FINAL QUALITATIVE EVALUATION:
Food Security Initiative in Niger
Executed in collaboration with
Africare,
CARE International,
Catholic Relief Services, and
Helen Keller International
January 24, 2005
Transfer Authorization Award No. FFP-A-00-00-00087-00
External Evaluation Team Coordinators, CARE-Niamey
Elizabeth Adelski, Team Leader Ali Béty
Issifou Bissala Abdou Garba
Ali Mahamadou
Abdou Moha
Resource People
Idrissa Amadou, M&E Coordinator, CARE-Konni
Pascal Payet, M&E Coordinator, Project Coordination Unit, Africare-Niger
Kwanza Price, PCU Financial Coordinator, Project Coordination Unit, Africare-Niger
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This report is the result of many people's time and effort that the evaluation team recognizes
with great appreciation. We thank all the consortium's staff who contributed to our safe
travels, to providing hospitality in the guest houses, to organizing our work in the offices and
the various field sites, and above all to answering our endless questions about the program's
many facets. The traditional and modern administrators, the government's technical services
who were program partners, and above all the men and women in the rural communities that
we visited all deserve our thanks for giving us time for interviews during a busy time in the
agricultural season. The NGO directors and administrative staff who resolved all types and
sizes of problems have our sincere thanks. We thank all of you and sincerely hope that this
report proves useful for your current and future work.
i
ACRONYMS
ADB African Development Bank
AKG African kitchen gardens
BSG Breast-feeding Support Group
CARE Cooperative for Aid and Relief Everywhere
CCA Food Crisis Cell
CC/SAP Coordination Cell/Early Warning System
CEWS-UR Community Early-Warning System-Urgent Response
CGV Community Management Committee
CILSS Inter-State Committee for Fighting Drought in the Sahel
COSAN Community Health Committee
CRS Catholic Relief Services
CS Cooperating sponsor
CSI Integrated Health Center
CSO Civil society organization
CSR4 Cooperating Sponsor Results Report and Resource Request
CUSA Unit Committee for Food Security Intervention (also: CSA)
CVD Village Development Committee
DAP Development Assistance Proposal
DIP Detailed Implementation Plan
DSC Development Support Committee (Catholic Church)
EU Emergency Response Unit (Unité d'Urgence)
EBF Exclusive breast-feeding
EVS Community Health Experts
EVN Community Nutrition Experts
EW&ER Early warning and emergency response
FANTA USAID Food and Nutrition Technical Assistance Project
FARN Center for Nutritional Learning and Rehabilitation
FEWSNET Famine Early Warning System Network
FFP Food for Peace
FFW Food-for-Work
FSIN Food Security Initiative in Niger
GON Government of Niger
GSA and GS2A Community Support Group for Breast-feeding/Child Feeding Practices
HKI Helen Keller International
IEC Information, education, communication
IGA Income-generating activities
IPTT Indicator Performance Tracking Table
HC Community Health Committee (COSAN)
HMC Health Management Committee (COGES)
HNRP Household nutrition recuperation program (FARN)
HKI Helen Keller International
LISN Local Initiative Support Network (RAIL)
M&E Monitoring and evaluation
MMD Women on the move (Mata Masu Dubara)
NGO Non-governmental organization
ii
ACRONYMS, continued
NRM Natural resource management
PCU Project Coordination Unit
SO Strategic Objective
TA Technical assistance
TBA Traditional birth attendant
TOR Terms of Reference
TS Technical Services (GON)
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VDC Village Development Committee
VHE Village health educator
VMC Village Management Committee (Africare)
VNE Village nutrition educators
WFP World Food Program
i
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Food Security Initiative in Niger (FSIN) is a response to the food insecurity that affects
the rural population in parts of in Niger. The program currently is in the beginning of its fifth
fiscal year and will end in mid-2005. It is funded by United States Agency for International
Development/Food for Peace (USAID,FFP), through monetization, and supported with Food￾for-Work (FFW) commodities. To date, FSIN has distributed 17,473 metric tons of bulgur
wheat to 366,000 program participants. FSIN is implemented by a consortium of four
nongovernmental organizations (NGO): Africare, CARE International, Catholic Relief
Services (CRS), and Helen Keller International (HKI). Each NGO contributes its particular
expertise to the consortium: Africare is responsible for monetization; CARE for organizing
surveys and studies; CRS for FFW; and HKI for nutrition.
FSIN works in seven departments in Niger, with 300 communities and approximately
300,000 people. Ninety-five percent of the participating households are classified as "very
vulnerable" or "vulnerable" in terms of food security; only 5% are "moderately vulnerable."
The program's overall goal is to improve the participants' food and nutritional security,
through its three strategic objectives (SO). SO1, strengthening community capacity to
manage food security, is based on training, education, and the establishment of community
structures (committees, support groups, input and cereal banks). SO2 is designed to increase
sustainable agricultural production by promoting environmentally sound cultural techniques.
This includes sustainable natural resource management (NRM) and cultural techniques for
rainfed cereal crop production and irrigated vegetable production. FFW is a cross-cutting
FSIN activity. Forty days of FFW during the hungry season enables participants to
implement new practices such as rehabilitating degraded fields with demi-lunes and enlarging
seasonal ponds for irrigation. SO3 works toward improving the nutritional status of women
and children under five, who are the most vulnerable to malnutrition. Its activities include
health and nutrition education, breastfeeding support groups, and constructing rural health
centerss. FSIN works to strengthen links between the communities and the government
technical services in order to build sustainability into the program.
Evaluation Methodology
This final, qualitative evaluation was done early in FSIN's fifth year in order to comply with
the USAID/FFP requirement to submit it before submitting their second DAP, which is due
in early 2005. The overall goal of the evaluation was to collect information about FSIN's
people-level impact, the lessons learned during its implementation, and recommendations for
the current and the second DAP. The evaluation team conducted its fieldwork in the four
districts where the cooperating sponsors (CS) work: in Agadez with Africare, in Tanout with
CRS/HKI, in Konni/Illela with CARE, and in Dogondoutchi with CRS/HKI. The team spent
17 days in the field and conducted interviews in a total of 20 communities. Separate groups
of women and men were interviewed in each community so that each had the opportunity to
give its perspective on the program. The evaluators used a topical guide with open-ended
questions to conduct the group interviews. FSIN staff, the government of Niger (GON)
Technical Services (e.g. Health, Community Development, Environment), and FSIN's
partners (e.g. Caritas and the African Development Bank) in each district also were
interviewed.
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People-level Impact
The evaluation team's overall conclusion is that FSIN has had a positive impact on
participants' food and nutritional security. This is the result of achievements in the program's
three SOs that have enabled the participants to make positive changes at the household and
community levels. The changes include increased community capacity to address constraints
on food security; participants' learning about and using sustainable NRM and agricultural
production techniques; and participants' positive behavior changes in health and nutrition
through learning as well as experiencing the advantages of changed behavior. FFW
definitely has contributed to FSIN's achievements as it simultaneously provided food and
enabled participants to implement new technologies. It also enabled people to invest their
labor in activities that they prioritize that also affect food security, such as building roads and
livestock corridors.
Participants' evaluation of FSIN's impact on their lives is quite homogeneous, despite the
program's different social and ecological environments. They consistently reported that
SO1's training and education were among the best-liked and most useful aspects of the
program, particularly in health and NRM. SO1 has built community capacity to work
together and women's increased participation in community affairs: "The best thing FSIN has
done is to organize committees; they are something new, and enable the community to
implement activities. We have learned that one person alone cannot make a decision; a group
of all types of people must assemble—men, women, and the poor." Participants have
increased their arable landholdings by rehabilitating degraded fields, increased off-season
vegetable production and thus revenues, and doubled their millet production in years with
good rainfall as the result of SO2. Rehabilitating degraded land for pasture and agriculture is
universally reported as an important impact by both participants and the Technical Services
(TS). FFW is essential in operationalizing SO2 and particularly for the poor, because it
enables them to invest their labor in improving their own fields instead of investing it in
others' in order to eat.
According to both men and women, SO3 has made visible improvements in people's health:
exclusively breastfed children are fatter and healthier; pregnant women who take iron are
stronger and have fewer problems at childbirth. People also have learned about the need for
micronutrients in the diet and the local foods that supply them.
Lessons Learned
Some key lessons learned about FSIN are:
• Capacity-building should be seen as a cross-cutting element that is essential for
the success of other program components.
• The program should recognize and plan for the fact that raising participants'
awareness and behavior change are long-term processes.
• All the CSs should provide literacy classes, particularly for women, because it is
necessary for engaging the population in implementing all three SOs.
• FSIN should promote women's participation because due to their traditional social
role they are reticent about participating in community affairs.
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Sustainability
The evaluation team, FSIN staff, and the TS concluded that sustainability inevitably rests
with the participants, because the state does not have the resources to meet the rural
population's need for social and technical services. The participants are the most optimistic
about this: "We can continue after the project ends; we can do what we learned on our own,
we have seen that it is in our own interest." The TS in all four districts, that are meant to
provide sustainability by continuing to support and promote community activities when FSIN
ends, consistently reported that they have the competence but not the resources to do so.
Their lack of resources—vehicles, funds for gas and perdiem, human resources—varies by
district but is a serious constraint on getting their work done. Linking communities to local
NGOs and civil society organizations (CSO) is an option for building sustainability into the
program, particularly if there is a second phase.
Recommendations
The evaluation's recommendations for FSIN include:
1. Work with FFP to start FFW activities earlier because currently they conflict with
crucial, rainy-season agricultural activities that become secondary because people prioritize
FFW.
2. Include a literacy component in FSIN-2, because illiteracy is a universal constraint
on implementing the program.
3. Link communities with local NGOs and civil society organizations that can help
them sustain their activities when FSIN ends.
4. Identify site-appropriate income generating activities (IGA), particularly for the
dry season, when both men and women need to generate income.
5. Improve the availability of and access to health services by improving the
functionality of the existing rural health centerss, and by constructing and equipping new
ones.
6. Standardize the program's animal husbandry activities, because animal husbandry
is an important component of household economic systems in all four districts.
Cross-Cutting Activities: Management, Food-for-Work, Monitoring and Evaluation,
and the Emergency Response Unit
Management
FSIN's cross-cutting activities—management, FFW, monitoring and evaluation, and the
Emergency Response Unit—also were evaluated. Management was assessed in terms of
FSIN's relevance to national policy and the program's integrated structure as a consortium.
The civil servants interviewed about the former consistently stated that FSIN's objectives and
implementation strategy fit well within Niger's current policy context, namely the National
Poverty Reduction Plan, working toward gender equity, and the Ten Year Health Plan (2001-
2011). The fact that FSIN works with the population to address its basic needs is seen as
appropriate in the GON's long-term orientation toward community-based development and in
the newer context of decentralization.
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Overall, staff's evaluation of FSIN’s integrated structure as a consortium, and their evaluation
of the advantages and disadvantages of working in a consortium, was positive. The
consortium is seen as an innovative organization with a positive effect on management. Staff
reported that the advantages of working in a consortium outweigh the disadvantages. The
major advantages are exchanging information and experience with a network of colleagues;
the CSs' complementary expertise, which produces good work; and learning about other
management systems and approaches to rural development by working with other NGOs.
The major problems with working in a consortium are busy colleagues and an overloaded
work schedule that make it difficult to keep on schedule.
Food-for-Work
FFW is an essential component of FSIN because it enables participants to implement both
household- and community-level activities to improve food security. These activities
included building roads, rehabilitating wells, and reforestation. FFW’s people-level impacts
include: raising participants' awareness about their capacity to protect the environment;
mobilizing people for collective, community action; building social solidarity through
collective work; avoiding household decapitalization from livestock sales to buy food; and
enabling people to use improved NRM techniques to rehabilitate their fields and increase
their arable land area. Participants reported that FFW replaced the men's traditional, dry￾season coping strategy of going to neighboring countries to earn money to support their
families. FFW enabled people to stay home and invest their labor in improving their
household and community resources, and thus their food security.
The major problem with FFW is that its activities are implemented in the hungry season and
thus conflict with households' need for labor for agriculture. Participants generally prioritize
FFW at the expense of their own fields, which is counterproductive to some extent. The
other weaknesses with FFW are that it creates an attitude of expectancy, if not dependency;
and that communities do not always maintain the structures they build with it (e.g. roads).
Nevertheless, the evaluation team definitely agrees with using FFW in FSIN. It is a
constructive means of mobilizing people who live in chronically food-insecure areas and has
contributed to achieving FSIN's strategic objectives.
Monitoring and Evaluation
FSIN has a standardized and integrated monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system. This
system allows the aggregation and disaggregation of data across time and space, which meets
the CSs' and USAID's need for information at both the district and the consortium levels,
respectively. Each CS has an M&E unit with one staff member, who is responsible for data
input and management. At the district level the M&E system is based on community
participation and periodic community capacity assessments, and monthly reports from the
field staff.
Staff cited information-exchange, the standardized M&E system, and quarterly meetings to
resolve M&E issues as strengths of FSIN's M&E system. Making the TS a partner in data
collection and in conducting studies is positive because it helps build their capacity. Overall,
staff consider the M&E system to be a good one, despite the weaknesses they also identified.
The need for data inputters in the district M&E units has been a weakness throughout the
program's lifetime. Other weaknesses are related to data quality: the SO heads should be
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more involved in data collection because it improves data quality, and FSIN needs to be able
to pay more in order to hire better data collectors.
The Emergency Unit (Unité d'Urgence)
CARE's strategic plan includes a component to strengthen the consortium's capacity for early
warning and emergency response. The Emergency Unit (EU) is responsible for coordinating
the numerous activities in early warning and response with donors and CARE's partners. The
evaluation focused on the EU's work at the community level, where Community Early
Warning System-Urgent Response (CEWS-UR) committees are in the process of being set up
in FSIN's intervention zone. The CEWS-UR is a system for communities to monitor and
report on potential threats to their well-being. There are five CEWS-UR committees in
Agadez and Tanout, where the system is still in an experimental stage; there are 10 pilot
CEWS-UR sites in Konni/Illela; and about 40 CEWS-UR committees set up in the
Dogondoutchi district.
The process of establishing the CEWS-UR committees has been a laborious one and not well
understood by the consortium, the TS, or FSIN’s participants. However, the system seems to
be a useful and accepted mechanism at the community level. Participants have used it to
report locust invasions and measles outbreaks to the appropriate TS. The potential
constraints on its use are the detailed monthly reports that the CEWS-UR committees are
required to write; the cost of responding to emergencies that a program could support, but not
communities; and the CEWS-UR’s integration into the state’s early-warning and emergency￾response system.
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TABLE of CONTENTS
Section Page
I. Introduction 1
A. Purpose of the consultancy 1
B. Methodology 
II. Summary and Conclusions 4
A. FSIN and the national political context 4
B. Impact 4
1. SO1 5
2. SO2 6
3. SO3 7
4. FFW 8
5. The most vulnerable households 9
C. Strengths and weaknesses 9
D. Lessons learned 11
1. Key lessons learned 11
2. Women: lessons learned 11
3. Change is a slow process: lessons learned 11
4. Programmatic lessons learned 12
5. Training: lessons learned 12
E. Sustainability 12
F. Recommendations 13
1. Recommendations for the current program 13
2. Recommendations for the DAP2 14
III. Strategic Objective One 14
A. Summary of SO1 activities 15
B. Impact 16
1. SO1 impact indicators 16
2. SO1 impact 17
a. Participants 18
b. Technical Services and FSIN staff 20
c. HKI’s Community Radio intervention 20
C. Strengths and weaknesses 22
1. Participants 22
2. Technical Services and FSIN staff 23
D. Sustainability 25
E. Lessons learned 26
 F. Recommendations 29
1. For the current program 29
2. For the DAP2 32
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TABLE of CONTENTS, continued
Section Page
IV. Strategic Objective Two 30
A. Summary of key activities 30
B. Impact 32
C. Strengths and weaknesses 35
1. Strengths 35
2. Weaknesses 36
D. Sustainability 37
E. Lessons learned 38
F. Recommendations 39
1. For the current program 39
2. For the DAP2 39
V. Strategic Objective Three 40
A. Summary of key activities 40
B. Impact 42
1. Quantitative impact evaluation 42
a. Stunting in children 43
b. Breast-feeding newborns 45
c. Vitamin A consumption 46
2. Qualitative impact evaluation 47
a. According to women 47
b. According to men 47
c. According to the Technical Services and FSIN staff 48
C. Strengths and weaknesses 48
1. Strengths 48
2. Weaknesses 49
D. Lessons learned 49
E. Sustainability 49
 F. Recommendations 50
1. Global recommendations 50
2. Recommendations for the DAP2 50
VI. Cross-Cutting Activities: Management, Food-for-Work, 51
Monitoring and Evaluation, and the Emergency Response Unit
A. Management 51
1. Institutional management organization 51
2. Human and financial resources 51
3. Strengths and weaknesses 52
4. Evaluation of the consortium's structure for
 program management 52
5. Strengths and weaknesses of working in a consortium 52
6. Lessons learned 53
7. Recommendations 53
8. Implementation of the midterm recommendations 53
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TABLE of CONTENTS, continued
Section Page
B. Food-for-Work 57
1. Summary of activities 57
2. Impact 58
3. Strengths and weaknesses 59
4. Sustainability 59
5. Lessons learned 59
6. Recommendations 60
C. Monitoring and Evaluation 60
1. Summary of the M&E system 60
2. Advantages and disadvantages of working in a consortium 61
3. Strengths and weaknesses of the M&E system 62
4. Lessons learned 63
5. Recommendations 65
D. The Emergency Response Unit 66
1. Summary of activities 67
2. Findings 67
3. Recommendations 68
References cited 70
Annex 1. Fieldwork and Activities Schedule and Topical Guide
Annex 2. Terms of Reference
Annex 3. Contact List
Annex 4. Indicator Performance Tracking Table
1
I. Introduction and Methodology
A. Purpose of the evaluation
The FSIN program currently is in the beginning of its fifth fiscal year and will end in mid￾2005. The CSs plan to submit a Development Assistance Proposal (DAP) to the USAID/FFP
office, for a second phase of FSIN. The timing of this evaluation was determined by the
USAID/FFP requirement to submit an evaluation of FSIN before submitting the DAP, which
is due in early 2005.
The overall goal of this final, qualitative evaluation was to collect information about FSIN's
impact on participants' lives, the lessons learned during its implementation, and
recommendations to contribute to the second DAP. The evaluation's specific objectives
included documenting the participants' views of the program's impact and the changes it
made in their lives; assessing the change in food insecurity among the targeted vulnerable
groups, particularly women and children under five; documenting changes in participants'
knowledge and practices related to improving their food security; evaluating FSIN's
operational strategy, including the benefits and costs of working as a consortium; and
investigating the implementation of the midterm evaluation's recommendations. The Terms
of Reference (TOR) for the evaluation are in Annex 2.
B. Methodology
The evaluation team conducted its fieldwork with the four CS in four districts: in Agadez
with Africare, in Tanout with Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and Helen Keller International
(HKI), in Konni/Illela with the Cooperative for Aid and Relief Everywhere (CARE), and in
Dogondoutchi with CRS/HKI. The team spent 17 days in the field and conducted interviews
in a total of 20 communities. Table I-1 below shows the departments and communities in
each district where fieldwork was conducted, and the partners and government Technical
Services that were interviewed. Three to seven communities were visited in each district.
Due to constraints of time for the evaluation in FSIN's vast intervention area, driving time to
reach the communities was a major factor in determining the sample for the evaluation. The
other criteria for the sample were communities: 1) in the districts' different agroecological
zones; 2) with varying performance levels, based on the FSIN staffs’ judgement; 3) of
different generations with FSIN, in Africare's and CRS/HKI's districts, because they
implemented their programs progressively. In brief, the reasons for choosing the
communities for the final evaluation were:
1. Africare, Agadez: All the Africare communities visited for the evaluation in Agadez are
in the department of Tchirozerine due to 1) the insecurity that made travel to Arlit
inadvisable; 2) the travel-time required to reach the communities in Arlit, which was four to
eight hours; and 3) the travel-time allocated for the fieldwork. The team conducted
interviews in:
• Four of the 48 communities in the Air agroecological zone;
• Two of the 24 communities in the Irhazer agroecological zone; and
• One of the 12 communities in the Tadress agroecological zone.
2. CRS/HKI, Tanout and Zinder: The communities that had made significant progress with
CRS/HKI and could be reached within the travel-time allocated for the fieldwork were
chosen for site visits.
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3. CARE, Konni/Illela: The community of Cheta was chosen because staff consider it a
moderately successful program site. It is in the valley where there is more access to water,
there are numerous FSIN activities, and the vegetable-gardening activity has been successful.
Awanchala was chosen as an example of a marginalized community in the arid, northern area
with mediocre performance, one of 10 functional CEWS-UR, and where FSIN has
emphasized nutritional activities. Goumbi Kano was chosen because it is included in the
District Plan for Health Development and as an example of successful health/nutrition
activities.
4. CRS/HKI, Dogondoutchi: The communities in this district were chosen based on the
types of program activities that have been implemented and travel-time. Angoual Magagi
Doka was chosen because it developed vegetable gardening with FSIN. In Dogon Kiria a
group of men was interviewed about HKI's radio intervention; no other FSIN activities were
addressed in this interview.
Separate groups of women and men were interviewed in each community so that each sex
had the opportunity to give its perspective on the program. The evaluators used a topical
guide with open-ended questions (Annex 3) and the group interviews lasted approximately
two hours. All of the evaluators used translators in Agadez because this enabled the
Tamashek speakers to express themselves easily. In the other three districts the three
Nigerien evaluators conducted their interviews in Hausa and the American consultant worked
with a translator. It should be noted that the self-reported information from the FSIN
participants is subjective, unverified, and subject to bias. These are universal caveats on any
self-reported information, qualitative or quantitative. A potential bias in this evaluation is
that the poorest people did not always have the opportunity to respond directly to the
interview questions, as group discussions often are dominated by the more important people
in the community.
The evaluation team interviewed three other categories of people in each district: FSIN staff,
the GON Technical Services (e.g. Health, Community Development, Environment), and
FSIN's partners (e.g. Caritas and the African Development Bank). Two CARE projects also
were interviewed: “Women on the Move” and “AIDS in Migration (SIDA en Exode).” The
team made courtesy visits to the traditional chiefs, the Prefets, and the Sous-Prefets, which
generally provided little in-depth information about FSIN.
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Table I-1. The Final Qualitative Evaluation Site Visits and Interviews
Interviews
Districts Dates Partners Technical Services Communities
Africare:
Agadez,
department of
Tchirozerine
Sept.
16-20
None Health, Literacy,
Environment,
Education, Rural
Development,
Hydrology.
Air1
: Goffat,
Boughoul, Egandawel,
Boudari.
Irhazer: Tamaghate,
Tiguidan Tagueite.
Tadress: Abalama.
CRS/HKI:
department of
Tanout and
region of
Zinder
Sept.
21-24
Caritas Tanout: Health,
Community Develop￾ment, Agriculture,
Environment, Rural
Development
Tanout: Sabon Kafi,
Garin Bagala, Yagagi.
Zinder: Dania
Maikogo, Bakin Birji
CARE:
departments of
Konni and
Illela
Sept.
25-29
"Women on
the Move;"
the Micro￾Project
project,
African
Development
Bank,
Tahoua;
CARE
project
“AIDS in
Migration
(SIDA en
Exode)
Konni: Community
Development, Literacy,
Environment, Livestock
Resources, Land Tenure
Commission,
Agriculture
Illela: Inspection of
Primary Studies, Social
Development, Commu￾nity Development,
Literacy, Environment,
Agriculture, Livestock
Resources, Land Tenure
Commission
Konni: Cheta,
Goumbi Kano.
Illela: Awanchala.
CRS/HKI,
department of
Dogondoutchi
Sept.
29-
Oct. 3
Committee
for
Development
Support
(Catholic
Church), and
the Local
Initiative
Support
Network
(RAIL)
Health, Community
Development,
Agriculture,
Environment, Rural
Development
Angoual Magagi
Doka, Samia, Kaiwa
Fako, Dogon Kiria2
,
Balessa, Rijia Samna
1
Air, Irhazer, and Tadress are three different agroecological zones.
2
The interview in Dogon Kiria was to collect information only on HKI's Radio Club
intervention.
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II. Summary and Conclusions
A. FSIN and the national political context
All the civil servants interviewed during this evaluation stated that FSIN's objectives and
implementation strategy fit well within Niger's current policy context. That context includes
the National Poverty Reduction Plan, working toward gender equity, and the Ten Year Health
Plan (2001-2011). Both civil servants and traditional chiefs appreciated the fact that FSIN
works with the population to address its basic needs and has a participatory, grassroots
approach. Building communities' capacity to manage their food security, and their being
proactive about it, is seen as appropriate in the GON's long-term orientation of community￾based development ("developpement à la base") since the seventies, and in the newer context
of decentralization.
FSIN also has initiated a community-managed early warning and urgent response system that
can be linked to the GON's departmental and regional systems. The goal of this system is to
help communities to identify the potential risks to their food security, advise the Technical
Services of level of the risks, and be proactive in local-level risk mitigation.
B. Impact
The overall conclusion of this evaluation is that, after four years, FSIN has had a positive
impact on participants' food and nutritional security. The positive impact is the result of
achievements in FSIN's three Strategic Objectives (SO) that, taken together, have enabled the
program participants to improve their food and nutritional security at the household and the
community levels. The improvement is due to communities' increased capacity to organize
themselves to address their constraints on food security collectively; participants' increased
knowledge and use of sustainable, improved NRM and agricultural production techniques;
positive behavior changes in health and nutrition as the result of learning as well as
experiencing the advantages of changed behavior; and FFW. FFW definitely has contributed
to FSIN's achievements as it has simultaneously provided food and enabled participants to
learn and use new technology. It also has enabled people to invest their labor in activities
that they prioritize, such as building roads and livestock corridors that also affect food
security.
According to participants, FFW is an important factor in their improved food security.
Another is the increase in their arable farmland due to the recuperation of degraded fields.
As one woman said, "Food security has increased and the need for out-migration (exode) has
decreased, mainly due to the rehabilitation of farmland and FFW." At this point it is not
possible to determine if the improvement in participants' food security will be sustainable
when FFW ends. FSIN works in the most food-insecure areas in Niger. Periodic drought,
poorly distributed rainfall, marginal soils, pests, population pressure, and lack of government
technical services all compromise agricultural production. A real lack of government social
services also compromises the population's health and educational status, which are important
factors in food security. It is reasonable to expect only limited improvement in food security
in this tough ecological and social context. The participants are optimistic about increasing
their food security through the combination of learning and activities that FSIN offers, while
they recognize the limitations they face. The evaluation team shares their attitude.
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It is interesting to note that participants' reports on the changes in their lives from working
with FSIN were quite homogeneous, despite the ecological and social differences of the four
districts where the program operates. The minor variations in their statements about FSIN's
impact on their lives reflected the site-specific constraints on food security and the specific
actions taken to address it in the different districts.
1. SO1
Participants' statements illustrate FSIN's impact in terms of its three SOs and FFW. SO1,
strengthening community capacity to manage food security, was based on training, education,
and the establishment of community structures (committees, support groups, and structures
such as input and cereal banks). The positive results of SO1 commonly reported by
participants included increased social solidarity; women's integration into community affairs;
people's increased awareness of their own potential to help themselves; and participants'
learning about improved practices in a range of areas, from democratic decision-making to
health to crop production. Following are some participants' statements about the positive
impacts of SO1.
Social solidarity:
• "Before FSIN individualism reigned and each family took care of itself; now,
there is social solidarity and decision-making is done together."
• "There is wider social solidarity now; the people from the outlying hamlets come
and participate in community activities."
Community organization:
• "The best thing FSIN has done is to organize committees; they are something
new, and enabled the community to implement activities."
• "We meet and make our own decisions; neither the project nor anybody else can
impose a decision on us. Learning to meet and make decisions is one of the most useful
things we have learned with FSIN."
Women's participation in community affairs:
• Women: "Men used to make the community decisions, but now women sit beside
them and take part in the decision-making. This fact is important: women are part of the
community and should be part of the decision-making."
• Men: "Now men and women meet to plan and implement activities related to
food security; they work together. Women attend community meetings and speak up;
sometimes they have better ideas than the men."
Building capacity:
• "Before FSIN, we wanted to manage our food security but we did not know how.
Now, with technical assistance from the project, we can implement our ideas."
• Women said that "It is easier to mobilize women now and we have acquired the
confidence that we will succeed at whatever we work on."
• A staff member said that "Participants learned that they are capable of getting
major projects like road-building done; they were surprised at their collective capacity."
6
Education:
• "Training and teaching have contributed to the decrease in people's poverty. They
also have changed behavior: women practice EBF and monitor children's growth."
• "We have learned to better manage our food security because we have learned to
rehabilitate our land and techniques such as reforestation to protect the environment. We can
teach others."
2. SO2
SO2 was designed to increase sustainable agricultural production by promoting
environmentally sound cultural techniques. This includes sustainable NRM and cultural
techniques for rainfed cereal crop production and for irrigated vegetable production.
According to participants, the impacts of transferring improved practices that participants can
easily use are: a significant increase in vegetable production, which generates revenue and
diversifies the household diet; the regeneration of pasture grass and trees in rehabilitated land,
particularly in the pastoralist area of Agadez; and an increase in cereal production in the
demi-lunes1
. Both men and women stated that, as the result of demi-lunes and improved
seed, their millet production has doubled in years with good rainfall. This increase is not
reflected in SO2's impact indicator, but it was reported in three districts (Dogondoutchi,
Konni/Illa, and Tanout).
According to participants, SO2's positive impacts also included an increase in households'
arable landholdings from rehabilitating degraded fields; diversification in vegetable
production; and decreasing conflicts between pastoralists and farmers as the result of
establishing livestock corridors and defining pasturelands. Participants' statements about the
positive effects of SO2 include:
Increases in production:
• "Agricultural production has increased due to the use of new techniques such as
demi-lunes, compost, and improved cultural practices."
• "The rehabilitation of degraded fields and the use of demi-lunes that conserve
moisture have increased millet production; the millet produces better in the demi-lunes than
in sandy soil."
Increases in revenue from vegetable production:
• "Learning improved production techniques for onion production has made it quite
profitable; many people have shifted from grain to onion production for that reason."
• In Agadez, one man's production of onions increased almost seven-fold. He
attributed this increase to the program’s training and the access it provided to chemical
fertilizer, pesticides, and agricultural tools.
Conflict reduction:
• "Conflicts with the pastoralists have decreased because with FFW we made a
livestock corridor and defined pasturelands."
 
1
 Demi-lunes are shallow holes in the shape of a half-moon, about a meter long, designed to conserve moisture.
7
Rehabilitation of farmland:
• "There are trees and pasture grass growing on rehabilitated land, where nothing
has grown for years."
• "The poor can cultivate more of their farmland because they have rehabilitated
some of it, so their production has increased."
3. SO3
SO3 is aimed at improving the nutritional status of women and children under five, who are
the most vulnerable to malnutrition. Community groups to support improved feeding
practices and breastfeeding, recuperation centers for malnourished children, vaccination
campaigns, the construction of rural health centerss, and health education were used to work
toward this objective. The impact indicators for SO3 show that FSIN has had a positive
impact on nutritional status. Stunting in children 24-59 months has decreased from 51% to
47% in four years, the proportion of communities where vitamin A consumption is above the
risk level has increased from 10% to 30%, and the proportion of children breastfed within
eight hours of birth has increased from 30% to 73% (IPTT, Annex 1). The positive impacts
of SO3 that participants generally cited were the construction of health centers, access to
health education information through HKI's Radio Club and Africare's Community Radio,
learning how to rehabilitate malnourished children and treat diarrhea, and learning about EBF
and hygiene. Both men and women stated that FSIN's health education was one of the best￾liked and most useful aspects of the program.
Education:
• "Women learned many new things about breastfeeding, hygiene, anemia and how
to prevent it with pills and vegetables, how to treat children who are malnourished or have
diarrhea, the value of vegetables in children's diets."
• Men said that "Hygiene promotes health: dirty children get sick."
Micronutrients:
• "People have learned about the importance of different types of local foods that
are nutritious."
• "We learned about foods that have vitamin A and iron."
Behavior change:
• "EBF children are fatter and healthier; they have fewer illnesses and less
diarrhea."
• "Women's and children's health is better; both go to the clinic when necessary and
women go for prenatal checkups."
Impact on women and children:
• "Women have stronger blood; they are healthier and childbirth is easier as the
result of taking iron pills. There is less risk of hemorrhage and the placenta descends when
newborns are put to the breast immediately. Women recover faster from childbirth because
their blood is stronger."
• "Healthier children mean less time and money spent on caring for sick children."
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4. FFW
FFW is a cross-cutting activity used to improve food security during the hungry season,
usually May-July, and to enable participants to implement their priority activities related to
food security. To date, FSIN has distributed 17,473 metric tons of bulgur wheat to 366,000
program participants. Participants reported that it provided food for two or three months,
depending on the size of the household. They also universally said that it replaced the men's
traditional coping strategy of seasonal migration (exode) to other countries (Algeria, Ivory
Coast, Nigeria) to earn money to support their families during the hungry season. The
activities implemented with FFW include land rehabilitation (demi-lunes, reforestation,
dikes) road-building, repairing wells, construction of community buildings (warehouses,
literacy and training centers), livestock corridors (delimited with trees).
According to both participants and staff there is a conflict for labor between FFW and
household crop production in the rainy season. The latter loses, as households allocate their
stronger labor (men) to FFW. This is counterproductive and should be avoided, but evidently
the combination of USAID's regulations on transporting and storing commodities and the
variable onset of the rainy season perpetuate the problem.
Participants consistently rated FFW as among the best-liked and useful components of FSIN.
The summary statement about FFW in all districts is that it has the double advantage of
providing food and rehabilitating the natural resource base. This is particularly important for
the poor, because it allows them to invest their labor in improving their own fields instead of
working in others' fields to earn money to eat. It also eliminates the poor’s need to take credit
during the hungry season and repay it with their harvest. FFW thus helps to alleviate the
vicious cycle that entraps the more vulnerable households: investing their labor in other
people's crop production, taking credit to survive, and losing some of their production to
repay the credit
Participants said that:
• "FFW decreases the number of men who go on exode and protects the
environment. It has the double advantage of providing food and enabling people to learn
NRM techniques."
• "FFW helps prevent household decapitalization as people are not obliged to sell
their livestock to buy food."
• "FFW enables the poor to work in their own fields and improve them with new
NRM techniques, instead of working for others in order to eat."
• "FFW in the hungry season enables the poor to survive, and builds useful
structures for the community and for individuals."
• "Conflicts with the pastoralists have decreased because with FFW we made a
livestock corridor and defined pasturelands."
• "Before we ate chaff; now we eat wheat."
The other impacts of FFW that the evaluation team noted were:
• Participants learned that they have the capacity to protect their natural resources.
• FFW mobilized people for collective work that benefitted the community, such as
building roads and health centers.
• The regeneration of vegetative cover and trees as the result of rehabilitating land.
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• Building social solidarity through working together on collective activities.
5. The most vulnerable households
The evaluation team was asked to assess FSIN's impact on the most vulnerable households.
Ninety-five percent of the households that FSIN works with are classified as vulnerable to
food insecurity: 70% are very vulnerable and 25% are vulnerable to food insecurity.
Women-headed households generally are the poorest. Our overall conclusion is that
participants' vulnerability has decreased somewhat during the life of the program, but as the
participants themselves said, they are still poor.
Four major factors have contributed to improving the poor's situation: FFW; increasing their
arable area by rehabilitating degraded fields; collective work by community members to
rehabilitate their fields using FFW; and the program’s use of a traditional means of building
up a household's livestock holdings, in which the most vulnerable households are given a
goat or sheep, keep the first two offspring, and give the mother to another poor household.
The significant advantage of FFW is that, for a limited period, it enables the poor to invest
their labor in improving their own fields and production instead of working for others in
order to eat. However, FSIN inevitably has differential impact on participants, depending on
their resource levels. Some better-off households hire the poor to make demi-lunes in the
formers' fields, having seen the technique's impact on production, which is a long-term
benefit for the well-off but not for the poor. For example, one community chief hired labor to
make over 500 demi-lunes in his fields. However, differential program impact is balanced by
the fact that only 5% of the participants are defined as "moderately vulnerable" and thus
likely to have the resources for such investments. Following is what participants themselves
said about FSIN’s impact on the poorest people's lives.
• "The poor can cultivate their own fields because FSIN provides seed and FFW.
Now they can keep their harvest, instead of using part of it to repay the credit they needed
during the hungry season."
• "Their lives have changed; they are not so hungry now because of FFW. Before
FSIN they went on seasonal migration. But the majority is still poor."
• "The poor benefitted from FSIN's teaching and training, which are for everyone,
but they are still poor."
• "Their food security has improved but they cannot say that they have enough to
eat. [Poor rainfall this year is a major factor]."
• "There is not a great difference in their lives. However, poor children's health is
better due to women's learning about health care. One problem is that poor women do not
have enough to eat so they do not have enough breast milk for EBF."
C. Strengths and weaknesses
Staff, the GON Technical Services, and FISN partners were asked about the program's
strengths and weaknesses. The former outweighed the latter and were more consistent; the
weaknesses tended to be idiosyncratic. FSIN's participatory approach, large geographical and
programmatic scope, and the good working relations and partnership that it has forged with
its partners—the GON administrators, traditional chiefs, the TS, local NGOs—consistently
were reported as the program's major strengths. The recognized value of the participatory
approach is that it "made the communities part of the program." As one TS staff member
said, "Communities did their own Action Plans and feel responsible for them." Another said
10
that "The difference with FSIN is that the communities are responsible and manage the FFW
and the work tools, not the Environment Service." FSIN's accent on training and education
also was reported as a strength, because it is the basis for all of the program's interventions.
The TS's overall assessment was that "FSIN got participants mobilized and taught them
things" and that there is a "strong involvement of the participants and the TS in all phases of
the program." The government administrators in all four districts reported that FSIN fits
perfectly into the national political context, is an excellent program because it addresses
people's basic needs, and should be expanded. The fact that FSIN has resources and has
provided some support to the local TSs by involving them in the program most likely
influenced the civil servants' assessment of the program. As many of them said, it is the
major (or only) program in their areas, and they rely on it to address their serious food
insecurity problems.
Participants' high illiteracy rates, the staff's need for training, and an overbooked work
schedule are the main weaknesses that staff and the TS reported. Lack of a literacy
component in FSIN is a universal program weakness that both staff and the TS identified.
High illiteracy rates are a constraint on program implementation across the board, and
particularly on women's engagement and awareness-raising. Africare in Agadez is
addressing this problem in its current DAP, but elsewhere it is a problem. Staff also
identified the need for more training for technical staff, and the need for training in M&E
activities for technical staff and the TS. The TS consistently reported that FSIN's work
schedule and its staff are overloaded, which creates a cascade of problems: staff are not
easily available to work with, it is not possible to adhere to the work schedule, so activities
are not implemented on time, and there is not enough time to do all the activities well. Staff
themselves identified some of these as weaknesses, so they should be taken into account in
the second DAP.
The evaluation team also documented staff's opinions of the advantages and disadvantages of
working in a consortium. The overall opinion is that working in a consortium is
advantageous, because:
• It enables people to share information and experience, including best practices, so
that there is a community-level benefit.
• There is a diversity of expertise that is mutually enriching, and the
complementary expertise improves the quality of the work.
• It gives FSIN a large and diverse geographical scope, which one NGO could not
cover.
• Staff have learned from the different NGOs' approaches, and about their different
management systems.
The major disadvantage that staff identified already has been cited as a systemic weakness:
an overbooked work schedule and overbooked colleagues. As a result it is difficult to find
time to meet colleagues and to keep the work schedule on track. Staff noted that problems
with working in the consortium in the beginning—confusion about the different NGOs’ roles,
lack of understanding of other NGO's approaches and management systems, the need to
standardize the M&E system—have disappeared over time. Overall, staff feel that the
advantages of working in a consortium outweigh the disadvantages.
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D. Lessons learned
1. Key lessons learned
Staff, FSIN documents, and the TS reported most "lessons learned" in the form of
conclusions. Some of these conclusions have been reformulated as lessons learned; the rest
are included in this section in their original form. The universal and most salient lesson
learned is that FSIN should have a literacy component. High illiteracy rates in the program
zone (up to 90%) are a constraint on FSIN's implementing all three SOs and a constraint on
participants' ability to learn and to manage their committees and activities. Illiteracy is
particularly a barrier to women's participation in community affairs and in committees, as
well as a constraint on activities such as monitoring children's growth and training matrons.
The other key lessons learned that generally apply to the consortium as a whole are:
• Capacity-building is a cross-cutting element essential for the success of other
program components.
• Volunteerism has its limits; people will drop out of committees if they are not
paid.
• Committee members travel extensively during the hungry season [to find work]
and large numbers of able-bodied people migrate after a poor agricultural season. This
affects performance in communities' committees and activities.
2. Women: lessons learned
Another universal lesson learned is that FSIN should be proactive in building women's
capacity and promoting their participation in community activities, including committees.
This is necessary to change women's traditional social role and increase gender equity. Staff
have learned that:
• FSIN should support women's participation because they are reticent about
participating in community affairs.
• The program needs to push to get both sexes on committees.
• Women's participation in community affairs and decision-making increases over
time, with training. It is a process that takes time.
3. Change is a slow process: lessons learned
Staff in some districts reported that they have learned that raising awareness and changing
behavior is a slow, gradual process. According to some staff, the participants have learned a
similar lesson: that their fields have degraded over time, and that rehabilitating them will be
a gradual process that takes time. A few staff reported the following lessons learned about
time and change:
• The program should recognize and plan for the fact that raising participants'
awareness is a process that takes time.
• Behavior change is a long-term process.
• There is lack of social cohesion in communities that have more than one chief,
and it takes time to get people to work together as one community.
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4. Programmatic lessons learned
• Working with communities and their satellite communities and hamlets (unités)
that have different ethnic groups in order to design one Action Plan contributes to social
solidarity and increases people's participation.
• One technical agent can work effectively in six or seven communities and their
satellite communities (unités).
• Working to improve nutritional status requires addressing literacy, access to
water, and controlling and preventing infection.
• It is increasingly difficult for the public health service to assume the responsibility
for and the continuation of FSIN activities.
• Technical Services: FSIN should make an Action Plan and adhere to it so that
participants do not get discouraged. The program needs to keep on schedule.
5. Training: lessons learned
• Teaching and training contribute to the emergence of community leaders.
• The number of trainings in all subjects increased people's capacity to manage their
food security.
• Traditional birth attendants should have three months of training; they only get
one week.
• FSIN should build on existing agricultural techniques; it should not impose new
ones.
• Disadvantaged populations will make positive changes in health behavior if
appropriate messages and strategies are used.
E. Sustainability
The evaluation team asked the participants, TS, and staff about the sustainability of FSIN's
program after it ends. The conclusion, with which we agree, is that sustainability rests with
the participants. They recognize this and are optimistic about it: "Yes, as the result of
everything we have learned and implemented with FSIN, our capacity to manage our food
security has increased. When the project leaves we will try to continue and do even better."
"We can continue after the project ends; we can do what we learned on our own, we have
seen that it is in our own interest." There are many acquisitions in knowledge and practices
that participants can use independently, from rehabilitating malnourished children with local
foods to seed multiplication to organizing democratic and inclusive committees to address
community issues.
However, two critical factors take precedence in the discussion of sustainability: first, it can
be discussed but not assessed at this point in time; and second, the overall conclusion is that
the participants cannot depend on the GON's social or technical services to continue or
support the participants' activities when the program ends. FSIN currently is in its fifth year
and running well, so the discussions about sustainability are theoretical. Sustainability only
can be determined two or more years after the program has ended. FSIN's second phase
could track some or all of the Indicator Performance Tracking Table (IPTT) indicators in the
communities that have graduated from the program as a sound basis for assessing
sustainability, for example. At this point in time there are only opinions.
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Overall, the staff and the TS recognize that sustainability ultimately and inevitably rests with
the participants, because the state does not have the resources to meet the rural population's
need for services. This is certainly true in the chronically vulnerable areas where FSIN
works, where due to poverty the population's needs are great and its ability to pay for services
is not. The effect of decentralization on this equation remains to be seen but it is
fundamentally a matter of the state's budget. The TS in all four districts, that are meant to be
the key factor in sustainability by continuing to support and promote communities' activities
when FSIN ends, consistently reported that they have the competence but not the resources to
do so. Their lack of resources—vehicles, funds for gas and perdiem, human resources—
varies by district but is a real constraint on getting their work done. FSIN's support amounts
to 80% of the TS's budget in one district where the program works, so that the TS there have
the means to work with the program. "Communities have to become responsible for
themselves because the TS do not have sufficient funding to cover their territory" were the
words of one TS staff member. The evaluation team's conclusion is that the TS cannot really
contribute to sustainability when FSIN ends.
The evaluation team believes that household-level activities such as EBF and improved
production techniques are more likely to persist over time than community activities such as
cereal banks or tree nurseries. Without the program's social and technical support, and
without FFW, people's motivation and their capacity to invest in their communities are likely
to diminish. Linking communities to local NGOs and civil society organizations (CSO) is an
option for building sustainability into the program. FSIN could help community committees
become formal structures recognized by the state as their communities' representatives
(“agrément”). This would facilitate their working independently with local NGOs, CSOs,
and banks after FSIN ends.
F. Recommendations
This section contains the evaluation team's key recommendations for the current program,
which is in its final year, and those for a second phase of FSIN. The complete set of
recommendations for each SO, FFW, and the program's cross-cutting activities are in their
respective chapters.
1. Recommendations for the current program
1. Increase the length and frequency of community training sessions, based on
consultation with the participants, in order to respond to participant demand.
2. Provide regular training to improve the program technicians' and the TSs' technical
expertise, in order to improve technology transfer.
3. Expand vegetable-gardening activities throughout the intervention zone by
creating new sites and expanding the existing sites, because vegetable production contributes
to households income and micro-nutrient consumption.
4. Identify a mechanism for participants to compensate community volunteers
(teachers and local experts), in collaboration with the participants, in order to reduce
turnover, because volunteerism has its limits.
5. Teach women to rehabilitate malnourished children in Tanout and Dogondoutchi
districts, in order to standardize these activities throughout the intervention zone.
6. Apply partial cost-recovery measures for health care in the rural health centerss, to
conform to national health policy.
14
7. Continue the FFW-supported activities of identifying and delimiting pastures in
Tanout, Dogondoutchi, and Konni/Illela, in order to decrease conflicts between pastoralists
and farmers.
8. Increase the staff in the M&E units: each unit should have one or two data
inputters and an assistant to the unit head. The M&E units currently have only one person,
who cannot get all the work done on time.
9. Provide solid training so that field staff and the TS partners use their M&E data￾collection forms correctly and understand why the information is needed, in order to improve
data quality.
2. Recommendations for the DAP2
1. Include a literacy component in FSIN-2, because illiteracy is a universal constraint
on implementing the program. "Food for education" may be an option for supporting
women's attendance and reducing dropout rates.
2. Work with FFP to start FFW activities earlier because currently they conflict with
crucial, rainy-season agricultural activities that become secondary because people prioritize
FFW.
3. Identify site-appropriate IGAs, particularly for the dry season, when both men and
women need to generate income. Working with organizations that provide micro-finance is
one option.
4. Link communities with local NGOs and civil society organizations that can help
them sustain their activities when FSIN ends.
5. Integrate the control of surface water into NRM activities, because the potential to
use it exists throughout the intervention zone.
6. Look for partners such as local NGOs that work in animal husbandry, in order to
complement FSIN's activities in Tanout where it is a major component of household
livelihood strategies.
7. Improve the availability of and access to health services by improving the services
in existing health centers, constructing new ones, and building rural roads.
8. Streamline the M&E system by focusing on the donor's and CSs' information
requirements in order to improve the quality of work at all levels. "Focus on the information
requirements" means providing only the information that is required by USAID and the CSs'
headquarters, until the M&E system can do that well.
9. Standardize indicators and data collection and analysis methods in the beginning of
the program, before any of them are used, in order to avoid data aggregation and comparison
problems later.
III. Strategic Objective One (SO1)
SO1 is "To strengthen communities' capacities to manage their food and nutritional security."
Its purpose is to build people's capacity to identify and manage community activities related
to food security. SO1 also includes building the capacity to implement SO2 and SO3
activities, which are agriculture/NRM and health/nutrition activities respectively. Capacity￾building thus is a cross-cutting activity that, as staff noted, is essential for the implementation
of and progress in the other SOs. The strategy for building capacity focuses on three areas:
1) establishing community structures (e.g. committees, support groups, cereal/input banks);
2) providing training to improve skills (fishing, agriculture, literacy, children's feeding); and
3) providing education (“sensibilisation”) to raise awareness and change behavior in key
areas including health and nutrition (EBF, the consumption of vitamin A-rich foods) as well
15
as agropastoral land management. SO1 takes into account participants' expressed needs for
training and teaching in specific areas. HKI's "Radio Clubs," which are a form of self￾teaching (“auto-encadrement”) to teach people about health, are included in SO1.
Establishing and managing democratic, inclusive committees (“la vie en association”) is a
basic element of SO1 in all four districts. It includes training committee members about
democratic processes of group participation and governance, such as the concept that they are
responsible to those who elected them. Teaching participants about social diversity and
inclusiveness in terms of ethnicity, age, sex, social class also is a basic part of SO1 in all
districts. FSIN participants set up numerous community groups; there are core groups such
as the Village Development Committee and the Food Security Committee, although they may
have different names in different districts. Community radios or Radio Clubs to
teach people about health and nutrition are another structure common to all four districts.
The following lists of the different committees in the four districts therefore are not
exhaustive. FSIN has detailed information on SO1's structures and training—for example,
the number and sex of people who participated in training sessions—that will be documented
when the program ends.
A. Summary of SO1 activities by district
1. Africare, Agadez:
• Support and training for community groups: the Village Management Committee,
the Food Security Committee, the FFW Committee, the CEWS-UR, health committees
(COSAN and COGES); the phytosanitary brigade, the veterinary technicians, and the
Breastfeeding Support Group (BSG).
• Support for the development of community Action Plans.
• Establishment of community savings funds.
• Training in a range of subjects: agriculture, animal husbandry, pasture
management, health and nutrition (including TBAs, health agents, and model mothers), and
in organizational capacity (management of cereal and agricultural input banks).
• Support and training for women's groups which manage credit for IGAs.
• Literacy training for the members of the "self-training" groups (information
diffusion through the training of community trainers).
• Establishment of 59 literacy centers.
• Establishment of one rural radio station which broadcasts information on relevant
subjects (human rights, health, education, agriculture) and reaches approximately 3,250
people.
2. CRS/HKI, Tanout/Zinder:
• Support and training for community groups: Food Security and Village
Development committees, health committees (COSAN, COGES); CEWS-UR; committees
for Vegetable Production, First Aid, Sustainable Agricultural Production, Tree Nursery, and
the Radio Club. Traditional birth attendants’ group.
• Training in staple crop and vegetable production, use of phytosanitary products,
NRM, health and nutrition, exclusive breast-feeding (EBF), knowledge and consumption of
micronutrients,
• Support and training for the development of community Action Plans and
committees.
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3. CARE, Konni/Illela:
• Support and training for community groups: committees for food security, dry￾season production, CEWS-UR, health (COSAN and COGES), livestock-rebuilding
(“habbanaye”), fishing, and roads.
• Support and training for the Breastfeeding and Child-Feeding Support Group,
children's nutrition rehabilitation centers, developing community Action Plans, and
community savings funds.
• Support and training to improve agricultural production including vegetable
gardening; health and nutrition, micronutrient knowledge and consumption, diarrhea
treatment; and child-to-child activity.
• Support and training for participants to manage health kits, pasture lands, and
community grain stocks.
• Training and refresher courses for all committee and group members including
TBAs, the health and food security committee members, literacy teachers, veterinary
technicians, and tree nursery experts.
• Teaching through cultural activities: songs, skits, field days.
• Support for grain production in collective fields, creating community cereal
stocks, and building granaries.
4. CRS/HKI, Dogondoutchi:
• Support and training for community groups: Village Development Committees
and FFW committees, Breastfeeding Support Groups (BSG), COSAN, GSA, and CEWS-UR
committees.
• Training of local experts in: committee formation and management, sustainable
agricultural production techniques, tree seedling/nursery production, improved agricultural
practices, vegetable gardening techniques, accounting, gum arabic production, gender and
development, early warning and urgent response, fishing, seed multiplication, TBAs; and
community educators.
• Support and training for community Action Plans,
• Five study trips for 96 participants.
• Support for opening five bank accounts to obtain loans.
B. Impact
1. SO1 impact indicators
SO1's two impact indicators and their change over time are shown in Table III-1 below. The
evaluation team was asked for a qualitative assessment of the quantitative impact indicators.
This was not feasible for the SO1 indicators, because 1) they are qualitative and 2) the time
allotted for interviewing the participants was not sufficient to assess these indicators and
cover all the other evaluation questions, so the latter was prioritized. A good assessment of
indicator 1.2 alone would have taken one of the two hours allocated for the participant
interviews.
The midterm survey in 2003 showed that only 61 of the intervention communities had
"designed their food security plan democratically and take into account gender and equity"
(indicator 1.1). This number falls short of the midterm target of 110 communities. Most of
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the participant groups interviewed for this evaluation reported that they were in compliance
with this indicator, but the Action Plans were not reviewed in detail with the groups so their
response is general. The group interviews did show that, outside Agadez, women generally
constituted half of the members on a committee rather than FSIN's required 25%. Reviewing
the written Action Plans indicated that most took gender into account, in terms of having
women's activities and support groups in the plan.
Indicator 1.2, the food security capacity index, consists of eight variables and 29 indicators.
Time did not allow a qualitative assessment of this indicator.
Table III-1. SO1 Impact Indicators
SO1 Impact indicators Level
Baseline
2000
Midterm
target
Midterm
achieved
2003
1.1 Number of communities that
designed their food security plan
democratically and take into
account gender and equity.
FSIN 0 110/142
(78%)
61/171
(36%)
1.2 Food security capacity index. FSIN 35 40.6 50.1
2. SO1 Impact
FSIN definitely has had a positive impact on participants' capacity to manage their food
security, according to the people interviewed for this evaluation (participants, staff, the TS,
and program partners). This positive impact is attributed mainly to transferring knowledge
and improved practices in community organization, NRM, agricultural production, and health
to the program participants. Participants consistently reported that SO1's training and
education were among the best-liked and most useful aspects of the program, particularly in
health and NRM. As a result of this training, and with program support, there are behavior
changes at both the community and household levels. Communities have established
integrated committees, designed Action Plans to improve their food security, and are
implementing the activities in those plans, partly with the support of FFW. At the household
level, people reported behavior changes such as EBF, increased vegetable consumption, the
adoption of improved NRM techniques such as demi-lunes, and the adoption of improved
cultural practices for both grain and vegetable crops.
The Technical Services (TS), staff, and program partners agreed that FSIN's approach to
capacity building was appropriate and effective. They believe that training and education for
technology transfer builds sustainability into the program. These people saw SO1's impact in
terms of changes in participants' behavior: being more proactive about organizing
community-level health care (e.g. contacting the Health Service to come and give
vaccinations), being more proactive about agricultural problems (e.g. reporting locusts),
building their relationship with the TS, and implementing improved NRM practices with
FFW.
The people-level impact of SO1 is best expressed in the participants' own words.
Participants' answers about changes in "community capacity to manage food security" were
primarily in terms of concrete changes in their health and agricultural production. Having
community committees and Action Plans were secondary answers. It was not really possible
18
to get answers about the "change in community management capacity" as such, perhaps
because it is abstract. It is interesting to note that people's responses about impact are quite
homogeneous, despite the social and environmental differences in the areas where the
consortium works. The minor variations in their statements about SO1's impact on their lives
reflect the site-specific constraints on food security and the specific actions taken to address
it.
a. Participants
Women made the following statements about the impact of SO1 on their lives:
• Women no longer hide, socially; now they get out and participate in community
activities. It is easier to mobilize women now and they have acquired the confidence that
they will succeed at whatever they work on. Women work together better now.
• Women are on community committees, but in general their participation is limited
due to illiteracy and their workloads. In some communities literacy is not a requirement but
it is preferred.
• We have learned to better manage our food security because we have learned to
rehabilitate our land and techniques such as reforestation to protect the environment. We can
teach others.
• Before we ate chaff; now we eat wheat.
• FFW decreases the number of men who out-migrate; it also protects the
environment. It has the double advantage of providing food and enabling people to learn
NRM techniques.
• The poor are a little better off but they still face difficulties. They still sell
firewood and charcoal to earn money for food. Their lives have changed; they are not so
hungry now because of FFW. Before FSIN they out-migrated. But the majority are still
poor.
• Women have learned about many health risks and health-care practices, including
children's and household hygiene, EBF, better child-feeding practices, and rehabilitating
malnourished children.
• Women are healthier and childbirth is easier as the result of taking iron pills.
• Exclusively breastfed children are fatter and suffer less from diarrhea and
sickness.
• The MMD micro-credit fund raised women's spirits: they got training in how to
manage and use it, and now they no longer have to go door to door asking for credit and
telling everybody their problems, they can get credit from the MMD fund.
A woman in Kaiwa Fako, Dogondoutchi district, was very
proud of her daughter and was showing her off to the
evaluator, much to the amusement of the women in the
interview group. The child is about three years of age and
the first of this woman's five children to be exclusively
breastfed, which she learned from FSIN. The mother said
that as a result of EBF her daughter is stronger and
healthier than any of her siblings, and there is not a
stronger girl in the community.
19
Men made these statements:
• The best thing FSIN has done is to organize committees; they are something new,
and enabled the community to implement activities. Before FSIN individualism reigned and
each family took care of itself; now, there is social solidarity and decision-making is done
together.
• We have learned that one person alone cannot make a decision; a group of all
types of people must assemble—men, women, and the poor.
• The community knows how to organize itself now and implement activities, as the
result of forming committees. People can continue these activities when the project ends.
• Now men and women meet to plan and implement activities related to food
security; they work together. Women attend community meetings and speak up; sometimes
they have better ideas than the men.
• Training is an acquisition; it is an inheritance for the community.
• As a result of project training people can meet to deal with food security issues.
They can establish or stock community cereal banks, for example.
• Millet production has doubled due to new cultural techniques and improved seed,
when the rainfall is sufficient.
• Food security has increased due to technology transfer and FFW, which allows
people to work in their own fields and not others'.
• Increased vegetable production due to FSIN's technology transfer has increased
incomes and decreased the need for dry-seaon out-migration for the majority of men.
• The poor can cultivate more of their farmland because they have rehabilitated
some of it, so their production has increased.
• The poor can cultivate their own fields because they get seed and FFW. Now they
can keep their harvest, instead of using it to repay the credit they had to take during the
hungry season.
• Pregnant women have fewer problems and deliver in good health as the result of
taking iron pills and training for the matrons. EBF protects newborns from illness. People
have learned about the importance of different types of local foods that are nutritious.
In Boudari village in Agadez, a man said that as the result of FSIN's technical assistance
for onion production, his production increased from about 30 sacks on two hectares to
230 sacks. He attributed this 6.7-fold increase to the program’s training and the access it
provided to chemical fertilizer, pesticides, and agricultural tools. One result of his
increased income was that his wife became the best-dressed woman in the village. An
indirect benefit was that he hired five poor people in the community to harvest his crop.
A group of men in Agadez said that they used to think that there were
things in life that they could not live without, namely their herds and
their pastoralist lifestyle. They thought that if they were no longer
pastoralists that life was finished. They have learned that they can
overcome that significant loss and live with other things. They have
learned this with FSIN. Those who lose all their herds and are dispirited
can come and work with FSIN and FFW, and stay in their homeland.
20
b. Technical Services and FSIN Staff
The evaluators interviewed personnel from the Health, Literacy, and Community
Development services and the heads (“responsables”) of SO1 about its impact. The TS's and
staff's reports of SO1's people-level impact definitely were positive, like the participants',
although the former tended to be more general. For example, one staff member said that
"Participants learned that they are capable of getting major projects like road-building done;
they were surprised at their collective capacity." The TS pointed out that participants
have become more proactive: "There has been a big impact on people's awareness and their
mobilization to recognize and address their problems." Representative statements from these
two groups of people are in Table III-2 below.
c. HKI's Community Radio intervention
One interview in Dogondoutchi was focused exclusively on HKI's community radio
intervention. It must be noted that this is the only in-depth source of information on this
intervention and therefore cannot be generalized to any other communities. The interview
was conducted with a group of men that included those responsible for operating the Radio
Club based in the community of Dogon Kiria. Unfortunately, the women who had come to
talk with the evaluation team were not presented to the team until the interview was finished,
so their perspectives on the intervention are missing. The team's appointment in another
community did not allow time to talk with the women.
The Radio Club in Dogon Kiria has been operating for 16 months. During the agricultural
season when people are busy it operates for two and a half hours in the evening; the rest of
the year it operates from 9 a.m. until noon. The radio broadcasts reach communities up to 35
kilometers distant that also are part of the HKI intervention and have radios. The radio
program's major purpose is to operate "Radio Clubs" in each community, which assemble
groups of people to listen to cassettes in order to learn about and discuss health topics
(nutrition, hygiene, malaria). The men interviewed in Dogon Kiria said that their cassettes
also addressed the fight against poverty. Initially they got cassettes on health from HKI and
now they buy their own, on topics such as polio and malaria. The radio program's second
purpose is to broadcast public health announcements, such as disease outbreaks or
agricultural problems (e.g. locusts). The TS use the radio to transfer information in their
technical areas such as health, livestock care, forestry practices, and agriculture.
The radio in Dogon Kiria also broadcasts announcements and music, for which people pay
about one dollar (500 CFA). The announcements are local news of births, deaths, marriages,
and greetings to people who are not in their home communities. People also can request
"concerts," which means that, for the same fee, they choose music and dedicate it to their
friends, and the radio broadcasts it.
The radio's revenue is from the fees paid for announcements and music; the latter was
reported to be very popular, especially among young people, and generate most of the
revenue. There are three radio agents (“animateurs”) in each of the participating
communities who collect people's requests and fees. According to the men interviewed the
radio staff's payment is 35% of these fees.
21
Table III-2. SO1 Impact, According to Staff and Technical Services
Respondent SO1 Impacts
FISN staff • Communities' awareness and taking charge of their
development has increased; there are positive changes in community
organization, decision-making, and social solidarity.
• Participants learned that they are capable of getting major
projects like road-building done; they were surprised at their collective
capacity.
• Village chiefs no longer monopolize community decisions.
• Participants now talk to the TS as equals and call on them
to do their work.
• Participants have come to understand that rehabilitating
their fields is a gradual and long-term process, as their soil degradation
also occurred over the long term.
• FFW enables people to work in their own fields and
increase their production, instead of selling their labor to others and
having to neglect their fields.
• Decrease in the proportion of malnourished children;
women know how to treat this problem with local products.
Technical Services • There has been a big impact on people's awareness and
their mobilization to recognize and address their problems.
• Organizing in committees has given people awareness of
their own potential to help themselves.
• People are better at organizing themselves now.
• People can take the initiative and report problems through
their CEWS-UR.
• People's reticence to deal with the TS has decreased now
that they have committees. One result is that more women go for
prenatal checkups.
• Men and women got literacy training and FFW provided
food during the hungry season.
• FFW has decreased the need for seasonal out-migration.
• The rehabilitation of farmland, enlargement of seasonal
ponds, and increase in vegetable production have improved
agricultural production and people's lives.
• There is a growing awareness of the need for literacy,
particularly among women.
• EBF is widely practiced now.
The main weaknesses with the radio intervention reported by the men in Dogon Kiria were:
• The monthly revenue is variable, which makes management difficult in terms of
paying good salaries and having funds for maintenance.
• Staff want higher salaries.
• The community agents (animateurs) need more training; they have had only one
session.
• They want the equipment necessary to capture BBC and VOA.
22
The men in Dogon Kiria as well as radio club members in many other communities (outside
Agadez) reported that they had problems with their equipment. The former said that some of
their equipment is broken and that they are not generating sufficient revenue for maintenance
and repair. Many of the latter said that they do not have batteries to operate their radios since
FSIN stopped supplying them, as long as a year ago. It is contradictory but understandable
that, when asked about the Radio Clubs' sustainability, both types of respondents reversed
their positions and said that they had the skills to maintain the equipment and the Radio
Clubs.
Overall, however, the men in Dogon Kiria reported that the radio intervention is a success.
FSIN participants in other communities were not asked about the radio program in detail, but
in general their comments also were positive. Participants in communities with Radio Clubs
reported that they listened to cassettes, discussed the information, and learned about health.
The men in Dogon Kiria reported three positive impacts of the radio program:
• An increase in social cohesion, particularly among young people who can keep in
touch by sending greetings and dedicating music to each other even when they are kilometers
apart.
• People have learned about health and health care; now they go to the health center
when they are sick instead of ignoring the problem. The participants interviewed in other
communities with Radio Clubs also reported that they learned about health in the clubs.
• It is no longer necessary to travel to the different communities to invite people to
social celebrations such as baptisms, because they can be announced on the radio, which
saves time and money. Participants in other communities agreed that saving time and money
was a real benefit of the radio intervention.
C. Strengths and Weaknesses
1. Participants
Participants generally were not good at assessing FSIN's strengths and weaknesses as
a program. They perceived its strengths in terms of the material support and technical
assistance (TA) it provided, such as FFW, cereal banks, and technology transfer that
improved crop production. Weaknesses tended to be identified in terms of what they needed
from the program. However, they did consistently identify one programmatic weakness:
FFW activities started late in theannual agricultural production cycle and conflicted with their
rainy-season agricultural production. The latter is the loser in this conflict as, according to
staff, people tend to prioritize the FFW activities at the expense of their crop production,
which is counterproductive. The other weaknesses that participants reported were:
• The nutritional centers need program support because the women who do not have
the food to participate are ashamed and stay at home.
• There should be more focus on animal husbandry.
• Women said that the FSIN technicians (“animatrices”) should come to work with
them once a week rather than once a month.
• Training sessions are not long enough.
23
2. Technical Services and FSIN Staff
It was difficult to get the TS and the staff to focus on SO1 as one component of FSIN and
assess its strengths and weaknesses; their responses tended to apply to the program as a
whole. The TS's overall evaluation of FSIN was positive; as one person said, "Globally, all
the TS are satisfied with the program." The fact that FSIN is in harmony with the GON
policies of working toward poverty reduction and decentralization was consistently noted by
all the TS and the local administrators. Good collaboration between the TS and FSIN was
cited as a strength in all four districts. FSIN's other strengths included the "Strong
involvement of the participants and the TS in all phases of the program, the diversity of
program activities," and the fact that "The project is participatory and large in scope" (Table
III-3 below). The TS seemed to appreciate the program's participatory approach because it
engaged the participants and increased communities' responsibility for their development.
The participatory approach, forging partnerships, building on traditional social structures, and
focusing on the most food-insecure households are some of FSIN's strengths reported by staff
(Table III-3). The first two were the most commonly cited strengths. Illiteracy and the fact
that "volunteerism has its limits" emerged as constraints on program implementation in all
four districts. Lack of community-level M&E systems to monitor progress with the Action
Plans also was cited as a common weakness.
The two weaknesses that the TS commonly reported were that FSIN staff and its schedule
were overloaded, and that illiteracy was a constraint on the program across the board.
24
Table III-3. SO1: Strengths and Weaknesses
Respondent Strengths Weaknesses
FISN staff • The participatory approach
makes the community part of the
program.
• Working in partnership with
those outside the consortium such as
Caritas and the TS.
• Integration of TS from program
inception.
• Focus on the most vulnerable
households, based on communities'
identification of them.
• The staff are from the area so
they know the language and the
customs.
• The program is based on
existing, traditional social structures.
• Self-teaching works because it
is done by social equals.
• Not having integrated two of the area's
major problems into the program: lack of
potable water and illiteracy.
• Community volunteers (committee
members) who are not paid eventually quit.
• Need to increase the number of
community-based technicians.
• The technical staff need more training.
• FSIN needs to address illiteracy, which
is a constraint, especially for women.
• There should be M&E at the community
level, done by participants.
Technical
Services
• FSIN has no weak points; the
structures and tools and M&E system
are all in place to work. It should
expand.
• FSIN works very well with the
TS and has strengthened the
collaboration among all the partners.
• Strong involvement of the
participants and the TS in all phases
of the program.
• The diversity of program
activities.
• The project is participatory and
large in scope.
• The difference with FSIN is
that the communities are responsible
and manage the FFW and the work
tools, not the Environment Service.
• Communities did their own
Action Plans and feel responsible for
them.
• FSIN got participants mobilized
and taught them things, and extended
their work to the central communities'
satellite communities, which is good.
• Program implementation is
done with rigor and there are the
means to do it.
• Insufficient focus on the area's major
problem, lack of access to water.
• The pastoralists in the northern part of
this area need support and should be included
in the program.
• Insufficient focus on protecting
vegetation for animal and human
consumption.
• Insufficient support for vitamin A
distribution.
• FSIN staff are too busy to be easily
available to work with; they are hard to find.
• As a result of the above, the work
calendar is disrupted and so are the activities
that were scheduled.
• Need to implement activities on time;
i.e., adhere to the work calendar
• There are too many activities to
implement, and not time to do them all well.
• Committee members are illiterate, which
creates a functional problem for the
committees.
• FSIN uses forms that illiterate
participants cannot fill out.
25
D. Sustainability
Participants consistently said that they will be able to continue what they learned to do with
FSIN when it ends. As one group of men stated, they will continue to work toward
improving their food security by combining their own experience and the knowledge they
have acquired with FSIN. However, it must be noted that virtually all the interview groups
pointed out that they depend on FFW for two to three months of the year, and that if it ends
they will have to resort to their traditional coping strategies: the men will migrate out during
the dry season (exode) and the women will stay home and scrape by, engaging in petty
commerce and selling their labor to earn money for food. According to some staff members,
it is the competent men who leave, which affects community committees and activities.
FFW clearly is essential in enabling people to work with FSIN because it replaces these
coping strategies. Its significant benefit is that it enables people to invest their labor in
improving their own farmland and community resources, instead of others'. Over the long
term this should improve their food security. But given where FSIN works—in regions that
are structurally or chronically food insecure—out-migration may always be necessary for part
of the population. The conventional wisdom in Niger is that rainfall accounts for 80% of the
variation in crop production, so in FSIN's districts rainfall is a major determinant of
production and therefore food security. Improved NRM and cultural practices can counteract
rainfall problems, to some extent, but assessing to what extent—i.e., the sustainability of
FSIN's program—must be done over the long term, perhaps five years.
The effects of food insecurity and out-migration on communities' implementation of their
Action Plans over the long term, without program support, remains to be seen. This is
particularly true of the more vulnerable households who, without support, can afford only
limited investments in NRM in their own fields and thus are trapped in the negative cycle of
low production and the need to sell their labor. Both the women and the men pointed out this
problem in field interviews. In a few communities some men reported that they hire labor to
make demi-lunes in their fields because it increases production, but this is certainly the less￾poor hiring the poorer. Any future evaluation of sustainability therefore should be done using
the three classes of vulnerability that FSIN defined.
The participants generally were the most optimistic about FSIN's sustainability. In all four
districts their statements about continuing without program support were quite homogeneous:
• Yes, due to everything we have learned and implemented with FSIN, our capacity
to manage our food security has increased. When the project leaves we will try to continue
and do even better.
• We want the project to continue but if it does not we will continue to work with
what we have learned.
• We can continue after the project ends; we can do what we learned on our own.
• We will continue the activities because we have seen that they are in our interest.
In principle the TS should contribute to sustainability because their job is providing TA to
their areas' communities, but they themselves recognize that that is problematical. Their
summary statement in all four districts was that they have the competence but the not the
means to do their work. The FSIN staff's overall appraisal was the same: that the TS could
not provide the same level of TA without program support, due to lack of means. The FSIN
staff were positive about the program's sustainability, but their statements should be taken
26
with a grain of salt because they also know, based on other projects' experiences, that many
of the activities they are supporting—cereal and input banks, community savings funds
(“caisse epargne communautaire”), forming committees, phytosanitary brigades—
disintegrate when projects end. Table III-4 on the following page contains the staff's and the
TS' statements about FSIN's sustainability.
E. Lessons Learned
Most of the "lessons learned" reported in the interviews for this evaluation, like those in
FSIN's pre-evaluation reports, actually are conclusions. The conclusions about SO1 collected
during this evaluation have been rephrased as "lessons learned" to the extent possible.
People's lessons learned and conclusions did not always focus on SO1; they often addressed
the program as a whole.
(A lesson learned is something that the program learned it should or should not do, and
generally includes the word "should," e.g. "Women should not be prioritized for FFW
because socially men have priority to do FFW;" "The program should plan for the fact that
awareness-raising is a slow process." A conclusion is a statement of fact that the program
recognizes: "Capacity-building is essential for the success of other program components.")
High illiteracy rates and the constraints that illiteracy places on both communities' and
individuals' capacity were noted by both staff and the TS in all districts. The general
conclusion was that FSIN2 needs to address illiteracy in order to promote progress in all its
sectors. Many of the staff's lessons learned (Table III-5) reflect gender issues: women's
literacy increases their participation in community decision-making and committees; women
need support to participate in community affairs; FSIN should work with men and women
separately to build capacity, until they are ready to work together; the program needs to push
in order to ensure that women are put on committees. Staff also have learned that raising
awareness and changing behavior are long-term processes. The TSs other lessons learned
included the need to include water and animal husbandry components in FSIN (Table III-5).
After four years of FSIN, both staff and the TS concluded that "volunteerism has its limits"
and both were thinking about how to address this issue (Table III-6). One TS person said that
participants are asked to contribute money, time, and labor to a plethora of activities and
committees, and that it becomes a burden. Staff noted that capacity-building is a cross￾cutting program component necessary for success in the other components. The need to
support women's development shows up in people's conclusions, just as it does in lessons
learned: with time and training women's social participation increases, this process takes
time, and women who generate income get more respect at home (Table III-6).
27
Table III-4. SO1: Sustainability
Respondent Sustainability Factors
FSIN staff • Sustainability is built into the program as its activities, for example cereal banks,
function independently.
• People will continue the economic activities they started with FSIN.
• The activities that communities decided to implement themselves, like cereal
banks, will continue.
• Community links with the TS and the inclusion of traditional chiefs are factors
in sustainability.
• Linking community CEWS-UR with local TS, and with departmental and
regional systems, will contribute to sustainability.
• It is questionable: will NRM continue without FFW?
• The customary chiefs said that they will support community activities.
• The TS will work with the communities to do M&E and report progress on
activities when FSIN ends.
• People probably will continue the activities that are most important to them and
their community, e.g. roads, vegetable gardening.
• 75% of the communities will have the capacity to continue some of their
activities, because 1) they have democratically-elected committees and 2) women and
the poor are the most numerous in the communities and they are involved in the
committees.
• FSIN provides training, and it is the basis of knowledge, the implementation of
new techniques, and their diffusion, that can continue when FSIN ends.
• Participants have come to understand that resolving their problems (e.g. soil
degradation) is a long and gradual process.
• An example of sustainability: training on EBF now is done by the women
themselves, the program technicians are no longer necessary.
Technical
Services
• In general, the TS have the competence but not the means (vehicles, gas, funds
for per diem) to do their work. The Agadez/Arlit area is vast, and we need program
support in order to cover the area. Our technicians should visit communities more
frequently, so they will need more resources from FSIN.
• Communities have to become responsible for themselves because the TS do not
have sufficient funding to cover their territory.
• The TS are in place to continue FSIN's work but they need strengthening.
• Participants have learned how to collect money and pay for what they need, such
as health-care visits from the Health Service. This service can provide healthcare as
long as people pay for their gas and meals.
• The participation of the other TS is more problematical because they have less
funding than Health.
• Decentralization is a factor in sustainability.
• How participants will manage their food security when the program ends
remains to be seen; it is problematical.
• Sustainability is built on the program's training and the communities' elected
committees.
• People's increased awareness will contribute to sustainability. Capacity-building
makes participants more proactive in addressing their problems. People's knowledge
about health will remain with them.
• Committees such as COSAN and CVA will always exist and do their work.
• Participants pay for healthcare now, but will they do so when FSIN ends?
• Training is a primary factor, such as training for the committees: it is the
development of human capital.
28
Table III-5. Lessons Learned
Respondent Lessons Learned
FISN staff • The program should recognize and plan for the fact that raising
participants' awareness is a process that takes time.
• FSIN should recognize that behavior change is a long-term process.
• FSIN should recognize that literacy is necessary for the CEWS-UR to
function.
• The program should continue to support literacy classes, especially for
women, because literacy is essential for committees to function well. It also is
necessary for key activities such as monitoring children's growth.
• FSIN should support women's participation because they are reticent
about participating in community affairs.
• The program should provide numerous training sessions in all subjects
because it increases people's capacity to manage their food security.
• The program should be prepared to push community participants in order
to get both sexes on committees.
• FSIN should build on existing agricultural techniques; it should not
impose new ones.
• FSIN should work with communities' satellite communities (unités) that
have different ethnic groups in order to make one Action Plan, because this
approach contributes to social solidarity and increases participation.
• FSIN should work with men and women separately to build community
capacity, until they are ready to work together.
• Other projects' experience shows that input banks disintegrate when the
projects end; FSIN should determine how to increase access to agricultural
inputs, including seed.
Technical
Services
• FSIN's entry point should be the population's primary problem, which in
Tanout is lack of water..
• FSIN should make an Action Plan and adhere to it so that participants do
not get discouraged.
• FFW should be used in the hungry season.
• Matrons should have three months of training; they only get one week.
(Note: ISAN provided 10 days of training because only some of the state’s
two-week training module is for midwives).
• FSIN should include animal husbandry activities.
• FSIN should address illiteracy because it is a serious constraint on
participants' capacity to manage their committees and activities.
29
Table III-6. Conclusions
Respondent Conclusions
FISN staff • Volunteerism has its limits; people will drop out of committees if they are
not paid.
• Capacity-building is an essential element necessary for the success of
other program components.
• There is lack of social cohesion in communities that have more than one
chief, and it takes time to get people to work together as one community.
• Communities can be divided by people's allegiance to different political
parties, but FSIN can overcome that as it is apolitical.
• With training, women's participation in community affairs and decision￾making increases over time.
• Large numbers of able-bodied people out-migrate after a poor
agricultural season.
• Teaching and training contribute to the emergence of community leaders.
• One technical agent can work in 6-7 communities and their outlying
hamlets (unités).
• Increasing women's participation in community planning and decision￾making is a process that takes time.
• Committee members travel extensively during the hungry season [to find
work].
• Illiteracy levels are high in community groups.
• Women who engage in IGA and generate income have more influence in
their households and with their husbands.
Technical
Services
• Volunteerism has its limits; the program needs to identify some type of
compensation.
• Literacy is necessary for committees to function, for matrons to function,
and for participants to fill out the forms to monitor their progress.
• Women's dropout rate in literacy classes is high because learning is more
difficult and takes longer than they realized.
F. Recommendations
1. For the current program
1. Continue training and education (“sensibilisation”) for capacity-building, technology
transfer, and behavior change because it is essential for progress in the other SOs, there is
strong participant demand, and it contributes to sustainability.
2. Increase the length and frequency of community training sessions, based on consultation
with the participants, in order to respond to participant demand.
3. Provide regular training to improve the program technicians' and the TS’s technical
expertise, in order to improve technology transfer.
4. Explore options to compensate community volunteers (committee members) for their
work in order to reduce turnover.
5. Provide training in machine maintenance and repair for the HKI Community Radio staff.
6. Consolidate the community committees in order to reduce their number. The CEWS-UR
should be part of the food-security committee, for example.
30
7. Implement a surveillance system to ensure that FFW commodities and the community
recipients are not misused by the community distributors.
.
2. For the DAP2
1. Work with FFP to start FFW activities earlier because currently they conflict with crucial,
rainy-season agricultural activities that become secondary because people prioritize FFW.
2. Invest the time in designing a sound detailed implementation plan (DIP) so that the
program has a solid basis for its annual plans.
3. Invest the time in meeting with partners to make a feasible annual work schedule and then
adhere to it, so that activities are implemented and completed on time.
4. Link communities with local NGOs and civil society organizations that can help them
sustain their activities when FSIN ends.
5. Include a literacy component in FSIN2, because illiteracy is a universal constraint on
implementing FSIN's program. "Food for education" may be an option for supporting
women's attendance and reducing dropout rates.
6. Complete the community activities that were not completed in FSIN1.
Include a "nomad school" education component in Agadez because it is a feasible means of
providing education for pastoralist's children.
7. Identify site-appropriate IGAs, particularly for the dry season, when both men and women
need to generate income.
8. Expand MMD's ("Women on the Move") role in FSIN2 because it is successful and
women need access to microfinance for IGAs.
9. Look for partners such as local NGOs that work in animal husbandry, in order to
complement FSIN's activities in Agadez and Tanout where it is a major component of
household livelihood strategies.
10. Incorporate education on HIV/AIDS into health education because seasonal migration,
and improved roads are risk factors. The "SIDA en Exode" project is a potential partner.
11. Include education on good governance, in order to help people work with
decentralization.
12. Increase the number of community-based program technicians (“animateurs”) in order to
meet participant demand for technical assistance.
IV. Strategic Objective Two (SO2)
A. Summary of the key activities in the districts
Cooperating sponsors implemented several types of activities to achieve SO2, "To increase
sustainable agricultural production by promoting environmentally sound cultural techniques."
Most of these activities were protecting or maintaining existing productive capital; training
also was done. The principal activities that the CSs implemented are summarized in the table
below.
31
Table IV-1: Summary of Activities in Each District
Zone Key FSIN Activities
Agadez • Establishment of community input and agricultural equipment banks, cereal
banks, and livestock feed banks.
• Training and equipping veterinary technicians
• Training and equipping phytosanitary brigades
• Constructing and rehabilitating wells for vegetable production
• Provision of draft animals for irrigation
• Construction and rehabilitation of livestock wells
• Installation of traps for jackals
• Rehabilitating land using NRM techniques
Tanout • Constructing wells for vegetable production
• Installation of irrigation systems (niyya da kokari pumps)
• Provision of improved seed for millet, sorghum, beans, and vegetables
• Creation of community tree nurseries
• Rehabilitation of land using NRM techniques (demi-lunes, zaïs2
, mulching)
• Training in sustainable agricultural techniques (use of manure, protection of
natural regeneration, improved pruning, mulching, composting)
• Enlargement of ponds
• Stocking fish in ponds
Konni/Illela • Building up community seed stocks
• Rehabilitation of land using NRM techniques
• Disseminating improved techniques (improved seed varieties, alternative
strategies for pest control, use of pesticides)
• Promotion of irrigated crops (installation of wells and the construction of
thresholds (“seuils”)
• Habbanayé3
• Establish of livestock input banks
• Training, retraining, and equipping of veterinarian technicians
• Stocking fish in ponds
• Training and equipment of fishermen
• Delimitation of corridors for livestock
Dogondoutchi • Construction of wells for vegetable production
• Installation of irrigation systems (niyya da kokari pumps)
• Provision of improved seed for millet, sorghum, beans and vegetables
• Creation of community tree nurseries
• Rehabilitation of land using NRM techniques (demi-lunes, zaï, mulching)
• Training in sustainable agricultural techniques ( use of manure, protection of
natural regeneration, improved pruning, composting)
 
2 Zaïs : shallow round holes dug about a meter wide which conserve moisture and are treated with manure and
other organic matter ; also called « tassa. ».
3 Habbanaye: giving an animal to an individual for rebuilding his livestock holdings. This practice is common
among the nomadic populations in Niger.
32
• Enlargement of ponds
• Stocking of fish in ponds
SO2 has had a strong level of achievement in all the CSs and their activities, and the strong
participation of local communities in the activities. Activities were designed and
implemented based on Action Plans set up by mutual agreement between the communities
and FSIN. The communities' strong participation also is due to ISAN’s participatory
approach; the contribution of the communities to funding and building infrastructure; training
and awareness-raising; and "self-teaching" through the program's training of local experts,
community development committees, and food security committees. FFW also contributed
to community participation. SO2's various activities made a considerable impact on
participants' livelihoods, as a result of community participation and motivation.
B. SO2 Impact
The FSIN program produced useful results for local communities as well as for the
consortium. Despite the difficult context in which the program operated, the field teams have
shown the capacity to adapt and to make remarkable innovations in program implementation.
The program operates in a context characterized by:
• Marked climate risks;
• High illiteracy rates;
• High rates of seasonal out-migration (exode) in the target populations, which often
affects the capacity for community-level self-teaching;
• A low potential in natural resources, particularly water resources and irrigable land,
coupled with severe environmental degradation;
• The intervention zone's lack of roads and therefore communities’ isolation.
• Poor social cohesion in some communities and frequent intra- and inter-community
conflict.
All of these factors contributed to limiting the program's impact.
SO2's impacts can be summarized specifically as:
• The gradual adoption of the technologies disseminated by the program (i.e., the
replication of improved cultural techniques in participants' fields) and an "opening up of the
spirit," as participants frequently reported, as a result of the program's training. For example,
according to the person in charge of Rural Development (Génie Rural) in the department of
Tchirozerine, communities have learned how to make rock cordons (correct spacing,
placement, the correct direction and height to resist bad weather), as well as how to construct
demi-lunes. The community of Sabon Kaffi in the department of Tanout had the following
adoption rates for improved agricultural techniques: 60 % for “zaïs”; 100% for using
manure on the fields; 80% for making demi-lunes; and 100% for improved clearing and
protecting natural regeneration. The participants' growth in awareness enabled FSIN to
develop the participants’ management capacities, to improve local governance through
planning meetings, and to push to increase women's involvement in community decision￾making. These factors contribute to the program’s sustainability.
33
• An increase in agricultural production due to (1) an increase in the area of arable
land (land rehabilitated with demi-lunes, zaïs, the establishment of new vegetable-gardening
sites or the rehabilitation of old ones) ; (2) improvements in productivity (increase in yields
due to the introduction of improved varieties and agricultural techniques) ; (3) securing
production through water control, as illustrated by the testimony below:
My name is « Wamachecka, » that means "the smallest" in Tamashek. Before I worked with
FSIN my well collapsed each year during the rainy season, which made me lose two to three
months of vegetable production. With FSIN’s support I benefitted from a well, enlarged my
field, and diversified my vegetable production by adding onions, tomato, and Greek fennel. I
sold these crops and bought my own draft animal for irrigation. Today I have become « the
biggest ».
The increase in agricultural production, including vegetable production that provides food for
consumption and for sale, contributed to improving the food security of participants in all the
districts. FSIN's indicators, ”the number of months of food the participants produce
themselves" and "the volume (MT) and value (CFA and USD) of agricultural products
chosen by the participating producers," have increased slightly over time, as Table IV-2
shows.
Table IV-2: Level of Achievement of SO2 Impact Indicators
Indicator
Baseline
(2000 & 2001)
Level of
achievement in
year four, 2004
Change,
baseline to
2004
Final
target
Number of months of food the
participants produce themselves 6.11 6.44 +5.4% 8.16
Volume (MT) and value (USD)
of the agricultural products
chosen by the participating
producers 
1.321 MT/HH*
$129
1.394 MT/HH
$313
+5.5% 1.630
MT//HH
(Source: S. Bakari, 2004)
*HH = household
This table shows a weak increase in FSIN's two impact indicators, which increased only
about 5% during the program's four years. However, these figures do not reflect the opinions
of the participants interviewed by the evaluation team. The participants reported notable
improvements in crop production when rainfall was good and when they used the new
techniques (e.g. mulching, zaïs, manure application). They reported that these techniques are
effective when there is sufficient rainfall.
The small change in these impact indicators underlines the strong link between agricultural
production and rainfall in Niger. The evaluators found that the areas of Agadez, Tanout,
northern Dogondoutchi, and Illela have had practically four years of drought. Without the
control of water that irrigation provides for production, it is difficult to improve agricultural
production in these unfavorable climatic conditions. Therefore, it is illusory or impossible to
reach the target levels set for these impact indicators, without an emphasis on irrigation.
34
• The diversification of agricultural production, mainly of vegetable production
(“culture maraichere”). FSIN introduced a range of vegetables: onions, cabbage, Greek
fennel, lettuce, watermelon, melon, tomato, carrots. For example, in the Tamaghate
community in Irhazer (Agadez), that historically is a livestock-production area, participants
working with FSIN produced a variety of vegetable crops such as watermelon, onions,
peppers, sweet peppers, tomatoes, squash, and Greek fennel. Before ISAN, they had
produced only melon. A similar change occurred in Air, where cultivating onions became
possible during the rainy season because FSIN helped install wells for vegetable production.
Some communities in the department of Tanout did not have the capacity for vegetable
production before FSIN’s intervention. Vegetable production contributes to improving
households’ micro-nutrient consumption. 
• Increases in income were reported to the evaluation team everywhere where
vegetables are produced and sold. Significant onion production was reported in Agadez and
Konni, although the problem of marketing also was reported. The areas of Tanout and
Dogondoutchi specialized in cabbage production, which also produced significant revenues.
Similarly, fish production by fishermen trained by FSIN provides income as well as a source
of protein. In some cases an increase in producers’ income is followed by their investment in
irrigation, in particular the purchase of motor-driven pumps. This has occurred in the
community of Egandawel (Agadez) and in the Konni/Illela area. For example, according to
the Imam of Egandawel, one year his son harvested 70 bags of onion during the rainy
season, due to FSIN’s technical assistance. He sold each bag for 8,000 francs, and with the
income bought a motorized irrigation pump and a bicycle for his brother who had worked
with him.
• Positive impacts on the environment were reported by the communities in all four
districts and by the TS. Different types of vegetative cover and trees have regenerated as the
result of FFW activities. This environmental regeneration and the support from FFW enabled
households to maintain their livestock, instead of selling them to buy food.
• FFW and FSIN's use of the traditional "habbanaye" practice helped rebuild
household livestock holdings, particularly among the most vulnerable households. FFW
supported the poor so that they did not have to sell their livestock during the hungry season in
order to buy food. One result was a change in the percent of households in the different
vulnerability classes, including an increase in the number of the “moderately vulnerable” and
the “vulnerable,” and a decrease in the percent of the “most vulnerable.” Table IV-3 below
shows these changes.
Table IV-3: Change in Vulnerability Classes in Agadez
Vulnerability
category
Percent at baseline,
2000 & 2001
Percent in year
four, 2004
Change, baseline
to 2004
A, Vulnerable 5 12.7 +7.7
B, Moderately
vulnerable
25 32.1 +7.1
C, Most
vulnerable
70 55.2 -14.8
Source : Africare, 2004
35
• Building roads with FFW helped to open up the intervention areas, which
facilitated the transportation and marketing of agricultural products.
• There was a reduction in the number of conflicts between pastoralists and farmers
in areas where forestry and improvements to manage land were made: delimiting livestock
corridors and pasturelands, enlarging ponds for livestock, digging or rehabilitating livestock
wells.
C. Strengths and Weaknesses
1. Strengths
The FSIN program has several strengths:
• A strong emphasis on training: the program based all its activities on training
and raising the awareness of the participants. This contributed to facilitating the
implementation of program activities and their replicability in the intervention zone. In most
cases the training was designed to create local experts (veterinary technicians, seed
multipliers, phytosanitary technicians, well diggers, nursery technicians), who should
continue their activities when FSIN ends. These local experts were operational when this
evaluation was conducted, and they had mastered practically all the technologies that FSIN
had disseminated. In certain cases there was also an exchange of local experts and thus
experience-sharing among communities.
• Use of participatory approaches: all the activities planned at the community
level were made by mutual agreement between FSIN and the community members, by
discussing and renewing community action plans each year. This facilitated the communities'
participation in implementing the plans, because their concerns were largely taken into
account. The organization of community forums and in certain cases inter-community forums
allowed the sharing of best practices in the intervention zone.
• Partnership with the TS and the administrative and traditional
authorities facilitated the program’s visibility and credibility with the districts and the state.
In several cases, the involvement of the TS in program implementation enabled them to do
their regular government work in their zones as well as to implement development activities
with FSIN. According to the head of the TS’s Environment Department in Dogondoutchi,
working with FSIN enabled them to do 80% of their government activities. Certain local
NGOs like « GYARA » in Konni/Illela and CAD in Dogondoutchi, in addition to the TS, also
have developed their capacities to supervise development strategies and develop project
proposals by working with FSIN.
• Food for Work was an excellent entry point for the program and one of the
strengths most frequently cited by the participants. FFW gave many communities access to
markets and transportation by supporting road-building, which facilitated participants'
marketing, particularly of their vegetable production.
• Targeting the most vulnerable households through the traditional practices of
“gayya” and “habbanaye” is another FSIN strength. "Gayya" is a day of communal work in
a person's field for which the voluntary labor is given meals; FSIN adapted FFW to this
custom. The targeting for “gayya” ensured that FSIN worked with the neediest households,
36
particularly those headed by women. For example, the community of Goumbi Kano in the
Konni/Illela district took the initiative to organize a “gayya” for 40 very vulnerable
households in the first year of the program, 30 households in the second year, and 30
households in the third year. These “gayya” consisted of making demi-lunes in the recipients'
fields.
• Community training by qualified program agents. 
• Providing the participants with seed that is short cycle, very productive, and
well adapted to their environments (millet, sorghum, beans). This enabled communities to
build up their grain stocks, which are evolving into seed banks.
• "Study trips" between communities allowed participants to exchange
experiences and provided positive learning opportunities
• Installing irrigation equipment made it possible for participants to increase
their vegetable production in FSIN's intervention zone, mainly in the district of Agadez.
• Delimiting livestock corridors and pastureland, and involving the Land Tenure
Commission in these activities, was highly appreciated by the communities, although not all
the CSs implemented these activities. Delimiting corridors and pastureland helped regulate
conflicts between farmers and herders, and there is a demand for them.
2. Weaknesses
Despite the program’s strengths there are some weaknesses that should be taken into account
to improve implementation:
• Delays in promoting vegetable production: Although much has been done in
this area, the evaluators noted some delays in implementation. In Konni/Illela there is strong
water potential in pond outlets that is not yet exploited. In Agadez, the most vulnerable
households’ access to irrigation infrastructure is limited by FSIN’s requirement that they
make a financial contribution to the program’s investment. Even households with access to
irrigation infrastructure have difficulting financing their vegetable production, so they
generally seek loans from usurers. In the CRS/HKI zones the small size of plots and the lack
of fencing (allowing damage by animals) are constraints on vegetable production that
participants often cite. The CSs generally are not addressing post-harvest issues such as
processing and marketing, despite their strong value-added potential for producers. However,
the CSs did conduct a study on how to address those issues in order to understand what
actions to take. Input supply problems arise where the program does not provide inputs to the
communities4
. Therefore the problems of organizing the producers for acquiring inputs and
processing and marketing their production remain.
• Insufficient or inconvenient training: many participants regret the very short
duration of training. Local experts express the need for more retraining. The timing of
training sometimes conflicts with agricultural work, which makes participation in the sessions
problematic. This in turn limits the training’s scope and effectiveness.
 
4
 Africare provided capital for agricultural inputs at the community level which is managed directly by a
committee in charge of renewing the stock each year; CARE contributed to establishing ties with approved
suppliers of inputs; and CRS/HKI provides seeds directly to market-gardening sites.
37
• Inconvenient FFW timing: the timing of FFW activities also is not always
favorable, especially in the southern zone (Konni/Illela, Dogondoutchi) where the rainy
season arrives earlier than in other areas of the intervention zone. The timing of the FFW
activities generally conflicts with agricultural work, forcing participants to choose between
the two.
• Partnership issues: although no major problems are reported in the FSIN
program’s partnerships with local communities and administrative and traditional authorities,
both the TS and local NGOs deplored the lack of FSIN’s logistical support for their
operations. Evidently this type of support was not planned in the DAP, but as FSIN bases its
sustainability on partnership, the weakness deserves mention here. Partnership with FSIN
apparently did not include specific training to strengthen the local NGOs’ management
capacity and autonomy. In many cases the partnership with FSIN was limited to the local
NGOs’ providing only services, that in some cases was limited solely to paying participants
their perdiem.
• Limits reached on volunteerism: one of the strengths of the program has been
to train community experts to continue to diffuse the techniques they have learned with FSIN
without program support. These experts were chosen by their communities for their human
qualities and have worked as volunteers since the program began. The evaluation team found
that many of them were dissatisfied with working for no pay, and their communities were
starting to ask themselves how to compensate them. A program is very often designed to
cover such a commitment. The limits of volunteerism are clearly being reached in the FSIN
population. There is also a strong tendency of the local experts to migrate in the dry season,
that was specifically reported in the Tanout district. This poses a problem for the
sustainability of local experts’ work and the dissemination of their expertise.
• Dissemination of improved seed: the evaluation team found weaknesses related
to (1) delays in supplying seed at the community level; (2) insufficient quantities of seed
provided; (3) lack of organization of the seed producers; and (4) difficulties in monitoring
demonstration fields.
• Finally, the communities expressed concerns about issues that are not yet
sufficiently taken into account by FSIN, that have limited its impact and effectiveness.
These are: (1) questions related to literacy and education in general, (2) the obvious problem
of lack of water in the district of Tanout, (3) questions relating to IGA, and (4) the need for
animal husbandry activities in the districts of Tanout and Dogondoutchi.
D. Sustainability
The evaluation team is pleased that sustainability is part of all the CSs’ action strategies.
Sustainability generally is based on: (1) training and installing local experts; (2) having
communities contribute to building infrastructure; and (3) partnership with the TS and local
NGOs. The CSs aimed to legitimize local strategies and match program activities with the
needs expressed by local communities.
Overall, the community training produced excellent results. The communities interviewed
reported that there has been a gradual adoption of all the techniques and sustainable
agricultural technologies initiated in the intervention zones: making demi-lunes, zaïs,
38
composting, improved pruning, protection of natural regeneration, and the use of manure.
The evaluation team observed that demi-lunes were systematically dug in private fields at all
the sites visited. Understanding and replicating these techniques constitute a basis for the
sustainability of FSIN’s SO2 activities. However, these activities do not eliminate the effects
of climate risk, and are only effective in periods of good rain. FSIN should take this into
account in disseminating the technologies, so that participants are not discouraged after a
poor production year.
The fact that communities have participated in and contributed to building infrastructure also
constitutes a basis for sustainability, because the communities have adopted the the
infrastructure. The evaluation team believes that the elements of cost recovery should be
introduced for all the SO2 activities, particularly those that require annual supplies (seed,
small agricultural equipment, inputs). The basis of cost-recovery already is being
implemented by Africare in Agadez, by setting up Community Development Funds with
program support and community participation. This should be done throughout the
intervention zone.
The capacity of the TS to ensure FSIN sustainability is doubtful because they support this
goal, they generally lack the logistical, financial, and in some cases even the human resources
to ensure the continuity of the program activities. The TS in some districts are only
operational when there is a program in their area that supports their work. FSIN also must
take into account that their adaptive capacity is problematical.
The local NGOs have greater adaptive capacity than the TS, as well as the advantages of
being more flexible and closer to the communities in terms of social relationships.
Partnership with the local NGOs is a good basis for sustainability, even if there have been
weaknesses in collaboration with FSIN. The collaboration should be maintained and
reinforced if possible. FSIN’s second phase could include a major component for
strengthening the local NGOs’ institutional and implementation capacities.
E. Lessons learned
Both the participating communities and the consortium benefitted from FSIN in terms of
lessons learned:
• Increasing agricultural production is a difficult objective in an environment where
the climate is a major risk factor and plays a dominant role in production, regardless of the
agricultural production techniques used. Controlling water—irrigation—is the only sure
means to increase production.
• If the constraint of unpredictable rainfall were removed by increasing the land
under irrigation, the dissemination of simple agricultural technologies that people can easily
master could contribute to increasing agricultural production, and to protecting and
rehabilitating land. Positive results would strengthen community support of such
technologies.
39
F. Recommendations
1. For the current program
1. Reinforce vegetable production activities throughout FSIN’s intervention zone by creating
new sites, enlarging existing ones, installing irrigation, and protecting the sites, in order to
supplement household micro-nutrient consumption and incomes.
2. Address producers’ needs for agricultural loans by helping them access a formal micro￾finance network, which would allow them to avoid usurers and increase their production
profits. These micro-finance networks exist in each district of FSIN—for example, the Rural
Credit Intermediation System (SICR KOKARI) in Agadez. It is important to take into
account the experience with rural credit in each district, particularly with regard to interest
rates in a Muslim society.
3. Organize producers in cooperatives to improve marketing, input supply, and post-harvest
processing activities. Agadez has an established tradition of cooperatives so the FSIN
producer cooperatives could join those that already exist.
4. For rain-fed crops, reinforce communities’ supply of short-cycle seeds and better organize
their system for reproducing seed.
5. Help producers acquire agricultural equipment, to reinforce sustainable agricultural
improvements. A system of cost recovery for the equipment should be set up through
negotiation with communities in order to ensure the sustainability of this activity.
6. In collaboration with participants, identify a mechanism to compensate community
volunteers (teachers, local experts) in order to reduce their drop-out rates.
7. Reinforce support for pest control, especially in the zones where pest infestations are
frequent (Tanout, northern Dogondoutchi and Konni/Illela), by training and equipping
phytosanitary brigades.
8. Help newly-established community groups (CVD, CUSA, CGV) obtain official
recognition (“agrément”) as community representatives, in order to strengthen their role as
official community representatives and make it sustainable to work with other programs in
the future.
2. For the DAP2
1. Support IGA for women and men to address the chronic food deficit and the weak
irrigation potential in the intervention zone.
2. Implement activities related to eliminating illiteracy.
3. Standardize the consortium’s activities for animal husbandry and in three related areas:
preventing and managing farmer/herder conflicts, delimiting livestock corridors, and
livestock production and health (training veterinary technicians and installing livestock input
banks). The consortium could seek a partner for the implementation of this recommendation.
4. Integrate the issue of lack of water in Tanout into program activities. This could be done
through a partnership or developing a project exclusively focused on water, due to its high
cost.
5. Integrate activities to mobilize surface water to exploit the existing potential in the
intervention zone (mini-dams, banks to contain manure [seuil d’épandage ] ) in order to
increase irrigation and agricultural production.
6. Support local NGOs and civil society in general to make FSIN activities more sustainable.
40
V. Strategic Objective Three (SO3)
SO3 aims at improving the nutritional and health status of households, in particular that of
children less than 5 years old and women in the FSIN intervention zone.
A. Summary of key activities
The following key activities were implemented to achieve SO3:
• Creating community groups to support immediate and EBF and to support
improved children feeding practices;
• Establishing community rehabilitation centers for malnourished children in
Agadez and Konni/Illela;
• Distributing iron tablets at the community level;
• Establishing health committees (COSAN) and training their members, as well as
training for traditional birth attendants (TBA), community experts for health (EVS) and
nutrition (EVN), and local experts who sell drugs;
• Training health personnel;
• Establishing community radios which disseminate messages to increase women’s
awareness about improved health and nutritional practices;
• Building and equipping health infrastructures.
A marked characteristic of SO3 is that the same health/nutrition activities were not
implemented in all of the program’s districts. For example, rehabilitation centers for
malnourished children have been established in the districts of Agadez and Konni/Illela, but
not in the districts of Tanout and Dogondoutchi. The key activities implemented in each
district are summarized in the table below.
41
Table V-1. SO3: Key Health/Nutrition Activities in the FSIN Districts
Zone Key activities
Agadez • Promoting best practices for breast-feeding and child nutrition through
the creation of community support groups;
• Treating diarrhea at home through Information, Education,
Communication (IEC) and training mothers;
• Promoting production and consumption of food rich in micronutrients
through IEC, training and creating vegetable gardens (AKG);
• Distribution of iron tablets at the community level;
• Establishment and training of community health committees (COSAN),
and local health and nutrition experts (EVS and EVN);
• Training of health personnel;
• Equipment of several rural health centers ;
• Development of a partnership with the government health services.
Tanout • Promoting best practices for breast-feeding and child nutrition through
the creation of community support groups;
• Treating diarrhea at home for children under five;
• Improving access to health and nutritional education through the mass
media;
• Establishment and training of COSAN;
• Training of health personnel and community health volunteers;
• Equipment of several rural health centers;
• Development of a partnership with the government health services.
Konni/Illela • Promoting best practices for breast-feeding and child nutrition through
the creation of community support groups;
• Promoting the consumption of micronutrients for children under five,
pregnant women, and women who breast-feed their children;
• Treating diarrhea at home for children under five;
• Improving vaccination coverage for children under five, particularly for
measles.
Doutchi • Developing a partnership with the government health services;
• Promoting best practices for breast-feeding and child nutrition through
the creation of community support groups;
• Treating diarrhea at home for children under five;
• Improving access to health and nutritional information through the
installation of 2 community radios and 60 “radio club” volunteers;
• Establishment and training of community health committees (COSAN);
• Training of health personnel and community health volunteers;
• Construction and equipment of several rural health centers.
42
B. SO3 Impact
SO3’s overall impact is quite positive. This conclusion is based on a quantitative evaluation
of SO3’s three impact indicators, and a qualitative evaluation by participants. The impact
indicators are: 1) the prevalence of stunting among children (defined as 24-59 months of
age); 2) the proportion of newborn infants breast-fed within eight hours of birth; and 3) the
proportion of communities in which vitamin A consumption is above the risk level. There is
positive change in all three indicators at the program level, and indicator number two reached
99% of its final target by 2004. During FSIN’s four years the proportion of stunted children
stunting has decreased by almost 9% and the proportion of communities whose consumption
of vitamin A is above the risk level has almost tripled. These are positive impacts, although
continued progress is still necessary to meet the program’s final targets for indicators one and
three.
Participants’ were clear and enthusiastic about SO3’s positive impacts on their lives. They
have acquired knowledge about how to improve women’s and children’s health and nutrition,
and they have applied it. For example, both sexes have learned about EBF, that vegetables
provide vitamin A and other micronutrients, that “dirty children get sick more often,” and that
malnourished children can be rehabilitated with local foods and expertise. Participants
reported that they have made corresponding behavioral changes; they were particularly
enthusiastic about EBF’s effects on children’s health. Many of the behavioral changes should
be sustainable as they are based on knowledge and local expertise (midwives, support groups
for EBF). FSIN also has helped participants and their COSANs get motivated to organize
and help finance the local health services’ community visits, which has spurred people’s
interest in them for more health care.
1. Quantitative impact evaluation
Table V-2 below summarizes the changes in SO3’s impact indicators from the baselines (that
were done in different years in different districts) to year four of FSIN. The table also shows
the amount of change still required for the indicators to meet their final targets. The figures
show that all three indicators are moving in the right direction.
43
Table V-2. Change in SO3 Indicators, Baselines to Year Four
(Source: PCU, IPTTFY04, draft version)
SO3 Indicators
Baselines,
2000 and
2001
Year
Four,
2004
Percent
change,
baselines to
2004
Final
program
target for
2005
Percent of
final target
reached in
2004
1. Prevalence of
stunting in children
24-59 months.
51.1% 46.6% -8.8%
(the right
direction)
43.54%
107%: the
indicator
needs to
decrease by
6.6%* to
reach its
final target.
2. Proportion of
newborn infants
breast-fed within
eight hours of birth
30.4% 72.6% +239%
(the right
direction)
73.15% 99%
3. Proportion of
communities in
which vitamin A
consumption is
above the risk level.
10.2% 28.7% +281%
(the right
direction)
36.8%
78%: the
indicator
needs to
increase by
28%** to
reach its
final target.
*The difference between the indicator in 2004 (46.6%) and its 2005 target is 3.06
percentage points, which is equal to 6.6% of the 46.6%
**The difference between the indicator in 2004 (28.7%) and its 2005 target is 8.1
percentage points, which is equal to 28% of the 28.7%.
a. Indicator 1: stunting in children
The prevalence of children’s stunting has decreased by 8.8% from the baselines in 2000/2001
to 2004 (Table V-2). However, the stunting rate needs to decrease an additional 6.6% in
approximately one year in order to meet its final target in FSIN’s last year, 2005 (Table V-2).
Figure 1 below shows the program-level change in the prevalence of stunting over time;
figures for the individual districts for the SO3 indicators are in the IPTT in Annex 4. Given
the rate of change in stunting since the baselines it is doubtful that this indicator will achieve
its final target, although the program has made good progress.
Indicator one should be interpreted cautiously due to the difficulty of determining children’s
exact ages in Niger. This indicator measures the relationship between children’s height and
their age. Height was measured objectively in FSIN’s surveys but children’s ages usually
were estimated by their mothers, and generally could not be objectively verified due to the
lack of birth certificates and birth records. Women often over- or under-estimate their
children’s ages, which potentially biases this indicator.
However, although interviewers cannot distinguish between these two errors, it is fair to
assume that they are approximately equal in a survey sample. This assumption means that
the two potential errors cancel out each other and the indicator’s potential bias. The
44
conclusion thus is that FSIN has contributed to reducing the proportion of stunted children in
its intervention zone.
Figure 1. Indicator 3.1: Percent of Stunted Children 24-59 Months
in FSIN’s Intervention Zone
(Source: PCU, 2004: IPTT FY04, draft version)
51.1% 47.8% 46.6%
43.54%
0
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Baselines
2000 &
2001
Midterm Final survey
2004
Target
2005
45
b. Indicator 2: breast-feeding newborns
There has been a significant increase in the proportion of newborn infants breast-fed within
eight hours of birth (indicator two). The values for this indicator rose from 30% in the
baselines to about 73% in 2004. This means that when FSIN began only three out of 10
newborn infants were breast-fed within eight hours of birth; four years later, the figure was
seven out of 10 infants. Indicator two thus reached 99% of its final target in 2004 (Table V￾2). The cautionary note here is that this indicator is based on self-reported information, that
is subjective and unverified.
Figure 2. Indicator 3.2: Percentage of Newborn Infants Breast-fed
within Eight Hours of Birth
(Source: PCU, 2004: IPTT FY04, draft version)
30.4%
64.7%
72.6% 73.15%
0
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Baselines,
2000 & 2001
Midterm Final survey
2004
Target
2005
46
c. Indicator 3: vitamin A consumption
Indicator three, the proportion of communities in which vitamin A consumption is above the
risk level, has almost tripled (+281%) from the baselines to 2004 (Table V-2). As Figure 3
shows, in 2004 about 29% of FSIN communities were above this risk level. However, this
indicator’s year-four level still needs to increase 28% in the program’s one remaining year in
order to reach its final target
Figure 3. Indicator 3.3: Percent of Communities with Vitamin A Consumption
above the Risk Level
(Source: PCU, 2004: IPTT FY04, draft version)
10.2%
30.0%
28.7%
36.8%
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
Baselines
2000 & 2001 Midterm Final survey
2004
Target
2005
47
2. Qualitative impact evaluation
Discussions with a range of respondents showed that SO3 had numerous impacts on
participants’ lives. Overall, the respondents unanimously declared that FSIN’s
health/nutrition component has resulted in better health for children and women, good breast￾feeding practices, better feeding practices for children, and the improved use of health
services.
a. The impact of SO3 according to women
The majority of women reported the following impacts of SO3 on their and their children’s
lives:
• Obvious improvement in their children’s health, who are stronger and healthier.
Due to the iron supplements that women receive from FSIN, they declared that their babies
are now healthier and appear stronger than those they had before FSIN.
• Clear improvements in women’s health, as the result of receiving iron
supplements and receiving more regularly the health services they need, including
vaccinations.
• The reduction of health risks related to anemia for pregnant women: due to the
increased coverage of iron supplements, women declared that they no longer suffer from the
problems of weakness and chronic fatigue they used to experience after childbirth.
• Women now give birth to babies in good health and under the supervision of
TBAs: women stated that now they systematically request the TBAs to help deliver their
babies. FSIN retrained the TBAs who, according to the women, are doing a good job and
are well-equipped to assist women during childbirth.
• A reduction in the number of diarrhea episodes for children who are exclusively
breast-fed: women stated that they noticed that children who are exclusively breast-fed are
healthier and have fewer diarrhea episodes than children who are given water.
• Nutritional rehabilitation for malnourished children and diarrhea treatment:
women reported that now they know how to treat children with diarrhea at home, and how
to rehabilitate a malnourished child using locally available foods.
b. The impacts of SO3 according to men 
The majority of men interviewed reported the following impacts of SO3 on their and their
families’ lives:
• Men improved their knowledge about health/nutrition, and have learned better
feeding practices for children’s health, particularly those related to immediate and EBF, as
well as the nutritional recovery and rehabilitation of malnourished children.
• Men are more aware of the utility of pre-natal check-ups for pregnant women,
vaccinations, iron supplements, and local foods rich in vitamin A.
• Improvement of night vision: men said that many of them had suffered from
poor night vision before FSIN. They have improved their consumption of foods rich in
vitamin A, based on advice from FSIN agents, so that the majority of them do not have this
problem any more.
48
• Men as well as women understand the advantages of practicing immediate and
EBF: the children who are immediately and exclusively breastfed are in better health than
those who were not.
c. Impacts of SO3 according to TS and FSIN personnel 
According to the TS and FSIN personnel the impacts of SO3 included:
• The progressive and effective involvement of the communities in addressing their
health problems, through the establishment or reinforcement of community health groups
(COSAN, COGES, EVS/EVN, TBAs, community support groups for breastfeeding,
nutrition, model mothers, local drug experts).
• Improved community participation in managing their own health, by assuming
responsibility for contributing to certain expenses (e.g. fuel and perdiem for nurses) in order
to organize the state’s mobile clinic services for their communities.
• FSIN’s partnership with government health services contributes to reinforcing
their capacity of to supervise the activities of integrated health centers and rural health centers
(“cases de santé”). Involving the government health services staff in training community
health workers has reinforced the government staff’s responsibility for monitoring health
activities carried out at the community level, including FSIN health and nutrition activities.
C. Strengths and weaknesses of SO3
1. Strengths
The main strengths of SO3 include:
• The emphasis on involving community health groups (COSAN, TBAs,
community support groups for breastfeeding, nutrition, local drug experts): from the start of
the program, the majority of SO3’s activities were centered on community involvement
through community health groups. By reinforcing these community health groups and
building their capacity and functionality, FSIN facilitated the communities’ implementation
and ownership of SO3 activities.
• The participation and involvement of communities in planning,
implementing, and monitoring SO3 activities: this participatory approach facilitated
communities’ involvement in the activities, such as their financial participation in
organizing mobile clinic visits for themselves. For example, in Dogondoutchi and
Konni/Illela, the communities are contributing money to finance mobile clinic activities
(fuel and perdiem for nurses) and the COSAN members are organizing the mobile clinic’s
visits.
• The partnership with the TS and the administrative and traditional
authorities: government health services personnel in the FSIN intervention zone were
extensively involved in planning, implementing, supervising, and monitoring SO3 activities.
The administrative and traditional authorities also were regularly involved in implementing
these activities.
49
• Food for Work and the complementarity between the agricultural sector
and the health/nutrition component was an excellent springboard for the nutritional
education and rehabilitation activities. Women reported that the availability of enriched
wheat from FFW made it possible to improve the nutritional status of the whole family,
particularly children less than five years old.
2. Weaknesses
The implementation of SO3 activities revealed a number of weaknesses that need to be
addressed in order to improve program results:
• The lack of permanent availability of certain food products needed for
cooking demonstrations and children’s nutritional rehabilitation, coupled with the lack of
vegetable gardens in the great majority of the FSIN communities Despite the appreciable
efforts made by FSIN to promote better feeding practices for children, the lack of availability
of certain foods poses a problem for nutritional rehabilitation.
• The voluntary work of the community health workers: FSIN’s health/nutrition
component relies primarily on community groups and community health workers. The
community health workers are chosen by the communities for their high moral qualities and
their motivation to work. They often work voluntarily, without any compensation.
Participants everywhere want FSIN to take charge of compensating the health workers. This
shows that the limits of volunteerism have been reached and that alternative means of
motivating community health workers should be explored.
D. Lessons learned
Three important lessons emerge from the evaluation of the SO3 activities:
• Addressing the nutritional problems of vulnerable populations very often exceeds
the strictly nutritional aspects and includes other, indirect factors that contribute to
malnutrition (the elimination of illiteracy, water supplies, controlling and preventing
infectious diseases). FSIN should consider taking these issues into account more.
• Behavior changes are possible even for the most vulnerable populations as long
as the strategies and messages used are appropriate for and adopted by these populations.
• Government health services are having increasing difficulty in ensuring the take￾over and sustainability of FSIN activities.
E. Sustainability
The sustainability of the impact of SO3 activities rests primarily on five main factors: the
adoption of sustainable and beneficial health practices and behavior; partnership with
government health services; the involvement of community groups; the involvement of
communities in planning, implementing and evaluating health activities; and the financial
contribution of communities to health activities including mobile clinic services.
• The adoption of sustainable and beneficial health practices and behavior: the
evaluation team noted with great satisfaction that women have very clearly adopted new
practices and sustainable and beneficial health behavior, particularly regarding feeding
practices and immediate breast-feeding. Women in all the communities reported that they
50
understand and have adopted immediate and EBF. Their statements were the same about
child nutrition practices and using the three basic food categories of food to feed children.
These changes in behavior will be the cornerstone of the sustainability of SO3 activities
because these behaviors, once understood and adopted, generally persist through life and
across generations.
• Involving the existing community groups (COSAN, TBAs): the health/nutrition
component works toward continuity after FSIN ends by reinforcing and revitalizing
community groups instead of creating new ones.
• The participation and financial contribution of the participants in building health
infrastructure, and their financial contribution to organizing mobile clinic services for
themselves, also are sustainability factors for SO3 activities. Communities are more inclined
to adopt and continue activities to which they have contributed physically and financially.
• Partnership with the government technical health services can only provide a
conditional sustainability for SO3 activities, given their lack of material and financial
resources to ensure a satisfactory continuation of FSIN activities.
F. Recommendations
1. Global recommendations
1. Support the extension of the Centers for Nutritional Learning and Rehabilitation (FARN)
where needed, through technical cooperation between communities and the existing local
expertise in the FARNs.
2. Support, catalogue, and disseminate women’s new recipes that use local food products to
rehabilitate malnourished children.
3. Extend and support the establishment of community support groups for breast-feeding
and child-feeding practices (GS2A) in all communities in the intervention zone ;
4. Reinforce and give full responsibility to the COSANs for all health activities to be
carried out at the community level, including FARN.
5. Involve the government health services more in planning, monitoring, and evaluating
SO3 activities, particularly in Agadez.
6. Consider broadening the community-based distribution of iron supplements to include
other products (chloroquine, oral rehydration solution), and the application of cost-recovery
mechanisms.
7. Support local initiatives aimed at coating iron supplement tablets to make them easier to
take, while intensifying public awareness campaigns about their utility.
8. Continue and reinforce the use of mass media for raising awareness about health and
nutrition.
2. Recommendations for DAP 2
1. Teach women in Tanout and Dogondoutchi to rehabilitate malnourished children in order
to standardize this activity throughout the intervention zone and contribute to reducing
malnutrition rates.
2. Continue constructing rural health centers and integrated community health centers in
order to support SO3’s objectives.
3. Improve the availability and accessibility of food by developing vegetable gardens where
possible.
51
4. Improve the availability and accessibility of basic health services by constructing and
equipping rural health centers and integrated health centers, and continue mobile clinic visits
in the districts of Konni/Illela, Tanout, and Dogondoutchi.
5. Apply cost-recovery mechanisms in the intervention zone.
6. Reinforce FARN by prioritizing the use of locally available food products.
VI. Cross-Cutting Activities: Management, Food-for-Work, M&E, and the
Emergency Response Unit
A. FSIN Management
1. Institutional framework
The institutional framework for the implementation of FSIN is composed primarily of the
Management Committee, the Program Coordination Unit (PCU), and the NGO members’
regional offices. FSIN activities are decentralized and implemented at the regional and
departmental levels.
The Management Committee, chaired by Africare, gives overall direction to the
program and ensures coordination and communication between the CSs. Quarterly
meetings are held to discuss progress achieved in program implementation, identify
opportunities and potential problem areas, and to make recommendations. Ten
quarterly meetings have been held to date. These meetings have kept all the CSs
informed about activities undertaken and difficulties encountered. The meetings also
allowed the exchange of information, expertise, and experience.
The PCU is responsible for monitoring and evaluation (M&E), producing reports,
coordinating activities among the CSs, sharing information, and disseminating best practices.
It is also the consortium’s liaison. The PCU is staffed by the head of the unit, the M&E
coordinator, the coordinator for local monetization, the financial coordinator, and support
staff. Each CS is represented by its staff in charge of implementing activities at the regional
and departmental levels.
This institutional framework is appropriate in theory but cumbersome in practice, leading to
delays in decision-making and activity implementation. For example, implementing various
decisions made during the coordination meetings was not followed up by the PCU, although
one of its most important roles is to ensure that important decisions made by the Management
Committee and during quarterly meetings are implemented. This would increase the
consortium’s effectiveness and smooth operation.
2. Human and financial resources
The CSs were satisfied with the human resources initially allocated for implementing FSIN’s
activities. The positions of district M&E coordinators in Tanout, Dogondoutchi and Agadez
were not initially planned but were added to the program.
No major problem was reported to the evaluation team about financial resources. All the
interviewees reported that financial flows were excellent. There were no instances of fund
shortages blocking program implementation during the program’s four years. Minor
52
problems related to the risks of handling large amounts of cash were reported in
Dogondoutchi, due to the absence of a reliable banking system there.
3. Strengths and weaknesses
Strengths of FSIN’s management system:
• Standardizing the Css’ different approaches;
• Standardizing data gathering, analysis, and reporting;
• Ensuring FSIN’s visibility to other organizations;
• Providing a coherent institutional framework;
• Decentralized management of the CSs’ activities;
• Defining the roles and tasks of the CSs so that their work is continuous, precise,
complementary, and does not overlap;
• Management is based on results with appropriate technical support in the field;
• Personnel are recruited and assigned by each CS for optimal effectiveness and
results;
• Motivated and hard-working teams are in place in each district, which have been
effective in implementing the program in the field;
• No overspending has been reported in any budget category;
Weaknesses of FSIN’s management system:
• The PCU initially was mistakenly viewed as a division of Africare rather than as
unit for all the CSs.
• The PCU initially was not perceived as an “independent entity” with equitable
access for all CSs.
4. Evaluation of FSIN’s structure for program management
The heads of the CSs’ field offices unanimously reported that the consortium’s structure has
had a positive impact on managing the FSIN program. These respondents pointed out the
consortium’s innovative structure, as this is the first time that four international NGOs have
worked together. The field staff also unanimously noted that the exchange of expertise and
experience among the different NGOs’ staff was a major advantage for the consortium
5. Strengths and weaknesses of working in consortium
a. Strengths of working in consortium
Staff reported several strengths of working in a consortium, including:
• Diversity in the programmatic approaches and intervention areas: each CS
maintained its own best practice management methods, allowing the others to benefit from
their experience.
• The four NGOs intervene in different areas, which gives the very favorable
impression that the consortium is conducting four different experiments at the same time.
• The availability of diversified expertise that each CS can use (health and
nutrition, survey and research methodologies).
53
• Sharing experience among the CSs, especially regarding “best practices” and the
difficulties encountered implementing program activities.
• Having one NGO deal with USAID for all the other NGOs, because it streamlines
submitting required documents.
• Having one request for funding for the four NGOs, because it decreases the
competition among them and reinforces their unity.
• Weaknesses of working in consortium
Despite the strengths noted above, some weaknesses also were noted:
• Confusion about roles among the four NGOs, especially at the beginning of FSIN.
The NGOs began program implementation before there was an explicit definition of their
respective roles. This gave something of a “who’s doing what?” aspect to the beginning of
the program.
• The CSs did not always submit the information necessary for reporting to USAID
on time. One of the strengths of working in a consortium is that only one NGO is in charge
of reporting to USAID, but this requires the timely submission of information from each CS.
This is not always the case.
6. Lessons learned
There are more problems than advantages when one of a consortium’s members is
responsible for program management.
7. Recommendations
1. Reinforce the PCU’s independence and promote equal access to it for all the CSs.
2. Improve the process of sharing information between the PCU and the CSs.
3. Make the PCU responsible for monitoring the implementation of important decisions that
the consortium makes at its meetings.
8. Implementation of the midterm recommendations
FSIN's midterm evaluation produced a total of 23 cross-cutting recommendations. The
consortium rejected one because it risked creating confusion in the program ("Standardize
FSIN's terms and concepts to better integrate them with the national policies of rural
development and decentralization;" Table VI-1 below). Note that recommendation 16 is
divided into two parts (16a. and 16b. in Table VI-1). Over half of the midterm
recommendations have been implemented (12 out of twenty-two), and nine others are in the
process of being implemented. Only one recommendation, concerning support for partners,
is under consideration and neither implemented nor in process: "Analyze the trends to
identify the zones that are chronically vulnerable and the types of problems that they face
regularly." FSIN thus has made excellent progress in implementing its cross-cutting midterm
evaluation recommendations.
54
Table VI-1. Status of FSIN’s Cross-Cutting Midterm Recommendations
Midterm recommendation
Implemented
or not Justifications
1. SO1: Strengthen the support and monitoring of COSAN that is
implicit in FSIN's strategy, and add an indicator.
Yes
2. SO1: Standardize FSIN's terms and concepts to better integrate
them with the national policies of rural development and
decentralization.
No Recommendation rejected.
3. SO1: Facilitate the exchange of best practices to analyze the
participation of women and vulnerable groups in reports, the
evaluation of FFW and in coordination meetings.
Yes
4. SO2: Design and implement a short-term action plan for
vegetable production and marketing.
Yes
5. SO2: Develop economic alternatives (IGA) for communities that
cannot produce vegetables.
In process Several initiatives are in process in the
program areas.
6. SO3: Organize exchanges among the experts in health and
nutrition about their common experiences and specific experiences
with FSIN, and they should be responsible for the recommendations
about health/nutrition.
Yes
7. Management: Encourage the PCU to prepare and execute a plan
of action for training to increase the value-added to training for
communities and program experts.
In process
8. Management: Promote information-exchange at the program
level by:
• creating 3 networks;
• reinforcing the PCU's backstopping;
• presenting results by objective and not by CS;
• develop a framework for reporting based on the CSR4 to
facilitate comparing reports at the district level and each CS
preparing annexes.
Yes All four components of this
recommendation have been implemented.
55
Table VI-1. Status of FSIN’s Cross-Cutting Midterm Recommendations
Midterm recommendation
Implemented
or not Justifications
9. Management: Reinforce the existing management discussions
and the mechanisms for reporting to the ministries, by formalizing
annual district-level meetings.
Yes
10. Management: Clarify the roles and responsibilities of the PCU
in finance, reporting, communication, M&E, and coordination to
satisfy the needs identified by the consortium.
Yes
11. Management: Reinforce the analysis of monetization and its
links with the trends in national food security and the investments of
FSIN in different regions, and share the information with customs,
clients, elected officials, and the regional and national administrative
authorities.
In process
12. M&E: Reinforce community self-monitoring and auto￾evaluations, based on the active role played by the Committees of
Food Security in data collection and tracking program impact.
In process The basic steps are underway, including
literacy training.
13. M&E: Revise the IPTT by:
• Disaggregating the data for Dogondoutchi and Tanout.
• Integrating the data from the baseline and the midterm
evaluation, and stratifying the data by vulnerable group in indicators
2.1 and 2.2.
• Add indicators for FFW to the IPTT.
Yes
14. M&E: Study a sample of at least one household per
community and per vulnerability level as a tool for developing
impact indicators for SO2 that are more realistic and reliable.
In process The process to implement this
recommendation is being put in place.
15. FFW: Simplify the annual reporting for FFW, facilitate the
comparative analysis of the FFW activities, and add FFW indicators
to the IPTT.
Yes
56
Table VI-1. Status of FSIN’s Cross-Cutting Midterm Recommendations
Midterm recommendation
Implemented
or not Justifications
16a. Partner support: Analyze the data from the Emergency Unit
(information management) to provide regular reports to FSIN
partners.
Yes
16b. Partner support: Analyze the trends to identify the zones that
are chronically vulnerable and the types of problems that they face
regularly.
No Under consideration.
17. Partner support: Disseminate the Operation System for the
use of food commodities. Ensure that each consortium member
allocates funds for transportation, distribution, and monitoring of
activities, and that all the field agents understand the process well.
In process The Operation System has been
disseminated but the allocation of
transportation funds is not certain.
18. Support to FSIN: Disseminate the Operation System for the
use of food commodities. Ensure that each consortium member
allocates funds for transportation, distribution, and monitoring of
activities, and that all the field agents understand the process well.
In process The Operation System has been
disseminated but the allocation of
transportation funds is not certain.
19: Support to FSIN: Define clearly the types of support that the
Emergency Unit can provide to FSIN partners, given its limited
staff.
Yes
20. Training: Training on "Needs Evaluation," including the
analysis of capacity and vulnerability, and the CEWS-UR, to benefit
all the FSIN partners.
Yes
21. CEWS-UR: The CEWS-UR models that CARE and CRS have
tested and implemented have shown their merit, and now
discussions and evaluations should be done to improve the system
so that eventually it can be replicated.
In process The workshop to discuss and evaluate the
CEWS-UR model has been held; the
model has not yet been diffused.
22. GON Emergency Plan: The Emergency Unit should continue
its participation in the process of establishing a GON emergency
plan to better understand the process occurring in Tahoua and to
support its recognition, but above all to seek synergy.
In process The process of establishing a GON
emergency response plan is in process and
CARE is participating.
57
B. Food-for-Work
1. Summary of activities by district
Table VI-2. Summary of Main FFW Activities by District
District Main Activities
Agadez • Demi-lunes, stone cordons for water control, enlargement of ponds,
fences for irrigated land.
• Production and planting of seedlings.
• Protecting river banks and (banquettes en terres).
• Building walls for community buildings (schools, health centers)
• Rehabilitation of wells.
• Rural roads.
Tanout • Demi-lunes.
• Enlargement of ponds, stocking ponds with fish.
• Production and planting seedlings.
• Building walls for community buildings(health centers, schools).
• Rural roads.
Konni/Illéla • Demi-lunes, zaïs, stone cordons for water control.
• Protection of ponds against silting up.
• Construction of community buildings (grain warehouse, literacy center,
training center).
• Building walls for community buildings (health centers, schools).
• Construction of banks to contain manure (seuils d'épandage).
production and planting of seedlings.
• Rural roads.
• Delimitation of livestock corridors.
Dogondoutchi • Demi-lunes, zaïs, stone cordons for water control.
• Enlargement of ponds.
• Treatment of river beds (koris).
• Production and planting of seedlings.
• Building rural roads.
• Rehabilitation of community cement wells.
• Building walls for community buildings.
58
2. Impact
Table VI-3. Impact of FFW
District Impact
Agadez • Raise communities’ awareness about their capacity to protect and
conserve their environment
• Mobilize communities for implementing community actions
• Improvement in vegetative cover
• Dialogue between communities resulting in social cohesion ;
• Preserving households’ livestock by eliminating annual sales and the
resulting decapitalization
• Increase in amount and availability of food stocks
Tanout • Adoption of NRM techniques
• Change in food consumption patterns
• Decrease in cereal prices (millet, sorghum) during FFW activities
• Dialogue between communities resulting in reinforced social cohesion 
• The availability of and the increase in food stocks particularly during
the three-month hungry season
• Raise communities’ awareness of their capacity to protect and
conserve the environment
Konni/Illéla • Learning and adoption of NRM techniques
• Demonstration of active community solidarity, in particular towards
vulnerable households
• Change in food consumption patterns
• Keeping participants at home (decreasing seasonal migration) which
increases labor availability for agricultural production during the rainy
season
• Dialogue among communities
• The availability of food in particular during the hungry season
• Building roads to open up certain zones not easily accessible before
• Improved coverage of food needs
• Contribution to local governance through the installation of the FFW
committee
Dogondoutchi • Dialogue between communities with reinforced social cohesion
• Change in food consumption patterns
• Improved coverage of food needs
• Development of local expertise particularly regarding NRM
• Building roads to open up communities and add value to local
economies (Konni and Dogondoutchi)
• The reduction of seasonal out-migration
• The availability of and access to food for the most vulnerable
households during the hungry season
• Stabilization of cereal prices when speculation is greatest (May-July)
• Enabled the TS to carry out some of their state responsibilities
• Support to local governance through the FFW committee
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3. Strengths and weaknesses
a. Strengths
• A great mobilization of the participants for FSIN community development
actions.
• The involvement of all social classes and women.
• The involvement of the TS.
• The participatory approach combined with taking gender and vulnerability status
into account.
• Participants’ learning, adopting, and replicating NRM techniques in their
individual fields.
b. Weaknesses
• The population’s priority is to satisfy their food needs; the work is of secondary
importance.
• The participants’ demands are directed towards FFW activities much more than
toward activities that are done without FFW (e.g. composting, improved pruning).
• FFW creates an attitude of dependence: communities demand FFW even when
they have their own food stocks.
• A weak adoption of certain activities (pasture lands, roads): some activities done
with FFW are not wholeheartedly owned by the communities.
4. Sustainability
The factors below are the basis for sustainability:
• Use of the participatory approach.
• Communities’ learning, adopting, and replicating NRM techniques.
• The adoption of certain improved techniques (improved pruning, composting, tree
nurseries).
• The creation of local expertise in NRM and in seedling production.
• The training provided.
• The establishment of community groups (CVD, FFW committees).
• The partnership with the TS and some local NGOs.
5. Lessons learned
• Participants perceived FFW as an end in itself, not as a means to improve
production.
• FFW contributed significantly to the achievement of the program’s strategic
objectives.
• Food consumption patterns changed without major difficulties with FFW.
60
6. Recommendations
a) Global recommendations
1. Implement FFW activities before households begin their rainy-season agricultural
activities because participants prioritize FFW, to the detriment of household production.
2. Continue and intensify FFW activities because FSIN’s intervention zone is chronically
food insecure and production most likely will be poor in 2004.
3. Continue to inform and raise communities’ awareness that FFW is a means and not an
end in itself.
4. Provide sufficient tools so that communities can participate extensively in FFW
activities.
b) Recommendations for the DAP2
1. Negotiate with communities to being FFW activities earlier (April, May) in order to
avoid conflict for labor for their household production, and distribute commodities later
(June, July).
2. Provide sufficient tools so that communities can participate extensively in FFW
activities.
3. Continue and intensify FFW activities because FSIN’s intervention zone is chronically
food insecure.
C. Monitoring and Evaluation
1. Summary of the M&E system
The consortium, coordinated by the PCU, developed FSIN's standardized and integrated
M&E system, and supported the CSs' use of common M&E indicators and data-collection
tools. The standardized system was based on the M&E plans in each CS's DIP, which were
developed in collaboration with USAID and the FANTA project. (Food and Nutrition
Technical Assistance project. FANTA provides technical assistance to integrate food
security and nutrition into development programs, in order to improve women’s and
children’s health). The creation of a standardized M&E system allows the aggregation and
disaggregation of data across time and space, which meets the partners' and USAID's need for
information at both the consortium and the CS (district) levels. The common set of 16
monitoring and evaluation indicators in the IPTT is used for the annual report that USAID
requires; in addition, each CS has its own, specific indicators. The consortium holds
quarterly meetings in which each CS reports on its progress and results and M&E issues are
addressed. The PCU M&E Manager is responsible for aggregating the CS data to the
program level and reporting it to FSIN's partners and the GON both quarterly and annually.
FSIN just recently installed a common software system for data input and management. The
lack of this system has hampered data management. The current task is to train staff to use
the new software.
Each CS has an M&E unit with one staff member, who is responsible for data input and
management. At the district level the M&E system is based on community participation and
periodic community capacity assessments, and monthly reports from the field staff. These
staff use FSIN's standardized data-collection forms to collect the M&E information in the
communities, under the supervision of the SO heads. District health staffs also submit
61
monthly reports to the M&E unit. The district M&E units are responsible for entering and
analyzing their data, which are used in the quarterly reports. The PCU is the central
repository for copies of all the CSs' monitoring forms and monthly reports. It is worth noting
that, despite the midterm evaluation's recommendation to increase their personnel, the
district-level M&E units are still understaffed.
FSIN also is setting up community-based M&E systems. One of these is the CEWS-UR,
which some communities already are using to monitor potential threats to their livelihood
security and to identify appropriate responses. This system is discussed in detail in section D
below. Setting up community-run M&E systems that will enable communities to track
progress in their Action Plans and plan future activities is under discussion.
2. Advantages and disadvantages of working in a consortium
Staffs' views of the advantages and disadvantages of working in a consortium were a key
topic in this evaluation. M&E staff reported that working in the consortium was positive
because "the exchange of experience and knowledge enriches the M&E work." Sharing
information and experience clearly is the primary advantage of working in a consortium as it
was consistently reported by these and all other types of staff. Other advantages cited were
having a standardized system that all the M&E staff understood and that facilitated sharing
information; that collaborating on surveys improved the quality of the work; and that
combining the complementary expertise in M&E among the CS produced a good result
(Table VI-4 below). Some staff said that when FSIN began it was difficult to work with the
different CSs' systems, but by now that has become an advantage, as they have acquired
experience with those systems. The advantages of working in the consortium thus
considerably outweigh the disadvantages, according to M&E staff.
The major disadvantage reported by most staff is the busy M&E work schedule, that makes
finding the time to meet colleagues and adhering to that schedule difficult (Table VI-4).
These same problems were reported by many SO1 staff as well as the TS, which indicates
that they are common problems, and that the DAP2 should have more realistic and
coordinated DIPs.
62
Table VI-4. M&E: Advantages and Disadvantages of Working in a Consortium
Advantages Disadvantages
• We have common tools so all the M&E
staff understand the system.
• There is a common method of
calculating the indicators.
• Standardized M&E work is an
advantage for sharing among the CS.
• The exchange of experience and
knowledge enriches the M&E work.
• Collaborating on surveys improves the
quality of the work, through planning and
analyzing together.
• There is complementary expertise in
M&E among the CS; combine it and there is
a good result.
• Exposure to and experience with other
management systems and other donors'
systems.
• It is difficult to find time in different
people's calendars to meet.
• It is difficult to get people together for
training because everyone is busy.
• People cannot always adhere to the
work schedule because there is often
someone who cannot come to a meeting or
make a decision, which disrupts the rest of
the schedule.
• People are obliged to obey group
decisions, even if they do not agree with
them.
• Initially it was difficult to collaborate
because of different M&E systems and
expertise.
• The consortium needs a central office
to do the accounting and streamline the
administration of organizing surveys and
hiring interviewers.
3. Strengths and weaknesses of the M&E system
Staff cited information-exchange, good quality data, the standardized M&E system, and
quarterly meetings to resolve M&E issues as strengths of FSIN's M&E system (Table VI-5
below). Making the TS a partner in data collection and in conducting studies is another
strength because it helps build their capacity. The availability of funds to collect qualitative
data and to conduct surveys also was reported as a strong point. Overall staff considers the
M&E system to be a good one, despite the weaknesses they also identified.
Many of the M&E system's reported weaknesses reflect four years of experience on the
ground that the second DAP should be able to address. These weaknesses potentially affect
data quality and therefore bear consideration in the DAP2. For example, staff reported that
some of the IPTT indicators need revision to be valid site-specific measures, that the SO
heads should be more involved in data collection because it improves data quality, and that
FSIN needs to increase its daily rate for interviewers so that it can hire more competent
people and improve the quality of the data collected. (Table VI-5). Inadequate staffing in the
district M&E units was reported as a universal weakness; this is not new. Some staff
questioned the utility of the plethora of data-collection forms that exist and pointed out the
need for streamlining them, as well as the need to train field agents use them correctly. Table
VI-5 below shows the M&E staff's assessment of their system's strengths and weaknesses.
63
Table VI-5. Strengths and Weaknesses of the M&E System
Strengths Weaknesses
• The exchange of information among
the consortium members.
• There is a standardized system of M&E
and indicators for all for CS.
• Common tools for data collection and
analysis.
• Good quality data.
• The collection of qualitative data,
people's testimonies.
• Quarterly meetings with all CS to
resolve M&E issues.
• All the CSs collaborate to conduct
studies; we define the methodology together.
• The TS also participates in our studies,
which builds their capacity. They participate
in data collection.
• There are numerous reference
documents.
• Funds are available to conduct surveys
that do not use the IPTT indicators to assess
impact, in addition to tracking the IPTT
indicators.
• The M&E units are under-staffed; one
person working alone cannot get all the data
input and analyzed on time. The midterm
evaluation recommended hiring data￾inputters but this has not been done.
• The IPTT indicators need to be
streamlined and revised so that they are better
measures of reality, which is district-specific.
• The heads of the SOs do not take
responsibility for the data collection for their
SOs; they need to be more involved.
• The software for data management was
just now installed; it is late, we needed it
earlier.
• It is difficult to hire good interviewers
for data collection due to the salary that FSIN
can pay. This affects data quality.
• We have learned that we have to define
criteria for hiring interviewers in order to get
competent ones.
• There are too many forms to collect
information. There are as many as 30 forms
but only about six are used.
• Self-M&E in the communities is not
really taken into account so it is not done. It
should be; it is important and part of
capacity-building.
• The community TBAs fill out the
forms that document women's intake of iron
pills, but there are no other community-level
forms that participants can do themselves.
• Each CS should have its own
indicators, perhaps at the district level, in
addition to the IPTT.
• The consortium does not share the
quarterly activity reports with the CS; the
reports go to the PCU. Staffs need to see
these reports before the quarterly meetings.
4. Lessons learned
Several of the "lessons learned" point to the need for training related to M&E (Table VI-6
below). Field agents' need for training to use forms correctly and to collect valid data was a
common theme, which indicates that it is an important lesson to address. Other lessons
learned were that FSIN needs to limit the size of its "training of trainers" workshops to ensure
that the training quality is good, and that participants need capacity-building to do their own
64
M&E. One staff member made the interesting statement that field agents and the TS "should
get feedback on the data they collect so that they understand what they and FSIN are doing.
Otherwise they are operating in a vacuum, which does not promote good work" (Table VI-6).
These lessons learned, like some of the weaknesses noted above, point to the serious need to
address the factors that affect data quality, namely the need for training and supervising data￾collection staff. The evaluator's sense, after interviewing a range of FSIN staff including
those responsible for M&E, is that the M&E system would benefit from being streamlined
and focusing on the essentials—the donor's and CSs' information requirements—in order to
improve the quality of its work at all levels. It is clear that there are data- and training-quality
issues that need to be addressed in FSIN's fifth year, as well as taken into account for the
DAP2.
Table VI-6. M&E: Lessons Learned
Lessons Learned
• FSIN should invest three months in planning in order to have a work plan and an M&E
system in place before rushing out to start the activities.
• The M&E unit makes field agents work with more rigor: when they know that there is
a full-time M&E person checking their data, they do a better job of data collection.
• Field agents should be well trained in data-collection methods so that the data quality is
good.
• Program technicians and the TS should get feedback on the data they collect so that
they understand what they and FSIN are doing. Otherwise they are operating in a vacuum,
which does not promote good work. They should get feedback because it would help them
do a better job.
• M&E tools should always be designed in collaboration with program participants.
• The TS is not a factor in sustainability due to their lack of means, including lack of
salary and perdiem that add up to lack of motivation. They have the competence, which
varies by office, but not the means to continue M&E after FSIN ends.
• Workshops for "training of trainers" should be limited to small numbers of people so
that the quality of the training is good.
• Participants need capacity-building so that they can implement their work plans and do
their own M&E.
• Illiterate TBAs can use the illustrated form to record women's intake of iron pills.
• Surveys should not be done when participants are busy.
65
5. Recommendations
a. For the current program
1. Increase the staff in the M&E units: each unit should have one or two data inputters and
an assistant to the unit head. The M&E units currently have only one person, who cannot get
all the work done on time.
2. Provide training for M&E staff on the new software system for data management. This
includes training the program heads and the district and program coordinators.
3. Train the SO heads (“responsables”) how to use the new data-management system so that
they understand how their data are input and analyzed, can recognize errors, and can use the
system.
4. One CS should provide annual, standardized training for all program technicians and TS
partners on data-collection and recording for M&E, so that both use their data-collection
forms correctly and understand why the information is needed, in order to improve data
quality.
5. Increase the salary that FSIN can pay interviewers (“enqueteurs”) so that the program can
hire competent ones and improve data quality.
6. Continue to involve the TS in data collection and surveys, in order to build their capacity
and maintain the partnership.
7. Limit the number of people who attend the "training of trainers" workshops so that the
quality of the training is good; determine the optimum number based on experience.
8. The PCU needs to ensure that all the CSs receive all the quarterly reports before the
quarterly review meetings, so that they are prepared for the meetings.
9. Systematically field-test the forms currently used by participants (e.g. the CEWS-RU
forms), including those designed for illiterates (e.g. the TBAs’ form for iron pills), to assess
their usability and the quality of data produced.
10. Improve the monitoring of the number of participants that are involved in the program's
different activities.
11. Set up community-level M&E so that participants can track progress in their work plans,
identify problems, and make plans. Design a system for illiterate people, where necessary.
b. For the DAP2
1. Invest three months in planning in order to have a sound work plan and M&E system in
place before starting the program activities.
2. Streamline the M&E system by focusing on the donor's and CSs' information requirements
in order to improve the quality of work at all levels. "Focus on the information requirements"
means provide only the information that is required by USAID and the CSs' headquarters,
until the M&E system can do that well.
3. To do the above: for the DAP2, design the consortium-level, standardized M&E system
and indicators, focusing it on information requirements. That is the core M&E system for the
DAP2 and the DIP2. CSs can add their specific indicators/extras to the core system for their
individual DIPs.
4. Standardize indicators and data collection and analysis methods in the beginning of the
program, before any of them are used, in order to avoid data aggregation and comparison
problems later.
5. Ensure that the IPTT indicators are valid measures of site-specific reality in the different
districts in the beginning of the program, in order to have useful data.
66
6. Train the SO heads (“responsables”) how to use the new data-management system so that
they understand how their data are input and analyzed, can recognize errors, and can use the
system.
7. Provide solid training so that staff and the TS partners can use their data-collection forms
correctly and understand why the information is needed, in order to improve data quality.
8. The district M&E units should provide regular feedback to program technicians and the
TS about the data they collect, so that they understand what they and FSIN are doing.
9. Increase the salary that FSIN can pay interviewers (“enqueteurs”) so that the program can
hire competent interviewers.
10. Design the forms for community-level M&E in collaboration with the participants and
then systematically field-test them for usability and data quality.
11. Use round percentages (no decimal points) in reporting.
D. The Emergency Unit
CARE made three observations related to Niger’s adverse environment that triggered the
establishment of the Emergency Unit (EU).
• Household livelihood systems are precarious; 
• Communities are little involved in the state’s formal early warning system;
• Responses to crises are neither timely nor appropriate.
These observations led CARE to consider, in its multi-annual strategic plan, the objective of
reinforcing “the capacities of CARE and its partners in the prevention of and response to
emergencies.” FSIN provided the means to pursue this objective and the EU was set up with
the following objectives5
 :
• Define and implement a plan for the early warning of and responding to
emergencies;
• Define a mechanism for monitoring household vulnerability in the FSIN and
CARE intervention zones;
• Train CARE and FSIN personnel and other partners’ staff in the early warning of
and responding to emergencies;
• Establish and maintain contact with partners and donors. The EU should
coordinate “the design of all essential tools for responding to emergencies, and also ensure
the centralization, processing, and the dissemination of information at the level of the
intervention areas. A strategy thus was established, based on monitoring vulnerability,
developing emergency early-warning and response plans, partnership with other
organizations (NGOs and the state’s sub-regional crisis prevention and management
committees), and support to communities to help them identify and set up local early warning
indicators.”
 
5
 See pre-evaluation final report of CARE (August 2004)
67
1. Summary of activities
The principal activities carried out in the EU’s framework are:
• The establishment of a mechanism for the early warning of and response to
emergencies, composed of a National Task Force, Regional Task Forces, and CEWS-UR
committees in FSIN’s intervention zone. Roles and responsibilities were defined for each
level.
• The development of emergency plans: these include CARE-Niger’s national plan
for early warning and response to emergencies, regional plans for all the regions of Niger,
and community emergency plans. Training workshops were organized for the regional task
force teams. Some of these teams have drafted outlines for their regional emergency plans.
It should be noted that the CARE-Niger plan is not yet finalized and that drafting the
community-level plans has not begun.
• The establishment of a mechanism to monitor vulnerability and early warning: the
EU has done this through an iterative and participatory process of discussion with all the
CARE projects and FSIN partners. This process led to the design of several forms (e.g. for
early warning and for evaluating victims); an operational mode of emergency food relief; and
a guide to collect information about food security and to evaluate agropastoral production.
The committee also requested the establishment of CEWS-UR committees in FSIN
communities. These committees will be responsible for collecting community-level
information and reporting it to the sub-regional or the FSIN level. Above all, the CEWS-UR
committees will be responsible for responding to local-level emergencies. They will seek
external help when the responses required are beyond their capacity.
• Training in early warning and emergency response for the ISAN and CARE staff,
and for their partners, the TS.
• Participation in the network, notably with the Inter-State Committee to Fight
Drought in the Sahel (CILSS), the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET), and
the World Food Program (WFP).
• Conducting emergency operations: support to flood victims in Konni department
in August 2002, operations to support communities at risk of food insecurity in the north and
northwest of Tahoua, support to the evacuees from Ivory Coast, support to flood victims in
Boughoul (Agadez), and support to the TS of Konni/Illela to mitigate animal disease.
2. Findings
The analysis of the EU’s activities shows that:
• The process of establishing the EU was laborious and initially not well understood
by FSIN’s or other partners, namely the TS and FSIN’s participants. The process is still
underway. The system is not standardized in Agadez or Tanout; it is being piloted in five
sites in those districts. In Konni/Illela the system is being piloted in ten sites. Dogondoutchi
district is more advanced and has forty community CEWS-UR. The TS find the system
sound enough but note that it uses neither the same approaches nor the same indicators as the
state’s formal system. FSIN participants do not understand the “early warning” aspect.
68
• Additional discussions have led to the establishment of a mechanism that is more
or less operational, depending on the case. The mechanism includes the various “Task
Forces” and the community-level CEWS-UR committees. The state’s emergency response
system quickly learned about this mechanism through the EU’s actions.
• The CEWS-UR committees function well enough in the communities where they
were set up, but their sustainability is not guaranteed because of the following problems: (i)
the laborious reporting system6
; (ii) the inherent costs of emergency response that only a
project could support, even if community emergency funds are programmed; and (iii) their
overlap with (rather than their inclusion in, at this point) the state’s formal system.
• The CEWS-UR mechanism is useful for effective response to crises at the
community level.
• The CEWS-UR mechanism is well accepted by communities, contrary to the TS
statements.
• The impact of the CEWS-UR has begun to be felt at the community level, namely
by their rapid reaction to human and animal health problems, as well as in conflict prevention
(herder/farmer problems). For example, the CEWS-UR committees played an essential role
in disseminating information about locust attacks in northern Dogondoutchi. The same was
occurred in Awanchala (Konni/Illela), where a measles epidemic was avoided because the
CEWS-UR quickly reported information to the health services.
• There is no mechanism for the consortium’s CSs to take direct charge of
emergencies. The EU based in CARE-Konni manages the support mechanism for
emergency victims. This limits the other CSs’ intervention capacities, particularly the
common problem of transporting food.
3. Recommendations
The CEWS-UR, as they operate in FSIN’s intervention zone, is a good tool for early warning
about crises. It complements the state’s early-warning and disaster-management system.
Therefore it should be maintained and extended to all the FSIN communities, taking into
account the following recommendations:
1. Simplify the community-level reporting system by having only two alert levels: normal
and abnormal.
2. Reinforce community capacity to collect and analyze data, and promote information￾sharing among the CEWS-UR committees in the same area
3. Intensify discussions with the TS at all levels to connect the CEWS-UR system with the
state’s system.
4. Continue the consortium’s discussion to identify the types of support that the EU can
provide each CS, and to standardize their methodology (data collection and analysis,
reporting systems, crisis-response practices).
 
6
 The reporting system consists of a set of indicators for food security, health, social relations, and the
environment, that communities monitor and report on each month to the program and the sub-regional Early
Warning System offices. The committees fill out a form with four warning levels (normal, alert, alarm, urgent).
69
5. Promote the establishment of community emergency funds in all the FSIN communities.
6. Each CS should have an emergency fund for dealing with disaster victims.
70
References Cited
Africare, "Pre-Evaluation Report on the Food Security Initiative Project in Agadez,"
September 2004.
Bakari, S., "Final Quantitative Study," final report, Food Security Initiative in Niger
(FSIN), July 2004.
CARE-Niger, "Pre-Evaluation Report on the Food Security Initiative Project in
Niger," September 2004.
McMillan, D.E., D. Jaharou, A. Mahamadou, D. Mariko, and H. Chano, "Mid-Term
Evaluation, Food Security Initiative in Niger (FSIN)," July 7, 2003.
Project Coordination Unit, FSIN, "Indicator Performance Tracking Table FY04, draft
version” October 2004.
ANNEX 1
Fieldwork and Activities Schedule
and Topical Guide
FSIN Final Qualitative Evaluation: Fieldwork and Activities Schedule
Date Activity
11 September Briefing - Meeting with M&E point people from each organisation
and team members, as well as PCU and DAP coordinators.
12-13
Septmber
Elizabeth and team plan, discuss, review and prepare. M&E people
available for discussions.
14 September Evaluation team presents a draft Table of Contents to M&E people,
DAP Coordinators and PCU.
15 September Team work continues; meeting with Jennifer Peterson and Madame
Chano Hadiza – M&E counterpart from the Ministry of Community
Developpement.
16 September Depart for the field, 10 hour drive to Agadez; details and
accomodation to be organized by CARE (lodging) and Africare.
17 September Visit Agadez – details to be provided
18 September Visit Agadez – details to be provided
19 September Visit Agadez – details to be provided
20 September Visit Agadez - details to be provided
21 September Depart for Tanout, 6 hour drive; accomodations and details to be
organized by CARE (lodging) and CRS/HKI.
22 September Visit Tanout – details to be provided
23 September Visit Tanout/Zinder – details to be provided
24 September Visit Zinder– details to be provided
25 September Depart for Konni, 6 hour drive. Accommodation and details to be
organized by CRS.
26 September Visit Konni – details to be provided
27 September Visit Illela – details to be provided
28 September Visit Illela/Tanout – details to be provided
29 September Depart for Dogondoutchi 2 hour drive- Accommodation and details
to be organized by CRS.
30 September Visit Dogondoutchi – details to be provided
1 October Visit Dogondoutchi– details to be provided
2 October Visit Dogondoutchi – details to be provided
3 October Depart for Niamey – five hours drive
4 October Day off.
5-10 October Evaluation team writes up the first draft report and prepares for two
debriefings.
11 October First debriefing with the consortium; second debriefing with USAID
and the Ministry of Community Development.
12 October Brief presentation to the Ministry of Community Development;
continue writing.
13-14 October Evaluation team continues writing.
18 October First draft, in French and English, sent to those who requested to have
it before the French version is complete.
1 November Dr. Moha begins translating the English sections of the report into
French.
1
TOPICAL GUIDE
FSIN: Final Qualitative Evaluation
Septembre, 2004
I. Project personnel
1. Program impact : global, by SO.
2. Strengths and weaknesses of the program?
3. Implementation of the midterm evaluation recommendations ? If not : why not?
4. Sustainability?
5. Lessons learned?
6. Recommendations?
7. Evaluation of FSIN’s overall structure in terms of program management?
8. Appropriateness of FFW?
- Contribution to achieving results?
- Impact on sustainability of program’s activities ?
9. Changes in vulnerability of the target groups?
II. Local NGOs
1. Project impact : global, by SO ?
2. Strengths and weaknesses of the program ?
3. Sustainability ?
4. Lessons learned ?
5. Recommendations?
6. Appropriateness of FFW?
- Contribution to achieving results?
- Impact on sustainability of program’s activities ?
7. Changes in vulnerability of the target groups ?
III. Administration (civil servants)
1. Project impact ?.
2. Program strengths and weaknesses?
3. Sustainability ?
4. Recommendations ?
IV. State Technical Services
1. Program impact : global, by SO.
2. Strengths and weaknesses of the program?
3. Implementation of the midterm evaluation recommendations ? If not : why not?
4. Sustainability?
5. Lessons learned?
6. Recommendations?
7. Evaluation of FSIN’s overall structure in terms of program management?
8. Appropriateness of FFW?
- Contribution to achieving results?
- Impact on sustainability of program’s activities ?
9. Changes in vulnerability of the target groups?
2
TOPICAL GUIDE, p. 2
V. Beneficiares
A. Impact
1. Have there been any changes in your lives in the past few years ?
- What changes ?
- Why?
2. Changes in your vulnerability to food insecurity ?
- Why, or why not?
- Changes in the different social groups here ?
3. Changes in nutritional status at the household level, among women and children, the most
vulnerable people ?
4. What parts of this program function well, in your opinion ? Why ?
5. What parts of this program do not function well ? Why not?
6. Can you recommend changes in the program to improve it in the future ?
B. KAP
7. Have you learned anything with the program ? What?
8. In your opinion, what are the most useful things that you have learned with the program?
10. Do you use any techniques or practices that you have learned with the program ? Which
ones ?
11. What are the most useful techniques/practices that you use that you learned with the
program ?
C. Community capacity related to food security
13. What is the capacity of your community to manage your own food security?
14. Has this capacity changed during the past few years?
15. What are the roles of men and women in managing community food security ?
16. Do you have committees ? how many men/women on your committees? how are they
chosen ?
18. What is your opinion of thes committees and your food security management plan (Plan
d'Action)?
19. Recommendations to improve your capacity to manage your food security?
20. Have you received support from FSIN for a community initiative?
- What initiative?
- When?
- Outcome?
21. FFW: have you received it ?
- Your opinion of FFW ?
- Advantages and disadvantages?
- Impact on your life ?
ANNEX 2
TERMS of REFERENCE
1
CARE INTERNATIONAL AU NIGER
INITIATIVES DE SECURITE ALIMENTAIRE AU NIGER (ISAN)
EVALUATION FINALE
TERMES DE REFERENCE
CARE International au Niger en collaboration avec Africare ; CRS/HKI
Key Contacts:
Dr. Amadou Sayo ACD CARE Niger
Ali Bety ANR Sector Coordinator CARE Niger
Véronique Praz Country Representative Africare Niger
Kwanza Price PCU Manager Africare Niger
Pascal Payet PCU ME coordinator Africare Niger
Abdou Garba CARE Konni, DAP coordinator
Idrissa Amadou CARE Konni, ME coordinator
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I. INFORMATIONS GENERALES
Programme : Initiatives de Sécurité Alimentaire au Niger (ISAN)
Durée du Programme : 2000 – 2005
Financement : USAID (Titre II)
Exécution : Africare ; CARE ; CRS/HKI
Zones d’intervention : Agadez (Arlit, Tchirozérine) ; Tahoua (Konni, Illéla) ;
 Dosso (Doutchi), Zinder (Tanout, Matameye)
Durée de l’évaluation : 34 jours
Démarrage de l’évaluation : 1er Septembre 2004
Fin de l'évaluation : 4 Octobre 2004
Responsable direct : Coordonnateur Programme ISA CARE
II. CONTEXTE
Le Niger est un vaste pays sahélien enclavé de 1.267.000 km2
. Onze pour cent (11%) des
terres sont cultivables, mais seulement le quart est exploité, bien que 90% de la force du
travail soit engagée dans l’agriculture.
Les conditions climatiques dures et les sols marginaux résultent en une productivité agricole
faible et placent des limites sérieuses sur les pratiques de culture alternative. La condition de
pauvreté de la plupart des ménages rend plusieurs solutions inabordables.
La pluviométrie demeure le principal déterminant de la production agricole au Niger, mais
la quantité de pluie et sa distribution ne sont pas prévisibles. Même au cours des années où
les pluies sont jugées abondantes, une très grande proportion de ménages ne produit pas
assez pour couvrir leurs besoins alimentaires.
La dégradation des sols force plusieurs agriculteurs à se déplacer vers les terres
traditionnellement réservées aux pasteurs. Ces terres marginales sont très peu productives et,
leur utilisation par les agriculteurs peut provoquer des violentes confrontations avec les
éleveurs dans les zones agricoles et agropastorales. En zone pastorale, la gestion du pâturage
et des points demeure la principale source de conflits entre éleveurs.
La pression démographique (3,3% par an), l’utilisation abusive du bois comme source
d’énergie domestique, le surpâturage et la rareté des terres agricoles ont forcé les
agriculteurs à adopter des stratégies de survie qui ne sont pas toujours compatibles avec la
gestion durable des ressources naturelles. Aussi l’agriculture nigérienne souffre-t-elle
beaucoup d’une absence de rotation de cultures, d’une pratique inappropriée de défrichage
(coupe abusive, brûlis), d’une réduction voir la disparition de la pratique de la jachère, d’une
faible utilisation de la fumure (organique et minérale), des techniques d’irrigation, etc.
Cette situation qui perdure d’année en année place le Niger en situation d’insécurité
alimentaire chronique laquelle a un impact mortel sur les plus vulnérables et
particulièrement les enfants et les femmes. Selon l'indice de développement humain calculé
par le PNUD, le Niger est parmi les pays les plus pauvres du monde; il se classe au 174ème
rang sur 175 pays. La population en deçà du seuil de pauvreté représente 63% de l'ensemble.
La majorité de ces pauvres se trouve en milieu rural (Document de Stratégie de Réduction
de la Pauvreté DSRP, 2002). Dans ce milieu rural les ménages les plus touchés sont ceux
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dont le chef n'est pas salarié et parmi ces derniers ceux qui soufrent le plus sont ceux dont le
chef de ménage est une femme au foyer ou une personne inactive. La pauvreté limite l'accès
aux services sociaux et aux autres satisfactions matérielles et morales.
La couverture éducative des enfants et des jeunes est faible et croît moins que la population,
dans ce domaine le Niger est le dernier pays de la sous région. Le taux brut global de
scolarisation est estimé à 34%, pour les filles il n'est que de 27%.
En matière de santé la situation appelle des efforts et des améliorations importantes, malgré
les investissements faits jusqu'ici. Les indicateurs suivants sont à cet égard illustrants:
- taux national de couverture sanitaire : 42%
- taux de mortalité infantile : 12,6%
- taux de mortalité infanto juvénile : 28%
- Taux de couverture vaccinale : 15%
- pourcentage des enfants non vaccinés en milieu rural : 47%
- pourcentage des enfants non vaccinés en milieu urbain : 7%
- pourcentage des enfants non vaccinés à Niamey : 2%
- espérance de vie à la naissance : 45,6 ans
- insuffisance pondérale ou malnutrition (poids/âge) des enfants de 0 à 5ans : 40%; ce taux
est plus élevé dans les régions de Diffa, Zinder et Maradi.
- retard de croissance des enfants de 0 à 5 ans: 40%; ce taux est plus élevé dans les régions
de Diffa, Zinder et Maradi.
- Pourcentage des femmes ayant reçu des soins prénatals : 36% en milieu rural (85% en
milieu urbain)
- Pourcentage des femmes rurales ayant été assistées par un personnel qualifié lors de leur
accouchement : 9% (65% en milieu urbain).
- Mortalité maternelle : 0,7% (le plus élevé au monde).
- Le nombre des malades du SIDA estimé à 65.000 personnes par l'OMS en 1997, les cas
signalés aux services de santé se chiffrent à 5624 en 2000.
- Seulement 14% des hommes et 3% des femmes reconnaissent avoir utilisé le condom
pour se protéger contre le SIDA.
La situation de santé de la population est aggravé par les insuffisances des conditions du
cadre de vie, la sous alimentation et la malnutrition. Le système de santé souffre des charges
récurrentes élevées, des faiblesses de recouvrement des coûts, de la mauvaise allocation des
ressources humaines, des insuffisances de gestion des ressources matérielles et de la
centralisation excessive des pouvoirs de décision et d'initiative.
La malnutrition est l'une des principales causes de mortalité des enfants nigériens. 41% des
enfants sont dans un état de malnutrition chronique et 20% sont dans un état de malnutrition
chronique sévère.
A peine 50% des nigériens ont accès à l'eau potable et seulement 4,9% des ménages ont un
robinet privé. Plus de 80% des nigériens n'ont pas de lieu d'aisance, ils font leurs besoins dans
la nature ou dans des endroits non indiqués; en milieu rural plus de 94,1% des ménages n'ont
pas de lieu d'aisance; seulement 2,8% des ménages urbains ont des toilettes personnelles avec
chasse d'eau.
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La sécurité alimentaire des populations reste précaire et préoccupante, et cela d'autant plus
que la croissance démographique se maintient à un taux élevé. Presque une année sur trois le
Niger accuse un déficit céréalier de 200.000 à 300.000 tonnes sur un besoin d'environ 2,5
million tonnes de céréales. Le système de sécurité alimentaire mis en place par le
gouvernement et les donateurs atténue les effets des crises certes, mais des poches sociales
touchées par le dénuement alimentaire total existent dans certaines zones du pays.
Depuis les indépendances, le Niger tente de définir et de mettre en œuvre une politique de
sécurité alimentaire susceptible d’inverser cette tendance. Les partenaires extérieurs,
gouvernementaux et non gouvernementaux, sont de plus en plus impliqués dans la recherche
d’une réponse adéquate à ce défit. C’est dans le cadre de cette mobilisation générale que en
mai 1999, quatre (4) Organisations internationales Non Gouvernementales (ONG) -
Africare, CARE International, Catholic Relief Services (CRS) et Helen Keller International
(HKI) - ont soumis à l’Agence de Développement International des Etats Unis (USAID) une
proposition d’activités (Development Activity Proposal, DAP) pour la mise en œuvre d’un
vaste programme de sécurité alimentaire dit «INITIATIVES DE SÉCURITÉ ALIMENTAIRE AU
NIGER (ISAN)». L’USAID a approuvé le programme en août 2000. Ce programme couvre
une période de cinq ans (11 août 2000 à 31 septembre 2005). Il a touché trois cent (300)
villages au niveau de sept (7) arrondissements du Niger à savoir Arlit, Tchirozerine, Dogon
Doutchi, Konni, Illéla, Tanout et Matamèye. La population cible est estimée à environ trois
cent milles (300 000) personnes.
Le but final du programme est l’amélioration de la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle dans
les zones cibles.
Trois (3) Objectifs Stratégiques (OS) sont définis autour de ce but :
1. OS1 : Renforcer les capacités des communautés à prendre en charge leur sécurité
alimentaire et nutritionnelle ;
2. OS2 : Augmenter la production agricole durable des ménages par la promotion des
techniques culturales respectueuses de l'environnement ;
3. OS3 : Améliorer l’état nutritionnel des membres du ménage, notamment les plus
vulnérables (les femmes et les jeunes enfants).
Le cadre logique présenté à l’annexe1 indique les indicateurs contractuels (dits également
indicateurs communs) d’impact et de suivi retenus au niveau de chacun des trois objectifs
stratégiques. Ces indicateurs constituent la base du plan de suivi de la performance du
programme (annexe 2).
Il a également été inscrit pour les cinq années d’exécution du programme des opérations de
Food For Work (FFW) à travers la distribution du blé bulgur. Les produits destinés à cette
distribution ont permis de soutenir les activités menées dans les zones d'intervention du
programme, en apportant une aide significative aux participants au cours de la période de
soudure pour les aider à faire face au déficit alimentaire grave. Les effets attendus d’une telle
stratégie est d'améliorer à long terme la production agricole et sa commercialisation par l’accès
aux services et aux infrastructures socio-économiques de base (marchés, centre de santé,
services agricoles, vétérinaires, etc.).
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Enfin, il a été confié à l’Unité d’Urgence de CARE Niger basée à Konni, la définition et a
mise en œuvre d’un mécanisme de prévoyance et de réponses aux urgences à travers
notamment :
• la définition des plans d’urgence régionaux ;
• la formation du personnel en matière d’urgence ;
• la mise en place d’un dispositif de suivi de vulnérabilité et d’alerte précoce au niveau
communautaire ;
• l’établissement et le maintien de contact avec les partenaires oeuvrant dans le domaine.
Les activités relatives aux trois objectifs stratégiques, celles conduites au cours des opérations
FFW, et les activités de l’Unité d’Urgence constituent les cinq (5) axes d’intervention
(secteurs d’activités) du programme.
La mise en œuvre du programme est assurée par les quatre ONGs participantes. Chacune
d’elle est responsable de la mise en œuvre des activités au niveau des sous zones dont elle a
la charge. Ainsi :
- Africare exécute son programme au niveau des arrondissements d’Arlit et de Tchirozérine
(Agadez) ;
- CARE International Niger met en œuvre son programme au niveau des arrondissements
de Konni, Illéla (Tahoua) et de celui de Matamèye (Zinder)
- CRS/HKI mettent en œuvre conjointement les activités de leur programme au niveau des
arrondissements de Dogon Doutchi (Dosso) et de Tanout (Zinder).
L’intervention au niveau de chaque district est spécifique d’une part aux réalités de chaque
zone d’intervention et, de l’autre à la stratégie d’intervention de chaque ONG. Ainsi, chaque
ONG a complété les trois objectifs stratégiques pour prendre en compte ces spécificités (voir
cadre logique spécifique adopté au niveau de chaque district). Cependant, l’ensemble des
composantes du programme est mis en œuvre selon une approche participative.
Pour faciliter le processus de coordination du programme, une Unité de Coordination du
Programme (PCU) dirigée par Africare est mise en place. Le PCU est responsable de la
centralisation des rapports pour en faire une synthèse globale et coordonne le système
commun de suivi et évaluation du programme. Il assure également la coordination et le
partage des leçons apprises ainsi que la liaison externe assignée. Cette unité assure aussi la
supervision générale des ressources fournies par l'USAID et veille, entre autres, à ce que les
organisations adoptent les mêmes approches en matière de mesures des performances du
programme et l'établissement des rapports y afférents. Cette unité a aussi pour tâche de veiller au
respect des procédures de l'USAID en matière d'établissement de rapports et d'information.
L'Unité rend compte à Africare qui a été désignée par les autres membres du consortium comme
principal intermédiaire dans toutes les relations officielles avec l'USAID.
Un Comité de direction du programme dit Comité de Pilotage, composé des Représentants
résidents des ONGs participantes, est chargé de l’orientation d’ensemble et de la supervision du
programme. L’annexe 3 présente l’organigramme d’ensemble du programme ISAN.
La valeur totale des ressources externes pour la mise en œuvre du programme est environ 20
millions de dollars américains. Ce chiffre inclut :
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• 20 650 tonnes de blé fortifié au soja destinées à soutenir des activités à caractère
communautaire par le food for work. ;
• le montant de la vente de 30 000 tonnes de riz et de 7 500 tonnes d’huile végétale qui
rapportera 17.800.439 dollars en monnaie locale. Ces transactions de monétisation sont
assurées par CRS au Burkina Faso, et par Africare au Niger.
• 2.199.562 dollars en devise américaine sur le compte 202 (e) de l'USAID.
En plus de ces ressources externes, la participation physique, matérielle et parfois monétaire des
communautés (cas de la construction de certaines infrastructures socio-économiques tels les
pistes et les centres de santé ) et de l’Etat( en consentant des taxes sur les produits de la
monétisation) représente des ressources non négligeables pour la mise en œuvre du programme.
En plus, des cinq secteurs d’activités relatifs aux trois objectifs stratégiques, le Food for
work, l’Unité d’urgence, une attention particulière a été accordée aux systèmes de suivi et
évaluation (commun et spécifiques) qui constituent le cadre de mesure de la performance du
programme et des réajustements de l’intervention.
Le progrès du programme vers la réalisation des trois objectifs stratégiques est mesuré à
travers la Table de Suivi des Indicateurs de Performance (TSIP). Cette table de suivi est
composée de l’ensemble des indicateurs communs présenté dans le cadre logique en annexe
1. En plus de ces indicateurs, chaque district a des indicateurs spécifiques qu’il suit pour
prendre en compte les spécificités des différentes zones.
Un plan commun de suivi et évaluation permettant la collecte des données pour le calcul des
indicateurs retenus, l’analyse du niveau des indicateurs fut conçu et mis en œuvre au niveau
du consortium. Ce plan s’est inspiré d’une part des résultats de l’atelier de suivi et évaluation
pour le Titre II tenu à Bamako, au Mali du 29 mai au 02 juin 2000 ; d’autre part, des plans de
suivi et évaluation mis en œuvre dans des programmes similaires en Afrique de l’Ouest ; et
enfin de l’expérience des ONGs participantes en matière de suivi et évaluation des
programmes de sécurisation des conditions de vie des ménages.
Le système de suivi et évaluation a prévu dans sa mise en œuvre trois grandes évaluations
notamment l’évaluation ou étude de base, l’évaluation à mi-parcours et l’évaluation finale.
Les études de base ont été organisées entre novembre 2000 et mars 2001 dans les cinq districts
du programme. Ces études ont permis de déterminer le niveau de départ des indicateurs
communs et spécifiques de performance du programme et de faire des réajustements par rapport
à certaines cibles qui sont soit surestimées ou sous-estimées. Elles ont donc permis de détailler la
planification avec des situations effectivement appréciées avec les bénéficiaires.
L’évaluation à mi-parcours a débuté en septembre 2002 avec la pré évaluation (documentation,
étude quantitative, préparation phase qualitative). La phase qualitative a été conduite en mars
2003 avec une équipe de consultants nationaux et internationaux, et les représentants du
gouvernement et de l’USAID. Cette phase de mars n’avait pas pris en compte les activités de
l’Unité d’Urgence pour laquelle les conditions d’une évaluation n’étaient pas réunies en ce
moment. Son évaluation a eu lieu en mai 2003 avec une consultante internationale.
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Cette évaluation à mi-parcours a permis non seulement de dégager les forces et les
faiblesses du programme mais aussi de formuler des recommandations pour une
amélioration de l’intervention.
Quelques forces du programme
• Parfaite cohérence avec les politiques nationales
• Grande complémentarité entre ONGs participantes
• Grande diversité des stratégies d’intervention, mais forte cohérence entre les programmes sur
le terrain
• Forte implication des groupes vulnérables
• Stratégie d’intervention basée sur les approches participatives
• Food for Work a partout contribué à crédibiliser le programme
• Implication des autorités coutumières et administratives, des services techniques de l’Etat et
de certaines ONG locales dans l’identification des villages bénéficiaires
• Chaque CS a mis en place un plan de durabilité
• Forte harmonisation dans le système de suivi
2. Quelques faiblesses du programme
• Réalisations et impacts du programme peu connus au niveau national, même dans certains
cas au niveau régional.
• Retard dans la mise en oeuvre des cultures maraîchères
• Les AGR ont été peu prises en compte dans la conception du DAP
• Faible implication des Agents de suivi et évaluation dans les activités de terrain et vice versa
• Faible information sur la monétisation au niveau national
3. Les recommandations de l’évaluation à mi-parcours
a. Relatives à l’Objectif Stratégique 1 (OS1) : Renforcer les capacités des communautés à
prendre en charge leur sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle
• Renforcer l’appui et le suivi des COSAN déjà implicite dans la stratégie de ISAN; ajouter un
indicateur 3.1 relatif à la performance de ces COSAN.
• Harmoniser les termes et concepts clés pour mieux s’intégrer avec les politiques de
développement rural et de décentralisation.
• Faciliter l’échange des meilleures pratiques pour l’analyse de la participation des femmes et
des groupes vulnérables dans les rapports, l’évaluation de FFW ou lors les réunions de
coordination.
b. Relatives à l’Objectif Stratégique 2 (OS2) : Augmenter la production agricole durable
des ménages par la promotion des techniques culturales respectueuses de
l'environnement 
• Elaborer et exécuter un plan d’actions à court terme pour le maraîchage et le marketing de
ses produits
• Développer des alternatives économiques (AGR) pour les villages n’ayant pas des
opportunités de pratiquer le maraîchage
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c. Relatives à l’Objectif Stratégique 3 (OS3) : Améliorer l’état nutritionnel des membres du
ménage, notamment les plus vulnérables (les femmes et les jeunes enfants)
• Organiser des échanges entre les experts de santé et nutrition sur les expériences communes
et spécifiques à ISAN et qu’ils prennent en charge les recommandations en Santé Nutrition
d. Relatives à la gestion du programme
• Encourager l’Unité de Coordination du Programme (PCU) à préparer et suivre un plan
d’actions des formations pour augmenter la valeur ajoutée des formations au niveau village
et des experts du programme
• Promouvoir les échanges d’informations au niveau du programme par :
Š la création de 3 réseaux ;
Š le renforcement du backstopping du PCU (fonds d’assistance technique et de soutien aux
activités des réseaux) ;
Š la présentation des résultats par objectif et non par ONG participante ;
Š le développement d’un canevas de rapport sur le modèle CSR4 pour faciliter la comparaison
des rapports au niveau des districts et préparer des annexes par ONG participante
• Renforcer les cadres de concertation existants et les mécanismes de rapportages aux
ministères, par la formalisation des rencontres annuelles au niveau district
• Clarifier les rôles et responsabilités du PCU dans les fonctions de finance, rapportage,
communication, suivi et évaluation et coordination pour satisfaire les besoins identifiés du
consortium
• Renforcer les analyses de monétisation et ses liens avec les tendances de la sécurité
alimentaire nationale et les investissements de ISAN dans les régions et partager
l’information avec la douane, les clients, les élus et les autorités administratives nationales et
régionales
e. Relatives au Suivi et Evaluation
• Renforcer le suivi communautaire et les auto évaluations en se basant sur le rôle actif joué
par les Comité de Sécurité Alimentaire dans la collecte des données et le suivi d’impact du
programme
• Réviser la table de suivi des indicateurs de performance (IPTT) en :
Š désagrégeant les données de Doutchi et Tanout
Š intégrant les données de l’étude de base et de l’évaluation à mi-parcours pour les groupes
vulnérables dans les indicateurs d’impact 2.1 et 2.2
Š ajoutant des indicateurs du food for work dans la table IPTT
• étudiant un échantillon d’au moins un ménage par village et par niveau de vulnérabilité
comme outil pour développer des indicateurs d’impact de la production agricole (OS2) plus
réalistes et plus fiables
f. Relatives au food for work
• Simplifier le rapportage annuel du food for work
• Faciliter l’analyse comparative des activités de food for work et ajouter des indicateurs y
relatifs dans la table IPTT
g. Relatives à l’Unité d’Urgence
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• Intégrer la fiche d’alerte précoce au guide à l’usage des agents de terrain dans un système
simple de suivi de vulnérabilité
• Analyser les données du système par l’Unité d’Urgence (Gestion de l’Information) pour
fournir des rapports réguliers aux partenaires de ISAN.
• Analyser les tendances pour identifier les zones à vulnérabilité chronique et les types de
problèmes auxquels elles font face régulièrement.
• Diffuser le mode opératoire pour l’utilisation des vivres. S’assurer que chaque membre du
Consortium prévoit des fonds pour le transport, la distribution et le suivi des activités et que
l’ensemble des agents de terrain comprennent parfaitement le processus
• Définir clairement les types d’appui que l’Unité d’Urgence peut apporter aux partenaires de
ISAN, compte tenu de son staff limité.
• Former tous les partenaires de ISAN sur «l’Evaluation des Besoins», incluant l’analyse des
capacités et de la vulnérabilité, mais aussi le SCAP-RU.
• Les modèles de SCAP RU mis en œuvre et expérimentés par CARE et CRS ont tous montré
leur mérite, par conséquent des discussions/évaluations doivent être engagées en vue de
l’amélioration du système pour une éventuelle réplication
• L’Unité d’Urgence doit continuer sa participation au processus de mise en place du plan
d’urgence du gouvernement pour mieux faire comprendre le processus en cours dans la
région de Tahoua et faciliter sa prise en compte, mais surtout rechercher la synergie
Un plan de mise en œuvre de ces recommandations a été élaboré aussitôt après l’évaluation. Ce
plan est également en cours d’exécution et il semble pertinent que l’évaluation finale apprécie la
prise en compte de certaines recommandations principales dans la mise en œuvre du
programme.
III. JUSTIFICATION DE L’EVALUATION FINALE
Les activités du programme ISAN ont officiellement démarré à partir du mois d’août 2000.
Le programme est donc dans sa quatrième année d’activités. Le document de proposition
des activités de développement ou DAP, avait prévu, dans le système de suivi et évaluation
du programme, une évaluation de base, une évaluation à mi-parcours au cours du troisième
exercice budgétaire (FY03) et une évaluation finale au cours de la cinquième année
budgétaire (FY05). Le programme étant actuellement dans la perspective de proposition
d’une nouvelle phase du DAP (conformément au calendrier de soumission des propositions
à l’USAID) a jugé utile de conduire l’évaluation finale en fin de quatrième année et début
cinquième année budgétaire pour tenir compte des leçons tirées de cette évaluation dans la
conception de la prochaine phase du DAP. Dans ce cadre, une étude quantitative a été
conduite entre février et avril 2004 (période correspondant à celle des études de base) pour
évaluer le niveau des indicateurs de performance qui ne sont pas déterminés par le suivi
quotidien. Les résultats de cette étude et les rapports d’activités permettront aux équipes
d’élaborer un document de pré évaluation qui sera une des sources d’information pour la
phase qualitative, objet des présents TDRs.
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IV. OBJECTIFS DE L’EVALUATION FINALE
4.1 Objectif global
• L’évaluation finale est sommative. De façon globale, elle apprécie l’impact du
programme sur la sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle des populations bénéficiaires. Il
s’agit donc d’apprécier les effets et impacts du programme en termes de renforcement des
capacités des communautés et des partenaires, d’augmentation de la production agricole,
d’amélioration de l’état nutritionnelle des membres des ménages notamment les femmes
et les enfants de moins de 5 ans.
4.2. Objectifs spécifiques
• Apprécier les réalisations quantitatives en rapport avec les niveaux ciblés pour les
indicateurs de performance en se referant à la table IPTT (Indicators Performance
Tracking Table). Apprécier qualitativement ces résultats et leurs effets.
• Apprécier les effets du processus de renforcement des capacités des communautés et des
partenaires en prévention et gestion des crises sur la prise en compte des risques
• Apprécier les effets du programme sur la réduction de la vulnérabilité des groupes cibles
y compris les femmes, les enfants et les groupes spécifiques de la zone d’intervention du
programme.
• Apprécier la stratégie globale et opérationnelle de mise de mise en œuvre du programme
pour l’atteinte des résultats
• Apprécier l’état de mise en œuvre de certaines recommandations parmi les plus
importantes de l’évaluation à mi-parcours
• Formuler des recommandations et tirer des leçons pour la conception d’une éventuelle
nouvelle phase du programme.
L’ensemble de ces préoccupations seront analysées à travers les questions clés proposées
pour cette évaluation.
QUESTIONS CLES
Les points contenus dans les questions clés seront analysées en mettant l’accent sur la
cohérence, la pertinence, l’efficacité, l’efficience, la durabilité et l’impact.
5.1. Implémentation des activités
• Les recommandations de l’évaluation mi-parcours orientées sur les effets, l’impact, les
résultats des objectifs stratégiques et sur le Suivi et Evaluation ont-elles été suffisamment
prises en compte dans la mise en œuvre du programme ? ont-elles contribué à l’atteinte et
à la qualité des résultats souhaités ?
11
• La stratégie opérationnelle du programme a - t’elle été efficace dans l’atteinte des
résultas. La stratégie a t’elle favorisé une adhésion et appropriation du processus, des
actions et résultats par les bénéficiaires.
• Y a t’il eu des changements dans le contexte sociopolitique ? Si oui lesquels ? Comment
le programme s’est-il adapté à ces changements ?
5.2. Analyse des effets et impacts du programme
• Quels sont les changements notables constatés au niveau des groupes cibles en termes de
connaissance, attitudes et pratiques dans les domaines d’intervention du programme
(agriculture, élevage, environnement et santé/nutrition) ?
• La mise en œuvre du programme a-t-elle permis d’améliorer la disponibilité alimentaire
dans les communautés et les ménages ?
• La mise en œuvre du programme a-t-elle permis l’améliorer l’accès à la nourriture des
femmes et des ménages bénéficiaires quelque soit leur niveau de vulnérabilité?
• La mise en œuvre du programme a-t-elle permis d’améliorer l’utilisation de la nourriture
au niveau des ménages bénéficiaires ? L’amélioration de l’utilisation, notamment par
l’adoption de bonnes pratiques est-t-elle visible dans l’état nutritionnel des enfants de
moins de cinq ans et peut-t-elle sembler durable ?
• Quels sont les effets induits -- positifs ou négatifs - des activités du programme, dans la
vie des communautés ?
5.3. Mise en œuvre des activités d’urgence
• Quels sont les effets et impacts des activités de l’Unité d’Urgence :
- chez les communautés en termes de renforcement des capacités locales (communautaires)
en matière de prévention et de gestion des crises ;
- chez les communautés en termes d’opérations d’urgences ;
- chez les partenaires (services techniques et ONG) en termes de renforcement de capacités
dans le processus d’élaboration des plans d’urgence, de contingence
5.4. Le food for work
• La stratégie du food for work est-elle appropriée au contexte de la zone d’intervention ?
• Le food for work a-t-il contribué à l’atteinte des résultats ?
• Quels sont les effets/impacts de la pratique du FFW sur la durabilité des activités du
projet ?
5.5. Durabilité
• Les stratégies du programme permettent-elles d’assurer la pérennité des acquis ? Ces
stratégies sont-elles pertinentes et efficaces pour maintenir les avantages liés aux activités
et à leurs impacts ?
12
• Quels sont les facteurs qui ont favorisé l’adhésion et la participation des populations aux
activités du programme ?
• Quelles leçons tire-t-on de la mise en œuvre du programme ?
• Le partenariat/collaboration avec les services techniques, ONG, etc.) a t- il contribué à la
diffusion, réplication et durabilité des actions du programme
V. METHODOLOGIE DE L’EVALUATION FINALE
L’évaluation finale comprend deux étapes composées de :
- Une étude quantitative : qui a déjà eu lieu en avril et mai 2004 et dont les résultats sont
disponibles pour servir à la mission d’évaluation ; elle a été dirigée par un consultant
national.
- Une évaluation qualitative, dont il est question ici. Elle utilisera les résultats de l’étude
quantitative et toute la documentation disponible pour son analyse qu’elle complétera
avec une série d’entretiens dans les communautés et auprès de tous les acteurs et
partenaires du programme. 
5.1. L’étude quantitative
L’étude quantitative a permis de recueillir des données statistiquement fiables qui
permettront de mesurer le niveau des indicateurs d’impact. Le niveau de ces indicateurs à la
période de l’évaluation sera comparé au niveau observé au moment des études de base et à la
mi-parcours pour apprécier les progrès accomplis le cas échéant, notamment par rapport aux
niveaux cibles. Dès lors il faut s’assurer que les données collectées sont comparables aux
données de l’étude de base.
L’étude quantitative a pour objet d’évaluer la réalisation des objectifs (impacts mesurables)
par rapport aux prévisions à travers la mesure des indicateurs communs et spécifiques relatifs
à chaque objectif stratégique. La connaissance du niveau des indicateurs nécessite une
observation directe des unités participantes (membres des ménages, ménages, communautés,
partenaires, etc.).
Le rapport de cette évaluation et les documents de pré évaluation des différentes ONGs seront
mis à la disposition de l’équipe chargée de l’évaluation qualitative.
4.1. L’évaluation qualitative
L’évaluation qualitative doit permettre de recueillir les avis des bénéficiaires et des
partenaires sur leur implication dans la mise en œuvre du programme. Elle permettra
également d’apprécier dans quelle mesure les activités du programme répondent aux besoins
des bénéficiaires. Elle devra aussi permettre d’apprécier l’acceptation de la part des
populations des stratégies de mise en œuvre des activités. Enfin elle sera l’occasion pour
apprécier le degré de transfert du pouvoir et des compétences aux communautés du point de
vue de leur habilitation et de la pérennisation de l’intervention. Elle mettra également l’accent
sur les leçons apprises et les recommandations.
13
Elle reposera sur des entretiens communautaires (focus groupes ou informants clés) et des
entrevues avec les principaux partenaires (services techniques, autorités administratives et
coutumières et société civile).
VI. ORGANISATION DE L’EVALUATION FINALE
6.1. Responsable
L’évaluation finale sera placée sous la responsabilité de CARE Niger en étroite collaboration
avec les autres ONGs participantes (Africare, CRS et HKI).
6.2. Supervision technique et équipement
L’évaluation sera menée sous la supervision technique de CARE Niger avec l’appui de
l’Unité de Coordination du Programme. Toutefois, en cas de besoin, les autres ONGs
participantes peuvent être sollicitées à tout moment par rapport à des questions spécifiques ou
à des questions d’ordre général.
CARE organisera en collaboration avec l’Unité de Coordination du Programme et les autres
ONGs participantes le déroulement de l’évaluation et mettra à la disposition de l’équipe
d’évaluateurs tous les moyens matériels (déplacement et hébergement) et humains pour les
visites des différents sièges des districts et de leur zone d’intervention.
6.3. L’équipe des Evaluateurs
L’évaluation sera conduite par une équipe externe placée sous la supervision de CARE Niger
avec l’appui du PCU. La langue de travail étant le français et les rapports soumis à l’USAID
devant être rédigés en anglais, les évaluateurs doivent nécessairement avoir une parfaite
maîtrise (lecture, rédaction et communication) de ces deux langues. Le Chef de l’équipe des
Consultants veillera à ce que le rapport de l’évaluation soit rédigé dans chacune des deux
langues. Le rapport doit donc être rédigé dans les deux langues et accepté et approuvé par le
consortium avant le paiement final des évaluateurs.
L’équipe chargée de l’évaluation sera composée de trois consultants et deux représentants de
l’USAID FFP (le bailleurs) et du Gouvernement du Niger:
Un Consultant International socio-économiste, Socio-Anthropologue ou agro-économiste
(chef d’équipe) avec une expertise confirmée en évaluation des programmes du Titre II de
l’USAID. Il est le premier responsable de l’équipe et doit par conséquent disposer d’une
sagesse et d'une habileté à diriger une équipe et à assurer la coordination des analyses et la
rédaction du rapport. Il est le responsable du rapport final et doit assurer que le document
répond aux normes du BHR/FFP de l’USAID.
Le chef d’équipe doit avoir une expertise en matière d’évaluation des programmes de
développement notamment en ce qui concerne le renforcement des capacités institutionnelles
locales, le développement durable, l’analyse de la vulnérabilité et les questions liées au risque
et à la gestion des catastrophes.
Un Consultant national Agro-économiste, socio-économiste, ou socio anthropologue avec
une expertise en évaluation des programmes et projets. Il doit avoir une expertise du
14
développement notamment en ce qui concerne les capacités institutionnelles locales, le
développement agricole durable et la nutrition. Il doit également avoir une connaissance sur
l’évaluation des programmes/projets de l’USAID.
NB : si le chef d’équipe est agroéconomiste, le consultant national doit être socio
anthropologue et inversement.
L’agroéconomiste doit avoir des compétences techniques en :
- évaluation de la faisabilité technique et les analyses coûts-bénéfices des technologies
agricoles pluviales et irriguées ; et les techniques de vulgarisation ;
- évaluation de l’impact environnemental des innovations agricoles et de la construction des
infrastructures socio-économiques.
- Il doit aussi être familier avec les projets de l’USAID dans les pays sahéliens.
Un Consultant national expert en évaluation des programmes de Santé-Nutrition ou expert
en santé publique. Il doit disposer de grandes connaissances en suivi et évaluation des
programmes de santé - nutrition basés sur une approche communautaire conformément à
l’Initiative de Bamako adoptée par l’Etat nigérien. Il doit donc être suffisamment informé de
la politique sectorielle de santé notamment les aspects de participation des communautés dans
la prise en charge des problèmes de santé (recouvrement des coûts, consultations prénatales,
vaccination de la mère et de l’enfant). En matière de nutrition, l’expert doit maîtriser les
outils d’évaluation des approches basées sur la déviance positive, en matière des pratiques
d’allaitement et d’alimentation des jeunes enfants (groupe de soutien à l’allaitement, groupe
d’appui à l’alimentation, maman lumière) et de récupération nutritionnelle à base
communautaire (foyers nutritionnels, suivi nutritionnel à base communautaire).
- Un Représentant du gouvernement nigérien. Il est la personne ressource représentant les
points de vue de la partie nigérienne. Il doit être averti de la stratégie nationale en matière
de sécurité alimentaire et nutritionnelle. Il doit apprécier sur cette base la pertinence et la
contribution du programme par rapport à cette stratégie.
- Un Représentant du BHR/FFP/USAID. Il est la personne ressource représentant les
points de vue du bailleur de fonds. Il doit disposer d’une expérience en matière
d’évaluation des programmes du titre II. De part cette expérience, il doit orienter l’équipe
d’évaluateurs dans le respect des normes en la matière.
- Au besoin, au niveau de chaque district, un représentant des services techniques peut être
associé à l’équipe
VII. RESULTATS ATTENDUS
Le principal résultat attendu de cette évaluation est le rapport d’évaluation axé sur le points
suivants :
• Les effets et impacts du programme ;
• Les leçons apprises ;
15
• Les recommandations concrètes et pertinentes, formulées à partir des forces et faiblesses
constatées,
• La fonctionnalité de la structure opérationnelle du Programme, c’est-à-dire
l’organigramme global (comité de pilotage, PCU, ONGs et Projets) – notamment dans les
aspects d’harmonisation, de partage d’expériences et des approches communes – est
appréciée et des propositions d’amélioration sont formulées ;
• Les recommandations pour :
Š la conception d’une nouvelle phase du DAP notamment en terme de choix d’objectifs et
d’actions pertinentes et de stratégie dans la zone cible.
Š Une meilleure prise en compte du processus de mise en oeuvre du mécanisme de
prévention et gestion des crises au sein du consortium
VIII. PROJET DE CALENDRIER
Le Calendrier suivant est proposé pour la conduite de l’évaluation à mi-parcours.
Jours Activités
15 juin 04 Elaboration des TDRs
17 juin 04 Envoi des TDRs aux CS pour feed-back
24 juin 04 Réception des feed-back des CS
25 juin 04 Finalisation des TDRs
7 juillet 04 Avis de consultation
31 juillet 04 Réception des offres consultants
2 Août 04 Choix des consultants
06 août 04 Approbation du consultant chef d’équipe par BHR/FFP
10 août 04 Signature des contrats consultants
01 au 02 septembre 04 Arrivée du chef d’équipe et Briefing à Niamey
03 au 05 septembre 04 Rencontre avec consultants nationaux ; Revue
documentaire ; programme de terrain, etc.
06 au 26 septembre Terrain (y compris des restitutions aux districts)
27 septembre 04 Débriefing à Niamey au Steering Committee
28 au 30 septembre 04 Rédaction Rapport en Equipe (Consultants, Superviseurs)
01 au 03 septembre 04 Finalisation Rapport draft (Chef d’Equipe)
04 septembre 04 Restitution des résultats préliminaires au noyau de S/E et
coordonnateurs de programme et direction de CARE
ANNEX 3
LIST of CONTACTS
Liste de Contacts
Nom et Prénom Fonction Location
Kathy Tilford Directrice, CARE-Niger Niamey
Najim Mohamed SG, Ministere du Developpement
Communautaire
Niamey
Pascal Payet Suivi et Evaluation (S/E) ISAN/PCU
Hamadou Adamou S/E CRS
Idrissa Amadou S/E CARE
Rhili Aaboubacar S/E AFRICARE
Aklou Sidi Sidi Coordinnateur AFRICARE Agadez
Kabwayi Kabongo Chef PCU
Baguirbi Issa Coodonnateur ISAN HKI
Idrissa Chipkao Coorrdonnateur Adjoint ISAN CRS
Edouard Jay Coordonnateur ISAN CRS
Ali Bety Coordonnateur ANR CARE
Gagara Abdou Communicateur PCU
Kwanza Price Agent Finance PCU
Alhassana I Outman Representante AFRICARE
Ibrahim Idi Issa Programme Manager AFRICARE
Fatimata Jules Traductrice Agadez
Harouna Hamani Nutritionniste HKI
Sayo Amadou Directeur Adjoint CARE
Saley Boukari Chef de District ISAN Doutchi
Ousseina Sountalma Coord. Adj.Securite Alimentaire ISAN Doutchi
Oumarou ELH Omar Coord. Adj. Sante/Nutrition ISAN Doutchi
Harouna Mayaou Charge de S/E CRS/HKI, Doutchi
Kailou Mallam Gerard CAD Doutchi
Michel Zanguina Maidabo CAD Doutchi
Alain Maiksoua CAD Doutchi
Souley Soumana Lacho Coordinateur de l'equipe, RAIL Doutchi
Sanoussi Chaibou Mali Informaticien de l'equipe Doutchi
Aziz Ameyagi Superviseur Sante/Nutrition AFRICARE Agadez
Kouna Biska Superviseur OS1 AFRICARE Agadez
Ounis Ahmen Superviseur Agriculture AFRICARE Agadez
Mohamen Alhousseine Superviseur FFW AFRICARE Agadez
Yahaya Yan Daka Gouverneur Agadez
Mr le Prefet Prefet Tchirozerine
Soumana Dogon Yaro Génie Rural Tchirozerine
Abdoul Karim Israel Hydraulique Tchirozerine
Sani Salaou Inspection Enseignement de base Tchirozerine
Mohamed Cheloukan Développement Communautaire Tchirozerine
Hassane Moussa Environnement Arlit
Mahaman Sani Samailla Ressources Animales Arlit
Hamid Mohamed Haïdara Alphabétisation Arlit
Oumarou Djatti Préfet Arlit
Elhadji Almoustapha Ibrahim Chef de Groupement Arlit
Abdoul Aziz Issa Santé Publique Arlit
Sanoussi Elisha President CARITAS Zinder
Mahamane Laoulai Moussa Chef District, CRS Tanout
Marafa Saley Tchiroma Coord. Adj. Survie de l’Enfant, HKI Tanaout
Mahaman Souradja Coord. Adj.Sécurité Alimentaire, CRS Tanout
Hassane Hamidine S/E CRS/HKI Tanout
Adèle Mêley Bienvenu Traductrice Tanout
3
Liste de Contacts, continued
Nom et Prenom Fonction Location
Yahouza Sabo Prefet Tanout
Salou Muonkaila Chef SAP Tanout
Hamou Djibrina Chef Service Génie Rural Tanout
Ibro Issa Service Environnement Tanout
Hamidou Issoufou Développement Agricole Tanout
Père Emmanuel Ngora CARITAS Zinder
Sœur Dolores Astorga CARITAS Zinder
Otchoumaré Haoua CARITAS Zinder
Haoua Ali hadi CARITAS Zinder
Père Callistus Baalaboore CARITAS Zinder
Anatovi Albert Clement CARITAS Zinder
Abdoulaye Mati CARITAS Zinder
Lamine Oumarou CARITAS Zinder
Abdou Garba Coordonnateur ISAN CARE Konni
Idrissa Amadou S&E ISAN Konni
Alio Namata Chef Unite d’Urgence Konni
Sanda Atarka AT Protection Environnement CARE Konni
Souley Moussa Gestionnaire des denrees CARE Konni
Aichatou Lawali AT CARE Konni
Ramatou Alfari AT Sante Nutrition CARE Konni
Mamane Sayo AT Initiatives Communautaires
CARE
Konni
Nazir Nakaka Technicien Développement
Communautire CARE
Konni
Mme Manou Saâ AT/PA Konni
Ali Oumarou DT AT S&E CARE Konni
Aïssa Boubacar Traductrice Konni
Abdoulaye Madougou Magasinier des denrées Konni
Goumar Alhassane Technicien Pisciculture/Foresterie Konni
Sani Mahaman Laminou Chef de Projet Santé
Barthe Dotti Chef de Groupement Peulh Konni
ELH Abdoulmoumouni Hassane Chef de Canton Konni
Lamine Amani Prefet Konni
Kané Issaka Environnement Konni
Mamane Maïnassara Ressources Animales Konni
Boubacar Abdoulaye COFO Konni
Chegou Tiza Bacha Développement Agricole Konni
Rabiou Ibrahim ONG GYARA Konni
Salissou Illiassou, DDDC DDDC Konni
Ibrahim Kaza Gaoh Alphabetisation Konni
Habibou Moussa Chef, "SIDA en Exode," CARE Konni
Ibrahim Amadou Ressources Animales Illela
Ibro Kada Développement Agricole Illela
Mamane Alassane Environnement Illela
Mani Saley COFO Illela
Mr. le Adjoint Prefet Adjoint Prefet Illela
Mamane Awache Chef Service GR Illela
Kalla Lari MMD Illela
4
Liste de Contacts, continued
Nom et Prenom Fonction Location
Ibrahima Oumarou Inspection Etudes de Base (IEB) Illela
Sahidou Ousseini Developpement Social Illela
Hamissou Gandasu Alphabetisation Illelat
Lamine Hassane CARITAS Tanout
Sanoussi Elisha CARITAS Tanout
Jennifer Peterson Ambassade des USA Niamey
Ali Abdoulaye CRS Nimaye
Marie Aughenbaugh AFRICARE Nimaye
Marianna Hensley CRS Niamey
Sarah BAILEY CRS Niamey
Ismaril Ekaney Chimier Coordinateur National, CASPANI￾YARDA
Tanout
Amadon Laoual Service Sante Dogondoutchi
Bako Kabsuri DDDC Dogondoutchi
ANNEX 4
INDICATOR PERFORMANCE TRACKING TABLE:
Impact Indicators
INDICATOR PERFORMANCE TRACKING TABLE, FY04
DRAFT VERSION
OS1: AMELIORER LA CAPACITE COMMUNAUTAIRE POUR FAIRE FACE AUX PROBLEMES DE SECURITE ALIMANTAIRE
Indicateur d'Impact Base Objectif mi￾parcours Réalisation mi-parcours*13 Réalisation vs. Objectif mi￾parcours Objectif An Fisc 04 Réalisation An Fisc 04 Réalisation vs. Objectif An Fisc 04 Objectif sur la durée du programme
Indicateur d’impact 1.1 # de communautés
ayant démocratiquement conçu leurs plans
de sécurité alimentaire avec genre et
équité
0 110/ 142 61/171 55% 200 200 (80%)
Africare Agadez 0 12 6 50% 20 (33%) NEC 30 (50%)
CARE – Konni/Illela 0 32/40 33 (sur 69) 60% 56 (80%) NEC 56 (80%)
CARE – Matameye14 (COSAN) 0 40 9 S 23%
CRS/HKI – Dogon Doutchi 0 13 7 S 54% 48 (80%) NEC 48 (80%)
CRS/HKI – Tanout 0 13 6 S 46% 48 (80%) NEC 48 (80%)
Indicateur d’Impact 1.2. Indice de capacité
de sécurité alimentaire
35.0 40.6 50.1 123% Augmentation
de 30%
Augmentat°
de 40%
Africare 27.0 31.1 52.5 169% 60 NEC 70
CARE – Konni/Illela 18.016 20.7 45.4 219% 60,1 NEC 62
CARE – Matameye N/A 42.217 35.9 85%
CRS/HKI – Dogon Doutchi 52.718 60.619 56.9 94% 69,3 68,7 99,13% 71,3
CRS/HKI – Tanout 42.320 48.721 59.9 123% 60 65
13 Ces données indiquent les réalisations pour sur la durée du programme pour les activités de santé de CARE Matameye achevées en Mars 2003.
14 Pour Matameye, cet indicateur a été calculé pour les COSAN en se basant sur “la fiche d’Evaluation de la Performance des COSAN”. Les évaluateurs à mi-parcours ont inclus les COSAN de Matameye dans les calculs des
objectifs et réalisations à mi-parcours.
16 La référence de base a été calculée de manière rétroactive après que le programme ait travaillé dans 20 Unités Interventions.
17 En l’absence de donnée de base, cet objectif correspond à une moyenne de l’indice de capacité communautaire de sécurité alimentaire.
18 Pour les 20 nouveaux villages sélectionnés en année fiscale 03. Ces villages sont situés dans la partie sud de la zone et ont fait montre de plus d’organisation que les villages sélectionnés en année fiscale 01.
19 Pour les 16 villages sélectionnés en année fiscale 01, ont donc bénéficié de deux années d’intervention du programme.
20 Pour les 20 nouveaux villages sélectionnés en année fiscale 03.
21 Cet objectif correspond à une augmentation de 15% du niveau des données de base.
OS2: ACCROITRE LA PRODUCTION AGROPASTORALE EN PROTEGEANT L’ENVIRONNEMENT
Indicateur d'Impact Base Objectif mi￾parcours Réalisation mi- parcours Réalisation vs. Objectif
mi-parcours
Objectif An
Fisc 04
Réalisation An
Fisc 04
Réalisation vs.
Objectif An Fisc 04
Objectif
sur la durée
du
programme
Indicateur d’Impact 2.1. Nombre de mois
de provision alimentaire des producteurs
participants37
Moy:6.11 Moy:7 6.2 89% 7,43 6,44 86,67% 8,16
Africare – Agadez 2000 : 6 Moy :7.3 6.0E 82% 6 6,37 106,1% 6,5
Très Vulnérable © 70% 5.27 (55.19 (57,5%) 4,91
Vulnérable (B) 24% 6.62
A7.04 (32,4%) 7,38
Moyennement
Vulnérable (A)
6% 10.35 A7I77 (10,1%)I 9,94
CARE – Konni/Illela Moy: 5.3 Moy: 6.7 5.52 82% 7 5,6 80% 7.8
Très Vulnérable (C) 68.1% 4.85 5,07 (66,5%) 4,22
Vulnérable (B) 22.3% 5.90 7,70 (24,6%) 7,14
Moyennement
Vulnérable (A)
9.6% 6.62 6,94 (8,9%) 9,17
CRS/HKI – Dogon Doutchi Moy:5.9 Moy: 7 6.1 E 87% 7,25 5,73 79% 8,4
Très Vulnérable (C) 56.0% 5.16 5,80 (62,1%) 5,31
Vulnérable (B) 29.5% 6.66 6,37 (29,1%) 6,72
Moyennement
vulnérable (A)
14.5% 7.37 7,51 (8,8%) 7,31
CRS/HKI – Tanout 7.0 Moy:8.67 7.3 84% 9 7,56 84% 9
Très vulnérable (C) 54.1% 3.0 5,64 (64,4%) 7,2
Vulnérable (B) 31.1% 7.0 8,92 (21,2%) 8,2
Moyennement
vulnérable (A)
14.8% 11.0 11,9 (14,4%) 9
37 Pendant l’étude de base, les ménages ont été demandés à propos du nombre de mois de couverture de leur besoin alimentaire avec leur propre production agropastorale en 1999 qui était une année à bonne pluviométrie,
et l’année 2000, qui était une année à mauvaise pluviométrie. Le staff du projet pense que cet indicateur n’est pas pertinent , sauf si les données des évaluations à mi-parcours et finale sont comparées à des années à
pluviométrie similaire. Le but de chaque district est d’augmenter de 2.5 mois la couverture. Le nombre de l’étuide de base à utiliser va dépendre de la pluviométrie des années où les évaluations à mi-parcours et finale ont été
conduites – Si l’année est bonne, il est espéré de couvrir une moyenne de 9 mois vers la fin du projet. Si l’année est mauvaise, il est espéré d’atteindre au moins 7 mois de couverture. Le % de ménages qui couvrent leurs
besoins, et le % de ceux qui réduisent leur consommation comme stratégie de survie seront suivis pour comparaison et triangulation.
Impact Indicateur 2.2. Volume (TM) et
valeur (CFA et USD)39 des productions
agricoles sélectionnées par les
producteurs participants
1,321 kg/HH
92 287 Fcfa
1486,13
kg
1368 kg 92% 1 595,34 Kg 1 394 Kg/HH
165 982 Fcfa
87,39% 1 629,98 Kg/HH
Africare –Agadez
(les produits à suivre dans le futur
comprennent les légumes, le lait, le bétail –
les données de base de ces produits seront
fournies par les producteurs participants
406 kg. 88,326
CFA
436.45 kg 419.3 kg 96% 466,9 Kg 427 Kg/HH
103 626 Fcfa
91,4% 487 kg Augmentation
moyenne de 20%
/HH
105 991 CFA
Très Vulnérable (C) 70.0% 431 Kg 1216.3 ND
Vulnérable (B) 24.0% 403,9 Kg N.A ND
Moyennement
Vulnérables (A)
6.0% 319,1 Kg 2086.7 ND
CARE – Konni/Illela
(Mil, sorgho, haricot; les produits à ajouter
dans le futur comprennent le riz, le manioc, le
poisson – les données de base seront
obtenues des producteurs participants)41
1 071 kg,
133 371 F cfa
1 204,88
kg
1 216,3 kg 101% 1 231,65 Kg 1 126 Kg/HH
130 831 Fcfa
91,4% 1285 Kg
Augmentation de
20%/HH
très Vulnérable (C) 68.1% 855.32 1 032,3 Kg ND
Vulnérable
(B)
22.3% 1306.03 1 531,2 Kg ND
Moyennement
Vulnérable(A)
14.5% 2061.79 1 716,2 Kg ND
CRS/HKI – Dogon Doutchi
(Mil, sorgho, haricot et légumes)
1,558 kg,
202.210 F cfa
1791.7 kg 2 086,7 117% 2134 Kg 1 521Kg/HH
199 208Fcfa
71,2% 2181kg/HH
283.094 F cfa
Augmentation de
40%
Très Vulnérable (C) 56.0% 1,109.01 1 735,8 Kg ND
Vulnérable (B) 29.5% 1,845.32 2 194,6 Kg ND
Moyennement
Vulnérable(A)
14.5% 2,700.87 4 252 Kg ND
CRS/HKI - Tanout
(Mil, sorgho, haricot et légumes)
2,270 kg 2,610.5 kg 1,544.8 59% 1622 Kg 1 673 Kg/HH
176 986 Fcfa
103,1% 1622 Kg
39 Les évaluateurs à mi-parcours, en se basant sur les inputs et réactions de FFP/Dakar, ont décidé qu’à cause du nombre des variables qui influencent la valeur des produits agricoles, que seulement les données du volume
total doivent être collectées pour cet indicateur.
41 *Les évaluateurs ont proposé de reporter seulement les trois cultures.
Très Vulnérable (C) 54.1% 1 396,3 Kg ND
Vulnérable (B) 31.1% 1 447,5 Kg ND
Moyennement
Vulnérable (A)
14.8% 2 352,2 Kg ND
SO3: AMELIORER L’ETAT SANITAIRE ET NUTRITIONNEL DES MEMAGES
Indicateur d'Impact Base Objectif mi￾parcours Réalisation mi- parcours Réalisation vs. Objectif
mi-parcours
Objectif An
Fisc 04
Réalisation An
Fisc 04
Réalisation vs.
Objectif An
Fisc 04
Objectif sur la
durée du
programme
Indicateur d’Impact 3.1. % d’enfants de 24
to 59 mois en retard de croissance
51.11% 48% 47.8% 100% 44,81% 46,6% 43,54%
Africare – Agadez 35.3%
F=34.6%
H=36%
32% 33.1% 66.7% 31% 38,3% 31%
CARE - Konni/Illela
(activités de santé ont debuté en Avril 03)
44.1%
F=46.2 %
H=42.2%
37% 41,1% 36%
CARE - Matameye
(Matamèye activités finies en March 03)
69.3%47 59.3% 56.4% 129%
CRS/HKI – Dogon Doutchi 53.9%
F= 55,3%
H=52%
50% 44.7% 236% 43% 46% 43%48
CRS/HKI - Tanout 59.7%
F=62.5%
H=57.4%
56% 67.6% 83% 65% 56,6% 60%
47 Ce chiffre a été corrigé via l’évaluation à mi-parcours qui a remarqué que les chiffres précédents reflétaient le poids/age contrairement à la taille/age. Donc à cause de l’augmentation de la valeur, les prévisions ont été
modifiées. La cible dans le DIP Original pour la durée de vie du projet (FY 03) pour Matameye était 64%
48 La cible pour la durée de vie du projet a augmenté sur la base des niveaux de l’indicateur à l’évaluation à mi-parcours.
SO3: AMELIORER L’ETAT SANITAIRE ET NUTRITIONNEL DES MEMAGES
Indicateur d'Impact Base Objectif mi￾parcours Réalisation mi- parcours Réalisation vs. Objectif
mi-parcours
Objectif An
Fisc 04
Réalisation An
Fisc 04
Réalisation
vs. Objectif An
Fisc 04
Objectif sur la
durée du
programme
Indicateur d’Impact 3.249. % d’enfants mis
au sein pendant les 8 heures qui suivent la
naissance
30.4% 39.8% 64.7% 163% 70,89% 72,6% 102,4% 73,15%
Africare - Agadez 33.3% 40.3% 73.5% 183% 80% 80,5% 100% 85%
CARE – Konni/Illela 24.3% 69,8% 60% 85,9% 71,8%
CARE - Matameye 39% 50% 54.2% 108%
CRS/HKI – Dogon Doutchi 36%50 38.8% 70.2% 181% 73% 73,1% 100% 75%
CRS/HKI - Tanout 20%51 31.4% 62.9% 200% 63% 82,8% 131,4% 65%
Indicateur d’Impact 3.3. % de villages dont
la consommation de la vitamine A est au
dessus du niveau de risque
10.22 30% 30%52 100% 32,52% 28,7% 88,25% 36,8%
Africare/HKI - Agadez 6% 20% A Déterminer
A
Déterminer
20% 6,7% 33,5% 25%
CARE – Konni/Illela 33%55 45% 36,7% 81,5% 50%
CARE - Matameye NE56 NA NA NA
CRS/HKI – Dogon Doutchi 9.78%57 30% 33.3% 111% 35% 53,6% 153,1% 40%
CRS/HKI - Tanout 6.30%58 30% 26.7% 89% 28 18,5% 66% 30%
49 Pendant les études de base les districts ont considéré différents groupes d’heures. Comme seul le groupe de 0-8 était universel, cet indicateur a été ajusté aux 8 premières heures après la naissance.
50 HKI, page 43 de l’ Evaluation Finale de leur Projet Survie de l’Enfant en 2000.
51 HKI, page 43 de l’ Evaluation Finale de leur Projet Survie de l’Enfant en 2000.
52 Cet indicateur a été calculé pour CRS Doutchi et Tanout seulement. Pour Agadez la taille de l’échantillon était très petite pour assurer la précision des données.
55 Dans de l’ Evaluation Finale du Projet Survie de l’Enfant de HKI en 2000, Le score moyen était de 24, mais il était de 30 dans leur zone d’intervention, et 40 in villages 0 – 5 km du centre de santé. Ainsi, ce niveau est
appuyé aussi par des données secondaires.
56 Indicateur non mesuré à l’étude de base et l’évaluation à mi-parcours à Matameye.( NE veut dire Non Evalué)
57 HKI, page 33 de l’ Evaluation Finale de leur Projet Survie de l’Enfant en 2000
58 HKI, page 8 de l’ Evaluation Finale de leur Projet Survie de l’Enfant en 2000