EVALUATION AND LESSONS LEARNED STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE SO 5: IMPROVED CITIZEN SECURITY AND PARTICIPATION IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES USAID/JAMAICA IR1: IMPROVED CAPACITY OF CIVIL SOCIETY TO ENGAGE IN DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES IR2: IMPROVED COMMUNITY/POLICE RELATIONS- COMMUNITY POLICING (PERF) IR3: ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE/ COURT IMPROVEMENTS Prepared by: 1500 K Street, NW, Suite 220 Washington, DC 20005 June 2005 Under USAID Contract No. DFD-I-00-04-00229-00 Democracy and Governance Analytical Services Technical Assistance Indefinite Quantity Contract DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica Table of Contents EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .............................................................................................. i Civil Society ................................................................................................................. i Community Policing..................................................................................................... i Administration of Justice............................................................................................iii GLOSSARY ................................................................................................................... iv IR1: Improved Capacity of Civil Society to Engage in Democratic Processes.............. 1 Introduction.................................................................................................................. 1 Background.................................................................................................................. 1 Capacity Building .................................................................................................... 2 Coalition Building & Networking ........................................................................... 3 Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 5 Findings ....................................................................................................................... 6 Lessons Learned .......................................................................................................... 7 Recommendations........................................................................................................ 8 Unresolved Issues........................................................................................................ 8 IR2: Improved Community/Police Relations ................................................................. 9 Introduction.................................................................................................................. 9 Background.................................................................................................................. 9 Analysis ..................................................................................................................... 10 Initial Steps............................................................................................................ 10 PERF Managerial and Technical Capacity............................................................ 11 Training of Citizens and Police ............................................................................. 12 Community Relations Building and Community Outreach................................... 13 Public Education.................................................................................................... 14 Community Police and Multi-Use Facility............................................................ 15 Importance of Other Donor Collaboration............................................................. 15 Findings ..................................................................................................................... 16 Conclusions and Recommendations.......................................................................... 18 Lessons Learned ........................................................................................................ 19 SO5 Small Grants Program.................................................................................... 20 IR 3: Administration of Justice: Improved Capacity of the Justice System.................. 21 Administration of Justice – Court Improvement ....................................................... 21 Findings ..................................................................................................................... 22 Recommendations...................................................................................................... 23 Annex: MSI/CIV-JAM Capacity/Organizational Building Activity............................ A1 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Civil Society In 2001 USAID/Jamaica began its five-year Strategic Objective Grant Agreement (SOAG) with the Government of Jamaica for “Improved Citizen Security and Partici￾pation in Democratic Processes.” Inclusive in this strategy were activities aimed towards achieving IR1: “Improved Capacity of Civil Society to engage in Democratic Processes.” To implement this aspect of the Democracy & Governance strategy, the implementing partner MSI-CIV-JAM was tasked with implementing IR1 of SO5. The focal point of the activity to be undertaken by the implementing partner is, through training, assisting these organizations and their leaders to become more effective participants in the na￾tional governance process. The overall objective of this strategy, to promote “good governance” at all levels of society, is being implemented through an enabling and sup￾port process for Civil Society and Community Based Organizations (CSOs and CBOs) and individuals to enhance organizational, institutional, and human capacity. These or￾ganizations are to acquire the ability to form alliances and coalitions that will enable a broader and more comprehensive role in the governance process, thus influencing pub￾lic policy. The expectation is that CSOs and CBOs will be able to “transform” from a state of ineffective advocacy to one in which organizations are largely able to be self￾reliant with the capacity to mount public advocacy campaigns and attract donor sup￾port, because of organizational and managerial ability. MSI/CIV-JAM has promoted CSOs and CBOs at various levels (local and national) of organizational development to come together in support of broader societal issues as compared to more simple “single issue” projects. There has been some dramatic change of attitude among the CSO/CBO leadership rela￾tive to the need and desire for increasing management and organization skill building of personnel through additional training. While there has been significant progress, the complete “transformation,” that is, the ability to be self sustaining, has not yet been achieved. It was reported from leaders of some of the oldest and most recognized CSO/CBO organizations that they had not yet achieved a level of organization and operations that would result in self reliance: i.e. the ability to fundraise, develop and maintain advocacy coalitions, conduct staff develop￾ment, and initiate effective advocacy strategies. Community Policing The Community Policing program funded by USAID/Jamaica serves to support the Mission’s Democracy and Governance Strategic Objective of “Improved Citizen Secu￾rity and Participation in Democratic Processes.” The Intermediate Result sought, IR2, is “Improved Community/Police Relations.” i DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica The activity is for a three-year period ending in September 2005. USAID’s implement￾ing partner is the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), a U.S.-based nonprofit organization working under a Cooperative Agreement for the amount of $3.1 million signed in October 2002. The activity is concentrated in the inner-city community of Grants Pen in Kingston and consists of technical assistance to the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF) in using the community policing philosophy and approach to law enforcement in Grants Pen. This approach calls for closer interaction between police and citizens in community affairs, a highly visible police presence in the community in non-threatening ways, and a shift away from heavy-handed police tactics because of the cooperation they receive from residents. Under the activity community residents also receive training in conflict reso￾lution and collaborative problem solving with the police that is designed to build trust between the community and the police force. PERF had mobilization problems and in the first year implementation proceeded very slowly. Since that time, with the placement of a resident advisor and his successor, the pace of implementation picked up sharply. Community policing is working well in Grants Pen, with good community acceptance of the new approach and a marked de￾crease in crime and violence. This has gained momentum slowly as the community and the police overcame a history of mistrust and bad relations. Some key findings from the program to date are: • The program is still ongoing, thus the evaluation cannot make definitive judg￾ments at this time. • The process of building a police/community relationship of trust and coopera￾tion is labor-intensive and requires time and patience on both sides for dialogue. • PERF’s ability to fund community activities such as sports competitions, sum￾mer camps, and “clean up, fix up” work days involving side-by-side participation by the police and residents was an important factor in changing the relationship. • Sustainability will depend on reforms in the JCF that make community policing the standard for the force in practice as well as policy. Some of the lessons learned to date are: • Community policing requires an important early phase of “sensitization” of the community, explaining to them the value of the concept and its commitment to participation by the community. This involves a series of open meetings inside the community where real dialogue can begin to happen around community needs and problems. • Community “readiness” plays a key role in the right timing for introducing community policing and it chances of acceptance. Some level of community or￾ganization already functioning and some awareness of the need for action to control crime and violence are important indicators of readiness. ii DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica • Empowerment of the community through support for community-based organi￾zations is a critical ingredient for success as it builds self-respect and creates a sense of “ownership” by the community over what is happening there. • “Presence” is an important concept, defined as a highly visible patrolling by the police and participation in community affairs beyond just law enforcement. • The community needs to see early tangible benefits in the form of social activi￾ties and improvements that reinforce the new, positive relationship with the police. • In troubled inner-city communities single-activity intervention strategies are unlikely to be successful. What is needed are coordinated, well-timed, new and positive inputs to the community that offer the possibility of achieving signifi￾cant change for the community, including changing the fatalistic mindset of residents. Community policing in Grants Pen has shown that efforts to reduce crime and violence can be successful when well-planned and executed with full community participation. Administration of Justice If the inner city initiatives are to be successful in normalizing civic relations, the formal system of courts must demonstrate its effectiveness in timely resolution of cases. Oth￾erwise, actions such as extra-judicial executions in the community, and by police themselves, will continue to feed the atmosphere of crime and violence. To this end, USAID supported a project to automate and expedite court proceedings in the Resident Magistrate Courts. The program consisted of six components: • A generator to provide a back-up power supply for the Supreme Court; • Computerization of seven Resident Magistrate’s Courts (of a planned 23); • Training for judges, prosecutors, magistrates and other Court personnel; • Putting the Laws of Jamaica on the Internet; • Strengthening the Court reporter system; and • Public Awareness through a Judicial Education Unit. Though the program’s funding was cut back sharply before full implementation, most of the activities were completed or are being carried on by Government even without USAID funding. Computers and the special case management software (JEMS) are be￾ing used in the court administrators’ offices but have not yet become operational in the courtrooms for court reporters and the magistrates. iii DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica GLOSSARY AMCHAM American Chamber of Commerce AWOJA Association of Women’s Organizations of Jamaica CBO Community Based Organization CIDA Canadian International Development Agency CSO Civil Society Organization DFID Department for International Development DG Democracy and Governance IDB Inter-American Development Bank IJHRC Independent Jamaica Human Rights Council JCF Jamaica Constabulary Force JFC Jamaicans for Justice MSI/CIV-JAM Management Systems International/Civic- Jamaica PERF Police Executive Research Forum PPP Peace and Prosperity Program SO Strategic Objective SMIP Senior Management in Policing USAID United States Agency for International Development UWI University of the West Indies iv DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica IR1: Improved Capacity of Civil Society to Engage in Democratic Processes Introduction The purpose of this report is to evaluate the impact of Jamaica USAID Mission’s De￾mocracy and Governance, Civil Society Project. This report will identify the scope of activity undertaken by the implementing partner, MSI/CIV-JAM, the lessons learned, and a means to establish guidance for the new Democracy and Governance Strategic Objective (SO13). The Evaluation Team conducted this evaluation during the period from May 15 to June 15, 2005. Meetings with USAID officials, other donors, the pro￾ject implementer, and community and governmental stakeholders were held. Visits to Grant Pen and Standpipe communities were conducted in addition to interviews and focus group session. Background In 2001 USAID/Jamaica began its five-year Strategic Objective Grant Agreement (SOAG) with the Government of Jamaica for “Improved Citizen Security and Partici￾pation in Democratic Processes.” Inclusive in this strategy were activities aimed towards achieving the IR1: “Improved Capacity of Civil Society to Engage in Democ￾ratic Processes.” To implement this aspect of the Democracy & Governance strategy, the implementing partner MSI-CIV-JAM was tasked with implementing IR1 of SO5. The overall objec￾tive of this strategy, to promote “good governance” at all levels of society, is being implemented through an enabling and support process for Civil Society and Commu￾nity Based Organizations and individuals to enhance organizational, institutional, and human capacity. The focal point of the activity to be undertaken by the implementing partner is, through training, assisting these organizations and their leaders to become more effective participants in the national governance process. These organizations are to acquire the ability to form alliances and coalitions that will enable a broader and more comprehensive role in the governance process, thus influencing public policy. The expectation is that CSOs and CBOs will be able to “transform” from a state of inef￾fective advocacy to one in which organizations are largely able to be self-reliant with capacity to mount public advocacy campaigns and attract donor support, because of organizational and managerial ability. It is anticipated that strengthening civil society activity will build on Jamaica’s democ￾ratic past and traditions by encouraging broader and deep participation by citizens, thus promoting more transparency at all levels. It must be noted that during the period of this evaluation, May 15 to June 15, 2005, there have been numerous public pro￾nouncements by the Prime Minister, the Opposition, and business and community leaders concerning the plight of crime and violence in the country. This might suggest that the nation’s tolerance for the current security situation is ending and that unified action to address and combat this situation may be imminent. 1 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica The MSI/CIV–JAM began implementation in September 2003, although the strategic planning began in 2001. This project was implemented as a two-year IQC task order that is scheduled to end on September 30, 2005. This point is noted, because MSI-CIV￾JAM has been in place for less than two years of a five-year strategic planning period. This by itself places severe limitations on the ability to fully achieve the envisioned strategic objective. The Evaluation Team met with representatives of more than 16 CSOs and CBOs and conducted individual interviews and group focused activities with a cross-section of these organizations. Twenty (20) was the target number of planned CSO/CBO organi￾zations to be supported. The project has been able to achieve 80% of its target, in spite of being on the ground for less than two years. The CSO/CBO organizations were pri￾marily national in scope and based in the capital city. The one exception is the Montego Bay Chamber of Commerce. The Evaluation Team members were able to observe sev￾eral training sessions in which the activities were either sponsored or facilitated by MSI/CIV-JAM. MSI-CIV-JAM has undertaken its mandate by using a number of inter￾vention approaches aimed to support effective civil society and community-based organizations. These are presented below. Capacity Building MSI/CIV-JAM developed a strategy that focused on capacity building among CSO and CBO organizations. Capacity building activities included conducting workshops (16) that focused on skill training and techniques: advocacy, communications, strategic planning, financial accountability, and project design and monitoring. Initially, these workshops were planned and held for short periods, usually one or two days. The MSI/CIV-JAM project team conducted a self-assessment of the methodology used dur￾ing the initial training sessions and determined that there were low levels of participation by representatives of CSOs and CBOs. The findings of the survey concluded that most of the CSO and CBO leaders had re￾sponsibility for all aspects of the operation of their respective organizations, and that this was the major contributing factor to low participation rates. MSI/CIV-JAM re￾designed its training methodology and protocols, which included fewer training ses￾sions, held over longer periods of time in “retreat type” settings outside of Kingston. This redesign resulted in greater attendance and greater team/consensus building among the organizational leadership. The capacity building activity has resulted in 15 of the 16 CSO/CBOs completing strategic plans. Spokespersons for these organizations have confirmed that training has increased effective program management, project design, and media relations. A member of the evaluation team was able to observe some of the training activity fo￾cused on advocacy and media relations. This particular training, facilitated by representatives of the League of Women Voters, focused on advocacy and the use of media to promote organizational goals. There was universal expression by participants of this workshop of the value and importance of the training itself and, the potential for 2 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica greater citizen involvement in civil society through coalitions with other organizations, aimed towards influencing national legislation and public policy. Participants confirmed that the media skills training will become an effective organiza￾tional tool for developing an advocacy strategy. It appears that the level and scope of training being provided by MSI/CIV-JAM is what is needed, and it is being applied across a broad spectrum of CSO and CBO organizations. Participants were very recep￾tive to the participatory nature of the training process itself. One participant remarked, “No chalk and talk here.” Because effective relations and use of the media (print and electronic) is so important to an organization’s ability to mobilize public opinion, the MSI/CIV-JAM project has forged partnerships with the University of the West Indies (UWI) and media establish￾ments to enhance skills in the areas of investigative journalism. Linkages with the Carter Center’s work in transparency through freedom of access to government infor￾mation have also been made in support of this strategy. MSI/CIV-JAM has provided to interested CSOs the results of research conducted on the legal status of NGOs. This information has enabled NGOs to develop an informed position on the Companies Act Legislation being debated in Parliament. This legisla￾tion will impact the future survival and operating conditions of such organizations. Several CBOs (e.g. St Margaret’s and Upper Room Community Church) were able to change their legal status based on the information researched by the CIV-JAM Project. Coalition Building & Networking MSI/CIV-JAM has promoted CSOs and CBOs at various levels (local and national) of organizational development to come together in support of broader societal issues as compared to more simple “single issue” projects. MSI/CIV-JAM has supported the de￾velopment of coalitions and campaigns on such issues as: o Elimination of Violence against Women o Elimination of Violence in Schools (Safe Schools), Public Private Part￾nership Public Education Radio Program o Public Education on the Child Care and Protection Act o NGOs Act MSI/CIV-JAM, as part of its technical assistance to CSOs promoting and developing advocacy strategies, also held meeting with government agencies that were the target of such advocacy activity. This is significant since it helps such agencies to recognize and accept that the advocacy activity being promoted by the CSOs is not intended to be “confrontational,” but rather to be seen as a significant contribution to improved gov￾ernance. One illustrative result is the fact that the Association of Women’s Organizations of Jamaica (AWOJA), which was viewed with some suspicion by gov￾ernment, now has office space in the Ministry of Local Government. 3 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica These activities have resulted in coalitions being formed between and among public and private agencies. One illustrative example has been the formation of a coalition of partners to develop a strategic advocacy position on the amendments to the Terrorism Prevention Bill. In response to the draft Terrorism Prevention Bill, six advocacy groups were able to form a coalition and register formal opposition to the original draft legisla￾tion. Oral and written submissions (testimony) were made by a number of CSOs (JFJ, IJHRC, AWOJA, and others) to the select-committee of the Parliament considering this legislation. This action by advocacy coalition groups, which lasted approximately one year, resulted in an increased level of transparency on the part of the Parliamentary Committee. The organized and focused response by civil society did impact on the final output, the adopted legislation itself. The adopted Terrorism Prevention Act was con￾siderably different (‘less draconian”) than its original draft. This is attributed to the role of the CSOs and their ability to positively affect deliberations on a piece of national legislation. MSI/CIV-JAM has provided technical assistance to CBOs in Grants Pen and the neighboring community organization of Barbican/Grants Pen Upliftment Movement in response to a request. Several CBOs in Grants Pen and two feuding “corner groups” have requested facilitation assistance to enable the two groups to move towards some level of peaceful coexistence. MSI/CIV-JAM supports the American Chamber of Commerce (AMCHAM), Commu￾nity Policing (PERF), and key community stakeholders in Grants Pen in developing a community management structure for the service center/police station currently being constructed in Grants Pen. A viable management committee, in which all stakeholders will share management responsibility, is an essential element that will impact the sus￾tainability of this Grants Pen pilot exercise in community policing. Other MSI/CIV-JAM successes include: promoting coalitions and advocacy networks in the area of media and citizen awareness; awards programs and conferences for inves￾tigative journalism and citizen awareness linked with the Caribbean Institute for Media Communications (UWI); and the Media and Press Association of Jamaica. The support for the media included the following activities: o Assist partner organizations’ efforts to build their public awareness programs, which included assistance in developing a Communication Plan, then providing training and technical assistance on how to create a communication plan. A communications training module was developed that demonstrated how com￾munication is linked to advocacy and program effectiveness. o Assistance to a woman-owned public relations firm to help the women’s sector organizations project their messages and build their image. This support in￾cluded quarterly roundtables between CSO leaders and media leaders. o Assistance to partners in the form of negotiating access to studio time and air time for CSOs, in exchange for commodity support to ROOTS FM (inner-city community radio station) to increase its broadcast footprint. 4 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica o Training assistance to CSO partners on the role of the media in building good governance through the promotion of a culture of Investigative Journalism (IJ). Two training programs for practicing journalists were implemented, in which forty (40) journalists have received training in investigative journalism methods. o Co-sponsored an Investigative Journalism Conference with the School of Jour￾nalism (UWI). o The Media and Press Association launched a US$2000 Investigative Journalism Award. A first prize was awarded in May 2005. o Facilitated ROOTS FM to prepare a 5-year strategic plan in which the primary objective was “Strengthening Governance through Community Radio.” The sta￾tion’s strategic programming statement is focused on promoting information sharing to the general public on local and national issues that can be influenced by civil society organizations. This is seen as a method of building community governance capacity. As stated above, the project has established an MOU with ROOTS-FM to provide commodity support to increase its signal strength and programming quality in exchange for studio and air time for civil society organization. Also, ROOTS- FM is being linked with the Washington-based National Association of Broadcasters, which will enable this community station to receive technical assistance in programming and broadcast technology. ROOT-FM’s links with the National Association of Broadcasters has en￾abled the station to begin the development of programming that can be sent through this international network to the Jamaican Diaspora in the U.S. and elsewhere. Since MSI/CIV-JAM began working with its partner CSOs on communication issues, the CSOs have been able to increase their exposure in the press by more than 100%. The average quarterly exposure during CIV-JAM’s first quarter was 22. The number during MSI/CIV-JAM’s sixth quarter (January-March 2005) was 45. This is based on a count of newspaper articles published highlighting CSOs advocacy activity in the “Ob￾server” and the “Gleaner” newspapers. The project has kept the articles themselves, for the record. Conclusion There has been a dramatic change of attitude among the CSO/CBO leadership relative to the need and desire for increasing management and organization skill building of personnel through additional training. When asked to comment on the level, type, and quality of training that has been received, some leaders noted that in the early stages the general attitude was “we do not need training . . . just give us the money.” However, during the latter stages of the project, some of these same leaders have recognized the need for increased capacity through training and have accepted the value of forming partnerships and coalitions. One leader remarked that “we now understand the need for and value of forming coalitions with other civil society organizations.” There has been an acceptance of the need for a variety of activities designed to build the organization’s capacity as a viable sustainable institution, and at the same time build the human resource capacity among the organization’s leadership cadre. Many 5 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica CSO leaders expressed the view that the knowledge gained was very useful in strength￾ening their respective organizations. Many have acknowledged that donor expectations, as a condition for funding support, are for effective management and accountability for resources received. However, it was equally noted that a sufficient number of CSOs and CBO have ac￾knowledged that continued technical support is still required. This project is scheduled to end September 30, 2005. Few of the participating CSO/CBO partner organizations will have reached a level of sustainability. There will be the need to continue technical support to these organizations for a longer period of time. The Evaluation Team observed that leaders were quick to indicate the value of meeting and sharing ideas. Perhaps more importantly, as expressed by one leader “it is impor￾tant to know that there are other leaders upon which one can call and depend on for support and assistance.” While there has been significant progress, the complete “trans￾formation,” that is, the ability to be self sustaining, has not yet been achieved. It was reported from leaders of some of the oldest and most recognized CSO/CBO or￾ganizations that they had not yet achieved a level of organization operation that would result in self reliance, that is the ability to fundraise, develop and maintain advocacy coalitions, conduct staff development, and initiate effective advocacy strategies. The ability to develop effective media advocacy strategies and at the same time mobilize broad based public support is cited most often in this context. A second, perhaps equally important aspect of long term sustainability is related to the development of the “second tier” cadre of leadership within these organizations. In order to build organiza￾tional capacity beyond the “one or two person” structure, it is necessary to have a broad based organizational and management leadership corps. The point is to build a level of human resource leadership that can propel and sustain these organizations into the fu￾ture. Findings 1. MSI-CIV-JAM has been able to successfully provide a broad range of skills and capacity building training aimed towards enhancing organizational, institutional, and human capacity. 2. MSI-CIV-JAM, through the promotion of team building and coalitions, has enabled organizations to form linkages to better build advocacy networks. 3. MSI-CIV-JAM efforts have resulted in an attitudinal change among organ￾izational leadership towards the need for training and advocacy activity, such that there is sufficient evidence that CSO/CBO leaders have recog￾nized the value and importance of skills needed to manage and build advocacy organizations. 4. Although MSI/CIV-JAM has been on the ground less than two years, the project has achieved 80% of its target number of CSO/CBO organizations. 6 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica 5. Institutional capacity and rapport building (a change in organizational be￾havior) is a slow and tedious process that requires a long term flexible support arrangement. The absence of such commitments often results in a “peak and valley” syndrome that may retard effective organizational growth. 6. While significant institutional and coalition building has been noted in most of the partner organizations, none of the CSOs/CBOs has achieved a level of self-reliance or sustainability sufficient to achieve the transforma￾tion necessary. 7. Institutional development, institutional growth, and human resource skill development have occurred in the organizations that have received train￾ing. Continued support will be required, with a greater focus on achieving institutional sustainability. Lessons Learned 1. Rapport building/institution building requires significant time to show transformational results. It is a time consuming process; therefore, short time frames are unrealistic. Development support for institutional/capacity building must consider sustainability with measurable indicators that must be part of the initial plan and dialogue at the outset. 2. For CSO/CBO organizations to achieve a level of transformation, technical assistance (support) will have to be provided in some form to achieve realis￾tic sustainability. Continued support of CSOs, CBOs, and NGOs offers an opportunity for broad based support to such organizations across SO sec￾tors of USAID. 3. Patience, persistence, and interpersonal trust among principal leaders is an essential factor in building long term coalitions and team building among groups across sectors, which is necessary for long term community govern￾ance. 4. Implementation strategy must be flexible and responsive to the partner or￾ganizations. This might require a flexible response to partner issues and concerns to accommodate the organization’s schedules. Training event schedules might have to be flexible in response: i.e. “bundling” workshops into retreats. 5. The evolution of effective CSOs and CBOs is sometimes directly related to key historical underlying conditions and issues. In lending support to such organizations, it is necessary to build upon any observed successes (Appre￾ciative Inquiry) as the basis for building sustainable CSO/CBO advocacy activity. The building of community and national alliances within an organ￾7 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica izational structure and removing the “turf” issues and concerns is essential to achieving transformational success. 6. Assisting CSO/CBO organizations to expand their vision and understand￾ing of broader national and international issues and their respective relationship to such issues is a significant contributing factor to strong coa￾litions and advocacy activity. 7. Combining top and second level management together in training pro￾grams enables CSO/CBO staff, who have acquired new knowledge and practices, not to feel “isolated” when “new learning” ideas are being im￾plemented within the organization. This increases the likelihood that new knowledge and practices can be successfully implemented and not lost when second tier management is promoted. 8. Observation has shown that CSO and CBO partner organizations appear to be willing to work together even though competition for limited re￾sources (personnel, funding, partisanship) and lack of opportunity are often impediments to building networks and coalitions. 9. A short project timeframe limits the number of sub grants and other sup￾port assistance that can target institutional and coalition-building, as coalitions take time to develop. Recommendations 1. Continuous (TA) support to CSO/CBO organizations across all sectors fo￾cused on “target” communities (communities in which development and/or infrastructure activity is being implemented) in collaboration with other donors, so as to achieve a “flooding effect,” thus raising the economic stan￾dards overall. 2. Mobilizing civil society (public opinion) in distressed communities must be seen in the context of improved availability of jobs and improvement of the general economic uplift of the community. This will assist the community to energize itself because of economic self interest. Skills training for youthful new entrants to the job market is a major part of this effort. 3. A strategic plan to engage private sector interest as a partner in the devel￾opment (local to the specific community), so as to help alleviate the poor economic conditions. Encourage public/private coalitions at the local com￾munity level as a way to promote community uplift. Unresolved Issues 1. A viable support mechanism that insures CSO/CBO institutional sustain￾ability for the future has not been established in order to ensure 8 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica sustainability and true transformation. What form should this support take MSI/CIV-JAM project? 2. How might the sustainability component (a statement found in most pro￾jects designs) become more than just a statement? How can this component be addressed at the outset with a set of measurable indications or bench￾marks so that progress or lack of progress can be measured? IR2: Improved Community/Police Relations Introduction This section covers the community policing work carried out under USAID’s Strategic Objective for Democracy and Governance (“Improved Citizen Security and Participa￾tion in Democratic Processes”). It is one of three Intermediate Results under SO5, the other two dealing with civil society and the court system. USAID considers both PPP and PERF (community policing) to be “pilot projects.” PPP is basically finished and can be evaluated fully. However, it is premature to evaluate PERF fully because so much of the planned activities have either only begun recently or have not even started (e.g. the opening of the Grants Pen multi-use facility/police station and the initiation of full-scale community policing with a newly-trained full staff complement of 70 offi￾cers). Inspector Michael Simpson, a strong advocate of community policing who will head the new force, is currently working alongside PERF personnel in their office. Ac￾cordingly, the full impact and effectiveness of PERF cannot be measured at this time, and findings, conclusions, and recommendations need to be qualified based on that fact. This applies especially to the key issue of sustainability. Background The national police, called the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), and the Ministry of National Security were the GOJ counterparts to USAID. JCF did the actual policing work; USAID’s assistance to the JCF was channeled through a Cooperative Agreement with the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), a U.S. organization that provided technical assistance in community policing techniques. Funding for PERF began in Oc￾tober 2002 and will end September 30, 2005. The community policing focused on the inner-city community of Grants Pen, and the program included funding for a variety of community activities sponsored by PERF as well as the assistance to the police. USAID already had significant involvement with Grants Pen and Standpipe through the Peace and Prosperity Project (PPP), which began in March 2001 and supported the Mission’s Inner City Development Special Objective of working in these two troubled and violence-riddled communities. PPP’s activities, implemented principally through the Kingston Restoration Company (KRC), aimed to increase employment and entre￾preneurship opportunities and to improve the communities’ capacity for conflict resolution. The Cooperative Agreement with KRC ended in November 2004, but an extension through a Limited Scope Grant Agreement until September 2005 is designed to facilitate sustainability of activities undertaken. Thus, both some continued PPP ac￾9 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica tivities and the PERF program will end together this September. An evaluation of PPP under separate cover is being written at the same time as this evaluation, but in order to measure overall development impact in the two communities, PERF (as the USAID￾funded program is commonly referred to by Jamaicans) and PPP should be seen as an integrated effort implemented during roughly the same time period in the same loca￾tions, especially Grants Pen. USAID supported a number of activities through PERF, such as: • Training of police and citizens • Community Relations Building and Community Outreach (including mentor￾ship) • Public Education • Model Community Policing and Services Facility Analysis Initial Steps The problem of crime and violence in Jamaica was not new and had already been rec￾ognized as a major impediment to national development both in terms of reduced economic growth and erosion of democratic political institutions. This problem is espe￾cially acute in inner-city communities, with USAID citing estimates that 75% of all crimes in Jamaica, especially murder, occur in the capital city’s two adjoining parishes of Kingston and Saint Andrew. To further define and focus the problem, statistics cited by USAID indicate that violent crime is concentrated in some 15 inner-city communi￾ties. The perpetrators are mainly unemployed young males who live in these socially marginalized communities that typically lack many basic public services and have a very poor quality housing stock. Though crime is part of a complex social dynamic, three variables stand out in analyzing the problem: (1) unemployment; (2) young males; and (3) low income, socially marginalized communities lacking in public infrastructure and services. The PPP and PERF programs were designed to focus mainly on these three issues. PPP included a large component focusing on conflict reso￾lution training as part of its approach. A part of the private sector in Jamaica decided to get involved in efforts to address the problem. The American Chamber of Commerce in Jamaica (AMCHAM) played a lead role and in late 2000 commissioned a diagnostic study of the situation using PERF. The study, issued in January 2001 and known as the “PERF Report,” was comprehensive and detailed, containing 83 action recommendations. JCF endorsed the report but also noted the additional resources the force would need in order to carry out most of the recommendations as well as actions required by other GOJ ministries and agencies. AMCHAM committed to raising funds from the private sector to build a new police station in Grants Pen that would serve as a model police station for the JCF (USAID later also became a contributor to the facility). However, these plans encountered con￾siderable community resistance because of the history of community mistrust of the 10 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica police, the particular site chosen, and the community’s interest in access to better social services as part of the plans. USAID helped to facilitate a dialogue process that brought in AMCHAM, community representatives, and police for a series of meetings around this issue. The outcome of this dialogue, which was useful itself in opening up channels of com￾munication between the community and the police, was a change in plans. The original concept of a police station was expanded into one of a multi-use facility that would in￾clude social service amenities such as a community meeting room, an ATM for banking services, a post office branch, and an adjacent health center. The health center construc￾tion work required the temporary relocation of the health center operations to nearby rented premises. AMCHAM, however, took a significant further step. Lobbying through the political process in Washington, AMCHAM was instrumental in Congressional action to amend Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act to allow USAID funds to be used to provide assistance to community policing in Jamaica. Normally, USAID was precluded by that statutory provision (with certain exceptions) from providing assistance to police. The AMCHAM involvement represented an excellent example of the kinds of partner￾ships USAID is promoting through the Global Development Alliance (GDA). One of the proposals coming out of the organized private sector’s recent mass demonstration and business closing for a day was the idea of “adopt a police station.” This is an attrac￾tive, practical idea, which should be followed up on aggressively by USAID in its new program as a highly visible way to get the private sector working with the public sector to improve police working conditions and promote citizen security. PERF Managerial and Technical Capacity This legislation opened the door for USAID/Jamaica for the first time to include police assistance in its programming to improve citizen security. Subsequently, USAID awarded a Cooperative Agreement to PERF in October 2002, in the amount of $3.1 million for community policing work, principally in Grants Pen. The grant will run un￾til September 30, 2005. However, PERF was inexperienced in international development work and suffered start-up problems. Nearly a year went by without placing a resident community￾policing advisor on the ground in Jamaica as planned. Ultimately, USAID itself identi￾fied a suitable candidate who was hired by PERF and arrived in Jamaica to take up his position in October 2003. The resident advisor became very well liked and trusted in Grants Pen because of his willingness to go directly into the streets and lanes of the community and engage with residents about their problems and how PERF might be able to help. This was an important factor in building a more positive relationship for JCF as well as PERF. But the relationship between the advisor and the PERF home office did not work out nearly as well, in part perhaps because he did not come out of the PERF ranks and was, 11 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica in effect, chosen by USAID. Differences of opinion about project implementation fi￾nally led to a change of advisors early this year. The new advisor has extensive experience in administration and management, which has led to a smoother relationship with the home office and with USAID, which was dissatisfied with PERF’s institu￾tional performance. This delay in placing a permanent resident advisor on the ground significantly affected the planned integrated approach of using PERF alongside of PPP, which had started earlier and was due to end in November 2004. It also left less time for PERF not only to implement its program but also to work on sustainability of the community policing effort, which required a fairly lengthy initial period of building mutual trust between the police and the community to replace the mutual mistrust that characterized police￾community relations. In addition to the experienced expatriate resident advisor, the PERF Jamaica office now is staffed with well-qualified Jamaican personnel who have developed strong links to the Grants Pen community. The office receives a large number of visitors, both sched￾uled and unscheduled, which is a sign of its acceptance by the residents. JCF counterparts are also working there and being trained as part of the preparations for moving to the new Grants Pen facility in a matter of months. Overall, PERF’s managerial expertise with its new resident advisor appears to have im￾proved noticeably, after a steep learning curve in how to carry out development programs overseas. Its basic technical expertise in policing matters is strong but was untested in an overseas setting. Separate from its relationship with its funding agency (USAID) and the reporting and accountability that entails (where PERF has been weaker), the ultimate judgment about PERF’s capability rests heavily on whether it has achieved the program’s goals. PERF is successfully introducing community policing in Grants Pen with strong approval and participation from the community’s residents. Whether more could have been achieved is an open question, but the results at this point are positive and recognized as such. Training of Citizens and Police PERF’s technical expertise in training is stronger than was its managerial capacity, and PERF has carried out training programs that are well delivered and received by the JCF. Using its U.S. network, PERF has arranged for several “rising stars” officers re￾lated to community policing to attend an advanced training seminar (SMIP) at Harvard University. PERF also arranged a study tour for its significant counterparts to various cities in the U.S. to learn about varying architectural and design considerations for po￾lice stations, depending on the circumstances of the areas being served. PERF carried out training activities for all the officers assigned to Grants Pen and also included officers from other stations in order to begin spreading the impact of training activities more quickly in the JCF. “Safe Encounters” and “Collaborative Problem￾Solving” were the two main community policing training courses given, sometimes in 12 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica collaboration with community residents. The courses have a tested and validated meth￾odology from use in the U.S. Police officers also received conflict resolution training in order to equip them to deal with citizens in non-violent ways in conflictive situations. Both the police and community residents expressed satisfaction with these efforts, see￾ing them as providing useful skills and breaking down the barriers to police-citizen cooperation. PERF also conducted a number of specialized training courses given to members of the JCF that did not target Grants Pen specifically but were of broader utility in upgrading the skill sets of specialists in the JCF. Training specialists from PERF came down from the U.S. for these offerings, which usually were of about one week’s duration. Community Relations Building and Community Outreach PERF funding, management capacity, and coordination with community organizations has made possible a significant number of community activities and events in Grants Pen. The evaluation team has asked residents, implementers, and participants which of these were valued most in an effort to prioritize among activities and determine their effectiveness. This has proven difficult because the almost universal answer is “We liked all of them, and we want all of them to continue.” In part this response is a meas￾ure of the social exclusion of the community and thus its hunger for having access to social activities that it sees as beneficial, and demonstrating that “someone cares about us.” Again, the overlap with PPP should be recognized. Most activities are targeted at youth, who are the most at-risk population but also the most enthusiastic and interested group if the barriers of mistrust of the police can be broken down. The organization of sports leagues and competitions is especially popular with both sexes, with netball for girls and football (soccer) and basketball for boys. PERF supplied uniforms, sports equipment, referees, and other such resources to enable the teams to feel a “professional” approach that built pride and self-esteem. An innova￾tive linked activity—a one-day workshop in conflict resolution—was a required precondition to participation in the sports activities. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the conflict resolution training was well received and got high marks from participants on its own merits. PERF also sponsored a summer day camp for youth in Grants Pen that gave them a fun and educational outlet during school vacation when they might otherwise be spending too much idle time on the streets. (There was no follow-up with the youth who attended the camp, but the camp experi￾ence was extremely popular in the community and no perceptible negative fall-out occurred because of the lack of follow-up activities.) PERF also supported “clean up, fix up” work programs that had police officers working alongside community residents in community improvement projects. PERF funded and managed the reconstruction of an important gully-crossing footbridge in Andrews Pen using local labor after it had been washed out by Hurricane Ivan. All of these activities brought police and citizens together in non-threatening situations and promoted a sense that the police were serving the community and helping to meet its needs beyond just law enforcement. 13 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica As part of the objective of integrating into the community more fully, PERF partici￾pates in a number of working groups and committees that are working on community development under the leadership of churches and CBOs, among others. This kind of collaboration is an important part of community policing approaches. One example is the Ministers Fraternal, a grouping of clergy from various denominations that has a youth outreach initiative where clergy and the officers who patrol the area work with “at-risk” youth in the neighborhood, and try to offer positive interventions to keep them from becoming involved with gangs. Another example is the In-School Mentorship program, which PERF supports at Shortwood Primary and Junior High. This follows the pattern of targeting youth as the primary at-risk population. Focus groups conducted in 2004 showed that the community’s perception of the police was still marked by dissatisfaction and mistrust, but that the community policing pro￾gram and related activities were being well received and beginning to improve relations. It will be very important to carry out a new focus group exercise, now planned for August 2005, with a methodology that will allow for meaningful compari￾son with the ones done in 2004. Community input from the 2004 exercise was taken into account by PERF in preparing its work program thereafter. Public Education In this area PERF contributed support to ROOTS FM, a community-based radio station with an inner-city audience. The station broadcasts Public Service Announcements (PSAs) sponsored by PERF as well as programming with roundtable-type discussions of community issues. These offer good opportunities for the CBOs to reach the com￾munity to stimulate action to solve problems. PERF pays for airtime, which helps to strengthen the financial footing of ROOTS FM. PERF is preparing its own “lessons learned” publication which is to be ready by August and will be disseminated in the community. PERF is also preparing videotape training materials that can be used in sessions with the community as well as with police offi￾cers. They also plan to use short video clips at daily roll call as “training vignettes” to make up for the lack of effective in-service training in the JCF. In relation to public awareness, domestic violence is a serious, “hidden” crime problem that helps to preserve a culture of violence that permeates many inner-city communi￾ties. PERF is working with MSI and Women, Inc., a CSO also involved in CIV-JAM, on a two-day training course and manual for the JCF to use in understanding domestic violence better and how to deal with it effectively. MSI is also helping PERF connect with CBOs in Grants Pen in a public education and awareness program about the prob￾lem of domestic violence. Women, Inc. has already prepared materials on the subject for use at the Police Academy, but the PERF effort will be a “real world,” serious effort to sensitize both the community and the police about ways to deal with this social prob￾lem that is also criminal. 14 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica Community Police and Multi-Use Facility The new Grants Pen Community Multi-use Facility is under construction and is sched￾uled to open by this August or September. PERF, with the assigned station commander, Inspector Simpson, are interviewing and carefully screening candidates to be assigned to staff out the 70-officer complement for the station, all of whom will receive intensive training in community policing methods. They will benefit from the state-of-the-art po￾lice facility and will be equipped with what JCF officers are supposed to have but often do not (e.g. handcuffs, batons). It will be difficult if not impossible to replicate the Grants Pen facility due to its cost, but it serves as a model station and the officers al￾ready assigned do not think successful community policing is heavily dependent on having such an advanced facility. They describe community policing as being out in the community on patrol with a highly visible presence on a continuing basis that allows them to know residents in a personal, helpful way and elicits cooperation from citizens. This helps to prevent crime and to identify criminal elements in the community. The police are using bicycle and foot patrols in Grants Pen, whereas before they only patrolled in squad cars or in groups large enough to project the ability to use force on a large and deadly scale. The six-bike patrol officer contingent is currently down to three, but we were assured that it would return to six or eight with the assignment of new of￾ficers and the opening of the new police station. The three rank and file officers that we interviewed expressed enthusiasm for the community policing approach, saying it made their work much more effective as well as satisfying due to the closer relationship with community residents. Importance of Other Donor Collaboration An important consideration to take into account about past and future work is that other donors were also working in the related areas of citizen security with interventions de￾signed to reduce crime and violence, though not necessarily directly in Grants Pen. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) funded a Citizen Security Project for $20 million that, after a slow start, has picked up its implementation pace and is working in a number of inner-city communities. The project includes funding for the refurbishing of police stations and community-level interventions. In its earliest stages, the project started some work in Grants Pen but shifted away once the USAID focus on Grants Pen became operational. The British Department for International Development (DFID) has a major project to build up the institutional capacity of the JCF and at the highest level to improve the Prime Minister’s and National Security Council’s ability to manage oversight of a national anti-crime strategy. DFID plans to continue this major involve￾ment with a follow-on project over the next several years, including support to community policing as an institutional model. The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has also supported good governance work in two inner-city communi￾ties and has been closely involved with the court system as part of a multi-donor legal reform effort in which USAID also participated through its work with the Resident Magistrates Courts. 15 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica Findings 1. The fact that community policing has not yet begun on the full-scale basis planned and the fact the new police facility has yet to open makes it neces￾sary to evaluate community policing on a qualified basis, awaiting full implementation in a time frame that goes beyond USAID’s project comple￾tion date. 2. In spite of initial problems at start-up and continuing problems with im￾plementation documentation and reporting to USAID, PERF (the community policing program and the institution) is viewed almost unani￾mously as a major success by everyone with whom our team met, especially the residents of Grants Pen themselves. The objective measure of results is a sharp reduction in the crime rate in Grants Pen, especially violent crimes. The qualitative measure, based mainly on interviews with a wide range of stakeholders, stands out very clearly, with people using superlatives in de￾scribing the positive changes in Grants Pen (e.g. reduced crime and violence, especially a sharp decline in the murder rate). Community polic￾ing (PERF) is given credit for this success. 3. The activities carried out under PPP contributed significantly to the suc￾cess of PERF (mainly its sponsorship of community activities and widespread conflict resolution training), as they were mutually reinforcing in building up the stock of social capital in the community. PERF perhaps benefited disproportionately in public approval because it worked more closely with the people in the community and its first resident advisor be￾came very well accepted in the community. KRC, the principal implementer for PPP, operated on more of a “top down” basis and did not gain full community acceptance as a result. Nonetheless, PPP inputs were significant, met output targets in almost all cases and added to opportuni￾ties available to the community. 4. The “readiness” of any given inner-city community to work effectively to￾ward positive economic and social change is a strong determinant for successful intervention and should be assessed carefully at the outset. In Grants Pen this “readiness” appeared in several ways: • Initial community policing had been started by JCF earlier and that outreach laid a foundation for the donor’s successful entry. • Community organizations in Grants Pen, alarmed by the level of crime and its negative effects, had already taken a strong public stand, warning the criminal element that people would report them to the police (more specifically, to a single trusted senior officer). • The reigning “don” in Grants Pen had been killed by police (under circumstances unknown to us) and that opened a window of oppor￾tunity to reach youth and young adults, especially males, with 16 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica alternative, more positive behavioral models and outlets for their time and energy. • Grants Pen is surrounded on three sides by middle-class communi￾ties, decreasing its physical isolation compared to inner-city communities in the downtown area. Put in other words, Grants Pen’s larger neighborhood is not a bad neighborhood and that gives Grants Pen a better chance of upward mobility as a community. 5. PERF succeeded in year two, once mobilized with a resident advisor on the ground who reached out well to the community, in building relationships with community residents that began to build greater trust in the JCF and more positive interactions between citizens and police. This is a labor￾intensive, time-consuming process that requires sincere “buy-in” by the of￾ficers involved. 6. The ability to have funding in the hands of PERF/JCF to support activities that the citizens desired and had a role in deciding upon made the project’s work more effective and contributed significantly to acceptance of the new policing approach. Sports competitions, help to schools, a summer camp program, and other such activities directly identified with the police (PERF) likely would not have been possible without the special financial capacity the project provided. It is not at all clear that JCF will have such funding on its own in Grants Pen (or elsewhere in the future) or that JCF can leverage funding effectively from cash-starved GOJ ministries and agencies to replace the USAID funding. 7. After having paid the “opportunity cost” of a low level of implementation in year one, PERF has since that time carried out effective training courses on community policing and related topics that have upgraded police skills, secured acceptance of the approach within JCF with the officers involved, and achieved a strongly positive response from the community to the com￾munity policing methods. Police can do law enforcement in the community without appearing to be an oppressive occupying force and are able to en￾gage residents in dialogue around problem-solving and crime prevention. 8. Community policing success does not appear to depend on state of the art, new police stations, though the new multi-use facility in Grants Pen should be a positive addition to the community and a giant step forward in giving the police a modern, functional, and much more pleasant working envi￾ronment. Upgrading the many run-down police stations should be sufficient to support new community policing approaches adequately if the officers involved accept the new approach as a preferable alternative to current methods. 9. Sustainable success in reducing crime and violence in Grants Pen in the long run will depend on greater JCF support throughout the force for 17 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica community policing (as distinct from rhetorical support or statements of policy that are not matched by behavioral change), and certainly will be needed for continued success in Grants Pen and for the extension of com￾munity policing elsewhere on the island. Other planned donor support for JCF and the Cabinet office will be an important ingredient in any reform process. Crime and violence in Grants Pen will be quite dependent on cul￾tural and structural reforms in the JCF overall. Community policing cannot exist as an oasis in Grants Pen. Conclusions and Recommendations The most important conclusions and recommendations are quite straightforward: Community policing is working successfully in Grants Pen and is an important devel￾opmental innovation that should be continued beyond the pilot stage. It appears to be an effective tool in reducing crime and violence. JCF crime statistics show that between 2003 and 2004 murder and robbery with aggravation dropped by 12.5% and 50%, re￾spectively. Anecdotal evidence during our research work indicated that the trend continues, and the important perception by the residents and outsiders is that Grants Pen has become a much safer community. However, successful and sustainable com￾munity policing over the longer term is highly dependent on acceptance within the JCF institutional culture and by JCF police officers of the community policing approach. It will also require much-needed improvements in the overall quality of life in inner￾city communities. This means the creation of job opportunities that offer feasible alter￾natives to a life of crime and physical upgrading of infrastructure and housing so that these communities do not remain stigmatized as “ghettoes” isolated from larger civic life. The single most important challenge is to reach young males, often school drop￾outs, with skills training and job readiness training and then succeed in actually placing them in jobs that they hold onto. Some of these recommendations or activities can be folded into a community-policing program, but others require a multi-faceted and com￾plementary approach bringing the other resources into the community. Stronger community organizations are essential to improving civic life and to be able to create the citizen counterpart groups to cooperate with the police in making their communities safer. However, USAID cannot let victory slip from its grasp in the bold, innovative commu￾nity policing program carried out by PERF. The pilot program is incomplete and will need at least another year of funding support to prove its worth. The new station and the trained 70-officer complement for the Grants Pen station will not be functioning until September, which is the same time PERF’s funding and activities come to a close. To avoid a hiatus in the program, which could be devastating, USAID should be pre￾pared to provide “bridge funding” and a project extension, if needed, until the end of the calendar year to PERF. This would be a realistic timeframe for having an imple￾menting partner, PERF or anyone else, on board and ready to continue the program under the new SO13 after an openly competitive award process. To a certain extent, the current accelerated work plan through September could be stretched out, but it would 18 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica be preferable to have PERF continue its desired work plan with other new activities through the end of the year. Lessons Learned 1. Community policing requires an important early phase of “sensitization” of the community by the police and any other entities (such as donor agency implementers) about what the new approach involves and how it will change the police’s relationship with the community. This consists mainly of a series of community meetings at which the police and the com￾munity residents can interact in an open dialogue in a non-threatening environment. 2. Effective community policing requires a serious training component for po￾lice officers at the outset of the program and on a continuing basis in order to ensure that a new mindset and behavioral changes take hold within the units. 3. Community “readiness” plays an important role in a timing sense as to whether and when a community will embrace community policing. Key in￾dicators are the level of community organization existing or ready and asking to be organized. 4. “Presence” is an essential element of community policing and is defined as a high visibility, frequent patrolling of the community by officers who in￾teract with the community’s residents and leaders about community needs and problems in addition to normal law enforcement. “Presence” is what tells both criminal elements and law-abiding citizens that the police are making themselves a part of community life and will be aware of important events occurring in the community, both for community improvement and crime prevention. 5. Empowerment of the communities through efforts to strengthen civil soci￾ety organizations and activities is a critical ingredient of success because it creates good working partners for the police and gives community resi￾dents a chance to interact with police from a position of greater self￾respect, and provides them with a sense of responsibility for playing an ac￾tive role (“ownership”) themselves in reducing crime and violence. 6. In order to show inner-city residents early and tangible benefits from community organizing and cooperation with a community policing ap￾proach, the police, donor-supported implementers and GOJ agencies need to have funding to support fast-starting community activities and events such as sports leagues, summer camps, youth clubs, training sessions, mi￾cro-credit, etc. The community will embrace community policing much more quickly and enthusiastically when they see positive actions occurring in their neighborhoods, especially ones sponsored by the police and in 19 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica which the police are working alongside the citizens in carrying out the ac￾tivities. 7. Single-target intervention strategies, including community policing pro￾grams, are unlikely to be successful in transforming troubled, violence￾riddled communities. Multi-faceted, multi-sector interventions timed and coordinated to bring together major inputs more or less simultaneously of￾fer the greatest chance for success. Only this approach is likely to change the mindset of a community, empower the community, improve the overall quality of life in a noticeable way, and create the opportunities for a trans￾formational change within the community. But without jobs being created for young men and women in the process, all else is likely to be unsustain￾able in the long run. Only higher income levels of residents and a sharp drop in the unemployment rate among young people ultimately will make possible a community’s ascent out of poverty, slum status, and social mar￾ginalization. SO5 Small Grants Program In addition to the Cooperative Agreement with PERF, USAID made three small grants to Jamaican CSOs, focusing mainly on human rights issues. USAID made a grant for $85,000 (later reduced to $55,000) to the Independent Jamai￾can Human Rights Council (IJHRC) for human rights education in the schools. IJHRC produced coloring books and a storybook on human rights themes for use in the class￾room. More than 12,000 of the coloring books were distributed to schools around the island. A similar number of the storybooks were distributed, and copies were given to all the Library Service branches. A second storybook has been written and illustrated and is ready for printing, but USAID funding is exhausted. IJHRC has proposals pend￾ing with donors that will likely result in funding to cover the cost of printing. IJHRC is also preparing a 130-page Resource Material document for teachers’ use in class for Grades 1-7. CIV-JAM is providing funding for educational consultants to fi￾nalize the guidebook, and IJHRC has a proposal with the EU for printing costs that is likely to be funded. IJHRC planned to hold 25 workshops for teachers to introduce the material and train them in its use. The workshops, for 50 teachers each, have had to be cut back to ten because of the shortage of funds but will be held beginning in Septem￾ber. The activity appears to be well designed and well executed, but the impact can only be measured over a much longer timeline. The Ministry of Education has given its full support to the activity and has collaborated closely with IJHRC, which is a promising sign for sustainability. Another CSO, Jamaicans for Justice, also received a small grant that allowed them to publish an important human rights report: The Jamaica Justice Report 2003-2004, enti￾tled “The Victim’s Voice,” which detailed the story of 17 persons who either died or 20 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica suffered injury due to police violence that appeared to be unjustified, and the tribula￾tions they or their surviving family members suffered at the hands of a dysfunctional justice system. Through the grant, JFJ also set up a central archive of human rights in￾formation and materials on the justice system, the only one of its kind in Jamaica. The data bank is available to the public in both electronic and written form. The information contained in the archives proved very useful to the NGO community in preparing input to the lengthy parliamentary debate over the Anti-Terrorism Act, which in the end was modified in many of the areas questioned. By creating a central source of information that is widely accessible, the results from the grant can be con￾sidered significant, especially as it applies to human rights organizations. IR 3: Administration of Justice: Improved Capacity of the Justice Sys￾tem Administration of Justice – Court Improvement As another component of SO5, USAID collaborated with the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Court in a program to modernize the operations of the Resident Magis￾trates’ Courts and other court improvements. The activity was made up of six components: • Strengthening of the Court reporting system • Judicial Training • Computerization of the Resident Magistrates’ Courts • Back-up power supply for the Supreme Court • The Laws of Jamaica on-line • Public Awareness Steno-writing machines have been purchased and training is ongoing for court stenog￾raphers who will be able to produce a written record of court proceedings. The system will be linked on a real-time basis to the computers in the courtroom. Currently, the judges themselves have to keep the written record, a very time-consuming task and one that does not use their skills as judges appropriately. The system is not yet operative, but assurances were given by personnel from both the Courts and the Ministry of Jus￾tice that the system will become operative in the near future. The wiring for the IT system is installed in the courthouses. The Judicial Training Institute has trained judges, prosecutors, and resident magistrates in a wide range of subjects relevant to the upgrading exercise. The project provided training specialists who updated the Institute’s curriculum, and the training programs can now be officially certified. The Court wants to take that to the next level of accredi￾tation and to be able to offer training on a regional basis for the Caribbean. Computerization of the Resident Magistrates’ Courts is partially completed. The “back office” functions of case management are now being done on the computers, but the 21 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica installation and use in the courtroom has not yet started. The equipment and wiring are ready, but data for the JEMS software program is still being inputted and training for magistrates and clerks is an ongoing process that is not far enough along to make the entire system operative. The Ministry and the Courts expressed confidence that the modernization process is a high priority and that the project objectives in this regard will be achieved in the near future even though the USAID funding has come to an end. The Chief Justice and the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Justice consider the special installation of a back-up generator for the Supreme Court to have been an im￾portant project result. Given frequent power outages, the back-up power supply has increased court efficiency markedly by allowing court sessions to continue uninter￾rupted. The capacity of the generator is great enough so that the Court is now planning to connect the Court of Appeals across the street as well. The Laws of Jamaica are now online, thanks to project assistance. The courts, attorneys and interested public can access them at www.moj.gov.jm. The government used to rely on private companies that produced CDs, but that system had proven unreliable and not widely accessible. The Ministry is expanding the web site by putting online in “real time” all Bills introduced in Parliament that relate to the justice sector. The Ministry has established a Justice Education Unit that is designed to be an outreach program to increase public awareness of current legal issues, citizens’ rights and re￾sponsibilities, all in layman’s language that is easy for the public to understand. Due to the lateness of access to the courtrooms and magistrates, the Evaluation Team was able to visit only the Halfway Tree Resident Magistrates’ Court, meet with judges and administrators, and observe courtroom criminal proceedings. We observed court personnel using the equipment and systems. They expressed eagerness to have the en￾tire system up and running. The Courts have joined in forming a Caribbean Users’ Association for the JEMS case management software, which is already in use in Trinidad and the Eastern Caribbean. This is a good step that should shorten the learning curve in Jamaica, allow it to avoid early problems encountered elsewhere, and allow Jamaica to keep current and learn from more advanced users. USAID originally planned to computerize the entire system island-wide, which totals 23 Magistrates’ Courts. However, USAID did not fully fund the program and it was cut back to seven courts, with the government providing additional funding to allow the program to reach 12 courts. Findings 1. The lack of access to the courts until the last working day, due to unavoid￾able protocol issues, made the Evaluation Team’s coverage of this component less than optimal. Court and Ministry personnel interviewed 22 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica had very positive impressions of the USAID assistance, and Government appears committed to completing the systems with its own resources. 2. The project ran behind schedule and did not reach all of its goals, espe￾cially the full computerization in courtrooms, by the project completion date. Due to strong Government commitment and the level of progress achieved to date, it appears that the goals of the project will be achieved in the end. Lack of planned USAID funding made it impossible to achieve coverage across the island, but the system is scaleable and can be built out if the Government can find the funds to do it. 3. The court system has acquired the knowledge necessary to be able to use the Judicial Training Institute to provide the necessary training to all per￾sonnel who still need to be trained in order to make the computerization program fully operational. 4. The Resident Magistrates’ Courts were an appropriate choice to upgrade, as they are courts of first instance where some 90% of citizens who end up in court have their first encounter with the justice system. 5. Assistance to both the Judicial Training Institute and the Judicial Educa￾tion Unit helped to make these functions more useful to the court system and the public, as well as more sustainable. This assistance also represented a good example of donor coordination of the kind be￾ing recommended for the Mission’s new programs. CIDA, at the same time as USAID’s program, provided assistance to the Courts of Appeal, and these activities were coordinated between the donors and with the Government during implementation. Recommendations The only recommendation regarding the Court Improvement program at this time is to try to link locations with the communities being selected for Community Policing and World Bank assistance in the new projects. If by chance the match is automatic, then the new program should take advantage of the improvements in that Resident Magis￾trates’ Court so that the people in the community will see both police and courts working better. USAID should also use the upgraded courts as one criterion in the site selection criteria when choosing new inner-city communities. Even better, USAID should try to add the court improvement package, if not present, in the courts serving the communities where community policing is being introduced in an expanded program. This could produce synergistic effects and give USAID a higher return on its fixed cost investments already made. 23 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica Annex: MSI/CIV-JAM Capacity/Organizational Building Activity Capacity-building • Organizational Strengthening: During March – December 2004, CIV-JAM held 16 workshops on: partnership (1), advocacy (3), communication (1), strategic planning (4), financial sustainability (4), project design and monitoring & evaluation (1), and training of trainers (2). Each of these workshops was at￾tended by an average of 18 participants representing 9-11 CSOs. • During January-May 2005, CIV-JAM held 11 workshops on: Institutional Strengthening for CBOs (1), Coalition-building (1), Grant Management (1), Business Planning (6), and Advanced Advocacy (2). Each of these workshops was attended by an average of 18 participants representing 9-11 CSOs. • Organizational Strengthening: CIV-JAM provided an average of five consulta￾tions to three CSOs per month on capacity-building organizational issues such as program effectiveness, management, project design and planning; and an￾other three consultations to six CSOs per month on coalition-building and advocacy issues. • Sustainability of MSI/CIV-JAM’s capacity-building framework: Identified local resource persons through a local training association (Jamaica Association for Training and Development) and provided them with models for use in support￾ing MSI-CIV-JAM capacity building activities. • Institutional Sustainability: All but one of CIV-JAM’s Partner CSOs now have a Strategic Plan. Advocacy, communications, and organizational sustainability are features of these Plans. The CSOs are now using their Strategic Plans to identify and design projects for implementation. They will therefore have stronger project portfolios that are consistent with their mandates and their stra￾tegic objectives. From these Plans we are able to identify synergies and develop effective coalitions. • Communication: A working relationship has been established with CARIMAC to provide training in Communication Strategy for CSOs. CSOs are better able to articulate their positions and establish positive working relationships with media houses. • Institutional Strengthening: MSI/CIV-JAM has researched the legal status of NGOs so that NGOs can take informed positions in the debates on upcoming changes to the Companies Act as it relates to the survival and operations of CSOs. • MSI/CIV-JAM has assisted 9 CSOs and 5 CBOs to prepare formal long-term Business Plans through a specially designed course developed with UTECH’s Technology Innovation Center. A1 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica • Strategic Plans are being formalized by Partner CSO Boards. • Members of the Safe Schools Initiative Secretariat participated in Project De￾sign and Grants Management training. Coalition Building, Networking, and Advocacy • Emerging Coalitions: MSI/CIV-JAM has facilitated CSOs coming together around issues including: Elimination of Violence Against Women; Elimination of Violence In Schools; Public Education on the Child Care and Protection Act; and Reduction of Crime & Violence. Some of these coalitions include pub￾lic/private sector partnerships. • Strengthening Existing Coalitions: MSI/CIV-JAM is providing support and technical assistance to existing coalitions in the children’s and women’s sectors. Both JCRC and AWOJA are experiencing renewed interest to work as coali￾tions. • Cross sector: MSI/CIV-JAM has developed a successful model to link commu￾nity based organizations (CBOs) in USAID’s Economic Growth program with CSOs in the D&G program (through administrative mentorship, capacity￾building services and partnering). In this context coalitions are established which bring local interests together to strengthen civil society’s agenda for gov￾ernance reform. • Cross sector: MSI/CIV-JAM has developed a model for a public/private sector ICT Training Program to address youth unemployment, and has convened a public/private sector coalition of implementing organizations to be funded by an IDB grant through the International Youth Foundation. • Coalition building: The CIV-JAM Advisory Board (CAB) has emerged as a coalition of civil society organizations working together to strengthen good governance. The CAB has become a forum where CSOs explore broad issues and develop a common understanding of the role of the CSO sector in strength￾ening governance. • Networking: MSI/CIV-JAM works with other activities and agencies whose programs contribute to strengthening governance, such as the UNDP’s Civic Scenario and USAID/SO5’s PERF Project in Grants Pen. • Influencing policy: A coalition of CIV-JAM Partner CSOs advocated success￾fully for amendments to the Terrorism Prevention Bill. • Request for Technical Assistance: The most representative community based organization comprising residents of Grants Pen and neighboring communities, the Barbican/Grants Pen Upliftment Movement, formally requested technical assistance in capacity-building and Strategic Planning from MSI/CIV-JAM. A2 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica • Request for Technical Assistance: The Montego Bay Chamber of Commerce formally requested technical assistance in coalition-building from MSI/CIV￾JAM. • Coalitions that MSI/CIV-JAM has facilitated already show signs of sustainabil￾ity: o Example: The Jamaica Youth Training and Employment Coalition has taken action to secure outside funding to supplement its anticipated grant from the International Youth Foundation. o Example: Several members of the Jamaica Youth Training and Em￾ployment Coalition have come together to explore new partnerships on other project activities. o Interaction between CIV-JAM’s CSO partners on activities has in￾creased. The CSOs increasingly see themselves as an emerging “CIV￾JAM coalition” to strengthen governance. • The University of Florida has created a Working Group on Advocacy in Ja￾maica, through which professors and graduate researchers provide technical assistance and feedback to MSI/CIV-JAM on a volunteer basis, and promote collaboration with Jamaica’s CSOs and educational institutions. • MSI/CIV-JAM brought together Jamaica’s leading training and employment￾creation NGOs, Verizon, Microsoft, Cable & Wireless, and the American Chamber of Commerce to design the Jamaica Youth Training and Employment Program that will provide training and jobs to 300 inner-city youths. Pre￾proposal has already been approved by the International Youth Foundation’s Entra 21 Program. • MSI convened and facilitated a stakeholders meeting (IJCHR, PALS, JCRC, HCDC, DRF, PERF, Jamaica Constabulary Force, Ministry of National Secu￾rity, Ministry of Education) to encourage partnership on the Safe Schools Initiative. This is being followed up with a national radio discussion series (see 10th bullet under “Media and Citizen Awareness” below). Media and Citizen Awareness • Investigative Journalism awards program: MSI/CIV-JAM established a Civil Society Award for Investigative Journalism, using criteria developed with the Caribbean Institute for Media and Communication (UWI) and the Media and Press Associations of Jamaica. The first award was made on World Press Day, May 3, 2005. • Investigative Journalism Seminar: MSI/CIV-JAM co-hosted a major conference on Investigative Journalism that brought together the heads of all of Jamaica’s A3 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica media houses and the country’s leading journalists from broadcasting and print media. Entitled “Creating a Culture of Investigative Journalism and the Use of Access to Information”, the conference was co-hosted with the Carter Center and the Media and Press Associations of Jamaica. Consensus was reached on the need for: 1. training in investigative journalism; 2. further exposure to ATI and its relevance to investigative journalism; and 3. further training for journalists in research methodology. MSI/CIV-JAM is following up with workshops for journalists in these areas. • CSO-Media coalition-building: MSI/CIV-JAM’s CSO-Media Roundtable Se￾ries is the first ongoing program that brings civil society and the media together to work toward strengthening governance. Due to the success of the CSO-Media Roundtable held in May 2004 (“Toward Media-Civil Society Partnerships for Strengthening Governance”), participants asked MSI/CIV-JAM to continue the dialogue on issues of concern to both civil society and the media. As a result, MSI/CIV-JAM decided to hold Roundtables on a quarterly basis. • The CSO-Media Round Table series has evolved into an advocacy-oriented M￾edia CSO Policy Committee, which is preparing a list of policy recommendations for media, civil society, and Government, based on the in￾formation and recommendations generated in the Roundtables. • Civil Society and Community Radio: MSI/CIV-JAM signed an MOU with ROOTS FM community radio station to provide it with commodity support to increase its signal strength and program quality in exchange for studio and air time to civil society organizations. The CSOs have taken full advantage of the opportunity for greater coverage and visibility of their issues by hosting two popular weekly programs. This relationship has prompted ROOTS FM to have a CSO on its Board of Directors. • Community Radio: MSI/CIV-JAM arranged for ROOTS FM to become an In￾ternational Member of the Washington-based National Association of Broadcasters. This membership provides technical assistance in programming and broadcast technology for radio stations. • ROOTS FM’s Board is meeting to finalize and ratify its Strategic Plan (draft prepared with TA from MSI/CIV-JAM). The Board Meeting’s theme is: “The role and impact of Community Media on Governance". The Strategic Objec￾tive articulated in ROOTS FM’s Strategic Plan is for ROOTS FM to be an engine for transformation, empowering citizens to achieve transformation of their lives and their communities. A4 DG SO5 Evaluation-USAID/Jamaica • Journalism and law students are gaining exposure to civil society issues and civil society organizations through special research assignments and CSO in￾ternships arranged by MSI/CIV-JAM. • Through the Media and Communications Department (CARIMAC) of the Uni￾versity of the West Indies, MSI/CIV-JAM is assisting 11 CSOs to prepare formal Communication Plans during Summer 2005. • MSI/CIV-JAM is supporting Jamaica’s leading public/private partnership cam￾paign against violence in schools, which is led by the Ministry of National Security and the Ministry of Education. This support is in the form of sponsor￾ship of a nationally broadcast radio program that will bring together community activists, students and teachers, police officers, CSO representa￾tives, and Ministry officials from the Safe Schools Initiative. • In response to expressions of interest by Partner CSOs, MSI/CIV-JAM has commissioned a Summer course on NGO Communications at UWI. This course will be available to NGOs beyond the lifetime of MSI/CIV-JAM. A5