GENERAL MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE CONTRACT (GMAC) 
Contract No: 674-C-00-01-00051-00 
Bushbuckridge Retail Water Distribution Project 
Final Evaluation 
18 May 2005 
This report was produced for review by the United States Agency for International 
Development. It was prepared by Richard Martin and Mankone Ntsaba, under Mega￾Tech, Inc.’s prime contract and addresses USAID/South Africa’s 
Strategic Objective no. 6: 
Increased Access to Shelter and Environmentally Sound Municipal Services 
MTI Contract No.: 0151-0105-PO-ME14
Please direct all queries regarding this report to: 
Mega-Tech/South Africa 
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337 Veale Street 
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0181 Pretoria RSA 
Tel. 012 452 0060 
Fax 012 452 0070 
Email megatech@intekom.co.za
Or 
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Tel. (703) 534-1629 
Fax (703) 534-7208 
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ii
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Focus of the evaluation 1 
1.2 Data collection methods 1 
2. Background 
2.1 Preliminary activities 3 
2.2 USAID’s bilateral agreement 3 
2.3 Coordinating and decision making bodies 4 
2.4 AWARD contract and hand-over workshop for Chemonics 4 
2.5 Contract Objectives 4 
2.6 Contractual staff, costs and level of effort 8 
2.7 Project review and monitoring workshop 9 
2.8 The demarcation process, and new legislation 9 
2.9 Transfer policy 10 
2.10 Impact on the project 11 
2.11 The Mid-Term review 11 
2.11.1 Policy/Transfer – the WSA and WSP 11 
2.11.2 Capacity building 12 
2.11.3 Service provision and implementation 12 
2.11.4 Recommendations of the plenary 13 
2.11.5 Outstanding institutional issues 14 
2.12 Institutional Framework 14 
2.13 The community served 16 
2.14 Special factors 17 
2.14.1 Lack of capacity 17 
2.14.2 Slow decision-making 17 
2.14.3 Lack of guidance 18 
2.14.4 Water Board and DWAF 18 
2.14.5 Summary 18 
3. Evaluation of the project components 
3.1 Assistance to local government in developing procedures for addressing 
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their new roles as water service authorities 20 
3.2 Assist WSAs in implementing decisions regarding water service provision, 
and establish WSPs, based on models that the various stakeholders choose 
which are efficiently managed and provide for regular and high quality services. 22 
3.3 Support the work of existing water services providers through technical 
assistance and training 23 
3.3.1 Water supply 24 
3.3.2 Water management 25 
3.3.3 Adopting tariffs which allow for the free basic water policy and price 
water at sustainable levels 26 
3.3.4 Cost control (metering individual connections, meter reading and effective 
billing) 26 
3.3.5 Regulatory measures (bylaws concerning illegal connections, damage to 
meters etc) 26 
3.3.6 Customer care (pay points at convenient locations, open at convenient 
times) 28 
3.3.7 Good staff and supervisory management practices 28 
3.4 Develop new generation of managers and empower key actors with the 
capacity to undertake key WSA and WSP business activities without outside 
assistance 28 
3.5 Assist the WSA in developing the WSDP 29 
 
3.6 Timings 29 
4. Focus groups 
4.1 Objectives of the focus group interviews 33 
4.2 Findings 33 
4.3 Performance in terms of expected outcomes (community benefits) 34 
5. Reporting 
5.1 Indicators 41 
5.2 Data 
5.2.1 Population and number of households 42 
5.2.2 Results for central and local government 42 
5.2.3 Funds leveraged 42 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Number of households receiving new or improved water services 43 
5.3.2 Funds leveraged 43 
6. Findings 
6.1 The contract 44 
6.1.1 The objectives 44 
6.1.2 What could the project control? 44 
6.1.3 A distinction between service provided by DWAF and BLM 45 
6.2 WSA 46 
6.3 Transfer 46 
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6.4 WSPs 47 
6.5 Community involvement 47 
7. Lessons learned from the project 
7.1 Timing 50 
7.2 Institutional framework 50 
7.3 Regulatory change versus service provision 50 
7.4 Community involvement 50 
7.5 Dissemination 51 
7.6 Future programming 51 
7.7 Skills supplied by the project 51 
8. Recommendations for future programming 
8.1 Falling between two stools 52 
8.2 Is it appropriate for international aid to be used for plumbing? 52 
8.3 Looking for wider impact 52 
8.4 The question of need and commitment 53 
8.5 Centralized decentralized technical assistance 53 
8.6 Continuous versus part-time technical assistance 53 
8.7 Skills 54 
8.8 Expatriate versus local staffing 54 
8.9 Conclusions 54 
8.9.1 Future projects 54 
8.9.2 BDM and BLM: The future 55 
Annexes 
 
1. Acknowledgements 57 
2. Documents consulted 58 
3. Survey instruments 59 
4. Focus groups 62 
5. CVs of evaluators 73
 
 
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Acronyms 
BBR Bushbuckridge 
BDM Bohlabela District Municipality 
BLM Bushbuckridge Local Municipality 
BWB Bushbuckridge Water Board 
CBO Community Based Organization 
COP Chief of Party 
DLGH (Provincial) Department of Local Government and Housing 
DPLG Department of Provincial and Local Government 
DWAF Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
MEC Member of the Executive Committee 
MLM Maruleng Local Municipality 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
PSC Project Steering Committee 
RDP Reconstruction and Development Program 
RFP Request for Proposals 
RWDP Retail Water Distribution Project 
SALGA South African Local Government Association 
TAT Technical Assistance Team 
TLC Transitional Local Council 
TOR Terms of Reference 
WSA Water Services Authority 
WSDP Water Services Development Plan 
WSP Water Services Provider 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
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Abstract 
1. The contract 
The contract was signed in September 2000 and ended in March 2005. It was 
structured in two phases. Phase one was designed to prepare WSAs and WSPs for 
facilities transfer: this phase was expected to take “approximately 25 months”. 
Phase Two was intended to start when the transfer program had been agreed to, 
and some schemes had been transferred to the emerging WSPs. The focus of this 
phase was to shift to issues of operation and maintenance, and cost recovery. In the 
event, and for reasons over which the contractors had no control, the hand-over of 
assets did not take place during the life of the contract and therefore Phase Two did 
not take place. 
2. Special factors 
Progress in implementing the contract was hampered by the special factors 
prevailing in the district. Most of these factors were identified at the mid-term review. 
These included: 
Lack of capacity 
The Bohlabela District Municipality (BDM) was particularly affected by the lack of 
capacity. This stemmed from the fact that the previous District Council (then the 
Northern, now Capricorn District Council) was split into four units. Even today, the 
BDM has not filled all its posts, and has not yet adopted its Human Resources Policy. 
Slow decision-making 
Decisions that, in the ordinary course of events might have taken months have taken 
years. Several reasons have been advanced to explain this, including: 
• Lack of experience 
• Political conflicts 
• Lack of clarity on roles and functions1
The combined effect of these difficulties was effectively to stall progress on the 
project for about two years. The impact of the inexperience was compounded by a 
lack of leadership from the Province. 
3. Evaluation of the project components 
Assistance to local government in their new roles as WSAs 
Bohlabela was only appointed WSA in October 2002, just over two years after the 
beginning of the project. The effect of this delay on overall project achievement 
cannot be over-stated. After the mid-term review, however, movement on these 
issues was good. Substantial progress was made in terms of its role as a regulatory 
authority and in terms of appointing WSPs. 
A MOU regarding the transfer was signed by the Minister and the Mayor in June 
2004, and an agreement on the subject was finally signed by DWAF in mid March 
2005. 
 
1
 It will be noted that under the constitution water is not a Provincial competency, yet the MEC 
for Local Government had the duty to assign powers to different arms of local government. 
This included the designation of Municipalities as Water Services Authorities (WSAs) and 
Water Services Providers (WSPs). This reluctance to take decisions was a factor at 
provincial and local level. 
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Assist WSAs in implementing decisions regarding water service provision 
In January 2002 the RWDP prepared a Water Services Provider Options Study which 
recommended that a new municipal entity should be formed by BDM, BLM and 
DWAF. The RWDP prepared a Business Plan for this activity, which went through 
several drafts, the latest of which was dated July 2003. Even though this concept 
had political support, the majority of the respondents in our interviews appeared to be 
working on the assumption that the BLM and MLM would be the WSPs within their 
respective areas. Meanwhile the project concentrated on strengthening the skills and 
administrative capacity of BLM, a decision which appeared to yield results, if only 
slowly. 
Support the work of existing water services providers through technical 
assistance and training 
In June 2004, at the same time as signature of a Bulk Water Supply Agreement with 
the Water Board, the WSA finally appointed the de facto WSPs as such. In this 
context, the following activities were supported by the project: 
• Water supply 
The RWDP undertook a demonstration project in Dwarsloop to, in effect, 
demonstrate how fair water distribution was possible even in situations of scarcity. 
After the project staff withdrew, however, the situation reverted to its previous 
condition. The RWDP also conducted a pilot at Marite. As in Dwarsloop, when the 
project was coordinating this activity, all the parties were cooperating and agreed on 
the action plan. As soon as the project handed this to the Water Services Manager to 
coordinate, with assistance from the project team, very little was achieved. Another 
project, to formalize illegal connections at Calcutta, ran into early problems due to 
objections from traditional leaders. However, all 4,000 households have since been 
registered and the municipality is now beginning to install meters in the area. 
• Water management 
The RWDP undertook water conservation training with Ward Committees. The 
program was considered a success. The Project also undertook studies of the DWAF 
systems which effectively constituted an audit of their condition. This work was done 
with the assistance of project-funded consultants, and is of a very high quality. 
• Adopting tariffs 
Revised tariffs proposed by the RWDP were adopted and put into operation with the 
signature of the WSP MOU in 2004. 
• Cost recovery 
Assistance with this activity was proposed to be completed in December 2002, but, in 
fact, not much was done until mid 2004, when a private sector debt collector was 
appointed. Quite substantial funds were subsequently received by the BLM from 
large consumers and businesses, and it was planned to extend the scheme to private 
consumers within the near future. 
• Regulatory measures 
Draft bylaws were submitted to the MEC for Local Government in Limpopo in late 
2002, but approval had not been received by the end of the contract. However, a 
search of the legislation has indicated that no such approval was required and that 
the only requirement was for the bylaws to be published in the Provincial Gazette – 
an act which the Gazette is duty bound to perform once it has been so requested by 
the municipality. 
viii
• Customer care 
Workshops with Ward Committees, designed to improve customer relations and 
awareness of water conservation issues, were conducted in April 2004. Meanwhile 
the BLM opened 11 regional offices which were being used as service points for the 
municipality. Regarding the establishment of a 24 hour facility for receipt of fault 
reports, and systems to repair them, there was little progress.
 
Develop new generation of managers 
Work with regard to this component at the WSA level showed some progress. 
Following the appointment of the Director of Technical Services, who worked closely 
with the Project team, a management team for the proposed WSP was established. 
However, the delays in forming the team limited the potential for technical assistance 
and training within the life of the contract. 
4. Focus Groups 
To obtain the perspective of consumers concerning the impact of the project, ten 
focus groups were convened by the evaluation team. The groups represented a 
variety of interests, including direct and indirect beneficiaries of the project, men, 
women, business etc. Two major conclusions may be drawn from the focus groups: 
• Most people were either unaware of the project, or if they were aware of it, 
considered that it had not met their expectations in improving the provision of water 
services. 
• The insufficient bulk water supply (due to faulty pumps, or insufficient supplies from 
the Water Board), illegal connections and vandalism combined to result in a very 
low standard of provision for most consumers. All the focus groups expressed 
dissatisfaction with the fact that water was not available on a 24 hour a day basis. 
Levels of information and communication about the project differed considerably 
between the settlements. 
5. Findings 
The Contract 
The contract was well designed but probably established unrealistic objectives and 
performance targets. By being based on the expectation of certain institutional 
changes, it proved impossible to implement as planned. 
WSA 
After the slow start caused by the late designation of BDM as the WSA, the RWDP’s 
work on developing the role of the WSA and its managerial capacity was generally 
undertaken successfully. 
Transfer 
The project made a very material impact on the transfer process, but the delays in 
the actual transfer effectively invalidated a substantial portion of the contract. 
WSPs 
Even though this was the “Retail Water Development Project”, assistance in terms of 
retail water provision lagged behind the other work. Technical assistance in terms of 
water management and cost recovery was provided, but achievements were limited. 
While a lack of capacity within BLM was a constraint, more could have been done. 
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Community involvement 
It is clear that the limited number of project staff and the District’s huge population 
meant that only a small proportion of communities could have received the degree of 
attention necessary to ensure full community involvement. However, this aspect of 
the work was not given sufficient attention and in general community involvement 
was not a strong point in the project. Project impact might have been enhanced if 
NGOs and/or local contractors had been used more. 
 
6. 0 Quantitative results 
The planned target was for 58,000 households to receive new or improved water 
services during the life of the project. In the event, the project reported that a total of 
28,520 households had benefited. Funds leveraged included capital and technical 
assistance funds from DWAF, Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Program funds 
from the DPLG, and funds from USAID’s governance program. These amounted to 
R9,005,000. It is difficult to be sure whether USAID can truly claim attribution to the 
total amount, but there can be no doubt that the project facilitated much of this 
expenditure. 
7.0 Recommendations 
Project design 
In future project design, to focus on a single district, as this project did, can be unduly 
restrictive, especially if there are doubts concerning the responsiveness of the target 
municipality. A better approach would be to combine a national program (which can 
represent the interests of local government at the national level) with direct 
assistance to a limited number of municipalities to address service delivery needs at 
the local level. Thus national systems and regulatory issues can be addressed 
together with direct assistance to the poor. 
To enhance motivation, municipalities should be required to apply for acceptance by 
the project. We consider that capacity building should build on the concept of the 
sharing of experiences and skills among participating and non-participating 
municipalities. We also think that the project should be designed to run over a period 
of at least five years, and preferably more, because it is only by seeing a process 
through from start to finish that the true value of technical assistance can be realized. 
Next steps 
In normal circumstances, the next step for the BDM over the next year or two would 
be to integrate the systems and the staff after transfer is made from DWAF. 
However, it appears more than likely that the BDM will be abolished after the next 
municipal election to be held before March 2006, and it is difficult to plan in the 
absence of certainty. 
Meanwhile, the WSPs can concentrate on replicating the reforms piloted by the 
project such as improved customer awareness, reduction of illegal connections, and 
metering all individual connections. This should be supplemented by improved 
management of the cost recovery systems. Meanwhile, there remains a huge 
challenge in terms of the availability of water. The Water Board and the 
municipalities who will need to collaborate and rationalize systems if they are to 
supply water for 24 hours a day. A new mindset is required by managers, water 
system personnel and the users in order to work together, manage and operate the 
system in a new way, and no longer tolerate water theft and wastage. 
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Bushbuckridge Retail Water Distribution Project 
Final Evaluation 
FINAL REPORT 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Focus of the evaluation 
The evaluation is intended to review the results, achievements, and impact of the 
program, highlighting areas of achievement in general as well as progress towards 
the following objectives assessed in the mid-term evaluation: 
o Transfer retail water infrastructure and personnel to Local 
Authorities (Program Objective 1); 
o Establish WSPs, based on models that the various stakeholders 
chose, which are efficiently managed and provide for regular and high 
quality services (Program Objective 2); 
o Determine how water service authorities are functioning and 
describe the regulatory and monitoring oversight established under the 
current legislative and regulatory framework (Program Objective 3); 
o Assist local government in developing policies and procedures for 
addressing their new role as water services authorities (Project Objective 
1); 
o Assist local government in implementing decisions made regarding 
water service provision (Project Objective 2); 
o Support the work of existing water service providers and/or assist 
in establishing new water service providers through technical assistance 
and training (Project Objective 3); 
o Assist the WSA in developing Water Service Development Plan 
(WSDP) required by the Water Services Act of 1997 (Project Objective 4); 
o Establish baseline data and measure progress of indicators that 
measure the condition at project initiation and provide periodic updates 
(Indicator 1); 
o Develop a new generation of managers and empower key actors 
with the capacity to conduct key Water Service Authority and Water 
Service Provider business activities without outside assistance (Indicator 
2). Key business activities, as stipulated in the Bushbuckridge contract, 
are listed in 2.2.1. above; 
o Provide an update on actions taken to achieve the program’s 
objectives, based on recommendations in the mid-term evaluation and 
o Review and comment on the quantitative data used to report on 
the program, which includes verifying total population figures for the area, 
the number of historically disadvantaged households, the final number of 
households that benefited from the program (28,520 households reported 
to USAID on September 30, 2004), funds leveraged, and revenue 
collected. 
1.2 Data collection methods 
Three methods were used to collect the information required. 
• Interviews 
• Focus groups 
• Documentary study 
1
This report is structured in five parts. 
The first is the background to the project, the second is an account of the data 
collected by interview; the third is the data collected through focus groups; the fourth 
is an assessment of the quality of the data reported by the project, and finally there 
are the findings and recommendations from the study. 
2
2. Background 
2.1 Preliminary Activities 
The Government of South Africa (GoSA) through the Department of Water Affairs 
and Forestry (DWAF) has been working towards a transfer of water supply services 
to local authorities since the change in government in 1994. This policy was placed 
into law as part of the Water Services Act of 1997. As a result of this, the 
Bushbuckridge Water Board (now named “Bushbuckridge Water”) was established to 
oversee the operation and management of the bulk water supply to Bushbuckridge 
and Nsikazi North Areas. 
The long-range plan was for a Water Service Authority (WSA) to be established to 
regulate how water supply (“Water Services Act of 1997”) and sanitation services (as 
discussed in the “White Paper on Basis Household Sanitation – September 2001”) 
would be provided in the District Municipality of Bohlabela. Water would be 
purchased from the Water Board through a service agreement with the WSA. Water 
Service Providers (WSPs) would carry out the provision of water to individual 
customers. The WSPs would operate the water systems, interact with customers, 
and ensure payments are made. Tariff structures would be set by the WSA at a price 
that reflected the true cost of providing service2
. These are the activities were to be 
carried out under the Water Service Act of 1997. 
2.2 USAID’s Bilateral Agreement 
In 1996, USAID established a bilateral agreement with the GoSA to support the 
development of institutional capacity for water supply in the Bushbuckridge/Nsikazi 
North area of South Africa. The bilateral agreement had three components: 
a. support for the establishment of a water board (for bulk supply), 
b. support for operations and maintenance (for both bulk and retail), and 
c. support for capacity building for water distribution (retail) managed by 
the local authority. 
Under a. and c. above, USAID provided initial support to establish and improve the 
capacity of the Bushbuckridge Water Board. USAID also supported a pilot activity in 
1999 and 2000 to increase the capacity of local councils. Both of these activities 
were channeled through Rand Water. 
The Environmental Health Project (EHP), a USAID/Washington based initiative, 
provided assistance to the Bushbuckridge area between 1996 and the start of the 
current project in September 2000, within the framework of the bi-lateral agreement 
with DWAF to support institutional development for water supply in the area. 
Bushbuckridge was selected as the location of a “Presidential Lead Project”. EHP 
conducted a broad-based study to assemble information related to water supply for 
the project area and developed an options paper for retail water supply. EHP also 
developed a project paper that described an institutional-building approach and 
strategy to establish water service providers. In addition EHP designed an 
assistance package for the Bushbuckridge Water Board, designing a 
communications strategy for the pilot phase program, implementing a lessons 
learned workshop for the pilot phase, a workshop which served as a link between the 
pilot phase and the long-term phase, and a workshop to provide input into the second 
year of the long-term phase. 
 
2
 How this is defined is a matter of debate. The above wording is reflective of the wording in 
the Water Services Act and the Municipal Systems Act. However, some municipalities use 
their government support grant (the “equitable share”) to subsidise the provision of services, 
and thereby reduce the tariffs. Under such an approach, the “cost” is reduced by the subsidy. 
3
2.3 Coordinating and Decision Making Bodies 
In August 1998, the Nsikazi Bush Water Forum was established to serve as a 
planning and coordinating body for water supply in the project area. It was 
composed of local government representatives, Water Board members, DWAF and 
Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) representatives. USAID 
also participated in this forum. The forum coordinated project activities. 
A separate Project Steering Committee (PSC) provided guidance to the project team. 
2.4 AWARD Contract and Hand-over Workshop for Chemonics 
During 1999 and the first 10 months of 2000, USAID supported the Retail Water 
Distribution Project (RWDP) in the Bushbuckridge area through agreements with 
DWAF. Rand Water served as DWAF’s fiscal agent and was provided project funds 
and consultants to support the Bushbuckridge Water Board (BWB) and the RWDP. 
A start-up phase project team was held in January 1999 using a combination of 
contracted individuals and a part time leader provided through an arrangement with 
Association for Water and Rural Development Cooperation (AWARD). EHP 
developed these start-up activities and the terms of reference for these in 1998. The 
program was to initiate the project, develop a basis of information, and prepare local 
authorities (in their roles as future Water Service Authorities—WSAs) to assume 
responsibilities for transfer of management and operation responsibility for retail 
water services and their designated Water Service Providers (WSPs) in accordance 
with the Water Services Act 108 of 1997. 
In April 2000, USAID/Pretoria issued an RFP for the selection of a contractor to carry 
on the work initiated by the interim team for retail water distribution and meet a broad 
range of project objectives. The purpose of this contract was to provide technical 
assistance to local entities in the BWB service area as they prepare to assume 
responsibilities for retail water service in their communities. The project aimed to 
build local institutional capacity to manage reliable and sustainable water service for 
approximately one million people. This contract was awarded to Chemonics 
International Inc. in association with Argil Ltd., Institute for Public-Private 
Partnerships, Manyaka-Greiling-Meiring Ltd. and ValuAdd, (this group hereafter 
known as the “New Agent”) in September 2000. 
2.5 Contract objectives 
The overall objective set out initially for the BBR-RWDP was to assist local 
government efforts to act as responsible Water Service Authorities and to support 
their initiatives. Specifically, this required that the Project: 
• Assist local government in developing procedures for addressing their new role 
as water service authorities; 
• Assist the Water Services Authorities (WSAs) in developing Water Services 
Development Plans (WSDPs) required by the Water Services Act; 
• Assist local government in a planning process that leads to decision-making 
regarding water service provision; and 
• Support the work of existing water service providers or assist in establishing new 
water service providers through technical assistance and training. 
4
The approach provided for a Project Steering Committee with full time advisory and 
secretariat support for the term of the project, placed water services advisors to 
support activities in each participating local government unit, and offered 
management and technical training through short courses, workshops, and on-the￾job training. The Project concept was to develop a new generation of managers and 
empower key actors to carry forward without external assistance at the end of the 
Project. The development assistance methodology was intended to enable, 
empower, help and support individuals who would conduct the daily business of 
water distribution and serve on boards. Indicators for successful development 
assistance were to be “capacity to conduct key business activities as the Water 
Service Authority and Water Service Provider (WSP) without outside assistance.” 
The contract was designed to be implemented in two phases. 
Phase one was designed to prepare WSAs and WSPs for facilities transfer: this 
phase was expected to take “approximately 25 months”3
. Activities which the 
contractor was supposed to undertake included the following4
: 
(a) Policy Planning and Transfer Process 
• Assist in developing annual work plans for the WSA and WSPs 
• Provide assistance and guidance to WSAs for choosing appropriate 
WSP structures 
• Work with local authorities, DWAF and current water services 
providers to define a realistic transfer program. 
• Help organize the formal acceptance of initial schemes for transfer. 
(b) Management Systems (Institutional development) 
Assist WSAs and WSPs to 
• Establish policies, bylaws and operational guidelines for WSPs 
• Develop interim organizational plan, staffing pattern and hiring process for 
WSPs 
• Formulate administrative processes, procedures and record keeping 
requirements for WSPs. 
• Create a financial management strategy including budget planning, billing 
and accounting, payroll requirements and other financial matters 
• Negotiate and accept selected staff for secondment and eventual transfer 
to WSPs 
(c) Customer Outreach and Education 
Assist WSAs and WSPs to 
• Review existing studies and conduct a baseline Knowledge, Attitudes and 
Practices study regarding expectations and attitudes about water 
services, payments, water use and rectification of illegal connections 
• Implement educational campaigns through community meetings, schools, 
poster campaigns and/or broader media. 
• Pilot test outreach programs and evaluate resulting behavior change 
• Evaluate the successes and limitations of Phase I education and outreach 
programs for incorporation into Phase II. 
(d) Customer service, Billing and Collection (Cost Recovery) 
 
3
 In fact, as is shown in the details provided below, due to the fact that transfer did not take 
place during the life of the contract, Phase 2 was never started. 
4
 These are summaries of the full text of the contract 
5
Assist WSAs and WSPs to 
• Assemble cost information from relevant organizations and establish a fee 
structure for cost recovery and identify subsidy requirements 
• Establish tariff rates and structures and methods for customer payments 
• Establish a billing and collection process, establish customer lists, read 
meters, local pay points, design a billing system, and pilot test it. 
(e) Operation and Maintenance 
Assist WSPs to 
• Investigate on-going operation and maintenance programs being 
implemented by current water services providers 
• Analyze current staffing and staff capabilities, and prepare for 
secondment and eventual transfer of selected staff to WSPs 
• Develop realistic O & M budgets 
• Plan and build O & M Management offices and workshops 
• Develop work norms and standard operating procedures 
• Establish inventory procedures 
(f) Institutional Learning and Staff Development 
Assist WSAs and WSPs to 
• Design and conduct management development program for all 
supervisory staff 
• Define a staff learning program; determine the skill needs required to 
meet performance standards, and set up mentoring relationships between 
team members and counterparts 
• Develop performance targets for each major department within the WSA 
• Conduct project review activities leading to lessons learned through on￾going feedback programs. 
Phase Two was intended to start when the transfer program had been agreed to, 
and some schemes had been transferred to emerging WSPs. The WSPs would use 
the processes, systems and procedures developed during Phase 1 to evaluate and 
improve operational performance. The focus of activity was to shift to operation and 
maintenance activities and cost recovery. The contract presents the activities under 
the same six categories, as follows: 
(a) Policy Planning and Transfer Process 
Assist WSAs and WSPs to 
• Develop annual operational plans for WSAs and WSPs 
• Evaluate progress towards fulfilling the requirement of the transfer 
plan 
• Monitor subsequent transfer phases in order to monitor emerging 
issues 
• Formalize on-going linkages between WSPs and other government 
agencies 
• Formulate a strategy and procedures for providing retail water 
services to unserved areas 
(b) Management Systems 
Assist WSPs to 
• Evaluate and refine administrative, financial, personnel and other policies 
and procedures to reflect the growing needs of the WSPs 
• Establish a budget process 
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• Ensure that WSPs’ staffing is in accordance with the needs and budgets 
(c) Customer Outreach and Education 
Assist WSAs and WSPs to 
• Conduct a follow-up Knowledge, Attitudes and Practices study in order to 
determine the effectiveness of Phase 1 programs 
• Plan and implement follow-up education and media campaigns 
• Outline a strategy for continued education and outreach after Project 
completion. 
(d) Customer service, Billing and Collection 
Assist WSPs to 
• Bill customers for services rendered and accept payment 
• Establish customer complaint function, and procedures for addressing 
complaints 
• Evaluate progress towards cost recovery by monitoring costs and income 
etc 
• Identify accounts, prepare billing for new customers 
• Refine the billing and collections process. 
(e) Operation and maintenance 
Assist WSPs to 
• Continue taking part in operation and maintenance programs 
• Accept responsibility for O & M of water distribution schemes according to 
agreed transfer program 
• Modify and refine work norms and procedures 
• Hire and train additional O&M staff as budgets allow 
• Establish a metering capability to respond to demands for individual 
connections 
• Identify private companies which could assist the WSPs in implementing 
maintenance work 
• Coordinate with Bushbuckridge Water Board and DWAF on establishment 
of monitoring systems. 
(f) Institutional learning 
Assist WSAs and WSPs to 
• Continue conducting management development programs for WSAs and 
WSPs 
• Augment staff learning programs and mentoring relationships 
• Monitor performance targets 
• Complete project review activities 
Key business activities were: 
 
• Annual work plans and long range strategic plan development for system 
rehabilitation and growth; 
• Budget and financial management including collection of debts and payment of 
accounts; 
• Satisfactory consumer relations including timely attention to requests for service, 
complaints, and educating consumers about responsible water use; 
• Efficient and cost effective operation and maintenance of water systems including 
borehole supplies, water storage facilities, and distribution networks; 
7
• Staff development and high performance and results management systems for 
staff; and 
• Communication with key external agencies and sector institutions to address and 
resolve issues. 
Skills and knowledge acquisition were to be demonstrated by successful 
performance at the individual and the organizational level. Key indicators for 
improved organizational performance were linked to successful staff performance in 
conducting business activities. The list of success indicators included: 
• Percent of revenues collected, 
• Cost per unit of water delivered, 
• Percent of unaccounted for water in network distribution, 
• Time required to respond to consumer complaints and requests for service, 
• Staffing ratio (consumers accounts per staff member), 
• Efficiency in operation of equipment and maintenance management, 
• Staff satisfaction and performance, and 
• Ability to achieve support for water improvement measures from political entities 
(i.e. DWAF, district and local government, bulk water providers, and local 
councilors). 
It was considered that as Water Service Authorities improved their performance, 
water distribution services to the people should also improve. 
Due to very substantial delays in the transfer process, Phase 2 could not be 
implemented in the form envisioned in the contract, although limited components 
were undertaken. 
2.6 Contractual staffing, costs and level of effort 
The contract was signed on 21st September 2000. Total expenditure authorized was 
$2,299,950. The proposal was based on the levels of effort shown in the second 
column below.: 
The contract was amended in June 2002, and the level of effort changed as shown in 
the third column in the Table below. 
Designation Number of person months 
Original 
contract 
2002 
modification 
Chief of Party 42 42 
Long term local professionals/Chemonics 
Institutional development 43 
Training 35 
Short term professionals 
Chemonics 18 15 
Manyaka Greyling Meiring 12 10 
Argil 18 14 
ValuAdd 18.5 14 
Institute for Public Private Partnerships 22 16 
Chemonics short-term professional 1 8 
Non-technical Support Staff/Chemonics 
8
Messenger/Driver 49 
Secretary/Receptionist 47 
Office assistant 35 
Accountant/Administrator 48 43 
Home office support 8.25 7.75 
Total 283.75 282.75 
EHP was asked to design and conduct a start-up workshop to hand over project 
activities to the New Agent and initiate the next phase of the project. This hand-over 
workshop was held in mid October 2000. 
This Hand-Over Workshop provided the opportunity for the Implementing Agent’s 
technical assistance team to work with the interim project assistance team, local 
government officials, and other local stakeholders in a collaborative environment 
conducive to team building and sharing of information and knowledge. Following the 
Hand-Over Workshop, the Technical Assistance Team (TAT) developed a work plan 
and initiated activities. 
2.7 Project Review and Monitoring Workshop 
After Chemonics had completed 10 months of their contract, USAID asked EHP to 
provide further assistance to the RWDP by conducting a Project monitoring/review 
workshop designed to assist the USAID Mission, the Project Steering Committee, 
and key project participants in reviewing the results of project activity to date through 
a workshop process. The primary outcome was to determine, through input from 
project participants, project successes and continuing issues, and to advise on 
modifications or enhancement to project strategy, and specifically work plan 
development for the second year of the project. 
2.8 The demarcation process, and new legislation 
On December 5, 2000, local government elections were held. This brought to an end 
the transitional phase of Local Government in the democratic area. The elections 
were the trigger for the bringing into force of three pieces of legislation: the Municipal 
Demarcation Act, which created completely new boundaries for all local government 
units, reducing their number from over 800 to 246, some of which straddled provincial 
boundaries in the interest of creating viable units; the Municipal Structures Act, which 
provided the rules for the elections and introduced alternative models for the conduct 
of council business, including the concept of executive mayors, a speaker for council 
meetings, code of conduct for councilors etc; and the Municipal Systems Act which 
provided for good governance in terms of planning, budgeting, service provision, 
public participation etc. 
This legislation ended the constitutionally transitional phase under which local 
government had been operating since 1993. However, the process had its own 
transition. Until the end of the financial year (30 June 2001) the new municipalities 
operated within the budgets of the previous Transitional Local Councils (TLCs). The 
second phase was to prepare new budgets for the new local government 
municipalities, but without the supporting planning and consultation which is required 
under the legislation. The third phase, to be completed by 30 June 2003, was to 
prepare and adopt an Integrated Development Plan, on which budgeting would 
thereafter be based. Other targets had to be met in terms of preparing staffing 
organograms and job descriptions, preparing asset registers, etc. 
9
While this process was difficult in areas where independent units were merged, and 
different policies and systems had to be reconciled, it was even harder in areas 
where completely new municipalities were established. 
Bushbuckridge was in the former category – it was an amalgamation of three 
previous TLCs. The Eastern District Municipality, now re-named Bohlabela District 
Municipality (BDM), was in the latter category. It had to be started from scratch, with 
no staff, systems or policies. Moreover, it was a cross border municipality, and it took 
time for the two provinces concerned, Limpopo and Mpumalanga to agree which 
province should take responsibility for it. Most of the area had previously been 
administered by the Northern District Council – based in Polokwane – which had now 
been divided into many smaller units, and renamed Capricorn. It was unable to 
provide substantive assistance to the new Districts into which it had been divided. 
The weakness of BDM was recognized by the President who declared it one of the 
areas for special support under the Integrated Sustainable Rural Development 
Strategy. However, this failed to result in any substantial increase in resources. 
Meanwhile, the District Municipality’s resource base – which was primarily the 
Regional Services Council levy – had taken time to develop, and is still far from being 
fully operational. 
This is not the place in which to describe the difficulties faced in detail, but one 
indicator of the situation is that it was only in February 2002 that the Municipal 
Manager was appointed. Other senior staff members have since been appointed, 
but operating systems are not yet fully in place. For example the Municipality’s 
Human Resources Policy – covering conditions of service such as leave, pensions, 
disciplinary procedures etc, has not yet been adopted. 
Bushbuckridge was in a better position. They had the staff of the three former TLCs. 
Their staffing had included Town Clerks, Town Treasurers, Public Works Officers and 
their respective departments. Amalgamation of the three TLCs took time, but a basic 
level of skill and experience was available. Bushbuckridge Local Municipality (like its 
predecessor TLCs) also received government’s constitutionally mandated subsidy – 
an “equitable share of national revenues”. Furthermore, they were providing water 
and other services within the gazetted urban areas under their jurisdiction – the so￾called R293 towns. 
Another factor which made the transition difficult was that the majority of the area 
covered by Bohlabela District Municipality was in the former homelands of Lebowa 
and Gazankulu. Thus there was a further challenge in harmonizing administrative 
practices, political ambitions and popular expectations from a variety of backgrounds. 
2.9 Transfer Policy 
At the same time as the boundaries and function of local government were being 
changed as described above, the water sector was undergoing a parallel 
restructuring whereby national government (in the form of DWAF) would no longer be 
involved in the development or management of water schemes, and would transfer 
all responsibilities and associated assets and staff to Local Government. 
The magnitude of this undertaking cannot be underestimated. Each WSA 
municipality supposed to take transfer of these assets would have specific concerns 
and positions regarding the transfers, and central government was in a very weak 
position, constitutionally, to force them to accept the transfer. 
10
Accordingly a massive transfer programme was started, with sweeteners in the form 
of supporting grants added. Local government resisted (fearing that the new 
schemes would be financial burdens), trades unions were quick to raise objections, 
and communities tended to favour the status quo. It therefore became evident that 
these transfers could not be achieved by a stroke of the pen, and projections 
regarding transfer dates (on which the contract was based) were soon proved 
optimistic. 
Many municipalities had the skills and the experience to deal with these issues, and 
even though this did not result in swifter decisions, at least they had the experience 
to deal with them. BDM had neither the skills nor the experience, so the transfer 
process added significant new challenges which took time and patience to 
understand, let alone address. 
2.10 Impact on the project 
The legislative and demarcation reforms described above had two impacts on the 
project. 
The first was the delays caused by the factors outlined above, such as weak financial 
position, lack of staff etc. Most importantly, as is discussed below, this substantially 
delayed the start of direct technical assistance to retail water providers. Throughout 
the remainder of this report we refer to the impact of the delays caused by these 
factors on project implementation. It may be slight consolation to know that similar 
problems are affecting much of the local government system, especially in the rural 
areas: but having said that, it must be recognized that the situation in Bohlabela is 
worse than most. The project has been powerless to intervene in such matters, and 
support that they have given provided no more than symptomatic relief – the 
structural and systems difficulties remain. As such it must be clearly understood that 
the failure of the project to reach the targets set in terms of retail water provision are 
the direct result of the exogenous factors listed above. 
The second impact has been in terms of the consequential delays in terms of 
meetings missed, decisions not taken etc by Councilors and officials of the 
municipalities. To ascribe these delays solely to lack of capacity is misleading: there 
is also acute mismanagement of time and a lack of respect for good management 
practice in terms of keeping to commitments etc. These are matters beyond the 
scope of this project, but their impact cannot be ignored. 
The consequent delays meant that Phase Two of the project (post transfer of assets 
from DWAF to the WSA) which had been expected to start by 2002 did not take 
place during the contract time-scale. 
2.11 The Mid-term Review 
At a workshop held on 17th August 2002, the review team presented its findings. 
Arising out of these and debate at the workshop, the following was adopted by the 
workshop. 
2.11.1 Policy/Transfer – the WSA and WSP 
Constraints identified by the Workshop 
• No alignment of draft transfer policy between DWAF and DM 
• Lack of clarity on the transfer process 
i. What to be transferred 
ii. What are the implications 
11
iii. Financial implications/ different frameworks 
iv. Usability of the draft policy 
Proposals by the Workshop 
• Development of a budget for provision of water services 
• Interdepartmental process of developing a single process of transfer 
which takes into consideration the financial requirements 
• Draft proposal to get feed back within two months 
• No policy promulgated by District municipality to guide the WSA to fulfill its 
role and responsibilities. 
• Documentation has been prepared but not adopted by the Council 
• No clear direction from the MEC 
• Check if other DMs have submitted 
2.11.2 Capacity building 
Objective 
Provision of personnel to enable the water services institutions to operate and 
manage sustainable service delivery. 
Constraints identified by the Workshop 
• Funds (for new services and maintenance) 
• Under design 
• Extensions of boundaries 
• Lack of infrastructure- boreholes etc 
• Billing system 
• Skills lacking: 
i. Technical 
ii. Administrative 
iii. Managerial 
• Ineffective awareness programs 
• Illegal connections 
Proposals by the Workshop 
• Undertake audit of existing and new systems 
• Improve under-designed systems 
• Audit training needs 
• Establish mentors and institutional support 
• Strengthen integrated development planning and get commitment from 
stakeholders 
2.11.3 Service provision and Implementation 
Constraints identified by the workshop 
• Financial problems at municipalities 
• Backlog in terms of infrastructure 
• Lack of policy in how to deal with non-payers/defaulters 
• RDP standard (shared taps) results in illegal connections 
• Lack of co-ordination of activities by the different role players, i.e. 
DWAF, Local Municipalities, Amokhosi, etc 
• Unplanned settlements 
12
• Local municipalities under staffed 
• DWAF over-staffed 
• Unplanned power interruptions – lack of communication between 
Eskom, DWAF and LM 
• Delays in repairs 
• Confusion regarding responsibilities on maintenance issues 
• Vandalism (e.g. taps and meters being stolen) 
Proposals by the workshop 
Policy 
• promulgation of by-laws and tariffs as soon as possible 
Coordination 
• resuscitation of the PSC for coordination purposes 
• Review TOR for the PSC and make distinction between operational 
and policy issues 
Power interruption 
• Request Eskom to give 7 days notice before planned interruption of 
supply 
Lack of resources 
• Proper tariffs to be in place 
• Water services to be reliable 
• Proper (accurate and up to date) billing systems to be used 
RDP standard 
• Policy to be reviewed to allow mixed level of service 
Vandalism 
• Water policing through Ward Committees 
• Replace copper meters with plastic ones 
• Do away with brass taps, if possible. 
2.11.4 Recommendations of the plenary 
1. Identify issues that can be achieved independent of the promulgation of the 
WSA/WSP policy. 
2. Address financial issues 
3. Identify personnel to undertake the tasks 
4. Address the lack of delivery in terms of water services 
5. Address the lack of designation of the roles and responsibilities 
6. Bohlabela District Municipality should continue to act as the WSA, until 
instructed otherwise 
7. SALGA, with the support of the MEC, should facilitate communication 
between the LM, DM, SALGA, DWAF, and DLGH (Provincial) 
Specific measures were agreed to expedite the establishment of the WSP/WSPs 
as follows: 
Task Date 
The Project should distribute the proposal for a WSP to 
all stakeholders 
20 August 
Comments to be received from stakeholders End of first week in 
September 
Meeting called to thrash out consensus on the WSP 
plan 
About 14th September 
Partnership agreement(s) prepared 
Approval by WSA 
13
It was also noted that it has been difficult for the national office of DWAF to manage 
the project effectively. It was therefore agreed that it would be preferable for the 
project to be managed by the Regional office in Polokwane. 
2.11.5 Outstanding institutional issues 
The review team also expressed concern over the fact that the Water Board had not 
been paid for any water that it had supplied; that the apparent failure of the MEC to 
declare Bohlabela District Municipality was causing very damaging delays; and that 
the Municipality had a duty to perform the function of WSA until it was officially 
informed to the contrary; and that the strained relations between the three 
municipalities should not be allowed to continue. 
2.12 Institutional Framework 
The diagram on the next page has been prepared as an introduction to the 
relationships between the stakeholders. 
14
CONSUMERS 
Communities Communities 
WATER SERVICES 
AUTHORITY 
WATER SERVICES 
PROVIDERS 
POLITICAL 
OVERSIGHT 
TECHNICAL 
OVERSIGHT 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
OVERSIGHT 
Maruleng Local 
Municipality 
6 technical staff 
Bushbuckridge Local 
Municipality 
45 tech staff 
DWAF local office 
Approx 500 tech. 
staff 
Bohlabela District Municipality 
4 water staff (2 part time)
DEPARTMENT OF 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
AND HOUSING
Limpopo Province 
DEPARTMENT OF WATER 
AFFAIRS AND FORESTRY 
(Pretoria) 
with regional and local offices 
Communities Communities Communities 
The Water Board, the bulk water supplier for the Bushbuckridge Local Municipality, 
employs approximately 150 technical people. 
The interesting aspect of this diagram is that there are multiple reporting structures. 
For example, the WSA is responsible for implementation of the Water Services Act 
on 1997, and reports to DWAF in that respect. Meanwhile, although water is not a 
Provincial competency, the provincial Department of Local Government and Housing 
has a constitutional duty to ensure that.municipalities fulfill their executive obligations, 
which include water services provision. 
15
Similarly, DWAF is a service provider under the control of the WSA. The WSA has 
the duty to approve tariffs and other aspects of the activities of the WSP, but DWAF 
staff, who manage the WSP, answer only to Pretoria. 
Bushbuckridge Local Municipality (BLM) receives a subsidy (the equitable share) 
from the National Treasury which it can use to meet the needs of service provision. 
Equally, DWAF, as a central government Department is reliant on the national budget 
for its funds. However, DWAF has no policy or history of cost recovery5
; whereas 
BLM is under a statutory obligation (in terms of both the Water Services Act and the 
Municipal Systems Act) to recover costs for services supplied. 
As noted above, BLM provided water within the urban areas (the so-called R293 
towns) and had a limited number of technical staff to maintain the system as well as 
meter readers. All water services within the rural areas were the responsibility of 
DWAF. 
2.13 The community served 
When the project was designed, the expectation was that the District to be served 
would consist of the Bushbuckridge and Nsikazi North areas. Due to the re￾demarcation of local government boundaries, and the fact that Bohlabela District 
Council (then known as the Eastern District Council) did not include the Nsikazi North 
area, but did include Maruleng Local Municipality, it was decided that the Project 
should cover the area for which Bohlabela District Municipality was responsible, i.e. 
Bushbuckridge and Maruleng municipalities. 
Key data for the Municipalities concerned are as follows: 
Population and household data: Bohlabela Municipality
Municipality 1996 census 2001 census 
Population 
Bushbuckridge 540463 499697 
Maruleng 91138 98038 
Bohlabela 631601 597735 
Households 
Bushbuckridge 111949 107923 
Maruleng 18235 21183 
Bohlabela 130184 129106 
Household size 
Bushbuckridge 4.82 4.63 
Maruleng 5.0 4.63 
Bohlabela 4.85 4.63 
Note: the population and household numbers for Bohlabela are the sum of 
Bushbuckridge and Maruleng 
Source: Stats SA, National Censuses (as presented by the Municipal Demarcation 
Board) 
 
5
 This is not to say that there is no cost recovery in schemes developed by DWAF. In rural 
schemes DWAF has encouraged beneficiaries to collect fees which can be used to pay fuel 
costs for borehole pumps and similar maintenance tasks. These are essentially savings 
schemes by the users – the funds are not collected by DWAF. The distinction is that DWAF, 
per se, operates as a grant-giving agency, and does not expect to recover the costs of 
infrastructure it provides. It should be noted that with the introduction of the Municipal 
Infrastructure Grant these arrangements are coming to an end, as all funds will be channelled 
through local government. 
16
Bushbuckridge: Access to Water Services 
(no of households) 
1996 2001 
In the dwelling 15347 5340 
Inside yard 18217 28070 
Community stand 55738 14992 
Community stand over 200m - 31358 
Borehole 12047 7624 
Spring 7094 4712 
Rain tank 1088 343 
Dam/pool/stagnant water - 2861 
River/Stream - 6013 
Water vendor - 438 
Other 1737 6171 
The symbol “-“ means that the question was not asked in 1996. 
Source: Stats SA, National Censuses (as presented by the Municipal Demarcation 
Board) 
It should be noted that definitional problems and poor interviewer training may 
account for the apparent drop in the number of households with a water supply in the 
house between 1996 and 2001. 
2.14 Special factors 
Time and time again the subjects interviewed explained that progress had been 
hampered by the special factors prevailing in the district. Most of these factors were 
identified at the mid-term review. However, it is considered useful to re-state them 
here and attempt to assess their importance at the current time. 
2.14.1 Lack of capacity 
The BDM has been particularly affected by the lack of capacity. As noted above, this 
stemmed from the fact that the previous District Council (then the Northern, now 
Capricorn District Council) was split into four units. Of these new councils BDM was 
the most remote, and although they did receive seconded staff from the Province, 
they inherited no permanent staff from the previous District Council. Even today, the 
BDM has not filled all its posts, and has not yet adopted its Human Resources Policy. 
Furthermore, there were massive demands on the Limpopo Provincial Department of 
Local Government and Tradition Affairs which prevented them from providing more 
than administrative support to Bohlabela pending appointment of permanent staff. 
2.14.2 Slow decision-making 
Decisions that, in the ordinary course of events might have taken months have taken 
years. Several reasons have been advanced to explain this. 
Lack of experience 
The BDM had no corporate experience to bring to bear on the decisions it had 
to make. In most cases, the fact that all decisions were affected by the 
legislation which came into effect on 6th December 2000, meant that 
precedent could not be relied upon by individual officers. Also, the Councilors 
were facing an entirely new legislative and administrative environment. 
These factors therefore eroded the confidence of officers in advising the 
Council, and the Councilors were also slow to take decisions. Thus they 
generally avoided making mistakes but at the expense of speed. 
17
Political conflicts 
It is no secret that relationships between the BDM and BLM have been 
strained at times. Two reasons have been given for this. The first is that 
there have been political tensions in the area for many years, which go back 
to jealousies between the previous homeland administrations and other 
intangible historical and ethnic tensions. The second is that, as long as the 
powers and functions of the District and Local Municipalities remained 
uncertain, there was obvious room for each party to compete for powers and 
functions. Such competition had the potential to result in bad human 
relations, political tensions and withholding of information. 
Lack of clarity on roles and functions 
BDM represents one of the most difficult cases as far as this matter is 
concerned. 
Under section 84(3) of the Municipal Structures Act, on 28th November 2000, 
the Minister of Provincial and Local Government authorized (in effect) local 
municipalities to perform functions to the extent that they were performed by 
their predecessors. An interpretation of this was that the Local Municipalities 
should continue to be the Water Services Providers, and that Bohlabela 
District Municipality, as successor to the Northern District Council should be 
responsible for the bulk water supply and become the WSA. This would be 
directly in line with the provisions of the section 84 (b) of the Municipal 
Systems Amendment Act (2000) that “A district municipality has responsibility 
for potable water supply systems”. 
However political rivalry fuelled the uncertainty and both local and district 
municipalities took a “wait and see” stance on the matter. The issue was 
further complicated by the fact that Local Municipalities in Mpumalanga were 
designated WSAs, while in Limpopo the tendency was for District to perform 
this role. For a while it was uncertain which MEC (Mpumalanga or Limpopo) 
would take responsibility for Bohlabela, as a cross border municipality. 
The combined effect of these difficulties was effectively to stall progress on 
the project for about two years. 
2.14.3 Lack of guidance 
The uncertainty was compounded by a lack of leadership from the Province. It will 
be noted that under the constitution water is not a Provincial competency, yet the 
MEC for Local Government has to designate Municipalities as WSPs. 
2.14.4 Water Board and DWAF 
Two other agencies are operating in the area, Bushbuckridge Water Board and 
DWAF. The former had been created shortly before the start of the project as the 
bulk water supplier for some of the area. However, the Water Board’s jurisdiction 
was different from Bohlabela’s which created some difficulties. Furthermore all the 
rural schemes within the area were operated by DWAF in a highly subsidized manner 
(effectively 100%). Before Bohlabela could effectively operate in its role as the WSA 
it had to establish a relationship with these two agencies. This also took time, and 
there were tensions around the question of the water board’s charges, and DWAF’s 
accountability. 
2.14. 5 Summary 
In brief, there were many respects in which the business of retail water provision was 
being impeded by institutional conflicts, administrative uncertainty and a lack of 
18
experience. The project therefore concentrated on clarifying the role of the WSA and 
strengthening its role in terms of the regulatory environment within which it operated 
and management skills. This was seen as a necessary first step in providing an 
environment within which retail water services could be provided efficiently and 
effectively. 
The situation was complicated by a decision that was taken in principle in 1992 to 
form a new WSP for the Bushbuckridge municipal area, rather than recognize the 
local municipality as the WSPs. This required a three stage process – first 
designating the Local Municipalities and DWAF as the interim WSPs; secondly 
forming a joint team between the three agencies and BDM, and finally creating a new 
structure (a municipal entity as provided for in Chapter 8 of the Municipal Systems 
Act section). This created institutional uncertainty and a lack of motivation by the 
local municipalities to enhance efficiency in light of the fact that they were due to lose 
the power shortly. 
To place the situation into context we conclude with a remark made at the workshop 
held on 11th March 2005 to review the initial findings of the evaluation: 
“I have studied each municipality in the country. There are huge challenges 
due to poverty levels and the hugeness of the organizations. Five years ago 
they didn’t exist. The pressure on local people in Municipalities is huge. They 
have little time left after meetings and workshops to do their job. It also takes 
time for them to learn and build up on the skills required to do their job. The 
project really is finishing before we achieve. Water Affairs has had a big 
change in the 5 years. In terms of lessons learnt, we can’t expect things to 
happen overnight. Province has said that Bohlabela is ahead of other 
municipalities, which shows they have done what they could, but more 
support is still needed”. 
 Stewart Gibson
19
3. Evaluation of the project components 
In this section we consider the individual components of the project, as identified in 
the mid-term review (and re-stated in the terms of reference for this study). The 
findings below are based on interviews and documentary sources6
. 
3.1 Assistance to local government in developing procedures for addressing 
their new roles as water service authorities 
The project was severely delayed by the lack of a decision on this matter. Bohlabela 
was appointed WSA in October 2002, just over two years after the beginning of the 
project7
. The effect of this delay on overall project achievement cannot be over￾stated. 
The BDM felt that little could be done with retail water provision, per se, until the MEC 
for Local Government in Limpopo had taken a decision on whether they or the local 
municipality were to be the WSA. USAID’s CTO agreed with this decision. At the 
time there was tension between BDM and BLM over the operation of water services, 
as BLM felt that they had the capacity and de facto responsibility for water services 
within their urban areas and should be given recognition as such. 
As a result of these hesitations concerning the appointment of a WSP, or the 
recognition of the de facto role of BLM, by the time of the mid-term review little had 
been achieved in this regard. However, while little progress was made with regard to 
putting in place the regulatory and managerial functions of a WSA, preparatory work 
could continue. This included matters such as drafting Bylaws, and preparing 
staffing structures, and deliberating on the form that WSP(s) would take. In addition, 
with funds from DWAF under the Masimbambane Program, the BDM commissioned 
a Water Services Development Plan. 
It is also important to note that debates concerning the roles of the agencies acted as 
a useful educational tool: as a result the leadership of Bohlabela District Municipality, 
especially the Executive Mayor, is considered to be among the best informed in the 
country. 
The mid-term review criticized the project for being preoccupied with the appointment 
of the WSA, while paying comparatively little attention to provision of retail water 
services. Whether this criticism was justified or not, it must be recognized that the 
RWDP’s slow but sure approach to the BDM has meant that both politically and 
administratively it has an excellent grasp of its responsibilities as a WSA. This might 
not have been achieved without the patient coaching undertaken by the RWDP over 
the years. 
Since the mid-term review, however, movement on these issues has been good. In 
its relationship with the Bohlabela District Municipality, the project had to tread a 
delicate path. On the one hand, project staff were more experienced and had more 
time available to deal with the issues than their political or staff colleagues. There 
was thus every temptation to run with issues, and make prescriptive proposals. On 
the other hand there was the need to respect the doubts, ignorance and hesitancy 
being felt by these people. This way required that decisions were made by the 
relevant persons within their own time, and though using information supplied by the 
RWDP, based on their own knowledge. The latter course of action created delays but 
 
6
 An important source of documentary information has been the quarterly reports. The last 
one available to the evaluation team was that of October - December 2004, and therefore 
some later material may not be reflected. 
7
 And BLM was only officially designated WSP, within its urban areas, in June 2004. 
20
ultimately resulted in more informed decision-making; and it is that approach that was 
adopted. 
Among the issues which the WSA had to confront were the following: 
Regulation: 
• Adopt Bylaws 
• Adopt tariff policy 
• Declare tariffs 
Water Services Providers: 
• Appoint WSPs 
• Negotiate transfers of assets and staff from DWAF 
• Develop WSP partnership entity which had been adopted as the preferred 
option in 2002. 
Substantial progress has been made in all these areas since the mid-term review, as 
described below. 
In addition, the project has made major contributions in several different capacities to 
the process for the transfer of staff and assets from DWAF to the WSA. 
• They participated in the Transfer Task Team, which was established to drive 
the process. 
• They advised the BDM with regard to the steps that would be required to 
prepare them to receive the staff and assets 
• They assisted the BDM in negotiations with regard to the terms and 
conditions under which transfers would be made 
• They conducted a detailed audit of the DWAF infrastructure to show what 
work needed to be done to bring it up to full working order. 
A MOU regarding the transfer was signed by the Minister of Water Affairs and 
Forestry, Buyelwa Sonjica, and the Mayor in June 2004. However, several issues 
required further negotiation before a transfer agreement could be signed. These 
were mainly relating to the conditions of service of the transferred staff under the 
BDM, how many would be transferred, and how selection would be undertaken. 
Even after the signature of the MOU, negotiations regarding the transfer were 
complex and protracted. There were four major issues. 
• The value of the assets being transferred 
• The subsidy that would be paid to the WSA to cover the cost of running the 
services 
• The number and quality of staff to be transferred from DWAF to the WSA 
• The possibility of secondment of DWAF staff to the WSA pending 
finalization of the Transfer agreement. 
The project played an important role in these negotiations, especially by helping BDM 
present its case effectively and efficiently and thereby protecting its interests. We 
were told that, in that respect, BDM conducted the negotiations significantly more 
professionally than the majority of WSAs in Limpopo Region. 
In the view of the Transfer Task Team these issues were resolved in December 
2004, and the agreement was signed by the BDM in that month. It must be recalled 
21
that DWAF is responsible for hundreds of such transfer agreements, and that each 
has its own peculiarities. In light of the scale of the problems and the lack of 
precedents, we cannot be surprised that finalizing agreements took time, even 
though, by their own program, DWAF has been running far behind schedule in this 
activity. The Transfer Agreement was finally signed by DWAF in mid March 2005, 
but difficult issues remain concerning conditions of service for the transferred staff. 
The situation has been complicated by the fact that SALGA is taking an active 
interest in this matter, and it is possible that resolution will not be achieved before the 
planned 1st July hand-over date. 
Although the delays in reaching agreement seem to be excessive, BDM was the 
second WSA in Limpopo to sign a transfer agreement. However, it is clear that these 
delays, and the difficulties experienced in agreeing the conditions under which DWAF 
staff might be seconded to BDM, created severe difficulties and frustrations for the 
parties concerned. BDM therefore decided to create an interim Water Services 
Management Team (of four persons) which was to consist of staff from BDM, BLM 
and DWAF. The team was mandated with addressing maintenance issues for all 
schemes within BLM. 
Even this modest concept took many months to materialize, including a delay of nine 
months caused by a lack of consensus on the appointment of the Manager. At the 
time of the evaluation BLM’s representative was only participating spasmodically. 
An ironic twist to this tale is that a decision appears to have been taken in principle 
that Bushbuckridge Local Municipality will be transferred to Mpumalanga immediately 
after the next Local Government elections, which must be held within 90 days of the 
expiry of the term of the Councils, which is 6th December 2005. If so, Bohlabela 
would have only a single local municipality under it, and would therefore most 
probably be amalgamated with another District. This will have major implications in 
terms of the WSA and its relationships to the WSPs under it. 
3.2 Assist WSAs in implementing decisions regarding water service provision, 
and establish WSPs, based on models that the various stakeholders choose 
which are efficiently managed and provide for regular and high quality 
services. 
In January 2002 the RWDP prepared a Water Services Provider Options Study which 
recorded the decisions of a workshop conducted in November 2001 on the subject. 
This recommended that, as far as the WSP role was concerned in Bushbuckridge 
Local Municipality, it should be played by a new municipal entity initially formed by 
BDM, BLM and DWAF. In due course, after assets and staff were transferred from 
DWAF to BDM, the new entity would absorb these and thus provide a single WSP for 
the whole BLM area. The co-coordinating committee approved this in the last quarter 
of 2002. 
 
Since then the concept has been somewhat modified. The model is now for a formal 
WSP which would also be responsible for ensuring that Community Based 
Organizations are operating their isolated schemes effectively. A total of 64 water 
committees were identified throughout the district and proposals for their training 
were submitted to Masimbambane for funding. The project initiated this study and 
contracted the Mvula Trust to conduct the study for them. A plan has also been 
prepared for AWARD, another NGO, to conduct the training of the WCs. All this was 
initiated by the project, but the WSA considers that it cannot be acted upon until the 
transfer has taken place, as to do so would be undermining the role of DWAF in 
22
those communities. To the evaluation team this would appear to be paying more 
attention to legal niceties than developmental needs. 
Meanwhile the RWDP prepared a Business Plan for this activity, which went through 
several drafts, the latest of which is dated July 2003. A legal opinion on the process 
to set up the WSP was handed over to the Municipal Manager for consideration8
. 
Even though this concept has political support, the majority of the respondents in our 
interviews appeared to be working on the assumption that the BLM and MLM would 
be the WSPs within their respective areas. This has the attraction of (a) not requiring 
the formation of a new entity – a difficult enough procedure where only one agency is 
involved, but a comparatively slow, expensive and politically sensitive one in the 
Bohlabela case; and (b) building on existing functions and powers instead of 
removing them. None of the subjects interviewed in DWAF, BDM or BLM talked with 
enthusiasm about the prospect of forming a new entity. However, it is possible that 
when staff are transferred from DWAF to the WSA perceptions on this matter will 
change, and the political will and resources will be found to form a new entity. 
Meanwhile the project has concentrated on strengthening the skills and 
administrative capacity of BLM, a decision which appears to be yielding results, if 
only slowly. As the focus groups have revealed, however, there is still a long way to 
go9
. 
3.3 Support the work of existing water services providers through technical 
assistance and training 
In June 2004, at the same time as signature of a Bulk Water Supply Agreement with 
the Water Board, the WSA finally appointed the de facto WSPs as such. 
Meanwhile, knowing that the WSA intended to recognize the role of BLM as the 
interim WSP, the RWDP proceeded to address the operational issues of water 
delivery. As noted in the mid-term review these would include strengthening the 
following: 
• Water Supply (continuous supply, good pressure)
• Water management (dealing with illegal connections etc)
• Adopting tariffs which allow for the free basic water policy and price water at 
sustainable levels
• Cost control (metering individual connections, meter reading and effective 
billing)
• Regulatory measures (bylaws concerning illegal connections, damage to 
meters etc)
• Customer care (pay points at convenient locations, open at convenient times)
• Good staff and supervisory management practices.
 
8 This process will of course be affected by possible changes in the provincial boundaries 
which will see Bushbuckridge Local Municipality going into Mpumalanga and Maruleng going 
into Limpopo after the next local government elections in about January 2006. The 
implications of this are that the WSA Bohlabela will have no constituency therefore may not 
exist or may exist in another form by incorporating another municipality in place of 
Bushbuckridge. 
9
 It must be made clear that a substantial percentage of the BLM’s population is served by 
DWAF, and thus does not fall within the direct control of the BLM itself. Many of the problems 
highlighted by the Focus Groups are concerned with DWAF schemes. 
23
Below, we summaries the actions taken in respect of each of the above items: 
3.3.1 Water supply 
In a situation where supply is insufficient to meet the demand, a measure of rationing 
is required so that consumers at the (topographically) higher end of a scheme 
receive water. This is a common problem in the BLM area. The improved distribution 
is usually achieved by closing valves overnight to allow reservoirs to fill up, and 
opening the valves when there is sufficient pressure for all consumers. Sometimes 
this will have to be done on an area basis, e.g. one area will be served in the 
morning, another in the afternoon, and a third in the evening. Otherwise it may 
operate on a part-time basis, e.g. for just part of the day for the whole scheme. 
Although the RWDP prefers to assist partners in undertaking tasks, rather than doing 
the work itself, it undertook a demonstration project on these lines in Dwarsloop, just 
before the mid-term review in July 2002. This was an instant success, and brought 
credit to the project. Unfortunately after the withdrawal of the project management 
from the operations, the system has once more lapsed and is unreliable. 
This is explained by a lack of commitment by local counterparts10 and the fact that 
the operators brought together in the team all belong to different organizations. The 
RWDP feels that unless there is leadership that is prepared to push everybody in a 
certain direction, which the project provided at the initial meetings, as soon as the 
people are back in their organizations, they fall back into old routines. 
 
This has been the case with the Marite Scheme. In February 2004, the RWDP was 
requested to coordinate implementation of procedures for addressing equitable 
distribution of water in the scheme, otherwise known as BBR06. The parties 
concerned were Bushbuckridge Water Board, BLM, DWAF and BDM. BBR06 was 
implemented as a pilot site and the processes were to be documented so that they 
could be replicated in other areas. The team to be assisted by RWDP comprised the 
Technical Director of Bohlabela, the Technical Services Director of the Water Board, 
the local DWAF Water Manager and the Technical Director BLM.
 
When the project was coordinating this activity, all the parties were cooperating and 
agreed on the action plan. As soon as the project handed this to the Water Services 
manager to coordinate, with assistance from the project team, very little was 
achieved. Added to the problem is Eskom's reluctance to replace cables stolen by 
communities in the area before they can get assurance from the communities that 
these will not be vandalized again. Councilors have failed to obtain such assurances 
from the community that satisfy Eskom.
 
Another project, to formalize illegal connections at Calcutta, ran into early problems 
due to objections from traditional leaders. However, all 4000 households have since 
been registered and the municipality is now beginning to install meters in the area. 
As soon as the meters are installed, the customers will be brought into the municipal 
billing system. This has been relatively successful and may be replicated to other 
areas. The project's input was mainly to assist in organizing the community to accept 
the formalization through interaction and registering the households. It did not fund 
the meter installation but rather facilitated the installation by the municipality
 
The RWDP maintains that one of their biggest challenges was in changing people’s 
attitudes towards doing things differently. One of the reasons why the pilot tasks 
 
10 This was stated by the Mayor of BDM at the project review workshop held on 11th March 
2005 
24
worked well during the period that the project team coordinated the activities was that 
during that period, they could ensure that the different organizations and 
individuals put their personal, historical, and political conflicts aside and focused their 
energies on the task at hand. The RWDP took the approach of always advocating 
working as a team between the municipalities, the Water Board, DWAF and civic 
organizations. However, as soon as the project team handed the coordination of 
these teams back to the local counterparts, the old conflicts arose and took the focus 
away from the task at hand. These tensions are deep rooted either in tribalism, 
politics or otherwise. Consequently people have tended to go back to their normal 
business. The principal of including DWAF, Water Board and BLM staff was 
intended to set a precedent for the days when all these people would be working 
together under the proposed municipal entity WSP. While this might have been 
justified from the theoretical point of view, in practice it diluted the sense of 
responsibility which should have been exerted by BLM, the de facto service provider 
in the area concerned. 
 
Additionally the conditions of employment of DWAF staff and the municipality were a 
big issue. The maintenance teams work an 8 hour day. There is no provision for 
them to work in shifts or assurance that they will be paid overtime etc. Thus, when 
confronted with the need to work out of normal hours, (e.g. when opening the valves 
to ensure effective water distribution either early in the morning or late at night) they 
simply did not do so. The project felt itself powerless to change this situation. Until 
the Municipalities and DWAF view the water business as a 24/7 service the 
situation is unlikely to improve much. 
Since the Water Services Management Team has been in operation, coordination 
between DWAF and BDM has improved. The BLM has also collaborated at the 
working level but there has been a tendency for it not to participate at the senior 
level. The team is also reported to suffer from a lack of effective leadership.
3.3.2 Water management 
As an add-on to Ward Committee training being conducted by an SO1 appointed 
training team, the RWDP undertook water conservation training. This dealt with 
issues such as maintenance of pipes and fittings to prevent water loss and illegal 
connections. The program was considered a success, and, so to speak, opened the 
eyes of the participants in this regard. 
On an entirely different aspect, the Project has undertaken studies of the DWAF 
systems which effectively constitute an audit of their condition. This work was done 
with the assistance of project-funded consultants, and is of a very high quality. They 
confirm, however, the findings of the focus groups that the standard of water 
management is very low, and it will be an enormous task to bring the systems up to 
the standard where continuity of water provision is assured for the majority of the 
residents in the BLM. 
These reports also provide the WSA with essential information on which to negotiate 
with DWAF regarding (a) the work to be undertaken before hand-over, and (b) the 
value of the assets to be transferred. 
In addition, the work gives the future WSP a basis on which to plan improvements to 
the water management. 
The RWDP commissioned studies of all schemes which lay down the fundamentals 
of water management that should be instituted for the areas concerned. We consider 
that these could be a useful starting point for training in the Organization and 
25
Management of these schemes, an activity that the project would have undertaken if 
the transfer of the schemes to BDM had taken place during the project life span. In 
any case, the reports are a good start, although the studies appear to be unrealistic 
in terms of the duties proposed as routine maintenance, and further work might be 
required before they are adopted. 
However, until the hand over of systems from DWAF has been undertaken, and the 
role of the WSP in relation to the WSA and the Water Management Team has been 
clarified, there is a reluctance by the BLM to adopt new systems. In the meanwhile, 
responsibility for implementing the procedures has been given to the Water Services 
Manager. 
3.3.3 Adopting tariffs which allow for the free basic water policy and price 
water at sustainable levels 
The tariffs in operation at the time of the Mid-term review were far too low for 
meaningful cost recovery. For example, whereas the tariff in the urban areas of 
Bushbuckridge was 33c a kilolitre, the Water Board charged BLM R2,60 a kilolitre. 
Thus the BLM was incurring a loss of R2,27 on every kilolitre of water it sold to its 
consumers – a clearly unsustainable situation11. Revised tariffs have been proposed 
by the RWDP, and have since been adopted and put into operation with the 
signature of the WSP MOU in 2004. 
3.3.4 Cost control (metering individual connections, meter reading and 
effective billing) 
Assistance with this activity was proposed to be completed in December 2002, but in 
fact not much was done until 2004. This was due to a lack of capacity at BLM, which 
was finally addressed by the appointment of a private sector company of debt 
collectors. The emphasis was initially on revenue from the large users such as 
government institutions and businesses, as agreed in the mid-term review workshop. 
Revenues received in the first three months were received as follows: 
July 2004 August September Total 
3,384,069.30 626,233.43 670,940.71 4,681,243.44 
It should be noted that these receipts are for all charges, not water alone. The very 
large sum in July follows commitments by consumers to pay their arrears. 
 
While these figures are very encouraging, it should be noted that there is a very long 
way to go before the system is fully operational. It is necessary to compile accurate 
data on all consumers, and to develop better reporting procedures. For example, in 
the context of this study, it has not been possible to determine how much of the 
amount billed has been paid, how much of the water supplied has been charged for 
etc. 
Meanwhile, the RWDP undertook a pilot project at Calcutta aimed at eradication of 
illegal connections and installation of meters. These two measures, if replicated 
throughout the BLM urban areas will have a major impact on cost recovery. In the 
rural areas, where most people are served by shared standpipes the impact will be 
less on the cost recovery and more on the availability of water. 
3.3.5 Regulatory measures (bylaws concerning illegal connections, damage to 
meters etc) 
 
11 Which was addressed by not paying the Water Board, and thereby passing unsustainability 
to a different agency. 
26
Draft bylaws were prepared in 2002, and had been widely workshopped by the time 
of the mid-term review. Before they can be legally adopted by BDM, it was thought 
by BDM (and the RWDP and, apparently, by the Provincial Department of Local 
Government and Housing) however, that they must be approved by the MEC for 
Local Government in Limpopo Province. Although they were submitted in late 2002, 
approval had not been received by the time of writing. It is known that the bylaws 
were approved by the legal department in the Department of Local Government, but 
it is not clear why nothing was done subsequently. After the National elections in 
2004 a new MEC was appointed, only to be replaced about six months later. It is 
understood that with the appointment of a new MEC, approval might be received 
shortly. An explanation given the by Municipal Manager of BDM was that a possible 
reason for the delays in approval was that the By-laws incorporated water tariffs. 
Approval of cost increases is never a popular task for politicians, and it is possible 
that this was the reason for the delays. 
The bylaws were re-submitted recently together with proposals for increases in tariffs. 
However, in the opinion of the evaluation team, tariffs should not be part of by-laws, 
but should be adopted as part of the budget process on an annual basis12. 
 
Until bylaws have been approved, both BDM and BLM lack the legal power to 
penalize, for example, those responsible for illegal connections. This emasculates 
the system, and severely limits the scope of the WSP with regard to enforcement of 
regulations and cost recovery. 
The question to be addressed here is whether the contractor could have been more 
effective in pushing for the Bylaws to be adopted (and, by inference, to expedite 
decision on the appointment of the WSA). It is clear that from the tactical point of 
view they were not in a strong position to do so in their own capacity – that would 
have been construed as external interference and could have led to even greater 
delays. From the point of view of facilitating meetings and/or presenting a case more 
effectively, it is considered that they did all that could reasonably have been expected 
of them. 
However, a much more fundamental point has arisen, which raises the question as to 
whether the contractor advised the municipality properly. According to our search of 
the legislation, no approval was required, and the municipality had a right to adopt its 
own bylaws without reference to the Province. The only possible reason for 
consulting with the Province could be that their lawyers could advise whether there 
was any conflict between the bylaws and any other law (which would, clearly, and as 
stated in the constitution (s 156 (3)) make that by-law invalid).13 They could therefore 
have proceeded to adopt the bylaws in 2002 and start enforcing them as soon as 
they were gazetted. 
 
12 S. 24 (2) of the Municipal Finance Management Act, 2003: “An annual budget (a) must be 
approved before the start of the budget year . . .(c) must be approved together with the 
adoption of resolutions as may be necessary – (i) imposing any municipal tax for the budget 
year; (ii) setting any municipal tariffs for the budget year;” 
13 The constitution states “A municipality may make and administer by-laws for the effective 
administration of the matters which it must administer” (s156.(1) (a); section 162 continues 
“(1) A municipal by-law may be enforced only after it has been published in the official gazette 
of the relevant province. (2) A provincial official gazette must publish a municipal by-law upon 
request by a municipality.” A search of the Constitution, the Municipal Structures Act and its 
amendments, the Municipal Systems Acts and its amendments, and the Municipal Finance 
Management Act have not disclosed any right of a Province to approve or control the making 
of bylaws by a municipality. 
27
3.3.6 Customer care (pay points at convenient locations, open at convenient 
times), and communications 
As noted above, workshops with Ward Committees, designed to improve customer 
relations and awareness of water conservation issues were conducted in April 2004. 
The RWDP assisted in the developing a communication strategy and workshopped it 
with the stakeholders in January 2003. The process was participatory and the 
stakeholders outlined the issues that they saw as critical for communication. At this 
workshop, the municipality agreed to implement as a matter of urgency, 3 of the 8 
tasks. The main reasons for the delays in implementing the strategy was that there 
was no custodian of this strategy at the WSA. As soon as the commercial manager 
was appointed in April 2004, he requested assistance with implementing some of the 
activities. Currently the RWDP is assisting him setting up the interim fault reporting 
system, which is one of the tasks that were identified in the strategy. 
As was revealed in the focus groups, perceptions regarding institutional 
responsibilities for water provision and a general appreciation of the workings of 
water systems were very weak. This is evidence of poor communications between 
the service providers and the public. From the point of view of the evaluation, this 
has been a weak point. The communications strategy referred to above was too 
limited in concept and too narrow in focus to address the wider issues highlighted by 
the focus groups – namely that the majority of consumers understand little about the 
working of he water services and feel little responsibility for their condition. 
When this point was discussed at the Workshop and subsequent reviews of the 
evaluation, the point was made that it is difficult to generate positive attitudes to a 
system that seldom works. To be more specific, if there is no water in the pipes the 
vandalism is most probably an expression of frustration rather than thoughtless 
vandalism. 
In both cases, it is felt that the project could have supported measures to increase 
consumer understanding and involvement. In this instance staff capacity did not 
need to be an issue: it is the type of work best implemented by NGOs such as 
AWARD. 
Meanwhile the BLM has opened 11 regional offices and these are being used as 
service points for the municipality. The coverage of these areas is very good as they 
cover the entire municipal area. They are open from 8 to 16:30 which is probably 
adequate considering the rural nature of the area and the comparatively high 
proportion of households who have adults who are not in full-time employment. 
Regarding the establishment of a 24 hour facility for receipt of fault reports, and 
systems to repair them, there has been little progress.
3.3.7 Good staff and supervisory management practices 
A baseline management systems audit for the WSP was undertaken in 2001. A 
second audit was planned for June 2004, in preparation for the transfer of DWAF 
assets and staff. The intention was to determine the degree to which a complete 
realignment of the system would take place, or whether it would be possible to 
achieve a satisfactory system through realignment. However, since the transfer date 
was deferred, the audit has not taken place. 
3.4 Develop new generation of managers and empower key actors with the 
capacity to undertake key WSA and WSP business activities without outside 
assistance 
28
29
Work with regard to this component at the WSA level has shown progress. A 
Director of Technical Services has been appointed, and he has worked closely with 
the Project team. Since his appointment, the Management team for the proposed 
WSP has also been established. This consists of four persons, and is located at the 
RWDP offices, which were rented by the BDM and provided to the project after the 
lease ended on their previous offices. It is concentrating on improving the 
performance of the rural schemes in collaboration with DWAF and BLM. 
This team is being used to address problems throughout the BLM area and is being 
operated on a learning by doing basis with project support. It is unfortunate that the 
cut-off date for the project prevented further training of the staff. 
The team is using the two current pilot projects at Marite and Calcutta as models for 
future engagement in these issues. In particular, the work at Calcutta – eliminating 
illegal connections and installing meters is an important model which, after a slow 
start, seems to be working well and to be replicable throughout the BLM area. 
However, proposals to attach staff from the BLM to the team, and thereby enhance 
their capacity, have not been working according to plan. This may be due to tensions 
between the Manager and BLM, or a lack of commitment to the concept of the Team. 
The formation of this team is being viewed as an important step in the handover of 
assets from DWAF to the WSA. However, as with most components of the project, 
the delays in transfer (on the one hand) and BDM’s delay in establishing human 
resources policies (on the other) have combined to weaken this aspect of the project. 
Symptomatic of the problems facing BDM was the difficulty they faced in trying to 
recruit the Manager of the Water Services Team. The project advised the BDM to 
recruit a person from outside the area who could approach the job without the 
baggage of past affiliations and loyalties. Unfortunately the inability of the 
Municipality to attract such skills resulted in them appointing a compromise candidate 
for the post. He is an ex-DWAF employee from the area. Whilst this would have 
been a positive due to his knowledge of the area, it is proving a negative since the 
old tensions are resurfacing thereby hampering implementation. 
This is, in a way, a microcosm of the problems which the transfer of staff from DWAF 
might present. There is sense in the BDM that DWAF will retain its best people and 
only offer for transfer those which are less experienced, productive and effective. 
Similarly, the DWAF staff who are expecting to be transferred are reluctant, feeling 
that service in the local government environment might offer less job security and 
poorer conditions of service. For example, while DWAF and the BDM agreed in 
principle that DWAF staff should be seconded to the BDM as a transitional 
arrangement until all the final details had been thrashed out, hesitations over taking 
the step triumphed and nothing was done.
3.5 Assist the WSA in developing the WSDP 
This activity was undertaken before the mid-term review. A review was undertaken 
about a year later. 
3.6 Timings 
In order to illustrate the problems faced by the project in completing tasks as 
programmed, we have tabulated the planned and actual completion dates of 
activities, as indicated in quarterly reports. 
Task No 
2002 2003
July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct
1 WSP & bulk Agreements Mar-02 
1st
rev 2nd Rev 2nd Rev 3rd Rev
Sign MOU on transfer Nov-02 1st Rev
Set WSP partnership Jan-03 1st Rev
Recruit Mgt team for WSP Jul-01 1st Rev 2nd Rev 3rd Rev
Update WSDP Jan-03
1st 
Rev 
Transfer of assets Jul-0 3 
2 WSP mgmt systems audit Aug-01 1st Rev 2nd Rev
Improvement to extg systems Dec-02
3 Establish accounts Jul-02 1st Rev 2nd Rev
3rd 
rev
Institute billing procedure Sep-02 1st Rev
4 KAP survey Jan-01
Identify Public Awareness progs Oct-02 1st Rev 2nd Rev
5 WSP systems audit Dec-01 1st Rev
Record dwgs water, sewerage 0 Apr- 3 
Illegal connection strategy Jul-03
6 Skills audit for WSA Dec-02 Dropped
30
Skills audit for WSP Dec-02 Dropped
Training program designed Jan-03
Training program implemented Jun-03 
Report Tracking Chart: page 1 Key: activity completed 
Report Tracking Chart, p. 2 
Task No 
2003 2004
Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
1 WSP & bulk Agreements Mar-02 4th Rev 
Sign MOU on transfer
hip 0 
Nov-02 1st Rev
Set WSP partners Jan- 3 
Recruit Mgt team for WSP Jul-01 4th Rev
Update WSDP Jan-03
Transfer of assets Jul-03 1st Rev
2 WSP mgmt systems audit Aug-01 3rd Rev 4th Rev
Improvement to extg systems Dec-02 1st Rev 2nd Rev
3rd 
Rev 
3 Establish accounts Jul-02 4th Rev
Institute billing procedure Sep-02 2nd Rev 3rd Rev
4th 
Rev 
4 KAP survey Jan-01
Identify Public Awareness progs Oct-02 ev 
dit 0 
3rd R
5 WSP systems au Dec- 1 
Record dwgs water, sewerage Apr-03 1st Rev
2nd 
Rev 
Illegal connection strategy Jul-03 1st Rev
6 Skills audit for WSA Dec-02
Skills audit for WSP Dec-02
Training program designed Jan-03 1st Rev 2nd Rev 3rd Rev
4th 
Rev 
Training program implemented Jun-03 1st Rev 
31
32
Report Tracking Chart, page 
3 
Task No 
2005
Jan Feb Mar Apr May June July Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
1 WSP & bulk Agreements Mar-02
Sign MOU on transfer Nov-02
Set WSP partnership Jan-03
Recruit Mgt team for WSP Jul-01
Update WSDP Jan-03
Transfer of assets Jul-03 2nd Rev
2 WSP mgmt systems audit Aug-01
Improvement to extg systems Dec-02
3 Establish accounts Jul-02
Institute billing procedure Sep-02
4 KAP survey Jan-01
Identify Public Awareness progs Oct-02
5 WSP systems audit Dec-01
Record dwgs water, sewerage Apr-03
Illegal connection strategy Jul-03 2nd Rev
6 Skills audit for WSA Dec-02
Skills audit for WSP Dec-02
Training program designed Jan-03
Training program implemented Jun-03 
 
4. Focus Groups 
4.1 Objectives of the focus group interviews 
The overall objective of the focus group interviews was to assess community 
perspectives regarding the program. 
4.2 Findings 
A detailed report on the focus groups is included in Annex 4. Two major conclusions 
may be drawn from them. 
• Most people were either unaware of the project, or if they were aware of it 
considered that it had not met their expectations in improving the provision of water 
services. 
• The insufficient bulk water supply (due to faulty pumps, or insufficient supplies from 
the Water Board), illegal connections and vandalism combine to result in a very low 
standard of provision for most consumers. 
Levels of information and communication about the project differed considerably 
between the settlements. In areas that were identified as pilot sites, especially the 
urban and peri-urban areas, there appeared to be a general knowledge of the 
existence of the project. Some residents remember community meetings where the 
project was introduced. What is not clear is the communication content of the 
meetings. Residents cannot distinguish between the project’s objectives and the 
various components of the broader USAID program whose objectives were: 
• To support the establishment of a water board (for bulk supply), 
• To support operations and maintenance (for both bulk and retail), and 
• To support capacity building for water distribution (retail) managed by 
local government authority. 
All the above activities are seen as one project “that has been around for over five 
years but has not delivered water”. Moreover, even the objective of supporting 
capacity building for retail water is still confused with the delivery of water 
infrastructure by the municipality. 
A major problem from a community perspective was that there was no clear 
understanding of the critical importance of institutional strengthening as a 
prerequisite of all other components of service delivery such infrastructural 
development, customer care and water conservation. The partners involved in the 
project developed a communication strategy dated November 2002 the purpose of 
which was to develop mechanisms to disseminate information among the people and 
the relevant institutions. This document attempted to explain the vision and 
objectives for improving water services in Bohlabela. The communication strategy 
was also meant to help stakeholder institutions involved in the Bohlabela water 
program to bring about the required changes in policies, operational procedures and 
behaviors of the people, so as to make the program a success. Furthermore, the 
strategy placed emphasis on two elements which are: 
• determining and clarifying institutional responsibilities: and 
• reducing water losses to help ensure availability to as many people as 
possible. 
33
34
There is evidence of some communication effort on the part of the RWDP and its 
partners, even in localities as far as Hluvukani which was not one of the pilot sites, 
but is part of the Bohlabela Water Services jurisdiction. In this area Councilors were 
fully aware of the project, but ordinary residents did not have any information about 
the project or the institutions responsible for the project. There is a strong possibility 
that councilors do not disseminate information to the broader community. In the pilot 
project site of Calcutta, where project consultants have recently been active, 
residents were aware of the project, mainly because of the communication effort, and 
the visibility of the project activities. Regular meetings had been held to discuss 
issues such as the formalization of illegal connections and the metering thereof. 
4.3 Performance in terms of expected outcomes (community benefits) 
Project benefits reported by the community included awareness about water 
management, conservation and issues of scarcity. Residents of Dwaarsloop, 
especially councilors, reported on workshops that had been held to explain the line 
functions of a WSA and WSP, and the role of supporting institutions and inter￾governmental relations. 
No participation was reported by the community and no capacity building at the local 
level was reported. 
The tables on the following pages summarize the findings of the focus groups. 
It must be noted here that the views of the focus groups cannot be used as a criterion 
by which to measure the effectiveness of the contractor, as Chemonics had no direct 
control over the actual water provision. Nevertheless, it is disappointing to note that 
the project had comparatively little impact as measured by improvements in the water 
supply for the ordinary resident. 
Settlement/ 
Focus group 
Group profile and project intervention Reported participation, awareness Impact 
Dwaarsloop 
Mixed group of 
men and 
women 
urban and 
peri-urban. 
(RWDP 
beneficiaries) 
• Pilot site – system stabilization and equitable 
distribution of water 
• The main problem identified by the project 
was reliability of service to an extent that 
residents would go without water for days and 
even weeks. The water treatment plants were 
inadequate. The distribution of water was 
inequitable. Some portions of the area would 
have enough water to a point of wastage while 
some would not have any water at all. 
• The main intervention was the upgrading of 
the water scheme and the rationing of water, 
so that one area could be provided with water 
for a specific number of hours. 
• This required a management program that 
involved the closing of valves at specific for 
specific periods to allow the equitable 
distribution of water. RWDP employed 
members of the community to close and open 
valves at appropriate times. This worked well 
in bringing about equity in provision, together 
with some stability to the system. 
• The Ward Council received project 
supported water management training 
• There was awareness of the 
project by all members of the focus 
group 
• Communication strategy 
implemented. There has been 
communication about the project, 
but not adequate 
• Awareness was mainly about the 
existence of the project, and its 
objectives. 
• There was no awareness of the 
implementation plan and why 
certain tasks were undertaken 
• Capacity building workshops for 
councilors was very successful 
• Illegal connections remain a 
problem, but will not be eliminated 
unless there is reasonable service 
• Yes, but dissatisfaction 
remains 
• Service remains 
unreliable, stability of the 
system has deteriorated. 
Not enough done on 
system upgrade 
• Problems arose when 
the management 
responsibility was 
handed over to 
municipality. Operators 
were not prepared to 
work after hours as this 
was not included in their 
conditions of work. 
Payment of community 
members (by 
municipality) to perform 
the same task was not 
possible due to 
budgetary and internal 
policy constraints. 
35
Settlement/ 
Focus group 
Group profile and project intervention Reported 
participation, 
awareness 
Impact 
Marite 
All women and 
children at 
standpipe, 
peri-urban 
RWDP 
beneficiaries 
• Pilot site – system stabilization and equitable 
distribution of water; upgrading of boreholes, pumps 
and reservoirs: introduction of diesel pumps 
The main problem identified by the project was 
unreliable service, resulting in unavailability of water for 
extended periods. 
The project pilot intervention was the upgrading of the 
water schemes including boreholes, pumps and 
storage tanks, so as to address equitable distribution of 
water in the Marite scheme. It was hoped that the tasks 
would be implemented as a pilot so that the process 
could be documented and implemented elsewhere. 
• Variable project 
awareness 
• No participation 
• Limited. Even though this was a 
pilot site the water supply was 
reported to be unreliable 
• Similar to the problems 
experienced in Dwaarsloop, as soon 
as the project handed over 
management to local institutions, 
the process collapsed, and very little 
was achieved. 
• Illegal connections, especially by 
water vendors, undermine the 
service 
• When water is available, water 
pressure is low resulting in long 
queues at standpipes 
Marite 
RWDP pilot 
site 
(beneficiaries 
of the project) 
Mixed group of 
men and 
women 
• Same as above • Variable 
awareness 
• No participation 
• Limited. Even though this was a 
pilot site the water supply was 
reported to be unreliable 
• The problem of cable theft and 
illegal connections has not been 
solved 
• Residents are ready to pay for 
water via metering 
36
Settlement/ 
Focus group 
Group profile and project intervention Reported participation, 
awareness 
Impact 
Calcutta 
RWDP pilot 
site 
(beneficiaries 
of the project) 
Men only, peri 
urban to rural 
• Pilot site - pilot cost recovery. 
• Formalization of illegal connections 
• Initially the pilot ran into problems because 
traditional leaders expressed their objections 
to the project. It was noted that the main 
problems was inadequate consultation, and 
lack of clarity on the roles of the various 
institutions. 
• The project developed a strategy to 
develop mechanisms to disseminate 
information among the people and the 
relevant institutions. 
• There is relatively higher 
awareness of the project, 
especially the formalization of 
illegal connections as a 
component of system 
stabilization. 
• Yes, as this is a recent pilot 
site, the impact is clear in terms 
of improved regularization – 
formalization of illegal 
connections. 
• Residents prepared to pay for 
water 
• After a series of consultations, 
there has been an improvement 
in the support given to the pilot. 
4000 potential users have been 
registered and will soon be 
included in the municipal billing 
system once municipal meters 
have been installed. 
Thulamahashe 
RWDP pilot 
site 
(beneficiaries 
of the project) 
men only, 
urban 
• Pilot site – Cost recovery, resident 
registration for billing communication 
strategy, ward councilor training, system 
stabilization. 
• Thulamahashe is a densely populated 
township where the offices of the District 
Municipality and those of a number of 
provincial and central government 
departments are located. Thus 
Thulamahashe can be considered the 
administrative centre of BDM. 
• There is limited project 
awareness 
• Unable to differentiate 
between project activities and 
routine activities of municipality 
and DWAF 
• No participation 
• Inadequate cost recovery 
reportedly due to unreliable 
service 
• Public seemed unaware of 
Ward Committee training 
• Yes, in terms of improved 
systems for cost recovery. 
• No impact in terms of 
improved service delivery due to 
inadequate treatment capacity 
37
Settlement/ 
Focus group 
Group profile and project intervention Reported participation, awareness Impact 
Bushbuckridge 
CBD 
Businesses 
operating in 
the CBD (all 
male) 
Focus of 
RWDP cost 
recovery 
campaign 
(beneficiaries 
of the project) 
• Not described as a pilot, but a lot of targeted 
activity in the area. 
• Consultations about service delivery and cost 
recovery with businesses and key institutions 
• In an attempt to develop a sustainable tariff, 
the project investigated and reported on the 
impacts of the prevailing tariff which was way 
below the tariff of bulk water. 
• Businesses (many of which are in BBR CBD) 
and key institutions including government 
departments targeted. 
• Revised tariffs are in operation 
• Although cost recovery has 
started in this area the 
businesses claim it is not 
equitable as most residences are 
not paying 
• There is clarity on institutional 
roles 
• No effective consultation with 
users 
• Yes in terms of cost 
recovery, but 
dissatisfaction remains due 
to lack of reliability of water 
supply 
Hluvukani 
Mixed group of 
men and 
women, deep 
rural 
No direct 
benefits from 
RWDP 
• Non pilot site, deep rural. 
• No direct project activity 
• Information meetings were held during the 
early stages of implementation. 
• The local municipality has established a 
regional office that operates as a service point 
for the municipality (one of eleven in operation 
in BLM). 
• Awareness resides mainly with 
Councilors and officials. No 
general community awareness. 
• No participation 
• None 
• Boreholes remain 
dysfunctional because of 
broken pumps and 
unavailability of diesel. 
• No proper fault reporting 
mechanism and fault 
response time is very long 
38
Settlement/ 
Focus group 
Group profile and project
intervention 
Reported participation, awareness Impact 
Allandale (all 
women and 
children at 
standpipe) 
• Not direct 
beneficiaries 
of the RWDP 
• non-pilot site, rural 
• There are RDP standard community 
taps 
• No awareness of the project 
No participation 
• None 
• There is an extensive network of illegal 
connections 
• Service is unreliable 
• Although there are many standpipes, 
most of them do not have water. Residents 
still have to walk long distances. 
• Water pressure is a problem 
• Water losses due to unattended running 
taps 
39
40
Settlement/ Focus 
group 
Group profile and project intervention Reported participation, awareness Impact 
Rolle 
non- project site 
mixed group of 
men and women, 
rural but close to 
Thulamahashe 
• Not direct 
beneficiaries of 
RWDP 
• Non-pilot site 
• Close proximity to Thulamahashe 
• No awareness of the project 
• No participation 
• None 
• Unreliable service 
• Purification plants 
inadequate 
• Residents go for up to 
six weeks without water 
• Many illegal 
connections 
• Diesel pumps 
unsatisfactory and must 
be replaced with 
electrical pumps 
Amashangana 
Tribal Authority 
(men only) 
• Part RWDP site 
• Cuts across settlements, some of 
which are within pilot areas while 
some are not. 
• Consultations on illegal connections 
and other community problems 
• There is awareness of the project 
• No participation reported. They have 
to deal with community problems 
including lack of water, but municipality 
excludes them in planning and 
implementation of projects. 
• None, even though part 
of the area was a project 
site. 
• Dissatisfied with 
reliability of service 
5. Reporting 
5.1 Indicators 
The contract required that Chemonics should establish base-line data and measure 
progress of indicators that measure the condition at project initiation and provide 
periodic updates. 
The indicator against which the project was required to report was as follows: 
"Number of low-income communities applying sustainable environment management 
practices." 
In 2002 the contractor requested an explanation from USAID on this indicator noting 
the complexity of this. The explanation received was: 
Indicator Description: Communities as defined by municipality, 
disaggregated by municipality and agreed with USAID. 
 
Sustainable – activities that can continue without substantial donor or other 
external support. Number of communities with running water systems which 
serve over half of the population and where costs are being recovered 
and used to maintain or improve system. New Agent defines degree and 
footnotes it. Also, there must be ways to limit water loss. 
 
Substantial progress has been made on this item since the mid-term review, and in 
response to changes in reporting requirements by USAID. 
In brief, a detailed table has been compiled which includes population data for each 
“community”, aggregated into schemes. For each community the table shows the 
population covered, and reliability of the water system, stated in percentage terms. 
The data is further qualified by an estimation of sustainability. 
We must note that the definition of sustainability is creates difficulties, in that funding 
is reliant on the very “external support” which is excluded in this definition of 
sustainability. Virtually no cost recovery has taken place, and given the 
government’s Free Basic Water policy, it is unlikely that most people will ever be 
expected to pay. The project uses the BLM’s budget figures for water services as an 
indication of the financial provisions being made for the cost of the service. These, in 
turn, are primarily sourced from the grant provided by central government (the 
“equitable share”). 
The reporting does not clearly distinguish between the schemes operated by DWAF 
and those operated by the BLM. The DWAF schemes are grant funded through a 
different system, and a grant will be paid to BDM for three years to cover the 
immediate maintenance costs. It is hoped by all parties that the equitable share will 
be increased after the date of transfer, but there can be no guarantee regarding the 
amount. In other words there are questions regarding the long-term sustainability of 
the present grant funding, given DWAF’s stated intention to withdraw all subsidies 
within five years. 
The data lacks precision in many respects, and while the raw data appears 
impressive, manipulation is necessary in order to compile reporting. For example, for 
each given community, figures of reliability are applied. Thus, if a figure of 50% 
reliability is used, only half the population is counted as receiving a water supply. In 
fact, all of them may be receiving a water supply, albeit for half the time. With this 
caveat, and recognizing the substantial costs that would be required to obtain more 
41
accurate figures, we consider that the reporting regarding “the number of households 
receiving new or improved services” is as accurate as can be expected in the 
circumstances. 
Given that the numbers reflect only the “households receiving . . . improved services”, 
and not, for example, a 24 hour water service, it is clear that they do not necessarily 
indicate the number of households who are satisfied with the service received. There 
is therefore no factual conflict between (a) the fact that many households received 
improved services and (b) the frustrations reported by the focus groups regarding the 
fact that the water supply was unreliable, even though they may appear to present a 
different picture. 
In theory any marginal improvement in a service (such as the repair of a burst pipe) 
could have been reported as “improved services”. However, the project only counted 
households benefiting from capital expenditure, such as replacing diesel pumps with 
electric, the complete rehabilitation of a water scheme, etc. 
5.2 Data 
5.2.1 Population and number of households 
When the data were reported to USAID, the population calculations (derived as 
described above) were converted into households on the basis of 6 persons per 
household. In fact, under the Census 2001, the average household size in Bohlabela 
was 4.63. We therefore think that the data reported could have been an 
understatement in that respect. The most likely explanation for the discrepancy is 
that the figure of 6 used by DWAF refers to the number of consumers per plot, thus 
making about 1.3 households per plot which is fairly typical. However, it seems that 
the number of households quoted by the project in its reporting – 123,776 – is 
relatively close to the correct number of 129,108 (Census 2001). 
However, If we calculate the population, as the project did, by multiplying the number 
of households by the figure of 6 persons/household, then serious differences 
emerge. The total population calculated by that method comes to 779,790 rather 
than the 2001 Census figure of 597,735. 
5.2.2 Results for central and local government 
Within this context it is also important to note that although the focus of the RWDP 
was primarily on local government’s role, any improvement in the standard of water 
services within the jurisdiction of the BDM was reported as an improved result. We 
consider this legitimate in that the BDM, after being appointed the WSA had the task 
of improving the delivery of water services through all WSPs, including DWAF. Thus 
when additional households were served, and/or water supply became more reliable 
through the upgrading of the system (such as replacing a pump) all households 
benefiting from that development were counted as receiving improved services. 
5.2.3 Funds leveraged 
The other matter reported on is the funds leveraged. In this category, the project has 
included the Masimbambane program (a central government funded technical 
assistance program for weaker municipalities), Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure 
Program funds for additional water meters, and refurbishment programs being 
undertaken by DWAF in preparation for the transfer of assets. There is no way to 
demonstrate that these funds would not have been available without the support of 
the project. The project could claim that the funds were leveraged as they assisted 
the parties in applying for these grants. We are thus confronted with a definitional 
issue: on balance we would consider these claims to be legitimate. 
42
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Number of households receiving new or improved water services 
The project reported that a total of 28,520 households received new or improved 
water services during the life of the project. Attribution in such cases poses 
difficulties, but it is fair to claim that the project facilitated these developments and 
can claim to have played a part in them, even if only an advisory one. The planned 
target was 58,000 households. 
5.3.2 Funds leveraged 
As noted above, substantial capital investments were made during the life of the 
project within the BDM. These included capital and technical assistance funds from 
DWAF, Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Program funds from the DPLG, and 
funds from USAID’s governance program. These amounted to R9,005,000. In 
addition there were contributions in kind from all the municipalities, which provided 
office space, furniture and other support. No attempt was made to attach a value to 
these in-kind contributions in the reporting. 
43
6. Findings 
The most important points to have arisen from the work to date are as follows: 
6.1 The Contract 
This evaluation concerns the performance of a contract. It must be recognized 
that the program was designed before the current local government demarcations 
were in effect, and there were many uncertainties about the roles and 
responsibilities of the new municipalities to be established in December 2000. 
By any standards the program was well designed and the contract is remarkable 
for the degree of detail and understanding of the operating environment. This is, 
of course, a reflection of the fact that USAID had been actively supporting 
activities within the area for about three years – as described in section 2.2 
above. 
The question which must be addressed here is whether the contract established 
appropriate objectives and realistic targets. 
6.1.1 The objectives 
The objectives were spelt out in detail in the contract, and with very few 
exceptions have been implemented to some extent. 
They included institutional and service delivery components. However, the 
operating assumption was that if capacity were built, there would be an 
improvement in water service delivery. A balance had to be struck between the 
need to develop institutional capacity14, and on-the-ground improvements to the 
provision of water services. There is little doubt that the institutional aspects of 
the project, although very slow, were successful. At the evaluation review 
workshop held in mid-March, the Mayor of Bohlabela indicated that he felt that as 
an institution, they had been capacitated “We have reasonable capacity in Local 
Government. However, we haven’t succeeded in forcing people to do things at 
an operational level”. However, he admitted that this institutional capacity has not 
resulted in the improvements in service delivery capacity that was hoped for. He 
said “Once support is withdrawn, problems occur, which says that capacity hasn’t 
been translated into the transfer of skills”. 
A criticism of the contract is that it did not recognize the resource constraints of 
the contractor in terms of LOE. Our view is that the objectives of Phase 1 were 
realizable, but they might, even in a situation where the institutional constraints of 
the BLM and BDM did not exist, have required more effort (in terms of person 
months) than was provided for them in the contract. However, while, in pre￾contract exchanges, the contractor expressed concern about the limited LOE 
available within the contract, by signature of the contract it implicitly accepted that 
the objectives could be realized. 
6.1.2 What could the project control? 
It is easy to blame a contractor for not succeeding if outputs are not as planned. 
However, in so doing a clear distinction must be made between outputs that were 
within the control of the contractor and those which were not. 
 
14 This included the development of bylaws, identification and approval of tariffs, appointment 
of WSPs at the Water Board and Local municipalities, clarification of roles and responsibilities 
in Bohlabela, DWAF being appointed to provide water in rural areas, billing systems in place 
to bill consumers and collect revenue, as well as providing assistance when needed, etc 
44
In this project there was an assumption that the project would result in an 
improvement in service delivery standards. For example, the indicators included: 
• Percent of revenues collected, 
• Cost per unit of water delivered, 
• Percent of unaccounted for water in network distribution, 
• Time required to respond to consumer complaints and requests for service, 
• Staffing ratio (consumer accounts per staff member). 
The contractor’s position is that it did what was required to facilitate such 
improvements in service delivery, and demonstrated management practices 
which would result in improved services on several occasions, but that if the will 
to implement such changes did not exist, the contractor was powerless to do 
more. 
As noted above, the Chief of Party stated that the reason why the systems lapsed 
after the project withdrew was the lack of commitment from the local 
counterparts. The approach of the RWDP had always been to advocate working 
as a team, which had to include the municipalities, the Water Board, DWAF and 
civic organizations. However, as soon as the project team handed the 
coordination of these activities back to the local counterparts, staff reverted to 
their old ways. He felt that unless the leadership pushed everybody in a certain 
direction, things would not change. 
The evaluation team accepts this point, but considers that an earlier start on such 
matters would have allowed the project to try alternative systems of achieving 
change. It was perhaps natural that, in light of the dominance of technical people 
in the project, that management matters were not a focus of their work. A wider￾ranging management focus might have enabled them to diagnose why there was 
an apparent lack of commitment to service, and try to focus on more managerial 
innovation. 
6.1.3 A distinction between service provided by DWAF and BLM (DWAF 
not a focus as all services would be transferred) 
The focus of the project has been the WSA (BDM) and the main WSP, BLM. It is 
not clear at this stage how the division of responsibility will fall when the DWAF 
infrastructure is transferred15. However, it is clear that the intent of the contract 
was to strengthen the WSPs, which, for the purposes of this contract are the two 
municipalities of Bushbuckridge and Maruleng. 
 
The main area of concern for the project is the fact that after so many years of 
support and so much input (financial and otherwise); there is evidence of poor 
service to an extent that many residents do not have access to water. A number 
of reasons have been advanced explaining why and how this has happened, 
which have been discussed in more detail above. 
Of importance in connection with community perceptions, however, is that when 
the BLM and DWAF were appointed as WSPs, neither had the necessary 
capacity to function at the level expected by the user communities. Firstly, DWAF 
is not geared for a WSP function, and does not have the necessary systems such 
 
15 The plan to form a single WSP in which BDM and BLM are essentially partners, 
administered through a new Municipal Entity has not advanced to the stage where it is ready 
to start operations at the date of transfer. 
45
as billing and customer care. DWAF has been carrying out this task (sub￾optimally though) because of the backlogs and the absence of any other service 
provider, especially in the rural area. In the absence of proper systems, there has 
not been any cost recovery, and in the process operations and maintenance 
suffered because of lack of appropriate budgets. 
BBR Local Municipality had been providing a service, but this was also sub￾optimal, mainly because of inadequate capacity (human resources and systems). 
There has however, been an improvement in cost recovery, implying that there 
will be some budget for operations and maintenance. 
In the mid-term report, one of the recommendations was that the project, though 
not geared for service delivery, should support the Local Municipalities in specific 
areas of service delivery in pilot sites. This was implemented with varying levels 
of success. However, in spite of an emphasis on team work, the popular 
perception is that institutional responsibilities have not been clearly defined. This 
has resulted in a fragmented water services provision environment. The 
workshop noted that there must be a formalized collaboration structure along the 
lines of the Masimbambane Sector Support Program, where all role players can 
plan, budget, implement, monitor and report together within a unified 
environment. 
Having been appointed as a WSP, DWAF had the duty to provide service delivery 
in the specified areas, and therefore had to gear up accordingly. DWAF reported 
that a WSP budget and necessary subsidies have been identified. 
The transfer of operations and maintenance personnel from DWAF was delayed 
for a number of years, and this is probably one of the reasons why the there is so 
much dissatisfaction about performance in maintenance. 
6.2 WSA 
The work on developing the role and the capacity of the WSA has generally been 
undertaken successfully, and after the slow start caused by the late designation 
of BDM as such, its role as the WSA has been effectively supported by the 
project. 
The RWDP’s role in developing an appreciation of the issues concerning water, 
the regulatory environment, and matters of management concerning water 
provision had been widely recognized and applauded. It has left a legacy of well 
informed people at both the political and management levels. 
The RWDP also played an important role in facilitating decisions around the 
nature of the future WSP, establishing the interim Water Services Management 
Team, and assisting the coordination of the four players in the water services 
sector. 
6.3 Transfer 
The project has made a very material impact on the transfer process, by 
providing technical assistance relative to the question of: 
• Costs to the WSA of absorbing the staff 
• The right of the WSA to decide who should be transferred 
• The need for DWAF either to bring the schemes into full working 
condition, or for them to compensate the WSA financially so that they can 
do so. 
46
• Setting up a management structure to absorb the new staff. 
This work is, we understand, the first of its kind in Limpopo Province. The fact 
that the transfer agreement was signed on 11th March is important, as it means 
that transfers can take place on 1st July 2005. 
However, doubts remain whether the WSA will be ready for such a transfer, 
especially in light of the fact that the RWDP will not be there to assist them. 
6.4 WSPs 
In spite of the name of the project, assistance in terms of retail water provision 
continues to lag behind the other work. Technical assistance in terms of water 
management and cost recovery has been provided, but achievements to date 
have been limited. While a lack of capacity within BLM has been a constraint, 
this is an area where it is considered more could have been done. 
The lack of a reliable water supply to the majority of the residents is a major 
concern. The complexity of the situation has been fully dealt with in earlier 
sections of this report. However, we consider that it would have been possible to 
strengthen this aspect of the project if it had received attention at an earlier stage. 
This was certainly envisaged in the Terms of Reference of the contract. 
For example, pilot projects such as were undertaken at Dwarsloop and Marite 
could have been started at an earlier stage in the project. These were not 
dependent on the appointment of a WSA, and concern day-to-day water 
management issues. Lessons learned from such projects could then have been 
used to refine and improve the model. The current view, expressed by several 
people at the final workshop was that without RWDP support piloted systems will 
not work. However at the same workshop, the BDM Mayor emphasized his 
commitment and determination to capitalizing on the work of the project and not 
allowing the gains they have made to be lost. 
6.5 Community involvement 
In general community involvement has not been a strong point in the project. It is 
clear that the limited number of project staff and the huge population covered 
mean that only a limited impact would have been possible. 
In this context, it is of interest to record the findings of the evaluation review 
workshop held in mid-March 2005, most of which are connected with the question 
of community involvement. 
Areas of concern Implications for the 
project 
Proposed actions 
The institutional support 
benefits have not 
cascaded to the 
beneficiary communities 
Negative attitude of the 
consumers and 
perceptions of failure 
towards the project 
Capacitate the WSP 
to fast track the 
development of 
physical infrastructure 
and service delivery 
The demand by 
consumers for not only 
better services which they 
cannot always afford, but 
also provision of these 
services within a short 
This implies that more 
effort needs to be directed 
towards informing 
consumers and involving 
them in planning and 
operations 
Ensure consumer 
representation in 
planning and 
implementation. 
Inform communities 
accordingly 
47
period of time. 
Unclear institutional 
responsibilities and 
inadequate collaboration 
Consumer confusion over 
who is supposed to 
provide the service or 
perform specific tasks 
Clarify the role of the 
BBR as a WSP and 
fast track the transfer 
process. 
Establish a 
collaborative structure 
for water services 
provision 
The absence of a clear 
strategy for operations and 
maintenance of water 
schemes 
Inadequate service 
provision and haphazard 
maintenance and query 
response 
Develop a strategy 
and implementation 
plan/s for the WSP 
Fast track the transfer 
process 
Lack of participation in 
decision-making and 
operations. 
Continuing dissatisfaction 
by community members 
with their perceived 
exclusion 
Involve representative 
structures. 
Over reliance (by local 
institutions) on the support 
provided by the project 
Local sustainability is 
questionable after project 
withdrawal 
Provide institutional 
capacity building 
support to the WSP 
 
This is perhaps evidence that although a communication strategy was developed 
by the project, it was either not pursued with sufficient vigor, or was inappropriate. 
Once more, we consider that if this had been made a focus of the project earlier, 
results might have been better. 
As is well known, community involvement is a major factor in the matters of 
maintenance and cost recovery. The evidence from focus groups and other 
sources16 is of extensive theft of components and vandalization of installations. 
This is combined with a culture of illegal connections – sponsored, we are led to 
believe, by staff of the water services providers. We believe that an aggressive 
program of community involvement possibly led by local consultants and 
municipal staff could have made a substantial difference. 
DWAF has long practiced community participation at the project design and 
implementation level. However, the on-site staff were not equipped for this type 
of work: their job was technical – to keep the installations running. For them 
community consultation would therefore not have been their strong point. 
Similarly, community consultation in this form had not been practiced previously 
by BLM. They were therefore strong neither in theory or practice in this field and 
 
16 For example, the report undertaken for the project on The Identification of Immediate 
Improvements to the Village Water Supply Systems in the Sub-Region BBR06, Africon 
Engineering (undated) 
48
may have felt that it was not their job. A community development officer was 
appointed in 2003, and could have participated in such activities, but of course 
could not have done the work alone. 
In brief, instilling a culture of participation and involvement in the three agencies 
concerned would have been a major task, and it can be seen in hindsight how 
this was relegated to the status of an optional extra. 
To be fair to the contractor, the language of the contract speaks of consumer 
outreach and education – a rather top down approach. The contractor undertook 
the initial Knowledge Attitudes and Practices survey required, but did not allocate 
much of their effort to it subsequently. 
Community involvement is a skill which is not always recognized as such. In view 
of the large number of rural schemes within the WSA’s jurisdiction, and the fact 
that the communities are, de facto WSPs, this is an area which should also have 
been given priority in terms of capacity building and training in the staff of the 
BLM. 
As noted above the proposal for a formal WSP which would also be responsible 
for ensuring that Community Based Organizations are operating their isolated 
schemes effectively. A total of 64 water committees were identified throughout 
the district and proposals for their training were submitted to Masimbambane for 
funding. The project initiated this study and contracted the Mvula Trust to conduct 
the study for them. A plan has also been prepared for AWARD, another NGO, to 
conduct the training of the WCs. All this was initiated by the project, but it was 
decided not to initiate this work until transfer had taken place. 
 
49
7 Lessons Learned from the project 
7.1 Timing 
The project started too early for the objectives it was meant to achieve, e.g. the 
entities that the Project was meant to work with only started two years after the 
project was started. The contract established very demanding targets which might 
have been achievable within a perfect world, but within the very weak and 
uncertain institutional environment in which the project operated, the targets were 
simply unachievable. 
 
There are possibly two lessons to be learned from this aspect. The first is that 
the contract should have recognised the possibility that these regulatory and 
institutional matters could take time to resolve and should have provided 
objectives to be achieved in the absence of such decisions. 
The second is that, even if the contract did not make provision for such 
eventualities, the contractor and other stakeholders should have used their skills 
and time to think out of the box, and address the bread and butter issues of water 
services delivery while the higher-order regulatory and administrative matters 
were being resolved. 
7.2 Institutional Framework 
The delays in terms of the transfer of staff and assets to BDM severely delayed 
implementation of the project. Delays in the approval of the bylaws also created 
important difficulties. However, it must be recognized that some of the key 
indicators in terms of the institutional framework were not within the manageable 
interest of the project. 
 
The lack of a project driver within the DWAF was also a contributory factor to the 
limited success of the project. This might have been achieved if one of the Chief 
Directors at DWAF had this project as an element in his/her performance 
assessment. Similarly, a lack of commitment by the Provincial Department 
responsible for Local Government appears to have been a cause of delay, and it 
is unfortunate that they were not more actively involved. 
 
7.3 Regulatory change versus service provision 
The contractors were primarily appointed to provide technical assistance in terms 
of water services provision. Their attention was diverted to issues over which 
they had comparatively little control – e.g. decisions to be taken by Provincial 
political leaders. While their support in these matters was very useful it possibly 
was less effective in terms of water services delivery than other work which they 
were better equipped to affect: e.g. the operation of water services, metering, 
cost recovery, maintenance etc. The good work done during the last six months 
of the project demonstrates clearly what an impact might have been made if that 
work had started from the beginning. 
7.4 Community involvement 
The focus groups showed the lack of support and understanding at the 
community level regarding water services. Strong community involvement could 
have made an important contribution in regard to issues such as illegal 
connections, water wastage, vandalism, maintenance and cost recovery. There 
is no doubt that, if implemented in conjunction with the technical assistance and 
support given in the pilot projects, community involvement could have been 
increased substantially with positive results. 
50
Furthermore, even as a stand-alone activity, community involvement in the rural 
areas would have been an important contributor to improvement of the 
management and performance of the schemes. 
7.5 Dissemination 
The COP made presentations to workshops and conferences, but we consider 
that there were very useful lessons to be learned from the project which would 
have benefited a wider audience. One of these was the methodology used in 
relation to transfer which might be a very useful model. Another was the bylaws 
which they developed for the WSA. There is also a great need for case studies 
that can be used by practitioners and academics alike. 
However, this was not specifically required by the contract, and the above 
comments should not be construed as a criticism of the contractor’s performance. 
7.6 Future programming 
This project fell between two stools in that it was neither an institutional 
development project, nor a down-to-earth technical project. 
It is possible that direct technical assistance to DWAF in order to facilitate transfer 
agreements, and train the staff of recipient municipalities, might have been more 
appropriate. 
It was unfortunate that, on many occasions, the participating agencies – mainly 
the Water Board, BDM and BLM – showed a lack of commitment to working with 
the project. A situation in which municipalities had to bid for support under the 
project, and thereby demonstrate their suitability as recipients of assistance, for it 
would have generated more positive relationships. 
7.7. Skills supplied by the project 
The nature of the contract was such that technical people dominated the staffing. 
In practice, a wider-ranging management focus might have enabled them to 
diagnose why there was an apparent lack of commitment to service, and allowed 
them to remove the apparent obstacles in the adoption of the systems proposed 
in the pilots. It might also have generated innovations in management practice to 
overcome the shortcomings of the present systems. 
Similarly, staff with a better understanding of the dynamics of community 
involvement and how to achieve greater community support and mobilization 
might have been able to address the apparent degree of community apathy or 
even alienation as reported by the focus groups 
51
8. Recommendations for future programming 
8.1 Falling between two stools 
The contract – at least in its style of implementation – fell between the stools of 
macro and micro targets: the macro targets relating to the role of the WSA and its 
policies; and the transfer of assets from DWAF to the WSA; the micro related to 
improvements in the water supply and associated administrative and technical 
management issues. One could characterize this as the alternative of policy and 
plumbing. 
In some ways the policy issues are more important, but they were severely 
impacted matters over which the nominal client, the WSA, had no control. These 
include the speed and style of the negotiations with DWAF over transfer of 
assets; the designation of the roles of the District and Local municipalities, etc. 
On the other hand the plumbing issues inevitably have a parochial feel to them, 
and substantial investment by USAID could only be justified if it led to meaningful 
improvements in practice beyond the borders of BDM. 
Our view is that the plumbing issues were susceptible to greater influence by a 
project such as the RWDP than the policy ones. The pilot projects undertaken by 
the project show that there are many related issues on which practice could have 
been improved with exponential improvements in the delivery of water if followed 
through systematically. For example greater community involvement and support 
could be an important factor in reducing illegal connections and managing water 
resources more prudently; this, in turn would have generated more support for 
cost recovery by those receiving individual connections as well as improving the 
standard of service; this in turn would have enabled the WSP to improve its 
standard of maintenance, and thereby increase its cost recovery, etc etc. 
Increases in metering, improved registration and billing, better fault processing 
systems and more customer-friendly offices could have been important by￾products. 
If such a result were achieved, exciting lessons from the experience could have 
been disseminated throughout the very many poor rural municipalities in South 
Africa which have been struggling with similar problems. 
All of these were tried by the project, but it was too little and too late for the full 
value of the impact to take place. 
8.2 Is it appropriate for international aid to be used for plumbing? 
If the conclusions of the above section are accepted, we should then ask 
whether, in hindsight, the contract should have focused on the WSP level; and by 
extension, whether USAID should, in future, fund the contracts to improve the 
delivery of services at the micro level. 
When expressed in this way, one must conclude that although the RWDP 
contract could have made greater impact if it had concentrated on the plumbing 
issues, this would not necessarily have justified the expenditure of the funds. 
This is because the expenditure would not have made an impact beyond the 
direct beneficiaries, and even though it could have made an impact at a wider 
level, the type of contract would not have fostered putting the practices into effect 
in many other municipalities. 
52
8.3 Looking for wider impact 
That there are substantial challenges in the water sector goes without saying. In 
our experience these do not lie in a shortage of funds for new infrastructure, but 
weaknesses in management and operations. These weaknesses are partly due 
to a lack of experience, and partly due to a lack of good management practices at 
the local government level as a whole. 
These challenges are evident throughout all sectors: roads, power, water, social 
services and health. The challenge is the breadth versus depth argument: should 
one try and look at the country as a whole, or take specific sectors; and within 
sectors, should one address all local government, one or two provinces, or a few 
municipalities? The arguments are clear: results are more likely to be positive the 
more focused the assistance is, but the impact may be lesser. 
The RWDP project of course chose the latter option, and concentrated 
comparatively high levels of resources on three municipalities. The opposite 
extreme would have been to fund advisers in crucial Departments to address 
issues of national impact. 
8.4 The question of need and commitment 
Another factor which is troubling in the context of the RWDP has been the 
apparent lack of commitment by BLM to the project, which might, in turn have 
been caused by political and other tensions that are a feature of the area. The 
fact that the project was established before the municipalities in their present form 
may have been an additional factor. Whatever the cause, the RWDP might have 
had more impact if the beneficiaries had actively sought the assistance, rather 
than being presented with it as a fait accompli. 
Projects are more likely to succeed where the beneficiaries actively apply for 
participation, and demonstrate that they have the wherewithal to make good use 
of project support. It is therefore desirable to build such factors into the project 
design, and thereby ensure, as far as possible, that project beneficiaries are 
committed to and need the resources of the project. 
8.5 Centralized/decentralized technical assistance 
Restricting ourselves, in the present context, to the water sector; and establishing 
that future project beneficiaries should be self selecting on the basis of interest 
and aptitude, we are led to suggest that projects that provide technical assistance 
to selected municipalities, but which also develop the links which facilitate 
improved performance, are likely to have greater impact and to be better value for 
money. 
These links are of two kinds: the first is links between the national and local level: 
those which effectively stalled the RWDP for so long. By providing TA at a 
national level more attention would be paid to improving the national/local 
relationship and thereby expediting decisions and making systems more 
effective. The second kind is to link participating municipalities: the concept of 
transfer of knowledge between peers has been demonstrated to be among the 
most effective forms of capacity building. 
8.6 Continuous versus part-time technical assistance 
The SA government funds many technical assistance projects. The standard 
model is for the TA to be provided by consultants who only engage sporadically 
with the beneficiary municipality. The impact of such assistance is usually limited 
to short-term gains in performance, instead of systematic improvements in output. 
53
The beneficiaries of the RWDP praised it for the fact that the staff were available 
on a full-time basis, and only criticized it for the fact that the staff were sitting in 
their own offices rather than that of the municipalities. 
We agree with this view: modest gains on a sustainable level are preferable to 
short-term fireworks which fade from view only too quickly. A project which 
therefore generates real changes at a slow but sure pace seems to yield better 
results than the high profile, high pressure, short-term intervention. 
8.7 Skills 
The RWDP was dominated by technical skills, but the problems they faced 
included managerial, administrative and social issues. Although they could call 
upon short-term specialist advisers, they were not strong in these issues either. 
We consider that the nature of local government is such that future projects 
should be able to supply a wider range of skills. 
8.8 Expatriate versus local staffing 
South Africa’s record in local governance is quite patchy. There has never been a 
local government training college which would prepare staff for their duties and 
give them a thorough understanding of the legislative environment in which they 
will work. University courses exist, but they tend to be focused on more rarified 
matters than the humdrum tasks of administration. In brief there is a lack of 
experienced and skilled manpower, a lack which was exacerbated by a 
substantial loss of manpower during the two local government transformations of 
1996 and 2000. 
There is need therefore for staff development. The major focus of this could be on 
developing a cadre of people who, while providing services to municipalities are 
themselves learning through a collegiate transfer of skills and experience under 
the project, aided by guidance and vision from highly experienced expatriates. 
Thus the project fosters the exchange of experience between municipalities and 
between those providing the TA so as to generate critical mass and maximize on 
the demonstration effect – an aspect conspicuously lacking in the RWDP. 
8.9 Conclusions 
There is real value in improving services at the local level. This is a direct way of 
assisting the poor and disadvantaged which has tangible results which everyone 
can applaud. 
However, to focus on a single district is unduly restrictive, especially if there are 
doubts concerning the interest of the beneficiary municipalities in the assistance 
offered. There is great merit in combining a national program (which can 
represent the interests of local government at the national level) combined with 
direct assistance to a limited number of municipalities. 
Municipalities need to be actively looking for support and to be open to new ideas 
and the potential of developing improved ways of working. This can be 
encouraged by a well designed system whereby municipalities apply for 
acceptance by the project. 
But the true value in such projects is not to the individual municipality and its 
residents, but to the broader community, and very substantial value can be added 
by incorporating systems which encourage the sharing of experiences and skills 
among participating and non-participating municipalities. This value can be 
54
further enhanced by actively training and encouraging all staff working on the 
project at the local level. 
All this takes time, and another lesson must be that while designing the project to 
avoid the crippling delays caused by institutional road-blocks which the RWDP 
faced, it should also be designed to run over a period of at least five years, and 
preferably more. It is only by seeing a process through from start to finish that 
the true value of technical assistance can be realized. 
8.10 BDM and BLM: The future 
It appears more than likely that the BDM will be abolished after the next municipal 
election to be held before March 2006, so the future remains uncertain. Indeed 
we consider that it is possible that the transfer may be delayed until after the 
election for this reason. In other circumstances there would be little doubt that 
the attention of the BDM in the next year or two should be on integrating the 
systems and the staff after transfer had been made from DWAF. This would 
have posed difficulties in terms of management, but would probably not have had 
a major impact on water services per se. 
For the WSPs, particularly BLM, the issues will different: will the proposed new 
municipal entity be formed, and if so what will the consequences be for their 
existing staff, incomes and relationship with the public? If BLM remains the WSP 
– which we think is greatly preferable – then it can concentrate on increasing the 
coverage of the reforms piloted by the project in terms of improved customer 
awareness, reduction of illegal connections and metering all individual 
connections. This should be supplemented by improved management of the cost 
recovery systems. 
There also remains a huge challenge in terms of the availability of water. This 
must be addressed jointly by the Water Board and all the municipalities who will 
need to collaborate and rationalize systems if they are to supply water for 24 
hours a day. A new mindset is required by managers, water system personnel 
and the users in order to work together, manage and operate the system in a new 
way, and no longer tolerate water theft and wastage. 
55
Annexes 
Annex 1 Acknowledgements 
 Annex 2 Documents consulted 
Annex 3 Survey instruments 
 Annex 4 Focus groups 
 Annex 5 CVs of evaluators
56
Annex 1 
Acknowledgements 
We wish to acknowledge with gratitude the following who so kindly made time within 
their busy schedule to assist us: 
USAID Melissa Knight 
 Nkosiphambili Ndhlovu 
DWAF Pretoria William Moraka – Assistant Manager, Transfer 
DWAF Polokwane Alsor Matukane – Chief Director 
 Ramaano Masibigiri – Deputy Director ISD 
Bohlabela District Municipality C Maluleke – Executive mayor 
 Patience Nyakane – Speaker 
 Gert Deysel – Dir: technical servs 
 Shadrack Tshilakalange – Dir: corporate servs 
 Rodwell Mnisi – municipal manager 
 Norman Mukhawane – service manager 
Bushbuckridge Local Municipality C Lisa – Municipal manager 
 Paul Manaka - Technical manager 
Maruleng Local Municipality Liz de Beer – Municipal Manager 
 Sam Modiba – Previous Technical Manager 
Bushbuckridge Water Board Patience Nyakane – Chairperson 
 Gibson Nkune - CEO 
Retail Water Project Robert Mbwana 
 Thabo Molewa 
 Stewart Gibson 
57
Annex 2 
Documents consulted 
Africon Engineering International: The identification of Immediate Improvements to 
the Village Water Supply Systems, Task 1, undated (for several areas) 
Africon Engineering International: The identification of Immediate Improvements to 
the Village Water Supply Systems, Task 2, Operating Procedure, undated 
Chemonics: 
Quarterly Reports: 
1 July - 30 September 2002 
I October – 31 December 2002 
1 January – 31 March 2003 
1 April 2003 – 31 June 2003 
1 July 2003 – 31 September 2003 
1 October 2003 – 31 December 2003 
1 January 2004 – 31 March 2004 
1 April 2004 – 31 June 2004 
1 July 2004 – 31 September 2004 
1 October 2004 – 31 December 2004 
Chemonics: Bohlabela District Municipality: Water Services Provider Partnership for 
Bushbuckridge Local Municipality, July 2003 (Revision No 3) 
Chemonics: Managing Water for Drought, Fact Sheets, April 2004. 
EVN Africa: The identification of Immediate Improvements to the Village Water 
Supply Systems in Maruleng Municipality, Report of Task 1, June 2003. 
Mabotha Investment (Pty) Ltd: Situation Assessment Reports, December 2004. 
Mega-Tech, Inc.: Bushbuckridge RWDP Mid-Term Review????? 
Nyeleti Consulting (Pty) Ltd: Immediate improvement to Village Water Systems in 
Bushbuckridge South, August 2003. 
Nyeleti Consulting (Pty) Ltd: Operations Manual, August 2003. 
USAID: Request for Proposals No 674-00-P-005, Technical Assistance to 
Bushbuckridge Water Board Services Area 
USAID: Contract with Chemonics Inc 21 September 2000, and amendments 
Vumbani Development Enterprises cc: Formalisation of Water Supply Systems in 
Calcutta, December 2004. 
Vumbani Development Enterprises cc: Strengthening and Enhancing Collaborative 
Mechanisms – Municipalities and Traditional Authorities in the BDM area, February 
2005. 
58
Annex 3 
Survey Instruments 
Interviews 
The interviews were structured around the following themes: 
Powers functions and staffing following the demarcation in 2000 
Is there clarity on the role of the District and Local Municipalities? 
Is the role of MEC for Local Government in Limpopo Province in relationship 
to Mpumalanga clear? 
Are all municipalities now fully staffed? 
Establishment of the WSA 
Is there any ambiguity about the Bohlabela DC’s role as a WSA, in terms of 
its powers and functions? 
Does it have the capacity to perform its functions? 
What difficulties have been experienced? 
What are its achievements? 
Transfer of infrastructure and personnel from DWAF to the WSA 
What has been achieved? 
What remains to be achieved? 
What have been the difficulties? 
What has been the role of the BBR RWDP in this? 
Establishment of the WSPs 
What has been achieved since the Mid-term Review? 
What remains to be achieved? 
What have been the difficulties? 
Operation of water services 
What has been the contribution of the BBR RWDP to this aspect? 
Which institutions has BBR RWDP been working with? 
Has the operation of water services improved since the mid-term review? 
What has been the role of the BBR RWDP in this? 
What project activities have taken place in the field of: 
• Consumer education – water costs, illegal connections, etc 
• Training of staff to operate customer care systems 
• Maintenance – establishment of maintenance teams, stores systems, 
effective supervision 
• Repair and replacement of faulty water meters 
• Use of pre-paid meters 
• Establishment of improved billing and collection systems 
• Establishment of indigent policy and free basic water tariffs 
• Establishment of regulatory and administrative framework to deal with 
non-payment, illegal connections, removal/vandalisation of meters etc. 
Sanitation 
Has the WSA established a sanitation policy? 
What activities have been undertaken by the BBR RWDP in this connection? 
Management information 
What data has the BBR RWDP collected in terms of base-line data and 
performance indicators since the mid-term review? 
59
Capacity building and training 
What activities have been undertaken by the BBR RWDP in this connection? 
How were activities selected for project support? 
Who have been the beneficiaries? 
What have been the results? 
How were the results measured? 
Technical assistance and support 
What activities have been undertaken by the BBR RWDP in this connection? 
How were activities selected for project support? 
Who have been the beneficiaries? 
What have been the results? 
How were the results measured? 
Management of the Project 
How has the management of the project evolved since the mid-term review? 
What have been the successes and difficulties in this regard? 
 
Focus Groups 
Each focus group comprised 10 participants, selected to represent some larger 
population or group of community water users. Each session was about two hours in 
length, with all participants encouraged to actively and creatively express their views 
in response to the questions asked. Sessions were recorded on a flip chart and on a 
lap top computer. 
The questions were structured firstly, with respect to the terms of reference which 
refer to (i) information about the project, (ii) community participation; and (iii) benefits 
to the community. Secondly, the questions were structured with respect to improved 
access to water services by local populations described as: 
• Provision of potable water 
• Reliability of service 
• Customer service / relationship / cost recovery 
• Maintenance and response to community needs 
• Preventing water losses 
Structured questions on information and community understanding 
1. Are you aware of the BBR RWDP? 
2. When did the project start? 
3. Were you informed by the authorities that such a project was planned? 
4. Do you remember any form of communication relating to the initiation of the 
project? 
5. What can be improved in the future? 
6. Who is the owner / custodian / manager of the project (an institution)? 
7. What was the project meant to achieve? 
Structured questions on community participation 
1. Were you involved in the needs analysis leading to the initiation of the 
project? 
2. Were you involved in the planning of the project? 
60
3. What information was solicited from you in order to design the project? 
4. What information did you provide? 
5. Do you know of anybody who was consulted during the planning of the 
project? 
6. Do you know community members who participated in the implementation of 
the project? 
7. In which components of the project did community members participate in if 
any? 
Structured questions on community benefits 
1. Describe how the community has benefited from the project since inception 
(directly or indirectly) 
2. Did you have access to water prior to the project? 
3. Do you have access to clean water (potable)? 
4. Describe the pre-project and post-project water delivery and access 
5. Do you experience any problems with regard to the availability of water now? 
6. What is the current source of water? 
7. Are you satisfied with the current level of service? 
8. Are you satisfied with your current mode of water delivery? 
9. What should be improved in the current levels of service? 
10. Do you believe that the project has changed your quality of life? 
Structured questions on customer care and cost recovery 
1. Do you receive the free basic water supply of 6kl/month? 
2. Do you pay for water? 
3. Where are you paying, is the pay point accessible? 
4. Do you receive your accounts regularly and timeously? 
5. Do you agree with the stipulated accounts? 
6. Have you ever received an account that you believe is incorrect? 
7. What is the procedure for correcting accounts? 
8. Where and how do you submit queries and enquiries? 
9. Do you know how to read your account? 
10. Do you have a water meter? 
Questions on maintenance and customer care 
1. Do you ever experience water shortages? 
2. Where and how do you report water shortages and other problems? 
3. Describe experiences of responses from the authorities when there are 
problems (both positive and negative)? 
4. Does your area ever have water leaks? 
5. What is the procedure for reporting leaks? 
6. What is the general response of the authorities when leaks are reported? 
7. Compare the pre-project and post-project response to problems of water 
leaks and pipe bursts and illegal connections? 
8. Have you been exposed to training programs on water conservation? 
61
Annex 4 
Focus Groups 
1. Objectives of the focus group interviews 
The overall objective of the focus group interviews was to assess community 
perspectives regarding the program and make recommendations, based on 
community understanding of the project and the resultant expectations. 
In this regard, the following issues were critically evaluated: 
(i) Community understanding of the project objectives and modus operandi. 
(ii) Implications of the institutional development and support in relation to service 
provision 
(iii) Community representation and participation in the various components of the 
project 
(iv) Effectiveness and strategic impact of the project as a whole 
(v) Achievement of the expected outputs and progress in meeting strategic 
objectives, which included: 
• An assessment of the institutional collaboration (including community 
structures and support) 
• An assessment of service delivery (provision of potable water and reliable 
service including maintenance) 
• An assessment of management services including customer care and 
cost recovery 
• An assessment of maintenance and responses to faults 
• An assessment of the crosscutting issues such as prevention of water 
losses 
2. Methodology and approach 
The study was structured to reach a diverse set of key stakeholders and make 
effective use of the time frame for conducting the interviews and preparing the report. 
The aim was to gain a deeper understanding of participants' views and experiences, 
their feelings, perceptions, beliefs, knowledge, and attitudes. These data are most 
useful for identifying priorities for and barriers to service delivery; identifying local 
perceptions and attitudes about the project; and identifying local aspirations. These 
data are important for developing recommendations for future program strategies. 
In generating and selecting the interview guide, the level of structure had to be based 
upon the goals of the evaluation. Topics and questions were generated from issues 
raised in the mid-term evaluation, the terms of reference and knowledge of the 
common challenges of water services in South Africa. 
Conducting the Focus Groups 
Each focus group comprised 10 participants, selected to represent some larger 
population or group of community water users. Each session was about two hours in 
length, with all participants encouraged to actively and creatively express their views 
in response to the questions asked. Sessions were recorded on a flip chart and on a 
lap top computer. The questions were structured firstly, with respect to the terms of 
reference which refer to (i) information about the project, (ii) community participation; 
and (iii) benefits to the community. Secondly, the questions were structured with 
respect to improved access to water services by local populations described as: 
62
• Provision of potable water 
• Reliability of service 
• Customer service / relationship / cost recovery 
• Maintenance and response to community needs 
• Preventing water losses 
Localities and Participants 
Participants were drawn from a broad range of community institutions and 
individuals. These included politicians (Councilors), Civic organizations, youth and 
women’s groups, business people and Tribal Authorities. To include a taste of direct 
experience, one focus group meeting was conducted with participants organized on 
the spot from a public tap in Marite (project pilot site). 
The study identified a number of categories of participants, mainly based on gender, 
urban/rural, groups with Councilors, groups with Tribal Authorities. The geographical 
area covered by the project is large, covering more than 100 villages. The BBR￾RWDP has concentrated its efforts on some localities and not others. When choosing 
localities for focus group interviews, this matter was taken into consideration. 
The following was the ultimate choice of localities; 
• Localities that were targeted by the project as pilot sites, which include 
Dwarsloop, Thulamahashe, Marite, and Calcutta (mainly urban and peri-urban) 
• Localities that are part of the Bohlabela District Municipality but are located 
further away from the Bushbuckridge town which formed the nucleus of project 
activity. These included Rolle, Allandale and Hluvukani which are mainly rural. 
• Stakeholders in BBR CBD targeting mainly businesses operating in the area. 
• Amashangana Tribal Authority 
3. Findings 
A table giving a description of focus group profiles and summary of key issues is 
included in the main text
3.1 Information and communication 
Levels of information and communication about the project differed considerably 
between the settlements. In areas that were identified as pilot sites, especially the 
urban and peri-urban areas, there appeared to be a general knowledge of the 
existence of the project. Some residents remember community meetings where the 
project was introduced. What is not clear is the communication content of the 
meetings. Residents cannot distinguish between the project’s objectives and the 
various components of the broader USAID program whose objectives were: 
• To support the establishment of a water board (for bulk supply), 
• To support operations and maintenance (for both bulk and retail), and 
• To support capacity building for water distribution (retail) managed by 
local government authority. 
All the above activities are seen as one project “that has been around for over five 
years but has not delivered water”. Moreover, even the objective of supporting 
capacity building for retail water is still confused with the delivery of water 
infrastructure by the municipality. 
A major problem from a community perspective was that there was no clear 
understanding of the critical importance of institutional strengthening as a 
63
prerequisite of all other components of service delivery such infrastructural 
development, customer care and water conservation. The partners involved in the 
project developed a communication strategy dated November 2002 the purpose of 
which was to develop mechanisms to disseminate information among the people and 
the relevant institutions. This document attempted to explain the vision and 
objectives for improving water services in Bohlabela. The communication strategy 
was also meant to help stakeholder institutions involved in the Bohlabela water 
program to bring about the required changes in policies, operational procedures and 
behaviors of the people, so as to make the program a success. Furthermore, the 
strategy placed emphasis on two elements which are: 
• determining and clarifying institutional responsibilities: and 
• reducing water losses to help ensure availability to as many people as 
possible. 
There is evidence of some communication effort on the part of the RWDP and its 
partners, even in localities as far as Hluvukani which was not one of the pilot sites, 
but is part of the Bohlabela Water Services jurisdiction. In this area Councilors were 
fully aware of the project, but ordinary residents did not have any information about 
the project or the institutions responsible for the project. There is a strong possibility 
that councilors do not disseminate information to the broader community. In the pilot 
project site of Calcutta, where project consultants have recently been active, 
residents were aware of the project, mainly because of the communication effort, and 
the visibility of the project activities. Regular meetings had been held to discuss 
issues such as the formalization of illegal connections and the metering thereof. 
3.2 Organizational arrangements 
The management of the program deals with the issues surrounding the 
responsibilities of the players that are tasked to deliver on the water services in 
Bohlabela. These tasks were designed to achieve very particular objectives.
The evaluation mission considers that the project design was logical and correct, but 
underestimated. The client and the implementation team had a clear understanding 
of the main and secondary objectives of the project. 
The findings of the focus groups suggest that the difficulties of trying to target 
institutional issues (management capacity) within an environment of service backlogs 
and the resultant water crisis, was not clearly communicated to the beneficiary 
communities, nor understood by them. Their view was that more emphasis should 
have been placed on infrastructure than on institutional development. The project 
had supported infrastructure improvements in certain pilot sites, but this was found to 
be inadequate by the communities. Consequently the communities developed 
negative attitudes towards the project and perceptions of failure. Thus community 
perspectives in this report are about water delivery rather than institutional capacity 
building which became a major objective of the project. 
Benefits of the institutional capacity building effort in the WSA have not translated 
into improved water delivery to residents. There are obvious gaps between the 
institutional support activities (WSA) and the level and quality of services provided. 
Many of the problems described are about poor service delivery, including 
inadequate provision, unreliable supply and poor maintenance. Although some 
residents are not sure who should be providing the service, it is clear that the main 
problems are in the water services arena. 
64
The name of the project “Retail Water Distribution Project” also created some 
confusion on the part of the communities. It gives an impression that the 
implementing agency is going to act as a Water Services Provider, dealing with 
issues of reticulation, distribution and general service delivery. In the meantime this is 
the responsibility of the Municipality and other institutions. The attainment of these 
issues would not be as a result of the direct inputs of the project but rather as a result 
of the local counterparts having acquired new skills (noting that the project 
design was such that RWDP should not directly do the work for them but rather built 
their capacity). This point was raised in the mid-term review, but obviously was not 
properly communicated to stakeholders. 
3.3 Efficiency of Institutional Arrangement for Project Implementation 
While there was a coordinating mechanism in the form of a Steering Committee, 
comprising the RWDP, Water Board, Municipalities etc., institutional responsibility 
has never been clarified to the public. This means that the user community does not 
know who their service provider is. They do not understand the inter-institutional 
relations and how the institutions support one another. 
3.4 Community participation 
Provision was made in the planning documents for the design and implementation of 
the projects to follow a participatory and consultative approach. In this way, it was 
believed that communities would buy into the projects thus further strengthening 
program sustainability. 
The evidence from the focus groups in the rural areas, especially non-project pilot 
sites was that community participation was reported as minimal or almost non￾existent in the project. The main community-based development structure was the 
Community Development Forum (CDF). The CDF dealt with a broad range of 
community development issues including water. Except in a few localities, there were 
no water committees which could form a forum for articulating community needs and 
priorities, and thereby make a meaningful input to the water services program. 
A more participatory and consultative approach would have helped the project 
managers to understand communities’ priorities with regard to water supply. This 
form of participative planning and subsequent feeling of ownership would also have 
helped when developing programs to eradicate illegal connections. 
3.5 Assessment of project effectiveness (Impact) 
3.5.1 Performance in terms of expected outcomes (community benefits) 
Project benefits reported by the community included awareness about water 
management, conservation and issues of scarcity. Residents of Dwaarsloop, 
especially councilors, reported on workshops that had been held to explain the line 
functions of a WSA and WSP, and the role of supporting institutions and inter￾governmental relations. 
However, a major weakness of the capacity building effort was reported to be the 
lack of broader involvement of the community representatives in the project. This 
would have helped articulate community needs and thereby provided an opportunity 
for the project objectives and activities to be aligned to community needs. There is a 
strong belief that while the institutional capacity building objective of the project was 
relevant to the needs of the municipality, the project pushed this objective over and 
above community needs for access to water. 
65
Residents stressed the point that they understood the principle of institutional 
strengthening, but also indicated that this should have been accompanied by 
measures to provide access to water even if it was not full scale provision. With these 
observations, residents believed that the project was selective in attending to the 
needs of the municipality, which is indicative of an externally driven agenda. They 
believed that had the communities been properly consulted during conceptualization 
or inception, some of the resources would have been allocated to delivery on the 
ground. 
A suggestion made was that RWDP should not disengage from its activities, but 
should continue for a while to help both the District and the Local Municipalities to 
implement some of the strategies, bylaws, customer care etc. which the project 
helped develop. Regardless of how successful the project has been in developing 
and supporting the WSA, until such time that water has been delivered, the project 
will be deemed a failure in the eyes of the user communities. 
3.5.2 Provision of potable water 
Communities report a huge backlog in the provision of water. Some villages go 
without water for up to two months. In areas where there is no bulk piped water 
supply, users rely on boreholes for water provision. Residents interviewed in Marite, 
which is one of the project pilot areas, reported that the boreholes are inadequate, 
and in many cases dysfunctional. The main problems emanate from broken pumps, 
no electricity, insufficient diesel, stolen cables, vandalism and poor maintenance. 
Pumps fail as a result of both ageing and vandalism. Regrettably there is no proper 
reporting mechanism, resulting in poor response from the service provider. 
Furthermore, it was reported that some of the infrastructure belongs to DWAF while 
some belongs to BBR Municipality. In one area we were told that the borehole 
infrastructure belongs to Mvula Trust. When a pump is broken or dysfunctional, the 
community reports to the Ward Councilor who in turn reports to the Municipality. 
More often than not, DWAF operators will fix their own infrastructure first and then 
only fix infrastructure belonging to other institutions if there is time or equipment. 
There are reports of DWAF staff indicating to residents that they are just doing a 
favor by fixing infrastructure that does not belong to the Department. This has 
created negative attitudes on the part of the water users whose interest lies in water 
availability rather than institutional responsibility. 
Theft and vandalism were said to emanate from the community as many residents 
believe that the culprits do not travel far to steal equipment including electricity 
cables. There are also reports of stolen JoJo tanks, especially when they are empty 
and easier to carry. These problems have been reported to the Community Policing 
Forum (CPF) and to the South African Police; however, there does not seem to be 
any progress in solving the problem. Marite was singled out as a high crime area 
where the community has to come together to solve the problem. 
On the issue of diesel, it was not clear to the participants who should provide it, and 
where the money should come from. After some debates, it was agreed that the 
Municipality must begin to replace diesel pumps with electric pumps which are 
believed to be more reliable. Where diesel pumps are still in use, the Municipality 
must be responsible for providing diesel. A suggestion by some community members 
to make diesel provision the responsibility of the users was rejected on the basis of 
the fact that access to water still remains in-equitable, therefore it would be unfair for 
people to contribute equally while some have easier access to water. An example of 
this problem is in Boikhutso, where residents closest to the source do not have 
access to water, while residents closest to the reservoir do have access. 
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3.5.3 Reliability of service 
Unreliability was noted as a major problem affecting service delivery. This problem 
was mentioned by all the groups interviewed. Residents in Thulamahashe, which is 
the largest settlement, reported problems of water unavailability for periods of over 
24 hrs. This was particularly serious for Section C. Though the problem still persists, 
there have been improvements since the upgrading of the water mains and some 
form of reticulation. 
A focus group interview conducted at a standpipe in Marite provided an insight into 
the types of problems experienced by residents, especially women and children who 
are carriers of water. The first observation that the evaluation team made was a row 
of buckets and other containers waiting to be filled at the standpipe. The pressure 
was very low and the water was coming out in dribs and drabs. The residents were 
waiting their turn while sitting under a tree. Many of the people at the standpipe were 
children, some as young as eight. We were told they had been waiting for over two 
hours. While some residents complained about the unreliability of the standpipes, 
and advocated house connections, some believed that house connections that do not 
produce any water will not help. Residents showed us a number of tanks and 
reservoirs, and confirmed the problem of illegal connections as a cause of service 
failure. 
3.5.4 Maintenance and responses to complaints 
The communities complained about the poor maintenance of the infrastructure 
accompanied by lack of response when faults are reported. The problem is 
complicated by the multiplicity of service providers. In the area of Hluvukani, for 
instance, residents identified infrastructure belonging to the municipality, DWAF and 
the Mvula Trust. There are reports of DWAF employees refusing to service boreholes 
that belong to the municipality. There are reports of several dysfunctional boreholes 
at any given time as a result of lack of diesel, or broken engines due to lack of spare 
parts and vandalism. 
In all cases, the lack of maintenance is stated to be a huge problem. Reasons 
advanced for this are the dispersion and difficult access which make it costly for 
service providers to travel and provide maintenance; secondly, the municipality does 
not seem to have well-developed maintenance structures and cultures. Finally, there 
appears to be no delegation to the communities or to the private sector. Private 
participation is extremely limited, possibly due to the remoteness and poverty of the 
concerned population. 
Operations and maintenance have to be given priority. There is a need to establish 
dedicated O& M teams and train staff accordingly. There was a strong proposal for a 
reporting system with proper logging of queries and responses that could be used for 
monitoring the performance of maintenance personnel throughout the district. 
3.5.5 Customer service, relationship and cost recovery 
Issues of cost recovery and customer care seem to be important to the residents 
closest to the main urban centre of BBR which are Thulamahashe, Dwaarsloop and 
the BBR CBD. Residents believe that the current cost recovery mechanism, including 
metering, bill preparation, and the general debt management is at best inadequate, 
and at worst dysfunctional. Residents believe that the municipality does not know 
who their customers and debtors are, and how much money is owed to municipality. 
If such monies could be collected properly many of the operations and maintenance 
problems would be overcome. A case was raised of the information that came from 
the “proof of residence” process initiated as a result of FICA, whereby residents were 
67
asked by their banks to provide proof of residence through their municipal bills. Many 
residents had to go and present themselves at the municipality to request copies of 
their recent bills. It became clear that the number of debtors and the monies owed 
were much higher than previously thought. 
3.5.6 Preventing water losses 
The problem of illegal connections, burst pipes and dripping standpipes was 
mentioned in all interviews. 
The problem of illegal connections is the most complex, as it is caused by a number 
of factors. Residents believe that the problem could be solved or alleviated by the 
reticulation to individual homesteads. It is believed that some residents get involved 
in illegal connections simply because they do not want to queue at the standpipe, 
while some resort to the practice because standpipes nearest to their stands do not 
have water. On the other hand, in the more urbanized areas where there is stand 
reticulation, certain residents use illegal connections to avoid paying for water 
supplied via their meters. There are also reports of water vendors who, having 
obtained water via illegal connections, sell it at exorbitant prices to residents. 
Residents believe that employees of the municipality and DWAF are the worst 
culprits in respect of illegal connections, as they have the skills and the tools to carry 
out these connections. These employees do not only connect illegally for their own 
consumption, but also charge other residents for the service. 
Circumstances leading to illegal connections are many and varied, and the problem 
requires a multi-pronged strategy supported by all institutions and the user 
community. Everyone agreed that illegal connections cannot be stopped until delivery 
and reliability reach a certain level acceptable to the community. 
Water losses from dripping standpipes result from a combination of poor 
infrastructure, lack of maintenance, irresponsible usage by the community and 
vandalism in the form of theft of pipes. Residents related incidents where the tap was 
left to run overnight because residents had been queuing for water at the specific tap. 
The water was coming through in dribs and drabs; hence the tap was left open. 
When the water pressure was restored or normalized, the water was left to run 
attended for the entire night. While residents were all in agreement that this behavior 
is unacceptable, they expressed frustration with the waiting and the long queues at 
the standpipes. 
Burst pipes are caused mainly by lack of maintenance and on a few occasions 
shoddy workmanship due to illegal connections. In the absence of a proper reporting 
mechanism, the response is slow and sometimes not forthcoming. There are 
instances where residents take advantage of burst pipes and use them as water 
sources for the day. 
3.6 Recommendations for the way forward 
Residents are still not convinced that the project did the correct thing by placing more 
emphasis on institutional strengthening than on water provision. Recommendations 
emanating from the community interviews are therefore mainly on issues of water 
provision, although there are a few on institutional collaboration and roles and 
responsibilities. 
3.6.1 Water provision (availability, reliability and conservation) 
Provide extensive reticulation throughout the District: this was put forward as a 
main recommendation from the community. Since research has been conducted on 
the sources of water for bulk supply i.e. Inyaka Dam, it is time to ensure that those 
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water sources provide bulk water for municipal services. It was felt that there must be 
fast tracking of Phase 2 and 3 of Inyaka Dam project which will see the completion of 
the water treatment plant and associated reticulation. 
Upgrade existing purification plants. This should be an interim measure while 
awaiting water access from Inyaka Dam. Since there has been an investment in the 
existing plants, this infrastructure must be maintained and operated in such a way 
that there is an improvement in access. 
Diesel pumps must be replaced with electrical pumps: It has been noted that the 
major problem with boreholes may not be drought, but the poor equipment being 
used to pump water. It is recommended that borehole equipment be upgraded, 
especially in those areas where there is currently no bulk supply or reticulation. The 
boreholes still serve a purpose and if functioning properly they can augment 
provision in remote areas. The pumps should also be provided with ample security to 
avoid theft and vandalism. 
Jojo tanks must be replaced with concrete reservoirs which are bigger and 
cannot be stolen. Jojo tanks have proved to be inadequate especially where 
communities are growing. 
Individual house connections should be considered in areas where metering is 
possible and where there is a potential for payment. 
There seems to be a lot of emphasis on the provision of potable water for human 
consumption. In the meantime there are areas in Thulamahashe and Dwaarsloop 
where there is water borne sewerage. Water for sewerage has to be given priority
in these areas, as the shortage of water will be a recipe for disease. 
3.6.2 Maintenance and responses to reporting of faults 
Establish a reporting system that can log in faults and queries and develop a 
charter for responses. Having established the roles and responsibilities of role 
players, this must be followed up with a reporting system and an associated charter. 
Without this there is a tendency for the responsible institutions to remain accountable 
to themselves rather than to the users. The reporting system must indicate structures 
that communities report to, which should keep records of complaints and responses, 
and provide feedback on corrective action. 
The institution responsible for operations and maintenance, in this case the 
WSP must be responsible for the training of operators. Moreover, the WSP must 
set up suitable stores system for effective supply of parts needed in emergencies. At 
this stage the supply of parts comes from the stores in Thulamahashe. The problems 
of broken equipment, dysfunctional infrastructure and low pressure can only be 
solved if there is a proper maintenance structure with effective supervision and 
reporting mechanism. 
3.6.3 Community participation 
There is need for the creation of mechanisms to promote community 
participation. As mentioned earlier, community participation is important in rural 
water supply and maintenance. This practice recognizes that communities constitute 
a great asset, and one that needs to be tapped; whether by involving them in the 
design of the program, by asking for their participation in kind, or by asking them to 
supervise work that is contracted out. It can also serve as the basis for greater 
accountability in public investment. Successful rural water schemes are community 
69
based, and focus on what users want and are able to sustain. This takes time, and 
requires community members to be involved in the design process. 
Technical assistance and training should be provided to the communities until they 
are capable of maintaining water points or piped systems, administer the water 
scheme in a financially responsible way, and handle routine operations and 
maintenance. A new generation of pumps has been designed for village-level 
operation and maintenance, designed for low cost, ease of maintenance, and 
resistance to abuse and vandalism. 
A focus on institutional development should continue for sustainability: This 
support should extend to all stakeholder institutions including water committees. 
Develop local technical capacity so as to ensure that communities do not rely 
solely on help coming from the main centers such as BBR and Thulamahashe. Given 
the scarcity of resources, there is a need to ensure expenditure efficiency. This could 
be improved by developing local capacity for planning and managing infrastructure 
3.6.4 Institutional roles and responsibilities 
Clarify roles and responsibilities and communicate this to users so that they 
know which institution to contact for a variety of services. This activity should also 
determine points of accountability. Role clarification will also solve the problem of 
ownership of equipment and its maintenance. 
Establish and strengthen village water committees. The existence of a formal 
organization to manage the water system and training of household members is a 
significant factor in ensuring water system sustainability. In many case-studies 
positive correlations are found between water system sustainability and the level of 
training received by the water committee in operations and maintenance. The Village 
Water Committees should work through the CDF and represent the various 
communities on IDP the Forum, and in the preparation of a Water Services 
Development Plan (WSDP). 
Involve NGOs, CBOs and Tribal Authorities as all these institutions have a role to 
play in representing the various sectors of the community. Inter-institutional 
collaboration will also reduce the burden on officials and councilors who more often 
than not are over-burdened with a variety of community development issues. 
Consider private sector participation and initiate contacts with a number of private 
sector entities with a view to engaging them in development co-operation. 
3.6.5 Cost recovery 
Determine the proper number of legally connected customers and develop a 
database for billing and payment. This will go a long way towards attaining 
financial sustainability. Payment will be encouraged by an improved level of service 
and reliability. Faulty meters must be repaired as they are a source of conflict 
between users and the municipality. The municipality should also develop and 
implement an effective system for penalizing non-payers. This process can slowly be 
extended to other parts of the municipality which are currently not connected. 
Formalize and legalize illegal connections via metering so as to correct poor 
workmanship and leakages. Where illegal connections are in un-connectable areas, 
the municipality has to get rid of such connections and educate the community on 
water use, costs of water, and the problems of illegal connections. 
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Water vendors must be discouraged because they access municipal water free of 
charge through illegal connections, but sell it at exorbitant prices. Water vendors 
should rather be formalized and transformed into water services providers. In this 
way water vendors will pay for bulk water, the municipality will be able to control 
prices and monitor the service provided. 
3.6.6 Communication 
This aspect of the project and the broader Bohlabela Water Services Program can be 
greatly strengthened, and it is recommended that the communication strategy be 
implemented aggressively. Community structures must be involved in marketing 
the strategy and dissemination of information on the various components of the water 
program. Emphasis must be placed on training of Water Committees, Ward 
Councilors and system operators. This will impart a sense of ownership to the 
beneficiaries, and result in improved co-ordination between government, NGOs, 
communities, the private sector and other role players. 
3.7 Conclusions 
Key findings 
Presentation of the results comprises a summary of discussions emanating from the 
focus group interviews. The focus groups revealed the communities’ perceptions of 
their water supply needs and of the various attempts to meet these needs. Although 
data from these groups cannot be relied upon as being representative of the total 
population of Bushbuckridge, the opinions obtained provide an indication of the 
issues most relevant to the user communities. This can be used as a useful guide in 
the design of future schemes. 
Overall, the focus groups were well received by the participants. Many participants 
expressed their appreciation of having the opportunity to hear more about the RWDP 
and the general water issues in Bohlabela. They also were glad to be able to express 
their opinion on this subject where they have been assured that their opinions will be 
documented and reported as part of a final evaluation report. 
A capacitated and skilled WSA must not be negated by system faults such as an 
unreliable water supply. However, there were many comments regarding the lack of 
institutional co-ordination in terms of operations and maintenance, and there was 
very limited evidence of any effort to involve community structures in the planning 
and implementation of projects. The institutional capacity building benefits as 
experienced by the WSA have not cascaded to the beneficiary communities. A lot still 
has to be done to capacitate the WSP and supporting institutions, to create a unified 
water services environment. 
On the other hand these findings indicate that there is a willingness by local 
communities to become involved in activities that would better their situation. This 
enthusiasm should be embraced, and active participation by members of the 
community should be encouraged in future projects. The community's involvement is 
critical to the success of this Bohlabela Water Supply Program because these are the 
people who can best determine what motivates them and what would help them to 
lead a better life. 
The project’s success was influenced by many external factors and institutions. It is 
imperative that the activities of such institutions must be managed in such a manner 
that they are supportive of the project objectives. Secondly, communities must take 
ownership of the projects and be encouraged to protect the infrastructure, and to pay 
for services. A communication strategy has been developed, and it needs to be 
implemented aggressively to facilitate information flow among stakeholders. 
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The areas of concern for the project are: 
• The negative attitude of the consumers towards the project 
• The demand by consumers for not only better services which they cannot 
always afford, but also provision of these services within a short period of 
time. This implies that more effort needs to be directed towards educating 
the consumers. 
• Unclear institutional responsibilities 
• The absence of a clear strategy for operations and maintenance of water 
schemes 
• Continuing dissatisfaction by community members with their lack of 
participation in decision-making and operations. 
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Annex 5 
CVs of evaluators 
RICHARD JULLION MARTIN
CURRICULUM VITAE 
Personal
Name Richard Jullion Martin 
Citizenship British 
Languages English, French 
Marital Status Married with three children (born 1969, 1976, 1979) 
Skills and experience 
Mr Martin has undertaken many program reviews and evaluations, and has written 
and taught on the subject. He has worked with the legislative, administrative and 
developmental aspects of water provision in South Africa over many years. He has 
in-depth experience in local government and worked with many NGOs over a period 
of four years. He has considerable experience in conducting workshops and 
facilitating community participation. 
He was the Team Leader of a Mid-Term Review of the Bushbuckridge Retail Water 
Project for USAID (other team member was Mankone Tsaba), conducted in August 
2002. He was also responsible for the evaluation of Rand Water Board’s USAID 
grant-funded support program for the Bushbuckridge Water Board. These two 
assignments have given him in-depth understanding of the conditions under which 
the Retail Water Project has operated. 
He was a member of a joint UNDP/USAID evaluation of the People’s Housing 
Process, which involved detailed review of the administrative and financial 
arrangements, the experience in the field, interaction with stakeholders such as 
Provincial Departments, and community groups, and an evaluation of the outputs in 
terms of quality and quantity. 
He was a team member of a USAID evaluation of the results of six USAID funded 
training for local government officials conducted in South Africa. This involved postal 
questionnaires to the participants and their supervisors which enabled objective 
evaluation of the personal and institutional improvements in performance as a result 
of the training. This was supplemented by telephone contacts and in-depth 
interviews with the training bodies concerned. 
He was team leader of an evaluation of the USAID grant to the South African Black 
Contractors (SABCAP), and was responsible for making recommendation for the use 
of remaining funds. This work was supplemented by detailed work for SABCAP to 
program their future activities. It involved in depth consultations with members of the 
construction industry, beneficiaries of SABCAP, the Department of Public Works and 
similar stakeholders. 
He was team leader of the evaluation of USAID’s First Urban Project in Botswana. 
This was a wide-ranging project to develop the local capacity to develop low -income 
housing and associated infrastructure, as well as land reform matters. 
He taught on the subject of monitoring and evaluation of urban projects at the 
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Bouwcentrum International Education, and has published on the subject. In addition, 
as Deputy Director of the $40 million World Bank Lusaka Squatter and Upgrading 
Project, he established a monitoring unit, and was an active participant in 
establishing the methodology for the longitudinal (2 year) evaluation of that project 
(funded by IDRC and the World Bank). 
He has a detailed knowledge of the legislative and administrative framework for 
water services. Until May 2002 he was Program Co-coordinator of the European 
Union program “Strengthening Local Government in Mpumalanga and Limpopo 
Provinces”. This provided funds for the provision of infrastructure and capacity 
building for infrastructure in selected local authorities. It involved detailed 
assessment of the administrative and financial capacity of municipalities in delivering 
services to the poor. He is also a program manager of studies in the matter of cost 
recovery in relation to water projects for the Water Research Commission. He was 
also actively involved in establishing the first community-based Water Board in South 
Africa for the Olifants River Catchment area. 
He and his firm are undertaking research work in the field of water. Three studies 
are of particular relevance here: Examples of successful Cost Recovery, for the 
Water Research Commission, 2002; Cost recovery experience in the amalgamated 
Municipalities, 2004, for the Water Research Commission, and Cost of Water for the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, 2004. Under Sigodi Marah Martin’s 
contract with DWAF he is also participating in a three year assignment to develop the 
regulatory system for water services in South Africa. 
Mr Martin has conducted workshops with a wide variety of clients. These include 
community groups (in the preparation of LDOs for the Eastern Gauteng Regional 
Services Council, Hlogotlo and Koedoesrand TLCs, and the design of a community 
center at Cyferkuil), Local Government groups, such as the Eastern District Council, 
North West Province, Local Government stakeholders in Mpumalanga and the 
Limpopo Provinces, interest groups for the Olifants River Water Board, Lusaka City 
Council. Mr Martin was involved in many training and workshop activities in Kenya 
while working of the USAID Small Towns Project. He taught and conducted 
workshop for senior professionals at the Bouwcentrum International Education, in 
Tanzania, Indonesia and Thailand. Previously, in Lusaka, the project referred to 
above pioneered the use of community-based development and engaging 
stakeholders through interactive workshops. 
Education
1997 Higher National Diploma, Association of Arbitrators 
1986 LLB (Intermediate) 
London University 
1966 Andrew Grant Research Fellow, 
Edinburgh College of Art 
1965 Dip TP (Town and Country Planning) 
Edinburgh College of Art 
1963 DA (Architecture) 
Edinburgh College of Art 
1960 MA (Architecture) 
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Cambridge University 
Professional Qualifications and Associations
1965 Member, Royal Institute of British Architects 
1967 Member, Royal Town Planning Institute 
1967 Member, Zambia Institute of Architects 
President 1976-1978 
1972 Member, Zambia Institute of Planners 
Vice-President 1974-1976 
1993 Member, Institute of Housing of Southern Africa 
Vice Chairman, Gauteng Branch, 1996-1999 
1994 Member, Association of Chartered Town Planners of South Africa 
Chairman, 1997 - 1998. 
1995 Fellow, Association of Arbitrators of Southern Africa 
1996 Member, Institute of South African Architects. 
1997 Fellow, Association of Arbitrators of Southern Africa 
1997-1999 Committee Member, Gauteng Institute for Architecture 
1998 Chairman, Association of Chartered Town Planners in South Africa 
Official Appointments
Member, Town and Country Planning Appeals Tribunal, Zambia 
75
Member, Architects and Quantity Surveyors Registration Board, 
Zambia 
Academic Appointments
External examiner, MSc Development Studies, McGill University 1977 
External examiner, Newcastle University, M Phil, Housing, 1980 
External examiner, University of the Witswatersrand, BSc (Town and 
Regional Planning) 
External Examiner, University of the Witswatersrand, MSc (Housing). 
Employment 
1996 – present Director, Sigodi Marah Martin 
Providing consultancy services in the fields of housing, urban development, local 
governance, planning and development and the management of water services. 
He managed the firm’s studies undertaken for the Water Research Commission in 
2000, 2003 and 2004, on cost recovery. He also participated in the study for DWAF 
on the cost of water. He is a lead consultant in the current study on the regulation of 
water services in South Africa. 
He has undertaken evaluations and program reviews in a number of different fields, 
including the People’s Housing Process, The South African Black Contractors 
Association, six of USAID’s Local Government training programs. He has also 
participated in the establishment of a community based Water Board for the Olifants 
River catchment area. 
He has undertaken substantial work concerning governance in the delivery of 
infrastructural services. He contributed to the World Bank/USAID study of Fiscal 
Decentralization in Africa being conducted by NALAD, acting as an advisor to the 
NALAD team in respect of the Zambia study, and team leader of the process in the 
case of Ghana and Zimbabwe. He prepared an overview of the process and lessons 
learned for the World Bank (2000). He assisted in the development of Strategic 
Plans for Lusaka (1999) and Ndola (2001). 
Projects also include planning overview and policy review for the Eastern Gauteng 
Services Council and planning studies and support for the Lekoa Vaal Transitional 
Metropolitan Council. He has conducted a study for the Banking Council of South 
Africa regarding cost recovery problems in respect of mortgages and Local 
Government rates and services charges, and evaluations of the USAID Black 
Contractors' assistance program, the USAID Local Government training programs, 
and the UNDP/USAID People’s Housing Process. Recent work includes a Water 
Research Commission study of successful cost recovery experiences, and an 
analysis of, and proposals for a rental housing policy in South Africa, for USAID. 
Mr Martin is also a Trustee, and Chairperson of the Technical Committee of the 
Libuyile Community Development Trust, which has capital of $350,000. It 
administers a revolving project preparation loan fund and assists communities to 
prepare and develop housing projects. 
1999 – 2002 Program Coordinator: European Union Program 
Heading a team of management consultants appointed by the European Union to 
strengthen local government in two Provinces of South Africa, working in the national 
Department of Provincial and Local Government. Funds are divided between 
infrastructure development and capacity building and training. Beneficiaries include 
provincial, district and local administrations. The program is planned to take four 
76
years, and has a budget of about $15 million. It has looked at the powers and 
functions of different agencies in government and the legislative and administrative 
framework for the delivery of water services. 
1993-1996 Chief of Party, Community and Urban Services Support 
Project
Leading a team of 28 professionals and 14 support staff working from offices in 
Johannesburg, Durban, East London and Cape Town to develop housing projects. 
The project interacted with 72 communities with plans to develop about 100 000 
houses. Projects supported by CUSSP and already in progress included the 
presidential projects of Cato Manor, Durban, Duncan Village, East London, and the 
Serviced Land Project in Cape Town: about 25 000 houses are being developed from 
these and other CUSSP supported communities. Projects were in nine of the eleven 
Provinces, and range from those serving the very poor to those in the lower middle 
income groups. The project included continuous training and capacity building of 
South African staff in issues regarding housing and community development. 
CUSSP was requested to and engaged many consultants to advise the Government 
and private sector on matters concerning housing and housing finance, and worked 
closely with the Department of Housing (who seconded a staff member to CUSSP), 
and Provincial and Local arms of Government. It prepared extensive guidelines in 
the management and support of low income housing, and documentation of the 
lessons learned from CUSSP’s extensive involvement with the sector. It also 
commissioned work regarding the assessment of environmental impact of residential 
development, with special reference to Knysna, and environmental guidelines for use 
by community facilitators. 
In addition to administering the $18 million CUSSP project Mr Martin served on a 
number of committees, including the Housing Support Center Task Team in 
Gauteng; the Black Construction Industry Task Team, and the Water Research 
Commission’s Steering Committee for the On-Site Sanitation Evaluation project. 
1981-1992 Regional Technical Advisor, United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), Nairobi, Kenya 
A member of a small team of specialist advisers contributing to project development, 
project management, technical assistance and training in the fields of urban 
development and housing in East and Southern Africa, within the Regional Office of 
Housing and Urban Development. The work covered most countries in the region, 
with particular emphasis on Kenya, Botswana and Zimbabwe. Emphasis was on 
urban management, infrastructure standards, planning and project management 
systems, cost recovery and affordability. 
1978-1981 Workshop Coordinator, Bouwcentrum International 
Education Foundation, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Conducted and coordinated courses for middle and senior staff from developing 
countries on housing building and planning, with special emphasis on squatter 
upgrading and site and service projects. Also prepared and organized or contributed 
to courses in Bandung (Indonesia), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) and Bangkok 
(Thailand). The courses were for 5 months in Rotterdam, and 1 - 3 months 
elsewhere. Assisted and participated in conferences in Bandung and Arusha. 
77
1974-1978 Deputy Director, Housing Project Unit, Lusaka City 
Council
Responsible for the execution of a $40 million World Bank funded project, reporting 
to the Project Director. Staff of about 350 people, serving settlements with a total 
population of about 100,000; improving a total of about 17,000 houses, building 
11,000 new units of self help housing, constructing community facilities and off-site 
infrastructure. 
1971-1974 Senior, later Chief Architect/Town Planner, National 
Housing Authority, Zambia
Responsible to the Chief Executive for all architectural and town planning work of the 
Authority. Work included preparation of the project proposal for squatter upgrading 
and site and service to the World Bank, and representing Zambia at the subsequent 
negotiations; preparation of physical development plans for Kite (pop 240,000) and 
Kabwe (pop 85,000), housing layouts for site and service schemes (about 24,000 
plots in six urban centers),preparing plans for and advising Local Authorities on 
squatter upgrading projects, appraisal of housing schemes submitted by Local 
Authorities for Local Sanction, research into aspects of low cost housing and site and 
service schemes, preparing publicity material and exhibitions to further 
understanding of, and interest in site and service projects by the public. Directing 
two films on the subject. 
1971 Assistant Architect/Town Planner, Zambia Housing Board
Responsible for contract administration, final account, exhibitions and publicizing site 
and service schemes. 
1970-1971 Junior Partner, Montgomerie Oldfield Kirby and Partners
Responsible for opening a new office for the practice in Lilongwe, Malawi, and design 
of Trades Training Institutes, schools and private houses. 
1967-1969 Assistant Architect/Town Planner, Zambia Housing Board
Responsible for the supervision of several major housing projects, preparation of a 
master plan for a new town to serve a remote coal mine, designing many small 
housing scheme throughout Zambia, and research into plot use in low cost housing. 
Before 1967 Architect in offices in Edinburgh and London; Town 
Planner with Edinburgh Corporation. 
END 
78
CURRICULUM VITAE
Mankone Ntsaba
Personal information
Surname Ntsaba 
Other names Mankone, Mabataung 
Sex Female 
Date of birth 
Place of birth 
Nationality South African 
ID. 
Postal address P. O. Box 66628 
 Woodhill, 0076 
 South Africa. 
Tel (W) (012) 800 4292 
Fax (012) 993 0903 
Cell 
e-mail 
Education 
1990 MSc., Rhodes University 
1987 BSc Hons., Rhodes University 
1983 BSc., (Applied Environmental Science) National University of Lesotho 
1978 Certificate in Basic Draughting Technician Training School of 
Lesotho 
1977 Matric (COSC) Lesotho High School 
Other training 
" Proposal selling and performance management 
 for enhanced customer satisfaction BMI Insight 
" Sensitising for service awareness BMI Insight 
" Mobilising for service delivery BMI Insight 
" Empowerment of first line supervisors Groman Consulting 
" Advanced Leadership Program, Groman Consulting / 
CSIR 
" Total Quality Management (TQM) Groman Consulting 
" Theory of Constraints Avraham Y Goldraat 
Institute 
" Management Skills Avraham Y Goldraat 
Institute 
" Critical Chain Project Management Training Avraham Y Goldraat Institute 
" MBA in a nutshell, New York Institute of Finance 
" Malcom Baldrige National Quality Award 
 (MBNQA) Criteria overview, Groman Consulting 
" Malcom Baldrige National Quality Award 
 (MBNQA), examiners course, Groman Consulting 
" Executive Course in Technology and 
 Development, Wits University. 
79
Work Experience
Dates 1999 to date 
Institution Tsinde Development Consultants 
Position Director 
Duties 
• Key Account Management and customer relationships 
• Preparation of proposals and tender documents 
• Project management 
 
 
Date 1997 to 1999 
Institution Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), 
 Division of Water, Environment and Forest Technology 
(Environmentek) 
Position Program Manager; Technology for Development and Capacity 
Building 
Main duties Member of the Management Team responsible for; 
• the overall management and coordination of activities with a community 
development component 
• planning and coordinating technology development and transfer to poor rural 
and urban communities 
• marketing CSIR technologies to funding and implementing agencies 
• ensuring acceptable financial results and performance targets in the area of 
technology for Development, and other projects operating in areas of high 
market failure 
• designing and coordinating programs of human resources development and 
training 
• Implementing government’s human resources development policies in 
relation to technology transfer 
Other tasks Member of the Transformation Task Team, supporting the HR 
Management Department with recruitment and mentoring as a 
component of the Employment Equity and Affirmative Action strategy 
Member of the broader CSIR Technology for Development Forum, 
and part of a team facilitating the process of collaboration and 
integration between the CSIR and the University of Pretoria. 
Date 1996 to 1997 
Institution CSIR, Environmentek 
Position Program Manager; Water Supply and Sanitation 
80
Main duties Overall strategic leadership and direction for the Program, including; 
• Management and coordination of projects in water supply, sanitation, waste 
water treatment, water quality management and water health. 
• Budgeting and financial management, including responsibility for financial 
results and maintenance of performance standards. 
• Introduction and management of Quality Projects 
• Responsible for career development and performance management of staff 
• Key account management and customer relationships 
• Marketing and product management 
• Managing investment in product development 
Other tasks Member of the Strategic Human Resources Management Committee 
Date 1993 to 1996 
Institution CSIR, Division of Forestry Science and Technology (Forestek) 
Position Project Leader 
Main duties Part of a team of researchers in the field of Natural Resources 
Management, and responsible for; 
• Proposal generation and execution of projects 
• Applied research into the use of natural resources in community 
development. 
• Training and capacity building in natural resources management. 
 
Date 1991 to 1993 
Institution University of Transkei 
Position Lecturer in Physical Geography 
Duties Preparation and delivery of lectures in Geomorphology and 
Climatology 
 Conducting practicals and field research for students 
 supervising students’ projects 
Date 1989 to 1993 
Institution University of Zululand 
Position Lecturer in Physical Geography 
Duties Preparation and delivery of lectures in Geomorphology and 
Climatology 
Conducting practicals, field research and supervising students’ 
projects 
 
Date 1984 to 1985 
Institution Goronyane High School, Thaba-Nchu 
Position Teacher 
Duties Teaching Geography and Biology 
81
Languages: Sesotho, iSiXhosa, iSiZulu and English 
Key projects, publications and presentations (involved as an individual or as a 
member of a team) 
2004 Strategy for National Water Quality monitoring and Assessment, 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
2003 Public Transport plan for the Southern District Municipality, Department 
of Transport, North West Province 
2002 Minimum requirements for public participation in the transformation of 
Irrigation Boards, into Water user Associations Department of Water Affairs 
and Forestry 
2002 National Sanitation Program Management Contract, Department of Water 
Affairs Forestry. 
2002 Strategic and business planning support, Policy and Legislation 
Department of Public Transport Roads and Works 
2002 National Coordination of the Masibambane Water Sector Capacity Building 
Program, Department of Water Affairs / EU and other funders. 
2002 Mid-term evaluation of the Bushbuckridge Retail Water Distribution Project, 
USAID 
2001 Assessment of Water Demand Management Technologies in Southern Africa, 
IUCN 
2001 Diagnostic study of the Alfred Nzo District Municipality, Municipal Infrastructure 
Investment Unit 
2001 Diagnostic study of the Kgalagadi District Municipality, Municipal Infrastructure 
Investment Unit 
2001 Monitoring and Assessment Information Strategy, Department of Water Affairs 
2001 Evaluation of the Nelspruit Water and Sanitation Concession, Development 
Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) 
2001 Evaluation of Water Conservation and Demand Management technologies in 
Southern Africa, IUCN 
 
2000 Integrated Water Resources Management, mapping of needs in South Africa, 
Global Water Partnerships 
1999: Capacity Building in the Power Sector of South Africa, report to AFREPREN, 
Nairobi. 
1999: Public participation and scoping, module for EIA training course, National 
Department of Health 
82
1999: Scoping and the development of terms of reference for an EIA training course, 
IUCN, Pretoria
1997: Social Impact Assessment module for an EIA training course prepared for the 
Greater Johannesburg Metro.
1995: Community Participation Module. Part of the IDT Consolidation Coordinators 
course, Work Inc, Cape Town. 
1995: Facilitator for a strategic planning workshops for Mzingisi Development Trust, 
Port Elizabeth. 
1995: Social Impact Assessment and Public Consultation for Maquasa Mine Project, 
Eastern Transvaal, Report to Walmsley Environmental Consultants. 
1993: Social Impact Assessment (SIA) of the proposed Modimola Dam, Mmabatho. 
CSIR report to the Department of Water Affairs, Bophuthatswana. 
____________________ 
MANKONE NTSABA DATE 07 October, 2004 
REFEREES 
1. Dr Alex Weaver 
Environmentek, CSIR 
P.O. Box 320, 
Stellenbosch 
7999 
Tel: 27 21 888 2443 
Fax 27 21 888 2693 
E-mail aweaver@csir.co.za 
2. Dr Anthos Yannakou 
Executive Deputy President 
CSIR 
P.O. Box 395 
Pretoria 
0001 
Tel (012) 841 3225 
Email yannako@csir.co.za 
83