BACKGROUND This report summarizes fi ndings of an assessment of The Asia Foundation’s (TAF) program on Islam and Civil Society (ICS) in Indonesia. Funded by USAID since its inception in 1997, the program involves collaboration with Muslim lead￾ers and organizations to support democ￾racy training and civil society develop￾ment. It encourages the development of a politically secular Indonesia, based on values of freedom, religious tolerance, and pluralism. The Center for Development Informa￾tion and Evaluation of USAID’s Bureau for Policy and Program Coordination (PPC/CDIE) undertook an in-depth assessment of the program during February–March 2004. The purpose was not simply to assess the organization, achievements, and shortcomings of the program, but also to draw policy and programmatic lessons that can be ap￾plied in other Muslim or predominantly Muslim societies. The evaluation details lessons learned relating to the design and implementa￾tion of civil society programs in the Muslim world and suggests precondi￾tions for their success. Conducting a training program on gender equity within Islam in Indonesia. SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF THE ISLAM AND CIVIL SOCIETY PROGRAM IN INDONESIA PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AND PLURALISM IN THE MUSLIM WORLD PD-ACG-325 ICS PROGRAM AND PARTNERS Islam in Indonesia has been pluralistic and tolerant. Mainstream Muslim reli￾gious leaders are generally committed to the values of democracy and inter￾religious tolerance. Moreover, the coun￾try has a rich tradition of broad-based Muslim organizations that have gener￾ated social capital, creating a favorable environment for social activism. Finally, the country has undergone a successful transition from authoritarian rule to a democracy based on the principles of competitive elections and the rule of law. In 1997, TAF submitted a proposal to USAID on Islam and civil society. The objective was to strengthen the efforts of a diverse group of Muslim religious NGOs who were committed to promoting the engagement of Indonesia’s Muslim majority population in building democracy and civil society. USAID accept￾ed the proposal and pro￾vided an initial three-year grant in September 1997. Subsequent funding has The Asia Foundation allowed TAF to continue and expand this program. The ICS program is based on two prem￾ises, which inform its ongoing activities: • To develop and nurture broad-based support for democratic political reform, NGOs that are linked to Muslim organizations must be used as intermediaries to effectively trans￾mit and explain crucial civil society concepts to ordinary Indonesians. Rather than creating civil society organizations, TAF helped existing civic and educational organizations in the Muslim community to undertake new initiatives. Many of the organiza￾tions had already begun to champion PPC EVALUATION BRIEF NO. 13 BUREAU FOR POLICY AND PROGRAM COORDINATION FEBRUARY 2006 2 PPC EVALUATION BRIEF NO. 13 This paper was researched and written by Robert W. Hefner, Professor and Associate Director, Institute on Culture, Religion, and World Affairs, Boston University; and Krishna Kumar, Senior Social Scientist,CDIE, USAID. They are grateful to the colleagues, Indonesian experts, and friends who assisted the endeavor. democracy and civil society in the 1980s. Others had been active in general education and welfare services and now sought to extend their activities to civic education and democ￾racy training. Drawing on its 30-year history of collaboration with Muslim organizations, TAF identified NGOs dedicated to the pro￾motion of a pluralist, tolerant, and democratic Indonesia. • Religious terminology is more effective than secular discourse in winning popular support for democratic values. Indonesian society had been transformed by an Islamic resurgence, making the country religiously and culturally more Islamic. As a result, increasing numbers of Indonesians look to Islam as a source of guidance and inspiration, while at the same time they seek to enhance democracy and strengthen civil society. The ICS program has about 30 partners with a broad array of activities and target audiences. The current program operates in six fields: civic education and Islam, democracy training through mosque and pesantren (residential religious school) networks, pluralism and tolerance, Islam and the media, gender, and policy advocacy. PROGRAM-SUPPORTED ACTIVITIES CIVIC EDUCATION Civic education has been a central component of the ICS program since its inception, and it remains its largest and most ambitious initiative. Seven ICS partners are currently engaged in civic education activities, reaching audiences varying in size from a few dozen to tens of thousands of students a year. An example of a small activity is the monthly seminar conducted on six university campuses by a conservative Muslim student organization. Founded in 1982, the organization has long had a theologically conservative reputation. However, the ethno-religious violence that raged in Indo￾nesia from 1998 to 2002 led its young leadership to develop an interest in combating extrem￾ism by developing seminars on pluralism and democracy. Its activities are targeted at university campuses known as strongholds of hardline Islamism. Most of its meetings are attended by 15–25 people. At the other end of the spectrum are projects on civic education currently at the State Islamic University (UIN) in Jakarta and the private Mu￾hammadiyah University (UMY) in Yogyakarta. With the financial support of the ICS program, UIN convened a special committee to prepare material for a course book in Indonesian entitled Democracy, Human Rights, and Civil Society in 1999. The book and its subsequent editions are being used in civic educational classes taught in the university. The UMY is the second ICS partner currently involved in the development of a civic education program based on principles of democracy and human rights. Like its UIN counterpart, the UMY program is intended to replace the authoritarian indoctrination required under the Suharto regime with courses on de￾mocracy, pluralism, and citizenship. DEMOCRACY TRAINING THROUGH MOSQUE AND PESANTREN NETWORKS ICS activities also seek to encourage and pro￾mote democratic values in pesantrens and mosques, which are the only sources of civic education and information for many Indone￾ABOUT THIS BRIEF SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF THE ISLAM AND CIVIL SOCIETY PROGRAM IN INDONESIA 3 sians. Often teachers and preachers from these institutions have more credibility than leaders of government and political parties. Therefore, as early as the mid-1980s, and well before the in￾auguration of the ICS program, TAF and several European aid agencies identified pesantren and mosque networks as potential nodes for the dis￾semination of information about democracy. Four projects continue today under the aus￾pices of the ICS program. One partner works in collaboration with the largest association of South Sulawesi pesantrens (1,500 pesantrens and 13 institutes of higher education). It has also established a network of pesantrens designed to address common problems, such as religious extremism and intra-religious tolerance. Another partner supports a democracy-training program in six large pesantrens in Java. The Source: Central Intelligence Agency. training is intended to introduce democratic student government into pesantrens, a significant innovation in an institution long known for its strict hierarchy. The program also encourages stu￾dent participants to go into society and conduct research on district-level government, with an eye to bringing inefficiencies and corruption to public attention. The goal is to link these internal reforms in pesantren government to external initiatives on good governance. The partnering institution hoped to expand this program from its current 15 districts to 150. Still another partner conducted workshops on democracy education for preachers (khatib) at Friday mosque services in the Jakarta area from 2002 to 2004. During 2002–03, it trained some 500 preachers on matters of pluralism, tolerance, and democracy. Taken together, these preachers PPC EVALUATION BRIEF NO. 13 reach about 50,000 congregants each week. Some 2,000 handbooks for sermons on democ￾racy and pluralism were also distributed through this program. If funding can be expanded, the hope is that this program can be extended to cit￾ies across Indonesia. PLURALISM AND TOLERANCE INITIATIVES As ICS activities expanded, TAF and its partners realized it was not sufficient to promote values of religious pluralism and tolerance; it was also necessary to mainstream the “rich pluralism and variety of approaches within intra-ethnic dis￾course and dialogues.” A long-established center for the promotion of pluralist Islam is preparing a book on inter￾religious relations and pluralism by a team of renowned Islamic scholars that is expected to be used in sermons and speeches. Another organi￾zation undertakes activities to raise awareness about pluralism within the Islamic community. Founded by graduate students with pesantren backgrounds, the organization maintains close relations with religious leaders and pesantren officials who have entered the political arena. It organizes meetings and seminars and is working to develop a network of pesantrens for combat￾ing violence. The International Center for Islam and Pluralism (ICIP), which was established in mid-2003, aims to promote scholarly exchange between Indone￾sian Muslims and Muslim activists and scholars in other parts of the Muslim world. Its seminars, fellowships, and visitor programs help strengthen research and scholarship by Indonesian Muslims on democratic pluralism, link these intellectuals to like-minded Muslim scholars in other Muslim societies, and translate and disseminate materials created by Indonesian Muslims to other Muslim countries. ISLAM AND THE MEDIA The ICS program also supports several partners who have undertaken many media activities aimed at an array of age groups, social classes, and regions. For example, one partner undertakes many activities that reach hundreds of thousands of people. Its most promising activity is a weekly one-hour radio talk show aired by 40 radio sta￾tions in 40 cities, “from Aceh in the western part of Indonesia to Maluku in the east.” The topics mostly relate to pluralism and its relevance to Islamic doctrine, and mainstream Muslim leaders and scholars answer questions from the audi￾ence. Based on transcripts from the show and interviews with mainstream Muslim scholars, the partner also provides a weekly half-page col￾umn to more than 100 daily newspapers. It also runs seminars on university campuses, target￾ing science and professional faculties regarded as strongholds of Islamic fundamentalism. The partner sponsors a website that features articles, reviews, and weblinks on democratic Islam that receive 9,000 hits per day. Finally, it produces public service television ads in support of plural￾ism and tolerance. The Asia Foundation Bus advertisements promote tolerance and active nonviolence to teenage youth. 4 SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF THE ISLAM AND CIVIL SOCIETY PROGRAM IN INDONESIA 5 Another partner publishes an insert in a popular magazine that is read by at least 20,000 teenagers and sponsors bus-side advertisements to promote tolerance and active nonviolence. Yet another partnering organization distributes at mosques 52,000 copies of a weekly flyer that targets lower￾middle-class and lower-class readers, covering topics such as Islam and women’s rights, Islamic views of farmers’ rights, and democracy. The organization is also Indonesia’s most important publisher of Muslim and translated Western works on democracy, pluralism, and gender equality. Another institute partnering with ICS is en￾gaged in organizing radio talk shows on issues of Islam and pluralism. It also runs public service announcements on television on democracy, pluralism, and Islam that reach some 40 mil￾lion viewers and publishes a tabloid insert and a scholarly journal. ICS also supports a group in Makassar, South Sulawesi, that sponsors a weekly radio program and university seminars on Islam and pluralism where attendance ranges from 15 to 30. The group has sought to provide a moderate voice in a province that has been torn by radical Islamist agitation since the fall of Suharto. ISLAM AND GENDER Partners of the ICS component on Islam and gender support gender equality, women’s politi￾cal participation, and nonviolence. As with the media component, gender activities are multi￾tiered, with target audiences ranging from small workshops for religious scholars to large radio audiences. Partners are working to enhance the understand￾ing of gender issues among women preachers (muballighat). Others conduct training sessions on women’s social and political rights and aim to educate male and female pesantren leaders on Islam and violence against women. One partner established domestic violence counseling and advocacy centers in towns across Indonesia, the first such national network. These activists have been at the forefront of the campaign to high￾light threats to women’s rights posed by efforts to implement harsh interpretations of Islamic (sharia) law. “ One partner established domestic violence counseling and advocacy centers in towns across Indonesia, the first such national network.” Other partner activities include organized seminars and radio programs on gender bias as a source of violence against women. One partner organizes seminars and sponsors radio talk show campaigns that reach an estimated 1 million listeners, and it conducted workshops involving activists engaged in the movement against imple￾mentation of sharia legislation. Another partner sponsors gender-education activities, distributes a weekly flyer on gender issues, publishes a quar￾terly journal, and sponsors bimonthly forums on Islam, gender, and democracy in four strategically important pesantrens. POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLICY ADVOCACY Several ICS partners are engaged in policy advo￾cacy and efforts to professionalize the operations of Muslim political parties. A partnering institute runs programs designed to help Islamic parties improve their platforms by focusing on the needs and concerns of the people, rather than on implementation of Islamic law. Another partner’s projects aim to increase citizen participation in district policymaking. A third partner trains rural people to organize co￾operatives, operate microfinance institutions, and engage in policy advocacy in local government. PPC EVALUATION BRIEF NO. 13 A Jakarta-based NGO conducts hearings, legisla￾tive research, and direct advocacy for religious minorities and publishes a brief bulletin on Muslims and minority religions in Indonesia. It aims to counteract radical Islamist efforts to implement sharia and outlaw local religious traditions deemed heterodox or un-Islamic. The NGO established a database on religious dis￾crimination and prepared a working paper that identifies laws and regulations that protect the rights of religious minorities. In recent years, it has concentrated its activities in the provinces of West Java (Jawa Barat) and South Sulawesi (Sulawesi Selatan), where radical Islamists have been especially active. One of the ICS partners coordinates initiatives designed to promote reconciliation between victims of the 1965–66 violence (which took an estimated half-million lives, most from the ranks of the Communist Party) and Muslim leaders who participated in the violence. In addition to reconciliation, the program seeks to change legislation that continues to bar ex-communists and their children from government services, including enrollment in institutions of higher education. RESULTS AND LIMITATIONS On the whole, ICS partners were quite effective. They worked hard and undertook the planned initiatives. During its first year of operation, ICS program partners had to respond to the tumult of regime change, economic recession, and bitter sectarian violence. Even then, their achievements were quite satisfactory. The partners fared much better during the second phase. The assessment team did not find that any partner that had experienced outright failure. The majority of program partners have performed well, many exceptionally so. However, the assessment team identified a few general shortcomings of the projects and activities. Many partners found it difficult to keep up with planned project schedules. Often, the delays were caused by overly ambitious plans, unrealistic timetables, and limited experience. In a few cases, program partners undertook a project without careful planning. In one example, the preparation of a monograph on the concepts of democracy, pluralism, and human rights was delayed because the writers were located quite a distance from each other and had problems meeting regularly. An experienced organizer would have anticipated the problem and arranged for transportation. In a more serious example, little progress was made in a program of civic education that was to be introduced as a component in required courses on religious history and theology. Because of cultural and structural barriers, ICS partners found it difficult to secure women’s participation on the scale expected. For example, women’s participation in the otherwise highly successful project on civic education remained consistently 20–30 percent of the total number of participants. Low women’s participation was The Asia Foundation helps NGO partners to advocate for greater roles for women in policymaking. 6 The Asia Foundation SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF THE ISLAM AND CIVIL SOCIETY PROGRAM IN INDONESIA 7 also a problem in another civic education train￾ing program. A few partners also encountered resistance from conservative clergy. Many conservative elements took exception to flyers produced by one partner and accused it of “disparaging the relevance of religion and insulting Islam for the sake of West￾ern democratic ideas.” To diffuse the tensions, the partner organized a meeting with critical Muslim leaders. Resistance by conservative clergy is neither unexpected nor uncommon: program partners have to take it into consideration. A major ICS program limitation is that neither TAF nor the partners appear to have given much thought to sustainability of current activities without continued, substantial outside support. Interviews with program partners indicated that many assumed that TAF funding would con￾tinue indefinitely. They have made little effort to make their activities cost effective or self-sustain￾ing. For example, a magazine produced by one partner is unlikely to cover its expenses from sales and advertising for years to come. Many—if not most—current initiatives supported by the ICS program would probably cease in the absence of USAID funding. TAF and its partners should explore ways to raise resources locally so that the program can survive without USAID funding. ICS PROGRAM IMPACT EXPANDING A NATIONAL DIALOGUE ON ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY The most important contribution of the ICS program is probably that it has expanded a national dialogue on the issues of democracy, hu￾man rights, and gender equality. A cross-section of people—students, Islamic and women leaders, and even the informed public—are participating. What is most encouraging about this dialogue is that issues of democracy, pluralism, and toler￾ance are being discussed with reference to Islamic theology, practices, and symbols, as well as the problems and challenges facing contemporary Indonesian society. Some examples show how the ongoing dialogue engages and has potential for engaging a large audience: • In Indonesia’s 47 state-supported Islamic col￾leges and institutes, about 75,000 students took a full-term course on democracy and hu￾man rights in 2003. The program has started covering all 46 state Islamic institutions of higher education. Together, these institutions enroll about 18 percent of Indonesia’s college students, train the majority of Muslim profes￾sionals who work in the various government ministries associated with Islamic affairs, and set the tone for public discussion in the Mus￾lim community as a whole. • The civic education curriculum is now begin￾ning to be taught in all 35 Muhammadiyah universities, which have a combined popula￾tion of 30,000 students. All enrolled students will take a full-term course that discusses the concepts of democracy, human rights, and gender equality from an Islamic perspective. In light of Muhammadiyah’s influence in the Muslim community as a whole, this develop￾ment is likely to have a profound impact on future professionals and Muslim leaders gradu￾ating from these universities. • Media initiatives reach millions of people across the country through weekly radio call-in talk shows. One on religion and tolerance is relayed through 40 radio stations nationwide, and another on Islam and pluralism reaches listeners through five radio stations in South Sulawesi (Sulawesi Selatan). A weekly televi￾sion call-in show on gender equity within Islam reaches viewers in the greater Jakarta area, and there is a monthly television talk show on Islam and pluralism in the Yogyakarta area. There are no hard data on the audiences of these shows, but TAF estimates that the combined audience runs into several millions. 8 PPC EVALUATION BRIEF NO. 13 • Over 2,000 pesantrens in Java, Sumatra, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan participated in a variety of training programs on gender, hu￾man rights, and democracy over the course of the program. Program partners promoted discussions on Islam and democracy within pesantrens by creating training materials and curricula and training senior religious leaders in principles of Islam and democracy. • About 200,000 flyers addressing contempo￾rary issues from an Islamic perspective are distributed in hundreds of mosques in selected regions of the country. The program has also supported a dialogue between adat (local cultural groups) and pesantrens or mainstream Muslim groups that were prone to conflict in West Java and South Sulawesi (Sulawesi Selatan). The continuing effects of this dialogue, initiated and supported by the ICS program, cannot be underestimated. It has directly and indirectly helped mainstream democratic forces who believe that Islam supports the values, beliefs, and ways of life that constitute the ethos of a just, demo￾cratic society. STRENGTHENING INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY The program has also contributed to strength￾ening the institutional capacities of many of its partners. Before their involvement in the program, most of the partners had little or no experience working with international donors or undertaking initiatives promoting democ￾racy. Moreover, many partners did not possess expertise in organizing meetings and workshops or producing publications targeted to different audiences. All this changed as a result of their partnerships with the ICS program. In interviews with the assessment team, some partners indi￾cated that they benefited from their participation in program activities. TAF’s financial and techni￾cal support enabled them to develop innovative projects, acquire new expertise, and even secure resources from other international organizations. Many partners have grown over time, although their growth cannot always be attributed to their partnership in the program. However, there is little doubt that it helped. The strengthening of Muslim civil society organizations commit￾ted to pluralism and democracy is likely to have positive effects on the ongoing democratization process. FACILITATING FORMAL AND INFORMAL NETWORKS The program has also facilitated formal and in￾formal networks among over 30 Muslim partner organizations that have begun to see themselves as an emerging force committed to building a pluralistic, democratic country. These organiza￾tions help each other in many ways, often by sharing ideas, people, and resources. Within this large network, there are several subnetworks: one supports a dialogue on Islam and gender, one plugs pro-democracy Islamic media into mainstream media, and one facilitates coopera￾tion among Islamic educational institutions. For example, when a pro-polygamy campaign was begun by Islamist groups in Indonesia, the Islam and gender network mobilized a multipronged media campaign, publishing columns in the nation’s largest daily newspaper and arranging for ICS partners to argue against polygamy on a radio show and a national TV station. ICS partners have joined with some Christian and interfaith groups to form a “rapid-response pluralism advocacy network” whose primary mission is to monitor regional and national leg￾islation for antipluralist elements and galvanize the nationwide network into a multipronged advocacy campaign against such legislation. Though this group is still in its formative stages, it has already helped roll back the Religious Har￾mony Bill, proposed legislation that would have severely restricted interfaith relations. Exposing SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF THE ISLAM AND CIVIL SOCIETY PROGRAM IN INDONESIA 9 the bill to national scrutiny and debate generated a public outcry that resulted in its public retrac￾tion by the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the bill’s sponsor. FACTORS AFFECTING PROGRAM PERFORMANCE Several factors have contributed to the success of the ICS program. Strong Muslim interlocutors: An important con￾tributing factor is the strength of Muslim civic organizations in Indonesia, including two of the largest civil society organizations (NU and Mou￾hammadiyah) in the Muslim world. These have made education and welfare, rather than party politics, their primary focus. The ICS program has very much benefited from their legacy, and many program partners are nongovernmental offshoots of the two organizations. A respected intermediary organization: TAF’s 37- year history of working with Muslim organiza￾tions in Indonesia contributed to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the program. TAF established its reputation as a dedicated and high-minded aid partner possessing a depth of knowledge and understanding of the Indonesian scene. It has also recruited highly qualified Indonesian and Western staff with ties to local communities and Islamic networks. TAF’s reputation and past ac￾tivities neutralized suspicions that programs with a more direct link to the United States might inspire. Local ownership: Local ownership of the program contributed to its success. TAF allowed partner organizations to develop and manage their own activities. Participating organizations submit￾ted proposals that were funded by the program, when deemed appropriate. Thus, program activi￾ties were not imposed from outside, but rather conceived and designed by the participating organizations. Working through already existing NGOs and networks also heightened program access and legitimacy. It is worth noting that the few ICS projects that proved ineffective were those with weak local ownership. Many partners: Rather than concentrating its resources in a single organization, TAF worked with a variety of organizations. Indonesia’s Mus￾lim community is highly segmented, and access required working through organizations with ties to—and legitimacy in—each subcommu￾nity. The resulting wealth of training programs succeeded in bringing democratic training and organization to a broad array of communities. Autonomy and flexibility: USAID provided TAF with autonomy and flexibility, contributing fac￾tors in the program’s success. USAID provided necessary encouragement and support when needed, and largely relied on TAF’s judgment in launching new initiatives within the program framework. USAID’s approach allowed TAF to move with a speed that would have been impos￾sible for programs managed from afar, enabling TAF to adjust to emerging opportunities and respond to new challenges. LESSONS FOR REPLICATION The ICS program provides some valuable les￾sons that should be considered in planning and implementing similar programs. One set of les￾sons pertains to some preconditions that should be met. 1. The existing political system should allow civil society, media, and political groups to engage in discussions of public policy issues. “TAF’s 37-year history of working with Muslim organizations in Indonesia contributed to the legitimacy and effectiveness of the program.” 10 PPC EVALUATION BRIEF NO. 13 Suharto’s Indonesia was not a free society, but the regime did not prohibit public discussion of major policy issues. Moreover, democracy and freedom has flourished in the post-Suharto era. Although there has been liberalization in countries such as Jordan and Morocco, many Middle Eastern countries directly or indirectly control civil society organizations and political parties. In such countries, ICS-type programs cannot be initiated and implemented. Fortu￾nately, there are many Muslim countries— such as Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Niger, or even Pakistan—that permit public discussion of policy issues. 2. At least some credible religious leaders should be committed to democracy and pluralism and willing to take the initiative to promote them. Indonesia has enjoyed a legacy of broad-based Muslim civil society organizations whose lead￾ers largely subscribe to the vision of a plural￾istic, democratic Islam. Most of these leaders were educated in secular social sciences or other fields. The problem is that the leadership of Islamic civil society organizations in many Muslim societies is strictly in the hands of conserva￾tive religious leaders who have little exposure to secular education. In such countries, it will be difficult, though not impossible, to find Islamic leaders who are willing to sponsor and support similar programs. 3. To initiate and manage the program, the country should have well-established inter￾mediary organizations that enjoy the trust of local Islamic leaders and organizations as well as the trust of USAID. The success of the ICS program also depended on TAF’s experience, expertise, and reputation. Intermediary organizations are needed to provide a buffer between USAID and recipient Muslim religious organizations. While USAID must be assured that its funds will be managed and accounted for, Muslim religious leaders and organizations must be confident about the motives underlying assistance. The Indonesian experience indicates that an established inter￾mediary organization can protect indepen￾dence of recipient Islamic organizations. In many Muslim countries, established orga￾nizations exist that can serve as intermediar￾ies. For example, the American universities in Beirut and Cairo could perform such inter￾mediary functions if USAID were to launch a civic education program in Middle Eastern countries. 4. USAID and the U.S. Embassy should be fully committed to the program and pre￾pared for the risks involved in working with Muslim civil society organizations. USAID/Indonesia enjoys the U.S. Embassy’s unquestioned support for the ICS program. Both USAID and the embassy are aware of the risks involved in working with Muslim religious leaders who do not necessarily share the U.S. vision in the international arena. The essential point is that USAID should have a long-term strategic vision for engaging Islamic leaders that is shared and supported by the U.S. Embassy. Both should realize that many leaders and organizations who receive USAID funds might disagree with U.S. poli￾cies and programs. A greater risk is that some organizations presently committed to peaceful “Intermediary organizations are needed to provide a buffer between USAID and recipient Muslim religious organizations.” SUMMARY ASSESSMENT OF THE ISLAM AND CIVIL SOCIETY PROGRAM IN INDONESIA 11 political change might renounce their commit￾ment to nonviolence in the future. LESSONS FOR PROGRAM DESIGN The ICS program also provides four lessons for designing similar programs. 1. USAID should enable indigenous groups and leaders to design and implement civil society programs. In Indonesia, USAID and TAF have enabled program partners to develop their own initia￾tives and plans, taking into consideration their capabilities and concerns. They decide what they would do and how they would do it. USAID and TAF play only a supporting role. Such arrangements, while promoting commit￾ment and initiative, also deflect criticism that program partners work for a foreign power. The ICS model seems most suitable in the present political climate, in which Muslim countries harbor serious misgivings about U.S. intentions. 2. The program should engage multiple Islamic groups working on different issues and problems. The ICS program has partnered with differ￾ent groups. Its partners launched civic educa￾tion in Islamic institutions of higher learning, promoted civic education in pesantrens and state schools, established women’s crisis centers in cities and towns, published and dissemi￾nated books on pluralism and democracy, and organized meetings and seminars targeted to different audiences. Working with multiple partners is a promising strategy because it creates a synergy in which various sponsors of program activities mutually reinforce and help each other. It also protects the program from abject failure if one or more partners do not perform well. Depending on local circumstances and interest, the program should seek to engage groups, such as women’s religious groups, Muslim youth organizations, Islamic schools and educational institutions, and print and electronic media entities. 3. The program should be designed as an evolving initiative that can respond to emerging opportunities and challenges. One conspicuous feature of the ICS program is its flexibility. It is not blueprinted with precise indicators. TAF enjoyed unprecedented autonomy to reorient and redirect the program in the aftermath of the fall of the Suharto government. The program can recruit new partners as opportunities arise and drop old ones when they fail to operate. The obvious lesson is that any Islamic civil society program should enjoy maximum flex￾ibility to respond to emerging challenges and opportunities. Program operators should be able to change and modify plans when neces￾sary. Such programs should be free from the regulatory requirements imposed on develop￾ment programs. Perhaps USAID should either provide grants or sign cooperative agreements with intermediary organizations to ensure that the planned program has the necessary flex￾ibility. 4. The program should be managed by staff members with intimate knowledge of Is￾lamic traditions in the country and able to establish rapport with Islamic leaders and institutions. The ICS program in Indonesia is highly staff-intensive because it involves working directly with grassroots organizations. Both TAF and USAID have excellent staff who are not only knowledgeable about local conditions in different regions but also sensitive to local culture and traditions. In fact, within USAID, the program is managed by a local expert The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of USAID. This paper is available from USAID’s Development Experience Clearinghouse (DEC). To order or download, go to dec.usaid.gov and enter the document identification number in the search box (see front cover). The DEC may also be contacted at 8403 Colesville Rd., Ste. 210, Silver Spring, MD 20910; tel 301-562-0641; fax 301-588-7787; email docorder@dec.usaid.gov. Editorial, design, and production assistance was provided by IBI-International Business Initiatives, Arlington, VA, under contract no. HFM-C-00-01-00143-00. For more information, contact IBI’s Publications and Graphics Support Project at 703-525-2224 or pgsp@ibi-usa. U.S. Agency for International Development 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20523 Telephone: 202-712-4810 www.usaid.gov REFERENCES The evaluation drew on unpublished reports and documents prepared by the Asia Foundation, including semiannual grant impact monitor￾ing reports for 1998–2003 and grant proposals submitted to USAID in 1997 and 2000. Asia Foundation. 1997. Grant proposal submit￾ted to USAID. Jakarta. Asia Foundation. 2001–03. Grant impact moni￾toring report. Jakarta. Asia Foundation. 2003. Democracy in Indonesia: A survey of the Indonesian electorate in 2003. Jakarta: TAF. Dijk, Kees van. 2000. A country in despair: Indonesia between 1997 and 2000. Leiden: KITLV Press. Hefner, Robert W. 2000. Civil Islam: Muslims and democratization in Indonesia. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Hefner, Robert W. 2004. Remaking Muslim politics: Pluralism, contestation, democratization. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. 2003. The true clash of civilizations. Foreign Policy (March– April). International Crisis Group (ICG). 2002. Al￾Qaeda in Southeast Asia: The case of the “Ngruki Network” in Indonesia. Corrected 10 January 2003. Brussels: ICG Asia Briefing (August 8). Ramage, Douglas. 1995. Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam, and the ideology of tolerance. New York: Routledge. who enjoys superb rapport with civil society organizations. It is important that, at the planning stage, USAID provide for staff members who possess an intimate knowledge of Islamic traditions in the country and are able to establish rapport with Islamic leaders and institutions.