3 
FMI 
Financial Markets International, Inc. 
7735 Old Georgetown Road Smte 310 Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Tel (301) 215-7840 Fax (301) 215-7838 hi ha@h~-~ncet 
Evaluation of the 
New Economy Project 
Prepared for 
USA!DIJamaica 
September 8,2003 
Contract No. PCE-I-00-99-00010-00 
Task Order No. 805 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Executive Summary 
A. Background 
B. Swpe of Work 
C. Findings 
D. Conclusions and Recommendations 
E. Lessons Learned 
Introduction 
A. Background 
B. Scope of Work 
Methods and Caveats 
Analysis 
A. The Extent to Which the NEP has Been Successful 
B. The Operation and Impact of the NEP 
C. The Most Successful Component of the Project 
D. Aspects of the Project that Have Worked Best and Least 
E. Sustainability 
F. Selection of Sub-contractors 
G. Perceptions of NEP Assistance Impact and Quality 
Mission Strategy Implications 
Conclusions and Recommendations 
Lessons Learned 
Selected Bibliography 
Appendices 
Page 
1 
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1 
2 
3 
5 
6 
6 
8 
9 
Executive Summary 
A. Background 
USAIDIJamaica contracted Financial Markets International (FMI) to conduct 
an evaluation of the New Economy Project (NEP) as part of the process for 
developing its country development t strategy for 2004-2009. The NEP is a 
demand-led initiative to provide technical assistance and training to selected 
businesses and business service organizations that can in turn assist Small, 
Medium and Micro Enterprises (SMMEs) improve their profitability and 
competitiveness. The NEP also works with government to reform polices and 
administrative processes that impact SMMEs. The NEP is the center piece 
initiative of the Mission's Economic Growth Strategy Objective (Sol) - 
Improved Business Environment for Developing Small, Medium and Micro 
Enterprise Sectors - and encompasses the following Intermediate Results: 
IRI Persuading the public and private sector to identify and reduce 
constraints to doing business in Jamaica 
IR2 Strengthening business skills of senior managers to enable 
Jamaican business firms to compete more effectively in the global 
market 
IR.3 Upgrading small business firm and micro enterprise access to 
financial resources 
In order to achieve its objectives, the Mission contracted Carana Corporation 
in May, 2000 to implement them through the provision of a combination of 
technical assistance, training and "network and database development and 
dissemination." 
B. Scope of Work 
The purpose of this evaluation, as stated in the Scope of Work (SOW), is "to 
assess the performance of the New Economy Project and determine the impact 
that it has had in meeting the Economic Growth SO - Improved Business 
Environment for Developing the Small, Medium and Micro Enterprise Sectors 
- in its Intermediate results." The Mission intends to incorporate results of 
the evaluation and lessons learned into the development of its five year 
strategy (2004-2009), and to make decisions with respect to the future of the 
NEP. It is also interested in determining the replicability of the NEP demand￾led model elsewhere. 
C. Findings 
In reading this evaluation it is essential to bear in mind two caveats 
First, it most instances it is still too early to measure impact accurately and completely, 
and more time will have to pass in order to make a final judgment. Still, the evidence to 
date is highly suggestive, if not entirely conclusive, as borne out in the findings and 
analysis. 
Second, as the NEP is a demand-led model, its activities and results need to be 
understood and assessed in the context of the market place. That is, unlike "supply-led 
initiatives, the NEP by definition responds to market signals that are not always reflective 
of the broader USAID Intermediate Results. 
The major overall finding according to the available evidence is that the NEP has been 
successful, specifically with respect to reducing constraints to doing business in Jamaica and 
meeting the expressed needs of project clientsheneficiaries. 
The successes of the demand-led model have been due to: 1) the integration of five key 
parameters - cost-sharing, client ownership, partnership relations between the clients 
and NEP, use of client-based priorities in designing interventions, and selectivity in 
choosing clients; 2) four integral project management features - responsiveness, 
flexibility, quality and the ability to work successfully in the Jamaican context. 
By the same token, selectivity also could be considered to be a project weakness in that it 
could limit outreach to the wider SMME population. However, that by working with 
established "wholesaler" business service organizations, the project eventually should be 
able to reach a wide target population on a sz~stained basis. 
Other key factors distinguishing NEP from other donor projects, and which basically 
have served as selection criteria for clients, include: use of "wholesale" companies and 
agencies - i.e., organizations that produce a multiplier effect in proving services to 
enhance SMME performance and that are "sustainable"; an increasing willingness to 
take on calculated risk; effective and high quality NEP staff sub-project management. 
The NEP has substantially exceeded its established targets in terms of the number of 
SMMEs and clients served. 
Preliminary data on IRl (reduction of constraints to doing business) suggest a limited but 
uniformly positive and growing impact. 
IRl activities have resulted in substantial improvements in creating efiiciencies in 
government agency processes as evidenced by the information provided to date. 
The NEP has been able to leverage a mean average of $2.10 for every 31.00 expended. 
The lack of data and short time frame make it difficult to measure impact, particularly 
with respect to IR2 (improving business skills), but projectperjonnm~ce has been rated 
excellent. 
Demand for technical assistance in IR1 and IR2 has proven to be strong. Demand in IR2 
(increased access to credit) is minimal and project resources have been reallocated to 
reflect that shift in the market. The one of three sub-projects in IN, however, has 
demonstrated very positive results.' 
Clients across lRs expressed substantial satisfaction with the NEP, citing responsiveness, 
timeliness and quality of STAs as particularly critical to success. 
In large part the project has achieved sustainability in that most of the clients it has 
worked with are viable enterprises able to continue serving SM;L.IEs without subsidy, thus 
maintaining in effect the NEP process. 
The downside is that some SMMEs, especially at the micro level, may find it difficult to 
afford unsubsidized services, even if the business service companies themselves are 
sustainable. 
The method of selecting clients has worked well, particularly with respect to the 
effectiveness and quality of the sub-wntractors that have been chosen. 
The NEP is suitable for replication elsewhere. 
The internal operations of the NEP are managed efficiently, but data on project 
performance and results are dispersed, only partially tabulated and not organized in a 
central repository. 
The sub-project approval process was initially very cumbersome due to several factors. 
This has been made more efficient and the mean average for approvals is now just 10 
days. 
Carana has been responsible for management deficiencies that could affect project 
performance if not corrected. 
D. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Conclusion: While not enough time has lapsed, or data made 
available, to judge the impact of the NEP definitively, the evidence to 
date suggests the project is achieving its goals. 
Recommendation: The NEP should establish a system for 
collecting, storing and tabulating data on project performance and 
impact. This should include requirements for all clients to establish a 
base line and provide data on individual sub-project outcomes and, 
where feasible, impact on SMME recipients of technical assistance and 
training. USAID should conduct an impact assessment in June 2004. 
Conclusion: The NEP has achieved institutional sustainability 
through its client wholesaler organizations, which are business service 
enterprises, established NGOs and government agencies. 
Recommendation: In order to sustain the NEP process, meet 
project and Mission objectives fully, protect its investment and 
maximize impact, USAD/Jamaica should extend the project at a /_--_1 minimum for three years. 
Conclusion: The key features of the NEP model - i.e., demand-led, 
cost sharing, ownership, partnership, client-based priorities, 
- 
' The other two clients dropped out of the project. 
selectivity, - have been instrumental to its successes, as well as staff 
and STA responsiveness, flexibility, quality and ability to work 
effectively in the local context. 
Recommendation: As of this time the NEP model does not require 
any modifications. However, it should be monitored over the LOP and 
open to any changes that can be proven to ensure and enhance the 
integrity of its performance and impact. 
Conclusion: The lack of due diligence reviews increases the risk of 
failed sub-projects. While the NEP has experienced few failures, if the 
project is extended it may increase risk as it enters into sub-contracts 
with new wholesalers. 
Recommendation: The NEP should conduct due diligence reviews 
on prospective clients. These do not and should not be highly detailed, 
but establish as best as possible client financial and management 
viability. 
Conclusion: The client selection process is subjective. There are 
benefits to that in that many if not all of the clients have been "known 
quantities." 
Recommendation: Aside &om the due diligence, which would 
come after the first round (i.e., Activity Criteria Selection [ACS] form) 
of the selection process, it would be usehl to assign weights to the 
criteria in the ACS, providing balance to the subjective judgments that 
are currently used. This would also have the benefit of countering 
potential criticisms of the selection process, and by implication the 
project, and help maintain its positive image. 
Conclusion: The quality and mix of the LTAs and STAs have been 
effective in producing client satisfaction and results. 
Recommendation: The NEP should maintain the present balance of 
LTAs and STAs, and continue its current vetting process for advisors. 
Conclusion: The management deficiencies at Carana have the 
potential to cause problems for the project. 
Recommendation: Carana take immediate steps to correct delays in 
payments to STAs and vendors, and stabilize staff turnover. 
Conclusion: Focus should be on the quality and appropriateness of sub-projects, in 
addition to the expanding the size of the target sectors to be reached, especially with 
respect to IR2 activities. Ifthe wholesalers are sustainable, then their services will be 
available to most of the target groups in any event in the market place. By contrast, IR1 
activities by definition reach across the SMME sector and discrete target groups. 
Recommendation: Quality and appropriateness of sub-projects should be given 
priority in the selection process. 
E. Lessons Learned 
The lessons learned from the NEP are not all necessarily unique or new However, they are 
instructive. 
The data indicate for now that a demand-led model for SMME development will work 
and allocate efficiently resources if allowed to respond to market signals. This implies 
the need for flexibility in altering project tactics as required by events on the ground. 
0 Client commitment to the services provided is essential to success. Indeed, the hFP staff 
learned this lesson early on, and requires clients to dedicate a project manager, as well as 
share costs up ffont. 
The ultimate test of a demand-led initiative and client commitment is the willingness of 
the client to share costs. 
Enforceable contracts, specifying exact sub-contractor responsibilities and deliverables, 
need to be signed between project management and clients. 
0 A client-driven project runs risks of poor decisions and choices. However, there is no 
rule that consultants have a monopoly on good judgment, and ultimately the client should 
be responsible for setting priorities and selecting STAs. The fact of the matter is that in a 
demand-led initiative, by definition it must be the client that makes the final decisions. 
0 Strengthening the SMME sector and improving competitiveness requires a parallel 
strategy working with both the business community and government. While a modem 
and effective policy, regulatory and procedural framework is essential to creating a more 
productive and competitive private sector, ultimately it is rigorous and equitable 
enforcement, coupled with sound management, that will make the difference. 
Responsiveness to client needs is critical to effective project performance. This was 
bome out consistently. It is necessary for project staff to be responsive, timely and 
accessible - as well as competent. 
Theuse of highly qualified (i.e., quality) advisors is critical. This may be a truism, but it 
is honored a good deal in the breach in many projects. 
II. Introduction 
A. Background 
USAIDIJamaica has contracted Financial Markets International (FMI) to 
conduct an evaluation of the New Economy Project (NEP) as part of the 
process for developing its country development strategy for 2004-2009. The 
NEP is the center piece initiative of the Mission's Economic Growth Strategy 
Objective (Sol) -Improved Business Environment for Developing Small, 
Medium and Micro Enterprise Sectors - and encompasses the following 
Intermediate Results (IR): 
IRl Persuading the public and private sector to identify and reduce 
constraints to doing business in Jamaica 
IR2 Strengthening business skills of senior managers to enable 
Jamaican business firms to compete more effectively in the global 
market 
IR3 Upgrading small business firm and micro enterprise access to 
financial resources 
Despite some recent gains in reducing the level of poverty and recovering 
from the financial crisis of the 1990s, the Jamaican economy has performed 
poorly over the past two decades. The highest positive growth rate in the last 
decade was only 2.0 percent, and in the period 1996-1999, Jamaica sustained 
negative growth in real GDP.' As of 2000, the official unemployment rate 
was 15 percent. It is safe to suggest that the real numbers of unemployed are 
higher. The one positive sign was the reduction in the poverty rate, from 44.6 
percent in 1991 to 16.7 percent as of 2001. This was calculated to be due 
principally to a surge remittances and a significant decline in inflation from a 
peak of 77 percent in 1992, to single digits in 2003. 
Given the bleak, if marginally improving economy, the Mission decided there 
was a compelling need to "narrow its strategic focus" and coordinate private 
and public sector activities to create a policy and regulatory environment 
conducive to improving the competitiveness (i.e., productivity) of small, 
medium and micro enterprises (SMME) and increasing domestic and foreign 
direct investment. It also recognized the need to improve business skills at the 
company level and expand access to credit. 
In order to achieve its objectives, the Mission contracted Carana Corporation 
in May, 2000 to implement the project through the provision of a combination 
of technical assistance, training and "network and database development and 
dissemination." 
2 The macroeconomic statistics on this paragraph are from Andrew S. Dowries, "Producti\it)' 
and Competitiveness in the Jamaican Economy," a report prepared for the IDB, March 2003. 
The New Economy Project has been the center piece of USAIDIJamaica's 
economic growth strategy (Sol). Its objectives, as defined by the 
Lntermediate Results under Sol, are to: 
identify and reduce constraints to doing business in Jamaica 
strengthen business skills at the SMME company level 
increase access to private credit for SMMEs 
The purpose of the NEP is to strengthen the SMME sector as the "engine" of 
economic growth for Jamaica. This is accomplished by improving the policy 
and regulatory environment impacting business, strengthening skills at the 
enterprise level and making credit more accessible. The project, a three year 
initiative, was funded initially at $6 million and has received an additional $2 
million to extend it an additional year. 
The NEP was conceived as a demand-led initiative, organized and managed in 
a way to be able to respond quickly and efficiently to market signals. It 
eschews the conventional "supply-side" model, and instead provides 
assistance only to companies and government agencies that express a specific 
demand for services, contribute cash or a combination of cash and cash 
equivalents as partial payment for technical assistance or training and assign a 
senior manager to coordinate the project directly with NEP st& and advisors. 
In addition, the NEP requires "clients" to establish their own priorities and 
select short-term advisors from a list of at least three candidates identified by 
NEP staff. The purpose is to make the client take as much responsibility as 
possible for decisions and actions. The NEP enters into what are in effect 
business arrangements with beneficiaries instead of the more conventional 
donor-recipient relationship. 
The NEP seeks "wholesaler" clients; that is, public and private organizations, 
including business service companies and government agencies, that impact 
the private sector and reach large numbers of SMMEs The NEP works with 
clients who want to invest in projects that will have the kind of impact the 
NEP is looking for, but who need some kind of assistance. The NEP actually 
serves as a catalyst, providing clients with the minimal support to enable them 
to take on projects that are judged to have an opportunity to enhance the 
SMME sector. In most cases: clients indicated they would have invested 
their own resources in the project, but that they would either have had to wait 
substantial periods of time (up to 18 months), or would have been able only to 
fund a partial initiative. 
In the first year of the project, NEP staff implemented a marketing drive to 
promote the initiative and identify clients, and "sell" technical assistance and 
3 This ms based on interviews w&h 22 out of the 52 past and present clients. 
training services. Unlike supply-side projects, the NEP has relied on a 
tangible demand for services from prospective clients, all of whom share in 
the attendant costs. Since then, there has been more than sufficient demand 
for NEP services and the project, as will be seen, has exceeded all its targets. 
NEP staff are now fully engaged in working with existing clients, as well as 
preparing to work with the last few organizations that will be can-ying out 
specific initiatives. 
A major goal of the NEP is to achieve sustainability. As part of the strategy to 
meet that objective, the project works with what have been labeled 
"wholesalers"; This institutional infYasttucture, as will be seen, has served as 
the foundation for a sustainable process to strengthen the SMME sector as a 
key to economic growth and development for Jamaica. 
The NEP is relatively small, with a Chief-of-Party (COP), three Case 
~ana~ers~and a three person support staff Case Managers (and the COP) 
work closely with clients and have developed very close and - in most cases 
- productive relationships. As will be seen, this has become a project 
hallmark. In some instances, where appropriate, the Case managers and COP 
also provide some limited technical advice. 
B. Scope of Work 
The purpose of this evaluation, as stated in the Scope of Work (SOW), is "to 
assess the performance of the New Economy Project and determine the impact 
that it has had in meeting the Economic Growth SO - Improved Business 
Environment for Developing the Small, Medium and Micro Enterprise Sectors 
- in its Intermediate results." (See Appendix for a copy of the SOW.) The 
Mission intends to incorporate results of the evaluation and lessons learned 
into the development of its five year strategy (2004-2009), and to make 
decisions with respect to the future of the NEP. It is also interested in 
determining the replicability of the NEP demand-led model elsewhere. 
As of mid-August 2003 there are only 2 full-time Case Managers. The Case Manager who 
left the payroll in August has been retained on a short-term basis to work nith some of his 
clients. 
JII. Methods and Caveats 
A straightforward methodological approach was used for the evaluation. Specifically, the 
following techniques were used: 
Review of documents 
Content analysis of selected documents and interview notes 
Semi-structured, open-ended interviews of a random sample of managers and staff of 22 
(out of a total of 55) project benefi ciarieslclient organizations 
Open-ended interviews with key USAIDIJamaica officials 
0 Close-ended survey of selected sample project beneficiaries/clients 
Participant observation 
SWOT exercise with USAID SO1 team members and NEP staff 
Appendix I contains a complete list of interview respondents 
In reading this evaluation it is essential to bear in mind two caveats. 
First, it most instances it is still too early to measure impact accurately and completely, 
more time will have to pass in order to make a final judgment. Still, the evidence to date 
is highly suggestive, if not entirely conclusive, as borne out in the findings and analysis. 
Second, as the NEP is a demand-led model, its activities and results need to be 
understood and assessed in the context of the market place. That is, unlike "supply-led" 
initiatives, the NEP by definition responds to market signals that are not always reflective 
of the broader USAID Intermediate Results, as will be seen in the analysis. .As a 
consequence, IR3 - improved availability of finance, which was originally envisioned to 
be one of the three integral components of the NEP - proved ultimately not to reflect 
market demand. To its credit, and remaining faithful to the demand-led character of the 
model, NEP staff redirected project resources to Rs 1 and 2 where a demonstrable 
demand did exist, rather than attempting to impose assistance interventions that night 
have been initially projected but ultimately did not reflect market realities. 
V. Analysis 
The SOW outlines a comprehensive set of specific research questions that forms the framework 
of analysis for the evaluation, and around which the following analysis is organized. The 
questions address the key issues of performance and impact, examining the technical approach 
and model, as well as the implementation and management of the project and results to date. 
A. The dent to which the NEP has been successful in meeting the objectives of 
the SO and why. 
The entire analysis is directed at these two overarching questions. The short answer is that 
according to available evidence the project has been successful in achieving many of its 
objectives, especially with respect to IRI. In the case of IR2, not enough data were available at 
this juncture to come to firm conclusions on the project's impact. However, the NEP has 
performed very successfully in its work with business service organizations that provide 
assistance to SMMEs. In the case of IN, very little demand existed (only three clients expressed 
interest). The one sub-project that actually was implemented - the Jamaica National Small 
Business Company (JNSBC) - produced significant results. 
B. The operafion and impact of the NEP and why. 
1. Operation 
a. Internal 
The operation of the NEP, at least in a management sense, is elementary. There is a Chief-of￾Party (COP) with a staff of three sub-project or Case Managers (CM), and a three person support 
staff (an Office Manager, Project Assistant and Logistics Coordinator/Driver). Work flo\v is 
routinely coordinated, and assignments and reporting lines are simple and clear. Case Managers 
are given substantial autonomy over their sub-projects and, according to those sub-project 
clients/beneficiaries who were interviewed, there exists a high level of satisfaction with the 
performance of all CMs, including the COP. Moreover, as will be documented later on, 
objective indicators reinforce the perceptions of CMs - and clients - as producing results and 
generally meeting or exceeding targets. 
CMs are each assigned sub-projects to manage depending on availability of time and fit. For 
example, two CMs with IT skills manage IT projects. These tend to be in IRl so that one CM in 
fact manages the majority of sub-projects in IR2. However, overlap occurs. Nevertheless, one 
of the hallmarks of the NEP, both in terms of its management and client relationships, is 
flexibility. Focus is on results, and the COP makes it clear that organizational and operational 
rigidities will not be tolerated. Given the demand-led nature of the NEP model, and realities on 
the ground, this appears to have been a highly effective approach. One client accurately summed 
up the character the NEP organization as "lean and mean." Staff meetings are held irregularly, 
limiting to some extent the sharing of information to identify possible project complementarities 
and exchange ideas and information that would come from scheduled weekly sessions; although 
much of this occurs informally. 
During the first year of project operations, the COP and CMs focused a great deal of their efforts 
on marketing services. These have included a range of interventions to increase the ability of 
businesses service companies and organizations to meet SMME needs to enhance productivity 
and profitability, especially in the use of IT, and to help government agencies reform 
cumbersome administrative processes that impact the competitiveness of the private sector. 
Since then the need to market has decreased, as the project has become established and a 
growing awareness of its presence and services has been developed. CMs concentrate on 
managing technical assistance and follow-up. Their style is to be hands-on, responding quickly 
to client requests and needs. They are virtual partners with clients, and maintain close quality 
control over short-term advisors (STAs). Indeed, several clients indicated that one of the 
principal strengths of the NEP was the CMs' ability to identify and mobilize quality ST.&. A 
key feature of the NEP model, not so incidentally, is that the client chooses the STA(s), not h4P 
staff The CM presents a list of candidates, usually three, and reviews the qualifications v.ith the 
client who makes the final decision. This makes the client take responsibility and reinforces the 
notion of ownership, a practice absent in many conventional donor supported projects. 
While project files are organized and complete, they tend to vary by CM. There is no uniform 
process, and that makes data retrieval cumbersome. Similarly, while data on project 
performance and impact exist, they have been only partially tabulated and updated. In addition, 
many are organized and maintained by the individual CMs, rather than in any central data 
repository. Organizing project data in a more orderly and standardized manner would 
significantly facilitate their retrieval, tabulation and utilization. Moreover, routinely and 
systematically updating impact and performance data would enhance project management and 
planning, and give NEP stafF and USAID the ability to document performance and impact 
patterns to make any necessary modifications in approach, and to do it in a timely way. 
The management disconnects that do exist are basically between the NEP and the Carana home 
office. The high rate of turnover of Carana backstop st& has caused needless delays and 
confusion. Since the beginning of the project there have been eight different home office 
support/backstop personnel, four different contract specialists and five financial staff with whom 
the NEP team has interacted. The principal problem is the time it takes for new back stop and 
other Carana staff to become familiar with the project and its requirements. This can reduce 
responsiveness, one of the project's hallmarks. As a demand-led initiative, it is essential to keep 
clients satisfied. And as the interviews with clients have repeatedly shown, responsiveness is 
highly valued. While this is not a major problem yet, letting it languish could be detrimental. 
Another and potentially more serious issue is the delays incurred by Carana in payment of fees 
and reimbursement of expenses to STAs. It was reported that many STAs have not been 
reimbursed in a timely way by Carana. One CM reported that all of the STAs he has managed 
have never been paid on time. The concern is that STAs will not agree to return due to Carana's 
payment practices. In the same vein, Carana has reportedly lagged in payments to local vendors 
serving project clients. In some cases, for example the National Land Agency @%A) and Ofice 
of the Registrar of Companies (ORC), vendors (Orion Sofhvare and InfoExchange respectively), 
vendors were said either to have threatened to suspend or suspended their services until payment 
was made. Late payments to vendors have been reported to have occurred as well in other 
instances. Once again, these are not yet major problems, but could compromise the project if left 
un~orrected.~ 
b. US AID 
Operational relationships with USAID generally have been close, if somewhat uneven. due 
principally to the fact that there have been three CTOs, two of whom were also Directors of the 
Mission's Office of Economic Growth (OEG), over a three year period, each with a different 
operating style and level of authority within the Mission. One issue of concern to both the 
Mission and project staff has been what they perceive to have been lengthy delays in the 
approval processes for some sub-projects. Table 1 on the following page illustrates the number 
of days for approvals to be granted, by project, date and budget amount. While there have been 
some egregious delays, including the Jamaica Intellectual Properties Office (JIPO) initiative that 
was finally abandoned, the fact is that the average time to process and approve subprojects over 
the life of project (LOP) to date has been 25 days. The extraordinary fluctuations have been 
principally due to discontinuities caused by the changes of CTOs, repeated requests for more 
information fiom USAID and prospective client u~esponsiveness (see Appendix I1 for a 
chronology of the "Regs and Legs" sub-project that serves as an example of the kinds of 
problems encountered in the approval process) It might be reasonable to assume that larger 
value projects may take longer than smaller initiatives. However, while a S333,000 project took 
just 29 days to process, a $68,000 package did not receive USAID's approval for a period of 99 
days. Similarly, it took USAID 187 days - over half a year - to approve a project ~alued at 
$220,000, yet it processed another for a little over that amount ($230,000) in only 17 days. But 
apart from the five (out of fifty-two) sub-projects that took over two months to process. the mean 
average time for approvals has been 25 days, the median 10 days and the modal just 2 days .hd 
over the past year the mean average has been reduced to only 10 days. The exTraordinary delays 
did, however, fall into a specific time frame - from August 2001 to June 2002, a period during 
which there was no permanent CTO present, suggesting a lack of management certainty and 
continuity that may have been responsible for the delays. Fortunately, the situation has been 
corrected and working efficiently for the past year. 
Both NEP and USAID staff attribute improvements in the approval process largely to the 
Activity Criteria Selection form (ACS), developed by the last OEG Director and introduced in 
June 2002. The chronology on Table 1 bears this out to some degree. The ACS is a one page 
summary (see Appendix III) that determines the eligibility of applicants and the projected risk 
level of the project. It replaced a tedious and counterproductive process whereby NEP staff had 
to write a detailed Task Order to be submitted to USAID for approval. After Mission approval, 
then a Work Order had to be drafted, which was essentially the scope of work that served as the 
basis for the contract with the sub-contractor. Adapting procedures from the private sector, the 
OEG Director at the time was able to streamline the application process and reduce the time for 
approval. The ACS replaced the task order and now, subsequent to USAID approval, the h'EP 
staffdraft the work order that is signed off by the client. This, combined with improvements in 
the time it takes for the Mission to approve projects, has relieved the NEP of excessive paper 
Carana was asked to reply to these reports. As of this writing, no response has been 
received, although Carana did state in an e-mail from its Executive Vice President that prompt 
payment is its policy. 
work and accelerated the application process, saving time and resources that are now able to be 
allocated to managing technical-assistance and training. 
2. Impact 
As a preamble to the assessment of impact it is essential to keep in mind two caveats: 1) The 
project is on-going so that the ultimate aggregate impact cannot yet be measured. That is, as 
already cautioned, most of the impact cannot be effectively assessed until enough time has 
lapsed for the interventions to have been able to attain - or not - their intended objectives. 
However, many of the results may be measured now. That is, efficiencies in government agency 
processes, for example, have been achieved, but there are few data available yet to indicate how 
that may have impacted the SMME sector. By contrast, a review of NEP activities shows 
conclusively that the NEP has surpassed, sometimes substantially, its target; performance and 
profitability; 2) USAID did not require or request a baseline for measurement to be constructed, 
thereby circumscribing the ability to determine causality and establish empirically verifiable 
impact. Still, despite methodological and resource constraints, it has been possible to identify 
impact trends and draw several important conclusions. 
Finally, it is important to point out that one indicator of impact for the NEP project has been 
"leverage." This is the value attached to the resources, both cash and in-kind, contributed by the 
clients. Table 1 lists leverage coefficients by project. It is clear that the NEP has had a 
substantially positive impact in terms of generating $2.14 for every project dollar spent in 
providing technical assistance and training. This is another key strength of the demand-led 
model, which uses projects funds more as investments than expenditures, and actually generates 
a return on the investment. 
Table 1 
Length of Time for Sub-project Approvals and Activities by Total Expenditures 
New Economy Project -Schedule of Activities 
ClienffProject Name 
ICT 
USAIDIIADB ICT 
JBA Automated Clearing House 
Jamaica Conference Board 
JNMCC 
CCMB 
ORC 
JMA (HACCP) 
Lets Investments 
FTAA Conference 
NEPA Info Systems 
MCS.com 
National Land Agency 
Ja. Credit Bureau 
Competitiveness & Trade Program Development 
Pesticide Control Authority - Phase 1 
CourtsINew Horizon 
Global Trade Communication - Briefing Room 
Manchester Chamber of Commerce 
Paymaster 
Jamaica Central Securities Depository 
IBM ASP Service 
Emarketing 
Customs e-payment pilot 
Safeguard Act 
Shipping Association of Jamaica (Phase I) 
Shipping Association of Jamaica (Phase II) 
BDO 
PSOJ 
FTC Phase I 
Regs & Legs 
PriceWaterhouseCoopen EXORDIA 
FTC Phase II 
Mona School of Business 
Date Date Date Closed 
submitted Approved 
28-Aug-00 5SepOO 31-Dec-00 
16-Aug-00 SSepOO 31-Dec-00 
6-Feb-01 6-Few1 31-Dec-02 
I-Mar-01 I-Mar-01 31-Dec-01 
12-Mar-01 15Mar-01 31-Dec-02 
30-Nov-00 1-Dec-00 31-Dec-01 
I-Mar-01 21-Mar-01 31-Mar-03 
16-Mar-01 1 -Apr-02 
16Mar-01 20-Mar-01 31-Dec-01 
21-Mar-01 30-Mar-01 31-Dec-01 
30-Mar-01 29-May-01 
1-May-01 2-May-01 31-Dec-02 
1-May-01 5May-01 30Jun-03 
31-May-01 SJun-01 31-Decal 
22-Jun-01 25Jun-01 31-Dec-01 
2-Jul-01 6-Jul-01 31-Dec-02 
20-Aug-01 22-Feb-02 
22-Aug-01 7-SepOl 
2-SepOl 7-SepOl 31-Dec-02 
1-0d-01 8-06-01 31-Dec-02 
50ct-01 9-06-01 31-Dec-02 
10-Oct-01 I-May-02 
12-Oct-01 15-Dec-01 
12-Nov-01 2Jan-02 
30-Oct-01 29-Oct-01 31-Jul-02 
26Feb02 14-Mar-02 31-Dec-02 
17Jul-02 12-Aug-02 
21-Feb-02 13-Mar-02 
26-Apr-02 3-May-02 28-Feb-02 
29-May-02 4-Sep02 
13-Jun-02 29-Oct-02 
19-Jul-02 11-Sep02 
9-Oct-02 18-Oct-02 
22-Feb-03 23-Feb-03 30-Apr-03 
Anti Dumping & Subsidies Commission -Phase 1 
Jamaica Intellectual Properties Office (JIPO) 
Coffee Industry Board 
PCA (Phase II) 
MlCT E-Commerce legislation 
Anti Dumping & Subsidies Commission - Phase 2 
SBAJ 
MIND Online (E-Leaming pilot) 
Bev Manley 
IMP Business Training for SMMEs 
JMA Business Skills Development Project 
MCOC- RAE Convention 8 Expo 
NLA Phase II 
ORC Phase II 
JBDC 
FTC Ill 
OUR Technical Assistance: Liberalization 
MoFP Tax Collections 
GOJ Investment Incentive Regime 
Trade & Competitiveness Training 
Coffee Climate Control 
a. IRI Reducing Constraints to Doing Business in 
Jamaica 
An impact analysis of changes in legislation, regulations and procedures at this point in the 
project is somewhat premature. The political and governmental orocesses. bv their nature. are - . * 
generally slow and open to a wide range of pressures and events: It takes, for example, many 
steps for a bill to be drafted and read, subjected to testimony and amendments, passed through 
committee, redrafted and finally signed into law. Similarly, there are relatively lengthy 
processes for issuing proposed regulations, receiving comments and publishing final rules. 
Government procedures, too, take time to reform and put in place, partly due to the process of 
change itself and, in some cases, requirements for statutory amendments. Nevertheless, the NEP 
has been able to effect some important changes, and continues to do so. Results to date can be 
seen now and are presented in Table 3. In needs to be underscored that the information in the 
table has been provided by the clients and is only for projects that have been completed. In 
addition, conclusions that can be drawn from the data would have been more precise had there 
been a baseline. Nevertheless, the figures that have been reported show uniform, substantial 
improvements in government agency processes affecting SMMEs, describing a positive trend is 
consistent and significant. 
For example, NEP recently completed work with the Ministry of Commerce, Science and 
Technology in drafting e-commerce legislation, the first of its kind in Jamaica and essential to 
the efficient operation of electronic commercial transactions. Although the bill has yet to be 
enacted into law, something beyond the control of the NEP, the fact that it has been drafted with 
project assistance is a major step forward. Similarly, the NEP has been successful in working 
with the Pesticide Control Agency (PCA) and Jamaica Customs Agency to streamline fee and 
levy collection processes. In this case some quantitative indicators are available. The PCA 
reports NEP assistance resulted in reducing the time it takes to register pesticide products from 
as much as five years to under one year. Similarly, the Office of the Registrar of Companies 
reported that the NEP supported project to establish a web site to permit on-line registration 
showed an increase of subscribers from 70 in all of 2002 to 149 in the first quarter of 2003. .And 
the "e-Customs" sub-project with the Shipping Association of Jamaica has established an 
electronic capacity for processing manifests that is currently being used successfdly by IS out of 
20 shipping agents. 
It needs to be noted that the measures for assessing IRI activities do not reflect accurately actual 
accomplishments. For example, the fact that a project is able to work with counterparts to drafl a 
bill is not counted as a success because it is a "product" and not a "process." Yet without key 
statutes and regulations (i.e., "products"), other objectives cannot always be met. It may be 
suggested that the real indicator is enactment of the bill into legislation md its mbseqiret~t 
enforcement. However, that is beyond the control and competence of a USAJD-hnded project. 
This applies to a lesser degree to regulations, although not necessarily to administrative 
directives. 
Table 2 
Client Activities by Budget, Expenditure, IR, Leverage Factor and Sector 
New Economy Project - Schedule of Activities 
ClientlProject Name Budget Expended IR IR Client Leverage Sector 
31 Jun-03 Count Investment Factor 
New Economy Project 
ICT $50,479 
USAIDllADB ICT $60,637 
JBA Automated Clearing $333.000 
House 
Jamaica Conference Board $55,257 
JNMCC $93,395 
CCMB $95,757 
ORC $202,702 
JMA (HACCP) $0 
LETS Investments $79,916 
FTAA Conference $12,049 
NEPA Info Systems $0 
MCS.com $92,057 
National Land Agency $268.598 
Ja. Credit Bureau $1 0,000 
Competitiveness 8 Trade $12,050 
Program Development 
Pesticide Control Authority - $33,614 
Phase 1 
CourtslNew Horizon $220,047 
Global Trade $230,905 
Communication - Briefing 
Room 
Manchester Chamber of $10,995 
Commerce 
Paymaster $1 56,492 
Jamaica Central Securities $144,192 
Depository 
IBM ASP Service 
Emarketing 
Customs e-payment pilot 
Safeguard Act 
Shipping Association of 
Jamaica (Phase I) 
Shipping Association of 
Jamaica (Phase II) 
BDO 
PSOJ 
FTC Phase I 
(' = projected) 
1 0 so 
1 0 $20,000 
1 1 $333,000 
1 1 $20,000 
3 17.000 $777.778 
0.00 Public 
0.20 Public 
I .00 Private 
1.79 Private 
6.67 Private 
0.98 Private 
0.96 Public 
0.00 Private 
0.33 Private 
0.00 Public 
0.00 Public 
1.91 Private 
4.04 Public 
1 .I 8 Private 
0.00 Public 
0.60 Public 
3.1 0 Private 
0.17 Public 
1.52 Private 
1.32 Private 
9.55 Private 
1.64 Private 
0.00 Public 
14.25 Public 
0.00 Public 
0.94 Private 
0.52 Private 
1.69 Private 
2.54 Private 
1.05 Public 
Regs & Legs $356,000 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers $113,000 
EXORDIA 
FTC Phase II $130,000 
Mona School of Business $12,735 
Anti Dumping & Subsidies $40,228 
Commission - Phase 1 
Jamaica Intellectual $0 
Properties Office (JIPO) 
Coffee Industry Board $1 70,000 
PCA (Phase 11) $50,000 
MlCT E-Commerce $164,905 
legislation 
Anti Dumping & Subsidies $270,000 
Commission -Phase 2 
SBAJ $41.237 
MIND Online (E-Learning $108,000 
pilot) 
Bev Manley $8,159 
IMP Business Training for $38,406 
SMMEs 
JMA Business Skills $14,873 
Development Project 
MCOC- RAE Convention & $5,000 
0.00 Public 
1.77 Private 
0.23 Public 
0.00 Public 
0.00 Public 
0.00 Public 
0.24 Public 
0.06 Public 
0.33 Public 
0.09 Public 
0.00 Private 
2.22 Public 
1.1 0 Private 
2.04 Private 
0.00 Private 
11 30 Private 
&PO 
NLA Phase II $125.000 
ORC Phase II $100,000 
JBDC $65,000 
FTC Ill $55,000 
OUR Technical Assistance: $25,000 
2.00 Public 
1.00 Public 
0.13 Public 
1.15 Public 
0.00 Public 
Liberalization 
MoFP Tax Collections $150,000 
GOJ Investment Incentive $100,000 
1.00 Public 
0.00 Public 
Regime 
Trade & Competitiveness $40,000 0.00 Public 
Training 
Coffee Climate Control $45,000 
TOTALS $5,094,4 
31 
1 S100,000 - 
$6,486,73 
0 
Average 
2.22 Public 
Table 3 
Selected Sub-project Impacts by Target and Percent Improvement* 
30% reduction in the time required to comply with business facilifation .' 
. . I 
Pesticide Control Auihwity - Pnase 1 !processes 80%( Global Trade Communication - '100 - MO business executives using trade information as aka1 inputs 
BrieBng Room linto strategic decision-making process TWO i 
Paymaster" 
- 
**These projects have been suspended 
N/A= Not available 
50% Reduction in time required for updates of the 710.003 Customer I I 
i 
accounts. ~f~i 
PCA (Phase I!) Reduce tlme taken to register locally manufactured goods by 50% 75% 
Jamaica Central Securities 
Depositow 
Customs e-payment pilot 
*Percentages were reoorted bv clients 
50% Reduction in time taken for settlement. Same day settlement instead 
of 13 days WA' 
90% Reduction in time taken to process broker payments 9996' 
IA reduction in the time taken to achieve cons~us with Government and : 
PSOJ 'other public sector agencies on policy and strategic issues NIA 
Table 4 
NEP Sub-project Targets and Results by IR 
b. IR2 Strengthening Business Skills 
Project impacts at the wholesaler and in particular SMME levels have been difficult to assess due 
to the fact that few data ever have been generated. True, findings !?om the personal interviews 
indicated strong satisfaction with the technical assistance and NEP in general, and some clients 
were even able to produce information on results and some limited impact, suggesting a 
favorable trend. However, the ultimate impact measure is at the SMME level (i.e., growth in 
revenues and profit margins, reductions in costs), and those data have never been collected. A 
survey questionnaire to measure the impact of training on SMME participants was developed for 
the evaluation and circulated to the NEP client training ~r~anizations.~ However, the response 
rate was too low to be able to use the data with any confidence. Unfortunately, neither the NEP 
nor the clients require SMME sub-project participants to provide data on results of the training 
and technical assistance interventions. 
There was, however, strong consensus on the part of clientslbeneficiaries that the technical 
assistance provided by the NEP "made a difference," as several beneficiaries expressed it. There 
has clearly been a positive impact on project clients, even if no such measurement could be made 
of the SMME end-users. This in turn has positive implications for sustainability. The more 
established the wholesalers are, the greater their ability to sustain the process of offering 
technical assistance and training services to SMMEs. Moreover, there has been a demonstrable 
demand for services by SMMEs as evidenced by JNSBC, FSC and MCS, among others (see 
Table 3). 
Although the NEP is organized by IRs, the fact is that most activities overlap. A good example 
is the MCS BizPay project, Jamaica's first on-line payroll service. This service consists of 
access to a web site to assist SMMEs, especially at the smaller end of the scale, improve the 
efficiencies and accuracies in payroll management and complying with tax requirements. The 
service costs US15 per month, which is easily affordable. According to the Manager of MCS, 
close to 100 packages have been sold since the project was initiated 15 months ago. The goal is 
to sell 500 units by February 2005. BizPay, while a service to assist ShOEs, also impacts 
These included BDO Jamaica, New Horizons Learning Centre, Worlduide Technologies, 
Jamaica Advanced Computer Systems (JACS) and Manchester Cl~anlber of Commerce. 
government by facilitating the accurate and timely payment of taxes. The same can be said of 
the e-payments for Customs brokers. 
c. IR3 Improving Access to Finance 
The NEP was established specifically as a demand-led initiative, designed to respond to 
requirements of the market place. While there was a need for USAID to provide - or project - 
some broad guidelines in the Scope of Work with respect to the areas in which activities would 
take place, specifically IRs 1,2 and 3, the very nature of the project requires that it offer senices 
only where a tangible demand exists. This was not the case with respect to financial sen-ices 
(IR3). NEP stsreported meeting with 16 financial institution^,^ including commercial, 
merchant and investment banks, building societies and credit unions. Thirteen indicated no 
interest in working with the project. Part of the reason was that key commercial banks were 
undergoing consolidation at the time. For example, Scotia Bank, National Commercial Bank and 
Union Bank were considering mergers. Citibank was withdrawing from retail operations. And 
these four institutions were reported to represent about 80 percent of the industty In addition, 
interest rates on government bonds and paper were (and still are) very high and offered a more 
attractive, simple and secure return than revenues generated from loans. Moreover, in Jamaica 
bond interest income carries no tax liability. 
With one exception, the institutions that were willing to work with the NEP were either were not 
sufficiently capitalized or did not follow through on their initial interest. One important 
exception to the 16 institutions has been the Jamaica National Small Business Company 
(JNSBC), which evolved ultimately from the USAID-supported Partners Program, a micro￾finance initiative started in 1995, and which is now self-sustaining. Although little demand 
existed in this IR, the quality of the assistance that was provided was outstanding and easily 
measured. Short-term technical assistance was provided to help the institution improve its loan 
management system, upgrading its technology, including the development of an accompanying 
operations manual. JNSBC reported that once the new system was installed and operational, 
loan arrears of more than thirty days dropped from 12 percent of portfolio to just 1126 percent 
within a twelve month period. 
C. What has been the most successful component or feature of tlteproject? 
Before proceeding to a discussion of the specific "components" of the NEP that have 
contributed to its success, it is important to highlight aspects of the model that distinguish it 
from other SMME assistance models, and that basically constitute the core criteria for client 
selection. 
The potential client must be a "wholesaler," i.e., a government agency, orsanization or 
company that services or impacts a number of SMMEs, such as a management training 
' These institutions include: National Commercial Bank. Scotia Bank, CIBC, Citibank. Union 
Bank, Dering, Bunting and Golding, Victoria Mutual, Cooperative Credit Union League. Issa 
Merchant Bank, Sigma Merchant Bank, National Development Foundation, City of Kingston 
Credit Union, LETS, Barita Investments, Maybeny Investments and Manufacturers Merchant 
Bank 
institution, regulatory agency, financial intermediary or business services company. The 
idea is to enhance the business service infrastructure, rather than provide assistance and 
training directly to individual companies, thus creating a multiplier effect. The benefit of 
this approach is that it allows for greater outreach to the SMME community, creates 
economies of scale and improves chances for sustainability. 
Despite the high selectivity, some potential clients/projects are chosen in part on the basis 
of limited risk. The NEP essentially distinguishes between a "risky" project and a "bad" 
project. 
Project management has been another key to the successes enjoyed by NEP. This takes 
several forms. First, CMs work closely with clients as partners. Second, CMs are 
particularly responsive and accessible. Third, the COP delegates substantial authority 
and responsibility to the CMs, permitting them to be responsive and flexible. At the 
same time, he holds them accountable. This has proven to be a very effective 
management style. The quality of the staff, too, has been a significant strength. CMs are 
skilled, experienced and committed. 
1. Demand-Led 
There is no single component or feature of the project that can be identified as being the "most 
successjid." To the contrary, it has been the integration of several critical features that has 
contributed to its success, both in its design and management, as well as its uniqueness. The 
most signifcant feature, however, is that the project was designed to be demand-led,s which 
clearlv has been an essential variable in achieving success. It is a welcome departure from , - 
conventional "supply-led" donor projects that are essentially imposed on governments andfor the 
private sector with little to no participation in the design and implementation by host country 
hationa~s. The NEP, by contrast, offers a set of servicks that is market-based. That means that 
clients actually want the services and are willing to pay for them, demonstrating a seriousness of 
purpose typically lacking in supply-led initiatives. The model is distinguished by five key 
parameters: 
Cost Sharing: Clients, or potential clients, are free to request technical assistance but 
must pay for it, at least in part. It is a process of self-selection and a kind of reverse 
triage, working with organizations most likely to produce results. Payment in most 
instances is in cash not just in-kind, although - it it be a combination. The notion is that 
cash is a more serious demonstration of commitment to the assistance. 
Ownership: Clients must sign contracts (work orders), once again reinforcing the 
seriousness of purpose of the assistance. In effect, they "own" the project. That is, the 
client is really the one who is implementing the assistance. NEP STAs senre as mentors 
or guides. Each client is required to appoint a dedicated project manager. STAs are 
It should be pointed out that there are and have been other demand led projects supported by 
USAID, including the highly successful "BOLINVEST' export promotion initiative in 
Boli~la, and managed by Carana in the early 1990s. \+%at makes the NEP different. is not so 
much that it is demand led, but that it has successfully combined the other features of the 
model into an integrated approach. 
identified by NEP but the actual selection is made by the client. This is yet another way 
in which clients are made to take ownership of the sub-projects. 
Partnership: NEP staffwork with clients as partners. This is partly a factor of the 
demand-led model, whereby the "donor" does not dictate to the beneficiary, but meets an 
expressed need. This makes the relationship a business arrangement cemented by the 
cost-sharing, rather than the conventional, and frequently patronizing, donor-beneficiary 
configuration, 
Ctient-based Priorities: The client determines hidher own agenda and priorities. 
Assistance is not based on a preconceived "need" by a donor. Instead, the client 
expresses hislher own need for assistance, which is reviewed by the NEP. If it is 
determined that the need is real and appropriate, and meets project selection criteria, the 
NEP will then negotiate a contract to provide the relevant service. In effect, the project is 
client-driven. 
Selectivity: The NEP works only with clients that are believed to have a maximum 
chance to succeed. The idea is that it makes no sense to invest in sub- projectsklients 
that cannot demonstrate basic organizational capacity, which is especially important 
given that two major objectives are to work with "wholesalers" to achieve a multiplier 
effect as well as attain sustainability. 
2. Responsiveness (Timeliness) 
The interviews with project beneficiaries showed uniform praise for the responsiveness and 
timeliness of NEP staff This was clearly perceived to be one of the prominent strengths of the 
NEP and its team. Over 94 percent of those responding indicated responsiveness - and 
accessibility, which was also used to characterize the relationship with NEP staff - to have been 
in their view a critical project feature. Moreover, responsiveness to client needs was described 
on several occasions as a kind of partnership behveen NEP and the client, with a level of respect 
that was rarely experienced with other, more conventional donor projects. Timeliness, a feature 
of responsiveness, was also judged to be a significant strength of the NEP. When clients spoke 
of responsiveness, they were also lauding the NEP for meeting their demands hlly and in a 
timely way - once again, showing the benefits of a market-led approach. While responsiveness 
by itself does not produce results, it does make it easier to work with clients, thereby enhancing 
the opportunity for attaining results. 
Flexibility is considered both by beneficiaries and NEP staff alike to be an essential ingredient to 
success. Given the nature of a demand-based project, by definition there exists a need for 
flexibility for at least two reasons. First, project initiatives need to be agile enough to 
accommodate quickly to changes in the market place. Second, particularly in IRl activities, a 
shifting political environment requires the ability to adapt to unanticipated events and changes on 
the ground. NEP staff is aware of this and while the project requires a certain amount of 
organizational discipline, and clients must live up to prescribed expectations, the demand based 
nature of the project model allows for - and even encourages - flexibility. 
4. Quality 
The quality of the interventions has been established by the results achieved to date, and 
expressions of client satisfaction with both the NEP staffand STAs, ranging from "very good to 
"excellent." Of all those reporting, only one respondent complained about the quality of the 
assistance. In one case, an STA did not have the appropriate skills, and was terminated and 
returned home immediate~y.~ It may be that part of the high level of satisfaction with the STAs 
is that the clients themselves actually choose from a list of STA candidates the expert(s) they 
want. The role of the NEP staff is to identify potential consultants and work with the client in 
the selection process. But the ultimate choice is the client's, and hdshe has to live with the 
consequences of hislher decision. 
5. Context 
Although not explicitly mentioned in any of the interviews, it became apparent that the ability of 
the NEP team, particularly the long-term advisors (LTA), to function effectively in the local 
environment and culture can strongly be suggested to have been an additional reason for success. 
The COP, a Grenadian citizen and Barbadian resident, who has worked extensively throughout 
the English-speaking Caribbean, knows many of the leading private and public sector actors and 
brings an intimate knowledge of the culture and business practices of the region. In addition, 
two of the three CMs are Jamaican, one of who was educated in the U.S. and the other in the 
U.K. The other CM is British, but had worked several places elsewhere in the Caribbean before 
joining the NEP team. 
D. What aspects of theproject lmve worked best and which Itave worked lea? 
The section immediately above has shown already what aspects of the hEP model have worked 
and why. But what about those features that have worked the least or not at all? The client 
interviews were remarkable in that scarcely any criticisms were made of the hEP and its 
operations. The only suggestion for improvement in the approach was that hEP staff should 
distinguish more clearly between bad and risky sub-project clients and be prepared to assume 
more risk than they have. The strongest criticisms were actually internal - from USD and 
NEP stafFthemselves. 
"Cherry picking" (i.e., selectivity), while considered to be a strength in the SWOT," was 
also identified as a weakness. For reasons discussed in more detail below: it was 
believed that selectivity had limited the ability of the project to reach out to a larser 
SMME population, especially at the micro enterprise level. 
Similarly, the client-driven feature of the NEP was felt to be both a strength and a 
weakness. While it does allow for client priorities to drive the sub-project, it limits the 
9 This was a STA working on the ORC sub-project. There were two other instances where 
STAs were terminated prematurely, but that was at the discretion of the NEP swand not at 
the request of the client 
lo An abbreviated SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) exercise to mien 
the project was held \&b NEP staff and cognizant Mission officials (see Appendix IV for 
results). 
more objective needs assessment of the NEP staff. However, this should be able to be 
corrected fairly easily. NEP staff should be able to negotiate intervention strategies with 
the client, as they already do to some extent, in order to help focus the technical 
assistance on more appropriate objectives. But ultimately it still has to be the client who 
makes the final decisions. 
A few projects have been "front-loaded." That is, the NEP has provided resources for 
the project design and development phase only, leaving it little influence over the client 
during implementation. The NEP staff is aware of this problem and has taken steps to 
correct it, moving toward an incentive-based system whereby clients receive payments 
after achieving specified results. 
In a similar vein, a very few sub-projects have suffered from a lack of client 
commitment, although on balance this has by no means been a significant problem. IBhl 
is a case that has been pointed to frequently. In this instance, the client has been slow to 
implement the project as agreed to, and as of yet has not complied hlly with the terms of 
the work order. It could be argued that as a client-driven initiative, the NEP cannot 
exercise the kind of oversight and management than would otherwise be the case in more 
conventional supply-driven initiatives. However, there is more than ample evidence 
showing repeated failures of supply-driven projects where direct management was 
exercised over "clients" or beneficiaries. Nevertheless. with more due diligence - and 
evidence of prospective client commitment, it may be possible to curb if not entirely 
eliminate the potential of such problems occumng in the hture. 
The other project weaknesses were more process than technical, and did not represent an 
inherent deficiency in the model itself. Specific deficits have included: 
The fact that the Mission did not require a base line to be developed, making 
measurement of project performance and impact difficult. Among other consequences, it 
has resulted in no standardized data collection and organization. 
Funding of initiatives under Cooperative Agreements (CAs) directly from the Mission to 
the Jamaica Chamber of Commerce, specifically the Briefing Room, Conference Board, 
Automated Clearinghouse (ACH) and the Regulations, Legislation and Process 
Improvement Project (Regs and Legs) has caused some management disconnects as the 
sub-projects are partly a NEP responsibility, but their contractual obligations are directly 
with USAID. With the exception of a positive assessment of the ACH initiative, the 
other projects have received mixed reviews. There may be little debate over the need for 
these kinds of initiatives, but the issue is actually whether the Mission should have in 
effect weakened NEP's authority over its clients by essentially circumventing agreed 
upon project procedures. 
The sub-project approval process, which has been addressed in detail, was a problem for 
the operation of the project. 
E. Should sustainability be an issue for such a project? Should it be confinued 
even gif is not sustainable? 
The short answer to the first question is yes. But "sustainability" is open to competing 
definitions based, in part, on the object of sustainability. In the case of the NEP the question 
needs to be asked: what is to be sustained? Is it the project, the client organizations, the process 
or some combination? USAID will not "sustain" any project indefinitely, ruling out that mode as 
an option. The beneficiary organizations fall into two categories: the "wholesalers" and their 
clients. The fact of the matter is that the wholesalers have been selected in large measure 
because they were already determined to be "sustainable." The clients operate in the market 
place and their "sustainability" depends on their ability to meet demand for their services or 
goods profitably, without subsidization. That leaves the process - and resources. But that 
requires some kind of institutional capacity to be sustained. If the project succeeds, it will by 
implication be sustainable (a tautology, but true). That is, the technical assistance and training 
will have helped improve the performance of the wholesaler clients to satisfy the demands of the 
market profitably, and continue the process. Ultimately, however, it will be the market itself that 
determines sustainability. That is, if there continues to be a demand for the kinds of services 
provided by the project. 
The weakness in the approach is that at the lower end of the SMME scale, many enterprises, 
especially at the micro level, may not be able to afford unsubsidized services. The demand may 
well exist, but the means may not. Unfortunately, neither time, circumstances (e.g., many 
prospective interview respondents were on summer vacation) nor resources permitted a more 
thorough examination of end-user impact and capacity. This is clearly the kind of information 
that will be required to make informed decision with respect to development of the Mission's 
five year strategy. 
In the case of lRl the sustainability issues does not entirely apply, as government agencies do 
not depend on market demand to be sustained. The question then is really whether or not the 
Mission should continue the NEP until it has achieved the desired (to be defined) impact. Given 
the track record to date of both the model and the project, it would be logical for the Mission to 
extend the project. 
Whether or not the project should be continued if it is judged to be not sustainable (a moot issue 
in light of the evidence to date) is ultimately a decision for the Mission to make based on AID 
policy and strategy. Nevertheless, there are two key points to be underscored in arriving at any 
final decision with respect to the future of the project. 
0 As already mentioned, to a large degree the project already is sustainable, somewhat 
begging the question. That is the benefit of selectivity. 
0 Continued work with public agencies is critical if the SO and IRl are to be achieved. By 
definition, government agencies are sustainable. What the NEP needs to concentrate on 
then is sustaining the processes that they help put in place. And that means focusing on 
leadership, management and technical skills training. 
F. How appropriate is the method of selecting sub-contractors who cq* out the 
work in the various activities? 
Ifthe proof of the pudding is in the eating, then the method of selecting sub-contractors 
("wholesalers") has been very effective. That is, the impact analysis shows, at least vith the 
evidence available, that theNEP is achieving its goals. It may be suggested that the reasons for 
this are the following: 
Careful selection of sub contractors who already have a proven record and are likely to 
succeed. 
Use of high quality STAs 
Hands-on approach to working with clients 
Flexibility and responsiveness - to make adjustments quickly to shifting demands and 
market conditions 
It may reasonably be asked why "cream" or "cherry pick" in the selection process; that these are 
companies and organizations that would most likely survive and prosper even in the absence of 
NEP assistance. Indeed, 20 out of 22 respondents who were interviewed specifically reported 
they would have gone ahead with their individual projects even without NEP assistance. 
Nevertheless, there is a compelling logic for "creaming." 
First, delays in action and decisions can result in lost opportunities. As beneficiaries indicated 
across the board, the great value of the NEP was that it permitted them to accelerate their 
projects substantially. For example, the ORC estimated that to finance and implement its project 
on its own would have occasioned a delay of a year and a half. 
Second, selectivity is an integral part of the wholesale approach. By working with relatively 
strong companies and organizations, the chances for sustaining the process are greatly enhanced. 
This is key. Strong wholesalers will be able to provide their services to clients on a sustained 
and sustainable basis, in effect institutionalizing the project and ensuring a tangible return on 
USAID's investment indefinitely. 
The greatest disconnect is in the application process. Some sub-contractors are lax in meeting 
deadlines and unskilled at preparing proposals. Yet these are issues that can be managed without 
too much difficulty, although in some cases prospective clients have been lost or rejected as the 
result of their own mismanagement. But that is the market at play, and the responsibility is on 
the prospective client. A larger problem is the lack of due diligence reviews, which is directly 
under the control ofthe NEP management and staff, While the selectivity process has doubtless 
helped avoid major mishaps, the fact is that due diligence of Paymaster and the Jamaican Central 
Securities Depositary (JCSD) might have averted the problems incurred with those clients. 
These kinds of reviews absorb resources, but so do failures. Fortunately, so far the sucwses of 
the NEF' far outweigh the few failures. 
One question that has been posed by the Mission and the NEP is whether the project should offer 
its assistance to fewer but larger sub-projects, or more but smaller initiatives, with the goal of 
expanding the target population. The review of the NEP suggests that this is a false choice. 
While it is an important question, the focus should be on qtiali~~ aldappropriateness more than 
scope. There is understandably a desire - and need - to reach out to and strengthen as many 
SMMEs as possible. But in !R2 wholesalers first need to provide quality services that will be 
sustainable and meet a demand, and then seek to expand their customer base. 
By contrast, the impact of IRl activities is by its nature greater in scope. Improving the 
efficiency of government procedures and drafting laws and regulations to promote a climate 
more favorable to SMMEs cuts across the entire sector. But the point is that ShOvEs need the 
benefits of improvements at the company as well as the national level. The Mission may want to 
consider setting priorities for activities, but other than at the global level, this would defeat the 
demand-led approach that responds to market signals. 
The administrative processes involved in choosing and approving a sub-project have improved in 
efficiency over the LOP. It is understandable that for the first year or so that USAID was 
substantially involved in the selection and approval processes. Although it was not labeled as 
such, effectively the NEP has been a demonstration initiative, in essence testing a new model. 
However, now that the project has been operational for three years, continued Mission 
involvement in basically operational details, while not as intense as it had been at times during 
the past two years, is no longer necessary. The fact is that the Mission has delegated more 
responsibility to the project, authorizing NEP management to enter directly into sub-contracts 
with clients. Previously, Task Orders had to be submitted to USAID for approval before the 
project could begin, and then a work plan negotiated between the client and h%P. 
If selectivity is a strength it is also a weakness, as was cited in a SWOT exercise with US.m 
Mission and NEP staff. The concern is that the more marginal companies and organizations that 
require technical assistance and services are not reached. If the purpose is to strengthen ShfhEs, 
so the argument goes, then these other entities need to be provided services as well. That is true, 
and if the project is extended USAID and NEP may want to consider a more focused strategy for 
extending services to a larger population. However, it is important to keep in mind the design of 
the current approach which is to reach out to the "retail" level through the wholesaler clients, 
with respect to IR2. In addition, through IRl activities, the NEP has been working with 
government agencies to improve the business environment for all commercial enterprises. So, 
the project has already reached across the retail level indirectly to some degree, even if most 
SMMEs have not received direct technical assistance or training. And this has been one of 
NEP's objectives. 
G. How is the quality and impact of the assistance being provided by NEP 
perceived? 
As indicated earlier, there is uniform praise for NEP assistance. Of a sample of 22 out of 52 
current and past beneficiaries who were interviewed, ail indicated that the assistance they 
received was "excellent" or "very good" in terms of quality and responsiveness. The perception 
was equally positive among those able to measure or estimate impact. Once again, it is 
important to restate the caveat that for most sub-projects not enough time has lapsed to be able to 
measure full impact. In this sense, the jury is still out. But thus far the consensus perception has 
been very positive 
The few negative judgments on NEP sub-projects came not from clients as From project staff. 
Moreover, closer examination of the reasons leading to the "failure" of some initiatives to meet 
their goals shows the circumstances to be less than clear cut. For example, in the case of 
Paymaster, a project to help design and install a computerized reporting system for a company 
that collects bills for other firms, the client experienced a financial crisis halfway into the sub￾project and was unable to acquire software it needed to enhance its operations. It could be 
argued that NEP st& should have conducted a thorough due diligence of the client. In fact, that 
was discussed but never acted upon. In hindsight it would have made sense to take that 
precaution, but at the time the judgment was to proceed without conducting a review .hother 
case was the JCSD that never lived up to the terms of the work order, was not prepared to follow 
through on its commitment, ignored the advice provided by the consultants, and has yet to solve 
the problems that were identified. But, as already reported, NEP staff almost never conduct due 
diligence reviews of their prospective clients, especially the larger and more established firms. 
While the incentive payment process may now be able to help curtail this kind of problem, it is 
still no substitute for due diligence. 
Beneficiaries, perhaps predictably so, were less judgmental in their assessment of h%P deficits. 
The fact of the matter is that very few "weaknesses" were cited. In one instance the client 
suggested that more follow-up was needed. In two others the complaint was that the approval 
processes for the project took too long. Perhaps the most useful criticism, reported by three 
respondents, was that they felt the NEP was too risk averse and should not "cherry pick" clients. 
Their argument was essentially that by not taking on more risk, the NEP was limiting the 
potential of its impact. As one respondent put it: NEP should learn to distinguish between 
"risky" projects and "bad" projects, although NEP staff believes it already does that. This is a 
point that the Mission and NEP may want to review in developing the five year strategy, 
assuming the project is extended, or at least the NEP model continued under another modality. 
However, there is little question that the selectivity strategy has worked thus far. So the decision 
may well be "if it ain't broke, don't fix it." On the other hand, if the project is continued and 
expands the scope of its activities, it may by force of circumstances begin to take on more risk. 
V. Mission Strategy Implications 
What are the implications of the W's performance and impact to date on USAIDIJamaica's 
2004-2009 year strategy? How could or should the NET' fit in? These are key questions for the 
Mission to consider in the next few weeks as it finalizes its strategy. It seems clear from the 
foregoing analysis and findings that the NEP has been successful to date in terms of not only 
performance, but also in its ability to maximize chances for sustainability. The model has been 
constructed to achieve this critical objective, and current evidence suggests that an exqended 
project will expand the NEP's activities and successes on a sustainable basis. 
The value and success of the NEP has been demonstrated. It is difficult to imagine not 
continuing the project as an integral component of the 2005-2009 Sustainable Development 
Strategy. As just noted, the model has been designed specifically to be sustainable and the 
evidence to date shows that it is working. Several of the wholesalers already have systems in 
dace. with the assistance of the NEP. to orovide services to SMMEs for unsubsidized fees. hd , . these organizations and companies are already self-sustaining. The major challenge will be to 
provide affordable services to SMMEs, especially at the micro level. It is likely that some form 
bf subsidy may be required. That could come from a sliding scale, whereby more established 
enterprises pay higher fees for service, in effect providing a partial subsidy to the less robust 
SMMEs who would pay a lower fee,. 
NEP's work with government to develop the legislative and regulatory framework required to 
improve the business environment (IRI) needs to continue as well, although the issue of 
sustainability does not apply in the same way as it does to the private sector. While the demand￾led approach has been effective in that it has required full agency participation, including cost￾sharing, the purpose has been to strengthen the public institutional processes and policy 
framework, not to develop independently sustainable fee-for-service agencies Despite the 
progress made to date in streamlining bureaucratic procedures impacting SMAEs, and drafting 
legislation to improve the business environment, more needs to be accomplished. It is especially 
critical that efforts by USAID over the next five years also focus on the enfiorcement of laws. 
regulations and reformed procedures. That is the ultimate test of success. While this is beyond 
the scope of work of the NEP, it is nevertheless a critical factor in providing an effective legal 
and regulatory environment supportive of SMMEs, and the Mission should consider 
incorporating it into its strategy. 
Access to credit did not turn out to be in demand, somewhat surprisingly. However, the lesson 
here is that a demand-led initiative has by definition to respond to market signals and be able to 
change its focus and strategy accordingly. That is precisely what has happened in the case of 
NEP. It may be, then, that there will emerge other and unanticipated demands from the market, 
and the NEP needs to be prepared to respond accordingly. For example, as the COP has noted, 
there exist "natural clusters" in the Jamaican economy. Among the most obvious is the shipping 
industry, where a variety of actors is involved, including, shippers, importers, exporters, agents: 
teamsters and brokers. Clusters constitute a potential opportunity to expand NEP activities, 
assuming the demand exists. NEP staff could test the market to gauge'the response. 
In addition, there is still more to do in IRs 1 and 2. An incomplete count indicates that over 2000 
SMMEs have been reported to have received direct training and other services from NEP 
wholesalers. The number of micro loans at mSBC was reported to have increased by 10 
thousand since the completion of the sub-project. The impact of improved services at h2.4 will 
have reached thousands of SMMEs, while improved procedures at the ORC affects the entire 
formal SMME community. 
If the NEP is extended, how should it seek to expand its impact? It can work withnew clients, 
augmenting the number of wholesalers, thereby increasing its impact on SMMEs. But as it 
reaches out to this target group, it is possible that the quality of the client base may diminish, 
although the NEP may want to take more calculated risks to expand services to SMhEs. If 
selectivity works, as it seem to, and provides the basis for sustainability, then the Mission may 
want to contemplate seeking to expand the sub-project portfolio with existing clients - as well 
as working with qualified new sub-contractors. 
Finally, while not directly part of USAID/Jamaica's strategy, the issue of replicability of the 
NEP model in other countries needs to be addressed. AID is constantly chronicling "lessons 
learned" in an attempt to improve its capacity to achieve program goals, including economic 
growth and development. The successes of the NEP provide the Agency with a model that could 
and should be replicated, especially in the LAC region, where the preconditions for generating 
results exist - particularly experience with international trade and working in a market 
economy. It should be axiomatic that successful projects andlor development models be 
replicated. One point is critical, however. In order for the model to work, it will be necessary for 
the implementing USAID mission to be committed fully to the maintaining its integrity. 
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 
This section of the report will address, inter alia, the question in the SOW if 
there are "any adjustments that are necessary in the design of the project." 
Conclusion: While not enough time has lapsed, or data made 
available, to judge the impact of the NEP definitively, the evidence to 
date points clearly to a trend suggesting the project is achieving its 
goals. 
Recommendation: The NEP should establish a system for 
collecting, storing and tabulating data on project performance and 
impact. This should include requirements for all clients to provide 
establish a base line and provide data on individual sub-project 
outcomes and, where feasible, impact on SMME recipients of 
technical assistance and training. USAID should conduct an impact 
assessment in June 2004. 
Conclusion: The NEP has achieved institutional sustainability 
through its client wholesaler organizations, which are business service 
enterprises, established NGOs and government agencies. 
Recommendation: In order to sustain the NEP process, meet 
project and Mission objectives fully, protect its investment and 
maximize impact, USAIDIJamaica should extend the project at a 
minimum for three years. 
Conclusion: The key features of the NEP model - i.e., demand-led, 
cost sharing, ownership, partnership, client-based priorities, 
selectivity, - have been instrumental to its successes, as well as staff 
and STA-responsiveness, flexibility, quality and ability to work 
effectively in the local context . 
Recommendation: As of this time the model itself does not require 
any modifications. However, it should be monitored over the LOP and 
open to any changes that can be proven to ensure and enhance the 
integrity of its performance and impact. 
Conclusion: The lack of due diligence reviews increases the risk of 
failed sub-projects. While fortunately the NEP has experienced few 
failures, if the project is extended it may increase risk as it enters into 
sub-contracts with new wholesalers. 
Recommendation: The NEP should conduct due diligence reviews 
on prospective clients. These do not and should not be highly detailed, 
but establish as best as possible client financial and management 
viability. 
Conclusion: The client selection process is subjective. There are 
benefits to that in that many if not all of the clients have been "known 
quantities." 
Recommendation: Aside from the due diligence, which would 
come after the first round (i.e., ACS) ofthe selection process, it would 
be useful to assign weights to the criteria in the ACS, providing 
balance to the subjective judgments that are currently used This 
would also have the benefit of countering potential criticisms of the 
selection process, and by implication the project, and help maintain its 
positive image. 
Conclusion: The quality and mix of the LTAs and STAs have been 
effective in producing client satisfaction and results. 
Recommendation: The NEP should maintain the present balance of 
LTAs and STAs, and continue its current vetting process for advisors. 
Conclusion: The mismanagement at Carana has the potential to 
cause problems for the project. 
Recommendation: Carana take immediate steps to correct delays in 
payments to STAs and vendors, and stabilize staff turnover. 
Conclusion: Focus should be on the quality and appropriateness of sub-projects, in 
addition to the expanding the size of the target sectors to be reached, especially with 
respect to IR2 activities. If the wholesalers are sustainable, then their services will be 
available to most of the target groups in any event in the market place. By contrast, IRI 
activities by definition reach across the SMME sector and discrete target groups. 
Recommendation: Quality and appropriateness of sub-projects should be given 
priority in the selection process. 
VII. Lessons Learned 
The lessons learned From the NEP are not all necessarily unique or new. However, they are 
instructive, and if acknowledged could avoid pitfalls in implementing similar (and even not so 
similar) initiatives. 
The data indicate for now that a demand-led model for SMME development will work 
and efficiently allocate resources if allowed to respond to market signals. This implies 
the need for flexibility in altering project tactics as required by events on the ground. 
Client commitment to the services provided is essential to success. Indeed, the hEP staff 
learned this lesson early on, and requires clients to dedicate a project manager, as well as 
share costs up Front. 
The ultimate test of a demand-led initiative and client commitment is the willingness of 
the client to share costs. 
Enforceable contracts, specifying exact sub-contractor responsibilities and deliverables, 
need to be signed between project management and clients. 
A client-driven . 
~roiect runs risks of ~oor decisions and choices. However. there is no - 
rule that consultants have a monopoiy on good judgment, and ultimately the client should 
be responsible for setting priorities and selecting STAs. The fact of the matter is that in a 
demand-led initiative, by definition it must be the client that makes the final decisions. 
Strengthening the SMME sector and improving competitiveness requires a parallel 
strategy working with both the business community and government. While a modem 
and effective policy, regulatory and procedural framework is essential to creating a more 
productive and competitive private sector, ultimately it is rigorous and equitable 
enforcement, coupled with sound management, that will make the difference. 
Responsiveness to client needs is critical to effective project performance. This was 
borne out consistently. It is necessary for project staff to be responsive, timely and 
accessible - as well as competent. 
The use of highly qualified (i.e., quality) advisors is critical. This may be a truism: but it 
is honored a good deal in the breach in many projects. 
APPENDICES 
Selected Bibliography 
BDO, "Taxation Planning and Reference Guide," June 2002 
BDO, ''The Small Business Funding Guide" 
Blake, Marion, "SMME Business Skills Improved Program: End of Program 
Evaluation Report - Software Training," May 2003 
Booz Allen and Hamilton, "Jamaica Business Roadmap - Reducing Business 
Constraints," February 2001 
Development Associates, "New Ewnomy Project, Final Evaluation Report, 
USAIDIJamaica," May 2003. 
Downes, Andrew S., "Productivity and Competitiveness in the Jamaican 
Ewnomy," Inter- American Development Bank, March 2003. 
Hall, Beverly, "Analysis of the Small Business Association of Jamaiq" 
December 2002 
JAMF'RO, "Doing Business in Jamaica and the Industrial Data Guide" 
New Economy Project, selected project files for the PC4 NL4 SAJ, FTC, 
OCR, "Regs and Legs," MIND, JETS, IMP, IBM, FSL, CCMB, PSOJ, 
JNSBC, and SBAJ 
New Economy Project, Work Plans, 2001 through 2003 
Regulations, Legislation and Process Improvement, "Status Report," August 
2003 
The Allen Consulting Group, "A Jamaican Ecommerce Blueprint," August 
2002 
USAID New Economy Project contract with Carana Corporation, #OUT￾PCE-1-801-98-00014 
USAID/Jamaica, "2001 Semi-Annual Review" 
USAID/Jamaica, "SO l Semi-Annual Review, December 2002" 
APPENDIX IV 
SWOT Analysis Results 
STRENGTHS 
Responsiveness to market (demand vs. supply) D 
Availability of technical assistance (appropriate match, timeliness) M 
Quality of expertise M 
Client selection of STAs D 
Partnership M/D 
Ownership D 
Methodology/process M/L) 
0 Trust (as result of TA) M 
0 Open communication among NEP, USAID and Carana) M 
Clear NEP staff understanding of SO and IRs M 
Autonomy from Carana M 
Flexibility M/D 
"Cherry picking" D 
Client driven D 
NEP as catalyst D 
Design flexibility - post implementation D 
WEAKNESSES 
Clash of operatinglproject management styles within NEP 
"Special projects" (supply driven) 
"Cherry picking" 
No base lineldata 
Client driven 
OPPORTUNITIES 
0 On-line skills training 
Work with "natural clusters" (shipping and berthing, ICT, utilities) 
IRI (demand and institutional development) 
WTO, FTAA, CSME training 
THREATS 
Losing momentum (funding, demand) 
0 Potential conflict with regional project (C-Trade) 
Mission strategy change 
0 Other donors 
D= Project design 
M=Project management 
APPENDIX I 
PERSONS INTERVIEWED 
d Project Clients 
Barned, Belva, Acting General Manager, Jamaica Shipping Association 
Brown, Ruby, Management Institute for National Development 
Chin-Sue, Hyacinth, Registrar, Pesticide Control Authority 
9 Cocking, Andrew, Deputy Group President, Capital & Credit Merchant Bank 
Collins, Amanda, Administrative Officer, Private Sector Organization of Jamaica 
Davis, Dena, Small Business Association of Jamaica 
Davis, Robert, General Manager, Management Control Systems, Ltd. 
Downer, Richard, Partner, Price Waterhouse Coopers 
9 Fearon, Trevor, Executive Director, Jamaica Chamber of Commerce Executive Director, Jamaica 
Conference Board 
Francis, Patricia, President, JAMPRO 
Grant, Lorenzo, Managing Director, Fiscal Services Limited 
Jenez. Edmundo. General Manager. -. JETS. Ltd. 
Knight, Garfield, Director of Information and Technology, National Land Agency 
d Laidlaw, Cheryl, President, Private Sector Organization - of Jamaica 
Lee, Barbara, Executive Director, Fair Trading Commission 
Linton, Andrew, IBM 
Manley, Beverly, Beverly Manley & Associates 
Miller, David, General Manager, Fair Trading Commission I Moss-Solomon, Jimmy, Mona School of Business, University of the West IndiesIChef Corporate Affairs 
Officer, Grace, Kennedy & Company 
Parker, Marlene, Director of Research and Financial Services, Private Sector Organization of Jamaica 
Ramlogan-Ching, Judith, CEO, Office of the Registrar of Companies 
Singh, Clyde, Bank of Nova Scotia 
i, Washington, William, Manager, BDO 
Whylie, Frank, General Manager, IN Small Business Loans, Ltd. 
Williams, Abe, Former President, Small Business Association of Jamaica 
Wright, Franklin, Senior Programme Officer, Institute of Management and Production 
SJ NEP 
D' Aguilar, Beryl, Office Manager/Accountant 
Duquesnay, Michael, Case Manager 
Hall, Nigel, Case Manager 
9 Julien, Michael, Chief-of-Party Nurse, Cheryl Francis, Case Manager 
Peart, Patricia, Project Assistant 
Wilson, Rohan, Logistics CoordinatorlDriver 
Burrowes, Jirnmie, Business Development Specialist 
Jordan, Mosina, Director 
Rushing, Kevin, Deputy Director 
Wright, A. John, CTO 
d 
APPENDIX I1 
Regs and Legs Project 
Chronolom of Events 
1.30th March 2002. Tony Gomes e-mails the first JCC proposal for the regs and legs project. (NB: The 
"proposal" is not really a proposal because it consists of half a page of a "modus operandi" that implies 
that a liaison officer should be hired to interact with government to get GOJ to resolve critical "regs and 
legs" issues.) 
2. 1 April - 20th April 2002. NEP asks JCC to provide more information on the project e.g. objective, 
inputs, activities, outputs, who is going to manage it, more detailed description of the modus operandi, 
indicative implementation schedules etc. We meet with JCC's Tony Chang and Tony Gomes on at least 
two occasions but no additional (written) information is provided to NEP. 
3. Last week of April. Michael Julien concludes that no written information will be forthcoming and 
decides to prepare a concept paper in the form of a Review Questionnaire. The concept paper is based 
entirely on discussions held with Tony Chang and Tony Gomes. 
4. 1st May 2002. NEP faxes the Proposal Review Questionnaire to JCC. (The questionnaire was used to 
develop concept papers and "task orders" under the old OEG/NEP system). 
5. 7th May 2002. Tony Gomes clarifies the questions raised in the NEP fax of 1st May via his e-mail to 
Michael Julien. Mr. Gomes indicates that Arthur Thompson, a retired civil servant, is the preferred JCC 
candidate for the Liaison Officer (manager) position. 
6. 8th May 2002. Michael Julien sends completed questionnaire form (i.e. concept paper) to John Wright 
requesting a review and a golno-go signal prior to meeting with Tony Gomes (Tony Chang is 
unavailable). No formal response received from OEG. 
7. 13th June 2002. NEP again takes the initiative and prepares a draft task order for the project. h4ichael 
Julien sends letter with attached draft to JCC asking them to review and submit formal request for 
assistance to NEP. 
8.24th June 2002. Michael Julien begins discussions with Arthur Thompson and prepares a SOW for 
the position. At our request, Mr. Thompson provides CV and EBD to NEP. The next planned step: 
USAID approval and contract for Mr. Thompson to begin work by midJuly 2002. 
9.26th June 2002. JCC sends first formal request to NEP requesting assistance along the lines of the 
draft task order that NEP sent to JCC on 13th June. 
10. End of June 2002. NEP sends task order to OEG for green light on it (i.e. to proceed with the 
project). 
11. 13th Julv - 4th Auwst 2002. Michael Julien, the NEP Case Manager responsible for the Regs and 
Legs project, goes on leave for three weeks. 
12.23rd Julv 2002. JCC holds a separate meeting with OEG sometime in July after which J. 
BurrowesIOEG calls Mike duQuesnay to specify changes to the task orderlproject. 
13.24th Julv 2002. Mike duQuesnay sends memo to OEG confirming the changes that were verbally 
requested but suggests that the matter be dealt with on MJ's return to work in early August. Note: At that 
time Michael Julien still on holiday in the UK. 
14.9th Aumst 2002. Following his return to work, Michael Julien sends an ACS (the 
new submission form) to OEG reflecting the changes requested by OEG as recorded by Mike 
duQuesnay in his memo of 24th July 2002. 
15. 27th August 2002. JCC's Acting Executive Director, Trevor Ferron gets involved in the project. He 
sends NEP the relevant request to support the ACS. NEP had asked JCC to send this confirmation in 
early August -before sending the ACS to OEG. However, JCC submits the request "late". 
16.29th August 2002. Michael Julien sends an e-mail to Trevor Ferron asking JCC to identiijr an 
interim project manager. The e-mail emphasizes that NEP needs an "active and available" JCC 
counterpart to work with to get the project started. Would Trevor be the person filling this role? 
17. September 2002. JCC attention is focused fully on upcoming national pre-election 
events involving the private sector. The election is scheduled for 16th October 2002. hFP does not 
receive a response to the request of 29th August 2002. Michael Julien calls Trevor Ferron about once 
every 5 -10 days. Trevor confirms by the end of September that not much will be done on Regs and 
Legs (by JCC) until after the election. 
18. 17th October 2002. NEP prepares a draft task order reflecting the ACS information that was sent to 
OEG. The task order is intended for JCC signature. However it cannot be signed by JCC because it is 
pending OEG approval of the ACS submitted to OEG dated 8th August 2002. 
19. 17th October -27th October 2002. JCC, in separate meeting(s) with government officials and OEG. 
decides to modify the project for the second time. The revised plan (i.e., the third version) is to locate 
the project at GOJ's Cabinet Office (that is, the office of the Prime Minister). NEP and JCC agree to split 
design and implementation into two parts -Phases I and 11. NEP prepares a revised ACS for 
Phase I and submits it to OEG for reviewlapproval on 29th October. OEG approves the ACS the same 
day. 
20. November 2002. NEP and JCC spend the month of November on various pre-design activities 
including identifying consultants, drafting scopes of work and a fixed price contract, and reviewing the 
proposed survey questionnaire developed by Market Research Limited. The JCC is asked to obtain and 
make membership lists available from JCC itself as well as other PSOs (e.g. JMA, JEA, PSOJ, tourism 
etc). 
21. 15th November 2002. NEP sends JCC a detailed work order for review and JCC signature. The work 
order includes Phase I work as well as budget estimates for Phase I1 (i.e. long term implementation) of 
the project. 
22. 6th December 2002. Patricia Peart, NEP's Project Assistant, sends an e-mail to Tony Chang/JCC to 
remind him that the work order sent to JCC on 15th November needs to be signed and returned to NEP. 
(The client must approve the work order prior to NEP hiring consultants and deploying other resources 
under every NEP activity). As of the date of this chronology, NEP still does not have a signed work 
order from the client for either Phase I or Phase 11.). In the meantime MRL complains to NEP that JCC 
had not provided the requested membership lists -although repeated requests were made by them for this 
information over a 2 -3 week period. 
23. 15th December 2002. All the necessary paperwork completed (USAID approval of consultant's rate; 
final questionnaire approved by JCC, contracts etc). Both MRL and the short-term consultant, 
# Marguerite Orane, begin Phase I work on the project. 
24. 15th January 2003. Survey completed by MRL and reviewed by JCC and NEP. Marguerite Orane 
presents preliminary findings and recommends a privatelpublic sector workshop on the project's modus 
operandi. 
# 
The other objective of the workshop is to obtain consensus on the proposed approach. Also, three 
candidates are identified for the project manager position (previously the liaison officer post). However, 
there is growing pressure from JCC and GOJ to identify "low hanging fruit" (i.e. quick hits) that can be 
worked on immediately. NEP agrees and asks JCC to set up appropriate meetings with the 
relevant agencies to zero-in on the key issues to be addressed. NEP also agrees to bring in SITA for this 
J 
purpose. This would constitute a third major cftafzge in project desigdstart up work. To date, we are 
waiting on JCC to set up the relevant meetings. Meanwhile, the workshop was scheduled for 22 January 
2003. 
ji Dated: Wednesday, January 22,2003 
Project Management Checklist 
The eight-step plan to successful project implementation 
1. Client Letter asking for technical assistance. The request must be specific and must highlight the 
benefits of the activity. One or two pages please! 
2. Work Order. This summarizes the activitylproject, inputs required, roles of each contributor, 
expected output/result, brief description of skills required, time frame for implementation, and budget 
showing who is contributing what. The WO is prepared by the project manager and agreedkigned by the 
client. 
3. Project Charter prepared in working session(s) with client. The project scope restates the work order 
in much greater detail with the objective being to "nail down" specific client resources and 
responsibilities as well as the provider's (e.g. NEP's) resource commitments to the project. The project 
manager prepares this and the client agrees to it in writing. 
4. Scope of Work. The project manager must prepare this. It is a detailed list of tasks, responsibilities, 
outputs expected from short-term experts. The SOW is based on the Charter. Note: you must present 
consultants to each client for interviewlassessment. NEP will identify the consultants via Carana. 
5. Project Plan, prepared in detail by the project manager and the client. The plan must show who is 
responsible for getting each task done, timeframe, linked or predecessor tasks, timing of progress 
meetings etc. The plan is agreed to, preferably by confirmation in writing, by the client. The plan is used 
in progress (review) meetings for monitoring implementation. 
6. Progress Meetings with the client held preferably at the start or end of each week and no less than 
once every two weeks. The client must appoint an internal manager. Helshe will prepare agenda and 
minutes and be responsible for getting hislher team to do their work. These meetings are use to 1) 
monitor how each active task has progressed and the extent to which each contributor has carried out 
hisher agreed task(s) or action(s). Microsoft Project is the required software/layout. 
7. Progress Updates to New Economy Project must be provided verbally and confirmed by e-mail or 
memo to the NEP case manager on a weekly basis. These updates must highlight 1) progress, 2) 
proposedlagreed revisions and 3) any other key factor influencing implementation. 
8. Progress Updates to oversight entity (such as the Regs and Legs Committee). This must be 
provided in detail in line with the project manager's reporting requirements. Updates must be as specific 
as possible. Generalized comments are not acceptable. For each project they should highlight 1) 
exactly what has been accomplished and 2) what is going to be accomplished behveen the current and 
the next reporting period. 
APPENDIX 111 
ACTMTY CRITERIA SELECTION (ACS) FORM 
Client: 
Project: 
1. What is the requestor's vision? 
2. What is the purpose of this assistance? 
3. What is the nature and extent of work to be done? 
4. How will the assistance improve the present condition? (Clear results) 
b. Critical assumptions are? (What must exist to achieve results) 
5. IdentificationNalidation of logical consistency (causality) to IRs 
6. Detailed technical requirements? 
7. What is the time fiame for completion of assistance? (Holy many phases) 
8. USAID/NEP contribution? 
9. Counterpart contribution? 
10. Probability of activity success? 
b. Institution Capacity for activity sustainability? 
11. Is there a strong recommendation for the allocation of program and staff resources to this proposed 
activity? 
Chief of Party: Date: Case Manager: Date: 
Authorized by: Date: 
't / 
APPENDIX IV 
SWOT Analysis Results 
Responsiveness to market (demand vs. supply) D 
Availability of technical assistance (appropriate match, timeliness) M 
Quality of expertise M 
Client selection of STAs D 
Partnership MiD 
Ownership D 
Methodology/process MID 
Trust (as result of TA) M 
Open communication among NEP, USAID and Carana) M 
Clear NEP staff understanding of SO and 1% M 
Autonomy from Carana M 
Flexibility MiD 
"Cherry picking" D 
Client driven D 
NEP as catalyst D 
Design flexibility - post implementation D 
WEAKNESSES 
Clash of operating/project management styles within NEP 
"Special projects" (supply driven) 
"Cherry picking" 
No base linddata 
Client driven 
On-line skills training 
Work with "natural clusters" (shipping and berthing, ICT, utilities) 
IR1 (demand and institutional development) 
WTO, FTAA, CSME training 
THREATS 
Losing momentum (hnding, demand) 
0 Potential conflict with regional project (C-Trade) 
0 Mission strategy change 
Other donors 
D= Project design 
M=Project management 
! 
il APPENDIX V 
Contract No. PCEId0-99-00010-00 
Task Order No. 805 
A.4 STATEMENT OF WORK 
The Contractor will carry out the following activities as part of the evaluation exercise: 
Meet with the members of USAID'S SO1 team and Mission management. 
0 Review the following documents: The CaranaTask Order, NEP's Work plans and the various project 
documents. 
0 Interview key SO partners including project senior managers and key team members plus private sector 
leadedpartners responsible for projects in which NEP is involved. 
The Contractor will submit a report to USAIDIJarnaica evaluating the activities described above and should also 
address a number of critical issueslquestions including the following: 
+ The extent to which the NEP has been successful in meeting the objectives of the SO. 
+ why? 
+ The operation and impact of the New Economy Project. 
+ Why? 
+ What has been the most successful component or features of the project? 
+ what needs improvement? 
+ Has NEP been an effective demand-based system to provide targeted TA in a timely manner? 
+ How can the model be improved? 
+ Does it make sense to continue such a project even if it is not sustainable and, if so, why? 
+ Should sustainability be an issue for such a project? 
+ What aspects of NEP have worked best and which have worked the least? Why? 
4 Is the quality of NEP project management appropriate? 
+ How appropriate is the method of selecting sub-contmctors who carry out work in the various activities? 
+ How is quality and impact of assistance being provided by NEP perceived? 
+ Are there any adjustments that are necessary in the design of the project? 
A5 DIFFERENTIALS AND ALLOWANCES (JULY 1996) 
(This clause does not apply to TCN or CCN employees. TCN and CCN employees are not eligible for differentids and 
allowances, unless specifically authorized by the cognizant Assistant Administrator orMission Ditor. A copy of such 
authorization shall be retained and made available as part of the contractor's records which are required to be preserved 
and made available by the Txamination of Records by the Comptroller General" and "Audit" clauses of this contract). 
(a) Post differential. Post differential is an additional compensation for senice at places in foreign areas where 
conditions of environment differ substantially from conditions of environment in the continental United States and 
warrant additional compensation as a recruitment and retention incentive. In areas where post differential is paid to 
USAID direct-hire employees, post differential not to exceed the percentage of salary as is provided such USAlD 
employees in accordance with the Standardized Regulations (Government Civilians. Foreign Areas), Chapter 500 (except 
the limitation contained in Section 552. "Ceiling on Payment") Tables-Chapter 900, as from time to time amended. will be 
reimbursable hereunder for employees in respect to amounts earned during the time such employees actually spend 
overseas on work under this contract. When such post differential is provided to regular employees of the Contractor, it 
shall be payable beginning on the date of arrival at the post of assignment and continue, including periods away from post 
on official business, until the close of business on the day of departure from post of assignment en route to the United 
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Contract No. PCEI-00-99-00010-00 
Task Order No. 803 
States. Sick or vacation leave taken at or away from the post of assignment will not interrupt the continuity of the 
assignment or require a discontinuance of such post differential payments, provided such leave is not taken within the 
United States or the territories of the United States. Post differential will not be payable while the employee is away from 
hislher post of assignment for purposes of home leave. Short-term employees shall be entitled to post differential 
beginning with the forty-third (43rd) day at post. 
(b) Living quarters allowance. Living quarters allownce is an allowance granted to reimburse an employee for 
substantially all of hidher cost for either temporary or residence quarters whenever Govemment-od or Government￾rented quarters are not provided to hider at hidher post without charge. Such costs are those incurred for tempmy 
lodging (temporary quarters subsistence allowance) or one unit of residence quarters (living quarters allowance) and 
include rent, plus any costs not included therein for heat, light, fuel, gas, electricity and water. The tempMary quarters 
subsistence allowance and the living quarters allowance are never both payable to an employee for the same period of 
time. The Contractor will be reimbursed for payments made to employees for a living quarters allowance for rent and 
utilities if such facilities are not supplied. Such allowance shall not exceed the amaunt paid USAID employees of 
equivalent rank in the Cooperating Country, in accordance with either the Stan* Regulations (Govemnt 
Civilians, Foreign Areas), Chapter 130, as from time to time amended, or other rates approved by the Mission Director. 
Subject to the written approval of the Mission Diector, short-term employees may be paid per diem (in lieu of living 
quarters allownce) at sates prescribed by the Federal Travel Regulations, as from time to time amended during the time 
such short-term employees spend at posts of duty in the Cooperating Country under this contract. In authorizing such per 
diem raw, the Mission Duector shall consider the particular circumstances involved with respect to each sucb short-term 
employee including the extent to which meals andlor lodging may be made available without charge or at nominal cost by 
an agency of the United States Government or of the Cooperating Government, and similar factors. 
(c) Temporary quarters subsistence allowance. Temporary quarters subsistence allowance is a quarters allowance 
granted to an employee for the reasonable cost of temporary quarters incued by the employee and his family for a period 
not in excess of (i) 90 days after fust anival at a new post in a foreign area or a period ending with the occupation of 
residence (permanent) quarters, if earlier, and (ii) 30 days immediately preceding final departure from the post subsequent 
to the necessary vacating of residence quarters, unless an extension is authorized in writing by the Mission Diream. The 
Contractor will be reimbursed for payments made to employees and authorized dependeuts for tempomy qumers 
subsistence allowance, in lieu of living quarters allowance, not to exceed the amount set forth in the Standardii 
Regulations (Government Civilians, Foreign Areas), Chapter 120, as from time to time amended. 
(d) Post allowance. Post allowance is a cost-of-living allowance granted to an employee officially stationed at a post 
where the cost of living, exclusive of quarters cost, is substantially higher than in Washington. D.C. The Contractor will 
be reimbursed for payments made to employees for post allowance not to exceed those paid USAJD employees in the 
Cooperating Country, in accordance with the Standardized Regulations (Government Civilians. Foreign Areas), Chapter 
220, as from time to time amended. 
(e) Supplemental post allowance. Supplemental post allownce is a form of post allowance granted to an employee at 
bidher post when it is determined that assistance is necessary to dehy extraordinary subsistence costs. The Contractor 
will be reimbursed for payments made to employees for supplemental post allowance not to exceed the amount set forth in 
the Standardized Regulations (Government Civilians. Foreign Areas), Chapter 230, as from time to time amended. 
(0 Educational allowance. Educational allowance is an allowance to assist an employee in meeting the extraordi 
and necessary expenses. not otherwise compensated for, incurred by reason of hidher senice in a foreign area in 
providing adequate elementary and secondary education for bidher children. The Contractor will be re.lmbursed for 
payments made to regular employees for educational allowances for their dependent children in amounts not to exceed 
those set forth in the Standardized Regulations (Government Civilians. Foreign Areas), Chapter 270, as fromtime. to time 
amended.(See Standardized Regulation 270) 
(g) Educational trayel. Educational travel is travel to and from a school in the United States for secondary education (in 
Lieu of an educational allowance) and for college education. The Contractor will be reimbursed for payments made to 
regular employees for educational travel for their dependent children provided such payment does not exceed that which 
Page 5 
Contract No. PCEI-00-99-000lMH) 
Task Order No. 805 
would be payable in accordance with the Standardized Regulations (Government Civilians. Foreign Areas), Chapter 280, 
as from time to time amended. 
(See Standardized Regulation 280) Educational travel shall not be authorized for regular employees whose assignment 
is less than two years. 
(h) Separate maintenance allowance. Separate maintenance allowance is an aUowance to assist an employee who is 
compelled, by reason of dangerous, notably unhealthful, or excessively adverse living conditions at hidher post of 
assignment in a foreign area, or for the convenience of the Govemment, to meet the additional expense of maintaining 
hidher dependents elsewhere than at such post. The Contractor will be reimbursed for payments made to regular 
employees for a separate maintenance allowance not to exceed that made to USAID employees in accordance with the 
Standardized Regulations (Govemment Civilians, Foreign Areas). Chapter 260, as from time to time amended. (See 
Standardized Regulation 260) 
(i) Payments during evacuation. The Standardized Regulations (Govemment Civilians, Foreign Areas) provide the 
authority for efficient, orderly, and equitable procedure for the payment of compensation, post differential and allowances 
in the event of an emergency evacuation of employees or their dependents. or both, from duty stations for military or other 
reasons or because of imminent danger to their lives. If evacuation has been authorized by (be Mission Dimtor the 
Contractor will be reimbursed for payments made to employees and authorized dependents evacuated from heir post of 
assignment in accordance with the Standardized Regulations (Govemment Civilians, Foreign Areas), Chapter 600, and the 
Federal Travel Regulations, as from time to time amended. (See Standardized Regulation 600) 
(j) Danger pay allowance. (1) The contractor will be reimbursed for payments made to its employees for danger pay not 
to exceed that paid USAID employees in the cooperating country, in accordance with the Standardized Regulations 
(Government Civilians, Foreign Areas). Chapter 650, as from time to time amended. (See Standardized Regulation 650) 
(2) Danger pay is an allowance that provides additional compensation above basic compensation to an employee in a 
foreign area where civil insurrection, civil war, terrorism or wartime conditions threaten physical harm or imminent 
danger to the health or well-being of the employee. The danger pay allowance is in lieu of that pan of the post diffemtial 
which is athibutable to political violence. Consequently, the post differential may be reduced while danger pay is in effect 
to avoid dual crediting for political violence. 
A.6 REPORTS 
The Contractor will be required to deliver to the Office of Economic Growth, in Kingston and 
USAIDtWashington, PPC/CDIE/DI, five copies of a report containing the findings of the evaluation together 
with recommendations for achieving the Intermediate Results. The evaluation should state whether this 
approach should be maintained for the next strategy as well as the prospects for utilizing this appmach in other 
AID Missions. 
A.7 TECHNICAL DIRECTIONS 
Technical Directions during the performance of this task order shall be provided by the Technical Officer as stated in 
Block 5 of the cover page or his designate, pursuant to Section F of the contract. 
A.8 TERM OF PERFORMANCE 
a Work shall commence on the date noted in Block 7 of the cover page. The estimated completion date is reflected in 
Block 8 of the cover page. 
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