RAISE PLUS-LIMITED SCOPE OF WORK 
FINAL REPORT 
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES (PESA) 
FINAL EVALUATION 
August 2006 
This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for International Development. 
PRIVATE ENTERPRISE SUPPORT 
ACTIVITIES (PESA) FINAL 
EVALUATION 
FINAL REPORT 
Submitted by: 
Weidemann Associates, Inc. 
In cooperation with: 
Agricultural Management Group, Inc. (AMG) 
Submitted to: 
USAID/Tanzania 
Contract No.: 
AEG-I-00-04-00010-00 Task Order #AEG-I-05-04-00010-00 
Period of Performance: 
March-June 2006 
Prepared by: 
William Masawe
Agribusiness Specialist 
Gregory M. Sullivan 
Agribusiness Development Program Specialist 
DISCLAIMER 
The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States 
Agency for International Development or the United States Government. 
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Table of Contents 
 
 Page 
LIST OF ACRONYMS 3
SECTION ONE: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4
SECTION TWO: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 9 
SECTION THREE: PROJECT DESIGN AND ACTIVITIES 11 
SECTION FOUR: PROJECT STRATEGY AND IMPLEMENTATION 16 
SECTION FIVE: SUSTAINABILITY 18 
SECTION SIX: COST EFFECTIVENESS 21 
SECTION SEVEN: GENDER STRATEGY 26 
SECTION EIGHT: PERFORMANCE AND MONITORING PLAN 28 
SECTION NINE: ANNEXES 31 
Annex 1. Scope of Work 31 
Annex 2. Work Plan and Schedule of Evaluation Team 34 
Annex 3. References 36 
Annex 4. Descriptions of Associations Visited 38 
Table 4.1 Interviews of Association and Apex Members 38 
Table 4.2 USAID Evaluation, Alliance Meeting, Morogoro Attendance 42 
Annex 5. Cost Effectiveness Analysis Tables 43 
Table 5.1 Present Value of Project Costs and Projected Incremental Sales 43 
Table 5.2 Reported Sales by Commodity Sub-Projects 44 
Table 5.3 Sub-Project Analysis of Incremental Net Revenues With and 45 
Without DAI PESA Project 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
AAS Agribusiness Advisory Service 
ADF Africa Development Fund
AMSDP Agricultural Marketing Systems Development Project 
AGM Annual Group Meeting 
BDS Business Development Services 
BCR Benefit Cost Ratio 
C-E Cost Effectiveness 
CRDB Community Rural Development Bank 
DAI Development Alternatives, Inc. 
ECI Ebony Consulting International 
FO Field Officer 
GoT Government of Tanzania 
IR Intermediate Result 
IRR Internal Rate of Return 
ISD Integrated Subsector Development Methodology 
LO Liaison Officer 
LOP Life of Project 
LTTA Long Term Technical Assistance 
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation 
MAMCOS Madibira Agricultural Marketing Co-Operative Society 
MRPS Micro-Finance Rural Participatory Scheme
MSE Micro-Small Enterprise 
NPV Net Present Value 
PC Project Coordinator 
PESA Private Enterprise Support Activities 
PMP Performance and Monitoring Plan 
RPMS Rural Participatory Micro-Finance Scheme
RTS Results Tracking System
SACCOS Savings and Credit Cooperative Society 
SOW Scope of Work 
STTA Short Term Technical Assistance 
TCCIA Tanzania Chamber of Commerce and Industry Association 
ToT Training of Trainer programs
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
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Section One: Executive Summary 
USAID’s Private Enterprise Sector Assistance (PESA) project focuses on improving the 
income of Micro and Small Enterprises (MSE) through the formation of associations for cost￾effective delivery of technical, business and management information. Initially, the project 
focused on introducing policies to improve the business environment. USAID funding for 
the project was US$ 11.95 million, but funding was reduced to US$ 8.39 million. The budget 
cut resulted in USAID’s sharpening the focus of project activities. 
1.1. Methodology of Evaluation 
This evaluation focused on program impacts and on the cost-effectiveness of its delivery of 
services. In conducting the evaluation, the team reviewed product documents to determine 
structure and to understand how the various components were interrelated. The evaluation 
team met with representatives of USAID, DAI PESA and other PESA project organizations 
to assess the effectiveness of their collaboration. Meetings were held with project staff at 
both the headquarters and zonal offices. A questionnaire was used to gather information 
addressing the questions in the SOW. Interviews were conducted with project beneficiaries 
to observe their association meetings and, where possible, to inspect crop production 
activities. Group interviewees were male and female association leaders and members. 
1.2. Key Findings 
1. The DAI PESA project made significant progress in establishing smallholder agricultural 
producer associations in six regions of Tanzania. There are approximately 21,000 MSEs 
enrolled in 173 associations. The amount of capacity building provided to MSEs and 
associations is impressive. Project beneficiaries reported benefiting from both technical and 
business training. The large number of associations can be credited to a committed project 
staff that provided needed skills to project beneficiaries. Many of the newly formed 
associations are weak, and association members remarked that some will likely “die a slow 
death” after the end of the project. The evaluation team could not ascertain the sustainability 
of all associations as the viability of each varies widely across zones and commodities. The 
team believes the establishment of associations will take time, as did the successful 
Kilimanjaro Specialty Coffee Growers Association which took six years. Project 
beneficiaries reported that they needed their association to provide them access to credit and 
markets if their incomes were to increase. 
2. DAI PESA has put the development of the apex (a management entity responsible for 
more than one association) as its top priority for the time remaining in the Life of Project 
(LOP). Nine apexes have been formed which will be important to the sustainability of the 
project. The apex organizations for the commodity associations are clearly in the start-up 
mode. The apexes, if they receive additional project support as well as support from other 
donors, could manage to stem the decline in associations, but this will require a longer time 
frame than is currently allowed under the existing LOP which ends October 7, 2006. The 
current assessment is that only a few of these apex organizations will be sustainable at the 
closure of the project. The Subawanga apex will likely decline because it was formed in 
December 2005, its remote location, and size of operation. 
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3. Producer associations which are starting to find their way will have difficulty in 
supporting their apex with funding unless fees can be tied directly to marketable contracts 
developed and implemented by the apex. Within the early stages of contracting and product 
standards, apexes face challenges to implement marketing contracts based on meeting 
product standards. The producer associations will want to insure their own survival with 
paid-in membership and delivery of benefits to their members. Producer associations will 
need capacity building in business services, membership development and governance advice 
for some time. A simple activity for the apex is to undertake purchases of bulk inputs (e.g., 
fertilizer) for its members, which will serve to build a relationship between the apex and its 
associations. 
4. The SO9 and SO12 objectives are targeted at agriculture in the rural sector. The project’s 
design proved effective enough for DAI PESA to exceed its targets, but sustainability may be 
an issue because of the lack of infrastructure and capacity to address structural changes, 
especially in the policy area. 
5. The project’s design focuses on support to farmers who are organized into associations. In 
actuality, farmers and their associations operate from a weak position in a market system that 
includes high marketing costs and the lack of a progressive agro-processing industry. 
Ultimately these factors will impact the performance of associations and their apexes for the 
foreseeable future. 
6. DAI PESA had a policy component at the beginning of the project, but budget reduction 
caused one activity to be eliminated and a second to be downgraded in importance. 
Government of Tanzania (GoT) institutions are still too weak to implement policies 
benefiting the private sector. Tax reforms are needed and market reforms, such as the 
elimination of oversized lembessa bags, would improve the returns to producers and to 
government tax authorities. Public policy creates the needed awareness, but on-the-ground 
changes have not materialized. 
7. DAI has adapted well to the Mission’s declining budgets and to the transition from SO9 to 
the new SO12. Project staff has been creative in shifting resources to where they have their 
highest return. A negative impact of the declining budget was DAI’s decision for some staff 
to have dual positions. This has been problematic, especially for Monitoring and Evaluation 
(M&E). Project staff showed a willingness to reach out to other donor agencies to leverage 
their resources, e.g. the African Development Fund (ADF). DAI estimated that its activities 
have resulted in US$ 16.1 million in funds being invested by donor partners. 
8. The marketing linkages activity was slow to establish and results were lackluster. The 
recent employment of a marketing specialist will produce improvements in this area. The 
market tests in Nairobi for onions and oranges served as a lesson that the market can be 
punishing for lack of product quality and poor market timing. Associations undertaking 
market trials benefited from the learning experience. Marketing committees are being 
formed in the apexes and more market trials are expected. 
9. A sustainable source of market information has not developed in the private sector. 
Negotiations of supply contracts require access to market information on supply and demand 
for products. The project-published magazine, Miafutaji, although colorful and informative, 
is unlikely to provide effective market information to members of associations. Moreover, 
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associations will be unable to bear the cost of this publication after the close of the project. 
(At the end of the evaluation, the team learned that the magazine would be discontinued.) 
10. DAI promotes the concept of alliances to further the policy dialogue. The public-private 
sector fora create a venue for discussing policy-related issues. The apex has a role to play in 
private-public sector dialogue at the regional level when action is more difficult at the 
national level. Alliance meetings are occurring (e.g., the Tanga Region has held eight 
alliance meetings). Participants of meetings need to be asked to address a current problem
with the coordinated game plan that they have agreed to. These fora will be difficult to 
sustain unless another donor picks them up, or unless the GoT is provided with an incentive 
to institutionalize them. 
11. The Results Tracking System (RTS) has not been a useful tool for project management. 
Inherent problems with the RTS have been allowed to persist, and the problems will need to 
be addressed before the next annual data collection in August 2006. Asking DAI to be the 
gatekeeper to receive project impact data from other PESA collaborators was not effective 
and caused some false starts. The RTS has the potential to be used by all stakeholders in 
planning activities and in improving performance. Questions exist about data collection on 
the part of DAI PESA. The sampling frame was not standardized for all project areas. 
Furthermore, some indicators do not provide an appropriate understanding of what has been 
achieved. 
12. USAID did not emphasize cost-effectiveness in its design of DAI PESA. However, even 
though facing a reduction of project funds, DAI was successful in establishing a cost￾effective system of establishing associations and apexes to deliver needed capacity building 
resources to MSEs. The primary financial indicator is gross sale revenue by MSEs. The 
Benefit-Cost Ratio (BCR), the Net Present Value (NPV) and the Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR) exceeded standard cut-off levels for an acceptable investment. Two commodity sub￾projects, paddy and sugarcane, overshadowed the results when the project is based on 
absolute levels of revenues and volumes. Paddy and sugarcane represented 86 percent of the 
estimated incremental gross revenues from project interventions. Both of these sub-projects 
had producer associations before the start of DAI PESA, though their effectiveness is 
questionable. It is important to disaggregate the project results by sub-project to better assess 
the impact of USAID’s investment. 
13. DAI PESA did not have a gender strategy which resulted in the lack of an effective 
communication message. Project staff, however, displayed a strong dedication to ensuring 
women’s participation. Women have roles in the associations though men hold most of the 
leadership positions. Men reported that they valued the role that women played in the 
association as well as their ideas, transparency and ability to stay on task. In general women 
said that they were respected for their participation. Some women did mention that they did 
not share equally in the benefits from product sales. A report issued by the company carrying 
out trainings noted that the level of women’s participation needs to be improved. 
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1.3. Key Recommendations 
The project is in its final year. In the time remaining, the evaluation team proposes the 
following recommendations for DAI PESA and USAID. 
1.3.1. DAI PESA 
1. The project should continue to strengthen associations and apexes. The project can use 
trainers from recent Training of Trainer (ToT) programs to conduct the trainings. 
Associations need to complete the full complement of training modules. Business 
Development Services (BDS) services need to be embedded as a component of the apex for 
support by the associations. An Agribusiness Advisory Service (AAS) composed of former 
project staff could be contracted by the apex to provide consulting services. A business plan 
for the AAS needs to be done together with an assessment of the apexes’ willingness to pay 
for types of consulting services. 
2. Project focus on improving MSEs’ access to credit and to market linkages should: 
¾ Develop bankable proposals for apex organizations, using the commodities produced 
by its members as collateral. This requires the development of better crop budgets at 
the farm level. 
¾ Advocate for continued donor partner participation in warehouse receipts and in other 
micro-credit lending programs. 
¾ Assist the marketing committees of apex organizations to conduct market surveys, 
e.g., fresh vegetables in Dar es Salaam. 
3. Market information is important in the SO12. A simple market price reporting scheme
modeled after the Community and Rural Development Bank (CRDB) “bank by phone” can 
link associations to markets by cell phones. 
4. Apexes will need assistance in basic business support with an office, computer and a staff 
person. Operating funds can be sourced from other donors or from the members themselves. 
The office needs to be “bare bones,” but should still give the apex credibility to negotiate 
contracts. 
 
5. Alliances are a good forum to discuss specific problems, but they should be convened 
sparingly, or otherwise their impact will become ineffective. Alliance meetings can be called 
on a specific problem. Each meeting requires a clear work plan and a set time frame for 
achieving one or two measurable outputs. 
6. The project will need to work on the Results Tracking System (RTS), if the Performance 
and Monitoring Plan (PMP) is to be effective. DAI needs to supply an M&E person before 
the next annual survey to improve data collection procedures, analyses, and reporting. This 
next survey needs to be an end of project summary. The survey will need to account for the 
impact of other donors cooperating with DAI PESA in sub-project locations. 
Reanalyzing the prior data collected is unlikely to be cost effective. Efforts need to focus on 
collecting meaningful data in August 2006. A greater understanding of the project’s impact 
on household income is needed. 
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7. DAI submitted a request for a four month “no cost extension” to USAID. There is clear 
evidence that the benefits of this extension would exceed the costs. The project is making 
reasonable progress in strengthening associations and apexes. Persons trained under the ToT 
component can provide the remaining modules. The staff is poised to make strides in 
boosting the confidence of apex leaders and their respective committee members. 
The project has also requested an additional $700,000 to carry the project to June 30, 2007. 
The results from the cost effectiveness (C-E) analysis indicate that each dollar invested in 
DAI PESA results in US$ 1.82 in incremental gross revenues to producers, and therefore the 
additional investment is warranted. 
1.3.2. USAID 
1. It is recommended that USAID, working with DAI, address the deficiencies in the SO12 
to address the weak agro-processing industry. 
2. USAID will need to engage the private sector now in the development of a market 
information system rather than postpone this activity. 
3. USAID needs to consider how the RTS can be a more effective management instrument 
used by all project stakeholders. 
1.4. Lessons Learned 
There have been several lessons learned from the DAI PESA project. 
1. Smallholders are attracted to opportunities for training when their livelihoods are 
improved. Both men and women attended trainings, although women’s attendance could be 
higher. 
2. Smallholders require a full complement of services in the areas of capacity building, 
availability of credit and access to markets, if they are to remain engaged with their 
association and apex organizations. If the organization is transparent and responsive to 
producers’ needs (even if services are not immediately forthcoming), producers will remain 
engaged for a period of time. 
3. DAI PESA lacks a gender strategy. This results in an ineffective communication program
which does not convey the proper messages that could have engaged women more effectively 
in the project. 
4. It is more cost effective to address deficiencies in management tools, e.g. the RTS, early in 
the project, rather than allow problems to become more difficult and costly to remedy. 
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Section Two: Introduction and Background 
2.1. Introduction 
This USAID evaluation of DAI PESA is being conducted as the project is due to close in 
September 2006. The focus of this evaluation is on the impact of the project and DAI’s 
effectiveness in implementation. The SOW sets out a set of questions to be answered by the 
evaluation team (see Annex 1). 
The evaluation team reviewed pertinent documents and conducted personal interviews of 
project staff, project beneficiaries and other stakeholders. A list of interviews is found in 
Annex 2. The project provided reports and other documents (see Annex 3). The evaluation 
team made site visits to producer associations and apex organizations and used a 
questionnaire to evaluate key issues. Interviews were also conducted with project staff, 
extension agents, and other PESA cooperators both in and outside Dar es Salaam. 
The evaluation team thanks the DAI PESA project staff in arranging meetings with 
stakeholders in the project zones. The team attended two Annual Group Meetings (AGM) 
and one private-public sector alliance meeting. William Masawe and Gregory Sullivan 
conducted the evaluation. 
2.2. Background 
2.2.1. General Setting 
A significant period for Tanzania was in 1992 when the GoT shifted from a socialist to a 
private sector-led economic development approach. For many years Tanzania focused on the 
resettlement of smallholder agriculturalists into collectives. The GoT’s intent was to bring 
services as well as planned agricultural production and marketing. The failure of the 
cooperatives has left a negative image among producers and has made farmers wary of any 
activities that encourage group formation. Some of the DAI PESA associations are former 
farmer groups that have been reorganized, while others are new. The project assisted in the 
formation of 173 associations and nine apex organizations.
The trends in global trade are impacting the agribusiness sector in Tanzania. Competitive 
forces are impacting Tanzania, with Brazil and China emerging as major exporters of 
cashews. South African products are being imported. Supermarkets, though still in their 
infancy, are affecting the food distribution system. DAI is responding to these market forces 
to position its target commodities in the local and regional markets. 
2.2.2. Project History and Adjustments during LOP 
The project was signed in October 2002 as contract number PCE-I-817-99-0002-00 and Task 
Order 817. The inauguration date was February 2003. A shortfall in USAID’s Economic 
Growth budget resulted in a reduction of project funds to US$ 10.2 million. A second 
funding cut occurred and the budget was reduced to US$ 8.4 million. Budget cuts required 
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elimination of one activity (policy and Long Term Technical Assistance (LTTA)) and the 
downsizing of another (private-public sector policy dialogue). 
USAID undertook its new strategic objective (SO) in FY 05 and a new SO12 replaced the 
revised SO9 beginning in FY 06. The new SO12 places more emphasis on the delivery of 
technical training to farmers and on improving marketing linkages. The project successfully 
established a large number of associations. In March 2005, DAI began to focus on apex 
organizations and established oranges, vegetables and paddy apexes to support member
associations. 
2.2.3. Project Structure and Activities 
The project activities are in six target regions: Tanga, Morogoro, Iringa, Ruvumu, Mbeya and 
Rukwa. A project coordinator in each zone managed regional activities. Each zonal office 
has a project coordinator (PC), two field officers (FO) and an office secretary. Staff at the 
headquarters in Dar es Salaam backstopped the field activities. In addition, the project hired 
liaison officers (LOs) as resident advisors to support a particular commodity sub-project. 
Typically a LO is a staff member in the Ministry of Agriculture who receives a topping up of 
his/her salary and a monthly operating allowance. In one sub-project a retired sugar 
specialist was hired to provide technical training. 
The project initially had seven activities, two in policy, four in capacity building and one in 
performance and monitoring. In addition, the project has been a catalyst for other donors to 
provide additional support activities in the areas of HIV/AIDS and savings and credit 
cooperative societies (SACCOS). 
The budget reductions resulted in DAI reducing the amount of Short Term Technical 
Assistance (STTA) and in doubling job responsibilities of the local staff. This doubling of 
job responsibilities has resulted in lower performance in the coordination of certain activities 
like M&E and market linkages. The project made good use of LOs who supported the 
activities of the FO. 
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Section Three: Project Design and Activities 
3.1. Overview of Project Design and Activities 
DAI PESA started in October 2002 and activities began in February 2003. The project 
underwent modifications because of USAID budget constraints and a new SO. The initial 
Strategic Objective, SO9, was general in scope with “increased participation of micro and 
small enterprises (MSE) in the economy.” The three intermediate results (IRs) for SO9 
focused on improving the policy environment, improving market linkages, and increasing 
capacity building of MSEs. The SO12 is more directed at agricultural production and 
“incomes increased for small farmers in selected commodities.” The new SO has two IRs: 
increased production of selected agricultural commodities, and access to markets for selected 
agricultural commodities increased. Each of the new IRs have sub-IRs. 
In the revised modification of DAI PESA, activity 1 was increased to support business 
associations. Activity 2 on private-public dialogue was reduced, and activity 3 on 
collaboration with government institutions on policy, was dropped. Activity 4—establishing 
market linkages of private enterprises—was retained in full. Activity 5 was to make business 
and market information available and was retained, though no funding was available during 
the first several years. Activity 6 was retained to increase business and enterprise skills. For 
Activity 7, the Report Tracking System (RTS) was retained, with DAI to remain as the 
gatekeeper for collected PMP results from the other PESA team partners. 
3.2. Findings 
3.2.1. Objectives of the Final Revised PESA Proposal 
The expected overall result of the USAID/Tanzania PESA Program is “Incomes of Small 
Farmers Increased in Selected Commodity Sub-Sectors.” The objective is clear and direct 
compared with the objective of the previous SO9. The SO9 objective was too broad in scope 
for the resources available and for the allotted time in the LOP. The SO9 addressed issues of 
enabling environment in the value chain, with emphasis on public policy interventions. It 
was unclear what level of the value chain the policies should target. The result is that the 
project was unlikely to have the necessary impacts on smallholder farmers, because of the 
GoT’s inability to implement policy changes in the short to medium term. USAID expected 
too much and too soon. 
The emphasis of the SO12 is on increasing productivity and trade of selected commodities. 
This project is a performance-based task order with identified results. 
3.2.2. The Objectives and the Mission’s Result Framework 
The project’s objectives are in line with the results framework, because of a clearly defined 
focus on agricultural smallholders and the needs for both productivity and trade 
improvements. IRs are clear and directly linked to the objectives. The three IRs allow for 
necessary coordination between the farmer and the supply inputs and output markets. 
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3.2.3. The Objectives and DAI’s Manageable Interest 
The Mission’s SO12 fits within DAI management strengths and is supported by the 
company’s Integrated Subsector Program (ISP). DAI effectively applies its ISP to the 
development of associations and apex organizations. 
DAI staff is competent and able to adjust to the new objective and the results framework of 
the SO12. In the case of the RTS, DAI was given the responsibility for collecting and 
assimilating data from other PESA partners into a report for USAID. This activity was 
outside DAI’s manageable interest. Consequently, for a period of time, M&E duties were 
performed by a staff member with responsibilities for other project activities. 
3.2.4. Targets and Achievements of DAI PESA 
The indicators, targets and achievements for the final revised SO9 and the SO12 are 
presented in Table 3.1. Where appropriate, the indicators that match up for the two SOs are 
placed in the same row. The revised SO9’s objective is to increase incomes of small farmers 
in selected agricultural commodity sub-sectors. This objective is similar to SO12. 
The two important target indicators are gross sales revenue and household income. 
Gross sales revenue. Gross sales revenue increased for all commodity sub-projects. Gross 
sales revenue of core project commodities were US$ 1,595,795 in FY03. Gross sales 
increased to US$ 7,709,136 in FY04, and to US$ 12,497,151 in FY05. The target was to 
increase gross sales revenue by 5 percent each year. The project reports a sales increase of 
over 300 percent for FY04 over the baseline, and a cumulative increase at the end of FY05 of 
683 percent. A difficulty arises in determining how much of this increase is due directly to 
the project and how much is based on changes in market conditions and other factors. 
Household incomes. The project did not collect field data on household income. The
assumption is that increased gross sales revenues will result in a net increase in household 
income. The difficulties facing smallholder households are their constraints in working 
capital and in the availability of household and hired labor to implement new technologies 
and marketing activities. It is important to understand what the returns to both of these 
limiting factors are, in order to determine if a household is better off because of the project. 
Furthermore, women said in interviews that additional income is not shared equally in the 
household because men spend it on non-essential items if they obtain it. In short, money is 
not finding its way back to the improvement of household livelihoods. DAI PESA is 
providing training on the importance of SACCOS as well as on household budgeting of 
expenses. As women become more integrated into the household decision-making process, 
there will be an improvement in their livelihoods. 
Number of new producer organizations established. DAI PESA established 173 
associations from May 2003 through March 2006. This includes the creation of nine apex 
organizations. Out of 173 associations, 79 were reformed from an existing farmer group. 
The project then shifted its focus to developing apexes to provide services to its member 
associations. Although it is difficult to specifically determine what state these associations 
are in, it is clear that some are stronger than others. 
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Percent change in membership in producer organizations. DAI PESA successfully 
increased membership in producer organizations from 5,844 to 21,106 at the end of FY05. 
The project expects to add approximately 630 new members in FY06. The percent change 
will be measured at the end of FY06. With the baseline set with the associations that have 
been formed, it will be of interest to now determine if paid membership is increasing or
decreasing, indicating the viability of associations in the future. 
Value of production marketed by producer organizations. The value of production 
marketed by producers who are affiliated with associations was approximately US$ 12.49 
million at the end of FY05. This value is estimated to increase to US$ 12.62 million at the 
end of FY06, an estimated increase of 10 percent. An important clarification is that this 
indicator should not imply that associations are negotiating the sale of their members’ 
commodities.
Volume of production marketed by producer organizations. Producer association 
members marketed 228,219 metric tons (MT) for FY05. The target is for the volume to 
increase to 239,630 MT by the end of FY06. An important clarification is that this indicator 
should not imply that associations are negotiating the sale of their members’ commodities. 
Number of new producers trained in improved technologies and methods. From May 
2003 through September 2005, 44,939 MSEs were trained by DAI-PESA. In the first two 
quarters of 2006, 11,132 producers were trained. Training has been a large component of the 
project and stakeholders reported gaining valuable information from this activity. Producers 
reported record keeping was important to evaluate their agricultural enterprises and also their 
households’ activities. 
Increase in yields. Crop yields were not tracked earlier in the project, but evidence indicates 
that yield of commodities in specific subsectors have increased because of DAI-PESA. For 
example, sugarcane production increased among outgrowers in Kilombero from 18 to 36 MT 
per acre. Onion production has increased from 8 to 10 bags to 25 bags per acre. Producers 
indicated in interviews that technical training was effective in increasing yields. The project 
encouraged producers to adopt new seed varieties for sunflower, onions and vegetables. Rice 
yields have not shown dramatic increases, because the varieties preferred are low yielding, 
but have a unique flavor profile. Paprika production per acre remains low in the range of 180 
to 220 kg per acre. 
Percent change in areas cultivated under improved technologies and methods. This 
indicator is new for the project under the SO12. From field interviews it was observed that 
producers are increasing crop areas using new technologies. For example, paprika producers 
are expanding into new areas or converting acreage in maize to paprika by an average of .5 
acre per producer. 
Number of policy fora organized by producer organizations. At the end of FY05, DAI 
PESA had conducted 12 policy fora. The target for FY06 is 20, and 13 meetings had been 
completed by the end of the second quarter. It seems likely that DAI-PESA will reach its 
target for this year. 
Number of new business partnerships established by producer organizations. This 
indicator is new for DAI PESA beginning in FY06. The estimate is for 20 partnerships to be 
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established by producer organizations. Thirteen have been created in the first two quarters. 
Oranges from Tanga represented the first attempt by an association to undertake a marketing 
arrangement between its members and buyers. 
3.3. Conclusion 
DAI PESA is successfully achieving the targets set for the project. The project has 
established a broad base of associations across six regions of Tanzania. The organizational 
model of DAI-PESA, the quality and dedication of its staff, and the demand for services by 
smallholder farmers contributed to the rapid establishment of associations. The large number 
of associations overshadows their current capacity to deliver services to their members and to 
be sustainable after the close of the project. 
Reporting indicators emphasize volume and value of sales. A more defining indicator is the 
number of sales occurring under marketing contracts, as these are important for the success of 
the project. Contract selling has been slow to emerge and farmers have complained about 
their access to markets. 
Grades and standards are being gradually introduced by the project. For example, the paprika 
price is based on three grades. The grading system provides producers with an indicator of 
how to improve their production and, therefore, receive higher revenues. Onion producers 
are using better seeds to comply with market requirements. Sunflower producers are using 
improved seed to increase yields. Establishment of grades and standards will result in more 
efficient market transactions and the ability of associations and their apex to negotiate 
forward contracts. 
The design of PESA is narrowly focused on smallholder agriculture. The revised SO9 helped 
DAI to better direct their efforts and resources. However, a limitation appears in the SO12 
with the absence of attention given to agro-processing and to other downstream marketing 
functions that are important to boosting demand for agricultural commodities. This leaves an 
important void in the Mission’s SO12. 
3.4. Recommendations 
The following recommendations are proposed: 
¾ Greater use of liaison officers, as they will need to continue to strengthen the 
associations in supply and quality control to meet contracts negotiated by the apex. 
¾ Address concerns in collection and measurement of indicators in the PMP and in the 
functioning of the RTS, before the next annual field surveys are conducted. 
¾ Design and implement a system that improves the communication of PMP results to 
all stakeholders, including associations and their apex organization, for each specific 
commodity group. 
¾ Improve the SO12 and the IRs to address the need for a stable and progressive agro￾processing industry that can interface with farmer associations and their apex. 
Page 15 of 52 
Table 3.1. Indicators, targets and achievements for DAI PESA project 
SO9 SO12 Baseline Target Achievement
#1. % change in 
no. of MSEs in all 
program-assisted 
subsectors 
#5. % change in 
membership in 
producer 
organizations 
Baseline = 5,844 
MSEs at start 
Target: 15% 
increase/year 
Increase 633 (3%) 
in FY06 
End of FY05, 
21,106 MSEs – 
261% increase. 
FY06: TBD 
#2. Total no. of 
new MSEs formed 
Baseline = 5,844
MSEs at start 
Target: 2,809/yr End of FY05 
15,262 new MSEs 
Exceed target 
#3. Total number 
of policy 
dialogues held 
annually between 
MSEs and GoT 
reps 
#6. no. of policy 
fora organized by 
producer 
organizations 
FY04 baseline= 0 
FY06 baseline= 12 
FY04 Target N/A 
FY06 target = 20 
End of FY04, 9 
End of FY05, 12 
In FY06 – Qtr 1 & 
2 completed 13 
#4. % change in 
total value of
program subsector 
sales by MSEs by 
USAID-funded 
activities 
#7 Value of 
production marketed 
by producer 
organizations 
Baseline = $1.5M FY04&05 = 5%/yr 
FY06 = 10%/yr 
FY04 = $7.709M 
FY05 = $12.497M 
FY06 TBD 
#5. Avg. % 
change in volume
of sales by MSEs 
in program
subsectors 
#8 Volume of 
production marketed 
by producer 
organizations 
Baseline = 24375 
MT 
Baseline for FY06 
= 228,219 MT 
FY04&05 = 19%/yr 
FY06 = 239,630 
MT 
End of FY05 
increase of 836% 
FY06 TBD 
#6. % change in 
no. of programs 
assisting MSEs to 
access inputs 
Baseline = 2,819 FY04&05 = 5%/yr FY04 = 81.5% 
FY05 = 6.6% 
#7. % change in 
no. of MSEs
accessing training 
support services 
#2. No. of new 
producers trained in 
improved tech. & 
methods 
Baseline = 0
Baseline FY06 = 
44,939 
Target = 2,100 
MSEs 
FY06 Target = 22% 
(54.939) 
FY04 & 05 = 
43,361 MSEs 
trained by end of 
FY06 = 56,071 
#1. % increase in 
yields of selected 
commodities 
Baseline = 
228,219 MT 
Target = 239,630 
MT 
FY06 TBD 
#3. % change in area 
cultivated under new 
tech. & methods 
Baseline TBD Target TBD FY06 TBD 
#4. no. of new 
producer 
organizations 
established 
Baseline = 176 
(from 5/03 to 9/05)
Target = 4 FY06 = 180 
#9. No. of new 
business partnerships 
created by producer 
organizations 
Baseline = 0 Target = 20 in FY06 FY06 = 13 (end of 
Qtr 2) 
Page 16 of 52 
Section Four: Project Strategy and Implementation 
This section examines the strategy employed by the implementer and how the 
implementation was conducted. 
4.1. Findings 
4.1.1. DAI PESA’s Strategy for Implementing PESA 
DAI employed a strategy called the Integrated Subsector Development (ISD) methodology. 
This strategy is described in the Second Annual Work Plan, Version #4 (page 14). The 
strategy has four stages: 1) subsector selection, 2) subsector study, 3) subsector support 
planning, and 4) subsector support delivery. DAI recognized that with limited project 
resources, it was necessary to concentrate their efforts. 
Subsector Selection. The project used a pre-selection screening of subsectors based on ten 
criteria. In addition, Ebony Consulting International (ECI), which conducted the subsector 
studies, had a list of seven criteria for screening subsectors. For example, the subsector had 
to be in one or more of the six targeted regions and represent opportunities for growth. 
Furthermore, there had to be a large number of farmers involved with a critical mass of 
growers that could be organized. Finally the subsector had to have a perceived competitive 
advantage in the market. The selection criteria do not anticipate what is the best use of 
USAID funds in relation to other opportunities. The selection of two sugar sub-projects, both 
with established associations, calls into question the selection process. 
Subsector Study. Subsector studies were completed on oranges, rice, paprika, sunflower, 
onions, sugarcane, and horticulture products leading to project activities. Other studies were 
completed on cashews, fish, beans and tea, but no action was taken on these commodities. 
The studies were of satisfactory quality and helpful to the planning of the sub-projects. 
Subsector Support Planning. DAI realized the need for other donor organizations to be 
brought in early in the project. The project collaborated with public sector agencies, 
Tanzania Chamber of Commerce and Industry Association (TCCIA), Ministry of Agriculture, 
and other donor organizations. This action leveraged the funds available to the project. DAI 
describes their planning process as: “[by] pulling together all the productive and supportive 
parties as allies, and by organizing alliance and association level partners to prioritize and 
take on improvements, we are preparing critical-mass producer areas to be reliable suppliers, 
producers of value-added items, and in general desirable sources to buyers for on-going 
commerce.” 
Subsector Support Delivery. The evaluation team found that the project is performing at a 
satisfactory level in delivery of services. Training was conducted and appreciated by the 
stakeholders. Stakeholders reported that they lacked the confidence to obtain the necessary 
working capital or to establish market linkages. Farmers did say that they wanted greater 
access to credit and to markets. 
Page 17 of 52 
4.1.2. Effectiveness of DAI PESA 
The ISD calls for support for marketing linkages, and this activity was weak in the beginning 
of the project. With a full-time market coordinator since August 2005, activities are rapidly 
being implemented. 
4.2. Conclusions 
DAI developed a concept paper on selecting subsectors best suited for project interventions. 
The concept paper looks for the presence of key conditions to be present in a subsector for 
project consideration. The project management has to examine its selection criteria to 
evaluate if it has the proper mix of commodities in its portfolio. A question that the 
evaluation team has is the selection of sugarcane. This is an industry that is impacted by 
trade agreements, receives subsidies in key producing nations, and is a commodity that is 
dumped on the world market. Furthermore, the outgrower schemes in Kilombero have been 
in existence for a long period of time, are well established and are not in immediate need of 
DAI-PESA’s limited resources. 
It would have been important to see more farmer participation in the selection of
commodities to determine if there were circumstances present that would have otherwise 
eliminated a commodity like sugar from being selected. 
In regards to the orange sub-project—and likely similar in other commodities—is the 
influence of the traders/brokers and their relationship with producers. In the case of oranges, 
these traders can lock up a producer’s production for multiple years through contracting, 
which limits the role of the association. 
Sunflower production in Rukwa Region is also a questionable choice for a commodity. The 
number of producers is small and the area is not convenient for DAI-PESA intervention. On 
the other hand, the attractive aspect of the sunflower sub-project is that 14 processors formed 
the Subawanga Sunflower Oil Processors Association (SSOP), and direct marketing can be 
organized between producers and processors. However, more resources will be needed to see 
significant benefits in this subsector. The sunflower program in zone 3 will end early, and it 
is unlikely that much activity will continue.
4.3. Recommendations 
The following recommendations are proposed. 
¾ Involve producers using participatory tools to identify the relevant subsectors. DAI 
would have realized very early in the LOP that stakeholders viewed working capital 
and market linkages as key constraints to be addressed. 
¾ Develop business plans for the apexes to increase the access to credit and markets. 
¾ Assist associations and apexes to realize their hidden sources of capital to better 
access credit and markets through the use of trainings and business development. 
¾ Provide intensive training for its field officers who will assume new responsibilities as 
business advisors. 
Page 18 of 52 
Section Five: Sustainability 
5.1. Findings
DAI refers to “producer associations as our base platform for sustainable farmer 
development.” To gauge if the project will be sustainable, the evaluation team interviewed 
stakeholders of associations and their apex organizations. Out of 47 associations contacted, 
stakeholders in 25 organizations (53 percent) said that their association would survive after 
DAI PESA. Twenty percent of the associations reported that their survival was questionable 
or will be difficult. Thirteen stakeholders (27 percent) of associations said survival was not 
possible. There was no apparent correlation between the duration of time since an 
association was founded and its likelihood for survival. An association will have a higher 
probability to survive if strong leadership is present, membership receives adequate training, 
and market linkages are established. For example, paprika associations are forming a 
business relationship with a prominent buyer, Tanzania Spices Limited (TSL), and this group 
will likely continue to operate. The outgrower sugarcane schemes have been in existence 
before DAI PESA began, and they have good financing and strong market links to the sugar 
mill. Onion producers in Iringa receiving credit from the Micro-Finance Rural Participatory 
Scheme (MRPS) are likely to survive. DAI PESA has helped to make these producers credit￾worthy. The access to credit can be a key driver in the sustainability of associations. 
Stakeholders were asked whether their apex organization was sustainable after the end of the 
project. Out of 27 responses, fifteen (56 percent) said yes, nine (33 percent) gave a qualified 
yes (e.g. with difficulty), and three stakeholders (11 percent) said no. Stakeholders who 
believed that the association will survive also believed that their apex will survive. 
Association leaders reported the initial number of founding members and their current 
membership. For the associations sampled, the number of members declined 10 percent. It 
will be important for the apex and the associations to track membership numbers and to 
determine the reasons members are not paying their membership dues and leaving the 
association. 
Stakeholders were asked about milestones reached in preparation for their survival after DAI 
PESA. Sixty-four (64) percent of stakeholders said that their association had a bank account. 
Slightly over 80 percent said that their association was registered. Approximately 60 percent 
had established SACCOs with an average amount of Tsh. 3.13 million per SACCO. These 
are strong indicators that an association will survive after the project. 
Out of a total of 173 associations, 79 were re-formed from a farmer group. These 
associations are relying on DAI PESA as a last resort to organize themselves into viable 
business organizations. These reformed associations have been resurrected from failed 
cooperatives, or in the case of Mbeya, as water user associations. These reformed 
associations have presented the greatest challenges for project staff. 
Stakeholders of apex organizations generally agreed that the foundation is not solid yet for 
continuing their operations. Further training of apex committees is needed if the 
organizations are going to produce tangible results. For example, the evaluation team
Page 19 of 52 
witnessed the election of representatives for the marketing committee of the Ifakara rice apex. 
It was a satisfying sight to see each candidate get up before the group of over 40 members 
representing 19 associations and state their case for being on the marketing committee. 
These team building exercises improve leadership skills and provide self-confidence to the 
members of the associations and apexes. 
The issue of sustainability is whether the apex can replace the functions being currently 
performed by the DAI PESA staff. The apex will have to attract commercial opportunities 
for its members if associations themselves are to be viable. In turn, associations will have to 
establish the capacity to pledge and deliver on marketing contracts established by the apex. 
This will require meeting market specifications in contracts for quantity, quality and time of
delivery. The vegetable apex in Mgeta is testing their capacity to deliver fresh vegetables to 
Shoprite supermarkets in Dar es Salaam. 
5.2. Conclusions 
DAI PESA staff provided intensive training to a large number of association members. This 
training has empowered individuals to recognize opportunities. Individuals reported better 
budgeting decisions regarding business and household finances. 
Notwithstanding the amount of training conducted, the project recognizes the current 
weaknesses in the apex organizations. Sustainability of associations and apexes will be at an 
uneven pace. Associations and their apex that can deliver a complete package of services to 
its members have a better chance of surviving. The project will have to bring these 
organizations up to a level of competency so that they can be viable after the project closes. 
At the present time, associations are willing to support their apex. Annual fees have been 
paid by many member associations, indicating solid support for the apex. 
The apex will have to provide services that create value to their member associations. 
Without measurable benefits, the influence of the apex will decline and most association will 
experience a slow death. 
Associations will have to gain the self-confidence to not see themselves as weak entities, but 
rather as having a viable future. These associations are fighting to overcome two historic 
disadvantages: the failure of the cooperative movement and a sense of dependency that a 
donor will provide for them. Overcoming these constraints will require the emergence of 
dynamic leaders who see the possibilities of the associations. 
Associations do not operate on a level playing field. Agro-processors in the sub-projects are 
not seen as being innovative. In the case of paprika there is a sole buyer, which creates the 
difficulty in having balanced negotiations on prices and quantities. The SO12 has not 
effectively addressed this marketing constraint, and the weak structure of the marketing 
channels affects the sustainability of producer associations and their apexes. 
5.3. Recommendations 
In the time remaining in DAI PESA, the staff will need to press on with their game plan to 
strengthen apexes to deliver tangible benefits to its members. These are some recommended 
actions to be considered. 
Page 20 of 52 
¾ Field officers have been designated as business advisors. They will need intensive 
training to carry out these new functions with apex organizations. Retired 
professionals in the immediate vicinity could be recruited. 
¾ Association and apex members still require demand-driven training. Some 
associations have not received their full complement of training modules and these 
need to be completed. The project has undertaken ToT programs and these 
individuals need to be mobilized to complete any outstanding training modules. 
¾ DAI PESA needs to assist the apexes to package and present bankable projects to 
lenders. These can be in the form of marketing opportunities, deliverable contracts, or 
warehouse receipts programs. These projects can support the apexes in input 
purchasing programs. For example, the Ifakara rice apex has 20 associations and 
approximately 1,300 members under its umbrella. If each member pledges to supply 
2 bags of rice to the apex’s marketing program, this would constitute 260 MT of 
paddy (unrefined rice) with a farm gate value of Tsh. 39 million (US$ 39,000). The 
value of the paddy could be used as collateral for a bank loan for production inputs, or 
to establish a program to allow for the paddy to be held and sold later in the year 
when prices typically rise for paddy and rice. 
¾ Credit schemes like the MPRS/CRDI need to be initiated so that a larger number of 
association members have access to credit. 
¾ USAID will need to revisit the SO12 and its IRs, if it seeks to reach its objective of
increasing incomes to smallholder farmers. This can be done within the context of the 
current DAI PESA, or through other funding mechanisms available to the Mission. 
¾ The leadership of the apexes needs to track membership numbers and determine why 
members are not paying their membership dues and leaving the association. 
Page 21 of 52 
Section Six: Cost Effectiveness 
The evaluation team used standard project analysis methods to measure cost effectiveness. 
Project documents, expert testimony from project staff, and interviews with project 
beneficiaries provided the necessary information to complete the analysis. 
6.1. Findings 
6.1.1. Least Cost Delivery Systems 
The SO9 for USAID did not specifically address the issue of developing least-cost delivery 
systems. The indicators focused more on maximizing returns to the project beneficiaries 
(MSEs). 
The project staff did a good job of meeting performance targets during a period of declining 
project funding. DAI allocated resources effectively to establish associations and later apex 
organizations. DAI PESA program staff were assigned multiple responsibilities, and 
although the sharing of job responsibilities was a cost saving, it also resulted in less-than￾expected results from M&E and marketing linkages activities. 
One field officer was assigned in each region. The ratio of MSEs and associations to field 
officers is high, resulting in field officers being stretched too thinly. DAI employed liaison 
officers (seconded from the Ministry of Agriculture), providing effective support to the field 
officers. In Mbirali District, DAI PESA staff worked with the project staff of Madibira 
Agricultural Marketing Co-Operative Society (MAMCOS) and the funding project, ADF. 
This cooperation was important to DAI effectiveness. 
6.1.2. Cost Effectiveness (C-E) in PESA Objectives 
The purpose of measuring C-E is to determine whether there has been a satisfactory return on 
USAID’s investment in DAI PESA. The results of the financial analysis can be compared to 
other investment opportunities that USAID has in Tanzania or even outside of Tanzania. 
C-E is a measure of a project’s costs and benefits that will occur over time. Because project 
costs and benefits occur at different time periods, it is necessary to estimate a present value 
for each for proper comparison. This working definition applies to DAI PESA, because 
project costs occur in the early years and benefits will accrue after the project has ended. 
A key project impact indicator is the amount of gross sales. Each year in August, DAI 
collects data from MSEs to estimate the volume and value of products sold by each 
commodity sub-project. The use of gross sales as an indicator has some limitations for 
evaluation purposes. First, year-to-year variations in sales can occur because of weather, 
which impacts the market sales price and the volume marketed. Second, each MSE would be 
producing all the products—even without the project—so the project’s effect has to be 
measured as incremental sales. Third, the MSEs have incurred additional costs (cash and 
non-cash) to implement DAI PESA activities, compared to production without the project. 
Finally, other donor projects in both rice and sugar have impacted the MSEs, so that the 
allocation of benefits to just DAI PESA is difficult. 
Page 22 of 52 
 6.1.3. C-E based on project costs and gross sales
The project cost for DAI PESA is US$ 8.4 million (Annex 5, Table 5.1, column 5). If a 
discount rate of 20 percent is applied, then the present value of the project costs is estimated 
at US$ 5.43 million (see Annex Table 5.1, column 7). The accumulated sales by MSEs in the 
first three years were US$ 21.8 million. Assuming a 5 percent rate of growth in sales per 
year starting in year 4 until year 10, the estimated gross sales—less an adjustment for growth 
in sales without the project—would be US$ 108 million at the end of ten years (Annex 5, 
Table 5.1, column 10). The present value of the accumulated incremental gross sales would 
be US$ 36.8 million, assuming a discount rate of 20 percent. The benefit-cost ratio (BCR) is 
6.78, which indicates US$ 1.00 invested in DAI PESA resulted in US$ 6.78 in incremental 
commodity sales by project beneficiaries. A BCR greater than 1 indicates that the investment 
will generate greater benefits than costs of the investment. The IRR on the incremental gross 
revenues is 253 percent, which reflects the project’s success in increasing incremental gross 
sales. The net present worth (NPW) of the project is US$ 31.4 million. 
 6.1.4. C-E Analysis based on sub-project commodities
DAI PESA works in seven commodity groups: oranges, onions, paprika, paddy, sugarcane, 
sunflower, and vegetables. The number of MSEs at the end of FY05 was 18,810 (another 
project document sets the number of MSEs at 19,159). They are mostly paddy (41.5%), 
sugarcane (19.5%) and paprika (21.5%) producers. The project reported total sales of US$ 
26.34 million for all MSEs in all commodity sub-projects, based on audits for FY03, FY04, 
and FY05 (see Annex 5 Table 5.2, Col. 9). 
Sugarcane and paddy sales were $22.2 million, approximately eight percent of gross sales 
reported by DAI PESA. An estimate of incremental gross sales (FY04 and FY05 less FY03 
sales) is US$ 15.2 million. Paddy and sugarcane incremental gross sales were US$ 13.1 
million, which represented 86 percent of the incremental sales (see Annex 5, Table 5.2, Col. 
9). 
The sales of the paddy and sugarcane sub-projects overshadow the sales of other sub-projects. 
Sugarcane has a strong network of two established associations in Kilombero and a sugar 
mill, which is operated by a South African conglomerate, with mills in other African 
countries. There are also agreements between the GoT and the South African company on 
business arrangements with the producers in the outgrower schemes. These factors make it 
difficult to estimate the benefits attributed solely to DAI PESA. The same can be said for the 
Madibira rice scheme, where ADF is operating the rice mill. 
6.1.5. C-E Analysis based on with and without project interventions. 
The use of gross sales figures does not give a complete picture, because it does not include 
the costs that producers incur to achieve the higher yields resulting from the DAI PESA 
trainings. Anecdotal data were collected on costs of production by the evaluation team. 
However, without detailed cost of production data comparing impacts “with and without 
project assistance,” only a general estimate can be made. An effort was made to estimate the 
incremental production and marketing costs associated with DAI interventions (See Annex 5 
Table 5.3). In some cases, the assumption was made that incremental costs were a percent of 
the reported gross sales for the product.
Page 23 of 52 
Orange. DAI estimated that orange production in Tanga has increased from 5,514 
kg/producer to 8,383 kg/producer, and that the price per kg increased from an average 
of US$ .03 to US$ .082 (6 oranges per kg). The incremental increase in gross 
revenues per producer is US$ 288. In Morogoro, orange production per producer 
declined during the time period, because of weather, from 8,300 to 6,800 kg per 
farmer. The price increased however from US$ .022 to US$ .068. Incremental gross 
revenue per producer increased US$ 48. 
Onion. Production increased from 1,000 kg per farmer to 2,500 kg per farmer. The 
price increased from US$ .06 to US$ .09/kg. The increase in the incremental gross 
revenues is US$ 76 per farmer. 
Paprika. This is a new crop for producers. Production is rising each year as 
producers learn how to cultivate, harvest and dry the product. Production is averaging
200 kg per ac and the average gross revenue per farmer is US$ 23. 
Paddy. Production in the Chimala scheme in Mbeya Region increased from 1600 kg 
to 1800 kg/acre, and the price increased from Tsh. 85 to Tsh. 210/kg. This represents 
a US$ 200/acre increase in gross revenue, or about US$ 484/farmer. In the Madibira 
sub-project, yields remained constant, and the price increased from Tsh. 210 to Tsh. 
236/kg. Incremental revenues were US$ 184/farmer. In Ifakara, rice production has 
increased from 720 kg/ac to 1,350 kg/ac, an increase of 87 percent. Price increased 
on average from Tsh. 210 to Tsh. 236. The incremental gross revenue to the producer 
in Ifakara was US$ 124. 
Sugarcane. Production per MSEs at the Kilombero sub-project went from 10 MT/ha 
to 27 MT/ha, and the price increased from US$ .0125 to US$ .0166/kg of sugarcane. 
Each farmer received on average an additional US$ 224. There was no increase in 
incremental gross revenues at the Turini sub-project based on the data received. 
Sunflower. Seed production in Subawanga declined in both production and the sales 
price. No improvement was seen for the period under review. Sunflower yield per 
acre in FY06 is expected to double because of better seed varieties. The incremental 
gross revenue is US$ -12.00. 
Sunflower oil and cake processors saw impressive changes in their incremental gross 
revenues. Processors manufactured 4,000 lt of oil and 15,000 MT of cake before the 
project. At the end of FY05, sale of oil was 14,000 lt and sale of cake was 23,200 kg. 
The total incremental increase in gross revenue per processor from oil and cake was 
estimated at US$ 7,442. 
Vegetables. Production increased from 1,370 kg/ac to 1,600 kg/ac, and the price per 
kg increased from US$ .06 to US$ .139/kg. Vegetable producers realized an increase 
of US$ 123 in additional gross revenues per year. 
The total adjusted annual incremental gross revenue from the project was US$ 4.42 million 
(see Annex 5 Table 5.3, Summary Statistics). This amount is the minimum annual gross 
value created by the project per year realized at the end of FY05. The average increase in 
Page 24 of 52 
additional gross returns per MSE was US$ 274 at the end of FY05. If the sunflower oil and 
cake processors are removed from the analysis and just commodity producers remain, the 
average increase in gross revenues per farmer was US$ 237 (see Annex 5 Table 5.3, 
Summary Statistics). The top three commodity sub-projects with the highest incremental 
returns per MSE were sunflower oil and cake processors (US$ 7,442), paddy producers in 
Chimala (US$ 484), and orange producers in Tanga (US$ 288). The three commodity sub￾projects with the lowest incremental gross revenues were sunflower seed (US$ -11), 
sugarcane in Turini (US$ 0) and paprika (US$ 22). 
The evaluation team chose to take the incremental annual gross revenue realized at the end of 
FY05, and projected this amount to 2012, assuming that this value remained constant in real 
terms. The stream of incremental gross revenues is offset by USAID project costs (Annex 5 
Table 5.1, Scenario #2). Both streams of benefits and costs are discounted, using a rate of 20 
percent. The estimated BCR is 2.18. The ratio is significantly lower than when only gross 
sales are considered, but the BCR is still greater than one, which is our cut-off number for 
rejection of an investment project. The IRR for the projected 10 years is 57 percent, which is 
greater than the current opportunity cost of capital in Tanzania (estimated at between 25 to 30 
percent in rural areas).. USAID’s investment has had a satisfactory financial rate of return. 
The NPV of the incremental benefits from the commodity sub-projects is US$ 6.41 million, 
using a discount rate of 20 percent for the ten year period. 
6.1.6. Secondary Benefits 
DAI examined the impact of DAI PESA on other commodities produced by MSEs. The 
inference is that skills received in training for orange production would impact on other crops 
grown by MSE. For example, maize is planted for the first three years in newly established 
orange orchards. Maize yield has increased from 400 kg to 600 kg per acre, and the price of 
maize has increased from Tsh. 60/kg to Tsh. 150/kg. The incremental increase in revenue to 
the farmer has been Tsh. 66,000/acre ($60/acre). 
Though it is reasonable to expect that a diffusion of skills to other crops can occur, anecdotal 
information and the difficulty in measuring impact does not warrant inclusion in the financial 
analysis. It is reasonable to acknowledge that DAI PESA has improved the capacity of a 
large number of MSEs and that this generates secondary benefits, but it is not sufficient to 
justify the worthiness of USAID’s investment in DAI PESA. 
6.1.7. Donor Partner Values 
DAI PESA was a catalyst for other donors and organizations to become involved in the seven 
commodity sub-projects. The extent of other donors’ direct involvement varies by 
commodity and zone. Some of the key partners are: ADF, Agricultural Marketing Systems 
Development Project (AMSDP), and CIDR/RPMS (Rural Participatory Micro-Finance 
Scheme). The evaluation team received a list of donor partners, and the amount of their 
contributions disaggregated by each project zone totaled to approximately US$ 16.1 million. 
The evaluation team did not consider this amount in the C-E analysis, because there was no 
way to validate the impact that these investments had on DAI PESA results. DAI has done 
well to attract these partners, who could be important collaborators in carrying on DAI PESA 
activities after the close of the project. 
Page 25 of 52 
6.2. Conclusion 
USAID has received an acceptable rate of return on their investment in DAI PESA. 
A more appropriate measure of cost effectiveness is to consider incremental net changes in 
sales, rather than the absolute value of sales. MSEs in the sub-projects would have been 
producing most of the products promoted by DAI PESA, except for possibly paprika. 
The analysis reveals that the product sub-sectors with the highest incremental benefits to 
MSEs are in sunflower oil and sunflower cake processing, paddy in Chimala and oranges in 
Tanga. The revenues to producers of sunflower seed actually declined for the two years 
being measured. The prospects for increased yields from better varieties of seed will improve 
incremental gross revenues to producers. During the same period, sunflower processors 
realized large net increases in revenues. 
One of the poorest performing product categories was in sunflower seed production in 
Subawanga, sugarcane in Turini and paprika. Though sugarcane represents a very large 
percent of the gross sales reported for MSEs, the incremental gross revenues accounting for 
additional costs for implementing interventions were not as attractive as other commodity 
sub-projects. Though onions had an incremental increase of US$ 76/MSE, if the product can 
be stored and sold in the off-season market window, then the revenues to the producer are 
attractive. 
6.3. Recommendations 
¾ The project indicators need to focus on incremental changes in income to the MSEs. 
This measure will be more indicative of changes in household livelihoods. 
¾ The project needs to develop crop budgets to improve decision making in the 
selection of sub-projects. An analysis using crop budgets would have determined that 
sugarcane was not an attractive candidate in DAI PESA’s portfolio of projects. 
Page 26 of 52 
Section Seven: Gender Strategy 
7.1. Findings 
7.1.1. Gender Strategy 
DAI PESA did not have a gender strategy. Out of an estimated 21,100 members in 
associations, women comprise 32 percent of the membership. This percentage could 
certainly be higher given the important role of women in agricultural production and in 
household activities. It was evident in meetings held with associations that gender awareness 
is embedded into the project activities. The project staff is sensitive to the important role that 
women play both in the associations and also in households’ survival. The number of 
professional women on staff in DAI PESA is small at the present time. 
When asked to list women’s strengths, men responded that women were more likely to be 
transparent in their operations, as well as more dependable than men in following through on 
tasks. This was a common response in many associations. In a few cases women assumed 
the position of chairperson of their association, but mostly males prevailed in these positions. 
Men were quick to point out in group meetings with the evaluation team that they believed 
that it was important to have their wife as a knowledgeable partner in business activities, in 
the event of a death in the family. Male stakeholders repeated this several times in different 
evaluation interviews, so it seems clear that DAI PESA has chosen to communicate this 
message to encourage husbands and wives to attend the meetings together. 
In several association meetings, women addressed the group about being accepted by male 
members in the association. They felt that their opinions were sought out and respected. The 
GoT has had a national gender strategy and this seems to be evident in the villages visited. 
Women remarked that the training provided information on how to better budget and manage 
their household finances. 
Women did express their concerns about sharing equally the benefits of the project with their 
husbands. Some women felt that though there was an understanding about their role, the 
benefits would be taken by the husband. Other women said allocation of benefits from sale 
of products was not as much a problem. Women were frank about the need for greater 
equality in making decisions. However in almost all meetings, men dominated the 
discussions with the evaluation team, even after repeated solicitation of women’s comments. 
A woman did remark that men needed to be more accommodating in allowing women to 
participate in overnight field trips to observe production and marketing practices. 
The fact that the project has no female field officers and only a PC who was hired late in the 
LOP (December 2005) has probably resulted in less advancement of women in associations. 
In a quarterly report, the training supervisor noted that women’s participation in training had 
remained low and that new ideas were needed to improve women’s attendance. The project 
did hire a female LO in Iringa Region, and she was very effective in the field. This is one 
good example, but for the most part women implementers have not been involved. 
Page 27 of 52 
7.1.2. Improvements in economic opportunities for women 
M&E data were not collected on specific benefits being garnered by women. If members in 
general benefitted from the project, then it could translate into economic opportunities for 
women. Certainly women in association interviews stated that their situation had improved 
because of the opportunities realized through project activities. The allocation of resources in 
the household needs to be examined. Women stated publicly that their husbands will spend 
the proceeds from the sale of the products without consulting them, and such expenditures 
could be on non-essential items. 
7.2. Conclusions 
Even though there was not a gender strategy in DAI PESA, the project fostered an 
environment of involving women in the development of the associations. 
Men in the associations were not threatened by having women active in the associations. The 
number of women as a percentage of members indicated an effort on the part of DAI PESA 
to have women’s representation. 
Women held positions of leadership in some associations. However, for the most part, men 
were in control and women were more passive in their interactions in the meetings. 
Without a gender strategy and constant awareness of women’s status in Tanzanian society, 
gains in gender equality will not occur. 
The level of women’s participation in training could be improved and an effective 
communication message directed at women on the benefits of the program would result in 
greater participation. 
7.3. Recommendations 
¾ More female trainers are needed to assist in capacity building of associations and their 
apex. 
¾ Women-only training modules can serve an important function for increasing their 
participation.
¾ Household surveys are needed to determine if the gains made in marketing
commodities results in improvements in household livelihoods. 
Page 28 of 52 
Section Eight: Project Monitoring Plan (PMP) 
8.1. Findings 
PESA had nine SO9 team partners at its inception. USAID reduced the number to four (DAI, 
ACDI/VOCA, Technoserve and Enterprise Works), which was more manageable for 
implementing the PMP. 
The PMP had a shaky beginning with intense interactions between USAID, DAI and the 
PESA team partners on the best course of operations of the RTS. Some of the implementing 
partners were not clear on DAI’s role in the PMP, and there was an initial resistance on the 
part of the team partners to be fully cooperative. 
The reporting by the donor partners was not properly documented, so numbers could not be 
harmonized across subsectors. During one period, data were submitted in one format only to 
be recoded in another format leading to entry errors. The initial program was in ACCESS, 
and the computer programmer who designed the program left the project at a critical stage of 
its development. The program became unworkable across the different PESA projects, and it 
was not effective for program management. These events lingered and affected the 
usefulness of the PMP. 
DAI made staff assignments, which negatively affected the usefulness of the RTS. At one 
point in the project, the staff person responsible for M&E had other job responsibilities. This 
commingling of assignments most likely resulted in the M&E activities getting shorted in the 
necessary time and resources required to be effective. 
When it was recognized that the RTS was not reflecting accurately the situation in the field, a 
consultant was hired to review 100 interviews from each of DAI PESA’s 12 sub-projects for 
two years. Divergence in the level of impact was found between the RTS findings and the 
smaller sub-sample of interviews. It is not clear how to explain the differences. What was 
consistent is that year-to-year trends for the two samples tracked each other. 
With the Mission’s shift in focus from SO9 to SO12, indicators on the increase in yields and 
percent change in area cultivated under improved technologies and methods may pose 
measurement challenges. It will be important to get the PMP operational with proper field 
information. 
The project is tracking indicators from both SO9 and SO12 in its quarterly reports. This 
decision allows for consistency in tracking the impact of the project from its inception. 
8.1.1. Data Quality and Validity 
A weak link in the DAI PESA project is the data collection, analysis and reporting. The 
evaluation team confirmed that data were collected at the field level. However, the various 
methods used to collect data and survey procedures within and across zones were not 
consistent. This has led to the aggregation and projection problems. It was reported at one 
Page 29 of 52 
field location that beneficiaries with larger land holdings were excluded from the sample 
because this was a smallholder project. 
There was no mention made of steps to pre-test the survey instrument and to make necessary 
adjustments before entering the field. This can result in spurious results. Validation of the 
data being collected was not consistent, and in one case the PC redid the data collection to 
reconfirm what was being observed in the field. The lack of a pre-testing and validating the 
data means that there are no assurances that the RTS can be an effective tool for 
management. 
DAI was tasked with the responsibility of receiving data from the other contractors and of 
compiling the data for reporting to USAID. Without a consistent protocol for collecting data 
on its own activities, it was not in a position to be a good steward of the process of data 
management from the other donor partners. 
8.1.2. Performance Indicators 
DAI PESA had performance indicators. The performance indicators changed when the 
Mission revised the SO9 and then transitioned to the new SO12, but, in general, the same
indicators remained. Some new indicators on yield were added and measurement may be 
difficult to obtain accurate figures. 
DAI encountered problems with the RTS. The reporting process and the software used were 
not efficiently implemented. This was a system design problem. The RTS was not structured 
in a user-friendly way. 
8.2. Conclusion 
The RTS is not an effective tool for tracking DAI PESA impacts. The project is having wider
impacts that are not being effectively tracked. This is because the software program is 
limited and resources are not allocated by the project to effectively use the RTS. 
The program lacks the ability to be an effective tool for management decisions. Furthermore, 
associations and now apexes are not benefiting from the information to the degree possible. 
The sampling frame, data collection and validation of results were not consistent from 
location to location. Sampling methods in each zone varied based on the time and interest of 
the PC. 
8.3. Recommendations 
¾ DAI needs to assign a STTA consultant specializing in M&E to review all aspects of 
the RTS and make necessary changes before field data collection starts in August 
2006. The STTA could be from DAI headquarters in Washington, D.C. The LTTA 
staff person for M&E needs to spend some time in the field in order to become
acquainted with the situation on the ground and be able to better understand and 
validate the data being collected. 
Page 30 of 52 
¾ The sampling frame and data collection need to be consistent across all sub-projects. 
Stratified sampling is recommended to allow for different size of land holdings of 
beneficiaries. The structure of the sampling needs to be accepted by each PC and the 
field enumerators. If possible, based on time and cost, one team should do the survey 
in one zone. A sub-project that is spread across more than one region or zone should 
be done by the same enumerators. For example, paddy sub-projects in Mbeya and 
Iringa would be done by the same team. 
¾ The project needs to drill down on the performance of each commodity sub-project. 
The M&E results need to be disaggregated so that apex members and their 
associations can be informed on how the group is performing relative to other 
associations. For example, paprika growers have not achieved the results of other 
growers in the country. It would be instructive to compare differences. The impact of 
the project on household livelihoods would be recommended rather than just tracking 
gross sales revenues. 
Page 31 of 52 
Section Nine: Annexes 
Annex 1 Scope of Work 
I. EVALUATION FOCUS 
The focus of this evaluation is to assess the performance of DAI’s implementation of PESA. 
Relating to activities 1, 4, 5, and 6 the contractors will answer the following questions: 
1. What were the objectives of the final revised PESA proposal? Were these objectives 
clearly stated? Why or why not? Were they in line with the Mission’s results 
framework? Why or why not? Were they within the manageable interests of DAI 
and the PESA project? Why or why not? Were the targets and achievements outlined 
in the final revised PESA proposal realized? Why or why not?
2. Did DAI employ a strategy in implementing PESA? If so, describe the strategy 
including how it was developed. Was the strategy employed by DAI (including 
staffing practices) effective in realizing the goals of PESA? If so, what major 
variables accounted for this success? If the strategy was not effective in realizing the 
goals, explain why. 
3. Is there a definition of sustainability in the PESA proposal? If not, why not? If there 
is a definition, is it likely that the results reported by DAI are sustainable? Why or 
why not?
4. Was cost effectiveness a stated objective in PESA’s proposal, the Mission’s results 
framework, or DAI’s PESA strategy? If not, what is a “working definition” of cost 
effectiveness that might apply to PESA implementation? Why is this definition 
applicable? According to this definition, has the implementation of PESA by DAI 
been cost-effective? (Here the contractor is allowed to choose several different 
measures of cost effectiveness [e.g., return on investment, cost/benefit analysis, cost 
per project beneficiary, etc.] as long as the measure is explicitly stated and directly 
addressed in the evaluation of cost effectiveness.) 
5. Although not an explicit goal of PESA, was an effective gender strategy in place, and 
has it led to improvements in women’s economic opportunities? Why or why not?
Specific to Activity 7, the contractors will answer the following questions: 
1. Was data quality and validity addressed in the PESA proposal, results 
framework, or PESA strategy? Why or why not? If quality and validity are 
addressed, what is the quality and validity of DAI’s data collection 
methodology and data collection for PESA activities? If data quality and 
validity were not addressed, what commonly accepted measure of data quality 
and validity can be used to evaluate DAI’s data collection methodology and 
data collection? According to this measure, what is the quality of DAI’s data 
collection methodology and data collection? 
2. Were performance indicators established for DAI’s management of 
USAID/Tanzania’s SO9 Results Tracking System? Why or why not? How 
well did DAI manage (in terms of efficiency and effectiveness) the Results 
Tracking System for USAID/Tanzania’s SO 9?
Page 32 of 52 
It is important that the recommendations that result from this evaluation take into account 
USAID/Tanzania SO 9 and SO 12 goals and objectives and as well as those of the PESA. 
USAID/Tanzania acknowledges that it is normal during the course of an evaluation that 
additional germane questions may arise. USAID/Tanzania will consider recommendations 
from the Contractors to changes tin the set of questions within SOW once they arrive in 
country. 
II. METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
The contractors will use rapid appraisal techniques (e.g., key informant interviews, site 
observations, mini surveys, etc.) when conducting this evaluation. The evaluation team will 
inspect the operations of DAI’s office in Dar es Salaam and field offices. In the field, the 
contractors will visit and meet representative farmers and farm groups associated with the 
major commodities DAI has worked with over the past three years (i.e., oranges, onions, 
paprika, rice, sugar cane, and sunflower). 
Another concern to examine is if the strategy and resources used by DAI to achieve the PESA 
program’s targets are cost-effective. The contractors will use a cost-effectiveness (C/E) 
comparison of monetary and non-monetary benefits related to different techniques used by 
DAI. 
III. TEAM COMPOSITION 
The evaluation team will consist of an external consultant as Team Leader and up to two 
Technical Specialists. The Team Leader should have hands-on experience in agro-business 
development (or other relevant field) in East Africa and experience in the design, 
implementation, and evaluation of USAID projects. The Technical Specialists should come
from fields that complement those of the Team Leader to cover the full range of skills needed 
(e.g., background in areas such as monitoring and evaluation, crop production, rural finance, 
market analysis, trade, or agricultural development). The inclusion of African professionals 
as Technical Specialists is highly recommended. 
The contractors will describe the use of USAID expertise in the work plan, and the work plan 
will describe the process of consultations and discussions with key USAID staff – in 
Washington or at the Mission. A staff member from the EG So will participate in the 
evaluation process. 
IV. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
The team will submit a detailed work plan along with the schedule of field work, specifying 
how the information will be collected, organized, and analyzed to meet the information needs 
specified in the scope of work not later than three days after the team arrives in Tanzania. 
The work plan will be submitted to and approved by the EG SO before the consultants begin 
for field work. 
After completing the field work and before leaving country, the team will submit a draft 
evaluation report and brief EG SO staff. The EG SO staff will provide comments and 
suggestions within one week after receiving the draft. 
Page 33 of 52 
The Final Report (hard copy and electronic version in Word and PDF format) will be sent to 
the Mission within two weeks after the completion of the field work in Tanzania. In addition, 
in accordance with ADS 540.3 an additional copy of the final report will be submitted to 
USAID’s Development Experience Information and Reference Services (DEXS). 
To ensure that the evaluation findings and recommendations are presented in a way that is 
useful to the Mission, the following outline is recommended: 
• Executive summary not to exceed two pages in length composed of a brief 
methodology statement, findings, and key recommendations. 
• Introduction and background section for the overall evaluation 
• Brief description of PESA activities 
• Discussion of SOW questions, using the following format: findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations. 
Page 34 of 52 
Annex 2 Work Plan and Schedule of Evaluation Team 
April 2, 2006 (Sunday) U.S. consultant arrives from the U.S. 
April 3rd (Monday) Introductory meeting at USAID with Steven Fondreist and Tim
MacAndrews. Meeting with Joe Burke, COP of DAI PESA and other staff in the head office. 
April 4th (Tuesday) Review of project documents and continued interviews with project staff.
April 5th (Wednesday) Review of project documents and consultant attends the afternoon 
session of the bi-annual project meeting and sits in on discussions on linking project 
stakeholders to other donor funders. 
April 6th (Thursday) Review of documents and consultant conducts afternoon session on 
project evaluation schedule and elicits information on project data for financial analysis and 
cost effectiveness. 
April 7th (Friday) Meeting with Tim Pipers of Technoserve to discuss M&E protocol with 
DAI PESA.
April 8th (Saturday) Review of documents and preparation of draft outline. 
April 9th (Sunday) Departure to Tanga with Tanzanian consultant for start of field visits. 
April 10th (Monday) Attend AGM meeting for Tanga Apex Organization for orange 
associations. In afternoon visit with the members of the Kilongo association and tour orange 
groves. 
April 11th (Tuesday) Meeting with two associations for oranges (Maili Moja F.A and 
Kwamgwe F.A), then drive to Morogoro. 
April 12th (Wednesday) Meeting with members of Kilolo Best Onion Apex and association 
members and Mr. Erasto Lameck, the field officer for Iringa. Drive to Nyanzwa village and 
interview farmers and tour onion fields and irrigation scheme. Interviews conducted with 
both association and non-association members. Travel to Iringa for the night. 
April 13th (Thursday) Travel with Erasto Lameck to conduct two meetings with members of 
paprika associations in Mangalali and Ihemi. 
April 14th (Friday) Meeting with Erasto Lameck. Held discussion with Ms.Sauda Omary, 
Liaison Officer (LO) for paprika sub-project and also working on biointensive foods for 
HIV/AIDS families. 
April 15th (Saturday) Review of project documents and prepare draft report in Iringa. 
April 16th (Sunday) In Iringa and review of documents. 
April 17th (Monday) Review project document and continue with preparation of the draft 
report in Iringa. Meeting with Mike Rousso of CRISO chip factory in Iringa to discuss food 
Page 35 of 52 
processing opportunities and the purchase of paprika and chilies for the factory and sunflower 
oil for the fryer. Travel in afternoon to Mbeya. Evening meeting with Joel Strauss, Project 
Coordinator for Zone 3. 
April 18th (Tuesday) Travel with Joel Strauss to Chimala and interview Mr. Wambura, 
chairman of association and secretary of the apex. Interview Mr. Vahaye, rice farmer and 
operator of rice mill in Chimala. Drive to the rice scheme at Kapunga. Continue travel to 
Madibira and the rice scheme and meet with the staff of the project. Conduct interview and 
then travel to Mafinga for the evening. 
April 19th (Wednesday) Early departure to drive to Ifakara in Morogoro Region to attend the 
AGM meeting of the Ifakara high quality rice apex. Interview members from the association 
(see Annex 4, Table 4.2). 
April 20th (Thursday) Traveled with the F.O Erasto Lameck and the L.O. Mr. M.P.S 
Lukurunge and the association head of Mbingu Rice Association Mr. Sanga to interview 
members of the association. After meeting depart to Morogoro for the evening. 
April 21st (Friday) Attended the apex meeting of the Morogoro Orange Growers Association 
and Apex for names of associations in attendance. Depart the AGM and drive to Mgeta to 
visit with members of the vegetable associations. After the meeting depart to Dar es Salaam. 
April 22nd (Saturday) Meeting with COP J. Burke and M & E Specialist, Marco Wamara on 
data requests for project evaluation. 
April 23rd (Sunday) 
April 24th (Monday) Work in the DAI PESA office preparing the draft report to 
USAID/Tanzania. 
April 25th (Tuesday). Work on the draft report. 
April 26th (Wednesday). Work on draft report. 
April 27th (Thursday) Work on draft report and make presentation to USAID/T project staff. 
April 28th (Friday) Work on draft report and depart in evening to the United States. 
Page 36 of 52 
Annex 3. References 
DAI PESA 1st Quarterly Report (Oct – Dec. 02) 
_________ 2nd Quarterly Report (Jan - Mar. 03) 
_________ 3rd Quarterly Report (Apr – Jun. 03) 
_________ 4th Quarterly Report (July – Sept 03) 1st Annual Report 
_________ 5th Quarterly Report (Oct – Dec. 03) 
_________ 6th Quarterly Report (Jan - Mar 04) 
_________ 7th Quarterly Report (Apr – Jun 04) 
_________ 8th Quarterly Report (July – Sept 04) and 2nd Annual Report 
_________ 9th Quarterly Report (Oct – Dec. 04) 
_________ 10th Quarterly Report (Jan – Mar 05) 
_________ 11th Quarterly Report (Apr – Jun 05) 
_________ 12th Quarterly Report (Jul – Sep 05 and 3rd Annual Report) 
_________ 13th Quarterly Report (Oct – Dec. 05) 
_________ 14th Quarterly Report (Jan – Mar 06) 
_________. Tanzania Investor Roadmap – Primers on Regulations. 3rd Edition 
_________. Cashew Policy Forum, March 26, 2004 
_________. Weights and Measure Forum, July 29, 2004 
_________. Policy and Taxes in The Tanzanian Cashew Industry. October, 2004 
_________. Commodity Information Collection and Dissemination. Rice in Mbarali and 
Oranges in Muheza. September 30, 2003. 
_________. Delivering on the Brand Promise – Brand Strategy Options for Mbeya High 
Quality Rice.
_________. Competitive Analysis of Tea in Tanga Region: Case Study Amani-Muheza 
Districts. 
__________. Guide Book on the Registration of Associations in Tanzania. April, 2006. 
__________. Miafutaji magazine. Volumes 1 – 3. 
Page 37 of 52 
Page 38 of 52 
ECI Africa and DAI PESA. Competitive Analysis of Sunflower in Sumbawanga District. 
Final Report. May, 2004. 
__________. Competitive Analysis of Beans in Rukwa Region. Final Report. May, 2004. 
__________. Cashew Nuts Sub-Sector Study. Final Report. October, 2003. 
__________. Rice Sub-Sector Study. April, 2003. 
__________. Competitive Analysis of Cotton in Ulanga District, Morogoro. September, 
2003. 
__________. Orange Sub-Sector Study. Final Report. April, 2003. 
__________. Fresh Horticulture Sub-Sector Study. Final Report. November 2003. 
__________. Competitive Analysis of the Sugar Industry in the Kilobero Area. Final 
Report. May, 2004. 
__________. Competitive Analysis of Fish (Dagaa) Harvesting in Ruvuma Region. May, 
2004. 
__________. Competitive Analysis of the Paprika Industry in Tanzania. Final Report. May 
2004. 
__________. Competitive Analysis of Onions in the Iringa Region. May 2004. 
USAID. Training Impact Assessment of DAI PESA Project. June, 2005. 
Annex 4 Descriptions of Associations Visited 
Table 4. 1 Interviews of Association and Apex Members - DAI PESA Evaluation, April, 2006 
No. Association Name Product Date
Established 
Founder 
members 
Current 
Members 
Bank 
account 
Will the 
association 
be 
sustainable 
after DAI 
PESA ends? 
Will the 
Apex be 
sustainable 
after DAI 
PESA 
ends? 
Does the 
Association 
have 
SACCOs?
(how much 
deposited?) 
Assn. 
paid 
Apex
fees? 
Registered 
Male Female
Tanga Region
1 Tanga Orange Apex Oranges YES YES YES
2 Kilongo Oranges 1998 30 34 YES YES YES, 1.8 million 
3 Mailimoja Oranges April, 2005 63 7 NO NO, unlikely YES, small amount 
4 Kwamowo Oranges April, 2004 106 45 15 YES NO YES 600,000 
Iringa Region
5 Mkomnozi Onions 2004 81 36 20 NO NO NO YES
6 Uwawai Onions 2004 7 33 8 NO NO NO YES
7 Nyanzwa Onions 2004 10 35 13 YES NO NO YES
8 Mwuvilu Onions 2003 81 35 10 NO NO NO YES
9 Msosa Onions 2004 138 63 40 NO NO YES YES
10 Cchwai Onions 2004 74 57 22 NO NO NO YES
11 Kilolo Best Onion Onions 2005 6 assn. NO NO YES YES 
12 Mangalali Paprika 2003 57 38 29 YES YES, questionable Apex is weak YES, 800,000 NO
13 Ihemi Paprika April, 2004 87 88 40 NO YES NO NO
Page 39 of 52 
Table 4. 1 Interviews of Association and Apex Members - DAI PESA Evaluation, April, 2006 cont’d
No. Association Name Product Date
Established 
Founder 
members 
Current 
Members 
Bank 
account 
Will the 
association 
be 
sustainable 
after DAI 
PESA ends? 
Will the 
Apex be 
sustainable 
after DAI 
PESA 
ends? 
Does the 
Association 
have 
SACCOs?
(how much 
deposited?) 
Assn. 
paid 
Apex
fees? 
Registered 
Mbeya Region
14 Igumbilo / Isitu Rice 1998 68 87 89 NO NO NO NO YES 
Morogoro Region 
15 Furaha Rice 1998 18 9 9 YES NO, will die NO, will die NO YES
16 Uwaki Rice 1995 46 28 18 YES YES YES NO YES
17 Nguvu kazi Rice 1995 48 46 2 YES YES YES NO YES
18 Mngeta Farmers Assn. Rice 2004 185 20 42 YES NO YES YES YES
19 Kichanga F.A. Rice 1997 60 32 4 YES NO YES NO YES
20 Kapolo Rice 1997 50 40 10 NO YES YES NO YES
21 Tupendane Rice 1997 12 20 23 YES YES YES NO YES
22 Tegemeo Rice 1997 12 21 32 YES YES YES NO YES
23 Mapambano Rice 1996 12 7 27 YES YES YES NO YES
24 Mchombe F.A. Rice 2004 30 20 15 YES YES YES YES 300K/- YES
25 Mkangawalo F.A. Rice 2004 45 28 32 YES YES YES YES 1.2M/- YES
26 Njage F.A Rice 2003 60 140 16 NO YES with difficulty YES with difficulty Yes 130K/- YES 
27 Lukolongo F.A. Rice 2003 70 20 30 YES YES YES Yes 270K/- YES 
28 Igima F.A. Rice 2003 60 140 16 NO YES with difficulty YES, with difficulty Yes 800K/- YES 
29 Mzalendo Rice 1996 20 60 80 YES YES YES, with difficulty NO YES
30 Mzalendo Rice 1996 20 60 80 YES YES 50/50 NO YES
Page 40 of 52 
Table 4. 1 Interviews of Association and Apex Members - DAI PESA Evaluation, April, 2006 cont’d 
No. Association Name Product Date
Established 
Founder 
members 
Current 
Members 
Bank 
account 
Will the 
association 
be 
sustainable 
after DAI 
PESA ends? 
Will the 
Apex be 
sustainable 
after DAI 
PESA 
ends? 
Does the 
Association 
have 
SACCOs?
(how much 
deposited?) 
Assn. 
paid 
Apex
fees? 
Registered 
31 Mbingu F.A. Rice 2003 39 26 34 NO YES with difficulty YES with difficulty Yes 1.4M/- YES 
32 Twende pamoja Rice 1996 20 34 28 YES YES YES Yes 250K/- YES 
33 Vijana mbasafa Rice 1996 12 42 26 YES YES NO, will die Yes 80K/- YES 
34 Matoke not present Rice 793 524 1317
35 Luholole Oranges 2004 50 4 21 NO YES YES YES 2.7M/= 
36 Kibwaya Oranges 2003 105 8 25 NO YES YES YES 2M/=
37 Twangeganwe Oranges 2003 80 20 40 YES YES, with difficulty YES, with difficulty YES 38M/= (WARD) 
38 Nige Oranges 2003 50 3 22 YES YES YES NO
39 Changa F.A. Oranges 2003 28 24 24 YES YES NO YES 2.178 M 
40 Kungwe F.A. Oranges 2003 120 15 22 NO YES YES YES 1.9M 
41 Tambuu Oranges 2003 48 6 24 NO YES YES NO
42 Kivuma Oranges 2003 50 22 18 YES YES YES with cum YES 2.3M/= (WARD) 
43 Kiswira F.A. Oranges Dec, 2003 45 10 12 YES YES 
YES 
depend on
FAS 
VICOBA 
2.3M
44 Goza Oranges 2003 43 7 14 YES YES depend on Apex NO NO
Page 41 of 52 
Page 42 of 52 
Table 4. 1 Interviews of Association and Apex Members - DAI PESA Evaluation, April, 2006 cont’d 
No. Association Name Product Date
Established 
Founder 
members 
Current 
Members 
Bank 
account 
Will the 
association 
be 
sustainable 
after DAI 
PESA ends? 
Will the 
Apex be 
sustainable 
after DAI 
PESA 
ends? 
Does the 
Association 
have 
SACCOs? 
(how much 
deposited?) 
Assn. 
paid 
Apex 
fees? 
Registered 
45 Mtombozi Oranges 2003 61 18 45 YES YES with difficulty YES with difficulty YES 500K 
46 Twisutie Vegetables Sept, 2003 143 70 73 YES YES, questionable YES YES NO
47 Twangehemwe Vegetables Sept, 2003 96 YES YES YES YES NO
48 Chawakibu Vegetables Sept, 2003 88 28 30 YES YES, barely YES YES NO
49 Chawakaki Vegetables Sept, 2003 60 YES YES YES YES NO
Page 43 of 52 
Table 4. 2 USAID Evaluation, Alliance Meeting, Morogoro Attendance 
S/N Name ORGANIZATION 
1 ANNA DAUDI MBUNGE TAMBUU FAMAS 
2 GODIFREY HERMANI MWENYEKITI TWANGEHAMWE, MGETA 
3 MALISA E.T.N. ASSISTANT PROJECT COORDINATOR - UMADEP, SUA 
4 BATINA SITHARA USAID/TZ 
5 AMIA M. BAKARI INTERMON OXFAM - PROGRAM COORDINATOR 
6 JACOB J. MWIMBE KIVUMA FARMERS ASSOCIATION 
7 JUMANNE MFAUME MBUNGE - LUHOLOLE FARMERS ASSOCIATION 
8 ISSA MKWAMA MWENYEKITI LUHOLOLE FARMERS 
9 ADAMTI TASIANI KATIBU MVIWATA MOROGORO MGAZI YA KAT 
10 NICOLAUS RAFAEL MWENYEKITI KISWIRA FARMERS 
11 ANNA MARY PAULO MJUMBE KISUYA FABIS 
12 OMARI TANDIKA MTOMBOZI FARMERS ASSOCIATION 
13 TWAIBU ABDUL NIGA MTOMBOZI FARMERS ASSOCIATION/KATIBU 
14 LIGUMULU J. SADDA DCDO-DED MOROGORO 
15 HUSSENI J. DILUNGA MJUMBE WA BODI KTK KUNGWE F.A. 
16 MAJESHI HUSENI MWENYEKITI WA TAMBUU FAMAS 
17 AKHUSERI KIVA MWENYEKITI KWIGWE FARMERS 
18 EZEKIEL CHANUAMAR CHAWAKAKI MBUNGE 
19 SKOLASTIKA BALTAZARI MBUNGE CHAWAKABU KATA BUNDUKI 
20 EUSTAKI A. MOSHI CDO - MKUYUNI-MOROGORO 
21 SOLOMON MHANGO MULTIFLOWER LTD - SALES REPRESENTATIVE 
22 ABDALLAH P. KAMBI MBUNGE KIBWAYA F.A. 
23 HEMEDI M. CHAMALI MWENYEKITI KIBWAYA F.A. 
24 CHARLES J.GENDAEKA MBUNGE NIGE FARMERS ASSOCIATION 
25 HERRIEL KISUMO AFO - MATOMBO 
26 MDOGWA KAMPENI AFISA MTENDAJI TCCIA MOROGORO 
27 GANUTE A. LUKUMBO MWENYEKITI NIGE FARMERS ASSOCIATION 
28 ELISA PAWANAYE WEST-ENVIRONMENTAL / ED OFFICER 
29 MSAKI USAID/TZ 
30 STEPHEN USAID/TZ 
31 HANS MHELELA CONSULTANT REAL SUPPORT SYSTEMS MOROGORO 
32 AMDANI MUSTAFA GOZO FA 
33 IDDI KINDAMBA DAI PEA FO MOROGORO 
34 LAMECK KIKOKA SNV MOROGORO 
35 LOGART A. ALPHONCE GOZO FA 
Annex 5 Cost Effectiveness Analysis Tables 
Annex Table 5.1 Present Value of Project Costs and Projected Incremental Sales
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
USAID Cost Disc.
Rate 
P.V.
Project 
Cost 
G.R. Total
Sales w.g. 
Incremen￾tal Sales P.V. of Incr. Sales Incr. Sale Less Proj. 
Cost 
Net 
Present 
Worth 
Incremen￾tal Gross 
Revenues 
Pre. Value
Incr. G.R. 
Incr. Sale
Less Proj. 
Cost 
Net 
Present 
Worth 
Year Labor Direct Total 0.2 0.2 1.05 $ $ $ $ $ $
0 0 1.000 0 D.R.=20% D.R=20%
1 2003 1,136,528 1,004,643 2,141,171 0.833 1,783,595 1,595,795 0 0 -2,141,171 -1,783,595 0 -2,141,171 -1,783,595
2 2004 919,103 1,138,701 2,057,804 0.694 1,428,116 7,709,136 6,033,551 4,187,285 3,975,747 2,759,169 0 -2,057,804 -1,428,116
3 2005 864,463 1,138,701 2,003,164 0.579 1,159,832 12,497,151 10,737,787 6,217,179 8,734,623 5,057,347 4,442,000 2,571,918 2,438,836 1,412,086
4 2006 1,058,785 1,138,701 2,197,486 0.482 1,059,188 13,122,009 11,274,676 5,434,394 9,077,190 4,375,206 4,442,000 2,141,044 2,244,514 1,081,856
5 2007 0.402 0 13,778,109 11,838,410 4,759,041 11,838,410 4,759,041 4,442,000 1,785,684 4,442,000 1,785,684
6 2008 0.335 0 14,467,014 12,430,331 4,164,161 12,430,331 4,164,161 4,442,000 1,488,070 4,442,000 1,488,070
7 2009 0.279 0 15,190,365 13,051,847 3,641,465 13,051,847 3,641,465 4,442,000 1,239,318 4,442,000 1,239,318
8 2010 0.233 0 15,949,883 13,704,440 3,193,134 13,704,440 3,193,134 4,442,000 1,034,986 4,442,000 1,034,986
9 2011 0.194 0 16,747,378 14,389,662 2,791,594 14,389,662 2,791,594 4,442,000 861,748 4,442,000 861,748
10 2012 0.162 0 17,584,746 15,109,145 2,447,681 15,109,145 2,447,681 4,442,000 719,604 4,442,000 719,604
3,978,879 4,420,746 8,399,625 5,430,732 108,569,849 36,835,935 100,170,224 31,405,203 11,842,372 6,411,640
Scenario #1. Comparison of Gross Sales and USAID Project Costs Scenario #2. Incremental gross revenues less cost to implement 
Benefit￾Cost 
Ratio 
= 6.78 Benefit- Cost Ratio = 2.18
IRR = 253 IRR = 57
Net 
Present 
Worth 
= 31,405,203 Net Present Worth = 6,411,640
Page 44 of 52 
Annex Table 5.2 Reported Sales by Commodity Sub-projects 
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 Col. 6 Col. 7 Col. 8 Col. 9 
Total Sales Oranges Onions Paprika Paddy Sugarcane Sunflower Seed Sunflower Oil-Cake 
Vegetables
U
S$ U
S$ U
S$ U
S$ U
S$ U
S$ U
S$ U
S$
Year 1 119,539 70,146 197,674 1,387,605
Year 2 254,135 152,
7
73 2
61,533 8,038,69
6
2,483,745 18,7
9
0
2
93,907
Year 3 699,932
2
2
6,295 568,274 7,233,45
7 3,129,30
7 25,136
956,269 224,615
T
otal 1,073,60
6 449,
214 1,0
27,481 16,659,758 5,613,05
2 43,9
2
6 1,250,17
6 224,615 26,341,8
28 Tot. 
Sale
22,272,810
Sugar/Padd
y
84.5
0
Percent
Total 
Incre
mental 
Sales 
Oran
ges O
nio
ns Paprika
Padd
y Sugarcane Sunflower Seed Sunflower Oil-Cake Vegetables Total
U
S$ U
S$ US$
US$ US$
U
S$ US$
US$
Year 1 0 0 
0
0
Tear 2 134,596 82,627 63,859
6,651,091
Year 3 580,393 156,149 37
0,600 5,845,85
2 645,562 6,34
6
6
6
2,362
T
otal 714,
989 238,
7
7
6
434,459 12,496,9
43 645,562 6,34
6
6
6
2,362
0 15,199,438 Tot. Inc. 
Sales
13,142,5
05 Sugar/Padd
y
86.4
7
Percent
This table is copied from Annex Table 5.1 and Financial Summary
Page 45 of 52 
Annex Table 5.3 Sub-Project Analysis of Incremental Net Revenues With and Without DAI PESA Project 
Commodity Production/ acre (kg) Acre/ MSE Production Kg/ Producer Price per Kg Revenue/ Producer MSEs by Commodity & Projects Revenue per Project Commodity % of Total 
Oranges - Tanga 
Without project 2.5 5415 0.03 162.45 
With project 4.72 8383 0.082 687.406 
Additional cost per producer
Additional cost per acre for 
production and marketing 236.069
Additional cost per acre for 
marketing 
Incremental Gross Revenue per 
producer 288.887 1048 302753.89 0.06847214
Oranges - Morogoro 
Without project 0.75 8293 0.022 182.446 
With project 1.2 6862 0.068 466.616 
Additional cost per producer
Additional cost per acre for 
production and marketing 236.069 
Additional cost per acre for 
marketing 
Incremental Gross Revenue per 
producer 48.1013 588 28283.563 0.00639673
Page 46 of 52 
Annex Table 5.3 continued 
Commodity Production/ acre (kg) Acre/ MSE Production Kg/ Producer Price per Kg Revenue/ Producer MSEs by Commodity & Projects Revenue per Project Commodity % of Total 
Onions 
Without project 1200 0.81 972 0.06 58.32 
With project 2500 0.81 2025 0.092 186.3 
Additional cost per producer
Additional cost per acre for 
production and marketing 51.7818
Additional cost per acre for 
marketing 
Incremental Gross Revenue per 
producer 76.1982 548 41756.604 0.00944386
Paprika 
Without project 0 1 0 136.4 136.364 
With project 200 1 200 0.795 159.091 
Additional cost per producer
Additional cost per acre for 
production and marketing 
Additional cost per acre for 
marketing 
Incremental Gross Revenue per 
producer 22.7273 1415 32159.091 0.00727324
Page 47 of 52 
Annex Table 5.3 continued 
Commodity Production/ acre (kg) Acre/ MSE Production Kg/ Producer Price per Kg Revenue/ Producer MSEs by Commodity & Projects Revenue per Project Commodity % of Total 
Paddy - Chimala 
Without project 1600 2.3 3680 0.082 300.769 
With project 1800 2.9 5220 0.191 996.545 
Additional cost per producer
Additional cost per acre for 
production and marketing 210.909
Additional cost per acre for 
marketing 
Incremental Gross Revenue per 
producer 484.867 4149 2011713.7 0.45497795
Paddy - Mbirali 
Without project 2000 2.5 5000 0.202 1009.62 
With project 2000 3.2 6400 0.215 1373.09 
Additional cost per producer
Additional cost per acre for 
production and marketing 181.818
Additional cost per acre for 
marketing 
Incremental Gross Revenue per 
producer 181.657 3082 559867.93 0.12662217
Page 48 of 52 
Annex Table 5.3 continued 
Commodity Production/ acre (kg) Acre/ MSE Production Kg/ Producer Price per Kg Revenue/ Producer MSEs by Commodity & Projects Revenue per Project Commodity % of Total 
Paddy - Ifikara 
Without project 720 1 720 0.033 23.5385 
With project 1350 1.5 2025 0.073 147.611 
Additional cost per producer
Additional cost per acre for 
production and marketing 
Additional cost per acre for 
marketing 
Incremental Gross Revenue per 
producer 124.072 574 71217.532 0.01610687
Sugarcane - Kilobero Production/ HA (MT) HA/ MSE Production MT/ Producer Price per Kg Revenue/ Producer MSEs by Commodity & Projects Revenue per Project Project % of Total 
Without project 19 1.6 30.4 0.013 380 
With project 27 1.6 43.2 0.017 719.476 
Additional cost per producer
Additional cost per acre for 
production 90.9091
Additional cost per acre for 
marketing 24.6212
Incremental Gross Revenue per 
producer 223.946 3156 706773.77 0.15984704
Page 49 of 52 
Annex Table 5.3 continued 
Commodity Production/ HA (MT) HA/ MSE Production MT/ Producer Price per Kg Revenue/ Producer MSEs by Commodity & Projects Revenue per Project Project % of Total 
Sugarcane - Turini 
Without project 15 3 45 0.008 360 
With project 15 3 45 0.008 360 
Additional cost per producer
Additional cost per acre for 
production and marketing 0
Additional cost per acre for 
marketing 
Incremental Gross Revenue per 
producer 0 520 0 0
Sunflower Seed - Subawanga Production/ acre (kg) Acre/ MSE Production Kg/ Producer Price per Kg Revenue/ Producer MSEs by Commodity & Projects Revenue per Project Project % of Total 
Without project 291 1.46 424.86 0.175 74.3505 
With project 275 1.46 401.5 0.165 66.2475 
Additional cost per producer
Additional cost per acre for 
production 3.31818
Additional cost per acre for 
marketing 
Incremental Gross Revenue per 
producer -11.4212 441 -5036.741 -0.0011391
Page 50 of 52 
Annex Table 5.3 continued 
Commodity Production/ proc/yr Produc- tion in … Price Price per Revenue/ Producer MSEs by Commodity & Projects Revenue per Project Project % of Total 
Sunflower Processing
Subawanga 
Without project 4000 lt 0.7727 lt 3090.91 
15000 kg 0.0363 kg 545.455
With project 14000 lt 0.7727 lt 10818.2 
23200 kg 0.0363 kg 843.636 
Additional cost per processor 583.091 
Additional cost per acre for 
production
Additional cost per acre for 
marketing 
Incremental Gross Revenue per 
producer 7442.36 82 610273.82 0.13802219
Vegetables - Morogoro Production/ acre (kg) Acre/ MSE Production Kg/ Producer Price per Kg Revenue/ Producer MSEs by Commodity & Projects Revenue per Project Project % of Total 
Without project 1370 0.75 1027.5 0.064 87.68 
With project 1600 2 3200 0.139 222.4 
Additional cost per processor 11.12 
Additional cost per acre for 
production
Additional cost per acre for 
marketing 
Incremental Gross Revenue per 
producer 123.6 500 61800 0.01397696
Page 51 of 52 
Annex Table 5.3 continued 
Summary Statistics 
MSEs by
Commodity
& Projects 
Revenue 
per 
Project 
Project % 
of Total 
Total Adjust Incremental Gross 
Revenues 4,421,563 1
Estimated Number of MSEs 16,103
Average per MSE (US$) 275
Total Adjust Incremental Gross 
Revenues Without Sunflower 
processors 
3,811,289
Estimated Number of MSEs 
Without Sunflower Processors 16,021
Average per MSE (US$) 238
Page 52 of 52