact that a number of cooperatives and cooperative members and farmers who were surveyed at the baseline 
changed and/or were replaced during implementation, along with the tendency of beneficiaries to underestimate the 
benefit they accrued as a result of the Program on the one hand and their inability to recall with accuracy 
quantities/value of production on the other hand added another dimension to the above constraint. While the 
evaluation team was able to deal with most of these issues, the fact remains that quantitative evaluation findings 
cannot be used in isolation from the qualitative findings, as both complement each other. 
9 
D. Report Structure 
The report is presented in seven chapters. This chapter introduces the program and the evaluation in brief. Chapter 
two assesses the WBFS Program as initially designed in 2006. Here discussed are the existing context and future as 
anticipated at the time, the original goals and objectives, and the methods and resources expected to be used to 
achieve them (strategy, components, organizational structure and staffing, funding, planning and management), and 
the expected results. 
Chapters three through seven provide an assessment of the five Program components and all the above as they 
unfolded in practice. Here discussed are the changing contexts and circumstances, the strategies, components and 
activities as they were implemented in practice, and the program planning and management process that guided 
them, and the actual results compared to initial objectives and expected results for each component. 
The Appendix includes the list of the people interviewed during the evaluation. 
10 
CHAPTER TWO: THE WBFS PROGRAM AS DESIGNED AND ITS ASSESSMENT 
A. Context at the Time of Design 
As reflected in the WBFS Program proposal, the Program was designed within the context of diminishing 
livelihoods and uncertain political and economic future. At the time of the design, as the Program proposal 
highlights, Palestinian were experiencing reduced purchasing power as a result of a number of unfavorable 
economic and political conditions including border closures, increased number of checkpoints and movement 
restrictions, and loss of income by some 130,000 PA employees. According to the Program proposal, food 
insecurity was estimated at 37% of the West Bank population, and anticipated to increase to 51% by the end of 
2006. Poverty rates stood at 75% and 73% in the northern and southern West Bank, respectively. And 
unemployment rates at the national level (West Bank and Gaza Strip) estimated at 31%. 
From a livelihood perspective, the situation in the West Bank was bleak. A growing proportion of rural and farmer 
households, once considered immune to food insecurity by virtue of their having access to natural and physical 
capital, were quickly entering into the circle of food insecurity as they were no longer able to cope with the loss of 
income (as a result of reduced local consumption and rising dependency) and increasing prices of agricultural inputs. 
Small growers had very limited opportunities to sell their products outside the West Bank, further squeezing their 
already tight profit margin and rendering their work in agriculture unfeasible. 
Agricultural cooperatives, like most small businesses and civil society organizations in the oPt, were losing ground 
and unable to effectively help their members and constituents overcome the difficulties that the general political￾economic situation was imposing upon them. Most of these cooperatives have been traditionally weak, from both 
administrative and technical perspectives, and unable to provide value-added services to their members. Little was 
being done by the PA in the political and economic spheres to rejuvenate market and tackle the stifling trade and 
slowed investment. 
In addition to border closings and movement restrictions, the barrier wall construction continued to impact food 
security and livelihoods. The Program proposal highlights that “populations living near the barrier wall are often 
unable to reach their jobs, markets or farmland. Among those affected by the barrier wall, 53% are reported to have 
reduced their food supplies, 51.5% are living below the poverty line, and 47.7% are reported to be disconnected to a 
sewage disposal system.” 
The context within which the WBFS Program was designed included the optimism generated from the successful 
experience of ACDI/VOCA in previous agribusiness and rural livelihood support projects, including a relatively 
recent United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) funded small grants and agribusiness development 
programs which were implemented between 2002 and 2006 in partnership with local non-governmental 
organizations. This WBFS Program expands and refines these projects. Documents reflecting on the experience of 
ACDI/VOCA’s previous agribusiness and food security programs in the oPt confidently stated that the working 
models of these programs –and proposed for implementation in the WBFS Program- and their focus on agricultural 
and agribusiness development could be replicated in the future. This was especially true when the UN Office for 
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) concluded in 2006 that “it is of utmost importance to invest in 
Palestinian agriculture in order to tackle… issues that dramatically affect the agricultural sector and the populations 
who depend on farming livelihoods.” 
B. Program Goal, Intermediate Results and Strategy Components 
The WBFS Program was designed with the overall goal of promoting sustainable livelihoods and increase food 
security among 2,175 poor and marginalized stallholder households in the West Bank (15,225 direct and indirect 
beneficiaries) by improving agricultural production, processing and commercial farming and agribusiness. Under 
this goal, two intermediate results (IR) were envisaged, namely: 
11 
IR 1: Increased smallholder income 
through enhanced cooperative 
capacity and commercial agriculture 
growth. 
Goal: Increased food security and sustainable rural livelihoods among 2,175 
smallholder farmer households in the West Bank through improved agricultural and 
agribusiness systems. 
1.1: Increased commercial production, post harvest handling 
and marketing 
1.2: Improved agribusiness and cooperative management. 
1.3: Improved household value-added products 
IR 2: Improved access to and use of 
productive assets for household food 
production and livelihood strengthening. 
• IR-1: Increased smallholder income through enhanced cooperative capacity and commercial agricultural 
growth: three result outputs were designed to contribute to achieving IR-1, all of which organized under 
cooperative agribusiness growth strategy. These were: increased commercial production, post harvest and 
processing; improved agribusiness and cooperative management; and, improved household value-added 
products. 
 
• IR-2: Improved access to and use of productive assets for household food production and livelihood 
strengthening. This result envisaged assisting rural households in improving their use of productive assets 
(including water and land assets as well as unemployed household labor), enhancing household 
agricultural production techniques, and increasing livelihoods security by expanding generation of 
additional household food and income. Within the framework of this results, three activities were 
envisaged, namely: establishing and improving home gardens; construction of cisterns, small greenhouses 
and grey water treatment units for home garden irrigation and production; and, application of improved 
farming technologies such as drip irrigation, cultivation practices, planning and integrated pest 
management. 
Figure 1: WBFS Program Results Chain
The cooperative agribusiness growth (CoAG) and rural household support (RHS) strategies were selected on the 
basis of lessons learned from ACDI/VOCA’s previous programs and projects in the oPt, which suggested that 
augmenting internal food security by means of increasing overall production and reducing costs of production, and 
promoting market access are among the most effective means for improving food security and livelihoods. 
A three-tier methodology would be used to implement the CoAG and RHS strategies. The first tier consisted of 
Grants Management, and the second comprised direct technical assistance. Under the former, ACDI/VOCA would 
use its well-established grant funding approach to channel USAID development assistance to local NGOs to 
implement the development interventions it identified in the Program design document. The grants management 
system would facilitate effective coordination and enable the selection (through a competitive application process) 
and performance monitoring of implementing partners effectively. The second tier involved the direct engagement 
of ACDI/VOCA in the provision of short-term technical assistance and training through in-house staff and external 
consultants. Direct technical assistance was envisaged to include training of farmers and cooperative leaders on 
topics related to greenhouse production, cooperative development, marketing, small ruminant sheep dairy 
12 
production and farming as a business. The third tier involved coordination with partners and with external 
stakeholders, particularly USAID-funded projects, to maximize the effectiveness and efficacy of the Program. 
 
Gender integration comprised the third methodological approach of the WBFS Program. Women would be 
integrated into the Program primarily through the RHS activities, and more generally through other activities. 
Inclusion of women in training and designating them as the direct beneficiaries of the support provided by the 
WBFS Program to the extent possible, and giving priority to female-headed households in the selection of 
beneficiaries would be the techniques used for gender integration. The Program design envisaged that women 
would represent at least 43% of the overall program beneficiaries, and 32% of the RHS component. 
B.1. Cooperative Agribusiness Growth 
The CoAG strategy component was envisaged to “reap the quickest and most sustainable impact for smallholder 
farmers active in small scale agribusiness production and processing.” As explained below, this was to be done 
through working with cooperatives in various agricultural sectors to increase value and improve marketability of 
crops and processed foods in the local and Israeli markets. Towards this end, farmers would be provided with 
assistance to address production and marketing constraints on the one hand, and support would be given to clusters 
of farmers to adopt collective schemes in production, post-harvest handling and marketing. 
B.1.1. IR-1.1. Increased commercial production, post harvest handling and marketing 
Three agricultural sub-sectors were to be targeted through the increased commercial production, post harvest and 
marketing activities. These were: olive oil, small ruminant dairy, and horticulture production.4
 The following is a 
summary of what would be done under each of these. 
• Improved olive production, harvesting, pressing and oil storage: Targeted interventions would include 
support to olive oil producer cooperatives and their members to increase quantity and quality of olive oil 
produced. This would be done through introducing pre-tested collective olive harvesting, pressing and oil 
storage methods within the targeted cooperatives. The introduction of the collective olive pressing and oil 
storage (COPOS) program would entail training in principles, methods and benefits of the COPOS 
program, as well as training to the cooperative management teams on issues related to management of 
collective oil production schemes. The WBFS Program would also finance the procurement and 
distribution of harvesting materials, storage tanks, and management tools. In addition, it would provide 
50% matching support to the target cooperatives for upgrading phyto-sanitary capacity of leased private oil 
extraction presses. The expected results were as follows: 
o Increased Income of US$ 375,000 for targeted cooperative members from quality price premiums 
of US$ 1,250 per metric ton of olive oil. 
o Enhanced knowledge and skills for 500+ farmers in collective olive harvesting pressing, 
processing and oil storage. 
o Increased capacity of 11 olive oil producing cooperatives to produce 200 metric tons of high￾quality virgin and extra-virgin olive oil, of which at least 80 percent would be extra-virgin. 
• Improved small ruminant dairy production (SRDP): A pilot project would be implemented in cooperation 
with the Palestinian Livestock Cooperative Union (PLCU) whereby local sheep and goat milk would be 
collected from 150 members of livestock cooperatives, processed and marketed by existing dairy 
producers, thus building sustainable marketing linkages. This would be done in conjunction with technical 
assistance to the target cooperatives and their members to help them improve their milk production, 
quality/hygiene control processes, and cooperative management systems. The project would also provide 
up to 67% support funding to targeted farmers investing 33% of the cost of essential tools for commercial 
milk production, such as milking machines and cans. The expected results were as follows: 
o 3,750 liters/day sheep’s milk processed into cheese and yogurt. 
o Increased income of approximately US$ 11/day for each of the 150 targeted farmers. 
o Strengthened dairy cooperatives’ institutional capacity. 
 
4
 For additional information on the rationale behind targeting these sectors, please refer to the WBFS Program proposal. 
13 
o Improved management and quality of processing in participating dairy plants. 
o Improved pasteurized sheep’ milk product marketing. 
• Horticulture production and marketing for vegetable farmers and cooperatives (HPM): ACDI/VOCA would 
leverage its experience in implementing similar previous projects in the horticulture sub-sector to introduce 
modern and advanced agricultural techniques and practices in greenhouse production in the northern parts 
of the West Bank. This would include the construction and rehabilitation of some 350 greenhouses (315 
dunums), and the provision of technical and extension services in integrated pest management (IPM) 
techniques, crop management, protected agriculture, crop diversification and quality standards to 350 
vegetable farmers and their agricultural cooperatives. IPM technical training for farmers will cover 
cultivation practices, planning and scheduling of crop cultivation, composting, water use, drip irrigation 
techniques and maintenance, soil management, minimizing use of pesticides and insecticides and other 
relevant topics. Materials necessary for IPM production, such as mesh, double doors, and traps for natural 
enemies would also be provided to beneficiary farmers. In addition to this, ACDI/VOCA would train 
farmers on employing Farming-as-a-Business (FaaB) techniques as a way of improving their farm 
management practices and enhancing profitability. 
ACDI/VOCA, within the framework of the HPM component, would complement the above activities by 
assisting cooperatives in improving their access to markets, particularly to the Israeli market. This would 
be done through technical assistance for improving production protocols followed by farmers and their 
cooperatives, and developing and installing the necessary systems for quality-assurance and post harvest 
handling to improve the marketability of agricultural crops produced. The results envisaged under the 
HPM component were as follows: 
o Decreased input costs for 350 farmers and cooperative members. 
o Increased income for 350 targeted farmers and cooperative members. 
o Chemical residue reduced by 30% on IPM produced crops. 
o Improved marketing channels for IPM produced crops in the West Bank and Israel. 
o Increased production quality standards. 
 
B.1.2. IR-1.2. Improved agribusiness and cooperative management 
In conjunction with and to complement IR-1.2, the WBFS Program would address the traditionally weak 
management, organization and marketing functions, which have rendered these cooperatives unable to operate 
profitably and effectively serve their members. This would be approached through two strategies, namely: 
agricultural cooperative capacity building; and marketing assistance. Under the former, cooperatives would be 
assisted in developing their internal systems, procedures, databases and organizational profiles (electronic and print). 
They would also be provided with training on cooperative principles, management and business-oriented 
administration. Under the latter –marketing assistance, assistance would be provided to cooperatives in developing 
marketing plans, exploring marketing opportunities, and preparing samples, product fact sheets and other marketing 
tools. The results envisaged from these two strategies are summarized in the table below. 
Table 3: Expected Results: Improved agribusiness and cooperative management (IR-1.2)
Agricultural cooperative capacity building Marketing assistance 
- Internal systems (membership, accounting and 
financial management) improved and implemented in 
12 farmer cooperatives. 
- Membership databases established and used in 12 
farmer cooperatives. 
- Twelve (12) cooperative production profiles and 
promotional means developed 
- One hundred and twenty (120) cooperative staff and 
members trained in business management, integrated 
crop management production and marketing. 
- Sixty (60) cooperative board members trained on 
cooperative management and good governance. 
- Improved business capacity confirmed through the 
- MIS systems established and 10 marketing plans 
developed 
- Over 30 business meetings, workshops, field visits 
and promotional events conducted, resulting in 
increased business transactions 
- Legal protocols and contracts established, including 
guidance created to mitigate risks and ensure timely 
payment 
- Samples, product sheets and other marketing media 
designed and produced for 10 cooperatives. 
- The creation of web pages in Arabic and Hebrew for 
six cooperatives. 
- 20% increase in vegetable produce sales to Israel 
14 
Agricultural cooperative capacity building Marketing assistance 
number of new contracts, sales or Memoranda of 
Understanding with Israeli and Palestinian buyers. 
B.1.3. IR-1.3. Improved household value-added products 
Through supporting targeted clusters of women cooperatives and women organizations that produce market￾consistent food products in improving the quality of and marketing their products (traditional foods), this activity 
would create a viable source of additional household income and food for marginalized families who do not own 
sufficient areas of cultivable lands. Emphasis would be given to linking participating cooperatives and women 
groups to one or more local food trading firms through business agreements, and improving the business operations 
of the participating cooperatives and women organizations. More specifically, 160 women from 10 women’s 
cooperatives/groups would be trained on production and marketing of consistent traditional Palestinian products; 10 
women cooperatives/organizations would be trained in small business and marketing and provided with support to 
start and sustain operations; and assistance would be provided to the target cooperatives/organizations in marketing 
their processed foods. The expected results were as follows: 
• Ten (10) women cooperatives/groups trained in business management and marketing, and operating as a 
small business. 
• Enhanced skills and knowledge of 160 women in home-based food processing. 
• At least 4 new product brands introduced into the local market. 
• Increased average monthly income of US$ 100 for each target household. 
 
B.2. Rural Household Support 
To address food insecurity among poor rural households, ACDI/VOCA would partner with the Applied Research 
Institute of Jerusalem (ARIJ) within the framework of the WBFS Program to improve access to and use of 
productive assets for household food production and livelihood strengthening through a rural household support 
(RHS) strategy. This involves the provision of assistance to 700 marginalized poor households in establishing half￾dunum home-based agricultural gardens that would provide a source of food and additional potential source of 
income for the household. For each home garden, through its partner organizations, would construct a cistern, gray 
wastewater treatment unit or small greenhouse (90m2
), depending on its specific need and appropriateness of 
geoclimatic conditions. Irrigation networks, seeds, and pumps, as well as agricultural training would be provided to 
supplement the home gardens and make their utilization more efficient and effective. The expected results of the 
RHS strategy component interventions were as follows: 
• Increased access to and productive use of natural and household resources necessary to grow food. 
• Decreased household expenditure on water. 
• Enhanced skills and knowledge on topics such as water conversation, drip irrigation maintenance and 
cropping practices. 
• Increased access to and productive use of land for production throughout the year. 
• Increased vegetable production. 
• Enhanced skills and knowledge on topics such as water management, fruit and vegetable cultivation, and 
pest management. 
Critical to the success of the RHS component was the timely construction of home gardens. The WBFS Program 
proposal envisaged completion of home gardens involving cistern construction before the winter season to allow for 
rainwater collection, whereas no such stipulation was spelled out for home gardens involving greenhouses and gray 
wastewater treatment units. 
15 
C. Resources: Organizational Structure, Human Resources, and Funding 
C.1. Organizational Structure and Human Resources 
The following observations can be made about this structure: 
a) The core of the structure was to be the Executive Management and Project Staff. This would consist of 
ACDI/VOCA’s Chief of Party and his Deputy; a Monitoring and Evaluation/Compliance Manager; a Financial 
Manager and a Bookkeeper; an Office Manager; and Program Specialists ( Agriculture/Agribusiness, 
Cooperative Development, and Food Security). This core team would be collectively responsible –under the 
direct supervision of the Chief of Party and in close coordination with the USAID assigned Cognizant Technical 
Officer- for the implementation of the Program activities. 
b) Each of the Program Specialists would be responsible for overseeing the implementation of one or more of the 
five Program components. Each Specialist would work with prospective grantees on grant proposals, activity 
start-up and implementation, conducting field visits at project sites and verifying achievement of the outputs. 
The Program Specialists would work together as a team to ensure the proper integration of the various program 
activities. 
c) Each of the grantees selected to implement a Program component would hire the appropriate number of staff 
necessary for successfully implementing that component’s activities. The number and qualifications of staff 
was not explicitly identified at the Program design, however, it was implicit that ACDI/VOCA would ensure –
through the grant making process- that grantees hire the adequate number and type of staff, commensurate with 
the need under each component. 
The core Program structure and grantee project staff would be well supported by locally and externally recruited 
consultants hired to assist in such work as agricultural cooperative development, domestic and international 
marketing, agricultural systems, and greenhouse production. 
C.2. Funding 
Overall funding for the contracts portion of the Program (pass through sub-contracts), the bulk of which would go to 
finance physical assets to cooperatives and farmers, was expected to be US$ 2.55 million (Table 4). This amount 
would be almost equally split between year one and two of the Program’s lifetime. The remaining US$ 2.45 million 
would be earmarked for salaries, fringe benefits, allowances and travel and per diems (29%); direct training 
provision by ACDI/VOCA (0.25%); short-term technical assistance (0.74%); indirect costs (12.6%); and, other 
direct costs (6.2%).5
Table 4: The WBFS Program budget (US$), by year
Line Item Year One Year Two Total 
Salaries and Services $345,216 $439,593 $874,809 
Fringe Benefits $124,581 $127,583 $252,164 
Allowances $101,610 $88,201 $189,811 
Travel and Per Diems $77,212 $58,223 $135,435 
Training $5,125 $7,390 $12,515 
Consultants $22,250 $14,868 $37,118 
Other Direct Costs $322,943 $308,050 $630,984 
Pass Through Subcontracts $1,208,225 $1,350,224 $2,588,449 
Total $2,457,800 $2,542,200 $5,000,000 
 
5
 The percentage of the total grant amount; i e. US$ 5 million. 
16 
D. Monitoring and Evaluation 
Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) was given special emphasis in the WBFS Program. Almost four pages out of the 
30-page program proposal were devoted to it. This was for two reasons: 1) M&E is an important management tool, 
especially for a multi-dimensional complex program in a complex working environment such as the WBFS 
Program, and 2) it was a ‘development experiment’, one of a new generation of ACDI/VOCA’s agribusiness 
development and food security programs being tested in the West Bank.6
 The M&E system played the key role of 
extracting policy lessons from program experience. 
Consequently the proposal document set out in some detail the system and scope of M&E. This included its purpose, 
strategy and coverage, outputs and activities, a schedule of M&E activities and details on these. The overall M&E 
system was later further developed –during the first two months of operation- to include a detailed M&E Plan that 
integrated programmatic M&E with US government (USG) regulatory compliance and financial management 
requirements. 
The M&E plan provided three primary functions: (1) collect and analyze data; (2) provide “real time” measurement 
of achievements toward the program’s anticipated positive results via interventions and activities; and (3) serve as a 
management tool to adjust activities, address unforeseen constraints, and document and evaluate effectiveness. The 
M&E plan would act as a tool to monitor, report, analyze and disseminate data on indicators, yearly targets, 
activities and anticipated results. It would also incorporate a mix of quantitative (surveys and secondary data) and 
qualitative data (focus groups, key informant interviews). The main program-level performance indicators that 
were formulated and elaborated in the Monitoring Plan are presented in the overleaf (Table 5: Indicator Performance 
Tracking Table). 
The strategy and coverage of the M&E system involved: 
• A ‘rigorous but minimalist approach’ focused on a few, key set of objectives and results-related questions 
and using only essential data collection and reporting 
• A mix of methodologies – quantitative, qualitative, surveys baselines, final evaluation, etc. 
• Being participatory - beneficiaries and grantees involved in establishing indicators (KPI), program 
baselines, and performance assessments. 
• Program monitoring mechanisms would include data entry into MIS, GIS, monthly monitoring of 
objectives, and regular beneficiary assessments (particularly trainees). 
• Special efforts to test and develop the M&E system, with a particular focus on facilitating management 
decision making and high-level monitoring. 
• M&E of the program at several levels including inputs, outputs, performance , and impact. 
M&E staffing and institutional resources included an in-house local M&E specialist to design and lead the effort. 
This specialist would work with the WBFS Program staff and grantees to carry out the M&E activities. In addition 
external consultants would provide special technical backstopping particularly during the initial stages of M&E 
design, KPI establishment, baseline survey and final evaluation. 
 
6
 Interview with ACDI/VOCA D/COP.
17 
Table 5: WBFS Program Indicator Performance Tracking Table (IPTT) 
2007 2008 LOP
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
 Annual Monitoring Indicators target target target target target target target target target 
Program Level Indicators
PI1 Total # of beneficiary HH assisted 0 60 599 1,004 1,794 2,105 2,175 2,175 2,175 
 
 - Men 0 54 307 471 1,039 1224 1,238 1,238 1,238 
 - Women 0 6 292 533 755 881 937 937 937
Total Number of direct and indirect 
beneficiaries assisted 0 420 4,193 7,028 12,558 14,735 15,225 15,225 15,225 
 - Male 0 234 2,104 3,483 6,421 7,539 7,763 7,763 7,763 
 - Female 0 186 2,089 3,545 6,137 7,196 7,462 7,462 7,462
PI2 % of trained producers with knowledge 
of improved production techniques 0 TBD 50% TBD 70% 70% 70% TBD 70% 
 IR 1: Cooperative Agribusiness Growth Component (CoAg) 
Imp.1.1 $ Value of Commodities sold by 
members through their cooperative * 0 0 91,800 40,250 1,228,250 453,100 507,100 314,050 2,634,550 
 
 - Horticulture 0 0 0 0 198,000 297,000 391,500 274,050 1,160,550 
 - Small Ruminant milk 0 0 91,800 20,250 20,250 116,100 75,600 324,000 
 - Olive oil 0 0 0 0 980,000 0 0 980,000
 - Traditional Food 0 0 0 20,000 30,000 40,000 40,000 40,000 170,000 
Imp.1.2 Metric tons of crops/commodity sold 
through cooperatives ** 
 
 
 
 - Horticulture 0 0 0 0 330 495 652.5 456.75 1,934
 - Small Ruminant milk 0 0 136 30 30 172 112 0 480
 - Olive oil 0 0 0 0 200 0 200 
 - Traditional Food 0 0 0 8 12 16 16 16 68 
Imp. .3 % of residue analysis tests accepted 0 0 0 0 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 
Imp.1.4 Average price/kilo of selected crops *** 
 
 -olive oil 0 0 0 N/A $4.90 $4.90 $4.90 $4.90 $4.90 
 -tomatoes 0 0 0 N/A $0.60 $0.60 $0.60 $0.60 $0.60 
 -cherry tomatoes 0 0 0 N/A $0.00
 -cucumbers 0 0 0 N/A $0.50 $0.50 $0.50 $0.50 $0.50 
 -bell pepper 0 0 0 N/A N/A 
 -snow peas 0 0 0 N/A N/A TBD
 -green bean 0 0 0 N/A $0.50 $0.50 $0.50 $0.50 $0.50 
Imp.1.5 # of new market linkages 0 0 1 4 0 5 5 5 20 
Imp.1.6 Average Org Assessment Rating TBD TBD 0 70% 70% 70% 70% TBD 70%
 - Horticulture 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 
 - Small Ruminant milk 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 
 - Olive oil 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 
 - Traditional Food 70% 70% 70% 70% 70% 70%
Mon1.7 Number of improved commercial 
greenhouses 0 0 0 257 20 76 0 353 
 
 - # of rehabilitated greenhouses 0 0 0 130 20 76 0 226 
 - # of new greenhouses 0 0 0 127 0 0 0 127 
Imp.2.1 % increase in household income 
 - Horticulture N/A N/A N/A N/A 70% 
 - Small Ruminant milk 60% N/A N/A N/A 70% 
 - Olive oil N/A N/A N/A N/A 70%
 - Traditional Food 33% N/A N/A N/A 70% 
 IR 2: Rural Household Support (RHS) 
Imp.2.2 Cubic meters of water storage capacity 0 0 9,800 
4,200 2,100 
2,100 5,600 0 23,800 
Mon.2.3 Number of households implementing 
home gardens 
 
 - Cisterns 0 0 140 0 30 30 80 0 280
 - GWWTU 0 0 50 0 0 0 60 0 110 
 - Greenhouses 0 0 140 120 20 100 20 0 400 
18 
E. Assessment of the Program Design and its Relevance 
Overall, the WBFS Program was very well designed, and quite innovative in several of the approaches it proposed. 
The design document was well informed about what it took to promote sustainable livelihoods and enhance food 
security in the oPt. It was also, quite commendably, well-informed about the context within which it was to attempt 
to do so. It comprehensively identified all the basic objectives that would need to be met over time, the methods – 
strategies, components, tasks – needed to meet them, and the resources - human and financial – that would have to 
be in place for this. 
Particularly remarkable was the detail with which some aspects of the program were spelled out. Examples include 
the type of M&E that would need to be done to both help manage what was a complex and ambitious program, and 
the activities that would be implemented under each of the Program components. The lengths to which the WBFS 
Program design team went to identify prospective grantees and cooperatives –evidenced by the relatively 
comprehensive information provided about them in the proposal- and the participatory design process are quite 
evident. This is highly commendable and warrants special praise. 
The linkage that the Program design made between development and emergency assistance through the use of a 
livelihood development approach –albeit not explicitly mentioned as such in the Program proposal- is also quite 
remarkable and demonstrates the design team’s robust understanding of development approaches and the local 
context. Similarly, the design’s attention to institutionalization of improvements introduced in cooperative 
management, as well as the detailed description of the coordination processes with other USAID-funded programs 
and other stakeholders to create synergy and avoid duplication are worthy of special applaud. These –in the opinion 
of the evaluation team- are among the distinctive aspects of the WBFS Program design. 
Below, with some benefit of hindsight no doubt, we will discuss three aspects of the WBFS Program proposal that 
might have been improved given what could have been known at that time. The value of doing this is two-fold. First, 
it helps identify where an issue that might have arisen later in program implementation had its roots in the problem 
of how the program was designed, or at least, in part resulted from the way it was designed and not simply in the 
way it was implemented. Second, identifying improvements may offer lessons for how future similar programs 
should be designed. 
a) Lack of a section on Assumptions and Risk Management in the Program proposal: Such a section in the 
Program design document would have prompted the designers to consider the possibility of some of their 
optimistic assumptions not being borne out and taking account of this possibility in the design. For 
example, not only would the Program proposal document have suggested the risk of delays in procurement 
of equipments and inputs, it might have explored how this might affect the program (especially given the 
agricultural seasonality) and how to respond (risk management). 
Thus a possible slower implementation scenario might have been allowed for, given that much of the 
program area and potential projects required USAID vetting a Geographic Code Waiver approval. As it 
was, the wide scope and rapid pace of the program as designed assumed a best-case scenario which then the 
program was under pressure to live up to. To an extent, some risks and mitigation measures were identified 
in the M&E system developed after the commencement of the Program, but, again, these were somewhat 
narrowly focused and assumed a rather optimistic scenario. While the M&E Plan was envisaged to be a 
work-in-progress document and continuously updated to accommodate changes and issues emerging during 
implementation, very little updating thereof took place. 
b) The challenge of changing farmers’ attitudes was slightly underestimated: The experience of ACDI/VOCA 
and other development organizations in the oPt in working with farmers and introducing new farming 
practices could have been cited to justify special efforts for changing farmers attitudes under the WBFS 
Program. The focus on imparting knowledge and skills through extensive training is quite commendable 
and demonstrates the designers’ cognizance of the challenge of changing practices, but insufficient to 
sustain results and commitment to new practices on the long-term. 
19 
c) Incongruence between targeting the poorest households and requiring relatively high levels of 
contribution/cost sharing from them: While beneficiary contributions are regarded as an essential element 
to sustainability, considering that the Program was designed to target poor households, it would have been 
more effective had the 25% contribution requirement been significantly reduced (for example, to 10%). As 
we shall examine later, the 25% contribution requirement has indeed constituted a “barrier to benefit” for 
several extreme poor households who would have greatly benefitted from the Program interventions. In￾kind contributions along with a waivers process for reducing the required contribution amount could have 
been considered and negotiated with USAID at the time of design. 
These design weaknesses notwithstanding, the evaluation team believes that the WBFS Program as designed and as 
implemented was and remains unquestionably relevant to its context and responds to real needs of its target 
beneficiaries. The premise that efforts need to be made to improve livelihoods through strengthening livelihood 
capitals (human, physical, social, natural and financial) is -beyond doubt- a critical factor to ensuring the food 
security of people. Without doubt, the livelihood development approach followed by the WBFS Program is among 
the most effective and efficient approaches to ensuring the target groups sustainable livelihoods. 
In terms of its policy and strategy linkages, the project is believed to be highly relevant to the sectoral policies in the 
oPt (particularly those related to facilitating private sector growth and development; i.e. cooperatives), as well as to 
the USG objective of promoting stability in the Palestinian Administered Territories and USAID’s objectives related 
to enhancing agricultural production and agribusiness development. More specifically, the WBFS Program 
activities directly address USAID West Bank and Gaza objectives of increasing access to markets through private 
sector revitalization by improving the commercialization of smallholder farmer products. 
Moreover, the Program is highly relevant to and in line with the organizational capacities and strategies of 
ACDI/VOCA and the implementing organizations. The overall goal, objectives and results of the project are 
congruent with each other, and are believed to be relevant –both individually and collectively as manifested in the 
result chain- to the problem analysis presented in the project proposal document. 
20 
CHAPTER THREE: THE SMALL RUMINANT DAIRY PRODUCTION COMPONENT 
A. Overview and Performance Targets 
On 12 March 2007, ACDI/VOCA and the PLCU signed an agreement to implement a six-month pilot small 
ruminant dairy collection, processing and marketing project with two livestock cooperatives in the villages of Saida 
(Tulkarem governorate) and Bazarya (Nablus Governorate). In December 2007, a proposal submitted by PLCU for 
a second phase continuation was approved for implementation by ACDI/VOCA and USAID. This phase focused on 
strengthening the processes and results achieved under phase one through continuing technical support to the 
targeted cooperatives, and expanding the pilot into a third cooperative in the town of Yatta (Hebron Governorate). 
The overall goal of the project in both phases was to increase the income and improve the livelihood of 150 sheep 
farmers (65 under phase one and an additional 85 under phase two). This goal was to be achieved through a 
capacity building strategy that involves the provision of training to farmers and cooperatives; equipment necessary 
for hygienic milk production, testing, collection, and storage; and, marketing services. While similar in many 
instances, the project specific objectives and results under phase two differed from those in phase one as shown in 
the table below. 
Table 6: Specific objectives of the SRDP project implemented by PLCU (Phase I and II)
Phase I Objectives Phase II Objectives 
Obj#1: To increase the capacity and enhance the skills 
of 65 sheep farmers to produce high quality raw milk 
that satisfies the requirements of the Palestinian Raw 
Milk Standard (MF-600-1999). 
Results:
- Enhanced skills and knowledge of farmers on milk 
analysis and collection management. 
- Enhanced skills and knowledge of milk hygiene, 
milk quality and collection. 
- Enhanced skills and knowledge of farmers on 
sheep and goat farming and farm management. 
- Increased skills and knowledge of sheep farming 
and collective processing. 
- Improved sheep milk quality and milk collection 
process. 
- Reduced risk of sheep milk contamination. 
- More efficient milking operations. 
Obj#1:To Collect and sell 1,500 liters of sheep milk 
daily from Bazarya and Saida Livestock Cooperatives 
through managing and supervising the milk collection 
process and establishing business relationships between 
the cooperatives and Al-Jibrini Dairy Factory. 
Results:
- 65 beneficiaries ready to participate in the milk 
collection scheme developed through the project. 
- Two milk collection centers ready for milk 
collection. 
- 1,500 liters of clean and tested milk collected daily 
from Saida and Bazarya Cooperatives. 
- Increased skills and knowledge of sheep farming 
and collective processing. 
Obj#2: To increase the capacity and managerial skills 
of six cooperative employees and 14 board members in 
Bazarya and Saida Cooperatives to effectively manage 
the collection of 2,000 liters of milk daily. 
Results:
- Improved cooperative and managerial skills of 14 
board members and 6 employees. 
- Increased control of the cooperative in internal 
processes and the milk collection process. 
- Increased feasibility of the milk collection process. 
Obj#2: To increase the capacity and enhance the skills 
of 85 new sheep farmers to produce high quality raw 
milk that satisfies the requirements of the Palestinian 
Raw Milk Standard (MF-600-1999). 
Results:
- Enhanced skills and knowledge of 85 new farmers 
on milk analysis and collection management. 
- Enhanced skills and knowledge of milk hygiene, 
milk quality and collection. 
- Enhanced skills and knowledge of farmers on 
sheep and goat farming and farm management. 
- Increased skills and knowledge of sheep farming 
21 
Phase I Objectives Phase II Objectives 
and collective processing. 
- Improved sheep milk quality and milk collection 
process. 
- 1,500 liters of clean and tested sheep milk 
collected daily from Saida, Bazarya and Yatta. 
- Empowered farmers with best practices and skills 
in sheep farm management and clean milk 
production. 
Obj#3: To improve marketing of the sheep milk 
products. 
Results:
- Increased consumer awareness of the existence of 
new sheep milk products in the local market. 
- Increased demand for sheep milk products. 
Obj#3: To increase the capacity and managerial skills 
of cooperative employees and board members of the 
three targeted Cooperatives to effectively manage the 
collection of 3,000 liters of milk daily. 
Results:
- Improved cooperative and managerial skills of 7 
board members and 1 employee of Yatta 
Cooperative. 
- Increased control of the cooperative in internal 
processes and the milk collection process. 
- Increased feasibility of the milk collection process. 
Obj#4: To improve marketing of sheep dairy products 
through marketing and promotional activities. 
Results:
- Increased consumer awareness of the existence of 
new sheep milk products in the local market. 
- Increased demand for sheep milk products. 
The activities designed for the achievement of the above results: 
• Organizing 23 training workshops with farmers on: milk analysis and collection management; milk 
hygiene, milk quality and milk collection; sheep and goat farming and farm management. 
• Conducting extension 900 visits to farmers (600 extension visits during Phase one and 300 during phase 
two). 
• Distributing 235 thirty-liter milk cans (150 and 85 in phases one and two, respectively). 
• Distributing 25 milking machines (only in phase one). 
• Preparing and distributing a manual on clean milk production practices and farm management. 
• Conducting two central workshops for cooperatives boards and staff on the principles of cooperative work 
and cooperative management (one in each phase). 
• Providing technical assistance to cooperatives to develop their management and financial systems, 
including on-site training on the application of these systems. 
• Supporting the three target cooperatives’ infrastructure by providing each with a small refrigerator, milk 
cooling tank, weighing balances and milk analyzers. 
• Conducting a marketing campaign of the new dairy products to include customized labels, radio and 
television advertisement, banners and billboards. 
22 
B. Assessment of Component Implementation 
B.1. Project Start-up and Development 
As noted above, the first phase of the SRDP project commenced with the signature of the grant agreement between 
PLCU and ACDI/VOCA on 13 March 2007 -already after the beginning of the period during in which the seasonal 
milk production is at its height (February - May), with a designed duration of four and a half months and expected 
funding of US$89,602.7
 PLCU began work immediately, benefiting from the preparatory work it had started before 
the contract signature. By that time, PLCU had prepared training materials, began contacting prospective suppliers 
and conducted meetings with the targeted cooperatives and farmers. 
The project was envisaged to be implemented with the assumption that the milk collection tanks and other milk 
collection equipment to be provided by the project would be procured and delivered to the cooperatives before the 
height of the milking season to enable the farmers to capture the full benefits expected at the time of the project 
design. This, however, was not possible as a waiver for the procurement of equipment from local suppliers had be 
approved by USIAD on account of no U.S. supplier interest in the procurement solicitation. This waiver request, 
submitted on 13 March 2007, was not granted until 5 May 2007. As we shall examine latter, this caused frustration 
among the beneficiary farmers who were expecting to derive income from selling fresh milk and practice what they 
had been trained on when their milk production is abundant. It also led to underperformance vis-à-vis expected milk 
collection targets. 
Between March and May 2007, PLCU and ACDI/VOCA focused their efforts on recruiting the project staff, 
finalizing contracts with farmers, leveraging beneficiary contributions, and delivering training and milking 
equipment to the beneficiary farmers. Significant efforts were also made in working with Al-Qaisi Dairy Factory –
the dairy producer selected to procure milk from farmers- on improving quality standards and marketing. 
By the time the milk collection tanks, milk collection cans, milking machines, and milk testing equipment had 
arrived, PLCU had already completed most of the training courses it had planned and was well positioned to work 
with farmers on the implementation and institutionalization of the milk collection system. It should be noted here 
that this was possible only because PLCU decided to take the risk and order the procurement of the milk storage 
refrigerated tanks from a local supplier while the waiver request was pending USAID’s approval. While 
unorthodoxly risky, the PLCU’s decision to commence the local procurement process prior to receiving USAID’s 
approval on the source of origin waiver request is the principle reason behind the ability of the project to deliver the 
results it did. 
Phase two of the project commenced on 15 February 2008, with a lifetime of four and a half months and a 
confirmed budget after amendment of US$ 52,173. This phase put a greater emphasis on marketing and promotion, 
as well as strengthening business relations between the cooperatives and the dairy producer (Al-Jibrini Dairy 
Factory). It also had the benefit of incorporating lessons learned from phase one, and as such no provisions were 
made therein for the procurement of equipment, particularly the milk cooling tank, that require source of origin 
waivers from USAID. This was predicated on the assumption that the milk cooling tank provided to Saida 
cooperative could be transferred to the Yatta cooperative after the former had shown indications that it wished to 
withdraw from the project, and especially since the cooling tank provided to Yatta cooperative was leased. As it 
was, Saida Cooperative decided to withdraw from the project at the beginning of phase two on account of 
“unfavorable milk prices provided by the dairy factory”8
 and its members’ desire to process milk and sell dairy 
products themselves due to rising prices of dairy products. 
The following sections provide more details on the achievements of the project’s objectives and results. In several 
places, the objectives and results of the project under both phases were grouped and aggregated by the evaluation 
team to facilitate readers comprehension of findings on the one hand, and to avoid redundancy in the analysis on the 
 
7
 PLCU was not vetted by USAID until March 12, 2007. The target cooperatives were submitted for vetting on Feb 19. No vetting determination 
received from USAID, who instructed ACDI/VOCA to work with cooperatives through in-kind grants until a detmination could be made. 
Vetting requirement was later removed (June 18). Until then, ACDI/VOCA could not provide any of the two participating cooperatives with 
more than $2,500 in assistance. 
8
 Al-Sahel interview with Mr. Jamil Ibrahim, Saida Cooperative Chairman. 
23 
other. The latter was deemed to be particularly important due to the similarity between the objectives and results in 
both phases. 
B.2. Effectiveness 
We shall discuss here the project’s achievement of its specific objectives, as highlighted above. In doing so, we rely 
on several sources of information, namely: information made available by ACDI/VOCA and PLCU; information 
gathered through interviews with the three target cooperatives and beneficiary farmers; and, relevant survey 
findings. 
B.2.1. Objective 1: Increasing farmers’ capacity to produce high-quality raw milk 
This objective was pursued through a combination of training and provision of equipment to farmers. While farmers 
training focused on increasing farmers’ knowledge (and consequently practices) of the ways through which milk 
production hygiene standards can be improved through a variety of measures, the distribution of milk collection cans 
and milking machines to farmers intended to reduce the risk of milk contamination and make the milking processes 
more efficient. 
Both anecdotal evidence and survey results clearly indicate that this objective was fully achieved, albeit the degree 
to which individual farmers’ capacity was built differed from one farmer to another. Field observations and focus 
group discussions with farmers in the three targeted cooperatives clearly revealed that the overwhelming majority of 
beneficiary farmers have improved their knowledge of the processes needed for the production of high-quality, 
hygienic milk. Many of whom, in interviews, were eager to explain the entire process needed to be in place to 
ensure high-quality, hygienic milk production. 
Field observations and survey findings have also shown that a significant proportion of the beneficiary farmers have 
begun paying more attention to the way they clean their farms and livestock udders, the way they feed their 
livestock and they way they manage their farms. When comparing baseline data and the results of the survey 
conducted within the framework of this evaluation on key capacity indicators in this regard, significant 
improvements can be observed.9
 The most salient of these are the following: 
a) Increased frequency of cleaning livestock farms: When comparing baseline indicators with the evaluation 
survey findings in relation to the frequency at which farmers clean their farms, we notice a significant 
increase in the percentage of farmers who clean their farms on a daily basis increased from 26.2 percent at 
the baseline to a whopping 56 percent at the end of the project, which is quite significant given the fact that 
baseline report noted tendency of beneficiaries to provide “more favorable answers” of fear of losing their 
opportunity to be part of the project. 
Table 7: Frequency of cleaning livestock farms, pre- and post-project compared (% farmers) 
Locality Reference Daily Weekly Monthly Yearly Total 
Saida Baseline 13.8 6.9 69.0 10.3 100 
At evaluation 5.3 15.8 63.2 15.8 100 
Bazaria Baseline 37.5 28.1 15.6 18.8 100 
At evaluation 72.4 3.4 20.7 3.4 100 
Yatta Baseline N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
At evaluation 74.1 18.5 0.0 7.4 100 
Total Baseline 26.2 18.0 41.0 14.8 100 
At evaluation 56.0 12.0 24.0 8.0 100 
b) Increased proportion of farmers utilizing improved techniques in cleaning farm tools and equipment, as 
well as sheep and goat udders: As Tables 8 and 9 below show, the percentage of farmers who utilize 
 
9
 Baseline data for Yatta Cooperative farmers is not available. Thus, conclusions on improvements are made on the basis of the improvements 
observed in key indicators for Bazarya and Saida farmers only. 
24 
disinfectants when cleaning farm tools and equipment and livestock udders have increased quite 
significantly from its pre-project levels. This is indicative of the effectiveness of training and extension in 
improving the knowledge and practices of farmers in this regard, which has a direct effect on the milk 
hygiene and quality. 
Table 8: Use of disinfectant in cleaning farm tools, pre- and post-project compared (% farmers) 
Techniques used in 
cleaning tools and 
equipment 
Locality (baseline) Locality (at evaluation) 
Saida Bazarya Total Saida Bazarya Yatta Total 
% % % % % % % 
Water only 6.9 15.6 11.5 10 25 5.7 15.2 
Water with salt 6.9 15.6 11.5 0 4.5 8.6 5.1 
Water with disinfectant 86.2 68.8 77.0 90 70.5 85.7 79.8 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Table 9: Use of disinfectant in cleaning sheep and goat udders, pre- and post-project compared (% of 
farmers) 
Techniques used in cleaning 
tools and equipment 
Locality (baseline) Locality (at evaluation) 
Saida Bazarya Total Saida Bazarya Yatta Total 
% % % % % % % 
Water only 13.8 9.4 11.5 40 40.9 14.3 31.3 
Wetted cloth with disinfectant 6.9 3.1 4.9 30 52.3 40 43.4 
Water and salt 0 0 0 0 4.5 45.7 18.2 
Other 79.3 87.5 83.6 30 2.3 0 7.1 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
What is noteworthy to mention here is that the percentage of farmers who indicated use of disinfectants at 
the baseline were using ammonium-chloride-based and scented disinfectants, which are strongly 
inadvisable. This was not the case at the end of the project, where only 23 percent of the farmers who 
indicated using disinfectants also indicated to scented and/or ammonium-chloride based detergents. 
c) Substantially increased proportion of farmers who can properly identify feeding requirements for sheep as 
well as milk quality attributes: The number of farmers who could articulate what the type and quantities of 
feed needed for sheep and goats reached 95 percent and 92.3 percent of the surveyed farmers in Yatta and 
Bazarya respectively, whereas the percentage was 62.1% in Saida at the time of the baseline survey. 
Similarly, the percentage of farmers who could name at least three types of milk analysis tests that reveal 
the quality of milk reached 91.3 percent (87.2 percent, 92.6 percent and 94.8 percent in Saida, Bazarya and 
Yatta, respectively). The most common tests mentioned were the PH test, the added milk test, the fat 
content test and the protein test. This is quite an astounding level of recall given the fact that none of the 
farmers knew anything about milk quality attributes before the project.
d) Increased percentage of farmers who utilize farm records: At baseline, only 39.3 percent of the 
beneficiaries indicated use farm records (58.6 and 21.9 percent in Saida and Bazzarya respectively). This 
proportion grew to 66.7 percent at evaluation as shown in the figure below. The records that the farmers 
mentioned using include vaccination schedules; expenses and revenue records; livestock records like 
(numbers , date of birth…vaccination); pregnancy and delivery schedule; medication schedules; and 
feeding schedule. While the above percentages and the diversity of farm records mentioned by surveyed 
farmers struck the evaluation team as too high, field observations suggest that it quite possible that project 
has been effective in mainstreaming the use of farm records among farmers through training and extension.
25 
Figure 2: Percentage of farmers using farm records
The provision of stainless steel milk cans to the beneficiary 
farmers has indeed made the milk production process more 
hygienic, as anecdotal evidence suggests that milk was usually 
collected in plastic buckets before the project. Farm 
observations in all three cooperatives confirmed that farmers are 
still using these cans. The main shortcoming in this regard is 
that the number of distributed cans to individual farmers was 
not sufficient in some cases to substitute the need for plastic 
containers as their daily production of milk is beyond the 
holding capacity of the distributed containers. This 
notwithstanding, these farmers’ capacity to produce hygienic 
milk has been undoubtedly improved. 
In terms of increasing the efficiency of the milk collection 
process, results have been mixed. If we consider the savings10
that farmers accrued as a result of selling their milk to the Al￾Qaisi (phase one) and Al-Jibrini (phase two) dairy factories 
instead of processing it, then we can reach an unquestionable 
conclusion that the capacity building strategy –an essential 
precondition to increasing the quality and salability of fresh 
milk in this case- has indeed increased the efficiency of the milk 
collection process. However, if we consider that the level of 
actual utilization of the 25 milking machines by farmers, which 
is the main indicator used in the project design to measure 
improved milk production efficiency, we conclude that the 
project has not been successful in making the milk collection 
process more efficient. 
Field observations and findings of farmers’ interviews revealed that very few –if any- of the 25 Bazarya and Saida 
farmers who received the milking machines through the project are actually using them on a regular basis. This is 
mainly because the use of these milking machines is best suited for elevated11 parlors so as to avoid having the teat 
cups and the vacuum pipes touch the floor (to avoid milk contamination), whereas the parlors in both Bazarya and 
Saida are not elevated. One farmer told the evaluation team that he stopped using the machine two days after he 
first used it because the ewes kept stepping and trampling over its pipes. Cooperative leaders interviewed confirmed 
that this farmers’ case also applies to most farmers who received the milking machines. This is unfortunate, 
 
10 Refer to section on Impact for calculation of these savings accrued by farmers as a result of selling fresh milk compared to processing it. 
11 Refer to section B 2.3. for further details on the marketing activities and achievements thereof. 
“I have owned sheep for more than ten 
years, but I never knew that so many factors 
affect milk attributes… [I also never 
considered] how simple things such as 
cleaning the parlor and separating ewes 
from lambs, and separation of ewes into 
different feeding groups could have a 
significant impact on milk production and 
quality… At first I was not convinced and 
thought that these new concepts and 
techniques were all nonsense. But I quickly 
changed my mind… Now, as you can see, I 
practice everything I have been trained on… 
I keep farm records that contain daily 
information on what and how much I feed 
each sheep, I clean the parlor after each 
milking to reduce contamination, and I have 
been able to group my sheep into three 
different feeding groups which helped me 
reduce costs and increase production. I am 
now thinking of expanding my farm and 
doing more to develop production.” 
26 
especially given the relatively high cost of these machines and the proportionate high level of amount of 
contribution paid by farmers who received it. 
While the achievements made in capacity building are quite significant –even admirable given the project time 
frame and budget, the evaluation team believes that more needs to be done to raise the capacity of the farmers and 
their cooperatives on the one hand to improve the quality of milk produced, and on the other hand change farmers’ 
attitudes towards the production of high-quality and hygienic raw milk. Milk test records show that some milk 
consistency issues are still prevalent (and have been raised as concerns several times by the both Al-Qaisi and Al￾Jibrini), while field observations revealed that some parlor cleanliness and hygiene issues are still unaddressed. 
Highlighting these issues, as noted before, is not to discredit achievements, rather to signal areas where follow-up 
interventions could be needed. After all, there is only so much that can be done through a pilot project that spans 
five months. 
B.2.2. Objective 2: Building the capacity of beneficiary cooperatives 
As noted above, the cooperative capacity building objective of the SRDP project focused on improving the 
institutional capacity of the targeted cooperatives through providing them with cooperative management systems 
(including systems for milk collection and quality control), as well as building the capacity of cooperative 
employees and board members -through training- in cooperative management and milk collection processes. The 
capacity building objective also included the provision of milk cooling tanks, milk analyzers and weighing scales to 
augment the feasibility of the collective milk collection process. 
On the balance, the evaluation team believes that cooperatives capacity building objective has been satisfactorily 
achieved, as measured by achievements of the expected results. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the cooperatives 
are capable of carrying out their responsibilities vis-à-vis the milk collection process as a result of training, 
extension and follow-up by PLCU. 
Twenty eight staff and Board members of the three targeted cooperative have received training on cooperative 
management and work principles, which –according to cooperative leaders interviewed- has helped the cooperative 
leaders better understand the role they should play in organizing members and improving the services provided to 
them. Likewise, the training provided to the lab technicians and cooperative employees responsible for the milk 
collection process in the three cooperatives on the management of the collection of milk has been essential in 
building the capacity of the cooperatives in effectively managing the process. The fact that cooperatives have milk 
collection records that contain detailed information on the chemical attributes (through tests conducted) for each 
batch of collected milk accepted from each farmer is –in the opinion of the evaluation team- sufficient evidence that 
adequate capacity for effective collective milk collection has been built. 
This technical capacity was further augmented by physical and administrative capacity building activities. The 
provision of the milk cooling tanks (holding capacity:1000 liters) to Saida and Bazarya, and the procurement of 
Yatta Cooperative of a similar cooling tank, has increased the physical capacity of these cooperatives to administer a 
collective milk collection and marketing service for their members. It has also made this service –as envisaged in 
the project design- more feasible as it subsidized a significant part of its start-up cost. In terms of capacity building 
at the administrative level, the project has also left clear marks. 
The administrative and financial systems developed by the project for Bazarya and Yatta Cooperatives have helped 
these cooperatives properly document a significant amount of their work, which –according to interviewed 
cooperative leaders- was done in a haphazard manner before the project. Particularly significant is the development 
of milk collection system, which includes procedures, work instructions, and forms that have been instrumental in 
helping the cooperatives effectively manage and institutionalize the milk collection process. The financial, 
administrative and milk collection system struck the evaluation team as, both, comprehensive and user-friendly, 
which may explain why cooperative leaders and staff interviewed expressed their satisfaction thereof. 
The following key observations could be made in relation to the cooperative capacity building objective and how it 
was pursued: 
 
a) Training provided to cooperative Board members and staff on cooperative principles and cooperative 
management was too brief and the results –how much was learnt and/or retained- unclear. While the 
27 
cooperative leaders interviewed generally were highly appreciative of the training workshop on cooperative 
management and reported that it helped them transform the way they work, the evaluation team maintains 
that this contention is largely unrealistic given that the training was limited to for five hours and covered 
rudimentary topics. The emphasis of the training approach was on lecturing and teaching –generally 
speaking- the technical skills and procedures to implement the collective milk collection system. 
Particularly lacking was any capacity building related to the enhancing the role of the cooperative Boards 
in promoting members’ commitment to the milk collection and marketing process as an effective means of 
increasing the profitability of the cooperative. Enhanced capacities in this area would have better equipped 
the cooperatives (particularly Saida and Bazarya, where milk consistency issues had arisen the most and 
where farmers were most reticent to engage effectively in the project) to socially pressure member farmers 
into engaging more effectively in the project. Building cooperative capacity in cost recovery (associated 
with managing the milk collection and marketing service) was equally lacking. The pilot nature of the 
project as well as its short lifetime may have been why such capacity building efforts were left out. 
 
b) The utility of some parts of the administrative and financial systems developed by the project has been 
somewhat limited. A review of the cooperative documents revealed that several aspects of both the 
financial and administrative systems have not been implemented and/or used either because an occasion 
has not arisen since their adoption to warrant their use (for example elections), and/or due to limited 
knowledge/capacity among the staff on how to use them. Examples include the partial application of the 
inventory system, the financial reconciliation procedures, and the marketing system. This is 
understandable, however, given the fact that these systems have been recently completed (May 2008) and 
training on their use has been relatively limited. The evaluation team did sense that both cooperatives, 
particularly Yatta Cooperative, is keen on fully applying these systems through learning-by-doing, which is 
to be worthy of recognition. 
c) The withdrawal of Saida Cooperative from the project has had a negative impact not only on the overall 
volume of collected milk target as we shall examine below, but also on the projects’ effectiveness and 
efficacy in relation to the cooperative capacity building objective; i.e. the degree to which capacity had 
been built. It is unquestionable that had Saida Cooperative been excluded from the project from the 
beginning and the resources devoted to it were directed towards the other two cooperatives, the overall 
capacity of these cooperatives would have been strengthened more substantially. Of course, this much is 
easier said in retrospect than at the beginning of the project when all institutional indications suggested that 
Saida Cooperative and its members would be ideal candidates for this pilot project. It should, however, be 
noted for future programming consideration. 
B.2.3. Objective 3: Improving the marketing of sheep milk products 
Significant efforts were made by both PLCU and ACDI/VOCA to improve the marketing of the milk products 
manufactured from the milk collected through the project. This included, inter alia: providing assistance to two 
dairy plants (Al-Qiasi in phase one and Al-Jibrini in phase two) in product development for sheep and goat dairy 
products such as yogurt, yogurt paste (labaneh), white goat/sheep cheese (Halloumi) and other types of cheeses that 
require different processing and storage techniques; conducting direct promotion sales visits to popular supermarkets 
in the cities of Ramallah, Tulkarem and Jenin with the purpose of promoting the newly produced brands as well as 
addressing concerns of the supermarkets that carry the new brands; and, conducting several advertising campaigns 
using billboards, posters, information leaflets, tabloids, newspapers, and local television and radio. More than 35 
tasting event were also organized in a popular shopping centers in several West Bank cities where the products are 
distributed. Moreover, efforts to improve the merchandizing of the newly produced sheep and goat dairy products 
were made, including in-store promotions, product information tags and shelf display improvements. 
While the effectiveness of these marketing efforts could not be accurately ascertained by the evaluation team as it 
requires a different measurement approach than the one used in the evaluation, the team contends that these efforts 
were extremely important in creating demand for the newly manufactured products in a characteristically very 
competitive, price elastic market. These efforts are thus worthy of applaud. 
28 
In terms of the anticipated results under the marketing objective12, the evaluation team believes that they were 
achieved. An accurate measurement of the level to which these results were achieved, however, could not be 
ascertained as it requires data collection techniques that are beyond the scope of this evaluation. That said, the 
considerably large number of advertisements through various sources of media and the frequency thereof; combined 
with the promotional activities and sales visits carried out by both PLCU and ACDI/VOCA in both phases of the 
project have undoubtedly increased consumers awareness of the existence of these new brands. 
The evaluation team cannot be as conclusive, however, when it comes to the project result related to increasing 
demand for sheep and goat dairy products. This is largely because data required for measuring market growth 
demand could not be readily obtained by the evaluation team, and –to a lesser extent- because of the unsteady 
demand for fresh milk by the dairy producers in both phases due to marketing problems. While a substantial 
79,000 liters (79 MT) of milk were collected, processed and marketed by Al-Qaisi and Al-Jibrini dairy factories, this 
volume alone cannot be used as an indicator for increasing demand. At best, it is an indicator for increased sales of 
sheep and dairy products, which, in turn, could be the consequence of interplay of various factors that cannot be 
entirely attributable to the marketing interventions of the project. 
It should be noted here that increasing demand for new products in a relatively mature market and/or gaining 
consumer loyalty for a new brand usually requires a great deal of effort and resources which could not be made 
through the SRDP project. Despite the commendable marketing efforts and activities undertaken by PLCU and 
ACDI/VOCA, the evaluation team is of the opinion that the result related to increasing demand for sheep dairy 
products may have been too optimistically broad to be included as a result to measure the achievement of the 
project’s marketing objective. A better result could have been “increased sales of sheep and goat dairy products”. 
The following observations could be made about the marketing efforts made through the project. These are made 
with the view of generating lessons learned for future programming as most of them could not be tackled through 
the WBFS Program either because of limited resources allocated to the SRDP project and/or the restrictions on the 
use of USAID funds: 
 
a) While the substantial marketing activities that have been implemented through the projects have been 
effective in raising consumers awareness of the newly introduced products and –to a lesser extent￾increasing demand, they may have been more effective had they been built on an analysis of consumers’ 
preferences and purchasing habits. For example, a consumer survey may have identified issues related to 
consumers’ preferences in relation to dairy products that could have been tackled in marketing and product 
development. Advertising and promotion cannot be the primary techniques in increasing demand, 
especially if grounded by traditional predispositions about consumers preferences. 
 
b) The project budget earmarked to marketing was limited and technical assistance in marketing was too 
narrowly focused on advertising and promotion. Given the fact that sheep and goat dairy products existed 
in the local market, the project may have benefitted from higher allocation to marketing and more focus on 
product differentiation through –for example- packaging or Guerilla Marketing techniques.13
c) Linked to the previous point, technical assistance to the dairy producers in production management may 
have been extremely beneficial in improving the marketability of the produced dairy products. Such 
assistance may have effectively been able to provide solutions to the producers to enable them to reduce 
their relatively high cost of diary production and improve their ability to produce homogeneous products 
more consistently. 
d) While focusing the marketing activities on one dairy producer was in line with the resources made 
available to the project and its pilot nature, it entailed the risk of transferring downstream supply chain 
 
12 As noted earlier in the report, these results were: increased consumer awareness of the existence of new sheep milk products in the local 
market; and, increased demand for sheep milk products. 
13 It was assumed that the dairy factories would take greater responsibility for this, predicated on the assumption that they have the requisite 
experience in marketing their own products. 
29 
constraints to the cooperative. This risk materialized indeed, rendering the project unable to meet its target 
for volume of milk marketed, which in turn prompted several farmers to suspend their engagement in the 
collective marketing initiative. Diversifying the client base of the cooperatives –i.e., having business 
relations with two or more dairy producers as opposed to just one- may have circumvented the effect of 
marketing constraints faced in both phases of the project. 
 
B.3. Efficiency 
For the purposes of this evaluation, the assessment of the SRDP project efficiency was done through investigating 
the following efficiency factors: i) project actual costs compared with appraisal estimates and any revisions; ii) 
implementation performance; iii) the level of benefits and their growth curve compared with expectations; iv) 
utilization rates for project facilities and services; quality of inputs provided; and adequacy of the project benefits 
stream vis-à-vis its costs. 
On the balance, the SRDP project has demonstrated considerable efficiency in transforming available inputs and 
resources into outputs. This, as we shall examine in further detail below, is largely attributed to the effective use of 
financial (and human) resources, the high level of cost effectiveness of the overall intervention, and the quality of 
inputs provided. 
B.3.1. Utilization of Resources 
Table 10 below sets out detailed breakdown of the SRDP budget and actual expenditure. A total of US$126,000 
was allocated to the two phases of the SRDP project, with US$ 73,827 under phase one and US$ 52,173 under phase 
two. As shown in the table below, the actual total expenditures as well as expenditures on the budget line items 
were in line with initial project estimates. Only minor deviations occurred as a result of the increasing prices of 
equipment, which could not be anticipated at the time of design. It is thus quite commendable that the project was 
implemented without any substantial cost overruns. 
The budget structure in terms of the percentage of funds earmarked and spent on equipment (43 percent) and 
marketing (17.5 percent) is commensurate with what the evaluation team believes is needed for such type of a 
project. The fact that savings in administrative and staffing costs were reallocated to equipment budget line items is 
worthy of recognition as it increased the efficiency of budget utilization. The evaluation team is of the opinion that 
the project budget as designed and as discharged has been highly effective in producing the project’s results. 
 
 
 
30 
Table 10: SRDP budget as planned and implemented
Description Budget
% of total 
Budget
Actual 
Expenditures
% of Total 
Expenditure Budget
% of total 
Budget
Actual 
Expenditures
% of Total 
Expenditure Budget
% of total 
Budget
Actual 
Expenditures
% of Total 
Expenditure
Equipment
One-Ton SS Recep ion Tank 9,000 00 12 2% 10,152.29 13.7% 0.0% - 0.0% - 9,000.00 7.1% 10,152.29 8.0%
Milk Analyzer Equipment 3,600 00 4.9% 3,867.49 5.2% 3,300 00 6.3% 3,300.00 6.4% 6,900.00 5 5% 7,167.49 5.7%
Refrigirators 525 00 0.7% 546.00 0.7% 410 00 0.8% 410 00 0.8% 935.00 0.7% 956.00 0.8%
Electronic Balance 825 00 1.1% 918.38 1.2% 680 00 1.3% 680 00 1.3% 1,505.00 1 2% 1,598.38 1.3%
Milk Cans (3 liters) 9,000 00 12 2% 9,536.97 12.8% 4,285 28 8.2% 4,285.28 8.3% 13,285.28 10.5% 13,822.25 11 0%
Portable Milking Machines 16,875 00 22 9% 17,983.58 24.2% 0.0% - 0.0% - 16,875.00 13.4% 17,983.58 14.3%
Computers & Printers - 0.0% 0.0% - 2,490 00 4.8% 2,490.00 4.8% 2,490.00 2 0% 2,490.00 2.0%
Total Equipment 39,825.00 53.9% 43,022.71 57.9% 11,165.28 21.4% 11,165.28 21.5% 50,990.28 40.5% 54,187.99 42.9%
Marketing
Promo ional Material 2,400 00 3.3% 1,948.85 2.6% 15,303.37 29.3% 15,303.37 29 5% 17,703.37 14.1% 17,252.22 13.7%
Marke ing Consultant & Volunteers 3,000 00 4.1% 2,349.55 3.2% 1,500 00 2.9% 1,500.00 2.9% 4,500.00 3.6% 3,849.55 3.1%
Design/Prin ing of Products Sheets - 0.0% 0.0% - 970 00 1.9% 970 00 1.9% 970.00 0 8% 970.00 0.8%
Total Marketing 5,400.00 7.3% 4,343.40 5.8% 17,773.37 34.1% 17,773.37 34.3% 23,173.37 18.4% 22,116.77 17.5%
Training Sessions
Training Material 1,200 00 1.6% 1,142.85 1.5% 1,649.79 3.2% 1,651.60 3.2% 2,849.79 2.3% 2,794.45 2.2%
Training Workshop/Closeout Workshop 1,237 50 1.7% 1,242.74 1.7% 995 05 1.9% 995 05 1.9% 2,232.55 1 8% 2,237.79 1.8%
Total Training Sessions 2,437.50 3.3% 2,385.59 3.2% 2,644.84 5.1% 2,646.65 5.1% 5,082.34 4.0% 5,032.24 4.0%
Staffing
Project Coordinator 6,800 00 9.2% 6,273.55 8.4% 6,426 00 12.3% 6,426.00 12.4% 13,226.00 10.5% 12,699.55 10.1%
Extension Agent/Milk Quality 5,000 00 6.8% 4,612.90 6.2% 4,725 00 9.1% 4,725.00 9.1% 9,725.00 7.7% 9,337.90 7.4%
Extension Agent/Vet 6,000 00 8.1% 5,535.48 7.4% 1,134 00 2.2% 1,134.00 2.2% 7,134.00 5.7% 6,669.48 5.3%
Accountant/Admin. Assistant 2,700 00 3.7% 2,490.97 3.4% 2,250 00 4.3% 2,250.00 4.3% 4,950.00 3 9% 4,740.97 3.8%
Total Staffing 20,500.00 27.8% 18,912.90 25.4% 14,535.00 27.9% 14,535.00 28.0% 35,035.00 27.8% 33,447.90 26.5%
Administrative Costs
Transportation 1,250 00 1.7% 1,250.00 1.7% 2,430 00 4.7% 2,134.60 4.1% 3,680.00 2 9% 3,384.60 2.7%
Telecommunicatons 750 00 1.0% 780.82 1.1% 602.40 1.2% 573 82 1.1% 1,352.40 1.1% 1,354.64 1.1%
Sign Boards 285 00 0.4% 271.39 0.4% 126.12 0.2% 126.13 0.2% 411.12 0.3% 397.52 0.3%
Utilities 480 00 0.7% 476.16 0.6% 394.60 0.8% 392 95 0.8% 874.60 0.7% 869.11 0.7%
Office Rent 1,400 00 1.9% 1,400.00 1.9% 1,800 00 3.5% 1,800.00 3.5% 3,200.00 2 5% 3,200.00 2.5%
Office Supplies 1,500 00 2.0% 1,496.32 2.0% 674 56 1.3% 672.77 1.3% 2,174.56 1.7% 2,169.09 1.7%
Bank Fees - 0.0% 0.0% - 27.14 0.1% 27.14 0.1% 27.14 0 0% 27.14 0.0%
Total Administrative Costs 5,665.00 7.7% 5,674.70 7.6% 6,054.82 11.6% 5,727.41 11.0% 11,719.82 9.3% 11,402.11 9.0%
GRAND TOTAL 73,827.50 100.0% 74,339.30 100.0% 52,173.31 100.0% 51,847.71 100.0% 126,000.81 100.0% 126,187.01 100.0%
Phase I Phase II Total Phase I & II
31 
B.3.2. Targeting and Beneficiary Selection 
The SRDP envisaged targeting farmers largely on the basis of socio-economic criteria, as shown in the table below: 
Table 11: Socio-economic indicators for beneficiary selection under the SRDP project
Criterion Description 
Income: Households with limited income sources; households that have lost their main source of 
income due to the Intifada; households with a monthly income of NIS 1200 or lower. 
Head of household: Female-headed households 
Assets: Household with limited ownership of goats, minimum savings, and very limited assets 
(poor households). The main source of income from the goat rearing. 
Size and 
composition of 
household: 
Families with a high dependency ratio, and/or families with a high proportion of young 
children. 
Agricultural land: Families who have limited land ownership. 
Number of sheep: Farmers who own 30-40 or more milking goats.
Cooperative 
membership: 
Farmers who are cooperative members. 
Farm adaptability: Farms which are capable for rehabilitation and enlargement 
Commitment: Serious farmers who demonstrate commitment to the project activities. For those who want 
to get milking machine they must to commit providing the factory with at least 40 liters of 
milk daily . 
Ability to meet cost 
leverage: 
Farmers who are able to pay their contribution in cash or in kind. 
Baseline survey results show that the project was successful in reaching out the beneficiaries it originally envisaged 
targeting. The evaluation survey results confirmed this conclusion, albeit it also highlighted varied levels of 
targeting efficiency when it comes to assets and gender criteria. Women comprised 7 percent of the total SRDP 
project beneficiaries, while the percentage of beneficiary farmers who own less than 30 heads of sheep and goats 
comprised close to 40 percent of the total number of beneficiaries. 
Having said this, however, the evaluators would like to make the following two observations about the selection 
criteria: 
a) The criterion stipulating that beneficiaries must have a minimum ownership of 30 milking goats implicitly 
excludes some poor smallholder farmers, thus food insecure or vulnerable farmers. This is not to 
generalize and say that farmers who have ownership of 30 goats and received service through the project 
are not poor and those who have less are, rather to signal that such criteria must be cross checked with 
others at all times. 
b) While in-kind contributions were identified in the selection criteria as an acceptable means for leveraging 
beneficiary contributions, no mechanism was put in place by the project to accept them and only in-cash 
contributions were accepted. While the evaluation team did not come across any farmer who could not be 
enlisted to benefit from the project due to his/her inability to leverage the required cash contribution, the 
fact remains that in-cash contributions constitute a form of “barrier to benefit” to many poor households. 
Food security projects must take this into serious consideration when formulating beneficiary selection 
criteria so as not to implicitly exclude any beneficiaries who could effectively benefit from these projects. 
B.3.3. Implementation Efficiency 
As noted in section B.2.1 above, the implementation of the project was delayed by some three months as a result of 
the delay in the USAID approval of the geographic code procurement waiver for the stainless steel tanks. This delay, 
combined with the late vetting approval received for PLCU mentioned above, would have been detrimental to the 
project, had the PLCU not taken all the necessary preparatory steps needed to install and commence the milk 
collection process immediately once the approval was granted. This, again, is worthy of recognition as it not only 
saved the project from failing, but also because it reduced the risk of a substantial cost overrun. As it was, the 
32 
project was implemented within the period originally planned despite procurement delays in phase one, and without 
any substantial cost deviations. 
B.3.4. Utilization of Services 
The efficiency of the project in terms of the level of beneficiaries’ utilization of the physical assets they received 
through the project has been mixed. Judging utilization efficiency by the proportion of beneficiaries who have 
improved their farm management and hygiene practices (section B.2.2.) as well as the high level of utilization of 
milk cans (3 liters), we conclude that the project has been efficient. Also, if we also use the extremely high level of 
utilization of assets provided by the project and the high level of participation in the milk collection process among 
the beneficiaries belonging to Yatta Cooperative as a proxy for utilization, we conclude that utilization efficiency 
has been extremely high. 
However, using the farmers’ level of utilization of the milking machines, the overall level of farmers’ participation 
in the collective milk collection and marketing service, and the cooperatives utilization of the stainless steel tanks 
with which they were provided as proxies for utilization efficiency, we conclude that the project’s efficiency has 
been subpar. The interplay of several factors is believed to have contributed to this, namely: 
a) Farmers’ commitment and attitudes towards cooperative work: Despite the fact that farmers did indeed 
participate in the milk collection and marketing process and were able to market a substantial volume of 
milk at very favorable prices that increased their income as we shall examine below, anecdotal evidence 
gathered through interviews with beneficiary farmers suggests that they are still not entirely appreciative of 
collective marketing through their cooperatives, and are less convinced that selling fresh milk at the prices 
they received from Al-Qaisi and Al-Jibrini is more profitable than processing milk into dairy products 
themselves. Evaluation survey results confirmed this by revealing that a whopping 87.5 percent and 47.7 
percent of the project beneficiaries from Saida and Bazaria respectively believe that the collective milk 
collection and marketing has not increased their income, as shown in the figure below. 
 
Figure 3: Beneficiaries opinion regarding the profitability of marketing fresh milk (% of farmers) 
While farmers beliefs about profitability is simply wrong, as we shall examine in the section on impact 
below, the disbelief in the feasibility and profitability of collective marketing of milk, combined with the 
factors highlighted below, is probably one of the main reasons behind the low levels of utilization. It is 
also likely to be the reason why Saida cooperative decided to withdraw from the project and why a large 
proportion of the farmers Bazaria stopped collecting milk for marketing through their cooperative. What is 
noteworthy here is that the withdrawal of Saida from the project has caused a significant utilization gap for 
the project, as the equipment with which it was provided (valued at US$ 9,300) has been sitting idle at the 
time of the evaluation for more than six months. 
33 
b) The delay in milk collection: The delay in implementation of phase one of the project essentially meant that 
the height of the milk season could not be captured, thus reducing the incentive for effective utilization of 
equipment on the one hand and for participating effectively in the milk collection process on the other. 
c) The limited suitability of parlors for the effective use of milking machines (see above, B.3.4). This has 
rendered milking machines in several cases impractical for daily use by farmers, which reduces their 
utilization efficiency. 
d) Limited participation in of beneficiaries in milk collection and marketing: With the exception of Yatta 
Cooperative members, survey results show that a significant proportion of the beneficiaries did not 
participate in the milk collection process, and those who did sold small proportions of their total milk 
produced through their cooperative (Table 12). This was a major reason behind the generally low utility 
rates of equipment and the under-performance with regard to milk marketing targets. 
Table 12: Distribution of the beneficiaries with respect to the percentage of milk produced sold through their 
respective cooperatives during the last season 
Cooperative Percentage of milk produced sold to cooperative 
0 (liters) 1-20 (liters) 21-50 (liters) 51-99 (liters) 100 (liters) 
Yata 2.8 13.9 13.9 5.6 63.9 
Bazaria 47.9 8.3 22.9 0 20.8 
Saida 83.3 0 6.7 6.7 3.3 
 Total 43.0 7.9 15.8 3.5 29.8 
B.3.5. Beneficiary Satisfaction 
From a beneficiary satisfaction perspective, the project was highly efficient. The evaluation survey findings show 
that despite the relatively low levels of beneficiary participation in the milk collection and marketing processes, 
there is a substantial level of satisfaction in among beneficiaries in the three target cooperatives with different 
aspects of the project. As the figure below shows, the beneficiaries’ overall satisfaction exceeded 86 percent in all 
project performance categories. This is quite substantial. 
 
Figure 4: Level of beneficiaries’ satisfaction with various aspects related to project implementation (% 
beneficiaries) 
B.3.6. Achievement of Target Indicators 
Table 13 below juxtaposes the planned targets against the achieved targets under both phases of the SRDP project. 
While this table presents project performance target indicators at the level of project impact and results, the main 
focus here –for efficiency measurement purposes- shall be on output related indicators, which appear in italics in the 
below table. 
The table, which is based on PLCU and ACDI/VOCA reported data, shows that most planned output targets 
were either fully achieved or surpassed, with the exception of the targets related to the distribution of milk cans 
34 
under phase two (which fell 29 percent short of target), and the target related to the number of direct women 
beneficiaries. On the balance, the efficiency of the project in terms of output achievements is considered 
satisfactory given all the above mentioned constraints. 
Table 13: Planned vs. achieved performance target indicators 
 
 
 
Program Indicators
SRDP PHASE I SRDP PHASE II14
Targeted Actual % of 
target 
Targeted Actual % of 
target 
PI1 Total # of beneficiary HH assisted (cumulative) 80 79 99% 185 184 99% 
 
 - Men 72 74 103% 159 167 105% 
 - Women 8 5 63% 14 13 93%
Total Number of direct and indirect beneficiaries 
assisted 560 489 87% 1,211 1284 106% 
 - Male 312 269 86% 678 719 106% 
 - Female 248 220 89% 533 565 106% 
PI2 % of trained producers with knowledge of 
improved production techniques 1 0 80% 70% 0 0% 
IR 1: CoAg Growth Component 
Imp. 1.1 US$ Value of small ruminant milk products sold 
by members through their cooperative 91800 18910 21% 312,000 $62,952 20% 
Imp. 1.2 Metric tons of small ruminant milk products sold 
through cooperatives 136 22 16% 312 57 18% 
Imp. 1.5 # of new market linkages 1 1 100% 1 2 200% 
Imp. 1.6 Average Organizational Assessment Rating 70% 70% 100% 70% 70% 70% 
In.1.1: Capacity Building 
In.1.1.1 # of small ruminant farmers trained on farm 
management
30 88 293% 85 117 138% 
In.1.1.2 # of small ruminant farmers trained on milk 
analysis and collection management 30 119 397% 85 103 121% 
In.1.1.3 # of small ruminant farmers trained on milk 
quality 60 79 132% 85 117 138% 
In.1.1.4 # of cooperative staff and board members trained 
on cooperative management 20 21 105% 8 7 88% 
In.1.1.6 Total number of conducted workshops 11 13 118% 14 18 129% 
In.1.3 equipments & devices 
In.1.3.1 # of distributed milk cans 150 150 100% 85 60 71% 
In.1.3.2 # of distributed portable milking machines 25 25 100% 0 0 0% 
In.1.3.3 # of distributed milk cooling tanks 2 2 100% 1 1 100% 
In.1.3.4 # of distributed milk analyzers 2 2 100% 1 1 100% 
In.1.3.5 # of distributed weighing 2 2 100% 1 1 100% 
In.1.3.6 # of distributed refrigerators 2 2 100% 1 1 100% 
In.1.3.7 # of distributed computers 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 2 100%
 In. 1.4 Extension & marketing visits 
In.1.4.1 # of conducted extension visits 600 636 106% 300 384 128%
In.1.4.1 # of conducted marketing visits 50 94 188% 100 308 308% 
 
14 As mentioned earlier, Phase II of the SRDP project targeted 185 farmers, of which 80 were targeted also under Phase I. 
35 
B.4. Impact 
B.4.1. Economic impact: impact on beneficiaries’ livelihoods and food security 
The project sought to increase the income and improve the livelihood of the beneficiary farmers through increasing 
the feasibility of milk production, collection and marketing for farmers and their cooperatives on the one hand and 
improving farmers’ capacity in producing milk on the other. The premise on which this two-tier strategy was based 
revolved around the principle of reducing cost of milk production and processing. 
Although the proxy performance target indicators used for measuring the achievement of the project’s goal (US$ 
value and Metric tons of small ruminant milk products sold by members through their cooperative) were not achieved, evidence 
gathered through interviews with farmers and from project documents indicates that the project did indeed 
contribute to increasing farmers’ income, albeit to varying degrees. This conclusion is based on the following 
findings and conclusions: 
a) Percentage of surveyed farmers reporting income increases: As noted above, survey results show that 66.7 
percent (123) of the target beneficiaries believe that their incomes have increased by 28.2 percent as a 
result of the project. 
b) Production cost savings accrued to farmers as a result of milk marketing: On average, processing milk into 
cheese costs between NIS 15-19, most of which comprising economic costs that are unaccounted by 
farmers. If we consider that farmers received NIS 3.6 per liter of milk sold through the project, and factor 
that each kilogram of cheese requires anywhere between 3.5-6.6 liters of milk , we can easily conclude that 
the opportunity cost of processing one kilogram of cheese is at least NIS 2.4 per liter. This opportunity 
cost has been transformed into savings to farmers through the project. Factoring the time spent on 
marketing of cheese by farmers and the telecommunication and transportation costs associated with it, will 
increase these savings. 
c) Production cost savings accrued to farmers as a result of improved farm management skills: Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that significant beneficiary farmers accrued substantial savings as a result of the new 
practices they started using in relation to farm management and feed. One of the farmers interviewed in 
Yatta estimated the cost savings he accrued as a result of improved feed management for his 32 heads to be 
in the realm of NIS 1500 in four months. 
While the level of correlation and relationship between the increase in income accrued by farmers and their level of 
food security could not be ascertained by the evaluation, especially given the exponential increase in food and feed 
prices that have ensued after the commencement of both phases of the project, it is unquestionable that the accrued 
income increases have increased the beneficiaries access to food, or at least cushioned them from becoming more 
vulnerable or food insecure. 
The contribution of the project to the overall WBFS Program target envisaged form the SRDP component (Increased 
income of approximately $11/day for each of 150 targeted farmers), however, has not been simply because the 
number of beneficiary farmers who were involved in milk collection and marketing was far below the 150 farmers 
target. This underperformance, in the opinion of the evaluation team, is much more related to the optimistic original 
target for the number of farmers who will accrue income increases rather than project failure. It may have been 
more realistic at the design to anticipate a 30 percent dropout rate among beneficiaries and, thus, set the target of 
increased income for 100 farmers instead of all the 150 farmers. Had this been the case, the project would have 
been much closer to achieving its income impact target. 
From a utilization perspective, the general state of food security has improved as a result of improved milk hygiene 
and reduced risk of milk contamination (see B.2.2 above). However, the significance of this improvement could not 
be ascertained by the evaluators as it is beyond the scope of this evaluation. 
 
In terms of improving the livelihood of the beneficiaries, the provision of training and equipment to the beneficiary 
farmers and their cooperatives have undoubtedly increased their physical, financial, human and social capitals. This 
36 
in turn has expanded their livelihood assets and diversified their capacity (livelihood strategies) to cope with adverse 
conditions in the future. 
B.4.2. Sectoral impacts 
As a pilot project, the SRDP –in the opinion of the evaluation team- has left a substantial mark on the small 
ruminant sector. It has demonstrated, and effectively so given its short lifetime and resources- how with little 
resources and business acumen effective private-private relationships could be built to serve economic and 
agricultural sector development. It has also demonstrated to farmers how traditional ways of conducting business 
need to be adapted to keep pace with global trends and practices, and –more importantly- it showed them how this is 
possible. Moreover, the project has introduced a new approach to small ruminant sector development that had not 
existed in the oPt before, thus increasing the potential for mobilizing funding and investments in its support. 
Already, two projects funded by Oxfam GB have been launched to replicate the SRDP experience in Tubas and the 
Jordan Valley areas. This may have not been possible without the experience of the SRDP. 
 
B.4.3. Impact on Women 
It may very well be true that project was not entirely successful in mainstreaming gender as it originally envisaged, 
but its impact on some women in the beneficiary households has been significant. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
the burden of milk processing, most often shouldered by women, has been significantly reduced within the 
beneficiary households that were part of the milk collection and marketing. According to PLCU reports and 
interviews and evaluation focus group discussions, the milk collection and marketing service introduced through the 
project has relived women from a very onerous responsibility and enabled to spend more time with their children 
and family members. 
B.4.4. Overall Assessment of Impact 
On the balance, the impact of the project on the food security and livelihood conditions of the beneficiary 
households has been moderate, despite the general increase in incomes of some 67 percent of the beneficiaries. The 
overall impact rating is largely fueled by the project’s inability to meet its goal level performance targets, 
particularly that related to the value of milk sold, and the relatively small proportion of beneficiaries who indicated 
that their incomes have increased substantially (in real terms) as a result of the project (Table 14). 
Table 14: Percentage distribution of beneficiaries who reported increased income with regard to level of 
increased income 
Cooperative 5-10% 11-20% 21-35% 36-50% 51%+ Total 
Yatta 20.6 17.6 17.6 35.3 8.8 100 
Bazaria 17.4 52.2 21.7 4.3 4.3 100 
Saida 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Total 19.0 32.8 19.0 22.4 6.9 100 
This is not to say that the project did not have other equally important impacts. In fact the sectoral impact, the 
impact on women and the impact on internal relations within the target cooperatives could outweigh the food 
security and livelihood impact targets. The evaluation team contends that if the beneficiary cooperatives re￾establish the marketing linkages established by the project and resume the milk collection and marketing service, the 
impact on food security and livelihood will likely surpass its original target. The onus is now with these 
cooperatives to tap the resources the project has made available to them, especially since 93.8 percent of the 
beneficiaries have indicated willingness to market milk through their cooperatives if the opportunity arises (see 
Figure 5 below). 
37 
Figure 5: Would you market fresh milk through the cooperative if the possibility arises again/continues? (% 
of farmers) 
B.5. Sustainability 
The likelihood of the sustainability of project results mixed. It is likely for Yatta Cooperative, but unlikely for Saida 
and Bazaria Cooperatives. The following points summarize the foundations on which this conclusion is based: 
• Higher level of commitment to and sense of ownership of the collective milk collection and marketing 
service among the Yatta Cooperative farmers when compared to Saida and Bazaria Cooperatives: In 
interviews, the Yatta Cooperative and its farmers struck the evaluation team as more highly committed, 
more business oriented and better organized than the cooperatives in Saida and Bazaria. This despite the 
fact that the Yatta Cooperative and its farmers received relatively less technical and financial support from 
the project than the other two cooperatives. The Yatta Cooperative management is highly engaged in 
administering the milk collection process and is extremely cautious to follow strict standard measures when 
it comes to testing milk samples, storage, and record keeping. This is not the case in the other two 
cooperatives. 
 
• Stronger business relations between Al-Jibrini Dairy Factory and Yatta Cooperative: Yatta Cooperative is 
the only of the three beneficiary cooperatives who indicated having good relationship with Al-Jibrini Dairy 
Factory. It was also the keenest to maintain this relationship. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Al-Jibrini 
has a reciprocal sentiment, which increases the chances for continued business relations. 
• Proximity of Al-Jibrini Dairy Factory to Yatta Cooperative: The fact that Al-Jibrini Dairy Factory is 
located much closer to the premises of the Yatta Cooperative (located in the same governorate) than to the 
premises of Saida and Bazaria Cooperatives, makes it more cost efficient for Al-Jibrini to deal primarily 
with Yatta Cooperative as it reduces the cost of transportation and lead time. 
• Higher quality milk in Yatta than in Saida and Bazzaria, particularly the latter: A review of a random 
sample of milk test results revealed that, on the balance, the quality of milk collected from Yatta is higher 
than in Saida and Bazarya, particularly the latter. A higher protein and soluble content, and PH closer to 
4.5 were more systematically found in the samples reviewed in Yatta than those examined in Bazaria and 
Saida. 
• Larger cooperative members’ ownership of small ruminants in Yatta than in Saida and Bazaria: The fact 
that Yatta Cooperative members have a combined ownership of some 60,000 heads of sheep and goats 
makes the cooperative an ideal milk supplier for any dairy producer. 
38 
The above notwithstanding, Bazaria and Saida Cooperatives could resume milk collection and marketing if they 
manage to forge a business relationship with dairy producer for this purpose. As noted earlier, the fact that 88.4 
percent and 95 percent of the Saida and Bazaria Cooperative members have indicated willingness to resume 
marketing milk through their respective cooperative is strong enough indicator that the likelihood of sustainability of 
the project in these cooperatives could be improved on medium- or long-run. 
C. Overall Conclusions and Recommendations 
The SRDP project was well designed and demonstrated high level of relevance to the local context and to the overall 
goal of the WBFS Program. Its foremost strength is its innovative approach to sector development and focused 
cooperative capacity building strategy. Commendably, the project as designed did not gold plat expected results and 
sought to do only what is necessary in a pilot project. 
Despite encountering substantial delays as a result of administrative procedures related to procurement of 
equipment, PLCU managed to effectively implement the project on time and within the parameters of the allocated 
budget. PLCU is to be commended for this and for its ability to achieve the specific objectives of the SRDP project, 
namely building the capacity of farmers and their cooperatives in producing high-quality hygiene milk, and 
marketing processed sheep and goat milk products. The evaluation findings clearly show that substantial 
achievements have been realized in this regard, although they also suggest that slightly better results could have 
been achieved. 
The project had moderate immediate impact due to the inability to meet it impact target indicators. Sufficient 
evidence also could not be gathered to support the conclusion that the project was able to increase the food security 
of its beneficiaries as originally envisaged in the project design. Gathering such evidence would have required more 
time and resources than what was made available to the evaluation team and would have necessitated a different 
assessment approach than the one used in this evaluation. However, sufficient evidence exists to support the 
conclusion that the project has contributed to increasing the income of a large proportion of the farmers by way of 
facilitating marketing of milk at favorable prices to the farmers and helping farmers cut their milk production and 
livestock rearing costs. The project has also left a tangible impact on the livelihood of the beneficiaries by imparting 
knowledge and skills, and providing equipment which augmented their human, physical and social capitals and 
diversified their livelihood assets. Moreover, the project has had a substantial impact on women in the beneficiary 
households as it allowed them more time to spend with their children and family members by reducing their 
workload related to processing milk for livelihood purposes. 
The sustainability of the project is likely in Yatta and unlikely in both Bazaria and Saida. This is largely due the 
suspension of the milk collection service in the latter cooperatives, and the higher levels of commitment among the 
beneficiaries in the former than the latter. Despite this, the likelihood of sustainability of the project in the latter 
localities could be improved if the milk collection and marketing service could be resumed. 
The main lessons learned from the SRDP are the following: 
a) The small ruminant sector faces major difficulties as a result of increasing feed prices. These difficulties, 
however, could be effectively overcome through farm management improvement and marketing strategies. 
Such strategies would not only improve sector viability, but also contribute to improving the livelihood of 
important vulnerable group, smallholder farmers.
b) Livestock cooperatives can play an effective role in sector development interventions. However, for these 
cooperatives to do so, their technical, administrative and management capacities would need to be built. 
Substantial proportion of such capacity building efforts would need to be focused on working with 
cooperative leaders and staff towards establishing effective management and accountability systems, as 
well as developing business acumen. Special emphasis should also be given to establishing cost recovery 
systems and helping cooperatives establish complementarities between the services they provide to reach 
economies of scale and improve service provision.
39 
c) Working with livestock farmers and convincing to change traditional practices can be extremely 
challenging. Extensive extension, support and learning by doing and observing are among the most 
successful strategies that could be used in gaining the confidence of livestock farmers and getting them to 
agree to change their common way of doing things.
d) It is extremely important that realistic performance targets are set during the project design as these targets 
will be the basis on which the project is evaluated. This is particularly important when setting objective 
and goal level indicators. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect that project beneficiaries will accrue the same 
level of benefit by a project, as individual differences and personal characteristics are major factors in 
determining the level of benefit that a beneficiary could be expected to accrue. Hence, the expectation that 
all the SRDP beneficiaries will accrue the same level of increase in income (US$11/day) as a result of 
being targeted by the project was unrealistic as it was predicated on the erroneous assumption that all 
beneficiaries will equally be willing to effectively participate and implement what the project sought to 
introduce. Setting a lower target for the number of beneficiaries expected to accrue the income increases 
would have been more realistic. 
e) Introducing new technologies to farmers should be part-and-parcel of an integrated performance 
improvement/farm development approach, and one that can bridge all technical gaps that may hinder 
application of the new technology. As it was, the introduction of the milking machines to SRDP project 
beneficiaries proved to be an inefficient strategy as the parlors were not well-suited for the effective 
utilization of these machines. Had the project made allocations for farm adaptation, the rate of utilization 
would have most likely been much higher.
f) Addressing supply chain constraints is critical to the effectiveness of sectoral development interventions. 
The experience of SRDP suggests that tackling downstream supply chain constraints is as important as 
developing the supply chain upstream. Accordingly, integrated interventions that tackle supply chain 
constraints throughout the chain are more effective in creating sustainable improvements on the long-term. 
g) Planning for implementation of any development project must anticipate risks associated with project 
implementation and their impact on the project performance, and build well-though out risk mitigation 
measures to prevent these risks from materializing. Special emphasis in such considerations should be put 
on factors that may affect implementation delays and cost over runs. Donor approvals, exchange rate 
fluctuations, availability of local materials, and supply chain constraints are among the most critical factors 
that affect the timely implementation of any project and are often underestimated at the time of design. 
h) USAID funded projects involve standard provisions that restrict the use of US Government funds to a 
certain commodities, products and works that may not be commensurate with what would be needed for 
integrated agricultural development projects targeting the poor. Moreover, the USAID provisions 
stipulating substantial USAID involvement in key project matters and approvals of procurement of supplies 
above a specified threshold level could sometimes cause unexpected implementation delays, which could 
be detrimental to projects with short lifetime and/or whose successes are contingent on implementing 
activities during a very specific period. Accordingly, care should be exercised when exploring USAID 
funding should be explored 
The key recommendations emerging from this evaluation for immediate action are the following: 
a) ACDI/VOCA and PLCU are strongly encouraged to seek funding to provide additional support to the three 
target cooperatives to resume (in the case of Bazaria and Saida) and improve their milk collection and 
marketing services. Special emphasis should be on closing the hygiene gaps (i.e. improving parlor hygiene 
conditions), establishing milking sites, and building effective marketing strategies. 
b) Linked to the previous point, PLCU should encourage Saida and Bazaria Cooperatives to either seek out 
ways to resume their milk collection and marketing activities or return to PLCU the equipment they 
received through the project. PLCU should seek legal advice in this matter and act accordingly. Should the 
Cooperatives decide to return the equipment, PLCU should seek a recipient cooperative that would be 
40 
willing to repay Saida and Bazaria Cooperatives their contribution. Yatta Cooperative could be an ideal 
candidate. 
c) PLCU should continue its support to Yatta cooperative over the short-term and seek out ways to encourage 
and assist other cooperatives to introduce the milk collection and marketing service within their package of 
services. Exchange visits to Yatta Cooperative could be an effective means of doing this. 
 
41 
CHAPTER FOUR: THE HORTICULTURE PRODUCTION AND MARKETING 
COMPONENT 
A. Overview and Performance Targets 
After having received USAID’s technical approval on 12 February 2007 on the pre-selection of nine cooperatives15
for possible inclusion under the Horticulture Production and Marketing (HPM) Component of the WBFS Program, 
ACDI/VOCA sent a Request for Proposals (RFP) from non-governmental organizations for the implementation of 
the HPM component activities with six of the nine pre-selected cooperatives. The RFP along with detailed proposal 
instructions were sent to three NGOs, namely: TALEM, ANERA and ESDC on 20 February 2007. TALEM 
declined to submit a proposal one day before the deadline for submission of proposals, while ESDC and ANERA 
decided to submit a joint proposal whereby the latter is primary grantee and the former a secondary. 
ANERA’s proposal was favorably reviewed by ACDI/VOCA and sent to USAID for technical review and approval, 
which was granted on 20 April 2007 contingent upon the cancellation of one activity: renovation of cooperative 
facilities. A sub-award agreement in the total amount of US$756,623 was signed between ACDI/VOCA and 
ANERA on 25 April 2007, with an agreed completion date of 15 July 2008. The Project was designed with the goal 
of the project was “to promote sustainable livelihoods and reduce food insecurity among poor and marginalized 
farmers and households by improving commercial smallholder farming and agricultural business opportunities and 
by working with agricultural cooperatives.” 
Through targeting 350 farmers belonging to the agricultural cooperative in six localities (Thinaba; Baqa Al￾Sharqeya; Qalqilia; Qabatia; Tamoon and Atouf; and, Bardala), the project sought to achieve its livelihood and food 
security improvement goal through pursuing the following specific objectives over its lifetime: 
• Improve the income level of 350 vegetable farmers by 15 percent from greenhouse operations through 
reducing input costs (promoting collective purchasing) and increase sales prices (promoting collective 
marketing through coops); 
• Increase production of safe and healthy vegetables by adding new 95 dunums of greenhouses and 
rehabilitating another 220 dunums to be more suitable for application of Integrated Pest Management 
(IPM) techniques; 
• Build the technical capacity and know-how, through training and extension, of 350 farmers in 
environmentally-safe greenhouse vegetable production techniques such as IPM and Integrated Crop 
Management (ICM) to be applied for all assets of the farmers including the newly established/rehabilitated 
greenhouses; 
• Train 350 farmers on Good Agricultural Practices (GAP) techniques to meet the phyto-sanitary 
requirements and market protocols for marketing their produce in the local market and exporting it to the 
Israeli market; 
• Build the human and institutional capacities of the target cooperatives through various trainings as well as 
collective systems development and implementation in the cooperative and in the farms of participating 
members; 
• Foster improved relations among cooperative members through training and other technical assistance 
tools; 
• Initiate and engage in marketing linkage exercises between the six participating cooperatives and local and 
Israeli buyers; 
• Improve competitive growth through a stronger cooperative structure; 
• Achieve production quality requirements and smallholder awareness of production quality standards and 
market orientation; 
• Increase effective acquisition and utilization of market information to respond to market demand; 
 
15 A total of 19 cooperatives were Assessed by ACDI/VOCA staff using the Cooperative Assessment Tool (CAT) customized by ACDI/VOCA 
staff. This tool was used to assess the cooperatives against 13 different governance, management, and service categories. 
42 
• Improve collective purchasing and marketing; 
• Develop cost-effective cooperative approaches to reach a large farmer base; and, 
• Expand cooperative and farmer member market and supply linkages. 
The project objectives would be pursued through a two-track strategy. The first track would focus on cooperative 
development and growth (much in line with the WBFS Program design), and was envisaged to focus on building 
cooperative marketing capacities and improving their business practices to enable them and their members to 
compete in the market on an equal footing with the other larger private sector firms. This was to be done through in￾depth organizational assessments of the six selected cooperatives to identify their collective and individual 
organizational development needs. Based on the assessment conducted by ACDI/VOCA of the target cooperatives, 
the project design envisaged developing systems for improving management, financial administration, 
accountability and members services functions, as well as providing the cooperatives with training and equipment to 
improve their post-harvest handling practices and business [and marketing] management. Provision of technical 
assistance by external Palestinian and Israeli marketing experts was also envisaged to assist the cooperatives in 
establishing marketing linkages and building relationships with Israeli buyers. 
The second track would focus on building cooperative farmers’ capacities to effectively contribute to the success of 
the activities described in the first track, whereby farmers showing interest to sell to prospective Israeli or 
Palestinian buyers, willingness to adopt and follow production protocols for intended markets and ability to meet 
other post harvest requirements would be selected. Through working with these farmers, the project would 
rehabilitate/construct plastic and net greenhouses for 350 farmer members of the six proposed vegetable-producing 
areas. This would be complemented with capacity building work with technical training and extension services in 
IPM and ICM techniques, protected agriculture, crop diversification, value chain assessments, production protocols, 
phyto-sanitary requirements and quality standards for the beneficiary greenhouse vegetable farmers. The project 
proposal stated that if other technical needs are identified during project implementation, these needs would be 
addressed through technical assistance, local consultancy and training support. 
B. Assessment of Component Implementation 
B.1. Project Start-up and Development 
Project implementation began on schedule on 1 May 2007. The first two months of the project were utilized for staff 
and beneficiary mobilization, cooperatives visits and assessments, and planning of workshops and preparation of 
training materials. In early June 2007, after further assessment by the project team, a request to drop the North 
Jordan Valley Cooperative in the village of Bardala was made because the cooperative was selected to receive 
similar assistance to that planned by the project from an AusAid funded project implemented by CARE. 
Coincidently, serious doubt was emerging about the seriousness and commitment of the cooperative in Tammoun as 
a result of its failure to follow-through with several crucial matters needed for the timely and effective 
implementation of the project. At the request of ANERA, the project Steering Committee approved dropping both 
Tammoun and Bardala Cooperatives, and replacing them with Al-Jalameh Cooperative in late June 2007. By that 
time, however, significant effort and time had been invested in cooperative meetings and beneficiary selection in 
both Bardala and Tammoun by ANERA and ESDC, while ACDI/VOCA had invested resources in conducting one 
Farming as a Business (FaaB) training workshops with Tammoun Cooperative members. 
While dropping both Bardala and Tammoun Cooperative did not impact the project in terms of the total number of 
beneficiaries targeted, it did however force a change to the type of planned activities and the number of targeted 
beneficiaries in each cooperative. The net greenhouses that were planned in Bardala could not be implemented in 
any of the five selected cooperatives due to their unsuitability to the weather conditions, and had to be replaced by 
plastic greenhouses. The number of beneficiaries planned for in Tammoun and Bardala were distributed among the 
five participating Cooperatives as shown in the table below. 
43 
Table 15: Number of new and rehabilitated greenhouses planned
Cooperative 
# of new constructed units # of rehabilitated units 
Qalqilia Coop 30 66 
Thinnabeh Coop 27 32 
Baqa Coop 20 10 
Qabatia coop 30 76 
Al-Jalameh coop 20 42 
Total 127 226 
 
Despite the obstacles faced which caused implementation delays, ANERA was able to fast-track activities and 
regain much of the time lost at in the first few months of implementation. By September 2007, the contract for the 
rehabilitation and construction of the greenhouses was already awarded, the majority of the beneficiaries selected, 
and most training courses planned. Also by that time, an agreement was reached between ACDI/VOCA and 
ANERA, whereby the former would be directly involved in the project implementation through building on the 
FaaB training it was implementing within the framework of the project by providing technical assistance to the five 
beneficiary cooperatives to improve their export potential. This was largely facilitated by ACDI/VOCA’s ability to 
leverage support to the target cooperatives to obtain Global Gap certification from the Palestinian Agricultural 
Relief Committees, which provided all physical inputs needed for this purpose. 
B.2. Effectiveness 
Given the relatively large number of specific objectives identified in the project proposal and the high level of 
complementarities among them, the project effectiveness will be assessed through assessing the degree to which the 
project has been able to improve the income level of vegetable farmers; and, to build the human and institutional 
capacities of the target cooperatives. 
B.2.1. Farmers’ Income 
As noted above, the project sought to increase the income of farmers through reducing input costs and increasing 
sales prices. The reduction of input cost was envisaged to be done through three main strategies, namely: i) 
encouraging farmers to adopt IPM and ICM techniques, thus reduce their production and land maintenance costs , ii) 
introducing improved farm management practices to allow farmers to ascertain level of cost and profitability and 
take actions as necessary; and iii) encouraging farmers and their cooperatives to adopt collective marketing. The 
objective related to increasing sales prices was primarily pursued through encouraging farmers to improve the 
marketability of their crops in Israeli and international markets as well as through promoting export-oriented, cash 
crops, and establishing marketing links to allow these farmers to sell their products at favorable prices. Critical to 
this was the ability of the project to assist farmers in marketing their products during the period in which 
international prices are at their seasonal peak; i.e. when demand is high and supply is low. 
A) Farmer training 
Significant efforts and resources were geared toward farmer capacity building under the HPM project. Fourteen 
FaaB training workshops were implemented with the participation of 328 farmers from the five target cooperatives. 
These workshops were complemented with 12 follow-up training courses attended by 186 beneficiaries and six 
exchange visits to a Khaizaran Farm in Tubas area where FaaB principles are rigorously followed. In addition to the 
FaaB training, 14 training courses were implemented with the participation of 329 farmers. 
While the sheer number of the training courses is worthy of recognition in its own merit as it is sufficiently 
indicative of improved farmer capacity, the effectiveness of these training is even more laudable. Field observations 
gave a very clear indication that the utility of farm records and farm management practices are extremely high. All 
farmers interviewed had farm records in which they kept daily record of all of their farm activities, including cost 
44 
and income calculations. Many of these farmers kept very detailed records of all of their expenditures (including 
business-related costs in several cases) and made calculations monthly calculations of their profits and losses as well 
as cash flows. Evaluation survey results confirmed field observations in this regard by showing that almost all 
beneficiaries are using farm records for business management purposes. The survey results have also shown that the 
proportion of farmers who use farm records for these purposes has significantly increased from the baseline as 
shown in the figure below. 
Figure 6: Percentage of farmers utilizing various farm management techniques, before and after project 
compared
According to farmers, the utilization of farm records, enables them to cut their losses once they loss recurs. As on 
farmer put it, “farm records help us recognize our loss much quicker, and because of that we could stop whatever it 
is we are doing that is causing us to lose, even if it is ceasing cultivation”. The high level of use of farm records and 
the potential they provide for improved commercialization of agriculture are considered by the evaluation team as a 
huge success. ACDI/VOCA and its staff who conducted the FaaB training are to be congratulated on this 
achievement. 
The IPM training had similar results, although the level of its application among farmers was lower than in the case 
of FaaB techniques. While all farmers visited applied IPM techniques, the majority of them were not applying it in 
an integrated approach. This notwithstanding, the results have been quite positive. Farmers interviewed expressed 
their high level of satisfaction with the IPM/ICM training they received, highlight that the application of IPM and 
ICM techniques has accrued them savings ranging between NIS 400-700 per season per dunum; i.e. an average of 
NIS 800-1300 per year. This is quite significant for farmers, as this average savings equates to production cost 
savings of 5-10% per year. 
According to the evaluation survey results, the application of IPM/ICM techniques by has substantially increased as 
a result of the project. Results show that the proportion of farmers applying these techniques has increased by 163 
percent (29.5 percent to 77.5 percent) from its baseline level as shown in the figure below. This quite a substantial 
improvement given the traditional challenge associated with introducing change to common and well-entrenched 
practices known to farmers. 
45 
Figure 7: Percentage of farmers utilizing various IPM/ICM techniques, before and after project compared 
B) Greenhouse Construction and Rehabilitation 
The effectiveness of greenhouse construction and rehabilitation on farmers’ income has been substantial. Survey 
results show that the both activities have substantially increased the productivity –thus the income- of the 
beneficiary farmers. 
Table 16: Total quantity and value of crops sold in local market 
Crops 
New construction Rehabilitation Total 
Total 
quantity 
(Kg) 
Price 
(NIS) 
Value 
(NIS) 
Total 
Quantity 
(Kg) 
Price 
(NIS) 
Value 
(NIS) 
Total 
Quantity 
(Kg) 
Price 
(NIS) 
Value 
(NIS) 
Tomatoes 464850 1.2 557820 533900 1.5 800850 998750 1.4 1358670 
Cucumbers 510853 1.6 817365 712872 1.55 1104952 1223725 1.5 1922316 
Green Beans 9200 3.4 31280 10500 2.5 26250 19700 3 57530 
Green Peppers 25000 1 25000 59000 2.3 135700 84000 1.7 160700 
Jews Mallow 11200 2 22400 84001 2.5 210002 95201 2.4 232403 
Pumpkin 20610 3.6 74196 31500 3.5 110250 52110 3.5 184446 
Cow peas 1000 5 5000 15700 4 62800 16700 4.5 67800 
Peas 11000 0.8 8800 0 0 0 11000 0.8 8800 
Others 0 0 0 4000 1 4000 4000 1 4000 
Total 1,053,713 1,541,861 1,451,473 2,454,804 2,505,186 3,996,665 
46 
Based on the figures in the table above, the average area of land owned by the beneficiaries of new construction 
(2218m2
) and rehabilitation (2233m2
), and the average area of greenhouse constructed (630m2
) or rehabilitated by 
the project (1000m2
), we can conclude the following through a simple arithmetic16: 
• The new construction activity has increased the income of its beneficiaries by an average of NIS 5,340 last 
season. 
• The rehabilitation activity has effectively increased the income of its beneficiaries by an average of 
NIS10,570 last season. 
The reason for the difference in the value of increase in income is quite simple: the average area of the rehabilitated 
greenhouses is almost double that for the new construction. Further analysis of the efficiency of both activities is 
discussed below. 
C) Market Linkages 
Considerable efforts were made by ACDI/VOCA to establish business linkages between the target cooperatives and 
Israeli buyers. These efforts began in late May 2007 with the hiring of an Israeli agribusiness and marketing 
consultant to identify market needs and potential buyers, assist the cooperatives to acquire market information, and 
coordinate business meetings with potential buyers and make arrangements for exchange visits, among others. 
Contact was initiated by the consultant with several Israeli traders and buyers in close coordination with 
ACDI/VOCA’s COP and DCOP, and initial visits were conducted to most of the traders and buyers contacted to 
discuss their willingness and readiness to work with the target cooperatives. The results of these meetings were 
encouraging, and, consequently, face-to-face business meetings were organized between cooperatives and three 
Israeli companies (MOR-10, Agro-Star and Agrexco). 
Meetings were organized between Agro-Star and Thinnaba and Baqa Cooperatives, and an agreement was reached 
with these cooperatives to cultivate and market a cluster of cherry tomatoes in 25 dunums for export and for the 
Israeli market with the participation of 33 farmers (18 from Baqa and 17 from Thinnaba). The plan was to begin 
cultivation at the beginning of October for first harvest in November when the international market prices are at 
their height. Following this agreement, ACDI/VOCA coordinated a technical training for farmers in both 
cooperatives with Agro-Star with the purpose of introducing to farmers all the requirements and special conditions 
for planting and cultivation of cluster cherry tomatoes. Follow-up meetings were later conducted, in which a formal 
agreement was signed and information regarding the production, quality standards and packaging and transport was 
provided by Agro-Star. ACDI/VOCA commissioned an Arab-Israeli agronomist and an export specialist to provide 
guidance and extension support to the cooperatives; including the provision of advice on the species of tomatoes to 
cultivate, quality monitoring and grading and packaging. 
Meetings were also organized between Agrexco and the heads of Al-Jalameh and Qabatya Cooperatives in July 
2007 to discuss business cooperation opportunities. These meetings resulted in an initial agreement between the two 
cooperatives and Agrexco for the pilot cultivation of 10-15 dunums of green Italian zucchini in Al-Jalameh and 10-
15 dunums of snow peas in Qabatia. However, Al-Jalameh Cooperative decided to disengage for this initial 
agreement. ACDI/VOCA continued coordination with Agrexco, and managed to facilitate the formalization of an 
agreement between Agrexco and Qabatya Cooperative in December 2007 for the cultivation of and marketing of 15 
dunums of snow peas by 24 cooperative member farmers. According to this agreement, planting would take place 
in November with harvest of ten tons of snow peas slated to begin in late January 2008. 
The 59 farmers began cultivation of the crops on time under the close supervision and guidance of the consultant 
hired by ACDI/VOCA. In the meantime, and as a result of the Israeli companies’ request for EurepGap certification 
from the cooperatives and their farmers, ACDI/VOCA was heavily engaged in coordinating with PARC to leverage 
its activities for the provision of GlobalGap certification for the three cooperatives with the framework of a Dutch￾funded project it was implementing. Consequently, PARC agreed to supply the participating 57 farmers and their 
cooperatives with inputs and cover the GlobalGap certification fees. 
 
16 This is based on three step process: 1) dividing the value of reported production sold last season by the number of respondents in each category 
(82 farmers for new construction and 104 farmers for rehabilitation) to get the average income per beneficiary from the sale of agricultural 
products ; 2) dividing the average income per beneficiary in each category by the average area of greenhouses owned and cultivated last season 
for each category of farmers to get the income from each square meter of cultivated greenhouses; and, 3) multiplying the result from (2) by the 
average area of greenhouse constructed/rehabilitated to get the income derived directly from that service. 
47 
ACDI/VOCA immediately began work on readying the cooperatives for certification by contracting two local 
extension consultants and a quality assurance coordinator to assist the cooperatives and member farmers in meeting 
the production and processing standards. A GlobalGap consultant was also recruited to develop and assist in the 
implementation of a cooperative management system in the cooperatives and assist them throughout the certification 
process. To further facilitate the certification process, ACDI/VOCA, based on USAID approval, amended the grant 
agreement with ANERA in December 2007 and allocated funding for the construction of three cold storage units in 
the three cooperatives undergoing the GlobalGap certification process. 
The efforts and resources that have been devoted by ACDI/VOCA and ANERA to establish market linkages 
between the cooperatives and Israeli buyers have been remarkable and have had an astoundingly quick impact on the 
institutional capacity of the cooperatives and on the individual capacity of the 57 participating farmers as we shall 
examine in the following section. However, in terms of contribution to increasing the farmers’ incomes, the 
effectiveness of these efforts have been far below expectations. As it was, the farmers who participated in export 
contracts ended up losing instead of generating income and making profits. Several factors contributed to this, most 
of which were beyond the intervention capacity of ACDI/VOCA. The most salient of these factors are the 
following: 
a) The weather crisis: The rainfall patterns combined with below average precipitation rates have classified 
the agricultural year 2007/2008 as a year of drought. This was compounded by several days of frost during 
early January 2008, which destroyed entire fields. The effect of the frost in particular on the beneficiary 
farmers was catastrophic as it wiped out a large proportion of their export crops, and substantially stunted 
the growth, productivity and quality characteristics of the crops that seemed to have withstood the frost. 
Consequently, the salability of the export crops was hugely constrained by below standard crops and the 
late marketing; i.e. marketing could not be done during the period in which international market prices are 
at their height as originally envisaged. For example, snow peas were slated for harvest 45-60 days after its 
cultivation in mid January, however, harvest was not possible due to stunted growth until early March, i.e. 
more than one and a half month late. 
 
b) Late cultivation: Compounding the effect of frost on crops growth and productivity was the relatively late 
cultivation which was largely due to the delay in signature of agreements between the cooperatives and the 
Israeli companies. The late cultivation of cherry tomatoes made it subject to cold weather conditions 
before its buds could grow to tolerate such weather, thus its first harvest was delayed by more than two 
weeks from what was originally planned for, which is quite a substantial delay in export agricultural 
commodity markets and one which carries heavy price consequences. 
 
c) Below average international market prices for selected crops: While global market prices for agricultural 
commodities were on an upward trend since early 2007, the prices of a number of commodities were 
characteristically volatile. While tomatoes and snow peas were not among these crops, in 2008 their prices 
in the market prices were 5-8 percent below their average for the same period in the two preceding years 
due to above average imports. This directly affected the prices that could be gotten for these crops 
downward, squeezing the profit margin of, both, the Israeli companies and the beneficiary farmers. 
d) Farmers’ attitude to grading and packaging: Anecdotal evidence suggests that despite their high level of 
awareness and high level knowledge of grading process requirements and packaging techniques, farmers 
did not develop the attitude necessary for ensuring that these requirements are adhered. Grading was done 
effectively by farmers, and the grading committees established within cooperatives did not seem to have 
the authority to enforce adherence to the required grading standards until late into the season. According to 
ACDI/VOCA staff, a significant proportion of the exported crops were either rejected or sold in secondary 
markets due to grading quality issues, which in turn reduced sale revenue. 
 
e) Delay in certification: The certification of the three cooperatives came much latter than expected, thus 
limiting the sale of the largest proportion of the quantities produced within the framework of the project to 
European wholesalers who are notorious for buying at low prices. 
48 
f) Limited experience of Agrexco in snow peas export: Agrexco signed the agreement with Qabatia 
Cooperative for piloting the snow peas cultivation and marketing. This rubric was used because Agrexco 
had never been engaged in snow peas export before. As a result, the company was not able to properly 
advise the farmers and their cooperative of the market information needed for effective production and 
marketing, including inability to provide advice on the proper packaging, acceptable residue levels and sale 
prices. 
 
g) High transportation cost and transport through put: Delays in transporting crops as a results of long 
processing time and back-to-back systems at Israeli checkpoints have added to the margin squeeze of 
farmers (due to the high cost of back-to-back transport) and often caused irreversible damage to the 
inbound crops (as a result of direct exposure to weather elements and long waiting times), which directly 
affected acceptability and prices of exported goods. While ACDI/VOCA made highly commendable 
efforts to liaise with the Israeli Civil Administration to expedite the crossing process of agricultural 
commodities originating from the three cooperatives and inbound for export, very little was done at 
checkpoints to ensure that this happens. The Project Manager estimated that 10-20 percent of the total 
shipments sent for export by the three cooperatives sustained substantial damage at the Israeli checkpoints 
and were unfit for sale in neither the export market, nor in Israel. 
The ability of the cooperatives to export and meet their production-for-marketing targets despite all the above 
factors and their compound effect should not be taken lightly. In fact, it deserves both praise and admiration. The 
evaluation team strongly believes that while the market linkages established by through the project did not meet 
their intended target for increasing farmers’ incomes, it does not discredit or take away from the achievements made 
by the project in this regard. The long term impact of the export experience –as we shall examine below- has a 
strong potential for far outweighing the positive results achieved by the project vis-à-vis increased farmer’s income 
through construction and rehabilitation of greenhouses. 
B.2.2. Farmers’ Knowledge and Practices 
We highlighted in “Section A” of this chapter how the project envisaged building the capacity of the beneficiary 
farmers toward improved agricultural practices. In section B.1.1. above we discussed the effectiveness of IPM/ICM 
training on farmers’ practices and income. We shall briefly discuss here the effectiveness of other training programs 
in terms of their contribution to increasing production of safe and healthy vegetables. 
In addition to the IPM/ICM and cherry tomato cultivation for export training courses mentioned above, ANERA 
implemented the training courses on soil management and irrigation, food hygiene and safety, and chemical residue 
traceability training courses. All of these training courses focused on raising the breadth and depth of farmers’ 
knowledge of the importance of safe agricultural practices from a food security and sustainable agriculture 
perspectives. To a large extent, these trainings also focused on making the linkage between reducing the level of 
reliance on pesticides and insecticides and production cost reduction. 
Evaluation survey results show that the effectiveness of these training courses have been very high. While the 
percentage of farmers who reported knowledge of different agricultural terms and concepts related to “Good 
Agricultural Practices” did not substantially increase from its baseline levels, the proportion of farmers who could 
properly explain what is meant by safe agriculture and good agricultural practices increased substantially. On 
average, 88 percent of the surveyed beneficiaries could provide definitions for all terms related to agricultural 
product safety which were part of the training they received. And, an average of 92 percent could describe the key 
processes needed to ensure the safety of agricultural crops. The overwhelming majority of these farmers also 
indicated practice of these processes in their farms. This level of knowledge is unequivocally high and demonstrates 
the project’s success in building the knowledge among farmers on agricultural product safety issues. 
Much like the case with IPM/ICM, evaluation field observations confirmed that there is a very high level of 
correlation between knowledge of good agricultural practices and practice. The overwhelming majority of 
beneficiary farmers visited indicated significant reduction in the use of chemical pesticides and insecticides, and 
many of them claimed using 10-20 percent of what they had been used to over the years. None of the farmers 
surveyed and/or interviewed indicated using Methyl Bromide to sterilize the soil. All of them reported using soil 
solarization techniques. This constitutes sufficient evidence, in the opinion of the evaluation team, to support the 
49 
conclusion that agricultural crops produced by the beneficiary farmers are now safer and more environmentally 
friendly than the level at which they were before the project. 
B.2.3. Cooperative Development and Growth 
Cooperative capacity building activities were implemented largely as planned, and achievements were in line with 
what had been expected at the time of design. Capacity building activities aimed at building the management and 
administrative capacity of the cooperative staff and leaders, as well as building the physical/organizational capacity 
of the five target cooperatives. The capacity building activities were based on an assessment conducted by 
ACDI/VOCA’s Cooperative Assessment Specialist, through which broad areas for capacity building interventions 
were identified. The following points summarize all the capacity building activities that were implemented within 
the framework of the HPM project. 
• Procurement and supply of computers and printers: based on the recommendations of an assessment of the 
information technology resources and infrastructure available in the five target cooperatives which was 
conducted by an external consultant commissioned by ANERA and ESDC, four computers and printers 
were procured and delivered to Baqa, Thinnabeh, Qabatia and Al-Jalameh Cooperatives. Qalqilya 
Cooperative was provided with a photocopier. The provision of this equipment was instrumental for the 
effective implementation of other capacity building interventions. 
• Introducing a management system in all five cooperatives: A management consultant commissioned by 
ANERA developed a model cooperative management system for the beneficiary cooperatives on the basis 
of organizational gap analyses for two of the most active of the five cooperatives, i.e. the two that have the 
most number of services. In working with ANERA, ESDC and ACDI/VOCA, the consultant developed a 
comprehensive management system, complete with procedures and electronic forms. This system was 
reviewed and approved by ACDI/VOC A, ANERA and ESDC and latter presented to and discussed with 
the five cooperatives in a central workshop in Ramallah. The system was customized for each of the five 
cooperatives and, latter, adopted by them. Training and coaching was provided to the cooperatives through 
the project to ensure its full adoption and implementation. The management system and its accompanying 
procedures and forms covered all aspects of management services carried out by the cooperatives, and thus 
was intended to help them improve internal decision making, adopt better controls and strengthen overall 
management, governance and transparency. It was also intended to assist them in adopting other necessary 
management requirements needed for GlobalGap certification, such as record keeping on member farmers. 
• Introducing an electronic financial system in all five cooperatives: A financial consultant was developed a 
financial system using the same process used for developing the management system. “Sham”, computer￾based accounting software developed locally, was procured by ANERA and installed in all five 
cooperatives. An external consultant was later commissioned to work with the cooperatives on 
customizing the financial system to better fit their own needs and to integrate this system with the 
previously developed management system. A central training workshop was conducted for the Board 
members and staff of the five cooperatives to encourage and help them institutionalize the system within 
their cooperatives. Two follow-up training on the use of the “Sham” were also conducted with the 
participation of five Board members (one from each cooperative) and the five accountants of the target 
cooperatives. 
• Training on cooperative principles and democratic governance: Fifteen one-day training workshops were 
conducted with 287 beneficiaries of the five cooperatives. This workshop aimed at strengthening the 
cooperative values among the beneficiaries, and imparting knowledge to them on issues related to 
cooperative management and governance. The training outline focused on introducing cooperative 
principles, Cooperative Law and bylaws, cooperative governance, cooperative business skills. 
• Workshop on cooperative management: A central workshop entitled “Cooperative Management 
Development and Sustainability” was held in Ramallah in February 2008 with the participation of 25 Board 
members and staff from the five cooperatives. The workshop included keynote speeches and presentations 
by prominent cooperative leaders on issues related to cooperative values and principles, cooperative 
accounting and financial planning; cooperative business ventures as means for effective member services 
50 
and sustainability; collective purchasing and marketing; and marketing and promotional campaigns. The 
workshop also included a case study presentation on the Ramallah Poultry Farmers Cooperative, which is 
one of the well-known cooperatives in Palestine for its good governance practice and first-rate financial 
performance. 
• GlobalGap certification, provision of grading and packaging tools and cold storage facilities, and 
marketing/export linkages (described above).
• Website and brochure development: Within the framework of ACDI/VOCA’s support to the five 
cooperatives, an internet domain name was obtained for each cooperative and a website was developed for 
each of them by an external e-marketing consultant. This consultant also developed a brochure for each of 
the five cooperatives. 
The cooperative capacity building objective was unquestionably achieved. Where cooperatives had little knowledge 
of how to plan, manage and implement, document and report on their activities and services, the training resulted in 
all of them learning at least the basics in all of these. This was a commendable result given that the entire allocation 
for training over the lifetime of the project was $78,000, 9.9% of total budget. It was also commendable given that 
training fell largely on the shoulders of the project team. 
The provision of the management and financial systems has transformed the way the cooperatives conduct their 
business. Where cooperatives had rudimentary manual systems and procedures to manage their business processes, 
the systems provided by the project helped them improve the way they operate by increasing efficiency, accuracy 
and organization, and, more importantly, be able to organize membership services and governance. The databases 
developed through the project to assist the cooperatives in the GlobalGap certification process have -without doubt￾improved the capacity of these cooperatives to explore marketing opportunities for their willing members and speak 
on their behalf. Coalescing information on the area of land cultivated by members and the types of crops cultivated 
which used to be considered an impossible task by cooperatives, can now be done with a click of a button by them. 
Engaging in the GlobalGap certification process and having been through the process of exporting has built a 
tremendous capacity within the three cooperatives, despite the unfavorable results when it comes to economic 
returns. Going through the GlobalGap certification process and, later, the export process has raised the level of 
awareness and knowledge of these cooperatives of exporting requirements and they are now substantially better 
positioned to engage in export activities than ever before. The physical infrastructure they have received through 
the project for this purpose gives them a competitive advantage over others in this field. Meeting face-to-face with 
Israeli buyers and export companies should not be under-estimated as it significantly improved the cooperatives 
business negotiations capacity. As one of the cooperative leaders put it to the evaluation team, “the project helped 
us become experts in the export business in no-time, and we can now advise others what to do”. The capacity built 
through the GlobalGap certification and export process is highly commendable given the fact that it was added to 
the project during implementation on the basis of an emerging opportunity. 
 
Finally, the evaluation team views the integrated capacity building approach followed by the project and the high 
level of commitment of the project team with high regard. It is this approach and commitment that has made all of 
the above achievements possible. ACDI/VOCA and ANERA are particularly commended for their ability to 
manage such a highly demanding approach to capacity building. 
The main shortcoming that the evaluation team would like to highlight is the delay in the production of cooperative 
brochures and establishment of the cooperative websites, which were completed towards the end of the project, and 
the limited attention to cooperative capacity building in the area of website maintenance. While the former is not 
substantial on the grand scheme of the project, the latter is slightly more substantial from a sustainability and 
efficiency perspective. It was clear through interviews that cooperatives do not have the requisite capacity to update 
their websites or use email. The long-term effectiveness and utility of the website development should thus be 
examined in an ex-post evaluation. 
51 
B.3. Efficiency 
For the purposes of this evaluation, the assessment of the project efficiency was done through investigating the 
following efficiency factors: i) project actual costs compared with appraisal estimates and any revisions; ii) 
implementation performance; iii) the level of benefits and their growth curve compared with expectations; iv) 
utilization rates for project facilities and services; quality of inputs provided; and adequacy of the project benefits 
stream vis-à-vis its costs. 
On the balance, the HPM project has demonstrated considerable efficiency in transforming available inputs and 
resources into outputs. This, as we shall examine in further detail below, is largely attributed to the effective use of 
financial (and human) resources, the high level of cost effectiveness of the overall intervention, and the quality of 
inputs provided. 
B.3.1. Utilization of Financial and Human Resources 
Funding: The total planned budget to the HPM project was US$ 788,751, of which 66 percent was allocated to 
greenhouse construction and rehabilitation; 9.7 percent to training and technical assistance; and, 18.5 percent to 
project staff salaries and benefits. The remaining 5.8 percent were allocated to equipment, local travel, and 
operational and indirect costs. Table 16 below provides further details on the project budget as designed and as 
discharged. 
The total expenditures incurred by the HPM project were in line with what had been planned. Over expenditure in 
certain line items was within the allowable threshold agreed between ACDI/VOCA and ANERA. The overall 
budget was not affected by these over-expenditures due to under-expenditure in other line items and savings accrued 
from beneficiary contributions as a result of exchange rate fluctuations. Financial documentation and reporting 
overall was also well designed, well kept and followed. The full extent of the monitoring and evaluation system 
and processes described in the project proposal were adequately operationalized. 
Staffing: The expertise of the project staff was found to be well in-line with what is needed and their qualifications 
and responsibilities were commensurate with each other. The high level of coordination between ANERA and 
ESDC and the high level of cooperation between the project team on the technical levels may have been the one of 
main reasons for the effective utilization of financial resources as it minimized the need for external assistance and 
played a major role in closing the skill gap when needed on both administrative and technical levels. 
52 
Table 17: HPM budget as planned and as discharged
Line# Description
1 Greenhouses 
1.1 Construction of Plastic Greenhouses (650 m2 each) 425,331.00 53 9% 425,331.00 54.0%
1.3 Rehabilitation of Greenhouses (1 Dunum each) 89,442.00 11 3% 89,442.00 11.3%
1.8 Traps 2,290.00 0 3% 2,290.75 0.3%
1.9 Sign boards and Banners 3,352.00 0.4% 2,596.89 0.3%
Total Greenhouses $520,415.00 66.0% $519,660.64 65.9%
2 Training & Technical Assistance
2.1 Training & Technical Assistance Targeting Cooperatives
2.1.1 Coop Principles & Democratic Governance Wkshp 1,820.00 0 2% 1,733.00 0.2%
2.1.2 Central Workshop - Coop Management 2,700.00 0 3% 2,086.00 0.3%
2.1.4 Consultants 7,500.00 1 0% 7,500.00 1.0%
2.1.5 Accounting Software and Training 5,695.00 0.7% 5,695.00 0.7%
2.1.6 Computers & Printers 4,785.00 0.6% 4,785.00 0.6%
2.1.7 Project Website for promotion & Networking 3,263.00 0.4% 3,263.00 0.4%
2.1.9 Grading & packaging Tools & S ickers & Cold Storage 39,390.00 5 0% 38,439.00 4.9%
Sub-Total $65,153.00 8 3% $63,501.00 8.1%
2.2 Training & Technical Assistance Targeting Farmers
2.2.1 IPM Training - 3 days each wkshp, 3 wkshps each coop 7,920.00 1 0% 7,920.00 1.0%
2.2.2 Soil Management and Irriga ion Quality Workshops 1,440.00 0 2% 1,327.97 0.2%
2.2.4 Pesticides Residue Testing 3,500.00 0.4% 3,521.14 0.4%
Sub-Total $12,860.00 1.6% $12,769.11 1.6%
Total Training & Technical Assistance $78,013.00 9.9% $76,270.11 9.7%
3 Publications
3.2 Cooperative Brochures & Business Cards 2,400.00 0 3% 2,350.00 0.3%
Total Publications $2,400.00 0.3% $2,350.00 0.3%
4 Salaries and Benefits
4.1 Salaries
4.1.1 Project Manager (100% of Time)- ANERA 36,250.00 4.6% 37,950.00 4.8%
4.1.2 Accountant (10% of Time) 2,936.00 0.4% 2,936.00 0.4%
4.1.3 Manager - Finance & Administration (10% of Time) 642.00 0.1% 642.00 0.1%
4.1.4 Project Assistant (100% 0f Time) - ANERA 9,450.00 1 2% 10,050.00 1.3%
Sub-Total $49,278.00 6 2% $51,578.00 6.5%
4.2 Benefits
4.2.1 Benefits - 20% 9,856.00 1 2% 9,856.00 1.3%
Sub-Total $9,856.00 1 2% $9,856.00 1.3%
Total Salaries and Benefits $59,134.00 7.5% $61,434.00 7.8%
5 Local Travel
5.1 Vehicle Fuel 2,900.00 0.4% 2,900.00 0.4%
5.2 Vehicle Maintenance 725.00 0.1% 992.52 0.1%
5.3 Vehicle Insurance and Registration 1,450.00 0 2% 1,450.00 0.2%
Total Local Travel $5,075.00 0.6% $5,342.52 0.7%
6 Equipments
6.1 Computer - Laptop & Printer) 1,435.00 0 2% 1,435.00 0.2%
6.2 Printer 494.00 0.1% 418.03 0.1%
Total Equipments $1,929.00 0.2% $1,853.03 0.2%
7 Office Rent 
7.1 (26% of Ramallah office) 2,610.00 0 3% 2,610.00 0.3%
Total Rent $2,610.00 0.3% $2,610.00 0.3%
8 Direct and Indirect Cost
Total Direct Cost 1-7 $669,576.00 84 9% $669,520.30 84.9%
Indirect Cost (48.69% of ANERA Personnel Costs) $28,792.00 3.7% $28,792.34 3.7%
Total Direct and Indirect Cost (ANERA) $698,368.00 88.5% $698,312.64 88.6%
% of Total 
Ependitures
Total Program
Summary Program Contribution Report 
Budget 
Amount
% of Total 
Budget
Cumulative 
Expenditures
53 
Line# Description
9 Pass through to ESDC
9.1 Salaries
9.1.1 Director (18%) 6,436.00 0.8% 6,899.00 0.9%
9.1.2 Project Coordinator 1 (50% of Time) 13,581.00 1.7% 10,888.80 1.4%
9.1.3 Project Coordinator 2 (50% of Time) 13,581.00 1.7% 14,100.50 1.8%
9.1.4 Agronomist 1 (100% of Time) 15,857.00 2.0% 17,002.00 2.2%
9.1.5 Agronomist 2 (100% of Time) 15,857.00 2.0% 17,002.00 2.2%
9.1.6 Administrative Assistant (30%) 3,140.00 0.4% 3,490.00 0.4%
Sub-Total ESDC Salaries $68,452.00 8.7% $69,382.30 8.8%
9.2 Other ESDC Direct Costs
9.2.1 Office Rent (25%) 4,531.00 0.6% 4,531.00 0.6%
9.2.2 Office supplies 3,625.00 0.5% 3,571.27 0.5%
9.2.3 Telecommunication 3,625.00 0.5% 3,492.33 0.4%
9.2.4 Local Travel / Transportation 10,150.00 1.3% 8,968.46 1.1%
Sub-Total Other ESDC Direct Costs $21,931.00 2.8% $20,563.06 2.6%
Total Pass through to ESDC $90,383.00 11.5% $89,945.36 11.4%
Grand Total $788,751.00 100.0% $788,258.00 100.0%
% of Total 
Ependitures
Total Program
Summary Program Contribution Report 
Budget 
Amount
% of Total 
Budget
Cumulative 
Expenditures
B.3.2. Targeting and Beneficiary Selection 
Considerable efforts were put into the beneficiary selection process. ANERA and ESDC began with visiting all 
target cooperatives and meeting with cooperative members to explain the project objectives and its implementation 
processes. Public advertisements soliciting applications from interested cooperative farmers were posted in public 
places within the targeted communities. These advertisements included a brief description of the project, 
beneficiary selection criteria, and instructions on how and when to apply. 
Once the application deadline was reached, a preliminary review of the applications was done by a committee 
comprising ANERA, ESDC, ACDI/VOCA and representatives from each cooperative. The preliminary review 
involved verification of completion of applications by beneficiaries and an exclusion of all single applicants; i.e. 
those not having dependents, and those indicating lack of readiness/willingness to leverage the required 
contribution. Farmers with comparatively large ownership of greenhouses were excluded from receiving new 
construction, but not from the greenhouse rehabilitation activity. A list of potential beneficiaries was thus prepared 
in each cooperative, and verification visits to applicants were conducted by ANERA Field Coordinators to all 
farmers on these lists. In addition to verifying information provided in the application, these visits were intended to 
assess farmers readiness to introduce new agricultural techniques and collective activities, such as collective 
marketing and purchasing. Once all field visits were completed and verification data entered into a database, the 
selection committee met again to make the final selection of beneficiaries. The selection process was guided by the 
number of new greenhouses and greenhouse rehabilitation interventions allocated for each cooperative. 
This process was effective in identifying those beneficiaries most in need of assistance. Involving the cooperatives 
in the selection process was an efficient way of creating a sense of ownership and verifying eligibility of applicants 
in a timely manner (cooperative leaders involved knew the beneficiaries and their socio-economic conditions, and 
thus could verify application and field data). The selection process was also highly efficient in terms of its ability to 
select farmers who could effectively contribute to the project’s objectives and overall goal. 
This notwithstanding, the evaluation survey indicated to a few number of inclusion errors, where a number of 
farmers who have ownership of greenhouses in excess of three dunums received new greenhouses through the 
project. According to ANERA, this inclusion was primarily due to the limited number of cooperative members in 
certain localities compared to the number of allocated number of greenhouses for new construction. Moreover, 
some exclusions errors were noted, where some farmers who could have effectively benefited from the project’s 
new construction activities were excluded due to their inability to provide the required in-cash leverage, which was 
meant to increase ownership and, thus, sustainability. The exclusion of these individuals, albeit unintended by the 
project’s selection criteria, is quite unfortunate especially since the HPM project was designed to improve the food 
54 
security mainly through addressing economic access constraints faced by vulnerable farmer households. As it was, 
the poorest and most vulnerable farmers may have not been able to equally benefit from the project as their fellow 
less vulnerable farmers due to the high level of in-cash contribution required by the project. 
B.3.4. Utilization of Services 
As shown in Section B above, the overwhelming majority of the farmers have introduced IPM/ICM techniques in 
their farms, and cooperatives’ level of reliance on the management and financial systems with which they were 
provided is very high. Judging by this, the evaluation team contends that the utilization efficiency of the project 
results is very high. Future utilization prospects are equally high, albeit there is some concern about the future 
utilization of the cold storage, grading and packaging facilities. This concern emanates from the fact that none of 
the three cooperatives were using these facilities at the time of the evaluation on account of expiration of all export 
contracts facilitated by the project. A more objective assessment of the utilization rates of these facilities could thus 
be part of an exp-post evaluation. 
 
B.3.5. Beneficiary Satisfaction 
From a beneficiary satisfaction perspective, the project was highly efficient. The evaluation survey findings show 
that 95 percent of the project beneficiaries are satisfied with the overall stream of benefits they received through the 
project. Of those, 96.8 percent are satisfied with the economic return they were able to accrue as a result of the 
project. Extension services provided by the project seem to have been particularly efficient in terms of their 
contribution to the overall level beneficiary satisfaction, as 98.4 percent of the interviewed beneficiaries expressed 
satisfaction with the services provided by the project’s extension agents. These extraordinary levels of satisfaction 
indicate that the project was able to deliver to farmers the outputs and results it promised them at the end of the 
project. 
 
Figure 8: Level of beneficiaries’ satisfaction with various aspects related to project implementation (% 
beneficiaries) 
B.3.6. Achievement of Target Indicators 
Table 18 below sets out the project’s planned performance targets against those achieved. On the balance, all output 
targets (italicized in the table below) were achieved or surpassed. The under achievement or lack thereof in certain 
training outputs is justified by an agreement reached between ACDI/VOCA and ANERA that these training would 
be covered by PARC within the framework of the GlobalGap certification process. Based on project documents 
obtained from ACDI/VOCA, these seem to have been implemented as planned. At the same time the under 
achievement on output targets related to number of trainees is due to over-estimation at project design, thus 
underperformance here is acceptable. 
55 
Table 18: Planned vs. achieved performance indicator targets under the HPM project
 
Code Program indicators Cumulative 
Targeted achieved % of target 
PI1 Total # of beneficiary HH assisted (cumulative) 413 386 93% No of beneficiaries
 - Male 413 372 90% 
 - Female 0 14 - 
 
Total # of direct & indirect beneficiaries assisted (cumulative 
&disaggregated by sex) 2891 2143 74% 
 - Male 1652 1295 78% 
 - Female 1239 848 68% 
P12. % of trained producers with knowledge of improved production 
techniques 75% 100% 130% 
IR 1: Cooperative Agribusiness Growth Component (CoAg) 
Imp 1.1 $ Value of Commodities sold by members through their cooperative $1,175,000 $674,562 57% 
Imp 1.2 Metric tons of crops/commodity sold through cooperatives 2500 1430 57% 
Imp. 1.3 % of residue analysis tests accepted 
 Imp. 1.4 Average price $/kilo of selected crops 
Imp 1.4.1 - Tomatoes 
Imp 1.4.2 - Cherry tomatoes 
Imp 1.4.3 - Cucumbers 
Imp 1.4.4 - Bell Pepper 
Imp 1.4.5 - Green bean 
Imp 1.4.6 - Snow peas 
Imp 1.4.7 - Jews Mallow 
Imp. 1.5 # of new market linkages 6 3 50% 
Imp. 1.6 Average Organizational Assessment Rating 70% N/A N/A 
Mon 1.7 # of improved commercial greenhouses 
 - # of green houses rehabilitated 226 226 100% 
 - # of plastic houses constructed 127 128 101% 
In.1.1: Capacity Building Indicator 
In.1.1. # of workshops 
In.1.1.1 # of coop principle and democratic governance workshops 14 15 107% 
In.1.1.2 # of central training / Coop management workshops 1 1 100% 
In.1.1.3 # of FaaB workshops 14 14 100% 
In.1.1.4 # of post harvest handling workshops 14 0 0% 
In.1.1.5 # of IPM workshops 14 14 100% 
In.1.1.6 # of soil management & irrigation quality workshops 14 14 100% 
In.1.1.7 # of green house management & alternative farming workshops 14 0 0% 
In.1.2. # of trained persons in the workshops 
In.1.2.1 # of coop principle and democratic governance workshops 353 287 81% 
In.1.2.2 # of central training / Coop management workshops 30 25 83% 
In.1.2.3 # of FaaB workshops 353 328 93% 
In.1.2.4 # of post harvest handling workshops 353 0 0% 
In.1.2.5 # of IPM workshops 353 329 93% 
In.1.2.6 # of soil management & irrigation quality workshops 353 312 88% 
In.1.2.7 # of green house management & alternative farming workshops 353 0 0% 
In. 1.3 Extension 
In. 1.3.1 # of extension visits 6480 6040 93% 
56 
B.4. Impact 
The project has left a clear mark on the livelihood of the beneficiary farmers and their cooperatives. While much of 
the project impact areas have been discussed in section B.2 above, the following points summarize what the project 
had been able to achieve vis-à-vis its intended goal of increasing the food security and livelihoods of the 
beneficiaries and their households: 
• The project is believed to have increased the 
income of 127 farmer households by an 
average of NIS 5,340, and the income of 226 
others by NIS10,570 last season. This 
increase in income is directly related to 
increased productivity of agriculture through 
the construction of new greenhouses (for the 
former group) and the rehabilitation of existing 
greenhouses (for the latter group). This 
additional income would significantly increase 
with year-round cultivation. The increase in 
farmers’ income has reduced the vulnerability 
of the beneficiary households to food security 
as it decreased their economic food access gap 
and augmented their livelihood resources 
through the provision of productive assets to 
them. 
• The project has contributed to increasing the 
overall national capacity for local production 
of greenhouse crops. This was done by 
bringing 80 dunums of greenhouses under 
cultivation. 
• The project has improved the capacity of five 
target cooperatives to provide improved value￾added services to their members. This was 
done through a variety of technical assistance 
interventions that built the internal 
organizational and institutional capacity of the 
target cooperatives. Now, three cooperatives 
representing more than 250 farmer households 
are ready to immediately engage in the profitable export business, and if they so chose they can effectively 
contribute to improving the local economic conditions within the communities they serve through the 
creation of employment opportunities. 
• The project has effectively improved internal relations between the target cooperatives. Evaluation survey 
results revealed that 88.2 percent of the beneficiary farmers feel that their relationship with their 
cooperative has increased as a direct result of the project, while the remaining 11.8 feel that their 
relationship with their cooperative has not changed. 
• From a food safety and utilization perspective, the project has undoubtedly contributed to major 
improvements. In addition to what was mentioned earlier regarding the reduced use of chemical pesticides 
and insecticides, anecdotal evidence gathered within the framework of this evaluation strongly suggest that 
the application of safe agriculture techniques has transcended the 306 dunums targeted by the program as 
farmers began implementing IPM/ICM techniques in the majority of their land holdings. 
“I cultivated 2,800 tomato seedlings in one dunum 
for export. Based on what we were told, I expected 
to export five tons and generate an income of NIS 
25,000. But, what I got was less than NIS 5,000, 
which does not cover my production costs. It was a 
very bad season by all means, and I cannot blame 
[ACDI/]VOCA or anyone else. Everything went 
against our wishes… Going through the export 
experience was very good for all of us, I think. It 
taught me personally what is needed to produce 
high-quality crops, and I believe that I am now able 
to export if the opportunity arises again. Next time, 
however, we have to plan a lot more carefully and 
be prepared to ask for better contract terms… 
The training we received was excellent by all means. 
We have receive training in the past, but it was not 
like the training this project provided… I have 
changed the way I do things around my farm as a 
result of the training… I now monitor my irrigation 
schedule; I use much, much less chemical pesticides; 
I pay attention to the safety period; and I maintain 
records of everything I do in the farm. I even started 
calculating my profits and expenditures down to the 
last Agorot… I just was going through my records 
now, and I realized that my cost of production 
dropped by 18 percent.” 
57 
The project has had a negative short-term impact on the 59 farmers who participated in the export contracts, as these 
farmers sustained income losses due to the failure of the export contracts to deliver sufficient income to these 
farmers to cover all of their production costs. These farmers may very well be worst off now as a result of their 
export losses than they were before the project. However, as noted earlier, the knowledge and experience these 
farmers gained as a result of their involvement in the export process has been substantially greater than the 
remaining beneficiary farmers. This may act a counterweight to the loss they sustained on the medium long-term. 
B.5. Sustainability 
Overall, the likelihood of the sustainability of the project results is quite likely due to the following factors: 
a) Strong sense of ownership of the physical infrastructures established through the project among 
beneficiaries. This is largely because the infrastructures provided to them were –and still are- highly 
relevant to their needs, but also because they took part in and contributed to their implementation. 
b) Commitment of cooperative leaders to maintain the systems developed through the project and to seek 
ways to re-engage in export marketing. In interviews cooperative Board members showed strong interest 
in re-engaging with Israeli companies to export products. Already the Thinnaba cooperative has signed a 
contract with an Israeli wholesaler for the marketing of agricultural products in Israel. This would not have 
been possible without the project. Moreover, there is strong evidence to suggest that Israeli exporters have 
become aware of the readiness of the three cooperatives that received the GlobalGap certification for export 
and have begun contacting them to explore joint business activities. 
c) Simplicity of technologies introduced and low cost of maintenance and operation of the infrastructure 
established. The bias against high-cost, advanced technologies was stressed in the project’s design which 
helped the project maximize the potential of project sustainability. Both the greenhouses and the cold 
storage units could be maintained and operated quite easily by the project beneficiaries themselves or by 
local contractors when needed. 
C. Overall Conclusions and Recommendations 
The HPM project was well designed and demonstrated high level of relevance to the local context and to the overall 
goal of the WBFS Program. Its foremost strength is its integrated approach to capacity building which involved 
targeted training and extension to farmers and their cooperatives on the one hand, and establishment of facilities to 
complement capacity building. 
Despite several extraneous factors that forced implementation delays that made it very difficult for ANERA, ESDC 
and ACDI/VOCA to keep their planned sequence of activities and achieve some of the project’s key performance 
targets, the project was implemented on time and within the parameters of the allocated budget. The cooperation 
and close collaboration among the three partners –ANERA, ESDC, and ACDI/VOCA- was instrumental in making 
this possible. The partners are commended for this achievement. 
The project objectives have been met effectively. The evaluation findings show that the average increases in income 
among the beneficiaries of new greenhouses was in the realm of NIS 5,340, while it was around NIS 10,570 among 
the beneficiaries of the greenhouse rehabilitation activity. With the cost savings accrued by beneficiaries as a result 
of utilizing IPM/ICM and other farm management techniques on which they were training, it is highly likely that 
these values are higher. However, the effectiveness of the project in terms of the economic return to beneficiary 
farmers (59) from export activities was well below expectations, but this was largely due to factors beyond the 
control of the implementing partners. The evaluation team is convinced that the partners have done all they could to 
mitigate the effect of these factors, but the multitude of these factors overpowered all of the mitigation efforts made. 
The project’s capacity building activities aimed at cooperatives have transformed the way the five target 
cooperatives discharge their responsibilities and better positioned them to provide improved value-added services to 
their members, with a high degree of transparency and efficiency. The cold storage, grading and packaging 
58 
facilities provided to three of the five target cooperatives, and the GlobalGap certification these cooperatives 
received and their involvement in exporting members’ crops through Israeli companies –brokered by ACDI/VOCA, 
were invaluable in raising cooperatives’ organizational capacity. Going through the entire export process and 
meeting the GlobalGap requirements have essentially enabled the three cooperatives to take quantum leap and join 
the ranks of globally certified cooperatives and agricultural producers. This is highly commendable given it was 
possible in a relatively very short period of time and without being an integral part of the project design. 
Based on the assessment of the way resources were used, the beneficiary selection process, achievement of planned 
outputs and beneficiary satisfaction, the evaluation team is of the opinion of that the project was efficiently 
implemented. The outputs produced were in line with original expectations in terms of quantity and quality. The 
project budget was discharged much according to what had been agreed, and financial processes and documentation 
were well maintained. The project was well staffed, and the human resources seemed to have the requisite 
backgrounds and experience for implementing the project activities. Beneficiaries’ satisfaction, used as a proxy for 
achievement of declared results and outputs, was remarkable, with more than 94 percent of the beneficiaries 
indicating satisfaction with the overall stream of benefits they received, and more than 98 percent indicating 
satisfaction with the economic return accrued as a result of the project. 
The immediate impact of the project could be easily be observed by the evaluators. Driven by productivity gains as a 
result of increased area of land under cultivation, the project increased the seasonal income of 128 farmer 
households who received new greenhouses and 226 farmer households who received greenhouse rehabilitation by an 
average of NIS 5,340 and NIS10,570, respectively. It has also contributed to increasing the farming income of all 
354 beneficiaries by 10-15% percent as a result of facilitating an equal reduction in production cost. The increase in 
income essentially means that the project has decreased the food insecurity or vulnerability thereto of the 354 
beneficiary households. The project has also contributed to increasing the overall national capacity for local 
production of greenhouse crops by bringing 80 dunums of greenhouses under cultivation; improved the capacity of 
five target cooperatives to provide improved value-added services to their members and increased their potential 
contribution to local economic development; improved internal relations within the target cooperatives; and 
noticeably improved the safety of agricultural products. The direct impact of the program on women, however, has 
been marginal. 
The project has had a negative short-term impact on the 59 farmers who participated in the export contracts, as these 
farmers sustained income losses due to the failure of the export contracts to deliver sufficient income to these 
farmers to cover all of their production costs. This notwithstanding, the knowledge and experience these farmers 
gained as a result of their involvement in the export process has been substantially greater than the remaining 
beneficiary farmers. This may act a counterweight to the loss they sustained on the medium long-term. 
The sustainability of the project is quite likely due to the high sense of ownership among the beneficiaries of the 
newly constructed and rehabilitate greenhouses; the commitment of the cooperative leaders to use and maintain 
systems, the level of institutionalization of these systems; and the adequacy of technologies introduced by the 
project for the local context. 
 
The main lessons learned from the HPM project are the following: 
a) Agricultural cooperatives could be effective agents for agricultural development if given the appropriate 
resources, training and coaching. The HPM project experience has shown that cooperatives have the desire 
to grow and provide value-added service to their membership base, but lack the technical knowledge, 
expertise, and –sometimes- attitude to make this possible. Their business acumen is particularly weak. 
b) Marketing agricultural products remains the main constraint facing agricultural development, and the 
principal reason behind the food insecurity of Palestinian farmers. Effective interventions are thus crucially 
needed to address the marketing constraints faced by agricultural producers. Helping farmers and their 
cooperatives obtain EurepGap and GlobalGap certification are extremely effective strategies for doing just 
that. 
c) Limited access to external markets is the most critical factor behind the marketing problems faced by 
Palestinian agricultural producers. However, lack of experience among Palestinian farmers and their 
59 
cooperatives in export processes and requirements is equally critical. Given the current political 
environment, the most effective interventions to address the marketing problems are those that help farmers 
and their cooperative improve their capacity and readiness for exports. 
d) The integrated approach to cooperative capacity building is crucial to the success of any cooperative 
capacity building intervention. The integrated approach to capacity development was the reason why the 
HPM was successful in achieving its capacity building targets. To this end, capacity building programs 
should include provisions for systems development, farmer training and coaching, cooperative Boards’ 
training and coaching, cooperative facility upgrades and development, and –most importantly- specialized 
training on specialized business topics such as business negotiations and contract management, 
international commodity market training, and marketing management. 
e) Timely cultivation, strict grading and packaging systems and processes are critical factors to the success of 
any agricultural export venture. Thus, planning for such venture must be grounded with accurate market 
information and solid risk mitigation measures. In the Palestinian context, risks to be considered should 
include, inter alia, availability of inputs, closures and changing transport procedures, farmers’ attitudes 
towards adherence to grading and packaging, Palestinian Authority phyto-sanitary certifications, and 
weather conditions. 
f) In development programming, and particularly in food security programs, beneficiary selection criteria 
should be carefully crafted to ensure congruence between the programming objectives and the beneficiary 
selection criteria. If the objective of a food security program is being pursued through interventions at the 
household level, then households most in need should be targeted and selection criteria to enshrine this 
approach should be established. It follows that beneficiary contributions –if required by a donor- should be 
set at a level that does not prevent those most in need from benefiting from the intervention. 
 
 The key recommendations emerging from this evaluation for immediate action are the following: 
a) ACDI/VOCA should seek out ways to extend further support to the three targeted cooperatives. In 
particular, it should assist them in identifying export opportunities on the basis of solid market information. 
Within the framework of this support, training should be provided on business negotiations and business 
planning. USAID is strongly encouraged to extend further support to ACDI/VOCA for this purpose. 
b) The three cooperative are strongly encouraged to further institutionalize the systems developed by the 
project. They should convene a General Assembly meeting to discuss and formally approve these systems 
as soon as possible. 
c) The three cooperatives are strongly encouraged to explore export opportunities. In this regard the 
cooperatives must not expect buyers to set a minimum price for the crops to be purchased, as this is not a 
common practice in the agricultural commodities trade market. Instead, cooperatives should negotiate 
better contract terms and provide incentives to buyers to gain preferential treatment and facilities from 
them. 
d) ANERA should publicize the success of the HPM project and seek out funding for its replication. 
 
60 
CHAPTER FIVE: OLIVE OIL PRODUCTION, HARVESTING, PRESSING AND OIL 
STORAGE 
A. Overview and Performance Targets 
After having completed an assessment of 19 potential oil producer cooperatives -through which 11 cooperatives 
were pre-selected for inclusion in its Olive Production, Harvesting, Pressing and Oil Storage (OPHPOS) component 
of the WBFS Program, ACDI/VOCA sent an RFP along with detailed proposal instructions in April 2007 to three 
local organizations: the Palestine Trade Center (PalTrade); the Economic and Social Development Center (ESDC); 
and the Near East Foundation (NEF). The three organizations were pre-qualified on the basis of their previous 
experience in olive oil sector development projects and their demonstrated management and financial capacity. 
One week before the proposal submission deadline, ESDC informed ACDI/VOCA of its intent not to participate in 
the bid, leaving the competition between PalTrade and 
NEF. By end of May, ACDI/VOCA had informed 
PalTrade that its proposal was favorably accepted, 
conditional upon certain modifications. 
PalTrade proceeded with introducing these 
modifications and sent a revised proposal to 
ACDI/VOCA, which in turn reviewed it and forwarded 
it to the USAID CTO for approval on 22 June 2007. 
On 28 June 2007, the CTO provided her comments on 
the proposal. The comments were discussed in a 
meeting in early July 2007, and on 11 July 2007 
USAID informed ACDI/VOCA of its approval of the 
project. The project agreement was signed on 18 July 
2007, with an estimated completion date of 31 January 
2008. The relatively long lead-time between the 
proposal submission and contract signature was largely 
due to time spent on identifying and recruiting the 
needed technical staff after the refusal of PalTrade’s 
implementing partner, Al-Zaytouna, and four other 
local organizations that were identified by PalTrade as 
alternative partners during contract negotiations with 
ACDI/VOCA to sign the USAID mandatory Anti￾Terrorism Clause (ATC). This delay, as we shall 
examine later, stalled the launch of the project and was 
one of critical factors that constrained the project from 
achieving its envisaged results. 
In line with the overall WBFS Program goals and the 
objectives set by ACDI/VOCA for the OPHPOS 
component, PalTrade designed under the rubric of 
increasing smallholder income through enhanced 
cooperative capacity and commercial agribusiness 
growth. In particular, the project goal was 
strengthening backward linkages and managing the 
relationship throughout the value chain via a market 
driven strategy using the selected cooperatives as the 
main driver for developing the value chain. The aim 
was to improve the management procedures and controls along with the overall efficiency of the value chain by 
utilizing best international practices in the olive oil industry, while the main objectives were: 
The Palestinian olive agricultural sector has a significant 
national value as it symbolizes Palestinian history and 
resilience, as well as its historic contribution to the local 
economy and employment. The importance of olive 
sector is demonstrated in a number of ways, inter alia: its 
significant contribution to agricultural income, where it 
makes up about 15% of the agricultural output in 
bountiful seasons; its contribution to agricultural exports 
(US$ 15 million per annum); and its significant 
contribution to the creation of seasonal jobs (about three 
million person workdays in bountiful years). Palestinian 
olive oil has a characteristically unique flavor and aroma, 
with a relatively high percentage of liquefaction. It 
supposedly tops some 25% of total olives -compared to 
15% in most other countries- which offset the processing 
cost associated with its collection and transportation. 
Palestinian olive oil also has strong historical and 
religious value around the world, giving it a special 
"country of origin" advantage in some countries; i.e. a 
significant export potential. Its strengths and advantages 
aside, the olive oil sector suffers from a number of 
weaknesses, namely: (i) outdated and inefficient 
production techniques; (ii) low and fluctuating 
productivity of groves; (iii) increasing transportation 
costs and relatively high labor costs; (iv) lack of access to 
finance; (v) lack of adequate storage facilities; and (vi) 
weak marketing and distribution, both at the local and 
international levels. Palestinian farmers produce an 
average of 20 - 22 thousand tons of olive oil annually. 
Local consumption only accounts for 12 thousand tons 
leaving an annual surplus of 10 thousand tons. Some of 
the main reasons for such surplus are the fragmented 
production and distribution and the lack of knowledge and 
equipment to deliver world-class olive oil.
61 
• To develop the management, financial and business systems for 11 targeted cooperatives and encourage 
collaboration among farmers in terms of collective operations including procurements, olive pressing, 
production and storage of extra virgin olive oil and marketing. 
• To train farmer groups and cooperatives on techniques and procedures of olive harvesting, post harvest 
handling and oil storage. 
• To assist farmers and their cooperatives in the production of high quality olive oil through the provision of 
ventilated crates, stainless steel storage tanks and other post-harvest materials that improve post-harvest 
practices and quality, as well as providing targeted rehabilitation and maintenance of cooperative olive 
presses. 
Towards the achievement of this chain of results, the project envisaged providing support to clusters of farmers 
affiliated with olive producing cooperatives in adopting the “well-tested” collective olive pressing and oil storage 
(COPOS) scheme. Eleven cooperatives and 500 of their member farmers would be targeted to adopt this scheme, 
which would increase their olive oil quality and value, and improve their production methods. In doing so, the 
project would help farmers and their cooperatives improve the marketability of their olive oil which would 
culminate in the sale of a total of 200 metric tons of high quality, extra-virgin olive oil, with a total value of 
US$980,000. 
The implementation began immediately after the signature of the contract with ACDI/VOCA. First done was the 
advertising of the project in the eleven target cooperatives to facilitate the expeditious selection of beneficiaries, and 
the assessment of the eleven cooperatives capacity development needs. The former was completed in August, and 
the latter in early September 2007. A total of 559 applications were received from the eleven target cooperatives, of 
which 500 were favorably selected on the basis of an evaluation against pre-set standard criteria (household income, 
household size, dunums owned, and ability/readiness to leverage the required in-cash contribution). Table below 
shows the distribution of the beneficiaries according to the target cooperative to which they belong. 
Table 19: Distribution of OHPOS project beneficiaries by cooperative 
Cooperative/Society Name Village/Locality District No. of 
Beneficiaries 
Marj Sanur Olive Oil Cooperative Sanur Jenin 15 
Azoun Cooperative Azoun Qalqilia 31 
Tulkarem Cooperative for Organic Olive Oil Tulkarem Tulkarem 20 
Palestine Fair-Trade Association Jenin Jenin 157 
Sir Agricultural Cooperative Sir Jenin 16 
Kofr Allabad Cooperative for Olive Pressing and Marketing Kofr Allabad Tulkarem 28 
Cooperative Society for Pressing Olives (CSPO)- Beit Jala Beit Jala Bethlehem 16 
Agricultural Cooperative for Investment and Development Salfit Salfit 112 
Immatin Cooperative for Olive Pressing, Processing and 
Marketing Immatin Qalqilia 35 
Baqa Al-Sharqiya Cooperative for Olive Pressing Baqa Al-Sharqiya Tulkarem 26 
Ya’bad Cooperative Society for Olive Pressing Ya’bad Jenin 44 
Total 500 
Ya’bad cooperative was removed the list of 11 targeted cooperatives as its farmers (44) elected not to participate as 
originally agreed due to the expected low yield in 2007. The farmers felt that the expected amount of oil that will be 
left after withdrawing amounts for home consumption and for gifts to relatives and friends will not be sufficient to 
initiate collective storage and marketing. Accordingly, PalTrade proceeded the implementation of the project with 
the participation of 10 cooperative and 456 farmer members. 
62 
B. Assessment of Component Implementation 
B.1. Effectiveness 
B.1.1. Cooperative Growth and Development 
Cooperative capacity building activities were implemented largely as planned, albeit some caveats in terms of 
results were observed as we shall examine below. Capacity building activities implemented within the framework 
of the project aimed at building the management and financial capacity of the cooperative staff and leaders, as well 
as building the physical/organizational capacity of the ten target cooperatives. As noted earlier, the capacity 
building activities were based on an assessment conducted by ACDI/VOCA’s Cooperative Assessment Specialist, 
through which broad areas for capacity building interventions were identified. The following points summarize all 
the capacity building activities that were implemented within the framework of the OHPOS project. 
• Procurement and supply of computers and printers, stainless steel tanks, PH meters, ventilated crates, 
pruning tools, and scales: Immediately after the launch of the project, PalTrade conducted a 
complementary needs assessment to verify the initial physical capacity development needs in the ten 
cooperatives identified in ACDI/VOCA’s cooperative assessment report. Based on this assessment, a list 
of physical assets/equipment needed by the cooperatives to effectively engage in the COPOS scheme was 
coalesced, procured and delivered to the cooperatives (see table below). As we shall examine below, the 
delivery of a several of these equipment was substantially delayed to the detriment of some project results. 
Table 20: Equipment and facilities provided to beneficiary olive producer cooperatives 
Cooperative 
No. of 
Farmers 
Ventilated 
Crates Scales Photocopier Computers Printer 1-Ton 
SST 
5-Ton 
SST 
PH￾Meter/Lab 
Sanor 15 340 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Fair Trade 157 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 
Azzon 31 425 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 
Sir 16 200 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Immatin 35 405 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Beit Jala 16 1160 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 
Tulkarem 20 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Kofr Labad 28 250 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Baqa El 
Sharqia 26 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 
Salfit 112 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 0 
Total 456 2780 8 1 8 9 10 8 8 
• Minor rehabilitation works in olive presses owned/leased by five cooperatives: minor rehabilitation works 
to improve the general hygiene and phyto-sanitary conditions were carried out in five of the target 
cooperatives (Sanour, Fair Trade in Jenin, Immatin, Beit Jala and Baqa Al-Sharqeya). The other five 
cooperative presses were excluded either because they were deemed to be in need of major rehabilitation 
works that are beyond the financial capacity of the project to implement, or because their general phyto￾sanitary and hygiene conditions were deemed appropriate. 
Table 21: Description of olive press rehabilitation works
Cooperative Rehabilitation Description 
Sanor Floor tiling, siding, isolating press boiler, and minor press maintenance works. 
Fair Trade-Jenin Installing iron concrete floor support, tiling and siding, and minor painting works. 
Immatin Floor tiling and rehabilitation of doors and windows . 
Beit Jala Paving press loading and waiting area. 
Baqa El Sharqia Floor tiling and siding, procurement of a heavy-duty fan, and press boiler isolation. 
63 
• Introducing a financial and management system in all ten cooperatives: A management consultant 
commissioned by PalTrade within the framework of the project developed “A Quality Management System 
for Olive Oil Cooperatives” and a financial system for introduction in the target cooperative. The 
consultant presented these systems to the olive cooperatives’ representatives in a central workshop and 
latter began visiting the cooperatives to customize the systems and train the cooperatives on their 
implementation. 
• Introducing a collective olive pressing system in all ten cooperatives: This involved the design, deployment 
and training of cooperative leaders on a computerized system for managing the COPOS scheme. The 
system was installed in all ten cooperatives and a total of 20 cooperative representatives attended. 
• Training of cooperative staff, designated lab technicians and olive press technicians on the COPOS scheme: 
This training aimed at imparting the necessary knowledge among cooperative staff and technicians 
responsible for the olive pressing and olive oil collection and testing to effectively implement the COPOS 
schemes. The training included presentation of the attributes of high-quality olive oil and the factors that 
influence quality pre- and post olive harvest and oil pressing, standard COPOS pressing techniques, olive 
testing procedures, and olive oil collection management. 
 
The OPHOS project has effectively built the physical and administrative capacity of the ten target cooperatives to 
implement the COPOS scheme. This was largely possible through the provision of equipment and the introduction 
of the collective olive pressing management system as well as the training of cooperative leaders and staff on its 
implementation. As a result of these interventions, the ten olive producer cooperatives have –without doubt￾become more cognizant of the importance of collective olive pressing as a strategy for obtaining higher quality and 
higher value yields, and –more important- have the means to implement and effectively manage such collective 
pressing programs. The project’s effectiveness in terms of building the managerial and financial capacity of these 
cooperatives, however, has been mixed. This is largely due to incongruence between the systems developed and 
some cooperatives’ needs on the one hand, and the under-utilization of some cooperatives of the administrative and 
financial systems developed through the project on the other. 
Having said this, the following observations could be made about the cooperative capacity building approach 
followed by the project and its results: 
a) The lack of readiness of some cooperatives to implement the COPOS scheme has substantially constrained 
the project from achieving its cooperative capacity building objectives: It was clear from interviews that the 
level of commitment to and belief in the COPOS scheme among cooperative leaders has not matured 
equally among the target cooperatives. While some cooperative leaders showed high levels of enthusiasm 
about the value of the COPOS scheme –although highlighting the need for effective marketing to 
complement it, others dismissed its importance altogether and highlighting that they have always been 
convinced that COPOS schemes will not work. This predisposition was a major constraint to effective 
olive oil collection as we shall examine below, but more importantly is believed to be the reason why some 
cooperatives did not utilize the management and financial systems developed by the project. It is 
unfortunate that the initial cooperative organizational assessments conducted by ACDI/VOCA, and on 
which basis the target cooperatives were selected, and those conducted by PalTrade during implementation 
were not able to identify these readiness issues or put adequate measures to mitigate their effect. 
b) Training developed capacities in narrow technical skills to the neglect of broader cooperative 
developmental knowledge and skills: Training focused largely on people and skills required for the 
successful functioning of the COPOS scheme to the neglect of others. It focused on narrow technical skills 
to ensure persons such as the cooperative technical staff, and to a lesser extent, the officers and some 
cooperative members understood how to implement the procedures for preparing and implementing 
collective olive oil processes. The one-day workshops, with several topics packed within them, were too 
short to adequately teach these topics. They were even more inadequate for training in broader cooperative 
developmental skills. Symptomatic of a rather narrow, utilitarian view of training and capacity building 
was the training on financial and management systems. This was reduced to a central five-hour workshop 
and a few coaching visits by the consultant rather than being a more comprehensive tool for ensuring the 
proper adoption and adherence to the systems. Consequently, training was much less successful in 
64 
building the more cooperative developmental capacities highlighted in the project proposal. Such training 
might have eased problems faced in the program such as the difficulty some cooperatives had regarding 
integrating the developed systems in their operations. 
c) Systems and training documentation focused effectively on specific procedures and guidelines to the 
neglect of documentation serving broader capacity development needs: Consistent with the above, 
documents produced in support of capacity building tended to be short procedural guidelines, memos, 
financial agreements and protocols. These laid out how to implement and report on the COPOS scheme. 
d) The overall quality of some equipment provided was not commensurate with the level of capacity building 
envisaged in the project proposal: This is largely related to the pruning tools and collection sheets, and to a 
lesser extent, printers. Shears provided were of obvious low quality and sheets distributed to farmers to 
collect olive were too small. Two of the cooperatives interviewed expressed dissatisfaction with the printer 
and scale they received highlighting that the former did not function properly when it was installed and was 
not replaced despite several requests made to PalTrade to follow-up with the supplier, whereas the latter 
had problems in calibrating. 
e) The substantial delay in the delivery of equipment to the cooperatives may have further reduced their 
commitment to the project: Major delays were encountered by PalTrade in delivery of equipment to 
cooperatives, which reduced the incentive for cooperatives to effectively engage with PalTrade. The most 
prominent of these delays was related to the delivery of the 5-Ton stainless steel tanks, which were not 
delivered to the cooperative until January 2008, after the end of olive harvesting season, due to PalTrade’s 
refusal to accept the below standard tanks delivered by the supplier in November. As we shall examine 
later, while PalTrade’s refusal to accept the tanks may have had negative consequences on the overall 
commitment of cooperatives to the project, its positive strategic consequences on sustainability of the tanks 
are unquestionable. 
B.1.1. Farmers Capacity to Produce High Quality Extra-Virgin Olive Oil 
Through the provision of ventilated crates for olive collection, pruning and harvesting shears and training and 
awareness workshops, the project envisaged enhancing cooperatives farmers’ knowledge on the COPOS scheme, as 
well as improving their practices. Evidence gathered through farmers’ interviews and evaluation survey results 
strongly indicate that substantial achievements were made in this regard. The tables below confirm this by showing 
significant increases in the proportion of beneficiary farmers who practice the right olive oil production techniques, 
whereas the section on the project impact below provides an account of the rather considerable economic benefits 
accrued by the beneficiaries as a result of these practices. 
Table 22: Beneficiaries management of Jool (% of farmers indicating practice) 
Cooperative 
Separate the jool 
before picking to 
pressed alone 
Jool and olive 
pressed together 
Jool is not 
collected at 
all Others Total 
Immatin Cooperative 14.3 0.0 85.7 0.0 100 
Eastern Baqa 16.0 0.0 84.0 0.0 100 
Beit Jala Cooperative 60.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 100 
Tulkarem Cooperative 35.3 0.0 64.7 0.0 100 
Salfeet Cooperative 93.1 0.0 0.0 6.9 100 
Sanour Cooperative 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Seir Cooperative 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100 
Kufr Al-Labad Cooperative 26.1 0.0 73.9 0.0 100 
Azzoun Cooperative 31.0 27.6 31.0 10.3 100 
Total (at Evaluation) 38.7 4.1 54.6 2.6 100 
Total (at Baseline) 56.4 27.3 15.5 0.9 100 
65 
Table 23: Frequency cleaning of olive fruits (% of farmers indicating practice) 
Cooperative Daily 
When the harvest is 
finished 
Clean the olive at 
the press Total 
Immatin Cooperative 91.4 8.6 0.0 100 
Eastern Baqa 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Beit Jala Cooperative 20.0 60.0 20.0 100 
Tulkarem Cooperative 94.1 5.9 0.0 100 
Salfeet Cooperative 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Sanour Cooperative 86.7 13.3 0.0 100 
Seir Cooperative 93.8 6.3 0.0 100 
Kufr Al-Labad Cooperative 95.7 4.3 0.0 100 
Azzoun Cooperative 96.6 3.4 0.0 100 
Total (at Evaluation) 93.3 6.2 0.5 100 
Total (at Baseline) 79.7 3.4 11.9 5.1 
Table 24: Tools used by the beneficiaries to pick the olive fruits (% of farmers indicating practice) 
Cooperative name By hand Stick Rake 
Immatin Cooperative 100.0 0.0 94.3 
Eastern Baqa 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Beit Jala Cooperative 0.0 0.0 100.0 
Tulkarem Cooperative 100.0 5.9 100.0 
Salfeet Cooperative 3.4 3.4 100.0 
Sanour Cooperative 100.0 0.0 100.0 
Seir Cooperative 93.8 0.0 100.0 
Kufr Al-Labad Cooperative 100.0 4.5 100.0 
Azzoun Cooperative 100.0 55.2 100.0 
Total (at Evaluation) 82.5 9.8 99.0 
Total (at Baseline) 38.3 88.7 61.7 
Table 25: Percentage distribution of farmers according to type of containers they use to keep the harvested 
olives (% of farmers indicating practice) 
Cooperative name Bags 
Ventilated 
Crates Both Others Total 
Immatin Cooperative 20.0 74.3 5.7 0.0 100 
Eastern Baqa 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Beit Jala Cooperative 0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Organic Oil Cooperative 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Salfeet Cooperative 3.4 89.7 6.9 0.0 100 
Sanour Cooperative 6.7 0.0 93.3 0.0 100 
Seir Cooperative 0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Kufr Al-Labad Cooperative 91.3 8.7 0.0 0.0 100 
66 
Azzoun Cooperative 37.9 34.5 17.2 10.3 100 
Total (at Evaluation) 42.8 43.8 11.9 1.5 100 
Total (at Baseline) 61.8 19.1 18.2 0.9 100 
Table 26: Frequency of olive pressing (% of farmers indicating practice) 
Cooperative 
How often do you press your harvested olives? 
Daily On steps 
After picking all 
the fruits Total 
Immatin Cooperative 58.8 32.4 8.8 100 
Eastern Baqa 0.0 100.0 0.0 100 
Beit Jala Cooperative 20.0 0 80.0 100 
Tulkarem Cooperative 0.0 100.0 0.0 100 
Salfeet Cooperative 17.2 82.8 0.0 100 
Sanour Cooperative 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Seir Cooperative 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Kufr Al-Labad Cooperative 4.3 95.7 0.0 100 
Azzoun Cooperative 0.0 100.0 0.0 100 
Total (at Evaluation) 72.1 28.3 0.0 100 
Total (at Baseline) 20 60.0 20 100 
B.2. Efficiency 
B.2.1. Utilization of Financial and Human Resources 
Funding: The total budget to the HPM project was US$ 204,523, of which 50.1 percent was allocated to tools and 
equipment; 13.6 percent to training and technical assistance; and, 21.6 percent to project staff salaries and benefits. 
The remaining 14.5 percent were allocated to indirect costs. Actual total expenditures were US$174,527, of which 
56.5 percent was for tools and equipment; 8.1 percent was for training and technical assistance; and, 24.4 percent 
was to project staff salaries and benefits. The remaining 11.5 percent were allocated to indirect costs. The variance 
between budget and actual expenditures was due to cost savings in certain budget line items (such as 5-Ton stainless 
steel tanks), cancellation of the olive flow research activity due to the lack of local presses for this purpose, 
reduction in the number of some equipment purchased, and an original overestimation of the cost of training. Table 
27 below provides further details on the project budget as designed and as discharged. 
It is quite obvious that the budget required for the implementation of the project was underestimated at the time of 
design. Substantially more funds were needed to procure the high quality pruning tools needed to effectively 
implement the COPOS, and equally substantial funds were needed to rehabilitate the cooperatives presses. 
Consequently, at the encouragement of USAID personnel to find ways of implementing the program in a manner 
that would not require a lengthy delay due to source origin waivers in order to provide the required materials during 
the olive harvest season (October-December), certain sacrifices on quality were made. While this is commendable 
from a management perspective, it led a certain degree of efficiency loss; i.e. resources were not used in the most 
cost effective manner. A better alternative would have been to request USAID’s approval on increasing the total 
budget to ensure that the needed works and level of quality of equipment could be raised. But this would have been 
had to be done very early in the project implementation. 
 
Staffing: The project structure envisaged in the project proposal was well instituted and all identified staff positions 
were filled. The expertise of the project staff was found to be well in-line with what is needed and their 
qualifications and responsibilities were commensurate with each other. The technical staff hired by the project had 
been part of the implementation of several COPOS schemes and seemed to have high-end technical skills. Much of 
the technical training on olive harvesting and pressing techniques was shouldered by them, quite commendably. 
67 
Table 27: OHPOS project budget and 
expenditures
Description Budget Amount % of total 
Budget
Cumulative 
Expenditures
% of 
expenditures
1 Tools and Equipments
1.1 Ventilated harvesting crates/sacks 4,500.00 2.2% 2,199.31 1.3%
1.2 Storage tanks (five-ton capacity) 58,500.00 28.6% 45,513.00 26.1%
1.3 Transport tanks (one-ton capacity) 16,500.00 8.1% 25,500.00 14.6%
1.4 Oil testing lab 4,500.00 2.2% 4,846.00 2.8%
1.5 Scales 2,475.00 1.2% 3,279.56 1.9%
1.6 Harvesting & Burning Tools 4,020.00 2.0% 4,838.23 2.8%
1.7 Computers and printers 4,500.00 2.2% 4,950.00 2.8%
1.8 Rent - additional storage space (3 months per site) - -
1.9 Press Rehabilitation (minor) 7,500.00 3.7% 7,500.00 4.3%
Total Tools and Equipments $ 102,495.00 50.1% $ 98,626.10 56.5%
2 Training & Technical Assistance
2.1 Training & Technical Assistance Targeting Cooperatives
2.1.1 Coops coordinators Training/ collective pressing scheme & 
Management 1,900.00
0.9% 1,440.39 0.8%
2.1.2 Training/ Olive Oil testing 3,060.00 1.5% 1,141.00 0.7%
2.1.3 Training/ Coops System Development 800.00 0.4% -
2.1.4 Training / Press Technicians 1,840.00 0.9% 419.14 0.2%
2.1.5 Close out workshop 1,000.00 0.5% 770.80 0.4%
2.1.6 Local Technical Consultant(s) (coop, financial, IT systems)
 7,500.00 3.7% 7,636.71 4.4%
2.1.7 Local Awareness/Promotion Program 3,500.00 1.7% 1,530.00 0.9%
Sub-Total $ 19,600.00 9.6% 12,938.04 $ 7.4%
2.2 Training & Technical Assistance Targeting Farmers -
2.2.1 Farmers Training/ Olive harvesting/handling, Oil quality, 
collective pressing scheme 5,280.00 2.6% 1,191.77 0.7%
Sub-Total $ 5,280.00 2.6% $ 1,191.77 0.7%
2.3 Consulting/Research/Field Coordination
2.3.1 Olive Oil Production Consultants & Field Coordinators - -
2.3.2 Technical research on oil yield from olive fruit 3,000.00 1.5% -
Sub-Total $ 3,000.00 1.5% $ -
Total Training & Technical Assistance $ 27,880.00 13.6% 14,129.81 $ 8.1%
3 Salaries and Benefits
3.1 Salaries
3.1.1 Project Manager - (50%) 7,374.00 3.6% 7,109.50 4.1%
3.1.2 Project Technical Assistant - (80%) 6,375.00 3.1% 5,823.50 3.3%
3.1.3 Accountant - (75%) 4,914.00 2.4% 4,914.00 2.8%
3.1.4 Administrative Assistan (80%) 3,032.00 1.5% 3,092.80 1.8%
3.1.5 Project Field Coordinator (80%) 4,032.00 2.0% 4,160.00 2.4%
3.1.6 Part-time Trainer / Extention Agent 1 Coops / Farmers 2,520.00 1.2% 2,600.00 1.5%
3.1.7 Part-time Trainer / Extention Agent 2 Coops / Farmers 1,500.00 0.7% 1,500.00 0.9%
3.1.8 Part-time Trainer / Extention Agent 3 Press maintinance 600.00 0.3% 480.00 0.3%
3.1.9 Part-time Trainer / Extention Agent 4 Oil Quality 1,500.00 0.7% 1,500.00 0.9%
3.1.10 Cooperative Site/Pressing Coordinators (11) 9,900.00 4.8% 9,000.00 5.2%
Sub-Total $ 41,747.00 20.4% $ 40,179.80 23.0%
3.2 Benefits
3.2.1 Benefits -Project Manager 745.00 0.4% 797.56 0.5%
3.2.2 Benefits- Project Assistant 740.00 0.4% 586.07 0.3%
3.2.3 Benefits -Accountant 605.00 0.3% 596.42 0.3%
3.2.4 Administrative Assistan 414.00 0.2% 345.82 0.2%
Sub-Total $ 2,504.00 1.2% $ 2,325.87 1.3%
Total Salaries and Benefits $ 44,251.00 21.6% 42,505.67 $ 24.4%
Line
Total Program
68 
Description Budget Amount % of total 
Budget
Cumulative 
Expenditures
% of 
expenditures
4 Other Direct Cost
4.1 Transportation 10,500 00 5.1% 10,771.86 6.2%
4.2 Office supplies 1,100 00 0.5% 1,020.15 0.6%
4.3 Telecommunication 6,007 00 2.9% 1,064.56 0.6%
4.4 Printed materials 1,000 00 0.5% -
4.5 Promotional Oil Samples 840 00 0.4% 894.58 0.5%
4.6 Project Signs, labels and Banners 1,500 00 0.7% 1,852.11 1.1%
4.7 Bank fees 700 00 0.3% 412.26 0.2%
4.8 Audit 5,000 00 2.4% -
4.9 Office rent (15% of Ramallah office) 3,250 00 1.6% 3,250.00 1.9%
Total Other Direct Costs $ 29,897.00 14.6% 19,265.52 $ 11.0%
Currency Variance
Grand Total $ 204,523.00 100.0% $ 174,527.10 100.0%
Line
Total Program
B.2.2. Targeting and Beneficiary Selection 
PalTrade began with visiting the leaders of all target cooperatives to explain the project objectives and its 
implementation processes. Public advertisements soliciting applications from interested cooperative farmers were 
posted through the cooperatives in public places within the targeted communities. These advertisements included a 
brief description of the project, beneficiary selection criteria, and instructions on how and when to apply. Once the 
application deadline was reached, a preliminary review of the applications was done by a committee comprising 
representatives from each cooperative, and then sent to PalTrade for further review. Of the total 559 applications 
that were received, PalTrade selected 500 beneficiaries. As noted above, this number dropped to 456 with the 
withdrawal of Ya’bad Cooperative from the project. In most cases No filed visits or interviews were conducted by 
PalTrade to verify application information, especially when it comes to the larger cooperatives whose members span 
several communities. 
While efficient in terms of time requirements and resource utilization, this process was not entirely effective in 
identifying those beneficiaries most in need of assistance. Evaluation survey evidence indicates, albeit 
inconclusively, that several of the selected farmers may have been deemed ineligible had visits been conducted as 
their reported income to the survey questionnaire does not necessarily classify them as resource poor, or of large 
families. Moreover, some possible exclusion errors were noted. 
B.2.5. Beneficiary Satisfaction 
Despite their complaining about the low quality of pruning tools they received, surveyed beneficiaries seemed 
positive –on the balance- about the benefits they had accrued as a result of the project, namely production of high￾quality olive oil. This, if nothing else, is indicative of the success of the project to deliver the results it had promised 
to farmers. The evaluation survey findings show that 64.7 percent of the project beneficiaries are satisfied with the 
overall stream of benefits they received through the project. Of those, about 80 percent are satisfied with the 
economic return they were able to accrue as a result of the project. A whopping 85.9 percent of the surveyed 
beneficiaries indicated satisfaction with the overall performance of PalTrade, while 78.7 percent reported 
satisfaction with the extension services provided by the project, which came as a surprise to the evaluation team 
given the relatively few number of extension visits reported by PalTrade. The proportion of beneficiaries indicating 
an average level of satisfaction (in-between) was considerably high (between 14.2-30.4 percent). The tables below 
summarize the survey findings in relation to the beneficiaries’ satisfaction. 
 
69 
Table 28: Beneficiaries satisfaction with various aspects of project (% of farmers indicating response)
Cooperative 
Are you Satisfied with the overall level of benefit you received? 
Satisfied In-Between Not Satisfied Total 
Immatin Cooperative 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Eastern Baqa Cooperative 32.0 68.0 0.0 100 
Beit Jala Cooperative 33.3 33.3 33.3 100 
Tulkarem Cooperative 38.5 61.5 0.0 100 
Salfeet Cooperative 56.0 36.0 8.0 100 
Sanour Cooperative 93.3 0.0 6.7 100 
Seir Cooperative 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Kufr Al-Labad Cooperative 35.0 45.0 20.0 100 
Azzoun Cooperative 72.4 27.6 0.0 100 
Total 64.7 30.6 4.7 100 
Cooperative 
Are you satisfied with the PalTrade’s performance? 
Satisfied In-Between Not Satisfied Total 
Immatin Cooperative 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Eastern Baqa Cooperative 88.0 12.0 0.0 100 
Beit Jala Cooperative 33.3 33.3 33.3 100 
Tulkarem Cooperative 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Salfeet Cooperative 60.0 40.0 0.0 100 
Sanour Cooperative 93.3 6.7 0.0 100 
Seir Cooperative 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Kufr Al-Labad Cooperative 90.0 10.0 0.0 100 
Azzoun Cooperative 79.3 20.7 0.0 100 
Total 85.9 13.5 0.6 100 
Cooperative 
Are you satisfied with the services of the extension agent? 
Satisfied In-Between Not Satisfied Total 
Immatin Cooperative 87.5 8.3 4.2 100 
Eastern Baqa Cooperative 88.0 12.0 0.0 100 
Beit Jala Cooperative 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Tulkarem Cooperative 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Salfeet Cooperative 12.0 48.0 40.0 100 
Sanour Cooperative 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Seir Cooperative 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Kufr Al-Labad Cooperative 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Azzoun Cooperative 72.4 24.1 3.4 100 
Total 78.7 14.2 7.1 100 
B.2.6. Achievement of Target Indicators 
Table 29 below sets out the project’s planned performance targets against those achieved. Judging by the level of 
achievement of output targets (italicized for easy reference), which are used primarily here for measuring efficiency, 
the project’s efficiency has been below expectation. Output targets related to training (i.e. number of trainees) have 
70 
been underachieved. This was mainly because several invited trainees were not able to attend the entire training 
program (partial attendance). 
Similarly, with the exception of the number of pruning tools which were reduced to as a result of the reduction in the 
number of beneficiaries, most output targets related to the provision of equipment were not met. Notwithstanding 
the beneficiary satisfaction highlighted above, the evaluation team considers this underperformance and the 
surrounding circumstances leading to it materialization (cost underestimation at design, delayed launch, and lack of 
commitment of farmers) as major factors behind the relatively low level of achievement in other performance 
indicators. The effect of the project design -particularly its costing, sequencing, assumption and risk mitigation 
measures- on its implementation and level of achievement of results cannot be underestimated. 
Table 29: Project Performance Indicators: Planned vs. Achieved
Reference Indicator 
LOP Target Actual
% of 
Target
 Program Level Indicators 
PI1 Total # of beneficiary HH assisted (cumulative) 
no of beneficiaries 588 521 89% 
 
 - Male 525 492 94% 
 - Female 63 29 46%
Total Number of direct and indirect beneficiaries 
assisted (cumulative and disaggregated by sex) 4,116 3,647 89% 
 - Male 2,289 3,444 150%
 - Female 1,827 203 11% 
PI2 % of trained producers with knowledge of improved 
production techniques 75% 0 0% 
 IR 1: Cooperative Agribusiness Growth Component (CoAg) 
Imp. 1.1 $ Value of olive oil sold by members through their 
cooperative 980,000 294,873 30% 
Imp. 1.2 Metric tons of olive oil sold through cooperatives 200,000 44,221 22.1%
Imp. 1.4 Average price/kilo of olive oil ($) $4.90 $6 114%
Imp. 1.6 Average Organizational Assessment Rating 70% N/A N/A 
IN.1.1: Capacity Building
In. 1.1.1 # of trained farmers in the olive harvesting and 
collective pressing scheme 500 359 72% 
In. 1.1.2 # of trained persons in the collective pressing scheme 
management workshop 11 14 78.6% 
In. 1.1.3 # of trained persons in the collective pressing 
management software and forms workshop 11 20 182% 
In. 1.1.4 # of trained persons in the olive oil testing workshop 25 17 68% 
In. 1.1.5 # of trained persons in the cooperative management 
system workshop 11 17 154.5% 
 IN.1.2 Olive oil equipment & devices 
In. 1.2.1 # of distributed olive oil storage & transport tanks 19 10 53% 
In. 1.2.2 # of distributed ventilated harvesting crates 6750 2780 41% 
In. 1.2.3 # of distributed scales 6 8 133% 
In. 1.2.4 # of distributed olive oil testing labs 10 8 80% 
In. 1.2.5 # of distributed pruning tools 500 455 91% 
In. 1.2.6 # of distributed computers and printers 11 8 73% 
In. 1.2.7 # of rehabilitated olive presses 5 5 100% 
 In. 1.3 Extension visits 
In. 1.3.1 # of extension visits 1000 487 49% 
71 
B.3. Impact 
To be objective, is to conclude that the full impact of the OHPOS project cannot be ascertained without at least two 
olive harvest seasons have lapsed after its completion. This would allow for a better measurement of the impact on 
the cooperatives and farmers livelihoods, especially since the project was implemented in a year in which olive 
production is low. Olives are seasonal crops with an alternative bearing cycle of two years. 
This notwithstanding, early impact could be observed, namely: 
a) Change in farmers’ knowledge, skills, and attitudes towards cooperation and untraditional olive harvesting 
methods: The collective pressing process and the positive results it brought about have noticeably changed 
farmer’s attitudes towards cooperative work. Interviewed cooperatives indicated that their membership has 
grown significantly as a result of the project. Survey results also confirm that beneficiary members’ 
relationships with their cooperatives have been strengthened as a result of the project. Indicators on 
changed practices and attitudes exhibited above clearly show that a majority of the beneficiaries who 
received training and benefited from the project will be utilizing the improved olive harvesting techniques 
in future seasons. 
b) Increased farmer profitability and improved framer household livelihood: While the low yield season in 
2007 was a major factor behind the generally high olive oil process (to the relative disregard to quality 
attributes), evaluation evidence clearly suggest that beneficiary farmers who have produced extra-virgin 
olive oil were able to obtain higher prices for their oil than those who only produced virgin oil. Bothe 
survey results and PalTrade data confirm this evidence. PalTrade data shows that the average price 
obtained for the 44.2 metric tons of extra-virgin olive oil sold by the project beneficiaries was US$ 
6/kilogram, or at a premium of US$ 1.1 over market price. Survey results confirmed this figure by showing 
that the average price received by farmers through the sale of extra-virgin olive oil through their 
cooperatives was NIS 23.125/kg, which is even higher than the premium reported by PalTrade. This 
increase in income has undoubtedly had a positive effect on the livelihood of the farmers, where the 
average increase in disposable income made possible through the project was at least US$240 per farmer in 
the 2007 season17
. 
Table 30: Distribution of the beneficiaries with respect to their sales and prices of olive oil (through the 
cooperatives only) 
Cooperative Name18
Average quantity & price 
(container of 16 kg) 
Sold Price (NIS) 
Immatin Cooperative 5.8 384 
Eastern Baqa 11.3 384 
Beit Jala Cooperative 2.1 480 
Tulkarem Cooperative 0.0 0 
Salfeet Cooperative 23.9 352 
Sanour Cooperative 14.7 380 
Seir Cooperative 0.0 0 
Kufr Al-Labad Cooperative 0.0 0 
Azzoun Cooperative 18.8 336 
Total 15.0 370 
 
17 On the assumption that the average farmer sold 240 kilograms of extra-virgin olive oil through the cooperative at a premium price of US$1 
above the market price for each kilogram sold. Given the fact that many farmers sold more quantities than what the cooperative sold for them, 
and that several cooperatives and farmers were able to sell at higher that the average price of NIS 370, the average increase in income for 
individual farmers is probably higher. 
18 Beneficiaries from cooperatives whose names do not appear in this table were not interviewed as it was not possible for the evaluation team to 
gain access to them.
72 
c) Improved export potential: The project contributed to improving the exportability of Palestinian olive oil. 
With the increasing global demand for extra-virgin olive oil, and the increased capacity among Palestinian 
farmers and cooperatives meeting this demand, the Palestinian olive oil sector stands better poised to tap 
any available exporting opportunities in the future. The increase in olive oil exports will immediately have 
a growth effect on the local economy. 
d) Cooperatives institutional and organizational capacity building: Through the provision of office 
equipment, oil testing, weighing and storage facilities and training to the beneficiary cooperatives, these 
cooperatives have become better able to serve their members and seek out ways to sustain their services. 
Three out of the four interviewed cooperatives reported that they are already seeking opportunities to for 
marketing extra-virgin olive oil for the 2008 season. 
The project had little direct impact on women as only 
29 women were registered as beneficiaries. No 
negative impacts could be observed as a result of the 
project. 
That said, that evaluation team is of the opinion that the 
impact of the project would have been maximized had 
the stainless steel tanks been delivered before the 
harvest period, and provisions in the project design 
were made to: i) introduce an integrated approach to 
cooperative capacity building; ii) strengthen the 
marketing capacity and business acumen within 
cooperatives; iii) ensure proper rehabilitation and 
development of cooperatives’ olive presses; iv) allocate 
more substantial budget to harvest tools; and v) 
provide effective and efficient transport tools to 
farmers. Moreover, the implementation of the project 
in a more bountiful year would have undoubtedly 
improved results and increased impact. 
B.5. Sustainability 
Overall, the sustainability of the project is likely, albeit the likelihood of sustainability in some cooperatives that are 
not convinced with the COPOS scheme and have not managed to establish the critical mass of farmers needed to 
make collective marketing feasible is highly unlikely. The most prominent of these latter cooperatives are the Beit 
Jala and the Tulkarem Cooperatives. PalTrade’s intention to continue working with the willing among the target 
cooperatives within the framework of a French-funded olive oil marketing program increases the overall chances of 
sustainability of the OHPOS project. 
Farmers’ changed practices vis-à-vis harvesting processes will most likely be sustainable despite the fact that most 
pruning tools provided to these farmers to sustain several of these practices have been broken. Anecdotal evidence 
gathered through interviews suggests that farmers will most likely replace these pruning tools next season. 
Ventilated boxes are still kept by the cooperatives for farmers’ use next season. 
The sustainability of the stainless tanks is particularly sustainable. This is due to their high quality of production, 
which is largely attributable to PalTrade’s due diligence in follow-up and monitoring of the supplier throughout the 
production process of these tanks. The assertion that PalTrade made, particularly the Project Manager, that these 
tanks must be manufactured according to world-class standards is worthy of special praise here as it has contributed 
to increasing the durability of these tanks and stretched their lifetime to at least 10 years. The onus is now with the 
cooperatives to effectively use them, and only time will tell if this will happen. 
“I have been hearing about collective olive pressing 
for quite some time now, and how it helps farmers 
produce better quality oil for export and this is why I 
was eager to participate in the project. I learned a 
lot from the COPOS training we received, and was 
able to produce 100% extra-virgin olive oil last 
year… I sold about 150 kilograms through the 
cooperative to one of the export companies at a 
price of NIS 23 per kilogram, which was at least NIS 
3 above the market price. I was very happy and 
made me feel that my and my family’s effort in 
harvesting the olive and pressing it on a daily basis 
did not go to waste… I hope that we can do the same 
this year. 
73 
The cooperatives systems will probably not be sustainable in the larger and better established cooperatives such as 
Beit Jala Cooperative, but are likely to be sustainable over the medium term in the smaller, newly established 
cooperatives. The evaluation team believes that the sustainability of these systems would have been increased had 
more time been allocated to their development and implementation within cooperatives. It is highly likely that these 
systems will be considered as building blocks by any future capacity building activity in the target cooperatives. 
 
C. Overall Conclusions and Recommendations 
On the balance, PalTrade’s OHPOS project made modest achievements and did not contribute to the overall goal 
and objectives of the WBFS Program as originally envisaged. This was largely due to relatively late start resulting 
from –what should have known been at the time of design- partnership problems in relation to the signature of the 
mandatory ATC, clear underestimation of budget requirements, and relatively ineffective targeting of cooperatives. 
This notwithstanding, the OHPOS project has made a number of achievements. These were related to capacity 
building of farmers and their cooperatives capacity to engage in COPOS schemes in the future. 
The full impact of impact of the project could not be ascertained with accuracy. However, early impacts related the 
projects achievements could be observed. These were: changed farmers’ knowledge, skills, and attitudes towards 
cooperation and untraditional olive harvesting methods; increased farmer profitability and improved livelihood of 
framer households; improved export potential of Palestinian olive oil; and, improved cooperative capacity for 
implementing the COPOS scheme. 
Three main lessons learned can be highlighted from the implementation experience of the project, namely: 
a) The Palestinian olive oil sector has a significant export growth potential. Tapping this potential fully, 
however, requires concerted capacity building and export promotion and development efforts from several 
stakeholders. Several olive producer and agricultural cooperatives have been targeted by development 
programs and projects for the purpose of increasing their capacity to produce high-quality, exportable olive 
oil. Many of these interventions have failed and many succeeded. It is thus essential for any future 
program with a similar goal to examine the lessons learned from these interventions, including this one, and 
scrutinize with utmost diligence the readiness of these cooperatives for effective involvement in such 
interventions. 
b) In addition to assessing farmers’ and cooperatives readiness to engage, interventions similar to the OPHOS 
project, must consider the alternative bearing cycle of olive trees. Launching a new collective olive 
harvesting, pressing and oil storage program in low yield year will likely have lower results than if 
implemented in a high-yield yield, all other things being equal of course. 
c) Careful budgeting and implementation scheduling are critical to any project design, but particularly so for 
short-cycle projects. In budgeting, market prices of equipment and services should be investigated and 
scrutinized, and contingency reserve should be allocated. Implementation planning must assume the worst￾case scenario and develop appropriate mitigation measures. If a project faces a risk of failure due to these 
risks, whether in design or during implementation, they should be immediately ceased. 
 
The recommendations emerging from the evaluation of the OPHOS project are the following: 
 
a) ACDI/VOCA is strongly encouraged to avoid further engagement in the olive oil sector as many other 
organizations are now active in the sector. Re-engagement should be considered only when there is a real 
need for ACDI/VOCA’s experience in agribusiness development. 
b) Given the considerable experience it has developed over the years in the olive oil sector, PalTrade is 
strongly encouraged to continue working in the sector. Future programming in the sector should make 
provisions for integrated capacity building approaches, including training of cooperatives on sales 
negotiations and pricing techniques, as well as the generic type cooperative management training. 
74 
c) Future projects aiming at expanding or replicating the collective pressing project must take into 
consideration the timing issues given that the olive harvesting season is rather short. Given the difficulties 
often associated with delivery of procured goods logistics management must be given utmost attention. 
d) As the 2008 olive season is quickly approaching, PalTrade and ACDI/VOCA are strongly urged to contact 
the cooperatives targeted under the OPHOS project and encourage them to start preparing for replicating 
the COPOS scheme this year. The two organizations are also strongly encouraged to provide whatever 
means of support available to them and needed by these cooperatives to remobilize members and identify 
marketing links. Through such support, both PalTrade and ACDI/VOCA could ensure that the equipment 
they provided to these cooperatives are being effectively used and are problem free. 
e) Linked to the above, PalTrade is strongly encouraged to leverage funding and technical support to the 
cooperatives targeted by the OPHOS project from its French-funded olive oil marketing project. If 
possible, support should be channeled to filling the organizational capacity gaps left unaddressed by the 
current project. 
75 
CHAPTER SIX: IMPROVED HOUSEHOLD VALUE ADDED PRODUCTS 
A. Overview and Performance Targets 
Within the framework of its cooperative growth and development, and marketing strategies of the WBFS Program, 
ACDI/VOCA awarded the Economic and Social Development Center (ESDC) on 1 October 2007 a sub-award in the 
value of US$91,986 to implement the proposal it had submitted two months earlier. The project, which was titled 
“Promoting Sustainable Livelihood of Palestinian Rural Women through Value Added Cooperative Food 
Processing” (VACFP), aimed to increase food security and sustainable rural livelihoods among 160 rural women 
households through improving their and their cooperatives capacities to produce and market value added food 
products. The specific objectives of the project were as follows: 
a) To increase the income level of 160 rural women by 33% by the end of the project. 
b) To build the target cooperatives/associations’ capacities in homemade food processing and effective 
marketing techniques. 
c) To build the cooperatives/associations’ management, operational and organizational capacities of ten 
targeted cooperatives. 
d) To promote the concepts of group business synergy through cooperation, teamwork and self reliance in two 
targeted districts: Hebron and Bethlehem. 
e) To preserve surplus of fresh vegetables and fruits that used to go to waste. 
f) To link the 10 targeted cooperatives with local and external buyers. 
g) To strengthen self-initiative among women’s cooperatives/associations, and their relevance as a 
contributing participant in the Palestinian economy and civil society. 
The project would achieve these objectives by means of working on market-led technical assistance, production and 
marketing / promotional support as follows19: 
First, ESDC would tailor its technical assistance to each targeted cooperatives based on findings and 
recommendations of a market assessment that it would commission. 
Second, ESDC would build the technical capacities of the target group qualitatively (160 rural women in the 
districts of Hebron and Bethlehem) by assisting them to produce healthier, standardized and hygienic processed food 
items that are appropriate for small-scale home-based food production, and, if needed by providing them with 
relevant technical assistance, local consultancy and training support. 
Third, ESDC would build cooperative capacities and improve their business practices to enable them to compete in 
the free market on an equal footing with the private sector. After carrying out in-depth organizational and financial 
assessments of the selected cooperatives, the project team would engage in various activities with these cooperatives 
that aim to develop internal systems, including financial and management manuals, with a particular focus on 
member services, market linkages (through a central promotional exhibition), production and business profiles to 
promote their products and services. These coops would also be assisted in assessing the Palestinian Standards 
Institute ( PSI) requirements and determine which specific sorting and packing operations are required. In addition, 
the project team and Cooperative Development Specialist from ESDC would conduct one central workshop for 
cooperative staff on cooperative principles, business planning and business management to introduce cooperative 
boards and management on good governance issues, including accounting, business transparency and efficiency, and 
formulate plans to use cooperative assets to facilitate handling, packaging, logistics and storage. 
The proposed interventions would also introduce other support to the target women and their cooperatives, including 
materials necessary for faster and standardized production, such as food processors and kitchen utensils. Testing of 
quality in processed food items will take place periodically to ensure safety and success of the technical training 
 
19 VACFP proposal, page 8. 
76 
interventions. Through the support of ESDC's marketing specialist, the project team would work with cooperative 
leaders to identify potential buyers in local and external markets, and improve linkages through meetings, field visits 
and other events to build relationships. 
Much of what had been designed for was implemented. Immediately following the contract with ACDI/VOCA, 
ESDC, in close coordination with ACDI/VOCA, organized a project launch event through which it and 
ACDI/VOCA explained the objective of the project and its work modalities. It also began the recruitment process 
for two Field Coordinators and soliciting proposals from marketing and management consultants to carry out the 
market assessment and the cooperative management systems development. The process of staff recruitment was 
completed by the end of October 2007, and the hired staff commenced work on 1 November 2007. The marketing 
consultants began his 7.5 day task also in the same period. The management consultant, however, was not recruited 
until 1 March 2008 for a consultancy period of 35 days. 
Concurrently, ESDC launched the project in the below listed cooperatives by meeting with the cooperative leaders 
again to explain the project purpose and work modalities. 
Local committees were formed in these meetings to assist in the project implementation, project advertising, and 
beneficiary selection, which took place largely as planned and were completed by end of December 2008. In the 
mean time, the cooperatives/associations of Beit Inoun, Injaz, and Thahirieh withdraw from the project for their own 
reason. They were immediately replaced by Al-Shawawreh Women Center, Bani Naim Women Charitable Society, 
and Tqoa’a Women Association. 
The main changes that were introduced to the original proposal during implementation were the following: 
a) Increasing the number of planned training hours to 100 and reducing the theoretical training hours to 80 
hours. 
b) The exhibition planned to take place in Ramallah was replaced by two exhibitions, one in the city of 
Hebron and one in the city of Bethlehem. The change was introduced on the basis of discussions with 
ACDI/VOCA were it was believed that organizing exhibitions in urban centers that are closer than 
Ramallah to the cooperatives would be more effective for establishing market links. 
 
B. Assessment of Component Implementation 
B.1. Effectiveness 
Due to the large number of objectives identified in the project proposal and the high level of linkage between many 
of them, this section examines effectiveness from the perspective of the contribution of the project to the capacity 
building of women and their cooperatives/associations, as well as its contribution to raising the income of the 
targeted women. 
B.1.1. Capacity Building of Rural Women and the Cooperatives
• Hebron Cooperative for Agricultural Processing 
• Dura Cooperative for Agricultural Processing 
• Ithna Cooperative for Rural Development 
• Beit Ummar Women Association 
• Beit Inoun Women Cooperative 
• Batir Center for Women and Child 
• Husan Women Cooperative 
• Injaz Women Cooperative 
• Thahirieh Women Cooperative 
• Beer Al Hummus Women Association 
77 
What had been planned for in the project design in terms of building the capacity of the beneficiary women and their 
cooperatives/associations was implemented, although some variations were noted over and above what was 
mentioned in the previous section. The cooperative development and capacity building activities were as follows: 
a) Provision of training on cooperatives principles and business management: A central training workshop 
was held in Bethlehem with participation of 34 women cooperative/association leaders from the targeted 
organizations. The training covered the main topics of cooperative principles, business planning and 
business management, and good governance. The training also touched upon basic accounting, and 
business planning knowledge areas. 
b) Provision of management and financial systems, and training: On the basis of the systems developed within 
framework of the HPM project, the management consultant hired by ESDC developed management and 
financial systems for the women cooperatives targeted under the VACFP project. The consultant 
introduced Cooperative/Association Board members to these systems in brief workshop held individually 
with each cooperative, and transferred over to the cooperatives for implementation. The management 
consultant conducted a few follow-up visits to oversee implementation of the systems and help the 
organizations in any issues arising from implementation. 
c) Provision of training and coaching on marketing, as well as providing assistance in identifying market 
links: A marketing consultant was commissioned by ESDC to assist the target organizations in developing 
their marketing capacity through providing with training and helping them market their products. The 
consultant also carried out two central training workshops for the target cooperatives’/associations’ leaders 
in Hebron and Bethlehem on marketing techniques and methods. These workshops aimed at imparting 
knowledge to participants (17 in Hebron and 16 in Bethlehem) on market channels, market plans, 
marketing techniques and negotiations. 
d) Provision of food processing equipment and prepping kitchens: In line with what had been planned, and 
following the discussion of the market assessment results with the target cooperatives in which the food 
products to be produced by each cooperative/association were identified, ESDC procured kitchen 
equipment, tools and utensils for all the target cooperative, each according to its identified need. Each 
cooperative was also provided with packaging materials, product identification labels carrying the brand 
name of the manufactured product, and a stamp. 
e) Organization of two exhibitions: Two exhibitions were organized in the cities of Bethlehem and Hebron to 
showcase and promote the processed food products produced by the target cooperatives/associations. 
In addition to these activities, the beneficiary women were subject to a 10 hour-technical training on topics related 
to, inter alia, food preservation and hygiene, good manufacturing practices, quality control, nutritional value of 
various processed foods, and safe handling and use of raw materials. This training was followed by 20 hours of 
practical training on the application the first training in the production of the specific product the cooperative 
members were going to produce. 
Based on the sheer number of capacity building activities implemented over the course of the project, the relatively 
high level of attendance rates in the training courses, and the acceptable level of utilization by 
cooperatives/associations of the systems developed and introduced by the project, the evaluation team believes that 
significant capacity has built among the target cooperatives. Where the target cooperatives/associations had little 
organizational capacity and knowledge of how to produce, package and market high quality home-style foods the 
training resulted in all of them learning at least the basics in all of these. The kitchen equipment and tools provided 
to them, albeit below expectations, have also increased their organizational capacity to carry out, organize and 
control the quality of such work. Where most of the target cooperatives had no standardized products that they 
could sell in the local market, the project helped them establish such products, and under a brand name. 
The provision of the management and financial systems has transformed the way several of the target/cooperative 
cooperatives conduct their business. Where cooperatives had no systems and procedures to manage their business 
processes, the financial and administrative systems provided by the project helped them improve the way they 
78 
operate and manage their internal affairs. Many of the interviewed cooperatives told the evaluation team that they 
never used to take minutes of meetings before the introduction of the systems in their cooperative, but are now 
documenting not only meetings, but also all other activities. Two of the cooperatives have started using the 
electronic copy of the systems and report much efficient operations. These examples, however, are not the norm. 
The experience of engaging in exhibitions and market visits, albeit proved ineffective in terms of generating sales 
and establishing market links, has exposed cooperatives/associations to the world of marketing. Now, these 
cooperatives can build on what they have learned in promoting and marketing their products. 
Individually, the beneficiary women have gained knowledge and developed new skills and practices in food 
production that they did not know before. Many women reported paying more attention to the nutritional value of 
the foods they make at home, while others also reported attempts to better regiment their children’s food 
consumption habits. Several women have also started producing the same types of food produced by their 
cooperatives at home, something that they were not able to do before as they lacked the technical know-how. 
On this strong foundation of achievements, the way forward is to highlight some observations related to overall 
design and implementation of the capacity building activities. The value of doing this is twofold. First it identifies 
reasons for deviations from targets during project implementation, particularly in relation to impact; and, second, it 
helps signal areas for improvement in future programming. 
a) Many women cooperatives/associations targeted by the project were still in their organizational infancy 
stages, and a few had not been officially registered yet. Thus, they may have not needed the level of 
sophistication enforced in the management and financial systems introduced by the project. Simpler and 
more adapted systems than the ones introduced may have encouraged some of these cooperatives to rely on 
them more systematically. 
b) Implementation of training courses was squeezed over a relatively short period of time, and courses were 
not properly sequenced. This may is partly due to short lifetime of the project, but largely due to spotty 
planning. Training effectiveness may have been better had these issues been addressed during design and 
implementation. 
c) Marketing training was too short and too broad for a project such as VAPCF, which seeks to establish 
effective markets for new products. This may have to do with the capacity of the trainer and the budget 
allocated for this purpose. The training conducted on marketing would have better served the objectives of 
the project had it been done early in the project cycle, or at least before the exhibitions had take place. 
d) Significant efforts were made in preparing and sending invitations to the exhibitions, and in follow-up with 
invitees, to the detriment of exhibitors’ preparations for the exhibit. The exhibiting cooperatives were not 
adequately prepared for these events and had no previous experience to fall back on when and if needed. 
The exhibitions would have been a more effective strategy in both developing the cooperatives marketing 
capacity and in helping them sell their products and close deals had they been trained on stand behavior, 
sales and promotion techniques and provided with information on the potential clients among the 
prospective visitors before the exhibitions. These exhibitions would have also been more effective had 
more efforts been made to organize business meetings for the cooperatives with potential buyers during the 
exhibitions. Arranging a follow-up program with buyers who visited cooperatives exhibition booths would 
have been equally important. 
e) The market assessment seemed to have key methodological deficiencies which may have misguided the 
selection of products. The methodology used in conducting the market assessment was heavily reliant on a 
qualitative survey of supermarkets and their visitors in three main cities. There was no clear mechanism to 
ensure representative selection of respondents, and there was no analysis of competition. The basic 
questions in a standard market assessment (the four-Ps) were not answered by the market assessment 
conducted. This was hardly because of the lack of professionalism or experience of the consultant, rather 
due to the limited budget and time allocated for the market assessment. This is quite unfortunate as a 
matter of fact, especially since ACDI/VOCA’s approval of the VAPCF proposal was predicated on an 
assumption that ESDC has the required market information to make an informed decision when selecting 
79 
the food products to be produced. The market assessment deficiencies are particularly adverse given that 
the products studied and selected are abundantly available in the local market, and it could be argued that 
they are subject to hyper competition. 
f) The quality, quantity and standards of tools and equipment provided were well below what had been 
described in the project proposal, and in a number of cases in contravention with the hygiene standards 
stipulated by GMP (for example, providing plastic instead of stainless steel cutting boards). Field 
observations have revealed that this is a serious issue in all visited cooperatives, where sub-standard, low￾quality equipment and materials were provided. In some cases, the utensils that had been delivered were 
found to be either rusted or unfit for the type of production in which the cooperative is engaged. Plastic 
chopping boards provided, whereas safe production requirements stipulate that chopping boards must be 
made of glass to reduce the risk of cross contamination. Ovens provided were not fit for the type of 
commercial use cooperatives were prepped for. Evidence suggests that this is the case in the overwhelming 
majority of cooperatives/associations, and is largely due to limited availability of funds earmarked for 
equipment. This is very unfortunate especially since much of the targeted organizations’ capacity to 
deliver the results was contingent upon their level of capacity to produce quantitatively and qualitatively. 
B.1.2. Beneficiaries Income 
The effectiveness of the project in terms of its contribution to increasing the beneficiaries’ incomes is mediocre at 
best. The reported total value of all quantities sold by the cooperatives of the produced products under the project is 
US$ 5,643. This translates to average revenue of US$32.1 per beneficiary, without factoring production costs. 
When considering that production cost from materials only for the produced crops ranges between 20-40 percent of 
the sale price, we conclude that the average total income that may have been generated by the beneficiaries as a 
result of the sale of manufactured food products ranges between US$ 19.3-24, which is almost half of the value they 
leveraged toward the project. Even this income was not accrued by the beneficiaries as most cooperatives opted to 
retain profits made from the sale of the foods produced for reinvestment in future activities or to cover operational 
expenses. 
Both, interviews with beneficiaries and survey results confirm that the income accrued by beneficiaries has been 
very modest, if at all, because the cooperatives had not had enough time to market their products by the time of the 
evaluation. The table below shows the survey results on the self-reported income received by beneficiaries in 
relation to the return that sale of produced food. 
 
Table 31: Average beneficiary self-reported income from the sale of food products through cooperatives 
Cooperative Name Mean (NIS) 
Maximum 
(NIS) 
Hebron Cooperative 0 0 
Al-Usra Cooperative 0.0 0.0 
Al-Shawawreh Cooperative 43.2 80.0 
Ithna Cooperative 0.1 1.0 
Bani Niem Cooperative 0.0 0.0 
Battir Cooperative 0.9 1.0 
Beit Ummar Cooperative 0.0 0.0 
Taqou' Cooperative 0.2 1.0 
Dura Cooperative 0.0 0.0 
Husan Cooperative 25.6 63.0 
 Total 9.5 80.0 
The effectiveness constraints to the realization of the increased income objective are more or less the same as those 
made in the previous section under the rubric of observations. The most salient constraint to the achievement of 
acceptable levels of income by beneficiaries is the weak approach to product marketing, the limited experience 
within cooperatives in this regard, and that marketing activities that were carried out were cramped into the last 
80 
twenty days of the project. The mediocre level of effectiveness vis-à-vis the project objective on increased income 
of beneficiaries is grave as it also directly undermines the achievement of the overall goal of the project. 
 
B.2. Efficiency 
B.2.1. Utilization of Financial and Human Resources 
Funding: The total budget allocated the VACFP project was US$ 99,567, of which 23.4 percent was allocated to 
tools and equipment (material support); 11.1 percent to marketing activities; 19.4 percent to training and technical 
assistance; 6 percent to publications (including training materials and marketing related printed materials), and, 39 
percent to project staff salaries and benefits. Actual total expenditures were US$ 96,861, with no substantial 
variance between line item expenditures and those budgeted, except for the line item on publications on which some 
cost savings were accrued. Table 32 below provides further details on the project budget as designed and as 
discharged. 
Budget constraints were identified above as constituting a major constraint to the effective implementation of the 
project. It is highlighted here as a major constraint to efficiency as well. It is quite obvious that the budget required 
for the implementation of the project was underestimated at the time of design. Substantially more funds were 
needed to procure the equipment and material support needed for the effective implementation of the project as 
designed. 
While there were no cost overruns, the expenditures were too thinly distributed on several activities. It may have 
been wiser for the project to reduce the scope of its activities early into the project implementation –once the 
problem with limited budget was detected- and reallocate cut activity budget to other line items. Given the quality 
of inputs provided, the project expenditures were not cost effective, even if maintaining low costs and minimizing 
cost overruns. This should have been detected and signaled by ESDC’s Accountant and Finance and Administrative 
Manager very early in the project implementation. Had a budget reallocation been requested with the proper 
justification, ACDI/VOCA would have most likely indulged it. 
 
Staffing: The project structure envisaged in the project proposal was well instituted and all identified staff positions 
were filled in accordance with procedures. The expertise of the project staff was found to be well in-line with what 
is needed and their qualifications and responsibilities were commensurate with each other. No material problems 
could be detected in relation to staff utilizations. The utilization of staff was appropriate.
81 
Table 32: OHPOS project budget and expenditures
Budget Amount % of total 
Budget
Cumulative 
Expenditures
% of 
Expenditures
1 Training & Technical Assistance
1.1 Project Orientation
1.1.1 Orientation Workshop 195.98 0.2% 195.98 0.2%
Sub-Total 195.98 0.2% 195.98 0.2%
1.2 Technical Assistance Targeting Rural Women
1.2.1 Rural Women Training 2,827.00 2.8% 1,691.31 1.7%
1.2.2 Trainer Fees 1,800.00 1.8% 2,500.00 2.6%
Sub-Total 4,627.00 4.6% 4,191.31 4.3%
1.3 Technical Assistance Targeting Cooperatives
1.3.1 Market Survey of Homemade Food Products 1,522.00 1.5% 1,522.27 1.6%
1.3.2 Consultants (Management & Financial) 6,495.00 6.5% 6,494.53 6.7%
1.3.3 Central Workshop - Cooperative Management 505.00 0.5% 664.00 0.7%
Sub-Total 8,522.00 8.6% 8,680.80 9.0%
Total Training & Technical Assistance $ 13,344.98 13.4% $ 13,068.09 13.5%
2 Material Support
2.1 Production Supplies such as Food Processors, Kitchen 
Utensils, Refrigerators, Stainless Steel Tables, etc.
 16,247.00
16.3% 16419.5 17.0%
2.2 Marketing Supplies such as Packaging Inputs, Labels, 
Wrapping Machines, etc. 5,000.00
5.0% 6,504.43 6.7%
2.3 Sample Products' Testing - Quality Control 2,100.00 2.1% -
Total Material Support 23,347.00 23.4% 22,923.93 23.7%
3 Publications
3.1 Printing of training manual (Standardized Food Processing) $ 1,200.00 1.2% $ -
3.2 Cooperative Brochures & Roll-Ups 2,500.00 2.5% 2,191.00 2.3%
3.3 Project Sign Boards & Training banners 2,300.00 2.3% 937.65 1.0%
Total Publications 6,000.00 6.0% 3,128.65 3.2%
4 Marketing
4.1 Central Exhibition 9,500.00 9.5% $8,516.55 8.8%
4.2 Product displays and tasting events (at super markets) 1,600.00 1.6% 3,450.00 3.6%
Total Marketing Exhibition 11,100.00 11.1% 11,966.55 12.4%
5 Direct Project Personnel 
5.1 Project Manager (100% of Time) $ 12,983.00 13.0% $ 12,983.22 13.4%
5.2 Field Worker1 (100% of Time) 9,000.00 9.0% 8,497.04 8.8%
5.3 Field Worker2 (100% of Time) 8,299.00 8.3% 8,253.15 8.5%
5.4 Marketing Specialist (25% of Time) 3,039.00 3.1% 3,038.68 3.1%
5.5 Accountant (25% of Time) 1,819.00 1.8% 1,819.03 1.9%
5.6 ESDC Director (10%) 2,247.00 2.3% 2,247.03 2.3%
5.7 ESDC Finance & Admin Manager (10%) 1,482.00 1.5% 1,481.67 1.5%
Total Direct Project Personnel 38,869.00 39.0% 38,319.82 39.6%
6 Other Direct Administrative Costs
6.1 Transportation 2,250.00 2.3% $2,328.90 2.4%
6.2 Office supplies 1,800.00 1.8% 2,271.50 2.3%
6.3 Office rent & utilities 956.00 1.0% 956.00 1.0%
6.4 Telecommunication 1,800.00 1.8% 1,871.59 1.9%
6.5 Bank Fees 100.00 0.1% 25.50
Total Other Direct Administrative Costs 6,906.00 6.9% 7,453.49 7.7%
Grand Total 99,567.00 100.0% 96,860.53 100.0%
82 
B.2.2. Targeting and Beneficiary Selection 
The evaluation team could not ascertain the level of involvement of ESDC in the beneficiary selection process. 
However, based on anecdotal evidence suggesting that cooperative leaders had a relatively free rein in selecting 
applicants and replacing beneficiaries after the beneficiary list was originally drawn up, the evaluation team believes 
that ESDC was not effectively involved in the beneficiary selection process. This notwithstanding, there does not 
seem to be any serious exclusion errors as the socio-economic characteristics extracted from the project baseline 
survey indicate that the selected beneficiaries fit within the criteria set for beneficiary selection; i.e. low income and 
large households. Nevertheless, a more systematic and transparent beneficiary selection process could have been 
possible as it would have increased the efficiency of implementation. 
B.2.5. Beneficiary Satisfaction 
Surveyed beneficiaries expressed a high degree of dissatisfaction with the benefits they had accrued as a result of the 
project, which confirms the evaluation team’s assessment of the mediocre effectiveness vis-à-vis increased income. 
The beneficiaries’ satisfaction with the overall performance of ESDC fared better, with 56.9 percent of the 
beneficiaries expressing satisfaction in this regard, compared to 12.4 percent who were dissatisfied. The 
beneficiaries’ level of satisfaction with the Project Field Coordinators was the highest, with 82.4 percent of the 
beneficiaries indicating satisfaction in this regard. This is not surprising as Field Coordinators were based in the 
same areas where the cooperatives/associations were located and maintained regular visits with them. 
Noteworthy here is the proportion of beneficiaries who were relatively indecisive about their level of satisfaction 
with the overall benefits received and the overall performance of ESDC; i.e. those indicating and “in-between” 
satisfaction level. Given the overall performance of the project, the evaluation team is of the opinion that if these 
respondents were pressured to chose a binary answer, it is highly likely that the majority of them will indicate 
dissatisfaction. Naturally, this is a subjective judgment and should not be factored into the overall evaluation of 
efficiency. However, it is objectively deduced from several anecdotal evidences suggesting that beneficiaries often 
tend to be favorable than unfavorable when assessing the performance of others. 
Table 33 below, which summarizes the survey results in relation to beneficiaries’ satisfaction with the three aspects 
mentioned earlier could provide more insight into the efficiency assessment made in this section of the report. 
 
83 
Table 33: Beneficiaries satisfaction with various aspects of project (% of farmers indicating response)
Cooperative 
Are you satisfied with the overall benefit you received? 
Satisfied In-Between Not Satisfied Total 
Hebron Cooperative 50.0 16.7 33.3 100 
Al-Usra Cooperative 23.5 58.8 17.6 100 
Al-Shawawreh Cooperative 39.1 34.8 26.1 100 
Ithna Cooperative 0.0 0.0 100.0 100 
Bani Niem Cooperative 0.0 26.7 73.3 100 
Battir Cooperative 0.0 0.0 100.0 100 
Beit Ummar Cooperative 20.0 60.0 20.0 100 
Taqou' Cooperative 17.6 47.1 35.3 100 
Dura Cooperative 5.6 0.0 94.4 100 
Husan Cooperative 17.6 35.3 47.1 100 
 Total 16.4 28.3 55.3 100 
Cooperative 
Are satisfied with the performance of ESDC? 
Satisfied In-Between Not Satisfied Total 
Hebron Cooperative 50.0 33.3 16.7 100 
Al-Usra Cooperative 47.1 52.9 0.0 100 
Al-Shawawreh Cooperative 60.9 34.8 4.3 100 
Ithna Cooperative 93.3 0.0 6.7 100 
Bani Niem Cooperative 0.0 33.3 66.7 100 
Battir Cooperative 86.7 6.7 6.7 100 
Beit Ummar Cooperative 50.0 50.0 0.0 100 
Taqou' Cooperative 29.4 41.2 29.4 100 
Dura Cooperative 83.3 16.7 0.0 100 
Husan Cooperative 58.8 41.2 0.0 100 
 Total 56.9 30.7 12.4 100 
Cooperative 
Are satisfied with the performance of the ESDC Field 
Coordinator(s)? 
Satisfied In-Between Not Satisfied Total 
Hebron Cooperative 50.0 16.7 33.3 100 
Al-Usra Cooperative 88.2 11.8 0.0 100 
Al-Shawawreh Cooperative 95.7 4.3 0.0 100 
Ithna Cooperative 100.0 0.0 0.0 100 
Bani Niem Cooperative 26.7 13.3 60.0 100 
Battir Cooperative 93.3 6.7 0.0 100 
Beit Ummar Cooperative 60.0 40.0 0.0 100 
Taqou' Cooperative 94.1 0.0 5.9 100 
Dura Cooperative 88.9 5.6 5.6 100 
Husan Cooperative 88.2 11.8 0.0 100 
 Total 82.4 9.2 8.5 100 
84 
B.2.6. Achievement of Target Indicators 
Table 34 below sets out the project’s planned performance targets against those achieved. Judging by the level of 
achievement of output targets (italicized for easy reference), which are used primarily here for measuring efficiency, 
the project’s efficiency have been met or surpassed. The high level of output achievement in this case, however, is 
not a good judge of efficiency as the qualitative nature of outputs is highly questionable. 
Table 34: Project Performance Indicators: Planned vs. Achieved
Reference Indicators Targeted Actual % of target 
 Program Level Indicators 
PI1 Total # of beneficiary HH assisted (cumulative)
No of beneficiaries 160 242 151% 
 
 - Men 0 0 0% 
 - Women 160 242 151% 
Total Number of direct and indirect 
beneficiaries assisted (cumulative and 
disaggregated by sex) 
1,120 1,739 155% 
 - Male 480 784 163% 
 - Female 640 955 149% 
PI2 % of trained producers with knowledge of 
improved production techniques 75% 93% -- 
 
IR 1: Cooperative Agribusiness Growth 
Component (CoAg) 
Imp. 1.1 $ Value of Traditional Food sold by members 
through their cooperative 170,000 5,643 3% 
Imp. 1.2 Metric tons of Traditional Food sold through 
cooperatives 68 1.02 2% 
Imp. 1.4 Average price/kilo of Traditional Food $2.50 $7.30 292% 
Imp. 1.5 # of new market linkages 13 0 0% 
 # of new brands 4 10 250% 
Imp. 1.6 Average Organizational Assessment Rating 70% N/A N/A 
Imp. 1.7 Percentage increase in household income for 
VAF beneficiaries 33% 0 0% 
 In.1.1: Capacity Building 0 
 
# of Trained beneficiaries in Home Made Food 
processing "Theoretical" 160 172 108% 
 
# of Trained beneficiaries in Technical 
demonstration food processing "Practical" 160 156 98% 
In.1.1.1 # of trained coop leaders in coop principle 30 34 113% 
 In.1.3 equipments & tools 
 In. 1.4 Field workers follow up visits 
In.1.4.1 # of project team follow up visits 190 256 135% 
B.4. Impact 
The main impact of the project at the time of the evaluation has been related to the capacity building of women and 
their cooperatives, which have been highlighted in section B.2. above. A derivative of this is the positive impact it 
left on the women by means of assisting them to assume a certain degree of responsibility in the economic 
85 
livelihood of their households and be more actively engaged in their local communities. Evidence suggests that 
women have gained a higher degree of respect as result of their attempt to be economically productive household 
members, within socially and culturally acceptable parameters. While the impact in this regard is still small, it has a 
relatively good growth potential should the cooperatives succeed in mass production and marketing of processed 
foods. In relation to this, the project has helped strengthen women’s relations with their cooperatives and local 
organizations, thus bringing them closer to being effectively represented. 
From a food security perspective, the project has had no impact on reducing the food security of the beneficiary 
households as it neither succeeded in increasing their incomes nor improved their food utilization and preparation 
practices within their households. 
That said, there are prospects for greater impact on the long run, especially if further support is provided to these 
cooperatives. Already, several cooperatives have plans to explore marketing opportunities within their communities 
and governorate, and some –like Al-Shawawreh Women Center and Battir Women Society- have succeeded, albeit 
on a limited scale. With time, if the momentum created by the project does not get lost, greater impacts could be 
achieved. 
B.5. Sustainability 
Overall, the likelihood of the sustainability of the project results at the time of evaluation was moderate due to the 
limited marketing opportunity available to most of the target cooperatives and the general loss of interest felt by the 
evaluation team during interviewed with project beneficiaries and cooperative leaders. Support is essentially needed 
to ensure that the few achievements that have been made by the cooperatives do not get lost. 
Having said this, it should be noted that there is a sense of interest among some of the target 
cooperatives/associations to build upon what has been achieved and not lose ground. Within these cooperatives, 
cooperative leaders interviewed showed evidence of being active in soliciting support from various organizations to 
build upon what has been done through the VACFP project. 
The sustainability prospects of the project would be greatly improved if ESDC follows through with its commitment 
to continue supporting the targeted cooperatives within the framework of its core programs and funded projects. At 
the time of evaluation ESDC was exploring opportunity for re-engaging with Ithna and Dura Cooperatives and 
trying to help them market their dairy products through local organizations and wholesalers. It was also looking into 
leveraging support through a Swedish-funded program it is implementing to Dura Cooperative to expand its dairy 
production capacity and diversifying their product line. 
 
C. Overall Conclusions and Recommendations 
VACFP has demonstrated the value of a simple capacity building approach to the development of the relatively 
inexperienced women cooperatives and associations. It has demonstrated how, with some capital assistance, 
capacity building and a marketing support much cooperative development work can be done. It has also 
demonstrated that women cooperatives have the potential to assume responsibility for this work. 
VACFP has also demonstrated, however, that much work remains to be done before such development could 
continue sustainably. Progress has been made with regard to cooperative capacity building of the ten target 
cooperatives, but more substantial improvements are still needed. 
In terms of VACFP objectives, those of cooperative development and women capacity building were met. Little 
progress has been made in relation to helping women increase or effectively contribute to their households’ income. 
This is why VACFP is believed to have not been able to achieve its own full potential. 
Three main lessons learned can be highlighted from the implementation experience of the project, namely: 
86 
a) Home-based food processing remains a viable means of generating additional household income and 
preserving foods for later use. Home-based processing activities are appealing to women because they can 
be performed at home where the women can attend to their children, and can provide women with the 
opportunity to put their skills to use and generation of additional household income. Thus, women 
cooperatives could be effective in bridging the gap between women’s desire to generate income for their 
household through productive employment and the cultural expectation that she has to stay at home. 
b) The operations of many of rural women cooperatives/associations are not yet sustainable because of 
meager capacities and resources as well as the lack of a vision to address the issues facing them. 
Furthermore, the majority of these cooperatives / associations are not well organized to deal efficiently with 
wholesalers or buyers both from the local or external markets. Rural women cooperatives have limited 
business and service capacity to compete as commercial organizations and effectively market products on 
behalf of their members. 
d) Careful budgeting and implementation scheduling are critical to any project design, but particularly so for 
short-cycle projects. In budgeting, market prices of equipment and services should be investigated and 
scrutinized, and contingency reserve should be allocated. Implementation planning must assume the worst￾case scenario and develop appropriate mitigation measures. If a project faces a risk of failure due to these 
risks, whether in design or during implementation, they should be immediately ceased. 
 
The recommendations emerging from the evaluation of the VACFP project are the following: 
 
a) ESDC is strongly encouraged to integrate the willing of the ten targeted cooperative under the VACFP 
project in its cooperative capacity development and marketing initiatives. 
b) ACDI/VOCA should seek out ways to pilot a second phase of the VACFP project utilizing the lessons 
learned from the implementation of the first phase. Particular emphasis should be placed on physical 
infrastructure development and marketing. 
87 
CHAPTER SEVEN: THE RURAL HOUSEHOLD SUPPORT COMPONENT 
A. Overview and Performance Targets 
Within the framework of the WBFS Program, ACDI/VOCA signed a grant agreement with the Applied Research 
Institute of Jerusalem (ARIJ) to implement a project titled “Improving Livelihoods and Food Security in Southern 
West Bank” (ILHFS). The project, which was the main activity implemented by ACDI/VOCA to achieve the results 
of the Rural Household Support (RHS) component of the WBFS Program, was implemented over two consecutive 
phases (Phase I: 19 February- 30 September 2007; and, Phase II: 1 October 2007-30 June 2008). 
The ILHFS project aimed to improve the food security and livelihood of 790 marginalized, impoverished and 
vulnerable rural households (420 in Phase I and 370 in Phase II) through assisting them to establish productive 
vegetable home gardens that provide them with a source of food and a source of supplemental income.20 More 
specifically, the project identified three objectives to reach this goal, namely: 
a) Improve access to food for 790 impoverished and vulnerable agricultural households in a cluster of villages 
in Bethlehem and Hebron Governorate through the installation of 790 home gardens to produce vegetables, 
herbs and fruits for household consumption. Of the total 790 home gardens to be constructed, 400 would 
have baby-greenhouses (90m2
), 280 would have rainwater collection cistern, and 110 would have grey 
water treatment units. 
b) Provide access to water and improve water use and reuse efficiency by 3,1480 cubic meters (11880 from 
the treated grey water and 19600 from harvested rainwater) for domestic and agricultural purposes in the 
selected areas of Bethlehem and Hebron.
c) Increase capacities and skills of 790 targeted households in agricultural practices and water management 
especially women household members.
Before moving on to the assessment of the project as implemented, three key extraneous obstacles that were 
encountered during the implementation of the project –which started on schedule- should be noted here, as reference 
will be made to them in several places throughout the assessment. These are: 
a) Below average and uneven rainfall: The winter of 2007 was characterized by below average precipitation 
rates and uneven distribution of rainfall. Rain fell in few consecutive heavy showers at the beginning of the 
season, which gradually stopped in mid January, depriving rain-fed crops from a very much needed 
irrigation and reduced the usual average of rainwater harvest by those who have the means to do so. The 
rainfall patterns combined with below average precipitation rates have classified the agricultural years 
2007/2008 as a year of drought. 
b) Frost: While moderate frost conditions are known to happen in the oPt, their incidence in late 2007/early 
2008 was exception. Frost conditions spanned several days , with occurrence all across the West Bank, 
even in the Jordan Valley which has been traditionally immune to such conditions. The frost’s impact was 
felt most by farmers who saw their crops dissipate as they stood helpless. Crops that were not affected by 
the frost were few and far in between, and those that were not destroyed suffered stunted growth and below 
average productivity. The general effect of the frost was noticeably felt in the project target areas. 
 
20 ARIJ’s proposals for Phase I and II of the ILHFS project included different goal, purpose and objective statements. However, the statements 
were very similar in meaning, with some details being the main variance. To facilitate the evaluation and reduce redundancy, especially since 
both phases were considered as one project by ACDI/VOCA, the evaluation team opted to rely on the project’s chain of results as stated under 
Phase I of the project. This choice was made simply because the statements of results in the Phase I proposal were slightly better crafted for the 
evaluation purpose than those in Phase II. 
88 
c) Delay in setting up home-gardens as a result of the delay in the approval of source of origin waivers from 
USAID for the procurement of non-US made irrigation systems: The delay in setting up and cultivating 
home gardens was reported in Q2. This two-month delay was mainly due to the delay in obtaining the 
geographical code waiver for the drip irrigation system. Waiver was submitted to USAID on 26 April and 
again in 6 May 2007, with ensuing clarifications. Another waiver was submitted on 10 May 2007. Waiver 
approved on June 20th but there were a couple of questions concerning the source and origin of materials 
shown as Israel in the approved waiver that ACDI/VOCA wished to clarify and these were not answered 
until early July 2007. This delay caused a loss of the 2007 winter season’s cultivation (planned cultivation 
in May and June). 
B. Assessment of Component Implementation 
B.1. Effectiveness 
B.1.1. Improved Access to Food 
All planned activities under this objective were completed at the time of the evaluation. A total of 790 home 
gardens were established, of which 280 included the construction of cisterns, 400 included the construction of baby 
greenhouses, and 110 included the construction of grey water treatment units. This translated to a total of 355 
dunums of open irrigated cultivation and 36 dunums of greenhouses. All 790 beneficiaries have received vegetable 
and herb seeds and seedlings sufficient for the cultivation of up to half a dunum of open field or 90m2
 greenhouse. 
The seeds cultivated included tomatoes, cucumbers, bell peppers, green beans, zucchini, lettuce, cabbage, eggplants, 
spinach, cauliflower, cabbage, peas, green onions, radishes and thyme, all staple foods for the average Palestinian 
household. During the life span of the project 450 home gardens and greenhouses were cultivated twice (two 
cycles) with vegetable seeds and seedlings, and 340 home gardens and greenhouses were cultivated once. 
The simple fact that these home gardens have been constructed and cultivated is sufficient to indicate that physical 
access of the beneficiary households to vegetables, fruits and herbs has improved substantially. Survey results 
confirm this by revealing that the average beneficiary household has utilized an average of 329m2 of its developed 
home garden for the production of vegetables, 194m2
 for fruit trees, and 90m2 for medicinal plants as shown in the 
table below. 
Table 35: Nature of use of home gardens according to the average area of land used (m2
) 
Nature of Home Garden Use Cisterns Greenhouses GWTU Total 
Vegetables (Open field) 449 234.5 348 329 
Fruit trees 166 256 144 194 
Greenhouses 0 90 0 90 
Medicinal plants 35 16.5 51 26 
While the figures in the above table are quite high, they cannot be generalized to all 790 beneficiaries. The survey 
findings reveal that the percentage of beneficiaries who have received cisterns and grey water treatment units and 
have not cultivated their home gardens after the first harvest is relatively high is 52.1 percent and 36.2 percent, 
respectively. The high percentage of cisterns’ beneficiaries not cultivating their home gardens is largely the result of 
the late completion of the cisterns and the low rainfall rates, which have prevented beneficiaries for collecting 
sufficient amount of rain water for irrigation purposes. Thus, this percentage will most likely drop after this winter 
season. The evaluation team, however, could not say the same about the high percentage of grey water treatment 
units’ beneficiaries not cultivating their land as no explanation could be found. 
This notwithstanding, drilling further into the survey results reveals that quite substantial quantities of various crops 
have been produced by the beneficiary households who have cultivated their home gardens over the period 
extending from the completion of their home gardens to the evaluation (August 2008), as shown in the table 36 
below. On average, excluding fruits, each beneficiary household produced 331 kg of various agricultural crops. 
The implications of this level of production in terms of income transfer effect, i.e. value of income usually spent on 
the crops produced now spent on other food and non-food items; is quite substantial. This is most likely why 63.6 
percent of the surveyed beneficiaries reported increased ability to purchase food items that were beyond their 
economic reach before the project. This, in the opinion of the evaluation team, is a considerable achievement, 
89 
especially when considering all the effectiveness constraints associated with the drought, frost and delay in the 
installation of the drip irrigation networks. It is even more substantial given the exponential increases in food prices 
that coincided with the implementation of the project (the Palestinian Consumer Price Index (CPI) soared to a record 
168.16 in February 2008, continuing a noticeable trend that began to emerge in 2007. For the tenth month in a row, 
the increase in the CPI was largely driven by a 4.74 percent increase in food prices in the West Bank). 
Table 36: Total production from home gardens 
Crop 
Total Production (Kg) Total 
Production 
(Kg) Cisterns Greenhouses GWTU 
Tomatoes 4,686 30,042 2,210 36,938 
Cucumbers 565 21,200 318 22,083 
Green beans 30 938 43 1,011 
Squash 2,172 5,462 1,496 9,130 
Pea 0 18 32 50 
Cabbage 7,73 1,384 1,155 3312 
Radish 87 227 26 340 
Green pepper 35 611 23 669 
Pepper 83 894 42 1,019 
Thyme 310 279 56 645 
Pumpkin 3,015 2,856 1,560 7,431 
Onion 270 262 200 732 
Eggplant 811 4,006 878 5,695 
Others 348 2,764 744 3,856 
Total 13,185 70,943 8,783 9,2911 
Average Production Per Beneficiary (Kg) 231 381 237 331 
The ILHFS project was also highly effective in improving beneficiaries economic access to food beyond what was 
mentioned above. 39.1 percent of the surveyed beneficiaries who cultivated their home gardens reported selling 
part of their home garden crops in the local market. Greenhouse beneficiaries account for the majority of these, as 
shown in the figure below, which is largely attributable to the intensive farming nature of greenhouses. 
Figure 9: Percentage of beneficiaries reporting sale of home garden produced cops, by service
The total value of crops sold by the surveyed beneficiaries according to the evaluation survey was NIS 75,741, most 
of which (81 percent, or NIS 61,369) emanating from the sale of greenhouse crops. A simple arithmetic calculation 
shows that the project has been successful in increasing the seasonal income of some 309 of its 790 beneficiary 
households by an average of NIS 537. Due to the varying levels of production and the difference in the proportion 
of beneficiaries who indicated sale of their crops between the three types of home gardens, it follows that both the 
90 
number of households who were able to accrue income through the project from crop sales and the value of increase 
in seasonal income for these households was not equally distributed among the different types of home garden. 
91 
Table 37: Total quantity and value of home garden crops sold by surveyed beneficiaries in local market, in kilogram, by crop type
Crop 
Cisterns Greenhouses GWTU Total 
Quantity 
(Kg) 
Avg. 
Price 
Value 
(NIS) 
Quantity 
(Kg) 
Avg. 
Price 
Value 
(NIS) 
Quantity 
(Kg) 
Avg. 
Price 
Value 
(NIS) 
Quantity 
(Kg) 
Avg. 
Price 
Value 
(NIS) 
Tomatoes 2145 2.1 4504.5 15675 1.4 21945 260 1.7 442 18080 1.73 26891.50 
Cucumbers 260 2 520 11540 1.9 21926 50 2 100 11850 1.97 22546.00 
Green bean 0 0 0 563 3.3 1857.9 0 0 0 563 1.10 1857.90 
Squash 865 2.4 2076 2285 2.3 5255.5 115 1.5 172.5 3265 2.07 7504.00 
Cabbage 390 1.8 702 235 2.3 540.5 0 0 0 625 1.37 1242.50 
Radish 70 1.5 105 61 2.4 146.4 0 0 0 131 1.30 251.40 
Green pepper 0 0 0 129 2.3 296.7 0 0 0 129 0.77 296.70 
Pepper 20 1.8 36 165 2.2 363 0 0 0 185 1.33 399.00 
Thyme 159 6.9 1097.1 88 6.6 580.8 0 0 0 247 4.50 1677.90 
Pumpkin 1395 1.4 1953 990 1.5 1485 420 1.4 588 2805 1.43 4026.00 
Onion 153 1.9 290.7 0 0 0 20 3 60 173 1.63 350.70 
Eggplant 392 3.1 1215.2 1330 2.1 2793 150 2.5 375 1872 2.57 4383.20 
Others 41 3.3 135.3 995 4.2 4179 0 0 0 1036 2.50 4314.30 
Total 5890 2.15 12634.8 34,056 1.8 61368.8 1015 1.7 1737.5 40961 1.88 75,741.10 
92 
According to survey results, the average additional seasonal income accrued by the beneficiary households that 
received greenhouses from the sale of home garden crops was NIS584, whereas it was NIS 421 and NIS 289 for the 
beneficiary households that received cisterns and grey water treatment units, respectively. Generalizing these results 
to the total target population leads to the conclusion to the following conclusions: 
a) 226 of the 400 beneficiary households that received greenhouse home gardens were able to increase their 
income by NIS 584 per season. 
b) 11 of the 110 beneficiary households that received grey water treatment units were able to increase their 
income by NIS 289 per season. 
c) 72 of the 280 beneficiary households that received cisterns were able to increase their income by NIS 584 
per season. 
To ascertain these findings and further understand the effect of the project on economic access, the evaluation team 
made a quick comparison between the reported level of monthly income by the beneficiary households at the 
baseline and at evaluation (Table 38). What emerged from this indicated to a considerable level of achievement, as 
the percentage of households in upper income groups has increased at the expense of lower income groups. This is 
clearly an indicator of decreased level of poverty, and by proxy, decreased food insecurity. 
Table 38: Household monthly income (NIS), by income groups at baseline and at evaluation 
Monthly Income Reference Cisterns Greenhouses GWTU Total 
Less than 1000 
NIS 
Baseline 58.1 47.5 34.3 47.4 
At evaluation 16.5 20.7 7.1 16.4 
1000-1500 
Baseline 27.9 11.9 20.0 19.0 
At evaluation 37 41.4 33.3 37.8 
1501-2000 
Baseline 9.3 25.4 22.9 19.7 
At evaluation 10.2 21.8 26.2 16.8 
2000+ 
Baseline 4.7 15.3 22.9 13.9 
At evaluation 36.2 16.1 33.3 29 
Other survey findings confirming that the project has been successful highly effective in meeting its objective 
related to increasing access to food among the beneficiaries are the following: 
a) 73 percent of the surveyed households indicated reduced expenditure on food (without having to lower 
quality of consumed foods and/or frequency of intake); 
b) 44.1 percent of the surveyed households indicated feeling more food secure than before; 
c) 20.1 percent of the surveyed households (all GWTU beneficiaries) indicated decreased expenditures on 
vacuuming cesspits; and, 
d) 13.5 percent of the surveyed households reported decreased water bills. 
B.1.2. Access to Water, Water Use and Reuse Efficiency 
As noted earlier, ILHFS project envisaged providing access to water and improving water use and reuse efficiency 
by 3,1480 cubic meters (11880 from the treated grey water and 19600 from harvested rainwater) for domestic and 
agricultural purposes in the selected areas of Bethlehem and Hebron. The key activities to achieve this were the 
construction of 110 grey water treatment units, the construction of 280 rainwater harvesting cisterns (capacity of at 
least 70m3
) for supplementary irrigation, and the installation of drip irrigation systems in all constructed home 
gardens through the project. 
All of these activities were commendably completed as planned at the time of the evaluation. 280 household 
cisterns (70 cubic meters in water storage capacity) constructed for families with no stable water source to increase 
the amount of water available for supplementary agricultural use at the household level. Survey results show that 
the majority of these cisterns are used for domestic and irrigation purposes, whereas some 52 percent of them are 
being primarily used for domestic purposes. Project efficiency aside, this demonstrates that the constructed cisterns 
came to respond to a real need, and quite effectively so. 
93 
In line with targets, 110 gray water treatment units were constructed to collect and treat gray waste water. These 
units have made it possible for households to use –for the first time in many cases- grey water that otherwise went 
to waste for irrigation purposes. The design of the constructed units is highly efficient not only from a cost 
perspective, but also in terms of treatment capacity. ARIJ estimates that the constructed grey water treatment units 
have a treating capacity of 1 cubic meter daily (11880 cubic meters annually). Thus, the units can serve a 
household of 14 members and can treat up to 75-80% of the grey water discharged by them on a daily basis. 
Undoubtedly, treatment and recycling of household gray water has environmental as well as positive health impact. 
It is also an effective way of reducing household expenditure on cesspit vacuuming. 
According to ARIJ, 60 samples from the treated grey water were collected and tested for their chemical and 
biological characteristics to ensure that the units are working properly and that treated water characteristics meet the 
Palestinian standards for the treated waste water. These tests confirmed that eh units are working properly and that 
treated water discharged by them is fit for irrigation purposes. 
Supplemental irrigation systems were installed for each home garden constructed by the project. The drip systems 
are effective means of plant irrigation as well as efficient solution to the limited water availability. Field 
observations confirmed that the supplementary irrigation networks constructed were properly installed, covered 
anywhere between 300m2
-600m2 home gardens, and were used by beneficiaries for irrigation purposes. According 
to ARIJ’s Final Project Report, the total established irrigation networks reached 790 units, forming 100% of the total 
planned networks. The irrigation system contains one cubic meter tank to preserve the pumped water from the 
cisterns by the provided one horse power pump then, water flows by gravity into main irrigation pipes then into 
lateral pipes and finally to the drip pipes, which contain the dripping nozzles. Additionally, there is a pipe 
connecting the roof with the cistern to harvest the rainwater with a filter to insure the quality of harvested water. 
Evidence gathered through interviews with beneficiaries suggests quite clearly that access to water as a result of the 
grey water treatment units and the cisterns has been increased. Beneficiaries of cisterns were particularly vocal in 
stressing that the cisterns they received improved their livelihoods in several ways. One of these beneficiaries told 
the evaluation team that his worry about water availability and constant nagging to his wife and children about water 
completely disappeared after the cistern was completed and charged with water. “I used to refuse to let the kids 
bathe except once a week, but now they bathe when they want” he told the evaluation team. Grey water treatment 
units were an effective solution for all beneficiary households’ interviews to the problem of costly cesspit 
vacuuming. These households were extremely happy with the performance of their treatment units, and many of 
them highlighted that it has saved them as much as NIS 200 every month. 
Based on the quantitative and qualitative output target achievement, the evaluation team concludes that the project’s 
objective related to access to water and improvement of water use and efficiency has been achieved. The team has 
no further comments on either the objective itself or the way it was pursued. 
 
B.1.3. Capacity Building of Beneficiaries in Agricultural Knowledge and Practices 
The capacity building objective was at the heart of the ILHFS project design and central to its success. It 
importance stemmed from its heavy focus on practical training and extension. Its envisaged contribution to the 
success and sustainability of the other project objectives made it particularly important, and highly commendable. 
The training strategy was tapped with the purpose of augmenting beneficiaries’ knowledge in agriculture and 
agriculture management, as well as encouraging their use of environmentally-friendly and effective agricultural 
practices. This objective was also particularly important because it primarily targeted women. 
During the lifetime of the project, 50 different training workshops were conducted with the attendance of 1,609 
individual participants, of whom 63.7% were women. Training was both theoretical and practical and covered such 
topics as grey water utilization for irrigation, operation and maintenance of grey water treatment units, water quality, 
home garden management, and food processing management. Table contains the distribution of conducted training 
workshops by type of training. The women contribution was clear as the agreements were signed with women and 
the participation of more than one person per households was encouraged. 
94 
Table 39: Training courses conducted within the framework of the ILHFS project
Course Theme 
of Training 
Workshops Men Women Total % 
Women 
Food Processing 6 10 121 131 92.4 
Gray Water Management and Water Quality 14 129 198 327 60.4 
Greenhouses Management 13 231 351 582 60.3 
Home garden management 15 193 342 535 63.9 
Key Farmers 2 20 13 33 39.4 
Total 50 583 1025 1609 63.7 
The training workshops conducted were both focused and well targeted. The workshops on food processing 
primarily targeted women and covered the topics food preservation, food hygiene and food processing of home 
garden production. The workshops on grey waste water treatment and water quality focused on both technical 
matters related to the units’ operation and maintenance, and theoretical matters related to, inter alia, safety methods 
to avoid water contamination, optimization of water use and environmental impacts and recommended uses of the 
treated grey wastewater for irrigation. The primary target group for this workshop was the beneficiaries who would 
be most likely responsible for operating and maintaining the units. The workshop on greenhouses focused on the 
imparting knowledge and skills to farmers on the appropriate cultivation techniques under protected systems. In 
addition to introducing crops suitable for greenhouse agriculture and their cultivation periods, the training focused 
on imparting knowledge to farmers on how to reduce the utilization of chemicals and mechanisms for the 
introduction of IPM techniques and organic agriculture as means to increase productivity, product safety and fight 
pests and diseases. The workshop on home gardens management focused on imparting knowledge to farmers on the 
importance of and how to IPM techniques and organic agriculture as means to increase productivity, product safety 
and fight pests and diseases. Key farmer training workshops were special workshops organized with the 
participation of farmer leaders from the target communities and project beneficiaries to discuss issues related to crop 
management, crop rotations, IPM techniques, organic products, farming as a business, Gray waste water 
management and water management, food hygiene and food processing for home gardens products, farmers to 
farmers networking and cooperation. 
Training materials covering all the above training topics were coalesced into a six-chapter booklet entitled “Practical 
Guide for the Palestinian Agricultural”, which was produced in two editions (one in phase I and one in phase two) 
and distributed to all beneficiary. 
The project’s Agricultural Specialists and extension agents provided the beneficiary farmers with required extension 
services to assist them in improving their agricultural practices and resolve any issues or obstacles related to the 
implementation of the project. Farmer Field School (FFS) sessions were also conducted within the framework of 
the project’s extension activities. These probably were the most innovative of all training and extension activities.. 
FSS sessions were conducted by ARIJ staff in close collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture and well￾experienced farmers and farmer community leaders. Sessions began with a meeting in which farmers discussed 
difficulties and problems they faced in their home gardens and receive feedback on ways to overcome them. 
Participants are then divided into small groups and lead in field visit to a participant’s home garden for practical 
training in implementing the recommendations provided earlier. During these visits, extension agents asked 
participants to diagnose any problems encountered in the home garden and to propose solutions, which were usually 
tried or discussed on the spot. 
The following observations could be made about in relation to the capacity building and training objective: 
a) Training and extension were carried in concert, reaching all project beneficiaries. Training records show 
that training was implemented in all target communities and with the participation of all beneficiaries. The 
same is true with regard to extension. The extension activities covered all 790 project beneficiaries. 
Extension agents from the Ministry of Agriculture were invited to join the project team in providing 
extension service to the project beneficiaries to build a relationship among them, and to link them with the 
beneficiaries to follow up with them after the project end which enhances the sustainability of project 
implemented activities and assist in improving farmers’ productivity. A total of 11970 household extension 
95 
visits were conducted. On average, each of beneficiary household received anywhere between 15-16 
extension visits throughout the project’s lifetime. In interviews, most beneficiaries confirmed that 
extension visits were extensive and were in excess of ten visits. The effort made by the project team in 
extension is worthy of particular praise. 
b) Training was highly effective in increasing the level of knowledge of beneficiaries of key agricultural 
issues on which they were trained: Training pre- and post-tests conducted by ARIJ show that training was 
highly effective in raising the knowledge levels among trainees of key agricultural issue. While the 
evaluation team could not verify the accuracy of these test results, interviews with farmers indicated that 
beneficiaries levels of knowledge of agricultural practices included in the training courses was very high. 
For example, all interviewed beneficiaries could properly identify what soil solarization is and could 
explain how it is done. Similarly, all beneficiaries who received grey water treatment units could explain 
how their units function and how they could be maintained. Greenhouse beneficiaries were also able to 
explain what IPM techniques are, although many of them did not refer to it them as such. The combination 
of training and extension, thus, seem to have been highly effective in raising the capacity of the 
beneficiaries in line with what was planned. This is quite a commendable achievement given that many of 
the targeted beneficiaries did not have prior experience in agriculture. 
 
c) Training materials were well developed and made easily accessible to farmers: The booklet “Practical 
Guide for the Palestinian Agricultural” developed through the project struck the evaluation team as 
comprehensive and accessible to the average farmer. It is a very valuable legacy to be left behind by the 
project. The efforts made in its development are thus highly applauded, especially when considering that 
all beneficiaries have received a copy of it and all of those interviewed confirmed that they often refer to it 
for technical matters. This, based on the experience of the evaluation team, is highly unusual, which speaks 
highly of the practicality of the booklet. 
d) Overall, the objective of capacity building activities has been met, and commendably so given the minimal 
financial resources allocated to training. The project staff and the ACDI/VOCA ILHFS Project 
Coordinator are particularly applauded for this achievement.
B.2. Efficiency 
B.2.1. Utilization of Financial and Human Resources 
Funding: The total budget allocated the ILHFS project was US$ 1,633,522, of which 86.3 percent was allocated to 
home garden interventions; 0.9 percent to training and technical assistance; and, 9 percent to project staff salaries 
and benefits. Indirect costs accounted for 3.8 percent of the total budget. Actual total expenditures were US$ 
1,633,452, with no substantial variance between line item expenditures and those budgeted, except for the line item 
on project staff salaries and fringe benefits. Table 32 below provides further details on the project budget as 
designed and as discharged. 
 
The fact that a very high proportion of the budget was earmarked and actually spent on direct services and 
infrastructure to the beneficiaries, and that so much capacity had been built with so little resources is astounding. In 
fact, unusual for development projects having similar level of funding to ILHFS. The evaluation team believes very 
strongly the both the way the budget was structured and the way in which it was discharged guaranteed the highest 
degrees of cost efficiency, and maximized resource utilization. Both ACDI/VOCA and ARIJ are commended for 
this achievement. 
 
Staffing: The project structure envisaged in the project proposal was well instituted and all identified staff positions 
were filled in accordance with ARIJ’s internal procedures. The expertise of the project staff was found to be well 
in-line with what is needed and their qualifications and responsibilities were commensurate with each other. The 
workload of staff was adequate, and administrative records show that staff time was dedicated fully to the project. 
Staff deployment took place when needed, and staff pay levels are believed to have been set at the same level as 
ARIJ’s pay scale. The utilization of human resources is thus believed to have been highly efficient.
96 
Table 40: ILHFS Project budget vs. actual expenditures
Budget Amount % of total Budget Cumulative 
Expenditures
% of 
Expenditures
1 Home Garden Interventions
1.1 Rainwater harvesting cisterns 581,724.12 35.6% 581,592.12 36%
1.2 Small green houses 411,439.81 25.2% 411,439.81 25%
1.3 Gray wastewater treatment units 168,635.89 10.3% 169,305.42 10%
1.4 Drip irrigation networks 248,367.55 15.2% 247,969.26 15%
1.5 Vegetable & herbs seed and seedlings - -
Total Home Garden Interventions 1,410,167.37 86 3% 1,410,306.61 86%
2 Training & Technical Assistance
2.1 Training workshops 7,322.15 0.4% 6,979.85 0%
2.2 Final review workshop 1,840.00 0.1% 437.55
2.3 Testing of treated gray water 3,750.00 0.2% 3,470.00 0%
2.4 Publications 2,300.00 0.1% 2,305.00 0%
Total Training & Technical Assistance 15,212.15 0.9% 13,192.40 1%
3 Direct Project Personnel 
3.1 Director (30%) - (25% from Jan.08 to Jun. 08) 26,335.18 1.6% 26,335.18 2%
3.2 Project Coordinator (50%) 18,899.70 1.2% 19,477.96 1%
3.3 Senior Extension Agent1 (70%) 16,912.66 1.0% 16,912.66 1%
3.4
Senior Extension Agent2 (70%) - (50% from Jan.08 to Jun. 
08) - (100% from April. 15, 08 to Jun.08) 14,755.24 0.9%
 14,755.24 1%
3.5 Junior Extension Agent1 (100%) 15,068.60 0.9% 15,068.60 1%
3.6 Junior Extension Agent2 (100%) 13,538.06 0.8% 13,538.06 1%
3.7 Jan.08 to Jun. 08) 13,252.07 0.8% 13,252.07 1%
3.8 Procurement Officer (20%) - (70% from Jan.08 to Jun. 08) 5,603.83 0.3% 5,603.83 0%
3.9 Secretary (100%) 11,745.36 0.7% 11,745.36 1%
3.1 Field Worker1 - (100%) 3,000.19 0.2% 3,269.03 0%
3.11 Field Worker2 - (100%) 2,881.91 0.2% 3,150.75 0%
3.12 Junior Extension Agent3 (100%) from April 15, 08 1,678.01 0.1% 2,011.85 0%
3.13 Junior Extension Agent4 (100%) from April 15, 08 1,407.18 0.1% 1,686.85 0%
3.14 Procurement Assistant (100%) from April 15, 08 1,407.18 0.1% 1,686.85 0%
Total Direct Project Personnel 146,485.17 9.0% 148,494.29 9%
4 Other Direct Administrative Costs
4.1 Transportation 31,616.47 1.9% 31,414.95 2%
4.2 Office supplies 5,103.45 0.3% 5,490.98 0%
4.3 Office rent 6,658.31 0.4% 6,658.31 0%
4.4 Telecommunication 6,370.16 0.4% 5,913.95 0%
4.5 Utilities 4,034.69 0.2% 4,409.95 0%
4.6 Audit Fees 7,700.00 0.5% 7,396.00 0%
4.7 Bank Fees 174.23 174.23
Total Other Direct Administrative Costs 61,657.31 3.8% 61,458.37 4%
Grand Total 1,633,522.00 100.0% 1,633,451.67 100%
Total Program
97 
B.2.2. Targeting and Beneficiary Selection 
The process of targeting conducted by ARIJ at project design was highly attentive to efficiency; i.e. utilizing project 
funds to target the communities most in need for the type of proposed interventions. This process was grounded by 
the WBFS Program set criteria, available statistical data (rainfall, land availability, proximity to city, population 
size) and availability of water and sewage networks. The selection was also based on satellite land-use and 
agriculture cover satellite maps as well as ARIJ's assessment of these communities and its extensive knowledge and 
experience in the targeted areas through previous work and research on poor and disadvantaged households. While 
a preliminary list of target communities was included in ARIJ’s proposal to ACDI/VOCA, actual targeting did not 
take place until further community visits and surveys were conducted after the launch of the project. 
In selecting beneficiaries, the process used was highly participatory and included several layers of eligibility 
verification. Community leaders in the selected villages were approached to assist in providing project-related 
information. Community leaders on the committees included agricultural cooperatives representatives, active 
farmers, women’s clubs, and other community leaders. In most cases, representative of all community based 
organizations and local authorities were contacted. Following this initial contact, which also included an 
introduction to the project, the project team commenced with establishing village-based Community Committees 
(CC), which include various stakeholders. Sixteen CCs were formed in the project target (the community committee 
of Yatta was selected to cover two targeted communities), with a total membership of 118 persons (representing 61 
local organizations operating in the target communities), of whom 31 were women. 
These CCs were tasked with advertising the project, its objectives and interventions through posting at main 
buildings and public sites in their villages to familiarize local beneficiaries with the project. Through these 
advertisements, interested households were instructed to apply for participation with the CC. Multiple eligibility 
criteria specified by the project were included in the advertisement (as a first layer for self-exclusion). 
Table 41: Socio-economic Indicators for Project Beneficiary Selection 
Income Households with limited income sources; households that have lost their main source 
of income due to the Intifada; households with a monthly income of NIS 1,800 or 
lower. 
Head of Household Ideally female-headed households. 
Assets Households with limited ownership over land, minimum savings, and very limited 
assets (poor households). 
Size and composition 
of household 
Families with a high dependency ratio, and/or families with higher proportion of 
young children. 
Agricultural land Families who have limited land ownership, with unutilized gardens and close to the 
household site with an area of at least 500 m2
. 
Water resource Families with no, or limited, water resources in areas where water prices are high. 
Waste water For gray water construction: Families living in houses not connected to public 
sewerage networks but is connected to the public water supply network. Capability of 
separating gray water from black waste water. 
Political situation Families living in areas most affected by the current political situation. 
4955 applications were received by the CCs. A participatory screening and selection process was instituted to 
govern the beneficiary selection process in accordance with the above listed criteria. ARIJ in close collaboration 
with the CCs classified applicants into three categories based on information presented in the application: 
• Category A: applicants deemed most in need and suitable applicants (based on matching application 
information and eligibility criteria); 
• Category B: applicants deemed as likely suitable but their economic situation is better than those belong to 
category A. 
• Category C: applicants deemed ineligible (e.g. rich people, have no home gardens, do not have required 
infrastructure). 
98 
Based on this categorization, all applications were studied and analyzed by the project team with a full participation 
of the CCs. Preliminary list of approved applications was coalesced on the basis of this review. These applicants 
were then visited by the project team and the CCs to verify accuracy of information provided in the application. 
Applicants found to be eligible as a result of the verification done through these field visits were confirmed as 
beneficiaries with the CCs, and those who were not were immediately excluded. 
Based on the final selection made through field visits, agreements were signed between ARIJ and each beneficiary 
household, in which the respective responsibilities of each were identified. Forty two beneficiaries decided to 
withdraw after contract signature, however, as they were not able to secure the in-cash contribution required of 
them. These were quickly replaced from the applicants who were put on a waiting list. 
While the beneficiary selection process was quite time consuming, it was very effective in identifying those who are 
most in need. Thus, it facilitated the efficient use of resources for realization of the project objective. Baseline 
survey results confirm this (refer to table 38 above). The main shortcoming in the selection process is related to the 
criteria on in-cash contribution. As it was, this has prevented 42 highly eligible and needy beneficiary households 
(possibly more given the first layer of self-exclusion) from effectively benefiting from the project. This number 
would have been more had ARIJ not leveraged funds from its own resources to cover beneficiary contribution. This 
is unfortunate from the stand point of the objective of the project, which identified targeting the most impoverished 
and most marginalized. 
B.2.5. Beneficiary Satisfaction 
Surveyed beneficiaries expressed a high degree of satisfaction with the benefits they had accrued as a result of the 
project, which confirms the evaluation team’s assessment of, both, the project efficacy and efficiency. Table 33 
below, which summarizes the survey results in relation to beneficiaries’ satisfaction with the overall benefit they 
received as a result of the project, the performance of ARIJ, and the performance of the extension agents. 
Table 42: Beneficiaries satisfaction with various aspects of project (% of farmers indicating response)
Satisfaction indicator Service Satisfied 
In 
Between 
Not 
Satisfied Total 
Are you satisfied with the 
overall benefit you 
received from the project? 
Cisterns 89 11 0 100 
Greenhouses 84.2 13.9 2 100 
GWTU 80.6 19.4 0 100 
Total 85.7 13.3 1 100 
Are you satisfied with the 
overall performance of 
ARIJ? 
Cisterns 96.3 3.7 0 100 
Greenhouses 85.1 12.9 2 100 
GWTU 94.4 5.6 0 100 
Total 90.5 8.5 1 100 
Are you satisfied with the 
services of the agricultural 
extension agents? 
Cisterns 87.8 4.9 7.3 100 
Greenhouses 72.3 12.9 14.9 100 
GWTU 75 11.1 13.9 100 
Total 78.2 9.3 12.5 100 
B.2.6. Achievement of Planned Performance Targets 
Table 43 below sets out the project’s planned performance targets against those achieved. The table shows quite 
clearly that all output targets (italicized in the table below) were commendably achieved or surpassed. This is yet 
another evidence of efficiency, facilitated by careful planning and high level of organizational commitment to 
implementation follow-up. ARIJ is applauded on this achievement. The impact of this level of performance on the 
WBFS Program is quite substantial, as it means that the overall objectives of the Program’s RHS component have 
been fully achieved. 
 
99 
Table 43: Project Performance Indicators: Planned vs. Achieved
 
 
Program Indicators 
PHASE I Phase II PHASE I & II 
Target Achieved % of 
Target Target Achieved 
% of 
Targe
t 
Target Achieve
d 
% of 
Targ
et 
P.1 Total # of beneficiary HH assisted 
(cumulative) No of beneficiaries 450 450 100% 340 340 100% 790 790 100% 
 - Male 90 0 0% 50 0 0% 140 140 100%
 - Female 360 450 125% 290 340 117% 650 650 100%
Total Number of direct and indirect 
beneficiaries assisted (cumulative 
and disaggregated by sex) 3150 3435 109% 2380 2613 110% 5530 5530 100%
 - Male 1440 1714 119% 1070 1358 127% 2510 2510 100% 
 - Female 1710 1721 101% 1310 1217 93% 3020 3020 100% 
P.2 
 % of trained producers with 
knowledge of improved production 
techniques 75% 0% 0 0 0% 0 1 0% 
 IR.1 Rural Household Support 
Ind2.1 Rainwater Harvesting Cisterns 
2.1.a. 
 Number of cisterns completed & 
handed over 140 140 100% 140 140 
100
% 280 280 100% 
2.1.b. 
Cubic meters of water storage 
capacity 9800 9800 100% 9800 9800 
100
% 19600 19600 100% 
Ind2.2 Small Green Houses
2.2.a. 
Number of greenhouses completed 
and handed over 260 260 100% 140 140 
100
% 400 400 100% 
2.2. b 
Dunums of plantation under green 
houses 23.4 23.4 100% 12.6 12.6 
100
% 36 36 100% 
Ind2.3 0
2.3.a. 
Number of GWTU units completed 
and handed over 50 50 100% 60 60 
100
% 110 110 100% 
2.3.b. 
Cubic meters of treated water 
capacity 450 450 100% 540 540 
100
% 990 990 100% 
2.3.c. 
 Number of established and planted 
home gardens 50 50 100% 60 60 
100
% 110 110 100% 
2.3.d. 
 Number of tests conducted on 
treated water 30 0 0% 60 30 50% 90 90 100% 
2.4.e 
Dunums of home gardens planted 
25 25 100% 30 30 
100
% 55 55 100% 
 Number of established and planted 
home gardens 450 450 100% 340 340
100
% 790 790 100%
 
Dunums of home gardens planted 
199 199 100% 156 156 
100
% 355 355 100% 
 
CB 3: Capacity Building Indicator 
Ind3.1
Greenhouses, water/ wastewater and home gardens management and plant production Workshop 
3.1.a. 
 Number of workshops 
14 20 143% 13 30 
231
% 27 27 100% 
3.1.b. 
Number of trained persons in the 
workshops 460 755 164% 435 839 
193
% 895 895 100% 
Ind4
Number of monitoring & 
evaluation visits and extension 
visits 3860 4989 129% 5050 6981
138
% 8910 8910 100%
100 
B.3. Impact 
The impact of the project has been largely discussed in 
the section on effectiveness above as there is no 
attribution gap between the goal of the program 
(improving food security and livelihood of the target 
population) and the objectives (increasing access to 
food, water, and human capital development). Thus, to 
avoid redundancy, it suffices concluding here that the 
project has been aptly successful in improving the food 
security and livelihood conditions of its target 
beneficiaries by increasing their physical and economic 
access to food, providing them with productive assets 
on which they could depend to produce food and 
generate income if and when they opt to, and equipping 
them with the technical knowledge and skills to do just 
that. 
Other impact areas and results reported by ARIJ that 
were deemed appropriate for use here, although are the 
following: 
• 790 home garden providing 5942 family 
members with basic, safe and nutritious 
vegetables and fruits.
• Enhanced skills and knowledge of cropping practices, cultivation, pest management, water optimization 
and drip irrigation, water quality, food hygiene and food processing for 1609 persons. 
• 280 household cisterns (70 cubic meters) constructed with a total 19600 cubic meters of water harvesting 
and storage capacity.
• 400 baby greenhouses (90 meter square) constructed with a total area reached to 36 dunum.
• 110 Gray waste water treatment units (1 cubic meter daily treatment capacity) contracted with collection 
and treatment capacity of 11800 cubic meters annually for agriculture.
• 391 dunums of home garden were cultivated as open irrigated field (90.8%) and under greenhouses (9.2%).
• Increasing income generation through creating 43,810 formal and informal work days.
• 1,260 m3
 of rainwater harvested and stored in the constructed cistern for supplementary irrigation. 
• 18,500 cubic meters of grey wastewater treated and used for irrigating home gardens plants. 
• Up to 34,700 informal working days performed by the household members. 
• 9,110 paid working days created for the workers in the targeted localities. 
B.4. Sustainability 
Overall, the likelihood of the sustainability of the project results is highly likely. This, despite some evaluation 
findings of under utilization of cisterns and grey water treatment units (see B.2.1 above). The rationale behind the 
overall sustainability rating is the strong sense of ownership of the physical infrastructures established through the 
project among beneficiaries, which was possible largely because the infrastructures provided to them were –and still 
are- highly relevant to their needs, but also because they took part in and contributed to their implementation. The 
project results are also believed to be sustainable due to the high level of knowledge built among the beneficiaries, 
and the simplicity of technologies introduced and low cost of maintenance and operation of the infrastructure 
established. 
“I cannot be thankful for them (ARIJ) for giving us 
this garden, which has enabled us to fulfill a dream 
we had. We have been eating tomatoes every day… 
Even when the price of one kilogram of tomatoes 
was more than NIS20, we had tomato in our house. 
Had we not had the green house, I am sure we 
would have not bought tomatoes for more than a 
month… It certainly provided us with a sense of food 
security… 
We produced and consumed many other things. For 
example, we cultivated thyme last year and 
processed more than 20 kilograms. We still more 
than 2 kilograms left stored. We also produced 
more than fifty kilograms of squash and 
cucumbers… We have not had to buy any of these 
crops for more than five months now… We probably 
saved more than NIS500. This is why I am thankful 
for them.” 
101 
C. Overall Conclusions and Recommendations 
The overall conclusion of emerging from this evaluation is that the ILHFS has been unquestionably successful in 
improving the food security and livelihood conditions of its 790 beneficiaries. This was largely due to its solid 
design, high degree of relevance to the needs of the target population, and high degree of implementation efficiency. 
As a result of the ILHFS project, some 309 beneficiary households have managed to increase their incomes from the 
sale of agricultural products produced in their home gardens by an average of NIS 537 per agricultural season, 
possibly more if we factor in expenditure cost savings on agricultural crops produced in the home garden and 
savings on cesspit vacuuming. 
The main lessons learned emerging from the evaluation are the following: 
a) Proper targeting and careful beneficiary selection is crucial to development success.
b) Planning for implementation of any development project must anticipate risks associated with project 
implementation and their impact on the project performance, and build well-though out risk mitigation 
measures to prevent these risks from materializing. Special emphasis in agricultural development projects 
should be on anticipating seasonality factors and how they may affect implementation and effectiveness. 
c) Commercial home gardens involving intensive protected agriculture and inter-cropping could be both an 
effective and efficient strategy for the alleviation of poverty and food security. 
d) In development programming, and particularly in food security programs, beneficiary selection criteria 
should be carefully crafted to ensure congruence between the programming objectives and the beneficiary 
selection criteria. If the objective of a food security program is being pursued through interventions at the 
household level, then households most in need should be targeted and selection criteria to enshrine this 
approach should be established. It follows that beneficiary contributions –if required by a donor- should be 
set at a level that does not prevent those most in need from benefiting from the intervention. 
The main recommendations resulting from the evaluation are the following: 
a) ARIJ is strongly encouraged to revisit all cistern and grey water treatment unit beneficiaries to follow-up 
with them on the status of their structures and encourage them to start preparing their home gardens for the 
winter season cultivation. 
b) ACDI/VOCA is strongly encouraged to publicize the success of its RHS component to encourage other 
donors to replicate the experience, particularly the baby-greenhouses and Farmer Field Schools 
interventions. 
c) In conjunction with the above, ACDI/VOCA should ensure the wide circulation of the “Practical Guide for 
the Palestinian Agricultural” to development organizations, cooperatives and agricultural associations. 
d) ACDI/VOCA and ARIJ are strongly encouraged to jointly seek funding for replicating the ILHFS project 
in other target areas. 
102 
APPENDIX: LIST OF PEOPLE INTERVIEWED 
Name 
Mr. Abdel Fatah Abed Rabbo OHPOS Beneficiary 
Mr. Abdel Rahim Khaled HPM Project Beneficiary 
Mr. Abdel Samad Marzouq PLCU 
Mr. Abdelrahman Hamadneh HPM Project Beneficiary 
Mr. Adeeb Abu Al-Rub HPM Project Beneficiary 
Mr. Adel Dweikat ACDI/VOCA 
Mr. Adnan Younis ACDI/VOCA 
Mr. Ahde Abdel Rahim Ahmad SRDP Beneficiary 
Mr. Ahmad Musbah Abu Ali SRDP Beneficiary 
Mr. Ahmad Odeh Musallam OHPOS Beneficiary 
Mr. Ali Ahmad Hreizat SRDP Beneficiary 
Mr. Ali Mekdad Mohammad Asaad Azzoun Cooperative 
Mr. Amjad Qasas PalTrade 
Mr. Aref Ahmad Al-Azzeh OHPOS Beneficiary 
Mr. Azam Abdel Rahman Baqa Al Sharqeya Cooperative 
Mr. Azam Suliman Kalef Azzoun Cooperative 
Mr. Azzam Suleiman Khleif OHPOS Beneficiary 
Mr. Esmaeel Karesha Thinnaba Cooperative 
Mr. Hani Amin Radwan HPM Project Beneficiary 
Mr. Hasan Atyani ESDC 
Mr. Ibrahim Jamil Organic Olive Oil Marketing Cooperative 
 Saida Cooperative 
Mr. Imad Huwatat ACDI/VOCA 
Mr. Isam Abdel Rahman Kitaneh HPM Project Beneficiary 
Mr. Issam Khaled Hanaysheh HPM Project Beneficiary 
Mr. Jaber Tamem Mansor Salem Bazarya Cooperative 
Mr. Jamal Burnat ACDI/VOCA 
Mr. Jamil Musa Abu Qubeita SRDP Beneficiary 
Mr. Khaled Ahmad Abu Ali SRDP Beneficiary 
Mr. Lutfee Tarek Mahmmod Bazarya Cooperative 
Mr. Mahde Ahmed Saud Bazarya Cooperative 
Mr. Mahmmod Fawzi Kazemea Qabatya Cooperative 
Mr. Mahmoud Abed Al-Hales SRDP Beneficiary 
Mr. Mahmoud Ali Nawaj'a SRDP Beneficiary 
Mr. Ma'moun Dawoud Rabi HPM Project Beneficiary 
Mr. Moayad Jaber Metwase Beit Jala Cooperative 
Mr. Mohammad Abdel Ghani Jaber HPM Project Beneficiary 
Mr. Mohammad Hanaysheh HPM Project Beneficiary 
Mr. Mohammad Husaan Bazarya Cooperative 
Mr. Mohammad Khaled ACDI/VOCA 
Mr. Mohammad Sa'id Shbeita OHPOS Beneficiary 
Mr. Mohammad Sleimieh ARIJ 
Mr. Mujahed Mana'a SRDP Beneficiary 
Mr. Mustafa Musbah Uwais HPM Project Beneficiary 
Mr. Nabhan Odeh Thinnaba Cooperative 
103 
Mr. Nader Hreimat ARIJ 
Mr. Nasser Amro ILHFS Beneficiary 
Mr. Nasser Kadous ANERA 
Mr. Nemer Nazal Qabatya Cooperative 
Mr. Nizar Fares Radwan HPM Project Beneficiary 
Mr. Osama Abu Rub Qabatya Cooperative 
Mr. Osama Abu Zeid HPM Project Beneficiary 
Mr. Rami Al Jada Tulkarem Cooperative 
Mr. Said Jaber HPM Project Beneficiary 
Mr. Salim Abdel Aziz Hussien SRDP Beneficiary 
Mr. Salim Salameh Radwan HPM Project Beneficiary 
Mr. Shehada Hamareh SRDP Beneficiary 
Mr. Shehada Mahmmod Dahajna Al-Mintar Cooperative 
Mr. So'ud Habbas ACDI/VOCA 
Mr. Tayseer Mohammad Yosef Baqa Al Sharqeya Cooperative 
Mr. Tayseer Sedke Suliman Qalqilya Cooperative 
Mr. Wisam Abu Zahra Al-Mintar Cooperative 
Mr. Wisam Rasmi Jaber HPM Project Beneficiary 
Mr. Wisam Salah Bakeer OHPOS Beneficiary 
Mr. Yosef Ali Jabar Baqa Al Sharqeya Cooperative 
Mr. Yosef Saleem Yosef Beit Jala Cooperative 
Mr. Zaki Awad Al-Najar SRDP Beneficiary 
Mr. Zeyad Abdallah Radwan HPM Project Beneficiary 
Mr. Zeyad Al Yones Tulkarem Cooperative 
Mr. Zeyad Othman Bakeer OHPOS Beneficiary 
Ms. Affaf Hasan Husan Women Cooperative 
Ms. Amal Manasra ILHFS Beneficiary 
Ms. Amal Mosa Al Shawawra Women Center 
Ms. Amneh Mahmoud Al-Rawashdeh VACFP Beneficiary 
Ms. Amneh Mohammad Salah ILHFS Beneficiary 
Ms. Baqa Al Sharkeya Baqa Al Sharqeya Cooperative 
Ms. Dina Amro VACFP Beneficiary 
Ms. Enaya Uwaineh Battir Women Center 
Ms. Farida Hussein Zeidan ILHFS Beneficiary 
Ms. Fatima Abdelfatah Awad ILHFS Beneficiary 
Ms. Fatima Jadallah Al-Jubour ILHFS Beneficiary 
Ms. Fatima Za'aqeeq VACFP Beneficiary 
Ms. Fayzeh Amro VACFP Beneficiary 
Ms. Ibtisam A'di VACFP Beneficiary 
Ms. Ibtixam Ali Abu Murrar VACFP Beneficiary 
Ms. Itaf Musa Husheyeh ILHFS Beneficiary 
Ms. Jamal Awad Beit Ummar Women Cooperative 
Ms. Jihad Abu Hartheya Battir Women Center 
Ms. Karima Sa'id Awad VACFP Beneficiary 
Ms. Khadra Awad Al-Amouri ILHFS Beneficiary 
Ms. Maryam Abdelaziz Awad VACFP Beneficiary 
Ms. Maryam Harbouq Battir Women Center 
Ms. Maryam Tarayra ILHFS Beneficiary 
Ms. Maryam Uwaineh Battir Women Center 
Ms. Mas'ada Al-Iswed VACFP Beneficiary 
104 
Ms. Mays Shak'aa ESDC 
Ms. Nada Mohammad Hasan Husan Women Cooperative 
Ms. Najah Hamad Al Shawawra Women Center 
Ms. Najla Zeidan ILHFS Beneficiary 
Ms. Nawal Awni Hashem Amro VACFP Beneficiary 
Ms. Rima Sa'id Awad VACFP Beneficiary 
Ms. Rozana Salim ACDI/VOCA 
Ms. Sa'deya Tmeizi VACFP Beneficiary 
Ms. Salma Thabet ILHFS Beneficiary 
Ms. Samira Issa VACFP Beneficiary 
Ms. Sara Al-Jundi ILHFS Beneficiary 
Ms. Siham Abu Arqoub VACFP Beneficiary 
Ms. Suhair Amro VACFP Beneficiary 
Ms. Wadha Hasan Abu Zahra SRDP Beneficiary 
Ms. Wafa Judeh Azzoun Cooperative 
Ms. Yusra Tmeizi VACFP Beneficiary 
Ms. Zainab Ahmad Ibrahim ILHFS Beneficiary 
Ms. Zainab Omar Zeidan ILHFS Beneficiary 
Ms.Fatheya Atta Jaber Husan Women Cooperative