PROJECT ASSESSMENT
-FOR￾SERBIA CRDA 
COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING
2001-2004 
SUBMITTED: MAY 2007 
USAID GRANT 169-A-00-01-00125-00 
SECOND EDITION
 Evaluator: Bosiljka Vukovic, Intern, Summer 2006
 Author: Bosiljka Vukovic, CRDA M&E Coordinator 
 Editor: Craig Hempfling, CRDA Chief-of-Party 
Acknowledgments 
This report would not have been possible without the contribution of many collaborators both 
at the Mercy Corps offices in Krusevac and Novi Pazar, as well as the eagerness and 
willingness of many former CDC members and municipal officials and representatives to 
participate in the focus groups and interviews over the course of this evaluation. 
I would first like to thank Craig Hempfling, Country Director of Mercy Corps Serbia, for his 
continuous encouragement and support throughout the process, and especially for his 
untiring effort in reviewing the many drafts and bringing this report to its final version. 
I would also like to express my gratitude to Joe Dickman, Senior Program Officer for DM&E in 
Mercy Corps Boston, for his support and input during the preparation and fieldwork phases of 
the process. Special thanks also to Paul Jeffery, Senior Program Officer for the Balkans, for 
his support and oversight of the process. 
Among Mercy Corps Serbia staff, I would like to extend particular gratitude to Mercy Corps’ 
Senior LED Officer, Dijana Spalevic, for countless hours of discussions regarding the CRDA 
work during this period, and Mercy Corps strategy and decisions in the early years of the 
program. Further thanks to Mercy Corps’ Novi Pazar staff members Sabina Jusufovic and 
Slobodan Derikonjic for their time and effort in highlighting key characteristics of their AORs 
and identifying key actors for the focus groups and fieldwork. 
Finally, I would like to thank our temporary field work consultant, Dusica Milicevic, who 
accompanied me in the field on all visits, doubled as driver on long trips to all meetings and 
visits, and who provided tireless personal and professional support to this assessment. 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
1 
Table of Contents 
Summary...................................................................................................................2 
Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 4
Results & Outputs................................................................................................................ 7
Groups Formed & Served............................................................................................... 7
Communities Served ....................................................................................................... 7
Projects Implemented...................................................................................................... 8
 Resources Mobilized.............................................................................................9
 Results & Output Analysis ............................................................................................ 10
Community Mobilization Approaches .......................................................................... 12
 Community Development Councils ............................................................................. 12
 Community Fairs ............................................................................................................ 17
Group Impact & Sustainability ....................................................................................... 20
 CDC Membership & Representation........................................................................... 20
 CDC Organizational Sustainability .............................................................................. 21
 CDC Impact..................................................................................................................... 23
M&E Record Keeping in CRDA....................................................................................... 24
Lessons Learned & Recommendations....................................................................... 26
 Program Design & Startup............................................................................................ 26
 Ensuring Success & Sustainability .............................................................................. 27
 Project Management and M&E.................................................................................... 27
 Project Implementation.................................................................................................. 28
Annex 1: Scope of Work, Serbia CRDA Project, M&E Assessment for Community 
Development Activities 2001-2004 
Annex 2: Areas for Discussion and Questions for Focus Groups and Interview 
Sessions
Annex 3: Summary Information on CDCs and Projects
Annex 4: Focus Group & Interview Results on CRDA Impact
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
2 
Summary 
Scope & Methodology: This report is one in a series of assessments undertaken to evaluate the activities of the 
Serbia Community Revitalization through Democratic Action (CRDA) program. This report covers four key 
aspects of the Community Development phase of CRDA from 2001-2004: i) Results & Outputs, ii) Community 
Mobilization Approaches, iii) Group Impact & Sustainability, and iv) M&E Record Keeping. Projects implemented 
are covered in a separate report by consultant Linde Rachel, completed in January 2007. The methodology for 
this assessment includes the analysis of project documents, interviews with current and former staff members, 
and three weeks of focus groups (20 CDCs), phone interviews (7 CDCs) and interviews with local government 
officials (11) responsible for coordination with Mercy Corps. 
Community Development Approach: From 2001-2004, prior to the strategic change by USAID toward 
economic development programming and the transition of CRDA to CRDA-E, Mercy Corps’ primary vehicle for 
community mobilization and project implementation was Community Development Councils (CDCs). CDCs 
operated primarily on the Mesne Zajednice (MZ) level, the lowest administrative level of governance in Serbia; 
MZs in turn mobilized the support and resources of their respective municipalities for project implementation. In 
2003 Mercy Corps undertook a second component, Community Fairs, to increase community involvement in 
urban areas. Community Fairs provided community groups, NGOs and institutions with a forum to present their 
project ideas to the broader community, who then voted on the projects; winning projects received financial 
support from CRDA. 
Projects Implemented & Match: The most visible impact of CRDA is the projects implemented: 475 projects 
valued at $23.77 million were completed through CDCs and Community Fairs. The vast majority of these 
projects, especially those identified through CDCs, involved the improvement and rehabilitation of basic civil 
infrastructure. Community Fair projects, by their nature, typically consisted of providing institutions and clubs with 
technology or other special equipment. Despite citizens’ initial skepticism and the economic hardship that 
challenged Serbia, Mercy Corps mobilized nearly 50% of the project cost ($12.67 million USAID; $11.10 million 
match) from communities and municipalities. The primary reason for this high level of contribution was the trust 
that Mercy Corps, and CRDA in general, earned in the communities. 
CDC Results & Impact: By autumn 2004, when CRDA transitioned to CRDA-E, 76 CDCs had been formed, 
implementing 312 projects. Furthermore, over the three years of community mobilization activities, new 
communities (MZs) joined the program through already-formed CDCs; as a result, by 2005, 300 MZs in 18 
municipalities participated in CRDA. Capital improvement projects were implemented in 135 different 
communities. CDC members identified the most significant changes in their communities as a result of CRDA; in 
popularity cited: improved work organization, increased local participation, benefit from a specific project, 
revitalized community, improved democratic practices, motivated future investment, readiness to work with 
donors, improved municipal-MZ relations, and increased citizen willingness for financial contributions. 
CDC Evolution: CDC activities underwent three phases of evolution. In Phase I, due to USAID pressure for a 
rapid startup, CDCs operated at the MZ level and generally consisted of MZ presidents and their councils. Phase 
II increased citizen participation in decision-making and project implementation, improved transparency, and 
strengthened linkages between citizens and authorities by establishing more strict voting rules, expanding 
membership (especially for women), and forming internal supervisory and financial control bodies. Phase III was 
marked by geographic expansion to include more communities, competitive elements for project selection on a 
regional level, and added input from technical experts to improve and facilitate project implementation. 
CDC Regional Office Differences: Due to a high level of autonomy, Mercy Corps’ three regional offices enjoyed 
considerable flexibility in their approaches. Differences between the offices were philosophical in nature: 
Krusevac and Prokuplje teams believed that by creating regional CDCs and making communities compete for 
resources, they would improve community planning and provide greater community-orientation of projects; in 
these AORs, mature CDCs were expanded to include new communities. On the contrary, the Novi Pazar team 
believed that by opening the project application to a majority of MZs, Mercy Corps could broaden the impact; 
therefore, the team continued to form independent CDCs for each new community added. While Krusevac and 
Prokuplje AOR CDCs began to compete on a regional level for projects within their AOR, Novi Pazar allocated 
fixed budgets to each CDC. As a result, while Novi Pazar formed significantly more CDCs, they implemented 
fewer projects overall than in Krusevac or Prokuplje. Both approaches had respective strengths and weakness: 
Krusevac and Prokuplje teams mobilized more communities; however, by expanding CDCs, organization became 
more challenging. As a result, the municipality, rather than communities, often became the driving force behind 
the projects. In Novi Pazar, the communities were the main agents; however, with their fixed budgets, CDCs 
became less engaged in project selection, resulting in more shallow and poorly justified proposals. 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
3 
Rural & Urban CDCs: While urban CDCs generally reflected Mercy Corps’ recommendations regarding the 
representation of special interest groups, the majority of rural CDCs were composed primarily of MZ 
representatives and their close associates. Rural CDCs, however, did demonstrate a significantly stronger sense 
of ownership of CRDA and the projects, validating 2003 observations that CDCs did not have sufficient appeal in 
urban areas (resulting in the birth of Community Fairs). While women represented at least 30% of the official
CDC membership, evidence shows that in both urban and rural CDCs most of the women representatives were 
either already active in their communities or were included only to satisfy Mercy Corps’ requirements. 
CDC Organizational Sustainability: No CDC officially registered as a civil society group with the arguable 
exceptions of one which became an agriculture association and six informal groups that existed prior to CRDA; 
only one continued to meet, and it did so under the auspices of an ongoing CRDA project. It can therefore be 
concluded that the goal of CDC institutional sustainability was not achieved. This should not be taken as a failure 
of Mercy Corps’ program, as it was at least partly due to the rapid transition to CRDA-E, the pressure to 
implement the new strategy, and the essential abandonment of CDCs in lieu of Municipal Economic Councils. 
Community Fair Results: From 2003-2005 Mercy Corps organized 29 Community Fairs, at least one in each of 
the 18 municipalities. In total, 604 civil society groups participated and competed for projects in the fairs. Over 
75,500 citizens (17% of Mercy Corps’ urban population) voted for projects, selecting 152 groups to receive CRDA 
support. Over three years, significant increases were observed both in the number of participating groups and 
voter turnout, demonstrating the success of community fairs as a tool for urban community mobilization.
Community Fair Regional Differences: The offices also had different strategies for Community Fairs: in the 
Krusevac AOR the primary responsibility for organization laid with the municipality with substantial support of 
Mercy Corps staff. In Novi Pazar, CDCs organized the fairs, with substantially less assistance from Mercy Corps. 
Although the number of participating groups was not significantly different between the AORs, this assessment 
concludes that the Krusevac approach was more effective in mobilizing the broader community, which impacted 
both attendance and the ultimate success of the fairs.
Community Fair Impact: Focus groups identified the key impacts of Community Fairs: increase community 
mobilization and participating stakeholders, bring people together and increase solidarity, identify problems faced 
by the community, and increase representation of neglected groups. Although Community Fairs had high social 
impact, they were extremely high maintenance and problematic initiatives for Mercy Corps staff. Procurements of 
highly diverse, specialized equipment for recipients that tended to be particular about branding often resulted in 
delays and procurement problems. Moreover, some groups that proposed projects were created solely for the 
purpose of participating in the fair, often resulting in unstable financial and logistical commitments to the projects. 
Lessons Learned & Recommendations: The following recommendations are offered based on the findings of 
this assessment: 
• Complete small, quick-start projects during program startup. 
• Choose partners and individuals who hold high respect in their communities. 
• Provide intensive training on methodologies throughout the project life cycle. Explain procedures 
thoroughly and repeatedly, not only to community leaders, but to their members and constituencies. 
• Assure that team members are well-educated and aware of local conditions, issues and actors. 
• Provide flexible program design, taking into account regional differences and conditions (rather than 
stressing uniformity) especially when the AOR covers economically and socially distinct regions. 
• Respect established commitments throughout the program. Avoid abrupt transitions in program strategy; 
if such transitions are necessary, first bring to a systematic closure all previous commitments. 
• Provide the necessary support and training to institutionalize groups to assure the sustainability of civil 
society groups and democratic institutions. 
• Establish effective relationships between the donor, contractor and client that actively involve clients in 
monitoring and oversight of the contractor. 
• Increase staff visits to the field and intensify their interaction with citizens. 
• Staff a full-time M&E Coordinator from the start to assure the quality and standardization of 
management systems and performance data. 
• Increase efforts to document experiences, challenges, plans and commitments with respect to specific 
communities and projects to smooth transitions due to staff turnover. 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
4 
Introduction 
Mercy Corps CRDA AOR 
CRDA Overview: Mercy Corps’ longest single-donor project to date is the Serbia 
Community Revitalization through Democratic Action (CRDA). The USAID-funded 
program spanned six years (2001 through 2007) and underwent a number of 
refinements and transitions during its life. The CRDA program itself is a six-year, 
$200 million USAID program; the program is implemented by five partners, each 
with a geographic AOR and funding in the amount of $40 million. 
Purpose of Assessment: Due to length of the project and the diversity of activities 
implemented, evaluating CRDA represents an opportunity to assess different 
development approaches and identify the conditions necessary for success of 
development assistance. As such, in addition to the assessment of the Serbia 
CRDA program itself, the evaluation findings will enhance 
Mercy Corps’ capacity to effectively target key areas and 
groups over the long-term and for self-sustainable growth 
in the countries where we work. 
CRDA Goal & Four Pillars: Commencing in 2001, at the 
onset of the democratic transition in Serbia, CRDA’s goal 
was to promote citizen participation in and between 
communities and clusters of communities to address their 
priority needs for the economic and social revitalization. 
Through citizen participation, communities identified and prioritized projects in four pillars: i) civic participation, ii) 
economic development, iii) civil infrastructure and iv) environment. Within these, community mobilization was the 
foundation of all programs and activities. 
USAID Strategic Framework: The CRDA program was implemented under USAID Strategic Objective (SO) 2.1, 
Increased Citizen Participation in Political & Economic Decision Making. Within this SO were five Intermediate 
Results (IRs). In the analysis conducted in this report, these IRs are considered as the primary criteria under 
which impact and success is measured. 
I.R. 2.1.1 Increased Citizens Participation in Community Development Activities 
I.R. 2.1.2 Increased Inter-Community, Inter-Ethnic Cooperation in Community Activities 
I.R. 2.1.3 Improved Social & Economic Infrastructure 
I.R. 2.1.4 Increased Incomes & Job Opportunities for Low-Income families 
I.R. 2.1.5 Improved Environmental Conditions and Practices 
Mercy Corps Community Development Approach: From 2001-2004 Mercy Corps’ primary vehicle for 
community mobilization and project implementation was newly-formed Community Development Councils
(CDCs). CDCs operated primarily on the Mesne Zajednice (MZ) level, the lowest administrative level of 
governance in Serbia. MZs in turn mobilized the active support and involvement of their respective municipalities, 
who contributed most of the financial matching contribution toward project implementation. In 2003 Mercy Corps 
began organizing Community Fairs as a way of increasing community involvement in urban areas. Community 
Fairs were events where community groups, NGOs and institutions presented their project ideas to the broader 
community, who voted on the projects; winning projects received financial support from CRDA. 
Mercy Corps Operations: Upon commencement of the program Mercy Corps divided its AOR into three regions 
of roughly equal geographic area, each covered by a separate office. The three regional offices in Krusevac, 
Prokuplje and Novi Pazar covered the 18 municipalities as shown in the diagram above. 
Community vs. Economic Investments: Beginning almost immediately on startup Mercy Corps rapidly 
identified and implemented community projects. At the same time, the Economic Opportunity pillar, implemented 
by partner Deloitte-Touche-Thomatsu (later Emerging Markets Group) conducted assessments then designed, 
refined and gained USAID approval for its strategy of investments (typically $30,000-$50,000) in agricultural 
processors, primarily in the fruit and dairy sectors. From 2001-2004 $12.67 million of USAID funds was invested 
in “community” projects while $4.06 million were invested in the “economic” component. (Note that numerous 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
projects in both categories carried over into 2005 and beyond; therefore, it is more accurate to say that this value 
in projects was approved or initiated, but not necessarily completed.) 
CRDA Budget Breakdown 
This diagram shows the breakdown of the $40 million USAID 
award (not including Mercy Corps cost share and community 
matching contribution toward projects). The two offset areas 
represent the funding for the programs assessed in this report. 
Community Fairs were continued into 2005 under CRDA-E in 
the amount of $252,000; the 2005 fairs and the associated 
projects are included in this assessment. 
Basis: $40 million USAID Investment Admin & ICR
2001-2007 
$13,190,000
Community CDC
2001-2004 
$11,930,000
Fruit & Dairy
2001-2004, 
$4,090,000
CRDA-E
2005-2007, 
$10,050,000
Community Fairs 
2001-2005
$740,000
CRDA Transition to CRDA-E 2005: In 2005, USAID and 
the US Embassy changed strategy and shifted programming 
priorities to focus almost exclusively on economic 
development. As a result, CRDA underwent a significant 
change from its prior emphasis on community development 
and civic participation to job growth and creation through 
Local Economic Development (LED), agriculture and MSME 
development. At that time Mercy Corps discontinued 
activities implemented through Community Development 
Councils (CDCs) while continuing Community Fairs for one 
additional year (nine fairs, 36 projects, $252,000 in 2005). 
Mercy Corps AOR Description: Mercy Corps covers the 18 
municipalities of southern Serbia shown in the map above; in 
the years covered by this assessment, they did so from 
three offices located in Krusevac, Prijepolje and Novi Pazar. 
(The Prijepolje office was later consolidated to Krusevac.) 
The AOR includes the six municipalities of Sandzak, an ethnically mixed region of Serbia consisting mostly of 
Bosnijaks and Serbs. The municipalities of Kursumlija, Prokuplje and Krusevac have high populations of IDPs 
from Kosovo (Kursumlija is highest with a population of 28% IDPs). The official population of the entire AOR is 
660,000; Krusevac is the largest city and municipality, with a population of 131,000. The entire AOR can be 
characterized as mostly rural with little comparative economic advantage and heavily reliant on the agriculture 
sector; most former state enterprises are either closed or operating at significantly reduced levels. 
M&E Overview: Due to the involved and complex nature of CRDA and the associated transitions, a 
comprehensive evaluation of the program is an arduous undertaking. To accomplish the task, the country team 
felt that the evaluation would be best served by breaking the assessment into discrete programmatic areas and 
periods. In broad terms, the series of assessments are: 
1. Community CRDA 2001-2004 
2. Dairy & Fruit Sector Impact Assessments 2001-2007 
3. Micro, Small & Medium Enterprise (MSME) Programs 2003-2007 
4. Local Economic Development (LED) 2005-2007
Community CRDA 2001-2004 Assessment: The first of these assessments includes the CDC and Community 
Fair activities and is further broken down into two separate evaluations. This evaluation presents the results and 
findings of four key aspects of CRDA: i) Results & Outputs, ii) Community Mobilization Approaches, iii) Group 
Impact & Sustainability, and iv) M&E Record Keeping. This assessment is supplemented by a second evaluation 
that covers Project Implementation & Impact, performed by consultant Linde Rachel in January 2007 wherein she 
assessed the $12.67 million in CRDA community project investments. A summary overview of the entire CRDA 
assessment is presented below; the highlighted area is the subject of this assessment and the separate 
assessment completed by Linde Rachel. The Scope of Work for these assignments is presented in Annex 1. 
CRDA Assessment Overview
5 
CRDA Assessment
Community CRDA
2001-2004
Activities:
Community Development Councils
Community Fairs
Assessment:
1. Outputs & Achievements
2. Community Mobilization Approach
3. Group Impact & Sustainability
4. Management & Organizational Issues
5. Project Implementation & Impact
Dairy & Fruit Sector Assessments
2001-2007
Activities:
Dairy Processors & Producer Associations
Fruit Processors & Producer Associations
Assessment:
1. Production Situation
2. Sales & Marketing
3. Collection & Distribution
4. Quality Control
5. Investment & Finance
6. CRDA Impact
MSME Development
2003-2007
Activities:
Refugee & IDP Small Grants
Income Generation Grants
Employment Expansion Program
Assessment:
1. Business & Job Sustainability
2. Program & Process
3. Training Programs & Services
3. Application & Selection Process
CRDA Assessment Overview
CRDA Assessment
Local Economic Development (LED)
2005-2007
Activities:
LED 2005
LED 2006
LED Surplus Funding Programs
Assessment:
1. LED Process
2. LED Projects
3. LED Institutionalization
4. Municipal Capacity Index
Community CRDA
2001-2004
Activities:
Community Development Councils
Community Fairs
Assessment:
1. Outputs & Achievements
2. Community Mobilization Approach
3. Group Impact & Sustainability
4. Management & Organizational Issues
5. Project Implementation & Impact
Dairy & Fruit Sector Assessments
2001-2007
Activities:
Dairy Processors & Producer Associations
Fruit Processors & Producer Associations
Assessment:
1. Production Situation
2. Sales & Marketing
3. Collection & Distribution
4. Quality Control
5. Investment & Finance
6. CRDA Impact
MSME Development
2003-2007
Activities:
Refugee & IDP Small Grants
Income Generation Grants
Employment Expansion Program
Assessment:
1. Business & Job Sustainability
2. Program & Process
3. Training Programs & Services
3. Application & Selection Process
Local Economic Development (LED)
2005-2007
Activities:
LED 2005
LED 2006
LED Surplus Funding Programs
Assessment:
1. LED Process
2. LED Projects
3. LED Institutionalization
4. Municipal Capacity Index
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
6 
Evaluation Methodology: This assessment was conducted in three key phases. 
Phase 1: Collection, synthesis and analysis of existing program data and reports. 
Phase 2: Interviews with key program staff about the project, activities and organization of the 
Community phase of CRDA. 
Phase 3: Focus groups and interviews with communities, CDC members, and municipal officials, 
including supporting field work and data collection. 
Sample Methodology: Focus groups and interviewees were surveyed though a list of standardized questions 
and issues for discussion. This guide is presented in Annex 2. The sample for CDC focus groups in this 
assessment was chosen both randomly and by designated selection. All CDCs were divided into three groups 
according to the number of projects implemented: 
• CDCs with fewer than two projects were surveyed via telephone. It was intended to contact all 17 of 
those CDCs; however, only seven were completed since the rest of the CDC presidents were either 
inaccessible or our local staff were unable to find their present contact information. 
• For CDCs that implemented between two and eight projects, random sampling was used. However, in 
order to ensure that all three regions were equally represented, the CDCs were first divided according 
to their office AOR, then CDCs within each were randomly chosen in Excel, weighted according to the 
number of municipalities covered by the regional office. The sample size included five CDCs from 
Krusevac, three from Prokuplje, and four from Novi Pazar. 
CDC Population & Sample Size
7
17
52
7 5
15
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
0-1 Project 2-8 Projects >9 Projects
Number of Projects Implemented
Number of CDCs
Population
Sample
• The four CDCs that had more than eight projects were chosen as 
follows: Aleksandrovac East (12 projects) was the pilot community 
for the first focus group. The CDCs from the three towns where 
Mercy Corps had regional offices were automatically included 
(Krusevac with 13 projects, Novi Pazar with 12, and Prokuplje with 
21.) The automatic inclusion of these CDCs was justified by their 
capacity to provide accurate information about the methodology 
employed by each of the offices since they had the most intimate 
contact with the project and team. 
Sample Size: From August 3 though September 15, 2006, beginning 
with the pilot Aleksandrovac East CDC conducted under the guidance of Joe Dickman, Mercy Corps Senior 
Program Officer for DM&E, 16 focus groups and 17 interviews with key contact persons were conducted in 13 
municipalities. Through these sessions, the team assessed 18 CDCs (representatives from additional 3 CDCs 
joined the team in the discussions). In total, 27 CDCs (36%) were reached through one of the aforementioned 
M&E tools. Although this represents only a third of the total CDCs, the results obtained can be considered 
indicative of the entire sample size due to these reasons: 
Focus Group Participants 
The unanticipated representatives from 
three CDCs that joined the planned focus 
groups turned out to be very beneficial for 
the assessment. In addition to allowing the 
team to obtain information concurrently 
from multiple CDCs at one time, they also 
provided interesting examples of regional 
cooperation among CDCs. Also, in each of 
the three cases, the uninvited participants 
were members of CRDA-E Municipal 
Economic Councils (MECs), which provided 
an opportunity to discuss their insights into 
CDC sustainability and the relationship 
between CDCs and MECs. 
• CDC selection was random for the majority of 
the sample, but took into account the 
geographically distinct areas within the Mercy 
Corps’ AOR. 
• Both rural (7) and urban (9) CDCs were initially 
randomly selected. The number of rural CDCs 
later increased to 11 when counting the 
attendance of other CDC members in focus 
groups and making one data correction. 
• Differences between CDC formations were 
observed on a regional (office AOR) level, and 
not within an individual office AOR. Responses 
and information obtained from CDCs within the same AOR regarding their experiences were very 
similar, indicating a high degree of statistical validity. 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
7 
Results & Outputs 
Project Inputs
$12.67 million USAID Project Funds
$7.5 million admin & overhead
Groups Formed & Served
Community Development Councils:
76 CDCs Formed
Community Fairs:
442 participating groups
162 groups financed
Communities Served
300 communities participating
135 communities implementing projects
97 rural communities
18 towns (municipal urban centers)
20 communities in cluster projects
Projects Implemented
475 total projects
312 CDC projects
152 Community Fair projects
11 projects through other means
Resources Mobilized
$11.39 million match contribution
$8.53 million municipal match
$2.86 million community match
$10.02 million cash match
$1.36 million in-kind match
O
U
T
P
U
T
S
Project Inputs
$12.67 million USAID Project Funds
$7.5 million admin & overhead
Groups Formed & Served
Community Development Councils:
76 CDCs Formed
Community Fairs:
442 participating groups
162 groups financed
Communities Served
300 communities participating
135 communities implementing projects
97 rural communities
18 towns (municipal urban centers)
20 communities in cluster projects
Projects Implemented
475 total projects
312 CDC projects
152 Community Fair projects
11 projects through other means
Resources Mobilized
$11.39 million match contribution
$8.53 million municipal match
$2.86 million community match
$10.02 million cash match
$1.36 million in-kind match
O
U
T
P
U
T
S
Overview: This section presents the quantitative outputs and 
achievements of the Community Development activities of the 
CRDA program from 2001-2004. Among the greatest successes 
of CRDA are the many examples of increased and improved 
dialogue between communities and municipal government, the 
development of individual community leaders, budget input by 
individuals and local leaders, and other actions described in the 
fieldwork findings section of this report. These achievements are, 
however, difficult to quantify and document aside from anecdotal 
evidence, and impossible to attribute solely to CRDA. This 
section, therefore, focuses only on results that are quantitative in 
nature, which can be attributed to CRDA, and which likely were 
core causes for the successes such as those cited above. These 
include: i) Groups Formed & Served, ii) Communities Served, iii) 
Projects Implemented, and iv) Resources Mobilized. 
Groups Formed & Served 
Community Development Councils: From 2001-2004, CRDA 
Community Development activities focused mainly on 
rehabilitating and constructing social and economic infrastructure 
priorities identified by communities according to their most 
pressing development needs, with little or no Mercy Corps 
guidance on the type of projects that should be selected. In order 
to achieve the “Democratic Action” goal of CRDA through an 
efficient and transparent decision-making process, Mercy Corps 
assisted communities in forming Community Development 
Committees (CDCs) as local decision-making bodies (locally 
referred to as GRZs, or Grupe za Razvoj Zajednice). CDCs were 
the primary decision making vehicles and intermediary bodies between Mercy Corps and the citizens and were 
responsible for: 
• mobilizing communities for project identification and selection; 
• collecting and ensuring community and municipality matching contributions; 
• monitoring and overseeing project implementation quality and schedules. 
CDC Results: By autumn 2004, when CRDA transitioned to CRDA-E, 76 CDCs had been formed representing 
300 MZs spread roughly equally throughout the 18-municipality AOR. During the three years from 2001-2004, the 
76 CDCs identified and implemented 312 projects. 
Community Fairs: Beginning in 2003, Mercy Corps diversified its community mobilization methodology and 
established Community Fairs, interactive events aimed at increasing citizen participation in urban areas where 
CDC and citizen participation was generally lower than in rural (village) MZs. Community Fairs provided an 
opportunity for schools, sports and other clubs, special interest groups (such as handicapped persons), and other 
civil society groups to present their project ideas to the broader community. Citizens attending the fairs then had 
the opportunity to vote for their favored project. In three years (Community Fairs continued through 2005) Mercy 
Corps organized 29 Community Fairs, organizing at least one in each of the 18 municipalities. In total, 604 civil 
society groups participated and competed in the fairs; 152 (25%) of these groups received funding for their CRDA 
project. (This figure does not include 11 projects selected but subsequently cancelled due to lack of feasibility or 
other issue preventing implementation.) 
Communities Served 
CDCs Formed & Communities Represented: Mercy Corps’ approach to community mobilization evolved over 
the first three years of CRDA, shifting from a strategy of cooperation with individual communities at the MZ level 
to one of fostering cooperation among neighboring MZs. As a result, with each year additional MZs began 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
8 
participating in CRDA; however, instead of forming new CDCs, in the majority of cases new communities joined 
CDCs already operated in their nearby vicinity. Consequently, by 2005 the 76 CDCs formed represented the 
interests of 300 MZs, representing far greater outreach by the approach than is immediately evident by 
examining only the number of CDCs formed. 
Communities Participating in Projects: Due to limited budgets and competition for projects, plus the large 
number of represented MZs, not all of the 300 MZs actively participated in project implementation. While 
representatives of each of these MZs had the opportunity to vote at CDC meetings, projects were actually 
implemented in 135 communities (45% of the 300 represented). Of these, 117 were rural communities, 97 being 
individual communities and 20 being rural cluster groups where a project served multiple MZs (counted as 20 
communities for the purposes of this report); the remaining 18 are the municipal urban centers. In summary, one 
would likely argue that the CRDA project impacted 135 communities with capital improvement projects, while 
increasing democratic participation in 300. 
Projects Implemented 
Projects Implemented: The primary output of CRDA in the eyes of the communities, as well as the bulk of the 
USAID financial resources, was clearly the projects. In total, 475 projects valued at $23.77 million ($12.67 million 
USAID resources) were implemented through CDCs and Community Fairs from 2001 through 2005. The vast 
majority of projects implemented were community infrastructure improvements of various types, as shown in the 
table below. (These figures do not include those implemented under the Economic Pillar by partner Deloitte￾Touche-Thomatsu, which was a separate strategy directly targeting private enterprises, primarily processors in 
the fruit and dairy sectors. For comparison purposes, there were 76 such projects with a CRDA investment of 
$4.09 million of USAID resources.) 
Project Breakdown by Pillar: CRDA community 
projects were classified into one of three pillars 
(excluding the fourth economic pillar): 
During the three years of “Community” CRDA implementation 
communities most often prioritized the rehabilitation of aging 
infrastructure and the construction and upgrading of new 
infrastructure improvements. Further, nearly half of the Civic 
Participation projects can trace their origins to a Community 
Fair, which by their nature often fall into this category of 
projects. Therefore, while CDCs are effective means of 
prioritizing infrastructure projects, the approach is less effective 
in targeting other project interventions. 
CRDA Projects by “Pillar” 
(Excluding Economic Pillar) 
Infrastructure
324 projects
Civic 
Participation
134 projects
Environment
17 projects
• Civil Infrastructure (324 projects): Social and 
economic infrastructure projects, including basic 
utilities (electricity and water) and facilities (e.g. 
schools, health centers, community centers). 
• Civic Participation (134 projects): Projects aimed 
at increasing citizen participation in local initiatives. 
Nearly half of the projects in this category were 
identified through Community Fairs, which by 
nature fall into this category since they are 
proposed by local special interest groups, clubs, 
institutions and schools. It is worth noting, however, 
that of these 134 projects, 49 of them were actually 
infrastructure improvements to sports, recreation 
and social infrastructure objects or facilities. 
• Environment (17 projects): Projects that aim to 
increase environmental awareness and protection. Similarly as above, however, most of these projects 
were also in fact infrastructure improvements for water treatment, erosion control and other 
environmental infrastructure. 
Project Types: The table below summarizes the projects implemented in various categories identified through 
CDCs and Community Fairs. As one would expect, CDCs generally selected infrastructure projects with broad 
community benefit such as roads, electrical transmission, and school and facility renovation. Community Fair 
projects on the other hand, again by virtue of the fact that the projects are proposed by special interest groups, 
included education, parks, health and “other” special initiatives. In general, CDC projects were more construction 
or facility-oriented while Community Fair projects tended to provide institutions and clubs with technology or other 
special equipment. Projects implemented by “Other” means include special initiatives identified and selected due 
to a particular, high priority community need supported by Mercy Corps. 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
9 
CRDA Community Projects Implemented 
Projects Implemented 
Project Type Project Types CDC Community 
Fair Other Total 
Education Kindergarten, Primary & Secondary 
Schools, Special Education, University 63 63 126 
Transport Bridges, Roads, Traffic Safety 75 2 77 
Water Water Distribution, Supply, Systems, 
Treatment 51 2 53 
Parks & Recreation Parks, Playgrounds, Sports Facilities 19 25 44 
Health Health Services & Training, Health Centers 20 21 1 42 
Community Development 
& Participation 
Community Centers, Theaters, Museums, 
Libraries, Urban Planning 20 13 3 36 
Electricity Electric Distribution, Transmission 31 31 
Miscellaneous/Other Information Boards, Civic Organization 
Support, Heating Systems, Other 13 12 5 30 
Social Welfare Elderly, Handicapped, Refugee Programs 5 8 13 
Environment Clean-Up/Remediation, Environmental 
Awareness, Flood Control & Drainage 8 2 2 12 
Communication Radio, Telephone 3 3 6 
Solid Waste Solid Waste Collection & Disposal 3 1 4 
Wastewater Wastewater Treatment & Systems 1 1 
TOTAL: 312 152 11 475 
Project Status: At the time of this writing (April 
2007) 343 of 475 community projects (72%) are 
totally complete; additionally, 112 projects are in 
finalization status (generally meaning that only 
collection of match documentation remains); 20 
projects still remain incomplete and roughly 
$50,000 remains in outstanding payments for 
incomplete projects. During the rapid transition 
from CRDA to CRDA-E, and the focus on new 
economic programs and activities, closing the 
existing CRDA community projects has been 
delayed. The country team is currently closing out 
the remaining CRDA obligations along with the 
CRDA-E projects. 
Community Project Assessment: The projects 
implemented through CDCs and Community Fairs 
were assessed by an external consultant Linde 
Rachel in January 2007; the report was finalized 
and released in March 2007. The scope of Ms. 
Rachel’s assignment was designed to be an external, unbiased assessment on how the financial resources of 
CRDA were invested. This report is intended to complement the findings of Ms. Rachel’s report. 
Community Project Status 
Project Status Number 
Complete: Project implementation complete & all 
documentation collected. 343 
Finalization: Project complete; typically only collection 
of matching documentation remains. 112 
Work in Progress: Construction or implementation 
ongoing. 15 
Tender: Construction or procurement is currently 
being tendered. 2 
On Hold: Progress held up, typically due to 
circumstances beyond Mercy Corps control, such as 
permit pending or other issue surrounding 
implementation in the community. 
2 
Approved: Project is approved but no procurement 
has been started. This may be due to action pending 
either on the part of the community or Mercy Corps. 
1 
Cancelled: Project cancelled, typically due to lack of 
adequate documentation on the part of the applicant, 
unresolved legal issues, inability to obtain necessary 
permit or license, or lack of willingness of community 
or beneficiary to collect pledged matching contribution. 
In most cases no financial resources were provided. 
32 
TOTAL: (excluding cancelled projects) 475 
Resources Mobilized 
Match Summary: Perhaps one of the greater achievements of CRDA is manifested in the amounts of matching 
contributions and changes in public perception in contributing financial resources toward realizing priority 
projects. Mercy Corps far exceeded budgeted requirements for matching documentation: 
Minimum Match (25%): $4.22 million (based on $12.67 million CRDA contribution) 
Actual Match: $11.10 million 
Match Policy: Mercy Corps CRDA handbook postulated that in order for a project to be approved, the 
community needed to demonstrate its capacity to collect at least 25% of the total cost for each project. For 15 
projects valued at greater than $100,000 Mercy Corps typically required a contribution of up to 50% (a dollar-for￾dollar arrangement). 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
10 
Early Challenges with Match: Community matching contribution was one of the most controversial aspects of 
the CRDA approach in the early years. Besides the obvious financial burden, Serbian communities were 
historically used to a system in which the government, and later foreign donors in the aftermath of the wars of the 
1990s, would assume 100% of the financial responsibility for local development efforts. As the first CRDA report 
and focus group data demonstrate, the majority of the public was suspicious and hesitant to contribute financially 
in 2001-2002. Mercy Corps staff members faced a difficult challenge in convincing citizens to participate 
financially. These opinions changed rapidly, however, as projects were successfully completed and USAID/Mercy 
Corps earned a reputation for honoring commitments. 
Mercy Corps overcame early challenges regarding project matching 
contribution as citizens soon realized that their priority projects would 
be completed. Nearly 50% of the cost for all community projects was 
provided by local governments and communities, demonstrating the 
leveraging power of the USAID funds. Of all match, 88% was 
contributed in cash. (These figures include match collected plus 
outstanding, uncollected match; final documented match may 
therefore be lower depending on current collection efforts. All USAID 
budget obligations regarding match have been exceeded.) 
Project Implementation Resources 
Mercy Corps & Community Match 
Municipality
In-Kind
$883,000
3.7%
Community
In-Kind
$388,000
1.6%
Community
Cash
$2.39 million
10.0%
Municipality 
Cash
$7.44 million
31.3%
Mercy Corps
$12.67 million
53.3%
Match Results: As shown in the diagram, while 
the majority of matching contribution came from 
municipal governments, the communities and 
stakeholders themselves contributed nearly $3 
million, $2.39 million in cash. After the startup 
year, Mercy Corps generally required that 
communities themselves contribute at least 5%, 
while the municipality was expected to contribute 
the remaining 20%. However, communities 
contributed close to 12% of the total project cost, 
accounting for 25% of all match. Of further 
interest is the fact that of the $11.1 million in total 
matching contribution by all parties, $9.83 million 
(89%) was in cash. 
Community & Municipal Contributions: Focus 
groups conducted with CDCs and other 
community partners reveal that the reason 
behind the high contributions was the trust Mercy 
Corps and the CRDA program in general enjoyed 
in the communities. Very soon after the 
beginning of the program, people realized that the selected projects would indeed be implemented; communities 
and citizens therefore quickly mobilized themselves to find the means to honor their commitment despite often 
having to undergo short-term economic hardships. In the majority of cases, however, the municipality remained 
the key contributor on CRDA projects. 
Results & Output Analysis 
Municipality Investment & Key Statistics: The table below provides a summary of CRDA investments, pledged
matching contribution, and key municipal statistics for the municipalities in Mercy Corps’ AOR. The highlighted 
rows are the municipalities hosting Mercy Corps field offices. 
Municipality Population HDI* Unemployment Projects
CRDA 
Investment
** 
CRDA 
Per Capita 
Investment 
CRDA 
Input 
%
Match 
%
Krusevac AOR 164 $4,580,000 $16.59 35.2% 49.7% 
Aleksandrovac 29,389 122 32.75% 33 $1,197,000 $40.73 9.3 42 
Cicevac 10,755 145 31.53% 20 $342,000 $31.80 2.6 35 
Ivanjica 35,445 111 30.83% 24 $500,000 $14.11 3.9 55 
Krusevac 131,368 37 35.41% 45 $1,411,000 $10.74 10.6 59 
Trstenik 49,043 105 28.16% 18 $502,000 $10.24 3.9 49 
Varvarin 20,122 177 38.73% 24 $628,000 $31.21 4.9 36 
Novi Pazar AOR 161 $4,247,000 $16.18 34.4% 49.8% 
Nova Varos 19,982 100 38.72% 14 $236,000 $11.81 1.9 40 
Novi Pazar 85,996 167 39.24% 48 $1,467,000 $17.06 11.7 41 
Priboj 30,377 146 48.53% 24 $631,000 $20.77 5.1 44 
Prijepolje 41,188 158 46.57% 20 $426,000 $10.34 3.4 53 
Raska 26,981 108 37.91% 19 $472,000 $17.49 3.7 55 
Sjenica 27,970 207 55.89% 15 $436,000 $15.59 4.0 68 
Tutin 30,054 203 64.76% 21 $579,000 $19.27 4.6 49 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
11 
Municipality Population HDI* Unemployment Projects
CRDA 
Investment
** 
CRDA 
Per Capita 
Investment 
CRDA 
Input 
%
Match 
%
Prokuplje AOR 140 $3,824,000 $31.64 29.9% 45.4% 
Blace 13,759 151 33.00% 32 $883,000 $64.18 7.0 42 
Brus 18,764 188 48.60% 20 $741,000 $39.49 5.8 54 
Kursumlija 21,608 189 30.75% 19 $410,000 $18.97 3.1 46 
Prokuplje 48,501 135 36.01% 45 $1,307,000 $26.94 10.6 45 
Zitoradja 18,207 184 54.70% 24 $483,000 $26.53 3.7 34 
* Human Development Index (HDI): Higher figures refer to a lower level of development. The most economically developed 
municipality in the AOR is Krusevac (with an HDI of 37) while the lowest are the Sandzak municipalities of Sjenica and Tutin, 
both which suffer from high unemployment and a general lack of developed infrastructure and utilities. 
** CRDA Investment figures shown in this table differ slightly (by $250,000 total) from those presented elsewhere in the report; 
this is due to USAID Reproductive Health earmark funds, how they were counted, and when they were invested.
Municipalities Hosting Mercy Corps Offices: The three municipalities hosting Mercy Corps offices obtained 
the largest share of CRDA funding between 2001 and 2004. While they are also the most populous municipalities 
(Trstenik without an office being, however, more populous than Prokuplje) there probably is a relationship 
between investment levels and the municipalities’ proximity to Mercy Corps offices. This is likely attributed at 
least in part to the fact that two of the AORs, Krusevac and Prokuplje, had the highest number of communities. 
Further related to this, citizens and municipal officials likely had more opportunities to build stronger relationships, 
gain trust, and share ideas given the proximity of the offices. 
The majority of CRDA funds for CDC and Community Fair 
activities were invested in infrastructure. Not represented in this 
diagram, however, is the fact that even much of the Environment 
and Civic Participation investments were actually infrastructure as 
well, as they included water treatment, erosion control and sports 
facility projects. For comparison, $4.09 million was invested in the 
separately-managed economic component implemented by 
Deloitte-Touche-Thomatsu, and not covered by this assessment. 
CRDA Budget by “Pillar” 
(Excluding Economic Pillar) 
Infrastructure
$10.30 M
Civic 
Participation
$1.99 M
Environment
$380 K
AOR Budgets: According to interviews with current and former staff members, municipal and community 
budgets were determined primarily by their 
responsiveness and ability to meet program and 
financial obligations. In 2002-2004, allocations were 
also driven by the HDI, but also continued to rely 
heavily on the responsiveness of municipalities and 
communities. The reality of the situation, however, 
was that budgets were often reallocated based on 
the capacity of the offices to implement projects 
within the timeframe requirements of the work plan. 
The Novi Pazar AOR in particular reportedly fell 
behind a number of times causing management to 
shift funds to other office AORs to keep spending 
on schedule. (It was also noted, however, that the 
Sandzak municipalities covered by the Novi Pazar 
office were often less responsive and more difficult 
to work with, so the spending delays were not 
necessarily a reflection on the program staff or 
management of the Novi Pazar AOR.) This 
provides a reasonable explanation why the less￾populous municipalities covered by the Prokuplje 
AOR may have received the considerably higher 
per capita CRDA investment. 
Per Capita Investment: Three municipalities stand out with respect to per capita CRDA investment: 
Aleksandrovac, Blace and Brus. (Again, all of the Prokuplje AOR municipalities had a considerably higher per 
capita investment.) Aleksandrovac, with relatively high economic indicators, ranks fourth overall in CRDA 
investment behind only the three municipalities with Mercy Corps offices. The small municipality of Blace, 
however, far exceeds all other municipalities in per capita CRDA investment. 
Municipal Matching Contribution: It was postulated by several staff members and focus group participants that 
municipalities with a greater capacity to meet matching contribution requirements might logically be awarded with 
higher CRDA funding levels. According to the data, however, this did not prove to be the case as there is little 
correlation between CRDA funding and matching contribution levels (though Krusevac, as might be expected, did 
provide the highest overall match as well as one of the highest percentages). Anecdotally, however, staff 
members overwhelmingly indicate greater ease in working with the larger municipalities and their corresponding 
higher budgets allocated by the republic government. Surprisingly, Sjenica, generally considered to be the most 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
12 
impoverished municipality in the AOR (and having the highest HDI) provided the highest percentage of matching 
contribution, almost all of it from the municipality and not community. This is attributed to the generally low 
investment level overall, however, and certainly not the ease with which Mercy Corps was able to cooperate with 
partners in that municipality. 
Documented Match: The table below shows the matching contribution collected to date by Mercy Corps field 
office. (At the time of this writing, $3.1 million in pledged match remains uncollected; hence the difference from 
the figures discussed above.) 
Matching Contribution Collected 
By Contributor and Mercy Corps AOR (collected only; not pledged) 
Match Office – AOR 
Provider Krusevac Prokuplje Novi Pazar Total 
Community $816,000 $259,000 $505,000 $1,580,000 
Municipality $1,329,000 $1,611,000 $1,776,000 $4,716,000 
Beneficiary $338,000 $169,000 $114,000 $621,000 
Republic $133,000 $74,000 $101,000 $308,000 
Electric Company $228,000 $47,000 $281,000 $556,000 
Other $27,000 $20,000 $169,000 $216,000 
Total $2,871,000 $2,180,000 $2,946,000 $7,997,000 
Community Matching Contribution: Many focus group participants stated that collecting match was a sensitive 
and difficult issue because of the economic hardships in the communities. As expected, the least developed 
municipalities had the lowest community match rates. The highest documented, municipal matching contribution 
is surprisingly the Sandzak municipalities in the Novi Pazar AOR, contrary to the expectation of most staff 
members. The higher municipal match in Novi Pazar is an indicator of success for the team’s cooperation with 
the municipality in a region where local politics often interferes with cooperation with any form of government. 
Community Mobilization Approaches 
Community Mobilization: From 2001 to 2004 Mercy Corps’ community development approach relied on the 
identification of community projects through local channels with little guidance on what communities should 
identify as their local priorities. In order to facilitate this process, Mercy Corps helped communities form 
Community Development Councils (CDCs) as local decision-making bodies. The CDCs functioned as the primary 
intermediary bodies between Mercy Corps and citizens, serving to: 
• mobilize community input for project identification, 
prioritization and selection; 
The majority of CRDA community projects were identified 
through the 76 CDCs. The 29 Community Fairs resulted in an 
additional 152 projects implemented. In addition 11 projects were 
identified through other means, including projects implemented in 
partnership with other USAID projects (SLGRP), plus some 
identified by Mercy Corps, such as a number of computer labs in 
schools, implemented in part to meet investment goals. 
CRDA Community Project Selection
CDC
312 Projects
Community 
Fairs
152 Projects
Other
11 projects
• collect and document matching contributions; 
• monitor progress and project implementation. 
Community Fairs: Beginning in 2003, Mercy Corps 
diversified its portfolio by adding Community Fairs, 
interactive events aimed at increasing citizen 
participation in urban areas where CDC and citizen 
participation was generally lower than in rural (village) 
MZs. Community Fairs provided opportunities for 
schools, clubs, special interest groups, and other civil 
society groups to present their project ideas to the 
broader community; citizens attending the fairs voted for 
their favored project, which were subsidized by Mercy 
Corps. In three years (Community Fairs continued 
through 2005 after the transition to CRDA-E) Mercy Corps organized 29 Community Fairs, organizing at least 
one in each of the 18 municipalities. 
Community Development Councils 
Community Definition: At this point it is important to note that the five CRDA implementers defined “community” 
in different ways. During this first phase, Mercy Corps defined community in terms of the existing mesne 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
13 
zajednica (MZ), the lowest administrative level of governance in Serbia. Rural MZs are traditional villages, while 
in an urban town or city, MZs represented the various neighborhoods. To illustrate the differences in 
methodologies, some CRDA implementers chose not to work in all of the municipalities in their AOR, while others 
attempted to cover the entire population within specific municipalities by defining “community” in various ways. 
Phase I
Community Mobilization Strategy
Step 1
Review Program Status
With Municipality
Step 2
Town Hall Meeting
CDC Membership
Prioritize Phase II Projects
Step 3
Develop Project Proposal
CDC Review & Approve
Step 4
Mercy Corps
Proposal Review
Step 5
Environmental Review
& Maintenance Plan
Step 6
Technical Design Review
Match Budget Finalized
Step 7
CD Team & Engineers
Review Design
With Community
Phase II
CDC & Project Strategy
Step 8
Tendering & Contracting
Tri-Party Agreement
Step 9
Project Monitoring
CDC & Transparency Board
Step 1
Review Program Status
With Municipality
Step 2
Town Hall Meeting
CDC Membership
Prioritize Phase II Projects
Step 3
Develop Project Proposal
CDC Review & Approve
Step 4
Mercy Corps
Proposal Review
Step 5
Environmental Review
& Maintenance Plan
Step 6
Technical Design Review
Match Budget Finalized
Step 7
CD Team & Engineers
Review Design
With Community
Phase II
CDC & Project Strategy
Step 8
Tendering & Contracting
Tri-Party Agreement
Step 9
Project Monitoring
CDC & Transparency Board
Step 1
Protocol Meetings
with Municipalities
Step 2
Select Target Communities
with Municipalities
Step 3
Information Meetings
With Target Community MZs
Step 4
Mercy Corps-Facilitated
Project Priority Meetings
Step 5
Site Review of Proposed 
Projects & Final Selection
Step 6
LOU Between Mercy Corps, 
Municipality & MZ
Step 7
Ongoing Follow-Up with 
CDCs during Project Works
E
N
G
I
N
E
E
R
I
N
G
C
D
T
E
A
M
Phase I
Community Mobilization Strategy CDC Phase I: Program reports from 2001-2004 give an account of a 
three-phase strategy for CDC formation and project selection over the 
period. The first phase (July 2001 through early 2002) was 
characterized by a rapid process of group formation and project 
identification. As requested by USAID, Mercy Corps and the other 
CRDA partners identified 60 communities, and identified at least one 
project in each during the first 90 days of CRDA. (Mercy Corps 
selected 61 projects valued at nearly $1.5 million in 17 of the 18 
municipalities.) 
Step 1
Protocol Meetings
with Municipalities
Step 2
Select Target Communities
with Municipalities
C
D
T
E
A
M
Step 3
Information Meetings
With Target Community MZs
Step 4
Mercy Corps-Facilitated
Project Priority Meetings
Step 5
Site Review of Proposed 
Projects & Final Selection
Step 6
LOU Between Mercy Corps, 
Municipality & MZ
Step 7
Ongoing Follow-Up with 
CDCs during Project Works
E
N
G
I
N
E
E
R
I
N
G
Selection Criteria: During this phase Mercy Corps selected partner 
communities by: i) reviewing relevant statistical data, ii) completing 
field visits to assess the readiness of communities to promptly identify 
priority projects, and iii) relying on the recommendations of municipal 
officials regarding their most needy communities. Although these 
criteria were applied in all three AORs, it is important to note that the 
three offices prioritized the criteria differently: 
• Krusevac: The team attempted to 
include all communities wishing to 
take part in CRDA. 
• Novi Pazar: The approach was 
guided by the municipalities’ lists of 
priority communities. 
• Prokuplje: Communities were 
identified independently from input 
by municipal officials. 
CDC Representation: After identifying the 60 MZs Mercy Corps facilitated the 
formation of CDCs. CDC membership prescribed the inclusion of the following 
groups and individuals: official MZ representatives, women and minorities (minimum 
30%), local business representatives, youth, local NGOs and/or individuals active in 
civil society. However, since Mercy Corps operated under a very strict schedule and 
a need for quick delivery of tangible results, the selection of members was rather 
simplified and focused primarily on local MZ officials to represent their 
constituencies. The MZ officials, in turn, mobilized the active support and 
involvement of their respective municipal officials. 
CDC Budgets: In both Phases I and II, the budgets for CDCs (and municipalities) 
were pre-established; therefore, CDCs had fixed budgets within which to identify 
and manage project implementation. 
CDC Phase II: After reaching the 60-projects-in-90-days target, in early 2002, the 
Mercy Corps team refined its community mobilization approach. The new approach 
was modified so as to increase citizen participation in decision-making and project 
implementation, improve transparency in the process, and strengthen the linkages 
between citizens and authorities. In terms of the CDCs themselves, Phase II aimed 
at increasing CDC responsibility in project implementation and strengthening their 
organizational capacity. A detailed, 22-step project selection and implementation 
strategy was developed; a condensed summary presenting only the steps involving 
CDCs is shown in the Phase II diagram. Specific changes included: 
a) establishing more strict voting rules for project selection; 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
14 
b) revising and expanding CDC membership, especially to increase inclusion of women; 
c) forming internal CDC supervisory and financial control bodies.
Project Design & Matching Contribution: During Phase II, Mercy Corps’ engineers also became more actively 
involved in the project design process, securing higher quality and better-prepared design documentation. Lastly, 
in order to reduce the still pervasive reliance of MZs on the municipalities in securing their match, the portion of 
match that comes directly from the communities was increased. 
Geographic Expansion & Inclusion: In the latter stages of Phase II, the team observed that because of the 
intensity of the original 90-day start-up, the initially-selected communities were primarily rural settlements, which 
often had less than 2000 inhabitants. As a result, the team decided to expand CRDA communities geographically 
to include representatives from surrounding villages with whom they shared common infrastructural and 
economic interests. The change both increased the number of project beneficiaries and decreased the instances 
of communities feeling “neglected” in the process. Phase II lasted through mid-2003. 
Step 1
• Existing CDCs meet with new targeted MZs.
• Outcome: Form RCC.
Step 2
• RCC trains new targeted MZs in Community 
Mobilization.
• Outcome: Form CDCs in new targeted MZs.
Step 3
• Local CDCs meet individually.
• Outcome: Identify local development 
priorities.
Step 4
• Local CDCs present priorities to RCC.
• Outcome: Select three regional priorities.
Step 5
• Local CDCs with selected priority projects 
organize Town Hall Meeting in their MZs.
• Outcome: Mercy Corps check project; MZs
given deadline for full proposal.
Step 6
• All approved and completed proposals 
submitted to Mercy Corps.
• Outcome: Mercy Corps scores proposals. 
Fixed budgets for CDCs no longer allocated; 
funding decisions made regionally based on 
project quality.
Phase III
RCC & CDC Expansion Strategy
Step 1
• Existing CDCs meet with new targeted MZs.
• Outcome: Form RCC.
Step 2
• RCC trains new targeted MZs in Community 
Mobilization.
• Outcome: Form CDCs in new targeted MZs.
Step 3
• Local CDCs meet individually.
• Outcome: Identify local development 
priorities.
Step 4
• Local CDCs present priorities to RCC.
• Outcome: Select three regional priorities.
Step 5
• Local CDCs with selected priority projects 
organize Town Hall Meeting in their MZs.
• Outcome: Mercy Corps check project; MZs
given deadline for full proposal.
Step 6
• All approved and completed proposals 
submitted to Mercy Corps.
• Outcome: Mercy Corps scores proposals. 
Fixed budgets for CDCs no longer allocated; 
funding decisions made regionally based on 
project quality.
Phase III
RCC & CDC Expansion Strategy
CDC Phase III: The desire to include even more communities to 
existing CDCs resulted in the transition to Phase III in mid-2003, 
after most of the originally-selected communities had completed 
several basic infrastructure projects. The team observed that after 
CDCs had completed projects that included the additional 
communities identified in Phase II, new projects proposed in those 
MZs became more individually focused, no longer targeting the 
broader interests hoped for. At the same time, Mercy Corps had 
strong feedback that new communities were eager to join CRDA 
and implement projects in their communities. To respond to this 
situation, Mercy Corps fundamentally changed the CDC project 
selection procedure and made the individual CDCs compete for 
project funding on a regional level within Regional Cluster 
Committees (RCCs), which consisted of old CDC members and 
newly-targeted MZs’ community leaders. RCCs were intended to 
train new MZs in community mobilization and assist them in 
forming local CDCs, which would then be in charge of local project 
selection; afterward, all CDCs would compete on a regional basis. 
Phase III meetings also included representatives of public utility 
companies, municipal officials and regional leaders. Phase III 
lasted through 2004 and the transition to CRDA-E. 
Project Selection: Project selection also became more complex, 
based on a scoring system where points were awarded for the 
number of beneficiaries, amount of matching (and especially non￾municipal community) contribution, maintenance plans and 
durability of the project. 
CDC Budgets: In Phase III the budgets for CDCs (and 
municipalities as well) were no longer pre-allocated, but all CDCs from each AOR were supposed to compete for 
funding on the RCC level, based on project quality. Each of the three offices was provided a budget to manage 
so that on an AOR-basis, budgets were pre-established. Competition, therefore, occurred only within the office 
AOR and not between projects in the three different AORs. 
Regional Office Differences: From 2001 through 2004, Mercy Corps facilitated the formation of 76 CDCs, which 
implemented 312 projects in the 18 municipalities in the AOR. The approaches between the three regional offices 
were different, however, resulting in differences between the results. While exactly half of the CDCs were formed 
in the Novi Pazar AOR, there were fewer projects implemented in that AOR than either of the other two AORs. 
Further, the Phase III CDCs on average implemented more projects in both the Krusevac and Prokuplje AORs 
than in Novi Pazar. These differences in CDC output are likely a result of the strategic differences in the 
approaches between the offices. This observation was endorsed by staff interviews and focus groups during the 
assessment. 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
15 
Krusevac Phase II Regionalization: Aside from the different criteria applied when selecting communities in 
Phase I, differences between methodologies became even more evident during the geographic expansion to 
neighboring MZs in Phase II. During this period, the Krusevac AOR seemingly responded to the changing CDC 
scope of work in the most organized manner. Any new MZ included was added to the geographically most 
appropriate existing regional CDC. As a result, these regional groups became fixed, unlike in the Novi Pazar 
AOR (which never adopted the regional approach) and Prokuplje AOR (whose CDCs seemingly never fully 
identified with the approach). During the assessment focus groups Krusevac AOR CDC members always 
referred to their former groups in the post-2002 regional context. 
Krusevac Phase III Regionalization: In Phase III the 
Krusevac AOR continued the regional decision-making 
process, however they did not follow the plan for forming 
new local CDCs. Instead, new communities joined 
existing CDCs; hence, the expanded CDCs were 
competing for project resources. The CDCs never met 
as RCCs; instead the expanded CDCs independently 
established priorities, which Mercy Corps staff then 
scored based on Phase III evaluation criteria. 
While the Novi Pazar AOR accounted for exactly half of the 
CDCs formed, they actually implemented the lowest number of 
projects. The differences in CDC output are a result of the 
strategic differences in the approaches between the offices. 
While the Novi Pazar AOR formed new CDCs each year, in 
Krusevac and Prokuplje, existing CDCs were expanded to 
include new communities. 
Regional AOR Performance Comparison
CDCs Formed by Regional Office
Krusevac AOR
20 CDCs
Novi Pazar
AOR
38 CDCs
Prokuplje AOR
18 CDCs
Projects Implemented by Regional Office
Prokuplje AOR
113 Projects
Novi Pazar
AOR
88 Projects
Krusevac AOR
111 Projects
CRDA Investment by Regional Office
Krusevac AOR
$4,580,000
Novi Pazar
AOR
$4,247,000
Prokuplje AOR
$3,824,000
Prokuplje Phase II Regionalization: The methodology 
was similar to Krusevac in the Prokuplje AOR during 
Phase II; however, there seemed to be a less 
methodical decision on how to expand the existing 
CDCs. There, new communities were selected based on 
the quality of their project proposals rather than 
geographical proximity to existing CDCs. As a result, 
although the documentation refers to a cluster division of 
CDCs in the Prokuplje AOR, focus groups and municipal 
officials (in Blace, Kursumlija and Prokuplje) indicated a 
process led from a few centers, rather than a regional 
approach. Zitoradja was an exception in the PK AOR; 
there, both the focus group and municipal representative 
identified CDCs in their regional forms from their 
inception. The working method described there also 
portrayed a regionally-representative decision-making 
process. 
Prokuplje Phase III Regionalization: The Prokuplje 
AOR also continued regional decision making in Phase 
III, but more in line with the planned strategy than in 
Krusevac (though here also there were no new local 
CDCs formed via the RCC vehicle). The CDCs selected 
their priorities locally with the highest priorities 
advancing to the RCC level; there the RCC, together 
with Mercy Corps staff, ranked all projects within the 
AOR. During these meetings, the local representatives 
were divided into several groups within which they 
ranked all but their own projects. Mercy Corps staff gave 
their own evaluation of the projects and the sum of the 
two determined the winners. Thus, it can be said that 
the selection procedure in the Prokuplje AOR was more direct and open. 
Novi Pazar Regionalization: The regionalization of CDCs in Novi Pazar seems never to have become accepted 
as a strategy. Consequently, while the number of CDCs in Krusevac and Prokuplje AOR remained fixed at the 
numbers dating from Phase II in 2002, in Novi Pazar the number of new CDCs continued to increase throughout 
CRDA. This continued to carry over into Phase III when, compared with Krusevac and Prokuplje, each of the new 
communities in Novi Pazar AOR became its own CDC. In the end, this explains the resulting disproportionately 
high number of Novi Pazar CDCs (50%) shown above. 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
16 
Krusevac & Prokuplje Approach Strengths: The fieldwork conducted during this assessment reveals that the 
lack of a singular, uniformly-evolving strategy embraced by all three offices was the result of fundamental 
differences in community mobilization strategy, rather than the result of administrative differences. The Krusevac 
team’s decision to create regional clusters was based on the premise that such a strategy would make Mercy 
Corps’ work more transparent and would increase the number of mobilized communities. Moreover, the team 
believed that by merging new with existing communities they would constantly introduce a competitive element to 
CRDA, resulting in better community planning and greater community-orientation of the projects. The team 
reckoned that, as a result, CDCs and local communities would need to remain alert to broader community needs 
in order to secure a new round of funding, thereby increasing the level of mobilization within the community. 
Krusevac & Prokuplje Approach Weaknesses: By attempting to cover as many MZs as possible, the Krusevac 
AOR team often merged geographically distant MZs into a single CDC; these communities rarely shared 
common problems and opportunities. As a result the RCC rarely met outside of required meetings with Mercy 
Corps. Thus, the CDCs never developed institutional capacity to become focal points for regional development. 
A Case of Centralization & Improper 
Representation Krusevac AOR Reliance on Municipal Support: 
Moreover, most of the CDC meetings in the Krusevac 
AOR were conducted in the municipal buildings, 
compared to Novi Pazar where CDCs met in a local MZ 
setting. (All four CDCs in Aleksandrovac, in the Krusevac 
AOR, did hold meetings in one of the represented MZs.) 
As a general rule, the public agency for city planning 
and/or representatives of public utility companies was 
often very active during CDC meetings in the Krusevac 
AOR. Although these are examples of very effective 
municipal support to MZs, focus groups conducted during 
this assessment indicate that, as a result of this practice, 
Krusevac CDCs became very much reliant on municipal 
support. The Ivanjica East Case Study in the text box 
presents a key example of how CRDA sometimes did not
succeed in making an impact on the communal 
organization of the targeted MZs, but instead relied on 
centralized municipal support during most steps of the 
project implementation cycle. This leading role of the 
municipality was justified by more efficient project 
implementation and a lack of institutional capacity within 
MZs. A similar situation was cited by focus groups in 
several other municipalities in the Krusevac AOR. 
Krusevac & Prokuplje AOR Geographic Proximity: An 
additional problem in the regional approach in both the 
KS and PK AORs was that in some cases, Mercy Corps merged too many geographically distant MZs into a 
single group. As a result, as noted by the Aleksandrovac West CDC focus group and municipal contact 
interviewee, the CDC rarely met outside of required meetings with Mercy Corps representatives. In that particular 
case, the CDC never developed institutional capacity to become a focal point for regional development. Instead, 
it became a forum where local communities advocated for the realization of their own development priorities. 
The Ivanjica East CDC visited during this assessment 
represents a key example of CRDA not succeeding in 
reaching the targeted local communities, but succeeding 
only on a centralized, regional level. In the case, ten CDC 
members were supposed to represent five MZs. However, 
for reasons that were not clear, the focus group revealed 
that only three of the five MZs were actually represented. In 
place of the remaining two MZs Mercy Corps allowed two 
female municipal officials whose families were originally 
from those MZs to serve on the CDC. 
The presidents of the three MZs that were represented, 
plus three young teenagers representing youth, did not 
show up for the focus group meeting. The two female 
municipal officials, who did attend the focus group, testified 
that they were surprised they were selected to represent 
those MZs. In their words, “We left our old MZs long ago; 
hence, we never really identified with their local problems, 
which made representing their interests challenging. Since 
we wanted to make something good happen for our 
ancestor land, we accepted and voted positively for the 
projects.” It was further noted that the youth representatives 
rarely showed up for meetings. 
The focus group also noted that the CDCs in Ivanjica were 
only responsible for project selection, while the municipality 
played the key role in writing proposals, preparing 
documentation and implementing projects. Several other 
focus groups conducted in the Krusevac AOR (Cicevac, 
Varvarin, Trstenik) revealed that the case of Ivanjica East
was not unique and that municipal officials were, for the 
most part, predominantly driving the process. 
Novi Pazar Approach Strengths: The Novi Pazar team believed that by opening the project application 
eligibility to a majority of MZs, Mercy Corps would be merely scratching the surface in those communities without 
making a real impact on them. Instead of increasing community mobilization, this would in turn reduce CRDA 
mobilization efforts to short-term organization merely in order to obtain donor financial assistance. Due to this 
fear of leaving no permanent impact on the communities, Novi Pazar management was reluctant to change its 
mobilization methodology. 
CDC Capacity Development: This assessment found that the Novi Pazar strategy was largely successful; 
however, the degree of institutional capacity was not uniform in all CDCs. Those that joined CRDA in Phases I 
and II, and hence had more time to practice decision-making and project implementation, had significantly higher 
institutional capacity. Those established in Phase III did not benefit from this experience to the same degree, as 
they did not have time to improve their learning curves and establish durable organizational legacies. However, 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
17 
this should not be cited as a weakness in the Novi Pazar strategy, but rather a consequence of the abrupt 
transition from CRDA to CRDA-E soon after the Phase III transition. 
Novi Pazar Approach Weaknesses: The Novi Pazar approach inherently resulted in more locally-centered 
initiatives than in the Krusevac and Prokuplje AORs due to its lack of a regional expansion strategy. Another 
hindrance observed in the mobilization efforts of the Novi Pazar AOR was the fact that management retained 
annual funding guarantees for each CDC throughout the duration of the program. Consequently, as one local 
staff member observed, “the existing CDCs became very lazy, drafting very shallow and poorly justified project 
proposals, a majority of which we were forced to finance to meet our spending obligations.” This practice was the 
primary contributor to the fact that the Novi Pazar office implemented the fewest number of projects, despite 
having the most CDCs. The question remains whether it would have been more beneficial to, rather than invest 
resources into forming new CDCs, expand the investment to new MZs under the tutelage of existing CDCs. 
Approach Unification Efforts: Beginning in 2004, management attempted to reconcile the strategic differences 
between the AORs. While the Krusevac and Prokuplje offices already had relatively similar approaches, 
unification was fully achieved when, in April 2004, the Prokuplje office was closed and merged with Krusevac. 
The differences in approaches with Novi Pazar remained unresolved at the end of 2004 when CRDA transitioned 
to CRDA-E and Mercy Corps essentially abandoned the CDC approach altogether. 
Community Fairs 
The Motivation: The idea of Community Fairs was created in 2003 by the Novi Pazar team as a way of 
increasing community participation in urban areas. The team determined that in the first two years of CRDA, rural 
areas had achieved a much higher level of community mobilization than urban areas. Mercy Corps had found it 
difficult to attract urban citizens to town meetings, even though many citizens and groups involved in civil society 
had individually approached Mercy Corps requesting support for small projects to support their group or special 
interest. Hence, a new venue was needed for urban citizens to address priorities relevant for the development of 
their communities. The result was the innovative Community Fair concept, events where different community 
groups, NGOs and institutions were able to present their project ideas to the community. Community Fairs were 
piloted in eight communities in 2003; after the initial successes, all three AORs embraced the method, making 
Community Fairs the second prevalent community mobilization and project selection method in CRDA. 
Community Fair Indicators for Success: Community Fair Goals Indicators 
The Community Fair Manual, prepared in 
2004, defines the key objectives of the 
activity; these are presented in the table to 
the right. This assessment is based on the 
evaluation of three of the six objectives 
and corresponding quantitative indicators 
identified by the author, as well as the 
findings from focus groups with CDC 
members. 
• Mobilize urban communities. 
• Increase diversity of decision makers.
• Identify projects. 
• Increase organizational/group 
visibility. 
• Educate the public about issues and 
problems. 
• Number of participating groups 
& organizations. 
• Number of projects 
implemented. 
• Build capacity in communities. 
• Number of citizens voting for 
projects. 
Average Participating Groups
(per Community Fair)
26.6
21.0
12.9
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2003 2004 2005
Participants per Fair
Participating Groups: In 2003 Mercy Corps 
organized eight community fairs, seven in the 
Novi Pazar AOR. Although the idea was new, 
citizens responded enthusiastically, proposing 
103 projects through the eight fairs. Following 
this positive response, Mercy Corps expanded 
Community Fairs to include all AORs. In 2004, 
twelve fairs were organized and the number of 
participating groups (each with its own proposed 
project) more than doubled to 252. In 2005, after 
the transition to CRDA-E Mercy Corps retained 
the Community Fair component and organized 
nine more fairs; 239 groups participated in the 
nine fairs, an average of nearly 27 project 
proposals per fair. 
From 2003 to 2005 the average number of participating groups per 
Community Fair more than doubled, indicating the success of the fairs 
in mobilizing urban communities. Since each participating group came 
prepared to present their project idea, these figures show both a high 
level of community mobilization and a diversification of interest among 
local decision makers. 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
18 
Novi Pazar Participating Groups: While increase in participants was a general trend, in the Novi Pazar AOR 
the number slightly decreased in 2004 compared with 2003. In three municipalities (Novi Pazar, Prijepolje, Tutin) 
the fairs were cancelled due to low participation; according to a staff focus group this was at least partly due to 
local elections and increased political tensions during that period which made it difficult to adequately publicize 
and garner participation in the fairs. 
Average Voter Turnout
(Voters per Community Fair)
1351
2715
3571
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
2003 2004 2005
Voters per Fair
The Community Fair manual states that, in urban settings where the 
population is highest, Mercy Corps often had difficulty getting even as 
many as twenty people to attend Town Hall meetings. In the first year 
alone nearly 11,000 people attended the fairs and voiced their opinion. 
In all, over 75,000 people voted in Community Fairs from 2003-2005.
Voter Turnout: Mercy Corps succeeded in 
organizing at least one fair in each of its 18 
municipalities. In the first year alone, nearly 
11,000 people turned out to vote for the new 
events. Over the three year period Community 
Fairs were held, over 75,500 citizens, or 17% of 
Mercy Corps’ urban population voted for 602 
projects, of which 152 received financial support. 
(Eleven projects were later cancelled; therefore, 
the original figure was 163.) The annual 
increases in voter turnout for Community Fairs 
indicate their growth in popularity and their 
success as a tool for community mobilization in 
the hard to reach urban communities. 
Projects Implemented: The number of projects 
implemented is only partly valuable as an 
indicator since Mercy Corps offices limited the number of projects per fair. For example in 2005, projects financed 
from the nine fairs were limited to four per fair – two for organizations and clubs (maximum $4,000) and two from 
schools and institutions (maximum $10,000). In 2004, however, the number of projects financed at each fair was 
flexible and depended on the quality of the fair’s organization, the participants’ creativity and presentation of their 
projects, and voter turnout. (The required match for Community Fair projects was typically 20%.) The table below 
summarizes the results of Community Fairs over their three years of implementation. 
Community Fair Results 2003-2005
Year Community 
Fairs 
Participating
Groups 
Average 
Participants
Per Fair 
Projects
Selected Voters
Average 
Voters 
Per Fair 
2003 8 103 12.9 40 10,806 1,351 
2004 12 252 21.0 77 32,585 2,715 
2005 9 239 26.6 36 32,138 3,571 
Total 29 594 153 75,529
Focus Group Results: To obtain qualitative feedback from communities regarding the impact of Community 
Fairs, focus groups were held with former CDC members and key staff members involved in the events. 
Respondents provided original responses, not selecting from a pre-developed list. Based on the results and 
discussions, the key areas of impact from Community Fairs were as follows (ranked in order most often cited). 
1. Increased community mobilization and number of participating stakeholders. Improved transparency 
in the project selection process, decreasing citizens’ suspicions about financial support and 
encouraging them to take a more active role in local development (93% of respondents). 
2. Bring people together, increase solidarity, enhance the community atmosphere, and improve the 
competitive and playful spirit in the community (50% of respondents). 
3. Identify the main problems faced by the community, and in particular allow the representation of 
small, neglected groups and their development needs (42% of respondents). 
Problems & challenges: Despite the positive impacts, Community Fairs faced several organizational and 
implementation problems: 
• Mobilizing local groups of people willing to assume the primarily responsibility for organizing and 
advertising fairs. Throughout all three years, Mercy Corps continued to play the key role in organizing 
and staffing fairs with minimal (albeit increasing) support from the local community. 
• Dealing with ad hoc groups created solely for the purpose of participating in the fair to receive a project. 
This often resulted in unstable financial and logistical commitments to the proposed projects. 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
19 
Basis: $40 million USAID Investment
Community Fairs 
2001-2005
$740,000
CRDA-E
2005-2007, 
$10,050,000
Fruit & Dairy
2001-2004, 
$4,090,000
Community CDC
2001-2004 
$11,930,000
Admin & ICR
2001-2007 
$13,190,000
Though Community Fairs were positive events from a 
community mobilization perspective, they were extremely high 
maintenance and problematic initiatives for Mercy Corps and the 
staff involved. This can be easily represented by comparing the 
two figures previously presented regarding the number of 
projects implemented and their associated value. Aside from the 
obvious fact that the high number of projects accounted for only 
a small monetary value, the projects were much more difficult to 
implement as they often required very diverse procurement of 
specialized equipment for recipients that tended to be very 
particular about quality and branding. In the face of the high 
spending targets of CRDA, Community Fairs often strained 
management, program and procurement staff and resulted in 
frustration by the groups involved due to the inevitable delays.
Projects & Investments of CRDA Activities
Other
11 projects
Community 
Fairs
152 Projects
CDC
312 Projects
• Routine delays on the part of Mercy Corps in 
implementing the selected projects due to the 
great number of very small and diverse 
procurement needs necessitated by these 
specialized projects. Delays were often caused by 
both program and procurement staff: from the 
program side, there was often little time to 
prepare specifications since new fairs were 
continuously being organized; from the 
procurement side, the small value of the fair 
projects made them less of a priority as 
procurement staff needed to meet their higher 
spending targets. 
• Difficulty in implementing the projects often 
resulted, as the groups proposing them were 
often not able to receive permits, projects were 
infeasible, project values were underestimated, 
and the groups were not able to meet financial 
obligations. 
Regional Office Differences: The two Mercy Corps 
regional offices (Prokuplje had already been closed 
and combined with Krusevac) also had different 
approaches and philosophies toward Community 
Fairs. In the Krusevac AOR the primary responsibility 
in organizing the fairs lied with the municipality and 
their identification of the group of people in charge of 
the event, with strong support from of Mercy Corps 
local staff. In Novi Pazar, on the other hand, CDCs 
were entrusted with organizing the fairs, with 
substantially less assistance from Mercy Corps staff. 
In 2005 all fairs were organized by a single Mercy 
Corps staff member with local support from the 
municipality and/or an organization charged with a supporting role. 
Observations on Regional Office Differences: Focus group discussions indicated that due to the municipal 
officials’ direct inclusion in the process in Krusevac, fair organization was less of a burden on Mercy Corps, as 
this practice facilitated permitting, advertising, and reservation of space, all of which were problematic in Novi 
Pazar. Hence, although the number of participating groups was not significantly different between the two AORs, 
it seems that the Krusevac approach was more effective in mobilizing the broader community, which impacted 
both attendance and the ultimate success of the fairs. It can be further noted that the average voter turnout per 
fair was 10% higher in Krusevac than in Novi Pazar (though this figure may not be significant and could easily be 
attributable to other causes). 
Recommendations & Lessons Learned: From the findings of this assessment and the above discussion, a 
number of recommendations can be made: 
• Mercy Corps should assure that groups selected to organize the fairs have broad public appeal and 
active support, if not direct participation, from municipal officials. 
• A more strict process of project and organizational pre-screening would help ensure the selection of 
genuine priority projects and organizations able to lead the project through its completion. 
• Mercy Corps assistance should be limited to procurement (not construction, which often resulted in 
permitting challenges) which would facilitate tendering and procurement. Further limiting the number of 
different items for procurement would result in additional efficiencies. 
• Community mobilization could be further increased from its already high level by adding a reward 
system in the process, such as special prizes (standard and procured in advance for the fair) for best 
presented projects. 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
20 
Group Impact & Sustainability 
Assessment Scope: This section of the assessment focuses on the impact and sustainability of groups formed 
in the Community Development era of CRDA from 2001-2004. In the community development efforts, Mercy 
Corps mobilized the formation of three different groups: i) CDCs and their successor RCCs, ii) Community Fair 
(in Krusevac and Prokuplje AORs), and iii) Special Interest Groups (SIGs). Community Fair groups were merely 
ad-hoc organizational teams that as such never developed a particular work dynamic or organizational capacity; 
as a result, they are not discussed in this report. SIGs were developed in 2004 in an effort to increase 
participation from groups that did not generally attend community meetings and other events organized in the 
communities. SIGs, however, were never realized, likely due to the lack of time. Thus, the focus this section of 
the report is the analysis of CDC impact and sustainability. The data presented was collected from community 
visits, focus groups with CDC members, interviews with current and former municipal officials and community 
leaders, and staff interviews, all conducted in August and September 2006. The fieldwork research conducted in 
this assessment includes: 
1. CDC Membership & Representation 
2. CDC Organizational Sustainability 
3. CDC Impact 
Assessment Challenges: The main challenge faced by the evaluator in assessing CDCs was the lack of readily 
available data on the CDCs. Since the process was handled from three different offices and led by constantly 
changing staff members, even basic information on the working dynamics and profile was missing. For example, 
there were little or no records on even very basic levels, such as the number of CDCs formed, their membership 
lists, frequency of meetings, the number of projects proposed and implemented, and their current status. Thus, 
an entire month was essentially spent compiling this level of data. This information is tabulated in Annex 3. 
CDC Membership & Representation 
Basis of Assessment Findings: Due to the nature of the focus groups surveyed and the fact that the focus 
groups were not always completely representative of the CDCs, the findings regarding representation of the 
various interests of the local communities are based primarily on the evaluator’s observations and participants’ 
comments during the focus groups, specifically: 
• the turnout of non-governmental and underrepresented groups at focus groups sessions; 
• their participation in the discussions during the sessions; 
• references to the main and participating actors in CRDA activities. 
Urban CDCs: All of the urban CDCs assessed included in their membership a representative of the public 
institute for Urban Planning; most also included representatives of public utilities companies, such as sanitary 
control or water supply; and most included representatives of education and/or health sectors. Most of these 
members were, however, on the public payroll and closely connected to the municipal government, thereby 
reducing or stifling membership diversity and input from civil society. In terms of the frequency of meeting, the 
CDCs surveyed indicated that meetings were held mostly when required by Mercy Corps; as a result, there were 
no developed group dynamics observed in any of the urban CDCs. In only two cases surveyed was there 
effective civil society diversity, and even in these two cases, the initial diversity did not last long. 
• The Kursumlija Town CDC was the only case assessed where a representative of the business sector 
was included and who actively participated in the work of the CDCs. The full membership of this CDC, 
however, met only three times, and as new communities were being added, the CDC was gradually 
transformed from a fixed-membership development council to a fluid group whose sole purpose was 
project selection and voting. 
• The Prokuplje Town CDC was the only CDC which had several locally active citizens plus a 
representative of a local NGO. However, at the focus group, it was revealed that this CDC had been 
“reformed” as the “civil society element was too noisy;” the CDC therefore remained primarily in the 
local government’s hands. (This fact was revealed during the focus group discussion for this 
assessment. Civil society representatives were shocked to learn that the group did not merely stop 
meeting, as they believed was the case, but that they had been excluded from its work.) 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
21 
Rural CDCs: In the rural areas, focus group discussions clearly revealed that the main actors in CRDA 
implementation were the MZ leaders. In a few cases the school directors were also involved. Rural CDC focus 
groups indicated that the rural CDCs met more frequently and, in addition to official project-selection meetings, 
other CRDA issues were often discussed during informal 
meetings and conversations among the community 
members. These groups seemed much more dynamic and 
interconnected in comparison with their urban counterparts, 
probably due to the closeness of the actors leading the 
process and the fact that most of the rural CDCs covered 
small geographies. In only one case was the CDC led by an 
individual other than an MZ leader or official: in the Kominje
CDC in Novi Pazar, the CDC formation and functionality 
was led by a local entrepreneur and recently returned 
Diaspora. 
Urban & Rural CDC Membership 
The membership of urban CDCs generally reflected 
Mercy Corps’ recommendations regarding the interest 
groups that should be represented. On the other hand, 
the majority of rural CDCs were composed primarily of 
MZ representatives and their close associates. When 
compared to urban areas, rural CDCs had a significantly 
stronger sense of common ownership of the CRDA 
process and projects, validating observations in 2003 
that CDCs did not have sufficient appeal in urban areas.
Hence, these findings give added justification for the 
organization of Community Fairs as a more targeted and 
effective means of urban community mobilization. 
Vulnerable Group Representation: Community meetings organized by CDCs were supposed to include 
vulnerable and underreported groups, including women, minorities and youth. However, out of 89 former CDC 
members participating in focus groups, only 12 (13%) were women. Of those, eight can be termed active
members. There were no representatives of youth or minorities in any of the focus groups. Furthermore, several 
CDC contact persons confirmed that it was not uncommon for CDC membership lists submitted to Mercy Corps 
to include the names of individuals who satisfied Mercy Corps’ requirements for CDC membership without their 
active participation. They stated that, in reality, many of the alleged members never attended or actively 
participated in the CDC, and that implementation of the projects usually fell upon a few very active, overly 
aggressive and dominant citizens. For these reasons it is very hard to assign any realistic figures to the 
participation of women and vulnerable groups, as required by USAID indicators. 
Gender Representation: While it 
is true that women and minority 
representatives represented 30% 
or more of the official CDC 
membership, anecdotal evidence 
from focus groups suggests that 
most of the women elected as 
CDC members were either 
already active in their 
communities (hospital or school 
managers, teachers, etc.) or else 
they were included only to satisfy 
Mercy Corps’ requirements. 
Nonetheless, for those already￾active female community 
members, CDCs proved beneficial as they provided the women with a venue where they could fight for the 
development of their communities on equal footing with men. In the CDCs, their vote was assured to be 
respected and followed. As such, their visibility and activity in their local communities did increase as a result. 
Gender Representation on CDCs 
(+) Gender Inclusiveness (-) Artificial Gender Representation 
There are several cases where 
gender ratio requirement as 
defined by the USAID indicator 
was not just formally satisfied, but 
achieved true gender equality and 
inclusiveness. In Bele Vode CDC 
(Novi Pazar) from 4 CDC 
members who came to the 
meeting, two were women, both 
working in the local school. Both 
women, and in particular the 
school president were very active 
in the session, and the president 
of the CDC continuously made 
references to their past work, 
often passing the word to them 
during the discussions. 
The president of the Prokuplje Northeast CDC 
cited an example of formally assuring the 
representation of women and vulnerable groups. 
During one of the town hall meetings organized 
by their CDC, Mercy Corps staff warned the 
CDC members that seven more women were 
needed to meet the 30% requirement for 
vulnerable group representation, and that if the 
requirement was not met, Mercy Corps would 
leave. In order to prevent that from happening, 
the CDC members present scattered around the 
city and “dragged several old ladies and school 
girls” to the meeting. The “missing” women 
came, and the meeting continued. However the 
question remains whether their appearance 
made any difference in the decision-making 
process organized that day. 
Under-Representation Causes: The conclusion that the active membership and participation of women and 
vulnerable groups was not generally observed by the CDCs can be partially explained by the particularly 
traditional mentality of the southern Serbia and the relative brevity of the CRDA program. A “structured” approach 
to CDCs came only with the second phase of CRDA community development activities; as such, it took time to 
produce the desired effects. Thus, that fact that the requirements for CDC membership were not always achieved 
should not cast a negative light on the impact of CRDA community mobilization and the program’s effect on 
increased local ownership of development activities. It is very likely that if the program continued, the new 
practices would have taken root, thereby impacting the representation of the vulnerable groups on a deeper level. 
CDC Organizational Sustainability 
CDC Sustainability Objective: The primary goal of CRDA was to help citizens to actively affect their 
communities in a positive manner through democratic participation. One of the SMART objectives identified by 
Mercy Corps in the 2004 logical frame was to “facilitate 60% of CDCs to become sustainable institutions that 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
22 
demonstrate tangible capacity for positive community development by end of CRDA.” The planned activities to 
accomplish this goal included “training CDC members to legally develop to independent, self-sustainable focal 
groups for regional development.” However, this activity was not undertaken due to the transition to CRDA-E; as 
a result of the transition, Mercy Corps effectively abandoned community development activities. 
Transition from Community CRDA: During the focus group interviews, it was apparent that Mercy Corps never 
directly informed the CDCs that the old working methodology was being abandoned and that CDCs would no 
longer remain the decision-making bodies for Mercy Corps’ financial resources under the new CRDA-E program. 
The failure to inform the members left the CDCs vulnerable and, in many cases, dissatisfied with the transition of 
Mercy Corps’ cooperation. 
Transition to CRDA-E: Although the CDC approach was abandoned, under the CRDA-E program Mercy Corps 
nominated five former CDC members per municipality for membership on the new Municipal Economic Councils 
(MECs), the new partner bodies for CRDA-E. However, it was left to the municipalities to decide on the final list of 
members, and in many cases municipalities chose not to include the CDC members nominated by Mercy Corps. 
The most often cited reason for not including these members was that since MECs were formed in 2005 (after 
local elections in 2004) some of these members belonged to the former governing political parties and that the 
new municipal officials wanted to include members with whom they had already cooperated. In other cases, the 
recommended CDC members were not interested, mostly due to the travel distance between their local MZ and 
the municipalities where the meetings were typically held. Based on the focus groups interviewed, only 2% of 
CDC members were included in CRDA-E MECs (based on a sample size representing 20% of all former CDC 
members). Out of the 27 CDCs surveyed in this assessment, only six (21%) had CDC members serving on a 
MEC; and of those, each had only one member on the MEC. (MECs were formed in only 15 of the 18 
municipalities, meaning that CDCs in three municipalities would inherently not have any members; this of course 
partly rationalizes the low percentage.) 
Post-CRDA CDC Activity Level: This assessment categorizes the activity level of the CDCs post-CRDA into 
five categories ranging from active to the complete dissolution following the cessation of Mercy Corps’ community 
development activities. 
Post-CRDA CDC Activity Levels
B A
C
D
E
Group 
(See chart.) 
Post-CRDA CDC Activity Level 
(Based on 27 CDCs surveyed in this 
assessment out of total of 76) 
CDCs Post-CRDA CDC Activity Level 
Graphical Representation 
A 
CDC continued meeting and/or transitioned into 
new organization to become eligible for other 
donors and activities. 
1* 
B 
Former CDC member serving on Mercy Corps 
CRDA-E MEC and still advocating for development 
of their community. 
6 
C 
Parts of CDC continued to exist after CRDA, but 
solely due to ongoing projects financed by Mercy 
Corps. 
1 
D 
An informal group existed before CRDA, and 
began calling itself a CDC for the purposes of 
Mercy Corps assistance. After CRDA, the group 
reverted to its original form. 
6 
E Entirely abandoned CDC approach; local 
development activities reverted to the MZ. 13 
* In this only example of a CDC registering into an official organization, the CDC transformed into an agricultural association which 
subsequently cooperated with Mercy Corps under CRDA-E. It cannot therefore be said that this CDC continued activities in line with 
those it performed in cooperation with CRDA Community Development. 
Sustainability Assessment: Since no CDC represented by the focus groups (and no known example exists 
overall) officially registered as a civil society group (with the exception of the agriculture association and the six 
that existed prior to CRDA) and only one continued to meet (but only under the auspices of an ongoing CRDA 
project) it can be concluded that the goal of institutional self-sustainability was not achieved. This, however, 
should not be taken directly as a sign of failure to increase community mobilization and participation. The 
predominant sentiment expressed across the focus groups was that the general outcome of CDC sustainability 
may have been different if CRDA had not transitioned so abruptly. Others expressed regrets in their tardiness in 
adapting to the new organization required by Mercy Corps. In general, most regretted the end of CDC support, as 
CRDA was one of the rare, or even the only, venues for underdeveloped rural communities to acquire support for 
their local development efforts. In the words of one Krusevac Town CDC member: “It is a pity that Mercy Corps 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
23 
changed its organization method when we finally got used to this kind of work, when we became trained and 
more efficient in it.” 
CDC Impact 
Focus Group Results: To measure the impact the CDCs and their activities had in communities, focus groups 
and interviewees were asked to provide up to five responses (as a group) about what they believed was the most 
significant change they observed in their communities as a result of CRDA. As seen in the diagram, the most 
cited impact was a change in the organization of work and consciences of people in the community. Many 
respondents also cited a particular project in their community, such as a new road or school rehabilitation. The 
top responses are discussed below and presented in full detail in Annex 4. 
The results shown in this diagram are taken from a sample group of 35 CDCs: 16 
CDC focus groups (representing 20 CDCs), 7 telephone interviews with CDC 
presidents, and 12 interviews with municipal contact persons who worked with, but 
were not members of, CDCs. Each group or interviewee was asked to respond to 
the question, “What was the most significant change observed in your community 
as a result of CRDA,” citing up to five results that they felt were most important. 
No list of pre-selected responses was provided, so that the responses were 
original from their side. Focus groups were asked to reach a consensus on their 
responses and reply as a group. Similar answers were later grouped together by 
the evaluator for purposes of analysis and presentation. 
CRDA Impact on CDCs 
(Top Responses from Sample of 35) 
0
5
10
15
20
25
Improv e
Work
Organization
Increase
Local
Participation
Benefit from
Specific
Proj ect
Rev italize
Community
Improv e
Democratic
Practices
Motiv ate
Future
Inv estment
Experience
with External
Donors
Improv e
Municipal-MZ
Relations
Prov ide
Matching
Contribution
Survey & Focus Group Responses
• Improve Work Organization 
(66%): A majority of the focus 
groups said that one of five main 
areas of CDC impact was to 
improve the organization of work 
in the community. In particular, 
the most important legacy cited 
was the practical training in 
presenting community problems 
and preparing project proposals. 
Through CRDA communities 
learned teamwork, the ability to 
strategically plan ahead, and to 
professionally complete their 
work on time and within budget. 
The Raska Town CDC focus 
group said that, “in the beginning 
project proposals looked like we 
were back in school again.” They 
did not understand the system or 
the need to present their 
problems in such a manner. Now 
former members are quick to 
write a proposal and help secure 
new funding for their town. In 
Cicevac, some CDC members 
continue to use Mercy Corps application formats when applying to other donors. All focus groups 
agreed that as Mercy Corps was among the first (and in many the very first) donors, the experience 
they acquired was instrumental for their subsequent activities. 
• Improve Local Participation (54%): Focus groups routinely stated that the CDCs increased the 
involvement of citizens in decision-making by creating incentives for communities to take a more active 
role in their development; 27% testified that the CDC experience helped them to identify the main 
priorities in their communities. The focus groups also revealed that CRDA investments served as 
stimuli for dysfunctional or nonexistent community mobilization efforts and succeeded in moving people 
away from the apathy of the 1990s. In addition, the focus groups revealed that most of the communities 
that joined the CRDA program in the later stages did so at their own request after observing Mercy 
Corps’ work on other nearby regions. 
• Revitalize Community (31%): Eleven respondents stated that CRDA contributed to the general 
revitalization of their community, increased the living standards, invested in the local infrastructure as a 
precondition for economic development, or a similar response. Of these, one focus group and two 
former CDC presidents stated that CRDA activities diminished population migration from their 
communities; all three of these were from Sandzak (two in Novi Pazar and one in Prijepolje). 
• Benefit from Specific Project (43%): Fifteen of the 35 respondents/groups cited a single, specific 
project implemented in their community, such as a road, water supply, school rehabilitation, and in one 
case, a garbage truck. 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
24 
• Improve Democratic Processes (23%): Eight respondents (six focus groups and two municipal 
contact persons) stated that their experience with CDCs increased the democratic practices in the 
municipality or community. The CDC methodology of prioritizing and selecting projects was the first 
experience with democratic decision-making for many interviewees and a rare occurrence of apolitical 
project prioritization based on objective criteria and community needs. 
• Motivate Future Investment (20%): Seven respondents argued that their involvement with CDCs 
motivated their community to increase investments into their community and undertake fundraising 
initiatives in order to continue school, electricity, water or other infrastructure projects. 
• Experience with External Donors (20%): Seven respondents stated that their experience with CDCs 
increased the readiness of both communities and municipalities in working with external donors. Apart 
from improving their learning curve and increasing municipal preparedness to present their 
development needs, some municipalities introduced a special budget line item designated for matching 
contributions for donor funds. 
• Improve Municipal-MZ Relations (17%): Six respondents (interestingly, three CDC focus groups and 
three municipal contacts) stated that the CDC improved the attentiveness of municipalities to the needs 
of the MZs. Mercy Corps investments were dependent on counterpart contributions which, due to their 
size, could rarely be matched by the MZ or community. Municipal officials therefore realized that the 
assistance was conditional on their support; as a result, they improved the channels of communications 
with the MZs. As a result, three municipalities now send priority identification forms to the MZs before 
finalizing their annual budget plans in order to obtain up-to-date information about MZs’ development 
needs. 
• Provide Matching Contribution (11%): Four respondents (three of them, however, were municipal 
representatives) observed an increase in the willingness of citizens to contribute financially to the 
development of their communities. The requirement for community match changed the perception of 
citizens that the government or external actors should be responsible for the development of their 
community. As a result of CRDA, several municipalities implemented a “dinar-for-dinar” investment 
plan. Under this plan, a separate bank account was opened for each MZ where any contribution paid 
by the local community is matched by the same amount from the municipal budget. Aleksandrovac 
municipality adopted this practice at the request of an MZ to finance a local electrical substation. 
• Negative Impact (1 CDC): Only one CDC, Blace South, cited negative responses on the impact of the 
CDCs. The focus group responses ranged from having “absolutely no impact,” to the mayor controlling 
all projects approved, to corruption on the part of Mercy Corps (correctly citing one individual who was 
fired from Mercy Corps for accepting bribes for project approvals). Though this focus group was very 
vocal in its criticism of Mercy Corps, it was noted by the assessment team that Blace South CDC was 
comprised of several MZs, and representatives of the MZ with whom Mercy Corps most cooperated 
were not present at the focus group. Adding to their frustration was that in 2004, the community was 
awarded an approved project which was never implemented due to the transition to CRDA-E. 
M&E Record Keeping in CRDA 
Web-PRS M&E System: The key (and only) program monitoring and evaluation tool in use by Mercy Corps and 
other CRDA partners in Serbia was the USAID-mandated Web-PRS (Project Reporting System), an online 
database developed, administered and licensed by CHF. (All five CRDA partners were required to purchase a 
licensing agreement for the life of CRDA.) PRS is a fairly sophisticated tool created to track all community and 
project data, impact, indicators and events, allowing users to quickly and easily sort and manipulate data and 
generate reports. However, because of its complexity, it has often proved bulky, challenging and reliant on 
external maintenance. 
Web-PRS Management: The management of Web-PRS varied among the five CRDA partners; while some 
partners designated a specific person or even team to be responsible for the system, within Mercy Corps it was 
the responsibility of individual program officers to both enter the data and verify its accuracy. Although from the 
inception of CRDA, one person was always responsible for “web publishing” the field entries (and in theory was 
supposed to check for and correct any mistakes made in the data entry process) the PRS managers within Mercy 
Corps apparently rarely assumed this role. Instead, they published the PRS data, but did not provide any sort of 
quality check of the entries. Only during the period from October 2002 through April 2005, did the Novi Pazar 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
25 
Head of Office, Alan Bennett, closely supervise the process; to his credit, his efforts significantly improved the 
accuracy and completeness of the information in Web-PRS for the Novi Pazar AOR during his tenure. 
Web-PRS Problems: As a result of the organizational structure of Mercy Corps Web-PRS management, many 
serious problems in the efficacy, accuracy and organization of the data and system were revealed in June 2006 
when this assessment was initiated. While some problems proved to be technical in nature and were resolved 
through cooperation with CHF, most of the problems originated within Mercy Corps and required considerable 
effort to correct, as well as implement changes to internal management and organization. These latter problems 
are presented in this section. 
Content Problems: CHF delivered training for all CRDA partners on the use of Web-PRS; however, since those 
initial trainings in 2001-2002 the turnover of Mercy Corps staff (and presumably other partners) was high over the 
years, as is typical with development programs. As a result, new project officers were only briefly introduced to 
Web-PRS by their tenured colleagues and were often left to resolve the ongoing data issues individually or 
informally among their immediate co-workers. It is easy to imagine how this problem was allowed to “snowball” 
through inconsistent data entry among project officers, lack of training for new staff members, apathy on the part 
of departing staff members, and an almost complete lack of oversight and system maintenance to control or even 
determine the extent of missing and inaccurate data. As a result, the following problems arose: 
• Inability to generate a report to count community projects. The ability to process even this most 
simple of requests, the number of community projects implemented, was not possible due to the 
irregular, inconsistent, inaccurate and general lack of updating Web-PRS. There were many cases of 
projects not entered in PRS, project codes entered incorrectly, and inconsistencies with respect to 
categorizing the project type, not to mention widespread missing data field entries. Resolving this 
situation required the full-time attention of the M&E Coordinator to review and correct the entries for 
over 1,000 projects, individually, to determine their status, pillar, category, and means of selection. 
• Inability to perform a search by a CDC or specific project location. Again, this seemingly simple 
but important search was impossible to perform to determine how many and which projects were 
identified and implemented by which CDC. Often program officers entered approximate, instead of 
actual, project localities if the actual locality was not already included in the pre-defined Web-PRS 
location menu. (The only individuals who could add localities were the Web-PRS managers in 
Belgrade; so rather than inform the Belgrade manager to add a new locality and await the result, 
program officers often just entered the nearest existing locality already in Web-PRS.) 
• Inability to identify projects based on their selection procedure or CRDA component. It was 
impossible to distinguish between projects selected by CDCs versus those selected by Community 
Fairs. All “community” projects bear the same “C” code regardless of whether they are CDC or 
Community Fair projects. To generate this list, searches were conducted on long text fields (for 
example to search for “Community Fair” in the project description) and the results counted manually, an 
obviously very inefficient means to generate this data. (This problem can be traced at least in part to 
reluctance on the part of the finance team to increase the number of codes available to distinguish 
project types and means of selection, since these were tied to increased accounting codes. Their 
reluctance in turn can be traced to a bad practice whereby finance, rather than program managers, 
assigned accounting codes.) This issue in particular could probably have easily been solved by 
requiring Program Managers to assign accounting codes for all program expenses. 
• Inability to accurately determine project status. It was impossible to accurately obtain an update of 
the project status (i.e. approved, under tender, contract signed, work in progress, finalization, complete) 
due to lack of updating the status as well as inconsistent understanding among program officers with 
respect to the definitions. To indicate the extent of this problem, at the time of this writing (April 2007) 
only 554 out of 1,370 projects undertaken by Mercy Corps during the life of CRDA are “completed” in 
PRS. 
• Inability to determine whether projects are on schedule. In addition to the lack of timely updating 
previously mentioned, target end dates were routinely updated without saving the original date. 
Therefore, though projects might be allowed to slip indefinitely, no flags were raised since the end date 
could easily be extended by project officers. 
• Inability to accurately determine CRDA investment: There were significant inconsistencies between 
the financial information in Web-PRS and in Mercy Corps’ official financial management systems. Once 
the payment errors in Web-PRS were discovered, an additional problem ensued: there was no 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
26 
accurate external financial database that could be easily used to correct Web-PRS due primarily to two 
reasons: i) project codes were not entered in the same format in Web-PRS and in MAS-90, Mercy 
Corps expense-based accounting system; and ii) the Quicken system used to track Mercy Corps 
accruals and obligations was also inaccurate, primarily due to procedural failures that did not capture 
canceled contracts, amendments and any other non-routine contract or payment circumstances. This 
problem was corrected beginning in November 2006, with the arrival of Frank Francis as Finance & 
Administration Director, when he organized a thorough check of Mercy Corps entire history of project 
payments; using these reconciled figures, all payments were subsequently entered in Web-PRS. 
• Inability to accurately determine matching contribution: It was not possible, and remains so, to 
accurately determine matching contributions collected. When projects are approved the pledged 
contribution is entered into Web-PRS; when the obligation is met, the figure is updated with the actual 
amount collected and documented. However, there is no way to distinguish between whether match is 
pledged or actually contributed and documented. Furthermore, no reliable and verifiable database was 
available that could be used to reconcile Web-PRS by project. Instead, a very labor-intensive process 
of verifying the original hardcopy match vouchers project-by-project was completed. 
Web-PRS Reconciliation: Reconciliation of Web-PRS data took six weeks of full-time attention at the beginning 
of the assignment to correct basic data entries so that searches could provide the data necessary for the Outputs 
section of this report, and to arrive to a point where the data could be used to begin laying out a strategy and 
design for the field work. Updating project status and reconciling financial figures took an additional month 
beyond that. A brief summary of the measures taken include: 
• All missing projects were identified through other databases and entered into Web-PRS. 
• Each and every project was checked, noting inconsistencies and missing data fields. 
• Community projects were systematically re-categorized into standard project categories. 
• All Community Fair projects were first identified, then modified to include a “CF” designation in front of 
the project title. 
• A separate database of all community projects was created, where all projects are organized according 
to their respective CDC. 
• Modifying target dates now requires that the prior deadline is recorded as a Web-PRS remark. 
• New, centralized data entry policies were introduced to ensure the accuracy of Web-PRS data with 
weekly managerial oversight by the M&E Coordinator. 
• All payment and match vouchers processed by the Finance department are automatically directed to a 
designated data entry specialist who is responsible for entering them into Web-PRS. 
Lessons Learned & Recommendations 
Applying Recommendations: On the basis this assessment, the following recommendations are offered for 
consideration in the design and management of future community mobilization programs. These should also be 
considered as evaluative conclusions in this assessment. 
Program Design & Startup 
Startup: Completing small, quick-start projects during the startup period were shown to be very effective as the 
practice quickly demonstrates that the organization’s efforts are serious, genuine and in accordance with the 
needs of the communities. 
Choosing Partners: When deciding on the initial community representatives, assure that these include 
individuals who hold high respect and esteem in their communities. If held in this regard, the local representatives 
will have significantly more success in mobilizing their communities; decreasing skepticism about the assistance 
program; and increasing the level of local participation, including the willingness to provide cash and in-kind 
matching contributions. 
Training Partners: It is crucial to provide in-depth training and education to the local partners at the inception 
and throughout the project’s life cycle. The beneficiary groups that are most often the focus of these types of 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
27 
projects generally lack the institutional capacity necessary to respond to the new and complex requirements 
mandated by donors (e.g. prioritization and decision-making procedures, preparing project proposals, and 
submitting supporting documentation). Mercy Corps’ experience in Serbia showed that short, informal seminars 
on basic proposal preparation and community mobilization are not sufficient to provide local partners with the 
necessary knowledge and competency, nor do they have desired long-term impact. Instead, there is a need for 
more intensive, higher impact trainings regarding the methodologies employed throughout the project life cycle. 
Ensuring Success & Sustainability
Training & Transparency: The CRDA experience showed that it is necessary to explain and review the policies 
and procedures thoroughly and repeatedly, not only to the leaders, coordinators and CDC presidents, but to all of 
their members and constituencies as well. Even when their leaders are highly educated and respected 
individuals, citizens’ unfamiliarity and lack of understanding regarding the project selection process can bring 
suspicion upon Mercy Corps’ transparency and impartiality, potentially harming the organization’s image and 
program appeal. 
Earning Local Trust: In the case of CRDA, Mercy Corps earned its current high level of respect and trust not by 
being a donor and investor at the local level, but by respecting established policies, obligations, budgets and 
deadlines. 
Preparing & Training Staff: Program success depends equally on the clients’ commitment as well as on the 
organization and its staff to design a program and to effectively assist clients in its implementation. Thus, it is 
necessary that all staff members are aware of the local conditions, acquire detailed information about the main 
actors in each of the communities and municipalities, know the main problems and challenges facing 
communities, and understand the legal environment that may affect the outcome of the projects. 
Group Institutionalization: In areas with no tradition of civil society and non-governmentally led development, it 
is unrealistic to expect that informal groups formed by external actors and donors will be sustainable, and that 
democratic working methods will carry over to future activities unless steps are taken to institutionalize the 
groups. This is no small matter as the institutionalization process itself requires significant commitments of time 
and resources by the communities, donor and supporting actors. Even despite this level of commitment, the 
donor should not expect great statistical results of sustainability as it is likely that successes will be few and far 
between. Many donor programs claim sustainability through the mere formal registration of groups, but true 
sustainability lies with changes and improvements in the way people work and their ability to adapt the principles 
learned so that they succeed in new opportunities and situations. 
Flexibility in Design: Program design should be flexible, taking into account the specificities of partners, 
communities and regions. Considering that CRDA covered several markedly distinct regions in terms of social, 
ethnic, economic and political development, it should not be assumed that the same program will produce the 
same results across the different regions. Although uniformity of the approach is desirable to assure an equal 
treatment of all communities (as well as from a management perspective) without an element of flexibility the 
approach becomes a rigid imposition of rules onto the communities. In Serbia, Mercy Corps’ management should 
have, perhaps, taken these regional disparities into account and instead of implementing all project types across 
its AOR, prioritize different programs in different communities. 
Changes in Programming: Abrupt changes in the program strategy and implementation should always take into 
account the previous commitments made by the program, and bring systematic and informed closure to those 
processes that are crucial to the mission of the program. In CRDA, this includes the implementation and 
completion of specific projects as well as an informed decision regarding the institutionalization of CDCs and 
communication, and the open communication of those decisions to the communities and clients. 
Project Management and M&E 
Field Visits: One of the most important recommendations proposed in this assessment is to increase the number 
of staff member visits to the field. Organizing more frequent visits to the local communities and holding wider and 
more open meetings with average citizens is crucial for the success of any community mobilization program, 
because these visits: 
• increase the visibility and the appeal of the organization, resulting in a feeling of trust and openness 
from both sides; 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
28 
• demonstrate consistency and enduring commitment to support, increasing the trust in the community 
about the motivation of the development program, and facilitating the work of the community partners 
(especially with respect to collecting matching contributions); 
• ensure the transparency and inclusiveness of decision-making and project implementation processes 
through constant monitoring throughout the project life cycle; 
• increase the level of local awareness about development issues on the parts of both the community 
and organization staff members; 
• provide the donor with an accurate assessment of the project status, implementation, and quality of 
work and new ideas for improving its processes and procedures. 
Systems Management & Oversight: Staffing a full-time M&E Coordinator from the start of the program, 
particularly on projects of the size and magnitude of CRDA, is essential to assure the quality and standardization 
of management systems and performance data, and to assure that any divergences from the goals and 
objectives, processes, and procedures, both internally and externally, are detected and resolved with the greatest 
efficiency to the program. While in the end, it can be said that the M&E data in Web-PRS was “salvaged” there 
still remains inconsistencies in certain project impact data. Plus, through continual maintenance, the Web-PRS 
system could have been a powerful management tool, particularly when the program strategy was designed for 
the transition to CRDA-E. (In CRDA this was corrected, albeit late, with the hiring of a full-time M&E Coordinator 
tasked with the responsibility to train staff on M&E and Web-PRS, coordinate and monitor the accuracy of data 
across offices, and assure the prompt updating of Web-PRS by the administrator when problems arose.) Since 
November 2006 Mercy Corps has had a centralized system with a single data-entry officer closely managed by 
the M&E Coordinator. 
Document Progress in the Field: In addition to improving the maintenance and documentation of the official 
Web-PRS M&E data, more effort should have been made to document experiences and challenges with respect 
to projects and specific communities, as well as plans discussed and commitments made to communities and 
municipalities. Aside from the obvious benefit this would have to the overall M&E process, this would have helped 
assure a smooth transition from one staff member to the next. The staff turnover of CRDA would have been less 
a hindrance had more of this information been preserved, updated, shared and documented among the staff 
members. Trying to relearn this information after such a long lapse in time resulted in conflicting accounts of 
many key actions and decisions taken by the project team. 
Project Implementation 
Contractor Oversight: The most common problem cited by clients during this assessment was with respect to 
contractors; in particular, the lack of adequate supervision of their work, which was Mercy Corps’ responsibility. 
(This is covered in much greater detail in Linde Rachel’s report.) The communities typically had no formal 
relationship with the contractors, neither in the selection nor in monitoring. Since Mercy Corps’ staff could not 
realistically reach all working sites at all stages of the construction (there were literally hundreds of ongoing 
projects at any one time) many inefficiencies and delays resulted. Some were never corrected, reducing the trust 
communities placed in Mercy Corps and sometimes even impacting the results of the project. To prevent these 
issues, Mercy Corps should consider establishing a different relationship between the three main actors (Mercy 
Corps, contractor, client) that involves the clients more actively, as a minimum in the monitoring and oversight of 
the contractor. 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
Annex 1 
Scope of Work 
Serbia CRDA 
Monitoring & Evaluation Assessment 
-for￾Community Development 
Activities 2001-2004
Serbia CRDA Project 
Monitoring & Evaluation Assessment 
Scope of Work 
1. Background 
Summary: This SOW outlines the plan and requirements for the 
consultant/intern to perform a thorough and objective Monitoring & 
Evaluation report on one (significant) element of the Community 
Revitalization through Democratic Action (CRDA) program implemented in 
Serbia by Mercy Corps from 2001-2004. It is intended that the final product 
of this assignment will be a report that serves to compile the quantifiable 
results of Mercy Corps CRDA efforts, provide impact and anecdotal data 
from focus groups and surveys to back up quantifiable results, and serve as 
a final assessment of the element in question. 
CRDA Program: CRDA is a six-year, $200 million USAID program 
implemented throughout Serbia from 2001-2007. USAID divided the 
country into five geographic regions, each served 
by a different implementing partner. Mercy Corps 
covers the municipalities of Southern Serbia 
shown to the right from offices in Krusevac, Novi 
Pazar and Priboj. 
CRDA Elements: The CRDA program can 
logically be divided into three areas for the 
purposes of its M&E Assessment. The effort 
outlined in this SOW will focus on monitoring and 
evaluating the first of these elements.
1. “Community” CRDA 2001-2004 
2. “Economic” Component 2001-2004, implemented by sub-grantee EMG 
3. CRDA-E 2005-2007
CRDA Transition: In 2005, USAID and the US Embassy changed strategies and shifted 
programming priority to focus almost exclusively on economic development. As a result, CRDA 
programming underwent a significant change from its prior emphasis on community development 
and civic participation to employment, income generation and Local Economic Development 
(LED). For all intents and purposes, the CRDA program is now fully transitioned so that minimal 
activities remain under the original elements. Note however, that some of the groups formed and 
bases established in the original CRDA remain active and continue to participate in CRDA-E 
activities. 
CRDA Budgets: The “Community” CRDA element represents the majority of CRDA resources 
spent over the life of the program. Of the total grant amount $40 million over six years (2001-
2007), about $27,640,000 was spent from 2001-2004, almost $17 million of which directly for 
project implementation, $13 million allocated on the “Community” element and $4 million for 
“Economic.” The “Community” element from 2001-2004 therefore accounts for the largest 
percentage of CRDA expenditures over the program life. 
CRDA “Community” Program: The CRDA “Community” element evolved over 2001-2004, 
undergoing a number of transitions while retaining a basic modus operandi, summarized from the 
Annual Report of October 2003: Regional Cluster Committees (RCCs) RCCs, introduced in 2003, 
were comprised of both newly-formed & Community Development Councils (CDC) and CDCs 
established in prior years. RCCs served to coordinate efforts of local CDCs and propose and 
develop projects spanning wider geographies. CDCs were created through open community 
meetings held by Mesto-Zajednica, or MZ (the smallest form of local government at the community 
level). CDCs consulted communities in project selection, prioritization, planning and 
implementation, leading the proposal and implementation processes. Beginning in 2003, the RCCs 
determined regional priorities. Local communities prepared project proposals which were scored 
by Mercy Corps for final selection. Special Interest Groups (Interest Based Clusters), including 
youth, women, disabled, minorities and environmental groups were encouraged to form so that 
their special interests could also be addressed. 
Community Fairs: In addition to the CDC efforts, Mercy Corps introduced an innovative approach 
to community participation and project selection called Community Fairs. Community fairs offered 
an exciting and social atmosphere of citizen participation, especially in urban areas where 
community participation was a greater challenge for the program. Community Fairs supported 
special interest projects of local NGOs, clubs, associations, schools and public institutions such as 
health centers. On the designated day, each organization exhibited a display where they 
presented their activities and projects to the entire community in a fun and interactive setting. 
Mercy Corps provided presenters with booth space and electrical connections. Attendees at the 
fair voted for their favorite projects and winners received a contribution from Mercy Corps to 
complete their project. In 2004, over 32,000 citizens participated in Community Fairs. 
USAID Indicators: All CRDA partners are required to track and report on the following indicators: 
• Number of Projects Implemented (by community/committee) 
• Number of Cluster Projects 
• Beneficiaries of Improved Social & Economic Infrastructure 
• Beneficiaries of Improved Environmental Infrastructure 
• Employment Created 
• Additional Income Generated 
• Increase in Agricultural Sales 
• Increased Access to Family Planning and Reproductive Health Services in Communities 
• Minorities or Women Comprise at least 30% of Community Committee Membership 
CRDA Web-PRS: CRDA partners use a standardized set of indicators and report on a CRDA-wide 
M&E system known as Web-PRS (Project Reporting System) developed and administered by 
CHF. Generally speaking, the database is capable of effectively capturing and reporting the data; 
however, data entered into the system is subject to errors in measurement as discussed below. 
Web-PRS Indicator Accuracy: Some of the errors which may lead to inaccuracy of information 
contained in Web-PRS include: 
• several historical glitches and bugs in Web-PRS; 
• attempting to fit data from wide variety of projects and activities into a relatively small 
number of fixed database fields; 
• applying formulas to project costs to estimate indicators (USAID directive applies various 
multipliers, depending on type of project, to estimate employment generated as a result of 
implementing projects); 
• inconsistencies between staff members inputting data; 
• reliance on sometimes inaccurate figures from CDCs; 
• inconsistent updating of project status and information; 
• staff turnover; 
• general lack of attention to detail; and 
• double-reporting of beneficiary groups. 
Prior M&E Efforts – CABS: In 2004, a temporary Mercy Corps staff member completed a first￾revision draft of a Community Attitudes & Behavior Survey (CABS) that assessed and measured 
changes in citizens’ attitudes and behavior regarding community participation, perceptions for 
sustainability of formed citizen groups, and local government responsiveness to the community. It 
is worth noting that for this study the "baseline data was collected simultaneously to the actual 
survey" since there was no similar baseline assessment examining these issues prior to beginning 
CRDA activities. The intern/consultant is expected to build upon and compare the results of this 
survey against the work outlined in this SOW. 
2. Scope of Work 
Summary: This assignment is intended to provide a complete, thorough and objective 
assessment of CRDA Community Development activities between the years 2001-2004. The 
assessment should include each of the following five areas, presented in greater detail below. 
• CRDA Outputs & Achievements 
• Group Impact & Sustainability 
• Project Impact & Sustainability 
• Community & Behavior Impact 
• Project Management Issues 
Section 1: CRDA Outputs & Achievements: The goal of this investigation is to compile and 
present the results and outputs of CRDA into a report where all of key data is presented in a single 
place. e.g.: "For an input of $26 million, we accomplished x projects of types a, b, and c; collected 
y community and z local government contributions; conducted xx community groups; yy people 
attending meetings prioritizing zz projects; etc." This section should essentially summarize data 
from reports during that time, project files, and PRS records and seek to resolve any discrepancies 
between data sources. In addition, the report shall present all results against the USAID indicators 
and provide a description of the means of measuring the results and an assessment of their 
accuracy. All results shall be backed up with a summary of the processes, description of activities, 
evolution of the program, and anecdotes of successes and challenges. 
Section 2: Group Impact & Sustainability: This section shall examine the institutional 
sustainability & impact of groups formed under CRDA: Community Development Councils, Interest 
Based Clusters, and Regional Cluster Committees. In addition to organizational sustainability, the 
assessment shall examine group activities and benefits provided to individuals, communities and 
local government as a result of the activities and seek to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of 
group formation & functioning as well as lessons and activities that could increase impact and 
sustainability in similar programs. 
Section 3: Project Impact & Sustainability: This area of the assessment shall examine the 
current condition, maintenance plans and records, sustainability & impact of various projects, likely 
grouped by type, implemented under CRDA. The assessment shall draw conclusions on the 
sustainability and effectiveness of various types of investments. The consultant/intern shall identify 
logical groupings of project types and perform a representative assessment of the current state of 
those completed projects and the impact that they have made during and after their completion. 
Project groupings may include, but are not limited to: Roads; Electric Projects; Water and 
Sewerage Projects; School Projects; Building Renovations; Hospitals & Health Care Facilities; and 
Reproductive Health & Family Planning Projects. 
Section 4: Community & Behavior Impact: This part of the assessment shall examine the 
impact of the CRDA participatory processes and the resulting ethos or behavior changes. What 
activities did we do, how did we do them, etc. For this part of the assessment the consultant/intern 
shall rely extensively on focus groups and interviews with CDC members and other project 
participants and beneficiaries. This section should also examine the portfolio of events and 
activities that were designed to affect citizen behaviors. These events include, but are not limited 
to town hall meetings, stakeholder and special interest group meetings, and Community Fairs. 
Section 5: Project Management Issues (optional): As time and priorities permit, this part of the 
assessment shall examine the Mercy Corps project management and organizational issues that 
governed the overall management of the CRDA program. This assessment shall seek to identify 
what the country team and organization learned about managing Community Development 
projects of this magnitude. Possible areas of investigation include: overall management and 
organizational structure required to implement the program; bottlenecks of implementation and 
means of overcoming them; project management tools developed in Serbia that could be applied 
to other programs, such as engineering estimates and procurement databases and tools; staff 
development; and project management tools, such as budgets and schedules. 
Data Collection & Analysis: In the first two weeks of the assignment (see Schedule below) the 
consultant/intern is expected to outline the strategy, schedule and level of effort:
• Define the applicable targets or “units of analysis:” communities, councils, municipalities, 
families, businesses, clinics, for each area of assessment. 
• Consider how data can be disaggregated to best answer the key evaluation questions: 
gender, ethnic group, income level, age, disability status, urban/rural, etc. 
• Determine how interviewees and other sources will be selected (randomly, purposeful 
sample, nominated by staff or community). Explain decision based on strengths and 
weaknesses of this approach and any contextual constraints. 
• Propose techniques or tools: surveys, observation, interviews, etc. 
• Estimate the amount of data to collect based on projected or desired statistical validity: 
sample size, number of interviews or focus groups, number of projects within particular 
category, number of communities. 
• Project how data will be analyzed through use of graphs, illustrations and tables. 
Evaluation Issues: The evaluation should take care to answer the following questions: 
• For the given donor input, what was the impact of this phase of CRDA? 
• Did we achieve our objectives and targets? 
• How accurate and dependable are our results? 
• What are the greatest successes of the project? 
• In what areas did we fail to achieve the desired or projected results? 
• What contributors were key to our over- or under-achieving desired or projected results? 
• How sustainable were our results? 
• What lessons did we learn and what tools did we develop that can be applied to similar 
projects in the future? 
• What process or implementation improvements could have been made to improve 
results? 
Error Estimation: When reporting quantitative results, the consultant/intern should estimate the 
accuracy of the results by identifying sources of error, estimating the amounts of error, then 
calculating overall error (or confidence level) of the result. 
3. Schedule 
Assignment Schedule: After an initial learning curve and planning preparation period, the 
consultant/intern is expected to work fairly independently on day-to-day activities. The schedule 
below is proposed to help the consultant/intern plan the initial days and weeks of the assignment. 
Day 1: Briefing meeting with management and key CRDA personnel. 
 Consultant/intern should be prepared to offer implementation and schedule 
input based on review of materials sent prior to assignment. 
Day 2: Consultant/intern familiar with Web-PRS 
Day 3: Consultant/intern present management with assessment of the soundness and 
accuracy of Web-PRS data, and a plan/schedule for revising/updating data to 
an acceptable degree. 
Week 1: End of week, consultant/intern presents outline and schedule for completion of 
assignment tasks, including but not limited to: PRS data verification; project site 
visits and assessments complete; Krusevac AOR focus groups; Novi Pazar 
AOR focus groups; CRDA outputs quantified and report Section 1. At end of 
Week 1, consultant/intern should have reviewed available data and reports and 
be familiar with CRDA program and general strategic direction. 
Week 2: M&E Team meeting (1-2 days), led by consultant/intern to work with 
designated staff members to finalize details of strategy and schedule. 
Management Briefings: The consultant/intern is expected to brief management at least once 
weekly on the status of the assignment, progress toward completion, potential concerns, and 
departures and details on the strategy and schedule. 
4. Assessment Team 
Assessment Team Members: The consultant/intern is expected to function with the assigned 
team of local staff members with limited supervision over daily activities. The consultant/intern is 
expected to lead the process, regularly brief management and reviewers, advise management and 
reviewers on technical matters, and incorporate recommendations. The team will consist of: 
• Bosiljka Vukovic: Consultant/Intern; responsible for leading process and producing draft 
and final reports. 
• Vladimir Milicevic: LED Advisor, Krusevac AOR local team member. 
• Sabina Razdaginac: LED Advisor, Novi Pazar AOR local team member. 
• Craig Hempfling: COP CRDA, responsible for strategic management and direction. 
• Hayden Aaronson: Project Manager, reviewer. 
• Joe (Mercy Corps Cambridge): DME Unit; backstop, strategy design and review, 
reviewer. 
• Gretchen Shanks: DME Unit; strategy design and review oversight, reviewer. 
• Paul Jeffery: Senior Program Officer, Balkans; reviewer. 
• External Consultant: Optional, as required. 
5. Budget 
“Community” CRDA 2001-2004 M&E Assessment 
Estimated Budget 
Item Quantity Unit Total 
Consultant/Intern Living Allowance 3 months $500 $1,500
Travel & Transportation – Airfare 1 round-trip $2,000 $2,000
Lodging 
 Krusevac Guest Apartment 
 Novi Pazar Hotel 
3 months 
10 nights 
$180 
$30 
$540
$300
M&IE (in field) 20 days $15 $300
Other (materials, miscellaneous) $500 $500
TOTAL: $5,140
External Consultant (optional) 
 Wages 18 days $400 $7,200
Item Quantity Unit Total 
 Travel – Airfare 
 M&IE 
 Lodging 
1 round-trip 
21 days 
18 days 
$2,000 
$40 
$30 
$2,000
$840
$540
TOTAL, External Consultant Option: $10,580
6. Assignment Logistics & Useful Information 
Working/Living Conditions at Site: Mercy Corps will arrange lodging for the intern. In Belgrade 
the volunteer will stay at the guest house and in Krusevac the intern will have her own apartment. 
The apartment has a kitchen, washing machine, telephone, and sufficient (though perhaps 
minimal) necessities. Hot water and electricity are available in all areas. 
Things to Bring: Following are some suggestions that might be helpful for the volunteer: 
• laptop computer and converter (if possible), 
• cash to cover expenses for the duration of the assignment, 
• comfortable walking shoes and warm clothes during winter months, 
• photos of home: family, house, business, relevant equipment; clients are always 
interested in what life/business is like in the USA, 
• insect repellent in summertime, 
• digital camera, 
• antihistamines/decongestants or other medications. 
7. Contact Information 
Mercy Corps HQ
Paul Jeffery 
Senior Program Officer 
3015 SW First Avenue 
Portland, OR 97201 
(503) 796-6800 
pjeffery@mercycorps.org 
Gretchen Shanks 
DM&E Unit 
1730 Rhode Island Ave. Suite 809 
Washington, DC 20036 
(202) 463-7322 
gshanks@mercycorps.org 
Joe (new hire) 
DM&E Unit 
Mercy Corps Belgrade
Banjicki Venac 18a 
11000 Belgrade 
+381-11-266-9753 
Damir Krosnjar (Logistics) 
Mobile: (063) 269-533 
Beth Durbin (Director Admin) 
Mobile: (063) 103-3727 
Milica Nikic (Admin Assistant) 
Mobile: (063) 103-0949 
Mercy Corps Krusevac
Kosanciceva 19 
37000 Krusevac 
+381-37-443-159 
Craig Hempfling (Country Director) 
Mobile: (063) 376-944 
Hayden Aaronson (Program Manager) 
Mobile: (063) 376-941 
Vlado Milicevic (LED Advisor) 
Mobile: (063) 337-099 
Mercy Corps Novi Pazar
Beogradska 1 
36300 Novi Pazar 
+381-20-335-200 
Ahmet Halilagic (Head of Office) 
Mobile: (063) 264-077 
Sabina Razdaginac (LED Advisor) 
Mobile: (063) 264-206 
Bibliography 
1. Mercy Corps CRDA Semi-Annual and Annual Reports, CRDA Program Reports submitted every six 
months covering six month periods aligned with federal fiscal year, 2001-2004. 
2. Comparative Analysis of the Community Attitudes and Behaviors Survey (CABS) Data, Mercy Corps 
CRDA Assessment, Oksana Chikina, Fall 2004. 
3. CRDA Web-PRS Project Reporting System, http://www.web-prs.com/. 
4. USAID Memorandum of December 5, 2003 from Art Flanagan, GDO Officer to CRDA COPs and M&E 
Units; Subject: Basis for Calculating Person Months Resulting for Economic Projects, Construction 
Contracts, and Commodities. 
5. ADF Memorandum of November 9, 2004 from ADF to CRDA Econ Pillar Discussion Group; Subject: 
Agreements Reached at Oct 18 meeting (CHF Belgrade) on USAID Economic Pillar Indicators: 
Employment Generated, Increase in Agricultural Sales, and Additional Income Generated. 
6. Collection of M&E Indicators Summary Sheet for CRDA, undated and unaddressed with content similar 
to USAID and ADF memorandums. 
7. CRDA Monitoring & Evaluation: Principles, Concepts and Practical Implementation of Performance 
Measurement, ADF, May 2003. 
8. ADF/CRDA Performance Measurement Plan and Tools. 
9. ADF/CRDA Performance Data Table, October 2005. 
10. Design, Monitoring and Evaluation Guidebook, Mercy Corps, August 2005. 
11. CARE-Uganda Guidelines to Monitoring and Evaluation: How are we doing? CRC – Tom Barton, 
January 1997. 
12. Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators, Technical Publication Series, USAID 
Center for Democracy & Governance, August 1998. 
13. Managing for Impact in Rural Development: A Guide for Project M&E, International Fund for Agriculture 
Development (IFAD), 2002. 
14. The Performance Management Toolkit: A Guide to Developing and Implementing Performance 
Monitoring Plans, Price-Waterhouse-Coopers; prepared for Policy and Program Coordination Bureau, 
Center for Development, Information & Evaluation, Performance Measurement & Evaluation Division; 
January 25, 2001. 
15. Performance Monitoring Indicators: A Handbook for Task Managers, World Bank Operations Policy 
Department , 1996. 
16. Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Tips: Preparing a Performance Monitoring Plan, Issue 7, USAID 
Center for Development Information and Evaluation, 1996. 
17. Performance Monitoring and Evaluation Tips: Selecting Performance Indicators, Issue 6, USAID Center 
for Development Information and Evaluation, 1996. 
18. Looking Back, Moving Forward: Sida Evaluation Manual, Stefan Molund and Göran Schill, 2004. 
19. Handbook on Monitoring and Evaluating for Results, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
Evaluation Office, 2002. 
20. Combining Experimental Error, http://www.rod.beavon.clara.net/err_comb.htm. 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
Annex 2 
Areas for Discussion 
-and- 
 Questions for Focus Groups 
and Interview Sessions 
 
 
Group Sustainability Guide – areas and questions for the focus groups and interview sessions 
1. Organization & dynamics of the CDCs: 
a. how were they formed? 
b. what was their purpose? what did MC tell them about their role and how did they 
perceive the CDCs? or it was the municipality who did most of the communication 
and coordination? 
c. how often did they meet? who called and organized the meetings and where? 
d. how many people attended the meetings? 
e. how often did they attend the meetings? if they were missing the meetings, why? 
f. coordination and communication with the MC staff: clarity, responsiveness 
g. coordination and communication with the Municipality? 
i. What was the effect of the CDC experience in terms of the cooperation with 
the municipal officials Æ did the cooperation improve, deteriorated or there 
was no change? 
1. and if there was a change, in what way can we measure that change? 
h. presence of the external experts and specialists in water roads, municipal 
infrastructure, schools and health care while the communities were deciding on the 
project prioritization? 
i. How much was the youth involved? Did MC every organize youth only meetings to 
determine their needs and priorities? 
j. Did we ever organize the joint economic/community development group meetings 
(CDC members, govt, business and other community leadership) with the aim of 
determining the focus of the economic program for years to come before we started 
with the MECs? 
k. Experience with the CFs? 
2. Participation, openness and Representation: 
a. Selection of the projects at the local level: – how were the projects selected? at the 
town meetings/the MZ council selected them/MZ president did the selection? 
i. who was present at those meetings: women, minorities, other MZ Council 
representatives? 
ii. was something done to encourage the participation of the vulnerable groups? 
b. at the CDC level – choosing the priorities – what was the group dynamic like, the 
intra-group relations, etc...? 
c. Were they informed about any changes in the selection procedures? and how these 
affected their work and their preparation for the project proposals? did the change 
impact the frequency of their meetings or the internal CDC dynamics Æ lobbying? 
d. When did they organize the town meetings? 
e. Match Æ how hard was it for you to come up with the match? Æ 
i. do you think communities should come up with the match or this should be 
left entirely to the municipalities? 
ii. What are the benefits of having a community match? 
3. Effect/Impact: 
a. Did the projects proposed reflect the community needs and priorities (ask the 
municipal representatives (perhaps even the MZ council members outside the CDC) 
and locals) 
b. In their opinion, what was the most significant change CRDA made in their local 
communities: either a project or an organizational change? and why? 
c. How successful were the community leaders in mobilizing their communities in 
coming up with the match: - this is to measure whether CRDA programs indeed 
increased the community participation and mobilization? 
i. need to identify the main problems and challenges Æ Belasica community: 
people were very suspicious of donors willing to just “give away” the funds, 
without an obligations to return the credits at some later point; 
d. Were their projects effective/successful? 
i. How did they assure that the projects got implemented in a timely and efficient 
manner? 
ii. Did they take on a role as monitors? How did they do it, and what were they 
exact tasks and schedules? 
4. Sustainability: 
a. Are groups still active in any form and if so how often do they meet? 
i. Maybe they merged with some other groups? 
ii. Are they using the same methods the CDCs were using Æ trying to get as 
many people on the board, mobilizing the local community, writing the 
applications, collecting the documentations, etc…? 
iii.
b. If not, when did they stop meeting? 
i. Were they informed about the end of the CRDA program? 
ii. What was the reaction when the groups stopped existing? 
c. Did their CDC membership help their further activities? 
i. Did they continue with trying to get external funding for local project 
proposals? increase the contacts with the municipality, foreign donors, etc? 
ii. are they now more aware of the existence of the other sources of funding? 
1. Do you see any change in your approach in trying to secure other 
financial assistance for the local community development? 
2. Are there any differences in the way they organize themselves, 
select/propose/carry out/fund the projects compared to 4/5/6 years ago? 
d. Do they know about MECs? 
i. is there any relation between CDCs and MECs? 
5. Personal perceptions: 
a. In their opinion, what is the best way to mobilize local citizens? 
b. =l==l==l==l==, what is the best way to assure the proper project implementation and 
impact? 
c. How should we measure the projects’ impact? 
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
Annex 3 
Summary Information 
-on￾CDCs and Projects 
Municipality
Total
Projects
Attempted
Total
Projects
Cancelled
Total
Projects
Completed
Number
CDCs CDC
Completed
/In Progress
CDC Projects
Cancelled
CDC Projects
Total CDC
Projects
Attempted
Completed
CF Projects
Cancelled
CF Projects
Total
CF Projects
Attempted
Other
Projects
Aleksandrovac 24 3 21 4 Aleksandrovac East 0
Aleksandrovac North 3 3
Aleksandrovac Town 7 2 9 7 1 8
Aleksandrovac West 4 4
Blace 33 2 31 4 Blace East 7 1 8
Blace South 4 4
Blace Town 10 1 11 4 0 4
Blace West 6 6
Brus 22 2 20 3 Brus South West 4 1 5
Brus Town 5 5 4 1 5
Brus East 7 7
Cicevac 21 1 20 2 Cicevac North 6 6 10 0 10
Cicevac South 2 1 3 2 0 2
Ivanjica 24 0 24 3 Ivanjica West 6 6
Ivanjica East 2 2
Ivanjica Town 8 8 8 0 8
Krusevac 46 2 44 5 Krusevac North 7 7
Krusevac East 2 2
Krusevac South-East 5 5
Krusevac South-West 6 1 7
Krusevac Town 12 12 12 1 13
Kursumlija 19 1 18 1 Kursumlija Town + village 14 1 15 4 4
Nova Varos 15 1 14 2 Nova Varos 5 5 9 1 10
Bela Reka, 2004 0 0
Novi Pazar 53 3 50 12 Bele Vode 3 1 4
Kominje, 2004 1 1
Lukare 4 4
Mur 4 4
Novi Pazar Town 10 2 12 13 0 13
Odojevice 1 1
Postenje 2 2
Pozega 2 2
Rajcinovice, 2004 2 2
Sebecevo 3 3
Sopocani 2 2
Trnava 3 3
Priboj 27 3 24 4 Kalafati/Mazici 4 4
Kajcinovici, 2004 0 0
Priboj Town 6 6 14 3 17
Zabrnjica, 2004 0 0
Prijepolje 21 1 20 5 Aljinovici 1 1
Brodarevo, 2004 2 2
Kamena Gora, 2004 1 1
Prijepolje 3 3 12 1 13
Zvijezd, 2004 1 1
Prokuplje 47 2 45 6 Prokuplje North 7 7
Prokuplje North_East 6 6
Prokuplje North-West 4 4
Prokuplje South 1 1
Prokuplje Town 19 2 21 5 0 5
Prokuplje West 3 3
Raska 20 1 19 5 Baljevac, 2003 1 1
Josanicka Banja 3 3
Kaznovice, 2003 1 1
Raska Town 3 1 4 10 0 10
Rudnica, 2004 1 1
Summary Information on CDCs and Projects
Annex 3
Municipality
Total
Projects
Attempted
Total
Projects
Cancelled
Total
Projects
Completed
Number
CDCs CDC
Completed
/In Progress
CDC Projects
Cancelled
CDC Projects
Total CDC
Projects
Attempted
Completed
CF Projects
Cancelled
CF Projects
Total
CF Projects
Attempted
Other
Projects
Summary Information on CDCs and Projects
Annex 3
Sjenica 19 4 15 5 Duga Poljana 2 2 4
Razdaginja, 2003 1 1
Kladnica, 2004 1 1
Sjenica 3 1 4 7 1 8
Vapa, 2004 1 1
Trstenik 20 2 18 3 Trstenik North 3 3
Trstenik South 4 4
Trstenik Town 4 1 5 7 1 8
Tutin 22 1 21 5 Crkvine, 2004 1 1
Delimedje 4 4
Melaje, 2004 1 1
Ribarice 2 2
Tutin Town 3 1 4 10 0 10
Varvarin 25 1 24 3 Varvarin Central 3 3 0 1 1
Varvarin East, w/ Varvarin 7 7 6 6
Varvarin West 8 8
Zitoradja 26 2 24 4 Zitoradja West 6 6
Zitoradja East 2 1 3
Zitoradja South 4 4
Zitoradja Town 4 1 5 8 0 8
KS AOR 50 5 5
NP AOR 20 2 2
PK AOR 10 1 1
MC AOR 30 3 3
TOTAL 495 32 463 76 300 21 321 152 11 163 11
Serbia CRDA Community Development Assessment 2001-2004 
Annex 4 
Focus Group 
& Interview Results 
-on￾CRDA Impact 
2. CF impact and experience
00 None 1. Revitalization of the community: 2. Improved living conditions 3. General development 4. Work organization improvements/project proposal writing skills 5. Stopping migration 6. Specific project benefits 7. Increased democratization 8. Improved MZ-Munic relations 9.Involvement of citizens in decision making 10. Increased comm mobilization 11. Motivation for further investments 12. Readiness to provide match 13.Increased readiness to deal with the donors 14. Local problems' identification 1.Involvement of citizens in decision making/Community mobilization 2. Added social values 3. Small, neglected groups/needs covered 4. Identitication of local problems
1 Aleksandrovac East x xx x x 99 99 99 99
2 Blace South x
3 Cicevac North
x (thouroughness and 
strategic decisions about 
development)
x (garbagge 
truck, etc…)
x (they didn't think about 
some issues before MC 
came in)
x (same as 10…) + 
increased other 
external I
x
x (cultural event, social 
interaction, creativity, 
etc..)
xx
4 Ivanjica East
x + team work + project 
writing & risk minimization 
(through MC trainings/ 
seminars + help)
x 99 99 99 99
5 Krusevac Town
x (more transparent 
decision-making, more 
parliamentary approach, 
avoding political 
conotations, etc…)
x
x (everyone was 
aware of each other's 
problems)
x (even wider citizen 
participation, etc…)
x (increased the 
community belonging 
feeling - solidarity, 
creativity, etc…)
6 Krusevac SW
x (a change in the way of 
thinking and approaching the 
problems, modernization of 
the work approach, etc...)
x (town hall meetings, the 
need for a high citizens 
involvement is now clear, 
etc…)
x (hearing other MZs' 
problems was v 
beneficial)
99 99 99 99
7 Kursumlija xx x x x x (creativity, etc…)
8 Prijepolje
MC thought them the value of 
good work organization and 
persistency
xx x x (high appeal to the citizens)
9 Prokuplje
x (there was a change in the 
way people perceived the 
requirenment for project 
proposal and 
implementation, etc…)
x (people r still 
actively involved in 
comm dev, looking 
for new I, etc…)
x (community spirit, kids 
engaged especially, 
competition spirit, etc…)
10 Novi Pazar xx
x 
(infrastructure 
+ education)
x (more attention to MZ 
needs in the writing of the 
municipal budget, etc...)
xx x x
11 Bele Vode, NP x 
x (a village was 
turned into a 
settlement!)
x (2 families 
returning from 
abroad, houses 
buing built at the 
side of the road 
MC buit, etc…)
x (reduced the political 
involvement) x x (moved people from aparthy) x (continuation of the electrification projects) 99 99 99 99
12 Rajcinovice, NP
x (profesionalism, team work, 
need for a complete 
documentation, strategic 
thinking about the project 
writing, etc…)
x (less political influence) x (indirect decision-making) x (continuation of the water projects) x (the mentality about match changed, etc..) x (using the MC format and experience) 99 99 99 99
13 Raska x (project writing skills, etc…) x x x (identification of common problems) x x (increased spirit of voluntarism, etc…) x
14 Trstenik x (education, health, etc…) x x (creativity, excitement, competition, etc…)
15 Varvarin Central
x (at that moment, the local 
communities couldn't do it by 
themselves, etc…)
x 
x (work methodology 
improved, closer to EU and 
world standards, etc…)
x x (increased transparancy)
x (increased % of municipal' 
budget allocation for MZ 
development, better contact 
with citizens and MZs)
x (direct involvement of 
citizens in decision-making)
x (people became more 
interested in their local 
development, etc…)
x (continuation of the 
school projects, 
etc…)
16 Zitoradja West
x (completeness of project 
documentation, clear 
application/selection 
procedures, etc…)
99 99 99 99
1 Kominje, NP a) Providing infrastructure for necessary economic dev; preventing people from migrating from villages 99 99 99 99
2 Odojevice, NP Rural dev 99 99 99 99
3 Zvijezd, PR a) General economic dev & revit
preventing people 
from migrating 
from villages
99 99 99 99
4 Prokuplje South x 99 99 99 99
5 Baljevac, RA General work organization improvements 99 99 99 99
6 Kaznovice, RA
MC made them think 
stretegically about their 
problems
99 99 99 99
7 Rudnica, RA Thoroughness in work Repetitor 99 99 99 99
1 Aleksandrovac x x xx
2 Blace roads, streets
x (increased interest in 
community initiatives, 
etc…)
x
3 Cicevac 
Necessary infrastructure for future 
employment increases and 
Investment attraction
Thoroughness in work 
preparation/project 
writing/budget
schools, trafo, 
roads
x (be 
responsible for 
your own 
development)
xx
4 Ivanjica 
x (tendering & procurement 
experience, respecting 
contracts & deadlines, etc…)
x x (improved comm organizations)
5 Krusevac 
x (building a school in a 
community signals to its citizens 
that they are not forgotten; 
infrastructure as a prerequisite for 
economic dev,etc…)
x (reached a 
large number of 
beneficieries, 
etc…)
x 
x (indirect decision-making, 
it's not just problem solving, 
but the entire mechanism of 
citizens involvement is 
started, etc...)
x (much better and 
more efficient 
idenfitication of local 
needs and genuine 
problems, etc…)
x (affected the inner strenght 
of the citizens, preventing 
apathy, making people be in 
charge of their own 
development, etc...)
x
6 Kursumlija
x (accountability, respecting 
the deadlines, debating 
prioritiess, project writing 
skills, strategic planing, 
coordiantion, writing projects 
ahead, teamwork, etc..
x xx x
7 Prijepolje
a) Team work & value of 
associations; 10 assoc 
founded
x (citizens gained more trust 
in the municipality, etc…) x
Cultural and Touristic 
Attraction
8 Prokuplje x x (direct contact with people, etc…)
9 Novi Pazar x (project writing, etc…) x (direct decision making, etc…)
x (because the 
projects were 
benefiting all of 
them)
99 99 99 99
10 Raska
x (MC was a fin injection needed 
for the revitalization of the 
communities after the 1999 
situation, etc…)
x (now they pay attention 
when selecting the projects, 
strategic decision-making)
x
x (more regular consultations 
with the MZs when making 
the annual budget)
x
x (people mobilized as 
the projects targeted 
their interests, gave 
impetus when the 
community came to a 
fin bottleneck, etc...)
x (continuation of the 
town center's 
refurbishments, 
Josanicka Banja 
improvements, 
etc...)
x
x (easier to identify 
the real common 
problems, etc…)
x
11 Varvarin x x (citizens were surveyed to get their priorities, etc…)
12 Zitoradja
x (citizens realized they should 
become more active!, + the 
material investments, etc…)
x (citizens should be the 
decision makers, writing of 
projects, etc…)
x (the mentality has 
changed/became more 
open, etc…)
x
x (less involvment of 
politics in the decision￾making, etc…) xx
Annex 4: Focus Group & Interview Results on CRDA Impact
1. What was the most significant change you observed in your community in the past five years as a result of the CRDA?