CDA COLLABORATIVE LEARNING PROJECTS
™ CDA - Collaborative Learning Projects ™ 17 Dunster Street, #202 Cambridge, MA 02138 ™
™ Phone: (617)661-6310 ™ Fax: (617)661-3805 ™ Website: www.cdainc.com ™
Creating a River between Two Fires 
Impact Assessment of the
Locally Initiated Networks for Community Strengthening Program (LINCS)
Lofa County, Liberia 
A Program of 
CHF International - Liberia 
With financial support from 
The US Agency for International Development 
Subgrantee Name: CDA Collaborative Learning Projects 
Stable Society Study: LINCS Substudy 
Prime Subgrant Number: 669-A-00-04-00009-00 
Subgrant Number: 23101-06-G-01 
August 2006 

Table of Contents
Executive Summary i
I. Introduction & Approach to the Assessment........................1
ƒ Purpose of the Assessment 
ƒ Challenges in Impact Assessment
ƒ CDA Assessment Team
ƒ Process and Methodology 
II. Background of the LINCS Program ......................................7
ƒ Goals and Objectives 
ƒ Theory of Change 
III. Application of RPP Analytical Tools ................................ 10
ƒ RPP Matrix and Theories of Change 
ƒ Criteria of Effectiveness
IV. Essential Findings ................................................................ 30
ƒ Assessment of Goals and Objectives
ƒ Program Strengths and Weaknesses 
V. Reflections on Key Questions ............................................. 40
ƒ Peace Constituencies and Security Dimensions
ƒ Decision Making, Leadership and Democracy
ƒ Access to Justice: Civil Adjudication and Mediation Processes 
ƒ Deeper Conflict Resolution: Truth, Justice and Tolerance
ƒ The Role of Traditional Reconciliation Methods 
ƒ Linkages between Livelihood and Conflict Resolution Processes 
VI. Recommendations .................................................................. 43
Appendices .................................................................................... 52
A. Interview Protocol 
B. Lists of Communities and Interviews
C. Models of Community Dispute Resolution 
Executive Summary 
This document reports the findings of an impact assessment of the Locally-Initiated Networks 
for Community Strengthening Program (LINCS) operated by CHF International in Lofa County, 
from 2004 to the present. The assessment is focused primarily on the conflict resolution and 
reconciliation elements of the program.
In some ways, this was not a “standard” evaluation, as CHF and the assessment team were 
interested in the broader societal impacts of the program—impacts on “Peace Writ Large” in 
Liberian society. While the assessment touched on the typical inquiry regarding whether the 
program completed certain activities efficiently and on time, we were mainly interested in 
whether the program contributes to proximate and long term peace in Liberia—and how.
Fulfilling the basic program requirements does not, in itself, address the question of broader 
impacts. The findings reported below address issues regarding program implementation, but 
largely with respect to how changes in program approach might increase the contribution to 
peace and reconciliation.
INTRODUCTION TO THE ASSESSMENT
The Terms of Reference for this assessment stated the purpose of the effort as follows:
1. To determine to what extent CHF’s efforts in Lofa have succeeded in helping to stabilize the 
post-war environment;
2. To determine to what extent structures and processes established by LINCS have either 
prevented escalation of conflicts in communities or are serving to transform the conflict by 
addressing the attitudes, behaviors, and structures that have been driving forces in the 
conflict;
3. To assess whether and how LINCS has contributed to Peace Writ Large; and 
4. To determine whether LINCS-created structures and process can contribute to a base-level 
justice system.
In addition, CHF staff and USAID officials indicated interest in learning about several important
topics in relation to the LINCS Program, including leadership and decision making at the 
community level; dispute resolution processes and access to justice; deeper reconciliation, truth, 
justice and tolerance issues; the development of democratic mechanisms; the evolution of 
security in the area; linkages among program elements. This group of questions and topics 
served as the basis for our inquiry. Each of these topics is addressed—often in multiple ways—
in the full report.
Sources of Information
The CDA team gathered information from several sources, including:
a. Interviews with groups and individuals in 13 Lofa County communities that have been 
participating in the LINCS Program;
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b. Interviews conducted in 3 Lofa County communities that have not been participating in 
the LINCS Program;
c. Interviews with CHF staff in Monrovia, Lofa County; Washington and Boston; 
d. Interviews with other NGO staff working in Lofa County, as well as local officials and 
UN personnel in Lofa; 
e. Interviews of government officials and NGO staff in Monrovia;
f. A conflict analysis workshop conducted with members of several communities in Lofa 
County; and
g. Review of project documents and reports.
BACKGROUND OF THE LINCS PROGRAM 
The LINCS Program was designed to address the objectives of USAID Liberia’s Next Steps in 
Peace Program (NSPP). The goal of NSPP was to support the early stages of the peace process 
and facilitate a peaceful reintegration of displaced persons, refugees, and ex-combatants. Within
this overall goal, NSPP sought to (a) strengthen constituencies for peace; (b) mitigate ongoing 
violence and avert imminent violence, and (c) address some of the causes and consequences of 
conflict. CHF’s LINCS Program sought to support the building and strengthening of peace 
constituencies at the community and district levels in Voinjama, Zorzor, and Salayea districts of 
Lofa County with a core goal of improving community level conflict management capacities.
The choice of Lofa County was significant, as this area was the scene of some of the worst 
violence (massacres, atrocities, destruction of churches, mosques and sacred spaces, widespread 
destruction of housing, etc.). During the fourteen years of warfare, the violence in Lofa County 
followed ethnic lines, and, in the aftermath, the contending tribal groups harbor deep resentment,
fear, mistrust, and hostility towards each other. Groups that reportedly lived in relative harmony
for many decades now live apart, as some groups have refused to return to their former houses 
and lands, and other groups have refused to receive their perceived enemies. Lofa County is 
considered as one of the areas of Liberia where violence is most likely to recur, a “flash point” 
county in a country only beginning to reemerge from national trauma.
Major Program Elements 
For more than two years, the LINCS Program has included three major components:
1. Establishment of Community Peace Councils and support for local leadership 
development, including training programs and associated awareness-raising activities.
2. Conduct of forums or dialogue sessions across ethnic lines, more formally called the 
National and County Level Forums.
3. Undertaking of livelihood projects and other joint community efforts communities.
Community Peace Councils 
In brief, the Community Peace Councils (CPCs) were established as an alternative mechanism
for handling a range of dispute types at the community level, especially in the absence of an 
effective judicial system. CHF hoped that the CPCs would provide a means for early resolution 
of conflicts that would contribute to preventing escalation to violence, especially conflicts
associated with IDP/refugee returns and reintegration of ex-combatants. The CPCs were also 
meant to become a peace constituency and to provide leadership in their communities. Finally, it 
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was intended that the CPCs would offer a model of an inclusive community structure that would 
help ensure participation by all groups in local level governance.
Efforts were made to make sure that all key groups were represented among the CPC 
membership: men/women; old/youth; and all ethnic groups. Most CPC members received four 
different training programs: basic peacebuilding skills, leadership, trauma healing, human rights, 
community security and community policing. Many of these training programs were also 
attended by other key community leaders (town chiefs, elders, members of women’s and youth 
groups, etc.). The CPCs serve as CHF’s principal point of contact in the communities, and are 
the base for organizing other community activities, including livelihood projects (see below).
National and County Level Forums
CHF realized that, while the CPCs might be able to address a variety of conflicts at the 
community level, some issues would likely be beyond their capability. One of the most salient 
inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts in Lofa County is between the Lorma tribe (and, in 
Salayea District, the Kpelle tribe) on one side and the Mandingo tribe on the other, largely as a 
result of actions taken by armed members of these ethnic groups against each other during the 
past fourteen years. The most obvious result is that many communities remain split. In some
cases, groups that formerly lived intermingled are now living separately but near each other; in 
other cases, Mandingo families have not returned to their former communities at all.
CHF found that powerful people connected with the area, but living in Monrovia or Guinea, 
often determine policies and actions at the community level. Therefore, as they wished to 
contribute to reconciliation among Lorma/Kpelle and Mandingo, they worked to identify those 
“opinion leaders” and bring them into the dialogue process. CHF, with support from the 
Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy (FOHRD) and other implementing partners, held 
a series of forums during 2004/5 among contending groups in several key communities. In the 
spring of 2006, CHF hired an additional staff person to focus solely on organizing and 
implementing forums, as a follow-up to the earlier efforts. CHF staff and its implementing
partners facilitate inter-ethnic dialogue sessions in an effort to identify outstanding issues and 
grievances and to negotiate agreements.
Community and Livelihood Projects 
For several reasons, CHF undertook additional practical efforts in the communities. These
projects generally took two forms: construction of community centers and income-generating or 
livelihood efforts, usually support for some form of farming or animal husbandry. One purpose 
of these efforts was to provide more concrete benefits to the participating communities, to give 
people tangible results from inter-ethnic cooperation, and to engage members of various tribes in 
working together on common projects to promote tolerance and cooperation. The projects also 
provided personal benefit to CPC members as incentive for continued service.
APPLICATION OF RPP TOOLS 
Section III of the full report explores the LINCS Program, using a set of concepts and 
frameworks developed through the Reflecting on Peace Practice process (a project of CDA 
Collaborative Learning Projects). These tools were devised as a way to assess the effectiveness
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of peacebuilding programs, including whether and how the program contributes to broader peace 
in a society experiencing violent conflict—what we call “Peace Writ Large.” The report 
explores the LINCS Program using four tools/concepts from RPP: the RPP Matrix; Theories of
Change; Criteria of Effectiveness; and Conflict Analysis. The program analysis presented in this 
Section provides the basis for the conclusions presented in Section IV. 
LINCS PROGRAM IN RELATION TO ITS OBJECTIVES AND EXPECTED RESULTS
The LINCS Program proposal to USAID articulated several objectives, including those restated 
below, along with a brief summary of the CDA team’s findings in relation to these objectives.
1. Strengthen and Expand Constituencies for Peace 
Program objectives: a) Increase the effectiveness of peace-building constituencies at the local, district 
and country level; b) Strengthen democratic civil leadership with a vested interest in peace; c) Increase 
quantity, quality and timely delivery of communication on issues affecting national to local peace 
building processes; d) Build capacity for local organizations to advocate for responsive national policies 
that contribute to peace; e) Provide logistical support for advocacy and collaboration; and f) Assist
community leadership groups to build inclusive and transparent management.
The CPCs may consider themselves to be, broadly speaking, peace constituencies, but they are 
not mobilized to advocate for peace. Rather, they are working—effectively in many cases—on 
local and interpersonal issues of conflict. They are not engaging in advocacy activities at the 
local, county or national levels. The team did hear repeated support for peace, exhaustion with 
the war process, a willingness to put the experiences of the past fourteen years behind them, a 
desire to avoid further violence, and a pragmatic desire to get on with life. In other words, there 
is strong public support for peace—but there is no identifiable civic organization or network of 
organizations advocating for it, and the CPCs do not appear to be filling this role. Furthermore, it 
is important to note that, alongside the verbal support for peace, we observed stark separation of 
populations along ethnic lines and explicit refusal to allow Mandingos to return to their lands, 
and heard persistent expressions of hostility based on war experiences.
The Forums, however, represent the potential for building a durable peace in Lofa County, 
supported by influential people both living in the county and in Monrovia. In a sense, then the 
Forums may be, slowly and indirectly, developing a peace constituency, though not by that 
name. If the Forum process succeeds at both the community-by-community and county levels, 
and if an institutional base can be found to continue support for an ongoing long-term 
reconciliation process, a truly influential peace constituency could emerge.
The program objectives stated above also call for strengthening democratic and civic leadership 
and inclusive and transparent management. The overall LINCS Program effort, including all of 
the training programs for the CPCs and others in leadership, has injected new concepts and skills 
into the communities. However, the CDA team also directly observed the dynamics among 
participants in the interviews (most of which were in groups), and we saw little evidence that the 
workshops have resulted in obvious democratic practices, either within the CPCs or in the larger 
communities.
While it is too early to know for certain, the Forums may induce changes in leadership of some
of the communities—either changes in the approaches to problem solving by individual leaders, 
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or changes in the expectations of community members towards their leadership. The agreements
themselves, if well implemented, will also reinforce community desires for peace.
In sum, the LINCS Program has laid the groundwork for addressing these objectives. However, 
additional work is needed to consolidate the introduction of new concepts in leadership and to 
truly mobilize constituencies for peace advocacy in the County, and a number of specific 
components need to be realized in the Forums for their contribution to become significant.
2. Mitigating Conflict and Violence 
Program objectives: a) Build and/or support local and county capacity for ongoing conflict mitigation, 
adjudication and peace building activities; b) Prepare communities and leadership for potential outbreaks 
of conflict and deal with the after effects of violent acts; c) Promote dialogues and collaboration among
contentious ethnic groups; d) Build local capacity for reconciliation of all returnees; e) Assist democratic
leadership to build skills and confidence in effectively managing community security and in reducing the 
impact of conflict; and f) Build the effectiveness of traditional and culturally appropriate mechanisms for 
reconciliation.
An ultimate conclusion about the effectiveness of the CPCs turns on the expectations about what 
they could/should be handling. As noted above, the CPCs represent a new community-based
mechanism for handling a wide range of conflicts. With the exception of land conflicts and the 
deeper inter-ethnic tensions, the CPCs are currently capable, in many cases, of addressing most
of the conflicts that arise at the community level, promote communications among parties, and 
perform a referral function for cases they cannot handle. CHF staff also report that the CPCs are 
able calm down volatile situations and did address land issues earlier during the transition period 
The capacity of the CPCs could be argued two ways. On the one hand, with considerable 
variation from community to community, they are addressing most community-level conflicts. 
On the other hand, they are not currently dealing with those conflicts most likely to result in 
widespread violence (land and religious/cultural issues). The CPCs’ positive and helpful role 
and experience needs to be expanded and strengthened to achieve a social institution closer to the
stated program objectives.
As regards the objectives calling for dialogue and collaboration among contending ethnic groups 
and the application of culturally appropriate mechanisms for reconciliation, the Forums program
represent the best hope for achieving these desired outcomes. If well executed, the Forums show 
promise for exerting a significant impact in this regard.
Considering the combined impacts of the CPCs and the Forums, the LINCS Program, as a whole, 
is achieving progress towards the objectives stated above. 
3. Address Causes and Consequences of Conflict 
In this area, the program objectives were to: a) Facilitate peaceful resolution of property and resource 
claims, perceived war crimes; b) Build Lofa-based peace constituencies’ ability to affect national 
decisions on resource allocation, management of extractive resources; c) Build Lofa-based peace
constituencies’ ability to affect national decisions on composure and civil leadership of reconstituted 
military and/or police; d) Build number and quality of psycho-social assistance mechanisms in Lofa.
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So far, the LINCS Program is not addressing the peaceful resolution of property and resource 
claims or perceived war crimes. Interpersonal issues regarding property hidden as people fled 
the area have been handled by the CPCs, but as discussed already, the CPCs have not so far dealt 
with more serious land and property disputes—and certainly not war crimes.
The team did hear accounts of trauma healing workshops, held under the LINCS Program, in 
which individuals were able to recount their personal experiences of atrocities—and some level 
of interpersonal reconciliation took place, when people who had participated in such activities
were present. One woman interviewed in Voinjama District said that she faced a young man who 
had killed her son and told him, “You must disarm your heart.” So far, these kinds of healing 
encounters are not a regular occurrence in the county, however. The LINCS Program has 
cooperated with other programs working on trauma healing. For instance, LINCS arranged for 
performances by the Flomo Theatre group. These performances brought together up to a 
thousand community members and addressed, through drama, issues regarding ex-combatant
reintegration and reconciliation. In these public settings, community members were able to 
reach out to each other and shout out how they should forgive each other and move on.
As mentioned elsewhere, the community Forums may be able to incorporate some elements of 
reconciliation and healing by working directly across the ethnic groups on specific issues and 
grievances that divide them. The CHF staff were clear that the objectives associated with 
national level policy advocacy have proven unrealistic, as least to date.
In sum, the LINCS Program has contributed in small ways to achievement of this set of 
objectives. With some rethinking and restructuring, the program has potential for making a more
significant contribution.
Expected Results 
The LINCS Program, by achieving the three major goal areas above, was expected to show the 
following results by the end of the program: a) Reduced violence in Lofa County; b) Peaceful return 
of internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and ex-combatants; c) Facilitation of reconciliation 
between ex-combatants and their families; d) Facilitation of reconciliation between ex-combatants and 
their ‘host’ communities; e) Development of Community Councils which can support reintegration, act to
resolve disputes and adjudicate perceived crimes, and mobilize the community to work towards peace; f) 
Community Councils trained and active in sensitizing the community to addressing the special issues 
regarding returned ex-combatants; g) Increased participation by all community members in community
decision making; h) Increased peaceful interaction among diverse, sometimes contentious groups within 
the community; i) Increased effectiveness and organization of district and county peace constituencies;
and j) Creation of a mechanism to facilitate communication between Community Councils and other 
leaders with UNMIL, UNCIVPOL as well as the NTGL’s new security forces.
The full report includes an extensive discussion of these Expected Results and how the various 
program components have contributed to them.
From our community visits and from discussions with local officials and UNMIL personnel, the 
CDA team feels that there is a relatively low level of violence in Lofa County, people have 
returned and been reintegrated successfully within their own ethnic groups, but not across or 
between different ethnic groups. Most disputes are handled nonviolently, so far. While the 
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LINCS Program may have contributed to these results, it would be difficult to attribute these
outcomes solely to LINCS activities. In addition, they may have, through their very existence, 
promoted an atmosphere of conflict resolution and problem solving without resort to violence. 
In our view, the results regarding reconciliation have not been accomplished in Lofa County, as 
yet. In Zeawordemai a group of women and youth asserted that they would “never forgive, no 
matter what.” They recalled that 500 boys were killed by Ulimo on Black Monday, an incident 
still on their minds many years later. This ongoing pain and hostility reinforces the need for the 
CHF Forums program, which has promise for making a significant contribution in this area. 
In terms of democratic decision making and participation, our observations field suggest that 
traditional forms of leadership are in full operation, with elders, town chiefs and landlords firmly
in control. Women and youth are formally represented in town discussions, but their voices are 
not strong. Minority groups do not speak up readily. Clearly more work is needed in this area.
In relation to the creation of peace constituencies, as already noted, there is strong public
sentiment in favor of peace, but no active and visible constituency openly advocating for it—and
there is persistent hostility and tension, unresolved incidents from the war, and obvious 
separation along ethnic lines.
As regards security issues, in repeated comments, communities attributed security to the
presence of UNMIL—and appreciated their role. The team heard reports of young men (some
ex-combatants) volunteering for the new Liberian army and police—an indication that 
communities favor these revived national institutions and hope that they will be able to guarantee
peace after UNMIL withdraws. It is hard to attribute this situation to the LINCS Program,
although one set of workshops under the program addressed community-police relations.
SUMMARY OF PROGRAM STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
The following is a summary of strengths and weakness of the Community Peace Councils and 
National and County Level Forums, which are directly addressed in the Recommendations 
presented in Section VI. 
Community Peace Councils 
Strengths:
The CDA heard from two different community members that the CPCs are a “river between two
fires” (from which we have taken the title for this report). We take this as an appreciation for the 
effective role the CPCs play in handling local disputes. 
ƒ The program has created the foundation for longer term, larger scale dialogue processes. 
ƒ The program informed communities about conflict and basic problem solving approaches.
ƒ CPCs provide a low-cost mechanism for handling local-level (mainly) interpersonal disputes.
ƒ CPCs provided an effective dispute resolution mechanism during the critical transition time
of the return and reintegration of IDPs/refugees, handling interpersonal disputes and, in some
cases, land issues. 
ƒ CPCs have provided some forms of leadership in communities, supplementing (and not 
replacing) traditional authorities.
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ƒ CPCs are an appropriate mechanism that do not contradict existing and historical structures 
that do work.
ƒ The program introduced key leaders to a variety of important skills and concepts that can be 
useful for any future development and/or conflict resolution programming.
ƒ CPCs have provided a useful entry point to communities for other important programs (e.g., 
Land Mine Action, domestic violence, trauma healing).
ƒ The CPCs, with additional attention and resources, constitute a possible new permanent
social institution for first level dispute resolution.
Weaknesses/Critiques:
ƒ CPCs are currently out of date, in terms of their representative function and credibility, since 
they were formed in 2004, and many more people have now returned to the communities. 
ƒ While the CPCs members have received at least four training programs, there has been little 
direct follow up to see whether/how people are applying those skills and concepts—CPCs are 
left to function on their own without direct support or mentoring, such as sitting in on actual 
dispute resolution processes or regular CPC meetings to discuss cases. 
ƒ The main contact between CHF and the CPCs is a monthly visit in which the group reports 
on their activities. 
ƒ There is no independent verification regarding the actual roles that CPCs are playing (types 
of cases handled, processes used, style of mediation/arbitration employed, rate of settlement,
acceptance of any settlement, durability of agreements, etc.).
ƒ CPC members feel burdened by their role, in terms of the time requirements without 
compensation—which has raised questions about the sustainability of the model, as interest 
may wane without some better reward system.
ƒ In many cases, only a few CPC members are truly active.
ƒ CPCs are not able to contradict traditional authorities—and in some cases town chiefs, elders 
and other leaders are fully involved with the CPCs (which has both positive and negative 
effects!).1
ƒ Generally, the CPCs reflect the same prejudices and dominant/subordinate patterns of their 
social context: minority groups in the towns are also minority groups on the CPCs, and have 
no stronger voice there than in other settings. 
ƒ The CPCs are mostly dealing with interpersonal disputes that the town chief is happy for 
someone else to handle; more serious issues, including land disputes, are handled through 
other more traditional means. (Whether this is a weakness or not depends on what the groups 
are expected to do.) 
ƒ CPCs are not equipped to address deeper issues of inter-group reconciliation or more difficult 
types of disputes, and are not used directly to support Forum activities, such as following up, 
monitoring compliance, helping to negotiate actual implementation, etc. 
ƒ There is widespread confusion about the real function/purpose of the CPCs (livelihood 
project implementers, dispute resolvers, the “CHF group,” etc.), and many community 
members (perhaps mostly recent returnees) are not aware of the services available.
1
 Many CPC members were elected/selected because they were respected members of the community. In some
cases, this means they are part of the town power structures, not an alternative to them. Other CPC members were 
simply those present in the early days of returns—and as traditional authorities have returned, their influence has
diminished, in some cases.
viii
ƒ The CDA teams found that some CPCs appear to be inactive, while there is open conflict 
among CPC members in other cases.
National and County-Level Forums 
Strengths:
ƒ National forums represent a potential for deeper resolution and reconciliation of inter-ethnic 
conflicts.
ƒ The Forums offer relatively neutral outside facilitation that enables contending groups to 
address sensitive issues.
ƒ The Forum program is able to bring together all of the key players, including influential 
people from Monrovia and Guinea. 
ƒ The Forums support the negotiation of agreements between conflicting groups, that can serve 
as the basis for resolving many specific disputes, especially over land ownership/use.
ƒ The Forums can help to develop a model of inter-group dialogue and negotiation that would 
be applicable elsewhere in Liberia. 
ƒ The Forums are organized in a way that links national, regional and local levels regarding 
inter-ethnic tensions. 
Weakness/Critiques:
ƒ At present the CHF Forum program is understaffed and overstretched, trying to organize 
processes in too many communities at the same time. High quality processes in a few places 
may be better than poorly implemented processes in many.
ƒ The program is not benefiting directly from previous experiences of dialogue and negotiation 
in Liberia, during earlier periods or by other organizations. 
ƒ Previous dialogue/negotiation efforts by CHF and its partners (in 2004-5) resulted in formal
agreements, but these were not written down, nor was there adequate follow up. 
ƒ Formal agreements appear to be at the level of broad principles only—more concrete and 
specific actions and an implementation plan are not addressed. For instance, in Ziggida, 
local people said that a Forum had negotiated an agreement, but tensions arose again, partly 
because the agreements were never implemented.
ƒ Current staff do not have the time to provide sufficient follow-up to the current round of 
dialogue processes. 
ƒ In the long-term, this kind of effort needs a sustainable Liberian institutional base. 
ƒ There is not always good communication to community members about what the purpose 
and result of the Forums are. Community members seldom mentioned the Forums in
interviews, and in two communities their impression was that the Forums were “just another
workshop.”2
RECOMMENDATIONS
The full CDA team met in Monrovia to develop an initial set of recommendations—which were 
then presented and discussed with the CHF Country Director. The summary of the 
recommendations presented below are only slightly different in substance and include 
2
 The current round of Forums are apparently making more specific plans for reporting back to the communities.
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explanatory text not included with the originals presented in Monrovia. (See Section VI of the 
report for the full text, with extensive discussion and explanation.) 
The first section of recommendations addresses the overall CHF program. We are assuming that 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding will remain at least one major program focus. Conditions 
in Lofa County certainly support a continuing emphasis on reconciliation and peacebuilding. 
Subsequent sections address the two major peacebuilding efforts.
General Program Recommendations 
1. Adopt narrower goals/objectives, expected results and indicators. 
2. Develop a stronger long-term plan, with associated staffing and structure of CHF programs.
3. Create better communication and cooperation among CHF program components—less 
compartmentalization.
4. Develop closer cooperative working relations with other NGOs working on similar/allied
issues in Lofa County. 
5. Provide for explicit follow up to training in concepts and skills: tracking of indicators that the 
training is being used; coaching in skills application support for desired changed behaviors. 
6. Establish a more robust M&E plan, including baseline data, specific indicators, a tracking 
and reporting system.
Community Peace Councils 
The CPC program has made a significant contribution during the past two years—and the 
program was appropriate for that transition period. The situation has changed considerably. 
Therefore, CHF needs to rethink the structures and approaches for this program component, even 
if this is only one of several different major program elements. The CDA team recommends that 
CHF perform a fundamental program redesign, building on the best elements of the past two 
years, and preparing for follow-up efforts.
We don’t have a clear recommendation regarding the exact direction the program should take, 
but we do see a range of possible options to be considered. Consider the following OPTIONS
for the CPCs (not all mutually exclusive):
1. Phase them out. Consider that the CPCs were a good mechanism for a transitional time, but 
that continued effort is not appropriate.
2. Transition them into development committees. As CHF undertakes other more
development-oriented activities, build on the relationships established through the CPCs as 
the base for that work, but discontinue their conflict resolution role. 
3. Wait and see. Merge with traditional mechanisms for dispute resolution. Watch what 
happens with the new government in relation to base level justice. Explore a role for the 
CPCs in terms of decision making and local level dispute resolution, if appropriate. 
4. Explore a role in relation to the TRC process. The CPCs could play a role in identifying 
local people to testify, and to participate in County-level activities. CHF could facilitate such 
participation with transport and other support. The CPCs might also play a role (with others) 
in local-level truth and reconciliation activities.
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5. Conduct a participatory process to determine the future shape, function, etc. Let the
communities themselves decide the future of the CPCs. This might lead to a phasing out (#1 
above), serious investment (#6) or some combination.
6. Make a serious investment in full development of the CPC model. Figure out how to 
transform the present structures into a sustainable community-level mechanism that is fully 
owned by the communities and performs a needed dispute resolution function.
Numbers 1 - 5 above are fairly self evident. We have offered specific detailed recommendations 
about how to approach Number 6. The headlines of those detailed recommendations are 
presented below. 
Redevelopment & Strengthening of the CPCs 
Throughout the report, we have indicated ways in which the CPCs have contributed, and some
ways in which they miss the mark. We believe that the CPCs show potential for playing a more
important role, but to realize that potential will require revision of the concept and further 
investment in the people and necessary structures. If CHF chooses to pursue #6 above, the 
following elements will be needed: 
a. Clarify the model and functions through a participatory process.
b. Clarify the roles and functions of the CPC through participatory development of a simple 
charter (composition, functions, types of cases in/out, operating principles…). 
c. Restructure and “re-elect” the councils. 
d. Complete the mediation training, using the ABA/CHF model.
e. Follow up training with direct coaching and mentoring.
f. Establish a better tracking and monitoring mechanisms.
g. Solve the compensation/reward issue.
h. Seriously reduce the number of members.
i. Develop (with ABA?) a resource center in Lofa County that offers resources, support, 
technical assistance.
j. Reduce the number of CPCs by developing town clusters. 
County and National Forums 
By our assessment, already laid out earlier in this report, the Forum effort shows great promise,
and the potential for having a profound effect on inter-ethnic relations in Lofa County. The 
suggestions below are intended to indicate how the program could be strengthened further. 
1. Devote more staff resources: reduce dependence/burden on one person.3
2. Clarify/tighten the goals and objectives of the program.
3
 This recommendation, reported informally while the CDA team was still in Liberia, has been implemented
already, and there are now three staff working full time on the Forums effort.
xi
3. Ensure that any agreements reached include a specific implementation plan. Develop the 
staff capacity to provide follow up. 
4. Find an appropriate long-term institutional base for this kind of effort, and cooperate in 
development of that mechanism. (Options: university, government agency, combo, free￾standing reconciliation NGO, sub-group of TRC…) 
5. Draw on expertise/experience regarding this type of dialogue and negotiation process held by 
other people/organizations in Liberia. Be sure to learn from past failures and successes. 
Develop capacity to share lessons learned in Lofa County.
6. Engage Forum participants in a process to determine future directions.
7. Complete a thorough review/assessment/stocktaking at completion of the current round of 
Forums, using an outside independent evaluator. 
8. Participate in Lofa County meetings in Monrovia for background information about what 
opinion leaders and others are thinking about.
9. Explore the potential roles for religious/ spiritual leaders in the Forums.
10. Bring issues to closure: don’t open issues and then leave. Consider these deeper 
reconciliation efforts as a long-term commitment.
CONCLUSION
The LINCS Program represents an admirable contribution to peacebuilding in Liberia. Most of 
the programs effects remain at the community and Lofa County level, and there is a mixed
picture regarding the program’s achievements against its stated objectives. However, the current 
progress and potential impacts from this effort have significance for the entire country, as Lofa 
County is well known as one of the most volatile areas that suffered most deeply during the war.
Few other organizations are attempting community-by-community reconciliation in Liberia—
and for this reason alone, the LINCS Program represents a valuable initiative. While we have 
made recommendations for program strengthening during the next phases of CHF programming,
overall, we were impressed with the accomplishments to date and the dedication of local and 
international staff members.
xii
I. INTRODUCTION & APPROACH TO THE ASSESSMENT 
This document reports the findings of an impact assessment of the Locally-Initiated Networks 
for Community Strengthening Program (LINCS) operated by CHF International in Lofa County, 
from 2004 to the present. The assessment is focused primarily on the conflict resolution and 
reconciliation elements of the program.
This first section reviews the purpose of the assessment and the approach taken to accomplish it.
Section II presents the basic background, in brief, to the LINCS Program, while Section III 
applies the tools and concepts of the Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) Project, as one way to 
explore the LINCS Program. Section IV presents the essential findings of the assessment team,
and Section V addresses a set of key questions posed by CHF and/or USAID in preparation for 
the assessment. Finally, Section VI offers recommendations, based on the observations and 
conclusions in the early sections of the report.
In some ways, this was not a “standard” evaluation, as CHF and the assessment team were 
interested in the broader societal impacts of the program—impacts on “Peace Writ Large” in 
Liberian society. While the assessment touched on the typical inquiry regarding whether the 
program completed certain activities efficiently and on time, we were mainly interested in 
whether the program contributes to proximate and long term peace in Liberia—and how.
Fulfilling the basic program requirements does not, in itself, address the question of broader 
impacts. The findings reported below will address issues regarding program implementation, but 
largely with respect to how changes in program approach might increase the contribution to 
peace and reconciliation.
The full CDA team would like to express its appreciation for all of the assistance received in 
Monrovia, in Lofa County and in Washington, from many CHF staff members. It was a real 
privilege to be offered the opportunity to accompany this significant program, even for a short 
while, on their journey towards peace and reconciliation in Liberia.
Purpose of the Assessment
The Terms of Reference for this assessment stated the purpose of the effort as follows:
1. To determine to what extent CHF’s efforts in Lofa have succeeded in helping to stabilize the 
post-war environment;
2. To determine to what extent structures and processes established by LINCS have either 
prevented escalation of conflicts in communities or are serving to transform the conflict by 
addressing the attitudes, behaviors, and structures that have been driving forces in the 
conflict;
3. To assess whether and how LINCS has contributed to Peace Writ Large; and 
4. To determine whether LINCS-created structures and process can contribute to a base-level 
justice system.
1
In addition, CHF indicated interest in learning about several important topics in relation to the 
LINCS Program:
ƒ Leadership: Has the program helped develop more effective and responsive leadership, 
as well as opportunities to reduce and manage conflict?
ƒ Dispute Resolution Processes: Has the program contributed to development of 
mechanisms for dispute resolution?
ƒ Truth, Justice and Tolerance Issues: Has the program created processes for addressing 
outstanding justice issues?
ƒ Democratic Mechanisms: Has the program created more access to decision making that 
affects individuals in the community and/or forums for discussion of issues critical to the 
community?
Finally, USAID staff in Monrovia identified the following themes of interest:
ƒ What are the dynamics of decision-making in the communities, and how are these
changing? (Related to the Leadership and Democratic Mechanisms questions above.) 
ƒ How is the security situation evolving at the community level, including the persistence 
or dropping away of old military command structures?
ƒ How do the various elements of the CHF program link to each other: community peace 
councils, livelihood projects, and the construction of community centers?
ƒ What processes are helping to address deep seated problems and more profound 
reconciliation? (Related to the Truth, Justice and Tolerance question above.) 
ƒ Is the program succeeding in forming “peace constituencies”?
ƒ Is the program helping people gain access to the justice system, in the absence of rule of 
law? (Related to the Dispute Resolution and Truth, Justice and Tolerance questions 
above.)
ƒ Should donors promote traditional rituals in reconciliation?
This group of questions and topics served as the basis for our inquiry. Each of these topics will 
be addressed—often in multiple ways—in the report below. As much as possible, the issues 
have been grouped in logical ways, to avoid repetition. See also Section V, where some of these 
questions have been addressed separately. 
Challenges in Impact Assessment
In the proposal for this assessment, CDA addressed some of the possibilities and limitations of 
impact assessment:
“CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, mainly through its Reflecting on Peace Practice
Project (RPP), has been working with the conflict resolution and peacebuilding
communities regarding a broad range of issues and controversies regarding the evaluation 
of programs that aim to contribute to peace. To date, experience shows that it is possible, 
2
using standard methods, to evaluate the immediate outputs (activities performed, events 
held, numbers of participants engaged, etc.), against project plans. More importantly, it is 
possible to ascertain the proximate outcomes of those efforts, in terms of relatively short￾term changes in behaviors, attitudes, establishment of new institutions, and so forth. The 
peacebuilding community as a whole is still struggling with the issue of how to measure
impacts, on what we have called “Peace Writ Large” or the broader societal level peace.
Here, the question is, given the successful delivery of outputs and the observable 
immediate outcomes, can we determine if these have contributed to the broader peace?
In this case, CHF has already documented the projects outputs, through a series of reports 
already available to the donor and others. Some of those reports also provide indications
about outcomes—in terms of disputes resolved, participation in reconciliation activities, 
leadership development, and so on. The job for the Impact Assessment will be to obtain 
additional information about outcomes in the participating communities, and to explore
the impacts at the Lofa County level. It may prove too early to make any definitive
judgments about impacts at the national level, but the assessment team will work with the 
information that emerges and, as the evidence accumulates, infer the linkages between 
the proximate outcomes and the national peace and reconciliation process.”
This estimation of the possibilities and difficulties proved accurate. As we report in full below, 
we came away with a clear sense of the near-term outcomes to date and some indications of their 
potential impacts on Peace Writ Large. Possible longer term impacts of the program can be 
projected—but these cannot be verified conclusively at this stage.
Approach to the Impact Assessment
CDA Assessment Team 
Five people participated in gathering information for the assessment:
Mabel Kear: An experienced Liberian organizer and trainer who has worked with several NGOs 
on peacebuilding programs.
Maureen Lempke: A professor of Development Studies at Duke University and an experienced
project manager.
Christof Kurz: A PhD candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 
who has worked for several years in NGO program administration in West Africa.
Korto Williams: Former USAID staff in Liberia and an experienced program organizer. 
Peter Woodrow, staff of CDA Collaborative Learning Projects and Co-Director of its Reflecting 
on Peace Practice Project, who served as team leader.
Peter Woodrow consulted with CHF staff in Washington and Monrovia to establish the 
parameters of the assessment and worked with the team to set up the protocols for field data 
gathering. The bulk of the community-level and other interviews in Lofa County were conducted 
by the other team members, while Peter pursued other contacts in Monrovia. 
3
Process and Methodology 
The CDA team gathered information from several sources, including:
1. Interviews with groups and individuals in 13 Lofa County communities that have been 
participating in the LINCS Program;
2. Interviews conducted in 4 Lofa County communities that have not been participating in the 
LINCS Program;
3. Interviews with CHF staff in Monrovia, Lofa County; Washington and Boston; 
4. Interviews with other NGO staff working in Lofa County, as well as local officials and UN 
personnel in Lofa; 
5. Interviews of government officials and NGO staff in Monrovia;
6. A conflict analysis workshop conducted with members of several communities in Lofa 
County; and
7. Review of project documents and reports.
Community Interviews 
The CDA team spoke with a wide range of people in Lofa County. These interviews were 
focused conversations, rather than the administration of a formal survey or questionnaire. While
the team used a consistent set of topics for discussion, this was not the administration of a 
questionnaire.4
 This process, used by CDA in many settings, allows for more interaction and 
follow up for clarification, and also gives room for the local people to talk about what is most
important to them.
The team talked with a range of groups and individuals in the communities, including local-level
leaders or officials (town chiefs, elders, landowners, heads of women’s and youth groups, etc.), 
members of the Community Peace Councils that CHF had created, and community members
encountered “on the street.” In each locale, the team endeavored to hear from men and women,
old and young, and from different ethnic groups.
During the past two years, CHF has implemented the LINCS Program in 70 communities in Lofa
County. In order to gain a full picture of the project outcomes and impacts, the assessment team
conducted interviews in 13 of those communities, in the districts of Salayea, Zorzor and 
Voinjama. A list of the communities visited is presented in Appendix B. These visits represent
interaction with approximately 270 people, almost always in groups—although it is difficult to 
estimate the exact number, as in many cases people joined and left in the course of 
conversations.
The team also conducted interviews in four communities similar to those where CHF has been 
working, but where no CHF activities have taken place. About 85 people were interviewed in 
that process, again almost all in groups. This provided information for purposes of comparison
with the participating communities. We explored the same general themes as with the
4
 See Interview Protocol in Appendix A.
4
“participating” communities, leaving out those directed specifically at the LINCS Program.
Several of these communities were quite remote and had little contact with NGOs.
An effort was made to interview people in Monrovia who have participated in the National
Forum program (described in full below). However, due to logistical difficulties, only one such 
interview was completed.
Interviews with CHF Staff, Officials and NGO Staff,
The team made an effort to speak with all CHF program staff in either Monrovia or Lofa County, 
to obtain their own reflections on the program. Conversations with other officials (magistrate,
development committee members, Ministry of Internal Affairs, UNMIL) and NGO staff were 
conducted in order to gain information about conditions and trends in the area, as well as 
additional perspectives on the CHF program.
Document Review 
The CDA team reviewed various documents. These included:
ƒ CHF initial LINCS Program proposal and other conceptual/analytical documents;
ƒ Regular LINCS Program quarterly reports, staff reports and assessments, and reports 
from implementing partner organizations; and 
ƒ A sampling of field reports from contacts with Community Peace Councils in Zorzor 
While this was not an exhaustive review, it did include the vast majority of the relevant and 
available documents.
Conflict Analysis
In order to assess the impacts of the CHF program, the CDA team needed an analysis of the 
conflict dynamics in Liberia at the Lofa County level. Such an analysis provides the basis for 
determining whether the project is addressing the right issues, as articulated by those who live in 
Lofa. To gain an analysis, the CDA team conducted a conflict analysis exercise in Konia town 
(Zorzor District), with participants from four nearby communities (Zegeda, Boi, Borkeza, 
Konia), one CHF staff person, and a representative of a CHF partner organization. The resulting 
analysis, expanded and refined through additional conversations in Lofa County and Monrovia, 
is presented below in Section III. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Data Gathered 
It is our judgment that the interview process enabled the CDA team to gain a thorough
understanding of community-level dynamics in Lofa County and the effects of the CHF program 
in those communities—within the limits that any outsider would encounter. Indeed, the Liberian
team members, while better able to communicate directly with villagers, were clearly outsiders 
to these remote areas as well. Thus, even though we were obtaining good and (as a whole)
5
reliable information, we were aware of deeper levels and layers of culture, dynamics and history 
that were not accessible to outsiders, perhaps rightly so.
At times, townspeople actively discouraged the team from making contact with minority group 
members—and the ability of minority group representatives to express themselves in larger 
gatherings was clearly proscribed. The team found ways to gain access to those groups and to 
supplement mixed group conversations with separate frank exchanges.
In addition, the towns selected by CHF staff for visits turned out to be mainly those that CHF 
calls “flash point” (i.e., high conflict) communities. Thus there was a bias towards more difficult
areas, rather than a mix of less and more conflictual areas. We do not feel that this bias causes a 
real problem in the data, as it would if the tilt were towards more peaceful communities. In other
words, the team saw the program where it was challenged most deeply. And, if we compare the 
participating and non-participating communities, they all face more or less the same issues.
In sum, we feel comfortable with the information gathered at the community level. While no 
single interview would provide a clear picture, the sheer number of discussions with a diverse 
range of people provided sufficient information to draw conclusions about the contributions of 
the Community Peace Councils, livelihood projects and, to a certain extent, the National and 
County Level Forums.
A final note about the data: While we had thorough conversations with CHF staff and with one 
participant in the National and County Level Forums program, we do not feel that we gained 
adequate information for a full assessment of that program element, although we will address its 
place in the range of program activities and its potential impacts. We recommend below (see 
Section VI) that, upon completion of the current round of forum events, CHF undertake an 
independent, locally-based (that is, lower cost!) stocktaking of the forum program, including 
interviews with a range of direct participants in Lofa County and Monrovia.
Team Discussions and Data Analysis
Upon completion of community and other interviews in Lofa County, the full CDA team
reconvened in Monrovia for two days of analysis and reflection. The team identified patterns that 
they observed, lessons learned and recommendations. These preliminary findings were shared in 
Monrovia with the CHF Country Director.
6
II. BACKGROUND OF THE LINCS PROGRAM
The LINCS Program was designed to address the objectives of USAID Liberia’s Next Steps in 
Peace Program (NSPP). The goal of NSPP was to support the early stages of the peace process 
and facilitate a peaceful reintegration of displaced persons, refugees, and ex-combatants. Within
this overall goal, NSPP sought to (a) strengthen constituencies for peace; (b) mitigate ongoing 
violence and avert imminent violence, and (c) address some of the causes and consequences of 
conflict.
Applicants for NSPP funding were asked to proposed programs to address these objectives in 
some way. CHF’s LINCS Program sought to support the building and strengthening of peace 
constituencies at the community and district levels in Voinjama, Zorzor, and Salayea districts of 
Lofa County with a core goal of improving community level conflict management capacities.
The choice of Lofa County was significant, as this area was the scene of some of the worst 
violence (massacres, atrocities, destruction of churches, mosques and sacred spaces, widespread 
destruction of housing, etc.). During the fourteen years of warfare, the violence in Lofa County 
followed ethnic lines during significant periods, and, in the aftermath, the contending tribal 
groups harbor deep resentment, fear, mistrust, and hostility towards each other. Groups that 
reportedly lived in relative harmony for many decades now live apart, as some groups have 
refused to return to their former houses and lands, and other groups have refused to receive their 
perceived enemies. Lofa County is considered as one of the areas of Liberia where violence is 
most likely to recur, a “flash point” county in a country only beginning to reemerge from
national trauma.
The rationale behind the LINCS Program is that a focused, locally-based mechanism for conflict 
resolution, involving mentoring and targeted skill building, would create strong peace 
constituencies at the community level. Therefore, the LINCS Program intends to develop 
community councils and other peace-building structures, in order to provide communities with 
the tools needed to address the ongoing challenges of building peace in Liberia. In other words, 
the LINCS Program seeks to contribute to “Peace Writ Large,” on the premise that by improving
the conflict management and reconciliation environment at the local level, security in Liberia as 
a whole will be enhanced, thus providing additional assurance of reduced violence in the period 
after peacekeeping troops and other external (international) sources of support leave.
Major Program Elements 
For more than two years, the LINCS Program has included three major components:
1. Establishment of Community Peace Councils and support for local leadership development,
including a series of training programs and associated awareness-raising activities.
2. Conduct of forums or dialogue sessions across ethnic lines, more formally called the National
and County Level Forums.
7
3. Undertaking of livelihood projects and other joint community efforts in participating
communities.
We will describe each of these components in brief below—and they will be discussed at length
in subsequent sections. 
Community Peace Councils 
In brief, the Community Peace Councils (CPCs) were established as an alternative mechanism
for handling a range of dispute types at the community level, especially in the absence of an 
effective judicial system. CHF hoped that the CPCs would provide a means for early resolution 
of conflicts that would contribute to preventing escalation to violence, especially conflicts
associated with IDP/refugee returns and reintegration of ex-combatants. The CPCs were also 
meant to become a peace constituency and to provide leadership in their communities. Finally, it 
was intended that the CPCs would offer a model of an inclusive community structure that would 
help ensure participation by all groups in local level governance.
The CPCs were established over a period of months in 2004 and early 2005 and initially included 
about six members, expanding over time to about twelve. Efforts were made to make sure that 
all key groups were represented among the CPC membership: men/women; old/youth; and all 
ethnic groups. Most CPC members received four different training programs: basic 
peacebuilding skills, leadership, trauma healing, human rights, community security and
community policing. Many of these training programs were also attended by other key 
community leaders (town chiefs, elders, members of women’s and youth groups, etc.). The 
CPCs serve as CHF’s principal point of contact in the communities, and are the base for 
organizing other community activities, including livelihood projects (see below).
National and County Level Forums
CHF realized that, while the CPCs might be able to address a variety of conflicts at the 
community level, some issues would likely be beyond their capability. One of the most salient 
inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts in Lofa County is between the Lorma tribe (and, in 
Salayea District, the Kpelle tribe) on one side and the Mandingo tribe on the other, largely as a 
result of actions taken by armed members of these ethnic groups against each other during the 
past fourteen years. During the war, massacres and atrocities were committed, homes destroyed, 
people assassinated, churches/mosques and other sacred places desecrated. The most obvious 
result is that many communities remain split. In some cases, groups that formerly lived 
intermingled are now living separately but near each other; in other cases, Mandingo families
have not returned to their former communities at all. In most (but not all) areas of the three
districts, the Mandingo are a distinct minority.5
 For more information on this conflict, see the 
conflict analysis of Lofa County in Section III. 
CHF found that powerful people connected with the area (raised there, often with family still 
living there), but living in Monrovia or Guinea, often determine policies and actions at the 
5 While there is some tension between Lorma and Kpelle, the conflicts between either of those groups and the
Mandingo are the most serious.
8
community level. Therefore, as they wished to contribute to reconciliation among Lorma/Kpelle
and Mandingo, they worked to identify those “opinion leaders” and bring them into the dialogue 
process. CHF, with support from the Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy (FOHRD) 
and other implementing partners, held a series of forums during 2004/5 among contending 
groups in several key communities. In addition to dialogues focused on specific communities,
they also organized at least one county level meeting to address broader issues.
In the spring of 2006, CHF hired an additional staff person to focus solely on organizing and 
implementing forums, as a follow-up to the earlier efforts. In May 2006, this new staff member
performed an assessment in sixteen designated “flash point” communities in Lofa County, 
identified opinion leaders that would need to participate, and communicated with government
authorities and others. In both the earlier effort and in the most recent activities, CHF staff and 
its implementing partners facilitate inter-ethnic dialogue sessions in an effort to identify 
outstanding issues and grievances and to negotiate agreements. The current effort is focused on 
those flash point communities in the three districts.
Community and Livelihood Projects 
For several reasons, CHF undertook additional practical efforts in the communities. These
projects generally took two forms: construction of community centers and income-generating or 
livelihood efforts, usually support for some form of farming or animal husbandry.
One purpose of these efforts was to provide more concrete benefits to the participating
communities—since the conflict resolution functions were less visible. CHF field staff reported 
that a main thrust of the community center and livelihood projects was to give people tangible 
results from inter-ethnic cooperation. That is, if all ethnic groups work together and reap the 
fruits from it, there will be peace. CHF also hoped that engaging members of various tribes in 
working together on common projects would promote tolerance and cooperation. A second 
reason for these projects was that CPC members were devoting their own time and energies to 
community level issues and needed some form of personal benefit as incentive for continued
service. Finally, CHF envisioned a time when they would be undertaking additional 
development-oriented programming, and initial projects would serve as an introduction to such 
efforts. As in other programs around the world, CHF uses its`PACE (Participatory Action for 
Community Enhancement) methodology for this aspect of the program.
9
III. APPLICATION OF RPP ANALYTICAL TOOLS
This Section explores the LINCS Program, using a set of concepts and frameworks developed 
through the Reflecting on Peace Practice process. These tools were devised as a way to assess 
the effectiveness of peacebuilding programs, including whether and how the program contributes 
to broader peace in a society experiencing violent conflict—what we call “Peace Writ Large.”
The TORs for this evaluation also states that it will, “assess whether and how LINCS has 
contributed to Peace Writ Large.”
The program analysis presented in this Section provides the basis for the conclusions presented 
in the following Section. Some readers may prefer to “skip to the bottom line” (Section IV), but 
they may also find that the conclusions presented there are not fully understandable without the 
analysis here in Section III.
One might also ask whether it is “fair” to assess the LINCS Program according to concepts and 
criteria that were not part of its original conception, even if those concepts are basically generic.
All peacebuilding programs desire to contribute to peace in some way, and the goals and
objectives of the LINCS Program are quite ambitious—and clearly at the Peace Writ Large level.
We will use four concepts from the Reflecting on Peace Practice (RPP) process to explore the 
LINCS Program:
ƒ The RPP Matrix
ƒ Theories of Change
ƒ Criteria of Effectiveness
ƒ Conflict Analysis 
The RPP Matrix and the Theories of Change work together—and the Criteria of Effectiveness 
and Conflict Analysis also function together, at least in part.
The RPP Matrix and Theories of Change
The RPP Matrix was developed during the earlier phase of RPP (1999-2003), through research 
and writing of 26 case studies, cross-case analysis, and workshops with peace practitioners 
across the globe. It represents one way to delve into a program’s strategy—often uncovering an 
implicit strategy and the choices made by the project or program.
The RPP Matrix reflects the fact that peace practice is driven by two essential strategies,
represented by the two columns of the matrix. The first is aimed at influencing “key people,” 
those who have the power to decide for or against peace. While key people often hold
recognized positions in society, they may also be people who are not so obviously powerful. A 
good example of a less obvious key people group is former soldiers (ex-combatants). While ex￾combatants do not often hold important positions and may be unemployed, they can undermine a 
peace process, as they maintain contacts with former colleagues and commanders, retain 
weapons, and have suffered trauma.
10
Figure 1: The RPP Matrix 
The other main program strategy is aimed at “more people,” based on the understanding that it is 
necessary to educate and mobilize large groups of people into active support of peace (or at least 
acceptance) to make progress towards peace. Some such programs seek, eventually, to influence 
key decision makers by building a strong constituency in support of peace. Others proceed on 
the assumption that engaging larger and larger groups of people and helping them develop 
resistance to further violence is a critical aspect of peace making.
The rows of the matrix show two levels of change at which most peace practice is aimed. The 
top row represents changes in individual skills, attitudes and behaviors, while the bottom row 
represents socio-political changes in social norms, institutions, laws, rules, regulations, structures 
and relationships among groups. 
Theories of Change (or Theories of Peacebuilding) are the underlying assumptions built into a 
program regarding how to induce the changes we seek. In simple generic terms a Theory of 
Change might state: “If we do X [action], it will result in Y [change in favor of peace]. Program
designers rarely state their theories of change explicitly—although it is usually possible to figure 
them out from the program logic presented. In the RPP process, we have been working with 
peace practitioners to make their Theories of Change explicit—so that the assumptions can be 
tested against reality and the experiences gained through program implementation.
In the text below we will look at two program components: Community Peace Councils and 
National and County Level Forums. We will not discuss the livelihood components of the 
program here, as they are not, in themselves, peacebuilding efforts and are not suited to 
application of these analysis tools. 
11
Community Peace Councils (CPC) 
Figure 2 below presents the CPC program as understood through the RPP Matrix. In the LINCS 
Program, once the CPCs were formed, the members and other key community members received 
a series of training workshops designed to enhance their skills in handling conflict and to build 
their leadership capacities as well. This initial series of activities is represented on the matrix in 
Figure 1, showing the CPC members and others receiving training. CPC members are shown on 
the “more people” side but somewhat towards the “key people” side, as the members are, in 
many cases, respected and/or influential individuals. Ex-combatants, and other influential town 
members are shown as key people, since they have greater direct influence on peace.
The CPC itself is shown as a new tentative social institution, designed to handle local level 
conflicts and prevent escalation. The matrix then shows dotted lines to “maintaining peace and 
preventing violence” and from there to an effect on the broader Liberian context. The lines are 
dotted because these impacts are hoped for but not proven. 
Evidence from our interviews in communities participating in the LINCS Program indicates that
the CPCs are handling interpersonal conflicts at the local level and work with other authorities to 
12
address more difficult issues, such as land disputes. The types of conflicts handled by the CPCs 
alone involve domestic quarrels and violence, petty theft, claims regarding property hidden 
during the war and found by others, unpaid debts, public drunkenness and minor squabbles 
leading to fist fighting.
The most serious conflicts in these communities involve religious/cultural issues and land claims
(house sites and/or farm land). In most cases (with a few exceptions), the CPCs are not handling 
such cases. Rather, we heard reports that the members of the CPCs help identify emerging
disputes and then recruit other authorities (town chief, landlord, elders) to bring resolution at the 
local level, if possible. Cases that remain unresolved at that level are referred on to a paramount
chief and/or to the court system (which is widely regarded as ineffective, corrupt and expensive). 
Newly reestablished government Land Commissions will also begin to reassert their role.
The CPCs also helped to smooth the process of IDP and refugee return to the communities,
including addressing some land issues, especially during the past two years of transition, when 
few local authorities (town chiefs, elders, district and county authorities) were present. Now that 
those authorities are back, the role of the CPCs in this area is less certain. While the CPCs were 
originally envisioned as addressing issues with respect to ex-combatants, community and CPC 
members did not mention their role in this. It is possible that they have contributed indirectly 
insofar as ex-combatants were parties to interpersonal disputes. In addition, some of the LINCS 
training programs (trauma healing, Flomo Theatre) addressed ex-combatant issues directly, 
which contributed to the ability of communities and ex-combatants themselves to cope with 
tensions.
CHF also hoped that the CPCs would represent a new model of inclusive leadership. However, 
training, awareness, and a position of responsibility do not necessarily counterbalance 
socialization and the profound effects of war and violence. While some CPCs seem to have 
succeeded in bridging the inter-ethnic divide, in most cases, the prejudices, resentments and 
distrust that prevail in the community at large are reflected in CPC members as well. One 
Mandingo group was quite vociferous: “The CPC cannot help, because they do not have equal 
membership and issue biased decisions. The CPC will never vote with a Mandingo. The good 
thing is that it is a place to bring problems, and the decisions that they make do stand.” While
this is only one direct statement, the team did hear such doubts expressed frequently by 
Mandingos. This issue should be addressed in future programming decisions. 
Theory of Change for the CPCs 
The CPC effort is based on several Theories of Change, which we will examine one by one. 
These theories (in bold italics below) have never been stated in this form in program documents,
although they are implicit throughout. Rather, these formulations are the CDA team’s
extrapolations from the program proposal and from discussions with CHF staff in the field. 
Embedded in the original concept for the CPCs was the following Theory of Change:
Theory #1 (CPCs): By establishing a new community-level mechanism for 
handling a range of dispute types, we will contribute to keeping the peace and 
avoiding incidents that have the potential for escalating into serious violence.
13
This theory represents a challenging issue not only for the LINCS Program, but for the entire 
peacebuilding field. Peace practitioners are engaged in efforts to develop new or enhanced base￾level community alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes in many conflict zones around 
the world. Many of these efforts explore traditional conflict resolution mechanisms and seek to 
reinforce and/or modernize them. Other efforts seek to connect local level ADR with the lowest 
levels of the judicial system.
The question is whether such community-level ADR processes contribute to the broader peace—
and if so, how. The answer turns on the extent to which local conflicts have the potential for
escalating and inciting widespread violence. If they do, then local level mechanisms for 
containing such conflicts would directly contribute to stopping a key factor in violent conflict.
If, however, local conflicts are unconnected to the driving factors of the conflict or the local level
conflict handling mechanisms are not able to address the types of conflict most likely to escalate, 
then the ADR effort would make little or no contribution to Peace Writ Large. On the other 
hand, such program may be quite important, useful and effective for entirely other reasons—
contributing to PWL is not the only reason to undertake such efforts!
The CPCs have provided a more accessible form of dispute resolution for a wide range of 
community-level problems. Thus, they contribute to containing local-level violence, and, during 
the transition period, some CPCs were able to handle certain land issues—one of the concerns 
most likely to lead to violence. At present, however, they are not dealing directly with the most
volatile issues likely to result in violence (land and religious practices). The CPCs do reinforce 
the general notion of peace and model how to find nonviolent solutions to problems. In some
circumstance, CPC members and other participants in leadership positions may apply the skills 
and concepts presented in training programs in considering a wider set of approaches to conflict 
resolution. They also, on occasion, prompt early response to rumors and volatile situations.
Another theory behind the CPCs concerns the idea of inclusion: 
Theory #2 (CPCs): By creating inclusive structures for community problem
solving, we can improve communication, respect and productive interactions 
among subgroups in the community, and improve the access of disenfranchised 
groups to decision making.
Simply by requiring representation from all “quarters” (ethnic and other divisions) within the 
communities, the CPC program may have helped erode the sense of separation resulting from the 
war. However, minority groups (mainly the Mandingos) in the community are also in the 
minority on the CPCs—and have no more power and influence on the CPCs than they do in 
other community forums where they are always outnumbered and their views can be dismissed.6
In meetings of the CDA team with groups of CPC members, it was evident that the Mandingo 
members did not feel free to speak openly. On those occasions when Mandingo members did 
speak up, this was often followed by sharp exchanges in local languages (hence 
incomprehensible to the team) that seemed to silence the minority members. In separate
6
 This poses an issue regarding the nature of “democracy.” If minorities are consistently denied their rights and/or a 
full voice, because they can always be outvoted, does this represent democracy? Structures that provide more equal
voice/representation, while not reflecting the same proportions as the population, may be more effective, depending
on the goals of the overall effort.
14
interviews, Mandingo community members were much more open and quite critical of 
community leadership and, in some cases, of the CPCs themselves. Mandingo members of 
CPCs who are able to exert influence in community decision making are probably able to do so 
because of the positions of respect they continue to hold, not because of their CPC membership.
As the CDA team conducted interviews in the communities, they heard many expressions of 
appreciation and respect for the CPCs. However, this appreciation was rarely (only one or two 
comments) associated with the inclusive nature of the group.
A third theory behind the CPCs and the broader LINCS Program training effort concerns the 
development of new leadership models:
Theory #3 (CPCs): By creating a new leadership group infused with democratic 
concepts and provided with critical skills, we can foster more effective and 
responsive leadership.
Most of the leadership training provided to CPC members was also provided to other 
town/community leaders (town chiefs, elders, women’s and youth group leaders, landlords, etc.).
CHF partner organizations who provided some of the training report that they saw and heard 
participants gaining new insights about leadership in their sessions. The CDA team also heard 
some references to concepts that interviewees must have picked up in training workshops. Since 
there were multiple participants from each participating community in those workshops, it is 
possible that they will be able to reinforce or challenge each other with regard to how leadership
is exercised in the communities.
In some communities, new leadership is emerging—although it is certainly too early to tell if 
they will be any more responsive than the old leaders. In any case, it would be difficult to 
attribute any of these changes to the CPCs or the LINCS Program generally.7
 The various 
training programs, offered to both the CPC members and others, may begin to sink in and 
produce some changes over time. On the other hand, there is little or no follow-up to the training, 
no accompaniment of people as they attempt to apply the skills, and no mentoring of training
participants. As far as we could see, CHF staff are not sitting in on community meetings or 
tracking specific decision making processes to see whether there are any discernable changes in 
leadership and how decisions are made. (I.e., are the skills introduced in LINCS workshops 
being applied?) 
National and County Level Forums
If we apply the RPP Matrix to the National Forum program, the diagram in Figure 2 results.
This program places greater emphasis on “key people,” as opinion leaders in Monrovia and 
Guinea are engaged in the process—recognizing that these people exert influence for or against 
reconciliation in Lofa County communities. By necessity, local and County level authorities and 
UNMIL representatives—who also influence peace and violence—are also engaged. The 
7
 It might be interesting (a research project by a university student from Lofa?) to explore the relationship between
the CPCs and new/emerging leadership. A study could look at the past and current positions of CPC members and
how they interact with traditional leadership structures.
15
Forums have also involved broader representation from the communities, including members of 
the CPCs.
The Forums themselves represent an activity at the socio-political level, since they deal with 
relations among significant groups. That is, the dialogues are aimed not at improving
interpersonal relationships but at negotiating real agreements on important issues. We have 
placed the Forums on the line straddling More People and Key People, since larger groups of the 
community are involved, along with the more powerful participants.
If all goes well, each Forum results in a formal written agreement regarding how the two (or 
more) groups will interact as they live together in the communities. Such agreements, if
honored, could result in actual improved relations among groups in the long term. In fact, it is 
possible that the increased positive contact and communication of the Forums could directly
improve relationships. Those improved relations (from the Forums and/or agreements) would, in 
turn, produce positive effects on the broader Liberian context—demonstrating the potential for 
reconciliation and peaceful coexistence.
In Figure 2, the “improved relations” and “effects on the broader Liberian context” are presented 
in dotted lines, since those are hoped-for impacts not yet realized. CHF reports from the earlier 
round of Forums indicate that some improvements were noted following the interactions—in 
Konia, for instance. However, in other communities, earlier Forums did not result in 
improvements, and CHF staff are undertaking further rounds of talks in an effort to make
16
headway. In Borkeza, for instance, a group of influential people from the community and from
Monrovia met several times and drew up a series of agreements. However, these were not 
written down formally and subsequent actions by the two groups eroded trust. In most areas, the 
Forum efforts are just beginning, and it is too early to tell whether they will succeed. 
Theories of Change for the Forums 
The issues between Mandingo and Lorma/Kpelle tribal groups are quite difficult, derived in large 
measure from the damage done by groups perceived as coming from the various ethnic groups 
during the war. Early in the 1990s there were ethnically-based attacks on Mandingos—and 
Lorma/Kpelle were seen by some as cooperating or even assisting these attacks. Later, in the 
late 1990s, Mandingos and others formed LURD (Liberians United for Reconciliation and 
Democracy), which attacked and occupied Lofa County for several years. LURD and its allies 
committed numerous atrocities, often perceived as targeting Lorma and Kpelle groups and their
sacred places. In addition, Mandingos are often seen as “foreigners” for a variety of reasons.
Some Mandingos have lived in Lofa County for many generations—even predating other tribes 
in some places. However, many Mandingos engage in trade throughout the region (Liberia,
Guinea, Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast) and families are often quite dispersed and mobile.
This is a highly simplified recounting of a complex history. In any case, Lormas/Kpelle and 
Mandingos harbor deep resentments, distrust and fear of each other—as demonstrated by 
changed housing patterns and widespread disputes over house site and farm land use and 
ownership. The need for the Forums arises from a need to address these intense inter-ethnic 
tensions. The situation calls for a deeper process of reconciliation facilitated by relatively 
neutral outside parties with the skills for inter-group dialogue and mediation of actual 
agreements.
The Forum program embodies two theories of change that we will examine in turn.
Theory #1 (Forums): If we bring together influential representatives and other 
community members of both (all) ethnic groups that are experiencing tension to 
engage in dialogue and negotiate formal agreements regarding outstanding 
issues, we can improve inter-ethnic relations and develop the basis for long￾term coexistence.
This basic premise appears warranted by the situation and the programmatic approach. A process 
of reconciliation on a community-by-community basis is clearly needed, in order to address the 
hostility created by actions taken during the war. The effort is also engaging the appropriate mix
of local and national/regional actors in the negotiation process.
However, success of the Forums will likely depend on the details of implementation, including 
the role of the facilitator(s); the quality of agreements reached (including implementation plans); 
the “meaning” of written statements; the degree of implementation and follow-through; linkages
among levels (community, district, county and national); involvement of formal authorities 
(tribal chiefs, district and county government, national ministries); and ongoing and repeated 
processes of reconciliation at multiple levels. These issues will be discussed in the 
Recommendations section of this report.
17
One might also consider whether negotiated agreements are the best or only means for 
addressing inter-ethnic tensions. Indeed, the dialogue process itself opens up communication and 
sharing of perspectives about the traumatic events experienced by all groups over the past years 
of warfare. It will be interesting to see how the overall process of reconciliation unfolds—and 
which mechanisms prove most effective in resolving issues and improving relationships. The 
program should assess, in an ongoing way, how the different Forums succeed and why.
Some dialogue processes in Liberia have included various traditional methods of reconciliation. 
Some people think that these traditional ceremonies are an important component of the process, 
while others stress that such ceremonies are most useful for reinforcing concrete agreements
achieved through some form of negotiation. Indeed, we heard Liberians expressing cynicism
about high officials arriving in communities to preside over empty rites (slaughtering of a cow, 
and so forth) that did nothing practical to improve relationships. Liberia has also launched a 
national truth and reconciliation process—and Lofa County will participate. It remains to be seen 
whether that national process will have impacts at the county and local levels (and vice versa).
A second theory is implied by the Forum approach:
Theory #2 (Forums): If we can negotiate the basis for coexistence among 
influential people at the national level and key local leaders of contending 
ethnic groups, it will become more possible to settle individual disputes over 
such issues as land claims.
By this approach, rather than trying to deal with many individual disputes, the program attempts
to develop broad agreements in principle—which can then guide resolution of specific claims.
This is a sound logic to this approach. There is, however, also a risk that groups will remain
deadlocked at the leadership level, leaving many festering land issues (and others) that could, 
over time, lead to violence, especially as the pressure on land increases with the return of more
people to their former communities.
Separate attempts are underway to address land issues without any broader inter-ethnic 
agreements. Town chiefs, landlords, elders, paramount chiefs, district and county officials, 
Justices of the Peace, magistrates and the courts (insofar as they exist) and the revived Land 
Commission are all theoretically empowered to address land issues. However, these officials 
and institutions are all controlled by the dominant ethnic groups, and the minorities (Mandingos) 
have no faith in their ability to handle inter-ethnic issues fairly. The same institutions/officials
are unable to address the other key area of concern, religious and spiritual practices. Rather, the
various formal and informal religious leaders must be engaged in resolving those.
Disputes also arise over interpretations of the Liberian constitution and provisions that allow 
land ownership by all Liberian citizens and guarantee ownership to those who have used a plot 
for twenty years. In particular, these provisions are disputed in relation to Mandingos, and there 
is widespread refusal to acknowledge their citizenship or their user rights to land.
18
RPP Criteria of Effectiveness 
The first phase of RPP (1999-2003), developed several Criteria of Effectiveness—elements of 
peacebuilding that all peace programs should address in one way or another. These Criteria
continue to evolve as learning and testing proceeds during the current phase of the RPP process. 
Although still evolving, these constitute a useful lens for looking at program effectiveness. We
are currently using the following six Criteria:
1. The effort addresses a key driving factor of the conflict or tensions.
2. The effort results in the creation or reform of institutions or mechanisms that address the 
specific grievances or injustices that are factors in this conflict.
3. The effort causes participants and communities to develop independent initiatives that 
decrease inter-group dividers and increase inter-group connectors.
4. The effort prompts people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to violence.
5. The effort results in an increase in people’s security and in their sense of security.
6. The effort results in a significant improvement in relations among groups in conflict.
The Criteria can be used as one method for assessing whether a program is likely to have an 
impact on the wider peace (“peace writ large”). While individual programs seldom address all of 
the areas included in the Criteria, RPP found that the more Criteria that a program addresses, the 
more likely the program is to contribute to the larger peace.
The CDA team used the Criteria as one framework for determining topic areas to be covered in 
community interviews and other forms of inquiry regarding the LINCS Program.8
 Thus the 
CDA team was interested in seeing whether and how the program was addressing key driving 
factors, whether the CPCs and Forums might be the kernel of new community-level institutions
to address abiding grievance, and whether communities are induced to take their own initiatives 
as a result of the program. Similarly, we explored issues of violence and security and how the 
program might have had impacts in that domain. The issue of inter-group relations was a key 
issue of concern, as this had been identified as a major source of conflict in the area.
The RPP learning process has also found that, as the Criteria are applied to programs, it is also 
necessary to pose several additional questions that cut across the Criteria: Is the program fast
enough? Is the program big enough? Is it sustainable? And is the program linked to other levels 
(local to district to county to national to regional) and other to other programs addressing similar
issues using complementary approaches? The relationships of each program component to the 
Criteria and to these cross-cutting factors (fast enough, big enough, etc.) are discussed further 
below.
Conflict Analysis as a Basis for Identifying Key Driving Factors (Criterion One)
Before we discuss the program components and the Criteria, we must first look at conflict 
analysis. In order to determine if a program has contributed to “stopping a key driving factor of 
conflict” (the first Criterion), it is necessary to perform an analysis that identifies those key 
8
 See the interview protocol in Appendix A.
19
20
driving factors. For this reason the CDA team worked with CHF staff to organize a one-day 
workshop in Lofa County, to hear the perspectives of local people regarding the ongoing 
conflicts in their area. That workshop provided useful information for the CDA team regarding 
how local people view the key driving factors of the conflict.
When the workshop information was supplemented by information from other sources (program 
documents and the full range of interviews at the community level, and with officials and 
implementing partners), we gained a comprehensive picture of the nature of conflict at the Lofa 
County level. Figure 4 presents that information as a conflict system, showing the dynamics 
among the conflict factors. This method of conflict analysis considers conflicts as “systems” of 
factors that operate in a pattern of dynamic interactions. 
In the Lofa County context, the combination of the mutual destruction and killings during the 
war and the resulting mistrust, fear and hatred are the central factors that link other elements. 
“Key driving factors” of the conflict are shown in larger and different typeface and include the 
two central issues already mentioned (war and the resulting mistrust, etc.), plus 
discrimination/unequal power, the influence of opinion leaders, ignorance and misunderstanding, 
and the debate over who is a “real” Liberian.
Broadly speaking there are two major areas of concern in the conflict system in Lofa County. 
The first surrounds the dynamics of land and land ownership, which results from the war 
experiences and the questions raised about the citizenship status of Mandingos. Long-term 
arrangements for land use, rarely written or provided in a formal title, have now been rejected 
(referred to as “breaking of pre-war arrangements” on the conflict map). 
The other major issue area concerns the isolation and separation of populations. In some 
communities, no Mandingos have returned at all. The team heard a story in Boi about the attempt 
of one Mandingo man to return, only to be chased out. In other places the separation is only a 
few hundred yards, as the Lorma have occupied one area, while the Mandingo are living in 
another (examples: Borkeza and Nekebouzo). 
In Nekebouzo for example, the CDA team heard from a mixed group of Mandingo and Lorma 
youth. At one point in the conversation, one youth accused the Lorma of killing and raping 
Mandingo, and then another said the Mandingos killed Lormas—and an argument ensued. The 
team asked why people are “confused and tense,” and why they are separated into an old town 
(now mostly Lorma) and new town (now Mandingo). They heard the following two perspectives: 
Lorma perspective: The Mandingos refuse to live in the old town where we all used to live 
together. Everyone has land and they are free to return to where they lived. The problem is 
that the community now has “aliens” from Bong, Nimba and Guinea, and they don’t belong 
in the community at all. These people are taking the land by force in the new town section. 
Prior to the war the new town section was market land. There was one man who had a 
coco/coffee plantation but that was all. There are some Mandingoes who have returned and 
they have returned to old town. 
A document was signed between the Lorma and Mandingo chiefs in 2000 in Baziwen[?] 
stating that the Mandingo would leave new town and allow that land to return to its pre-war 
status as market land. We really want to work together with the Mandingos and don’t 
understand why they are living separately 
21
Mandingo perspective: That agreement is completely illegitimate for several reasons.
At the court site Lorma held guns and forced our leaders to sign it. The document
contained nothing about a land agreement but rather was an entirely different document
that stated that the Mandingo admitted to killing all the Lorma. The new town was not 
market land at all, but was where Mandingo had lived and farmed
This brief exchange illustrates the depth of the hostility between groups in the wake of the 
fourteen years of war and violence, much of it undertaken with an ethnic twist. The issue 
of ignorance and misunderstanding—in addition to the destruction of churches, mosques
and sacred places during the war—lies behind much of the current tension over religious
practices. The relative isolation exacerbates that problem, and underlines the need to 
involve religious leaders in dialogue and negotiation processes. 
Based on the village-level interviews and discussions with local officials, the situation in 
Lofa County could be characterized as a “fragile peace.” One young man in Konia stated, 
“There are no guns, but there is no peace….I can forget, but I will not forgive. I know 
people who murdered my family and friends.”
While the various armed groups have been demobilized and UNMIL troops are in place, 
NGOs and officials assert that many ex-combatants maintain contact with their former 
comrades-in-arms and commanders. Some armed groups associated with the former LURD 
forces are said to be armed and ready to respond if needed just over the border in Guinea.9
Whether this latter is true or not, people in the communities perceive it to be true—which
represents a threat to security or their sense of security.
In this context, the land issues, and the causes of them, acquire significance as potential 
catalysts of violence, especially if the groups that remain armed perceive a threat to groups 
whose interests they are pledged to protect. Will groups currently excluded from farm land 
and house sites they formerly occupied for generations move to repossess them? How will 
other groups respond if such forcible reoccupations take place? If UNMIL withdraws will 
the situation of relative calm deteriorate?
While this analysis is useful for thinking about the first criterion, it can also serve as the 
basis for thinking more broadly about program strategies and determining whether a 
program is appropriately targeted—that is, addressing the right things.
The Criteria and the Community Peace Councils
The chart below indicates our assessment that the CPCs have had only a subtle and indirect 
impact on the key driving factors of conflict (Criterion #1). As already mentioned, the 
CDA team found that the CPCs, while performing an appreciated and valuable service in 
relation to interpersonal conflicts and some other forms of local conflict, are not addressing 
9
 Note that the CDA team has no direct evidence to support or refute these rumors, but is reporting the
experience of others in Lofa.
22
those issues most likely to escalate towards serious violence. (Fist fights and domestic
violence are serious concerns, but not likely to precipitate widespread bloodshed.) If the 
CPCs are contributing at all to stopping key driving factors, it is by promoting a general 
atmosphere of problem solving and quelling rumors.
Criterion
Community Peace Councils 
1. The effort addresses a key driving factor of the 
conflict or tensions. 
Earlier contribution 
Currently indirectly
2. The effort results in the creation or reform of 
institutions or mechanisms that address the specific
grievances or injustices that are factors in this conflict.
Certain kinds of disputes, 
potential for more
3. The effort causes participants and communities to 
develop independent initiatives that decrease dividers, 
increase connectors.
In some cases (but signs of 
dependency also present) 
4. The effort prompts people increasingly to resist
violence and provocations to violence. Yes, at a local level
5. The effort results in an increase in people’s security
and in their sense of security. Somewhat
6. The effort results in a significant improvement in 
relations among groups in conflict. Not directly
In most communities, the CPCs bring people together for joint community projects. These 
efforts begin to address, in small ways, the lack of community unity and low development 
factors (which are effects rather than key factors in our analysis). “Contact theory” or the 
“contact hypothesis”10 would suggest that joint projects are an effective way to erode 
distrust and fear. Might the LINCS livelihood projects and construction of community
centers, undertaken across ethnic lines, contribute to reducing some of the factors in the 
analysis, such as the cycles associated with “separation and isolation” and “communities 
not together”? CHF staff reported that the joint projects do have these objectives.
In response to critiques of the original contact theory, social scientists found that increased 
social interaction can be effective in reducing prejudice, distrust and fear, but only under 
specific conditions: the groups must have mutual interdependence, common goals, equal 
status, informal and personal contacts, social norms of equality, and the support of 
10 Originally posited by Gordon Allport in the 1950s and elaborated by Armour and Pettigrew (among
others). See Allport, Gordon, The Nature of Prejudice, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1954; Armour, D.
1972. "The Evidence on Busing." Public Interest 28:90-128; Pettigrew, T.F., “Intergroup Contact Theory”,
Annual Review of Psychology, 49 (65-85), 1998.
23
authorities, among others.11 While some of these conditions are met in the relations among 
tribal groups in Lofa County, others are clearly not—which may, then call into question 
the effectiveness of activities based on the assumption that contacts will help reduce
hostility.12
The strongest contribution of the CPC program is towards Criterion #2: creating/reforming
an institution to address specific grievances or injustices. As already noted, the CPCs are 
handling a range of interpersonal disputes, including petty theft, personal property claims,
and domestic issues. Community members frequently expressed appreciation for the 
CPC’s services, as they do not like paying the town chief to resolve issues or using the
slow and corrupt judicial system.
We should note that there is widespread confusion about the true role and function of the 
CPCs, including among CPC members themselves. In the course of our interviews, we 
heard reference to the following roles:
ƒ Community mediators
ƒ Development project managers
ƒ Fund raisers
ƒ CHF contact persons 
ƒ Community mobilizers and leaders
ƒ Landmine action contacts
ƒ Human rights activists
ƒ Child protection agents 
While some mix of these roles may be appropriate for the CPCs, nevertheless, community
members were not clear about what the groups are really for. Given this confusion, if the 
CPCs are to become a more permanent and useful social institution for base-level justice
and dispute resolution, there must be greater clarity—among community members—about
what they want the CPCs to do.
As noted already, the biggest issue is land disputes—and the CPCs, with a few exceptions, 
are not able to address these directly, at least not at present. CHF staff report that earlier in 
the program, before local authorities (town chief, landowner, elders) had returned, CPCs 
were playing a much more direct role in resolving land issues, although this was not 
reported in our interviews. The team found that CPCs are involving themselves in land 
issues, but are not playing a mediating or arbitrating role themselves. Rather, they identify
the problem and bring it to the town chief and other authorities for resolution. In some
cases, the town chief and other influential elders serve on the CPC—and therefore play a 
more central role in land disputes, but this is not due to their CPC membership. If the 
CPCs are to play a more significant role in handling more difficult disputes and deeper 
11 See, for instance, Aronson, E. and D. Bridgeman. 1979. "Jigsaw Groups and the Desegregated Classroom:
In Pursuit of Common Goals." "Equal-Status Inter-racial Contact: A Review and Revision of a Concept."
International Journal of Intercultural Relations 2:161-185 12 Indeed, other social scientists have gone to great lengths to challenge the basic assumptions of contact
theory. See H. D. Forbes, Ethnic Conflict: Commerce, Culture and the Contact Hypothesis, New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1997.
24
issues at the level of grievances and injustice, they will require additional capacity. This
issue is taken up in Section VI/Recommendations.
Regarding Criterion #3, the team found considerable evidence that most of the 
participating communities are not taking their own initiatives. The dependency syndrome
is announced loudly, as the entrance to every community is adorned with multiple
signboards declaring the active engagement of NGOs (and some foreign governments) in 
aid to that town. Of course, this situation was not created by CHF. In fact, most of those 
agencies arrived in Lofa County after CHF did. However, the general atmosphere is one of 
waiting for the initiative of the NGOs. Most NGOs have their own point-of-contact groups 
in the communities, resulting in a dizzying array of local community groups, each 
associated with a different NGO effort, and lots of overlapping memberships. This 
situation is regrettable and outside of CHF’s control—and correcting it would require 
efforts of coordination.13
In contrast, the team’s visits to “non-participating” communities in which CHF and other 
NGOs are not active, revealed that community members there, while just as poor or even 
poorer than communities with extensive NGO involvement, were much more engaged in 
self-initiated efforts. For instance, in Bulor, a poor and isolated all-Mandingo community, 
they had rebuilt the mosque and town hall on their own initiative.
Of more direct concern for CHF, team interviews in the communities revealed, in many
cases, that the CPC is viewed as the “CHF group,” not as a function or body fully owned 
and supported by the community. As they consider future programming, CHF must think 
about how to transfer greater ownership of the CPC function to the communities. Even 
though CHF is not solely responsibility for the dependency dynamics noted above, they 
must still consider how their own program can minimize the negative effects.
Regarding Criteria 4 and 5, the team found evidence that the program has contributed to 
containing violence at the local level—particularly interpersonal disputes that might
escalate. In this way, local people may feel more secure if such incidents are handled well 
and in a timely manner. However, when the team asked people whether they felt secure 
(and many did), they attributed that sense of security to the presence of UNMIL and the 
new Liberian police, the reestablishment of government functions, the revival of economic
activity, and the return of people to their homes. The CPCs were never cited as the source 
of a sense of security, even though most interviewees knew that we were there to talk 
about the LINCS Program. The LINCS Program also provided workshops on community 
policing, but community members rarely mentioned those—and those activities probably 
have gotten lost in the innumerable workshops provided by so many different groups. We
were not able to determine whether people are more resistant to violence than previously—
even though there is a strong sense of weariness with war.
13 In fact, the team heard repeated complaints from community members about actions of various NGOs that
exacerbate conflict, such as inequitable distribution of relief and resettlement goods, favoritism towards 
certain leaders and their cohorts, and differential access to water and sanitation facilities. These issues were
outside the scope of this assessment, but a multi-agency “Do No Harm” analysis of aid to the County is 
sorely needed!
25
In terms of Criterion #6, the CPCs are not addressing inter-ethnic issues directly. If they 
are having an impact on inter-group relations, it is through joint projects, such as 
construction of community centers and livelihood projects. (See the discussion above 
regarding contact theory.) The fact that all “quarters” (geographic and ethnic areas) are 
represented on the CPCs themselves represents the potential for impact on inter-group 
relations. Interactions and cooperation among multi-ethnic members of the CPCs may have 
improved relationships in some instances, but those interviewed in the communities did not 
mention this.14
As for the cross-cutting factors (fast enough, big enough, sustainable and linked), the CPCs
demonstrate some commendable attributes. Certainly, CHF introduced the CPS effort in a 
timely manner as the first significant numbers of people were beginning to return to their 
communities. In the crucial transition period, the CPCs are reported to have played an
important role in facilitating orderly returns and reintegration (at least among those ethnic
groups allowed to return!). In recent months, it appears that this leadership role has passed 
back to traditional authorities in most cases—and many other NGOs are operating in Lofa 
County.
The coverage of the CPC program is impressive: seventy towns in the three districts of 
Lofa County. This is a scale that has potential for real impacts. Those impacts will be 
stronger if the role of the CPCs can be expanded and consolidated, with full community
ownership and support, as needed, from CHF.
The sustainability of the CPC program is a serious question, treated more fully below in 
the Recommendations section. We see three dimensions of this issue: a) how to sustain 
participation of CPC members (through some form of compensation/reward); b) how to 
further evolve the dispute resolution function of the CPCs; and c) how to gain greater 
community ownership. Although the livelihoods projects were conceived partly as a way 
to provide some compensation to CPC members, they do not always see the projects as 
compensation. In one community, the CPC members were under the impression that CHF 
had promised compensation, but none was forthcoming—and they said, “The sheep [from
the livelihood project] are not compensation.” While not always stated this way, the issue 
of compensation was repeated in almost every conversation with the CPC members. Quite 
likely, the program should hold to the volunteer principle (partly because any form of 
monetary compensation is a slippery slope!), while looking for other ways to reward 
participants.
The CPCs would benefit from better links with base-level government and, if the taint of 
corruption can be eased, judicial functions. Recently, CHF has developed a partnership 
with the American Bar Association program on dispute resolution—which may provide a 
natural avenue for linking the CPCs to the judicial system and to other dispute resolution 
14 CPCs operate differently in handling specific disputes/cases. In some cases, individual CPC members
handle the issue. In others, they work in teams. In still others, the CPC acts as a full group. Given these wide
variations, it is difficult to tell how much actual interaction takes place among CPC members of different
ethnic groups.
26
efforts. As for other linkages, so far, the CPCs have largely functioned independently from
other programs, and the CDA team heard sharp criticism of CHF from several other
organizations for not attending key coordination meetings in Voinjama—whether this is 
deserved or not. On the other hand, the team did hear of ongoing cooperation with CCF’s 
work on gender-based violence and with Land Mine Action, and, in the early phases of the 
program, with Lutheran efforts for trauma healing. Decisions regarding which institutions, 
organizations and programs to link with (since they take time and energy) should be based 
on a conflict analysis and strategies for enhancing the effectiveness of the program.
The Criteria and the National and County Level Forums Program 
The chart below presents the CDA teams assessment of how the Forums program
contributes to the Criteria of Effectiveness. In our view, the Forums are potentially (but 
not yet) a powerful means for addressing some of the key driving factors of the conflict, 
including those most likely to precipitate renewed rounds of violence.
If the National and County-Level Forums can effectively address some of the issues that 
divide the tribal groups, including those that have caused groups to refuse to return, refuse 
to live alongside people from the other group, or refuse to allow people to return to former
lands, they will make a significant contribution to stopping key driving factors of the 
conflict and improving inter-group relations (Criteria #1 and #6).
Criterion
National and County Level 
Forums
1. The effort addresses a key driving factor of the 
conflict or tensions. Potential significant impact
2. The effort results in the creation or reform of 
institutions or mechanisms that address the specific
grievances or injustices that are factors in this conflict.
Possible modeling of 
mechanisms for wider 
application
3. The effort causes participants and communities to 
develop independent initiatives that decrease dividers, 
increase connectors.
Unclear
4. The effort prompts people increasingly to resist
violence and provocations to violence. Potential indirect effect
5. The effort results in an increase in people’s security
and in their sense of security. Potentially
6. The effort results in a significant improvement in 
relations among groups in conflict. High potential 
It remains to be seen whether the Forums will be able to negotiate agreements on relatively
practical issues (land use and access, respect for religious practices) without dealing 
27
directly with the more emotive issues that may require deeper levels of reconciliation 
(acknowledgement, apology, forgiveness, cleansing, and so forth). The Forum process is 
currently understaffed and overstretched, which impedes its capacity to follow up and
follow through on dialogue and negotiation sessions. This concern will be addressed 
further in the Recommendations section.15
The Forum program might be considered an experiment in reconciliation at the community 
and county levels. Other such efforts have been attempted in Liberia in the past—and 
CHF would benefit from learning more about the successes and failures of those other
efforts from Liberian experts available in Monrovia.16 Meanwhile, the Forum program has 
potential for being incorporated into a new/renewed Liberian institution that takes
responsibility for long-term attention to ground level reconciliation among contending 
groups (Criterion #2). So far, the appropriate institution has not been identified, and CHF 
will need to undertake additional consultations to determine how their efforts can 
contribute to related national initiatives.
It is too early to tell if the current round of Forum activities will help communities to start
taking their own initiatives for inter-group reconciliation (Criterion #3). We can imagine a 
scenario in which formal agreements that are implemented fully would contribute to 
people’s resistance to violence and to an increase in their sense of security, at least over 
time (Criteria #4 and #5).
As for the other cross-cutting factors (fast enough, big enough…), for the Forums, the real 
question is quality, rather than speed or quantity. The dialogue process needs to proceed at 
its own pace, without delaying unnecessarily. We also address the issue of size in the 
Recommendations, as we are convinced that undertaking dialogue processes well in fewer 
communities will be more beneficial than spreading resources too thin.
Ultimately, the CHF effort cannot be sustained, so a high priority for the next period will 
be to find a strong Liberian institutional base for such efforts. We also suggest in the 
Recommendations that CHF link more closely with others who have previous experience 
with dialogues in Liberia. A key element of the program is developing community to 
county to national linkages, so this is a real strength.
15 CHF has increased staff support and budget for this program component since the CDA team’s visit. 16 Former WANEP director, Sam Doe, would be a place to start.
28
IV. ESSENTIAL FINDINGS
This section will present the basic conclusions of the CDA assessment team regarding the 
LINCS Program. We start with a reiteration and discussion of the program’s goals and 
objectives, followed by a reflection on the strengths and weaknesses of the main program
elements.
The LINCS Program in Relation to Its Objectives and Expected Results
The LINCS Program proposal to USAID (and other subsequent documents reporting on 
the program) articulated several objectives, including those restated under the subtopics 
below. Taken together, these represent an ambitious set of goals—more than a single 
program might accomplish in a relatively short period! [We might note, in passing, that
CDA’s Reflecting on Peace Practice Program (RPP) has discovered a common deficiency 
in peacebuilding program planning: broadly stated goals that claim (hope for) too much
and expected results that are difficult to measure.]
1. Strengthen and Expand Constituencies for Peace 
In this area, the program objectives were to:
ƒ Increase the effectiveness of peace-building constituencies at the local, district and 
country level.
ƒ Strengthen democratic civil leadership with a vested interest in peace.
ƒ Increase quantity, quality and timely delivery of communication on issues 
affecting national to local peace building processes.
ƒ Build capacity for local organizations to advocate for responsive national policies
that contribute to peace.
ƒ Provide logistical support for advocacy and collaboration.
ƒ Assist community leadership groups to build inclusive and transparent 
management.
The CPCs may consider themselves to be, broadly speaking, peace constituencies, but they 
are not mobilized to advocate for peace. Rather, they are working—effectively in many
cases—on local and interpersonal issues of conflict. They are not, as far as we could see, 
engaging in advocacy activities either locally, at the county level, and certainly not at the 
national level. The team did hear repeated support for peace, exhaustion with the war
process, a willingness to put the awful experiences of the past fourteen years behind them,
a real desire to avoid further violence, and a pragmatic desire to get on with life. In other 
words, there is strong public support for peace—but there is no identifiable civic
organization or network of organizations advocating for it. And the CPCs do not appear to 
be filling this role. Furthermore, it is important to note that, alongside the verbal support
for peace, we observed stark separation of populations along ethnic lines and explicit 
refusal to allow Mandingos to return to their lands, and heard persistent expressions of 
hostility based on war experiences.
The Forums, however, represent the potential for building a durable peace in Lofa County, 
supported by influential people both living in the county and in Monrovia. In a sense, then 
29
the Forums may be, slowly and indirectly, developing a peace constituency, though not by 
that name. If the Forum process succeeds at both the community-by-community and 
county levels, and if an institutional base can be found to continue support for an ongoing 
long-term reconciliation process, a truly influential peace constituency could emerge.
The program objectives stated above, although not clearly defined, also call for 
strengthening democratic and civic leadership and inclusive and transparent management.
The overall LINCS Program effort, including all of the training programs for the CPCs and 
others in leadership, has certainly injected new concepts and skills into the communities.
In one community, a young man volunteered the statement, “true leaders do not seize 
power,” as something he had learned in the leadership workshop.
However, the CDA team also directly observed the dynamics among participants in the 
interviews (most of which were in groups). We saw little evidence that the workshops have 
resulted in obvious democratic practices, either within the CPCs or in the larger
communities. Rather, participants frequently interrupted and intimidated each other and
engaged in heated arguments. These encounters went beyond healthy debate and were 
usually unproductive and discouraging of frank exchanges.
On the other hand, the experiences of war and displacement, participation in programs in 
refugee/IDP camps, and the emergence of younger leadership seem to foreshadow a trend 
towards more democratic and transparent processes, as people’s expectations of their 
leadership have shifted. These changes cannot be attributed to the LINCS Program,
although, again the training programs and some contribution from the CPCs may support 
movement in that direction. 
While it is too early to know for certain, the Forums may induce changes in leadership of 
some of the communities—either changes in the approaches to problem solving by 
individual leaders, or changes in the expectations of community members towards their
leadership. If new agreements support coexistence, towns may seek leaders who are best 
able to implement such concepts. The agreements themselves, if well implemented, may
also reinforce community desires for peace. Finally, if the Forum processes include
effective elements of reconciliation, they may strengthen the notion that peaceful 
coexistence is even possible among formerly hostile groups.
In sum, the LINCS Program has laid the groundwork for addressing these objectives. 
However, additional work is needed to consolidate the introduction of new concepts in 
leadership and to truly mobilize constituencies for peace advocacy in the County, and a 
number of specific components need to be realized in the Forums for their contribution to 
become significant.
2. Mitigating Conflict and Violence 
In this area, the program objectives were to:
ƒ Build and/or support local and county capacity for ongoing conflict mitigation,
adjudication and peace building activities.
30
ƒ Prepare communities and leadership for potential outbreaks of conflict and deal 
with the after effects of violent acts.
ƒ Promote dialogues and collaboration among contentious ethnic groups.
ƒ Build local capacity for reconciliation of all returnees.
ƒ Assist democratic leadership to build skills and confidence in effectively managing
community security and in reducing the impact of conflict.
ƒ Build the effectiveness of traditional and culturally appropriate mechanisms for 
reconciliation.
An ultimate conclusion about the effectiveness of the CPCs turns on the expectations about 
what they could/should be handling. As noted above, the CPCs represent a new 
community-based mechanism for handling a wide range of conflicts. With the exception of 
land conflicts and the deeper inter-ethnic tensions, the CPCs are currently capable, in many
cases, of addressing most of the conflicts that arise at the community level, promote
communications among parties, and perform a referral function for cases they cannot 
handle. CHF staff also report that the CPCs are able calm down volatile situations and did 
address land issues earlier during the transition period. Some town chiefs refer cases to the 
CPCs, and some CPCs ask town chiefs to refer cases to them. There is wide variation in 
the relationships between the chiefs, representing the traditional conflict resolution
mechanisms, and the CPCs. 
Therefore, the capacity of the CPCs could be argued two ways. On the one hand, with 
considerable variation from community to community, they are addressing most
community-level conflicts. On the other hand, as noted in Section III, they are not 
currently dealing with those conflicts most likely to result in widespread violence. The 
CPCs’ positive and helpful role and experience needs to be expanded and strengthened to 
achieve a social institution closer to the stated program objectives.
The CPCs appear also to have played a useful role in helping to smooth the process of 
return for refugees and IDPs. CHF staff report that CPCs handled land disputes during the 
transition period. Some of the CPCs are also playing an early intervention role—
responding to rumor and information about impending violence. This role could be further
reinforced, particularly as it becomes clearer how the CPC are to relate to other authorities
(town chiefs, police, government officials, etc.).
As regards the objectives calling for dialogue and collaboration among contending ethnic 
groups and the application of culturally appropriate mechanisms for reconciliation, the 
Forums program represent the best hope for achieving these desired outcomes. If well
executed, the Forums show promise for exerting a significant impact in this regard.
Considering the combined impacts of the CPCs and the Forums, the LINCS Program, as a 
whole, is achieving progress towards the objectives stated above. 
31
3. Address Causes and Consequences of Conflict 
In this area, the program objectives were to:
ƒ Facilitate peaceful resolution of property and resource claims, perceived war 
crimes.
ƒ Build Lofa-based peace constituencies’ ability to affect national decisions on 
resource allocation, management of extractive resources.
ƒ Build Lofa-based peace constituencies’ ability to affect national decisions on 
composure and civil leadership of reconstituted military and/or police.
ƒ Build number and quality of psycho-social assistance mechanisms in Lofa.
So far, the LINCS Program is not addressing the peaceful resolution of property and 
resource claims or perceived war crimes. Interpersonal issues regarding property hidden as 
people fled the area have been handled by the CPCs, but as discussed already, the CPCs 
have not so far dealt with more serious land and property disputes—and certainly not war 
crimes.
In reality, the picture is quite mixed regarding land disputes. We found some CPCs that 
claimed they were handling land disputes, but when we probed further about exactly what 
they did, it turned out that they played a role in identifying the issue and bringing the 
appropriate authorities (usually the town chief and/or landlord) forward to make decisions. 
Some CPCs apparently handled house site and/or farm land issues by themselves in the 
earlier period, but we did not find a lot of evidence that they are currently playing this role. 
The team did hear accounts of trauma healing workshops, held under the LINCS Program,
in which individuals were able to recount their personal experiences of atrocities—and 
some level of interpersonal reconciliation took place, when people who had participated in 
such activities were present. One woman interviewed in Voinjama District said that she
faced a young man who had killed her son and told him, “You must disarm your heart.” So 
far, these kinds of healing encounters are not a regular occurrence in the county, however. 
The LINCS Program has cooperated, at least in its early stages, with other programs
working on trauma healing.
CHF staff also described the performances by the Flomo Theatre group in the area, 
arranged through the LINCS Program. These performances brought together up to a 
thousand community members and addressed, through drama, issues regarding ex￾combatant reintegration and reconciliation. In these public settings, community members
were able to reach out to each other and shout out how they should forgive each other and 
move on. This type of dialogue in a public setting was apparently a rare occurrence.17
As mentioned elsewhere, the community Forums may be able to incorporate some
elements of reconciliation and healing by working directly across the ethnic groups on 
specific issues and grievances that divide them.
17 Although these experiences were apparently rare and moving, interviewees in the communities rarely 
mentioned them. Even when prompted directly, interviewees only remembered them vaguely.
32
The CHF staff were clear that the objectives associated with national level policy advocacy
have proven unrealistic, as least to date.
In sum, the LINCS Program has contributed in small ways to achievement of this set of
objectives. With some rethinking and restructuring, the program has potential for making a 
more significant contribution.
Expected Results 
The LINCS Program, by achieving the three major goal areas above, was expected to show 
the following results by the end of the program:18
ƒ Reduced violence in Lofa County;
ƒ Peaceful return of internally displaced persons (IDPs), refugees, and ex￾combatants;
ƒ Facilitation of reconciliation between ex-combatants and their families;
ƒ Facilitation of reconciliation between ex-combatants and their ‘host’ communities;
ƒ Development of Community Councils which can support reintegration, act to 
resolve disputes and adjudicate perceived crimes, and mobilize the community to 
work towards peace; 
ƒ Community Councils trained and active in sensitizing the community to addressing 
the special issues regarding returned ex-combatants;
ƒ Increased participation by all community members in community decision making;
ƒ Increased peaceful interaction among diverse, sometimes contentious groups 
within the community;
ƒ Increased effectiveness and organization of district and county peace
constituencies; and 
ƒ Creation of a mechanism to facilitate communication between Community
Councils and other leaders with UNMIL, UNCIVPOL as well as the NTGL’s new 
security forces.
The Expected Results presented above are, in many cases, stated in terms of activities 
(facilitation, training, establishment of institutions), rather than in terms of specific 
outcomes or impacts—what those activities or entities might accomplish. In some cases 
there is an implied desired outcome, such as increased participation, increased interaction, 
increased effectiveness. Furthermore, there is no baseline data that would enable 
determination of whether the expected outcomes had occurred.
Nevertheless, it is possible to extrapolate a set of specific outcomes that the program was 
striving towards. These are presented below in present tense, positive terms, along with 
possible measures offered for illustrative purposes. In most cases, these are restatements
of the Expected Results above in a somewhat different format. Note that these are still 
goals—and the use of the present tense is a convention in goal statements and does not 
imply that the aims have been achieved. We discuss the extent to which these have been 
accomplished in Lofa County below.
18 From the LINCS program description (Attachment 2 of the Cooperative Agreement).
33
We have taken the time to offer these restatements and possible measures below because
these represent the kinds of things that the CDA assessment team tried to explore during 
visits and interviews in the communities and interviews with officials. Clearly the team
did not attempt to gather information on all of these factors, which would have been an 
impossible task. However, especially in those areas where CHF staff indicated that they
thought the program had achieved some impact, the team tried to find out what results 
could be observed. Community interviews touched on each of these topics to some extent, 
although not in equal measure. (Number 7, for instance, was not a major focus, since CHF 
indicated that they had not expended a lot of program resources in that area.) 
1. Lofa County communities experience low levels of violence. [Possible measures:
number of violent incidents, murders, attacks, intimidation; rate of calls upon 
UNMIL or Liberian police/security forces to intervene in violent situations;
increase in the sense of security among all groups.] 
2. Communities have accomplished the peaceful reintegration of returnees and ex￾combatants. [Possible measures: percentage of families returned to communities;
proportion of different ethnic groups returned; active participation of ex￾combatants in community life/work/activities; housing and land use patterns based 
on ethnicity or other factors; peaceful resolution of competing claims for land; 
positive attitudes towards people perceived as “different” in some way; growing 
acceptance of all as Liberians.]
3. Contending groups (ex-combatants/families, other groups undefined) have 
achieved reconciliation (undefined) and interact regularly and peacefully. [Possible 
measures: observed “normal” interactions among groups formerly hostile; 
willingness of victims and perpetrators to place past history of violence behind 
them; open expressions of regret and/or forgiveness; evidence of joint rebuilding
and/or reparation activities; spaces established and used for recounting difficult 
personal histories from the war; active trauma healing programs used by all 
groups.]
4. Disputes at the community level are handled effectively and without resort to 
violence. [Possible measures: documentation of the number of disputes, types, 
parties and issues; tracking of the processes used to attempt resolution; rate of
successful resolution by the varied mechanisms; durability of settlements;
“satisfaction” surveys among disputants.] 
5. All constituencies have a voice in community decision making. [Possible measures:
attendance by various groups (young/old, women/men, X/Y ethnic groups, etc.) in 
community meetings; tracking of who speaks how often and with what force; who 
is listened to and by whom; tracking of decisions actually made by whom and 
taking into account what input.] 
6. There is a mobilized, visible and credible constituency for peace. [Possible 
measures: there are groups who self-identify openly as peace advocates; individuals 
representing such groups speak up and/or intervene regarding potentially volatile 
issues; locally-initiated activities bring people together across various divides for 
dialogue and/or joint work.]
34
7. Community members are in regular positive communication with security forces.
[Possible measures: how secure do people feel by their own report and why; 
numbers of meetings between community members and security forces; number of 
issues/problems brought to security forces; positive attitudes by community 
towards security forces and vice versa (by survey); rate of local people signing up 
to serve in forces.] 
From our community visits and from discussions with local officials and UNMIL 
personnel, the CDA team feels that numbers 1, 2 and 4 above have taken place in Lofa 
County. That is, there is a relatively low level of violence, people have returned and been 
reintegrated successfully within their own ethnic groups, but not across/between different 
ethnic groups. Most disputes are handled nonviolently, so far. While the LINCS Program
may have contributed to these results, it would be difficult to attribute these outcomes to 
LINCS activities. The Community Peace Councils appear to have facilitated smooth
returns and are handling interpersonal disputes. In addition, they may have, through their 
very existence, promoted an atmosphere of conflict resolution and problem solving without 
resort to violence.
In our view, the reconciliation called for in #3 has not been accomplished in Lofa County, 
as yet. In Zeawordemai a group of women and youth asserted that they would “never 
forgive, no matter what.” They recalled that 500 boys were killed by Ulimo on Black 
Monday, an incident still on their minds many years later. This ongoing pain and hostility
reinforces the need for the CHF Forums program, which has promise for making a 
significant contribution in this area. 
Based on our observations in the field, # 5 is problematic. Traditional forms of leadership
appear to be in full operation, with elders, town chiefs and landlords firmly in control. 
Women and youth are formally represented in town discussions, but their voices are not 
strong. Minority groups do not speak up readily. Clearly more work is needed in this area.
In relation to #6, as already noted, there is strong public sentiment in favor of peace, but no 
active and visible constituency openly advocating for it—and there is persistent hostility
and tension, unresolved incidents from the war, and obvious separation along ethnic lines.
As regards #7, in repeated comments, communities attributed security to the presence of
UNMIL—and appreciated their role. We also heard reports of communities calling on
UNMIL to intervene when situations seemed to be getting out of hand. One group said that 
they called UNMIL right away when they saw a group of young men fighting. Another 
called upon UNMIL when hunters in the bush frightened people by shooting too close to 
towns.
The team also heard reports of young men (some ex-combatants) volunteering for the new 
Liberian army or for the renewed police—an indication that communities favor these
revived national institutions and have hope that they will be able to guarantee peace after 
UNMIL withdraws. It is hard to attribute this situation to the LINCS Program, although 
one set of workshops under the program addressed community-police relations.
35
Summary of Program Strengths and Weaknesses 
The following is a summary of strengths and weakness of the Community Peace Councils 
and National and County Level Forums, which we have directly addressed in the 
Recommendations presented in Section VI. 
Community Peace Councils 
Strengths:
The CDA heard from two different community members that the CPCs are a “river 
between two fires” (from which we have taken the title for this report). We take this as an 
appreciation for the effective role the CPCs play in handling local disputes. 
ƒ The program has created the foundation for longer term, larger scale dialogue 
processes.
ƒ The program informed communities about conflict and basic problem solving 
approaches.
ƒ CPCs provide a low-cost mechanism for handling local-level (mainly) interpersonal
disputes.
ƒ CPCs provided an effective dispute resolution mechanism during the critical transition
time of the return and reintegration of IDPs/refugees, handling interpersonal disputes 
and, in some cases, land issues. 
ƒ CPCs have provided some forms of leadership in communities, supplementing (and not 
replacing) traditional authorities.
ƒ CPCs are an appropriate mechanism that do not contradict existing and historical 
structures that do work.
ƒ The program introduced key leaders to a variety of important skills and concepts that 
can be useful for any future development and/or conflict resolution programming.
ƒ CPCs have provided a useful entry point to communities for other important programs
(e.g., Land Mine Action, domestic violence, trauma healing).
ƒ The CPCs, with additional attention and resources, constitute a possible new permanent
social institution for first level dispute resolution.
Weaknesses/Critiques:
ƒ CPCs are currently out of date, in terms of their representative function and credibility, 
since they were formed in 2004, and many more people have now returned to the 
communities.
ƒ While the CPCs members have received at least four training programs, there has been 
little direct follow up to see whether/how people are applying those skills and 
concepts—CPCs are left to function on their own without direct support or mentoring,
such as sitting in on actual dispute resolution processes or regular CPC meetings to 
discuss cases. 
36
ƒ The main contact between CHF and the CPCs is a monthly visit in which the group 
reports on their activities.19
ƒ There is no independent verification regarding the actual roles that CPCs are playing 
(types of cases handled, processes used, style of mediation/arbitration employed, rate 
of settlement, acceptance of any settlement, durability of agreements, etc.).20
ƒ CPC members feel burdened by their role, in terms of the time requirements without 
compensation—which has raised questions about the sustainability of the model, as 
interest may wane without some better reward system.
ƒ In many cases, only a few CPC members are truly active.
ƒ CPCs are not able to contradict traditional authorities—and in some cases town chiefs,
elders and other leaders are fully involved with the CPCs (which has both positive and 
negative effects!).21
ƒ Generally, the CPCs reflect the same prejudices and dominant/subordinate patterns of 
their social context: minority groups in the towns are also minority groups on the 
CPCs, and have no stronger voice there than in other settings.
ƒ The CPCs are mostly dealing with interpersonal disputes that the town chief is happy 
for someone else to handle; more serious issues, including land disputes, are handled 
through other more traditional means. (Whether this is a weakness or not depends on 
what the groups are expected to do.)
ƒ CPCs are not equipped to address deeper issues of inter-group reconciliation or more
difficult types of disputes, and are not used directly to support Forum activities, such as 
following up, monitoring compliance, helping to negotiate actual implementation, etc.. 
ƒ There is widespread confusion about the real function/purpose of the CPCs (livelihood 
project implementers, dispute resolvers, the “CHF group,” etc.), and many community 
members (perhaps mostly recent returnees) are not aware of the services available.
ƒ The CDA teams found that some CPCs appear to be inactive, while there is open 
conflict among CPC members in other cases.
National and County-Level Forums 
Strengths:
ƒ National forums represent a potential for deeper resolution and reconciliation of inter￾ethnic conflicts.
ƒ The Forums offer relatively neutral outside facilitation that enables contending groups 
to address sensitive issues.
19 Records regarding each CPC and its cases are kept in the CHF field offices. The CDA team reviewed the 
files in the Zorzor office and found that records there were fairly complete through February 2006, but were
quite incomplete after that.
20 CHF records rely on accurate reporting by the CPCs themselves. While the groups have no particular
reason to distort the facts, they may not fully understand terminology—and CHF staff may not either. For
instance, the records report that many cases are “mediated,” yet it is also clear that CPCs are almost all using
an arbitration model. Sorting that out would require direct observation by an informed person. 21 Many CPC members were elected/selected because they were respected members of the community. In 
some cases, this means they are part of the town power structures, not an alternative to them. Other CPC 
members were simply those present in the early days of returns—and as traditional authorities have returned,
their influence has diminished, in some cases.
37
ƒ The Forum program is able to bring together all of the key players, including 
influential people from Monrovia and Guinea. 
ƒ The Forums support the negotiation of agreements between conflicting groups, that can 
serve as the basis for resolving many specific disputes, especially over land
ownership/use.
ƒ The Forums can help to develop a model of inter-group dialogue and negotiation that 
would be applicable elsewhere in Liberia. 
ƒ The Forums are organized in a way that links national, regional and local levels 
regarding inter-ethnic tensions. 
Weakness/Critiques:
ƒ At present the CHF Forum program is understaffed and overstretched, trying to 
organize processes in too many communities at the same time. High quality processes
in a few places may be better than poorly implemented processes in many.
ƒ The program is not benefiting directly from previous experiences of dialogue and 
negotiation in Liberia, during earlier periods or by other organizations. 
ƒ Previous dialogue/negotiation efforts by CHF and its partners (in 2004-5) resulted in 
formal agreements, but these were not written down, nor was there adequate follow up. 
ƒ Formal agreements appear to be at the level of broad principles only—more concrete 
and specific actions and an implementation plan are not addressed. For instance, in 
Ziggida, local people said that a Forum had negotiated an agreement, but tensions arose 
again, partly because the agreements were never implemented.
ƒ Current staff do not have the time to provide sufficient follow-up to the current round 
of dialogue processes. 
ƒ In the long-term, this kind of effort needs a sustainable Liberian institutional base. 
ƒ There is not always good communication to community members about what the 
purpose and result of the Forums are. Community members seldom mentioned the 
Forums in interviews, and in two communities their impression was that the Forums
were “just another workshop.”22
22 The current round of Forums are apparently making more specific plans for reporting back to the 
communities.
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V. REFLECTIONS ON KEY QUESTIONS
This section addresses a series of issues raised by CHF in the Terms of Reference and/or 
USAID. In some cases, the comments here are quite brief, as the issue has already been 
addressed elsewhere. 
The Security Dimension
We have already commented on our perceptions regarding the current security situation in 
Lofa County, which we have characterized as a “fragile peace.” Local people and CHF’s 
implementing partners and staff all assert that old command structures, if not formally in 
place, still exist informally, and some armed groups are rumored to exist in Guinea.
The CDA team did explore people’s perception of security—whether they felt secure and 
why, whether this had changed over the past year or more and why. Generally people did 
feel fairly secure, and attributed this to mainly UNMIL. Many community residents 
mentioned that they hope that UNMIL‘s peace keeping mission will be extended until an 
effective security system (police and military) is set up in Liberia. Residents also 
mentioned the formation of the new government; there is a lot of faith in the new 
government’s ability to really change things. As indicators of security, people pointed to 
the ability to travel and go to market without fear, the resurgence of economic activity, the 
widespread (although incomplete) return of IDPs and refugees, rebuilding of homes and
other structures, and the functioning of schools.
Decision Making, Leadership and Democracy
As noted earlier in this report, traditional structures and styles of leadership are reasserting 
themselves in Lofa County. On the other hand, there are forces of change at work, and 
there may be opportunities for change. CHF can build on the training programs offered
through the LINCS Program by reinforcing the skills and concepts and accompanying
community leaders as they try to apply them. In the Recommendation section we discuss 
several options for the future role of the CPCs—and several of those options would lend 
themselves to supporting further community leadership development.
Access to Justice: Civil Adjudication and Mediation Processes 
People in the communities feel alienated from the official justice system, finding it 
universally corrupt, slow and expensive. One interviewee said, “There is no justice.” This 
is one of the reasons they appreciate the CPCs, limited as they are. If the CPCs can be 
strengthened, they have the potential for expanding their role to a more
regularized/institutionalized community mechanism for dispute resolution. Further 
cooperation with the ABA program is one avenue for supporting the CPCs, and other 
suggestions are offered in the Recommendations section.
In most communities, even where the CPCs were quite active, the traditional conflict
resolution systems are functioning, especially for the more serious issues, such as land 
39
disputes. Some issues are taken up by a quarter chief (sub-area of a town) and referred 
from there to the town chief, elders and paramount chief. Some people mentioned a role 
for the District Commissioner as well.
If that route fails, then the issue is taken to the court system, as problematic as it is. If the 
issue is a land dispute, the landlord (a traditional hereditary role) is seen as the final
decision maker at the local level, although his decision can be appealed to the court 
system. We found that the town chiefs are often referring cases to the CPCs and the CPCs 
are either referring cases to the chief or asking for permission to handle cases. Decisions by 
the CPC are sometimes reviewed by the town chief and/or elders.
All of these processes use an arbitration model in which the authority (CPC, chief, etc.) 
hears from the parties and renders a decision, which the parties can accept or reject. Only 
recently has a more mediating (i.e., non-decision making) role been introduced through the 
ABA/CHF training program.
Deeper Conflict Resolution: Truth, Justice and Tolerance
At present, the various ethnic groups harbor deep resentments, distrust, fear and even 
hatred, as a result of actions that the groups (or their representatives) took against each 
other during the war. If the recently launched national truth and reconciliation process can 
reach to the local level, it might have a beneficial effect. However, additional mechanisms
will be needed at the local level to supplement whatever processes are undertaken
nationally—and it is also important that local people be given a chance to participate 
(testify) at the national process.
Meanwhile, as noted, the Forums provide an opportunity to explore deeper reconciliation 
on a community-by-community basis. It will be important to engage in ongoing reflection 
on what is working and not—and document the process so that others can benefit from this
experience.
The Role of Traditional Reconciliation Methods
We did not uncover a lot of information about traditional methods of reconciliation. 
However, we did hear cynicism regarding empty ceremonies that have not been preceded 
by serious negotiation and reconciliation. Thus traditional rites can be (mis)used to gloss 
over real problems. But they have their place in long-term committed processes of conflict
transformation and reconciliation.
We did find, however, that traditional culture—which is a tightly guarded secret—is an 
unspoken yet powerful force in the conflicts. Secret societies play a role that is only dimly
understood by outsiders (including our team!) or even by local people who are not part of 
them. In some cases, traditional practices (visits by the “devil” for instance) seem to be 
used to control and intimidate minority groups. Important aspects of the conflicts in Lofa 
County involve such traditional practices. Therefore, local religious leaders will have to be 
involved in any successful reconciliation efforts.
40
Linkages between Livelihood and Conflict Resolution Processes 
While community members expressed appreciation for the LINCS livelihood programs,
they have also caused some problems. In some cases, the livelihood efforts have helped 
CPC members who have not otherwise been compensated for their work. However, even 
though the livelihood projects are not at the core of the program, they have absorbed 
enormous amounts of time, energy, attention and resources. As far as the CDA team could 
tell, CHF staff have been almost exclusively focused on the livelihood projects and 
community center construction in recent months, and have reduced support for the CPCs in 
their conflict resolution role.
In addition, there is confusion in the communities (and in the CPCs) about the role of the 
CPCs and the Project Management Committees. In some cases community and CPC 
members could not distinguish the two groups. Despite written agreements (contracts) for 
the livelihood projects, community members appeared quite confused about who would 
benefit and in what proportion from the projects.
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The full CDA team met in Monrovia to develop an initial set of recommendations—which
were then presented and discussed with the CHF Country Director. The recommendations
below are only slightly different in substance and include explanatory text not included 
with the originals presented in Monrovia.
The first section of recommendations addresses the overall CHF program. We are 
assuming that conflict resolution and peacebuilding will remain at least one major program
focus. Conditions in Lofa County certainly support a continuing emphasis on 
reconciliation and peacebuilding. Subsequent sections address the two major peacebuilding 
efforts.
General Program Recommendations 
1. Adopt narrower goals/objectives, expected results and indicators. 
The LINCS Program goals and objectives were extremely broad, making it difficult to 
determine the extent to which the program was achieving the outcomes desired. Future 
program efforts would benefit from tighter goals and objectives aimed at accomplishing a 
few key things well. It also should prove possible to articulate more specific indicators for 
such objectives. As one step in program planning, it would also be important to make the 
program’s Theories of Change explicit and to test whether they are valid in the situation.
2. Develop a stronger long-term plan, with associated staffing and structure of CHF 
programs.
The LINCS Program was undertaken during a transition period, when swift action was
warranted. Future programming can and should take a longer view, and build on the areas 
of considerable success of the program so far. Staff should be recruited and trained with 
the expectation that they will be retained for an extended period, and their skills should be 
keyed to the specific program goals. In particular, greater staff diversity (reflecting the
ethnic makeup of Lofa County)23 and more emphasis on conflict resolution skills would 
strengthen the program.
3. Create better communication and cooperation among CHF program components—less 
compartmentalization.
The CDA team found that CHF team members were not always aware of what other 
program elements were doing or why. The Forum program does not build on the CPCs
directly. The livelihood staff are not fully informed about the Forum effort, and do not 
seem interested in further development of the CPCs.
23 However, CHF cannot assume that simply by hiring from all ethnic groups that they will benefit inter￾group relations. CHF can model fairness and equality in their manner of working—and avoid mirroring
current social inequalities in society.
42
CHF should ensure that all staff understand the overall program and how CHF intends to 
achieve them, in their own area and other areas. Although the CDA team may have visited 
the field at a particularly hectic time (many CHF staff were preoccupied with completing
certain tasks before specific deadlines), the interviews with staff indicated that some were
not fully aware of how the overall program fit together—how the CPCs, livelihood 
projects and Forums are related. The overall program would be strengthened by a greater 
sense of team, in which everyone knows their own role, the functions performed by other 
units, and how it all fits together.
4. Develop closer cooperative working relations with other NGOs working on 
similar/allied issues in Lofa County. 
Whether it is deserved or not, CHF is perceived by other NGOs and UN staff working in 
Lofa County as going it alone. CHF has made efforts in the past to cooperate more fully, 
but currently the program would benefit from closer ties, especially with those groups that 
have related programs. We are not suggesting coordination for its own sake, but rather 
carefully determining where linked efforts will enhance effectiveness.
5. Provide for explicit follow up to training in concepts and skills: tracking of indicators 
that the training is being used; coaching in skills application support for desired 
changed behaviors, etc. 
CHF/LINCS and its implementing partners have invested considerable time and energy 
providing training to the CPCs and other leaders in Lofa County. However, in most cases 
there is no follow up to support training participants in the application of the skills and 
concepts presented in workshops. Received wisdom in the professional training field 
indicates that a high percentage of training is wasted when there is no system for 
supporting and coaching trainees. CHF should adopt a strategy for reviewing and 
reinforcing the skills and concepts already introduced, and for accompanying people who 
are trying to use them, in order to mentor/coach in a way that will improve decision
making and conflict resolution efforts.
6. Establish a more robust M&E plan, including baseline data, specific indicators, a 
tracking and reporting system.
In 2004, it was difficult to collect baseline information in Lofa County. The situation is 
much more stable at present, and a full monitoring and evaluation plan can be 
implemented, including specification of indicators that will be tracked. Those indicators 
will be most useful if baseline information can be collected on them.
The CDA team also came away with the impression that CHF field staff are not sure why 
they are collecting information about what the CPCs are doing—and how this might
inform their own work. Rather, the information is fed upward in the organization for 
inclusion in quarterly reports. It also appears that the information-gathering process has 
deteriorated during recent months, as the priority was placed on completing certain 
deliverables. CHF should develop a system for collecting and analyzing data from its 
43
programs, and use the results as feedback to the program that also informs mid-course
changes.
Community Peace Councils 
Section IV above on Essential Findings summarized the strengths and weaknesses of the 
CPC program element—which already raised questions about possible future directions.
The CPC program has made a significant contribution during the past two years—and the 
program was appropriate for that transition period. The situation has changed considerably. 
Therefore, CHF needs to rethink the structures and approaches for this program
component, even if this is only one of several different major program elements. The CDA 
team recommends that CHF perform a fundamental program redesign, building on the best 
elements of the past two years, and preparing for follow-up efforts.
We don’t have a clear recommendation regarding the exact direction the program should 
take, but we do see a range of possible options to be considered.
Consider the following OPTIONS for the CPCs: (not all mutually exclusive)
1. Phase them out. Consider that the CPCs were a good mechanism for a transitional
time, but that continued effort is not appropriate. 
2. Transition them into development committees. As CHF undertakes other more
development-oriented activities, build on the relationships established through the 
CPCs as the base for that work, but discontinue their conflict resolution role. 
3. Wait and see. Merge with traditional mechanisms for dispute resolution. Watch what 
happens with the new government in relation to base level justice. Explore a role for 
the CPCs in terms of decision making and local level dispute resolution, if appropriate. 
4. Explore a role in relation to the TRC process. The CPCs could play a role in 
identifying local people to testify, and to participate in County-level activities. CHF 
could facilitate such participation with transport and other support. The CPCs might
also play a role (with others) in local-level truth and reconciliation activities.
5. Conduct a participatory process to determine the future shape, function, etc. Let the
communities themselves decide the future of the CPCs. This might lead to a phasing 
out (#1 above), serious investment (#6) or some combination.
6. Make a serious investment in full development of the CPC model. Figure out how to 
transform the present structures into a sustainable community-level mechanism that is 
fully owned by the communities and performs a needed dispute resolution function.
Numbers 1 - 5 above are fairly self evident. Number 6 requires a bit more explanation—
and some further specific recommendations.
44
Redevelopment & Strengthening of the CPCs 
Throughout the report, we have indicated ways in which the CPCs have contributed, and 
some ways in which they miss the mark. We believe that the CPCs show potential for 
playing a more important role, but to realize that potential will require revision of the
concept and further investment in the people and necessary structures.
a. Clarify the model and functions.
Make a basic choice regarding the appropriate model and function of the CPCs for the 
future and secure buy-in from other authorities (town chiefs, Superintendent, district 
authorities, appropriate national ministries, etc.) 
There are many variants on the community peace council model, each implying different 
roles and functions, membership, relation to other authorities and structures (such as the 
justice system). Some of these variations are discussed more fully (yet still briefly) in
Appendix C, including inter-ethnic councils, community mediation panels, a land dispute 
resolution mechanism, and community councils.
Depending on which model/function is chosen, the CPCs might have quite different 
membership, training needs, etc. For instance, the inter-ethnic council model would imply 
equal membership by ethnic group, and the role of the group would be to monitor
relationships among the tribal groups, calling joint meetings for problem solving as 
needed.24 This is quite different from the violence-prevention function of the community 
council, which keeps alert to rumors of impending violence, and uses a council widely 
representative of women, men, elders, youth, police, and local government to initiate early 
intervention. Still another model, a local land dispute resolution group, requires more
technical knowledge, and works closely with a land commission or ministry. Of course, 
these models are not mutually exclusive, and many different combinations and variations 
could be devised. 
If CHF is moving forward with the CPCs (whether called by that name or another), this 
fundamental choice of model and function must be made. Who should be consulted and/or 
decide that model/function is an important question. Local authorities (County
Superintendent), Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Justice, and people in the 
communities themselves are some of the groups that might be consulted. If time, energy 
and resources are going to be invested in a future function, it will be important to develop 
wide agreement that the groups should exist and what they are expected to do.
b. Recharter the CPCs.
Clarify the roles and functions of the CPC through participatory development of a simple 
charter (composition, functions, types of cases in/out, operating principles…). 
24 Inter-ethnic councils can be structured or composed in many ways. Generally, though, efforts usually try 
to equalize membership, rather than reflect the proportions in society. Otherwise, minority groups remain
minorities, even in an entity designed to improve relationships. If the dynamics of dominance are carried
into such a group, it is less likely to succeed in promoting better interactions.
45
As we have noted previously, there is a lot of confusion, even among CPC members
themselves, about what the functions of the CPCs are. If the CPCs are to continue, one 
way to clarify their role would be to convene a representative group of CPC members who 
would, first, discuss the ways the CPCs have functioned best, and second, outline the 
future functions for the councils. The same group could also discuss a “charter” that would
define membership, means of election, criteria for membership (issues of diversity of 
gender, age, ethnicity, etc.), the types of cases the CPCs would be empowered to handle, 
relationship to other authorities, and so forth.25 The charter could also lay out the 
principles and ethics for the functioning of the CPCs, such as impartiality and 
confidentiality. [Note: Suggestion b) could be done without a). Or b) could be undertaken 
after a), in order to determine more detailed parameters within the basic model chosen.] 
c. Restructure and “re-elect” the councils.
Since most of the CPCs were formed in 2004 or early 2005, they were selected by the 
communities members who were present at that time—and many more have returned
since. It is widely acknowledged, including by CHF, that the groups need to be 
reconstituted, if only to gain the credibility of being elected by the current community
members.26
If the groups are going to be reconstituted, consistent procedures for election/selection 
should be clearly laid out, possibly using a process designed by local people as suggested 
in b) above. New selection should await the redefinition of the role, since that should
guide choices of community members to serve.
d. Complete the mediation training.
The ABA mediation training model (which CHF helped develop) would be appropriate 
and useful under most of the models and functions discussed. The training might need to
be further adapted somewhat, depending on the functions of the redefined CPCs. It should 
be noted that, in the view of CHF staff, the CPCs are currently using basically an 
arbitration model consistent with traditional practice in the area. That is, the CPC members
hear from the parties and offer a solution—which the parties can accept or not. In some
cases, the “decision” is referred to the town chief or elders for approval or enforcement. So 
far, then the CPCs do not provide a different kind of procedure, rather they are more
immediately available and cheaper than going to the town chief or magistrate.
[CHF has an ambitious schedule of training planned for the next four-five months, training 
hundreds of people. This should be slowed down, awaiting a firm decision about the future
role and function of the CPCs. If the CPCs are also reconstituted through a new 
election/selection, the new members will have to be trained as well—again arguing for 
slowing the training process down.]
25 As many community members are illiterate, strategies would be needed to cope with that reality. 
26 The CDA team also found that the process for designating the current CPCs varied widely. In some
communities, they were selected by the elders and town chief, after discussion in a community meeting.
Formal voting election seems to have been the exception, rather than the rule.
46
e. Follow up training with direct coaching and mentoring.
Experience shows that training in new personal skills is usually ineffective unless a)
participants have an immediate opportunity to apply the skills with support to do so; and b) 
benefit from coaching/mentoring from a person more skilled than they are. If the CPCs are 
expected to function truly as mediators, the mediation training will not be enough. This has 
been proven over and over in the U.S. context and elsewhere—and there is no reason to 
believe that the situation in Liberia is different.27 In addition, the mediation model
included in the ABA/CHF training contradicts the traditional modes of conflict resolution
in Liberia, emphasizing a neutral/impartial mediator and a confidential process. (Indeed
this model, widely used in the U.S., is also a challenge for most Americans!) If we really 
expect Liberians to apply this model of mediation, coaching is required. If so, then that 
may be an argument for reducing the total numbers of mediators (CPC members…) in 
order to focus on quality, rather than quantity.
f. Establish a better tracking and monitoring mechanisms 
The program would benefit from better information regarding how and where CPC’s 
exactly resolve disputes, settlement rates, methods used, adaptation of models/methods,
learning and feedback. 
So far as the CDA team could tell, CHF staff members do not observe the CPCs when they 
actually attempt to resolve local conflicts.28 Therefore, there is a gap in understanding how 
they are functioning, what methods they are using, whether concepts and skills introduced 
in training are applied, and so forth. Several of the recommendations above suggest that 
CHF needs staff in the field who have skills in conflict resolution (mediation, negotiation, 
reconciliation) and are prepared to work more directly and consistently with the CPCs, 
monitor their progress, and keep consistent records.
g. Solve the compensation issue
CPC members mentioned the lack of compensation in almost every conversation with the 
CDA team. This is a huge issue for the sustainability of this community institution.
Clearly a first step will be to gain greater community ownership of a dispute resolution (or 
other) function that they truly value. With that community ownership, it may be possible 
to devise a system of in-kind payment to CPC members, through community labor donated 
to their farming or other mechanisms. This is an issue for many NGOs all over Liberia—
and would benefit from coordination, at least within Lofa County, as the strategies of one 
NGO will affect the others.
27 The main author of this report, Peter Woodrow, was a mediation trainer in the U.S. and in various
international locations for more than ten years, and speaks from personal experience. 28 Apparently one CHF staff person was previously placed in the field and worked more closely with the
CPCs. That staff person now works from Monrovia and has little opportunity to monitor CPCs functions or 
to support them.
47
h. Seriously reduce the number of members. 
As already noted, it may prove helpful to reduce the total number of CPC members—to
focus on quality, allow for coaching/mentoring, reduce the compensation burden, and, 
under some models, equalize the participation from different ethnic groups. Of course, the 
number of members should be driven by the function(s) of the councils. In line with g. 
above, if there were fewer members, it would be possible to increase a focus on developing 
greater professionalism. Another strategy would be to concentrate on high priority 
communities (perhaps the flashpoint ones)or those CPCs/individuals that are most
effective.
i. Develop (with ABA?) a resource center in Lofa County that offers resources, 
support, technical assistance.
Depending on the model/function, it may prove effective to establish a resource center in 
Lofa County that provides ongoing support and technical assistance to the councils.
Ideally, such a center would be established under an appropriate government body, in order 
to gain at least some assurance of sustainability.
j. Reduce the number of CPCs by developing town clusters 
Another idea for reducing the burden of support, training and skill development would be 
to reduce the number of CPCs by establishing CPCs with fewer members that serve several
neighboring communities.
County and National Forums 
By our assessment, already laid out earlier in this report, the Forum effort shows great 
promise, and the potential for having a profound effect on inter-ethnic relations in Lofa 
County. The suggestions below are intended to indicate how the program could be 
strengthened further. 
1. Devote more staff resources: reduce dependence/burden on one person.29
The Forums are an important and sensitive initiative. They are also a high gain and high
risk venture. If they fail, for whatever reason, the effects could be widespread, souring 
efforts to bring contending groups together elsewhere in Lofa County and Liberia. We 
recommend, therefore, a deliberate pace with sufficient staff resources and time. Quality is 
much more important in this effort than quantity. Any success at resolving issues between 
ethnic groups in one community will have an effect on others nearby. Therefore it is more 
important to move slowly and steadily, taking on only the number of communities that can 
be responsibly engaged with the staff resources available. While the CDA staff were there, 
the two staff people working on this were functioning at their limit—and doing well. But
they acknowledged that they were barely able to maintain the pace required to meet
contract deliverables.
29 This recommendation, reported informally while the CDA team was still in Liberia, has been implemented
already, and there are now three staff working full time on the Forums effort.
48
2. Clarify/tighten the goals and objectives of the program. 
The staff people working on this program are the most senior and most skilled at CHF, and 
by all reports they know what they are doing. (The CDA team did not have an opportunity 
to observe them at work.) We recommend that the program develop quite specific 
objectives for each community, based on the situation there and the potential for success.
It should also be possible to identify several indicators that can be tracked for each 
community, in observable behavioral terms. Examples: follow-up contacts between groups 
on their own initiatives; agreements implemented; new problems identified and addressed 
independently; changes in housing/land use patterns (better mixing, more permission to 
return to farming, etc.).
3. Ensure that any agreements reached include a specific implementation plan.
Develop the staff capacity to provide follow up. 
So far, agreements appear to be stated in terms of broad principles, with few specifics and 
no implementation plans (who will do what, when, how, with what resources, etc.). If such 
detailed implementation plans are negotiated and agreed, there will be increased need for
CHF staff to follow up to see if the plans are carried out. Additional negotiation regarding
implementation may also be required. 
4. Find an appropriate long-term institutional base for this kind of effort, and 
cooperate in development of that mechanism. (Options: university, government
agency, combo, free-standing reconciliation NGO, sub-group of TRC…) 
In the long term, Liberia needs the institutional capacity to undertake reconciliation at the 
community-level (and at other levels!), including negotiation of practical issues. CHF can 
be working with other groups to help develop that capacity, whether it is based in a 
government department or at a university or straddling the two, or another model.30
5. Draw on expertise/experience regarding this type of dialogue and negotiation process 
held by other people/organizations in Liberia. Be sure to learn from past failures and 
successes. Develop capacity to share lessons learned in Lofa County.
Several people interviewed in Monrovia noted that this is not the first effort at community￾level dialogue, reconciliation and negotiation in Liberia. There have been notable failures 
and some successes in the past—from which the CHF-led effort can learn.31 At the same
time, CHF should increase its ability to document, analyze and share what it is learning.
6. Engage Forum participants in a process to determine future directions.
In July, CHF was completing one round of community Forums. Participants in those 
activities should be consulted/interviewed to determine their level of satisfaction with the 
process, to hear any ongoing concerns about the process, and to obtain suggestions for next 
steps, in relation to their particular community or for the Forum project in general.
30 UNMIL is concerned with developing this capacity and Interpeace (formerly the War-Torn Societies 
Project) is in the process of developing a new community dialogue effort in Liberia. 31 The CDA team did not research such past efforts. CHF could start by talking with Sam Doe (formerly
with WANEP) and its partners at LISTALS for references.
49
7. Complete a thorough review/assessment/stocktaking at completion of the current 
round of Forums, using an outside independent evaluator. 
Related to number #6 above, we recommend that CHF hire a local person or team to 
undertake a more thorough review of the Forum program to provide specific and detailed 
feedback before CHF staff launch the next round of dialogues. That feedback should be 
the basis for a thorough internal discussion at CHF to determine how to revise the program
approach to better achieve its ambitious objectives.
8. Participate in Lofa County meetings in Monrovia for background information about 
what opinion leaders and others are thinking about.
The CDA team became aware that there is a regular set of meeting of Lofa County-related 
people in Monrovia, most likely attended by many of the influential persons that CHF 
wants to engage in the dialogues. As possible and appropriate, CHF could attend these 
meetings to gain additional perspectives on events in Lofa County. 
9. Explore the potential roles for religious/ spiritual leaders in the Forums.
As noted, religious leaders are an important set of stakeholders in any dialogue about 
community and inter-ethnic issues in Lofa County. As far as possible, they should be 
included in any negotiations, as they would likely invalidate any agreements touching on 
religious matters that did not involve them.
10. Bring issues to closure: don’t open issues and then leave. Consider these deeper 
reconciliation efforts as a long-term commitment.
Related to #1 above, it is more important to bring a few things to real closure, than to 
address too many issues. And, if there is any question regarding future funding for the 
Forums component of the program, CHF should immediately scale back to what they can 
accomplish responsibly and fully within available resources.
Conclusion
The LINCS Program represents an admirable contribution to peacebuilding in Liberia.
Most of the programs effects remain at the community and Lofa County level, and there is 
a mixed picture regarding the program’s achievements against its stated objectives. 
However, the current progress and potential impacts from this effort have significance for 
the entire country, as Lofa County is well known as one of the most volatile areas that 
suffered most deeply during the war. Few other organizations are attempting community￾by-community reconciliation in Liberia—and for this reason alone, the LINCS Program 
represents a valuable initiative. While we have made recommendations for program
strengthening during the next phases of CHF programming, overall, we were impressed
with the accomplishments to date and the dedication of local and international staff 
members.
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Appendix A: Interview Protocol
Interviews took place along several dimensions of change that are important to 
peacebuilding, including: 1) sense of community security; 2) conflict resolution and 
management; 3) community decision-making and leadership; 4) inter-ethnic relations.
Within these lines of inquiry, we developed illustrative questions that address the six RPP 
Criteria of Effectiveness, among other things. These questions did not constitute a 
questionnaire or survey, but represented directions a conversation could take.
1. Sense of Community Security 
LINCS issues and goals relevant to this area: 
¾ Improving local security
¾ Accelerate flow of information on national peace process
¾ Increase quantity, quality and timely delivery of communication on issues affecting 
national to local peacebuilding processes 
¾ Prepare communities and leadership for potential outbreaks of conflict and deal 
with the after effects of violent acts
¾ Build local capacity for reconciliation of all returnees.
¾ Assist democratic leadership to build skills and confidence in effectively 
managing community security and in reducing the impact of conflict.
¾ Addressing substance abuse and violent behavior in ex-combatants 
Potential questions: 
x How secure do feel now in your community? Why/why not? What does security 
mean for you? What are the indicators of security?
x Has security changed in the past two or more years? How?
x Have people mostly returned to your community or not? If so, why? If not, why 
not? Percentage of people returned? IDPs/refugees? Have community leaders and 
chiefs also returned?
x Are community institutions functioning?
x Are some of your family members living elsewhere? What is the family coping 
strategy?
x What would make you feel more secure here in your community?
x How do questions of reconstruction and economic well-being affect the security 
situation?
2. Conflict Resolution and Management 
LINCS issues and goals relevant to this area: 
¾ Provide technical and organizational support to the community councils and other 
legitimate peace constituencies on a range of challenges to peace such as: 
facilitating fairer and more peaceful adjudication of claims; and creating and
improving reconciliation mechanisms;
¾ Build and/or support local and county capacity for ongoing conflict mitigation, 
adjudication and peace building activities; 
51
¾ Build the effectiveness of traditional and culturally appropriate mechanisms 
for reconciliation. 
¾ Facilitate peaceful resolution of property and resource claims, war crimes; 
¾ Build Lofa-based peace constituencies’ ability to affect national decisions on
resource allocation, management of extractive resources; 
¾ Build number and quality of psycho-social assistance mechanisms in Lofa.
Potential questions: 
x What kinds of disputes/problems among people typically arise in your community?
Have the kinds of issues changed since the war?
x In the past, how were such disputes in the community handled? Did that process 
work well, or were there ever problems with it? 
x Are those traditional dispute resolution processes still available and functioning?
Do people still use that process? Why/why not? 
x Are you aware of any new mechanisms for resolving conflicts? How does that 
work? Are people using that way of handling problems? Is it working well—or are 
there problems with it?
x [If they don’t mention the CPC] Do you know about the CPC and how it works?
What have you heard about it?
x What kinds of conflicts has the CPC been working on? Have they been effective?
Why/why not?
x Who has access to the CPC? Does everyone use it? Why/why not?
x Are there any other kinds of issues that are not handled adequately in the 
community—and how should they be addressed? 
x What is the relationship of the CPCs to the traditional ways of handling disputes?
x Will the CPC likely continue or not?
3. Community Decision-making and Leadership 
LINCS issues and goals relevant to this area: 
¾ Build effectiveness of peace constituencies through targeted support for:
¾ Improving vertical linkages with, among others: UNMIL (security support), and 
national peace constituencies (engaging in national policy issues on resource 
extraction and the composition and responsiveness of security forces). 
¾ Improving horizontal linkages to like-minded Lofa County groups seeking to 
improve collaboration on approaches to reconciliation, security, and 
advocacy on key national issues.
¾ Increase the effectiveness of peace-building constituencies at the local, 
district, and county level 
¾ Strengthen democratic civil leadership with a stake in peace 
¾ Build capacity for local organizations to advocate for responsive national
policies that contribute to peace. Provide logistical support for advocacy 
and collaboration.
¾ Assist community leadership groups to build inclusive and transparent 
management.
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¾ Build Lofa-based peace constituencies’ ability to affect national decisions on
composure and civil leadership of reconstituted military and/or police. 
Potential questions:
x How are decisions made in the community? Who takes part?
x Do you feel that you have a say in decisions that are made?
x Has community decision making changed since before the war? If so, how?
x Are there processes that seek input from community members regarding decisions 
for the whole community? How do those work? Who is involved or not involved?
x Have there been any recent changes in the ways that people participate in decision
making. Are these improvements or not?
x Have the CPCs played a role in helping make decisions? What is your view of that?
x Who is taking leadership in the community for peace and reconciliation? What are 
they doing?
x Is your community able to (1) identify and define problems and (2) formulate and 
apply solutions to those problems? Is this working better or worse than before the 
war? Why?
x How do you get information about what is happening outside of your village?
4. Intergoup/Inter-ethnic Relations
LINCS issues and goals relevant to this area: 
¾ Encourage civil society links across ethnic and tribal lines and build multi￾ethnic organizations 
¾ Promote dialogues and collaboration among contentious ethnic groups.
Potential questions: 
x Are different groups in the community getting along, or are there serious tensions? 
Are the inter-group tensions increasing or decreasing? Why/why not?
x What kinds of disputes arise between different groups in the community? What are 
the usual issues?
x How are those issues between groups (as opposed to issues between individuals or 
families) handled? Who gets involved? How does it work out?
x Who is involved with the CPC in your community? Does this represent all of the 
“quarters”?
x How were the CPC members chosen? What is you view of participation from all 
quarters?
x Have CPCs tried to address issues or tensions among different groups in the 
community? How has this worked out?
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Appendix B: List of Communities and Interviews
Participating Communities (estimated # of people in parenthesis)
Zorzor
1. Zorzor Town (20)
2. Borkeza (35)
3. Konia (15)
4. Boi (30)
5. Ziggida (20)
6. Nekebouzo (15)
Salayea
7. Salayea Town (15)
8. Telemai (15)
9. Gorlu (20)
Voinjama
10. Malamai (15)
11. Selegai (20)
12. Velezala (12)
13. Zawordemai (40) 
Non-Participating Communities 
14. Bulor (Voinjama district) (12)
15. Boiboimai (Voinjama district) (20)
16. Kalimai (Zorzor district) (25)
17. Gpayaquelleh (Salayea district) (30)
Other Interviews 
Monrovia
ƒ Brett Massey CHF Country Director ( 2 interviews) 
ƒ Albert Collee, CHF Mediation Training Specialist
ƒ Guessippina Bonner, American Bar Association
ƒ Tom Ewertt, Mercy Corps
ƒ Prof. Joseph W. Geebro, Ministry of Internal Affairs – Deputy Minister
ƒ Sharon Pauling, USAID Liberia Mission Office
ƒ Mike Curry, LCIP
ƒ Erin McCandless, Jonathan Andrews, UNMIL 
ƒ Forum participant from Mkapamai
ƒ Implementing Partners: 
o NEPI: Zeleh Kolubah
o LISTALS: Sam Hare, Jesse Karanley, Kemoh Sharif
o FHORD: John Jallah and Thompson Keyta
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Zorzor
ƒ UNPOL Zorzor
ƒ LWS: Mr. Howard LWS
ƒ Concern
ƒ CHF Staff:
o Momo Kamara
o Phillip Zoryu
o Peter and Manyou
o Swengbe
Salayea
ƒ District Development Committee coordinator 
Voinjama
ƒ LRRRC
ƒ Legal/Judicial Watch UNMIL
ƒ IRC Field Coordinator
ƒ IRC, Gender Based Violence Manager
ƒ Mandingo Chief
ƒ Magistrate
ƒ CHF Staff: CPOs and Field Director
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Appendix C: Models of Community Dispute Resolution
The following are thumbnail sketches of four quite different models of community-based
dispute resolution mechanisms. Each model was developed in response to different 
conditions and problems, and was also adapted to local cultures. The documents noted 
(with the exception of the video) are provided in a separate volume for use by CHF. 
Rumor Control/Early Intervention (Wajir, Kenya) 
The Peace and Development Committee in Wajir, northeastern Kenya was initiated by
local women who were tired of burying their sons as a result of inter-group fighting, often 
associated with cattle rustling or other illegal activities. Some of the incidents leading to 
deaths were caused by rumors that had no basis in the facts. The group of local women
initiated dialogue with groups of youth, and with elders, local government authorities and 
the police. The result was the establishment of the Peace and Development Committee,
which operated across a series of towns in the area, and included representatives of youth, 
women, elders, government administration and police. The group was trained in dispute 
resolution techniques, including early intervention, and was prepared to respond 
immediately to any hints or rumors of impending violence.
Documents:
ƒ “Kenyan Peace Initiatives: Kenya Peace and Development Network, the Wajir Peace and Development
Committee, the National Council of Churches of Kenya and the Amani People’s Theatre.” Janice Jenner 
& Dekha Ibrahim Abdi, RPP Case Study, 2000.
ƒ “Kenyan Women Lead Peace Effort,” Emma Dorothy Reinhardt, National Catholic Reporter, April 26,
2002
ƒ “The Wajir Story” Video documentary. Responding to Conflict, Birmingham, UK and Coalition for 
Peace in Africa, 2002.
Inter-ethnic Councils (southern Bulgaria) 
The inter-ethnic councils were established in southern Bulgaria, as a way to avoid the 
inter-ethnic bloodshed witnessed in neighboring former Yugoslavia. The council idea was 
developed through a series of participatory workshops that included representatives from
the three key ethnic groups, Bulgarians, Turks and Roma (gypsies). The council concept 
was written up as a formal charter, which was then presented and approved through a vote 
of the town council in five communities. Each inter-ethnic council had an equal number of 
representatives of each ethnic group, all of them respected members of their communities.
The council served as a place a) to build closer relationships and communication between 
key community leaders, and b) to identify and solve problems of common concern.
Documents:
ƒ “Accommodating Diversity, Promoting Cooperation and Managing Ethnic Conflict in Central Europe:
Final Report.” Submitted to the Pew Charitable Trusts, by CDR Associates, November 1995
ƒ Project to Institutionalize Multiethnic Participation and Democratic Decision Making in Bulgaria: Final
report.” Submitted to the Pew Charitable Trusts, by CDR Associates, November 1998 
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Land Dispute System (East Timor) 
As the Indonesian occupation East Timor ended, many of the records of deeds were 
deliberately destroyed, resulting in widespread chaos regarding land ownership,
particularly in urban areas. In some cases, there were competing records (privately held)
from Portuguese colonial authorities and from the Indonesian administration. In rural 
areas, most land was held in common and had no formal written title. Many people were 
displaced (IDPs and refugees) in the fighting during the long occupation and most
intensely in the period leading up to independence. Due to these long absences, people 
appropriated property, occupied dwellings and farmed land to which they had no legal 
claim. As a result of all of these factors, there were many land claims in both urban and 
rural areas—and no functioning judicial system to deal with them.
The Land and Property Directorate (of the Ministry of Justice) was charged by the new 
government to establish a way to resolve the many land claims, recognizing that it would
be many years before a newly reestablished judicial system could deal with them. The
Directorate set up a mediation program. In urban areas, Directorate staff trained as 
mediators worked directly on cases. In rural areas the trained staff mediators worked 
closely with the traditional land authorities to mediate disputes together. Disputants were 
given choices of how they wanted a dispute mediated—and could revert to the courts if
needed.
Documents:
ƒ “Designing Dispute Resolution Systems and Building Local Capacities for Settling Land and Property
Disputes in Post-Conflict and Post-Crisis Societies.” Christopher Moore, Gary Brown, CDR Associates,
2006.
ƒ Land and Property Directorate (LPD) Dispute Resolution System (Graphic), CDR Associates, 2003
ƒ “Custom and Conflict: The uses and limitations of traditional systems in addressing rural land disputes
in East Timor.” (A discussion paper prepared for a regional workshop on “Land Policy and
Administration for Pro-Poor Rural Growth”, Dili, December 2003.) Laura S. Meitzner Yoder, with
research assistance from Calisto Colo, Zacarias F. da Costa, and Francisco Soares. 2003 
ƒ “Report on Research Finding and Policy Recommendations for a Legal Framework for Land Dispute
Mediation.” Timor Leste Land Law Program. 2004
Community Mediation Panels (Sri Lanka) 
In Sri Lanka by the late 1980s, it would take at least five years for a civil claim to be heard 
in a court of law. Recognizing the enormous backlog of cases, the Ministry of Justice 
sought an alternative way to handle at least some matters. With technical support from the 
Asia Foundation, they established a network of Community Mediation Panels throughout 
government-controlled areas of the country. There are now 273 mediation boards and 
5,860 mediators.
The mediation panels are comprised of respected local people—people like school 
teachers, Buddhist monks, and local landowners. The panels work as a team (usually three 
people) and hear cases on a designated day in a public space. The parties are instructed to 
appear on the appointed day and, when their case is called, present their issue to the 
mediation panel—often with their families and neighbors in attendance. The panel then
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asks questions of the parties or of anyone else who may be present, probes for possible 
solutions, confers among themselves and, using a fair amount of persuasion, moves the 
parties to resolution, if at all possible. If the parties reject the proposed settlement, the case 
can be appealed to the court system.
Note: this model is quite different from the “pure” mediation model used in most US-based 
mediation programs. The mediators (plural, rather than singular) are well known to the 
parties (rather than unknown/neutral); the process is quite public (as opposed to 
confidential); the mediators are free to question anyone they like (rather than only the 
parties or their legal representatives); the panel usually offers a proposed solution and will 
exercise their moral authority to try to persuade acceptance (as opposed to a purely 
facilitative mediation model). These elements are appropriate to the Sri Lankan context 
and work well there.
Documents:
ƒ Mediation Boards Act, No. 72 of 1988, Government of Sri Lanka, Ministry of Justice.
ƒ “Designing Dispute Resolution Systems and Building Local Capacities for Settling Land and Property
Disputes in Post-Conflict and Post-Crisis Societies.” Christopher Moore, Gary Brown, CDR Associates,
2006.
ƒ [Additional reports to Asia Foundation may be available if needed.]
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