Haiti: 
Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
2 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 Page 
I. Executive Summary 6 
II. Summary of Recommendations 10 
III. Introduction 13 
IV. Assessment Scope and Methodology 14 
V. Findings 16 
A. Assessments of Past Efforts 16 
1. Courts 17 
2. Public Prosecutors Office 21 
3. Magistrates School 23 
4. Prisons 26 
5. Ministry of Justice 27 
6. Justice System 28 
B. Factors and Constraints 32 
C. Ministry of Justice Capabilities to 
 Receive USAID Assistance 40 
 D. Assessment of Physical Condition of the Haitian Courts 44 
VI. Recommendations for Future Programs 49 
A. Strategic Planning and Donor Coordination 49 
B. Legislative Reform 52 
C. Institutional Organization and Management 56 
D. Legal Education and Training 58 
E. Professional Career and Standards 61 
F. Court Administration & Management/Security 65 
G. Legal Services/Access to Justice 69 
H. Civil Society 71 
I. Prisons 73 
Appendices 
A. Literature review 75 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
3 
B. Contact list 77 
C. Discussion of proposed legislative changes related 
 to judicial careers 79 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
4 
List of Acronyms 
ANAMAH National Association of Haitian Magistrates (Association 
 Nationale des Magistrates Haïtiens)
AOJ Administration of Justice 
APENA National Penitentiary Administration (Administration Penitentiaire 
Nationale)
ARD Associates in Rural Development 
BUCODEP Bureau on Preventive Detention (Bureau de Controle 
 de la Detention Preventive 
CAI Creative Associates International 
CCI Framework for Interim International Assistance 
 (Cadre de Coopération Intérimaire)
CSM Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature 
DAP Director of Prison Administration 
DRL U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Democracy, 
 Human Rights and Labor 
EU European Union 
FADH Armed Forces of Haiti (Forces Armees d'Haiti) 
GAO General Audit Organization 
GOH Government of Haiti 
HNP Haitian National Police 
ICITAP International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 
IFES International Foundation for Election Systems 
INL U.S. Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics 
 and Law Enforcement Affairs 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
5 
JP Justice of the Peace (Juge de Paix) 
MAT Équipe des Conseillers Ministeriels
MICIVIH United Nations/Organization of American States’ 
 International Civilian Mission in Haiti 
MOJ Ministry of Justice 
NCSC National Center for State Courts 
NGOs Non-governmental organizations 
OAS Organization of American States 
OPDAT U.S. Department of Justice’s office for Overseas Prosecutorial 
 Development Assistance and Training 
PAP Port-au-Prince 
PASA Participating Agency Service Agreement 
UNDP United Nations Development Program 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
USDOJ United States Department of Justice 
WHA U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
6 
I. Executive Summary 
The Democracy and Governance Office of USAID/Haiti contracted with the National Center for 
State Courts (NCSC) to evaluate the impact and accomplishments of USAID programs in the 
justice sector in Haiti, carried out during the 1990’s. Given the many rule of law assessments 
conducted in recent years in Haiti, this assessment does not repeat previous reports, but rather 
summarizes and evaluates rule of law programs to date, and places major focus on 
recommendations for future mission programs. The team was composed of three rule of law and 
post-conflict experts, two from the international programs division of NCSC, and the third a 
comparative law professor with considerable previous Haiti experience. USAID identified two 
additional experts to work with the team on the ground. The in-country portion of the assessment 
was conducted from July 26 through August 5, 2004. 
Support for the justice sector by the US and other donors was extensive for the period from 1994 
through 2000. During this time, USAID implemented an Administration of Justice (AOJ) 
Program through contractors and the US Department of Justice (USDOJ). Other bilateral 
donors, including the Governments of Canada and France, and multilateral donors such as the 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the European Union and the Organization of 
American States (OAS) also provided assistance to the Haitian justice sector. 
The USAID AOJ program focused efforts in the areas of legal assistance to the poor, mentoring 
judicial personnel at the tribunal de paix level (in Port-au-Prince, Jacmel, and Saint-Marc), 
implementation of a manual case registration system, legal education to paralegals and citizens, 
creation of a bureau on preventive detention, support and technical assistance to the Magistrates 
School, and development of a legal framework for judicial independence. At the same time 
USDOJ’s Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training (OPDAT) provided assistance to 
the Parquets and the Magistrates School, including refurbishing of the physical facilities, 
development of a manual case registration system, and training for judges and prosecutors. The 
AOJ and OPDAT programs were terminated at the end of 2000 when the US suspended all 
assistance to the Haitian judicial system. This withdrawal resulted from the inability of the US 
and Haitian Governments to reach an agreement on continued assistance to Haiti’s justice sector, 
and growing concerns that the Government of Haiti lacked the political will to engage in 
meaningful judicial reforms. As a result, few tangible results from earlier rule of law assistance 
programs remain in Haiti today. 
In preparation for the on-site assessment, the team collected and reviewed a broad range of 
reports and documents that addressed the situation of the Haitian justice system during the past 
10 years, to include justice reform projects supported by USAID and other donors, reform efforts 
undertaken by Haitian NGOs and other groups (both with and without assistance of the GOH), 
and relevant legislation and other official GOH documents. Review of this documentation 
revealed few differences from the findings reported in past that several detailed assessments of 
previous US-supported programs. In addition to the document review, the assessment team 
interviewed more than forty individuals with expertise in the subject matter. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
7 
In addition to the documents enumerated above and detailed in Attachment A, the team 
conducted over 40 interviews with governmental and non-governmental officials, both in Haiti 
and in the US. Findings have been divided into seven program areas: 1) Courts; 2) Public 
Prosecutor Office; 3) Magistrate’s School; 4) Prisons; 5) Ministry of Justice; and 6) the Justice 
System (USAID justice assistance programs). In reviewing past programs in each of these areas, 
the team found that while numerous programs by USAID, international, and bi-lateral donors 
targeted a broad range of areas within the justice sector, programs suffered from a number of 
shortcomings that limited their effectiveness. Principal among these was a lack of political will 
on the part of GOH officials to engage with donors in carrying out reforms, an inadequately 
defined legal framework, lack of coordination among the donors, inconsistent program design 
and implementation, and failure to seek and incorporate local Haitian actors and stakeholders. 
These issues that tended to detract from achieving positive and sustainable results are further 
detailed in Part IV, Section B, “factors and constraints.” However, taken together, the result is 
that, despite the sizable financial and human efforts expended to improve the Haitian justice 
system, there are currently few areas where the effects of past programs can be observed, and, 
overall, past programs have had limited impact on the current state of the Haitian justice sector. 
In part, this can be attributed to limited program effectiveness at the time of implementation, but 
also the significant backsliding since the withdrawal of major donor assistance has contributed to 
the current state of affairs wherein the justice system of Haiti is best described as barely 
functional. 
The team also conducted a preliminary assessment of the MOJ’s technical, administrative and 
financial capabilities to receive USAID assistance and the Ministry’s capacity to implement a 
plan of action for judicial reform. The team found that the MOJ’s leadership team is comprised 
of very committed and highly qualified individuals. Nonetheless, lack of experienced and 
qualified mid- and lower-level staff to carry out most of the administrative and programmatic 
functions required to support reform efforts is an issue. Another issue is that the current MOJ 
and his management team are likely to leave at the end of the term of the Interim Government. 
This will result in lost capacity due to the interim nature of the current government’s mandate as 
the primary planning focus within the MOJ is on relatively short-term interventions rather than 
on long-term, sustainable strategies. Overall, the MOJ has an insufficient number of well 
qualified staff, is under-funded, will require significant support for capacity building and in 
determining future directions for sustainable reform programs, and will require assistance in 
implementing the programs. The team recommends supporting the MOJ’s implementation of the 
Framework for Interim International Assistance (Cadre de Coopération Intérimaire, CCI), while 
also engaging with the Ministry and other donors on the development of a higher-level 
comprehensive strategic plan. 
The assessment team also conducted a review of the physical condition of the Haitian courts and 
made recommendations for the most urgent renovations. Principal among the team’s findings 
and recommendations was the need to focus on improving the conditions of the Juge de Paix (JP) 
Courts. The JP Courts are generally in deplorable condition, and have almost no furniture or 
supplies. Since these courts handle approximately 70% of all cases, improving their physical 
conditions would have a major impact on how cases are handled, and on the public’s view of the 
courts. A plan for facility improvement can be developed, based on existing assessments, taking 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
8 
case volume and local needs into consideration. However, should USAID decide to underwrite 
physical refurbishment of JP Courts, such an effort should be tied to a facility management and 
maintenance plan within the MOJ to ensure that conditions do not once again deteriorate. The 
team recommends priority be given to the JP Courts located in buildings owned by the State. 
Prior to undertaking any improvement on rented facilities, a new lease should be negotiated 
according to which the rent cannot be raised, nor can the court be evicted by the property owner. 
Upon completion of the assessment of past programs, their impact on the Haitian system Justice, 
and the current state of the Haitian justice sector, the team developed a series of 
recommendations regarding future rule of law programs. These are found in Chapter V. The 
recommendations cover a broad range of topics including the need for comprehensive strategic 
planning, legal code reform, strengthening the Ministry of Justice’s administrative capacity, 
professionalization of the judiciary through career development and training of judges and court 
personnel, creating judicial accountability and oversight mechanisms, strengthening judge and 
bar associations, improving case management systems, supporting continued development of the 
Magistrate’s School, support for the law faculty, improving access to justice and supporting civic 
education programs, and revitalizing pretrial detention efforts. 
Despite the wide range of recommendations for inclusion in future rule of law programs, there 
are a number of themes that cross all programmatic lines that must be addressed in future 
programs to ensure an environment that is conducive to designing and implementing effective 
and sustainable rule of law programs. These include: 
o Sustained political will on the part of the GOH and relevant Ministries and institutions. 
o Long-term strategic planning that is holistic in nature; that clearly defines key functions 
that the justice system must be capable of providing, accompanied by shorter-term and 
detailed action plans that lay out specific activities that need to be implemented to build 
toward higher level goals. 
o Cohesive donor coordination that provides unified support for implementation of the 
Haitian strategic plan for justice reform. 
o A realistic length of time during which donors commit to continuing support and 
assistance. 
o Incrementally increase the absorptive capacity within the institutions of justice so that 
reforms and changes to the Haitian system of justice can be sustained and perpetuated 
into the future. 
While there are few visible impacts from previous programs, there are some notable exceptions. 
These include: the continued existence of the Magistrates School; continued use of the case 
registration system implemented in the JP Courts and Parquets by Checchi and OPDAT; and of 
remnants of the Bureau on Preventive Detention (Bureau de Controle de la Detention 
Preventive, BUCODEP) pretrial detention program. The team was also very encouraged to see – 
for the first time – a willingness of business and civil society leaders to work together and to 
become involved in bringing change to Haiti. This, and the relatively positive approaches to 
reform of the Interim Government, presents a unique window of opportunity to engage in 
effective rule of law reforms in Haiti. It will be incumbent upon the donor community, and the 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
9 
Haitians themselves, to work together to make this a reality. It will also be essential for donors 
to work with the GOH and Haitian counterparts to achieve local buy-in and support for reforms, 
both by developing clear benchmarks, and emplacing the necessary mechanisms to monitor 
forward progress and make adjustments along the way. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
10 
II. Summary of Recommendations:
The recommendations resulting from the assessment team’s evaluation of the current situation in 
Haiti are presented by category. Within each category, recommendations are presented in 
priority order. As a general comment, the team recommends that USAID engage with other 
donors to support activities and reforms that are described in the recommendations. In section 
of the report, the reasoning behind the recommendations is presented to provide for evaluation in 
the specific context within which each recommendation is made. 
Strategic Planning 
1) USAID (and other donors as appropriate) should adopt a dual-tracked approach to 
assisting the GOH/MOJ in planning for justice reform. In the near term (during the 
tenure of the Interim Government), assistance efforts should focus on select activities in 
the MOJ’s Cadre de Cooperation Interimaire (CCI), then, working with the newly elected 
government efforts should be directed to facilitating development of a high level, long￾term strategic plan encompassing all components of the justice sector. 
2) USAID should work closely with other donors to ensure that all programs of justice 
assistance do not duplicate, overlap, or contradict each other. Once the above-mentioned 
long-term strategic plan has been developed, that plan should serve as the broad 
framework within which all donor assistance should take place. In addition, rather than 
parceling out discrete areas of institutional reform amongst donors, donors should form 
multi-national teams to work with Haitian counterparts in carrying out reforms.
Legislative Reform 
3) International donor support is needed to fund the creation of a comprehensive program of 
legislative assistance that builds the capacity of the Haitians themselves to develop 
legislation, and related policy and procedures to assure its implementation. 
4) USAID (working with other donors) should provide financial and technical assistance in 
the creation of a project which will engage Haitians in a comprehensive review of the 
relevant state of the law, and the persistent lack of enforcement with regard to judicial 
appointment, discipline and removal so that key decisions can be made on related 
institutional reforms in the short-term and on legislative and constitutional reform in the 
long-term. 
Institutional Organization and Management 
5) USAID should provide technical assistance, training and some infrastructural support to 
improve and institutionalize strong management and administrative capabilities within 
the Ministry of Justice. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
11 
6) USAID should work with the US Embassy and other donors supporting rule of law 
programs to Haiti to ensure procedural harmonization by developing standard operating 
procedures across the entire system of justice. 
7) USAID or another donor should provide technical expert support for the establishment 
and operation of the Judicial Inspection Unit or other entity charged with providing 
oversight for judicial and prosecutorial personnel, and for holding them accountable to 
clear standards of conduct and performance. 
Legal Education and Training 
8) USAID should provide technical assistance and training in furtherance of establishing the 
judiciary as an independent branch of the State. 
9) USAID, together with the existing efforts undertaken by the French Government, should 
support a program to continue education and training at the National Magistrates School 
while legislative and/or constitutional reform regarding judicial training is ongoing. 
Support should include the following elements: 
• Development of a standardized curriculum at the School. 
• Development of practical, holistic training at the School, along with follow-up in the 
field following completion of classroom training. 
10) USAID, and or other donors, should provide technical assistance and support to the State 
University Law School. 
11) USAID should support the coordination of judicial placement with the MOJ or alternative 
institution created for that purpose. 
Professional Career and Standards 
12) USAID should continue to strengthen judge and bar associations and encourage their 
collaborative efforts. 
13) International donors should consider supporting a program to professionalize the 
judiciary and to strengthen the status of career judges and other justice sector 
professionals. Standard selection, promotion, and retention criteria should be developed. 
Court Administration and Management/Court Security 
14) USAID should consider reinstituting, modifying and expanding programs to support 
MOJ efforts in the areas of Case Tracking/Case Management, and Monitoring of Pre-trial 
Detention. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
12 
15) The USG should consider supporting the creation of a centralized criminal records 
system that is available nationwide (and ultimately automated). 
16) The USG should support development of short- and long-term plans to provide for 
security at physical facilities (courts and Parquets) and, as necessary, for judges, 
prosecutors and other court staff. 
17) USAID should provide funding for refurbishing JP Courts, giving priority to courts 
owned by the State. 
Legal Services/Access to Justice 
18) A component of USAID’s ROL project should include expansion of coverage of courts 
(particularly JP Courts) to rural areas. 
19) USAID (with other donor assistance) should consider development and implementation 
of a program to establish a nationwide system of legal services based upon coordination 
between the law schools and the bar associations in each jurisdiction. 
Civil Society 
20) In addition to working closely with Haitian counterparts to develop the long-range 
strategic plan for justice reform, USAID should foster local involvement and ownership 
of assistance programs over the shortest period realistic – doing so by supporting 
development of NGO networks. 
21) In view of the need for Haitian citizens to learn how to be responsible members of a 
democratic society, USAID education and citizen awareness programs should interact 
with justice reform programs. To the maximum extent possible, donor programs should 
adopt a cross-cutting programmatic approach that involves leveraging all available 
resources. 
22) International donors should support the establishment of a nation-wide program of civic 
education on the justice system offered in Créole specifically targeting the general 
population. 
Prisons 
23) The USG should revitalize the program to reduce the excessive levels pre-trial detention. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
13 
III. Introduction 
Since 1994, the United States, other donor countries and international organizations have 
provided extensive material and technical assistance to reform of the Haitian justice system. 
From 1993 through 2000, USAID implemented an Administration of Justice (AOJ) program 
through contractors and the US Department of Justice. Other bilateral donors, including the 
Governments of Canada and France, and multilateral donors such as the UNDP, the OAS, and 
the EU also provided assistance to the Haitian justice sector. The USAID AOJ program, 
implemented through Associates in Rural Development (ARD)/Checchi, focused efforts 
principally in the areas of legal assistance to the poor, mentoring judicial personnel at the 
tribunal de paix level, implementation of a manual case registration system, legal education to 
paralegals and public awareness education to citizens, creation of a bureau on preventive 
detention, support and technical assistance to the Magistrates School, and development of a legal 
framework for judicial independence. At the same time, USDOJ’s OPDAT provided assistance 
to the Parquets and the Magistrates School, including some refurbishing of the physical 
facilities, development of a manual case registering system, and training for judges and 
prosecutors. 
The AOJ and OPDAT programs were terminated at the end of 2000, when the US suspended all 
assistance to the Haitian judicial system. This withdrawal resulted from the failure of the 
Governments of the US and Haiti to reach agreement on continued assistance to Haiti’s justice 
sector, as well as growing concerns that the Government of Haiti lacked the political will to 
engage in meaningful judicial reforms. 
In 2001, USAID entered into a contract with the International Foundation for Elections systems 
(IFES) to implement a program to build constituencies within the justice sector, and forge 
coalitions to advocate for the rule of law in Haiti, consistent with GAO’s recommendations that 
USAID reorient its assistance by working through civil society to create popular demand for 
reform. 
At the present time, the needs of the Haitian justice system continue to be significant and the 
current Haitian context for justice sector reform is still very difficult and unpredictable. But the 
situation also provides for a number of opportunities to build upon. For example, the Interim 
Government has engaged with the UN in forward planning for reform; an “Interim Cooperative 
Framework” was developed in conjunction with the major multilateral donors at the July 2004 
Donors Conference; and the MOJ is committed to working with the international donor 
community to implement the MOJ’s reform plan with significant ownership on its part. In part, 
the plan was developed with participation of non-government Haitian stakeholders willing to 
actively contribute to the reform process. While large sectors of justice system employees and 
the general public are still mired in the status quo and waiting for things to change before they 
feel they can or want to contribute to the reform process, among key non-government 
stakeholder organizations, individuals who have demonstrated that they are ready to build 
alliances and actively participate (some are already engaged) in significant, long-term reform 
activities; take ownership; and build a democratic justice system even with limited means. 
Further, the international community has indicated its willingness not just for substantial, but 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
14 
more importantly, long-term engagement in Haiti. International donors are seeking Haitian 
leadership in the reform process and are cognizant of the need to closely coordinate all reform 
efforts not simply with Haitian stakeholders, but, in particular between and among other donors. 
They are ready to develop and support reform activities building on the many lessons learned 
from previous engagements. 
IV. Assessment Scope and Methodology 
The purpose of NCSC’s assessment was to analyze the results of previous USAID-funded 
activities supporting justice sector reform; assess the status and impact of activities to date; 
identify the needs and reform capacities of key justice sector institutions in Haiti; and provide 
recommendations for future programming. 
The original scope of work (SOW) for the assessment outlined the following 8 objectives: 
1. An accurate assessment of USAID’s different interventions in the Haitian judicial 
apparatus (courts, Public Prosecutors offices, Magistrates School, prisons and Ministry of 
Justice). This assessment must consider the concrete impact of these interventions in the 
establishment of a justice system that responds to the needs of the Haitian population in 
terms of accessibility, fairness and respect of human rights and other rights recognized by 
the Haitian constitution. 
2. An analysis of the factors and constraints that have affected the accomplishment of 
USAID’s justice programs. 
3. A determination of the sides effects of USAID’s activities in the justice sector and how 
USAID can build on these side effects in the development of a ten-year intervention in 
the justice sector. 
4. A determination of the overall impact of the AOJ program on the judicial apparatus 
including the Haitian Minister of Justice’s capacity to implement a plan of action for 
judicial reform. 
5. An assessment of the effectiveness of USAID’s diverse interventions in the prison’s 
systems, the Magistrates School, the Public Prosecutors Office (Parquet), the courts and 
tribunals and the administration of the Haitian justice system in general. 
6. A preliminary assessment of the Minister of Justice’s technical, administrative and 
financial capabilities to receive assistance from USAID. 
7. An assessment of the physical condition of the Haitian courts and recommendations on 
the most urgent renovation actions that are needed. 
8. Concrete recommendations on the development of USAID’s future activities in the 
justice sector. These recommendations must propose a clear strategy (for a ten-year 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
15 
 
period) that indicates specific actions for the continuation of the Agency’s projects in the 
justice sector. 
In preparation for the on-site assessment, the team1
 began to gather and review a broad range of 
reports and documents that addressed the situation of the Haitian justice system during the past 
10 years, relevant legislation, justice reform projects supported by USAID and others, as well as 
reform plans developed by various Haitian groups with or without support of the GOH. (A 
complete list of the literature reviewed can be found in Appendix A). 
The review of this documentation revealed that several detailed assessments of previous US￾supported programs had already been conducted. It also showed that most of these assessments 
resulted in very similar conclusions and recommendations for future work. In recognition of the 
extensive assessments and diagnostics of the Haitian legal system and the past assistance efforts, 
USAID and NCSC agreed that, rather than duplicating previous assessment efforts, NCSC would 
begin with the validation and consolidation of the findings of previous assessments, then focus 
principally on recommendations for future interventions that were fully informed by past 
experiences. Central to this effort to identify and validate findings were the: 1997 Development 
Associates’ “Haiti Justice Sector Assessment,” 1998 Creative Associates’ International 
“Evaluation of USAID’s Administration of Justice and Human Rights Fund II Programs,” the 
2000 GAO Reports “Lack of Haitian Commitment Limited Success of the US Aid to Justice 
System” and “Any further Aid to Haitian Justice System Should be Linked to Performance￾related Conditions”, and the 2001 UNDP report “Lessons Learned Exercise undertaken by the 
Emergency Response Division.” 
The in-country portion of the NCSC assessment took place from July 26 through August 5, 2004. 
The team conducted individual and group interviews with relevant representatives of key Haitian 
government and non-government institutions, as well as representatives from relevant 
international donor organizations. (A complete list of all individuals interviewed is attached in 
Attachment B). In addition, the team conducted on-site observations of court and Parquet 
operations in Port-Au-Prince, Cap Haitien, Gonaives, St. Marc, and Jacmel. The team further 
had discussions with a number of Haitians and knowledgeable foreign experts with broad 
knowledge of and experience in the political and societal developments in Haiti overall and in 
specific regions. The team also attended a meeting at the US embassy with the police advisory 
team to discuss current plans, and to establish linkages with their efforts. 
At the end of the field work the team conducted an exit meeting with USAID. Since returning to 
the US, the Washington-based members of the team have also de-briefed USAID and the 
Department of State (Western Hemisphere Affairs [WHA], International Narcotics and 
Legislative Affairs [INL], and Democracy, Rights, and Labor [DRL] bureaus). 
1
 The NCSC team consisted of Jan Stromsem, Executive Director of NCSC’s International Program 
Division (IPD), Heike Gramckow, Ph.D., Deputy Director, IPD, and Louis Aucoin, J.D., Ph.D., consultant 
to the IPD and professor at Fletcher Law School. They were joined by Maitre Henri D’Orleans, an 
experienced Haitian lawyer, law professor, and Director of the Academie de Formation et Perfectionnement 
des Cadres (AFPEC), and Phillip Lamarche, JD, formerly an advisor to the MOJ for USAID. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
16 
The need to conduct this assessment within a very short timeframe limited the time the team 
could spend in field visits outside of Port-au-Prince. As a result, and in coordination with 
USAID, the number of field locations visited was restricted to the most representative locations,2
and the time available to conduct on-site observations and interviews was curtailed. The still 
somewhat difficult security situation at the time the team visited Haiti also contributed to the 
relatively short amount of time spent outside of Port-au-Prince. It is also worth mentioning that 
many of the Parquets and courts outside of Port-au-Prince have not been operational for several 
months due to the difficult security situation following the events of February. The courts in 
Gonaives, for example, had been closed for the past nine months, and only opened again the 
week before the site visit. Also, review of court and prosecutor files was generally impossible 
since many of the buildings had been looted or burned, and the case files destroyed. The Palais 
de Justice in Gonaives had been completely gutted and the JP Court visited had been looted and 
all files either taken or destroyed. As a result, review of court files and other relevant 
documentation to support observations and anecdotal evidence was not possible. In a similar 
vein, statistical information – other then guesstimates provided by interviewees – was not 
available. As outlined later in the report, the lack of reliable statistics for court and prosecutor 
operations not only limited this assessment from obtaining more quantitative information (and 
limits future programming to building on only qualitative baseline information), but is an 
impediment for proper court and prosecution administration and management; impacts the 
transparency and accountability of the system; and limits the ability to justify adequate (needs￾based) budget requests and allocations for the judicial sector. 
Still, the team is confident that the information collected and site visits conducted are more than 
adequate to support the conclusions and recommendations drawn. 
V. Findings 
The following sections address the objectives of the original SOW in a slightly adjusted order to 
avoid repetition and provide for succinct reading. Section A “Assessment of Past Efforts,” 
addresses objectives 1 and 5 of the SOW, as well as the part of objective 3 concerning “side 
effects” of USAID’s activities and the part of objective 4 pertaining to the “overall impact” of 
the AOJ program. Section B addresses objective 2 (“factors and constraints”). Section C 
addresses part of objective 4 (the MOJ’s capacity to implement a plan of action) and objective 6 
(Preliminary assessment of the MOJ’s capabilities), and Section D focuses on objective 7 
(Physical conditions of the Haitian courts). The recommendations requested under part of 
objective 3 (how USAID can build on side effects) and objective 8 are found in a separate 
Chapter V, “Recommendations for Future Programs.” 
A. Assessment of Past Efforts
As described in the previous section, SOW objectives 1, part of objectives 3 and 4, and objective 
5, taken together ask for an assessment of the impact and the effectiveness of USAID 
 
2
 In addition to Port-au-Prince the team visited Cap Haitien, Gonaives, St. Marc, and Jacmel. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
17 
interventions in Haiti in the courts, prosecutors’ offices (Parquets), magistrates’ school, prisons, 
ministry of justice, and in the justice system generally. 
This section, assessing the impact of past efforts, is broken down into seven subsections: 1/ 
Courts, 2/ Public Prosecutors Offices, 3/ Magistrates School, 4/ Prisons, 5/ Ministry of Justice, 
and 6/ the Justice system in general (USAID justice assistance programs (Checchi and OPDAT). 
 1) Courts 
Programs implemented by the Checchi and OPDAT projects between 1996 and 2000 were 
initially designed to impact both the justice of the peace courts (the juge de paix, or JP Courts) 
and the Courts of First Instance. The Checchi Project was charged with providing support to the 
JP Courts by assisting them in establishing a system of case tracking. The project also set up a 
judicial mentoring program that operated in both the JP Courts and the Courts of First Instance in 
seven of the model jurisdictions. In fact, the project actually operated almost exclusively in the 
JP Courts in Port-au-Prince because the First Instance judges in that jurisdiction were not 
receptive to the program. OPDAT was to provide support to the courts by offering short-term 
training at the Magistrate’s School for court personnel that was to extend throughout the entire 
chaine penale (that is, the JP Courts, First Instance Courts, Parquets, police, and court clerks at 
all levels.) 
Checchi’s Programs: 
a. Case Registration in the JP Courts 
The Checchi “case tracking” program was initiated in 24 JP Courts and was to be expanded to 
another 64 JP Courts throughout the country. As of 2000, when the program came to an end, the 
program had been implemented in 83 JP Courts. The need for information concerning the 
number and kinds of cases being brought before the JP Courts was highlighted in a report 
entitled “Justice of the Peace Courts, Republic of Haiti,” prepared by Ministerial Advisory 
Team-Justice, US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operation Command, Fort Bragg, NC 
(MAT team report) in 1995, and this need was underscored at a conference on justice reform 
convened by Checchi in 1996. There is no doubt that the program had an impact, since the case 
registration form which was introduced in the JP Courts as part of Checchi’s program is still in 
use in many JP Courts today. The team observed that the registration form was being used in 
several JP Courts outside of the capital, but noted that there was no evidence of its use in JP 
Courts in Port-au-Prince. 
The effectiveness of the program is, however, another matter. The report of the evaluation team 
that conducted a mid-term evaluation of the project in 1998 contains several comments that are 
relevant to this subject. (See Evaluation of USAID’s Administration of Justice and Human 
Rights Fund II Programs, prepared by Creative Associates International [CAI] on April 27, 
1998). First, the report makes a key distinction by asserting that the Checchi Program as 
implemented at that time was a program of “case registration” and not one that could be correctly 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
18 
 
referred to as a “case tracking system.” The following comments contained in the report are 
illustrative of the distinction: 
Case tracking is a means to oversee and monitor the movement of a case through the criminal or civil 
process. Usually, case tracking involves measuring the position of the case against pre-established time 
frames developed for different kinds of cases….Tracking also involves seeing that required stages have 
been completed and that needed witnesses and documents are available. Continuous monitoring against 
time standards helps avoid undue detention, inconvenience to litigants and lawyers, conflicts in schedules 
and faded memories. .This level of monitoring requires attention by a single court authority, usually the 
judge, clerk, or administrator who is accountable for adherence to the agreed-upon standards. 
The report went on to explain that the establishment of a case registration system was at least an 
important first step toward the collection of the kinds of data that would be useful for case 
tracking, and noted that the case registration form did contain at least one category of 
information entitled “Diligence” which was used to capture information about the next steps to 
be taken in the case (such as future scheduled court appearances). However, the report also noted 
that key information such as the custodial status of criminal defendants and the names of their 
attorneys was missing from the registration form. 
The comments from this previous assessment report are set out here since they continue to be 
relevant to the issue of the effectiveness of the program, especially because the form that the 
current assessment team observed to be in use in the JP Courts is the very same form that was in 
use when the 1998 evaluation team wrote their report. This is an indication that no modifications 
have been made to the case registration form, and is particularly relevant in light of the 
comments cited above. 
Therefore, the concerns about the effectiveness and the limited impact of this intervention 
remain. For example, since the case registration form fails to record information pertaining to the 
custodial status of criminal defendants, the form is of little use in addressing the problem of 
unjustified, prolonged, pre-trial detention, which is one of the major problems cited consistently 
by all the previous assessments of the justice sector. In addition, it seems quite clear that the 
form is not used by any of the court personnel as a tool for monitoring since whenever the 
assessment team raised questions in any of the JP Courts regarding the number of cases handled 
on a weekly or monthly basis, either aggregated by type or as a whole, court personnel were 
universally unable to provide precise figures, and in some cases seemed not even to understand 
the possible value of statistical data3
. 
This is also particularly regrettable in light of the requirement appearing in Article 447 of Haiti’s 
Code d’Instruction Criminelle (Criminal Procedure Code) that states: 
Le juge de paix est tenu de visiter, au moins une fois par mois, les personnes retenues dans la 
maison d’arrêt de sa commune; le Doyen du tribunal, le juge d’instruction ainsi que le commissare 
du gouvernement ou son substitut, au moins une fois par mois toutes les maisons de detention 
contenant des accusés ou des condamnés, dans la ville ou siège le tribunal civil. (The Justice of the 
3
 Indeed, one of the interviewees (in charge of the institution in question) remarked that statistics would serve no 
purpose whatsoever. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
19 
Peace is required at least once a month to visit those persons detained in police holding cells in his 
commune. The Chief Judge of the First Instance Court, the investigating magistrate as well as the 
prosecutor or his substitute [are likewise required to visit] at least once a month all detention 
facilities housing accused or convicted detainees in the city where the First Instance Court sits.)4
 
If the system established under the Checchi Program had been a case tracking system which, at a 
minimum, contained information pertaining to the custodial status of criminal defendants, rather 
than a basic case registration system, the judicial actors cited in section 447 could use this 
information as a tool for monitoring illegal prolonged pre-trial detention. Although Checchi 
originally intended to create a case tracking program, it is clear from previous assessment reports 
that the monitoring that would be required for case tracking and systems to collect data for use as 
management tools never occurred. Moreover, since the form that was introduced did not contain 
information pertaining to the custodial status of the defendant, it could not have been used 
effectively for case tracking purposes.5
Despite these shortcomings, as things currently stand, the use of the case registration system in 
the JP Courts has clearly had an impact since cases are still logged into the register in many of 
these courts. The current assessment team found the form to be in use in JP Courts in Jacmel, 
Gonaïves, and Cap Haïtien. This is not negligible because this system of case registration is 
clearly preferable to the status quo in the First Instance Courts where registration practices are 
inconsistent. The 1998 evaluation team reported that the lack of a uniform registration system in 
those courts often led to the loss of files, the failure to assign cases and other factors which 
contributed to the failure to dispose of cases in a fair and timely fashion. Although the current 
assessment team was not able to observe whether these problems persist, it is quite likely that 
they do since the interventions of the international community in the past did not address these 
aspects of case tracking. 
 Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the case registration in the JP Courts is quite limited since the 
form is not consistently used and its use is not associated with the kind of monitoring which 
occurs in connection with case tracking – and it is clearly this type of monitoring that is sorely 
needed in Haiti. It is significant to note in this connection that when the current assessment team 
visited the prisons and inquired with some of the inmates and their keepers about the visitation 
requirements of Section 447, mentioned above, there was universal agreement that the visitation 
does not occur. This was particularly surprising in Cap Haïtien where the Court of First Instance 
is in very close proximity to the prison.6 This last observation underscores the importance of 
including the creation of standard operating procedures in future assistance programming and of 
assuring that judicial personnel are trained in the implementation of these procedures. 
 
4 When the assessment team visited the prisons and inquired with some of the inmates (and their keepers) about this 
requirement, there was universal agreement that this did not happen.
5
 The register itself did not have a specific section to record information pertaining to the custodial status of criminal 
defendants; however, there was a special sheet that each clerk had to fill out listing all pretrial detainees, along with 
the period of detention. The sheet was placed on the wall adjacent to the clerks so that all could see it, especially the 
Commissiare when carrying out their visits. In fact, such a sheet was posted on the wall in the JP court in Gonaives 
that the team visited. 
6
 The team also notes the fact that the two “VIP’s” at the National Penitentiary had not been visited by officers of 
the court, despite the fact that they had been in prison since March. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
20 
b. Judicial Mentoring 
The first important point to be made in assessing the impact of the judicial mentoring program is 
to note that it was very short-lived, and this fact contributed to the lack of sustainability of the 
program (in the sense that mentorees were insufficiently experienced to become mentors for 
others). It was begun in 1997 and was terminated by 1999. During the time of its operation, the 
program provided mentoring services in 23 JP Courts. In this period, four well-respected senior 
Haitian jurists (retired or semi-retired judges and law professors) and two expatriate technical 
consultants participated in the program. (See CAI Evaluation, page 35). The team learned that 
each mentor covered several JP Courts in the jurisdiction to which he/she was assigned, and, 
since they tend to be quite far apart, this too reduced the impact (especially as compared to the 
OPDAT program under which the mentors were assigned to a single parquet). It is not entirely 
clear why the program was terminated since it received a very favorable review in the mid-term 
evaluation. In that report, it was noted that participants had cited many benefits of the program, 
including the following: 
--increased coordination between justice sector participants; 
--distribution of codes, law, and legal documents; 
--preparation of uniform internal regulations; 
--development of a uniform procedures for rotation of court clerks (to avoid corruption); 
--reinforcement of concepts of judicial independence; and 
--increased understanding by JPs of their role. This factor was cited as significant in 
reducing delays in the JP Courts stemming from the transfer of files between the JP 
Courts and other levels of the chaine penale, particularly the Parquet’s offices. 
However, while the fact that judicial sector actors remember the program as functioning 
effectively at the time, the current assessment team did not observe any lasting impact of the 
mentoring program in terms of improved functioning of the courts. Instead, the team was 
repeatedly told of the total lack (and outdated condition) of codes, laws, and legal documents. 
The state of judicial independence was reported to be as deplorable as ever. In addition, 
significant delays resulting from the lack of understanding of their role on the part of JPs were 
noted, and there was no evidence that the uniform internal regulations were being used (or that 
they even existed). Moreover, the team was told that no mentoring was provided by the Haitians 
after international assistance ended. 
Since it has been several years since the program was terminated, it is difficult to assess why the 
program did not have a more lasting impact apart from noting that it was very short-lived, and 
this must certainly be related to its short-lived impact. 
Nevertheless, if judicial mentoring were to be considered as a strategy for judicial reform in the 
future, lessons learned from past programs should be taken into account. (See Recommendation 
#11 on this point). It is unfortunate that these short-term effects all but disappeared upon 
termination of the program, particularly since the benefits respond directly to many of the 
problems in the justice sector which have been identified in previous assessments and which 
were cited repeatedly by interviewees in discussions with the team. When asked about the 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
21 
 
judicial mentoring program today, several actors in the judicial sector remembered it as a good 
program that had a positive effect in terms of boosting the morale of judges who were mentored 
(morale remains low in the judiciary and many promising young judges continue to be drawn 
away by more rewarding career opportunities), and in terms of improving the quality of their 
decision making. 
A few lessons learned from the implementation of the program have also been retained. The CAI 
evaluation noted that there had been a proposal according to which mentors would be required to 
work with the Judicial Inspection Unit (that is currently located within the Ministry of Justice, 
thus potentially serving as a means to collect information that could be used to evaluate a judge’s 
performance). This proposal was rejected, and it is generally believed that this was the right 
decision. Experts in developing judicial mentoring programs elsewhere have noted that using 
mentors as “spies” destroys the mentor/mentee relationship and detracts from the effectiveness of 
the program. 
In addition, it became clear early on that mentors in the Haitian context must be Haitian. After 
conducting initial research, those implementing the program came to realize that the Haitian 
mentorees were not receptive to foreign mentors.7
Finally, it was noted that the OPDAT-offered mentoring program for prosecutors was entirely 
separate from that administered by Checchi. It has been suggested that mentoring should be 
administered as one unified program available to all actors in the judicial sector and that the 
mentors should receive training so that the skills and behavior they are trying to reinforce are 
uniform and conform to pre-established (and documented) standards.. 
2) Public Prosecutors’ Offices: 
The most significant USAID-funded intervention that impacted the chaine penale during the 
course of the AOJ Project was OPDAT’s model Parquet program. The program was instituted in 
seven model jurisdictions. Its purpose was to improve the quality of investigations in these 
jurisdictions, and it sought to accomplish this goal through the use of a case tracking system, and 
by providing program support to the prosecutors operating in these jurisdictions. Seven Haitian 
attorneys under contract to OPDAT (one for each of the jurisdictions) acted as legal consultants 
to the prosecutors. This program, in contrast with the case registration system administered by 
Checchi in the JP Courts was actually a case tracking system, since the legal consultants 
instituted a system of case registration that they used as a tool to help them identify bottlenecks 
and problem cases. When there were prolonged and arguably unnecessary delays in cases, they 
reported them to the Chief Judge of the jurisdiction who is empowered under Haitian law to take 
action to expedite a judge’s handling of an individual case. The legal consultants also intervened 
in individual cases, acting as mentors and technical assistants. 
7
 While noting that senior-level Haitian mentors are preferred over ex-pat mentors, the team was also told that 
receptivity of assistance depended to a significant extent upon the personality of the mentor and how he or she 
approached mentoring duties. Clearly, those who approach Haitian counterparts as professional equals (albeit 
working in difficult circumstances) tended to have far greater success. This dynamic should be an important 
element of any future mentoring programs. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
22 
In addition, OPDAT organized monthly meetings of the legal consultants in PAP where they had 
the opportunity to brainstorm solutions to systemic and structural problems, and receive training 
specific to these issues. OPDAT did not, however, develop training programs in the use of the 
case tracking system that could have served as a valuable tool to Haitian trainers to replicate 
training for new employees after OPDAT’s departure. 
There is no doubt that the training programs had an impact while it was in operation. MICIVIH, 
the Haitian Judicial Inspection Unit and CAI evaluated the program while it was going on and 
noted specific impacts in specific jurisdictions, such as the reduction of pre-trial detention, 
increased speed in the process of criminal cases, and the reinstatement of jury trials in major 
cases (where, for example, in one jurisdiction, they had not been held for six years). Some of the 
impact of the program is still being felt in the prosecutors’ offices today in the former model 
jurisdictions. In several of these, where the assessment team was able to visit Parquets (PAP, 
Jacmel, Cap Haitien, St. Marc and Gonaïves), the team found that some form of the registration 
system implemented by OPDAT as part of the model Parquet program was still in existence 
(however, the way in which the system was being used is now more akin to the Checchi version 
of registering cases, and it was clear that the registers were not being reviewed with an eye to 
problem identification, nor to determine issues related to pre-trial detention). 
In terms of the effectiveness of the program, several problems were noted during the course of its 
existence, and additional problems have arisen subsequent to OPDAT’s departure, further 
limiting its effectiveness in the long-term. Over the life of the project, evaluation reports noted 
problems in certain jurisdictions. In some, chief judges (doyens) never received reports of 
problem cases, and in other jurisdictions, chief judges received the reports but did not understand 
that they were expected to take action on them. In addition, there was almost no coordination 
between the Checchi and OPDAT programs, and this lack of coordination prevented the 
corrective measures taken from having more of a system-wide effect. This is particularly 
significant in terms of the potential it could have had for improving the performance of JP 
Courts. It is important to note in this connection that the JPs perform the role of judicial police in 
certain cases under Haitian law, and it is well-documented that significant delays are created by 
the fact that cases are frequently returned to the JPs by the prosecutors due to ineffective and 
incomplete ”information preliminaire” by the former. This is a stellar example of the results 
from the lack of a holistic approach to reform that has been raised frequently as a criticism of the 
overall AOJ program. In addition, the effectiveness of the program was limited by lack of 
participation by the MOJ at a time when the Ministry could have assisted by coordinating with 
OPDAT in the implementation of the program and responding to lessons learned as the program 
was implemented. The OPDAT program had originally anticipated such coordination, and the 
lack thereof is yet another example of the absence of political will for judicial reform on the part 
of the GOH that led to the termination of the AOJ program. This, in turn, is a major contributing 
factor to the lack of long-term impact from the OPDAT program. 
Finally, a few factors have served to limit the long-term effectiveness of the program. First, in 
some of the jurisdictions where the assessment team visited Parquet offices, (in PAP and Jacmel, 
in particular), officials reported that turn-over of personnel had made it difficult to maintain the 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
23 
systems established under the model Parquet program. Moreover, since the legal consultants are 
no longer in place, there is no way to implement case tracking as it existed when the program 
was functioning. Consequently, what exist now are vestiges of the case tracking system 
implemented by the OPDAT program. When the current assessment team interviewed the 
prosecutor at the Parquet in PAP, for example, he explained that the form introduced by OPDAT 
in the past had been adapted over time in response to the lack of basic skills of the new personnel 
who had been hired subsequent to OPDAT’s departure. In fact, when pressed on these issues 
during the interview in PAP, the prosecutor reported quite frankly that the register was not being 
reviewed with an eye to problem identification, nor to determine issues related to pre-trial 
detention. Consequently, it became clear to this assessment team that the way in which the 
system is currently being used is simply to log cases, not to create a case tracking system. 
In retrospect, this assessment team believes that the OPDAT case tracking system would have 
had a much more effective long-term impact had OPDAT developed a program of training in the 
use of the system, creating operational procedures directly linked to training, and using a “train 
the trainers” approach so that the system could have been kept alive in the face of the inevitable 
turn-over of personnel in the future. (See Section F of the Recommendations). 
3) Magistrates School 
The existence of a Magistrates’ School is actually mandated under Article 176 of the Haitian 
Constitution of 1987. It has been in existence since 1995. In that year, the former training 
facility for officers of the FADH (Forces Armees d’Haiti – Haitian Armed Forces) was chosen as 
the site for the school, and OPDAT provided significant material support by renovating six of the 
seven buildings on the grounds. Although the Haitian MOJ has been providing limited resources 
on an annual basis, the School has relied primarily on international assistance (See the section 
below on the report commissioned by IFES for more background information on the School). 
OPDAT PROGRAMS 
OPDAT’s assistance to training at the Magistrate’s School consisted of two types of programs: 
(1) Short-term training in the early stages of the AOJ Project included representatives from most 
of the institutional links in the chaine penale, including the courts. The training occurred in the 
field and at the Magistrates’ School, where seven joint seminars were held, involving judges, 
prosecutors, and police. These activities were conducted between January 1995 and November of 
1996, but they were discontinued at the request of the MOJ which took the view that training 
should not proceed until all judges had undergone vetting and those deemed unqualified were 
removed. The program was evaluated by USAID/Washington and DOJ/Washington in 1996. At 
that time, it received a favorable review, and joint training of the various actors was seen as 
effective. 
There does not appear to be much memory of this short-lived program amongst the Haitian 
actors in the judicial sector today, and thus it seems that whatever impact it may have had at the 
time was short-lived as well. The mid-term CAI evaluation called for a resumption of the 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
24 
program, and noted its potential for improving police/judiciary relations. The evaluation also 
recommended that the program should include training on investigative techniques, which was 
found to be lacking at the time (and is still lacking). The early termination of this seemingly 
worthwhile project by the Haitian MOJ was probably, in retrospect, an early indication of the 
lack of political will for judicial reform on the part of the GOH. This lack became increasingly 
clear in the period leading up to 2000 when all international donors withdrew assistance to the 
GOH in this and other justice-related areas. 
Nevertheless, the early existence of the short-term OPDAT training program and the positive 
reviews that it received merit some comment and give rise to recommendations for future 
programming. First, the termination of the program by the GOH explains at least in part why a 
more holistic approach was not taken in the implementation of the AOJ Program. (Note in this 
connection that the lack of a holistic approach has been cited by many as one of the factors 
contributing to the failures of the AOJ Project). Secondly, the short-term nature of the training 
should be questioned, as should the non-systemic approach that failed to link training to 
operational procedures, and failed to think through, with the Haitians, how the chaine penale
should operate to meet Haitian needs (and within the requirements of the law). While short-term 
training may be appropriate as part of a program of continuing legal education for all actors in 
the judicial sector, the training program for candidates for entry into a career in this sector should 
be sustained and form part of a continuing legal education (CLE) program. (See Section E of the 
Recommendations for discussions of the Magistrates’ School).
(2) In 1997 and 1998, OPDAT provided technical and financial support to the School during the 
first year in which it actually graduated 60 judges. (Since 1997, the School has graduated three 
classes of judges). As part of this support, an OPDAT attorney was assigned to assist in the 
planning and preparations of the program for the first graduating class. In addition, OPDAT 
covered initial faculty salaries, the salary of the Director and his secretarial staff, security 
services and supplies, and most operational expenses. Moreover, OPDAT conducted short-term 
training programs, which have been described above in the section on the Courts. 
It is difficult to assess the impact of OPDAT’s support of the Magistrates’ School separately 
from the support provided generally by the international community (France and the UNDP have 
also contributed substantially to the School throughout its existence, while all US support was 
terminated in 1998). Nevertheless, based upon comments and reactions of actors in the judicial 
sector, the assessment team was able to observe that, despite its problems and its fragility, the 
Magistrates’ School is seen as a bright spot on the otherwise bleak landscape of the judicial 
sector in Haiti. Even though there is insufficient data to prove assertions empirically, it is clear 
from anecdotal information that the training at the School has served to improve the level of 
training and the competence of the judiciary. It is important to note in this connection that prior 
assessments have universally cited the lack of training and competence of the judges as one of 
the most pressing problems facing the Haitian judiciary. In addition, the Magistrates School has 
provided a venue where none existed previously for various trainings, lectures, and public 
conferences where Haitians and international donors have been able to discuss and analyze the 
problems in the judicial sector and plan to address them. This continues to be the case as 
evidenced by the fact that the assessment team was able to attend just such a conference during 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
25 
the period in which the in-country portion of this assessment was conducted. The conference, 
which was entitled: “Pour un nouveau depart de la Magistrature haïtienne” (For a new 
beginning for the Haitian Magistracy), was organized under the direction of the School and 
included useful and informative lectures which took place over a two-day period. 
It is likewise difficult to assess the effectiveness of OPDAT’s interventions as separate from the 
international support generally. However, it is relevant to note that curriculum development at 
the School has been criticized as being ad hoc, and the mid-term evaluation by CAI criticized the 
lack of training on investigative techniques. Given US strengths in this area, it would seem that 
training in this crucial area would not have been difficult for OPDAT to provide. OPDAT 
explained the omission as an oversight at the time, but it should be noted here that the lack of 
training in investigative techniques was cited by several of those interviewed in connection with 
this evaluation as a persistent problem in the criminal justice area. 
In retrospect, the gaps in the School’s curriculum and its ad hoc nature can be attributed to a few 
factors. One is certainly the lack of coordination amongst US agencies providing assistance, as 
well as between other international donors. Another factor limiting the effectiveness of the 
curriculum is that Haiti’s criminal procedure and penal codes are very antiquated. As a result, 
they form a very poor basis on which to provide training and education for judges at the School. 
Finally, one of the problems related to the impact of the School on the development of the 
judiciary in Haiti has been the lack of coordination between the School and the GOH in the 
placement of matriculating magistrates. In fact, the report on the School commissioned by IFES 
indicates that over the course of the three classes graduated from the School, progressively fewer 
and fewer graduates were successfully placed. 
The IFES Report 
IFES has commissioned a report that was published very recently, in April of 2004. The report, 
entitled “Ecole de la Magistrature: Situation, perceptions et propositions d’organisation” 
(Magistrates’ School: Status, perceptions and recommendations for organization.), is a very 
comprehensive review of the history and function of the School from its beginning. The report 
provides detailed information on the support that has been provided by the international 
community and the Haitian MOJ; it describes both the curricula for each of the three graduating 
classes, and the program of continuing legal education for existing judges. The report also offers 
data on the placement of graduating candidates (thus detailing the lack of coordination between 
the School and the Ministry in this regard) and provides a full discussion of several of the issues 
that have been raised in connection with the School’s performance. For example, it is clear that 
there has been a lack of consistency in the curriculum from one graduating class to another, and 
this observation underscores the necessity for a uniform curriculum. The report points out that 
this holds true not only for the substantive courses which have been offered at the School, but 
also for the apprenticeship programs which also differed from one year to another and were not 
always well supervised. (As part of that program the student magistrates sit with magistrates in 
JP Courts, prosecutors’ offices, First Instance Courts, and in the offices of investigating 
magistrates). There has also been a good deal of discussion of whether the School should be 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
26 
independent from the MOJ, and the report sets out the several different proposals in connection 
with this issue. In addition, it laments the fact that the legal status of the School has never been 
established in law (although a draft law does exist) and makes the point that its current 
subservience to the MOJ is an informal arrangement. In this connection, it also provides analysis 
of existing draft legislation that would address these problems. Finally, the report sets out 
recommendations relating to some of these issues. 
This evaluation team has reviewed the draft legislation and notes that it addresses most of the 
issues that have been raised in connection with the School. For example, it offers a kind of 
middle of the road solution to the independence question by placing the School under the 
“guardianship” of the MOJ while at the same time limiting the MOJ’s authority over it. This is 
accomplished, for example, by providing that the authority for hiring and firing of the 
administrative staff was to be shared by the President of the Republic, the MOJ, and the School’s 
administrative board. The law would also allow the School to prepare its own budget subject to 
the joint approval of the MOJ and the Ministry of Finance. It also would require coordination 
between the School and the MOJ in the placement of the graduating magistrates. Despite the 
existence of the draft law, it is important to note that the IFES report itself indicates that there is 
no consensus with regard to these issues, and this fact was clear in discussions between this 
assessment team and the French advisor at the School. The team therefore recommends that the 
proposed draft law should also be one of the subjects of the legislative assistance program 
recommended below. (See Section F of the Recommendations). 
There has been a French advisor and a Haitian director at the School for the last three years. The 
last graduating class completed its promotion in 2002. Since then, the School has been used to 
hold seminars and symposia such as the one attended by the assessment team during their stay. 
Although there has been planning for another class, it is not clear if and when another graduating 
class will be admitted at the School. 
It is really too early to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of this project apart from noting that 
the issues treated in the IFES report are indeed the issues which actors in the judicial sector raise 
in discussing the School, and which have been cited in previous assessments. However, none of 
the existing documentation is as comprehensive as the IFES report in setting out the issues, and it 
seems only logical that this document will guide future debates on the future of the School. 
4) Prisons 
Appalling conditions at the National Penitentiary were among the first issues to be addressed by 
the international community in 1994. In 1995, after initial triage by the Multi-National Force, a 
national prison administration was established under the Ministry of Justice with the assistance 
of the UNDP and MICIVIH. APENA operated the prisons and trained prison guards until prison 
administration was transferred to the police. The prisons currently operate under the HNP’s 
(Haitian National Police) Director of Prison Administration (DAP). 
One of the most long-standing issues with regard to Haitian prisons has been excessive pre-trial 
detention. In May 1998, the BUCODEP was established in the National Penitentiary to review 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
27 
 
records of pre-trial detainees accused of minor offences and incarcerated longer than the normal 
sentence for the accused crime. According to law, a juge de paix from the jurisdiction reviews 
the case and determines if there is sufficient cause to continue to hold the accused. Also in 1998, 
the UNDP project to reform Haiti's National Penitentiary for men was completed, with major 
improvements in infrastructure and living conditions, the creation of new services, a change in 
attitudes towards inmates and the beginnings of a new prison system. 
Both the inspection of the National Prison by the assessment team and the results of a recent 
assessment of prison conditions by an INL police advisor demonstrate that the progress made 
due to previous assistance programs has been significantly eroded and conditions have 
deteriorated to an alarming degree. While remnants of the BUCODEP program can be seen and 
personnel are still tracking and recording mandatory court actions, such as required detention 
hearings, no judges are currently visiting the prisons. Detention hearings do not appear to be 
taking place, reviving the long-standing problem of pre-trial detention. In addition, although the 
prisons were emptied earlier this year, the prison population is rapidly growing and looting and 
other destruction has limited prison space and worsened conditions. Overcrowding and 
inadequate sanitation facilities are already having negative consequences for the several hundred 
inmates in the National Penitentiary and other prisons.8
 
5) Ministry of Justice 
In the course of the AOJ Project, only one USAID intervention targeted the MOJ directly. In July 
1997, USAID hired an advisor to the Minister of Justice pursuant to a Personal Services 
Contract. The Canadians also hired an advisor, and the Canadian and American advisors worked 
in the MOJ in late summer and early fall of 1997 until both of them began receiving death 
threats. While it was difficult to determine with certainty the source and motives of the threats, 
there were indications that they were related to the fact that both the Canadians and the USAID￾Checchi Program were urging the Minister to downsize the staff (particularly insofar as the 
“ghost” employees and persons simply hanging around the Ministry). However, the Minister 
strongly resisted such an action. The Canadians immediately withdrew their advisor and the 
American advisor (who is one of the authors of this report) moved his office to USAID where he 
worked from outside the government on various activities promoting judicial reform in a general 
sense. This obviously disappointing failure was attributed at the time to the lack of political will 
for judicial reform on the part of the GOH, which was becoming increasingly clear. 
One of the activities of the advisor after leaving the MOJ was to identify competent Haitian 
jurists who were genuinely interested in judicial reform and to work with them on planning 
activities. In this connection, the advisor worked with the Preparatory Commission on Law and 
Justice, composed of young Haitian jurists working under the auspices of the MOJ. That 
Commission spent one year developing a plan for justice reform which was formally presented to 
the President in July at a conference on justice reform, organized by the MOJ and held at the 
8
 During the visit to the National Penitentiary, the team was advised that some 780 prisoners were in residence, and 
in Cap Haitien,with three cells operational, there were approximately 90 prisoners. In both cases, men and 
adolescents are held in the same cells, but women prisoners are detained in separate facilities. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
28 
Presidential Palace. The American advisor acted throughout the year as a resource to the 
Commission offering comparative information and literature, and participating in related group 
discussions. The Report generally offers an indigenous blueprint for justice reform, but the team 
was informed that the current Interim Government does not look upon that particular report 
favorably. 
In spite of repeated attempts to obtain a copy of the Report, this assessment team was able to 
obtain the narrative portion of the Report, but was unable to review the action plan that is 
considered to be the most important part of the document. This is significant since this document 
could be enormously useful as part of the strategic planning which the team recommends 
(depending, of course, on how Haitians view this particular recommendation). (See 
Recommendation #1). It may be that the Haitians themselves have already done much of the 
work outlined in the report, and that the role of the donors may be one of support and assistance 
in its implementation. It is thus imperative that the document be reviewed in its entirety, and that 
its value (or lack thereof) is determined by Haitian counterparts. 
It should be noted that, despite the drawbacks in terms of emplacing advisors within the 
Ministry, USAID’s DG activities have nevertheless had a significant, albeit indirect, impact on 
the MOJ. First, in 1998, the American advisor identified Bernard Gousse as one of the most 
competent jurists in Haiti and as a person with a vision for justice reform. Mr. Gousse was 
consequently hired by USAID pursuant to a Personal Services contract and worked with the 
USAID DG office on justice issues. In the Interim Government, Mr. Bernard Gousse is currently 
the Minister of Justice, and there is no doubt that his experience at USAID has helped him shape 
his vision for reform and has given him an international donor perspective on the subject as well. 
This past experience could be of use in his implementation of judicial reform during the course 
of his mandate. 
The assessment team met with the Minister during the in-country part of the assessment and he 
shared his vision for justice reform. That vision is well-documented in the strategic plan 
document which was recently developed by the MOJ, entitled Cadre de Coopération Intérimaire
(Framework for Interim International Assistance – referred to as CCI in the remainder of this 
report). This document was created with donor assistance, but this kind of strategic planning 
exercise is unprecedented in Haiti and may very well reflect some of the influences on the 
current Minister stemming from his experience in working with USAID. 
In a similar vein, Jean-Philippe Vixamar, an eminent Haitian jurist, who also formerly worked as 
a justice advisor at USAID in 1996-1998 has been seconded by a Haitian NGO, under th 
auspices of the Canadian government, to act as an advisor to the current Minister. This is ye 
another situation where USAID DG activities in the justice arena may prove to have an indirect 
and positive impact on the MOJ. 
 6) Justice System 
There have been several USAID-funded interventions which have not targeted particular 
institutional links in the chaine penale but which have addressed some of the problems which 
Co
co
mment [p1]: See Henri Dorleans 
mments 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
29 
plague the justice system, such as lack of access to justice, lack of judicial independence, and 
lack of knowledge of the justice system on the part of the general public. These problems were 
addressed by Checchi’s legal assistance and legal education programs, and are now the focus of 
the IFES Constituency Building for Judicial Reform and Human Rights Program. 
Checchi Programs 
1. Legal Assistance 
The Checchi Program on Legal Assistance began in 1995 and operated through 1998. As part of 
this program Checchi provided grants to 12 NGOs, four bar associations, and three law schools 
to provide legal representation to indigent clients in several jurisdictions, including: Gonaïves, 
Saint-Marc, Les Cayes, Jacmel, Petit-Goave, and Hinche. Thus, the program operated in six of 
the seven model jurisdictions which were the focus of the AOJ Program (it did not operate in 
Cap-Haïtien, the seventh model jurisdiction, because a Belgian-funded NGO, called Réseau des 
Citoyens funded the creation of an organization, called the Bureau d’Assistance Judiciaire, which 
provided this service in the north of the country and was based in Cap Haitien). Instead, Checchi 
provided the service in Hinche, which was the only jurisdiction provided this service that was not 
also a model jurisdiction. 
Under the Checchi Program, lawyers made available through participating bar associations 
represented indigent clients in Courts of First Instance, and law students and paralegals 
represented them in the JP Courts (Haitian law allows paralegals and law students with two years 
of education to practice in these courts). Paralegals also assisted the lawyers in their 
representation of clients in the First Instance Courts, primarily by conducting client interviews in 
various prisons. Checchi provided monthly trainings to their grantees, developed training 
manuals, and monitored the grantees’ performance. As part of the grantee training, periodic 
symposia and conferences were also organized. 
In terms of the program’s impact, it must be noted that this appears to be the first time in recent 
memory that free legal services were offered to indigent clients in any systematic way, and there 
is no doubt that the program increased citizens’ access to justice. It also increased awareness of 
the necessity of these kinds of services, planted the seeds for the organization of bar associations 
throughout the country, and got lawyers in bar associations involved in providing these kinds of 
services. Although there is insufficient empirical data available to assess the program’s impact 
on pre-trial detention, it has been reported anecdotally that, in the locations where it was 
operating, the program did serve to reduce pre-trial detention. Now that the program has been 
terminated, there is no systematic provision of free legal services to indigent clients anywhere in 
the country; however, bar associations continue to provide these services sporadically, as do law 
students. 
The effectiveness of the program was widely questioned while it was in existence. Anecdotal 
evidence has implied that Checchi was receiving USAID funds yet failed to provide the service. 
In fact, there is no doubt that the services were being provided (this was verified by the CAI mid￾term review and by a study conducted for USAID by one of the authors of this report). 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
30 
 
However, it is true that there were problems in the provision of the services. Frequently, clients 
who were represented by program staff were unaware that they had been assigned an attorney; 
client confidentially was often ignored; and in many cases clients did not receive competent legal 
representation.9
 
2. Civic Education 
During the course of the Checchi contract, their efforts also focused on engaging with the public. 
These included group discussions, role-playing, lectures, and radio and television broadcasts. 
However, even at the time that these programs were being implemented, their impact was 
questionable. The Haitian public was, and remains, largely ignorant of even their most basic 
rights, including the right to an attorney. The CAI mid-term evaluation noted the ineffectiveness 
of this program and attributed it to a focus on the law, as opposed to practical solutions to the 
types of problems most frequently faced by Haitian citizens. Evidently, these efforts aimed too 
high and were not designed to use methodologies which would give the population the simple 
information that they need in order to acquire a basic understanding of the workings of the 
justice system and of their rights in this context. 
The IFES Program on Constituency Building and Human Rights 
This program was created in 2001 and represented a new strategy for USAID in the promotion of 
judicial reform in Haiti. After all international donors, including USAID, withdrew their direct 
support to the GOH in the area of judicial assistance, USAID decided to fund activities that 
would reinforce demands by Haitian civil society on its government to engage in judicial reform. 
As part of this program IFES has created four working groups representing four sectors of 
Haitian civil society—the legal, business, human rights and media sectors. The goal of these 
groups has been to develop strategies for the promotion of judicial reform. Also in the context of 
this Program, IFES has provided technical and financial assistance to the Federation of the Bar 
Association and the two newly created judges associations—the Women Judges Association and 
the National Magistrates’ Association (ANAMAH). 
With IFES’ support, the bar and judges associations have collaborated in several activities 
promoting judicial reform. Two separate roundtable discussions were organized by these 
groups—one of these sessions was centered on the report on the Magistrates’ School, 
commissioned by IFES and written by Dr. Montferrier Dorval, and the other on the report on the 
“Status of the Judiciary,” also commissioned by IFES and written by Maitre Leon Saint-Louis, 
both of which were published in the spring of this year. In 2002, these associations collaborated 
in a series of lectures and other events to commemorate law week (La Semaine du Droit et la St. 
9
 In one egregious case studied by one of the authors of this report at the time, a defendant found in possession of 
counterfeit money was erroneously charged under the penal code provision dealing with manufacture and 
distribution of counterfeit money as opposed to the less serious charge of simple possession. The lawyer 
representing the defendant under the Checchi grant failed to raise this issue during the trial, and the defendant was 
convicted of the more serious charge which carried a penalty of life imprisonment at hard labor. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
31 
Yves) in Haiti, and the theme of the law week was judicial independence. Among the events that 
were part of this exercise were lectures on this topic by one of the authors of this assessment, by 
the current MOJ, Bernard Gousse, and former MOJ Jean Joseph Exumé. In addition, they have 
collaborated in holding four ten-day seminars on justice issues, have prepared several radio 
broadcasts on justice issues in the provinces, and have worked together on four manuals on 
justice reform that are currently being prepared for publication. 
 
On August 19, these groups, acting with IFES support, organized an event to launch a new 
initiative, entitled “The Coalition for Justice Reform.” The President, Prime Minister and MOJ 
all attended this event. Once again, judicial independence was a major theme. This initiative 
represents a continuation of the previous efforts of the project described above, and its purpose is 
to broaden the base of support for judicial reform within civil society. 
This assessment team was able to observe that the IFES program has clearly had positive impact 
in the justice sector. Perhaps the most significant example of this lies in the fact that the 
collaboration between the judges and the lawyers has served to reduce the disdain in which the 
latter have traditionally held the former, and this in turn has served to create solidarity in their 
joint demand for judicial reform. 
In the past, there has been a very significant imbalance between lawyers and judges. The lawyers 
have been traditionally much wealthier and better educated than judges and for this reason, they 
tend to have had little regard for the judges whom they have often been able to intimidate and 
manipulate. This has contributed to the lowly status of judges in comparison to other legal 
professionals, and this in turn has made them vulnerable to corruption. All too often, judges 
have been dependent on lawyers in view of their superior knowledge of the law and their 
superior position of power and influence that sometimes results from ill-gotten gains flowing 
from corruption. It seems, however, that the situation is beginning to improve, as exemplified 
through the joint meetings and activities described above. Indeed, some of the lawyers who are 
active in the bar associations have demonstrated a changed attitude, characterized by a new￾found respect for the judges and for the role which they must play in order for the justice system 
to function properly. 
Even more importantly, judges and lawyers have learned to speak as one voice in the demand for 
judicial reform. The assessment team was able to observe this particular impact at the 
colloquium that was held at the Magistrates School at the end of July. On that occasion, one 
prominent member of the bar described the evolution in the relations between judges and 
lawyers. He explained that as part of previous efforts to establish judicial reform, the MOJ 
removed certain judges (typically older ones) whom they considered to be corrupt and 
incompetent, replacing them with younger graduates of the Magistrates School. He went on to 
explain that at first, other lawyers resented the younger magistrates (this is not difficult to 
imagine in light of the imbalance described in the previous paragraph), but, over time and by 
working in collaboration, they have learned to respect each other, and, more importantly, to 
speak in solidarity in demanding judicial reform. This was further reinforced by the fact that 
some members of the judges association also spoke at this conference. These observations 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
32 
certainly bespeak of progress in this area and serve as indications of increased respect for judges. 
This, in turn, should contribute to a readjustment of the imbalance previously described. 
However, in assessing the effectiveness of the impact of the IFES program, it is important to note 
that much still remains to be done. First of all, steps will need to be taken to strengthen the 
fledgling judges’ associations that thus far are composed almost exclusively of younger judges. 
The current composition of the judges’ association is indicative of the gap that currently exists 
between the older and younger judges, and this gap was underscored by several of the judicial 
actors interviewed by this assessment team. More senior judges will need to be integrated into 
the associations for them to have a real impact and to contribute positively to increasing 
solidarity not only between the judges and lawyers but also within the judiciary itself. 
Moreover, it remains to be seen whether the increasing demand from civil society and business 
leaders will succeed in moving judicial reform efforts from discussion to action. This evolution 
should be the goal of the recently created, more broadly based coalition between the judges’ and 
bar associations. In addition, several of the recommendations made in the final section of this 
report could also advance that goal. (See, for example Section B of the Recommendations 
related to legislative reform) 
B. Factors and constraints that have affected the accomplishment
 of USAID’s justice programs
In this section of the report, the team reflects back upon what was done, by whom and how, in 
the programs developed and implemented by the international donor community from 1993 until 
the present. This section also examines certain issues pertaining to the structure of international 
aid, as well as the relative programmatic successes or lack thereof stemming from the manner in 
which assistance was approached by the internationals and interpreted by Haitians receiving the 
assistance. 
Despite the opportunities presented to instill democratic processes of governing within Haiti, and 
the considerable efforts and resources expended over an approximate 10-year period, little 
remains from the programs carried out. For donors, and Haitians, to develop successful 
strategies for reform, it is essential to consider the lessons of the past, and to ensure that justice 
sector reform efforts this time take these lessons fully into account. 
In recent years, much has been written concerning the factors limiting the effectiveness of justice 
assistance and reform programs in Haiti. Principal among these have included: 
• Lack of GOH resources (coupled with the political determination to allocate a 
 scant 1% of the national budget to the MOJ); 
• Lack of a comprehensive strategic vision and plan to guide GOH and donor 
 efforts, leading to piecemeal and sometimes competing approaches, and 
 disconnected results; 
• Donor approaches that at times tended to impose programs – sometimes totally 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
33 
 unsuited to the Haitian context - rather than working with Haitian counterparts to 
 develop consensus-based solutions; 
• Donor programs – particularly training - that were not tailored to Haitian laws, 
 policies, or reality; 
• GOH willingness to accept donations and assistance from the international 
 community, but a marked lack of willingness to permit fundamental changes to 
 take hold in the judiciary and indeed across the entire system; and 
• Lack of a sitting parliament to pass reform legislation and to serve as a check on 
 executive authority, at least since the 2000 elections. 
All of these factors have contributed to less than positive results from donor efforts between 
1993 and 2000; however, two additional issues stand out as the most essential reasons why so 
many of the initial achievements ultimately came to naught. These are the apparent deliberate 
lack of political will that characterized most particularly the second Aristide Administration, and 
international reaction to the deteriorating situation in Haiti (especially as evidenced in increased 
allegations of human rights abuses), leading to their departure long before reforms could be 
sustained and institutionalized. Indeed, in the view of at least some Haitians and donors alike, 
departure of the international community was a key objective of the Aristide Government. 
In 2000, the GAO reported: “…despite the achievements of [the 6 year US program of 
assistance] the police force has not effectively carried out its basic law enforcement 
responsibilities, and recent events suggest that politicization has compromised the force…The 
judicial sector also has serious weaknesses, including lack of independence from the executive 
branch, outdated legal codes, cumbersome judicial proceedings, personnel shortages, inadequate 
infrastructure and equipment, and an ineffective oversight organization to stem corruption.” 
Similarly, according to the Intervention and Institution Building in Haiti (Beidas, Granderson, 
Neild 2002), “Reform of the justice system was to be the cornerstone for the establishment of the 
rule of law following the return to constitutional government. But eight years on, a vision and 
strategy for reform have yet to be agreed and implemented. (pg. 24). Donor impatience to see 
rapid results led to the quick fix approach – dictating decisions, programs, and timelines not 
amenable to bringing about long-term changes. (pg. 25). 
These critiques of past justice reform efforts point out that, despite the expenditure of millions of 
dollars and the plethora of programs that were developed and implemented in the justice sector, 
the consequences of the issues and constraints outlined above severely limited program 
effectiveness, rendered sustainability impossible, and led to the inevitable backsliding that 
currently characterizes the condition of the justice institutions in Haiti. USAID, and indeed all 
external donors, should take these issues into account, and develop strategies to avoid their 
recurrence, in developing all programs of assistance under the Interim Government. 
Certainly, lack of a broad-based strategic development plan was (and remains) a critical factor 
that contributed to the shortcomings in donor coordination. But this is not the only, nor the most 
important factor leading to the current situation wherein the institutions of justice are best 
described as dysfunctional. The fact that donors working in Haiti’s justice sector tended to take 
on responsibility for discrete aspects of the justice sector led to a “stove-piping” approach to 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
34 
justice assistance, rather than a unified and cohesive approach to components of the justice sector 
that should have developed in concert with one another. In addition, individual donor efforts 
frequently supported goals determined by the donor country and tended to mirror the national 
procedures of the donor country rather than reflecting Haitian ideas or approaches. This 
tendency has led to sharp criticism that international donor programs, to include USAID partner￾implemented programs, were imposed on the Haitians, rather than developed in concert with 
Haitian counterparts. The lack of donor coordination (and, at least in some instances, their 
decided penchant not to cooperate, other than through occasional meetings to review what they 
were doing in their various sectors) not only allowed for overlapping and conflicting efforts, but 
left donors vulnerable to manipulation by the GOH. This approach also failed to take strategic 
advantage of the very substantial leverage that donors could have exercised with the GOH early￾on to move forward reform agendas – especially had the donor community decided to act in 
unison. 
Another donor issue described to the team was the perception – by some Haitians - that donors 
sometimes failed to consider how Haitian counterparts receiving assistance viewed the situation. 
As related to the team, many Haitian judges, prosecutors and other justice system staff 
demonstrate a remarkable level of pride in what they are able to accomplish, despite their meager 
means and the fact that they work in very difficult conditions. One individual interviewed by the 
team described Haitian reaction to some donor assistance as the “silent shock.” He explained 
that the approach adopted by some donors tended to be interpreted by Haitians as outsiders 
“telling them what to do” and doing so in circumstances where it should have been apparent that, 
given the almost non-existent physical infrastructures and other material means, it would have 
been difficult if not impossible to follow donor advice. In other cases, donor-offered training did 
not take Haitian laws, policies, and customs into account, nor did the training adequately address 
the daily realities and conditions in which trainees would be expected to work. This in turn led 
to a feeling that donors not only did not understand the situation of Haitian counterparts, but that 
they were unconcerned about the lives or circumstances of those on the receiving end of donor 
assistance. When questioned about how to improve the situation, the recommended approach 
was to elicit ideas and solutions from Haitian counterparts, involving them to the greatest extent 
possible in program development and implementation, and doing so through working groups or 
other fora created to address one or more aspects of the reform effort. Clearly these types of 
critiques were not the universal impression of donor assistance and the team heard high praise 
for the work carried out by certain individuals and groups. However, for future donor efforts, 
both the approach and the individuals selected to implement programs in Haiti should take the 
Haitian perspective into consideration. 
Complicating donor-related issues, in the 1990’s, the lack of political will on the part of the 
Government of Haiti manifested itself in a variety of ways, and these too are noteworthy when 
approaching future programming. Key vacancies were frequently not filled, or filled not simply 
with inexperienced staff, but by persons who were against change of the status quo; conversely, 
the team observed now (as in previous years) numerous persons present at virtually all sites 
visited with no apparent job or official function. During previous interventions, personnel 
assigned to key positions frequently created obstacles to reform rather than facilitating reform. 
Indeed, it appeared that certain individuals had been specifically designated into “spoiler” 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
35 
positions – to ensure that substantive progress was not achieved. Despite promises to the 
contrary, the GOH frequently failed to provide adequate material resources to enable fragile 
reforms to reach sustainability, even when such resources could have been available from within 
the national budget. Public corruption, while recognized as a serious problem and a significant 
impediment to progress, was not addressed in a serious and concerted way. 
 
With regard to the local abilities to investigate and prosecute criminal cases, in particular, 
politically sensitive criminal offences, there was inadequate support to the investigation of 
serious crime and an ongoing effort to politicize the police that contributed to public perception 
of impunity. There was a lack of commitment to establishing the judiciary as a professional 
career with professional standards applied to all personnel. The resultant absence of effective 
oversight mechanisms, inconsistent procedures, inadequate judicial facilities, and inefficient use 
of judicial personnel (short work days, failure of personnel to appear for work at all, lack of 
proactive commitment to case management) that began to reappear in the late 1990’s are once 
again in clear evidence in Haiti. 
In addition to these broad constraints, priorities set by both the GOH and donors also contributed 
to an imbalance between the resources and attention given to the police vis-à-vis the other 
components of the justice system (especially the judicial and prosecutorial sectors). In trying to 
meet the timeline driven by the “exit strategy,” the balanced approach that had been adopted by 
the donors under the Governor’s Island Accords in 1993 (to proceed along separate but parallel 
tracks in developing all components of the justice system, and forging developmental links 
between all components), gave way to a skewed scenario in 1994 when the bulk of human and 
material resources were focused on restoring public security and building up the HNP. This 
preponderance of attention on the HNP continues to this day and is evidenced among others, by 
the fact that only 11.5% of the MOJ budget is allocated to components other than the HNP. 
While the lack of political will on the part of the Government of Haiti was a substantial factor in 
the withdrawal of support by most donors, this withdrawal took place at a very critical juncture 
of justice sector reform when institutions and fledgling reform efforts were most vulnerable. The 
departure of the international community contributed to the stagnation of the reform process and 
considerable backsliding in areas where progress had been made. A significant portion of the 
material goods provided by donors has disappeared and the GOH has had limited means and no 
incentive to replace them. It is clear from the current review, that in may cases, only small 
vestiges of major programs have survived the last four years following donor departure. 
 
It is worth noting that under the 1993 approach, USAID assistance programs dealing with reform 
of the courts and the parquets were closely coordinated with those to be carried out by the 
Department of Justice’s ICITAP (International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 
Program) police program, as well as with those planned by the UN and other key donors 
(principally Canada and France). Initially, USAID’s programs were to be developed and 
implemented by Checchi (at the time, called ARD/Checchi) and focused primarily on assistance 
at the level of the JP Courts (with Canada targeting the Courts of the First Instance). Original 
plans called for cross-training between the three principal components (courts, prosecutors, and 
police), as well as budgetary comparability. Agreements had been reached with the UN, as well 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
36 
 
as with other donors, as to what was to be done and by whom – but the overriding consideration 
for donors was that all efforts should be carried out in unison. Where possible, Haitian 
counterparts were consulted on all key issues and their input was integrated into plans. Rather 
than taking the approach of allocating disparate parts of the overall task to different donors, the 
broad strategy called for integrated efforts across the board. Even more importantly, justice 
reform planning, especially with regard to the HNP, called for incremental changes to take place 
over a 10-year period. All of this changed when the Harlan County sailed out of the Port-au￾Prince harbor in October 1993. 
The programs actually implemented in the 1994 scenario differed radically from the 1993 plans. 
USAID’s prominent position as coordinator of justice sector reform evolved to that of unique 
focus on the Checchi program, and later, the inclusion of the OPDAT prosecutorial development 
program (initially under Checchi, and ultimately through a PASA directly negotiated with the US 
Department of Justice). While due to the legislative prohibitions, the ICITAP police assistance 
program had never been under the direct authority of USAID, in 1993, plans for police assistance 
were coordinated closely with the other justice programs and, in fact, the ICITAP offices were 
housed within USAID. However, under the 1994 scenario, the program functioned out of the 
Embassy and reported directly to the Ambassador. Not that this, per se, was a bad thing, and 
certainly the weekly country team meetings convened by the Ambassador contributed positively 
to coordination of efforts amongst USG entities involved in justice sector reform. However, the 
rapid pace mandated for the police program, hampered the 1994 level of interaction, now seen as 
essential to a balanced approach to reform. 
The HNP reform effort would impact upon, and be impacted by, reforms of the other institutions 
of justice. Failure to effectively harmonize the two development efforts negatively impacted on 
both. This was, at least in part, a result of the bifurcation of the two efforts when the police 
reform program was placed under the Embassy and judicial reform under USAID. With regard 
to planning, however, while some degree of planning for individual components of the justice 
sector was conducted, it was not holistic in scope. Rather than producing an overarching 
strategic plan for the integrated development of all components of the justice sector, planning 
tended to focus on individual components and on minor, individual tasks associated with that 
component. No “blueprint” or “masterplan” was developed – not within and between US 
implementers - and even less amongst the broader donor community. Planning also failed to 
take into account the crucial linkages between key institutions, such as that between the Judicial 
Police and the courts and parquets, and the necessity of a harmonized approach governing the 
conduct of criminal investigations was all but ignored. Clearly, cross-institutional development 
of standardized procedures and uniformity of the chaine penale fell to the side, and, ultimately, 
the inability of the courts and Parquets not only constrained the progress of the HNP, but, in the 
view of many, were a contributing factor to vigilantism and summary executions alleged to have 
been perpetrated by the HNP in the latter half of the 1990’s.10
10 A very revealing example of the coordinative void between the USAID-led justice program and the 
Embassy-led ICITAP police program was evidenced at the sites of the Centre de Formation of the HNP and the 
Ecole de la Magistrature. Both were former FAd’H training facilities (the heavy weapons battalion in the case of 
the former and the officers’ training academy for the latter), and during the period when both facilities were 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
37 
 
In addition to these high level factors and constraints, there were a number of operational and 
implementation issues that limited program effectiveness and will continue to do so if not 
addressed in future programming. A very significant issue is that following presidential 
elections, virtually all personnel within the Ministry of Justice (and other ministries) are replaced 
by the incoming Minister(s) – taking with them the institutional knowledge and capacity of how 
to run the Ministry. While similar personnel changes also take place in many countries, 
replacements are usually limited to the most senior level management positions, leaving in place 
the cadre of career manager-level staff who know the institution and how to run it. This is rarely 
the case in Haiti. For example, within the Ministry of Justice, only the position of Director of 
Judicial Affairs has remained through changes in the Administration. Clearly, long-term 
sustainability of capacity development within the Ministry will require a re-examination of this 
practice. 
Low salaries paid to judges, prosecutors, and other justice sector staff is also a serious factor 
inhibiting long-term improvement of service delivered by justice institutions. Three significant 
problems arise from low salary levels. First, the most capable lawyers and other workers will not 
seek employment in government positions (and in Haiti this has already led to a situation in 
which lawyers tend to look down on judges). Second, when a worker cannot earn a salary 
sufficient to support a family, he or she must resort to seeking alternative means of 
supplementing income that, all too frequently, takes the form of accepting bribes or other types 
of corrupt or illegal practices. Third, the individual who is paid very little for his/her work tends 
to feel undervalued and this in turn tends to be reflected in the quality of work. In Haiti, the 
issue of low salaries paid to judges (and especially to the juges de paix) takes on particular 
importance because the police are paid significantly more. During a meeting in the Ministry of 
Justice, the team was informed that the government intended to raise the salaries of all civil 
service workers by 30%, and that some of the judges (particularly the juges de paix) would 
receive a 60% raise. This may still be the intention; however, the team was also informed that 
the police had already received a 60% raise – thus further complicating an already difficult 
situation. 
With respect to some of the USAID-funded programs to assist judges and prosecutors, some 
additional factors and constraints should also be noted. For reasons that are not totally clear 
from the literature or discussions, it appears that some interventions were carried out without 
first fully identifying the problem(s) needing to be resolved, thus rendering the assistance less 
valuable that it could have been. For example, from meetings and interviews, it appears that in 
preparing to introduce new case registers into the courts, a needs analysis was not conducted. 
Instead, flow charts of existing processing were prepared, and the registers were designed to 
match those processes, rather than analyzing how streamlining and other procedural 
improvements could have been effected. In addition to the rather limited vision in terms of the 
design of the register system, other constraints stem from problems in training (and the absence 
undergoing refurbishment, the gate between them stood open. When the Ecole began training for magistrates, the 
gate was firmly locked, and remains so today. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
38 
 
of institutionalized follow-up training), and that standard procedures were not introduced and 
used within the courts and Parquets, even when procedures were in fact prepared. The fact that 
the data contained in the registers tended to differ from court to court, that mistakes were made 
in data entry, that the register was never recognized or used as a useful tool to find cases, or 
check up on the status of cases and defendants, or to generate statistical data, is fundamentally a 
training problem (and procedural problem linked to training). A clear constraint to rendering the 
registers useful was the fact that after some initial instruction of how to fill out the registers, 
never was any form of on-the-job or refresher training offered. It is very clear that in a country 
such as Haiti, new skills need to be reinforced in the workplace continuously, at least until such 
time as the skills have been institutionalized. In the final analysis, the registers developed and 
emplaced in courts and Parquets were interesting, but had limited impact. Certainly for future 
assistance programs related to case processing, there is a need to look beyond the very immediate 
issue of manually logging cases. Careful examination is needed of what should be tracked of 
and why – then the processes developed and implemented must correspond to the broader goals 
(for example, the need for reliable statistical data for use as management tools) – even if this 
requires a longer period of time to operationalize. 
 Another important inhibiting factor was that, in retrospect, both the Checchi and OPDAT 
projects seem not to have approached their task holistically – that is, trying to achieve uniformity 
from court to court (such as between the JP and First Instance Courts), and procedural 
harmonization between the various institutions of justice.11 The lack of clarity over roles and 
responsibilities between the police, prosecutors, and the courts has had a serious deleterious 
effect upon the operations of all three institutions. 
To the historical factors and constraints described above, some additional factors should be taken 
into account. At the current time, for all components of the Haitian justice system (courts, 
examining magistrates, prosecutors, prisons, and police), some substantial degradation (physical, 
infrastructural, and operational) has taken place, eroding initial gains achieved in the mid-1990’s. 
Clearly, this situation results – at least in part – from the sustained lack of resources allocated to 
justice institutions. Moreover, while it must be noted that some of the physical infrastructure 
damage to courts, Parquets, police stations, and prisons, and the absence of case files, are due to 
the “evenements” of last February, a significant level of physical degradation was also observed 
in buildings that had not been touched during the uprising. Certain of the procedures developed 
and implemented by Checchi and OPDAT were in evidence (such as use of the registers in the JP 
Courts), and staff viewed these registers as highly important to their jobs12. However, data 
11 It should be noted that although there was some degree of cross-training between the various institutional 
components on principles of investigations and investigative techniques, no attempt was made to try to rationalize 
that process amongst the players, particularly as this pertains to who is responsible for what, where the duties of one 
group cease and the other group picks up, etc. Essentially – as with so much of the training that took place in Haiti, 
this cross-training was not part of a larger, goals and objectives-driven framework, and thus only contributed 
somewhat to enhancing the skills of attendees. But, even here, skill enhancement was for a short period of time 
because when trainees return to an institution that operates differently from the training, any gain is quickly lost.
12 It was indeed curious that in every court that had undergone some degree of damage, even in cases where the 
building was destroyed and the files burned, the register survived because the person responsible for logging cases 
had taken it home for safekeeping. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
39 
recorded in the registers seem to serve no real purpose (for example, cases cannot be retrieved by 
case number or subject name other than a physical review of all registers), and some of the 
greffiers seemed to lack basic skills required to properly log new cases into the registers. None 
of the basic equipment that had been donated (such as manual typewriters) was in evidence and, 
when questioned, the universal reply was that the equipment had broken down and that there 
were no means to provide for their repair. 
Perhaps even more serious than the physical condition is the apparent apathy observed on the 
part of many justice system employees. Indeed, while many of those interviewed vocalized 
considerable interest and pride in carrying out their jobs in a professional manner, this was not 
borne out by a review of records, cases, logs and other materials viewed by the team. As a 
curious example of this apathy, the case of the Palais de Justice in Cap Haitien is cited - the 
building that housed the Court of the First Instance and the Parquet. The Palais was looted and 
damaged in the late February riots. The local Bar, together with some local citizen’s groups, had 
managed to raise some $40,000 to refurbish the premises and purchase new furniture – 
something of which the court, the Parquet, and the Bar were rightfully proud. During the visit, 
some court employees were in the building, and one greffier was observed to be making 
notations into a register. However, when staff was questioned about how many trials had taken 
place in the new courtroom, the response was “none” because the cases had been taken or 
burned. Despite the fact that five months had elapsed since the February events, and that the 
courthouse had been completely repaired, very little activity was observed. There seemed to be 
no particular concern for the fact that cases were not moving through the system, nor for the 
recurrence of prison overcrowding. Repeatedly, those interviewed cited lack of means, 
particularly vehicles for use in visiting detainees, as the explanation for the fact that new cases 
were not being processed. While it is certainly true that means are lacking, it is difficult to 
understand why new cases cannot be created to deal with the growing prison population in Cap 
Haitien (where, as a result of the burning and looting only three cells remain in usable condition, 
but these already house approximately 70 newly detained prisoners) when the prison is located 
almost directly across the street from the Palais de Justice. Clearly, efforts to engender a work 
ethic, self-starting initiative, and self-sufficiency should be important ingredients for all future 
programs. 
At the current time, the situation of the justice system in Haiti continues to reveal a curious 
juxtaposition of positive and negative factors. Given the current positive attitude of the Interim 
Government to justice reform, at least so it would appear through public statements, some of the 
recent decisions and actions are troublesome. Conversely, some of the negative elements 
encountered in the 1990’s, such as lack of political will and refusal to discuss the hard issues, 
would appear to be more positive – but concrete actions do not seem to be following the rhetoric. 
However, resources are still lacking, as does apparently, the willingness to allocate resources to 
the justice system, despite reports that the salary level of employees would be raised. Also 
present, and of concern, is the lack of ownership of the system evidenced from virtually all 
interviews and a very fatalistic attitude towards possibilities of taking the initiative to bring about 
change and reform. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
40 
Despite these detractors, clearly there is a window of opportunity for Haitian counterparts and 
donors to join together in developing and implementing justice reforms. The recommendations 
section of this report contains many specific interventions – both broad-based and highly 
targeted – that could be undertaken with a reasonable expectation of success. However, success 
in the new millennium will require that donors and Haitians alike approach new programs with a 
clear understanding of why programs failed in the past, coupled with a strong vision – and clear 
roadmap - of how to move forward. US agencies must commit to work together, donors must 
approach Haiti in an integrated fashion, and opportunities for obfuscation and backsliding must 
be confronted and corrected immediately. Hopefully, the seeds of discontent that the team noted 
in nearly all persons interviewed, are sufficiently grounded that Haitians will be willing to put 
aside individual agendas and agree to work together for the greater national good. Certainly, for 
the first time in the more than a decade that members of the team have worked in Haiti, there are 
some positive indications that Haitians are now at the point where they are so fed up with 
everything that is wrong with Haiti that they are finally interested in engaging in a positive 
manner and willing to actively contribute to the reform of the justice system. 
C. Preliminary assessment of the Ministry of Justice’s (MOJ) technical, administrative 
and financial capabilities to receive USAID assistance and the Haitian Minister of 
Justice’s capacity to implement a plan of action for judicial reform
In the past, absence of absorptive capacity of the Haitian institutions that were targeted meant 
that much of the international aid which poured into following the restoration of President 
Aristide in 1994, was not used effectively. The capacity of the MOJ’s (and other institutions’) to 
absorb the significant assistance (technical and financial) needed to improve the operations of the 
justice system is important to designing an effective assistance program. As mentioned in the 
recently published UN discussion paper “Haiti: Lessons learned” (Lama Khouri-Padova 2004), 
developing the institutional capacities needed to carry out the reform programs will take 
significant time since many agencies do not have sufficiently trained personnel to effectively 
undertake even routine tasks. This is also a concern for the MOJ, especially if (as is so often the 
case) many of the current high level staff leaves following the elections. 
The assessment team noted that the current staff at the Ministry of Justice, at least at the top 
assistant levels, appears knowledgeable, competent, and anxious to engage in justice reforms. In 
1998, Bernard Gousse, the current interim Minister of Justice, was identified as one of the most 
competent jurists in Haiti and as a person with a vision for justice reform. Mr. Gousse was 
consequently also hired by USAID pursuant to a Personal Services contract and worked with the 
USAID DG office on justice issues. There is no doubt that his experience at USAID has helped 
him shape his vision for reform and has given him an international donor perspective on the 
subject as well. This past experience could be of use in his implementation of judicial reform 
during the course of his mandate. However, he capacities at the lower staff levels remain unclear, 
with regard to both numbers and their capabilities. The 1997 report developed by DAI 
concluded that the current scope of the MOJ’s authority is far too broad (see page 21 of that 
report), is overstaffed with untrained personnel, but lacks sufficient trained staff. While some 
progress seems to have been made, lack of qualified and well-trained staff still appears to be a 
problem. For example, from interviews with court representatives and Haitian experts, the team 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
41 
learned that the judicial inspection unit within the MOJ, tasked with important review functions 
related to court operations, is understaffed (with well-qualified employees) and ill-equipped to 
carry out its responsibilities. Other divisions seem to suffer from similar conditions. This is of 
concern because despite the fact that the top echelon staff at the MOJ appears both competent 
and reform-minded, plans can still fall apart at the implementation level. 
Also, the MOJ has extremely broad responsibilities, covering all components of the justice 
system (police, instructive judges, prosecutors, courts, and corrections). There appear to be no 
plans to change this situation; thus, the entire burden of justice system reform remains on the 
MOJ. Without the full capacity of the MOJ to implement, support, and in the long run sustain 
justice sector reforms, effective and lasting changes are questionable. The scope of the 
Ministry’s responsibilities also raises concerns over a balance of power within the justice system, 
and conflicts with the constitutionally guaranteed independence of the judiciary. 
On the other hand, a positive sign of the MOJ’s capacity to receive and effectively utilize 
USAID assistance is the existence of the CCI plan, and the development of a plan for the Ecole 
de Magistrature. The MOJ should be commended for their work on the CCI, which is good 
evidence for technical capacity and the willingness to engage in planning exercises. Similarly, 
there has been a request to the Canadians for the development of a strategic plan for the police to 
complement those related to the courts and the Ecole. 
The CCI Plan for the Justice Sector (Axis 1. Strengthen Political Governance and Promote 
National Dialogue) focuses on key priorities for the Interim Government to strengthen the justice 
sector. The MOJ’s plan is only one piece of the CCI framework for the transition process and 
was designed to address the most pressing issues in a way that progress can be made within the 
limited timeframe of the Interim Government’s tenure. The priority issues contained in the plan: 
improvement of the physical infrastructure, the fight against impunity, ensuring the 
independence of the judiciary, improving training and education of the judiciary, and promoting 
the participation of women in the judicial process, are laudable and important goals. However, 
they are only pieces – albeit important ones – of what is needed to reform the justice system to 
truly provide equal justice to all Haitians; and even these key issues require more long-term and 
additional efforts than what the MOJ currently envisions. 
As a result, the team has some concerns regarding the potential effectiveness of current planning 
within the MOJ in delivering effective programs that lead to tangible changes and sustainable 
reforms. The major concern is that the plan consists of important objectives, but the activities 
identified to implement those principles do not appear to be adequate to achieve the stated 
objectives. Also, while the plan was developed with a number of key stakeholders involved, the 
process did not seem to have focused on first establishing broad based consensus of the 
overarching goals and a vision for the justice system in Haiti. The plan is ambitious, but does 
not detail steps necessary to reach the goals articulated in the plan. 
With respect to implementation of the plan, it appears that the UN is going to support 
implementation, but the exact form of this support is unclear. Some parts of the plan require 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
42 
 
legislative changes that may be difficult under the Interim Government.13 All of the priority 
objectives contained in the plan will require significant time – more than the plan envisions. As 
currently written, the MOJ’s plan would likely result in a series of piecemeal interventions that 
are not linked to the broader justice sector goals that both the Ministry and other stakeholders 
appear to support, in particular broad sectors of civil society, to ensure that this plan will be 
sustained over time even if and when the Minister of Justice and/or the government changes. 
This means that while technically competent, solid strategic planning and recognition of what is 
really involved in developing and implementing sustainable reform activities remains a weak 
point within the MOJ. In the short run, the current plan needs to be more detailed and based on 
more information (i.e., options available, lessons learned, resources needed over time) than what 
the MOJ currently has available for well informed decision making and implementation. In 
addition, the current plan still needs to recognize and clearly establish who actually will be 
responsible for developing and implementing each reform stage, it needs to build in stronger 
accountability mechanisms, and incorporate lessons learned from other experiences. The plan 
also needs to include much more detailed and realistic cost and resource requirements that 
contain sustainability considerations. 
There is also some concern that some of the activities in the plan to address the issue of impunity 
may focus predominately on cases that involve Aristide supporters and not on a more balanced 
and objective approach to addressing impunity. 
In the long-run, there needs to be a more holistic – higher level, goals-oriented – planning 
exercise and the MOJ will need help in the development of this – to avoid the piecemeal 
approach and to ensure that the sorts of comprehensive reform envisioned are embraced by a 
broad constituency. Plans that were developed primarily by government representatives, even 
with some input from key stakeholders, are generally thrown out by the next government unless 
these plans are tied a broader vision for the justice system that is supported by a broad 
constituency of all justice sector components, the private sector and civil society. Considering 
that the current leadership of the MOJ, including all members of the Minister’s advisory team are 
scheduled to leave their positions when a new permanent government is chosen, the continuity of 
any plan is a serious concern – as is the longer-term capacity of the MOJ to carry reforms and 
effectively utilize foreign assistance. Capacity building below the top MOJ leadership – with a 
cadre of career professional employees who not leave the Ministry after the election - is therefore 
essential for sustained reform efforts. 
A very positive sign for the MOJ’s willingness and serious intent not just to support reform, but 
to take a leadership role in carrying out reform activities was that the MOJ senior staff did not 
request equipment and other material goods – this differs substantially from past Ministries and 
past projects. In addition, in the past, Haitian counterparts were actively requesting the 
international experts to “do it for them,” but now, there appears to be a commitment for reforms 
13 Although it is possible for the Interim Government to effect legislative changes through decrees, this practice can 
be of concern from the perspective placing too much power in the executive branch. If the Interim Government 
does issue decrees, language should be included that requires Parliamentary review after the new Parliament is 
seated. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
43 
to be carried out by Haitians, a sign of their will to take ownership. In addition, the past 
tendency of the GOH to emplace persons in Ministries for the purpose of running interference to 
ensure that little real reform takes place, has been replaced by what appears to be openness 
towards change. An example of this is that Jean Philippe Vixamar, a Haitian national, who 
worked for USAID in 1995-1996 and is currently funded by the Canadian Government, is now 
working within the Ministry, bringing both capability and experience, as well as local knowledge 
to this position, representing a major asset to the Ministry. 
Many questions remain relative to the local absorption capacity. Can the MOJ absorb on-going 
maintenance of physical rehabilitation of courts and equipment? Such efforts must include both 
a routine schedule of maintenance and planning for supplies. The MOJ also needs the capacity 
to put together a needs-based budget (as would the courts should they achieve financial 
independence), and the ability to monitor and report upon allocations and expenditures in an 
open and transparent manner – both areas in which the Ministry may need external assistance. 
The currently very low budget for the MOJ is a serious concern for any justice sector reform 
efforts. The Minister indicated to the team that the total budget for the MOJ is just equivalent to 
1% of the entire GOH budget. Of this budget the majority is spent on police. The courts only 
receive approximately 11.5% of the MOJ’s budget. While percentages per se reveal relatively 
little about what an agency actually needs in relation to what it gets, it is clear that such a 
minimal amount is insufficient to carry out and sustain even basic justice system improvement 
efforts – not to mention significant reform activities without the continued financial support from 
the international donor community. Assistance to the MOJ (and the courts) for developing a 
strong-needs based budget, effectively presenting it and lobbying for it would be an important 
element of building the MOJs capacity to absorb and sustain reform efforts. 
Any support provided to the MOJ and other parts of the justice sector needs to take into 
consideration the actual capacities the counterparts have and what responsibilities they can and 
will take on. Assistance to be provided should be (or become) part of the MOJ’s plans, 
developed and agreed upon with the MOJ, other donors, and other impacted stakeholders. Not 
only should the activities be specified, but each proposed planning and implementation step, as 
well as the responsibilities and resource needs (including training and technical assistance for the 
Haitian implementers), need to be defined, and this definition must be based on an appraisal of 
the specific problem targeted for resolution. As an example, court staff needs to assume 
responsibilities for some administrative tasks, i.e., to track cases. There may also be a need for 
staff in place to carry out new and additional tasks – but at present, particularly those working in 
rural areas, are often lacking very basic skills, sometimes this may include improving solid 
reading and writing skills. As a result, assistance may have to build in provision of such basic 
skills in order to implement changes. 
Also, in the past there was no follow-through by the GOH, and this aggravated the lack of 
sustainability. Moreover, no oversight capabilities were developed to provide for monitoring 
systems – a lesson learned that must be part of any future assistance provided. 
Sustainability must be a key consideration for all aspects of assistance, including ensuring that 
agency staff is given adequate responsibility for carrying out the new functions and activities. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
44 
Not only do the planning and development process need to be Haitianized – the implementation 
and institutionalization process must ensure that positive reform efforts contain and remain even 
when international donor support eventually ends. This also means that activities or programs 
cannot be imposed on Haitian counterparts. The assistance to be provided needs to be 
understood, accepted, and wanted, and programs need to be built incrementally depending on 
what the capacities of the Haitian counterparts can absorb. This may also require that some 
aspects of the reform process proceed at a somewhat slower pace than ideal to assure that the 
conditions to carry out and sustain the reforms are met. For example, the current plan for 
improving judicial independence provides for financial independence for the Cour de Cassation. 
The very competent directeur d’administration of the Cour de Cassation admitted that the court 
was not prepared to take on this responsibility. He was currently working with the Ministry of 
Finance to develop appropriate financial management structures; however, many questions are 
still open. Even the fundamental issue of who should decide how the budget should be allocated 
– the chief judge or the director d’administration – was a matter of debate between the chief 
judge and the director d’administration during an interview with both. 
Since financial independence is such an important reform step for the courts, their ability to 
demonstrate that they can plan for, manage and allocate money in an open, transparent, and 
responsible manner is essential for improving their credibility and for broader and continuous 
support for judicial independence in Haiti. In the long run it is desirable that all courts gain 
financial independence and assistance should be provided to explore the possibilities for 
incrementally providing more financial independence to all courts. If the financial management 
structures at the Cour de Cassation are insufficient, accusations of financial mismanagement tend 
to be made by those who do not support the independence of the judicial sector. Such 
developments could be a major setback for all the courts in Haiti. 
Still, in all reform efforts, donors and the Haitian counterparts should expect and be prepared for 
some setbacks and use these as a learning tool instead of looking at them as failures. Assistance 
needs to be designed to be flexible and allow for learning – even from failures. It is important 
for any assistance program to provide for an environment that supports and encourages change. 
This should involve assistance to key stakeholders to better understand change dynamics and 
how to manage change as well as creating structures to capture and analyze the lessons that have 
been and are being learned in the different agencies and locations throughout Haiti. This also 
needs to include sufficient opportunities for local stakeholders to share information and discuss 
approaches so they can learn from each other. 
D. Assessment of the physical condition of the Haitian courts and recommendations on 
the most urgent renovation actions that are needed 
The Canadian Government is committed to renovating the First Instance Courts, parts of the 
Palais de Justice (including the registry), and the MOJ, and has taken the initiative to survey their 
condition. The Canadian report is almost completed. Prior to the Canadian report, at least two 
comprehensive assessments of the physical conditions and needs of the JP Courts were 
conducted. One was carried out by MAT (material assistance to ministries) in 1995. At that 
time a group of 18 Haitian judges and lawyers, as well as members of the Civil Affairs Unit of 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
45 
 
the US Army, conducted a detailed assessment of the physical conditions of all of the 176 JP 
Courts in Haiti (that existed at that time). 
Under the program implemented by Checchi, a detailed assessment of the physical needs of the 
JP Courts, including an assessment of their workload and accessibility, was also conducted. The 
latter resulted in a map that shows the location of all JP Courts relative to the population size. 
This map clearly indicated which JP Courts were overburdened, which ones had low caseloads, 
and where the population had insufficient access to JP Courts due to distance and lacking 
infrastructures to reach the courts.14 Such detailed review of each facility is clearly beyond the 
scope of this assessment. However, Haitian counterparts and foreign experts interviewed 
unanimously stated that no improvements to the JP Courts have been made since the mid-1990’s 
and their conditions have only deteriorated. The visits to the JP Courts in Port-au-Prince, Cap 
Haitien, Gonaives, St. Marc, and Jacmel confirmed this statement. The physical condition of all 
JP buildings visited, the courtrooms themselves, and the furniture and equipment, if available at 
all, are abysmal. In general, most JP and many of the First Instance Courts are in very poor 
condition – inadequate space in the buildings; the space between the judge and parties is also 
inadequate; physical barriers to protect judicial personnel in hearing rooms is virtually non￾existent; and offices are very run down and have little or no supplies. Frequently, there is poor 
electricity, lighting, and no telephone connections. Particularly in the provinces, the courts are 
housed in substandard facilities – even by Haitian standards. Some of the data collected by the 
MAT review, showing the conditions of the courts are attached to this assessment. 
Of further concern is the fact that there is no security for judges, court staff and those appearing 
in the JP Courts. The security situation in the First Instance Courts or the Palais de Justice 
visited in Port-au Prince is not much different. This is particularly disconcerting when it comes 
to high profile cases, such as those related to the recent massacres, politically linked crimes, as 
well as major drug cases. The location and structural limitations of the First Instance Court 
buildings outside of PAP seem to prohibit installing sufficient security upgrades to support high 
profile cases. It may be advisable to concentrate all such cases at one location with enhanced 
security measures in Port-au Prince. Another key element to holding sensitive trials relates to the 
physical security of those involved in the presenting and hearing the case. The Ministry may 
require immediate assistance for providing adequate security for high profile trials. In fact the 
MOJ and the courts may need some quick assistance in how to prepare for and handle high 
profile trials, including how to handle and respond to the media. 
At the Palais de Justice in Port-au-Prince, the facilities of the Cour de Cassation are probably the 
best, but even they are fairly inadequate, cramped and not well organized. The fact that this 
court is supported by a very competent chef d’administration is visible by the way he runs the 
court. The rooms are relatively clean and everything appears to be quite orderly. There are 
some books and basic furniture, equipment, and supplies. However, the judges have no privacy 
for their deliberations since anyone can just walk through the room in which they are 
deliberating to use the (very inadequate) bathroom. There is no security (other than guard with 
14 While the map resulting from this assessment is displayed at the USAID/Haiti mission and the MOJ, the actual 
report was not available and could not be located by the time this reports was written. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
46 
 
an old machine gun at the entrance to the building), and virtually anyone can simply walk into 
the judges’ chambers and deliberation rooms. Some refurbishing and minor interior and external 
improvements could make a difference.15 In addition, the court lacks adequate equipment and 
supplies, not to speak of access to a decent law library. At the same time, the Cour de Cassation 
may be one of the few courts in Haiti that could currently implement and actually use limited 
automation to develop some of the much-needed information databases and to assist in financial 
management.16 
The facilities of the Appellate Court of Port-au-Prince, located just on the other side of the 
building, are in worse condition. This court is not supported by a chef d’administration and this 
absence is very apparent. The resources of this court are also visibly less than those of the Cour 
de Cassation. There is almost no furniture and no real equipment; there are no books, nor 
tangible administrative management support. The greffier responsible for the Palais de Justice 
only takes care of the building itself, not the courts. 
A visit to the registry at the Palais de Justice revealed information about the assistance it receives 
from the UN for archiving, leading ultimately to automation. The Government of Canada has 
provided shelving, and the registry will also receive furniture and equipment from the UN. The 
greffier is head of security and is responsible for the building as well as the registry. There have 
been several efforts in the past to improve the registry and archiving process. The team notes 
that the law seems to require that files be retained eternally, instead of allowing disposal of files 
according to a schedule of importance and need for retention. As a result, with few exceptions, 
all files have been retained. In 1985 a new Minister, Theodore Achille, ordered that the files be 
reviewed for purging unessential information. Apparently this was done only to a limited extent 
since the Minister was removed relatively quickly after this order was given. Checchi later 
began to reorganize documents, beginning with files dating from 1974. Due to space limitations 
at the Palais de Justice, older files were sent to the national archives. The registry is still using 
the logs developed as part of the Checchi project. It is notable that this court retains the same 
case file numbers assigned by the Parquets, but also assigns its own log number. It is unclear if 
and how this information is tracked further, but it appears that there is no real link to the actual 
case record or archive. Case tracking is not envisioned and even file retrieval of any but the 
most current cases is still difficult.17 Currently, the UN is providing assistance to archiving files 
by placing case file folders in boxes that are color coded by case type and separated by year. The 
archive/registry is later to be automated, but it is unclear if this process will involve the 
development of a system that would actually link the registry to the archive and if it will provide 
15 After our visit Maitre D’Orleans recommended that simple dividers were placed into the deliberation room to 
create a separate corridor to provide access to the bathroom and at the same time give the judges privacy needed for 
the deliberations. This simple adjustment was made and shows that with a little creativity and the will to take charge 
improvements can be made even with limited means. 
16 Simple databases that could be created and could be helpful to all courts in the long run would be: database of 
decisions of the Cour de Cassation, a collection of laws, and the beginning of court statistics. 
17 The same had been observed by the team that assessed the Checchi program in 1998 and recommendations to 
address these crucial issued had been made but none seem to have been implemented or if they were attempted they 
did not continue. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
47 
for some file and/or case tracking mechanisms. At present the computer equipment available to 
the registry is used for word processing only.18
The physical structures of the JP Courts visited all require improvements – as do the operational 
processes observed. The JP court in the south region of Port-au-Prince is centrally located, but in 
a very run down building with insufficient, basic furniture. Electricity seemed to be absent, as 
were telephones. The court staff had some manual typewriters, but it was almost impossible to 
discern who had responsibility for what by just observing the court. Similarly, the courtroom 
was filled with people, making it difficult to determine who was there for what purpose, whether 
they were working there, on official business, or simply watching. The team members had to 
work their way through those assembled to find the one judge that happened to be present in the 
court at the time of our visit. He was sitting in a dark corner, almost under a stairway, 
surrounded by about 15 people. Police offices were “hanging out,” ostensibly waiting to assist in 
some court business, but the presence of a huissier to keep some order was not visible. This 
court is clearly busy, but in bad repair, lacking furniture and supplies, and is very disorderly. 
The JP court in Gonaives was not in operation when the team arrived, but the huissier was ther 
keeping an eye on things. This did not include keeping people from coming, going and 
assembling in the hearing room just to watch what was going on. This court is in a simple 
building, a typical structure in downtown Gonaives. Vendors congregate all around the court 
and on the sidewalk. The building is in terrible condition, with mold on the walls, and what is 
left of the furniture is falling apart. The court was looted and all files are gone. What is left – as 
in almost every place visited - is the case registry logbook that the staff safeguarded19. However, 
when reviewed, the last entry in the criminal log was made on September 9, 2003. The court had 
reopened just the week before the visit (the end of July) and had heard a few cases since. But 
there must have been no misdemeanor crimes, since there is no record of them. Since there is 
generally no recording of civil cases other than on loose-leaf pages (the Checchi program only 
focused on criminal cases – a shortcoming since the majority of the caseload of the JP Courts are 
civil matters). Currently, this court just has one judge instead of three, two greffiers and a 
hussier. The JP court in Jacmel was closed when the team visited, but we were able to observe 
its condition. As many other JP Courts, it is housed in an old building downtown, in need of 
repair, with limited furniture and generally very limited storage capacity to keep files – if there 
are any files remaining in the court. 
 
18 Based on our not insubstantial experience with court automation, NCSC strongly recommends that any 
automation efforts commence with a detailed requirements and functional analysis of needs – and not simply the 
needs within the courts to locate cases and to generate statistical data. One of the most basic premises upon which 
automation should be based is a solid manual system, uniformly applied and used in all courts. In addition, the team 
perceived a need to establish connections between the various justice institutions around the country. All 
component parts of the Haitian justice system require some form of case tracking and management, and the potential 
ability to inter-link these components (and with other parts of the government, such as for example, with driver’s 
license records) will also be crucial. 
19 It was curious that the staff in every court visited had safeguarded the register book during the events of 
February. This can be a very positive sign that court staff value having a tool to keep track of case information. 
Comment [p2]: i
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
48 
 
The situation of the Parquet in PAP is not very different.20 OPDAT’s program seemed to have 
planned some improvements of the physical structures of the Parquet. However, if these plans 
were actually carried out, the results were no longer visible. The team visited the Parquet in 
downtown Port-au-Prince. The location is relatively easily accessible, but typically, it is housed 
in a deteriorated building. Lighting is limited, there is nobody to direct the public on where they 
need to go, and it is noisy, with little room. The Parquet has a few non-networked computers 
that are used for word processing only. They also have a scanner and a small copier that cannot 
handle what needs to be copied; they are lacking basic supplies. File folders are kept, but based 
on what the team observed, they appear somewhat disorganized. The staff is still keeping the 
logbooks to register cases “because it has proven successful,” but the data contained in the 
logbooks are not used for the purposes of file retrieval, nor for gathering statistics - data that 
were characterized as “useless”. 
While the conditions of the majority of the courts and Parquets visited are pretty dismal, there 
are some exceptions. In Cap Haitien, the Palais de Justice houses both the First Instance Court 
and the Parquet, and offers adequate facilities for both. The Palais de Justice had been looted 
and burned, as had other justice buildings, during the February events. However, the first floor 
of this building had been renovated in an extraordinary effort with funding from the local Bar 
Association and local civil society organizations. Consideration is being given to mounting a 
similar refurbishment effort for the second floor. Those assigned to the Palais de Justice, and the 
local Bar Association, are clearly very proud of these efforts; but, as described further under 
Section B, disappointingly little activity was observed inside the facilities. The two JP Courts 
visited in Cap Haitien, however, were in deplorable condition. One was housed in a rented 
building, the other on the first floor of a building that once served as barracks for the FADH. 
Both were very run down, with wooden floors full of cracks and holes, with imminent possibility 
of total collapse. 
Similar to Cap Haitien, the Palais de Justice visited in St. Marc and in Jacmel were in relatively 
good condition and order. But their quarters are quite cramped which, as mentioned above, is a 
particular problem if higher profile cases are to be handled. The Palais de Justice, and especially 
the JP buildings, were not constructed with functions of the courts and Parquets in mind. For 
example, adequate and secure storage for files is almost never available, and the same is true of 
separate and secure evidence rooms. Those that were viewed by the team contained items of 
evidence simply piled on the floor in the corner of an office, designated for evidence21 (and there 
is no system to ensuring evidence is not tempered with and can be tracked). 
20 Outside of PAP they are generally collocated with the first instance courts at the regional Palais de Justice which 
will be the focus of the UNs improvement efforts. 
21 The court in St. Marc has set aside one room to keep evidence – but there is no system to keeping or tracking 
evidence. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
49 
VI. Recommendations for Future Programs: 
Despite the deterioration of improvements effected during previous assistance efforts, and 
backsliding that has taken place in a number of key areas, there are two very positive impacts of 
these previous efforts that provide room for some optimism for future programs. First are the 
physical facilities and items that remain from the previous programs, such as the Magistrate’s 
School, the case registration logs, and the remnants of the BUCODEP pretrial detention program 
in the National Penitentiary. While it would be an overstatement to say that these legacies from 
previous efforts provide a substantial foundation for future programs, they do provide positive 
points of departure for expanded development of critical justice sector reforms. Second, earlier 
efforts to develop a strategic framework for reform have clearly born fruit. The diagnostic 
reports and proposals for substantive legal and institutional reform, that were produced by the 
GOH in the late 1990’s, and more recently as a result of the 2004 Donor’s Conference, attest to 
the broad acceptance by the GOH and donors of the need for a strategic view to reform. 
Based on the assessment team’s meetings with governmental officials, particularly those with the 
Ministry staff, there appear to be some positive elements that, with careful, targeted, and 
consistent support, could serve to effect real reform of the justice system in Haiti. However, 
while some positive and encouraging elements are present – and there is a definite window of 
opportunity – care must be taken to ensure that political will is maintained. Even these positive 
elements remain quite tenuous and there needs to be a substantial amount of support and tenacity 
on the part of the donors and Haitians to assure that reforms move forward to tangible and 
enduring change to the quality of life in Haiti. Sustaining GOH’s will to engage in reform, and 
improving its planning processes, particularly with regard to expanding stakeholder input, will 
continue to be a challenge. 
The final objective of the Scope of Work was to provide concrete recommendations on the 
development of USAID’s future activities in the justice sector. In this section, NCSC provides 
such recommendations and addresses a number of issues related to what it will take to achieve 
positive results from donor interventions this time. As described throughout this report, 
development of effective programs for the future will require a clear understanding of why things 
failed the last time. Success will also require concerted efforts by the USG and other donors to 
band together with reform-minded Haitians and move forward as a strong and united front. 
Although the Scope of Work requested recommendations related to future USAID interventions, 
the team, in consultation with USAID, is presenting the broad perspective of justice reform 
activities that are needed in Haiti – regardless of which donor might ultimately have 
responsibility for implementation. Areas recommended for USAID involvement are also clearly 
identified. 
A. Strategic Planning and Donor Coordination 
Recommendation No. 1: USAID (and other donors as appropriate) should adopt a 
dual-tracked approach to assisting the GOH/MOJ in planning for justice reform. In the 
near term (during the tenure of the Interim Government), assistance efforts should focus 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
50 
 
on select activities in the MOJ’s Cadre de Cooperation Interimaire (CCI), then, working 
with the newly elected government efforts should be directed to facilitating development of 
a high level, long-term strategic plan encompassing all components of the justice sector.
As described throughout this document, for the past decade, various donors have engaged in 
programmatic assistance to reform the justice system of Haiti that have had led to less than 
positive results. Dozens of diagnostics and assessments have been conducted, all containing 
some very practical and constructive recommendations for reform and assistance programs. 
However, implementation results have fallen far short of expectations. In part at least, these 
failures can be attributed to a piecemeal approach to programming, and the fact that there has 
never been a unified, comprehensive, and consensus-based, strategic framework, developed with 
and by Haitians, that clearly lays out goals and objectives, along with specific activities that will 
lead, incrementally, to achieving those goals and objectives. 
There are encouraging efforts that have already been carried out by various groups of Haitian to 
develop a framework for forward planning. Two notable examples include the March 1998 
report of the Preparatory Commission on legal and justice reform22, and the Ministry of Justice’s 
contribution to the Cadre de Cooperation Interimaire (CCI). With regard to the latter document, 
the team had a very constructive meeting with some of its authors within the Ministry, felt that 
the priority objectives identified were both appropriate and needed, and recommends that 
USAID (and hopefully other donors) supports certain of the activities outlined under key 
objectives and as described in the footnote below.23 
The GOH’s and the Ministry’s efforts to produce the CCI is a very positive step, and the 
document is excellent in terms of identifying the key issues and goals for the judiciary, and 
laying out the most immediate types of activities that should be undertaken during the Interim 
Government’s tenure. However, its focus on activities that can be carried out within the 18 
month mandate of the current Interim Government limits the scope of the document and what 
can be accomplished. The plan is also somewhat weak in tying all of the various activities into a 
well-conceived, holistic plan that builds incrementally towards establishment of a judiciary that 
can in fact provide the functions critically needed by the Haitian population (efficiency, fairness, 
impartiality, etc.) Indeed, the team noted that even if all activities enumerated in the CCI were to 
be carried out successfully, the overall results would not achieve the goals. And, with a new 
administration and new Ministry staff in place following the election, the team fears that 
progress made during the interim period might be lost, with the very real possibility of having to 
22 It should be noted that some Haitian scholars are reluctant to endorse the work of this particular 
Commission, for various reasons, including that some members were very young jurists, and that the Commission 
recommended introducing into the Haitian legal system external concepts (drawn largely from Latin America) that 
are irrelevant to the Haitian context. 
23 Under objective 1.1: physical rehabilitation, the team identifies Activity 2 (refurbishment of the JP Courts) as the 
highest priority; objective 1.2: fight against impunity, Activities 2, 3, and 8 (reinforcement of capacities and the 
“chaine penale” in courts and Parquets, and modernization of criminal procedures; objective 1.3: Judicial 
Independence, Activity 2 (reinforcement of management systems); and objective 1.4: Training and information, 
Activities 2, 3, and 6 (standardization of judicial training curricula, training for judicial staff, and improvement in 
production and dissemination of judicial information). 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
51 
 
start over again on at least some elements. Clearly this is not a situation desired by Haitians or 
donors, and to avoid this circumstance, the team recommends development of a companion-piece 
to the CCI – a higher level vision and long-term strategic plan that will, over time, serve as a 
roadmap to achieve the very laudable goals identified as priority objectives for the justice sector 
by the Interim Government. 
To address both the short- and long-term planning needs of the justice sector, the team 
recommends a two-pronged approach to the justice assistance program. First, engaging with the 
Ministry to provide assistance to implement the CCI, doing so in the areas enumerated in 
footnote #24. Secondly, to facilitate a broadly participatory process within Haiti, that includes 
both government and non-government actors, and to guide them in developing a high level 
strategic plan.24 Such a plan should outline the critical functions that the Haitian justice system 
must be capable of performing, so that the appropriate types of organizational, administrative, 
managerial structures and infrastructures needed to support these functions can be developed and 
implemented in a structured and cohesive way. In circumstances wherein the strategic planning 
method has been used most successfully, development of the plan itself is followed by a second 
exercise that involves assisting Haitian counterparts to develop a series of action plans, outlining 
the highest priorities and logical starting points for the 12-18 months of activities (which, for the 
most part will comport with the activities already contained in the CCI). The high level plan 
contains broad goals and objectives that will require years to fully achieve, while the action plans 
(one for each component of the justice system) lay out specific activities that need to be carried 
out in order to produce forward movement towards the higher goals. Similar to the CCI, action 
plans are laid out in chart format, with time lines and specific activities, but also identify parties 
responsible, approximate costs, and benchmarks towards higher goals. 
In addition to articulating clearly the priority goals for justice reform, the strategic plan and 
action plans present the full scope of what needs to happen over a specific period of time, along 
with the human and material resources, level of effort, etc, thus making it very clear what needs 
to be done and how long it will take. Perhaps even more importantly for Haiti, the plan can also 
serve as a "roadmap" according to which Haitians and international donor assistance would all 
work. In so doing, it is possible to eliminate much of the duplication, overlapping, or competing 
approaches that characterized past assistance efforts, while also developing Haitian buy-in and 
ownership of a clearly articulated plan. 
The planning processes need not be lengthy, but they do tend to be arduous in terms of having to 
think through the various steps necessary. However, from past experience, the results are well 
worth the efforts expended. 
The team recommend that, ultimately, an action plan should be prepared for each of the topical 
areas covered in this section of the report, e.g., the MOJ and component units, the Magistrates 
School, the Law School, etc. 
24 The team encourages participation of other donors in the strategic planning process, in particular to avoid the 
perception that the plan is the result of US imposition of a process or model. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
52 
Recommendation No. 2: USAID should work closely with other donors to ensure that 
all programs of justice assistance do not duplicate, overlap, or contradict each other. Once 
the above-mentioned long-term strategic plan has been developed, that plan should serve as 
the broad framework within which all donor assistance should take place. In addition, 
rather than parceling out discrete areas of institutional reform amongst donors, donors 
should form multi-national teams to work with Haitian counterparts in carrying out 
reforms. 
The many lessons related to donor coordination and cooperation -- that have been highlighted 
throughout this document -- must be both learned and applied by the donor community in 
preparation for future rule of law programming in Haiti. This means tailoring all training and 
technical assistance to the Haitian context; this also means staffing projects with individuals who 
understand (or who can come to understand) how to work in the difficult environment currently 
presented in Haiti. 
With regard to the strategic plan and planning processes described in Recommendation #1, for 
implementation to take place in a cohesive and coordinated fashion, all donors must agree to 
work within the broad framework of that plan (and the subordinate action plans). 
The assessment team met with all major donors during the in-country portion of the assignment. 
Donor representatives understood very well problems of the past interventions and voiced 
considerable interest in working to see that the same sorts of problems do not recur. Of specific 
interest in this regard was the unanimous desire to avoid the piecemeal approaches that tended to 
characterize past programs under which specific pieces of the overall programs were assigned to 
specific donors. As a means of avoidance of this particular problem, NCSC recommends 
working in teams comprised of international representatives. When such a model was proposed 
to international counterparts in Haiti, it was received with considerable interest and the team 
strongly recommends that this approach be adopted for future programming. 
B. Legislative Reform 
Recommendation No. 3: International donor support is needed to fund the creation of a 
comprehensive program of legislative assistance that builds the capacity of the Haitians 
themselves to develop legislation, and related policy and procedures to assure its 
implementation.
In many of the areas discussed above, existing statutory law will need to be reformed. In some 
cases this will require amendment of existing law, and in other cases, this will require creation of 
statutory law where none has existed before (for example, in the case of the laws relating to the 
Magistrates’ School and the status of the judiciary). In addition, some reforms, such as those 
pertaining to the role, functioning and composition of the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature
may entail constitutional reform. In the latter case, since under the Constitution, Articles 282-
284-4, all constitutional reform must begin in the legislature, proposed constitutional reform 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
53 
could appropriately be the subject of a - program of legislative assistance along with the reform 
of the statutory law. 
A considerable amount of work has been done already in the area of statutory development. As 
noted above, both Checchi and OPDAT worked on essential proposed legislation on judicial 
reform, and UNDP worked in this area as well. In the year 2000, the UN agency MICAH 
followed up on the work of the Preparatory Commission on the Reform of Law and Justice of 
1998 and, in coordination with the MOJ, prepared several key pieces of draft legislation. They 
are all listed on page 10 of the Report on the Status of the Judiciary, which was commissioned by 
IFES, drafted by Maitre Leon Saint-Louis and published this last spring. They are: 
The draft bill on the status of the Magistry 
The draft bill on the status of the CSM 
The draft bill on the status of the Magistrates’ School 
The draft bill on the Magistrate’s Code of Ethics 
The basic text on the philosophy of penal reform 
However, the problem with these efforts that have been undertaken to date has been that they 
have been largely driven by foreign experts and have failed to focus on the capacity building of 
the Haitians themselves in this area. In addition, these efforts have mainly been aimed at 
drafting texts rather than engaging in an analytical, problem-solving process that takes into 
consideration the related problem of implementation and policy development that are necessary 
to actually change behavior. 
Given the approach that is recommended here, it is not premature to launch such a project even 
though there is currently no legislature. This is so because, as noted in several instances above 
where these key pieces of draft legislation have been referenced, in many cases important issues 
still need to be resolved in connection with this legislation and consensus on the resolution of 
these issues needs to be built. Consequently, a program could be developed which focuses on 
problem-solving, consensus-building, and finally on drafting. The program should be designed to 
build the capacity of selected Haitians who participated in the past program. 
The problem with programs of legislative assistance in other countries has been that all too often 
they concentrate almost exclusively on the drafting of legislation. While it is true that drafting is 
a skill to be acquired, in some respects it is the easiest part of the process and should only come 
at the end of an analytical, problem-solving exercise which questions the necessity of the 
legislation and considers the essential issue of implementation. At the same time, the results of 
the research which will need to be conducted as part of this process can be used in consensus￾building in order to assure passage of the particular piece of legislation. This kind of exercise 
must be conducted by Haitians themselves so that they develop the necessary skills in 
shepherding legislation through the process and so that Haitians acquire a sense of ownership of 
the end result. 
As an example of a holistic legal drafting process, Professors Robert and Ann Seidman of Boston 
University direct this kind of program of legislative assistance at the university’s law school. The 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
54 
Program has two components. On the one hand, the Seidmans frequently travel to other countries 
where they assist in the development of programs of legislative assistance designed to meet the 
goals described above, and on the other hand, they bring key players from these countries to their 
program in Boston where they study the methodology and create strategies for the development 
and adoption of key legislation in their home country. This work always entails significant focus 
on the issue of implementation. 
Such a program in Haiti should focus in the short-term on executive officials since there is 
currently no Parliament. This is nevertheless appropriate since under Article 111-1 of the 
Constitution, the executive branch shares the power of legislative initiative (as well as the power 
to initiate constitutional amendment in the legislature-Article 282) with the legislative branch. 
Consequently, the program could involve key actors in the MOJ and key players in the judicial 
sector who will be essential to the consensus-building aspect of the exercise. They could work to 
revisit some of the basic questions that remain in connection with some of the draft legislation 
that has been prepared; they can also work on their resolution in preparation for the election of a 
Parliament. 
In the long-term, a legal reform program should be expanded to include selected members of 
Parliament. This kind of effort would be ground-breaking in Haiti since parliaments in the past 
have been notoriously weak, and this is one of the factors that has contributed to the several 
constitutional crises which they country has known. (See Aucoin, “Haiti’s Constitutional Crisis.” 
Boston University International Law Journal. Summer 1999). 
Finally, the uniform policies and procedures to operationalize new and/or modified legislation, 
recommended throughout this report should also be developed as part of this program. A very 
high priority for this type of assistance would be to work with key actors in the Presidency, 
Ministry of Justice, Bureau du Premier Ministre and in the judicial sector, helping them to 
develop uniform policies and procedures for use throughout the chaine pénale. This would serve 
several purposes. The process would require clear definition of roles and responsibilities 
between and among the principal institutions (courts, examining magistrates, prosecutors, and 
police); thereby rationalizing and harmonizing the conduct of criminal investigations. Such a 
project can also serve to provide for implementation of the key pieces of legislation which will 
be developed or finalized, as well as providing for consistency and uniformity in the training 
programs recommended below under Section D. 
Recommendation No. 4: USAID (working with other donors) should provide financial 
and technical assistance in the creation of a project which will engage Haitians in a 
comprehensive review of the relevant state of the law, and the persistent lack of 
enforcement with regard to judicial appointment, discipline and removal so that key 
decisions can be made on related institutional reforms in the short-term and on legislative 
and constitutional reform in the long-term. 
Presently, there are several issues that significantly impact judicial independence in Haiti. If 
these issues remain unresolved, it will be impossible to recruit highly qualified lawyers to work 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
55 
for the courts and to increase public support for the courts in Haiti. The two issues that require 
particular attention are the process of appointing judges to the bench and procedural mechanisms 
for removing judges (as well as constitutional guarantees protecting judges during such removal 
procedures). The judicial profession in Haiti suffers from the same problems that are present in 
many countries with similar economical, political and social environments: judges are not 
respected, salaries tend to be inadequate, the quality of lawyers appointed to the bench is low, 
there are no transparent and reliable criteria that can be applied during the selection and 
appointment processes, as well as during the dismissal procedures. (Note: details regarding 
possible legislative changes to codify these changes and improvements are included in 
Attachment C). 
Judicial appointment. The most important issue that is apparent from the very beginning is that 
there must be a selection mechanism in place that defines the criteria that ought to be followed 
during the selection process for judges. At the very minimum, persons who are appointed to the 
bench must have a law degree, and have gone completed additional training that focuses on 
judicial responsibilities and duties. Ideally, the team recommends that potential candidates 
should complete the course of study at the Magistrate’s School before they are appointed. Even 
though the Constitution mandates in Article 176 that there must be laws establishing the 
qualifications for the appointments of judges at the various levels of the judicial hierarchy and 
that a Magistrates School be created, to date, this has not been completed (although, as 
mentioned previously, there is a draft law on the Magistrate’s School). 
Presently, there are four laws that regulate judicial appointments and that need some major 
redrafting in order to address the issues discussed in this report - the Constitution of 1987, the 
law on the Conseil Supérieure de la Magistrature, the law of 1985 dealing with the organization 
of the Courts, and the 1995 decree of August 24 modifying that law. These documents describe 
in general terms the process of appointing judges to the Cour de Cassation, the Court of Appeals, 
courts of first instance, and the justices of the peace. 
 
In the current Constitution there is no provision that describes the current Conseil Supérieur de 
la Magistrature, and the law dates back to the early twentieth century. At present, the Conseil
consists of the judges of the Cour de Cassation sitting en banc. In the past, the Conseil was 
vested with the authority to discipline judges; however, it no longer fulfills that function. 
Nevertheless, the functions of the Conseil could be expanded and it could become a major player 
in the judicial selection process. The Conseil could serve as a judicial council if it is determined 
by Haitians that they want to have a judicial council that exercises disciplinary, appointment and 
promotion functions. The Conseil could act in all of these capacities. It is well known that 
judicial councils exercise these functions in other countries as a means of preventing executive 
interference that can occur when these functions are exercised directly by the MOJ or the 
President. If the Conseil takes over the three responsibilities discussed above, the current role of 
the executive branch in the appointment process will be greatly diminished. 
The Conseil Supérieure de la Magistrature could fulfill the function of disciplining judges. The 
Conseil does not exercise this function right now, but was doing this in the past under the 1920 
law. At the present moment, the Cour de Cassation acts like a judicial council and from views 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
56 
expressed to the assessment team in interviews that Haitians are not happy with the current 
composition since the Cour de Cassation has failed almost entirely to function in this capacity. It 
is apparent that some other solution must be found. 
(See Attachment C) 
Judicial Discipline - Under the present Constitution (Article 177), judges are not removable 
unless there are exceptional circumstances that are carefully outlined in the law and the formal 
procedures are applied. (discussed in more detail in Attachment C) 
 For example, judges can be removed through formal disciplinary proceedings following an 
accusation of violation of the disciplinary rules, which must be established by a written law. 
Judges can also be removed when they are found to be physically or mentally unsuited in a 
proper proceeding. When it comes to the members of the highest court, e.g., the Cour de 
Cassation, judges can only be removed through an impeachment-like procedure conducted under 
the auspices of the Senate which sits as a special “Haute Cour de Justice.” This is the same 
impeachment procedure which would apply in the case of the President, the Prime Minister, 
other ministers, members of the Electoral Council, or of the ombudsman in the Office du 
Protecteur du Citoyen. (The Haute Cour de Justice and its procedures are set out in Title V of 
the Constitution.) Furthermore, according to the law, judges are not to be even transferred or 
promoted without first giving their consent. 
In view of all of the issues discussed in this section, it is recommended that current legislation be 
changed (as described in detail in Attachment C).
C. Institutional Organization and Management 
Recommendation No. 5: USAID should provide technical assistance, training and some 
infrastructural support to improve and institutionalize strong management and 
administrative capabilities within the Ministry of Justice.
A key component of the strategic plan discussed in Recommendation #1 must relate to a strategy 
for building up the administrative and managerial capacities of the MOJ, doing so in such a way 
that improvements are sustainable over the long-term. In the near-term, the MOJ must be able to 
orchestrate the many donor programs focused on rule of law reform (and the existence of a 
unified strategic plan will greatly facilitate this task), while at the same time supporting on-going 
operations of the various institutions that fall under the authority of the Ministry. As discussed 
in the body of the report, the MOJ itself has already taken some important steps to move in this 
direction by preparing the CCI, raising salaries, and engaging with donors to discuss needs for 
external support. 
In order for capacity enhancements to be sustainable, some organizational changes within the 
MOJ will be needed. Principal among these is the need to establish a permanent cadre of 
professional and support staff within the Ministry who will remain in place after elections, thus 
providing much-needed continuity when a new Minister and top executive staff assumes 
responsibility in the new Administration. Within this context, it will be important to examine 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
57 
resource needs and allocations to the MOJ. Current salary levels for MOJ staff are inadequate to 
attract talented and experienced lawyers and managers. To develop an efficient and effective 
Ministry, the GOH will need to plan for realistic remuneration packages. The donor community 
can provide assistance in compiling realistic, needs-based budgets, however, the GOH must 
decide to invest in talented, dedicated, and competent personnel for any real reforms to take root. 
Depending upon the degree of forward movement in justice sector reforms, USAID should 
consider modest material and other infrastructural support to the Ministry. USAID should also 
consider providing assistance in budget formulation and presentation, as well as how to set up 
transparent systems to track expenditures. 
Recommendation No. 6: USAID should work with the US Embassy and other donors 
supporting rule of law programs to Haiti to ensure procedural harmonization by 
developing standard operating procedures across the entire system of justice. 
Largely because they were developed and implemented separately, often by several different 
donors, both training and standard operating procedures used by judges, prosecutors, and police 
are at times inconsistent or even contradictory. Frequently, special skills and other types of 
training do not take into account Haitian laws or existing operational procedures. Aggravating 
this situation, the team was informed repeatedly that there is a lack of clarity regarding the roles, 
responsibilities, and scope of authority between judges, prosecutors, and the police. Even within 
the police, there is confusion concerning the role and function Judicial Police vis-a-vis other 
divisions. Creation of multi-national donor teams mentioned in Recommendation #2 will 
partially alleviate these problems, as will working with Haitian counterparts to reach consensus 
on core functions and responsibilities of each justice institution. However, in carrying out 
assistance programs, the US and other donors should ensure that operational procedures across 
the entire justice system are harmonized, and that the procedures are fully consistent with 
training. 
Recommendation No. 7: USAID or another donor should provide technical expert 
support for the establishment and operation of the Judicial Inspection Unit or other entity 
charged with providing oversight for judicial and prosecutorial personnel, and for holding 
them accountable to clear standards of conduct and performance.
There appears to be broad agreement that the Judicial Inspection Unit is not adequately fulfilling 
the functions of providing evaluation and oversight of the judiciary. Whether or not the JIU 
should remain within the MOJ, be attached to the Conseil Superieur, or become an ad hoc entity, 
it is clear that as currently organized and staffed, it is unable to carry out routine inspections, nor 
to conduct investigations into allegations or wrongdoing or inappropriate behavior on the part of 
a member of the judiciary. 
Regardless of what the entity is called (the function that oversees the HNP carries the title of 
Inspector General), a neutral and objective body is required to ensure that the responsibilities of 
both judges and prosecutors are carried out in compliance with law and standard operating 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
58 
 
procedures. The specific organizational and managerial structure(s) required to provide this type 
of oversight should be the subject of deliberation in preparing the strategic plan; however, the 
resultant office or offices (depending upon whether separate entities are established to oversee 
judges and prosecutors), transparent oversight and accountability mechanisms must be essential 
parts of an overall reform effort, especially to enhance credibility of the judiciary in the eyes of 
Haitian citizens. 
As was the case in developing the OIG for the HNP, the team recommends that an experienced 
advisor work with the MOJ and the person charged to head the office(s) to develop selection 
criteria, procedures, and training required for staffing the office(s); documented procedures for 
carrying out inspections and receiving and processing complaints; conducting investigations; and 
developing realistic and objectively applied sanctions. Establishment of such functions implies 
the existence of clear policy and procedural rules for judges, prosecutors, and their staff; these in 
turn, must correlate directly to course content and training materials.25
D. Legal Education and Training 
Recommendation No. 8: USAID should provide technical assistance and training in 
furtherance of establishing the judiciary as an independent branch of the State. 
Haiti’s Constitution recognizes the independence of the judicial branch. The structures that 
enable the judiciary to act independently are, however, not in place and the full meaning of 
judicial independence in the Haitian context remains to be clearly defined. Today the judiciary is 
organizationally under the control of the Ministry of Justice. This in itself is an impediment to 
judicial independence, but is not unusual in traditional civil law countries. More importantly, 
the structures that not only allow the judiciary to ultimately act as an independent branch but 
make the judiciary function in an efficient, transparent, and accountable fashion are not in place. 
The governance and administration of the judiciary and the courts in Haiti exist only in 
rudimentary form. None of the assistance provided in the past addressed developing a 
functioning and sustainable governance and administrative structure for the courts. While lack 
of political will is often the reason why assistance does not focus on this aspect of reform, it is 
almost impossible for courts to efficiently function without such structures and any assistance 
provided to the courts has only limited chance to be sustained in the long run without these 
structures. Such governance structures require a policy setting body – preferably within the 
judiciary - that outlines how the courts should operate. Decisions are made by this body that 
never interfere in individual case decisions, but provide guidance and set standards for hiring, 
continuing professional education, professional responsibilities, ethics, performance, review and 
disciplinary processes, promotions and demotions for judges and court staff, public education 
about the courts and public outreach, and planning for reform. Also, this body would set 
standards and provide guidance for operating and managing the courts, including financial 
25 While outside the purview of this assessment, given the allegations of corruption against past government 
officials, the team strongly recommends that every Ministry of the GOH establish an Office of Inspector General or 
Office of Professional Responsibility to hold staff accountable to standards of conduct. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
59 
management, in a way that ensures professionalism, efficiency, access, transparency and 
accountability. 
Currently two entities are tasked with some of these responsibilities, the Conseil Superieure de la 
Magistrature at the Cour de Cassation and the Judicial Inspection Unit (JIU) at the MOJ. The 
MOJ also has the general responsibility for the administration of the courts. The law clearly 
defines the responsibilities of above entities but neither is in the position of fulfilling their 
mandated roles, for a range of reasons including, but not limited to lack of means. Nor do both 
entities currently have all the policy setting and governance functions needed to truly govern the 
courts in an efficient and democratic manner. What is missing is an entity responsible for 
planning and setting standards and policies for all court levels in Haiti. Ideally, this entity would 
be part of the Cour de Cassation or an independent judicial body. It could also be housed within 
the MOJ (or partially within the MOJ and partially under the Cour de Cassation). The new entity 
could also engage with the other branches of government to ensure appropriate funding levels for 
the courts, and provide input for new legislation from the perspective of the judiciary and that 
take impact on the courts into consideration. To be fully effective and efficient, such an entity 
would need to be supported by a strong administrative office that ensures that the policies and 
standards are implemented within the courts. Again, where such an office is hierarchically 
located is an important aspect of judicial independence, but in the short run, it is more important 
that an administrative office for the courts exist and that it be able to provide them with the 
information and means needed to operate properly. 
Since the current budget of the MOJ in general and for the courts in particular is so limited, the 
goal of providing all appropriate means the courts need, including salaries for judges and court 
staff at a living wage level (at least on a par with other justice sector employees), may be a very 
long-term goal. However, the fact that it will be a lengthy process does not mean that at least 
basic administrative support and functions cannot be established rather quickly. A first step 
would be to review with the MOJ and the Conseil Superieur their respective responsibilities, how 
they complement each other and what functions need to be added to provide the courts with a 
sufficient level of administrative support. Also, plans should address priority needs in the short￾run, while determining what should be put in place for more comprehensive support in the long 
run. Based on this dialogue, a realistic administrative structure for the courts can be developed 
that addresses personnel issues, as well as improving the infrastructure, management and 
administration of the courts. Assisting in making the resulting structure a sustainable reality 
should be the focus of assistance to the GOH and part of capacity building efforts for the MOJ 
and the courts. 
The team recommends a multi-donor team approach to implementing this recommendation. 
Recommendation No. 9: USAID, together with the existing efforts undertaken by the 
French Government, should support a program to continue education and training at the 
National Magistrates School while legislative and/or constitutional reform regarding 
judicial training is ongoing. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
60 
As noted in the text of the report the Magistrates School has been seen as a bright spot on the 
horizon of the judicial sector in Haiti. Most of the problems that have been associated with the 
Magistrates School relate to the fact that, while the School is mandated generally by the 
Constitution, there has been no legislation governing the school or the role it should play in the 
judicial system. Due at least in part to this lack of legal status, the program at the school has been 
ad hoc, and the curriculum has changed from one graduating class to the other. Moreover, there 
has been no consistent plan for placing graduates of the School in positions throughout the 
country. 
The need for legislation should be addressed as part of a comprehensive program of legislative 
assistance (See the Legislative Assistance Section), and certainly the proposed legislation 
described above in connection with the IFES report on the School should be taken into 
consideration. All of the issues that were identified in that report will need to be resolved in the 
long-term as part of the legislative assistance program. However, in the meanwhile, given the 
positive impact that education and training at the School has provided, education and training at 
the School should continue in the interim while legislative and/or constitutional reform is 
considered. It is clear from the assessment team’s interviews of Haitian actors in the justice 
sector, that there is broad consensus on this point. 
Assistance should also support the following elements: 
• Development of a standardized curriculum at the School. 
The IFES Report, described above, provides considerable detail on how both the long-term 
training and the continuing legal education at the School have been inconsistent from one year to 
another. This was undoubtedly the result of inadequate planning and donor coordination that also 
resulted in certain significant gaps in both programs such as the failure to provide training in 
investigative techniques. It also resulted in a situation whereby there was considerable difference 
in the capacity of judges in the different graduating classes. 
Consequently, donors should coordinate in the reinstatement of both the long-term training at the 
Magistrates’ School for judicial candidates and the program of continuing legal education for 
existing judges. Donor assistance should focus on the development of a consistent curriculum in 
both of these programs. 
• Development of practical, holistic training at the School, along with follow-up in the 
field following completion of classroom training. 
One of the problems associated with the training that has occurred so far at the School is that it 
has failed to train judicial actors in the various links of the chaine pénale to function together. As 
noted above, delays often occur because the actors do not clearly understand their role, nor the 
scope of their authority. This occurs, for example, when JPs inappropriately refer cases to 
prosecutors’ offices requiring the prosecutors to return the cases to them once they have had an 
opportunity to review them. Similar problems have been noted in connection with the interaction 
between the investigating magistrates and other judicial actors as well, and, importantly, the 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
61 
police frequently fail to comprehend their role vis-à-vis the courts and often are not sufficiently 
trained to conduct investigations properly. 
The most effective way to address this problem is to provide solid, practical training at the 
School to all potential actors in the system at the same time. Supplementing the process of 
harmonizing investigative procedures, the training should be done through the use of simulated 
moot court exercises in which police, prosecutors, student magistrates, sitting magistrates and 
clerks perform their roles under the supervision of qualified trainers at the school. These kinds of 
exercises are used for judges training at the Magistrates School in France, and similar methods 
are used to teach law students to practice law in law schools in the United States. This type of 
holistic training would serve to create and elevated standard of practice for all of the actors in the 
judicial sector, allow them to consider difficult ethical and legal issues that they are likely to 
encounter in the real world, and to avoid the failure to understand their roles that currently 
plagues the current system. 
It will be essential for this training to reflect clearly the uniform practices and procedures which 
should be developed at all levels of the chaine pénale. These practices and procedures should 
also be used in the mentoring program. (See Recommendation #11). The internal rules that were 
developed by Checchi in the JP Courts and by OPDAT for the Courts of First Instance can serve 
as foundational documents to facilitate this process. As noted above, these uniform policies and 
procedures could be developed as part of the legislative assistance program. (See 
Recommendation #3). 
Although OPDAT did provide some joint training as part of its program of short-term training, it 
had little lasting impact since the training was short and tended to be ad hoc. This kind of holistic 
practical training should be built into the School’s permanent curriculum so that all of the actors 
in the judicial sector can have their skills and their understanding of their respective roles 
constantly reinforced through training. In addition, all candidates graduating from the School 
should have a clear understanding of the various judicial roles played by prosecutors, JPs, First 
Instance judges, investigating magistrates, and judicial police. This understanding should come 
at least in part from their performance in a series of these kinds of practical, simulated exercises 
at the School. The skills and understanding should also be reinforced by their apprenticeship and 
through mentoring, assuming that a mentoring program is reinstated. 
E. Professional Career and Standards 
Recommendation No. 10: USAID, and or other donors, should provide technical 
assistance and support to the State University Law School. 
 USAID should continue to strengthen both the bar and judges’ associations and encourage them 
to work together. As noted above in connection with the assessment of the IFES program on 
Constituency Building for Judicial Reform and Human Rights, both the bar associations and 
judges associations have been strengthened. In addition, IFES has supported several activities 
which have involved their working together. These efforts have served to improve the status of 
judges. This is true because in the past, there was an enormous gap between the status accorded 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
62 
to lawyers and that accorded to the judiciary. In general, the lawyers have traditionally been 
much better trained and much better paid, and, as a result, they benefited from a superior status. 
This aberrant imbalance has contributed to weak and ineffectual performance by the judiciary 
due to the fact that they have often been intimated by the lawyers and have traditionally fallen 
prey to corruption. Training at the Magistrates’ School has served to some degree to address this 
problem, and the MOJ has taken some steps to raise judges’ salaries. It has also been very useful 
for judges and lawyers to form associations and to work together. In this way, they have come to 
a better understanding of the role which each of them plays in the judiciary and have come to 
speak as one voice in demanding judicial reform. This kind of progress has served already to 
improve the status of the judges to some degree at least in the eyes of the lawyers who have 
come to understand them better as a result of these efforts. 
However, more work clearly needs to be done in this area. For example, currently, the judges 
associations are composed almost exclusively of younger judges. One of the principal problems 
in this area is that the older judges are not yet participating in the judges’ association. This fact 
certainly reduces the impact of their demand on the government for judicial reform. 
Consequently, efforts will need to be made to recruit the older judges into the judges’ 
associations and encourage them to work with the bar associations. If and when this occurs, the 
judges associations can also serve as a source of solidarity for the judiciary and bolster their 
independence as it has in other countries where judges associations are more developed. It would 
seem only logical that the status of the judges in the eyes of society will increase along with their 
increased strength and independence, again as it has been in other countries, particularly in 
countries of the civil law tradition, where the status of judges has often been problematic. (The 
development of judges associations has had this effect in France, for example, where the status 
of judges has clearly improved at least in part due to the solidarity that judges have found in their 
associations). 
One thing that could be done to accomplish this goal would be to organize the kinds of 
roundtable discussions and seminars that have been held by this project in the past while 
featuring the older judges as the primary participants. They should be invited to lecture on topics 
related to judicial reform in which they have expertise. In this way, they can come to know some 
of the benefits of this kind of collaboration and solidarity. 
In the short-term, these associations should continue to receive financial and technical assistance. 
In this way, they can continue to build their membership as recommended and can begin to 
prepare to take on some of the training and mentoring responsibilities which have been 
recommended above so that they can assume these responsibilities in the long-term, once donor 
assistance is no longer available. 
Recommendation No. 11: USAID should support the coordination of judicial 
placement with the MOJ or alternative institution created for that purpose. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
63 
 
A key element of the professionalization process should be the establishment of an official career 
status for judges through legislation will need to be addressed. There is already a draft law on 
this topic, and it should be included as a part of the legislative assistance program, as 
recommended above. 
A second element recommended relates to regularly scheduled colloquia or symposia to focus on 
judicial issues, to be carried out around the country, with donor and/or local bar association 
support. Over time, such types of gatherings could form the nucleus of a continuing legal 
education program. 
In addition, and in order to building on the classroom skills enhancement training provided 
through the Magistrate’s School, the MOJ (with donor assistance until such time as the function 
can be sustained within the Ministry or appropriate entity) should also consider reinstating a 
mentoring program. The mentoring program administered by Checchi as part of the AOJ 
Program was reported to provide benefit in addressing some of the problems plaguing the 
judiciary in Haiti, as described throughout this document. Those involved in the mentoring 
program confirmed that during the period when it existed, the program was a useful tool that 
served generally to bolster judicial independence, and was noted for improving the quality of 
judicial decisions, while also boosting the morale of judges. However, the assessment team 
found little evidence of lasting impact of the program in Haiti today. This may have been 
because the program was so short-lived, but Haitians and international donors need to give 
further consideration to the question of the long-term impact, particularly in light of the 
significant expense of such a program. The question of local sustainability of a mentoring 
program must also be considered (with more senior and/or retired judges mentoring recently 
appointed judges). It may be that one of the other donors might be particularly interested in 
funding such a program, so this is one of the elements that needs to be examined as part of donor 
coordination. 
While it is recommended that the mentoring program extend to all newly appointed judges, if the 
program is reinstated, it will be of particular importance with respect to the integrity of the 
chaine pénale that it be implemented as a single program available at all levels of the process 
(judges, prosecutors, and judicial police).26 In this way, the program will be implemented in 
such a manner as to support the holistic training that has been recommended as part of the 
training program offered at the Magistrates’ School. 
The mentoring program should be administered and coordinated as part of the program of the 
Magistrates’ School. Mentors should receive training at the Magistrates’ School in uniform 
practices and procedures that should be applicable throughout the chaine pénale, and, as 
appropriate to assignments of trainees, mentors should also receive training in standard 
procedures for processing civil and/or commercial cases. The mentors should then use these 
uniform practices and procedures in their provision of mentoring services. This will once again 
serve to reinforce a holistic approach to training. These practices and procedures should also be 
used in the other programs at the School as well. 
26 The team is not suggesting that a single mentor work with judges, prosecutors, and the judicial police, but rather 
that the process should be coordinated between the three institutions so that all operational procedures, training, and 
mentoring are fully consistent. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
64 
Mentors must be experienced Haitian judges or law professors or those who have participated in 
a mentoring program as a mentee. (It should be noted here that the use of mentoring in this way 
may also serve to close the gap which currently exists between older and younger judges). 
It should also be noted that two active judges’ associations (ANAMAH and the Women’s 
Judges’ Association) have been formed recently. These judges’ associations should be consulted 
by those responsible for implementation of the program at the Magistrates’ School. In the long￾term, once the judges’ associations adequately represent both older and younger judges, it may 
be that they, acting in concert with the Magistrates’ School, may assume responsibility for 
administration of the program. This arrangement could prove to be a more sustainable option. 
Finally, as mentioned under Recommendation #3, an essential aspect of a successful 
professionalization program must include supervision and control of judges and other judicial 
personnel, and adequate sanctions for misconduct, the severity of which correlates directly with 
the nature of the behavior (see Recommendation #7). 
Recommendation No. 12: USAID should continue to strengthen judge and bar 
associations and encourage their collaborative efforts. 
As a part of the overall strategic planning process, the role of the State University Law School 
should be examined, with a view to assuring that the program of instruction meets the skills and 
capacity needs of both the GOH and the private bar. It will also be important to assure 
consistency between curricula and course materials taught at the Law School and those used at 
the Magistrates School to train judges, prosecutors and their staff. Recommended areas of 
assistance to the Law School could include review of the existing curricula and course materials 
with a view to introducing modern methods of instruction and practical exercises, ensuring that 
any changes to Haitian laws are correctly reflected in curricula, and updating course materials. 
Recommendation No. 13: International donors should consider supporting a program 
to professionalize the judiciary and to strengthen the status of career judges and other 
justice sector professionals. Standard selection, promotion, and retention criteria should 
be developed. 
The IFES Report demonstrated that with each of the three graduating classes, fewer graduating 
magistrates were placed each year. If this were to continue to be the case, confidence in the 
School would be undermined, and it would fail to serve the purpose of improving the problems 
related to the competence of the judiciary. 
As noted in connection with Recommendation #11, it may be wise to create an interim 
Presidential Commission or other body that deals with placement, while legislation relating to 
the establishment of a judicial council is considered. In the meanwhile, it will be necessary to 
engage with the MOJ to address placement of graduating candidates before future promotions 
are initiated at the Magistrate’s School. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
65 
F. Court Administration and Management/Court Security 
Recommendation No. 14: USAID should consider reinstituting, modifying and 
expanding programs to support MOJ efforts in the areas of Case Tracking/Case 
Management, and Monitoring of Pre-trial Detention.
Case tracking and case monitoring are critical elements in judicial and justice sector case 
management. Case management system is critical not only to the efficiency and effectiveness of 
court administration, but is critical to protecting the rights of both the accused and alleged 
victim. This was the rationale for making case registration one of the basic priorities of earlier 
court administration programs. However, there is a need for a much more robust and integrated 
program over the next several years to achieve the results that will assure that the Haitian people 
are served and protected by transparent case management processes. 
The handling of these two related areas as part of the AOJ Program that was conducted in Haiti 
between 1995 and 2000, constitutes some of the best examples of the way in which the AOJ 
Program was administered in a way which was not holistic. The Checchi Program implemented a 
project in the JP Courts that was essentially a system of case registration, not case tracking. The 
OPDAT Program implemented a case tracking system, which was comprised of a different case 
registration form, and concentrated almost exclusively on the prosecutors’ offices; the results 
from these interventions were inconsistent and changes were not institutionalized throughout the 
system. The BUCODEP Program monitored pre-trial detention in the National Penitentiary, 
focusing on JP Courts and using yet another system of registration. None of the programs 
administered by USAID addressed holding cell detention in the police stations. 
In view of difficulties arising from lack of uniformity in past programs, USAID should consider 
funding a uniform, nation-wide system of case tracking. The program should begin by a 
thorough functional and needs analysis of case processing by all elements of the justice system 
(courts, instructive judges, prosecutors, police, and prisons). Among the objectives of this new 
program for standardized administration of case tracking would be to alleviate a number of 
shortcomings of earlier programs. These include: 1) standardization of case tracking among the 
various courts to make the system uniform from the first point of entry throughout the justice 
system; 2) the creation of unique numerical identifiers for each case, assigned from the point of 
first entry into the system, and that remain with the case file throughout its passage through the 
system; 3) registers and tracking vehicles that would enable the greffiers to locate files; 4) 
simplification and streamlining the registration process; 5) introducing statistical elements that 
render the data gathered more useful (in terms of statistics, follow-up, location of cases, etc.); 
and 6) expansion of the system to include civil and commercial as well as criminal cases. 
A program of this nature could be created and introduced as a pilot program in the same seven 
model jurisdictions that previously served as models. The program should be staffed, as the 
OPDAT program was, with one Haitian attorney in each of the jurisdictions, who could be 
assisted by two legal assistants. The legal assistants currently working on the BUCODEP 
Program at the National Penitentiary should be integrated into the program. As part of the 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
66 
program, one uniform registration form should be used throughout all levels of the chaine 
penale, including the police stations and the prison. Each criminal file should be assigned a 
unique number at the point of first entry into the justice system (whether at the level of courts, 
Parquets, or police). The case file should retain this same number throughout its passage through 
the system. In addition to personal identifier data and a summary of the case (and charges, if 
any), the registration form should identify the accused’s legal representative, his or her custodial 
status (updated as necessary), the name of the judge currently assigned to the case, and include 
information providing the time and date for the next procedural event which is to occur in the 
case. This registration form should accompany the accused at all levels of the chaine penale and 
should be readily available for inspection at all the institutional links in that chain—police 
station, JP Courts, Prosecutors’ Offices, Courts of First Instance, prisons, and Courts of Appeal. 
The staff of the program in each of the model jurisdictions should use the standard form to 
monitor pre-trial detention in all of the police stations and prisons in the jurisdiction. They 
should visit these locations on a monthly basis and prepare a report that lists all of the problem 
cases. That list should be forwarded on a monthly basis to the JP Courts, the Chief Judge of the 
First Instance Court, the prosecutor’s office, the investigating magistrates, the police station and 
the prison within that jurisdiction. It should also submit a copy of this report to the MOJ, and to 
the Judicial Inspection Unit. The report should contain figures indicating the number of cases 
being handled by each institutional link in the chaine penale and should provide figures on the 
numbers of accused being held in pre-trial detention. The staff should visit the JP Courts, the 
Prosecutor’s office, and the doyen of the First Instance Court requesting action in the problem 
cases that have been identified. These reports and the uniform registration form should be used 
by the JP judges, the prosecutors, the doyens of First Instance Courts, and the investigating 
magistrates in their monthly monitoring as required under Section 447 of the Code d’Instruction 
Criminelle. 
This Program should be implemented in the seven model jurisdictions in the short-term, with 
donor assistance (for at least a three year period) and responsibility for administering the 
program throughout the entire country should be gradually (over the course of the following 
three year period) transferred to the prosecutors and the doyens of the First Instance Courts in all 
14 jurisdictions. Training in the administration and monitoring of the program should also be 
part of the curriculum at the Magistrates’ School. In this way, the monitoring which is currently 
implicit in Section 447 of the Code d’Instruction Criminelle can become an effective reality in 
the long-term. 
The new case management system must be designed as a manual system, but with an eye on the 
future automation, capable of capturing data that will be the basis for the creation of a criminal 
record database, accessible by all justice sector institutions. As mentioned above, and based on 
our not insubstantial experience with court automation, the team strongly recommends that any 
automation efforts commence with a detailed requirements and functional analysis of needs – 
and not simply the needs within the courts to locate cases and to generate statistical data. One of 
the most basic premises upon which automation should be based is a solid manual system, 
uniformly applied and used in all courts, including civil and commercial courts. In addition, the 
team perceived a need to establish connections between the various justice institutions around 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
67 
the country. All component parts of the Haitian justice system require some form of case 
tracking and management (and ultimately, automation of these records), and the potential ability 
to inter-link these components (and with other parts of the government, such as for example, 
with driver’s license, taxation, or banking records) will be crucial. In approaching automation, 
both Haitians and donors should endeavor to standardize data and software so that systems can 
be interconnected easily in the future. Not only will this approach lower the costs of system 
development, but this will also facilitate use and maintenance of the systems. 
The team learned from UN representatives in Haiti that UNDP is considering supporting a 
program to assist courts in automating case information. The team recommends that the USAID 
implementing partner in Haiti work very closely with the UN in this endeavor to ensure that the 
types of issues listed above are taken into consideration in developing this, or any, automated 
system within the Haitian justice system. 
Recommendation No. 15: The USG should consider supporting the creation of a 
centralized criminal records system that is available nationwide (and ultimately 
automated).
During the visit to Jacmel another aspect of case tracking and management was discussed and 
leads to a recommendation for creation, uniform use, and ultimate automation of a national 
criminal information system. At the current time, there is no effective centralized repository for 
data pertaining to persons arrested in Haiti on criminal charges, meaning that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to link a person (or group of persons) arrested in one part of the country with similar 
crimes committed elsewhere in Haiti. Both prosecutors and judges in Jacmel confirmed that if a 
person with a lengthy record of criminal offenses were to be arrested in their jurisdiction, they 
would have no way of knowing whether they were dealing with a first-time offender or a serious 
recidivist, nor if the sorts of crimes taking place in Jacmel might be linked to criminal activities 
perpetrated in other regions of the country. While recognizing that development and 
implementation of a central repository for criminal information will require considerable time, 
effort, and funds, the team nevertheless recommends support of developing just such a system. 
Ultimately the system should expand to provide access and use by all courts, Parquets, police, 
and prisons in the country. Obviously such a system will require development of written 
operating procedures, with built-in safeguards to assure its integrity and appropriate use. In 
addition, training and oversight modules and procedures will also need to be put in place, and 
uniformly applied in all jurisdictions. 
Although practical considerations likely dictate initial development of a manual system, given 
the strategic placement of Haiti in the north/south corridor between North and South America, 
the system should be automated nationwide over the shortest term possible, and should be linked 
with other criminal databases already in place in Haiti (such as the USG’s JICC or INTERPOL’s 
database of international offenders). 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
68 
 
Recommendation No. 16: The USG should support development of short- and long￾term plans to provide for security at physical facilities (courts and Parquets) and, as 
necessary, for judges, prosecutors and other court staff. 
At the current time, no system of security exists within the courts in Haiti. During visits, at most 
sites, there was no visible sign that a security system was in place, with the public allowed free 
access into most courts. In the First Instance Court in Port-au-Prince, one police officer was 
observed; however, he did nothing to check persons entering the premises, nor did he prevent 
members of the public from crowding around judges and other court staff. 
Especially with respect to high-profile or politically sensitive cases, security within courts and 
Parquets is not merely desirable, but a necessity. Under the organic law describing the role and 
function of the HNP, police are not charged with responsibility for protecting either the physical 
premises of courts or Parquets, nor with personal protection of judges, prosecutors, or other court 
staff. While the team does not recommend that over the long-term responsibility for court 
security should be given to the HNP, in the short run, consideration should be given to having 
police provide protection for certain types of cases and trials. Concurrently, the GOH (hopefully 
with donor support) should address the on-going need to secure both the physical facilities of 
courts and Parquets, and the staff assigned to work in these locations. 
Recommendation No. 17: USAID should provide funding for refurbishing JP Courts, 
giving priority to courts owned by the State 
Overall, significant support is needed to improve virtually all courts in Haiti, but most 
particularly the JP Court facilities. Not only because they are in terrible condition, or, at times 
the facility is lacking altogether,27 but also because these courts handle about 70% of the 
caseload in Haiti. Improvements at this level will have the largest impact and visibility for the 
Haitian public. It is the understanding of the team that the Government of Canada has again 
agreed to renovate the First Instance courts. Insofar as the JP Courts are concerned, the CCI plan 
envisions renovating 9 JP Courts by 2005, an additional 9 by 2006, and 25 more after that. In 
developing a priority list for courts to target, two suggestions are highlighted. First, priority 
should be given to courts with a higher volume of cases, i.e., mainly in Port-au-Prince and other 
urban centers. Secondly, it is recommended that only facilities owned by the State should be 
refurbished, unless it can be negotiated with owners that rent will not be raised on facilities 
refurbished, and that the lease will continue unchanged for at least a five-year period. In 
planning for renovations of JP Courts activities currently under way at the Ministry of Interior to 
build municipal centers in some areas that would also house the JP Courts should be reviewed. 
In determining the general conditions of court buildings, the report developed under the Checchi 
program should still provide valid guidance in determining which courts are carrying the highest 
caseloads. Recommendations contained in this report should also prove valuable in determining 
the need to establish additional JP Courts and/or closing or merging some of the existing 
facilities. 
27 Apparently the JP in the President’s home village currently operates just under a tree. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
69 
All of JP Courts require some basic renovations (paint, new doors and window shutters, repairs 
to the floors, electricity and improved lighting, telephones, fans, arrangements to provide access 
to lavatories). In planning for refurbishment, thought should also be given to improving the 
practical functionality of the courts by designing and building areas for storage of files and 
evidence. In some instances, it may be helpful to reconsider the functions of the court, along 
with who needs access to the court, and how this should take place. 
All courts require new furniture and equipment – as well as regular provision of standard 
supplies. The latter is beyond what can and should be provided by international donors. It is a 
responsibility of the MOJ. This again, leads to the question of the MOJ capabilities to handle 
and absorb international donor assistance. It also leads to the question of Haitian ownership in 
this process. In general, in order to enhance the MOJ’s and courts’ ability to take control over 
administration and maintenance of JP Courts (and other courts), the current systems for 
inventory control and ensuring regular maintenance should be reviewed. Having such systems in 
place and operating successfully should be considered as a pre-condition for assistance to 
improving the court infrastructure. Also, taking the example from Cap Haitien into account, 
there may be other opportunities for the courts to work with the community to raise local 
resources for use to enhance their conditions. Finally, the staff assigned to the courts also needs 
to engage in the process of improving their working conditions. During a meeting with staff 
from the First Instance court in Cap Haitien, the team recommended that the president of the 
court develop a basic and objective needs-based budget for presentation to the MOJ, clearly 
demonstrating what it needed and why. Of course, physical refurbishment of courts, Parquets 
and other justice facilities, must go hand in hand with efforts to improve the quality and quantity 
of work produced by the staff assigned to these locations, and a recommendation to this effect is 
included in the final section of this report. 
G. Legal Services/Access to Justice 
Recommendation No. 18: A component of USAID’s ROL project should include 
expansion of coverage of courts (particularly JP Courts) to rural areas. 
Access to justice in Haiti as elsewhere entails geographic proximity, affordability, and the ability 
for the public to understand and participate in the processes. Access to the courts in Haiti is 
particularly limited in rural areas. The distance to the nearest JP Courts can be significant and 
with lack of roads and transportation, it is sometimes necessary to walk extensive distances to 
reach a court. Also, since the official language in the courts is French, the majority of the 
population does not understand what is happening in court – literally, not just because they are 
unfamiliar with the proceedings. For most, hiring an attorney is needed for the purpose of 
representation, as well as to explain and guide them through the process, however this is beyond 
the means of most. All of this, combined with a general lack of understanding on how the courts 
operate, what their rights are, how the courts should protect their rights, and a general mistrust of 
the government means that most people in rural areas will not seek the assistance of the justice 
system and the courts to resolve conflicts. Rather they will go to the local priest, minister, or 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
70 
respected local elder; or they will simply take matters in their own hands, frequently resolving to 
violence. 
While it will take some time, and a range of interventions, including educating the rural 
population of their rights and responsibilities and democratic processes, and identifying viable 
settlement alternatives using respected local representatives in some structured way is an 
important step to increasing access to justice. In some areas, consideration should be given to 
establishing some form of local truth and reconciliation process to overcome long-standing 
conflicts that are a continuing source of violence. Increasing access must also involve finding 
better and creative ways to bring the courts to the people. Some Haitian experts have suggested 
setting up a form of “circuits riding” through which JPs assigned in rural areas could travel 
(provided they have the necessary transportation and other means) to localities in his/her 
jurisdiction on market days, where they would be available to hear cases from the local 
population coming to the marketplace. The Minister of the Interior has sought assistance in 
establishing municipal centers that would house the tribunaux de paix. It was also suggested 
that consideration should be given to holding hearings, at least on the JP Court level, only in 
Creole. 
Access to justice in rural areas is an important step, not merely in the democratization process, 
but also to provide for justice and reduce conflict situations. Many violent situations evolve 
from disputed civil matters and for this reason, the potential role of the JP Courts in reducing 
violence should not be underestimated. Working closely with Haitians knowledgeable of 
differing local situations, a series of possible options should be compiled on how to improve 
access to the courts in rural areas, especially programs that would bring the judges to the people, 
increased reliance on mediation to resolve conflicts, and use of Creole in the proceedings. 
Various options could be tested, then if and as successful, the concepts could be implemented in 
other rural areas. 
Recommendation No. 19: USAID (with other donor assistance) should consider 
development and implementation of a program to establish a nationwide system of legal 
services based upon coordination between the law schools and the bar associations in each 
jurisdiction
 
Legal Assistance was provided under the AOJ Program through grants that were made by 
Checchi to NGO’s, bar associations, and one law school. The Checchi program was plagued by 
many problems. Client confidentiality was not respected, clients often did not realize they were 
being represented, and legal representation was not always competent. Although Checchi did 
provide training, mostly focused on relevant legal issues, specific skills training was not 
provided. The NGOs used paralegals with three years of law school to provide the training and 
students at the law school were inappropriately used in a monitoring role. 
The decree of 1989 dealing with the provision of legal services nationwide should be 
implemented. Ideally, a GOH-sponsored public defender program should be included within the 
long-term strategic plan. However, this is a long-term goal that cannot resolve the immediate 
issues. As an interim strategy, a nation-level system of legal services should be based upon 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
71 
coordination between the law schools and the bar associations in each jurisdiction. USAID 
should consider funding the creation of a pilot program that would provide for such a system in 
the short-term and assist the Haitians in the creation of the system in the long-term. 
In the short-term, legal services offices could be established in each of the jurisdictions, and the 
role of these offices could be to provide grants to area law schools to initiate clinical legal 
education programs and to assure coordination between the law schools and the bar associations 
in the provision of legal services to indigent clients in criminal cases. As a condition of the 
grants the law schools could be required to hire experienced attorneys to administer the program 
and teach within it. The clinical program at the law school would ideally include training in 
client interviewing and counseling, legal research, trial advocacy skills, and legal ethics. The 
office of legal services in each of the jurisdictions could also be required to take action to 
organize bar associations in those areas where there are none and to arrange for representation of 
indigent clients by neighboring bar associations in the meanwhile. It could also be the 
responsibility of the legal services office to fund the creation of continuing legal education 
programs, organized by the bar associations, in which practicing members of the bar providing 
legal services to indigent clients can receive training specific to that role. 
Ideally, the legal services offices should be staffed by two attorneys and four legal assistants. 
This staff should also be responsible on a monthly basis for monitoring the legal services 
provided by the law schools and the bar associations. In this way, competent representation by 
law students with skill appropriate training, acting under the supervision of clinical instructors, 
can be provided in the JP Courts. Competent representation in the First Instance Courts by 
members of the bar could be assured by appropriate monitoring and training as described. 
There should also be a central office of legal services, based in PAP. The entire program should 
be funded with donor assistance over a five-year period. During this period, it should be the 
responsibility of the central office to work with law schools and bar associations to develop a 
plan for transferring responsibility for the administration of free legal services to indigent clients 
in criminal cases to the bar associations and the law schools in every jurisdiction of the country 
over the course of a five year program which will begin after the third year of the USAID funded 
program. The plan should also draw on resources to be provided by the MOJ, the Ministry of 
Education, and the bar associations themselves, with a view to establishing a permanent public 
defender program. 
H. Civil Society 
Recommendation No. 20: In addition to working closely with Haitian counterparts to 
develop the long-range strategic plan for justice reform, USAID should foster local 
involvement and ownership of assistance programs over the shortest period realistic, and 
should support citizen participation in and knowledge of justice sector reforms by 
supporting development of NGO networks 
The assessment team has noted throughout this document the existence of several NOG’s 
working in the justice sector, e.g., the Association Nationale des Magistrates Haitiens, the 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
72 
Federation des Barreaux d’Haiti, la Coalition Haitienne pour la Reformed u Droit et de la Justice, 
and others. 
On the one hand, past donor efforts have at times been hampered by the perceptions of Haitians 
that international experts are well-remunerated, but bring little more substantive knowledge to 
reform efforts than their Haitian counterparts. While not commenting on whether or not this is a 
correct perception, nevertheless, to achieve sustainability of reforms, local acceptance and 
ownership is essential. This means working closely with interested counterparts (within and 
outside the GOH) in developing and implementing plans, and, passing responsibilities to the 
local cadre as soon as possible 
In addition, given the growing number of local NGOs focused on justice reform issues, 
facilitating formation of networks would strengthen their abilities to stimulate change in the 
justice system, as well as to oversee sustainability of reforms. Donor support in bringing 
together the various NGOs working in the justice sector to develop common, consensus-based 
agendas, would help to sustain momentum for change both within the current Interim 
Government and future elected governments. 
Recommendation No. 21: In view of the need for Haitian citizens to learn how to be 
responsible members of a democratic society, USAID education, citizen awareness, 
economic support, and other programs should interact with justice reform programs. To 
the maximum extent possible, donor program should adopt a cross-cutting programmatic 
approach that involves leveraging all available resources. 
Given the magnitude of the reform efforts needed in Haiti, USAID (and other donors) should 
leverage all possible programmatic resources, and provide linkages across programs. For 
example, the team was told repeatedly that many Haitian citizens are unaware of even the most 
basic principles of democracy, the rights accorded to them, and the responsibilities expected 
from them. Civic education should be an essential element of all school curricula, beginning 
from primary school. Public education and awareness programs should also include information 
pertaining to civic rights and duties of citizens in a democracy. While recognizing that it may 
require a full generation to achieve the level of change needed to render current reforms fully 
sustainable, this process can be expedited by incorporating civic educational elements into all 
donor programs. 
Recommendation No. 22: International donors should support the establishment of a 
nation-wide program of civic education on the justice system offered in Créole specifically 
targeting the general population. 
Previous assessments have consistently emphasized the fact that the Haitian population has a 
very poor understanding of the formal justice system. They have a very limited knowledge of the 
law and equally limited understanding of the roles of the players of the justice system. This lack 
has contributed, in part at least, to the cynicism and mistrust of the justice system amongst the 
population. This is yet another factor which detracts from the respect in which judges are held 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
73 
and is a challenge to the effective exercise of their authority. Even prison officials reported to 
this assessment team that the population did not understand their role, and they felt that this 
ignorance was a factor contributing to the lack of respect that they sometimes experience in 
dealing with prisoners and their families. In addition, although legal services have been provided 
to indigent clients in the past, and continues to be provided on a sporadic basis, citizens have 
been poorly informed of these services and fail to understand their necessity. 
Efforts to improve this situation have been undertaken in the past, primarily as part of Checchi’s 
program as described above. However, the civic education were not appropriately targeted for 
the Créole-speaking, illiterate population. Although there were some radio broadcasts in Créole, 
most of the efforts involved analysis of the law and exposés of the proposals for judicial reform, 
which often occurred in French and were more accessible to the society’s elite than to the 
common man. These kinds of exercises aimed too high and failed to foster in the general 
population a basic understanding of the justice system that might serve to address the problems 
identified above. Finally, they were offered in a desultory fashion and only in discrete locations. 
At present, a much more comprehensive program of civic education is needed and should form 
an integral part of the new efforts at justice reform. The civic education program should be 
conducted nationwide and should be aimed at the general population. In this regard, it is 
important to note that a great deal can be learned from similar types of programs that have been 
conducted in other countries where illiterate populations have been involved in participatory 
democratic exercises. They have entailed, for example, theatrical presentations and role-plays, 
often conducted as part of widely accessible radio broadcasts. These types of exercises in Haiti 
will need to be conducted in Creole and should be designed to provide citizens with basic 
information about the nature and purpose of the justice system, and the role of the judges, 
prosecutors and other justice system employees with whom citizens may come in contact.. In 
addition, they should provide citizens with indications of how and when they need to access the 
justice system, and information about the availability of legal services widely accessible to the 
general population should be circulated and discussed as a part of the exercises described above. 
In the short-term, public information services should be developed and provided by the MOJ 
(preferably by the agency(ies) providing legal services). These efforts will require international 
donor support for their initial establishment and operation, especially in the creation of 
appropriate educational materials. In the long-term, public education and citizen awareness 
programs should become a permanent part of the services offered by the bar associations and law 
schools which provide legal services to indigent clients. 
I. Prisons 
Recommendation No. 23: Revitalize the program to reduce the excessive levels pre￾trial detention
Excessive pre-trial detention has been a long-standing issue and, despite the fact that the prisons 
were emptied during the February events, the population is building up again at an alarming rate. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
74 
In recent years, prisoners in pre-trial detention generally accounted for 80-85% of the prison 
population. Historically, there has been a lack of representation and excessive pre-trial 
detention, with individuals held for years before being afforded their legal due process. The 
UNDP project to reform Haiti's National Penitentiary for men was completed in 1998, with 
major improvements in infrastructure and living conditions, the creation of new services, and a 
change in attitude towards inmates (in terms of improved treatment). In May 1998, the 
BUCODEP was established in the National Penitentiary to review records of pre-trial detainees 
accused of minor offences and incarcerated longer than the normal sentence for the accused 
crime. A juge de paix from the jurisdiction was assigned to review the cases and determine 
whether there was sufficient cause to continue to hold the accused. As noted in this assessment, 
while clerks continue to maintain records at the National Penitentiary, the system of judicial 
visits and review has broken down. 
It is recommended that the previous program be re-initiated with the following components: 1) 
review and revision of policies and procedures for handling detainee records; 2) training of 
prison officials, judges and other court personnel in the legal requirements related to pretrial 
detention; 3) integration of pretrial detention program objectives and instruments with the case 
management system of the courts; and 4) developing effective oversight and accountability 
mechanisms to assure that pretrial detention polices and procedures are applied. 
In designing and implementing this program, a number of issues must be addressed that either 
were not addressed in past programs or have not survived from past prison management efforts. 
Among these are: 1) correction of the form to record the custodial status of the defendant, the 
judge assigned to the case, and the date of the next expected event; 2/ a requirement for adoption 
of the same form that will be developed for use by all courts handling criminal cases throughout 
the country, and for procedures to be developed requiring its use in a uniform fashion; and 3)
requirements for JPs, judges of the First Instance Courts, prosecutors and investigating 
magistrates to report monthly on all cases of pre-trial detention.. Monthly data should be 
collected by the staff registering the cases and submitted to all of those providing free legal 
assistance to criminal defendants, to the Chief Judges of the First Instance Courts, to the Ministry 
of Justice, to the Judicial Council, and to the Prison Administration. In keeping with 
Recommendations # 13 and 14, the uniform case numbering system, as well as the other case 
management and criminal record requirements should also be used in the prisons. 
It is important to note that there is an impending crisis in Haiti’s prison system that requires 
immediate action by the international community. Both the assessment team’s visit to the 
National Penitentiary and the recent INL police advisor assessment of the current state of the 
prison system indicate that broad institutional problems have reemerged in regard to 
overcrowding, sanitation, medical facilities, commingling of juvenile and adult prisoners, and 
security. The UNDP has provided a technical advisor and INL is currently funding limited 
improvements in the security area. While it is not recommended that USAID’s program in this 
area expand beyond the issue of pretrial detention, it should maintain close ties to these other 
programs and other efforts to address prison conditions since they are fundamental to the issue of 
the basic human rights of those in detention. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
75 
APPENDIX A 
Literature Review 
1) Actes du Symposium sur L’Assistance Légale en Haïti 1995 – 1999. Port – au – Prince, 
1999. 
2) Any further Aid to Haitian Justice System should be linked to Performance-related 
Conditions. GAO Report, 2000. 
3) Aucoin, Prof. Louis M. The Challenge Of Judicial Independence In Haiti: Theory And
Practice. Haiti: USAID/Port-au-Prince, 2000. 
4) Baptist, Jacob. Jean. La Cour de Cassation .Route de Croix-des-Bouquts : Les Ateliers 
Mitspa, 2003. 
5) Code de Deonontologie de la Magistrature Haïtienne. Pétion – Ville : Association 
Nationale des Magistrats Haïtiens, 2004. 
6) Dorleans, Henri. L’Education Civique sur le bout des Doigts. Nos responsabilities et nos
droits.. Port –au - Prince : Impressa, 2002. 
7) Dorleans, Henri M. La Communauté Internationale et les Droits de l’homme dans les
petits pays : L’Expérience de la Mission Civile Internationale OEA/ONU en Haïti . 
Port–au–Prince : CTDH/AFPEC, 1999. 
8) Dorleans, Henri. Une Société Civile pour Changer l’Etat. Port–au–Prince: 
 AFPEC/CTDH, 2001. 
9) Dorval, Dr. Monferrier. L’Ecole de la Magistrature. Port–au–Prince : IFES, 2004. 
10) Evaluation of USAID’s Administration of Justice and Human Rights Fund II Programs. 
Creative Associates International, 1998. 
11) “GOH Plan of Action”. Journal ( 1999) 
12) Haiti Justice Sector Assessment. Development Associates, 1997. 
13) IFES Rule of Law State of the Judiciary Report Series. Haiti, 2003. 
14) Justice of the Peace Courts, Republic of Haiti. Fort Bragg, 1995. 
15) Le Moniteur, Lundi 17 août, 1998. 
16) Le Moniteur, Lundi 24 août, 1995. 
17) Lack of Haitian Commitment Limited Success of the US Aid to Justice System. 
GAO Report, 2000. 
18) Lessons Learned Exercise undertaken by the Emergency Response Division. 
UNDP report, 2001. 
19) “Law on reform of the justice system”. Journal (1998) 
20) “Ministry of Justice and Public Security plan”. Journal (1999) 
21) Pour un nouveau départ de la Magistrature haïtienne. Port-au-Prince , 2004. 
22) Plan Haïtien d’Action pour la Réforme Judiciaire et la Mise en Application de la 
Constitution. 
23) Rapport d’Etude Tribunaux de Paix. Port- au – Prince, 1995. 
24) Task Order for USAID/ Haiti Rule of Law Services. Arlington: National Center for State 
Courts, 2004. 
25) Textes de base de l’exercice de la profession d’Avocat en Haïti. Port- au – Prince, 2003. 
26) Whelden, Richard. “Request to Amend USAID/ Haiti’s Special Objective, SpO 521 – 
 006, Streamlined Government “ memo., 2004. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
76 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
77 
APPENDIX B – Contact list 
Name Organization 
Audigé, Armand Juge and Juge d'Instruction 
Adhémar, Henri-Claude Juge d'Instruction 
Bastien, Daniel Joseph Police National D’Haïti 
Bonhomme, Françoise B. Cabinet de Consultation, de Formation et 
d’Assistance Légal ( COFAL) 
Cadet, Rock Dean of the Tribunal de Premiere Instance 
Casimir, Phel Commissaire du Gouvernement 
Callen, Pamela USAID 
Charles, Gervais Fédération des Barreaux d’Haïti 
Cisse-Gouro, Mahamane Nations Unies 
Collot, Gelin I. Faculté de Droit et des Science 
Economique (FDSE) de l’Université d’état 
d’Haïti 
Deumeni, Louis Nkopipie Programme des Nations Unies pour le 
Développement 
Dorval, Monferrier Centre de Droit Public 
Duchemin, Daniel Ambassade de France 
Dorleans, Henry Académie de Formation et de 
Perfectionnement des Cadres (AFPEC) 
Esperance, Pierre National Coalition for Haitian Right 
Gaston, Stanley Union des Jeunes Avocat Haïtien 
Hedouville, Renan Comite des Avocats pour le Respect des 
Libertés Individuelles 
Hercule, Carlos Centre Toussaint Louverture pour le Droit 
de l’Homme, La Démocratie et le 
Développement (CTDH) 
Fucien, Alix Juge d'Instruction 
Fortuné, Heidi Substitut du Commissaire du gvt. 
Guillaume, Me Ramon Doyen du Tribunal Civil de Saint-Marc 
Gilles, Me. Adler Jean Avocat 
Gruenberg, Stéphane Ambassade de France 
Jannini, Nettie USAID 
Jean Baptiste, Jacob Juriste, Directeur Administratif de la Cour 
de la Cour de Cassation et Publicitaire des 
Arrêts de ladite Cour 
Jean François, Norah Association Haïtienne des Femmes Juge 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
78 
(AHFJ) 
Jeudy, Jaures Substituts du Commissaire 
Jeune, Moline Louis Substituts du Commissaire 
Joseph, Maneste Louis Substituts du Commissaire 
Mervil, Wilson President of the bar ass. 
Mivrose, Justin Judge and Dean a.i. 
Morency, Joseph Ministère de la Justice 
Maxime, Jean Miguelite Inspecteur Général, Directeur DEFP/PNH 
Mecklembourg, Albert Haïti Télécommunications Internationales 
S.A. 
Mamet, Regis Programme des Nations Unies pour le 
Développement 
Paul, Jean-Peres Association Nationale des Magistrats 
Haïtiens (ANAMAH) 
SIME, Rejeanne Avocat – Programme des Nations Unies 
pour le Développement 
Rochon, Claude Canadian Police Experts Overseas 
Sanon, Jacques Miguel Av IFES 
Sanchez, Harry Secretary general of the bar ass. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
79 
APPENDIX C – Legislative changes needed to support Recommendation #3 (judicial 
career and training) 
There are many factors that contribute to making the judiciary a not very attractive career choice. 
Judges’ salaries are low, and the population widely views judges as corrupt and frequently 
incompetent. In addition, lack of judicial independence continues to be an intractable problem. 
Some of the institutional factors related to these problems are that judges are currently being 
appointed and promoted directly by the Ministry of Justice, and disciplinary action, particularly 
that of removal from the bench, is also being conducted by the MOJ. The MOJ appoints and 
promotes judges since under the 1987 Constitution; the territorial assemblies which are 
responsible for nominating candidates for appointment by the President have never been created. 
In the case of discipline, that function has clearly been assigned by a 1920 law to the Cour de 
Cassation, which is supposed to act as the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature in exercising this 
function. In fact, the Cour de Cassation, is required under Haitian law to act as a constitutional 
court, a court of last resort, and a judicial council. The court has not been successful at exercising 
all of these functions. Given its reticence, the MOJ fills the gap, and acts without legal authority 
in exercising this function. 
Although these problems have been frequently cited in previous assessments, their resolution 
presents a particular dilemma since the solutions to the problem will require legislation and 
perhaps even constitutional reform. These issues will therefore need to be addressed as part of a 
program of legislative assistance. (See recommendation XX, below.) The following sections 
provide some specific recommendations regarding issues which the Haitians will have to 
consider in deciding whether to draft legislation or engage in constitutional reforms relating to 
these issues. 
However, before these issues are addressed, it is necessary to consider the current state of the law 
relating to this subject. There are essentially four legal texts which deal with the judicial career—
the Constitution of 1987, the law on the Conseil Supérieure de la Magistrature, the law of 1985 
dealing with the organization of the Courts, and the 1995 decree of August 24 modifying that 
law. 
Article 175 of the Constitution provides that the justices of the Cour de Cassation are to be 
appointed by the President of the Republic from a list of three names for each judicial post 
submitted by the Senate. The judges of the Court of Appeals and First Instance Courts are 
appointed by the President from lists provided by the Departmental Assemblies, and the justices 
of the peace are appointed by him from lists submitted by the communal assemblies. Article 177 
provides that all judges are “inamovible.” This term means that as a general rule, judges are not 
removable (this does not apply to judges of peace). They can, however, be removed in 
exceptional circumstances through the application of formal procedures. For example, they can 
be removed through formal disciplinary proceedings following an accusation of violation of the 
disciplinary rules, which, according to Article 184-1 must be established by a written law, or 
they can be removed when they are found in a proper proceeding, to be physically or mentally 
incapable. In the case of members of the highest court, the Cour de Cassation, judges can only 
be removed through an impeachment-like procedure conducted under the auspices of the Senate 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
80 
which sits as a special “Haute Cour de Justice.” This is the same impeachment procedure which 
would apply in the case of the President, the Prime Minister, other ministers, members of the 
Electoral Council, or of the ombudsman in the Office du Protecteur du Citoyen. (The Haute 
Cour de Justice and its procedures are set out in Title V of the Constitution.) In addition, Article 
177 provides, as is the case in France that judges are not to be transferred or even promoted 
without their consent. Article 176 simply requires laws establishing the qualifications for the 
appointments of judges at the various levels of the judicial hierarchy and also requires that a 
Magistrates School be created. 
The Constitution does not mention the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature, but that institution 
was created by three laws which date from 1920 and 1925. It was first created in the law of May 
12, 1920 (No. 39 of the Moniteur and page 530 of the Code des lois usuelles.), and was modified 
by the law of January 12, 1925 and the law of June 28, 1925 (pages 532and 533). Under these 
laws, the Conseil Supérieur de la Magistrature is composed of all of the judges of the Cour de 
Cassation sitting en banc. It is empowered by the 1920 law to impose a punishment of censure, 
censure with reprimand, or suspension of up to six months. When a judge is suspended for the 
second time, the law authorizes the Conseil to remove him or her from office. The law also 
authorizes the Conseil to refer the judge to the criminal courts in those cases where the complaint 
alleges the commission of criminal infractions. 
As noted above, neither the constitutional provisions just described nor the law on the CSM has 
ever been implemented. In 1995, the above mentioned decree was adopted in order to provide an 
interim solution to the appointment problem in the absence of the assemblies required under the 
Constitution. It purported to amend the 1985 law on the organization of the courts. In so doing it 
set the minimum requirements for appointment to the various judicial posts, and established a 
bare bones procedure for the appointment of judges in the absence of the required institutions. 
According to the decree, judges of the Cour de Cassation are to be appointed by presidential 
decree, and all other judges are to be appointed by a Presidential Commission. 
It is important to note that in adopting the decree, the executive branch exercised authority which 
was clearly assigned by the Constitution to the legislative branch. It establishes the qualifications 
for appointment even though, as mentioned above, Article 176 of the Constitution requires that 
those qualifications be established by statute. Since it exercised this authority and as noted 
above, it purported to amend a pre-existing statute, it is perhaps not surprising that this decree 
was challenged as being unconstitutional. However, the decree in its preamble derives its 
authority from Article 136 of the Constitution which states: “The President of the Republic, who 
is the Head of State….shall see to the respect for and enforcement of the Constitution and the 
stability of the institutions. He shall ensure the regular operations of the public authorities and 
the continuity of the State.” The Court of Cassation ruled that the decree was constitutional. 
Nevertheless, the decree has never been implemented either, and the practices of the past 
continue in the present with the MOJ exercising both powers of appointment and discipline, 
including removal. 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
81 
USAID should provide financial and technical assistance in the creation of a project which will 
engage Haitians in a comprehensive review of the relevant state of the law and the persistent lack 
of enforcement. The problem with the work which has been done in this area in the past is that, 
once again, it is piecemeal, and the overall approach to dealing with the creation and supervision 
of the judicial career has not been holistic. Instead, donors and locals associations have drafted 
proposed legislation which deals with discrete aspects of the judicial career without taking a 
broader view of the problems in this area. 
The new project should be coordinated with the program of legislative assistance, discussed 
above. However, at the same time, it must seek answers to the basic question as to why the 
constitutional provisions and relevant law in this area have never been implemented. Once 
informed with answers to that question, the project should then undertake to answer the other 
basic questions which arise in this area. 
Many basic questions also arise in connection with the determination of the role and function of 
the CSM. One of the basic questions to be answered is whether Haitians want to have a judicial 
council which exercises disciplinary, appointment and promotion functions. In most other civil 
law countries, judicial councils exercise these functions so as to prevent the executive 
interference which can occur when these functions are exercised directly by the MOJ or the 
President. If Haiti decides that it wants the CSM to exercise this function, then the basic 
question arises as to whether it will be necessary to amend the Constitution. As described above, 
under the Constitution, all judges are to be appointed directly by the President from lists 
provided by the Senate, in the case of the Cour de Cassation, and by the territorial assemblies in 
all other cases. In other countries of the civil law tradition, judges are appointed by the executive 
from lists provided by judicial councils. 
In Haiti, there are a few different ways in which reform in this area could proceed. For example, 
the Constitution could be amended to give the CSM a role in vetting the candidates proposed by 
the assemblies or it could be amended so as to assign these functions to the judicial council 
exclusively thus supplanting the assemblies entirely. On the other hand, it is at least conceivable 
that the President could delegate his appointment authority to the judicial council. This solution 
would probably not require amendment of the Constitution and could probably be accomplished 
by decree. The choice of these alternatives should depend, at least in part, on the answers to the 
question as to why there has never been any implementation of these articles of the Constitution. 
Since the promotion function is not addressed in the Constitution, the assignment of this function 
can be dealt with by statute without constitutional amendment. The question remains as to 
whether Haitians want this function to remain with the MOJ or whether they would prefer to see 
it assigned to the judicial council. 
There is also the question of the composition of the judicial council. As noted, currently the CSM 
is composed of the Cour de Cassation sitting as a judicial council which is only authorized to 
exercise the disciplinary function. In general, it is clear from previous assessments and from 
views expressed to the assessment team in interviews that Haitians are not happy with the current 
composition since, as described above, the Cour de Cassation has failed almost entirely to 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
82 
function in this capacity. Since the CSM is not mentioned by the Constitution, its composition 
could be changed through legislation as opposed to constitutional amendment. However, the 
question may be of such importance that the Project should answer the question as to whether the 
composition of the CSM should be addressed in the Constitution or whether it should be dealt 
with in statutory law. 
In addition, the project will need to assist Haitians in deciding how these functions should be 
exercised while these other questions are being answered. Here the most basic question arises as 
to whether the status quo is acceptable. It would seem, based upon all of the assessments that 
have been conducted in the judicial sector that it is clear at this point in time that Haitians are not 
happy with the status quo, since they consider generally that there currently exists too much 
interference with and control of the judiciary by the executive. This view was expressed to the 
assessment team in many of the interviews conducted. Assuming, therefore, that this question 
can be easily answered, the project would need to move rapidly to the exploration of alternative 
solutions to the status quo in the short-term. 
Certain considerations are relevant to analysis of this question. First, the question arises as to 
whether the 1995 decree can and should be implemented. Were this to be the case, a Presidential 
Commission would exercise the appointment function for appointment of all judges outside of 
the Cour de Cassation. This alternative might be appealing since it would allow for an 
experiment with a body which will function essentially as a judicial council. This short-term 
solution might offer the opportunity to have a pilot program which might help answer some of 
the questions raised above in connection with the establishment of long-term solutions. 
It is important to point out that the 1995 decree, even if implemented, does not provide for even a 
short-term solution of the problems related to the promotion and discipline functions, nor does it 
provide for appointment of the Cour de Cassation in the absence of the Senate. However, it does 
offer a significant precedent which could guide Haitians in the creation of short-term solutions to 
these problems. Since the decree has been upheld as a constitutional exercise of executive rule 
making, then once again the executive could act by decree under the authority of Article 136 of 
the Constitution, as described above, also assigning those functions to a Presidential 
Commission. It would seem only logical that the functions should be assigned to the same 
commission which exercises the appointment function, since in that way the Commission would 
constitute an experiment with the kind of judicial council which exists in other civil law 
countries where judicial councils exercise all of these functions. However, given the precedent of 
the Cour de Cassation, it would seem that other approaches could be considered given the 
breadth of the decree-making authority which Article 136 appears to convey to the President. 
A caveat is nevertheless in order here. It is appropriate to remember that in a civil law country 
such as Haiti, the Cour de Cassation will not in theory be bound by its decision upholding the 
constitutionality of the 1995 decree and could rule differently on the constitutionality of other 
decrees. At the same time, it is important to note that even though previous Supreme Court 
rulings do not in theory have the formal status of precedent in civil law countries, they 
increasingly function as a practical equivalent. This observation suggests that the Cour de 
Haiti: Rule of Law Assessment 
National Center for State Courts 
August 2004 
83 
Cassation would be likely to uphold the constitutionality of these short-term measures taken by 
decree.