Haiti Transition Initiative:
Reflections on Program Strategy and Strengths
2004-2006
September 2006
Philippe Branchat, HTI Program Manager (2004-2006)
Stephanie Broughton, HTI Program Support Officer (2004-2006)
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS..............................................................................................................1
ACRONYMS ..................................................................................................................................2
INTRODUCTION...........................................................................................................................3
Report’s Purpose............................................................................................................................3
Program Design .............................................................................................................................4
PROGRAM CONTEXT................................................................................................................4
HTI Program Backdrop: Violence, Spoilers and Working in Insecurity ................................................5
HTI Communities ............................................................................................................................6
Social Inclusion ..........................................................................................................................6
The (Long) Lead up to Elections – Working with Youth and Focusing on Employment....................7
PROGRAM STRATEGY..............................................................................................................7
Four Stages of HTI .........................................................................................................................7
Working with IGOH – Early 2004 to Early 2005.............................................................................8
Focus on Community– Early 2005 to end of program ....................................................................9
Supporting MINUSTAH – Spring 2005 to end of program ..............................................................9
Post Elections – Supporting and Working with the elected government ........................................10
Conflict Prevention and Conflict Reduction: Working in the Provinces and Port-au-Prince.................10
Provincial Strategy – Conflict Prevention ....................................................................................10
PAP – Conflict Reduction ..........................................................................................................12
PROGRAM STRENGTHS.........................................................................................................15
Selecting Locations and Strategic Partners ....................................................................................16
Community Ownership..................................................................................................................16
Program Responsiveness and Flexibility ........................................................................................17
Multiple Partners ..........................................................................................................................18
Interim Government Involvement ...................................................................................................19
Critical Mass of Activities ..............................................................................................................19
Messaging/Branding.....................................................................................................................20
Transparency ...............................................................................................................................21
CONCLUSION – PROGRAM IMPACT/OUTCOMES ..........................................................22
Challenges to Measuring Impact....................................................................................................22
Anecdotes ....................................................................................................................................23
Annexes
Annex1 HTI Timeline
Annex 2 Quick Guide to HTI Strategy
Annex 3 Lessons Learned Working in Gang Areas
Annex 4 Key Outcomes and Relevant Grants
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ACRONYMS
CAMEP Centrale Autonome Métropolitaine d’Eau Portable
CEP Provisional Electoral Council
CGP Community Governance Program
CIMIC Civil-Military Cooperation
DDR Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration
EDH Electricité d’Haïti
ESF Economic Support Funds
FAd’H Forces Armées d’Haiti
GOH Government of Haiti
HNP Haïtien National Police
HTI Haiti Transition Initiative
IGOH Interim Government of Haiti
IMC Inter-Ministerial Commission
IOM International Organization for Migration
MINUSTAH United Nations Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti
MoPW Ministry of Public Works
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
OTI Office of Transition Initiatives
PADF Pan-American Development Fund
PAP Port-au-Prince
UNPOL United Nations Police
USAID United States Agency for International Development
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INTRODUCTION
USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives’ (OTI) mission is to support U.S. foreign policy objectives by
helping local partners advance peace and democracy in priority countries in crises. Seizing critical 
windows of opportunity, OTI works on the ground to provide fast flexible short-term assistance targeted at 
key political transition and stabilization needs. OTI launched a program in Haiti, the Haiti Transition
Initiative (HTI), in May 2004 in response to the political turmoil surrounding the resignation of President 
Jean-Bertrand Aristide on February 29, 2004. OTI’s goal in Haiti was to “support a peaceful transition by 
helping volatile communities create stability and progress.”
HTI was a collaborative partnership between the International Organization for Migration (IOM) and OTI. 
The programs objectives were the following: 1) enhance citizen confidence and participation in a peaceful 
political transition; 2) empower citizens and the Haitian government to address priority community needs; 
3) build cooperative frameworks between citizens and government entities at all levels; and 4) promote 
peaceful interaction among conflicted populations. The implementation of the program, which began after 
the ouster of Aristide and ended after the 2006 democratic elections and installation of the new
government, was designed based on OTI’s grant making mechanism.
To achieve the overarching goal of the program and the objectives and through the issuance of small 
grants, HTI aimed to create dialogue and generate momentum towards peace and democracy through
quick-impact projects. With an initial mandate of eight months and a budget of $3.2 million, HTI first 
opened offices in Port-au-Prince (PAP), Petit Goâve, and Saint Marc. These sites were selected based 
on their recent history and strategic importance in the Haitian political context, as well as the ability to 
physically work there.1
 When the program received additional funding in the summer of 2005, HTI was 
able to expand and open offices in Cap Haïtien and Les Cayes. All of the cities or neighborhoods in 
which HTI worked were considered “conflict zones” – or areas where violence was likely to be or easily 
incited. At the time of the Presidential inauguration in May 2006, program funding reached $16.8 million
in small grants funds with more than $10 million committed to over 440 activities. OTI ultimately provided 
a total of $22.25million to the program.
HTI is an example of a true partnership between OTI and an implementing partner, in this case IOM. 
There was substantial collaboration at every stage of the project, yet OTI allowed IOM enough space to 
be able to have the necessary flexibility to be responsive to program developments as they arose. OTI 
provided invaluable support, especially in galvanizing agencies of the United States Government to
address critical issues that were impeding the ability of the program to achieve its objectives. This was 
particularly crucial in enhancing the coordination between IOM and MINUSTAH. Although the lack of a 
permanent OTI representative presented some challenges, the program greatly benefited from the variety 
of experience and expertise of the short-term OTI representatives.
Report’s Purpose
Given the complexity of the Haitian context and the political and programmatic changes that took place 
during the first two years of the program, it is important for future programming to examine the evolution 
of HTI to help shape the way forward, and to consider the fundamental elements that may be applicable 
in similar initiatives. Hence, the purposes of this report are twofold: 1) to review the program strategy of 
HTI; and 2) to identify the strengths of the HTI program that could be applied to other OTI programs in 
similar contexts.
The first part of the report will provide information about the context within which HTI was implemented. 
Haiti has had a history of political turmoil and violence and was cycling through yet another highly 
unstable period when HTI began. The next section discusses the program strategy covering the four 
stages of HTI, and how and why HTI approached implementation differently in the provinces of Haiti
versus PAP. The next section focuses on the strengths of HTI including IOM’s approach of staying in the 
background rather than seeking attention; location selection; their insistence on community ownership of 
 
1
 For more detail on the events affecting each HTI site during the unrest of 2004, please refer to the Timeline in Annex 1.
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the projects; the flexible and responsive nature of the program; the commitment to including multiple
partners in the decision making process for projects; ensuring that the Interim Government of Haiti
(IGOH) was involved; encouraging communities to implement multiple projects; and developing a visible 
and compelling message. The conclusion of the report illustrates the program’s impact and outcomes
including comments on the challenges of measuring the impact of HTI and some anecdotes from program 
participants and others.
Program Design 
HTI was designed to contribute to the political process, as opposed to offering humanitarian assistance, 
through a high volume of targeted small grants that aimed to facilitate dialogue, build community
cohesion, and diminish the powers of spoilers. Through this small grants mechanism, HTI was able to 
unite communities and the government around neighborhood improvement projects. The dialogue
generated by the grants as a result of cooperatively developing and implementing projects with the
communities was used as a conflict mitigation tactic. 
Because each of the five cities in which HTI worked had unique local situations and the nature of the 
groups in conflict were different, the program design in each location was different. In PAP, the conflict 
was often between a community and the government so the programs focused on redefining the
relationship between the communities and the government, such as trust building. While in Saint Marc, 
one of the Provinces in Haiti, the conflict was between communities (also known as neighborhoods). In 
cases of inter-community conflict, the government played a key role in HTI project management acting as 
an impartial mediator while at the same time gaining legitimacy as problem solvers responsive to
community concerns. A critical element of the program design given these problems in the communities 
was to provide sufficient time for dialogue so that it would yield lasting positive change. Alternatively, the 
small grants were able to isolate spoilers so that the community and government could take back control 
of their communities.
The small grants mechanism was designed to fund locally identified projects. One of the ways this was 
possible was through a three-way grants decision making process split between the community, the
government and HTI. With this design the community was able to not only identify projects that would 
benefit their areas but also approve projects that were proposed by outsiders. The government’s role
was to help identify projects at the request of the community but also to endorse the projects so the 
communities saw that the government was interested and invested in what was happening in
marginalized neighborhoods. HTI did have official approval authority because it was in charge of
allocating funds and resources, but would only do so if the community and government were in
agreement on the project. 
By in large, the project itself was of secondary importance to the process through which it was identified 
and implemented and the dialogue created around it. This emphasis on process over product was
facilitated both by the distanced nature of IOM as implementer as well as a high degree of flexibility in the 
time for implementation. The ability to prolong a project enabled HTI to take a hands-off approach to 
problems, prompting the community to create local conflict resolution mechanisms or turn to the
government as a mediator. This process often took time as communities had been trained by NGOs that 
if they wait, eventually the NGO will solve the problem for them so that the product can be finished. By 
leaving residents to create their own mechanism to solve the problem, the process provided a shared
experience and a model for collective action that could be applied to other community problems. 
PROGRAM CONTEXT
The HTI program was implemented in a political environment fraught with violence, threatened by
spoilers, and enveloped in insecurity. Hence, the communities in which HTI worked and the people
whom they recruited for the projects were carefully chosen so that a momentum toward peace and
stability could be developed. 
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HTI Program Backdrop: Violence, Spoilers and Working in Insecurity
HTI was conceived as an urban assistance program with a specific focus to establish and/or maintain 
stability. For much of the first two years of the program, stabilization efforts took the form of violence 
prevention in the provinces and violence reduction in PAP. HTI concentrated only on preventing/reducing 
politically motivated violence, or violence that threatened the political transition. The program was not 
able to combat criminal violence such as the road banditry that plagued cities like Ouanaminthe, because 
it was the responsibility of law enforcement. Similarly, HTI had to focus on geographically concentrated 
rather than dispersed violence or threats, because it did not have the mandate or the ability to deal with 
violence on such a large scale. A primary example of this geographically dispersed threat was the ex￾Forces Armées d’Haiti (FAd’H). For much of 2004, former members of the FAd’H were concentrated in 
urban centers and they would have been a part of the violence prevention/reduction strategy of HTI. 
However, when their leader, Ramissainthe Ravix, died in April 2005, the ex-soldiers dispersed throughout 
the country becoming difficult or impossible for HTI to track.
The violence that HTI had the mandate to address was characteristically perpetrated by “spoilers,” or 
individuals with the goal of inciting collective disorder to promote their own interests. HTI identified three 
types of spoilers that impacted or could impact the success of violence prevention or reduction:
individuals with a political agenda but that were law abiding; members of armed “political” groups; and 
members of armed, criminal groups.
The political spoilers who operated within the law were easier for HTI to identify and deal with in program 
implementation. These types of spoilers were known to mobilize in areas where the population was 
visibly frustrated with the government or public processes. These frustrations were largely based on the 
lack of public services (water, electricity, etc) or the lack of dividends from the transition process. To 
defuse these tensions, HTI worked to bring the interim government to areas that were described as 
neglected by the government, enabling it to identify needs and provide basic services thereby removing 
the incentive for violence/unrest.
Addressing violence caused by armed groups, both political and criminal, was more complex for HTI to 
handle. Politically armed groups are known as chimeres, a term first used to describe the armed Lavalas 
youth but now refers to the thugs recruited by any political party. These groups are well integrated into 
the communities and appeared to have strong support. HTI projects provided leverage to more peaceful 
political elements in the communities to create pressure on the chimeres not to act violently and to “win 
back” those who were not fully integrated into the gangs by offering employment on projects and inviting 
them to participate in socio-cultural activities. The criminal armed groups often held a neighborhood 
hostage through fear and intimidation leaving peaceful community leaders powerless to act in the
absence of law enforcement (which was usually the case in most HTI target communities). Occasionally, 
these groups assumed a political identity to justify their actions but they were not controlled by political 
actors. HTI addressed this problem similar to the way it dealt with political armed groups – working with 
peaceful leaders to provide leverage to oust the gangs from control, which required much stronger
cooperation with law enforcement entities.
Because HTI was trying to sideline the spoilers, it was sometimes seen (by outsiders) as interfering with 
Haitian politics. This demonstrates the politically sensitive environment that existed during course of the 
HTI program. As a general rule, HTI did not hinder the staging of a well-intentioned, peaceful
demonstration, but it did discourage burning voting centers or destroying property as an expression of 
political frustration. For example, HTI was accused by a member of the international press of trying to 
distract Haitians from politics. However, it was the spoilers that were trying to distract the Haitian people 
from peaceful discourse and political participation. In reality, the HTI program reduced the tensions 
created by spoilers by rapidly helping communities and government address urgent needs. It also
reduced the availability of people to be mobilized by providing attractive alternatives to violence such as 
employment, sports activities, social events and other peaceful community activities.
Another challenge for HTI was the backdrop of insecurity that plagued Haiti during the period of
implementation. While most of the insecurity was in PAP, the movement of spoilers and the presence of 
armed groups in the provinces perpetuated concern that the violence in PAP would spread to the rest of 
the country. For HTI, however, it was namely Port-au-Prince that presented a challenging security
environment, particularly because of its unpredictability. Most of the security issues, with the exception of 
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kidnapping, were restricted to specific areas. By design, however, these areas were also targeted for HTI 
intervention, so the program had to develop a way of working in the area that would ensure the safety of 
staff and partners and enable the program to implement projects. 
HTI chose predominantly small infrastructure projects in the neighborhoods experiencing high levels of
violence for a variety of reasons. First, they were easy to monitor by making digital cameras available for 
partners to show progress. Second, it limited the possibility for money to be diverted since the cost was 
so small. If money went elsewhere, a fence would only go halfway around the field, for example. Also, 
the selection of projects was more careful, particularly with regard to any possible security threat to the 
community management committee. For example, clean-up programs were avoided because they left 
the management committee extremely vulnerable to pressure and intimidation to prolong activities and
extend the number of working days.
As a cardinal rule, HTI staff maintained regular, open communication with community partners to assess 
the situation on a daily basis. Partners would phone the office each morning to relay whether or not it 
was safe to visit. It was also necessary to coordinate very closely with MINUSTAH to share information 
and stay current on the security threats and incidents. However, HTI did not appear in public with
MINUSTAH military to avoid the possibility of staff or partners becoming soft targets.
HTI Communities
In general, HTI worked in poor communities and shantytowns that had very few, if any, public services 
and economic opportunities. These marginalized communities were susceptible to gang activity and 
political manipulation. As a result, they had high rates of crime and unemployment. Working with 
community groups and individuals, HTI identified that the needs of these areas were basic and included 
employment, infrastructure development and service provision, such as electricity and water. The lack of 
these basic services would continue to breed resentment and frustration toward the government, which is 
accused of either neglecting the community because of political identity (Lavalas supporters) or for not 
meeting the post-Aristide expectations of assistance. This resentment and the lack of employment 
provided fodder for spoilers who then convinced community members that their only option for earning 
money was to work for them. While there was an overabundance of poor, frustrated communities in both 
urban and rural areas, HTI intervened only in those locations where instability threatened to derail the
transition process.
Social Inclusion
One of the main issues that HTI had to deal with at the community level was social inclusion, which was 
demonstrated by the lack of public services in these areas. Residents of shantytowns were considered 
“moun sa yo” or “those people”, meaning people who do not belong to mainstream Haitian society. HTI 
decided to specifically address this issue because it reasoned that people who feel included in the
political system would be less likely to destabilize that system. Therefore, in addition to extending public 
services and encouraging the government to include residents of shantytowns in community activities, 
HTI also supported efforts to bring social activities like summer camps and carnivals to these
neighborhoods and to publicize the good works taking place through HTI support. While these efforts 
brought communities together and strengthened their cohesiveness, much remains to be done to change 
the broader public perception of residents from the marginalized areas.
Many of the zones that exploded into violence during the period of program implementation were Lavalas 
strongholds (Aristide supporters) because residents in these communities felt excluded from the transition 
by the interim government. Hence, HTI pursued a strategy to increase their sense of inclusion by
extending public services and bringing government attention to neglected neighborhoods. However,
because of this tendency to violence, Haitians outside of these communities assumed they were
comprised only of gang members, kidnappers and criminals. Therefore, HTI decided that it was important 
to work to change this perception otherwise the exclusion of these populations would be exacerbated. 
To refute the negative image and demonstrate that the people living in shantytowns were producing good 
works, HTI developed a variety of projects. Some were straightforward media projects involving a series 
of radio features and a calendar illustrating community efforts. HTI also sponsored high-profile sporting 
7
events featuring teams from the conflict zones in national facilities co-implemented with the Inter￾Ministerial Commission of the Prime Minister (IMC). These events raised the profile of their activities 
demonstrating that many youth from these areas were engaged in sports instead of violence.
Individually, these activities were successful, but as a whole they were insufficient to have significant 
impact on countering the negative images of people living in Haiti’s urban slums. Changing these long￾held negative images of HTI neighborhoods would require a dramatic increase in security to normalize 
the movement of people and goods in and out of these areas, improved basic services, and the
dedication to a long-term fight against discrimination. It was beyond HTI’s scope to address these issues.
The (Long) Lead up to Elections – Working with Youth and Focusing on Employment
Elections for the new government were originally scheduled to begin in September 2005 with two
additional rounds in October and November. However, the elections actually took place in 2006, except 
for local elections which had yet to take place at the time of this writing. In response to the original 
election schedule and the existence of significant destabilizing threats, in June 2005, HTI decided to
focus on two main pillars of activities during the run-up to the elections: increasing employment and
developing youth projects. This was facilitated by an influx of Economic Support Funds (ESF) that was
re-directed to HTI from Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and the Supplemental
Appropriations of 2005.
Increasing the number of employment projects was simply a matter of increasing the monthly
expenditures on labor intensive infrastructure projects. These projects included road rehabilitation,
construction of public spaces, and flood mitigation projects such as ravine reinforcement and canal 
rehabilitation. Youth activities were enhanced by a series of 26 summer camps that were part of a
strategy submitted by the State Secretary for Youth and Sport and reinforced by technical assistance 
from HTI management. The camps were designed to occupy young children during the mornings and 
older youth in the afternoons with basketball and football tournaments, which also drew in area residents. 
Under the banner, “Play for Peace,” these actives were highly effective at raising the profile of local sports 
associations as alternatives to gang activity in HTI areas, including nine particularly tense neighborhoods 
in PAP.
The two-pillar strategy during this timeframe was successful for both HTI staff operating in target areas,,
(as demonstrated by high levels of participation in the projects), and for HTI management as it simplified 
project identification and implementation which in turn enabled a rapid increase in the program’s monthly 
grant burn rate (from $200,000 to $800,000 in four months). The only negative aspect to this approach 
was the fact that the elections were delayed multiple times, finally occurring five months after they were 
originally scheduled. 
PROGRAM STRATEGY
During the first two years of the HTI program, the political situation was very dynamic. Key events 
changed the political landscape, new actors emerged and disappeared, and levels of violence changed 
dramatically in various neighborhoods. Facilitated by HTI’s responsive design, the program strategy
evolved with the changes in the political and social climate. However, because the context and
circumstances facing each field office was unique, each had to modify its approach based on the local 
situation. This section discusses the four stages of HTI: 1) working with the Interim Government of Haiti 
(IGOH); 2) focusing on the community; 3) supporting MINUSTAH; and 4) the post-election. Next, the 
section covers HTI’s different approaches to working in the provinces of Haiti – conflict prevention – as 
opposed to working in PAP, which concentrated on conflict reduction. 
Four Stages of HTI 
There were approximately four major shifts in the HTI strategy during the life of the project that
corresponded to major changes in the political landscape as well as changes within the program itself. 
The four shifts can be categorized as follows: 1) Working with the IGOH; 2) Focusing on the Community; 
3) Supporting MINUSTAH; and 4) Post Election.
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Working with IGOH – Early 2004 to Early 2005
Based on the pre-program assessment and lessons learned from the previous IOM-OTI collaboration in 
Haiti, HTI began program implementation with a strategic mandate to support the central government and 
help raise its visibility in the target locations.2
 HTI supported actions initiated by the interim government 
and worked to promote the democratic process in an apolitical, equitable, and transparent fashion with 
the objective of reducing the motivation for spoilers. The rationale was that a spoiler would be unable to 
mobilize people to burn a voting center, for example, if residents had direct contact with the government 
or had benefited from government involvement in some way. To this end, HTI established numerous 
partnerships with the main institutions of government at the national level, including the Ministry of Public 
Works, the State Secretary for Youth and Sport (Ministry of Education), the Ministry of Culture and
Communications, and the Office of the Prime Minister. While HTI management built relationships at the 
ministerial level, staff in the field primarily worked with mayors, who were appointed by the interim
government, and local representatives of the ministries and functional offices (i.e. the water authority, 
electrical utility, etc.). The government was expected to participate in project management committees 
and contribute resources to projects, such as heavy machinery or technical assistance.
Cooperating with the government was challenging, particularly given the size of the initial projects and the 
eventual dramatic increase in volume. Approaching the Ministry of Public Works with a small, $30,000 
project was not sufficient enough to motivate them to contribute supplementary resources to the project. 
However, within a year the Ministry was unable to keep its commitments for the provision of heavy 
machinery to work on HTI because ministerial representatives made promises that were either forgotten 
or that could not be fulfilled due to a lack of resources. During the first months of the program, HTI 
management negotiated a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Minister of Planning and
External Cooperation in an effort to formalize cooperation and legitimize HTI as a government partner. It 
was perhaps indicative of future problems that both senior officials in the Ministry and the interim OTI 
representative agreed on the text, but the formal document was never signed because the Ministry never 
responded. HTI estimates that the difficulty of working with government could have been due to the
disagreement between HTI and government on per diem rates, which were much lower than the IGOH 
representatives would accept. This was a point of contention in drafting the MOU.
Because there was no MOU, HTI management worked with the various ministries on an individual basis 
and had varying success. Success usually depended on the personalities of the people involved and
their status in the ministry. HTI found that working with Director General-level staff yielded the most 
productive partnerships because these people were constant within the ministry whereas the ministers 
themselves held much less stable positions. At one point, it was suggested to use HTI to project funds to 
employ people to work in key ministries to serve as liaisons and create leverage for the program. 
However, it was ultimately determined that this approach would not be successful mainly due to the high 
level of centralization within the ministries themselves. In the Ministry of Public Works, for example, only 
the Director General could order trucks to be deployed on a project site.
In the fall of 2004, the Prime Minister quietly launched the Inter-ministerial Commission for Neglected
Neighborhoods (IMC) to serve as a focal point for activities pertaining to conflict zones. Like the HTI 
program, the IMC was designed to be geographically focused, which brought representatives of all
Ministries around the table to plan assistance for these areas. At first, attendance was motivated by the 
fact that the representatives received a fee for each meeting, and ministries saw the IMC as a potential 
source of revenue for their own individual projects. Recognizing its potential, HTI became a strong
supporter of IMC activities, and provided a great deal of technical assistance to the group. However, the 
committee was limited by the lack of motivation of the ministries, the lack of authority of the Prime
Minister, and the conflicting political agendas of certain ministries (particularly the Ministry of Health). On 
the other hand, there were some jointly implemented activities, which included the 2005 carnival
celebrations for Cite Soleil, several national sporting events highlighting youth in HTI target
neighborhoods, and the launch of the “Play for Peace” brand of HTI activities.
 
2
 Previously, IOM and OTI implemented the Community Governance Program (CGP – 1994-1997), creating new community 
structures and then supporting these structures. The central government was not involved and, while the program was successful 
through democratic elections, the structures formed during the CGP were not sustainable. Returning to Haiti after 10 years of 
learning in other contexts, IOM and OTI designed the program to involve the central government more and sue existing structures.
9
Focus on Community– Early 2005 to end of program
In spite of the speeches it made throughout the transition process, the interim government actually did 
very little for the shantytown populations and even made numerous political mistakes which severely 
damaged its credibility.3
 Also, in many instances, HTI projects were delayed because the government 
was unable to meets its commitments, the most common of which were providing heavy machinery and 
sports equipment. For these reasons, HTI reduced the emphasis on interim government involvement and 
instead pursued a strategy of focusing more on community mobilization against violence and instability. 
However, ties with the interim government were not broken because working in the total absence of the 
interim government would have increased citizens’ frustrations and prompted more discontent towards 
the government. Hence, the government was involved to the extent that it validated each project by 
verifying that the communities submitted their requests to the relevant government agencies or by signing
the grant in the office of a ministry or sending a government representative to an inauguration ceremony 
for a project. While active engagement from each ministry was not possible, HTI endeavored to at least 
maintain the appearance of government involvement to achieve program objectives.
Supporting MINUSTAH – Spring 2005 to end of program
The ESF funds provided to HTI in 2005 came with a mandate to actively support the activities of the UN 
Mission for the Stabilization of Haiti (MINUSTAH). HTI began working with MINUSTAH’s DDR Unit on 
programming in gang-affected areas during the spring of 2005 and had already approved projects
supporting voluntary disarmament efforts prior to the ESF mandate. However, this endeavor became
problematic and yielded very little results because of the political landscape. Therefore, HTI moved to 
supporting more active peacebuilding efforts by concentrating activities in areas where there was a
significant peacekeeping presence, namely Cap Haïtien, Les Cayes, and certain neighborhoods of PAP, 
specifically targeting urban communities. Field staff met regularly with MINUSTAH Civil Affairs officers or 
the local UN Police (UNPOL) contingent to coordinate activities and to work cooperatively on identifying 
projects and emerging threats to stability.
In PAP, a tragic double murder of two community members who had worked on the summer camps 
proved to be a pivotal point in the HTI-MINUSTAH relationship. A security guard and cook who had been 
working on the Play for Peace camp in Bel Air were brutally murdered after a gang attack at the camp. 
While this could have been a random gang murder in Bel Air, there is strong evidence that suggests the 
murders were connected to the summer camps. 
Immediately following the murders, HTI management contacted MINUSTAH to share information so that 
MINUSTAH could respond appropriately. Unfortunately, the response did not come immediately and HTI 
was forced to appeal to the US State Department (via OTI) for assistance in getting MINUSTAH to
address the situation. Pressure was applied on the UN in New York and soon afterwards, operations 
commenced in Bel Air to arrest the gang leaders implicated in the killings. MINUSTAH’s response was 
absolutely critical at this time to provide communities in Bel Air evidence of the existence of law
enforcement so they could be more confident in their fight against the gangs. This gave the community a 
boost of confidence that they could continue to work with HTI knowing there was some protection of law 
enforcement in the area.
While MINUSTAH did not officially recognize the connection between HTI activities in Bel Air and the 
killings, events facilitated the initiation of an important and ongoing dialogue between MINUSTAH and
HTI resulting in mutual support on the ground. . Basically, the HTI programs facilitated MINUSTAH 
access to patrol areas it had not been able to go into before, and provided MINUSTAH information about 
security issues as they arose so they could react more quickly and build positive relationships with the
communities. Because MINUSTAH was able to react quicker in more locations, HTI programs and their 
participants were more protected, allowing for high volumes of activities to take place throughout Bel Air, 
which resulted in substantially reduced instability in the area.
 
3
 These mistakes included the detention of former Prime Minister Neptune without charge for a prolonged period of 
time, the lack of a resolution on the ex-FAd’H, the repeated delay of the elections, and the consistent poor 
communication throughout the transition.
10
Post Elections – Supporting and Working with the elected government
The community focused strategy combined with attention to employment and youth activities in the pre￾election period and supporting MINUSTAH was maintained though the February 2006 Presidential
elections and the subsequent Parliamentary elections. Once the new leadership was installed, however, 
the strategy changed. HTI moved quickly to support the new government by enabling it to make high 
profile improvements in Cite Soleil, which emerged as one of the top priorities of the new administration 
because of its equal potential for peace or destabilization. The area had proven its capacity to destabilize 
the capital, but with a ceasefire declared by gangs after the election, it seemed that there was greater 
potential to make significant progress towards stability. These initial projects, consisting of 20 projects 
worth $500,000, were intended to provide a breathing space of approximately six months during which 
residents of Cite Soleil would have employment and highly visible positive changes in their communities. 
The program would later implement a second phase of the same magnitude to magnify the program’s 
impact and provide the new government time to address ongoing issues related to gangs, and the
international community to direct additional, longer-term assistance into the area.
Conflict Prevention and Conflict Reduction: Working in the Provinces and Port-au-Prince
Because of the political and social circumstances of the provinces versus Port-au-Prince, HTI had to
adopt two different strategies. In the provinces, the HTI approach reflected a conflict prevention strategy. 
Much of the violence had abated within a few months of the uprising in 2004, but tensions still existed that 
could have been exacerbated by gangs and other spoilers. In Port-au-Prince, where violence was still 
regularly occurring, HTI programming focused on conflict reduction.
Provincial Strategy – Conflict Prevention
While the HTI cities outside of PAP experience much violence during the unrest of 2004, there were not 
periods of sustained violence during the transition process. This meant that the primary objective of HTI 
in these target areas, including Petit Goâve, Saint Marc, Cap Haïtien and Les Cayes, focused on conflict 
prevention, and, in some cases, reconciliation between communities that were previously in conflict prior 
to and during 2004. Each of these cities had unelected local governments consisting of three-person 
panels of mayors appointed by the interim government as well as holdover elements from the rebellion, 
which had the potential to act as spoilers. In most places, gangs were present but not as active in 
creating political havoc and criminal violence as the gangs in the capital. Hence, to reduce the possibility 
of conflict, HTI’s provincial strategy revolved around projects that focused on creating space for peaceful 
dialogue, including the local authorities in decision making and management, bringing in national service 
delivery agencies, and insisting on community-driven public service delivery.
Creating Space for Dialogue
A critical element of establishing dialogue, either between communities in conflict or between the citizens 
and government is having a designated, neutral space where people can meet. Early projects in Saint 
Marc, Petit Goâve and Les Cayes were renovations of rooms within City Hall to create physical space for 
dialogue. Locating these public spaces in City Hall also gave the government added visibility and the 
opportunity to demonstrate leadership for the good of the community.
However, dialogue requires not only physical space, but also a mechanism through which expression of 
needs and frustrations are allowed in a productive and non-threatening environment. HTI’s approach in 
Saint Marc is a model for how to create this process successfully. HTI provided technical assistance to 
the municipality for the establishment of the Saint Marc Development Committee, a weekly forum during 
which citizens could express their needs to the municipal authorities, the local ministerial representatives, 
law enforcement officials, and donors, and where project proposals were considered. This model could be 
particularly useful if decentralization becomes a priority for both the newly elected government and the 
donor/development community.
However, it does have two serious limitations. First, it requires significant donor funds to meet the needs 
and/or fulfill the requests of the citizens. The Saint Marc committee encountered difficulties because it 
could not meet expressed needs due to a dearth of resources (HTI’s resources were narrowly targeted to 
11
violence- or gang-affected communities). The second limitation of the model is that it requires a dynamic 
and involved municipality. Toward the end of HTI’s second year, the Saint Marc Development Committee 
stopped meeting because two of the three mayors left the city, leaving only one mayor with whom it was 
difficult to work. The City Manager attempted to keep the committee running but he lacked the political 
clout to motivate the others to participate. Unfortunately, HTI was not able to keep the momentum of the 
committee going as a result, but if there are fair municipal elections and HTI has an extended mandate in 
Haiti, it would be worth replicating this project in conjunction with other longer-term donor programs that 
target marginalized urban areas more broadly.
Mayor as Mediator
In areas where communities were in conflict, HTI worked to create or enhance a local mediation 
mechanism. Because mayors were unelected and were unable to run in the elections, they were
relatively neutral figures, and therefore could be good mediators in terms of public perception. In many 
cases, the principal mayor was generally apolitical while one of the deputy mayors was affiliated with the 
main political group or party in the town and had been involved in the 2004 turmoil. Regardless, HTI 
provided technical assistance to the municipalities to help them conduct business in a neutral, balanced 
setting as would be suitable for an institution of government. HTI was able to facilitate this by bringing 
municipal representatives to work in the areas where it was not previously safe for them to work. This 
demonstrated to the citizens that the municipal authorities were committed to upholding their
responsibilities to all residents. 
Accompanying the principle of equity were efforts to reinforce the municipality’s role as the primary 
authority by ensuring that community meetings, grant signings, tender openings, etc. occurred at City Hall 
rather than at the HTI offices. By doing this, HTI eventually helped build the credibility of the municipality 
so that when problems or conflicts arose, residents felt comfortable bringing the issues to the authorities 
before they escalated. This was illustrated in Saint Marc when youth from two warring neighborhoods 
wanted to hold a reconciliation football tournament. One of the local leaders (running for Parliament)
declared that youth from Portail Guepes would not be permitted to play in La Scierie, the two opposing 
neighborhoods, so the youth appealed to the municipality for a solution. Although the mayor was not able 
to convince the local leader to permit the tournament in La Scierie, he was able to work with the youth to 
find a neutral third location. Not only did the tournament take place successfully, the youth overcame an 
obstacle together peacefully and in collaboration with the government, sending a powerful message to the 
broader community. In fact, a few months later, these two sports groups joined a third in holding a three￾week, citywide tournament.
Participation of the National Government
In every HTI city, the program encouraged participation from the central government to work in neglected 
areas. In the provinces, this presented additional challenges because, typically, the influence of the
central government did not extend that far outside of PAP. Therefore, local representatives of the
ministries, particularly the Ministry of Public Works, lacked the resources to do much in their areas of 
responsibility. In some cases, HTI projects became a way to extend their resources, enabling local 
officials to meet community priorities in spite of their own lack of means. 
The best example of this was in Petit Goâve where the local representative of the MoPW had been so 
vilified for his inability to meet urgent needs that he feared for his life every time he entered the city prior 
to the arrival of the HTI program. The first HTI project in Petit Goâve was the construction of a bridge. 
This program enabled the responsiveness of the MoPW representative who was at the project site nearly 
every day providing technical expertise. Although the ministry was unable to provide the heavy
machinery it promised, a gap that was filled in by MINUSTAH, the positive role played by this
representative did not go unnoticed. After several more projects, the representative was spending most 
of his days in Petit Goâve and enjoying positive relations with the citizens.
To support an increase in the visibility of the central government in the provinces, HTI considered bringing 
ministry officials to project sites and local public meetings. Due to the time-intensiveness of this type of 
endeavor, the idea was not aggressively pursued. Nevertheless, the idea has potential if additional 
human resources were to be added to HTI and could be revisited with the Preval government.
12
Community-Driven Public Service Delivery
Due to the severe lack of government resources in the provinces, part of the HTI strategy was to create 
and reinforce participatory mechanisms for public service delivery. Using a successful model developed 
by the Centrale Autonome Metropolitaine d’Eau Potable (CAMEP – the national water authority for PAP), 
HTI worked with local representatives and communities to extend water and electricity service into 
neglected communities. The program helped to create a mechanism of dialogue with the service provider 
and shared responsibility for the service. In both Petit Goâve and Cap Haïtien, this model was highly 
successful for electricity. Residents of a single street or small neighborhood would organize with the 
representative from the local electricity utility, Electricité d’Haiti (EDH), to create an electricity 
management system. This would entail a single meter for which the community would select a committee 
responsible for collecting flat fees from users. This same committee would educate the community as to 
the dangers of illegal connections and monitor connections to ensure that the transformer would not 
overload. The committee would demand payment from people with illegal connections, which allowed the 
illegal connector leverage in terms of formalizing the system in their location. In return, EDH gave back 
roughly 10 percent of the fees collected to be saved by the committee to pay for maintenance. EDH 
provided the technical expertise to install equipment provided by HTI. The positive dialogue that took 
place through this project and process served to ease frustrations because community members were 
satisfied by the government’s responsiveness to their needs which was done transparently and
respectfully. This system brought the government and community together with both acknowledging the 
need for cooperation in order to have a sustainable structure. As in all work with the government, this 
model requires willingness on the part of government representatives. Unlike Cap Haïtien, Saint Marc 
was not successful in duplicating the electricity model because the local representative was not
interested.
PAP – Conflict Reduction
At the beginning of the HTI program, the situation in Port-au-Prince was very similar to that in the
provinces, but by October 2004, it had radically changed. A sharp increase in violence turned downtown 
Port-au-Prince into a war zone. There was active gun-fighting in the streets and a palpable security 
threat to international and local staff and partners. Gangs, both criminal and quasi-political, had control of 
certain areas of the city, severely limiting access to many HTI target neighborhoods. Where possible, the 
HTI Port-au-Prince team pursued the same strategic fundamentals as the provinces. However, the
persistent security threat necessitated other considerations, particularly the critical role of law
enforcement.
Return to “Normalcy”
The violence of 2004 significantly disrupted life throughout the main metropolitan areas. Moreover, the 
violence that ensued after the brutal beheading of police officers radically delayed the level of “normalcy” 
in PAP. Therefore, one objective of HTI’s strategy was to accelerate the reduction of violence by
encouraging “normal” activities, or activities that people were used to doing day-to-day before the
violence escalated. One of the first of these types of activities was sponsoring Carnival celebrations with 
the IMC in Cite Soleil where consistent high levels of violence prevented residents from going to the
national celebrations in downtown PAP. These projects simply extended activi ties available to residents 
of calmer areas to include shantytown residents. The Play for Peace summer youth activities similarly 
followed this strategy as did a series of public housing and latrine cleaning projects whereby payments of 
fees were restarted. By enabling a normal activity, like the annual latrine cleaning, residents also had to 
respond with normal behavior, i.e. paying their housing fees.
“Rule of Three” – Community Ownership, Development Assistance, and Rule of Law
To reduce active conflict in the areas hardest hit by violence, HTI identified a necessary formula for
stability known as the “Rule of Three” – community ownership, development assistance, and rule of law. 
All three aspects must be present to relieve conflict in the most violence-ridden locations. For example, 
HTI realized that in Haiti, law enforcement alone could not bring peace, nor could humanitarian
assistance. Only the community could be the engine in peacebuilding, and they could not do it without 
support from law enforcement and incentives provided by the government or the international community. 
Rarely were communities able to stand up to gangs in the absence of some sort of law enforcement, 
13
either police or peacekeepers, for fear of retaliation. This was evident in the Bel Air incident where an 
active community association had the support of HTI for their peaceful activities, but lacked the presence 
of a law enforcement entity to provide for their security. Nevertheless, law enforcement alone would not 
be sufficient since, in the absence of humanitarian or government resources, the community would not 
have a tangible, material incentive to disrupt the status quo.
“Tipping the Balance” – Community Empowerment
In areas controlled by gangs, there was a natural tension between the gang leaders and the community. 
Local residents were the first victims of the gangs, often seeing part of whatever they earned extorted by 
the gangs. Nevertheless, the gangs were dependent on residents for protection to a certain degree
because of the extent to which they were integrated into society. Gang leaders lived in known locations 
and could be turned over to police if not for the residents’ fear of retribution due to the lack of an effective 
justice system.
HTI worked to tip the balance of power in gang controlled areas away from the gangs and into the hands 
of peaceful community groups. This was accomplished by identifying civic groups and supporting
projects managed by a committee consisting of representatives of these organizations and government. 
It was expected that for a first project in an area, civic groups may have had to make arrangements with 
the gang in control to allow the project to take place in its territory. However, after a critical mass of 
projects had been achieved with more projects in the pipeline, the broader community recognized that the 
civic groups were bringing the jobs and improvement while the gangs were deterring progress. This shift 
could only occur if the change happens under the radar of the gangs, who could try to derail the process if 
they feel threatened by it early on. HTI accomplished this by implementing multiple projects in an area 
with multiple partners each with its own management committee so that no one person or group was 
seen as challenging the “power” of the gangs. 
The “Rule of Three” and “Tipping the Balance” principles were most effectively demonstrated in Bel Air 
following the MINUSTAH operations in October 2005. Cite Soleil, on the other hand, illustrates the
principles by their absence. Unlike in Bel Air, where there was a cohesive community supported by both 
a development assistance actor (HTI) and peacekeepers, Cite Soleil had neither a cohesive community 
nor rule of law, and consequently, HTI was not as successful. Although there were some active
community groups in Cite Soleil, many of the residents, particularly the respected leaders, had fled the 
area when heavy fighting broke out, and only the people without social authority, i.e. the poorest of the 
poor and youth, remained. This left a very small ‘community’ toward which to tip the balance and a very 
large area in which the community was diffused. Additionally, MINUSTAH troops in Cite Soleil did not 
have the same level of control of the area, nor did they employ the same approach to stabilization. 
Consequently, they did not have the same level of success. HTI remained as active as possible in Cite 
Soleil in spite of this lack of the Rule of Three because it was necessary to position the program for future 
work by building the credibility of HTI with residents. 
Working with MINUSTAH
HTI worked extensively with MINUSTAH, particularly in the second year, given both the ESF mandate 
and the partnerships required by the “Rule of Three.” Ideally, the Haitian National Police (HNP) would 
have formed the third piece of the puzzle, but rampant corruption and its politically-affiliated personnel 
made the HNP an impossible partner. Following the deaths of the two Bel Air residents, HTI established 
a mechanism of communication that strengthened the relationship between HTI and MINSUTAH and
enabled HTI to more fully support MINUSTAH stabilization efforts. Specifically, HTI provided information 
sheets by location with maps that marked project sites, which gave patrols a reason to go to certain 
areas. HTI community partners appealed to HTI staff to request additional patrols in project areas, which 
signaled to MINUSTAH that their troops would be welcomed at the location. This was particularly
important because MINUSTAH suffered from a very poor public image and was not well liked. At one 
project site, the patrol leader exchanged phone numbers with a member of the project oversight
committee so that they could stay in contact throughout the duration of the project. On a later occasion, 
the same community group invited MINUSTAH patrols to participate in an HTI-sponsored reconciliation 
football tournament. 
14
In addition to facilitating patrols, HTI also opened the door to MINUSTAH Civil-Military Cooperation
(CIMIC) to propose projects to maximize their own efforts. For example, HTI supported two projects 
proposed by the troop contingent in the section of Bel Air that borders Cite Soleil in an effort to extend the 
effects of Bel Air’s community improvement projects. To avoid conflict with their much less effective
counterparts in Cite Soleil, they used their own funds to support projects on the edge of their area of 
responsibility in Bel Air while HTI covered a section of neighborhood across the road from their activities 
in Cite Soleil. 
Throughout this collaboration, HTI was very careful to maintain a safe distance from MINUSTAH and to 
never appear together in public. This was necessary to ensure the ongoing safety of HTI staff. Although 
the public opinion of MINUSTAH improved dramatically in Bel Air, there was always the risk that good 
relations could deteriorate. If the public had perceived HTI staff (as well as the members of the
community committees) as an unarmed and unprotected extension of MINUSTAH, they could easily have 
become soft targets. 
As successful as the collaboration was with the peacekeepers in Bel Air, the relationship with MINUSTAH 
was generally problematic and high-maintenance. It was only possible because of pressure applied by 
the US State Department on the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the New York level 
(thanks to a request by OTI). In Port-au-Prince, IOM lacked the leverage to influence MINUSTAH to 
acknowledge problems and react and was unsuccessful in obtaining responsiveness on a continual basis. 
Staff within the civil-military coordination unit generally rotated every six months, requiring HTI staff to
start over developing relationships each time. Moreover, while peacekeepers in Bel Air seemed to
recognize that HTI could be a useful tool, the program struggled to establish the same relationship with 
MINUSTAH in other PAP areas. In general, MINUSTAH was not skilled in humanitarian operations and 
displayed very little political will to stabilize certain areas, specifically Cite Soleil. The nature of the UN 
force was itself problematic since it was primarily a military force rather than a police force, which would 
have been arguably more appropriate. 
HTI also recognized several severe strategic mistakes on the part of MINUSTAH. For example, the 
reaction to the two murders in Bel Air was first suspicion, denial, and inaction rather than an investigation 
into the incident followed by action. That would have sent a strong signal to gangs that those perpetrating 
violence would face dire consequences. 
Before HTI began working with the military side of MINUSTAH, it had an extensive history of collaboration 
with its DDR unit. This unit was established to address the problem of the ex-FAd’H and other armed 
groups, but later shifted its focus to address the problem of gangs. Due to differences in approach, the 
unit’s inability to respond quickly to changing conditions the ground, and the challenge of targeting
different groups (HTI targeted peaceful civic groups while DDR targeted gang members), this
collaboration proved difficult.
Program Initiatives – Bel Air and Martissant
Because of the high level of violence in PAP, HTI implemented particular initiatives in Bel Air and
Martissant, which experienced positive results. Nowhere was the plausible association between HTI and 
improved stability more evident than in these two locations where the neighborhoods underwent dramatic 
changes while HTI was present. 
Following the police beheadings that took place in October 2004, Bel Air became too violent to enter 
because of daily, spontaneous shooting in the streets. Bel Air was also the stronghold of Lavalas 
militants who had no interest in working with the interim government. In fact, the area was so volatile that 
MINUSTAH had been unable to establish a permanent base in the neighborhood. In spite of these
challenges, HTI was able to start a few projects and become known in the community as a credible
partner. By August 2005, MINUSTAH was able to establish a durable base of operations in Fort National 
at which point HTI met with a group of civic organizations to identify priorities. To reach a critical mass of 
activities, HTI immediately signed six grants for high-visibility, labor-intensive infrastructure projects like 
paving corridors and constructing public parks. 
Fort National is on one end of Bel Air, on the opposite side from the very hot zones. Nevertheless, the 
impact of that first intervention started a ripple effect that eventually reached the most violent and militant 
15
areas. After the start of activities in Fort National, civic groups from adjacent Ti Chery approached the 
HTI partners seeking assistance in duplicating the process in their own neighborhood. HTI repeated the 
model in Ti Chery, facilitating community identification of priorities and launching a group of projects at 
once. Communities felt more powerful because of the increased proximity of both assistance and law 
enforcement and were less tolerant of gang activity in their communities. One by one, gang leaders fled 
Bel Air and small neighborhood groups approached HTI for assistance. Within six months, normalcy (and 
traffic jams) had returned to Bel Air and the extent of HTI involvement had reached the border of Cite 
Soleil. Because HTI involvement went hand-in-hand with an expanded MINUSTAH presence and
increased community activity, it is impossible to claim sole credit for the transformation, but there is 
certainly a plausible association between the stability achieved in Bel Air and HTI programming which the
MINUSTAH Force Commander acknowledged to the IOM Chief of Mission during a joint field visit.
Martissant experienced a similar transformation, again with strong initiative by local civic groups. HTI had 
earned a positive reputation in Martissant as a program that both delivers and endures. Unfortunately, 
due to a reallocation of funds to support the Bel Air initiative, HTI involvement decreased significantly. 
After a deterioration in both the security situation and relations with MINUSTAH, a group of civic leaders 
approached HTI with a proposition. These organizations, with which HTI had worked in the past,
proposed a set of nine projects that would bring a significant amount of employment and neighborhood 
improvement to an area that was plagued with inter-gang violence. The critical part of the plan was how 
the projects were presented to the community. The groups announced the projects publicly at a
neighborhood carnival celebration but added that the projects would only happen if there was no violence 
during their implementation. This conditional promise of jobs and incomes to the neighborhood was 
enough incentive to precipitate a gang ceasefire. The gangs in Martissant were relatively well-integrated 
into the community, meaning that local gangs committed their acts of violence in neighboring
communities while leaving their own people unharmed. These gang members were sheltered (de facto) 
by their own community since residents were not ready to risk their own safety telling local gangs to stop 
being violent toward their neighbors. The jobs and improvements offered through HTI projects provided 
the incentive for community members to stand up to the local gangs, their “own people”, and say that the 
violence had to stop. After all, a gang member is always somebody’s son or cousin who is not immune to 
local pressure. When word of the civic groups’ plan spread throughout the area, the local gangs felt the 
tide of public opinion rising against them, and they declared a ceasefire among all gangs in the
Martissant/Grand Ravine/Ti Bois area. HTI reinforced this stability through 11 additional projects with the 
civic groups. This experience demonstrated the power of community groups to achieve peace in their 
neighborhood, but only if they have some sort of leverage, which HTI provided. However, the lack of an 
effective law enforcement presence in Martissant threatened the durability of this stability and the
neighborhood would later see a resurgence of inter-gang violence, demonstrating again the case for “the 
rule of three” in achieving lasting community stabilization.
PROGRAM STRENGTHS
Although the overall strategy may have been refined and altered throughout the duration of the program, 
it was based on methodological fundamentals that both guided and protected the integrity of the program. 
A guiding principle that impacted each aspect of the HTI approach was the invisibility of IOM. IOM 
distanced itself from the program so that it would not be given all of the credit. For the success of the 
program, it was more important for the government, communities and local organizations to be
recognized for their achievements in order to build local confidence. IOM interceded in program
implementation only to ensure quality and a transparent process. For example, IOM was not responsible 
for making sure that workers came to the job on time or for paying workers’ compensation if someone 
was injured while on the job. It was the responsibility of the community/local partner. If they did not take 
responsibility for the project, then they would not have had ownership of the success. Keeping this 
distance, however, was an ongoing challenge because instinctively, HTI management wanted to step in 
to help communities overcome obstacles. However, upholding this principle resulted in improved
community cohesion produced through the shared responsibility to manage the projects and resolve
problems together. 
In addition to keeping a distance from program implementation, HTI’s approach had a number of other 
strengths including how it selected locations and strategic partners; ensuring that the community owned 
the projects; the responsiveness of the program to local needs; the inclusion of multiple
16
partners/benefactors for each project; encouraging interim government involvement; undertaking a critical 
mass of activities; and the messaging/branding strategy.
Selecting Locations and Strategic Partners
HTI realized that it could not be very effective if the projects and project impact were spread too thinly 
across a wide geographic area. This, combined with initial resource scarcity, necessitated a strict and 
relatively narrow geographic focus, at both the national and municipal levels. Initial cities were chosen 
based on the political events of 2004. When the program expanded from three offices to five, Cap
Haïtien and Les Cayes were chosen based on a relatively simple analysis of the nature of the conflict in 
proposed areas and the capacity with which HTI would be able to make an impact. This analysis was 
made after site visits, meetings with government representatives, local organizations, police, citizens and 
discussions with MINUSTAH (Civil Affairs, Human Rights, Political Section, DDR, UNPOL, Military), as 
the newly allocated ESF funds were earmarked specifically for supporting MINUSTAH. Hinche was also 
considered because of the presence of ex-FAd’H in the area but was eliminated due to the lack of a 
concentration of individuals to target. Similarly, Ouanaminthe was considered because of the high level 
of violence experienced there, but was also rejected because the violence was primarily banditry, which 
HTI was ill equipped to address.4
 
Neighborhoods within target cities were selected based on known political instability and intelligence from 
local staff and partners, government officials, MINUSTAH, and other agencies or organizations in the
area. New neighborhoods were added as the situation on the ground evolved, for example if an area
became unstable due to gang activity, a political dispute, etc. It was also important to maintain balance 
when selecting neighborhoods, particularly in the provinces where the conflicts were typically between
neighborhoods. This not only prevented jealousy among residents, it also prevented the program from 
being seen as supporting a political agenda. Limiting geographic focus was most difficult at the
neighborhood level because there is a huge temptation to extend activities to all areas “in need.” 
However, this limitation was absolutely critical to prevent spreading the program too thinly. Addressing 
“need” occurred at the municipal level when appropriate, for example by supporting the creation of
municipal tool banks, repair of trucks, etc.).5
HTI did not work with individuals, but rather community groups, associations, and organizations. These 
groups were apolitical and without criminal ties, gang affiliation or strong political identity. When it 
entered new areas without any existing connection, HTI worked with a well-known humanitarian
organization, sports association or other formal civic group. Regardless of the nature, the first project 
provided the HTI team with an opportunity to understand who was doing what in the area and identify 
potential alternative partners for subsequent projects. HTI staff’s intimate knowledge of the communities 
in which they worked proved critical to the program’s ability to respond to dynamics affecting conflict 
utilizing small grant activities as tools for conflict mitigation. 
Community Ownership
A key element of the HTI program was its capacity to involve the target community (and the government) 
at every step of the process: identification, implementation and maintenance. More importantly, the
community was the main actor in charge of preventing problems and finding solutions once they
occurred. Being part of a project with the government was a way of being part of the transition, and 
residents were less likely to fight against the transition if they were part of it. In most programs,
community ownership was achieved by requiring a community contribution to each project. The
generation of income through HTI projects was necessarily an HTI goal due to the destitution of partner 
communities. Therefore, the community contribution to the project typically came in the form of security, 
coordination, and solving problems. The main responsibilities of the community included the identification 
of the project, involvement in the tendering process (typically with the relevant ministry and municipality), 
selection of unskilled workers, and coordination with the contractor. By placing the community in charge 
of selecting workers, it ensured that local residents were not only part of project management but also 
 
4
 Nevertheless, HTI supported a single project in Ouanamnithe to enhance MINUSTAH’s ability to provide law enforcement by 
helping the national electrical utility install public lighting.
5
 HTI faced criticism by residents of areas that were not targeted by HTI.
17
benefited from the wages provided. They also serve a vetting function, taking responsibility for choosing 
those most in need and those who will get the job done. 
Everyone, including the spoilers, had a stake in the selection of the workers. Even when the HTI team 
did not manage to engage the broader population during the project identification process, the word went 
out that a certain number of jobs would be created. To prevent the spoilers (often political parties without 
funds prior to elections) from trying to take credit for bringing resources to a neighborhood, the committee 
was in charge of choosing the workers. This tactic ensured that the “right” people received the benefit of 
wages without corruption or intimidation of the contractor, or manipulation by a spoiler. This self￾regulation occurred successfully in Petit Goâve where a group of women disapproved of the initial all￾male selection of workers and persuaded the committee to change the roster. The women activists then 
had to choose the beneficiaries of the limited number of positions, which they awarded to the neediest 
women in the area. It is important to not underestimate the community’s understanding of the issues that 
affect them. Members of the project committee know that they should include at-risk youth in the
employment roster in order to achieve stability, and also understand that the laborers could not consist 
entirely of youth as this would risk alienating the broader community. In fact, residents understood this 
balance more acutely than outsiders ever could. 
For programs similar to HTI, it is important to remember that each community has a particular personality, 
which serves to maintain a sort of order within the system, and could be characterized as a general 
community consensus. This quiet consensus, regardless of what outspoken leaders or noise-makers 
may say, supports projects that benefit the greater good, the sum of individual interests, whether that is a 
flood prevention project or a new school. This creates a self-regulatory mechanism that operates within 
a community that can be used to HTI’s advantage. If the general consensus (the community) does not 
validate a project, it will rarely be completed satisfactorily. However, if a project is recognized as
beneficial to the greater good, the community will ensure the conditions necessary for completion of the 
project. Large public gatherings rather than small, interpersonal meetings were essential to identify
projects or validate project selection in front of the community to ensure its success. For example, in an 
area where residents saw their houses washed away by floods, it was guaranteed that they would do 
everything they could to ensure the successful completion of riverbank reinforcement, even if it meant 
standing up to gangs. However, if the project was not supported by the community, there was no 
incentive for residents to risk retaliation, and in these cases, they would inform HTI staff. Likewise, if a 
steering committee was not similarly validated, its members were removed and replaced by people with 
more authority and concurrence with the majority without the HTI team’s involvement. This was not 
something that could be imposed upon a community, but rather something that naturally occurred
because the program provided the space for this ownership.
Program Responsiveness and Flexibility
What was successful about the HTI program was its responsiveness to community needs and its flexibility 
in the kinds of programs it implemented, the time in which they were completed, and the speed with which 
it moved from idea to completion. HTI was cross-cutting rather than sector-focused, meaning that its 
activities were not restricted to a single type of intervention such as education, infrastructure, health, etc. 
Therefore, each project could be designed to respond to the expressed needs of the community, so HTI 
usually supported whatever project the community identified as a priority within certain limitations. HTI 
avoided some types of projects, including those that could be corrupted for someone’s political agenda. 
For example, HTI rejected a request to renovate a community center in Les Cayes that was doubling as 
the Lavalas headquarters. Also, programs that were not sustainable, like clean-up programs which were 
often one-time projects, were generally avoided unless they contributed to a rehabilitation project. Stand￾alone latrines were never constructed with HTI funds because nobody was willing to pay for something 
they could do in a canal with impunity. 
An example of other successful community-driven programs included infrastructure projects. They
worked well as initial projects, especially in insecure areas, because they were easy to monitor in times of 
increased violence due to their ability to produce tangible results quickly. These projects also served as 
foundations for future activities. Electricity and water projects were a perfect tool for sending a signal that 
the transition was bringing positive change. Often conflicts arose between neighborhoods because one 
shantytown would steal these types of resources from a neighboring community. This problem that could 
be resolved through an HTI project similar to the one referenced above that took place in the provinces 
18
and provided water and electricity services to the communities. These projects also eased accumulated 
frustration toward the government and presented an opportunity to share management of these resources 
in a sustainable system. Moreover, extending basic services to a shantytown was a huge step toward 
social integration of these communities and reducing their isolation.
By in large, the project itself was of secondary importance to the process through which it was identified 
and implemented and the dialogue created around it. This emphasis on process over product was
facilitated both by the distanced nature of IOM as implementer as well as a high degree of flexibility in the 
time for implementation. The ability to prolong a project enabled HTI to take a hands-off approach to 
problems, prompting the community to create local conflict resolution mechanisms or turn to the
government as a mediator. This process often took time as communities had been trained by NGOs that 
if they wait, eventually the NGO will solve the problem for them so that the product can be finished. By 
leaving residents to create their own mechanism to solve the problem, the process provided a shared
experience and a model for collective action that could be applied to other community problems. 
In terms of the responsiveness, HTI was able to bring communities together and reduce violence or the 
potential for violence because of its stress on the process of implementing a program instead of the
product. For instance, when a contractor was attacked near the site of a soccer field rehabilitation project 
in Cite Soleil (IOMPAP001), HTI simply stopped the projects and left the community to find a solution to 
the problem with assurances that HTI would restart activities when the problem was solved. The
community responded by creating a system of escorts that ensured the safe transit of the contractors, 
after which project activities resumed and the project was completed, albeit nearly six months behind
schedule. Nevertheless, the common experience increased the cohesion of the community which was 
then applied to other, non-HTI community issues. A project which takes nine months instead of three 
months, but during which a community solved three problems together, is a successful project. 
Moreover, this emphasis on process also enabled HTI to keep the momentum going for program
implementation. For example, once a grant was signed, HTI began the tendering process immediately, 
leaving no time for community momentum to be lost. It wasn’t difficult to get communities mobilized to 
begin a project, but it was very easy to lose this energy (and program credibility) by delaying the start or 
resumption of activities. Therefore, when a community solved a problem which had resulted in a pause in 
activities, HTI endeavored to resume work immediately.
Multiple Partners
HTI projects were managed by committee, with members occasionally being formally elected but always
validated by the broader community, at a minimum. Committees were typically composed of
representatives from a formal community organization, members of the community at large,
representatives from the Municipality, and representatives of the relevant Ministry. Involving multiple
actors in the activity established a system of shared responsibility and shared recognition. It also ensured 
that the project contributed to stability in the entire community rather than reflect the agenda of a few 
individuals. The committee was a self-regulating mechanism in which community participation ensured 
that the government could not take full credit for the projects, and vice versa. If only one civic group was 
participating in the project, HTI tried to identify other local associations with which to work on future
projects to ensure that a single organization or individual did not gain too much power in the area. 
To ensure the integrity of the project management committee, HTI created a committee for each project 
lasting only as long as the duration of the project. HTI opposed the strategy of establishing local standing 
committees to oversee all development projects in a neighborhood. These kinds of committees often 
came with a certain cache that was attractive to individuals with political agendas rather than a
community agenda. Likewise, people who obtained power through force (i.e. gang leaders) could
formalize and legitimate their position in the community by securing a place on such a committee, not 
only injuring the credibility of the process but also the implementer and donor. Similarly, a committee that 
was too high-profile could also draw the negative attention of people whose power was threatened by 
positive development. Small, project-oriented committees that dissolved when the project was complete 
ran less chance of being both exploited and threatened by negative elements. Members of HTI
committees could be elected to subsequent project committees if the community wished it, which
guaranteed accountability to the people.
19
It was very common to have committee members occupy several roles, particularly with regard to
government representatives. For example, a Deputy Mayor could also have been the head of a political 
party, and the head of the football association could also have been a local business leader. HTI worked 
to prevent corruption of project goals by rigorously communicating with these people and publicly
referring to them in their institutional capacity rather than as individuals. The presence of other partners 
on the committee helped secure this distinction.
Interim Government Involvement
The involvement of the central (interim) government was absolutely essential to accomplishing the goals
of the HTI program. In Port-au-Prince particularly, much of the conflict was based on citizen frustration 
with the government. So to overcome this obstacle to a peaceful transition, the government had to
participate in projects in a positive way to demonstrate their will to help the communities. In the
provinces, the government (through the appointed transition mayors) had a crucial role to play in
resolving inter-neighborhood conflicts. Hence, depending on the area, HTI either brought the government 
to work in areas in which it was not liked or raised the profile of the government as a mediator in
municipal affairs. To work in absence of the government would have been to diminish its authority in the 
public domain and be in conflict with HTI objectives. 
In addition to the strategic necessity of working with the government, there was a functional need to work 
in partnership with them. Many of HTI’s grants were infrastructure projects; therefore it was imperative for 
them to be consistent with government plans. While HTI may have been able to build a water kiosk or 
install an electrical network, it could not have filled the water pipes or turned on the lights. Moreover, 
water and electricity were both limited resources so HTI worked with the government to encourage
sensitization training on wise usage to accompany any network expansion. HTI funds were also used to 
leverage additional resources to increase the supply by repairing an existing but non-functional hydro￾electric plant, for example. Additionally, through technical assistance to the government, HTI encouraged 
the government to inform communities diplomatically why their needs could not be met at that time (i.e., if 
they are outside the plan or it is a technical impossibility). Although the government’s message was not 
good news, by virtue of the fact that they acknowledged the community and its problems demonstrated 
that the government was listening.
Critical Mass of Activities
To have an impact, HTI realized that there needed to be a critical mass of activities in an area. As the 
representative of the State Secretary for Youth and Sport in Cap Haïtien said, “It is necessary to fill the 
space (power/leadership void) or someone else will.” As the program was working during a politically 
sensitive period in desperate areas where very few organizations had previously been involved, the
pressure on each project was significant. A single project in a neighborhood would seem like a weak 
attempt at appeasement rather than a decisive effort toward progress. In fact, the program worked to 
build positive momentum to change mindsets towards the transition, which required a significant number 
of projects sustained over time. In some areas, the critical mass grew gradually, while in others,
specifically Bel Air and Martissant (2006), HTI began with five or six projects to provide more “instant” 
critical mass. 
Once a critical mass of activities was achieved, it was necessary to maintain the momentum until a
natural ending point, such as a handover of activities to longer-term development programming. The 
program also saw the disastrous results of not sustaining the momentum when it seemed that stability 
had reached Martissant in mid 2005. The previously violent area had calmed significantly during the first 
year of HTI activities there, allowing the program to allocate resources elsewhere. However, as the
conditions for enduring stability had not yet been achieved, the situation deteriorated again. This decline 
was made tragically apparent when a gang from a neighboring area used a tournament during the “Play 
for Peace” summer camp as an opportunity to assert its power, resulting in at least eight people killed. 
HTI returned to Martissant en force through the Martissant Initiative described above. 
In ideal cases, HTI achieved critical mass through labor-intensive infrastructure projects and then
sustained positive momentum by adding activities and events to the spectrum of projects. Maintaining 
momentum was a critical aspect of the program and required that funding for new areas of intervention be 
20
evaluated against existing needs. However, the necessary size and scope of an initiative, and program in 
general, depended on the nature of the communities targeted by the program. A clear example of this is 
the contrast between Cite Soleil and Bel Air, both strategic and highly sensitive areas in Port-au-Prince. 
HTI achieved a critical mass in Bel Air with roughly $1 million and six months. However, this was enabled 
by a strong sense of community among residents, a relatively dense geographic area, and the additional 
support of MINUSTAH as a law enforcement presence. In contrast, HTI was unable to reach critical mass 
in Cite Soleil because of the lack of cohesion among residents, the lack of law enforcement and a wide 
geographic territory. While a huge amount of funding could have enabled HTI to make more of an impact 
in Cite Soleil, the limitations were equally due to the existing circumstances on the ground. 
Messaging/Branding
As vital to the program as achieving critical mass was, it was important to do so under the radar of
spoilers who might have tried to derail the process. For this reason, media and messaging activities had 
to be very sensitive to this and highly strategic. If too much attention was called to an initiative in an area 
that did not yet have sufficient rule of law to protect citizens, community partners could have been put at 
risk of retaliation by gangs. For example, before MINUSTAH established itself in Bel Air, HTI assisted a 
community group in holding a “Play for Peace” summer camp, which the community advertised widely
and even holding a “Peace Parade” in the neighborhood. A gang saw this as a threat to their authority 
and attacked the final camp event resulting in one injury and two deaths immediately after it. 
Additionally, while HTI’s emphasis on community ownership strengthened programs, it limited its control 
in assisting the communities to develop messages for projects. Given the inexperience of the community 
in creating messages, the projects were vulnerable to misinterpretations and spoilers who could corrupt 
the integrity of the project with their own message. For example, a major park in Cite Soleil was 
inaugurated by Aristide in February 2004, before it was completed. This park was chosen by the Preval 
government as one of the projects in their post-election strategy. The completion of the park could signal 
that the country is moving on, or it could be corrupted by spoilers to emphasize that Aristide is still a vital 
part of the political landscape. Therefore, it is advisable to avoid projects for which the risk of message 
corruption outweighs the benefits of the project.
Nevertheless, messaging was critical to broadening the impact HTI. HTI identified three distinct levels of 
messaging needed for the project. The first focused on the impact of HTI within the areas in which 
projects were implemented. While only some residents were employed on a construction site or had 
children who played on a soccer field, the whole community benefited from the psychological impact of 
the project if they felt connected to it. This was achieved by advertising projects locally, for example, with 
banners saying “People at Work” over a road rehabilitation work site and using standard USAID project 
boards. The second level of messaging was efforts to change the image of target areas in the minds of 
the public outside of target neighborhoods. To achieve this, HTI worked with the IMC of the Prime
Minister’s office to hold nationally televised sports events featuring youth from HTI target areas. 
Additionally, the program sponsored a series of short radio broadcasts about HTI projects throughout the 
five cities, which also achieved the first and second messaging objectives as residents from the target 
zones themselves listened to the broadcasts. The third level of messaging was advertising the
successes of HTI to the broader international community, including other offices of USAID. This was 
done to increase the likelihood of partnerships and coordination among other organizations and donors, 
but was almost exclusively in the form of briefing papers, standard USAID reporting and participation in 
coordination meetings rather than through the media. 
In general, HTI could have done more with regard to messaging. Communities were encouraged to use
the media to advertise their activities if they saw fit, but HTI was not very proactive in encouraging this
outside of specific media projects. In addition to the radio broadcasts, HTI organized a media tour for 
journalists to visit the “Play for Peace” summer camps in 2005 and sponsored a media event to launch 
the “Play for Peace” theme, but typically the program relied on the USAID/US Embassy press office to 
liaise with the media when appropriate. This area of the program could be improved, both in the quantity 
and variety. 
The experience HTI had with branding developed a concrete lesson learned – when the brand is created 
locally it has more of an impact than when it is created by the donor. HTI had two main “brands” 
throughout the program: “Play for Peace” (Jwe pou lape) and “Common Grounds” (Terrains d’Entente). 
21
The “Play for Peace” theme originated with the State Secretary for Youth and Sport and the IMC. The 
title was validated by each project committee and was widely used on banners and t-shirts. The
community groups internalized this theme, as demonstrated by the fact that one group created a spin-off 
of the brand. A sports association from Bel Air held a soccer tournament approximately six months after 
the attack on the “Play for Peace” camp, and after a successful pacification process they decided they 
had achieved peace and called the event “Play for Reconciliation.” 
Common Grounds (“Terrains d’Entente”), the other brand, described the sports fields, parks, and public 
kiosks created or rehabilitated by HTI on which “Play for Peace” activities took place. This theme had less 
success. It was suggested by the OTI Country Representative and was never owned by the
communities, which was partially the fault of the HTI staff members’ who did not frequently use it in daily 
conversations with beneficiaries. It was also partly because the term was only accurate once a critical 
mass of positive activities had taken place on the site (i.e. Ste Bernadette, Grand’ Ravine, Soleil 19). 
This could have been improved upon by having more formal inauguration ceremonies that unveiled a sign 
designating the site a “Terrains d’Entente.” Unfortunately, however, this term remains only a title on 
grants rather than a theme used by partners. 
Transparency
HTI was a credible partner for both communities and the government because it delivered what it
promised in a transparent way, thereby reducing the possibility of corruption. To avoid corruption, 
projects were strictly limited to less than $100,000 but generally did not exceed $50,000 and average 
about $23,500. This prevented the project from tempting officials or community members who were
interested in skimming a percentage off the total. At the beginning, HTI went further to prevent corruption 
by controlling all procurement needs for each project (i.e. each bag of cement, tool, etc.). This proved to 
be too much of a burden on staff as the monthly grant expenditures grew, so a formal system of tendering 
was put in place.
Tendering was useful not only in reducing the procurement burden on the staff and keeping them focused 
on the process, but it also gave more responsibilities to the community and management committee as 
they verified the work each day. However, if partners had been aware of how much money was allocated 
in the grant for a specific activity, there would have been significant potential for collusion between
contractors and partners when tenders were used. Therefore, as a precautionary measure, HTI decided 
to remove the budget from the grant agreement form signed by the partners to avoid this problem. To 
prevent accusations of favoritism on HTI’s part and to ensure that no single partner could decide tender, 
contractors were chosen by IOM with a committee in an open process. HTI received all tender
documents and contracts were validated by the community and government before being signed by IOM, 
though this rule was inconsistently applied by field officers. Having contractor selection validated by all 
partners was particularly difficult regarding government officials in Port-au-Prince, but HTI management 
continually stressed the importance of this principle. Another step requested by communities to ensure 
transparency was the requirement that unskilled laborers be identified by the community committee to 
prevent contractors from hiring only friends or people outside the target neighborhood. 
In addition to having an open contracting process, HTI made open communication a key element of all 
interactions with partners and beneficiaries. Communication with the population took place at public 
meetings, which avoided suspicions about activities and reduced pressure on the oversight committee. 
According to some local partners, Aristide used a significant portion of project funds to “buy peace” by 
paying the local spoiler. To prevent this type of corruption, public meetings with committee
representatives were held making it difficult for anyone to corrupt a committee member as he/she would 
have to answer to the entire community. Moreover, the committee also had to introduce the results of 
their work to demonstrate how project funds were used.
In an environment where communities were routinely promised things by government and other
organizations that never materialized, HTI only promised what it could deliver. Expectations from the
community were kept at a minimum to avoid disappointments, and partners were encouraged to remain 
realistic about how they presented projects to the greater public. It was important not only to deliver 
projects, but to do so in a timely fashion and with quality. While it was important to stop projects if there 
was a problem, it was equally important to resume immediately when it was resolved and to ensure that 
22
work continued at a reasonable pace. As important as doing what is promised, HTI was also open about 
what it was unable to do, which had a huge positive impact on the program’s credibility. 
Listening to the community was also a significant part of open communication and was crucial to avoiding 
pitfalls and political traps. At the project identification stage, it was important to listen to what residents 
said about each project idea to avoid selecting a project that was tied to a specific person or had a 
politically-charged history. Likewise, locals were the first to say if someone was being dishonest or a 
contractor delivered poor quality or if there was another project idea that should be explored, illustrating 
the self-regulatory mechanism of community ownership. HTI relied on residents to similarly report on the 
local security situation to ensure the safety of staff. 
CONCLUSION – PROGRAM IMPACT/OUTCOMES
The HTI program sought to bring stability to volatile areas by creating dialogue among parties in conflict, 
reducing the potential for spoilers to act, and enabling civic organizations to reduce violence in their
neighborhoods. The underlying assumption of the program was that the majority of residents want peace 
and stability and, as a group, they know best how to achieve this. Consequently, the effects and
successes of the program were assessed by looking at whether or not the community voice was heard. 
Expression of community voice was quantitatively measured through indicators such as the number of 
meetings held for each project and number of formal agreements between the community and
government. However, this dialogue was more often evident through qualitative indicators like
statements made by beneficiaries and partners and observations of activity levels in target areas or
violence trends.
The nature of the issues HTI addressed mean it is impossible to statistically demonstrate a direct causal 
relationship between HTI activities and community stabilization. “Stability” is difficult to quantify, and, as 
illustrated with the Rule of Three, HTI is only one part of a multi-actor effort. However, a plausible
association can be drawn to show the positive impact of HTI on the improved security of certain zones. 
Through anecdotes and measurable indicators, HTI was able to show its impact in the following ways: 
· The creation of community problem-solving mechanisms that were used outside of HTI
sponsored activities;
· Increased legitimacy of local and national government as evidenced through generally improved 
relations and increased deference to Municipalities to mediate;
· Isolation and disempowerment of negative elements (i.e. gang leaders fleeing areas with HTI
projects);
· Infrastructure rehabilitated or constructed with HTI funds used for non-HTI activities;
· Increased access for law enforcement through repaired roads and improved public lighting;
· Short-term employment generated.
During the first two years of operations, HTI saw its towns in the provinces remain calm and some
particularly violent neighborhoods in Port-au-Prince return to calm. 
Challenges to Measuring Impact
Evaluating the impact of HTI was accomplished through a variety of methods including both objective and 
subjective indicators. Each grant was written with a list of three to six objectives and a series of
standardized outputs. Objectives were a combination of concrete impacts (“Renovate a primary school”) 
to more abstract goals (“Enhance the relationship between the community and government”). Outputs 
were all measurable products such as “number of meetings between community and government,” and 
“person-days of employment generated.” Employment figures were collected each month while other
outputs were entered into the database at the closure of each grant. 
More abstract objectives were assessed through interviews, anecdotal information, and directly
observable processes. At the conclusion of project activities, HTI staff conducted interviews with project 
partners in the community and government according to a standardized evaluation tool. HTI staff was in 
the field on a daily basis, meeting with project partners and were constantly approached by residents 
expressing their appreciation for the activities. Also, staff observed incidents and processes that
23
demonstrated the effects of the program, such as a community group adding speed bumps to a newly￾refurbished road or organizing a community event on an HTI-funded public kiosk. Anecdotes were
reported in the “Hot Topics” section of the database and in monthly reports. 
In general, HTI could have improved the level of monitoring and evaluation. It was very difficult to collect 
the data as the people best positioned to do this were the field staff. Unfortunately, there is a strong, 
natural tendency to focus only on the implementation of a project. Staff found it difficult to extract them
from the logic of “project” (rehabilitate a road) to move towards the logic of “program” (i.e. support 
momentum). Moreover, the evaluation process was originally designed to evaluate each individual grant 
which became a huge burden as the monthly grant expenditures increased, and were also much less 
relevant as many of the grants were implemented as a package with several others. Most single grants 
had only a minor impact while the aggregation of all the grants in an area achieved a critical mass that 
was sufficient to dramatically alter the neighborhood. The Play for Peace summer camps were evaluated 
as a group, which marked a change in the conception of evaluations. In spring 2006, staff began
grouping grants by location or initiative and began evaluating on a more macro-level.
Nevertheless, informal evaluation was a constant process within the program, with program staff regularly 
discussing grants, partners, and locations. The HTI team would assess the general success of a project 
on course, identify aspects of the project that were not working, adjust methods and determine whether or 
not to work with certain partners again. While the greater political context governed broader strategy and 
geographic concentration, this constant process of discussion and reflection informed decisions on
individual grants and partners. 
Anecdotes
HTI staff was constantly being thanked in the field by community and government partners, but this is 
more a measure of good public relations than program success. However, with equal regularity, HTI
encountered anecdotes that represented true demonstrations of the plausible impact of the program.
· The HTI Program Officer for St. Marc went to a neighborhood in Gonaives where he thought he 
would find a violent protest going on as others had warned. Instead, when he arrived he saw a 
small group of people protesting because according to a local man everyone else was busy 
cleaning canals (an HTI project).
· The Petit Goâve representative of the Ministry of Public Works went from being vilified to being 
welcomed in the area because of his involvement with HTI projects. This prompted him to
increase his presence in the town, demonstrating more commitment and responsiveness from the 
government.
· The Mayor of Les Cayes went for a drink at an HTI-funded public park on the beach of a very 
volatile neighborhood. Some local youths (perceived as tough guys) saw him and called out that 
they should be buying his drink for all he has done for them. 
· A group of youths in Martissant formed an association to promote work over gang activity after 
meeting and working together on several HTI projects.
· After multiple projects in Soleil 19, which were to build community cohesion, residents donated 
part of their salaries from the “Play for Peace” summer camp to pay legal fees for one of the 
young men who worked with the sports association who had been falsely accused of being
involved in a kidnapping.
· At a meeting with community leaders from Cite Soleil and heads of UN Agencies, representatives 
repeatedly said that agencies could work in Cite Soleil without a problem if they followed the HTI 
model. One also said that he did not know what residents would have done for the past two 
years without HTI projects providing incomes to residents. 
· A local resident known for participating in road blockages in Petit Goâve was seen working on an 
HTI project by a neighbor. When he was teased about this newfound cooperation with the
government, he responded that he had no need to protest because he had a job.
24
· A community leader from Portail Montrouis, a neglected neighborhood in St. Marc known for
setting up roadblocks along the National Road, said that people were ashamed to admit they 
come from Portail Montrouis. After helping the community complete a new vocational training 
school, and several other projects, the same leader told HTI staff that residents were now proud 
to say they came from Portail Montrouis and had a renewed confidence thanks to the activities 
they accomplished with HTI support.
25
Annex 1: Timeline
September 2003
The violence that eventually brought down the Aristide presidency started reaching the boiling point in
September 2003 when clashes between militants and government forces (police) began. Rebel forces 
were composed of former members of the Haitian Armed Forces (FAd’H, Forces Armées d’Haïti) among 
others, including members of a gang known as the “Cannibal Army” whose leadership was from
Gonaives, known as the birthplace of the revolution that lead to the overthrow of the Duvalier dictatorship. 
Violence between the rebels and police escalated through January 2004, by which point nearly 100
people had died. 
February 2004
On 5 February, rebel forces drove police from Gonaives, setting police stations on fire, and in the four 
days that followed, 46 people were killed. Within two days, violence had spread south to Saint Marc 
where residents blocked the roads with flaming tires, looted the shipping containers at the port, and drove 
out police in gun battles leaving two dead. Violence in Saint Marc was primarily between residents of two 
areas, Portail Guepes, a predominantly pro-Aristide neighborhood, and La Scierie, an anti-Aristide 
stronghold. Political leaders from both areas had a longstanding conflict over control of the port which 
was exacerbated by the wave of rebellion, which culminated in the alleged “La Scierie Massacre”. 
Between 9 and 11 February, violence gripped Saint Marc; and at one point, residents of La Scierie claim 
that government forces carried out what can only be described as a massacre. Houses were burned and 
protesters fled into the nearby mountains where special police in a government helicopter shot at them. 
This controversial event is alleged to have been ordered by the highest level of government and is 
claimed to have left approximately 100 people dead. Some leaders and commentators assert that the 
massacre never occurred while others dispute the number of dead, claiming a much lower number. 
According to one report, an investigation into the event counted 44 dead with only 22 victims actually 
identified. 
Meanwhile, anti-government violence spread to other major population centers throughout the country. 
On 22 February, rebels gained control of Cap Haïtien, the second-largest city, and by 26 February, they 
had captured Les Cayes. Soon after, rebels entered Port-au-Prince and paralyzed the city with road
blocks and gun battles. On 29 February, Aristide fled the country with assistance from the US
government, later claiming that he was kidnapped. 
March 2004
US, Canadian, and French troops arrived as a short-term peacekeeping force while the UN assessed the 
situation and organized a full-scale peacekeeping mission. While the arrival of these forces resulted in a 
dramatic decrease of violence over all, pockets of volatility persisted in both pro- and anti-Aristide areas. 
Media reported that armed gangs held public executions of Aristide supporters in Les Cayes.
OTI sends an assessment team (Fritz Weden and Leah Werchick) to Haiti. The team recommends that 
OTI initiate a program to support the newly installed interim government in stabilizing communities in
urban slums.
May 2004
HTI activities commenced in Port-au-Prince, St. Marc, and Petit Goâve. With relatively limited resources, 
HTI restricts its activities to these three sites because of a combination of political relevance and logistical 
capacity. Port-au-Prince was clearly the top priority because of its strategic importance as the capital and 
most populous city as well as having the highest proportion of staunch Lavalas supporters living in
volatile, marginalized neighborhoods. St. Marc and Petit Goâve were selected because of their highly 
polarized populations and the nature of the conflicts they experienced during the unrest. Rather than 
being limited to rebels versus police, the conflict in both Petit Goâve and St. Marc escalated to violence 
26
between groups of residents, and was therefore well-suited to an HTI-style conflict mitigation program. 
Certainly other cities were similarly important (Gonaives, Cap Haïtien, Les Cayes) but the geography of 
Haiti and initial program resources limited the scope of the intervention. 
June 2004 (2 Grants; $61,896)
UN peacekeepers, led by the Brazilian military, arrived in Haiti to form MINUSTAH, the UN Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti. 
HTI signs its first grant for the rehabilitation of the St. Anne football field in Soleil 19, Cite Soleil
(IOMPAP001). The program initially emphasized the involvement of the Interim Government of Haiti 
(IGOH), both at the local and national level, in all HTI grants. The difficulty of including them in all stages 
of the grant process led to slow monthly expenditure rates in the first several months.
OTI begins rotation of senior field advisors and other staff to serve as acting country representative.
July 2004 (8 Grants; $313,578)
International donors met at the World Bank in Washington and pledged approximately $1.2 billion in aid. 
However, much of this aid was allocated for use after elections, leaving the government with very few
resources during the interim period. This lack of resources, particularly in the area of public works, 
became more evident as the volume of HTI projects increased. For this reason, the government’s 
general inability to keep up with the pace of HTI, the program moved to focus on community involvement
by spring 2005 during which the role of the government was still emphasized through public signatures 
and openings, but the emphasis on material contributions by the government was significantly reduced.
U.S. Ambassador James Foley requested OTI/IOM assistance in addressing disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration (DDR), specifically with regards to the former military (FAd’H). OTI 
senior field advisor Jason Aplon visits twice and determines that the conditions to undertake a DDR
program did not exist in the context of Haiti.
August 2004 (12 Grants; $335,319)
Ex-FAd’H members began occupying police stations, including Petit Goâve, in a series of actions that 
were largely well received by the population. In fact, in Petit Goâve, residents protested initial MINUSTAH 
action to reinstate police control because they claimed that the ex-FAd’H were more effective than the 
police at limiting gang activity in the area. 
HTI suspends activities in Cite Soleil following a security incident. A private transporter hired by IOM to 
deliver materials to a USAID-funded project was assaulted by a group of seven gang members on the 
way to the project site. The seven assailants waved their weapons, assaulted and robbed the vehicle 
occupants, and shot one of the vehicle tires. The deputy mayor of Cite Soleil with whom IOM had
coordinated on projects in Cite Soleil was informed and arranged an escort for the vehicle. Activities 
resumed within a few days under a new security protocol developed by the municipality and the
community. The new protocol mandated that community members escort all vehicles from the entrance 
of Cite Soleil to the project sites.
September 2004 (14 Grants; $158,584)
HTI signs its first grant in Gonaives to provide benches and materials for two public schools.
Hurricane Jeanne devastated Gonaives killing approximately 2,000 people, leaving 900 missing and
300,000 homeless. Participation by HTI staff in the UN coordination meetings revealed that the
involvement of the central government was severely neglected by the humanitarian community. This was 
particularly sensitive in the case of Gonaives because of its long history of mistrust and antipathy toward 
the government. 
27
HTI responded by supporting the government in its efforts to participate in the relief effort initially funding 
incidentals like spare truck parts and road markers, ultimately adding several employment generation 
clean-up, water distribution and flood prevention activities. HTI made the strategic choice to support 
government efforts to respond to the crisis by filling critical gaps that could have been exploited by 
spoilers. For example, HTI funded cleanups and extension of the water system into the Raboteau
neighborhood, the most volatile area of the city, which was neglected in the reconstruction effort. In
anticipation of a larger USAID reconstruction process, HTI made approximately $500,000 immediately 
available, which was declined by the USAID mission. 
Illegal militia groups, many of which included members of the ex-FAd’H, continued to occupy government 
buildings and demand payment of pensions, back-pay, reinstatement of the military and recognition for 
their role in ousting Aristide. The IGOH formed the Presidential Commission in Charge of Negotiations 
with the demobilized military to initiate dialogue with the ex-FAd’H and eventually the Bureau for the
Management of Demobilized Soldiers, under the Prime Minister’s office, to manage the registration, 
profiling, training and employment of former soldiers.
From September 2004 to June 2005, OTI undertook planning and preparation for the reintegration of the 
ex-FAd’H. In partnership with the MINUSTAH DDR section and the IGOH, OTI used $250,000 in seed 
money provided by USAID/Haiti to begin to define a DDR strategy for the ex-FAd’H. OTI focused only on 
reintegration since USAID is prohibited from providing support for demobilization or disarmament. OTI 
was later given $3million in ESF funds towards a reintegration program to be implemented by IOM. The 
preconditions for a successful reintegration project did not exist. Given these circumstances, OTI
redirected the $3million allotted for reintegration into its main HTI program to implement quick impact 
activities to support stabilization and economic revitalization in the most dangerous zones in PAP. 
Following the August security incident in Cite Soleil, HTI staff began to work more closely with the 
MINUSTAH Civil-Military Coordinator, introducing projects that were on-going in Cite Soleil so that the
MINUSTAH would not consider the gathering of people as a demonstration. HTI activity reports were sent 
to MINUSTAH but were received as a courtesy rather than a tool that could benefit their operations.
October 2004 (7 Grants; $93,251)
The month of October opened with sudden, horrific violence which began on 30 September under a cloud 
of suspicion. Some people say the violence, precipitated by the brutal beheadings of three police officers 
at the onset, was a direct reaction to police shooting into a peaceful pro-Aristide demonstration. Other 
reports claim that the government orchestrated the conflict as an excuse to crack down on Lavalas 
supporters and residents were merely defending themselves against government aggression. Whatever 
the cause, the result was that Bel Air, the main downtown section of Port-au-Prince, and Cite Soleil, 
including the major road which borders it, became no-go areas, the sites of daily violence, spontaneous 
gunfights, and clashes between various armed groups, including the police, MINUSTAH, and gangs, who 
frequently fought with each other. 
HTI continued to work in areas of the city impacted by the violence, but moved to almost exclusively small 
infrastructure for safety and ease of monitoring. Daily gun battles between gangs and police in Port-au￾Prince reduced the mobility of HTI staff causing a slow down in project implementation. Several local 
partners were forced to flee Cite Soleil, also impeding IOM’s ability to implement and monitor activities.
Security worsened in Gonaives as frustration from perceived in action and unmet needs eroded the
legitimacy and support for the central government. Attempts to work with USAID/Haiti on relief efforts 
failed. OTI/IOM expressed significant concern that other partners like CARE were not including the local 
government in response efforts. USAID allotted approximately $40million in assistance for hurricane
relief/reconstruction. OTI, still operating on a limited budget, did not receive any of these funds and
determined that it should close the Gonaives office to concentrate these resources in its other target 
areas. Without question, this was a difficult decision given the continued political relevance of the city 
and the highly volatile conditions following the hurricane. With good reason, IOM opposed this office
closure.
28
The interim government established an inter-ministerial commission to work in the sensitive
neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince as a demonstration of its will to work together with citizens living in 
Lavalas strongholds. The initial idea was to have a holistic vision of the problems faced by the targeted 
areas. Therefore, during the first months, every minister had appointed senior representatives to attend 
meetings twice a week. Despite the relatively good attendance during the first months, very few actions 
were initiated due to the weak authority of the Coordinator (and by extension the authority of the Prime 
Minister himself). Moreover, once the Prime Minister’s Office ran out of money to fund the attendance 
fees for the ministry representatives, the number of ministers represented decreased rapidly. 
It was important for HTI with regard to its specific mandate to support the commission, because both HTI 
and the commission were in theory aiming for the same objectives (make the government be visible and 
credible in marginalized areas). HTI management staff began attending meetings of the Commission and
formalized this cooperation in December. The first jointly implemented project, IOMPAP033 Carnival in 
Cite Soleil, was signed in February 2005.
November 2004 (12 Grants; $271,152)
HTI staff worked closely with the mayor of Cite Soleil to resume activities following a suspension in 
activities due to street violence. The mayor, a key HTI partner, coordinated with gang leaders to ensure 
the safety of HTI staff and community members working on projects. IOM insisted that local leaders, not 
IOM staff, deal with gangs to resolve problems like this.
December 2004 (4 Grants; $122,107)
After months of delays, HTI activities resumed at full speed following significant efforts made by the
municipality and central government working with community members and gang leaders to deal with the 
outbreak of violence in the area.
MINUSTAH began making incursions into PAP slum neighborhoods in coordination with the Haitian
police but severe criticism of MINUSTAH’s unwillingness to use force and its resulting failure to command 
respect from armed militia and gangs persists persisted. 
December marked the end of the first phase of HTI, when a significant challenge became evident: central 
government representatives were eager to participate in activities in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, 
but this did not extend into the provinces. At the same time, the strong sense of community found in the 
provinces was lacking in the metropolitan area.
All high level staff of the Bureau de Gestion, an office established to “manage the affairs” of the former 
military, were dismissed due to their complicity with attempts to facilitate the return of the armed forces of 
Haiti (FAd’H). The Secretary of State for Public Security announced that compensatory payments would 
be made to 6,000 former soldiers and several hundred higher ranking ex-FAd’H officers in an effort to
mollify insurgents and restore stability in the country. Payments would vary according to rank but average 
$4,800 per person for a total of approximately $30million. 
A faction of ex-FAd’H members, led by notorious rebel leader Remissainthe Ravix, occupied former
President Aristide's residence. Members of the interim Haitian Government and MINUSTAH negotiated a 
peaceful resolution after Ravix fled the scene. The remaining 46 members of the group were transported 
to the Haitian Police Academy where they were disarmed and registered. Those found to be legitimate 
members of the ex-FAd’H were given the first installment of compensatory payments by the Government.
January 2005 (6 Grants; $159,727)
Nothing to report.
February 2005 (6 Grants; $131,159)
Approximately 481 inmates of Haiti’s central prison, including former Prime Minister Yvon Neptune and 
former Interior Minister Jocelerme Privet, escaped during an attack by masked gunmen. Neptune and 
29
Privet turned themselves in soon after, but others eluded capture and went on to terrorize citizens with a 
wave of retaliatory violence. 
The one year anniversary of the departure of former President Aristide was marked by increased violence 
in several neighborhoods. Two thousand unarmed protestors took to the streets in Bel Air shouting anti￾Bush slogans, whom Aristide blames for his fall. During the demonstration, and to the surprise of the 
demonstrator’s UN escorts, police officers attempting to block the protesters fired tear gas and bullets into 
the crowd killing at least two people. In response, the UN sent 300 heavily armed peacekeepers and 50 
UN vehicles to secure a peaceful demonstration in Bel Air, kept the demonstration's route under tight 
control and denied access to Haitian police who wanted to enter the perimeter of the march. The Minister 
of Justice accused MINUSTAH of violating their mandate. Overall, violence and kidnappings increased. 
The interim government of Haiti (IGOH) confirmed municipal elections to be held on October 9 and
legislative and presidential elections to be held in two rounds on November 13 and December 18. 
HTI implements its first project with the Inter-ministerial Commission of the Prime Minister, a Carnival 
celebration for Cite Soleil (IOMPAP033).
March 2005 (9 Grants; $169,994)
March marked the first UN casualties when one Nepalese soldier in Hinche and one Sri Lankan near Petit 
Goâve were killed in clashes with ex-FAd’H. The Sri Lankan was killed when UN troops attempted to 
recapture a police station which had been occupied by ex-FAd’H. This operation was met with public 
protest from residents of Petit Goâve who blocked the national road with burning tires and accused the 
police of corruption, claiming that the ex-FAd’H were more effective at maintaining order than the police. 
April 2005 (8 Grants; $194,128)
On 6 April, the Interim Government issued a decree launching a National Dialogue process to be
organized by a commission of 12 people. The aim of this process was to depolarize the population in the 
lead up to the elections, scheduled for October at that point. However, due to a lack of public awareness, 
organization, and effective design, the National Dialogue is dead before it begins. 
HTI approved a set of four projects to support a local organization to bring women’s voices into the
National Dialogue process. These grants supported public forums in Port-au-Prince, Cap Haïtien, and 
Les Cayes.
MINUSTAH welcomed the start of voter registration for elections later this year. U.N. Special
Representative to the Secretary-General, Juan Gabriel Valdés, called it "a moment of joy for Haiti and the 
international community.” The Provisional Electoral Council launched the registration effort in Gonaïves. 
On 9 April Remissainthe Ravix was killed in clashes between ex-FAd’H and police/UN troops. Contrary to 
concerns that this would energize the ex-FAd’H forces, Ravix’s death essentially neutralized the threat 
posed by the former military. Remaining ex-FAd’H returned to their homes, quietly disappearing off the 
political landscape. 
OTI began efforts to redirect funds originally earmarked for the reintegration program for the ex-FAd’H to 
a strategy to support MINUSTAH efforts to combat gang violence. These funds facilitated the opening of 
offices in Cap Haïtien and Les Cayes, which were selected after an extensive evaluation process. 
May 2005 (10 Grants; $260,016)
HTI begins work on its first project in Bel Air after months of discussions (dating back to November 2004) 
with community leaders. The first project rebuilt a kiosk that had been burned by HNP police and served 
as a constant reminder of violence between pro-Lavalas supporters and the HNP supporters of the
incoming IGOH. This kiosk, and a follow on gala football day with the Inter-ministerial Commission of the 
Prime Minister, got HTI’s foot in the door.
30
U.S. embassy instates ordered departure of all dependents of U.S. government staff in Haiti. OTI 
representative, Merrie Archer, had to take her 3-year old son to Ft. Lauderdale to live with relatives.
June 2005 (22 Grants; $527,709)
The U.S. embassy instates an ordered departure of all but essential personnel. The decision was made to 
include Merrie Archer in ordered departure due to her status as a single Mom. She did not return to Haiti. 
OTI began its rotation of acting country representatives (Fritz Weden, Tom Stukel, Don Krumm, John 
Rigby, Katherine Donohue) which would end in April 2006 with the arrival of Lauren Barbour who
remained in Haiti until close out. 
OTI obligated $3million (redirected from reintegration) to IOM to support MINUSTAH operations in anti￾gang efforts in hot spots. OTI work ed with IOM to increase monthly expenditure rates, which jumped from 
$268,000 in May to $570,000 in June. HTI also refined strategy to focus on two main sources of easily￾mobilized people: out of school youth and the unemployed. HTI moved to increase employment projects 
and activities for youth.
IOM opens an office in Cap Haïtien (north).
July 2005 (28 Grants; $697,702)
In a joint raid of Cité Soleil, the notorious gang leader Dread Wilmé was killed along with a dozen other 
gang members. This came as part of one of the largest MINUSTAH operations yet with over 400
peacekeepers, four helicopters and over 40 armored vehicles. MINUSTAH reported fragmentation and
disarray among gang members immediately following the operation, but soon afterwards, new gang
leaders assumed the mantle of authority in Wilmé’s place. 
Father Gerard Jean-Juste, a prominent Lavalas leader, was arrested at the 21 July funeral of notable
journalist Jacques Roche. 
HTI responds by starting activities in Petit Place Cazeau, the home of Jean-Juste, as an effort to bring 
positive government involvement in the neighborhood. This effort is highly successful, particularly in
relation to the local school and water system.
As of late July, over 800,000 voters were reportedly registered in Haiti. Voter registration was extended to 
9 September. MINUSTAH projects registered between 3.6million to 4.1million voters using 424
registration sites and 50 mobile sites. However, the Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) and international 
community still faced challenges managing the security situation, budgetary limitations, and party and 
candidate registration and campaigning.
In an effort to provide alternate activities to youth at risk in targeted neighborhoods, HTI initiated “Play for 
Peace” summer activity camps in partnership with the SEJSEC and local sports and civic associations. 
Based in various locations in Cite Soleil, Bel Air, Martissant and Cap Haïtien, these activities provided 
daily sports and cultural activities, civic education and non-violence promotion. 
August 2005 (40 Grants; $595,236)
The CEP twice extended the deadline for political parties to register for upcoming elections, agreeing on 
15 September as the final date. Various political parties and groups in civil society expressed the hope 
that this additional time would have allowed moderate Lavalas candidates to register, thereby ensuring a 
more fully participatory process. On 9 August, the interim government announced that the local elections 
will be postponed until a date in late December; the presidential and legislative votes will be moved up 
one week from 13 November to 6 November, with the runoff election to be held 11 December. This was 
the first of many postponements.
OTI obligates $2.5M to IOM to further support MINUSTAH operations. IOM opens an office in Les Cayes 
(south).
31
Violence broke out during one of HTI’s “Play for Peace” summer youth activities in Martissant on 20 
August. Widely reported in both national and international press as a lynching, the incident was
described by HTI partners as a coordinated attacked with national police and neighboring gang members. 
According to partner reports, the police arrived with members of a rival gang, and the gang members 
proceeded to single out “informants” and attack them with machetes. Fatality figures very from six to 30. 
Following the incident, the camp was suspended for a few days, but activities resumed five days later. 
U.S. Ambassador James B. Foley, who led the U.S. embassy in Haiti since May 2003, left departed his 
post. He was replaced on an interim basis by former U.S. Ambassador to Haiti, Timothy Carney.
September 2005 (33 Grants; $752,050)
Another HTI Play for Peace Summer Youth Activity was attacked by gang members, resulting in the
murder of two residents who worked on the camp. At funeral services for one of the victims, community 
members displayed the t-shirt from the HTI camp on the casket.
HTI staff immediately contacted MINUSTAH to inform them of this event and request a response from law 
enforcement. Members of the community provided detailed information about the location of the
perpetrators, which HTI passed on to MINUSTAH. This information was not acted upon, and HTI
appealed to OTI for assistance. USG representatives in New York applied pressure on the UN
Department of Peacekeeping, which precipitated MINUSTAH operations in Bel Air resulting in the arrest 
or death of all three gang members involved in the killings. 
Following operations and establishment of a MINUSTAH base at Fort National, HTI was able to develop a 
series of projects in the area. Only weeks prior, this neighborhood was inaccessible to outsiders due to 
gang violence in the area, which also caused hundreds of residents to flee. The development of an
alliance of Fort National community groups supported by HTI led to new community-improvement 
initiatives which helped the area return to the bustling place it once was. HTI started with seven projects 
totaling more than $100,000 in Fort National.
October 2005 (28 Grants; $837,189)
Elections are delayed.
HTI monthly grant expenditures reached $920,000. Significant progress was made on communication 
and coordination with MINUSTAH forces on the ground. After attacks on HTI projects in Martissant and 
Bel Air in August, HTI staff met with representatives of MINUSTAH to create better channels of
communication to prevent project-related incidents and to improve the response by MINUSTAH when
such incidents occur. These improvements resulted in an immediate rebuilding of trust with the citizens of 
Bel Air, illustrated by a move on the community’s part to request HTI assistance in increasing MINUSTAH 
patrols near a project site. Through this successful interaction, the HTI team developed a briefing
mechanism to regularly update MINUSTAH teams on the ground on the location and status of projects 
and to keep communities informed of MINUSTAH efforts to improve security. This mechanism includes 
the use of Google Earth® mapping software, which enabled HTI staff to make detailed maps of project 
locations. These maps were sent to the MINUSTAH civil-military liaison and distributed to patrol
commanders.
November 2005 (28 Grants; $678,965)
A week after Prime Minister Latortue announced a 27 December date for elections Haiti’s electoral board 
postponed them until early 2006 with the first round scheduled for 8 January, a 15 February runoff, and 
local elections in mid-March. The change made it impossible for Haiti to meet the 7 February date 
established in the constitution for a change of government. The council had not finished printing ballots, 
distributing more than 2.5 million voter identification cards, or training poll workers on schedule. 
At the direction of OTI, IOM begins collaboration with the Pan-American Development Fund (PADF) on 
activities in Port-au-Prince under USAID/Haiti’s Urban Peace Building Initiative. This Initiative was an 
early attempt to direct resources to hot spots. Collaboration would prove difficult as the two organizations 
32
had dramatically divergent methodologies. PADF did not share IOM’s strong commitment toward refusing 
to work with gangs and seemed to be unwilling to develop a cooperative relationship. 
HTI returns grant expenditures to approximately $750,000 per month, as it is unclear when elections will 
actually take place. 
December 2005 (42 Grants; $691,167)
Kidnappings, already immobilizing residents of Port-au-Prince, sky rocketed in December with a reported 
30 kidnappings taking place during the first week alone.
HTI continued its pre-election strategy of mixing labor-intensive infrastructure projects with youth activities 
in Port-au-Prince conflictive neighborhoods. Priorities shifted as some areas like Martissant and Grand 
Ravine re-ignited due to the return of gangs while others like Bel Air and Petit Place Cazeau saw
increased stability. Cite Soleil continued to be a primary HTI neighborhood concern. 
January 2006 (32 Grants; $702,773)
Program activity in Cite Soleil remained challenging due to the security situation and the deteriorating 
image of MINUSTAH troops in the area. Accused of shooting at civilians and generally alienating the 
population of Cite Soleil, peacekeepers did not have the success that their counterparts had in Bel Air. 
Nevertheless, HTI continued to implement projects with the support of community partners.
February 2006 (35 Grants; $755,016)
René Préval, who served as President from 1996 to 2000, was elected president on 7 February. The 
initial vote count showed Préval just shy of the 50.1 percent majority needed to avoid a runoff. Before the 
election council announced the final vote tally, massive urban street protests – some spontaneous, some 
organized – erupted when rumors spread that the vote count was rigged. Thousands of discarded ballots 
were discovered in a garbage dump near Port-au-Prince, further stimulating claims of election fraud. 
Under an agreement between the Interim Government and the electoral council, some 80,000 ballots cast 
but left blank were allocated among the candidates in proportion to ballots cast with entries, giving Préval 
the majority vote needed to win without a runoff. A period of calm throughout Haiti followed including a 
sharp reduction in kidnappings.
HTI staff initiated engagement with Preval’s transition team to begin planning for what would be coined 
the “Cite Soleil Initiative,” an initial package of 20 projects identified by various Cite Soleil sub￾communities and the new government. Although the calm in Cite Soleil made it tempting to rush in with 
assistance, HTI’s strategy was to put the new administration at the helm of efforts to stabilize the area, in 
accordance to a request made by Preval to the international community. 
HTI also increased activities in Martissant to address the upswing in gang activity in the area. What would 
ultimately become a package of 17 projects worth approximately $450,000, this initiative was launched at 
a February Carnival celebration sponsored by HTI. The response to this initial activity was so strong that 
armed groups declared an area-wide ceasefire.
March 2006 (31 Grants; $760,647)
Led by USAID/DCHA/CMM, a team composed of CMM, DG, OTI, S/CRS, and LAC conducted a conflict 
assessment in Haiti. They identified the following key potential “spoilers” to stability in Haiti: the role of 
entrenched, violence-prone and amply armed elements of Aristide supporters and the disruptive prospect 
that the unpredictable Aristide would seek to return to Haiti; armed and violent neighborhood gangs and 
criminal networks; former elements of the Haitian Armed Forces (FAd’H) and the HNP; manipulative
efforts by Haitian elites, and a mix of nationalist/anti-foreign/anti-American elements. The CMM
assessment identified key, volatile “hot spots” (Port-au-Prince, Gonaives, Saint Marc, Cap Haïtien, Petit 
Goâve – all but one of which are focal areas for the HTI program and sites of HTI field offices) where civil 
unrest could threaten democratic rule.
33
USAID/Haiti and OTI commenced active planning for turnover of the HTI program to the Mission by
September 30. A significant indicator that the HTI program had proven relevant to current transition 
activities in Haiti was the desire on the part of the USAID Mission to absorb and fund the program, 
including the small grants mechanism with IOM as the implementing partner. Accordingly, OTI actively 
initiated a process of steering HTI activities, when feasible, to linkages with longer term Mission programs 
to accelerate incorporation of HTI into the Mission’s portfolio in advance of the turnover.
April 2006 (27 Grants; $612,298)
Parliamentary run-off elections were held 21 April with an estimated 30 percent of the country’s registered 
voters participating. Municipal elections are delayed with no clear date given.
HTI began meeting with Preval’s transition team to introduce the program and begin discussing
opportunities for collaboration. 
Lauren Barbour arrived and served as OTI Country Representative through OTI’s close-out in September 
2006.
May 2006 (63 Grants; $936,593)
On May 14, Rene Preval was inaugurated during a ceremony that drew thousands to the National Palace, 
marking the return of democratic rule in Haiti. Preval actively engaged with Haitian political parties, the 
public, and the international community to secure support for his new administration. President Preval's 
party Lespwa won 11 of 30 senate seats, boosting his support. Legislators in the Senate took the oath of 
office just a day after deputies in the lower house were sworn in. Haiti’s parliament hasn't convened since 
former President Jean-Bertrand Aristide was ousted in February 2004.
President Preval appointed a six-party coalition government in May, underscoring the need to unify Haiti's 
bitterly divided political factions after more than two years of instability. The 18-member Cabinet includes 
five members of Preval's 1999-2001 government. Preval nominated former Prime Minister Jacques￾Edouard Alexis as Prime Minister who many believe is capable of brokering relations between rival
political groups. Alexis announced that the government would embark on a 25-year development plan, 
including boosting access to public services for Haiti's poor, reinforcing the country's brittle state
institutions, attracting private investment, and restoring security. 
The list of activities to be included in the Cite Soleil Initiative was finalized by the GOH transition team, but 
not in time to be included in the inauguration speech. One of the first activities with the new government 
outside of the Cite Soleil initiative was a series of renovations to existing Terrains d’Entente to make them 
capable of showing World Cup soccer matches for public viewing. The World Cup period was identified 
by Prime Minister Alexis as being a vulnerable time for shantytown residents and provided an excellent 
opportunity for initial projects with the new State Secretary for Youth and Sport.
The HTI program bid farewell to core management staff Philippe Branchat (Program Manager) and
Stephanie Broughton (Program Support Officer) who left the program after two years of service. HTI 
welcomed Gabrielle Goodfellow as Program Support Officer, though a new Program Manager had not yet 
been named at the time of writing.
34
Annex 2: Quick Guide to the HTI Strategy
There is no one right way to do community stabilization, but there are guidelines to follow and definitely 
specific things to avoid doing. The basic steps for starting a program are as follows:
1. Identify target communities by gathering information from all available sources. 
2. Enter a community by meeting with politically neutral people (i.e. sports associations, religious 
leaders, school administrators) and appropriate political entities (i.e. municipality) provided that 
you remain distanced from individuals. Before focusing on a single project, have in mind at least 
2-4 potential projects, so that you know it will be possible to build/sustain positive momentum 
should the circumstances require it to be done immediately. 
3. Identify an initial project, usually a straightforward one that is generally accepted, like a sports 
field, and one with guaranteed beneficiaries. An initial project could be identified through public 
meetings or selected strategically but validated in a public meeting. The first project should be 
relatively low profile and will not necessarily be ideal, but will provide an entry point and a way of 
learning more about the community. Any mistakes will inform future activities and be relatively 
insignificant in the life of the program as many projects will be successful.
4. The implementation process of the first project (as with all subsequent projects) will yield
important information and lessons about the community and it will serve as an advertisement for 
the program. Word of mouth is more important than any other type of publicity. Once the
program is known, both within and outside the community, project ideas will not be difficult to find 
as the needs are numerous. 
5. Identify and implement more projects in accordance with the desired program objectives. 
Each field office had specific objectives pertaining to the unique political context of the cities in which they 
worked, with Port-au-Prince facing the added complication of persistent insecurity. For this reason, the 
program operated with a general framework of principles and a great deal of flexibility. In general,
program staff found what worked in their communities by being close to the process and listening to
partner.
Targeting Where and With Whom to Work
· In order to have the desired effect (achieve critical mass) it is necessary to have a relatively 
narrow geographic focus and/or a significant amount of funding.
· In selecting a zone of intervention, ask the questions: Is the source of conflict/violence something 
that can be addressed with this program? And will the program be able to achieve a significant 
effect?
· If an area is too hot to enter and you lack a good, reliable partner, start with projects on the 
outskirts and gradually move toward the more tense and violent zones.
· Work with groups, not individuals. Groups should be a-political.
· DO NOT work with any individuals with criminal ties, gang affiliation or strong political identity, 
regardless of their membership in useful groups. 
Process and Flexibility
· Infrastructure projects are a good start because they are easy to monitor in times of insecurity, 
provide tangible results quickly, and provide shells for future activities. 
· Avoid unsustainable projects like public latrines and clean-ups (unless as flood mitigation or for a 
specific purpose).
· Don’t solve problems for the community but rather stop activities and assure the community that 
things will resume when they find a solution. Remind them that this is their project and we don’t 
really care if it ever gets built or not. Also, the community should be made aware that the failure 
of the project will be their responsibility as well, and projects that fail will affect the likelihood of 
future projects.
35
Project Identification
· Projects should be in response to formally expressed community needs. Support existing
initiatives; don’t impose project ideas on the community.
· For all humanitarian actors everywhere, it is important to remember that just because you are 
helping the community does not mean that you are not also helping the bad guys. Do not select 
projects that can be manipulated later on.
Community Ownership
· Consider the community as a single entity rather than treating one association separately from 
another. As above, this means that all actors will be equally concerned with the successes of 
their neighbors and be affected by the consequences of the failures. 
· By placing the community in charge of selecting workers, it ensures that local residents are part 
of the project, as well as benefiting from the salary. No single person (particularly mayors or 
political leaders) should be responsible for this, as it can easily be used for political gain. 
Multiple Partners
· Make a new committee for each project and limit the life of the committee to the duration of the 
project
· If there is only one civic group involved in the committee, look for another group for subsequent 
projects to ensure that credit is diffused throughout the community.
· Some partners wear multiple hats (i.e. Head of Municipality and head of a political party) and it is 
vital to always communicate with the partner in his institutional capacity rather than political 
persona. 
Government Involvement
· Make sure the government is (or at least appears) involved in all projects to ensure that
community frustration toward it is not actually increased.
· A negative answer is still an answer and demonstrates responsiveness, acknowledgment of the 
shantytown and respect to residents. 
· Respect government plans and technical capabilities because a water kiosk is useless if nobody 
fills the pipes. 
· Work with General Directors of Ministries rather than the Minister him/herself. The DG is likely the 
only person with enough authority to order resources to be committed, and not subject to the 
same rate of turnover as Ministers which change with every new government or upon the
decision of the Prime Minister.
Critical Mass
· Achieve a critical mass of activities either through a gradual accumulation of projects or an initial 
set of five or six projects at the same time, according to the level of tension. A strategy of conflict 
reduction requires that HTI move quickly with a large number of projects at the same time to 
solidify and sustain stability once the community has made its move. A conflict prevention
strategy can achieve critical mass gradually over a longer period of time.
· Do not decrease significantly the level of activity until a natural ending point has been reached
such as the end of the transition or handover to another process. If momentum is lost before 
conditions for durable stability are achieved, progress may be lost.
· Critical mass can be achieved through labor-intensive infrastructure projects and then sustained 
by increasing the portfolio of HTI projects to include with activities and events, which are cheaper 
and useful in providing symbols and messages. 
Media and Messaging
· Media should be cognizant of and sensitive to the potential risk it could pose to community 
partners should gangs perceive a threat before security is sufficient to protect partners. 
· Messaging works best when it has been generated by the community. 
36
Transparency / Building Trust
· Use tenders for project implementation whenever possible, but do not print budgets on grant 
documents signed with the partners to avoid collusion with contractors. 
· Communication with “the community” should take place at public, advertised meetings to avoid 
suspicions and limit the committee’s corruptibility.
· Do what you say you will do and be honest about why you can’t if you can’t.
· Deliver. Deliver reactively. Deliver quality.
Working in Insecurity
· Listen to the community.
· Small infrastructure projects are easiest to monitor remotely using reliable community partners 
and digital cameras. 
· No clean-ups.
· Support the establishment of the Rule of Three (community initiative supported by law
enforcement and humanitarian assistance) by working behind the scenes to bring in MINUSTAH 
military, but only if this action is validated by the community. If MINUSTAH is reluctant to respond, 
request assistance (through OTI) from the State Department. 
· Do not appear in public with law enforcement of any kind (neither MINUSTAH nor HNP) or you 
run the risk of staff and partners becoming soft targets. 
37
Annex 3: Lessons Learned – Working in Gang Areas
Conflict situations involving gangs are inherently unpredictable and complex, depending on the nature of 
the gang, the community in which it is based, and the relationship between the two. Stabilization of an 
area with gang activity, therefore, requires a thorough analysis of the situation, appropriate
responsiveness, nuance, and a strong reliance on local partners. The following are lessons learned
through HTI’s successful efforts to support community-driven stabilization of activities with high levels of 
gang activity.
1. Know the limitations of the program and the type of violence it is able to address. HTI was not 
able to combat violence with no geographic or political roots, such as the road banditry that 
plagued cities like Ouanaminthe or the dispersed threat presented by the ex-FAd’H. 
2. Remember the “Rule of Three.” Freeing neighborhoods from gang control and influence must be 
a community-driven process. Nevertheless, this process must be supported by law enforcement 
(so the community feels protected from retaliatory violence and law breakers face the 
consequences) and by humanitarian assistance (to provide an influx of resources sufficient to
catalyze anti-gang action).
3. Avoid working directly with gang members at all costs, not only for legal reasons but also to avoid 
legitimizing gangs and reinforcing their ill-gotten authority. This applies both to identifying
potential projects as well as solving problems on projects generated by the gangs. 
4. Do not be a problem-solver. Instead, stop project activities and place the responsibility upon
community members and law enforcement to overcome obstacles or respond to conflicts with
gangs. The idea is to isolates potential spoilers of stability by empowering peaceful community 
groups and enabling government institutions to respond to frustrations that gangs/political actors 
could exploit. The shared experience of overcoming an obstacle builds cohesion. Reassure
partners that work will resume when the problem is solved, and react quickly when it is.
5. The premise of the HTI program was that a critical mass of geographically targeted projects that 
respond rapidly to community needs will result in changed attitudes and behaviors. To have the 
rapid impact desired from stabilization initiatives, geography, flexibility, speed, and scale matter. 
Critical mass can be achieved all at once or gradually.
6. Stay under the radar. If critical mass is being achieved through a gradual build up of projects, this 
must be done without attracting the attention of the gangs. If too much attention was called to an 
initiative in an area that does not yet have sufficient rule of law to protect citizens, community 
partners could be put at risk of retaliation by gangs. This means that media and messaging 
should be used sparingly and wisely and must be thought out very carefully.
7. Share responsibility and credit. Involve people from multiple sectors (community, government, 
civic groups, etc.) to ensure that no one actor takes sole credit for the project to use as a political 
tool. Implement projects through temporary committees established only for the duration of the 
project. The limited lifespan of the implementation committee avoids it from becoming a tool for 
legitimizing ill-gotten authority, exacerbating/creating power struggles, or presenting an
opportunity for corruption or pressure by gangs.
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Annex 4: Key Outcomes and Relevant Grants
During its first two years, HTI achieved important interim results in its efforts to stabilize volatile
communities in Haiti. This document highlights specific programmatic aims and accomplishments and the 
associated grants or groups of grants. This paper also describes some projects that were not successful. 
The date listed is the clearance date.
Tipping the Balance
The principle of tipping the balance of power in a community from gangs to civic organizations was most 
clearly illustrated in Bel Air where HTI signed a package of grants in one neighborhood and momentum 
spread to adjacent areas.
Fort National
IOMPAP096 Fort National Clean-Up 30 Aug 2005
IOMPAP098 Rehabilitation of the St. Michel Community & Health Center 29 Sep 2005
IOMPAP100 Fort National Sapatann Terrain d’Entente 10 Sep 2005
IOMPAP104 Fort National South Terrain d’Entente 10 Sep 2005
IOMPAP105 Fort National North Terrain d’Entente 10 Sep 2005
IOMPAP106 Road Rehabilitation and Wall Construction in Fort National 23 Sep 2005
IOMPAP111 Paving Pedestrian Walkways in Fort National 23 Sep 2005
Ti Chery
IOMPAP126 Ti Chery Neighborhood Clean Up 26 Oct 2005
IOMPAP127 Concrete Paving of Corridors in Ti Chery and Solino 21 Oct 2005
IOMPAP128 Ti Chery Canal Construction and Adoquin Paving 21 Oct 2005
IOMPAP129 Ti Chery Public Square Terrain d’Entente 24 Oct 2005
IOMPAP130 Completion of Paving Impasse Lamarque (Ti Chery) 27 Oct 2005
St. Martin
IOMPAP134 Concreting of Corridor Tamarin Club (Bel Air) 18 Nov 2005
IOMPAP135 Paving of Rue Mariela (Bel Air) 8 Nov 2005
IOMPAP136 Paving Corridor Ti Chery (Bel Air) 18 Nov 2005
IOMPAP137 Completion of Corridor Ti Jean (Bel Air) 18 Nov 2005
Diminish Mobilization Capacity of Spoilers
HTI reduced the quantity of idle people in areas of tension by providing employment for adults and
activities for youth.
IOMGNV004 Support to TPTC for Post-Flood Canal Cleaning 23 Nov 2005
IOMPAP050 Romulus Road Rehabilitation 3 Jun 2005
IOMPAP075 Play for Peace Summer Youth Activities Petit Place Cazeau 8 Aug 2005
Building Support for MINUSTAH
The activities in Bel Air described above built support for MINUSTAH throughout the area. Additionally, 
HIT implanted activities that complemented projects sponsored by MINUSTAH forces on the outskirts of 
Cite Soleil.
IOMPAP196 Rehabilitation of Volcy Road 28 Feb 2006
IOMPAP197 Volcy Road Terrain d’Entente 28 Feb 2006
Social Integration
An objective of the HTI was to promote a sense of inclusion among residents of traditionally neglected 
neighborhoods. The theory behind this was that people who feel like they are part of the transition will be 
less likely to engage in activities to destabilize it. 
IOMPAP033 Carnival for Cite Soleil 1 Feb 2005
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This grant ensured that residents who could not leave Cite Soleil because of the violence were 
still able to enjoy traditional Carnival festivities.
IOMLCY014 Latourterelle Plage Public Square Terrain d’Entente 16 Dec 2005
Les Cayes mayor reported that residents from outside of La Savanne, a neighborhood regarded 
by many to be too violent to enter, were coming specifically to enjoy this new public space, 
removing the stereotypes of the area.
IOMCAP013 Sainte Philomene Canal Rehabilitation 18 Aug 2005
IOMCAP014 Dos Centre de Sante Drainage Canal Rehabilitation 18 Aug 2005
IOMCAP015 Sainte Philomene Canal Rehabilitation: Second Section 18 Aug 2005
IOMCAP016 Isidor Canal Rehabilitation 18 Aug 2005
After a big rain, which left many of the nicer areas of Cap Haïtien flooded, residents of the 
shantytowns invited their neighbors from the flooded area to visit because the canal cleaning
projects ensured that their homes and shops were not flooded.
IOMSTM020 Municipal Vocational Training School 10 Jun 2005
IOMSTM032 Portail Montrouis Play for Peace Summer Youth Activities 23 Aug 2005
IOMSTM039 Portail Montrouis Basketball Terrain d’Entente 21 Oct 2005
IOMSTM040 Portail Montrouis Public Square Terrain d’Entente 21 Oct 2005
IOMSTM043 Improving Water Distribution in Portail Montrouis 21 Oct 2005
IOMSTM051 Play for Peace Reconciliation Tournament: Portail Montrouis 13 Dec 2005
A leader of a local development organization in Portail Montrouis said to the HTI Program Officer 
that thanks to HTI, residents were no longer ashamed to admit that they were from Portail
Montrouis and were proud of their neighborhood.
Changing Minds – Within the Community
HTI focused on bringing tangible indications that peace is accompanied by prosperity and positive
momentum. This was illustrated with the Bel Air initiative above as well as the social inclusion activities. 
Additionally, specific grants focused on removing symbols of violence in communities to aide in the
process of moving past the unrest.
IOMPAP042 Bel Air Terrain d’Entente Rehabilitation 19 May 2005
This project repaired a public kiosk that had been badly burned in conflict between residents and 
police.
IOMPAP166 Gwo Roch Basketball Terrains d’Entente 16 Dec 2005
This grant transformed into a sports field an area that was used by gangs for voodoo ceremonies 
before they committed illegal activities.
Changing Minds – Outside the Community
Two different types of grants attempted to demonstrate to the wider Haitian public the positive (non￾criminal) activities and accomplishments of residents of volatile communities. The first set were media 
grants to promote the activities of HTI partners, and the second set were activities co-sponsored by the 
Inter-ministerial Commission of the Prime Minister which brought sports teams from partner communities 
to national venues for high-profile events.
IOMPAP030 Extending the Effect of HTI through Media 16 Dec 2004
IOMPAP034 Reaching Out with Radio 24 Feb 2005
IOMPAP046 Play for Peace Program Launch 13 May 2005
IOMPAP078 Communicating Peace: Training for Trainers 26 Aug 2005
IOMPAP079 Communicating Peace: Port-au-Prince 26 Aug 2005
IOMPAP116 Grand Opening: Carrefour-Feuilles Community Cyber Center 19 Jan 2006
IOMPAP144 Building Capacity for Reporting on Community Stabilization 23 Mar 2006
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Activities 
IOMPAP174 Haiti Transition Initiative Calendar 9 Dec 2005
IOMCAP017 Communicating Peace: Cap Haitien 26 Aug 2005
IOMPGV044 Communicating Peace: Petit Goave 26 Aug 2005
IOMSTM033 Communicating Peace: St. Marc 26 Aug 2005
IOMPAP049 Play for Peace Gala Football Day 10 June 2005
IOMPAP080 Play for Peace International Match 19 Jul 2005
IOMPAP177 Play for Peace Holiday Tournament Finals 16 Dec 2005
Community Initiate
Because HTI grants build community cohesion, some communities demonstrate post-project initiative, 
accomplishing positive things for the neighborhoods without HTI assistance.
IOMPAP008 Martissant 1 Street Rehabilitation 25 Jul 2004
After HTI rehabilitated a neighborhood street, vehicles were able to move more freely and more 
quickly. Residents pooled resources to construct speed bumps to slow cars, and they kept the 
street free of trash.
IOMPAP069 Cite Soleil 19 Play for Peace Summer Youth Activities 30 Jul 2005
One of the leaders of the Soleil 19 sports association (and a strong HTI partner) was wrongly 
imprisoned without charge for several months. All community members who worked on the
summer camp donated a portion of their salaries to pay the necessary legal fees to have him 
released. 
Problematic and Failed Grants
IOMPAP005 Rehabilitation of Wharf Jeremie Road – Sidewalks 18 Nov 2005
IOMPAP006 Rehabilitation of Wharf Jeremie Road – Drainage Canals 18 Nov 2005
The estimates made by the Ministry of Public Works were very poor, leaving a huge funding
shortfall on their part to complete the works envisioned. While the HTI-funded component could 
be completed as a discreet activity, the project as a whole will seem unfinished to observers.
IOMPAP084 Capacity Building of Inter-ministerial Commission 30 Aug 2005
This was unsuccessful because the person hired to work with the ministries claimed that IMC 
coordinator was trying to extort half of his salary. He resigned. A second person was never hired 
because HTI was not able to reach consensus with the IMC coordinator. The person in question 
was highly qualified and seemed to be a good choice. The purpose of this project was to give 
resources to the commission to work more effectively, but the Coordinator made this impossible. 
The only recourse would have been to complain to the Prime Minister, which was not a viable 
option. 
IOMPAP123 “Jam for Peace” Musical Competition 13 Oct 2005
This was signed with the MINUSTAH DDR Unit and was never realized due to lack of follow￾through by DDR. 
IOMSTM012 Ministry of Public Works Truck and Backhoe Repair 15 Oct 2004
This project illustrated the difficulty in doing this sort of project in the provinces. A local contractor 
was used, but all the parts had to come from the capital. There were extreme delays and cost 
overruns because of the lack of an adequate assessment before the work began. It would have 
been more efficient to transport the entire vehicle to Port-au-Prince for service at the affiliated 
dealership. 
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IOMPGV035 Rehabilitation of the Lambi Club Cultural Center 30 Jun 2005
This project started as a good project with strong community support. Unfortunately, this support 
got a bit out of control when pressure was put on the IOM national staff engineer supervising the 
project to expand the works beyond the scope of the original contract. Under normal
circumstances, this pressure would have been deflected by the international staff member, who 
would be relatively immune from local pressure. The Petit Goave office was not staffed by an 
international for approximately three months during project implementation when the contracted 
works were modified to construct a much bigger structure, resulting in a significant shortfall. This 
underscored the need for international staff presence to support local staff and relieve any undue 
pressure placed upon them by partners.