October 2006 
This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International 
Development. 
It was prepared by Weidemann Associates, Inc. 
RAISE PLUS SET ASIDE IQC 
Evaluation of Livelihood Interventions funded through USAID 
Famine Fund Support to the Productive Safety Net Program 
And 
 OFDA 2005 Livelihood Annual Program Statement 
EVALUATION OF LIVELIHOOD INTERVENTIONS FUNDED THROUGH 
USAID FAMINE FUND SUPPORT TO THE PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET 
PROGRAM AND OFDA 2005 LIVELIHOOD ANNUAL PROGRAM 
STATEMENT 
FINAL REPORT 
Submitted by: 
Weidemann Associates, Inc. 
Submitted to: 
USAID/Ethiopia 
Contract No.:AEG-I-00-04-00010-00 Task Order #07
Period of Performance: 
September-January 2007 
DISCLAIMER 
The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States 
Agency for International Development or the United States Government. 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
i 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF ACRONYMS ............................................................................................................................................III
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .....................................................................................................................................IV
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................V
1. INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................................................................1
1.1. COMPOSITION OF STUDY TEAM...................................................................................................................1
1.2. OUTLINE OF THIS REPORT...........................................................................................................................1
1.3. METHODOLOGY AND CONSTRAINTS ............................................................................................................1
2. SUMMARY OF THE SPSNP INITIATIVE ....................................................................................................4
2.1. UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS AND OBJECTIVES ...........................................................................................4
2.2. COORDINATION AND PARTNER COLLABORATION .......................................................................................5
2.3. TARGETING .................................................................................................................................................6
2.4. INTERVENTIONS PROPOSED BY COOPERATING SPONSORS ...........................................................................6
2.5. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF PROGRESS TO DATE...............................................................................................7
3. DETAILED EVALUATION OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION ..........................................................8
3.1. PHYSICAL COVERAGE OF WOREDAS AND KABELES ......................................................................................8
3.2. PLANNING AND TARGETING.........................................................................................................................8
3.3. COVERAGE/DEGREE OF FOCUS...................................................................................................................10
3.4. INDIVIDUAL INTERVENTIONS.....................................................................................................................11
3.5. COST: BENEFIT ANALYSIS.........................................................................................................................12
4. CROSS CUTTING ELEMENTS ....................................................................................................................12
4.1. SOCIAL MOBILIZATION AND GROUP FORMATION .....................................................................................12
4.2. PERFORMANCE OF REVOLVING FUNDS......................................................................................................14
4.3. OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT OF GROUP ASSETS...................................................................................15
4.4. MARKET DEVELOPMENT............................................................................................................................16
4.5. APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY USAGE ..........................................................................................................16
4.6. GENDER ....................................................................................................................................................17
5. KEY FACTORS AFFECTING PROJECT SUCCESS.................................................................................18
5.1. INTEGRATION OF DIFFERENT INTERVENTIONS ...........................................................................................18
5.2. ATTITUDINAL DEVELOPMENT ...................................................................................................................19
5.3. PSNP/SPSNP COMPLEMENTARITY...........................................................................................................19
5.4. REPLICATION.............................................................................................................................................21
5.5. LINKAGES WITH GOVERNMENT.................................................................................................................22
5.6. PRIVATE SECTOR LINKAGES......................................................................................................................22
6. OVERALL IMPACT ASSESSMENT ............................................................................................................23
6.1. ATTRIBUTION OF IMPACT ..........................................................................................................................23
6.2. PROGRESS TOWARDS SUSTAINABILITY......................................................................................................24
6.3. OVERALL IMPACT ASSESSMENT................................................................................................................25
7. EVALUATION OF BEST PRACTICES........................................................................................................27
7.1. TRADITIONAL ELEMENTS ..........................................................................................................................27
7.2. INNOVATIVE ACTIVITIES ...........................................................................................................................28
7.3. LESS RELEVANT INTERVENTIONS..............................................................................................................29
7.4. UNDERLYING PRINCIPLES .........................................................................................................................29
8. ROLE OF COOPERATING SPONSORS IN SPSNP DEVELOPMENT...................................................30
8.1. NATURE OF SPSNP DEVELOPMENT ..........................................................................................................30
8.2. ROLE OF THE COOPERATING SPONSORS ....................................................................................................31
8.3. INTERACTION BETWEEN COOPERATING SPONSORS ...................................................................................32
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
ii 
8.4. COOPERATING SPONSOR EXIT STRATEGIES...............................................................................................33
9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS..........................................................................................33
ANNEXES...................................................................................................ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
ANNEX A. DESCRIPTION OF COMMON INTERVENTIONS .....................................ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
ANNEX B: BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................................................ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
ANNEX C: PRODUCTIVE SAFETY NET SUPPORT PROGRAM- RFA......................ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
ANNEX D: SCOPE OF WORK FOR THE EVALUATION ...........................................ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
ANNEX E: KEY QUESTIONS AND CROSS REFERENCED RESPONSES....................ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
ANNEX F: BENEFICIARY QUESTIONNAIRE..........................................................ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
ANNEX G: TABULATED RESULTS.......................................................................ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED.
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
ABG Asset Building Group 
ADP Area Development Program 
AIDS Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome 
ALT Alternative Livelihoods Transition 
CFW Cash for Work 
CIDA Canadian Institute for Agricultural Development 
CRS Catholic Relief Services 
CS Co-operating Sponsor 
DA Development Advisor 
DAP Development Assistance Program 
DFID Department for International Development (UK) 
DPPC Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Commission 
EFSR Emergency Food Security Reserve 
EC European Commission 
ETB Ethiopian ETB 
FAO Food and Agriculture Office 
FFP Food for Peace 
FFW Food for Work 
FSCB Food Security Coordination Bureau 
GFDRE Government of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus 
IR Intermediate Result 
KMA Kabele Marketing Association 
MLVP Market -led livelihoods for vulnerable populations
MOA Ministry of Agriculture 
ORDA Oromya Region Development Agency 
PA Producers’ Association 
PSNP Productive Safety Net Program 
PSO Program Support Initiative 
REST Relief Society of Tigray 
SO Strategic Objective 
SNNPS Southern Nations Nationalities’ and Peoples State 
SPSNP Support to the Productive Safety Net Program 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
WFP World Food Program 
Final Report 
Raise Plus- Limited Scope of Work 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Weidemann Associates Inc. appreciates the extensive support and cooperation of all who participated and 
assisted in the conduct of this evaluation. 
In particular we would like to thank both Federal, Regional and Woreda authorities for their willingness 
to spend time with us and for their help in coordinating the work. 
Our special thanks go also to the USAID office ALT staff for all their support in facilitating this study, 
for providing us with direction and facilities and for assistance in obtaining the information needed to 
conduct the study. 
In addition we would like to thank the Cooperating Sponsors for their assistance in providing program 
data, and for their willingness to provide information and be available to us when needed. We particularly 
appreciate the universal cooperation of all CS field staff and their helpful organization of field visits, 
interviews and beneficiary discussion groups. 
Finally, and most importantly, we would like to acknowledge our gratitude to the many SPSNP and 
OFDA beneficiaries who waited hours to speak to us, answered seemingly endless questions patiently and 
provided us with a unique insight into the problems that they are facing and the solutions that they are 
adopting to move towards sustainable household food security. 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
v 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This report details the evaluation of selected livelihood interventions in support of the Productive Safety 
Net Programme (PSNP) financed from the USAID Famine Fund. This is the first evaluation of such 
interventions, and covers only a proportion of the wide range of interventions undertaken by cooperating 
sponsors, many of which were only 75% complete at the time of assessment. As such, it is anticipated that 
some conclusions may be altered in the light of subsequent project developments. 
SPSNP projects were required first to assist PSNP beneficiaries to graduate from the program through its 
livelihoods diversification and expansion component and secondly to address the two main elements of 
the PSNP (resource transfers and community asset building) through its capacity building component. 
The former component (livelihoods diversification and expansion) is the subject of this evaluation. 
The original SPSNP proposals submitted by Co-operating Sponsors showed some uniformity of approach. 
In general, the proposals described programs and interventions that built upon Cooperating Sponsors past 
experience. Most of the proposed interventions were based around either social mobilization (e.g. savings 
and credit groups) and/or agricultural activities (e.g. backyard gardening, shoat rearing or beekeeping). In 
some cases, there was considerable infrastructural input (e.g. substantial water diversion structures), while 
in others, smaller amounts of physical inputs were provided. The proposals indicated a general awareness 
of the need for assistance in market development, and the need for attitudinal development was 
universally highlighted. 
The process of project implementation appeared to have proceeded smoothly with one general exception. 
Although initial disbursements in January 2005 had been timely, the close coordination with local 
administrations required for SPSNP projects resulted in negotiations with regional authorities that delayed 
almost all projects by 4/5 months, so that in most cases project implementation did not begin until 
April/May 2005. Otherwise, Cooperating Sponsors indicated that most programs have progressed as 
expected since that time. 
Project staff generally indicated that the development of a positive attitude amongst beneficiaries was a 
key element of every project, but that it required a longer time frame than was possible within a two-year 
project. Generally however, progress in project implementation can be considered good. Key indicators 
detailed in PMP documents have generally been met, although it must be accepted that for the most part, 
such indicators reflect project performance rather than project impacts. 
The overall number of beneficiaries targeted during the first 18 months of the programs totaled 83,000 
households or 415,000 beneficiaries (using the accepted approximation of five beneficiaries per 
household). This represents approximately 9% of the initial PSNP population and 6% of the revised 
figure and is slightly less than half of the coverage originally anticipated in the RFA. The total amount of 
funding spent on the development of household assets (as opposed to PSNP capacity development) 
amounted to US$8.36 million. This is equivalent to an investment of US$101 per household or US$20 per 
beneficiary. 
The intervention targeting process was subject to some criticism by SPSNP beneficiaries; it is suggested 
that the targeting process should seek to generate successful economic development on the basis of 
attitude, aptitude, and capacity. The selection process should involve selected members of the community 
and the local administration, but should not be allowed to become an “equitable distribution of assets”. 
The fact that the PSNP will support the more vulnerable members of the community allows such selective 
targeting to be achieved with minimal negative humanitarian effect. 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
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The coverage anticipated by the original Famine Fund RFA was approximately one million beneficiaries 
or 20% of the PSNP. In practice, even with a substantial reduction in coverage, the Cooperating Sponsors 
nevertheless generally indicated that the areas covered have exceeded their original expectations and that 
their resources have been overstretched as a result. The intensive targeting looked for in the RFA was 
rarely achieved. This single factor (extent of coverage) appeared to contribute most significantly to the 
level of success of different projects. A critical impetus, derived from more than one and preferably at 
least three interventions was generally considered necessary to move a household towards food security. 
Extended project coverage reduced the number of interventions at the household level to the point where 
in some cases at least 80% of beneficiaries were only receiving one intervention and consequently were 
not making discernible progress towards food security. 
The finance resources available within the SPSNP envelope were originally set at a maximum of 
ETB140/beneficiary. (US$16.4 million total funding, with an expected target group of one million 
beneficiaries). In practice, investment appears to have been of the order of ETB174 (US$20) per 
beneficiary due to reduced coverage. The cost of the interventions needed to achieve sustainable food 
security is estimated at approximately US$70-90 per beneficiary (given an average household size of five 
people). This is approximately four times the level of funding initially provided for SPSNP activities. 
A number of Cooperating Sponsors under SPSPN have started the process of group formation. The 
groups generally showed positive results, but it was evident that, the extent of the effectiveness of social 
mobilization varies from Cooperating Sponsor to Cooperating Sponsor, largely as a function of the degree 
of assistance provided to the group by field staff. In particular the Evaluation Team noted deficiencies in 
the performance and management of revolving funds, which require immediate correction to avoid the 
inculcation of bad practices in credit management amongst beneficiaries. 
The performance of revolving funds accumulating repayment for assets received by individuals or groups 
contrasts markedly with the performance of revolving funds in savings and credit groups. There was a 
clear sense of beneficiary ownership and self-determination in the latter case, which tended to be lacking 
in the former. It is recommended that both the Cooperating Sponsor and USAID undertake more rigorous 
monitoring of revolving funds initially offering small loans with short repayment periods and using peer 
pressure to ensure timely repayments. 
Most Cooperating Sponsors have not placed significant emphasis on market development. This is due not 
only to an apparent lack of skills and capacity on their part but also to the fact that produce from SPSNP￾sponsored activities such as honey or vegetables can either be consumed locally or that no marketable 
output has so far been produced. 
It was observed that in almost all aspects of all projects, appropriate technologies had been used that 
could be easily replaced or repaired by beneficiaries. 
Cooperating Sponsor projects were generally well compliant with gender issues and that most 
interventions were equally distributed between genders, although some exceptions were noted. In 
particular, participation of women in study tours was less than that of men. However, in terms of impact, 
there were no significant differences between genders in the extent of increased food security reported, in 
terms of both increased cash and food availability. Generally the survey results showed little differences 
between gender disaggregated data sets. This is not unexpected. Cooperating Sponsors have had long 
exposure to gender issues in Ethiopia and have developed appropriate responses. 
Key factors affecting project success include the integration of interventions. Most beneficiaries indicated 
that at least three interventions are required to achieve sustainable food security. and it was clearly 
reported and observed that greater impact was achieved if interventions were provided within the scope of 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
vii 
an integrated community-based program. Field staff emphasized that the integration of programs within a 
common “software” environment (i.e. imparting a consistent philosophy of self-help and business 
development) is essential to the success and sustainability of all diversification initiatives. The integration 
of SPSNP interventions with PSNP programs was also observed to be a positive factor. 
Field staff unanimously emphasized the importance of developing a positive beneficiary attitude in order 
to achieve sustainable development. To a considerable extent, all CS hardware and technical training 
interventions are effectively providing a “framework of opportunity” within which attitudinal 
development must take place. 
Complementarity of PSNO and SPSNP interventions was generally observed to be good. The PSNP has 
successfully supported chronically impoverished communities and allowed SPSNP activities to be more 
successful as a result. However, it appears that Cooperating Sponsors have yet to make full use of the 
opportunities for focused development that the PSNP provides. 
Given the limited resources available for SPSNP interventions, it is important that interventions should be 
easily replicated wherever possible, but experience in this area is variable. Generally, the lower cost, 
immediate impact interventions appear (not surprisingly) to be most replicable. These include backyard 
vegetable production, credit and savings groups and the provision of shoats on revolving basis. 
Frequently however, the evaluation team did observe complex and integrated interventions, especially 
those involving high initial capital costs or a significant degree of organization/administration that would 
not easily be replicated by small communities or individual households. 
Interviews with field staff and local administrators indicated that all Cooperating Sponsors have 
developed good working relationships with government at the grass roots level. However, relationships 
with woreda and zonal level administration were less consistent. Generally however, the woreda
administrations have welcomed the SPSNP interventions seeing them as complementing PSNP activities 
while Cooperating Sponsors have filled resource gaps where needed. 
It was noted that in most interventions, the private sector was limited to the role of buyer. There was little 
observed attempt to involve private sector participation in other roles such as seedling nursery 
management, inputs supply, repairs to equipment or out-grower schemes. In particular, only limited 
evidence was observed of Cooperating Sponsors linking groups or individual households to public sector 
financial institutions to secure micro-credit. 
In almost every case, SPSNP interventions were being undertaken in woredas and kabeles that had been 
subject to previous interventions by the CS. This meant that the interventions could not be considered as 
discrete initiatives, but rather as the culmination of a series of events extending back over several years 
prior to the SPSNP intervention. Such integration of programs over time may promote synergism, but it 
tends to confound the accurate analysis of impact 
In general the evaluation team was not able to assess the actual sustainability of interventions. It noted 
with concern that major group interventions required continual CS input at this stage, however, those 
interventions that provided discrete support to individual households did indeed appear to be potentially 
sustainable. 
The evaluation team found plenty of evidence on the ground to assess that overall, despite shortcomings, 
the impacts of both SPSNP interventions have been positive. 87% of beneficiaries stated that the activities 
they had undertaken under SPSNP had resulted in increased production of food for their own 
consumption. Of these 37% stated that livestock production/rearing had led to the most production of 
food for own consumption. Sixteen per cent of positive respondents stated that the increase was large, 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
viii 
67% stated it was moderate and 17% stated it was insignificant. However, impact has been limited where 
Cooperating Sponsors have spread themselves too thinly geographically. 
Nevertheless, the SPSNP intervention can be assessed to have shown significant impact, albeit at a lower 
level, over a longer time frame and amongst a more restricted target group than originally anticipated. It is 
also expected that this impact will have a degree of sustainability, although again this is limited by the 
high degree of reliance upon cooperating sponsors that the more complex group interventions require. 
Amongst the more traditional interventions, three activities stood out as being both well accepted, 
replicable, and generally sustainable. These were the facilitation of savings and credit groups, provision 
of shoats and establishment of household water supply systems. Each of these interventions had different 
strengths and was most appropriate in certain areas. Two areas of activity stood out as being of limited 
relevance under the current circumstances. The first of these was vocational training, which proved 
relatively costly and limited in both the number of beneficiaries that were assisted and the circumstances 
where skills could be applied. The second area of limited relevance was in the marketing of traditional 
agricultural produce. It was observed that at current levels of production, generated by SPSNP activities, 
outputs could be readily disposed of in rural markets without difficulty or additional assistance being 
required. 
The underlying principles that determine the most effective practices were assessed. The importance of an 
integrated approach was recognized together with the ability to limit interventions to selected areas and 
specific target groups, including particularly those who would be able to make the best use of 
interventions. In addition, the relevance of a given intervention to the beneficiary community was 
considered critical to success. 
All Cooperating Sponsor field staff reported that successful interventions also require coordination with 
local administration and in particular capacity development at the DA level so that successful 
interventions can be both sustained and replicated elsewhere. Limited capacity at the local administrative 
level is perhaps the biggest issue facing the successful implementation of SPSNP or any subsequent 
development initiative. The creation of successful examples should be one of the two underlying targets 
of the SPSNP exercise, and interventions should be integrated and focused to achieve this goal. The 
second target - of achieving successful replication of sound interventions depends upon the availability of 
local resources, and complementary programs will/are definitely required to facilitate this. 
It appeared that most of the interventions undertaken by Cooperating Sponsors fell short of the original 
expectations of those who had drafted the initial SPSNP RFA in the sense that most interventions 
repeated previous agriculturally focused programs and relatively few introduced new concepts or 
methodologies such as vocational training or other off-farm income generating activities. However, the 
evaluation team observed that the interphase between relief and market-orientated interventions (that are 
more typical of development) involves at least two stages. In the first, beneficiaries are assisted to achieve 
sustainable household food security with occasional surplus production. In the second, they are assisted to 
develop a consistent commercial surplus for the market with direct oversight and assistance from the 
Cooperating Sponsor. It is at this second phase of intermediate development that more market focused 
interventions are relevant. Until the second phase has been reached the traditional interventions are more 
appropriate to the level of development of both individual households and the surrounding economic 
environment. 
Cooperating Sponsors have been accepted as stakeholders in the national development process to 
supplement limited local capacity. However within this context, it was observed that the role expected of 
Cooperating Sponsors by local administrations is one that attempts to achieve too much with too limited 
resources. All parties should accept that the role of the Cooperating Sponsors in development is limited 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
ix 
(by capacity, resources and by national mandate) to that of assistance and demonstration or the 
establishment of pilot models that government can replicate and take to scale. 
The RFA for the SPSNP indicated that Cooperating Sponsors should liaise and learn from each other in 
terms of best practices. The opportunity for collaboration in this regard has not been fully exploited. 
If sustainability is to be achieved then some form of exit strategy is required. However, none of the 
Cooperating Sponsors appeared to have an exit strategy in place and nor was this an issue they mentioned 
or indicated that they had thought about. Nevertheless, given the limited resources available to carry out 
SPSNP interventions, it is necessary that Cooperating Sponsors should develop the capacity to relocate 
their programs once development has reached an appropriate stage in a given area. It will therefore be 
necessary to develop a longer-term outlook, considering how their relationship with beneficiaries should 
evolve to the point where they are managing more and more activities themselves, forging linkages with 
extension and the private sector independently of the Cooperating Sponsor. At present this aspect of the 
development process has not received adequate attention. 
Key conclusions and recommendations can be summarized as: 
• Extension of SPSNP programs to a five-year (total) time frame. 
• Redirection of targeting processes to concentrate on aptitude, attitude and capacity. 
• Greater emphasis on the development of a positive self-help attitude. 
• Integration of resources to provide at least two and preferably three interventions per household. 
• Increased funding through the introduction of other donor resources. 
• Greater use and profiling of savings and credit groups. 
• Reinforcement of credit procedures and training of field staff in credit management. 
• Increased private sector participation in the development process 
• Increased community participation in the planning process 
• Increased sharing of lessons learned and best practices between Cooperating Sponsors. 
• The development of Cooperating Sponsor exit strategies within the context of realistically 
achievable programs. 
Specific recommendations are also made for improved project design and selection. 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
1 
1. INTRODUCTION
This report details the evaluation undertaken by Weidemann Associates Inc. of selected livelihood 
interventions in support of the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) financed from the USAID 
Famine Fund. This is the first evaluation of such interventions. It is based upon extensive field 
investigation, but covers only a proportion of the wide range of interventions undertaken by cooperating 
sponsors, many of which were only 75% complete at the time of assessment. The projects under 
evaluation are still operational and may in some cases be subject to further modification. As such, it is 
anticipated that some conclusions may be altered in the light of subsequent project developments 
Under these circumstances, the conclusions of this report cannot be considered fully comprehensive, 
particularly where negative conclusions might be drawn; in which case, criticisms must be taken to refer 
to specific instances and circumstances. On the other hand, where positive conclusions and 
recommendations have been made, there are reasonable grounds to assume that these have more general 
predictive value. The evaluation has therefore been undertaken from a positive perspective, of assessing 
the overall value of the projects financed by the Famine Fund, of seeking out the most effective 
interventions in terms of both impact an sustainability, and of gathering insights into the transition from 
relief to development that these projects have been supporting so as to provide potential guidance for the 
design and implementation of further interventions in this critical area. 
1.1. Composition of Study Team 
The work was conducted by the Weidemann Associates Study Team consisting of Dr. George Gray 
(Development Specialist), Mr. Ali Dastgeer (Evaluation Expert) and Mr. Gebremeskel Desalegn 
(Agricultural Economist), working with two field interviewers (Mr. Tankir and Mr. Xiauo) who trained 
and supervised the activities of over 50 enumerators in the field. Data was subsequently processed by 
Agridev Consult. The report was compiled by the three principal consultants. 
1.2. Outline of This Report 
This report consists first of an introduction (this chapter) explaining the purpose of the evaluation exercise 
and giving a brief outline of the methodology used. It is followed by a chapter providing background 
information on the Support to the Productive Safety Net Program (SPSNP) initiative. The third chapter 
provides a detailed evaluation of the SPSNP initiatives from a general perspective, while the fourth 
assesses cross cutting issues including gender, relevance and sustainability. In the fifth chapter, key 
factors affecting success are discussed while the overall impact of projects is considered in chapter six. 
Chapter seven lists those interventions, which appeared to have the greatest potential impacts, while 
Chapter eight considers the role of the Cooperating Sponsors in this SPSNP development scenario. 
Finally Chapter nine presents the conclusions and recommendations of the evaluation. 
This evaluation made extensive use of a field questionnaire that supports the narrative text and 
conclusions. To reduce the length of the report, few of the tables generated have been reproduced within 
the text. They are instead referred to either in text boxes or in the text itself. References to tables 
numbered G1 to G69 refer to the complete tabulated data set which is to be found in Annex G. 
1.3. Methodology and constraints 
This study used two specific methodologies to evaluate the different projects. The first methodology, 
undertaken by the principal consultants, consisted of structured interviews using detailed checklists to 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
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obtain general information, both on the overall environment in which programs have been implemented 
and on the specific interventions themselves. In the first instance the consultants interviewed other donors 
and agencies working in the field of livelihood development, including CIDA, EC, WFP, the World 
Bank, and the Food Security Coordination Bureau (FSCB). Secondly, information was collected from 
each of the Cooperating Sponsors with regard to baseline data and their specific experiences concerning 
the implementation and outcomes of the SPSNP initiatives at the head office level. Thirdly, twelve 
projects were visited in the field1
. These had been selected by USAID, on the basis of geographical 
coverage and the activities undertaken, to be broadly representative of SPSNP interventions overall. In 
the course of field visits, the principal consultants used standardized checklists to interview project 
implementation staff, local administration (where available) and beneficiaries. 
The second methodology was based upon simple questionnaire to obtain data from a cross section of 
beneficiaries regarding the relevance, impact and sustainability of the different livelihood initiatives. The 
questionnaire was presented by local teams of interviewers (educational level of Grade 10 or above) who 
were given preliminary training in the required selection and interview process. Forty respondents were 
selected from each woreda as shown in Table 1. Beneficiaries were selected to obtain a representative 
cross section in terms of gender, age and income level within each woreda. As far as possible, the 
questionnaire was structured to allow statistical significant results to be readily determined. A copy of the 
questionnaire is attached (Annex F). It is recognized that the limitation of 40 respondents per woreda
restricts the significance of results obtained at a woreda level, however, when accumulated across 11 
woredas, the results show significant trends from which useful conclusions can be drawn. 
The limited time available required that the study team be divided into two groups, each group visited six 
projects in a given study area, (Table 1). The principal consultants in each team undertook structured 
interviews while the field interviewers held training sessions and supervised initial data collection. Where 
the enumeration exercise could not be completed in a single day, the field interviewers traveled separately 
within each study area to collect all completed questionnaires. In total the Evaluation Team visited 52 
separate kabeles, a full list is appended in Annex G. 
 
1
 Ten of the project undertook SPSNP interventions and two were for similar OFDA livelihood initiatives. 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
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Table 1. Project Sites Visited 
Woreda Cooperating 
Sponsor 
In Support of: Interventions 
Degua Temben REST PSNP 
Aheferom REST PSNP 
Cooperative development, marketing, provision of 
inputs, training, water harvesting, micro-irrigation 
Enderta CRS OFDA Provision of Agricultural Assets thru’ Vouchers 
and Technical Assistance 
Lay Gayint CARE/ORDA PSNP Voucher-based training within farmer groups, 
development of seed banks, off-farm income 
generation activities, savings and loan groups, 
formation of market linkage nodes. 
Tach Gayint FHI PSNP Assistance in apiculture, provision of shoats, bio￾intensive gardening, new crops and varieties, 
micro-irrigation, forestry, and attitude change 
Habru STC 
(UK)/ORDA 
PSNP Micro enterprise development, small scale 
irrigation, soil and water conservation, training in 
business management, restocking (shoats and 
poultry) community and family nurseries, 
apiculture, grain and seed banks, kitchen gardens 
and forage development. 
Dodota Sire CRS PSNP Seed and livestock fairs, multiple uses of water, 
training in rural business development, production 
and marketing of white pea beana 
Chiro CARE PSNP Voucher-based training within farmer groups, 
development of seed banks, off-farm income 
generation activities, savings and loan groups, 
formation of market linkage nodes. 
Sodo Zuria World 
Version 
PSNP Provision of Shoats and cattle, silk worm 
production, provision of improved seeds, pumps 
for micro irrigation, fruit trees. 
Kedida Gamella CHF PSNP Savings and Credit Group, training artisans 
(weaving, pottery and business skills), Support to 
women’s business center 
Meskan CHF OFDA Development of 5 asset building groups for 
poultry, shoats, vegetables and cereals 
Meskan CHF PSNP Water resource development, apiculture, poultry 
rearing, silk production and marketing, enset 
processing, construction of bridges and access 
roads. 
One recognized constraint of this methodology was that it did not provide a sound comparison between 
SPSNP beneficiaries and those PSNP beneficiaries who were not receiving the additional support of 
SPSNP. This was due to logistical constraints in that while the Cooperating Sponsors could assist in the 
congregation of SPSNP beneficiary discussion groups and interviewees for the evaluation team, the team 
had no means of identifying or selecting appropriate non-SPSNP beneficiaries either within the timeframe 
or with the resources available. However, in the course of beneficiary discussion groups, questions were 
repeatedly put to assess how much development SPSNP beneficiaries might have achieved using the 
resources available under the PSNP alone. Beneficiary responses were unequivocal that under the PSNP 
alone, households could be expected to achieve little development of their own assets. 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
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It should be noted that while the original SOW of the Evaluation Team did include 2005 interventions, 
field visits were restricted to only two OFDA project sites. As a result, it has been difficult for the Team 
to draw comprehensive conclusions as to the effectiveness of OFDA FY2005 livelihood interventions in 
general. Nevertheless, the team was able to assess the two OFDA sites visited in terms of developmental 
impact and has incorporated the lessons learned within the overall conclusions of this report. 
The Scope of Work for this evaluation is included in Annex D and a summary of the key questions, cross 
referenced against the relevant sections in this report, in Annex E. 
Throughout this report, the authors have avoided references to individual Cooperating Sponsors where 
possible. This is because, in the team’s opinion, the Cooperating Sponsors are all performing with equal 
effort and professionalism, but under widely differing circumstances. Moreover, it was quite clear that 
most differences in performance could be ascribed mainly to individuals – not institutions. Under such 
circumstances it would be misleading to make specific references or comparisons. 
2. SUMMARY OF THE SPSNP INITIATIVE 
2.1. Underlying Assumptions and Objectives 
The USAID SPSNP is financed from the Famine Fund, through Cooperative Agreements with a total 
award value of $16 million over a two-year period (now subject to a one year extension), the primary 
objective of which is to decrease the number of persistently poor requiring food or cash assistance to meet 
basic needs. The SPSNP is a supporting and complementary element to the PSNP (Productive Safety Net 
Programme). This larger program is based on the hypothesis that predictably vulnerable individuals 
require predictable assistance so they may protect and/or rebuild assets2
. Through the provision of 
consistent, multi-year assistance to vulnerable households and in ways that strengthen their (and their 
communities’) coping abilities, targeted beneficiaries have potential to re-attain and maintain food 
security in the long-term. 
The PSNP is designed around two basic transfer mechanisms: Public Works and Direct Support for the 
labor poor, which are targeted at chronically impoverished beneficiaries over the course of a three to five 
year period, through two main components (resource transfers and community asset development). 
USAID considered that in addition to these two components, livelihood diversification and expansion are 
important elements of a program designed to achieve sustainable household food security. Increased 
income or food production opportunities, would allow PSNP beneficiaries to become self-reliant and thus 
graduate from the PSNP program. 
The SPSNP was thus required first to assist PSNP beneficiaries to graduate from the program through its 
livelihoods diversification and expansion component and secondly to address the two main components 
of the PSNP (resource transfers and community asset building) through its capacity building component. 
The former component (livelihoods diversification and expansion) is the subject of this evaluation. It 
should be emphasized that capacity development at the local administration level has not been assessed.
Under the five-year goal (FY2004-2008), USAID addresses four strategic objectives (SO) and one 
program support objective (PSO) See Annex C. Activities conducted under the SPSNP were expected to 
be primarily be reflected within Intermediate Result (IR) 4 of SO 16: “Livelihood options for the food 
insecure protected, expanded and diversified”. The assumptions underlying IR4 are detailed in Annex C. 
However, certain key elements deserve emphasis: 
 
2
 This hypothesis is quoted verbatim from the SPSNP RFA. 
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Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
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• The purpose of this IR is to meet people’s basic needs in a predictable manner that will reach 
them before they lose crucial assets. It is also important to provide different options to allow 
people diverse livelihoods and to enable them to meet their food needs throughout the year. 
• By protecting livelihood systems and increasing opportunities to diversify livelihood options, IR 
4, contributes to overall economic growth by enabling the chronically poor to participate in the 
market and production-based activities. 
• The economic resiliency of the chronically poor will be achieved when they are able to rely on 
diverse livelihood strategies during times of both abundance and hardship, surviving the next 
shock with no outside assistance and without depleting their productive assets 
• Under this IR, by the end of 3-5 years, it is anticipated that sustainable increases in livelihood 
diversification opportunities will exist in all targeted woredas. 
• In three years, success in protecting assets, while increasing the capacities and opportunities of 
the persistently poor to participate in rural growth, should result in the stabilization of the 
numbers of Ethiopians regularly requiring food assistance and within five years these numbers 
should begin to decline. 
The primary objective of the SPSNP was to build upon the anticipated impacts of the PSNP (protection of 
household assets development of community assets), to develop a sustainable system that would protect, 
build, and diversify household assets, such that the resiliency to manage through shocks could be 
achieved. A robust economic growth strategy was envisaged together with a new approach to engaging 
with the chronically vulnerable that would not only provide safety nets, but would assist them with 
innovative asset protection and productive expansion opportunities. 
A wide range of possible activities for livelihood diversification were envisaged including agro-forestry, 
adoption of new drought-resistant crops, efficient irrigation technologies, seed nurseries, bee-keeping, 
improved livestock marketing or training in the range of new value-added businesses that were expected 
to emerge as a result of other activities under SO16. In particular, it was expected that SPSNP projects 
would collaborate with and disseminate lessons learned from USAID/Ethiopia’s Seeds and Fertilizer 
Input Systems Program, Agribusiness and Markets, and Irrigation programs. 
In addition to the above, SPSNP projects were expected to liaise with the Agribusiness and Trade 
Expansion project and with the “Market -led livelihoods for vulnerable populations (MLVP) development 
activity. Finally, since traditional gender roles in Ethiopian society limit the country’s ability to move 
forward; women’s participation in the SPSNP was considered to be paramount and were also assessed in 
this evaluation. 
2.2. Coordination and Partner Collaboration 
It was assumed that greater synergy and improved outcomes would result from coordinated activities in 
each targeted region. In addition to working closely with each other, Cooperating Sponsors were expected 
to program activities as part of the GFDRE’s Food Security Coordination Bureau (FSCB) Safety Net 
Program. Rather than operating as independent organizations, they were to operate as integral members of 
the GFDRE PSNP, programming in collaboration with government counterparts. It was also expected that 
a regional consortium operating modality would improve cooperation and coordination amongst partners, 
and would improve communication between woreda, regional and federal levels. 
Cooperating Sponsors were expected to prioritize programs in the designated SPSNP woredas based on 
the following criteria: 1) existence of other USAID programs; 2) level of need (percent chronically food 
insecure, access to health services); 3) potential for impact; 4) prior Applicant programming/investment in 
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the area; and 5) evidence of woreda willingness/desire to integrate SPSNP programming into the PSNP 
framework. 
Cooperating Sponsors were encouraged to develop informal partnerships with other USAID/Ethiopia 
partners or international organizations implementing programs in the selected target areas.
2.3. Targeting 
SPSNP programs were expected to intensively target livelihood diversification and expansion in woredas
where they would be working closely with woredas officials so as to innovate effective PSNP elements 
with high rates of success. At the same time, programs were expected to incorporate extensive targeting
by focusing on improving systems that reach beyond initial impact woredas and by working closely with 
regional governments, so as to extend program impacts using local, zonal and regional administrative 
capacity. 
Projects were to respond to both short- and longer-term objectives. These included the use of cash and 
food resources for immediate impact, such as protecting lives and smoothing consumption, while 
addressing longer-term objectives by enhancing community and household resilience to shocks, helping 
people build a more durable and diverse livelihood base (restoring and enhancing assets, resources, 
services and infrastructure), and enhancing the capabilities of individuals through a focus on health, 
nutrition and education. All projects were to contain elements the crosscutting themes of communities as 
a focal point and women’s economic and political empowerment and to focus on water resource security. 
Overall, the SPSNP was expected to make a demonstrable contribution toward reducing famine 
vulnerability in Ethiopia. 
2.4. Interventions proposed by Cooperating Sponsors 
An assessment of the original proposals submitted by Co-operating Sponsors showed some uniformity of 
approach. In general, the proposals described programs and interventions that built upon Cooperating 
Sponsors past experience. With the exception of activities proposed by one new CS, there were no 
significant departures from activities that had been undertaken in previous Development Assistance 
Programs (DAP’s). This may have been in part due to the relatively brief time available for proposal 
preparation in September and October 2004. It may also have been due to the fact that at that time, no 
knowledge was available as to how the PSNP would actually be implemented and what its impact might 
be on the ground. It is not surprising therefore Cooperating Sponsors were relatively conservative in terms 
of the type of interventions that they proposed to undertake. Interventions that had been successfully 
undertaken in previous projects were repeated in these proposals, or in some cases, ongoing interventions 
were built upon within the new SPSNP framework. 
Although there were some exceptions (notably the greater emphasis on off-farm income generating 
activities in SNNPR and the more unified “watershed management” approach used in Tigray. Most of the 
proposed interventions were based around either social mobilization (e.g. savings and credit groups) 
and/or agricultural activities (e.g. backyard gardening, shoat rearing or beekeeping). Training was 
provided in a wide range of different skills either as an integral part of a specific intervention (e.g. 
training in goat management), or as a central element of income diversification (e.g. in blacksmithing 
skills). In some cases, there was considerable infrastructural input (e.g. substantial water diversion 
structures), while in others, smaller amounts of physical inputs were provided. The proposals indicated a 
general awareness of the need for assistance in market development, although the degree of emphasis also 
varied considerably, and significantly, the need for attitudinal development was universally highlighted, 
to the point of being described as a separate Intermediate Result in some Results Frameworks. 
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This is not to say that the proposed interventions were not appropriate to complement the PSNP. In many 
cases, projects were closely linked to PSNP activities and built upon them (e.g. backyard gardening 
activities based upon water collection ponds constructed under PSNP). Equally a number of new 
technologies were introduced as part of the SPSNP activities; some appeared relevant to the overall 
development process, others less so. There was a clear sense that in this regard, most projects were 
“feeling their way” as they progressed and that learning by doing had replaced the less risky approach of 
undertaking an analysis of costs and benefits prior to the introduction of a new technology. Given the 
short time frame available for project development and implementation, this is not surprising. 
2.5. General overview of progress to date 
The process of project implementation appeared to have proceeded smoothly with one general exception. 
Although initial disbursements in January 2005 had been timely, the close coordination with local 
administrations required for SPSNP projects resulted in negotiations with regional authorities that delayed 
almost all projects by 4/5 months, so that in most cases (with the exception of Tigray) project 
implementation did not begin until April/May 2005. This appeared to be due to the new conditions 
existing under the PSNP, including uncertainty as to the targeting of beneficiaries. However in some 
areas, the fact that Cooperating Sponsors had been working on similar initiatives in the same areas prior 
to the SPSNP programs meant that some limited activities were possible from February /March. 
Cooperating Sponsors indicated that most programs have progressed as expected since that time, although 
at evaluation, implementation was inevitably no more than 75% complete and it was clear that some key 
results would not occur until November 2006 at the earliest (e.g., first harvests of honey for some 
beneficiaries) and many impacts would not be apparent until 2007. 
Some interventions had progressed more slowly than expected. In some specific cases this had been due 
to logistical and administrative problems (e.g., difficulties in obtaining suitable livestock, shortage of drip 
irrigation equipment, limited availability of seed for new varieties). Generally however, there had been 
delays in two areas. First, in the implementation of market development programs and in the provision of 
market support. This was not the case in those projects for which marketing was a central theme (e.g. the 
marketing of haricot beans to international brokers, or the marketing of milk or honey), but project staff 
indicated that less emphasis than originally anticipated had been placed on marketing in those projects for 
which market development was a supporting element rather than a central issue (e.g., backyard garden 
development); on balance this may in fact have been an appropriate management response (see section 
8.1 below). 
Secondly, project staff generally indicated that the development of a positive attitude amongst 
beneficiaries was a key element of every project, but that it required a longer time frame than was 
possible within a two-year project. This aspect of development was something that was not always clearly 
defined, but was variously described by project staff as “a positive outlook”, “the necessary software”, 
“being business orientated”, a “can-do” attitude”, “ a self-help outlook” and “thinking outside the box”. 
Although this last description is a hackneyed management phrase, it does perhaps best describe the need 
to move away from the fatalistic outlook, constrained both by physical and social limitations that restricts 
the choices available to many beneficiaries. 
Project staff in a number of cases highlighted the fact that “we have given them (the beneficiaries) the 
hardware (shoats, drip equipment, beehives etc) now we need to make sure they have the software”. The 
importance of this intangible element is widely recognized, but ways and means of imparting it are not 
well understood and there is a general sense that in the first 21 months of these projects, “software 
development” has not kept up with the provision of the hardware. 
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Generally however, progress in project implementation can be considered good. Key indicators detailed 
in PMP documents have generally been met, although it must be accepted that for the most part, such 
indicators reflect project performance rather than project impacts. 
3. DETAILED EVALUATION OF PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
3.1. Physical Coverage of Woredas and Kabeles 
The SPSNP projects under review have been implemented in 522 kabeles in 26 woredas. The numbers of 
kabeles and targeted beneficiaries together with associated ratios are given in Annex G . The coverage in 
terms of woredas represents a relatively small percentage (less than 10% of the total PSNP woredas in 
Ethiopia); within the PSNP woredas, coverage in terms of kabeles was much higher, averaging 61% and 
ranging from 20% of the kabeles in a woreda to 100%. Clearly at the higher levels, resources were more 
diluted and some implementation costs (such as travel) would be greater due to the wider geographical 
coverage. Within each kabele covered, the percentage of PSNP households targeted for SPSNP 
interventions averaged 37% and ranged from 3% to 100%. The percentage of PSNP households targeted 
for interventions within each woreda was very similar, at 30%, indicating that the kabeles in which the 
Cooperating Sponsors were active represented the majority of PSNP beneficiaries in their woredas. 
The differences in coverage were quite marked and closely associated with the nature of the interventions 
undertaken. Thus where off-farm income generating activities had formed a significant part of the 
programs, coverage was consistently limited. Between 3% and 18% of all PSNP beneficiaries in the 
relevant kabeles received SPSNP assistance under these circumstances, as compared with between 55% 
and 76% of PSNP beneficiaries in Amhara woredas where more traditional interventions (such as the 
provision of shoats and backyard gardening) were practiced. These differences were also reflected in the 
amount of funding utilized per beneficiary. In the more focused situation of support to off-farm income 
generating activities, investment in training and other household development interventions ranged 
between US$146 and US$472 per household, while where coverage was more extensive, resources 
available to each household were understandably less, in this case between US$21 and US$60 per 
household. 
In those projects where clear focus had been achieved within the context of integrated watershed 
development programs, the investment per beneficiary household was highest of all, ranging between 
US$477 and US$948 per household. 
The overall number of beneficiaries targeted during the first 18 months of the programs totaled 83,000 
households or 415,000 beneficiaries (using the accepted approximation of five beneficiaries per 
household). This represents approximately 9% of the initial PSNP population and 6% of the revised 
figure and is slightly less than half of the coverage originally anticipated in the RFA. The total amount of 
funding spent on the development of household assets (as opposed to PSNP capacity development) 
amounted to US$8.36 million. This is equivalent to an investment of US$101 per household or US$20 per 
beneficiary. 
3.2. Planning and targeting 
The degree of project planning seemed to vary considerably according to individual circumstances. In 
those cases where the CS had very close links with local government, SPSNP activities appeared to be 
part of an integrated program (such as a watershed management plan) that had been developed in 
cooperation with the different arms of local government. Under such circumstances it also appeared that 
the CS had been able to support the local administration by providing technical skills (e.g. water 
Final Report 
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engineers). This is significant given the clearly identified shortage of skills and coordination at the kabele
and woreda level and undoubtedly contributed to the development of a coordinated intervention package 
that was synergistic with the PSNP activities. 
In other cases, projects appeared to have “followed on” from previous activities undertaken by the same 
CS in the same area. This may have occurred in close collaboration with the local administration, but this 
was not always the case. The outcome of such a process was projects which appeared to be most 
appropriate to the circumstances, but which could not necessarily be viewed as an integrated response, or 
to build upon PSNP activities. Whether this apparent absence of “planning from first principles” could be 
ascribed to lack of preparation time, novelty of the PSNP environment or restricted thinking on the part of 
Cooperating Sponsors could not be determined, but it is evident that a new program, building upon the 
lessons of the last two years, should avoid the temptation to repeat traditional interventions unless they 
can be seen to contribute to an integrated approach to development within the context of the PSNP. 
At a grass roots level, beneficiaries highlighted shortcomings in the planning process. On more than one 
occasion, it was learned that beneficiary communities had not participated in project planning and design 
and that the sense of community ownership had been reduced as a result. Some initiatives were being 
undertaken without enthusiasm (women caring for silk worms complained that the work was tedious and 
not remunerative “but we do it anyway because we have been asked to and it would not be right to 
refuse”. This shortcoming was as evident in those programs undertaken in close cooperation with the 
local administration as in those undertaken by the Cooperating Sponsors alone. In some cases, the 
evaluation team observed initiatives which had not been requested by beneficiaries, which included 
untested technologies and for which beneficiaries were expected to pay all or part of the costs over time 
(e.g. the provision of cream separators to dairy groups). At the same time, it was apparent that not all 
beneficiaries were aware of the responsibilities that they had taken on by becoming members of some 
business groupings, including the assets that they jointly owned and for which they were liable. 
It appeared that while overall project concepts might have been subject to community approval, detailed 
project mechanisms had not always been discussed with beneficiaries, giving rise to a paternalistic 
development process in which the CS was working out all details and beneficiaries were simply 
complying with the requirements placed before them. 
The targeting process was similarly criticized by some beneficiaries, who complained that targeting by 
the community in conjunction with the CS and community administration, was not the most appropriate 
selection method. A commonly voiced criticism was that selected individuals who either spoke the 
loudest or had influence with the administration were too frequently selected as beneficiaries (indeed, 
“repeat beneficiaries”, who had taken part in more than one program over a number of years were 
observed by the evaluation team on more than one occasion) and it was recommended that the community 
elders should have a greater role in selecting beneficiaries, since they knew who had the greatest need. At 
the same time, beneficiaries occasionally complained that they had been selected to receive specific 
interventions without regard for their aptitude or needs. “They gave us chickens when we wanted sheep”, 
suggesting a somewhat arbitrary selection process that lacked detail. 
Cooperating Sponsors indicated that they targeted “the poorest of the poor” and the local administration 
appeared to support this philosophy. In practice however, either as a result of undue influence exerted as 
above, or because of practical limitations the evaluation team saw little evidence that such philosophy was 
strictly applied. Beneficiaries appeared to be selected on the basis of access, capacity to develop the assets 
provided, or influence, in addition to the more formal criteria of poverty and need. 
There are in fact sound arguments for moving away from an equitable selection process identifying the 
“poorest of the poor” to one that takes an individual’s capacity to successfully respond to a program of 
interventions into account. There is a clear distinction between the charitable distribution of relief, which 
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normally attempts to cover all those in need and support to the process of development, where resources 
are rarely adequate to cover the entire target group. Given the restricted availability of resources and the 
vast potential target group of PSNP beneficiaries, there is a real possibility that using a “relief type” of 
targeting, resources might be so diluted as to create no discernible impact. If this is to be avoided, 
targeting should instead focus on those beneficiaries who have the capacity to best utilize available 
resources and who can create both economic and visual impact within the community, on the basis that it 
is better to support a limited number of successful examples that can be followed by other beneficiaries 
using additional resources as and when they become available. The alternative, of providing limited 
support to a wide number of beneficiaries, might be equitable, but creates neither useful development nor 
effective precedents for others to follow. 
It is suggested that the targeting process adopted by Cooperating Sponsors should not follow the 
traditional principles of relief targeting. Neither should it be unduly influenced by community meetings, 
but should instead seek to generate successful economic development on the basis of attitude, aptitude, 
and capacity, while avoiding the “professional beneficiary” syndrome that can lead to a select group of 
individuals becoming regular targets for successive programs. This is a more difficult targeting process 
than that required for relief exercises and it is to be expected that at the very early stages of economic 
development that SPSNP programs support, such targeting will be less than perfect. Under other 
circumstances, targeting would be based upon a front-ended matching contribution that would oblige the 
beneficiary to assume some element of ownership and risk. Within the PSNP target group, where 
beneficiary assets are extremely limited, it is difficult to impose such a requirement. This highlights the 
need for the careful and detailed selection of beneficiaries on a participatory basis where possible. Such a 
selection process should involve selected members of the community and the local administration, but 
should not be allowed to become an “equitable distribution of assets”. If the information held within the 
community can be accessed in an biased way, then it is reasonable to expect that improved targeting of 
beneficiaries who can make the best use of resources would lead to more successful interventions more 
effective demonstrations and hence more incentives for replication. 
Targeting those who can make the best use of interventions may sound harsh, however, under 
circumstances where finances are limited, the achievement of successful projects that can serve to 
incentivize others is more important than diluting the impact of interventions to the point where no 
sustainable benefits are achieved. Other potentially more vulnerable members of the community may be 
sustained by PSNP support until adequate resources were available for more widespread development 
initiatives. This is one of the significant differences (and benefits) of the PSNP program – it permits 
greater focus on specific beneficiaries without the risk of malnutrition that would be incurred if the same 
approach was adopted without safety net support. 
The original RFA recognized that resources for SPSNP development would be limited and made 
recommendations for intensive targeting that could be extensively utilized. The validity of this approach 
has been borne out by the experience of the last two years. Where intensive targeting has been possible, 
interventions have been more successful and incentives for replication greater. It is reasonable that some 
Cooperating Sponsors might prefer to engage households in multiple activities while simultaneously 
reaching a large number of beneficiaries. However, given current resource limitations such a strategy will 
be limited in its effectiveness. Under such circumstances, Cooperating Sponsors who wish to achieve 
impact must either lobby for more resources, or focus activities on potential success areas/beneficiaries, 
recognizing that the PSNP will look after those who cannot be addressed immediately. 
3.3. Coverage/degree of focus 
The coverage anticipated by the original Famine Fund RFA was approximately one million beneficiaries 
or 20% of the PSNP. This has proved overoptimistic and the actual number of beneficiaries has been 
Final Report 
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closer to 415,000 4154. Despite this apparent concentration of resources, the Cooperating Sponsors 
nevertheless generally indicated that the areas covered have exceeded their original expectations and that 
their resources have been overstretched as a result. Although the original RFA looked for the “intensive 
targeting” of resources, this was rarely achieved. It was reported that during initial negotiations with local 
authorities, Cooperating Sponsors were commonly requested to extend the scope of their coverage to 
cover a greater number of kabeles than originally intended. In some cases this resulted in the coverage of 
the entire woreda and meant that field staff spent considerable time traveling from one project site to 
another (in extreme cases in excess of five hours). At the same time, the number of specific interventions 
per beneficiary was reduced to one or two at most, reducing impact at the household level and extending 
the potential time taken to achieve food security. 
In only one instance did the CS report the unhindered freedom to concentrate resources in a limited area. 
In this case, the close relationship between that CS and the local administration allowed the CS a greater 
degree of autonomy. This cooperation and concentration, together with the close integration with other 
programs (including PSNP) meant that resources were more effectively utilized, and impacts at the 
household level were greater, more immediate and more successful. 
This single factor (extent of coverage) appeared to contribute most significantly to the level of success of 
different projects. As discussed below (see section 5.1: “Integration of Interventions”), a critical impetus, 
derived from more than one and preferably at least three interventions was generally considered necessary 
to move a household towards food security. Extended project coverage reduced the number of 
interventions at the household level to the point where in some cases at least 80% of beneficiaries were 
only receiving one intervention and consequently were not making discernible progress towards food 
security. Conversely, in some areas here concentration of resources had been possible, approximately 
50% of targeted households had benefited from at least three interventions and anticipated achieving food 
security within four years. 
3.4. Individual interventions 
Cooperating Sponsors provided as many as 22 different interventions within a given target area. For ease 
of reference and comparison, these have been categorized under the following general headings: 
•Provision of inputs 
•Investment in large-scale infrastructure 
•Vocational Training 
•Formation of and support to Savings and Credit Groups 
•Household Water harvesting 
•Backyard gardening 
•Market facilitation 
Each of these categories contains a number of different interventions, which in turn might be 
implemented in different ways by different Cooperating Sponsors. At the same time, the environment 
within which different interventions might be implemented was also subject to considerable variation. 
Thus the degree of destitution was greater in some areas than in others, while availability of markets 
might be greater in some areas (particularly in SNNPS) than in others. This variation made it difficult to 
compare different interventions objectively. Nevertheless, it was possible to observe interventions that 
were clearly successful and others that were less so. It was also possible to determine areas of potential 
improvement that could make some interventions more effective. These aspects are considered in greater 
detail below. However, since it is important to understand exactly what sort of mechanisms are being 
considered, a brief description of each of the more common interventions is given in Annex A. 
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3.5. Cost: Benefit Analysis 
The finance resources available within the SPSNP envelope were originally set at a maximum of 
ETB140/beneficiary. (US$16.4 million total funding, with an expected target group of one million 
beneficiaries). In practice, investment appears to have been of the order of ETB174 (US$20) per 
beneficiary due to reduced coverage. Given an average household of five beneficiaries, this amount would 
provide approximately ETB870 per household. In practice, this amount appeared to be less than adequate. 
The average cost of a single intervention, including all necessary supports such as training rarely 
amounted to less than ETB900 (e.g. the provision of six shoats valued at ETB 150 each), and in some 
cases exceeded ETB1,200 (e.g. the installation of a hand-dug well). The evaluation team noted an average 
cost per intervention of at least ETB 1,000. 
Chronically impoverished beneficiaries repeatedly emphasized the need for more than one intervention 
per household if they were to begin to move towards sustainable food security. At least three separate 
intervention packages were considered necessary in most cases (e.g. shoat rearing, beekeeping and 
backyard gardening) in order to provide the cash income and diversity of production necessary for a 
household to support itself on an ongoing basis. In the example given above, the three enterprises might 
annually yield seven shoats (worth ETB 1,050 if sold young), 40kg of honey (valued at ETB1,600) and 
three crops of vegetables (valued at ETB 900), giving a total annual income of between ETB 3,000 and 
ETB 4,000 (US$350-460). The cost of the interventions needed to achieve such a level of income is 
estimated at approximately the same level (i.e. ETB3,000- 4,000, or US$345-460 per household), or 
US$70-90 per beneficiary (given an average household size of five people). This is approximately four 
times the level of funding initially provided for SPSNP activities. 
On the basis of these field estimates, it would appear that assisting a chronically impoverished household 
to achieve a position of sustainable food security would require an investment of $400. This implies a 
total investment of $400 million to support the graduation of five million PSNP beneficiaries (assuming 
that two million PSNP beneficiaries will not be able to participate in the graduation process). 
It might be argued that over time, and with experience, interventions might be better designed and 
targeted and thereby more cost-effective, reducing this overall cost. It must be recognized however that 
the figures quoted do not take all supporting costs into account. Moreover, the initial beneficiary 
households are in many cases lower cost targets (easily accessible, greater aptitude) and once such “low 
hanging fruit” have all been targeted, costs of interventions to other more remote and less developed 
households may actually increase. There are grounds therefore to conclude that the achievement 
sustainable development of most PSNP beneficiaries will cost at least $400 million. 
The above cost: benefit analysis is clearly only a rough approximation. Nevertheless it serves to indicate 
the extent of investment required at this level of development. An analysis of the average costs involved 
in raising a household from destitution to sustainable food security is a guide that can assist in 
determining the feasibility of both funding levels and goals in terms of beneficiary numbers and might 
usefully be repeated and refined in future project proposals. 
4. CROSS CUTTING ELEMENTS 
4.1. Social Mobilization and Group Formation 
A number of Cooperating Sponsors under SPSPN have started the process of group formation. Groups 
may be general credit and savings groups or cater to a specific activity such as groundnut, honey or fruit 
production groups. A number of positive impacts can be observed from these groups including: 
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• Beneficiaries have been able to undertake activities that would have otherwise been impossible 
for them to do on an individual basis due to prohibitive costs associated with the activity. 
Economies of scale and distribution of responsibilities have made production and marketing 
easier, reducing costs and increasing profits. 
• They provide fora for villagers to come together and discuss production methods and improved 
techniques. Villagers and the Cooperating Sponsors report that farmers who undertake study tours 
to other woredas or other regions can, on return, relate observations made during the tours and 
share ideas. At the same time, they enable the Cooperating Sponsors and government extension to 
interact with a larger number of people thereby reducing costs and increasing efficiency. 
• In the case of credit and savings groups, they enable collective savings to be undertaken which 
can then be used to revolve credit. Particularly poorer farmers are able to thus access cheap, 
flexible credit for a variety of social or economic needs. Interest earned remains within the group 
assisting in further building up group capital. 
• They assist in empowering villagers who can over time realize their potential and, as a group, 
undertake bigger projects in the future even without the assistance of the Cooperating Sponsor 
However, the extent of the 
effectiveness of social 
mobilization varies from 
Cooperating Sponsor to 
Cooperating Sponsor. In some 
areas, groups are actively saving 
and revolving funds, in others 
the amounts saved is meagre 
and no utilization of it has been 
planned. This appears to be a 
reflection of the degree of 
assistance provided to the 
savings group by field staff. 
Social mobilization does take 
time as communities have to 
develop an attitude to work 
together on a common economic 
activity: responsibilities are 
determined and duties assigned; 
bye-laws are made and applied 
and internal disputes have to be settled. At the same time, savings and regular meetings begin; internal 
lending and development of collective enterprises ensues. All this is to say that nurturing of groups takes 
time and it has been observed that the two-year period of SPSNP is too limited to enable groups to mature 
to their potential. In social mobilization efforts around the world, it has been generally observed that it 
can take five years or more before groups can begin functioning independently. 
Successful Social Mobilization for Credit
The credit and savings groups in Lay Gayint stood out as being 
remarkably effective. In that system, ‘Savings Advisors’ (more 
progressive than average farmers), assist in the introduction of new 
technologies to the groups. Around twenty of the 104 Savings Advisors 
are women. So far, in that woreda, 592 groups have been formed with 
10,222 members and the estimated total savings are ETB298,500. 
The groups save a small number of ETB each month and provided easily 
accessible credit to members from group savings. Around twenty of the 
104 Savings Advisors are women. According to the Cooperating Sponsor, 
the credit and savings groups are effective entry points enabling it to reach 
the most vulnerable households better. 
On the other hand, groups nurtured by other Cooperating Sponsors were 
poorer. Inappropriate advice meant that they were lagging in revolving 
their funds or in saving as efficiently. No training in internal lending was 
provided in the courses that group leaders attended. It is recommended that 
USAID in future make social mobilization a key prerequisite for the 
Cooperating Sponsors it funds. It should also encourage the building of the 
capacities of staff in the field in social mobilization both through 
classroom training and exposure visits. 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
14 
In some cases, social mobilization is either not envisaged within the project or is lagging behind other 
interventions. Some Cooperating Sponsors who had envisaged the establishment of Farmer Field Schools 
or Savings Groups early in their work-plans have still to begin the formation of such bodies. Ideally, it 
should have been one of the initial interventions because it takes time to develop strong groups. This lack 
of attention to it points to a lack of capacity amongst Cooperating Sponsor staff and/or inappropriate 
planning and placement of different interventions. 
4.2. Performance of Revolving Funds 
It was observed, particularly in Tigray, that some Cooperating Sponsors have used assets purchased under 
the SPSNP program to established revolving funds. Equipment or livestock, for example, is purchased 
and given to a household, which is supposed to repay over a number of years. The funds built up from 
repayments are then, ideally, to be used to service other households in similar or different activities. This 
is a good mechanism to enable poor households to build assets or undertake an income-generating 
venture. Because they have to repay, there is a much better chance that they will have a greater sense of 
ownership and be more responsible. Simultaneously, it enables the Cooperating Sponsor to service a 
greater number of households with limited funds than would have been the case if grants had been given. 
The attitude adopted to this revolving mechanism by some beneficiary groups and Cooperating Sponsors 
has been over-flexible. Significant-sized loans have been given for relatively large periods (3-5 years) to 
beneficiaries without emphasis on timely repayment. This attitude fails to instill financial discipline in 
loanees and repayment records were observed to be poor (<70%). 
There are a number of reasons for such an attitude. First, the Cooperating Sponsor is under no obligation 
from USAID to return any credit that is repaid to it. USAID gives grants, not loans under SPSNP. The 
Cooperating Sponsor revolves or plans to revolve the funds, but with no pressure on it to make itself part￾sustainable, it has no incentive to insist on timely repayment of principal and interest from its 
beneficiaries. Secondly, at least in the field sites visited, that while the lender is the Cooperating Sponsor, 
the beneficiary has to return the loan to the woreda/kebele administration or to his/her savings group or a 
committee consisting of the Cooperating Sponsor, woreda official and head of the department of 
agriculture and rural development. Observations indicated no strong sense of ownership of this money, 
and consequently the responsible body has little incentive to chase up defaults. Thirdly the capacity of 
Cooperating Sponsor field staff in micro-finance management is often limited and low exposure to 
successful micro-finance models has meant that an overly tolerant or paternalistic attitude has been 
accepted possible as a means of encouraging uptake. 
Questionnaire Data 
Of the 440 beneficiaries interviewed using under the quantitative survey, 146 stated that they had received 
assistance in forming savings groups and 167 stated that they had received assistance in cooperative formation. 
(Some of them may have received assistance in both). 
424 respondents replied to the question whether they had, as part of the activity/ies, joined a group or association 
promoted by the NGO. Two thirds or 75% stated they had. Of these 71% stated that their group was regularly 
saving. A quarter or 25% of these stated that on average members saved less than 1.25 ETB, 33% between 1.26 
and 2 ETB and 42% over 2 ETB. Of the 424 respondents, 
Of the 274 respondents who answered whether the group was undertaking any credit activities, 24% 
stated that it was. Only 30 members reported that they had taken credit from the group. 23% stated 
they had taken less than 47.5 ETB, 43% stated that they had taken between 47.5 and 100 ETB and 
33% stated they had taken over 100 ETB 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
15 
In other parts of the world, it has been witnessed that such a lax attitude will ultimately lead to not only 
high defaults, but also to a breaking of the partnership and trust between the Cooperating Sponsor and the 
village households. It will also harm the credit-worthiness of beneficiaries making it difficult for them to 
access funds from other sources. 
The performance of revolving funds might be enhanced through a more intensive monitoring process that 
would first look for specific principles in the project design in terms of the revolving fund repayment 
process. These would include how interest rates and repayment conditions are determined, procedures in 
the event of default, the anticipated level of repayment (hopefully between 90 and 95%) and repayment 
period. In addition, the project design should clearly indicate the ownership of funds. If funds are 
provided to a group, the basis on which individuals participate in the group ownership process and what 
happens to funds revolved in the event that the group is dissolved. Finally, project design should indicate 
the purpose to which revolved funds should be put, including whether the first beneficiaries can be 
eligible to draw new loans (on the basis of sound performance) or the funds are to be specifically revolved 
to new beneficiaries. If such information is supplied in the project design or inception report, then a 
quarterly report for each loan project should include details on disbursement rates, recovery rates, 
reinvestment levels, percentage of non-performing loans, and absolute default rates, including reasons for 
any variation from original expectations. It is accepted that the Cooperating Sponsors might receive funds 
as a grant, but if it is offered to beneficiaries as revolving fund then both the beneficiaries and the 
Cooperating Sponsors must treat it as such – as a key part of the development process. 
Linkages with micro-finance institutions such as WISDOM or with government banks, which lend to 
rural businesses or farmers were not witnessed in any woreda visited. Currently, businesses and income 
generating activities are at early stages and gaps in finance are filled from group savings or from the 
Cooperating Sponsor but as businesses start becoming bigger, institutional links will be required to formal 
institutions and all CSs have so far been weak in promoting such links. 
4.3. Ownership and management of group assets 
The performance of revolving funds accumulating repayment for assets received by individuals or groups 
contrasts markedly with the performance of revolving funds in savings and credit groups. In the first 
instance, the financial commitments were not always well understood by beneficiaries and ownership of 
the revolving finance tended to be unclear. In the second case, each member of the savings and credit 
group was well aware of the repayment terms (since they had decided this themselves), knew who had 
received loans and could exert peer pressure to ensure repayment. There was a clear sense of beneficiary 
ownership and self-determination in the latter case, which tended to be lacking in the former. 
This sense of ownership, or lack of it, extended to group assets (such as milk marketing outlets or honey 
extractors) that had been provided to producer groups and for which individual members were committed 
to make repayments. While the CS was aware of the responsibilities of group members, it was not always 
apparent that individual beneficiaries knew what was expected of them. It appeared that management and 
oversight by the CS was crowding out the development of business acumen and a sense of responsibility 
amongst beneficiaries. 
It is recommended that both the Cooperating Sponsor and USAID undertake more rigorous monitoring of 
revolving funds initially offering small loans with short repayment periods and using peer pressure to 
ensure timely repayments. USAID is also recommended to encourage the capacity-building of 
Cooperating Sponsor and woreda officials in micro-finance models through classroom training and 
exposure visits. The volume of ODA to Ethiopia may shrink over the coming years, and sustainable 
microfinance systems are one mechanism through which the Cooperating Sponsors and Ethiopia as a 
whole can reduce their dependency on external assistance. 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
16 
4.4. Market development 
Cooperating Sponsors indicated in their work plans that market linkage development was crucial to the 
activities they were undertaking. This, according to them, is also one of the hardest activities. A few 
Cooperating Sponsors are actively developing such linkages and are expecting to deepen market linkages 
further in their areas of operation. For example, market linkage activities have been undertaken for 
pottery, honey and silk producing Asset Building Groups or ABGs, where the Cooperating Sponsor has 
played a facilitating role in displaying products at events in Addis Ababa, as well as in regional markets, 
fairs and hotels. Assistance has also been provided in one woreda, to a ginger marketing ABG comprising 
60 women and to the development of a market linkage between a silk buyer in Addis Ababa and its silk 
producing ABGs. During the second quarter of 2006, over 15 kg of silk was sold by two groups in 
Meskan alone. The next step in the market development process would be the federation of ABGs into 
KMAs or Kebele Marketing Associations. 
The above response is well suited to a beneficiary community situated in a relatively accessible area with 
a developed marketing structure. A contrasting methodology has been developed in the northern part of 
the country where, in order to tackle poor market systems and market information systems, the 
Cooperating Sponsor has: 
• formed honey and milk cooperatives which are trained and then assisted to become self￾managed, 
• built storage and distribution centres for these groups and provided them skills and equipment, 
and 
• organized trainings for woreda officials and extension staff in marketing. 
With these exceptions however, most Cooperating Sponsors 
have not placed significant emphasis on market development. 
This is due not only to an apparent lack of skills and capacity 
on their part but also to the fact that produce from SPSNP￾sponsored activities such as honey or vegetables can either be 
consumed locally or that no marketable output has so far been 
produced. ORDA, for example, states that it has struggled with marketing and currently limits its role to 
only facilitating the provision of information in marketing through what it calls ‘market nodes’. 
Almost all Cooperating Sponsors have lagged in the promotion of off-farm activities (with the exception 
of production-related activities such as sericulture or apiculture). Where such activities were proposed, 
they were of the traditional variety: training of men and women in pottery, masonry, carpentry and 
weaving for example or as blacksmiths. Even in these vocations, beneficiaries have found it difficult to 
find gainful employment. The output of weavers e.g. has to compete with better quality imported 
products, which are modestly priced. It is difficult, however, to see what other or new activities could be 
undertaken in the economic setting of rural Ethiopia where purchasing power is low and demand for 
marketable goods and services limited. 
4.5. Appropriate technology usage 
It was observed that in almost all aspects of all projects, appropriate technologies had been used that 
could be easily replaced or repaired by beneficiaries. In some instances, where inputs had initially been 
sourced externally, local manufacture by had been encouraged allowing integration with other projects 
(e.g. In Tigray, a group of carpenters had been organized to produce frames for modern beehives). 
Circumstances were observed where the sourcing of replacement parts required the intervention of the 
CS, thus drip irrigation technology can now be sourced within Ethiopia, but this is beyond the current 
capacity of most individual beneficiaries who do not have access to the distant markets where the 
Questionnaire Data 
Of the 440 beneficiaries interviewed 
using under the quantitative survey, 
only just over 10% reported receiving 
assistance in marketing. 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
17 
necessary materials are available. Equally it was indicated by CS field staff, that some of the more 
complex spare parts in technology provided to beneficiaries would be fabricated in their own workshops 
(as opposed to private sector manufacture) raising the question not of appropriate technology but of 
management towards sustainability. This was a consistent element of the more complex integrated 
projects- not that the technology used was inappropriate, but that its management did not always 
anticipate or develop interaction between beneficiaries and the privates sector at all levels. 
4.6. Gender 
Forty four per cent of questionnaire respondents were women, and all responses could be disaggregated 
by gender, allowing a useful assessment of gender related issues. The original RFA placed some emphasis 
on gender sensitive interventions. In practice it was evident that Cooperating Sponsor projects were 
generally well compliant with gender issues and that most interventions were equally distributed between 
genders. Some exceptions were noted: Poultry farming in particular was more common amongst women, 
while more men undertook small-scale irrigation, (Table G37). A larger proportion of men were provided 
with beehives, seed and seedlings, while more women were provided with poultry sheep and goats. (Table 
G40) However, it is notable that these were the only areas where differences appeared significant. 
One significant and important difference observed was the smaller proportion of women undertaking 
study tours (Table G42). Although it is recognized that social conventions may work against this, it is 
nevertheless recommended that particular attention be paid to the inclusion of women in study tours in 
future projects. 
Interestingly in both cases (cash and food) a larger proportion of women reported large increases. Equally 
significantly however, more women reported using the additional cash to purchase assets and fewer 
women reported any increase in the diversity of diet as a result of the successful interventions (Tables 
G50 and G51). 
The participation of women in savings groups was equivalent to that of men, although women tended to 
both save and borrow smaller amounts (Tables G62 and G64). In terms of credit it was notable that 
where respondents had borrowed money to finance activities, no differences were seen between male and 
female access to credit. Again, while as many women as men expected to expand their small businesses, 
women anticipated access to credit to the same degree as men. These results suggest that within the 
context of the SPSNP projects, gender is not a factor with regard to access to credit. This is an unexpected 
response and merits further investigation. 
The anticipations of women with regard to the achievement of sustainable food security were equivalent 
to those of men (Table G52) In both cases the modal expectation was that food security would not be 
achieved within at least three years, less than half of both men and women expected to graduate within a 
five-year time frame (from the onset of PSNP) and less than 10 % expected to achieve food security 
within the time frame of the original SPSNP program. 
Generally the tabulated results show little differences between the disaggregated data sets. This is not 
unexpected. Cooperating Sponsors have had long exposure to gender issues in Ethiopia and have 
developed appropriate responses. In addition, the proportion of female-headed households in the targeted 
communities is relatively high (in some cases over 50%) so that targeting of female beneficiaries was 
high. 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
18 
5. KEY FACTORS AFFECTING PROJECT SUCCESS 
5.1. Integration of different interventions 
Because projects were so wide in their compass, many beneficiaries took part in only one intervention (as 
described in section 3.4). In some cases, this proportion was as high as 80%, in others almost all 
beneficiaries took part in at least two and sometimes three different interventions. This had a clear effect 
upon food security. Isolated interventions had little discernible impact upon food security and assets 
acquired in the course of those interventions were more vulnerable as a result. Most beneficiaries 
indicated that at least three interventions are required to achieve sustainable food security. These 
interventions need not necessarily be fully integrated and indeed an element of diversification would help 
mitigate future risk. However, it was clearly reported and observed that greater impact was achieved if 
interventions were provided within the scope of an integrated community-based program. 
The concept of the integrated rural development program has been well tested and found to be effective in 
some areas (such as immediate local impact), but lacking in others, particularly in terms of sustainability. 
Experience has shown that development within a selected community should be community driven if it is 
to continue once support has been withdrawn and requires a supportive environment in terms of 
government capacity if it is to be emulated elsewhere. Interviews with both woreda and kabele officials 
and with Cooperating Sponsor field staff suggest that while government policy may be supportive of 
SPSNP interventions, actual capacity to initiate parallel interventions in other woredas may be very 
limited. 
Nevertheless, although the concept of integrated rural development solution may be less than adequate to 
meet the current development challenge (especially given the limited resources available), it is considered 
more effective to focus SPSNP interventions within specific areas and communities than to attempt to 
cover a greater number of beneficiaries over an entire woreda. This integration can be considered from 
two aspects. On the one hand, integration can take place within the context of an overall development 
plan. The typical example being the watershed development model developed by WFP and widely 
utilized in Tigray. Such a plan allows considerable synergy between different elements. Thus, beekeeping 
benefits from closed grazing areas, which also increase groundwater percolation and raise the water level 
in hand –dug wells, while enclosed areas also provided fodder for dairy cattle and shoats on a cut and 
carry basis during the dryer months3
. On a different level, field staff emphasized that the integration of 
programs within a common “software” environment (i.e. imparting a consistent philosophy of self-help 
and business development) is essential to the success and sustainability of all diversification initiatives. 
The integration of SPSNP interventions with PSNP programs was also observed to be a positive factor. In 
those communities where community water supplies had been created, time available for fieldwork and 
other activities had been substantially increased. PSNP-developed soil conservation measures protected 
water collection cisterns from excessive silting and enhanced the value of hand-dug wells. Further 
synergies might exist if PSNP community works could be realigned to support household asset 
development, in which case the frequency of individual household water collection structures might be 
significantly increased. 
 
3
 Despite the integrated nature of the Watershed Development Plan, it was noted that two frequent elements are 
inherently contradictory. On the one hand, large structures are developed by communities to collect run-of for 
subsequent household and livestock use. On the other, bunds, cisterns and land closure devices are employed to 
maximize infiltration and percolation to the water table. If these latter devices become effective then the former will 
fail. 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
19 
5.2. Attitudinal Development 
Field staff unanimously emphasized the importance of developing a positive beneficiary attitude in order 
to achieve sustainable development. Such attitudinal development was not well described, but could be 
assessed as an increased “self-help” mentality, increased business acumen, reduced donor dependence, 
increased self determination and a sense that the future need not be worse than the present. It was also 
universally recognized that such change can only be a gradual process and it may take five years or more 
before it can pervade an entire community. Nevertheless, such change or “software development” is 
essential to the developmental process. Without an attitude of self-determination amongst target 
households, replication will not occur, sustainability will be limited and new business initiatives will not 
begin. 
The development of a positive attitude can be enhanced by three key interventions: 
• Training – both technical, vocational and commercial. 
• Exposure to success – “seeing is believing” was a phrase heard at every field visit. 
• Provision of opportunity – generally the inputs necessary to begin new income generating 
activities. 
These three elements are all essential if a positive attitude is to be successfully developed. It is trite, but 
effectively true that: 
Attitude without opportunity= frustration 
Opportunity without attitude= non-sustainability 
Attitude + opportunity= sustainable development 
To a considerable extent, all CS hardware and technical training interventions are effectively providing a 
“framework of opportunity” within which attitudinal development must take place. The significance of 
this approach cannot be overemphasized. Interventions that achieved limited commercial impact (such as 
savings and credit groups) nevertheless had a substantial positive impact upon beneficiary attitude, which 
was undoubtedly stimulating replication and self-determination. Those beneficiaries who had benefited 
from such groups could be expected to be effective recipients of future, more complex interventions. 
It was clear that while all field staff recognized the significance of a positive attitude, few could define it 
clearly or describe ways in which it could be stimulated. There is a definite need to examine this area of 
development more closely and for Cooperating Sponsors to design and undertake programs with 
attitudinal development as a primary focus. 
It is also clear that since the necessary changes are slow, a two or three year intervention will not be 
adequate to promote the required impact. Moreover, change can be expected to be even slower in those 
situations where interventions are diluted by being spread over a wide area or amongst a large number of 
beneficiaries. These observations were supported by most field staff and have clear implications for future 
initiatives. 
5.3. PSNP/SPSNP Complementarity 
SPSNP interventions are based upon the assumption that the PSNP will successfully protect individual 
household assets and will assist household development through the development of community assets. 
Experience has shown that these assumptions (and particularly the former) were largely justified. 
Although the PSNP was subject to a range of administrative and logistical problems, and continues to be 
suffer from capacity constraints at the local administrative level, the program was indeed successful in its 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
20 
primary goal of protecting household assets and with the exception of some areas of Amhara, food 
security in PSNP woredas was largely sustained. This impact was judged by beneficiaries and CS field 
staff to be critical to the success of SPSNP interventions. On the one hand, field staff reported that 
beneficiaries would not have been able to participate in SPSNP interventions if they had been obliged to 
try and support themselves. On the other beneficiaries reported that without the PSNP, heads of 
households would have migrated out of the family area looking for temporary work. 
In its second goal, the PSNP has resulted in the construction of community assets such as the construction 
or rehabilitation of a range of infrastructure including roads, bridges, terracing works and soil 
conservation, water channels, water harvesting reservoirs and dams. In this respect the PSNP has had 
more mixed success and shown mixed relevance to the SPSNP. Thus, vehicle-worthy roads have been 
less relevant for subsequent activities initiated under SPSPN largely because market development and the 
production of a surplus is still in its infancy amongst SPSPN beneficiaries so that most produce can be 
brought to market on the back of donkeys. At the same time, it was learned that limited coordination and 
capacity at the woreda level had resulted in some poorly defined PSNP projects that were not well 
integrated with any overall development plan. The Evaluation team also learned that in some cases, the 
development of infrastructure was undertaken not because there was a need for it, but to create man-days 
of employment for PSNP target beneficiaries. 
On the other hand, other infrastructure, particularly the terracing works and water structures, can be seen 
as a necessary pre-condition upon which subsequent SPSNP activities have been built (although some of 
these structures had been created prior to either the SPSNP or PSNP programs). Many SPSPN activities 
could not have been undertaken at all or their output would have been less had this PSNP infrastructure 
development not preceded them. Water structures of storage and channeling in particular have enabled 
water availability for horticulture, animal husbandry and improved cereal variety cultivation. Equally, the 
undertaking of Food/Cash for Works, if implemented by the same CS that undertook SPSNP enabled both 
the CS and the beneficiaries to develop a deeper relationship with and understanding that benefited the 
implementation of SPSNP activities. This was not always the case; in some woredas, Cooperating 
Sponsors are only implementing SPSNP and did not benefit from program integration to the same extent. 
With regard to food security, the universal opinion of both Cooperating Sponsors and beneficiaries was 
first that the PSNP as it is currently practiced will not result in the achievement of household food 
security in the foreseeable future. Secondly, that SPSNP interventions, when properly integrated could 
enable households to become food secure. However, the time period of two years for SPSNP was too 
short to achieve food security, (especially given that the first few months of most programs were spent in 
negotiation and were essentially planning phases). Even the expected third year extension was not 
considered enough; a longer period of between 5-10 years of sustained interventions was generally agreed 
to be necessary for any meaningful sustainable impact to be observed. Although these responses may be 
considered to exhibit a degree of “donor dependency”, the evaluation team agrees with the observation 
that a two or three year program is not long enough and that a time frame of at least five years is 
necessary to ensure lasting success. 
There is one further aspect of the PSNP program that is very relevant to SPSNP initiatives – namely that 
experience has now shown that the PSNP does effectively provide a mechanism to mitigate malnutrition 
amongst destitute communities, as a result of which, SPSNP-type initiatives need not be driven by an 
over-riding urgency to assist all beneficiaries. The need to achieve universal coverage is largely met by 
the PSNP, allowing development programs to be more focused and to target for success without risk to 
the most vulnerable. This is perhaps the most important aspect of the PSNP from a developmental 
perspective – that it allows a paradigm shift in Cooperating Sponsor targeting mechanisms. It does not 
appear that this has yet been fully appreciated by all stakeholders.
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
21 
5.4. Replication 
Given the limited resources available for SPSNP interventions, it is important that interventions should be 
easily replicated wherever possible. Experience in this area is very variable. The evaluation team found 
evidence that replication is happening in some areas and with regard to some interventions, although 
given the limited period of implementation, it is difficult to determine the extent of such replication. 
Generally, the lower cost, immediate impact interventions appear (not surprisingly) to be most replicable. 
Thus backyard vegetable production was one area where replication was clearly observable as its tangible 
benefits could be quickly appreciated. Similarly, the number of credit and savings groups organized by 
farmers themselves was rapidly increasing as non-beneficiaries approached the Cooperating Sponsor to 
provide bye-laws and to assist with registration. The provision of shoats that were revolved on an in kind 
basis is another example of a readily replicable intervention. 
Frequently however, the evaluation team did observe complex and integrated interventions, especially 
those involving high initial capital costs or a significant degree of organization/administration that would 
not easily be replicated by small communities or individual households. It is difficult to see how a village 
community could undertake water diversion works of the complexity and to the standards observed in 
Enderta, or how individual households could construct 4
or water cisterns without the facilitation of 
organizations such as the Cooperating Sponsors. The provision of shoats on a cash basis, where repaid 
funds were meant to be revolved was an example of a less replicable intervention by virtue of its high 
start-up cost and lax fund management. 
In general, the interventions with the greatest immediate impacts were higher cost and less replicable. 
Those with lesser (albeit immediate) impacts were more replicable. Interventions with longer-term 
impacts were intermediate in this regard. It was notable that no replication of vocational training inputs 
was reported – i.e. no trainees had been approached to pass their skills on to others. 
In addition to these constraints, replication was frequently reported to be limited by the high turnover 
amongst government staff in local departments in Ethiopia. This means that those officials with whom the 
Cooperating Sponsor has developed goodwill and who have been sensitized to plan and implement 
activities in a participatory, bottom-up manner can be relocated and new Development Advisors (Das), 
unaware of the approach, take their place so that sensitization must begin again. It is noted that the 
government accepts that in order for replication to be effective resources will have to be allocated to 
capacity building of DAs in participatory planning and in concepts such as watershed management and 
market development. Most participating Cooperating Sponsors do organize training courses for woreda
officials and extension staff in their own SPSNP woredas but these are a fraction of the total woredas in 
the country. On a larger scale, WFP in collaboration with the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development is in the process of training up Development Agents at the woreda and kabele levels. 
Finally, possibilities for effective replication are constrained by the attitude prevalent amongst some 
Cooperating Sponsors whereby inputs are provided and activities undertaken without any financial 
contribution by the beneficiaries. Cooperating Sponsors have justified this by stating that these are pilot 
activities requiring incentives for cautious beneficiaries to adopt them. In other cases, it has been argued 
that the cost of procurement of some equipment or input is beyond the financial capacity of the individual 
beneficiary or group e.g. milk selling centers or post-harvest storage centers. However, while these 
arguments may hold some weight, little attempt by the Cooperating Sponsors has been observed to shift 
this relationship towards one where beneficiaries are contributing more once the demonstration has been 
 
4
 Although no replication of hand dug wells was observed at the project sites visited, the authors learned of a project 
at Shere where an initial 15 six metre deep dug wells had been increased to 125 through unsupported replication by 
individual households. 
Questionnaire Data 
Of the 440 beneficiaries interviewed using under the quantitative 
survey, 433 answered whether they knew if other households had 
replicated their activity/ies. 22% replied that yes, many 
households had replicated, 40% replied that a few households 
had replicated while 37% replied that no households had 
replicated. 
27% of men reported that their activities had been replicated by 
many households compared to a lower 15% of women. 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
22 
successful and borne positive results. Where cost sharing has been encouraged e.g. by the provision of 
ruminants on credit, the credit periods are long, the credit amounts significant and repayment discipline 
poor. 
As result of the circumstances described, there are few resources available to replicate successful 
initiatives. It may be too early for households to be expected to provide contributions for development 
activities as the project at this stage is barely 18 months old. However Cooperating Sponsors do not 
appear to have begun even planning how their relationships will evolve with their beneficiaries over the 
coming years. Under such management the level of replication will continue to be low. 
In general it was observed that the level of replication of interventions was limited and that little 
consideration had been given to this element of the program in most cases, especially in the more 
complex, integrated cases (which tended to show the greatest impacts). 
5.5. Linkages with Government 
Interviews with field staff and local administrators indicated that all Cooperating Sponsors have 
developed good working relationships with government at the grass roots level (i.e. DAs and Producer 
Association (PA) administration). This includes the forging of practical working relationships with PAs 
for planning and targeting interventions, defining who can be classified as a beneficiary etc and with DAs 
for disseminating extension messages, training and transferring technology. Indeed, throughout most of 
the evaluation field visits, DAs generally accompanied Cooperating Sponsor staff wherever the evaluation 
team went. 
However, relationships with woreda and zonal level administration were less consistent. Some 
Cooperating Sponsors were implicitly linked with government at all levels and experienced no difficulty 
in becoming fully integrated into the local planning process. Indeed, the balance of resources appeared to 
be such that these Cooperating Sponsor were augmenting or even substituting for limited local planning 
and administrative capacity. In other areas, limited capacity at the woreda level meant that PSNP 
interventions and community asset development projects were not well planned and it was difficult for 
Cooperating Sponsors to achieve the necessary degree of integration with the planning process. 
Generally however, the woreda administrations have welcomed the SPSNP interventions seeing them as 
complementing PSNP activities while Cooperating Sponsors have filled resource gaps where needed. In 
addition some Cooperating Sponsors were well linked to research institutions and used both results and 
material to develop SPSNP interventions. Nevertheless, effective linkages with government are not 
helped by limited local administrative capacity and a shortage of DAs. It was repeatedly noted that while 
each PA is supposed to be served by at least three DAs, there is rarely more than one available and even 
these are frequently recalled for “retraining” purposes. This aspect of development could be improved; in 
order to further strengthen linkages with government, it is recommended that Cooperating Sponsors 
undertake study tours and exposure visits of woreda officials to sites where participatory bottom-up 
development has been operated by the Cooperating Sponsor for longer periods so that they can observe 
the impact of such efforts themselves. 
5.6. Private Sector Linkages 
It was noted that in specific circumstances, interventions had been designed to incorporate linkages to the 
private sector, both in the sale of produce such as milk, honey or haricot beans, silk, woven goods or 
pottery. However, in most other general interventions, the private sector was limited to the role of buyer. 
There was little observed attempt to involve private sector participation in other roles such as seedling 
nursery management, inputs supply, repairs to equipment or out-grower schemes. This is very much in 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
23 
keeping with the prevailing philosophy that farmers are better served by cooperatives rather than by 
individual traders, but unless such cooperatives are well and competitively managed, such an approach 
requires continued input from the Cooperative Sponsor and limits the sustainability of the interventions. 
In particular, only limited evidence was observed of Cooperating Sponsors linking groups or individual 
households to public sector financial institutions to secure micro-credit. Given that both the Cooperating 
Sponsor’s and community’s financial resources are limited, efforts need to be made identify channels of 
credit which, as the nascent businesses and business cooperatives start planning to expand or improve, 
will be needed to cover resource gaps. 
The introduction of the private sector provides new roles for the Cooperating Sponsor and assists in 
achieving an effective exit strategy with an increased probability of sustainable development. Thus the CS 
could promote private sector participation by inviting private sector players into the project as “Lead 
Farmers” or Lead Businessmen”. The CS would then play two key roles: first in selecting and introducing 
the most appropriate private sector partners and secondly as an arbiter to avoid any element of 
exploitation in negotiations between the private sector partners and PSNP beneficiaries. Once a sound 
business relationship had been established, the CS could progressively withdraw from the arrangement, 
leaving the private sector partner with the commercial incentive to ensure the sustainability of the 
beneficiary enterprises.
6. OVERALL IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
6.1. Attribution of Impact 
It was noted that in almost every case, SPSNP interventions were being undertaken in woredas and 
kabeles that had been subject to previous interventions by the CS. This meant that the interventions could 
not be considered as discrete initiatives, but rather as the culmination of a series of events extending back 
over several years prior to the SPSNP intervention. In particular, where Cooperating Sponsors had been 
working over a lengthy period, a more responsive attitude could be developed amongst beneficiaries 
(although it was equally possible for a more entrenched paternalistic attitude to be developed by the 
Cooperating Sponsor). 
This historical effect was evident not only in attitudinal development, but also in technical training and in 
watershed management program development, where it was commonly observed that beneficiaries had 
been subject to interventions over a significant period before the SPSNP programs had begun. 
This raises the issue of “development perspective” as a key aspect of this evaluation. From the 
perspective of a donor, USAID/Ethiopia has viewed SPSNP interventions as discrete activities, funded 
from particular sources, which can be evaluated as having specific and measurable impacts. This however 
is not the view of those who work with or benefit from these resources. 
From the perspective of a CS, many of the SPSNP interventions have been part of Cooperating 
Sponsoring programs that the CS has been carrying out with finances from different sources according to 
availability. Thus World Vision International has what are called Area Development Programs (ADPs) 
into which the SPSNP and the activities undertaken under it have been adjusted. Similarly, in the case of 
REST, SPSNP is a subset of its existing 5 year plans. 
From the perspective of many beneficiary households, the SPSNP initiatives are part of a continuum of 
assistance, which may be subject to changing conditionalities, but which nevertheless represents a gradual 
progression (albeit with an end that is not always clearly defined). 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
24 
It is therefore difficult to identify the specific impacts of SPSNP interventions per se. Many of the 
benefits observed could not be attributed to these programs alone, but to the gradual development process 
that had evolved from partnerships between Cooperating Sponsors and beneficiary communities 
established over more than the two-year period under consideration. Such integration of programs over 
time may promote synergism, but it tends to confound the accurate analysis of impact. 
6.2. Progress towards Sustainability
The sustainability of interventions will depend upon the degree of alignment to beneficiary needs as well 
as how much it contributes to income The evaluation team noted that producer groups whose objective 
seemed to be solely to support the provision of assets (such as shoats) lacked any form of inherent 
sustainability and once the supervision of the CS was withdrawn, beneficiaries who had received shoats 
would have no incentive to remain within such groups. This contrasted with groups such as savings and 
credit groups where the beneficiaries all stood to gain from the efficient functioning of the group as a 
whole. 
Crop production conditions over the last three years have been above average and this can be expected to 
have created an environment favoring the sustainability of interventions. However, current observations 
suggest that actual sustainability is limited by the short implementation period of SPSNP interventions. 
Since in many cases a number of months in year one were taking up in negotiation, planning and start-up 
activities, implementation periods in most cases are no more than 18 months. Thus groups may have been 
formed but are not functioning at their optimum. Revolving funds for ruminants have not been strongly 
institutionalized at the community level – they have gone through one or at most two cycles. Activities 
such as drip irrigation have seen only one harvest and in some cases, such as fruit trees, none at all. A 
longer implementation period would have enabled more benefits, both attitudinal and physical, to have 
been realized thus ensuring greater sustainability. 
In general however, most of the household level 
interventions for which infrastructural work had 
been completed could be considered to be 
potentially sustainable. Where inputs had been 
provided the benefits could generally be sustained; 
water-harvesting structures required little 
maintenance and backyard gardens could be 
repeatedly cultivated on a profitable basis. 
Nevertheless, such sustainability appeared less certain in the case of the more complicated group 
intervention. In particular, interventions that required the supervision of the CS to ensure repayment of 
loans and to assist in the marketing of produce and repair of equipment would clearly require such 
continued input on an ongoing basis for at least another twelve months and possibly more before they 
might be considered self-sustaining. 
Sustainability in this regard is intimately linked to the development of the necessary “software”, i.e. the 
business skills and attitude that will allow beneficiaries to make the correct decisions to ensure the 
success of marketing cooperatives and to guarantee the repayment of loans. As reported by all field staff, 
such attitudinal change is a gradual process, developed by the provision of suitable opportunities and 
enhanced by success in those ventures. Once attitudinal change has been achieved, its sustainability will 
depend upon a favorable business environment that offers further opportunities for development, but such 
changes cannot be expected to occur within the 18 months that have elapsed for most interventions. 
In general the evaluation team was not able to assess the actual sustainability of interventions. It noted 
with concern that major group interventions required continual CS input at this stage, however, those 
Questionnaire Data 
When asked what their future plans were regarding 
the activities they were undertaking, 34% stated that 
they wanted to improve them and 52% stated they 
wanted to expand them. Only 1 respondent was 
thinking of stopping the activity while 13% stated 
they wanted to merely maintain the activities at the 
present level and in the present state. 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
25 
interventions that provided discrete support to individual households did indeed appear to be potentially 
sustainable.
6.3. Overall Impact Assessment 
The evaluation team found plenty of evidence on the ground to assess that overall, despite shortcomings, 
the impacts of both SPSNP interventions have been positive: 
• The formation of savings and credit groups has enabled people to access credit on improved 
terms. Beneficiaries no longer have to obtain credit on tough and usurious conditions and can “get 
a foot on the first rung of the micro-finance ladder”. At the same time, their own savings in the 
groups are building up and they can develop small businesses of their own choosing. 
• The promotion of vegetable production has empowered female-headed households in particular 
who now grow vegetables to eat and sell. The diet within the household has diversified and small 
amounts of income are being earned from selling at home or within the local market. 
• Water pumps have reduced the time taken and distance traveled by women and children to fetch 
water. 
• Animal husbandry has led to the greater production of milk, increased income and restocking of 
family assets. 
• The formation of production and 
marketing groups has enabled the 
earning of greater income and lowering 
of costs as well as the introduction of 
appropriate, low-cost technology. The 
groups are taking the first steps towards 
building more productive businesses. 
• The closer interaction of villagers with 
Development Agents, facilitated by the 
Cooperating Sponsors, has enabled 
knowledge and skills to be transferred 
and also vaccination campaigns of 
livestock to be more effectively carried 
out. 
• Through all these activities, 
beneficiaries are developing a positive 
mindset of self sufficiency, self￾determination and business skills. 
• Women are participating more and 
expressing themselves more 
actively despite cultural inhibitions 
in almost all of the areas visited. 
Observations supported the statement of a 
management member of one Cooperating 
Sponsor: ‘A year and a half after SPSNP, 
there is a lot more hope than I had before. 
There is a convergence of thinking and 
vision.’ SPSNP has enabled Cooperating 
Sponsors to move beyond handouts and 
short-term solutions and to experiment with 
developing sustainable livelihoods. Even if 
SPSNP were not extended, it will have 
Questionnaire Data 
Of the 440 beneficiaries interviewed using under the 
quantitative survey, 431 beneficiaries answered whether the 
activities they had undertaken under SPSNP had resulted in 
increased production of food for their own consumption. Of 
these 87% of both male and female respondents replied yes 
they had and of these 37% stated that livestock 
production/rearing had led to the most production of food 
for own consumption, followed by horticulture and poultry 
rearing at 15 and 14% respectively. Other notable answers 
were small-scale irrigation at 10% and beekeeping at 7%. 
Of those who stated that production of food for their own 
consumption had increased, 16% stated that the increase 
was large, 67% stated it was moderate and 17% stated it 
was insignificant. Gender segregated, 12% of men and 20% 
of women stated that the increase was large. 
Questionnaire Data 
429 people responded to the question whether the activities they 
had undertaken under SPSPN had resulted in increased cash 
income. Of these, 83% stated that it had. Around 40% of these 
stated that the largest increase was due to livestock 
fattening/rearing, 17% stated it was due to horticulture, 14% said it 
was due to poultry, 9% due to small-scale irrigation and 6% due to 
beekeeping. Of those who stated that cash income had increased, 
12% stated that the increase was large, 77% stated that the increase 
was moderate and 11% stated that the increase was insignificant. 
Of the 351 respondents who answered what the increase per month 
in their net income had been, 25% stated that it was below ETB16, 
27 % stated it was between ETB16 and ETB50 and 48% stated it 
was over ETB50. 
Two thirds or 74% of those whose cash incomes had increased 
used it to buy food and 66% used it to buy household assets. Of 
the 426 people who responded to whether their household’s diet 
had diversified due to SPSNP activities they had undertaken, 80% 
stated that it had.
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
26 
introduced positive models of livelihood development that other donors and the government could 
strengthen and replicate given adequate resources. 
However, there are constraints, which hinder impact: 
• The impact of such interventions will be limited if other issues impinging upon economic 
development in Ethiopia are not tackled too. One such issue is the high population growth. Not 
only does this have an effect on amount of nutrition available per capita and on division of land, 
high fertility also negatively affects working mothers’ health and productivity. Although this 
problem was frequently mentioned by field staff, the number of activities being undertaken by 
Cooperating Sponsors under family planning and contraception is negligible under SPSNP. 
• Impact has also been limited where Cooperating Sponsors have spread themselves too thinly 
geographically. This was undoubtedly the most significant observed constraint upon impact and 
has meant that activities have been dispersed and complementary activities may not have been 
undertaken due to resource constraints. Reasons for spreading thinly include donor pressure as 
well as local government pressure that the CS must have presence in each kebele. This pressure is 
not homogenous throughout the country it appears as some Cooperating Sponsors were observed 
to be working in all kebeles in some woredas and only in a select few in others, depending upon 
the demands of the particular woreda authorities. Where the CS has been able to concentrate its 
activities, impact has been significantly more obvious. This was particularly noticeable in the 
case of REST, which has been able to integrate several activities in a limited number of 
watershed sites e.g. terracing, erosion control and percolator trenches (under PSNP) with water 
harvesting, apiculture and vegetable production. Such sites serve as powerful demonstrations 
which can be effectively used for study tours and exposure visits for farmers from neighboring 
woredas.
• It is significant that the number of potential beneficiaries in each woreda or kebele is much higher 
than the actual number of beneficiaries that have been reached. Lower outreach is chiefly due to a 
limitation of resources, otherwise Cooperating Sponsors report that the number of people 
interested in, e.g., taking up sheep and goat breeding is much more than can be serviced.
• Finally, most Cooperating Sponsors indicated the time scale of the initiative is too limited and 
that the work is only half done – even where infrastructural development projects are complete, 
positive attitudes of self-determination still need to be fostered.
Notwithstanding the above remarks, it should be noted though that in most cases, it is difficult to attribute 
any impact associated with an SPSNP activity solely to that USAID-financed intervention. Because the 
Cooperating Sponsors have been working in the woredas for several years prior to SPSNP and with 
resources from other donors, SPSNP must be seen as the culmination of a series of activities, building on 
earlier efforts. It is possible that SPSNP interventions undertaken without preceding work might have less 
impact.
Nevertheless, it is also quite clear that although the PSNP has been effective in its primary goal of 
protecting household assts and preventing food insecurity, neither beneficiaries nor those working in the 
field anticipate any significant progress towards the achievement of sustainable household food security 
unless additional interventions are put in place to develop household assets. In this regard, the SPSNP 
intervention can be assessed to have shown significant impact, albeit at a lower level, over a longer time 
frame and amongst a more restricted target group than originally anticipated. It is can also be expected 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
27 
that this impact will have a degree of sustainability, although again this is limited by the high degree of 
reliance upon cooperating sponsors that the more complex group interventions require.5
Overall therefore, SPSNP interventions have demonstrated significant benefits under particular 
circumstances. These benefits are limited in impact and will continue to be restricted unless the resources 
of either the Cooperating Sponsors or the local administration are significantly increased. 
7. EVALUATION OF BEST PRACTICES
As stated in other sections of the report, the time period for the implementation of activities may be too 
short to judge whether a practice has been good. At the same time, some activities were clearly successful 
in some areas or under certain management but less successful in other areas or under different 
management. Nevertheless some general principles can be established and these are noted below: 
7.1. Traditional Elements 
Amongst the more traditional interventions, three activities stood out as being both well accepted, 
replicable, and generally sustainable. These were the facilitation of savings and credit groups, provision 
of shoats and establishment of household water supply systems. Each of these interventions had different 
strengths and was most appropriate in certain areas: 
Savings and Credit Groups – were most relevant in the very poorest areas where beneficiaries had no 
means to access micro-finance institutions. They had the advantage of self –determination – beneficiaries 
formed their own groups, which they managed themselves and they were able to use loans for whatever 
business interest they wished. The group had a strong cohesion maintained by peer pressure and good 
loan performance. Although the impact of these groups was small, they nevertheless made a significant 
and immediate difference to the lives of those who participated in them. 
Provision of Shoats – this was the most widespread intervention and was applicable to both crop and 
livestock production areas, although in crop areas, some beneficiaries indicated that ultimately they 
wished to trade their shoats for oxen. Nevertheless, as an intervention, small ruminant production was 
well suited to the limited grazing areas available, provided useful additional household income and could 
(provide the ruminants were repaid in kind) be replicated easily. The main disadvantage of this 
intervention was that it is susceptible to drought and might not be sustained through environmental shock. 
The questionnaire responses showed that this intervention was highly rated by beneficiaries, especially 
female headed households as a means of increasing income. 
Establishment of Household Water Supply Systems – this was the most desired intervention, 
particularly in those areas such as in Tigray, where drought has been a recurring problem. Although the 
cost of the initial infrastructure was high (and this places a severe constraint on replication by individual 
 
5
 It is useful to compare the SPSNP interventions with the current household development program undertaken by 
the Government to complement the PSNP. This consists primarily of micro-credit facilities that are to be made 
available to PSNP beneficiaries. FSCB administration noted that the program suffered from a lack of trained 
personnel with the result that the amount of funds disbursed had been limited. More significantly however, the 
program required significant collateral before loans could be given and this was reported by SPSNP field staff to be 
beyond the capacity of the majority of SPSNP beneficiaries. The conclusion drawn by the evaluation team was that 
this program had been pitched at a higher level of development than most SPSNP beneficiaries had yet attained. In 
this regard, interventions such as savings and credit groups, which could be accessed by the very poor, were 
particularly useful in providing “intervening rungs” on the “developmental ladder”. 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
28 
households), the advantages to a household were immediate and included not only supplementary crop 
irrigation, but enhanced backyard gardening, including the development of household drip systems, stock 
watering and even provision of household drinking water in extreme situations. 
Study Tours – the practical value of study tours was repeatedly emphasized by beneficiaries. Visiting 
successful microprojects both incentivized other beneficiaries and allowed first hand experiences to be 
passed from one beneficiary to another. In a situation of limited resources, where replication is essential if 
benefits are to be spread over a wider area, study tours deserve to be a key element of all SPSNP projects 
as a primary means of disseminating information. The survey data reported that only 26% of trainees had 
been taken on study tours6
 (Table G10). This is regrettable since beneficiaries have clearly indicated that 
they are the best means of understanding just what a particular intervention requires and what it can mean 
in terms of benefits. Study tours allow the “software” to be developed, including both technical 
knowledge and the necessary incentive to achieve comparable success. Future SPSNP initiatives should 
seek to include study tours as an integral component of every intervention such that once a given 
intervention had been successfully established then that success should be exploited to the maximum by 
demonstration to as many other beneficiaries as possible. 
7.2. Innovative Activities 
Although there were no innovative activities in the sense that they had not already been tested in 
neighboring countries or elsewhere in the world, there were some activities observed by the evaluation 
team that were innovative to Ethiopia or to the area/woreda in question. 
• CRS has introduced in Ethiopia and other neighboring country what are called ‘seed fairs’ and 
‘livestock fairs’. These fairs give several buyers and sellers the opportunity to interact in one 
place simultaneously. Buying beneficiaries are given vouchers using which they can buy the seed, 
tools or ruminants of their choice – both the variety and the type. At the end of the day, CRS pays 
cash to the sellers to the value of the vouchers they have collected. A brief evaluation undertaken 
on behalf of CRS of the seed fairs gave a generally positive assessment.7
 CRS states that this 
method encourages the growth of local markets as local sellers get an opportunity to sell their 
products. Though not a primary purpose, CRS uses these fairs to disseminate information on 
HIV, nutrition and sanitation too. 
• Watershed development in Tigray by REST has been an innovative activity if seen in the national 
context. Within a given watershed, several activities at community and household level are 
undertaken which complement each other including the harvesting of water, horticulture and 
drinking water for livestock. The terracing and rehabilitation of land and gully reinforcement 
allows for beekeeping, agro-forestry and livestock rearing to then take place – SPNSP activities at 
the household level being built on previous PSNP activities at the community level. REST states 
that water harvesting has been an incredible trigger especially considering that effective water 
management was ‘appalling’ in the area. The CS introduced a range of new water harvesting 
structures. 
There is no systematic sharing of best practices or lessons being learnt by the various Cooperating 
Sponsors under SPSNP around the country. The progress reports submitted regularly by the Cooperating 
 
6
 Significantly fewer women (18%) undertook study tour than men (33%). Given the significant proportion of 
female headed households in the survey, this aspect requires particular attention. 7
 Bramel P.J. and Remington T, CRS Seed Vouchers and Fairs: A meta-analysis of their use in Zimbabwe, Ethiopia 
and Gambia (undated) 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
29 
Sponsors to USAID also lack documentation of lessons learnt. Such sharing should be actively 
encouraged by USAID if mistakes are to be avoided and good practices adopted. 
7.3. Less Relevant Interventions 
Two areas of activity stood out as being of limited relevance under the current circumstances. The first of 
these was vocational training. This was clearly successful in terms first, of imparting skills to a selected 
group of individuals and secondly, of moving those individuals very rapidly towards household food 
security. However, the approach proved relatively costly and limited in both the number of beneficiaries 
that were assisted and the circumstances where skills could be applied so that beneficiaries were not 
always able to find ready markets for their skills. This was a disappointing observation given the obvious 
need to diversify household incomes away from traditional agricultural activities, but it would appear that 
such diversification requires a market that has not yet been developed in most rural areas and that such 
skills might be more appropriate to peri-urban areas.8
The second area of limited relevance was in the marketing of traditional agricultural produce. In practice, 
Cooperating Sponsors had placed less emphasis on this aspect of development than had been generally 
indicated in initial proposals. However, it was observed that at current levels of production, such 
emphasis was in fact unnecessary and with the exception of honey, milk and some specific artisan 
products, most production generated by SPSNP activities could be readily disposed of in rural markets 
without difficulty or additional assistance being required. 
7.4. Underlying Principles 
There are a number of underlying principles that would appear to determine the most effective practices, 
the first of which being the importance of an integrated approach. Where interventions were integrated 
with local administrative development plans (such as watershed development plans) and where they built 
upon PSNP interventions then impacts were greater and sustainability was more probable. Secondly, and 
arising from the need for integration was the ability to limit interventions to selected areas and specific 
target groups, including particularly those who would be able to make the best use of interventions. Such 
a concentration of resources allows the development of communities who can move together towards 
food security in a sustainable way as opposed to isolated households whose future development would be 
much less certain. Thirdly, the effectiveness of practices appeared to be determined not only by the 
intervention itself, but also by its relevance to the beneficiary community and in particular by the manner 
in which it was implemented. The capacity of field staff as project managers and extension agents was 
observed to make a fundamental difference to the success or failure of interventions varying from savings 
and credit schemes to backyard gardens. 
Finally and perhaps most critically from the aspect of sustainability there is the need to coordinate with 
local administration and in particular to build capacity at the DA level so that successful interventions can 
be both sustained and replicated elsewhere. This need was recognized by all Cooperating Sponsors who 
also recognized that limited capacity in this area was a nation-wide shortcoming of local government. In 
some cases, Cooperating Sponsors have tried to avoid this shortcoming by taking on the role of the local 
administration, but this fails to recognize that ultimately local government capacity must be developed if 
the needs of the PSNP beneficiaries are to be met. 
 
8
 It is important to note that 41% of beneficiaries surveyed received PSNP Food Aid only while only 25% received 
cash only, and 33% received both (Table G4). This may indicate some bias toward areas where markets would be 
less developed and market-based interventions less effective. 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
30 
Limited capacity at the local administrative level is perhaps the biggest issue facing the successful 
implementation of SPSNP or any subsequent development initiative. Cooperating Sponsors have in the 
past taken on a role that to a considerable extent substituted for local administration in the distribution of 
relief. Such a role is not appropriate to the promotion of sustainable development. In the development 
arena, resources are limited and it is impossible to achieve the universal coverage of beneficiaries that 
might be the target of a relief exercise. Instead the best that can be hoped for is the creation of successful 
examples that can be replicated by other beneficiaries or by the local administration. 
The creation of successful examples should be one of the two underlying targets of the SPSNP exercise, 
and interventions should be integrated and focused to achieve this goal. The second target - of achieving 
successful replication of sound interventions depends upon the availability of local resources, and 
complementary programs will/are definitely required to facilitate this. 
8. ROLE OF COOPERATING SPONSORS IN SPSNP DEVELOPMENT 
8.1. Nature of SPSNP Development 
It appeared to the Evaluation Team that most of the interventions undertaken by Cooperating Sponsors 
fell short of the original expectations of those who had drafted the initial SPSNP RFA in the sense that 
most interventions repeated previous agriculturally-focused programs and relatively few introduced new 
concepts or methodologies such as vocational training or other off-farm income generating activities. 
However, it was also clear that the traditional interventions were in fact more appropriate to the level of 
development of both individual households and the surrounding economic environment. 
This does not imply that the solution to graduation is to achieve diversified agricultural-based livelihoods 
on drought-prone, small fragmented, degraded parcels of land. Rather that the non-traditional and off￾farm income generating activities tried so far have limited relevance on a wide scale and will be less 
effective in achieving sustainable household food security in the majority of current economic 
environments. To be more generally successful, these interventions will require increased private sector 
interest and investment in rural economies to exploit the non-traditional skills and products. 
It was evident that the traditional interventions helped effectively destitute households to generate food 
and/or cash resources in various ways so that they could move towards household food security. In most 
cases this involved the production of food for the household with the possibility of a small surplus that 
could be marketed locally. In a few cases, there was a much greater emphasis on marketing (e.g. the 
export of pottery or marketing of white pea-beans), and it would appear that in these cases, the 
beneficiary households had already moved beyond subsistence production to a position where much 
greater emphasis could be placed on cash crops or industries. These interventions appeared to be a second 
phase of intermediate development that is not yet appropriate for the majority of PSNP beneficiaries 
because the economic environment is not conducive to such interventions (e.g. there may be no ready 
market for the goods or services). This is simplistically represented diagrammatically below: 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
31 
Figure 1. Spectrum of interventions 
Shoat Rearing Off-farm IGA's Ongoing market￾Backyard gardening Marketing of comm- based development 
Water harvesting ercial surpluses activities (eg. ATEA)
Savings & Credit Micro-export
Phase 2a Phase 2b Phase 3
PSNP Activities
Relief distribution
DAP Projects
Phase 1
ALT Interventions ALT/BEAT Interventions (SPSNP) BEAT Interventions
The evaluation team concluded that the interphase between relief and market-orientated interventions 
(that are more typical of development) involves at least two stages. In the first, beneficiaries are assisted 
to achieve sustainable household food security with occasional surplus production. In the second, they are 
assisted to develop a consistent commercial surplus for the market with direct oversight and assistance 
from the Cooperating Sponsor. It is at this second phase of intermediate development (Phase 2b) that 
more market focused interventions are relevant. These might be associated with economies of scale 
(including organized groups or formal cooperatives) and the development of linkages to markets, finance 
and commercial technologies. If this second phase can be achieved, then more traditional developmental 
approaches become relevant whereby sustainable development without oversight is promoted. It would 
appear however, that the more market orientated second phase interventions are not appropriate until the 
first stage of achieving sustainable food security has been successfully met and only then if appropriate 
economic conditions (chiefly an adequate market) are available. Most SPSNP interventions are working 
at this first stage and this appears to be generally appropriate to the economic environment and conditions 
of the beneficiaries. The Government household development micro-credit program would appear to be 
more appropriate to “Phase 2b” of development and to be less relevant to the majority of PSNP 
beneficiaries. 
8.2. Role of the Cooperating Sponsors 
It would appear that Cooperating Sponsors will play a role in rural development in Ethiopia for the 
foreseeable future. In this context it is helpful that all Cooperating Sponsors have established good 
working relationships at the local administration (PA) level and most have good relationships at the 
woreda level. In general they have been accepted as stakeholders in the national development process to 
supplement limited local capacity. However within this context, it was observed that the role expected of 
Cooperating Sponsors by local administrations (and indeed the role which Cooperating Sponsors appear 
to have broadly accepted) is one that attempts to achieve too much with too limited resources 
The resources required to facilitate and oversee the process of economic development are generally 
greater per beneficiary than those required to distribute relief. They are also quite different in terms of 
skill sets. Hence, within the development context of SPSNP programs, it is not realistic to expect 
Cooperating Sponsors to target each and every household within their woreda/kebeles of operation, since 
both financial resources and manpower are inadequate to achieve this. 
All parties should accept that the role of the Cooperating Sponsors in development is limited (by capacity, 
resources and by national mandate) to that of assistance and demonstration or the establishment of pilot 
models that government can replicate and take to scale. To attempt to adopt a wider or more ambitious 
role would be to usurp the function of government as the primary development institution in the country. 
This view was a consistent theme in discussions with donors including CIDA and WFP. 
Final Report 
Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
32 
The Cooperating Sponsors do appreciate their limitations. They indicated that they would prefer to 
consolidate their work and be enabled to undertake activities in a concentrated manner in order to have a 
bigger impact. However, with pressure from government (and donors9
) to spread extensively, they state 
that they cannot work as intensively as they would like. 
In one specific case, a Cooperating Sponsor had indeed been able to work in a concentrated manner and 
had achieved significant impact as a result. The ability to achieve such focus appeared to be primarily 
derived from the close relationship between the CS and local government – to the extent that it appeared 
to be an integral part of the local administration itself - and the high standing in which the CS was held. 
This approach deserves further comment. On the one hand, the approach was definitely effective in terms 
of integrating with wider development initiatives and in terms of impacts achieved. On the other hand, 
under this approach, the Cooperating Sponsor adopted a role of continued involvement and supervision 
with no apparent intention to move on from the targeted areas other than through the expansion of its own 
resources. As such, the CS definitely appeared to be substituting for, rather than supplementing the role of 
the local administration in development. Moreover, the integrated nature of the interventions meant that 
the Cooperating Sponsor played an all-encompassing role that largely excluded private sector 
involvement in marketing or service support. 
Such an approach implies a degree of overall control that might be fraught with political undertones, 
especially in the arena of local (woreda and kabele level) politics. It is probably not the open model of 
development that proponents of liberalized markets and private sector economics would envisage, and it 
raises issues of paternalism, control, and freedom of choice. It also raises issues of fundamental policy – 
would such an integrated approach countenance off-farm income generating activities? or would it 
concentrate the bulk of its resources on the increased intensification of agricultural production?) 
However, despite these concerns, this integrated CS/local government approach appears the most 
effective way of working at this level of development. 
This is not to say that such an overall level of control would be appropriate at the next stage of 
development, where commercial concerns are of greater significance, but at what is essentially 
subsistence level agriculture, producing small and occasional surpluses for local sale, the integrated 
model appears to have greatest impact. How such an approach would be able to address subsequent stages 
of development as communities become more commercially mature remains to be seen. 
It must also be noted that other less directly engaged development models adopted by other Cooperating 
Sponsors were also effective in achieving impact, albeit in a less concentrated or integrated manner. In the 
long term, these other models may be more appropriate to sustainable commercial development, but at the 
stage where households are attempting to move from chronic impoverishment to sustainable food 
security, such commercial concerns are largely secondary. In the initial stages of development, the 
concentration of resources amongst Cooperating Sponsors that can demonstrate a high degree of 
integration and linkage with local government can be expected to have the greatest short-term impact. 
8.3. Interaction between Cooperating Sponsors 
The RFA for the SPSNP indicated that Cooperating Sponsors should liaise and learn from each other in 
terms of best practices. This was not observed to be happening. Instead, it was noticed that while a given 
intervention might be well undertaken in one area, a different Cooperating Sponsor undertaking a very 
 
9
 Although the RFA for SPSNP was quite specific in its description of intensive and extensive targeting, 
Cooperating Sponsors still indicated perceived pressure to report large numbers of both woredas/kabele covered and 
beneficiaries targeted. 
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Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
33 
similar intervention in close proximity might nevertheless achieve a much lower success rate. The main 
reasons for observed differences appeared to be small differences in implementation practice, which could 
easily be resolved if experiences were more readily shared. 
In fact, instead of the cooperation that USAID/Ethiopia would have preferred, some Cooperating 
Sponsors indicated a reluctance to share experiences and knowledge on the grounds that they were in fact 
competing for funds and to allow another CS to gain insight into successful practices might result in the 
loss of “competitive edge” and consequent reduction of funding available. 
This situation is regrettable since it is only the beneficiaries who suffer under such circumstances. Its 
remedy lies in the hands of USAID/Ethiopia who have to convince Cooperating Sponsors that funds are 
allocated on the basis of beneficiary need not on the basis of competitive excellence. 
8.4. Cooperating Sponsor Exit Strategies 
It must be recognized that most Cooperating Sponsors have been in Ethiopia, working often in the same 
woredas for years before SPSNP was developed. For example, Catholic Relief Services has been working 
in Ethiopia since the late fifties and REST since the late seventies. Similarly, ORDA was set up in 1984 
as an emergency response to famine in the northern part of Amhara region. From this perspective, a two 
or three year program such as SPSNP does not appear to justify the development of a CS exit strategy. 
If sustainability is to be achieved (and sustainability is indeed an essential element of all SNPSP 
interventions) then some form of exit strategy is required. However, none of the Cooperating Sponsors 
appeared to have an exit strategy in place and nor was this an issue they mentioned or indicated that they 
had thought about. 
Under the specific circumstances of the SPSNP interventions, such a long-term attitude on the part of the 
Cooperating Sponsors is understandable. Although the original proposals anticipated a high level of 
success in moving beneficiaries towards food security, experience has shown that a longer time-frame 
than the originally specified two-year period is required and this has been consciously or unconsciously 
reflected in the CS attitude to this work. It would not be realistic to expect to leave beneficiary 
communities within a two-year time frame and Cooperating Sponsors have made no provision to do so. 
The development of an exit strategy would be relevant within the context of a five-year program 
concentrated over a specific group of beneficiaries and if an exit strategy is required then the SOW should 
be adjusted accordingly. 
However, given the limited resources available to carry our SPSNP interventions, it is necessary that 
Cooperating Sponsors should develop the capacity to relocate their programs once development has 
reached an appropriate stage in a given area. It will therefore be necessary to develop a longer-term 
outlook, considering how their relationship with beneficiaries should evolve to the point where they are 
managing more and more activities themselves, forging linkages with extension and the private sector 
independently of the Cooperating Sponsor. At present this aspect of the development process has not 
received adequate attention. 
9. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The primary conclusion drawn by the evaluation team is that the SPSNP interventions assessed had 
resulted in positive impacts which, if continued (in the case of the SPSNP interventions) could be 
expected to result in sustainable increases in household food security. Different interventions had met 
with varying degrees of success but impact was as much related to the detail of implementation as to the 
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Evaluation of SPSNP and OFDA 2005 Interventions 
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nature of the intervention itself. In almost every case however, impacts had been diluted by excessive 
coverage and could be expected to be constrained by the limited implementation period. Nevertheless, 
where focus has been achieved, tangible progress has occurred which would not have been possible under 
the PSNP alone. It is therefore recommended that consideration should be given to extending 
SPSNP interventions over a minimum five year (in total) implementation period, during which 
time, interventions should be focused on a limited target group of beneficiaries. 
The targeting of beneficiaries was observed to follow traditional relief processes including a focus on the 
poorest of the poor and to have been influenced by local administrative considerations. As a result 
resources have not been most effectively utilized. It is recommended that in future consideration 
should be given to the targeting of those who can make the best use of interventions so as to provide 
effective demonstrations of the potential benefits to others. In this regard, the use of study tours 
and demonstrations was universally acknowledged to be effective in the field and deserves greater 
attention ( as demonstrated by: a)specific project budget lines and, b) greater participation of 
women in study tours) in future. 
It was recognized that the development of a positive self-help attitude amongst beneficiaries is critical to 
the success and long-term sustainability of interventions. It was also recognized that this could take at 
least five years to pervade a community. It is recommended that greater attention be given in 
programs to the development of a positive, self-help attitude, first by identifying and placing 
greater implementation emphasis on the processes involved in attitude change and secondly by 
using “hardware interventions” to support and enhance these process. 
Beneficiaries clearly indicated the need for at least two and preferably three interventions per household if 
sustainable food security were to be developed. Even under these circumstances, it was not expected that 
food security would be achieved in less than five years from program initiation. It is recommended that 
programs be designed to allow for the integration of interventions to provide a truly diversified 
source of income or production, utilizing two or more interventions per household and that 
targeting be restricted to achieve this. 
On the basis of the field observation, it would appear that assisting a chronically impoverished household 
to achieve a position of sustainable food security would require a minimum investment of $400. This 
implies a total investment of $400 million to support the graduation of five million PSNP beneficiaries 
(assuming that two million PSNP beneficiaries will be inherently unable to participate in the graduation 
process). This is substantially greater than the amount of funds available to the Cooperating Sponsors or 
GFDRE for such development. It is therefore recommended that consideration be given to inviting 
other donor institutions to adopt or support similar SPSNP programs to increase the degree of 
coverage and speed at which household food security may be achieved. 
Allowing for different circumstances and implementation techniques it was evident that the provision of 
household water resources was the most successful intervention with the greatest and most immediate 
impact. However, this was a generally costly intervention that could not be easily replicated by individual 
households. Besides this, the provision of shoats was widely accepted, generally low cost and easily 
replicated if revolved in kind, while backyard gardening was an effective activity for income 
diversification that could also be readily replicated. Off-farm income generating activities were 
significantly more limited in their marketability and appropriateness to rural beneficiaries in general. It 
was evident that the most successful and widely applicable interventions were those that built upon 
traditional production activities and did not exceed the absorption capacity of local rural economies. Off￾farm income generating activities required greater assistance by the CS in developing markets. 
Final Report 
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This latter conclusion highlights the difficulties inherent in developing a truly diversified economy that is 
not completely dependent upon the weather in the rural areas. It suggests again that an integrated 
approach is required in which every aspect of economic development is developed simultaneously. The 
individual interventions undertaken by Cooperating Sponsors to develop such activities as blacksmithing, 
weaving or pottery had limited relevance to rural economies and may experience difficulties in terms of 
sustainability in the future. 
Savings and credit groups were recognized as being powerful interventions that allowed beneficiaries a 
high degree of self-determination, were both replicable and sustainable and promoted the development of 
a self-help attitude. Although they did not have a great impact in financial terms, they nevertheless 
provided a first rung on the credit ladder and were particularly appropriate in the poorer areas. While 
savings and credit groups may not be relevant under every circumstance, it is recommended that 
all Cooperating Sponsors become aware of the performance of the groups facilitated by 
ORDA/CARE in Laye Gayint as examples of a successful, low cost intervention that has had 
significant impact. 
It is recognized that both micro-finance and commercial sources of credit can provide useful assistance in 
economic development. However, in many cases, SPSNP programs were encouraging lax credit 
procedures that were not conducive to good loan management by beneficiaries and which would reduce 
the chances of successful participation in more stringent micro-finance or commercial credit systems in 
the future. It is therefore strongly recommended that where funds are denominated as loans they 
should be treated as such and proper loan management procedures should be enforced. If less 
stringent conditions are appropriate then matching or pure grants should be provided rather than 
encourage the abuse of credit. 
In this regard it is also recommended that CS field staff be provided with further training in 
financial and particularly revolving fund management. 
There was little evidence of private sector participation in most interventions beyond the role of purchaser 
of produce. No significant attempts appeared to have been made to involve commercial sources of finance 
or to involve the private sector as service providers to individuals or producer groups. This may have been 
because the scope of development is too small to attract private sector interest, but it is nevertheless 
recommended that the private sector be involved in initiatives wherever possible as a means of 
ensuring commercial viability and sustainability. The role of the Cooperating Sponsor under such 
circumstances would be to introduce suitable partners and ensure the maintenance of equitable 
arrangements between all parties. 
Beneficiary responses indicated that the extent of community participation in the SPSNP planning process 
had been limited in some instances and as a result some interventions were either misplaced or irrelevant. 
This is a fundamental error that should be avoided. At the same time, it was apparent that not all 
beneficiaries were aware of the responsibilities that they were committed to when taking parting group 
activities that could have significant impact upon future sustainability. It is recommended that the 
financing and implementation of interventions should be contingent upon demonstrable community 
involvement in the planning process and that all beneficiaries be made fully aware of obligations 
entered into when becoming members of producer groups. 
Cooperating Sponsors appreciate the value of study tours to inform, sensitize and motivate beneficiaries. 
However, there is little or no interaction between Cooperating Sponsors to share lessons learned or best 
practices. In fact some Cooperating Sponsors appear unwilling to share information on the basis that they 
are competing for USAID resources. It is recommended that USAID/Ethiopia develops a more 
proactive system of information sharing amongst Cooperating Sponsors while working to develop 
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an attitude of trust between Cooperating Sponsors on the basis that they are operating for a 
common good and can work more effectively through cooperation. In particular, USAID might 
request a report on “lessons learned” from each CS at regular intervals throughout the program 
The role of the CS in the development process is very different from the role undertaken in the provision 
of relief. In particular, resource limitations require that CS interventions be of limited duration in a given 
area and that successful interventions should then be repeated elsewhere. Current philosophies of 
Cooperating Sponsors do not reflect such an approach. Instead there is a tendency to remain active in a 
given area for an extended period, becoming in some cases as much a part of the local administration as 
the administration itself. It is recommended that this situation be reviewed and the existing policy of 
support to local government be strengthened so that Cooperating Sponsors can work to strengthen 
and supplement local administrative capacity rather than substituting for it. This may require the 
revision of CS proposals to indicate quite clearly the roles that local administration is expected to 
play in implementing development programs and the support (both technical and financial) that 
will be provided to them in order to facilitate this. 
No exit strategies appear to have been considered or developed. This situation is untenable given the 
scope of the development problem and the resources available to deal with it. It cannot be expected that 
Cooperating Sponsors will continue to facilitate development in a given area ad infinitum. Neither 
however can it be expected that Cooperating Sponsors would be able to achieve sustainable food security 
and leave beneficiary communities within a two-year time frame. The development of an exit strategy 
will only be realistic within the context of a minimum five-year program concentrated over a specific 
group of beneficiaries. It is therefore recommended that while ongoing and future interventions 
should be revised to include clearly defined CS exit strategies, such strategies should be set within 
the context of longer-term and focused programs that have a realistic chance of achieving 
sustainable success. 
The Evaluation Team was tasked with recommending best practices in the light of observations made at 
the twelve project sites visited. This was not possible on the basis of observations alone; specifically 
because it was very clear that effectiveness depended less upon the nature of the interventions practiced 
than upon the care and professionalism given to project management. In most cases, this was determined 
more by specific individuals rather than principles or practices of any one intervention or CS. 
Nevertheless, a number of recommendations can be made that might contribute to improved design and 
selection of livelihood interventions: 
1. Recognizing that resources for development are normally provided within the 
context of a limited (3-5 year) envelope, project designers should assess whether or 
not it is practicable to achieve development across all members of a target area and 
if not how best to achieve effective replication of interventions by non-beneficiaries. 
2. Project designs should identify criteria for targeting beneficiaries on the basis of (1) 
above – if effective replication is desired, then targeting for aptitude, attitude and 
capability becomes more important than targeting for need. 
3. Project designs should make particular reference to study tours and the 
encouragement of the replication of successful interventions. 
4. Project designs should clearly identify the level of development of targeted 
beneficiaries and whether traditional activities (Phase 2a) or more market-based 
interventions (Phase 2b) are appropriate according to that level. 
5. SPSNP projects should seek to provide at least two and preferably three different 
types of intervention per household. 
6. Project designs should include an effective exit strategy. If an exit strategy cannot be 
included then the validity of the project must be reassessed. 
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7. Project designs should be shared with local administration and their buy-in to the 
concept of restricted and successful interventions serving as examples for effective 
replication should be obtained, prior to implementation. 
8. SPSNP projects should pay particular attention to the development of a self-help 
positive attitude, recognizing first that this takes at least two years and more 
probably five years to achieve throughout a community and secondly that the 
physical interventions effectively serve as a framework that supports the 
development of such an attitude. 
9. Projects should be selected on the basis at least in part of cost effectiveness. Project 
designs should include an estimate of the investment that will be required on a per 
beneficiary basis to achieve success. 
38