USAID
Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
Office of Transition Initiatives
Final Evaluation of OTI’s Program in Peru
Prepared By:
George A. Hill
Kelly A. McBride
Javier Diaz-Albertini
Assisted by:
Nadine Heredia Alarcon
August 2003
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Table of Contents
Section I. Introduction and Background..............................................................................3
Section II. The Changing Political Context of Peru ............................................................4
Section III. The Objectives, Issues and Methodology of the Evaluation...........................6
Section IV. Program Objectives and Assessment ................................................................8
1. Increased Civilian Oversight of the Military and Improved Civilian Military Relations.8
2. Support the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)............................................10
3. Decentralization and Local Government ........................................................................12
4. Support and Strengthen the New Peruvian Congress.....................................................15
5. Increase Civil Society Interest and Involvement in Combating Corruption...................17
Section V. Programmatic Findings and Recommendations .............................................19
1. OTI’s Ability to Meet its Stated Program Objectives....................................................19
2. OTI’s Ability to Modify its Strategic Objectives and Activities to Accommodate 
Changes in the Local Political Context ...............................................................................19
3. The Appropriateness and Effectiveness of OTI’s Themes and of its Program as a Means 
to Effect Change ..................................................................................................................20
Section VI. Monitoring and Evaluation Findings..............................................................21
Section VII. Management and Implementation Findings.................................................23
1. Start-up Issues.................................................................................................................23
2. Management of the Grant Cycle .....................................................................................24
3. Use and Effectiveness of the Data Base as a Management Tool....................................25
4. Advantages and Disadvantages of the In-kind Donation Mechanism. ...........................25
5. OTI’s Efforts in Situations of Democratic Transitions...................................................26
Annex A: People and Organizations Contacted .................................................................27
Annex B: Final Evaluation of the OTI Peru Program........................................................30
Annex C: Major OTI Grantees - Civil Society...................................................................35
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Section I. Introduction and Background
On November 30, 2000, President Fujimori voluntarily resigned from office and left Peru. 
His departure was preceded by a series of increasingly autocratic moves to centralize politi￾cal power in the presidency, co-op the national judiciary, and continue himself in power for a 
third term as president by means of an electoral process that in 2000, was judged to be not 
free nor fair. His resignation was triggered by a massive scandal in which his national secu￾rity advisor was revealed to have engaged in a pattern of political and criminal bribery on
behalf of the Presidency. Popular revulsion to these revelations brought down the govern￾ment.
In the aftermath of the departure, the President of Congress, Valentin Paniagua, was sworn in 
as interim President. New elections for Congress and the Presidency were scheduled for
April 2001, with the new government to take office in late July. 
On January 8, 2001, the U.S. Ambassador to Peru determined that the political crisis in Peru 
warranted a short-term response from the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives. Other
sources of discretionary funding from USAID were committed to support the all important
elections process for a new government in Peru. While the USAID Mission in Peru had
longer term plans to strengthen Peruvian democracy by financing projects in judicial reform,
decentralization and modernization of congress, those projects were not projected to come on 
stream until 2003. 
OTI designed a transition strategy in response to the political crisis. The strategy built on the 
long standing USAID Mission support for democratic participation and governance in Peru
and the Mission’s 40-year history of development assistance. That presence not only aided a 
rapid assessment of the main areas for OTI support, but also helped in the identification of
key players and institutions. The OTI strategy was intended to support peaceful democratic 
transition in Peru and to visibly associate the U.S. Government with the effort. OTI identi￾fied five areas for programming in support of the Peruvian democratic transition. 
· Support for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was established to re￾view and report on the violence and atrocities committed by Peru’s guerilla insur￾gency and the military in reaction to it. 
· Support to the new Congress and its members, most of whom were new to govern￾ment.
· Support for the Peruvian government’s decision to decentralize governmental author￾ity to its political regions.
· Support to improve the dialogue between the Peruvian government, civil society and
the military.
· Support for anti-corruption efforts.
As part of the strategy, it was understood that USAID resources would be available to sup￾port decentralization and the Congress after OTI transition assistance ended. The Truth
Commission had a limited mandate, with its final report due in June of 2003. In those areas, 
the outline of OTI’s transition role (or terminal role in the case of the TRC) was visible when 
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the program began. The civil/military dialogue and anti-corruption efforts responded to criti￾cal issues in Peru’s democratic transition, but the longer term context and implications of
OTI’s efforts were less foreseeable.
The OTI program began in February 2001 and was closed out in January 2003. During the 
period, OTI budgeted $11 million for its program in Peru. It financed 245 grants to local
civil society organizations, the private sector and the Peruvian Government, totaling
$6,575,963. Some 92 separate organizations received OTI grants. The program was coordi￾nated by two OTI contracted professionals sitting in the USAID mission and a contractor im￾plementation team from Creative Associates – housed separately.
Section II. The Changing Political Context of Peru
The political process leading to the Paniagua transition government in November 2000, be￾gan as early as 1996, when the Fujimori administration, allied with a Congressional majority, 
undertook a series of actions that jeopardized rule of law and weakened Peru’s democratic
institutions. Their goal was to guarantee Fujimori’s second reelection in 2000. Unconstitu￾tional laws were passed to permit this reelection; three judges of the Constitutional Tribunal
were removed when they ruled against them; free press was curtailed through direct or indi￾rect government pressure; smear campaigns on opposition members were carried out using
tabloids financed by the National Intelligence System; a majority of the judges in the judicial
system were made provisional and dependent on the executive branch; the traditional “cul￾ture of secrecy” prevalent in Peruvian public administration was furthered through Congress’
abdication of its oversight responsibilities and lack of access to public information; local
government lost many of its authorities which were centralized in the national government;
state officials openly used public funds to support government party candidates and secure
local popular support.
These and other actions combined to create a bleak panorama for free and competitive elec￾tions in April 2000. National and international pressure resulted in several electoral supervi￾sion processes, most of them allied with the Organization of American States (OAS) mission. 
Despite these efforts, the polling process was plagued with irregularities, most of which were 
publicly denounced before, during, and in the aftermath of the elections. Prior to the run-off 
elections, the OAS, the Office of the Ombudsman, and civil society oversight groups pre￾sented a list of conditions that had to be met in order to guarantee democratic polls. Most 
were not met and the OAS decided not to supervise the run-off. The opposition candidate –
Alejandro Toledo—called for a boycott of the elections. They were held, however, and Fu￾jimori was declared the winner.
The fraudulent electoral process aroused citizen indignation and protest. Pro-democracy 
demonstrations were held in many cities, including the massive march of the “Cuatro Suyos”
(“Four Cardinal Points”), when close to a quarter million Peruvians marched into Lima from
all regions to protest Fujimori’s third term inauguration in July 2000.
During the OAS foreign minister assembly held in Windsor, Canada, the delicate political
situation of Peru was discussed and it was agreed to send a high level commission to assess 
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its implications for Peruvian democracy. As a result of the visit, the OAS promoted the crea￾tion of a Dialogue Table (Mesa de Diálogo) comprised of the government and opposition
parties, with the participation of civil society, the Catholic Church, business leaders, and the
Ombudsman. The Dialogue Table agreed to discuss 29 issues including prioritizing free￾press, the reform of the intelligence system, human rights, civil-military relationships, and
judicial reform. This marked a “first transition scenario” with Fujimori still in government.
However, the public screening of the first “Vladi-video” in October was to rapidly change 
this scenario. Although corruption has permeated Peruvian political institutions since Colo￾nial times, the videos clearly supported the growing suspicion that Montesinos and Fujimori
had co-opted a good portion of political and state authorities through bribes. It was also clear 
that Montesinos had taped most of these transactions, probably for future extortion purposes. 
The whole corrupt power system was put in jeopardy and rapidly collapsed. Fujimori de￾cided, presumably after searching for and seizing incriminating videos, to leave the country
and resign from office.
This set the stage for a “second transition scenario” during the Paniagua government (No￾vember 2000 – July 2001). The government was bolstered by massive popular support but it 
had to face a two-fold challenge in order to establish the necessary conditions for the April
2001 elections and for paving the way for the new government: the dismantling of the Fuji￾mori legacy and the re-institutionalization of democracy. The immediate response included
the dismissal, investigation, and prosecution of many highly placed political authorities and
officials, including high grade military officers. Legitimate institutions in sensitive areas also
had to be reconstituted including the electoral office, the Constitutional Tribunal, the police
and armed forces, the Ministry of the Presidency, and the judicial system. In some of these 
areas, civil society participation was crucial in order to guarantee transparency through citi￾zen oversight and to promote longer-term sustainability of the initiatives. Significant events
during this time period included:
· A new Congress was elected in April 2001 and close to 65% were first-time mem￾bers, most with little political experience and/or support from a weakened political
party system.
· A Truth and Reconciliation Commission was formed in June 2001 with the sensitive
task of studying the genesis of political violence during 1980 to 2000, documenting
acts of terrorist and human rights violations, establishing responsibilities, recording
the sequence of violence, and developing proposals concerning reparations, national
reconciliation, and violence prevention.
· Civilian-military relations were undergoing important changes, especially due to the
incarceration of many high-ranking officers due to corruption charges and the ap￾pointment of a civilian as Defense Minister.
· The issue of corruption had acquired unusual importance due to its high-visibility 
during the Fujimori regime. A growing concern of civil society around the issue was 
evidenced in the formation of anti-corruption groups.
· After a decade of “hyper-centralization” during the Fujimori administration, regional
movements had started to sprout all over the country and citizen demand for greater 
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say in their districts, provinces and departments was a central issue during the 2001 
elections. 
These challenges coincided with difficult fiscal conditions inherited from the Fujimori ad￾ministration. Thus, international support for the transition process was essential.
Section III. The Objectives, Issues and Methodology of the Evaluation
The evaluation objectives were to: (a) determine the extent to which OTI/Peru met its pro￾gram objectives and (b) assess OTI program management effectiveness in pursuing these ob￾jectives (see Annex B: Evaluation SOW). In order to adequately respond to these objectives, 
two principal lines of action were established. The first was the examination of the five pro￾gram areas in terms of the appropriateness of their goals and strategies as means to effect 
change in Peru; their capacity to adapt to an evolving political context; the level of success in 
meeting each of the program goals; the level of institutionalization of the actions imple￾mented and their sustainability, especially in terms of the continuance of the initiatives by
grantees, USAID and other donors. The second was the analysis of management and imple￾mentation, focusing on program start-up issues (OTI/USAID Mission/Embassy relationships;
identification of partners; grant evaluation and implementation); contractor effectiveness;
grant and project management; monitoring and evaluation. An essential component of the
evaluation was to arrive at recommendations and lessons learned for both the continuing
USAID Mission activities and for future OTI programs. 
The main characteristics of OTI development assistance (short term support, limited grant
size, high impact activities) presented unique challenges for the evaluation team: 
· OTI interventions were mostly based on training, dissemination, information cam￾paigns, consensus building, and research and analysis, activities whose impacts were
difficult to measure because: (a) it was difficult to segregate OTI effect from other
donors and environmental catalysts; (b) attitudinal changes could only be appropri￾ately verified in terms of mid- to long-term institutionalization; (c) adequate monitor￾ing and evaluation mechanisms were not designed.
· Limitations concerning grant amount led to the support of a large number of projects 
(245) involving many private and public counterparts (approximately 100) in a con￾siderable number of localities.
· Impact assessment of the five program areas had to be inferred from the aggregate re￾sults of the sub-grants. In this process, the relative merit of each project’s contribu￾tion to program impact was not examined, except in particular anecdotal terms. 
In order to respond to evaluation objectives and these challenges, the methodology designed 
combined quantitative and qualitative analysis. The principal quantitative information
sources were the project and procurement data-base, baseline and exit surveys, final program 
reports on activities, attendance, number of materials and publications, and media monitoring
reports. Qualitative sources were mainly in-depth interviews and group dynamics with se￾lected informants (approximately 200), baseline and exit focus groups, and a detailed review
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of selected grant documents, dissemination material, and publications. The evaluation work
plan entailed the following actions: 
a. Initial coordination meetings and interviews with relevant OTI/Latin America
and OTI/Peru staff and other key USAID and State Department Washington
personnel. 
b. Documentation review, including the detailed examination of a sample of 30
grant documents covering the five program areas.
c. Interviews with OTI/Peru, Creative Associates staff, USAID, and US Embassy
personnel in order to discern programmatic, implementation, and management
issues, especially in terms of start-up process; management of the grant cycle; 
use of management tools, coordination mechanisms, etc. 
d. Interviews with local grantees and other implementing partners. The inter￾view contact list was coordinated with local OTI, CAII and USAID staff, al￾though other interviewees were added following suggestions of key infor￾mants (see Annex A: People and Organizations Contacted). Most of the inter￾viewees were major grantees. In order to conduct detailed assessments, the
team divided the five themes among members permitting a greater number of 
contacts. However, for key organizations that carried out projects in more than 
one theme, two team members usually participated in the interviews. 
e. Interviews with grantees in the cities of Arequipa, Ayacucho and Piura. Since 
more than 70 percent of OTI activities were implemented outside of Lima, it 
was important to examine the national impact of the program and it also per￾mitted contact with smaller grantees.
f. Interviews with key observers and informants of Peruvian society. This in￾cluded politicians, social scientists, representatives of international funding
agencies, and the former Defensor del Pueblo (Ombudsman).
g. Presentation of preliminary findings and recommendations to USAID Peru
staff, which generated important feedback for the final report. 
As a result of these efforts, close to 35 percent of all grantees were interviewed and the sam￾ple accounted for $4.5 million or 70 percent of OTI funds. Although the sample was not
strictly representative, it assured a solid base for assessment because of its weight in the
fundings and their intervention in the most salient aspects of the OTI program.
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Section IV. Program Objectives and Assessment
USAID/OTI began its Peru program in February 2001. The program ended in January 2003. 
The overall objective was to support the democratic opening created by the fall of President 
Alberto Fujimori’s government in November 2000. OTI sought to support the transition
government of Valentin Paniagua and later the newly elected government of Alejandro
Toledo. Through a consultative process involving OTI/Peru, the USAID mission, the U.S.
Embassy, Peruvian governmental representatives, and civil society representatives, five areas
were identified as key to a successful democratic transition in Peru and in need of OTI short￾term support. These areas were:
1. Increased Civilian Oversight of the Military and Improved Civilian Military Rela￾tions. 
2. Support and Technical Assistance for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
(TRC). 
3. Strengthened Local Government and Decentralization Efforts. 
4. Support and Strengthen the New Peruvian Congress.
5. Increased Civil Society Interest and Involvement in Combating Corruption. 
Below follows an assessment of the goals, strategic objectives, expenditures, activities under￾taken, and the findings for each of these five themes. 
1. Increased Civilian Oversight of the Military and Improved Civilian Military Rela￾tions
OTI’s goal was to increase civil society oversight and knowledge of the armed forces and to 
involve civil society in the decisions related to security and defense. The strategic objectives 
were to: 
1) improve Congress’ understanding of key national security and defense issues re￾quired to enact defense policy and to increase the willingness and capacity of civil￾ians to make decisions related to security and defense in an informed and participa￾tory fashion; 
2) improve the quality and quantity of media coverage of defense and security mat￾ters;
3) increase the level of civil society’s interest in and understanding of national secu￾rity issues, and to create an awareness of the importance of civilian control of the
armed forces.
A total of $850,000 was spent on 50 specific civil military projects by 15 civil society or￾ganizations (including one private individual), three public institutions, and one for-profit 
private company. The activities took place throughout the country. Given the scarcity of
civil society organizations specializing in the civil military matters, OTI approached groups
working on human rights and democracy issues and encouraged them to work on civil mili￾tary issues. In other cases, people interested in the issue were approached and asked to form 
an organization and develop activities. 
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The diverse activities undertaken to achieve the strategic objective one (see above) included 
training and technical assistance to congressional members and staff, particularly of the De￾fense Committee, and sponsoring public debates in which members of Congress and civil
society groups discussed defense and security proposals. The activities undertaken to
achieve strategic objective two (see above) included conducting media training and informa￾tion campaigns, and conducting workshops and meetings between civilians and military,
which focused on access to information and the role of the media in civil-military relations. 
Strategic objective three (see above) activities included sponsoring dialogues between civil￾ians and military throughout the country, conducting training on defense and security related
topics for civilians, and conducting information campaigns on civilian military relations.
The Civil-Military Program in Numbers
Number of grants 50
Total funding $880,098 100%
ß Civil society organizations (15) $613,596 69.5%
ß State institutions (3) $249,975 28.5%
ß Private firm (1) $16,527 2%
Major Results
ß # of laws with citizen participation 3
ß # of civilians trained in security matters and 
participating in civil-military dialogues 
7,000
ß # of active military trained in security matters 
and participating in civil-military dialogue 
991
ß OTI funded research approx. 10 studies 
ß OTI funded dissemination materials (informa￾tion campaigns, posters, t-shirts, radio pro￾grams, magazines and books) 
 Estimated 3 million. people 
reached 
OTI was very successful in achieving its strategic objectives with regard to civil military
matters. Insights gleaned from individual interviews indicate that OTI’s support had a major 
impact upon civilian military matters. All those interviewed agreed that OTI’s support was
instrumental in creating new civilian “interlocutors” on security and defense issues. OTI’s
program had a substantive impact on the congressional debate on key defense-related laws, 
and in easing tensions between civilians and military, especially in the former emergency
zones. The diverse events allowed for more than 7,000 civilians, 991 active-duty and 294 
retired military to be trained in national security and defense issues. Finally, the project pub￾lished several books and studies, and conducted information campaigns on defense and secu￾rity issues.
OTI developed its initial goals and strategic objectives based on a March 2001 assessment. 
After a planning and evaluation meeting in November 2001, OTI fine-tuned its goals and
“We held meetings and training workshops between civilians and military, which the 
editor of the newspaper El Comercio attended. Later we noticed an improvement in the 
quality and quantity of coverage by El Comercio, which has proposed we work to￾gether on a monthly supplement on civil military affairs. I am sure the editor’s interest 
resulted from his participation in our dialogues.” Enrique Obando, President, Instituto 
de Estudios Politicos y Estrategicos
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strategic objectives. As a result, OTI’s programs in the civil military area were very much in 
tune with the local political context and OTI’s staff and grantees responded effectively to the 
local demands and needs. For example, one OTI grantee, the Institito de Estudios Politicos y 
Estrategicos, organized and contributed to public debates in preparation of a national security
strategy (“The National Defense White Book”). Other grantees had input into defense￾related legislation, e.g. Ministry of Defense Law, the Transparency and Access to Public In￾formation Law. All these examples reflect the first time civil society organizations partici￾pated in decisions related to defense and security issues.
Regarding civilian military matters, it appears that little has been done by OTI to institution￾alize work in this area. All of the area’s grantees, U.S. Embassy and outside observers inter￾viewed agreed on the need to continue efforts to promote civilian expertise in security and
defense matters and to gain full civilian authority over the armed forces. One expert, former 
Defensor del Pueblo, Jorge Sanstiestevan, considered the progress made in gaining civilian
authority over the armed forces to be very fragile and too dependent upon the personality and 
leadership of the Defense Minister. He also said that civil military issues were the most cru￾cial area of OTI’s work.
At this time, no bilateral donor or international donor support will be available for continued 
work in the civil military area. Only two of the Peruvian groups that OTI worked with have 
received limited foreign foundation funding (from the Open Society Institute and the Ford
Foundation) to continue their work. 
2. Support the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)
OTI’s program goal was to support the Commission’s capacity to achieve its objective of es￾tablishing the truth and promoting reconciliation in Peru after 20 years of violence. Two
strategic objectives were designed and 60 grants were implemented with $1.8 million in
funding. 
The first objective was to support TRC capacity to implement its work plan and activities
efficiently. The Commission was the largest single recipient of OTI/Peru funds, with 35 ap￾proved grants and little over $1 million in funding. A majority of the grants (22) provided
technical support through the purchase of IT equipment, data-base design and training, expert 
and consultant assistance for the elaboration of recommendations, work-plans, research;
field-work equipment, interviewer training, and psychological support. The rest of the grants 
focused on communication and dissemination issues, strategy design; preparation and publi￾cation of materials, and the production and broadcasting of radio and TV programs. OTI
funds were essential in providing the decentralized offices with resources for the appropriate 
handling of testimonies including training, recording and field equipment, forms, transcrip￾tion and editorial support, and for regional TRC dissemination campaigns. 
The Truth and Reconciliation Program in Numbers
Number of grants 60
Total funding $1,801,767 100%
ß Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1,031,646 57%
ß Office of the Ombudsman - Peru 67,543 4%
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ß Civil society organizations 626,860 35%
ß Private firms 75,717 4%
Major Results
ß Reach of OTI funded TRC activities 19 regions/cities
ß Training prior to TRC operations 1,326 persons in 17 urban areas
ß Internal TRC OTI funded training 82 workshops
ß TRC-civil society training workshops 2,894 persons
ß OTI funded research 41 studies
ß OTI funded dissemination material (posters, 
calendars, brochures, comics)
350,000 (approx.)
The second objective focused on increased citizen awareness and knowledge of the TRC, on
promoting appropriate citizen participation in its activities, and increased public confidence
in the achievement of its intended result. A little over $770,000 was destined to this objective 
in 25 grants, NGOs received 81percent, the Office of the Ombudsman 9 percent, and a film
project 10percent. Although 14 NGOs received OTI support, five of them shared 83 percent 
of the funds, mostly for national dissemination campaigns and research. Before the TRC ini￾tiated its operations, 14 grants were implemented for increasing citizen awareness of the exis￾tence of the commission and its mandate. These projects were both of a national and re￾gional reach, using radio and television broadcasts in four languages (Spanish, Quechua,
Aymara, and Ashaninka), itinerant public fairs, and cultural activities (concerts, theatre). 
Once operations began, OTI agreed that all grants with civil society organizations would be 
coordinated with the Commission.
OTI met the stated program objectives and its support was critical in strengthening TRC ca￾pacity to carry out its mission. Two months before initiating operations (August 2001), the
TRC president presented a bleak outlook to international donors. The estimated budget for 
the September-December period was $1.2 million but available funds were only $282,000
from the public treasury and $50,000 from the UNDP. The quick reaction of the U.S. Em￾bassy and OTI permitted an almost immediate backing of TRC in the start-up of operations. 
This meant changing the original OTI objectives of supporting civil society participation in
dissemination of TRC activities, which only provided marginal direct support for the Com￾mission itself. In November 2001, the strategic objectives were changed to the ones stated 
above and the OTI program became a direct and close TRC supporter.
It is interesting to note that OTI funding had both quantitative and qualitative impact on TRC 
activities. On the one hand, it permitted the TRC to create the necessary infrastructure and 
acquire equipment to receive and process close to 15,000 human rights violation testimonies. 
On the other, it contributed to the quality of testimony by training interviewers, supplying
“I believe that the main issue behind TRC effectiveness is increasing citizen
awareness of its existence and maintaining its high level of citizen trust. This will 
assure the legitimacy of the final report. The issue of citizen confidence in its ca￾pacity to change the country is secondary because it is not part of TRC mission… 
Rather, it is the responsibility of human rights groups and civil society to pressure 
and oversee government compliance with the recommendations.” Member of a 
Human Rights NGO
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them with psychological and emotional support, and supervising the editorial quality of the
transcriptions of taped testimonies. 
In terms of the effectiveness of the program as a means to effect change, all interviewed in￾formants agreed that OTI support was essential to TRC activities because it was a flexible
and rapid source of funds that permitted the uninterrupted collection of human rights abuse
testimonies and their processing. Most observers considered, however, that the TRC failed to 
develop a consistent and coherent public and communication strategy. Exit surveys and fo￾cus groups financed by OTI tend to show that despite greater citizen knowledge and recogni￾tion of TRC and its mission, confidence in its capacity to find out the truth had actually
dropped. The TRC was seen by many citizens as an attempt to bring back the past, which
they prefer to ignore. Few efforts were made to link these past events with conditions that 
still exist in the present, a strategy that would have appealed to young citizens who only have 
vague memories of the period of political violence. Despite these observations, made by
various interviewees before the TRC report was completed, the team believes that OTI's ob￾jectives were largely achieved. Citizen awareness and knowledge of the TRC increased, par￾ticipation in the work of the Commission was broadened and confidence that the TRC was 
listening to and recording real human stories increased. There is and abiding cynicism in Pe￾ruvian society, however, that doubts whether the final TRC report will make a difference. 
The institutionalization and sustainability of OTI efforts in this theme are not a major issue
because the TRC mandate ends in July 2003 with its final report and recommendations. Due 
to the deep-rooted causes of Peru’s political violence, it is expected that TRC recommenda￾tions will have a bearing on most of the country’s political and democratic institutions: mili￾tary and police; the judicial system; attorney general; penitentiary system; public finances
(victim reparation); the educational system (reconciliation); among others. The Supreme De￾cree that created TRC only states that the final report will be presented to the President and 
the head of the legislative and judicial branches, and that all documents will pass to the Of￾fice of the Human Rights Ombudsman. It is expected that the latter institution, under its
mandate, will act on some of the recommendations. Likewise, TRC recommendations will
be an essential part of the human rights community’s agenda for the coming years. Both the 
Ombudsman and human rights groups receive significant funding from international coopera￾tion, an important fact considering the lukewarm support the TRC has received from Peru￾vian state institutions. 
3. Decentralization and Local Government
The program goal was to support citizen participation in the decentralization policy-making 
process and local governance, as an element of functioning democracy in Peru. Two strate￾gic objectives were designed to this effect. 
The first one sought to have civil society and local governments be informed, participate, and 
define the legal framework of the decentralization process. Most of the grants under this ob￾jective were awarded to representatives of the executive and legislative branches, either di￾rectly, by funding public audiences of the Congressional Decentralization Commission or
indirectly, by contracting the consultants, research, and massive public campaign requested
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by the decentralization team of the Prime Minister’s Office (Presidencia del Consejo de Min￾istros). Spending on this objective accounted for close to 70 percent of funds allocated to this 
programmatic area. 
The Decentralization Program in Numbers
Number of grants 39
Total funding 1,634,565 100%
ß Civil society organizations 789,093 48%
ß State institutions 275,380 17%
ß Private firms 570,092 35%
Major Results
ß Best practices disseminated 12
ß # of laws with citizen participation 6
ß # of citizens participating in legal definition 17,631
ß # Trained municipal personnel 4,617
ß # Trained leaders and officials 19,642
ß Estimated adult audience national campaign 
on decentralization
16,000,000
The second objective focused on local government and supporting increased citizen aware￾ness of and participation in local governance and decision-making. The strategy of this ob￾jective was based on: (a) the long experience of civil society organizations, especially NGOs, 
in promoting local governance capability; and (b) the growing interest of local authorities
(mayors, council persons) in fomenting participatory planning and budget mechanisms. A
total of 21 grants were approved and most of them were under $35,000 (78 percent). The 
emphasis was placed on training and dissemination in workshops, public forums, and other
courses, of best practices of participatory democracy in local government, strategic planning,
participatory local budgets, and local development commissions. 
In general terms, the OTI decentralization program had the ability to meet its stated objec￾tives. Its support was essential in broadening citizen input in important national legislation
concerning decentralization and local governments. Interviewed informants in Congress
clearly stated that there were no budget provisions for the decentralized public hearings such
as those conducted under OTI grants. This success, however, was strongly dependent on the 
individuals who headed the Congressional Commissions. The Decentralization Commission
was open to citizen input and actually introduced their initiatives in the proposed bills, while 
the Local Government Commission, despite public hearings, steadfastly stuck with the origi￾nal proposal. In terms of supporting local democratic governance, OTI helped in disseminat￾ing and training on mechanisms for citizen participation in numerous district municipalities 
(641 or about 30 percent of total districts). In the process, it also contributed to the formation 
of citizen oversight networks in some of the poorer areas of the country. It is difficult to as￾sess the mid-term impact of these actions since the only immediate appreciation is based on
“Decentralization is an irreversible trend in Peruvian political reality, despite the 
multiple problems, contradictions, and confusion surrounding the process. It is 
impossible to adequately address democratic issues in Peru without questioning 
the highly centralized character of the state and bureaucracy”. Jorge Santistevan, 
ex Defensor del Pueblo(Ombudsman)
14
the # of training sessions, # of persons trained, and # of networks formed and not on the level 
of comprehension, # of direct and concrete actions undertaken, and changes in attitudes.
OTI also adapted its strategy to changing sociopolitical conditions. Decentralization is a long
awaited citizen demand and OTI funded polls showed that more than 65 percent of Peruvians 
defined themselves as “descentralistas”. However, the political context of decentralization
changed radically in the first months of the Toledo government when regional governments
were introduced and elections for regional authorities were scheduled for November 2002. 
This was a very tight time frame for the definition of a new legal framework. OTI’s original
strategy was to promote civil society based proposals, which would later be presented to the 
legislature. This proved to be ineffective because it did not immediately involve the two sec￾tors that had the capacity to turn proposals into policies: the executive and legislative
branches. An important and appropriate strategy change was made to coordinate citizen par￾ticipation with these sectors via joint assemblies, hearings, and workshops.
The OTI Decentralization program effect on democratic transition was two-fold. First, it
demonstrated how to narrow the gap between different levels of the Peruvian state and the
citizenry. As a result, key state officials have a better understanding of citizen demands con￾cerning decentralization and how to appropriately respond to them in a democratic fashion. 
Second, it has contributed to the initial development of a responsible attitude towards decen￾tralization. Baseline polls and focus group analysis funded by OTI showed unrealistic citizen
expectations on decentralization, considering it as a sort of quick panacea for most of their
region’s problems. As a result, a massive public campaign was designed, with OTI funds, to 
lower these expectations and generate responsible, gradual, and participative attitudes to￾wards the process.
In terms of OTI institutionalization efforts in this program, work with local governments has
a long tradition among NGOs and other civil society groups, and is part of the international
cooperation agenda. OTI produced materials and has identified best practices that will surely
enrich their outlooks and practices. The office in charge of decentralization in the executive 
branch (National Council on Decentralization) has incorporated the need to constantly “take
the pulse” of citizens and not be solely limited to cabinet work around technical proposals. 
Finally, the USAID strategic plan will be supporting the decentralization process and the Pe￾ruvian Congress over the next five years. Most of these initiatives, however, are still strongly
dependent on the political will of a limited number of individuals and initial positive changes
are reversible. Civil society presence, partially supported by international funding, will still
be the best bet for institutionalization and sustainability.
“Traditionally, Peruvian state initiatives on decentralization have been supply￾driven with a strong inclination towards technical matters. OTI funded research 
permitted us (executive branch) to discover citizen demand on decentralization 
and to worry about the misconceptions and over-expectations that could eventu￾ally jeopardize even the best of technical proposals”. Member of Public Man￾agement Group in the Prime Minister’s Office
15
4. Support and Strengthen the New Peruvian Congress
OTI’s goal in working with Congress was to improve its institutional, political and adminis￾trative operations, and to improve the citizen-legislator relationship. In November 2001, the 
strategic objectives were redefined and limited to: 1) strengthening the Congress’ technical
capacity (focusing on ethics and internal reforms) and the implementation by Congress of
more participatory decision-making processes; and 2) increasing the level of citizen under￾standing regarding the roles and functions of the Peruvian Congress and increased citizen
participation in the legislative process.
Some $1.3 million was spent by 25 groups, including three congressional committees, on 36 
projects. When the project began, there were almost no civil society organizations working
on issues related to Congress and the process of selecting counterparts was not easy. OTI ap￾proached established civil society organizations and proposed that they include Congress in
their agenda. OTI also helped to establish new actors to begin work on Congress. The lack 
of local counterparts and OTI expertise with legislative development projects probably ham￾pered the success of Congressional program. 
The specific activities undertaken to achieve strategic objective one (see above) included the 
training of staff and members of Congress, preparation of studies or diagnostic materials to
provide key information in the congressional reform debate, and the organization of decen￾tralized hearings and policy debates sponsored by the Congress. Activities undertaken to￾wards strategic objectives two (see above) included holding workshops and training events 
on the role and functions of Congress, conducting information campaigns, and organizing
town hall meetings so that citizens and elected representatives might interact.
Support to Congress in Numbers 
Number of grants 36
Total funding $1,156,500 100%
ß Civil Society Organizations $1,002,051 99%
ß State Institutions $154,500 1%
Major Results
ß #of legislators and aides trained 50 legislators/400 aides 
ß #of congressional commissions that carried 
out OTI activities in Lima and decentralized 
offices 
5
ß #people who participated in public audiences 
of other events sponsored by Congress and 
funded by OTI 
7000 persons 
ß #people who were trained on the role and 
functions of Congress (through workshops, 
citizens fairs, theatre, board games, informa￾tion campaigns) 
10,000 persons
ß #citizen oversight networks established as the 
result of OTI training 
5 
ß #OTI funded studies 15 (approx.)
16
Based on individual interviews and OTI documentation, OTI’s congressional project was
partially successful in achieving its strategic objectives. Obstacles were encountered in the
effort to strengthen the technical capacity of the Congress and in implementing more partici￾patory decision-making processes. This appears to be because it was difficult to plan activi￾ties with members of Congress given their political demands, members’ reluctance to receive 
training, and in some cases, members’ reluctance to interact with civil society. While 50
members of Congress and 400 congressional aides received training and five offices or
commissions carried out public hearings outside of Congress, it is difficult to judge the im￾pact of these activities. Some of the various studies and research on Congress were more
successful, such as the widely used “Parliamentary Manual” produced by the Andean Com￾mission of Jurists. 
On the other hand, the effort to increase the level of citizen understanding regarding the roles 
and functions of Congress and increased citizen participation in the legislative process ap￾pears to be more successful at least in terms of sheer numbers of participation. Seven thou￾sand people participated in activities that were sponsored by Congress and financed by OTI. 
These included the National Consultation on the General Education Law, the debate on con￾stitutional reform, and training courses on the roles and functions of Congress. Although it is 
difficult to assess the impact of these activities, it is important to point out that five citizen
oversight networks were established and are operating to monitor Congressional activity.
At least 10,000 Peruvians, including elementary, high school and university students, aca￾demics, and male and female leaders of grassroots groups were trained on the role and func￾tion of Congress, through workshops, videos, board games, and plays.
OTI developed its initial goals and strategic objectives in a March 2001 assessment. Follow￾ing the election of a new Congress and a new congressional leadership in November 2001, 
OTI reassessed its efforts with Congress and focused on the strategic objectives mentioned 
above. 
While OTI was in-tune with the changing political context, Congress itself presented several
challenges that were outside of OTI’s control. The greatest challenge was the lack of con￾crete support and participation by the Congress, with a few exceptions, in OTI’s efforts to
collaborate on a reform process and Congress’ failure to take advantage of opportunities to 
interact with citizens.
“Our participants are not like the typical participant in an OTI project. OTI usually 
works with leaders, but in our case, OTI worked with women at the grassroots level. 
Our members come from the “club de madres” and the “comedores populares auto￾gestionadores.” With OTI, we trained 1500 women on the role of Congress and, as a 
result, four citizen oversight committees were established.” Maritza Barquero,
Exceutive Director, Centro de la Mujer Amazonas
17
Regarding institutionalization of support to Congress, USAID/Office of Democratic Initia￾tives has made a multi-year commitment to support legislative development. According to
OTI staff, the USAID mission did not consult with OTI before designing its new congres￾sional project, although the USAID did consult with specific OTI grantees and has included 
some OTI grantees in its new legislative development program. 
In addition to the confirmed USAID-financed legislative development program, the In￾teramerican Development Bank plans a major legislative program and several bilateral do￾nors have occasional activities. The Peruvian Congress has opened a special office to coor￾dinate international development assistance. This office may be useful in channeling and in￾stitutionalizing reform efforts.
5. Increase Civil Society Interest and Involvement in Combating Corruption
The anti-corruption theme had two objectives. The first was to increase civil society interest 
and involvement in the development and implementation of new national initiatives to com￾bat corruption. OTI supported projects to train public officials and civil society organiza￾tions, supported debates on anti-corruption issues and supported information campaigns on
combating corruption. Indicators of impact identified included: number of articles or pro￾grams in selected media; number of persons trained; number of initiatives by government to
address corruption issues; and polling data on citizen understanding and attitudes towards
corruption. The second objective was to establish citizen oversight groups and networks to 
effectively monitor and provide oversight of the management and use of public resources in
selected areas. Information campaigns, technical assistance and institutional support, and
leadership training and training of journalists were financed by OTI to achieve this objective. 
Indicators of success included: number of participants in training events and information
campaigns; number of citizen oversight groups/networks in the areas; and number of people
participating in citizen oversight groups.
OTI financed and implemented a total of 36 projects aimed at achieving the objectives. (An
additional two projects were financed under this theme to pursue a special target of opportu￾nity providing public defender services to prisoners). OTI approved a total of $824,696 for 
the 36 anti-corruption projects. (An additional $160,593 was approved, in two projects, for 
the special initiative with public defenders). 
OTI financed project outputs have included: 148 workshops trained an average of 29 partici￾pants (total 4292); four radio campaigns reached an average of 600,000 people; anti￾corruption fairs were attended by an estimated total of 50,000 people; and four information
pamphlets were published and distributed to an estimated 10,000 people. Six local area vigi￾lance networks were trained and other non-governmental organizations in six target areas
“Overall I’m not too sure how effective OTI’s work with Congress was. It’s not easy to 
work with Congress. But OTI did introduce a new line of work- consultations with citi￾zens on legislation – which was very important. OTI also experimented with different 
approaches, which will help us with our new program with USAID.” Antonio 
Gonzalez, Director, International Cooperation, Peruvian Congress 
18
outside of Lima were trained in how to develop anti-corruption oversight activities. Several
studies/analyses were produced on anti-corruption issues.
The Anti-Corruption Program in Numbers
Number of grants 38
Total funding 1,011,863 100%
ß Civil society organizations 791,797 48%
ß State institutions 218,105 17%
ß Private firms 1,960 35%
Major Results
ß 148 anti-corruption workshops (peo￾ple trained)
4292
ß 4 radio campaigns (average audi￾ence)
600,000
ß anti-corruption fair attendance 50,000
ß information pamphlet recipients 10,000
ß local vigilance networks trained 6
The primary measure of anti-corruption impact used by OTI was a comparison of citizen atti￾tudes and reported practices on corruption issues with a national sample survey baseline es￾tablished in November of 2001 and a follow-up survey conducted in November 2002. No 
significant changes in citizen attitudes towards corruption issues were detected by the survey.
 
Objective one assumed strong leadership by Peru executive branch on anti-corruption front, 
which was not forthcoming. For a country the size of Peru, 26 million people and a land 
area that is twice the size of France, the expectation that an investment of less than one mil￾lion dollars over 18 months could leverage measurable national level action on anti￾corruption primarily driven by civil society organizations may have been unrealistic. A na￾tion-wide survey, funded by OTI in December 2002, showed that 70 percent of those polled 
either had a high or medium tolerance for corrupt acts.
National level interest in anti-corruption activities is still largely focused on the pursuit of
judicial remedies against the Fujimori/Montesinos administration. The ability of Peru’s de￾mocratic institutions to deal with the trials, etc., will have an impact on citizen perceptions in
the anti-corruption theme. There is some evidence of sustainability of civil society efforts to 
address corruption issues. The formation of the national consortium of NGOs, PROETICA, 
promises a continuation of a forum for debate on the issues. OTI supported this organization. 
PROETICA’s Executive Director, Laura Puertas, noted that she expected financial support 
from other donors. “The Canadians feel that the U.S. is ahead of them in the anti-corruption 
area and we expect financing from them.”
Continuing issues in the theme included: high levels of citizen tolerance of corruption in 
daily life; and low credibility given to public institutions (justice system) and perceived lack 
of responsiveness of those institutions to citizen concerns on corruption issues. 
19
Section V. Programmatic Findings and Recommendations
1. OTI’s Ability to Meet its Stated Program Objectives
OTI was able to meet its program objectives. In terms of meeting the strategic objectives, the 
support to the truth and reconciliation commission, strengthening local government and de￾centralization, and the civil military area were the most successful OTI programs. The area 
of support to the new Peruvian Congress and the anti-corruption program were not as suc￾cessful as the previously mentioned OTI programs. 
In terms of sustainability and institutionalization, work in the area of decentralization and
support to Congress, and to a lesser extent anti-corruption, will continue with multi-year 
USAID-financed programs. Furthermore, the political commitment from the Peruvian gov￾ernment, people and Congress to continue decentralization bodes well for the institutionaliza￾tion of decentralization and strengthening of local government. The reform commitment of
the Peruvian Congress remains to be seen. Given a lack of funding and interest from USAID
and other donors, the work on civil military matters does not appear sustainable. Further￾more, civilian authority over the armed forces and defense and security matters is still very
fragile and not yet institutionalized despite the current civil defense minister’s efforts. Re￾garding the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it will present its final report in June 2003 
and disband soon thereafter. There will be expectations to implement its recommendations 
and, undoubtedly, requests for donor support. USAID’s new justice reform program may
address either directly or indirectly some of the TRC’s recommendations. 
Recommendation:
USAID and the U.S. Embassy should look for ways to continue support for work on civil￾military relations. The need for civilian expertise on security issues and the need for civil￾military dialogue has increased with the passage of new regulatory norms, which give civil￾ians more control over the military, the naming of key civilians in the Ministry of Defense, 
and the desirability of including civil society in the development of a new strategic plan on 
security issues (the National Defense White Book). An historic opportunity exists for civil￾ians to develop knowledge and control over security issues and we recommend that this ef￾fort be supported. The OTI grantees report that no major bilateral donor or international or￾ganizations have plans to support work on civil-military issues. The Open Society Institute 
and the Ford Foundation are providing limited funding to two OTI grantees to continue ac￾tivities. 
2. OTI’s Ability to Modify its Strategic Objectives and Activities to Accommodate 
Changes in the Local Political Context
 
For most of OTI’s tenure in Peru, the institutional and political framework was in constant
flux. In the face of these challenges, OTI assessed the situation, learned from its experiences, 
refocused its strategic objectives and activities where necessary, and mounted a large and di-
20
verse program. OTI was successful in working in a rapidly changing political environment
and establishing itself as a transparent, credible actor. 
OTI benefited from USAID’s long-standing collaboration with a wide variety of Peruvian
civil society organizations. As one result, OTI enjoyed easy access to and credibility with
local counterparts. OTI also benefited from the especially dynamic, diverse and strong civil
society organizations already operating in Peru. The OTI program did serve to introduce new
themes and approaches in its work with established civil society organizations. In the case of
newer organizations, collaboration with OTI assisted in the institutionalization of some of
these groups. Furthermore, networks or coalitions on specific issues developed as a result of
OTI´s work.
3. The Appropriateness and Effectiveness of OTI’s Themes and of its Program as a 
Means to Effect Change 
All interviewees confirmed that OTI’s five programmatic areas were highly appropriate and
relevant to the effort to support Peru’s democratic transition. These five themes responded to 
a real demand from civil society that was not being met by other international actors. 
While the themes were relevant to the democratic transition, it is not clear whether OTI’s
program was an effective means to effect change. OTI sought to bring about attitudinal
changes regarding democracy and civil society participation, yet there are unique difficulties
in measuring and evaluating the impact of OTI’s projects. First, it is difficult to segregate
OTI’s impact from other environmental catalysts. Second, attitudinal changes can only be
verified in terms of mid to long-term institutionalization and sustainability. Third, adequate
monitoring and evaluation processes were not designed. Finally, attitudinal changes and
changes in political culture occur over a long period of time, and its hard to imagine a two￾year, $6.5 million program bringing about lasting change in a large, complex country such as 
Peru. 
Instead, we can confirm that OTI’s program served U.S. foreign policy and developmental
goals. Specifically, OTI’s program is credited with helping to establish a constructive rela￾tionship between the U.S. government and the newly elected Toledo government by clearly
and visibly demonstrating that US objectives in support of democracy coincided with the in￾terests of the new government. 
“OIT assistance has been helpful because it landed on fertile ground and allowed us to 
make the most of the political moment” Enrique Obando, President, Instituto de 
Estudios Politicos y Estrategicos”
21
Section VI. Monitoring and Evaluation Findings 
OTI gave considerable attention to the monitoring and evaluation needs of its program
throughout the period of program design and implementation. Staff efforts were concen￾trated in three areas:
1. Specific objectives and indicators were included in each of the sub-grants that OTI fi￾nanced.
2. OTI identified indicators of accomplishment at the theme level.
3. A final evaluation was planned to assess overall program accomplishments.
The evaluation team reviewed a sample of 30 of the individual grants and confirmed that the 
indicators were relevant and that grantees reported results against those indicators. Creative 
Associates program development officers monitored progress of each of the grants against
those objectives and indicators. 
OTI also developed specific objectives and results indicators for each of the program themes 
in which it was active. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Decentralization, Support for
the Congress, Civil Military Dialogue and Anti-Corruption. The initial sets of indicators
were primarily drawn from the sub-grants. Since various grantees used similar techniques to 
achieve their individual grant objectives, such as training, seminars, workshops, etc. OTI
staff aggregated those results in measuring progress at the overall theme levels. Similarly,
significant individual grantee accomplishments, significant input into legislation, new or re￾vised government regulation, influential publication etc. were identified as they related to
relevant theme objectives. Media coverage of OTI funded civil society activities was also
monitored as evidence of program accomplishment. Some initial efforts were made to assess 
changes in attitudes and knowledge of citizens targeted by OTI financed media programs.
OTI’s operational model, however, presents some conceptual and operational difficulty in
designing appropriate evaluation instruments at the theme level. Fundamentally, OTI’s pro￾gram responded to requests from civil society organizations and from certain public
organizations for each grant. OTI was not in position to design grants specifically to achieve 
its theme objectives, but rather reviewed grant applications for consistency with its objectives 
and probable contribution to achieving indicators/targets. OTI staff control over the direct
application of resources to the achievement of its objectives was imperfect. 
In October 2001, OTI contracted a local polling firm (Imasen) to supplement its measure￾ments of accomplishment in each of the themes. Using staff suggestions and then validating
them in focus groups, the local firm designed and carried out a national sample survey de￾signed to assess knowledge and attitudes on key issues in each of the program themes. The 
initial survey constituted a baseline for a subsequent survey. The focus group information
and the initial survey results also were useful to OTI and contractor program staff in concen￾trating grantee efforts on key issues. 
22
The national sample survey was repeated in November 2002. OTI project development offi￾cers analyzed the survey results and summarized the accomplishments against the theme￾wide indicators as part of the contractor final reports on each of the programming themes. In 
general, no statistically significant changes in knowledge or attitudes on issues targeted by
OTI programming were recorded in the second national survey in any of the five program￾ming themes. 
The evaluation team’s assessment of the survey initiative, confirmed by interviews with the
firm contracted for the work, is that it was inadequate for the intended purpose of assessing
OTI´s impact because:
· slightly different sampling methodology from one survey to the next limited the
validity of comparisons;
· polling questions did not accurately reflect OTI strategic objectives, limiting the abil￾ity to establish a causal connection between OTI programs and changes in inter￾viewee responses. According to the IMASEN director, the only thing the results
could have been reliably used for would have been to assess a general change in atti￾tudes among respondents. Even so, the time frame of one year between baseline and 
the second exit survey is too short to obtain solid results. 
Another monitoring device used by OTI staff to track grantee activity was a year-long media 
tracking service. Since many of the grantees’ activities resulted in media coverage in the
theme areas and other grantees used media placements as part of their training efforts, OTI 
staff attempted to establish criteria for a contractor to count media messages by each of the 
programming themes. This media tracking effort was of some use recording intensity of me￾dia coverage among the five themes. However For program monitoring purposes, it was
flawed because it could not discriminate between general news coverage (or coverage of
other donor activities in a particular theme) and coverage specifically attributable to OTI ac￾tivities. 
Recommendation:
OTI should include a monitoring and evaluation expert in proposed activities from the begin￾ning of the program. The expertise should continue to be made available at appropriate
stages during the life of the project. Specifically, the development of each program objective 
should include identification of indicators that will help measure whether the objective has
been achieved. If the program objective has to be changed, the indicators also should be re￾viewed to ensure that they continue to be appropriate.
23
Section VII. Management and Implementation Findings
The OTI program in Peru was both complex and active. From a management perspective, it 
presented several challenges. A summary quantitative analysis is useful to capture those
challenges. During the two years of program activity, 245 grant projects were approved. 
Another 464 projects were reviewed by program development staff and rejected. Only 14 
projects that were initially approved by OTI were cancelled or not completed for a variety of 
reasons. The pace of project approvals accelerated strongly over the two-year period. Some 
90 projects were approved during the first year, with 155 approved during the last year of the 
program. Implementation for many of the initial year’s approvals fell into the last year as
well. Over 75 separate groups received OTI assistance, with many more participating indi￾rectly. Because of the nature of the projects, each grant approval implied multiple implemen￾tation actions, which OTI and its contractor directly managed. The implementation staff
dealt with over 2500 separate vendors during the course of the program. 
Overall, given the uncertain environment and the nature of the short-term response designed 
to respond to the democratic evolution in Peru, the program was managed to a successful
conclusion. Nevertheless, the team believes that OTI should learn from its management ex￾perience in Peru. Because the program has been closed and many data sources were not
available to the team in Peru, our ability to precisely identify the learning agenda was some￾what limited. We believe OTI should focus on the following questions: How is the interface 
between program and implementation staff managed, what kind of management information
system is needed to facilitate OTI and contractor adjustments in staffing and internal proce￾dures, and how should OTI try to shorten the learning curve of its grantees in dealing with its 
implementation model. 
1. Start-up Issues
The evaluation scope of work highlighted two questions on start-up issues: How did the OTI￾Mission and OTI-Embassy relationships affect program start-up of the OTI/Peru program? 
And, Did OTI appropriately identify all start-up needs in a timely fashion, or are there les￾sons learned which could be useful for future OTI programs?
The OTI Peru program start-up was delayed because the USAID Mission had an active de￾mocracy support program in its portfolio and was interested in close coordination with OTI
activities and the U.S. Embassy, which had been closely associated with the Fujimori gov￾ernment by Peruvian public perception, sensed a need to repair its image, and was concerned 
that OTI activities responded to that need. Consequently, both the Mission and the Embassy 
were intimately involved in reviewing and approving the initial grants which OTI proposed. 
While OTI staff reported that they learned a lot about the local environment and local NGOs 
as they reviewed potential grants with USAID staff, they also were frustrated at the slow ini￾tial pace of grant approvals. OTI staff arrived in Peru in February 2001 and the first grant 
was approved in May 2001. The OTI representative also participated in the Embassy “De￾mocracy Committee” and spent considerable time keeping its members informed about OTI
activities and potential activities. Managing the evolution of these essential relationships
consumed far more OTI staff time than had been planned. It is a credit to the OTI staff that 
24
within several months, a much more efficient relationship was established with both the
USAID Mission and with the Embassy. .John Hamilton, U.S. Ambassador said: “I started as 
a skeptic on OTI’s program in Peru, but as it progressed, I became a strong supporter.” 
While OTI identified start-up needs quickly and mounted its presence in Peru within a very
short period of time, the initial choice of contractor chief of party had to be changed and the 
design and operation of the contractor management information systems was cumbersome. 
A frustrating oversight of the initial organization left the Creative Associates contractor
without tax exemption protection under the USAID bilateral agreement with the Government 
of Peru. The issue did not slow down OTI activities nor impede their effectiveness, but it
increased costs of the activities. 
Recommendation:
To facilitate project start-up in countries already hosting a USAID Mission, a formal agree￾ment regarding the relationship and coordination between the Mission and OTI should be
developed at the beginning of the project.
2. Management of the Grant Cycle
While the evaluation scope of work asked: How effective was OTI/Peru’s contractor in meet￾ing OTI’s goals to be fast, flexible, and cost effective? The evaluation team tried to under￾stand the implementation challenges faced by the contractor. Understanding the grant cycle 
is the key. The OTI project development officers (PDOs) were the initial point of contact
between OTI and the grantees. They received the grant proposals then worked with the
NGOs, private firms, or government institutions to shape the final grant agreements. Upon
approval, the grants were handed off to the contractor implementation staff to support NGO 
implementation. Given the OTI model of direct procurement of goods and services required 
for implementation, each grant implied several different procurements. In the aggregate, the
245 approved grants caused the contractor implementation staff to deal with over 2,500 dif￾ferent vendors. The concentration of grant approvals in the last year of the two-year program 
caused a considerable bunching of implementation actions. While the contractor increased 
the implementation staff to meet increased transaction volumes, the PDOs also helped out in
implementation actions. The increase in implementation work load should have been pre￾dictable, but the head of the implementation staff reported considerable overwork and stress 
during the last six months of the OTI program. Significant diversion of PDO time from moni￾toring grant accomplishments could have been costly to overall program objectives. 
Recommendation:
OTI staff and the contractor chief-of-party should actively manage the interaction between
program and implementation staff to ensure that approved programs are supported, not ham￾pered, by the capacity to deliver assistance. Adequate information systems are needed to
support OTI management.
25
4. Use and Effectiveness of the Data Base as a Management Tool
The evaluation team, OTI staff, and Creative staff did not find the programmatic database to 
be a fully useful management tool to monitor or evaluate project grants. It was useful only to 
report project activity and final expenditures. However, the procurement and financial data￾bases were lauded as very useful by the procurement staff. While the programmatic database 
recorded project details, it could not be manipulated in any meaningful way. Given the num￾ber of grants, it would have been useful for monitoring and evaluation purposes to be able to 
aggregate grant activity by major recipient, by theme, by geographic location of intended
grant activity, etc. Even the PDO’s final reports comparing grant activity to strategic objec￾tives appear to rely on manual summaries of program information. As part of its evaluation,
the team manually prepared Annex C which characterizes the OTI Peru grant portfolio by
type of recipient, size of grant and objective. The USAID chief of the Office of Democratic 
Initiatives said she had been asking for this kind of information, but the database could not 
produce it.
1
Recommendation:
OTI should develop and use a database that can be an effective management tool. The data￾base should permit manipulation of program information. For example, sorting information
by recipient, geographic location, grant objective and other variables would be useful to sup￾port management decisions. Such capability also would facilitate strategy reviews during
program implementation and subsequent evaluation efforts. OTI contractors and staff should 
receive sufficient training on the database to take advantage of its capability to provide useful
management information.
4. Advantages and Disadvantages of the In-kind Donation Mechanism.
Under the OTI in-kind assistance model, the grantees receive goods and services, as specified 
in the grant agreement, purchased by the contractor implementation staff. The OTI/Peru de￾mocracy support grants involved a variety of relatively small activities, seminars, workshops, 
training activities in rural and urban areas, limited equipment and a lot of in-country travel. 
All grantees offered opinions on the model. For most, it was a form of assistance with which 
they were not familiar. Most grantees learned to use the model and some thought it was use￾ful because it obviated the need for them to worry about the need for financial accounting
and auditing services. For some, however, it was a cumbersome mechanism. Generally, lar￾ger grantees, particularly those with non-OTI sources of money, had little difficulty using the 
 
1
The OTI grant database support staff disagree with the assertion that "the database could not produce" infor￾mation on grant recipients, size, and objectives. Upon return from Peru and after meeting with the grant data￾base support staff, the chief evaluator agreed stating, "It appears that the database program captures much of the 
information that the [evaluation] team noted would have been useful." The chief evaluator added, "Inexplicably, 
the information was not used by OTI staff in the Peru project." The OTI grant database support staff further 
clarified this point, noting that OTI/Peru staff did not know how to fully utilize the database capability. They 
further pointed out that OTI has strengthened its commitment to database training for all OTI and implementing 
partner personnel. 
26
OTI assistance. In an illustrative case, when detailed grant planning omitted a key item for a 
workshop (flip charts), the grantee simply used its own resources to purchase them. Others 
coped with the OTI model differently. Servicios Educativos Rurales, (SER) designated one 
of its administrative staff to act as a full time liaison with the OTI implementation contractor 
to ensure that grant implementation needs were met. Over the course of the OTI program, 
the staff developed written instructions and explanatory materials designed to orient NGOs to 
make effective use of the in-kind assistance model. NGOs did adapt to the model.
For OTI, the in-kind assistance model reduces the risks of financial diversion and allows
programs to be closed out without long lag times of grantee audits, recoveries and other ad￾ministrative chores which could add to overhead. The model is not cost free to recipients. 
Many devoted considerable time to coordination with the OTI administrative staff. The need 
to specify precise items needed to implement each grant activity also may slow the grant
preparation process. The model also can be inflexible. When changes are required such as a 
work shop has to be delayed because of bad weather, working with a variety of vendors to re￾plan hotel space, travel arrangements, media representation, etc. puts stress on all involved. 
Recommendation:
OTI should adapt the model to accommodate the kinds of projects being financed. While it 
does allow OTI to work with smaller groups, it is difficult for some groups to administer and 
is relatively inflexible in accommodating changes of dates or locale for events planned in ap￾proved projects. 
5. OTI’s Efforts in Situations of Democratic Transitions
OTI is particularly well suited to provide assistance in complex, fast-moving situations of
democratic transition. Its rapid deployment mechanisms can provide assistance outside nor￾mal USAID programming cycle. OTI can establish a constructive relationship with transi￾tion and newly elected democratic governments by providing fast and flexible funding in the
principal areas of concern to the new government and civil society. In this way, the U.S. 
government can effectively demonstrate and provide concrete support for democratic transi￾tions. In situations of democratic transitions, OTI can be an effective tool for achieving U.S. 
foreign policy and development goals. 
“US objectives in the post Fuijimori period were to stabilize and facilitate the democratic transi￾tion and to recover the US image. OTI was very useful politically to the Embassy because it had 
quick funds available for projects for public diplomacy and for projects of interest to senior Peru￾vian government officials.” Willard Smith, Political officer, US Embassy, Peru
“We have heard on numerous occasions from President. Toledo and his leadership group that the 
US government has been very consistent in supporting the reestablishment of democracy. It’s 
clear that he means that the US responded to specific government requests. It was OTI that was 
able to respond to specific requests when other USAID funds were already tied up. Good exam￾ples are support to the TRC and civil military affairs.” Ken Yamashita, USAID Deputy Director
27
Annex A: People and Organizations Contacted
U.S. Government Staff in Washington
Russell Porter, Americas Team Leader
USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives 
(OTI)
Camara Garrett, Program Manager
USAID/OTI
Mary Stewart, Team Leader 
USAID/OTI 
Chris Phillips
Former OTI director 
Tom Geiger
Former USAID Mission Director, Peru
Neil Levine
USAID, Democracy and Governance Cen￾ter
Tom Cornell 
Former director, Office of South American 
and Mexican Affairs
Bureau for Latin American and the Carib￾bean
Roberta Jacobson
Former DCM, US Embassy Peru
John Hamilton
Former US Ambassador, Peru
Madeline Williams
Former Democracy and Governance pro￾gram manager in Peru
Richard Miles
Peru Desk Officer, US Dept. of State
Keri Eisenbeis
Former OTI civil-mililtary advisor
Richard McCall
Creative Associates International
Joel Jutkowitz
Development Alternatives International 
Program Management and Implementation Staff in Peru
Sandra Shuster, Chief of Party
Creative Associates
Hugo Centurion, Camila Gianella, Soraya 
Altabas, and
Monica Saravia, Program Development 
Officers 
Cecilia Delgado, Program Implementation 
Director
Creative Associates
US Government Staff in Peru 
Holly Flood, Program Director
USAID/OTI 
Eurydice Rodrick, Program Manager
USAID/OTI
Patricia Buckles
USAID Mission Director 
Ken Yamashita
USAID Mission Deputy Director
Kim Delaney 
28
USAID Chief, Office of Democratic Ini￾tiatives (ODI)
Stephen Brager
USAID, Deputy Chief, ODI
Willard Smith
First Secretary, Political Section, US Em￾bassy Peru
Colonel Bruce Yost
MAAG, US Embassy Peru 
OTI Grantees in Lima
Jose Antonio Gonzalez, Director
Ramon Perez, Advisor
International Cooperation Directorate
Congress of the Republic of Peru
David Lovaton, Executive Director
Ana Maria Tamayo, Director of Civil￾Military Project
Instituto de Defensa Legal 
Enrique Obando, President
Instituto de Estudios Politicos y 
Estrategicos 
Ricardo Uceda, Executive Director
Jenny Cabreras, Administrative Officer 
Instituto de Prensa y Sociedad 
Kela Leon, Projects Director 
Consejo de la Prensa Peruana
Ivete Motin, Coordinator
Desiree Rubio de Marzo, Press 
Coordinator 
Grupo Iniciativas de Proyectos en 
Comunicaciones 
Alberto Otarola, Project Director 
Comision Andina de Juristas 
Juan Rodriguez Kelley, President
Centro de Estudios Estrategicos en 
Defensa y Seguridad 
Percy Medina, Secretary General
Jorge Salazar, Project Director
Asociacion Civil Transparencia
Maritza Barquero, Executive Director 
Asociacion Centro de la Mujer “Las 
Amazonas”
Laura Puertas, Executive Director
PROETICA
Raul Callirgos, National Direcor
Ministry of Justice
Oscar Galdo and Liliana Alfaro
Donor Liaison Officer and Special 
Assistant to the Director
Controlaria
Javier Torres Seoane, Director
Servicios Educativos Rurales
Raul Tecco, Senior advisor
Friedrich Ebert Foundation
Monitoring and Evaluation Contacts in 
Lima
Javier Sirvas, Jose Soriano
Media Check
Giovanna Penaflor
General Manager 
IMASEN 
OTI Grantees outside of Lima 
Ayacucho
Rocio del Pilar Vargas Morales, 
Representative 
Defensora del Pueblo
29
Jose Coronel, regional office director
Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
Jeffery Gamarra
IPEZ
Arequipa
Gina Ramos, Jamie Paredes 
Red Interquorum Arequipa
Hugo Ramirez
Amakella
Radio Yaravi
Alberto Munoz Najar
Macroregion Sur
Piura
Eugenia Fernan
Defensora del Pueblo
Enrique Gomez
Red Interquorum Piura
Belia Concha
Radio Cutivalu
Other Experts 
John Youle
Former Director, American Chamber of 
Commerce, Lima
Jorge Santiestevan
Former Defensor Del Pueblo de Peru
Maragrita Seminario, Director
Legislative Strengthening Program of 
Peruvian Congress, State University of 
New York
Michael Shifter
Inter-American Dialogue 
30
Annex B: Final Evaluation of the OTI Peru Program
Scope of Work
I. Introduction
The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) was established by USAID in 1994 to support peaceful de￾mocratic change in countries of strategic importance and humanitarian concern to the United States. 
As part of USAID’s Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, OTI provides 
rapid, flexible assistance to countries poised for or undergoing political transitions. It serves as a 
‘rapid deployment’ agent addressing urgent transitional needs that cannot be conducted immediately 
by other USAID mechanisms. 
OTI enables USAID to capitalize on ‘windows of opportunity’ where quickly deployed aid can make 
a critical difference to a country’s transition to peaceful, democratic government. Interventions are 
tied to pivotal events, such as cease-fires, peace accords, or the advent of progressive leadership, of￾ten through key elections. OTI responds swiftly to these events with near-term, high-impact actions 
that target a country’s most pressing transitional needs.
While OTI’s interventions are fundamentally near-term, they lay the foundation for further long-term 
development assistance. While in-country, OTI works to bring new groups into the transition process, 
tests new activities for advancing democratic governance, and provides fast and flexible support for 
immediate transition needs. As appropriate and necessary, relationships and practices that prove pro￾ductive may be handed off to the USAID mission or other donors for further development when OTI 
phases out. For more information on OTI, please visit the website at
http://www.usaid.gov/hum_response/oti.
II. OTI/Peru 
USAID/OTI launched its Peru Program in February 2001. The overall objective of the OTI program 
is to support the democratic opening created by the fall of President Alberto Fujimori’s government in 
November 2000. OTI’s work complements and reinforces the USAID mission’s goal of encouraging 
greater citizen participation and engagement in the political process at all levels of government. OTI 
works to promote more participatory and transparent decision-making processes, with the goal of in￾creasing responsiveness and accountability in all levels of government. OTI’s Peru program grants 
have provided support for a wide range of activities including round-tables, information campaigns, 
technical assistance and training, and other short-term, high-impact activities that are primarily im￾plemented by Peruvian governmental and non-governmental institutions. Since the inception of the 
program OTI/Peru has approved more than 200 grants, mostly under $100,000 each. The total Febru￾ary 2001 – February 2003 budget for grants and overhead is approximately $11 million. 
III. Program Areas
Through a consultative process involving OTI/Peru and U.S. Embassy staff as well as numerous Pe￾ruvian civil society and governmental representatives, five key areas were identified as central to a 
successful democratic transition in Peru and in need of OTI short-term support. These are: increased 
civilian oversight of the military and improved civil-military relations; support and technical assis￾tance for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) established to address human rights abuses 
in Peru between 1980 and 2000; decentralization and local government strengthening; Congressional 
reform; and anti-corruption. A brief description of each area follows.
31
Civilian-Military Relations – OTI’s program focuses on three areas: strengthening Congressional 
capacity to enact defense policy and make informed, participatory decisions related to defense and 
security; improving the quality and quantity of media coverage of defense and security issues; and 
increasing the level of interest and understanding by civil society regarding defense and security is￾sues and the importance of civilian oversight of the military. Civilian-Military Relations objectives
are to:
· Improve civilian oversight of the military; 
· Develop more informed, participatory decision-making processes related to defense and secu￾rity; improve the quality and quantity of media coverage of military; 
· Increase civil society's understanding of defense policy and the importance of civilian control 
over the military.
Truth and Reconciliation Commission – OTI’s program focuses on informing the Peruvian public 
(particularly affected populations) about the TRC and its work. OTI also supports training and techni￾cal support to the TRC and institutions with which it works to ensure that it has the technical capacity 
to fulfill its mission. Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) objective is to:
· Enhance the work of the TRC and of NGOs that work in coordination with the TRC to ensure 
that its impact is maximized.
Decentralization and Local Government – OTI’s program focuses on informing civil society and 
local governments about decentralization, facilitating citizen participation in the decentralization pol￾icy process, and increasing citizen engagement in local government decision-making. Decentraliza￾tion and Local Government objectives are to:
· Inform civil society about new policy proposals; 
· Facilitate broad public participation in the policy-making process; 
· Strengthen participatory local governance. 
Congressional Reform – OTI’s program supports training and technical assistance to Congress 
members and staff, informing Peruvian citizens about the role and functions of Congress to promote 
more effective oversight of Congressional performance, and facilitating the implementation of more 
participatory and responsive decision-making processes. Congressional Reform objective is to:
facilitate Congressional accountability and responsiveness to the Peruvian electorate. 
Anti-Corruption – OTI’s program in this area funds activities to increase civil society interest and 
involvement in the development and implementation of new national initiatives to combat corruption 
and to strengthen civil society capacity to monitor the management and use of public resources. Anti￾Corruption objectives are to:
· Promote the development of national initiatives to combat corruption;
· Increase capacity of civil society and local institutions to monitor the management and use of 
public resources. 
OTI/Peru has held strategy reviews approximately every six months to examine its program design 
and implementation strategies to ensure that they are in line with Peru’s constantly-changing political 
context and are consistent with other USAID support. These strategy review sessions have also facili￾tated the development of a plan for the transition of OTI’s activities, as appropriate, to USAID/Peru’s 
Office of Democratic Initiatives (ODI) and/or other donors. While adjustments and refinements have 
been made, OTI’s initial programmatic focus and subject areas have remained intact. 
32
IV. Program Management
The ability to provide fast, flexible assistance is critical to OTI’s work. OTI has developed innovative 
funding mechanisms to ensure that speed and flexibility do not come at the expense of accountability. 
One highly successful tool is the Support Which Implements Fast Transition (SWIFT) IQC (Indefi￾nite Quantity Contract) mechanism, which OTI has used in a number of its programs, including Peru. 
Through SWIFT, OTI/Peru has worked with a variety of counterparts to implement its program, in￾cluding governmental offices and institutions, newly-established NGOs, small associations and stu￾dent groups.
V. Objectives of the Evaluation 
The principal objectives of this evaluation are two-fold: to determine the extent to which OTI/Peru 
met its program objectives; and to assess OTI program management effectiveness in pursuing these 
objectives. The evaluation will examine all five areas of the program’s work as well as assess pro￾gram management including strategy development and revision, program implementation, administra￾tion, and monitoring and evaluation activities. 
Program Questions 
Was OTI/Peru’s programmatic design appropriate as a means to effect change in Peru? (Were the five 
program areas selected the most salient to supporting Peru’s transition to democracy?
Did OTI/Peru meet its stated program objectives?
Was OTI/Peru sufficiently flexible to successfully adjust or modify its programmatic focus in re￾sponse to the evolving political environment? 
Which of OTI’s five program areas were most/least successful and why?
How effective was OTI/Peru’s monitoring plan in collecting useful information and using it to make 
program decisions? 
What is OTI “leaving behind” for USAID, other donors, and its implementing partners? How is OTI’s 
support expected to contribute to the effectiveness of longer-term ODI planned support.?
Management/Implementation Questions
How did the OTI-Mission and OTI-Embassy relationships affect program start-up of the OTI/Peru 
program?
Did OTI appropriately identify all start-up needs in a timely fashion, or are there lessons learned 
which could be useful for future OTI programs?
How effective was OTI/Peru’s contractor contractor in meeting OTI’s goals to be fast, flexible, and 
cost effective? 
Were mechanisms in place to ensure effective grants and project management, track and report spend￾ing? 
Were steps taken to ensure that local groups all had equal access to OTI assistance? 
Lessons Learned
What are the main programmatic lessons that can be learned from OTI’s work with local government 
entities, local media and NGO groups, community-based reconstruction projects, and conflict preven￾tion and mitigation efforts?
What were the main management and administrative lessons that can be learn, particularly in relation 
to OTI’s ability to meet its programmatic goals? 
33
What lessons can be learned from the planning for hand over and relations with the USAID Mission, 
other donors, the UN, and other partners?
Recommendations
Based on the evaluation findings and lessons learned, what are your programmatic recommendations 
for OTI’s on-going work in other countries?
What recommendations can you make regarding more effective program management?
More effective M&E design and implementation for future OTI programs.
VI. Methodology
The evaluation team is responsible for developing a coherent evaluation methodology that uses both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches. The methodology should include, but not be limited to inter￾views, document review, including OTI past results reviews (R4s), monthly reports, the OTI Peru 
database, surveys, diagnostic reports, strategy session reports, and monitoring and evaluation reports. 
Methodologies, including how the team will conduct field visits to evaluate the program’s manage￾ment and implementation, will be developed in consultation with OTI. The evaluation team should be 
composed of three people, all of whom should be fluent Spanish-speakers.
VII. Timing
A proposed timeline for the evaluation follows, but OTI will work with the evaluation team upon 
award to further define the evaluation timeline and to determine deliverable due dates.
Washington, DC (maximum of 10 business days per team member): Review OTI documents, develop 
work plan, and interview relevant OTI staff including the Program Development Team and Latin 
America Team. Interview key non-OTI USAID/Washington personnel, and other relevant field part￾ners with offices in the D.C. area. Meetings will be developed in coordination with OTI/Washington 
staff. 
Peru (estimated 12 business days of fieldwork per team member): Meetings with OTI and CAII staff, 
USAID and US Embassy personnel, local grantees and other implementing partners, to be determined 
in coordination with local OTI staff. Members of the team will make a minimum of two field trips to 
areas outside of Lima where OTI has implemented its program.
Washington, DC (maximum of 10 business days): Final report writing. 
VIII. Deliverables/Debriefings
The selected evaluation team will be expected to produce the following deliverables:
A work plan will be finalized by the evaluation team prior to departure for Peru, and cleared by the 
OTI Program Development Team, OTI/Latin America Team Leader in Washington, and the OTI/Peru 
Country Representative in Lima.
A six to eight page summary report of the major findings to be prepared and shared in the field. 
A final report as described below.
The final evaluation report should include quoted comments from interviewees, including but not lim￾ited to beneficiaries, grantees, OTI/CAII local and expatriate staff, OTI Washington-based staff, 
Washington-based USAID staff, USAID/Peru and US Embassy staff. The evaluation team should 
make use of existing documents related to OTI’s Peru program, which should be referenced, in the 
evaluation team's final report. The final reports will be comprised of at least the following sections:
34
· Executive summary
· Introduction and background;
· Summary of evaluation objectives and methodology;
· Significant successes and challenges;
· Programmatic and managerial lessons learned; and,
· Recommendations for other OTI programs.
In addition to the three deliverables, the evaluation team will be expected to provide briefings on its 
findings, including:
Based on the six to eight page summary report of the findings, a preliminary debriefing will be pre￾sented to the OTI/CAII management team and USAID/Peru staff in Lima prior to the evaluation 
team’s departure. 
A preliminary briefing of the team’s findings and recommendations to OTI/Washington staff upon 
return from Peru; and,
A final briefing to be determined by the OTI Latin America Team in Washington, DC.
IX. Team Composition
The evaluation team shall consist of one team leader, and one additional field-experienced evaluation 
specialist. The team leader should have extensive experience designing and conducting evaluations. If 
required, an additional member of the evaluation team can be hired locally to provide logistical and 
facilitation support.
One team member must have proven knowledge of and experience related to democracy programs. 
Familiarity with Peruvian politics, democracy and human rights programs and previous experience 
conducting evaluations in these areas is preferred. Local OTI staff may be available to help facilitate 
the work and logistical arrangements of the evaluation team when in Peru but the evaluation team 
should be prepared to conduct its work and move independently. The team will be expected to make 
a minimum of two field visits within Peru, in consultation with local staff.
The team should demonstrate the following experience and skills:
Content expertise: Academic and/or practical experience in designing, managing, implementing,
monitoring and evaluating democracy, and/or human rights programs in transition or post conflict 
settings;
Evaluation research: Academic experience in the social sciences evaluating programs, particularly in 
areas related to human rights and democracy building programs in transition or post conflict settings;
Rapid appraisal techniques: Academic training and experience with rapid appraisal techniques (sur￾vey development, direct observation, focus group interviews, community interviews and key infor￾mant interviews);
Survey and statistical analysis: Academic preparation and experience in survey research methods 
(survey design, sampling techniques and statistical computer applications);
Local knowledge: Specific knowledge of the Latin America (Peru strongly preferred) political, social, 
economic, and cultural environment; and, 
Language abilities: All members of the team will have a demonstrated knowledge of the Spanish lan￾guage. 
35
Annex C: Major OTI Grantees - Civil Society
Total grant amounts $100,000 and over
Organization Civil- Military Truth Com￾mission
Decentralization Anti￾corruption
Congressional 
reform
Total grant 
amounts
SER Servicios 
Educativos Ru￾rales
CA0020
62,422.62
CA0024
46,471.31
CA0078
12,820.32
CA0086
20,286.72
CA0023
67,702.93
CA0025
70.592.51
CA0136
68,474.24
CA0210
46,251.54
395,022.19
IDL Instituto de 
Defensa Legal
CA0045
12,821.35
CA0081
6,300.00
CA0130
18,248.91
CA0131
26,773.13
CA0059
29,916.87
CA0060
61,965.12
CA0148
38,060.00
CA0165
40.722.74
234,808.12
IPEDEHP
Instituto Peru￾ano de Educa￾ción en Dere￾chos Humanos y 
la Paz
CA0029
62,524.83
CA0099
62,414.41
CA0163
53,207.15
CA0243
21,195.76
199,342.15
Proética CA0021
12,405.91
CA0102
4,603.39
CA0192
57,796.89
CA0193
104,195.34
179,001.53
Transparencia CA0055
7,651.45
CA0075
51,465.54
CA0120
25,031.33
CA0142
59,183.84
CA0216
18,219.28
161,551.44
Comisión 
Andina de Juris￾tas
CA0185
37,015.69
CA0201
31,466.87
CA0208
21,152.04
CA0019
25,835.17
CA0085
5,303.23
CA0121
27,772.61
148,545.61
Promoviendo 
Derechos
CA0084
11,313.75
CA0101
78,831.82
CA0226
23,651.03
CA0236
24,657.29
138,453.89
Cuatro Tablas CA0109
33,650.31
CA0174
131,576.39
36
Organization Civil- Military Truth Com￾mission
Decentralization Anti￾corruption
Congressional 
reform
Total grant 
amounts
29,458.41
CA0232
68,467.67
IPYS Instituto 
Prensa y So￾ciedad
CA0033
50,198.48
CA0170
64,840.51
CA0215
13,876.35
128,915.34
IDEPE Instituto 
de Estudios 
Políticos y Es￾tratégicos
CA0026
58,360.31
CA0105
4,223.74
CA0172
1,820.54
CA0188
37,773.14
CA0191
8,361.17
CA0197
10,561.28
121,100.18
Instituto de 
Estudios Peru￾anos
CA0004
62,837.04
CA0112
58,175.63
121,012.67
Red para el 
Desarrollo de 
las Ciencias SS.
CA0096
59,520.72
CA0237
46,104.49
105,625.21
TOTAL 332,728.10 418,290.91 172,478.21 510,739.61 630,717.89 2,064,954.72
Other Important Civil Society OTI Grantees
Total grant amounts $51,000 - 99,999
Organization Civil- Military Truth Com￾mission
Decentralization Anti-corruption Congressional 
reform
Total grant 
amounts
Consejo de la 
Prensa Peruana
CA0110
12,739.99
CA0111
8,664.96
CA0126
26,076.85
CA0175
15,103.14
62,584.94
CEEDS Centro de 
Estudios Estraté￾gicos--
CA0108
25,618.29
CA0162
17,867.28
CA0189
4,714.42
CA0190
12,824,20
CA0245
19,295.62
80,319.81
Manuela Ramos CA0087
12,502.75
CA0202
73,310.24
85,812.99
37
Organization Civil- Military Truth Com￾mission
Decentralization Anti-corruption Congressional 
reform
Total grant 
amounts
Suma Ciudadana CA0132
77,168.81
77, 168.81
CEPEI
Centro Peruano de 
Estudios Interna￾cionales
CA0032
71,990.91
71,990.91
Red Interquorum 
(IQ)
CA0009 (AQP) 
1,477.84
CA0135 
15,913.90
CA0010 (Chicl)
1,482.46
CA0080 (RED)
4,014.58
CA0233
4,943.92
CA0093
(PIURA)
16,049.56
CA0092
659.62
CA0150
1,564.69
CA0180
20,569.91
66,676.48
APRODEH (Aso￾ciación pro dere￾chos humanos)
CA0018
4,272.87
CA0061
48,973.52
53,246.39
NDI. National 
Democratic Insti￾tute
CA0027 
63,273.00
63,273.00
EPAF. Equipo 
Peruano de An￾tropología 
Forense
CA0028
54,510.98
54,510.98
Foro Ecológico 
del Perú
CA0041
52,333.00
52,333.00
PROYAUYOS CA0046
17,335.28
CA0203
29,558.93
46,894.21
CNR CA0050
61,616.37
61,616.37
TOTAL 219,168.53 103,484.50 99,227.21 129,949.48 224,598.17 776,427.89
Other Civil Society OTI Grantees
Total grant amounts up to $50,000
Organization Civil- Military Truth Com￾mission
Decentralization Anti￾corruption
Congressional 
reform
Total grant 
amounts
SIDEA, Semi￾nario Interdisci￾plinario de 
Estudios Andi￾nos
CA0001
7,839.65
7,839.65
FEPUC. Facul￾tad de Educa￾CA0002 3,643.78
38
Organization Civil- Military Truth Com￾mission
Decentralization Anti￾corruption
Congressional 
reform
Total grant 
amounts
tad de Educa￾ción PUCP
3,643.78
AMMA. Aso￾ciación de Mu￾nicipalidades 
del Marañón 
Andino
CA0003
12,234.90
12,234.90
ASODEL Aso￾ciación para el 
desarrollo local
CA0006
12,326.04
12,326.04
Red Perú CA0007
39,640.41
39,640.41
TRAMAS CA0013
38,320.01
38,320.01
CICAP (Centro 
de Investigación 
capacitación 
asesoría y pro￾moción 
CA0014
12,166.39
12,166.39
IPAE
(instituto peru￾ano de adminis￾tración de em￾presas)
CA0015
9,626.90
9,626.90
EMGM. Es￾cuela mayor de 
gestión munici￾pal
CA0030
25,289.84
CA0198
3,270.42
28,560.26
Mesa de Con￾certación por el 
desarrollo del 
departamento de 
Ica
CA0031
10,523.24
10,523.24
SDE Servicios 
para el desar￾rollo equidad. 
CA0034
9,272.20
9,272.20
Centro de Pro￾moción de la 
Mujer Micaela 
Bastidas
CA0036
3,801.19
3,801.19
Centro de For￾mación apoyo y 
desarrollo ético 
cultural cris￾tiano
CA0039
5,361.72
5,361.72
Asociación 
cultural Atus￾paria
CA0042
15,429.59
15,429.59
Agroacción 
Andina
CA0043
18,931.81
18,931.81
Coordinadora 
Nacional de 
Derechos hu￾manos
CA0044
12,967.52
12,967.52
CODEIPA 
Comité de de￾sarrollo integral 
de la provincia 
de Aymaraes
CA0047
9,920.90
9,920.90
39
Organization Civil- Military Truth Com￾mission
Decentralization Anti￾corruption
Congressional 
reform
Total grant 
amounts
ALTERNATIV
A
CA0048
20,668.38
20,668.38
Comité Vicarial 
de derechos 
humanos del 
vicariato 
apostólico de 
pucallpa
CA0049
3,410.38
3,410.38
DESCO CA0051
10,343.38
10,343.38
CECODEL. 
Centro de com￾petitividad para 
el desarrollo 
local
CA0052
34,526.98
34,526.98
Centro de Co￾municación 
Amakella
CA0053
8,314.19
8,314.19
Instituto democ￾racia y desar￾rollo humano
CA0054
5,836.56
5,836.56
Cáritas 
Chachapoyas
CA0057
10,786.44
10,786.44
INTELTA
Radio Cutivalú, 
instituto 
teleeducativo 
los tallanes
CA0062
10,000.55
10,000.55
Foro ciudades 
para la vida
CA0063
48,813.35
48,813.35
VIDES
Asociación Vida 
y Desarrollo 
CA0065
20,733.93
20,733.93
Felix Luna Var￾gas
CA0068
13,067.18
13,067.18
Asociación 
Nacional de 
jueces para la 
justicia y la 
democracia
CA0076
1,283.96
CA0160
4,144.20
5,428.16
Asociación 
Centro de la 
mujer Las Ama￾zonas
CA0083
6,315.19
CA0174
8,247.78
CA0242
10,788.68
25,351.65
AMSAT. Aso￾ciación de mu￾nicipalidades de 
la cuenca del río 
Santo Tomás
CA0094
30,897.70
30,897.70
Iniciativa de 
proyectos en 
comunicaciones
CA0098
13,933.81
CA0196
21,761.82
35,695.63
NPA National 
policy associa￾tion
CA0107
19,515.02
19,515.02
CALANDRIA CA0113 34,972.01
40
Organization Civil- Military Truth Com￾mission
Decentralization Anti￾corruption
Congressional 
reform
Total grant 
amounts
11,572.06
CA0229
23,399.95
Escuela para el 
Desarrollo
CA0114
36,624.37
36,624.37
Colectivo 
Yuyarisum
CA0127
5,787.63
5,787.63
ILLA CA0128
43,641.61
43,641.61
Parroquia Santi￾ago Apostol de 
Urcos
CA0134
9,164.10
9,164.10
Iniciativa Ciu￾dadana
CA0140
18,004.25
CA0171
12,572.63
30,576.88
Asoc. Cultural 
LA TARUMBA
CA0145
5,278.19
5,278.19
CECODES. 
Centro de Co￾municación para 
el desarrollo 
social.
CA0152
9,873.31
9,873.31
Centro de Estu￾dios regionales 
andinos Bar￾tolomé de las 
Casas. 
CA0156
29,090.29
29,090.29
CARE PERU CA0164
36,095.38
36,095.38
Universidad 
Científica del 
Sur
CA0177
2,594.17
2,594.17
IIDA. Instituto 
de investigación 
y Desarrollo 
Andino 
CA0194
10,451.75
10,451.75
APORVIDHA. 
Asociación por 
la vida y la dig￾nidad humana
CA0200
8,575.91
8,575.91
Escuela superior 
de pedagogía, 
filosofía y 
Letras Antonio 
Ruiz de Mon￾toya.
CA0227
46,506.25
46,506.25
Luz y Arte Aso￾ciación cultural
CA0231
40,211.02
40,211.02
Asociación civil 
radio marañón 
del vicariato 
apostólico San 
Francisco 
Javier.
CA0238
7,009.54
7,009.54
ETC Andes CA0244
14,623.97
14,623.97
Vicaria de soli￾daridad prela￾tura de Ayaviri.
CA0159
10,005.03
10,005.03
41
Organization Civil- Military Truth Com￾mission
Decentralization Anti￾corruption
Congressional 
reform
Total grant 
amounts
tura de Ayaviri.
Cámara de 
Comercio de 
Lima
CA0035
8,706.00
8,706.00
Macro Región 
Sur
CA0005
25,970.62
CA0011
12,301.88
38,272.5
TOTAL 61,700.36 105,085.45 517,387.31 151,107.70
0
146,735.08 982,015.9
Private For Profit Grantees
Organization Civilian- Mili￾tary
Truth Com￾mission
Decentralization Anti￾corruption
Congressional 
reform
Total grant 
amounts
LEO 
BURNETT
CA0181
126,371.78
CA0182
173,971.19
CA0183
166,005.22
CA0184
104,511.42
570,859.61
Luna llena 
Films
CA0161
75,717.58
75,717.58
M&d Seminar￾ios y Eventos
CA0224
16,526.82
16,526.82
Peru Monitor 
S.A.
CA0209
1,960.60
1,960.60
Sub-Total 16,526.82 75,717.58 570,859.61 1,960.60 756,278.61
MEDIA 
CHECK 
(CA0138)
91,214.00
TOTAL 16,526.82 75,717.58 570,859.61 1,960.60 847,492.61
OTI Grantees – Peruvian State
Organization Civilian- Mili￾tary
Truth Com￾mission
Decentralization Anti￾corruption
Congressional 
reform
Total grant 
amounts
CONGRESS CA0056
3,288.63
CA0125
11,612.10
CA0157
21,365.62
CA0077
59,260.47
CA0133
20,326.18
CA0144
36,192.73
CA0146
81,125.01
CA0100
59,121.84
CA0103
7,725.19
CA0118
34,563.93
CA0153
6,117.77
CA0186
14,947.00
CA0235
12,593.13
CA0240
19,379.74
387,619.34
EXECUTIVE CA0017
9,343.66 (PRES)
CA0038
27,961.91
CA0073
92,742.07
197,899.42
42
Organization Civilian- Mili￾tary
Truth Com￾mission
Decentralization Anti￾corruption
Congressional 
reform
Total grant 
amounts
CA0158
67,851.78
all in Min. of 
Justice
ATTORNEY 
GENERAL 
(Fiscalía)
CA0069
6,517.38
6,517.38
COMPTROLLE
R’S OFFICE
CA0071
44,619.76
CA0122
2,210.00
CA0168
8,068.18
CA0205
41,604.67
96,502.61
OMBUDSMAN CA0040
7,898.00
CA0058
6,856.25
CA0070
1,669.55
CA0088
638.53
CAO123
37,360.46
CA0154
12,370.08
CA0176
7,717.88
CA0217
32,771.15
CA0239
3,406.29
CA0022
4,442.68
CA0064
55,274.86
CA0079
7,825.30
178,231.03
TRUTH AND 
RECONCILIAT
ION 
COMMISSION 
35 GRANTS
1,031,736.70
1,031,736.70
Mesa departa￾mental de con￾certación de 
lucha contra la 
pobreza de Are￾quipa 
CA0214
16,265.58
16,265.58
Comisión Na￾cional Anti 
corrupción
CA0139
13,283.91
13,283.91
Municipalidad 
Provincial de Ilo
CA0037
3,259.52
CA0223
3,445.51
6,705.03
Plan Binacional 
de Desarrollo de 
la Región 
Fronteriza Perú￾Ecuador
CA0095
30,772.48
CA0178
31,655.34
62,427.82
TOTAL 249,974.53 1,099,279.54 275,380.90 218,105.25 154,448.60 1,997,188.82