Bureau for 
Institutional
Reform and
Democracy
Phone: 0049-89-3610.4550
Fax: 0049-89-3610.4551
e-mail: BIRDmunich@aol.com
Comeniusstrasse 10
D-81667 Munich, Germany
www.birdmunich.de
BiRD, Kenya Representation
P. O. Box 63493, Muthaiga
Nairobi
Phone: +254-733-741.155
Systems Evaluation of the 
National Civic Education Programme (NCEP) 
(USAID Purchase Order No. 623-O-00-02-00088-00)
FINAL REPORT
prepared by:
Markus Brunner (BiRD)
Thomas Oyieke (Matrix)
Max Mmuya (BiRD)
submitted by
BiRD GmbH
(Bureau for Institutional Reform and Democracy), 
Germany
and
Matrix Development Consultants, Kenya
November 7, 2002 Munich, Germany/Nairobi, Kenya
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Table of Contents
1. Executive Summary.................................................................................................. 3
Background to the NCEP and the Systems Evaluation .............................................. 3
Key Findings ............................................................................................................ 4
Key Recommendations ........................................................................................... 10
2. Introduction ............................................................................................................ 15
2.1. Background...................................................................................................... 15
2.2. ToRs and Objectives of the Evaluation............................................................. 16
2.3. BiRD/Matrix-Methodology .............................................................................. 16
2.4. Mission Schedule ............................................................................................. 18
2.5. Acknowledgements.......................................................................................... 19
3. The Evaluation Process........................................................................................... 20
3.1. Overall Assessment of the NCEP ..................................................................... 24
3.2. Relevance and Project Preparation and Design ................................................. 24
Table 1: Possible Structure of an Interlocking Logical Framework for the NCEP.... 30
3.3. Efficiency ........................................................................................................ 32
Table 2: Comparing the Initial and the Actual NCEP Budget (as of September 2002)
............................................................................................................................... 42
Table 3: Cost-benefit Ratios at Implementing Level................................................ 47
3.4. Effectiveness.................................................................................................... 51
3.5. Impact.............................................................................................................. 57
3.6. Sustainability ................................................................................................... 60
4. Other Issues............................................................................................................ 63
4.1. Quality and Effectiveness of Educational Materials used in carrying out Program 
Activities ................................................................................................................ 63
4.2. Comparison between NCEP and other Basket Funding Models........................ 66
4.3. Impact of the NCEP on the Constitution of Kenya Review Process (and vice 
versa)...................................................................................................................... 72
5. Lessons Learned and Recommendations................................................................. 74
5.1. Summary of Lessons Learned .......................................................................... 74
5.2. Recommendations............................................................................................ 81
5.2.1. The Future of the NCEP................................................................................ 81
5.2.2. The Management Framework of Future Multi-Donor Governance Efforts..... 82
Annexes:..................................................................................................................... 86
A1. Terms of Reference/Statement of Work................................................................ 86
A2. List of Interviews................................................................................................. 89
A3. List of Documents................................................................................................ 92
A4. List of Acronyms................................................................................................. 94
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1
Background to the NCEP and the Systems Evaluation
Through the NCEP, 10 donors organised in the Donor Steering Committee (DSC)
funded general civic education activities by more than 70 Kenyan civil society
organisations (CSOs), organised in 4 consortia and also comprising a number of non￾consortia CSOs. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) was contracted by the donors to act as 
financial management agent and to provide the technical assistance team (TAT/FMA). 
After a long planning and preparation period, the NCEP started in August 2000 with the 
mobilisation of the TAT/FMA, and implementation of project activities ended by the
end of September 2002. The winding up of the NCEP will take until the end of
November 2002. 
Another USAID-sponsored evaluation assesses the impact of the NCEP on end￾beneficiaries. The focus of the systems evaluation, however, is primarily on programme 
organization, management and implementation, also taking into consideration some
other issues.
On August 29, 2002, the joint bid of the Bureau for Institutional Reform and
Democracy (BiRD) GmbH of Munich, Germany, and Matrix Development Consultants 
of Nairobi, Kenya, was awarded the contract to undertake the systems evaluation of the 
National Civic Education Programme (NCEP) by USAID. The evaluation was carried
out over an elapsed period of six weeks, from the beginning of September to October 
15, 2002 (the date of submission of the draft report), by a team of three consultants: Dr. 
Markus Brunner, Senior Program Officer with BiRD, and Mr. Thomas Oyieke,
Director/Principal Consultant of Matrix, were deployed for the full duration of the
assignment, and Dr. Max Mmuya of the University of Dar es Salaam, an associated
expert of BiRD, joined the team for one week in September to contribute a regional
perspective. The evaluation team held initial briefing meetings with the client, the DSC￾members, consortia representatives and the TAT/FMA, reviewed relevant
documentation, and afterwards met the DSC-members and the four consortia
secretariats plus, all in all, 13 CSOs (both in Nairobi and in Kisumu and Mombasa) and 
3 ECEP regional co-ordinators individually, in the course of it interviewing also a
number of facilitators. The draft report was submitted to USAID on October 15, 2002, 
and was circulated to the DSC members, the TAT/FMA and consortia representatives. 
The team held debriefing meetings with the same groups. Written comments on the 
draft report were received by two DSC members (DFID and USAID) and the
TAT/FMA.
 
1
 Following the comments from the debriefings on the draft report, the final report contains an enlarged 
executive summary, giving a brief background of the NCEP and the systems evaluation and listing key
findings and recommendations. A full list of lessons learned and recommendations is contained in chapter 
5 of the report.
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The evaluation assesses the NCEP's management framework against the evaluation
criteria of relevance (including project preparation and design), efficiency, and
effectiveness, and, to a lesser extent, impact and sustainability of the management
structure, also considering cross-cutting issues (mainly gender), where appropriate. The 
NCEP management structure as a whole, its various components and sub-components 
are thereafter rated according to an internationally accepted rating scale.
Key Findings
The key findings of the evaluation are presented along the lines of our inquiry, and
comprise the following elements:
Introduction
· Overall assessment of the NCEP:
When the NCEP was finally commissioned and implemented, it proved the possibility
of implementing large-scale multi-donor governance programmes involving a great
variety of domestic implementing CSOs, following a common agenda, under
harmonised approaches and professional guidance by a technical assistance team and a 
financial management agent. 
The NCEP management framework achieved quite a number of things – like providing 
a substantial sum of money for civic education through a basket fund, maintaining the 
coherence and unity of the donor group, delivering the outputs through a professional
management structure of technical assistants and financial managers, countrywide
coverage following a common curriculum etc. – the benefits of which should not be
underrated. As far as this was achieved within the timeframe envisaged, and with
considerable resources mobilised, the NCEP is considered to be a success. 
· The difficulties of applying commonly used evaluation procedures:
The NCEP did not always follow the requirements of project cycle management for a 
number of reasons. It was variously described as a "first-time experience" involving
such a great variety of donors and implementing partners, and as a "learning process"
for everybody involved, leading to the adoption of an "evolutionary approach" to
project planning and management. Some of the key outputs usually expected to be
achieved in the planning and preparation phase (like, for example, detailed project
documents including resource and implementation schedules, quality logical
frameworks and benchmarks, clear designation of roles and responsibilities on the
various levels etc.) were not produced, making it near impossible to do, for example,
variance analyses of budgets and time variance analyses of schedules.
· Political environment and political sensitivities:
A substantial part of the problems and peculiarities influencing the NCEP are associated 
with the policital environment and the political sensitivities involved. Government
criticism of donor efforts in the sector, and the donors' reactions to this criticism, have 
shaped the NCEP in various ways, leading, among others, to some of the delays
experienced in the planning and implementation phases of the NCEP, to the adoption of 
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a low-profile communication strategy, or to the focus of the programme on the
transparent and accountable use of donor funds by the participating CSOs. 
Despite the shortcomings in project preparation and implementation due to the poor
policy environment and the political sensitivities, the risk mitigation strategies adopted 
in reaction to these factors allowed the programme to go ahead, and finally to be
implemented, however for a much shorter period of time than originally envisaged.
The politics of the CSO-sector:
The NCEP has shown that the CSOs usually are as multifacetted as the society within
which they are operating, and that the benefits of grouping them together in consortia 
should be weighed against the time and efforts required to do so. In the NCEP, this
became most obvious with the conflict around NACEFCO, and later with the conflict in 
the Gender Consortium. 
Relevance and Project Preparation and Design
Whereas our overall assessment for the NCEP's relevance is "Highly satisfactory", the 
NCEP's project preparation and design clearly qualify as "Less than satisfactory". 
· High relevance of the NCEP:
For a programme like the NCEP to be relevant, its objectives have to be situated within 
political developments of the country within which the programme is implemented, and 
have to reflect the existing programmes and mandates of stakeholders (CSOs). The
NCEP achieved both.
· The benefits of a harmonised approach to civic education:
Working within the framework of a common curriculum according to predefined
criteria (in the case of NCEP non-partisanship, political neutrality, and non-advocacy) 
led to a more professional and holistic approach to civic education, fostered a sense of 
unity among participating CSOs and has provided the basis for the programme to be
implemented almost without disruptions in a politically sensitive environment.
· Poor integration of cross-cutting issues:
For a number of reasons, cross-cutting issues, mainly gender, were only poorly
integrated into the core NCEP-materials and into the operations of CSOs outside the 
Gender Consortium.
· Long preparation and planning with low-quality outputs: 
The large number of stakeholders involved in the NCEP on various levels, and political 
sensitivities, necessarily led to delays in preparation and planning, severely impacting
upon the time left for implementation of activities. 
However, this long project preparation and planning time did not produce high-quality 
outputs, and created a number of problems later on in the programme's lifespan (due to 
unspecific programme documents and logical frameworks, lack of a detailed
stakeholder analysis and detailed schedules, late or delayed implementation of certain
activities like the baseline survey and the mapping exercise, lack of specific roles and 
responsibilities of the various levels of the management structure etc.).
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· Adequate design of the management structure and the M&E-systems:
The basic set-up of the management structure for the NCEP was acceptable and
appropriate to the contents of the programme and the political environment. 
Qualifications in this area relate to the lack of guidelines (roles and responsibilities) for 
the various levels, especially for the HoMs, and insufficient decision-making authorities 
on some levels, especially the TAT/FMA and the consortia secretariats. 
The initial M&E-outlines have adequately reflected the requirements of donors for
financial accountability and constant overview of programme progress, but were still
too unspecific in the programme document, and some of the vital M&E-tools (baseline 
survey and mapping study) only came in late in the project's lifespan.
Efficiency
The overall efficiency of the NCEP management framework is assessed as
"Satisfactory”. Quite a number of efficiency-bottlenecks uncovered in the course of the 
evaluation are due to inadequate programme preparation, planning, and design, as
detailed in the report. 
· Less than possible efficiency of the management structure:
Largely due to omissions in the preparation, planning and design of the NCEP, the
management structure was less efficient than it could have been, leading to delays,
duplication of tasks, and frustrations among project partners. Therefore, key individuals 
had to provide much more input to the programme than would have been expected. 
Despite all these shortcomings, the management structure still provided the basis for the 
NCEP to finally take off and be implemented, and the various levels, especially the
DSC and the TAT/FMA, largely improved their performance in the course of the
programme, particularly once implementation of activities by most of the participating 
CSOs had started towards the end of 2001.
- HoMs-level: The involvement of the HoMs in the NCEP was beneficial to
counter criticism by Government officials and to politically steer the
programme, but due to the fact that their tasks were never specified, the HoMs
got involved in details of programme management which could have been left to 
the DSC or the TAT/FMA.
- DSC-level: The DSC managed to uphold the unity of the donor group, to
achieve high funding levels, and to technically steer the NCEP, but also got
directly involved in the day-to-day management of the programme for a number 
of reasons. 
- TAT/FMA-level: There is a consensus that the efficiency of the TAT/FMA
improved in the course of the programme, but also that the tasks of especially
the TAT were not specified in sufficient detail at programme-start and that the 
TAT/FMA was not given enough space of manoeuvre within which to operate.
- Consortia secretariat-level: With the exception of ECEP, consortia secretariats
largely served as central contact points only, but were not fully integrated into 
the management of the programme. 
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· Various degrees of efficiency in the collaboration between different
stakeholders:
The efficiency of the collaboration between the various levels had a number of strengths 
and weaknesses, with collaboration among the DSC, among the CSOs of their
respective consortia and between TAT/FMA and CSOs working reasonably well, but
with the overall information flow basically being only bottom-up and less than
satisfactory, with hardly any contacts between CSOs of different consortia and with the 
complete absence of donor-CSO relations. 
· Adequate and improving up-ward reporting:
The reporting and control structures put in place for the NCEP were basically adequate 
and provided for efficient upward-flow of information, with considerable improvements 
on the part of the TAT/FMA in the course of the programme, from a situation which
was perceived by some donors to be unsatisfactory at the beginning. 
· Insufficient levels of authority:
Decision making structures within the NCEP were top-heavy, with insufficient levels of 
authority for stakeholders other than the donors, leading to a cascade-like picture of
instructions and directives from top to bottom and some frustration among project
partners (CSOs, TAT/FMA).
· Inadequate or lacking schedules:
The lack of clearly defined work programmes, implementation schedules and a
prioritized task list for various activities had both the effects of causing delays and of 
not allowing for an ex-post evaluation of how timeframes were adhered to by the
various actors.
· High levels of funding, but unspecific budget lines:
The total level of funding for the NCEP was considerable, and variations between
original budgets and actual disbursement were minor. However, due to the absence of a 
detailed planning and costing of activities, a meaningful cost-benefit analysis after
project-end cannot be done.
· Generally efficient management systems:
Apart from the programme document and the logical frameworks, the quality of NCEP 
systems (appraisal criteria and processes, M&E-systems, databases) developed in the
course of the programme largely provided for an efficient management of the
programme, with some delays due to issues mentioned in the report relating to project 
preparation and planning. 
Effectiveness
· Effective donor and CSO co-ordination and CSO guidance:
By and large, the NCEP both provided for effective co-ordination among donors and
effective co-ordination and technical and financial guidance of CSOs. However, due to 
the consortia structure and the lack of inter-consortia contacts, CSO co-ordination 
mainly took place within the consortia, or through the TAT/FMA. Furthermore, the
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NCEP did not provide for an effective exchange of information between donors and
CSOs.
· Substantial strengthening of local contact bases of CSOs:
Due to the focus of the NCEP on deploying CSOs in areas in which they had already
operated, and on employing facilitators of the area in which they undertook civic
education activities, the NCEP provided for effective relationships both between CSOs 
and target communities and between facilitators and target communities. This localised 
capacity building and the strengthening of local networks of CSOs is considered to be a 
major success of the NCEP.
· Improved entry and delivery strategies:
Most of the CSOs interviewed during this evaluation stated that they underwent a
learning process regarding different entry and delivery strategies, revealing
shortcomings in project preparation and planning.
· Improved technical and financial management of donor funds:
The technical and financial M&E-systems of the NCEP largely provided for an effective 
management of donor funds, minimising loss of funds, streamlining technical
implementation and providing for feedback of M&E to ongoing activities. It was,
however, questioned whether the M&E systems of the NCEP could have been more
consolidated and less labor intensive, producing similar outputs but freeing up resources 
at the level of CSOs for project implementation, instead of reporting and management.
· Varying degrees of problem solving capacity:
The problem solving capacity of the NCEP varied, with the issue of inadequate timing 
not being resolved at all (except for, possibly, the short phase of implementation of
civic education activities), to the rather satisfactory handling of the exit of NACEFCO, 
amongst others.
Impact
· Positive impact on donor co-operation in the governance sector:
The NCEP clearly had the impact of enhancing, harmonising and professionalising
donor co-ordination in the governance sector.
· Substantial capacity building across all types of CSOs:
The NCEP's impact on participating CSOs and the wider CSO-community was largely
positive, with substantial capacity building effects (both financial and technical) across 
all types of CSOs. The harmonisation of procedures and approaches did not have an
adverse effect on participating CSOs, and was widely appreciated. 
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Sustainability
· Donor-driven nature of the NCEP:
Right from the start, the NCEP was perceived to be largely donor-driven. The issue of 
ownership, however, is more important for larger, mostly Nairobi-based CSOs and
consortia secretariats than for smaller CSOs in the field, which seem to be much more 
focused on implementation than concerned with the question of "Who owns the
programme?". 
· Low level of sustainability on the part of CSOs:
The sustainability of the NCEP with regard to future civic education activities of CSOs 
is considered to be low – without substantial donor funding, civic education will not
continue. 
· Strong likelihood of future joint donor efforts in the governance sector:
Regarding the effects of the NCEP on the sustainability of donor co-operation, however, 
the assessment is positive, due to the largely positive experiences of donors with the
pooling of their resources within the NCEP.
· Management structure follow the concrete design and requirements of specific
programmes:
The infrastructure of the TAT/FMA is partly being used for other programmes already 
(K-DOP, EPPP), but it is assessed to be unlikely that the TAT/FMA will continue to be 
used in the same form and scope in future projects.
Quality and Effectiveness of Educational Materials produced by the NCEP
· The benefits of a joint approach and harmonised materials:
The three core-NCEP materials (curriculum, handbook, trainer's manual) as well as the 
flipcharts produced by the Gender Consortium were widely appreciated and effectively 
used by most of the CSOs interviewed. Improvements are necessary to more adequately 
incorporate gender and some other issues, especially the topic of conflict.
Comparison between NCEP and other Basket Funds:
· Similar problems in other basket funds:
A comparison between the NCEP and other basket funds revealed a number of similar 
problems, like: the issue of the design of the management structure; the question of lead 
donor and roles and responsibilities; relationships between donors and CSOs and other 
implementing partners; the time required for harmonisation of approaches and delays in 
project preparation and planning; and above all the need for high-quality programme
documents (logframes, schedules etc.).
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· Strong benefits of joint approaches:
However, the comparison and the experiences of various basket funds also underscored 
the benefits of joint donor approaches, especially when large funds are required to
meaningfully support activities and when funding is for sectors perceived to be
politically sensitive.
Impact of the NCEP on the CKRC (and vice versa)
· Benefits of independence of donor activities in the governance sector from state 
actors:
One lesson learned from the NCEP is that there is some benefit in not formally linking 
donor efforts in the governance sector to governmental or parliamentary initiatives, as
donors (and CSOs) usually do not have any influence on the course such state-led 
activities are taking. 
· Positive impact of the CKRC on the NCEP:
CSOs can benefit from the higher credibility of state-led initiatives like the CKRC for 
their own operations, as was the case in the NCEP especially regarding the support of
provincial and district administration to NCEP-CSOs.
· Direct impact of the NCEP on the CKRC:
On the other hand, the activities of the CSOs participating in the NCEP had, in a
number of cases, a direct impact on the CKRC. Generally, it was proven that donor￾funded governance activities can form the basis for enhanced participation of Kenyans 
in processes like the CKRC.
Key Recommendations
The key recommendations are grouped into recommendations regarding, on the one
hand, the immediate future of the NCEP and, on the other hand, the recommendations 
for the improvement of the management framework of future multi-donor governance 
efforts, the latter again divided into recommendations of major relevance and those
concerning minor issues. 
Recommendations for the Future of the NCEP
· Continuing civic education after the general elections:
Many respondents rate the process of civic education as a very important tool for nation 
building. It is therefore felt that the momentum created by the NCEP should not be lost, 
and the possibility to address the domestication of the (yet to be instated) revised
constitution and to present it within the context of development and overall people's
rights should be pursued.
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· Sustaining the momentum in the short to medium term:
To sustain the momentum of civic education, well-performing CSOs should be put in a 
position to continue to provide the services even at a reduced rate and intensity in order 
not to lose the capacity in which the NCEP so heavily invested, both in terms of money 
and personal efforts. If there is no follow-up project, or if a second phase of the NCEP 
(or a similar programme) takes some time before it is implemented, these capacities will 
be lost, and future projects will have to start afresh.
· Taking into consideration preliminary results of the impact assessment:
In case there is a positive decision on the above, preliminary results of the ongoing
impact assessment of the NCEP shall be considered in deciding which CSOs and which 
modes of delivery should receive financing in the short to medium term to sustain the 
capacities created under the NCEP. 
· Sustaining the momentum with a substantially reduced management structure:
If an intermediate continuation of the NCEP is approved, it is assessed that this can be 
done with a substantially reduced management structure, especially at the TAT/FMA￾level, as the systems developed for managing the NCEP and the core materials and
delivery methodologies can be used without major adaptations. 
· Making use of the NCEP databases:
As was noted in the report, the NCEP has generated a wealth of information regarding 
the capacities and performance of individual CSOs, target group outreach and
geographical coverage. The TAT/FMA should be put in a position to present this
information in a format which can be effectively used by both donors and CSOs.
Key Recommendations for the Management Framework of Future Multi-Donor 
Governance Efforts
· The need to optimise preparation and planning:
As the NCEP and other basket funds have shown, there is a strong need to focus on the 
quality and timeliness of project preparation, planning and design, taking into
considerations the key issues which will impact upon project implementation later on. 
Issues to be considered are: 
- following more closely the project cycle management requirements and its
different phases and elements, even though other factors influencing the
preparation and planning phase might seem more important at various stages; 
- possibly conducting a project cycle management workshop at the beginning of
future joint programmes with the various stakeholders, in order to impress the 
importance of elements like high-quality logical frameworks, detailed resource
and implementation schedules etc. on both donors and other implementing
partners;
- investing both time and money in the design of workable and high-quality 
programme documents, logical frameworks, resource and implementation
schedules attracts costs, but will reduce the workload for donors and
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implementing partners later on in the project's lifespan and can help avoiding
points of friction; 
- defining roles and responsibilities of various actors sufficiently before starting
implementation; this can help in reducing overlapping and duplication of tasks
later on and provide project partners with a predefined set of parameters within 
which to take decisions and to proceed with implementation;
- doing things at the right time, clearly prioritising tasks and realistically
sequencing them (like conducting baseline surveys and other preparatory studies 
before starting implementation etc.).
· Efficiency of the management structure:
It is recommended that management structures are designed which provide for a smooth 
operation of the programme, but do not create unnecessary layers without specified
tasks. 
In the case of the NCEP, for example, the involvement of the HoMs was necessary
because of the political sensitivity of the intervention, but their roles – politically
steering the programme – should have been specified in relation to what the DSC was 
supposed to do, and adhered to.
Equally, when creating a structure like the consortia secretariats, future programmes
should look at how to integrate them more effectively in the management of the
programme, apart from being mere contact points for communication purposes. 
Furthermore, the efficiency of operations should be improved by providing project
partners with sufficient levels of authority, within which to take decisions, and again
clearly spell out the terms of engagement of the various levels beforehand, including
specifying the reporting requirements and the character and frequency of information
flow between the various levels. 
· Flexible design:
In any case, a large programme like the NCEP will have to provide for some flexibility 
in the design of the management structure (and the allocation of funds) in order to cope 
with unforeseen events (like the exit of NACEFCO in the case of NCEP) and to enable 
the adaptation of the programme according to ongoing experiences. 
Flexibility can, amongst others, be achieved: 
- by providing project partners with sufficient levels of authorities to adapt the
programme, as noted above; 
- in the area of external technical assistance required, by concluding a framework 
contract with consultants to provide services on an ad-hoc basis according to
pre-established terms of reference, and the possibility of renewing the
framework contract once the original resources have been used and more tasks 
are needed to be performed; and/or
- by specifying budget lines in enough detail beforehand and at the same time by 
providing a substantial budget for contingencies.
· Mid-term evaluations:
Related to the above, mid-term evaluations – preferrably by external consultants – shall 
be conducted to assess whether the programme is on track and to identify areas for
improvement when there is still time to implement them. 
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· Facilitate direct contacts between donors and implementing partners:
The creation of a forum where donors and implementing partners (in the case of the
NCEP: CSOs) regularly meet and exchange their views can help in raising mutual levels 
of understanding, both about political concerns of donors and about difficulties faced by 
implementing partners.
· Maintain the focus on capacity building:
Future programmes should continue to incorporate capacity building of project partners 
as an integral part of programme activities, as capacity building usually is the most
tangible and immediate result of such activities, whereas the benefits for the ultimate
beneficiaries mostly only materialise in the long term. A focus on capacity building,
coupled with other measures, is also more likely to achieve sustainable effects. 
· Adequately consider issues of sustainability:
The integration of sustainability on a much more systematic level already at the stage of 
project preparation and planning is necessary in order not to invest in structures which 
are immediately lost after project-end and to create a lasting impact with partner
organisations. To this end, implementing CSOs should be encouraged to integrate
appropriate exit options, or the establishment of alternative sources of funding, in their 
project proposals.
· Enhance the efficiency of basket funding:
Although basket funding has a number of advantages and is assessed to be the way
forward for efforts especially in the governance sector, there is a need to find more
efficient ways of co-operation among donors. 
Most notably, the co-operation of donors participating in a basket fund can be enhanced 
by, amongst others, allocating specific roles and responsibilities to individual donors,
depending on capacities and feasibility. Thereby, the workload for the lead donor
(which constitutes a cost factor usually not charged to the programme budget) can be 
reduced, and the sense of ownership and participation strengthened on the part of other 
donors. However, there should still be the possibility for smaller donors, lacking the
capacity to actively take part in the management of programmes, to participate in basket 
funds, not least to achieve higher levels of funding and to spread the information and 
experiences gathered during programmes like the NCEP. 
Additional Recommendations
· Although there is some benefit to donors in having aggregates of CSOs
(consortia), the experience with the NCEP (with, especially, NACEFCO and the 
Gender Consortium) implies that future efforts should encourage CSOs to come 
up with workable structures themselves, without undue interference by other
parties. 
· Project implementors should make a conscious effort to ensure that cross-cutting 
issues, especially gender issues, are adequately considered at the various levels
of the programme.
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· A conscious effort should also be made to avoid the creation of an elite of CSOs 
by keeping the mechanisms for joining both consortia and future basket funds
open and transparent.
· The impact of educational materials produced in course of programmes could be 
increased by providing translations (where necessary) and smaller brochures and 
leaflets which can be distributed more widely.
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2. INTRODUCTION
2.1. Background
The NCEP is implemented by over 70 indigenous CSOs in Kenya and has a national
coverage. It includes roughly over two million citizens as participants. The 
organizations implementing the NCEP have agreed on a common vision, shared
principles and a non-partisan curriculum in order to provide civic education in a co￾ordinated manner and to establish a framework for unity among the different civic
providers. To this end, a civic education curriculum, a handbook and the trainer's
manual have been developed to enable facilitators to provide non-partisan civic
education to Kenyan citizens. 
The participating CSOs have organised themselves into four consortia (CEDMAC –
Constitutional Education for the Marginalized Categories, CRECO – Constitutional
Reform Education Consortium, ECEP – Ecumenical Constitutional Education
Programme, Gender Consortium), and implementation of activities was done through
the member CSOs of these consortia and through a number of non-consortia CSOs. 
Preparation and planning for the NCEP began right after the 1997 elections, with
discussions between civic education providers in Kenya and donors, out of which the 
NCEP was created. The NCEP as a programme actually started with the contracting of 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) as financial management agent. In August 2000, the
project office was set up and the Technical Assistance Team and Financial Management 
Agent (TAT/FMA) mobilised. 
The NCEP is funded by a group of 8 donors (Royal Danish Embassy, Royal
Netherlands Embassy, Swedish Embassy, Canadian High Commission, DFID,
Norwegian Embassy, Finish Embassy, Austrian Embassy). Additionally, USAID and
the European Commission signed the MoU, but did not contribute to the basked fund. 
These 10 donors are represented on the Donor Steering Committee (DSC). DFID is the 
lead donor, the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) the deputy lead donor. USAID
funded the impact assessment and the systems evaluation, and Switzerland (not
represented on the DSC) funded the reprinting of NCEP materials.
The TAT/FMA put in place by PwC has the tasks of overseeing the whole programme 
and in particular is responsible for the financial management and accounting as well as 
the assessment of project proposals, capacity development of project partners, general
technical assistance, and ongoing monitoring, gap analysis and program reporting. The 
TAT/FMA manages the donor basket fund and is contracted through the lead donor.
The implementation of project activities has ended in September 2002, after a three
months extension period for some of the CSOs from July to September 2002, and the 
envisaged project-end date for the NCEP is the end of November 2002. 
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2.2. ToRs and Objectives of the Evaluation
Whereas an impact assessment of the NCEP had been planned right from the start, the 
systems evaluation was decided rather late in the programme's lifespan. 
In July 2002, USAID, on behalf of the NCEP DSC, invited consulting companies to
submit proposals to undertake a systems evaluation of the NCEP, focusing principally
on programme organization, management and implementation. Among the objectives of 
the evaluation are to: 
· identify the implications of the NCEP framework for the CSOs in the governance 
and human rights sector; 
· assess the effectiveness of the programme management structure; 
· assess the efficiency of the (financial and technical) systems developed for the
management of the program; 
· assess the impact of the NCEP on the Constitution Review Process and vice
versa; 
· identify the management problems faced and effectiveness of the steps taken to
solve them; 
· draw a comparison between NCEP and other basket funding models; identify
lessons learnt; 
· and make recommendations for improvement of the program management
framework. (See Annex A1 for the detailed Terms of Reference/Statement of Work.)
The results of this systems evaluation are intended to give a catalogue of lessons learned 
and recommendations for possible future multi-donor efforts in the governance sector
and influence and improve their programme management framework. 
2.3. BiRD/Matrix-Methodology
After a competitive tender process, the joint bid of the Bureau for Institutional Reform 
and Democracy (BiRD) GmbH of Munich, Germany, and Matrix Development
Consultants of Nairobi, Kenya, was awarded the contract. Both companies are
internationally active with a proven track record in the preparation, management and
evaluation of development projects, with a focus on programmes in the field of
governance. 
The team was made up of three experts: Dr. Markus Brunner, Senior Program Officer 
with BiRD GmbH and teamleader, and Mr. Thomas O. Oyieke, Director/Principal
Consultant with Matrix Development Consultants, as main experts to be deployed for
the full duration of the consultancy; and Dr. Max Mmuya (BiRD's associated expert) of 
the Department of Political Science and Public Administration at the University of Dar 
es Salaam, Tanzania, as regional expert, who joined the team for one week during the 
phase of interviews with donors and CSOs in order to contribute additional regional
expertise. 
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In line with the BiRD/Matrix proposal, the NCEP management framework will be
assessed according to the following evaluation criteria:
Relevance of the project relates to the overall objective and to the preparation,
planning, and design of the project and the extent to which its objectives address
identified problems and needs. Work programmes and their coherence, the set-up and
the structure of relations between the various levels as well as the intervention logic will 
also be considered in line with the evolution of the NCEP.
Efficiency focuses on the question "Were things done right?" regarding project
implementation. It assesses how well the various activities transformed the inputs and
resources into intended results, in terms of quality, quantity and timeframe. It assesses 
the financial and technical systems, the management structure, and the cost and
management efficiency with which the resources were translated into results within the 
various components of the intervention as well as the relationship between the various
levels of the programme.
Effectiveness assesses how the results/impacts of the project achieve the project
purpose, how far the intended beneficiaries benefited from the product or services made 
available to them via the project activities, focusing on the programme management
structure and its effects on the operation of the programme (both in terms of donor-co￾ordination and CSO-co-ordination and –guidance as well as regarding problem solving 
capacity).
Impact denotes the relationship between the project's overall objective and purposes
and how the NCEP management framework impacted on donor co-operation and on the 
CSO-sector and individual CSOs, both in terms of planned and unplanned impacts. 
Sustainability indicates how positive impacts of the project have continued or are
likely to continue after funding ends, or which actions have to be taken so that positive 
effects continue. It also touches upon the question of ownership.
As specified in the Statement of Work (i.e. the Terms of Reference), the focus of the 
systems evaluation is on the criteria of efficiency and effectiveness. We have decided
that relevance (including project preparation and design) is equally important, whereas 
impact and sustainably are of lesser interest for generating lessons learned and
providing recommendations for the management framework of future multi-donor 
governance programmes. We will nonetheless assess the NCEP management
framework also against these evaluation criteria, to the extent possible. 
Cross-cutting issues, in the case of this systems evaluation mainly gender, will be
incorporated in the assessment on various levels, i. e. where appropriate.
As per standard evaluation approach, each of the criteria presented above will be rated 
as follows:
1 – Highly satisfactory,
2 – Satisfactory,
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3 – Less than satisfactory,
4 – Highly unsatisfactory.
The above-mentioned criteria are assessed through: 
· a comprehensive review of pertinent documentation and materials (for a full list, 
see Annex A3), and
· the results of semi-structured focus group discussions and key informant
interviews with donor representatives, the TAT/FMA, consortia representatives and 
representatives of individual CSOs, including facilitators (for a full list of interview 
partners, see Annex A2),
applying both traditional research and evaluation specific instruments.
2.4. Mission Schedule 
The contract was awarded on August 29, 2002, and the evaluation was carried out over 
an elapsed period of six weeks, starting at the beginning of September. The draft report 
was submitted on October 15, 2002, and the final report is due on November 7, 2002. 
The team started with an initial meeting with the client, followed by a series of intensive 
meetings with the TAT/FMA, in order to get a better understanding of the various
components of the NCEP and to procure basic documents and materials.
Also at the beginning, briefing meetings were held with members of the DSC
(September 11) and consortia representatives (September 12). 
Following the review of relevant documents and the procurement of further documents 
from DFID, the team held individual meetings (from September 20 to October 9) with 
all the members of the DSC, three Heads of Mission or Deputy HoMs, all the four
consortia secretariats and, all in all, 13 CSOs and 3 ECEP regional co-ordinators, both 
in Nairobi and in Kisumu (September 30 and October 1) and Mombasa (October 3 and 
4). The team also attended the ECEP review workshop in Thika and the CEDMAC
review workshop in Nairobi. For the intensive round of interviews, the core team was 
joined by Dr. M. Mmuya for one week, from September 22 to 27, 2002. 
For conducting the interviews, semi-structured interview guidelines were prepared and
applied, in different versions for donors and CSOs. 
The team also sent out e-mail-questionnaires to two former key DSC members not
present in Kenya anymore, and gratefully acknowledges the insights provided by both 
Karijn de Jong and Jelte van Wieren, formerly representatives of, respectively, the lead 
donor and the deputy lead donor.
A concluding meeting with the TAT/FMA on October 9 served to answer most of the 
outstanding issues at the end of the evaluation. 
The draft report was submitted to USAID and circulated to the DSC members, the
TAT/FMA, and consortia representatives. The team held debriefing meetings with the 
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DSC (October 22) and the TAT/FMA and consortia representatives (October 29).
Written comments on the draft report were given by DFID, USAID and the TAT/FMA. 
A full list of interview partners is annexed to the report (Annex A2), as is the full list of 
documents reviewed (Annex A3). 
2.5. Acknowledgements
We would like to thank all our interview partners for taking time to share their
experiences of the NCEP with us and for demonstrating a high degree of flexibility
when it came to arranging meetings, mostly on short notice, as it usually happens with 
exercises taking place within a tight timeframe. Specifically, we want to acknowledge 
the co-operation of the TAT/FMA in sharing their experiences with us, in providing
relevant documentation, and in facilitating contacts to the participating CSOs and
consortia. 
Compared with the work plan in our proposal, it was only the CKRC with which we 
could not arrange for an interview, due to the events of the constitutional review process 
at the time the evaluation took place.
On a final introductory note, we also want to mention that, when drafting the report, we 
were affected by a dynamic which is not unfamiliar with evaluation exercises: Despite 
all the obvious and not-so-obvious successes of the NCEP, we tend to spend more time 
and space on discussing failures and shortcomings. This is, however, done with the aim 
of contributing to an improvement of future similar operations, therefore it should not
be read as blaming anybody, but with the idea which we strongly share – that it was and
is an important exercise, and that it is worthwhile looking at ways of how to make it
even more efficient and effective.
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3. THE EVALUATION PROCESS
Before actually discussing the results of the systems evaluation, we find it necessary to 
make some few remarks in order to gauge the peculiarities of the NCEP which also
affect this evaluation. 
The NCEP defies, in quite a number of ways, the application of common evaluation
procedures, mainly due to, firstly, the nature of its planning and preparation process, 
secondly the political environment, and thirdly the political sensitivities involved. 
The Nature of the NCEP's Planning and Preparation Process
In an ideal scenario, and according to the guidelines for project cycle management, a
project would usually consist of a number of distinct phases (terminologies might differ 
from donor to donor): a project identification phase after general programming of the 
sector; an appraisal phase; a financing or decision-making phase; an implementation
phase; and an evaluation phase. 
These phases usually include, at different times, detailed problem, strategy, and
stakeholder analyses, the drafting of detailed implementation schedules including a
logical framework (or logical frameworks, if there are a number of projects in a certain 
sector, possibly in the form of interlocking logical frameworks) with indicators of
expected results and impact as well as implementation and resource schedules. Also, the 
management structure and the roles and responsibilities of the various levels as well as 
reporting, decision making and monitoring and evaluation procedures should be well
enough specified in advance, that is, before project-start. Internal monitoring
accompanies project implementation to constantly assess project progress and to adjust 
the project, if necessary, and evaluations – which may either be mid-term, final or ex￾post evaluations – are used to generate lessons learned and to give recommendations for 
future projects and for the general programming of sectoral activities.
In reality, however, other factors than the requirements of project cycle management
usually come to play a role as well, and sometimes a quite significant one. 
In the case of the NCEP, these other factors were, for example, the NCEP as "a first￾time experience" and "a learning process in which things evolved as the project went
along", rather than strictly following the requirements of project cycle management,
and, even more importantly, the political environment within which the NCEP was
implemented and the political sensitivities associated with it.
Taken together, these other factors led to a situation in which the NCEP shows some of 
the above features of project cycle management, but their sequencing does not always 
follow the usual project format.
For example, there was an initial signal by some donors to fund civic education
activities in Kenya in the context of the constitutional reform process, but only if the
various providers came up with a coherent structure. This was followed by a round of
intensive consultations among intermediate project beneficiaries, that is Kenyan civic
education providers, partly facilitated by some donors of the Likeminded Donors Group 
(LiMiD), which eventually produced the five-consortia-structure, later reduced to a
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four-consortia-structure. This process took quite some time, from right after the 1997
elections to late 1999, and also saw the growing readiness of the donor group to fund 
civic education activities in a joint approach. By early-1999, the consulting company
South Consulting was hired by DFID, the RNE, SIDA and DANIDA, and produced a
detailed report in mid-1999, entitled "Analysing applications to provide civic education 
for the Kenyan Constitutional Review process", which was a mixture of a pre-feasibility 
and project appraisal study, containing the idea of a basket fund and recommendations 
for the management structure. 
Thereafter, negotiations between and among donors and CSOs continued, and in May
and June 2000, a document called "Civic Education in Kenya. Memorandum of
Understanding for a Group of Donors on Donor Co-operation and Support to Civic
Education" was signed by 10 donors (8 funding and 2 non-funding donors), establishing 
the NCEP-basket fund (or joint financing account; the MoU also foresees the possibility 
of bilateral funding, or a combination of both by some donors). By the end of July 2000, 
DFID as the lead donor contracted PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to act as financial
management agent (FMA) of the NCEP-basket fund and to subcontract a technical
assistance team (TAT) for managing the technical aspects of the programme. 
The TAT/FMA was mobilised on August 1, 2000. Noteworthy, neither a detailed
programme document nor a logical framework or detailed implementation and resource 
schedules had been drawn up by then. What would usually be done in the appraisal
phase, was then carried out by the implementing body, the TAT/FMA, in consultations 
with donors and CSOs, as the project had already started. Furthermore, a detailed
programme document was not in place until the end of 2000, detailed budgets were not 
negotiated until much later, and logical frameworks were revised "as the project went 
along" – and neither had the roles and responsibilities of the various management levels 
been specified before the project had started. 
All this makes it difficult to near impossible to do both a variance analysis (comparing 
planned and actual costs and disbursements) and a time variance analysis (comparing
planned and actual activities), as no detailed implementation and resource schedules
were available at the start of the project, and the rough schedules which were available 
at one time or another were being revised as the project progressed. Equally, measuring 
the performance of the project against the indicators of the logical framework cannot be 
done in the strict sense of a usual evaluation, as the indicators of the original logical
framework are rather unspecific and a more detailed logical framework was only
produced halfway through the project. 
Some part of this can be explained by the peculiar nature of the NCEP as mentioned
above – the NCEP as a "first time experience", the multitude of stakeholders involved, 
also on the level of the contracting authority, the (only) partly participatory nature of
project preparation and planning, and the evolutionary nature of the NCEP. However, 
part of it is also due to omissions in planning and design, and we will come back to that 
in the relevant sections below. 
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Political Environment and Political Sensitivities
However, chief among the other factors influencing the NCEP, according to a number 
of interview partners, are the policital environment and the political sensitivities
associated with the NCEP. 
The political environment, or the "poor policy environment", as one respondent put it, 
regularly affected both the planning and the implementation of the NCEP and comprises 
the political events and activities associated with the wider framework within which the 
NCEP was conceptualized and implemented. 
Some examples might suffice to illustrate this point:
· Initially, the NCEP was linked to the parliamentary constitutional review process, 
and later delinked, when this process did not take off. This led to deliberations
among donors, delays and changing approaches in the run-up to the NCEP. 
· Once the NCEP was taking shape, several Government representatives, including 
the President, publicly criticized the NCEP, and especially the funding donors for,
amongst others, drafting a civic education curriculum for Kenyans; for funding CSOs 
perceived to represent opposition to the Government; for interfering with Kenya's
sovereignty; for exporting civic education to rural areas through Nairobi-based 
opposition CSOs; and for wanting to impose the donors' values on Kenya.
· The Government also argued that the donors' efforts (and monies) for civic
education were misdirected and should rather focus on poverty alleviation. 
The political sensitivities referred to in a number of interviews we conducted relate to
the ways donors tried to deal with this criticism. 
For example, following this criticism and pressure on individual donors in their bilateral 
contacts with the Kenyan Government, the donors sought to reach an understanding
with the Government, if not an approval for the NCEP. 
Equally, implementation of the NCEP was delayed in various ways to await the merger 
of the parliamentary review commission and the faiths-led Ufungamano intitiative. 
And once the CKRC-act was passed, and the CKRC mandated to provide civic
education for the purpose of the constitutional review, the donors felt that there was a 
need for some form of collaboration between the CKRC and the NCEP, leading to
presentations of the NCEP to the CKRC and negotiations between donors and the
CKRC on the concrete shape of such a collaboration. 
Consequently, the political environment and the political sensitivities shaped the NCEP 
in quite a number of ways. As a reaction to Government criticism, a number of "risk
mitigation strategies" were put in place, among them: 
· the adoption of a low-profile communication strategy; 
· the focussing on delivery strategies like workshops instead of strategies attracting 
wider publicity (e. g. radio); 
· contacts to and efforts towards collaboration with other stakeholders like the 
CKRC and the Government; 
· the strict accounting requirements put in place for the NCEP in order not to stand 
accused of financing "corrupt" CSOs; and
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· a generally cautious approach by donors to certain activities within the NCEP
perceived to be sensitive (like the pretesting of materials; theater as a delivery
strategy etc.).
It is clear that the political environment and the political sensitivities had also
influenced the NCEP in a number of other, more subtle ways, like emphasising the
control aspect in the relationships between the various stakeholders. All this caused
delays, frustrations on the part of various stakeholders at various times, and some of the 
deviations from what would be an "ideal project" in terms of project cycle management. 
But – it also allowed the project to go ahead, and finally to be implemented, at the
expense of the shortcoming discussed later in the report. 
Where the political environment and political sensitivities had a significant influence on 
issues discussed in other sections of the report, we will only refer to them, without
specifying them again. 
Not mentioned by most of our interview partners, but in our view also part of a poor
policy framework, leading to delays at various stages, is what could be called the
"politics of the CSO-sector". The effects of this were most obvious in the preparation
stage of the NCEP, when the consortia were formed in a lengthy process, and later on in 
the conflict within what finally became the Gender Consortium. 
A possible lesson to be learned from the NCEP in this regard is that CSOs usually are as 
multifacetted as the society within which they are operating, and that the benefits of
grouping them together in consortia should be weighed against the time and efforts
required to do so. 
Divergent Assessments
Finally, the multitude of NCEP stakeholders involved in its planning and
implementation – 10 donors on two levels, more than 70 CSOs (including project staff 
and facilitators), plus four consortia secretariats and the TAT/FMA as the core group of 
the NCEP – makes it only natural that opinions differ, and sometimes quite
substantially. Equally, the experiences and assessments of persons involved in a
programme like the NCEP over a long period of time might differ from the assessments
of evaluators, who come in for a short period of time and rather judge a programme by
its results, and not by the difficulties of the process through which these results were 
achieved. 
At this point, we want to emphasise that the ratings for the various levels and
components of the programme are entirely ours, and that they may not be corresponding 
to the views expressed by any or all of the stakeholders interviewed. We will, however, 
note major discrepancies in assessments by the different stakeholders wherever we feel 
it is necessary. 
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3.1. Overall Assessment of the NCEP 
The overall assessment of the NCEP management framework regarding the
combination of the criteria of efficiency, effectiveness, relevance, impact, and
sustainability and taking into consideration cross-cutting issues (mainly gender) is
"Satisfactory".
The NCEP management framework achieved quite a number of things – like providing 
a substantial sum of money for civic education through a basket fund, maintaining the 
coherence and unity of the donor group, delivering the outputs through a professional
management structure of technical assistants and financial managers, countrywide
coverage following a common curriculum etc. – and it did so in a difficult political
environment. These achievements should not be underrated. 
However, these outputs were achieved, among others, at a considerable cost (money and 
time which went into planning and implementation), the actual implementation phase
was very short, decision making procedures were, to a large extent, cumbersome and
slow, especially before implementation of civic education activities had started, the flow 
of information between the various levels had quite a number of flaws, and gender
issues were only poorly covered by actors outside the Gender Consortium.
3.2. Relevance and Project Preparation and Design
The relevance of the NCEP management framework is assessed against its stated
objectives and against project planning, preparation and design, mainly based on the
NCEP Programme Document (the version which was available to us dates from January 
2001 and is labelled "Final Draft") and interviews with stakeholders. 
Whereas our overall assessment for the NCEP's relevance is "Highly satisfactory", the 
NCEP's project preparation and design clearly qualify as "Less than satisfactory".
Relevance regarding its stated objectives, at the beginning and at project-end – "Highly 
satisfactory"
The overwhelming majority of respondents, both donors and CSOs, see the NCEP as a 
very relevant programme "to promote general awareness of democratic principles, the 
practice of good governance, the rule of law and constitutionalism" in order to
"contribute to the consolidation of a mature political culture in Kenya", both at the time 
when the NCEP was designed and at project-end.
Obviously, this assessment is also influenced by the wider political environment in
which the NCEP is situated – from the re-introduction of multipartyism in 1992 to the 
negotiations within the Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group (IPPG) and, finally, the
merging of the parliamentary and the faiths-led Ufungamano constitutional review
processes – and of which it has become an integral part. 
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Relevance regarding the previous work and the mandates of participating CSOs –
"Satisfactory"
Most of the CSOs interviewed stated that they had done civic education – in various
forms and with various orientations – before the creation of the NCEP. In this respect, 
the NCEP complemented their existing work, and enhanced their capacities to continue 
implementing civic education activities. This is mostly true for the considerable number 
of CSOs which had been in existence well before the NCEP started. On the other hand, 
however, there can be no doubt that the possibility of receiving funds through the NCEP 
led to some refocussing of activities within existing CSOs, and also to the creation of
new outfits in the course of inter-CSO-consultations prior to the NCEP. 
Relevance regarding the NCEP-objective to "carry out general civic education
activities in terms of a standard and politically neutral core curriculum" – "Highly
satisfactory"
Whereas quite a number of CSOs involved in the implementation of NCEP-activities 
clearly have a history of advocacy and bias towards the political opposition (which is, in 
large measure, only natural considering Kenya's political history), the core-NCEP￾principles of political neutrality, non-advocacy and non-partisanship and the fact that
quite diverse organisations had to conform to a common civic education curriculum 
were widely appreciated across the various types of CSOs. Although some noted that
the principle of non-advocacy was sometimes difficult to comprehend and implement, 
the NCEP-principles and the core curriculum were seen as major success factors, having 
allowed the programme to be implemented almost without disruptions, and having
forged a sense of unity among participating CSOs by collaboratively working on a
common agenda. 
Relevance regarding "mainstreaming of gender equity in national civic education 
activities and specific targeting of women participants" – "Less than satisfactory"
It seems that the existence of a Gender Consortium was seen by most of the other
NCEP-implementors and stakeholders as sufficient to achieve the above objective. 
Gender issues, therefore, were largely treated as a separate aspect of civic education,
though partly (but rather poorly) integrated into the NCEP-materials (curriculum,
handbook, trainer's manual; discussed below). To be sure, the capacity of organisations 
focussing on gender rights was strengthened, and civic education activities focussing on 
gender awareness and empowerment of women were supported through the CSOs of the 
Gender Consortium (or at least a majority of them). 
But there was obviously no cross-consortia capacity building in gender mainstreaming
(partly due to the late mobilisation of Gender CSOs after the conflict in the Gender
Consortium), no special effort towards integrating gender issues into the NCEP on its
various levels (as could have been expected by prominently naming "mainstreaming of 
gender equity" as Output 3 in the Programme Document), and most of the CSOs of
other consortia were very unspecific on how they have integrated gender as a cross-
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cutting issue into their respective activities. An open question is also the capacity of the 
CSOs of the Gender Consortium to carry out gender mainstreaming without additional 
technical input. 
Quality of Preparation and Planning – "Less than satisfactory" 
Considering the amount of time and the number of meetings and consultations on
various levels – among donors, between donors and CSOs, among CSOs – which went 
into the NCEP's preparation and planning phases, the net effect of these preparations is 
rather disappointing. Apart from the regular donor consultations in the LiMiD-group 
and bilateral contacts between donors and CSOs, there were at least two civic education 
provider workshops (Mbagathi I and II), the proposal appraisal study by South
Consulting and further rounds of extensive consultations among the various
stakeholders before the NCEP took on a clearer shape. This process witnessed, among 
others, the formation of the four implementing consortia and the formation of the fifth 
consortia, NACEFCO (National Constitutional Education Facilitative Committee),
which originally was meant to perform a number of specific tasks for the NCEP. Due to 
the politics of the sector and the personalities involved, however, NACEFCO failed to 
live up to its role and finally dropped out of the NCEP, leaving especially the
TAT/FMA to carry out tasks originally foreseen to be performed by NACEFCO. 
If the aim was to provide for ownership of the process among Kenyan CSOs by
employing a participatory approach to planning, then this was definitely not achieved. 
Still by now, most CSOs see the preparation phase and the process of consortia building 
as largely donor driven or responding to donors' demands, although among some of the 
CSOs, there is a kind of "rewriting of history" by claiming that it were the CSOs which 
were the driving forces. 
As planning for the NCEP took place on various levels – donor-, consortia-, and CSO￾levels – delays were to be expected. And again, the political environment (like, for
example, the linking of the NCEP to the constitutional review between 1997 and 1999) 
was responsible for some of the delays – which became obvious when the programme 
moved faster once the decision to delink the NCEP from the constitutional review
process was taken.
However, despite the fact that the detailed report by South Consulting (the draft
available to the evaluation team dates from June 1999) already included most of the
elements which were later to be found in the NCEP-design, though sometimes on a
level too general for a project appraisal study, it took another year until the TAT/FMA 
was finally mobilised. 
It is worth noting that during this long project preparation and planning phase some of
the key issues of project programming were not performed – neither was there, to our 
knowledge, a detailed stakeholder analysis undertaken, nor was the management
structure sufficiently specified (with roles and responsibilities of the various levels), nor 
were logical frameworks, implementation and resource schedules prepared. Equally,
some of the major problems faced during implementation were not identified during the 
preparation and planning phases, which again led to some delays later on which could 
have been avoided. Furthermore, some vital instruments and tools for planning
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individual interventions – like problem, objective, and strategy analysis – were not
developed at all, whereas other crucial tools, mainly the baseline survey and the
mapping study, were only undertaken and finally available half-way through the project.
The process, however, also had its positive highlights – not the least of which were:
firstly, the agreement reached by implementing CSOs to carry out general civic
education according to a common curriculum, largely developed by themselves (with
facilitation by the TAT/FMA); secondly, the readiness of donors to jointly fund such
civic education activities with a substantial amount of money which, according to some 
interviews, by far exceeded the amount which would have gone into bilateral civic
education activities; and thirdly, the building of confidence and trust among donors and 
CSOs (which was, however, shaken at various times due to the lengthy process). 
Quality of Programme Design – "Less than satisfactory"
Again considering the long preparation and planning phase, it is surprising that the
eventual programme design was not more specific on overall purpose, project objective, 
expected results and planned activities of the NCEP. These omissions led to problems 
later on during project implementation and also pose considerable challenges to this
evaluation. 
One example shall serve to highlight this point: Among the expected outputs (or results) 
of the NCEP, we have identified two main results – firstly, to facilitate and enable the 
carrying out general civic education activities by a number of Kenyan CSOs, and
secondly, to build the capacity of these CSOs, both technically and financially, to do so. 
Both tasks were mainly vested in the TAT/FMA, and as the absorption capacity of local 
CSOs and their capacities to implement civic education activities were not properly
assessed before the start of the project, there was no estimate of the time and resources 
needed to perform the two tasks. The TAT/FMA, in conjunction with the DSC, mainly
the lead donor, subsequently, had to respond in an ad-hoc manner to challenges arising 
in the course of the project, at various points in time reallocating resources from one
task to the other. It is noteworthy that the TAT/FMA and the lead donor did so with
considerable flexibility and personal input. 
However, it also makes it difficult to near impossible to do a sensible and meaningful 
cost-benefit analysis of the programme, as there was no clear distinction between
resources mobilised for capacity building (technical and financial) on the one hand and 
actual programme management and implementation on the other hand. Overall, it is true 
that the NCEP demanded a high degree of flexibility due to the large number of
stakeholders, and that not everything could have been planned in advance, especially in 
a politically sensitive environment. 
However, one possible lesson for the design of future multidonor governance
programmes with a variety of objectives could be to establish a kind of "cost centres"
for each objective before project start, preceded by a more detailed planning phase. This 
would give donors the possibility to actually compare costs for individual objectives
with similar exercises in other sectors, and it would also give the implementing agency 
a more detailed picture of what will have to be performed, and how and when. The
results of this more detailed breakdown of tasks to be performed by the respective
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implementing agency would have to be costed and integrated into the logical
framework.
A different approach to planning and project preparation could also have led to logical 
framework(s) of a higher quality and to a prioritisation and sequencing of tasks to be
performed on the various levels of the programme. 
Again, just as an example, the donors could have contracted the baseline survey and the 
mapping study some time before project start (i. e. before the mobilisation of the
TAT/FMA), in order to produce quality indicators and benchmarks for the development 
of logical frameworks and the internal monitoring and evaluation system or to find out 
which geographical areas or target groups are underrepresented in the project proposals 
of the participating CSOs. 
Another example is the drafting of implementation schedules: As the end-date for the 
NCEP was known (provided the absence of early elections), the TAT/FMA (and the
DSC) could have drawn up a list of essential tasks at the beginning of the programme, 
with minimum times required and latest possible start-dates, in order to provide the
various levels of the NCEP (HoMs, DSC, TAT/FMA, consortia, CSOs) with
benchmarks on when decisions have to be made or on when certain tasks have to be
completed. 
Quality of the Programme Document (including Terms of Reference for the TAT/FMA) 
– "Less than satisfactory"
Corresponding to the rather poor ratings for project preparation and planning and the
NCEP design, the Programme Document reflects a number of the characteristics
discussed above.
Whereas it gives a fair overview of the main elements of the NCEP, its objectives and 
expected outputs, it is far too unspecific in many ways to form the basic document of a 
programme such as the NCEP.
Partly, this can again be explained by the evolutionary nature of the NCEP, within
which "things were developed as the project went along". However, considering the
time the final draft of the Programme Document was prepared and also approved –
January 2001 – it could have been much more detailed in many of the areas covered. 
For example, the Programme Document still mentions the KWPC, whereas, at that
point, it was already clear that there was a major crisis in what later became the Gender 
Consortium. Equally, the HoMs are not mentioned at all in this document, although they 
were already involved in the NCEP. 
The Terms of Reference for the TAT/FMA seem to have adequately reflected the tasks 
and responsibilities of the FMA, whereas the job description of the TAT is rather
sketchy.
A more detailed and specific Programme Document could have helped in avoiding
some of the delays experienced later on in the programme, and it could also have given 
much clearer indications of what needs to be done, and when. The finalisation of the 
Programme Document was the task of the TAT/FMA.
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Quality of Logical Frameworks and OVIs – "Less than satisfactory"
Faced with a situation described above, the original logical framework was basically a 
desk job reflecting what the implementing firm saw as possible purpose, results and
indicative activities within the framework of an ongoing project – the TAT/FMA has
owned to this fact in several meetings. 
No wonder therefore, that the logical frame is not specific in terms of deliverables. The 
objectively verifyable indicators (OVIs) are not quantifiable, qualitative and time/space 
bound. Reading the logframe, one does not see clearly what the NCEP was to achieve. 
Reports show that there was very limited application of logical frameworks in
monitoring achievements and performance against preset targets. Instead, the
programme depended on roll-out plans produced (and adapted) on an ongoing basis.
NCEP Logical Framework:
The logic between the overall goal and project purpose is there. The problem starts with 
the outputs. 
Firstly, there are far too many outputs (10) for a project designed for only between one 
and two years. Some of the outputs could as well be activities, like outputs 1.
Monitoring and evaluation mechanisms developed and implemented; 3. Coordinated,
non-partisan and holistic civic education undertaken country wide; 5. Effective financial 
and programme management implemented; 9. Appropriate teaching and learning
materials developed. 
Secondly, the purpose and results are not specific, measurable, and verifyable – no
realistic quantities (targets) are set, the ones which are there are too open ended and not 
time specific.
In our opinion, the original outputs stated in the Programme Document were more
appropriate as they state desirable future situations. In refocusing the logframe, the best 
thing would have been to finetune aspects such as the vertical logic and to provide
benchmarks of achievement and performance along the horizontal logic. For example, 
the OVIs, as stated elsewhere, should have been made more qualitative, quantitative and 
set within time and place. As far as we are concerned, the revised logframe for the
NCEP (only produced after the methodology workshop, held from October 30 to
November 4, 2001, i. e. 15 months into the programme) may have caused more
confusion than helped with effective and efficient programme delivery – that is if the
implementation team relied on it. Instead, the programme was allowed to proceed in
response to roll-out plans made by the CSOs. This is a very loose arrangement to the
extent that one cannot hold neither the TAT/FMA nor the DSC responsible for
providing lead into the achievement of the programme's overall purpose and goal. The 
NCEP logical framework should have interlinked or interlocked with the consortia
logical frameworks and the individual CSOs logical frameworks because what
individual CSOs set out to achieve was supposed to impact on the achievement of the 
NCEP as a whole. 
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Consortia Logical Frameworks:
These were supposed to be subsets of NCEP logframe. The consortia should have
helped their CSOs to focus their logical frameworks on the relevant thematic concerns 
that ideally should have been derived from the NCEP overriding logical framework. 
As it is, the logical frameworks of most of the consortia have demonstrated a good
vertical logic whereby the achievement of activities will impact on the results, which in 
turn will impact on the purpose and, hopefully, result in achievement of the programme 
goal. To start with, the OVIs are mostly specific, measurable, attainable (numbers are
indicated and fairly conservative), realistic (they intend to operate within their existing 
areas of jurisdiction) and almost all have indicated a timeframe within which they want 
to carry out their part of civic education. The Gender logframe is a bit too general – like 
the NCEP logframe. There was need to specify numbers against the OVIs set. Again for 
Gender, it is not easy to discern if the set targets are to be achieved by the consortium or 
by the member CSOs.
Some of the outputs are cutting across most consortia. For example, gender issues are 
the concern of all the CSOs. The TAT should have found common denominators for co￾ordinating the gender mainstreaming by using gender specialists (of the Gender
Consortium or external experts) to provide initial training to all the other consortia.
From a programme (or project) cycle management point of view, an interlocking logical 
framework brings into focus the interrelation between different players in a programme 
as large as the NCEP. The different thematic project purposes, which are derived from 
the results of the programme level logical framework, will jointly contribute to and
impact on the level of achievement of programme purpose and thus the overall
programme goal. Unfortunately, this detailed planning approach was not possible under 
NCEP for several reasons discussed elsewhere in this report.
Table 1: Possible Structure of an Interlocking Logical Framework for the NCEP
Programme ECEP 
Consortium
CRECO 
Consortium
CEDMAC 
Consortium
Gender 
Consortium
Non –Consortia 
CSOs
Overall Goal
Programme 
Purpose
Overall 
Objective
Overall 
Objective
Overall 
Objective
Overall 
Objective
Overall 
Objective
Results/Output
s
Project 
Purpose
Project Purpose Project Purpose Project 
Purpose
Project Purpose
Activities Results/Out
puts
Results/Outputs Results/Outputs Results/Output
s
Results/Outputs
Activities Activities Activities Activities Activities
Monitoring and Evaluation Design – "Satisfactory"
Overall, the design of the M&E-system seems to have adequately reflected the scale of 
the programme as well as the requirements of donors for financial accountability and
constant overview of programme progress.
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The basic M&E-tools and -procedures are described in the Programme Document and in 
the relevant annex ("NCEP: An Outline of Programme Monitoring and Evaluation
Design") and consist of a baseline survey and a mapping exercise as well as internal
M&E through, mainly, a programme tracking and management tool.
However, as noted above with respect to the Programme Document as a whole, the
M&E-systems described in the Programme Document are still too unspecific, forms and 
detailed procedures are not yet developed, and above all, what should have been the
basis for internal M&E – baseline survey and mapping exercise – were not yet
available, again reflecting weaknesses in programme preparation and planning.
Management Structure Overall – "Satisfactory"
At the first glance, the design of the NCEP's management structure seems to reflect an 
adequate approach to the magnitude of the programme and to the political sensitivities 
referred to above. The efficiency of the management structure will be discussed below, 
at this stage it is only its design which is of interest. 
The donors are constituted on two levels – the Heads of Mission, with the UK taking the 
lead, and the Donor Steering Committee, with, correspondingly, DFID being the lead
donor and the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) being the deputy lead donor. 
On another level, there is PwC which was contracted to provide the TAT/FMA with an 
originally predefined (but not very specific) set of tasks to be performed and reporting 
requirements, based on the Terms of Reference for the TAT/FMA.
On yet another level, there are the national secretariats of the four consortia which –
according to the Programme Document – also had a number of tasks within the NCEP 
framework whereby their existence (and financing) can be justified. The effectiveness
of the consortia structure will also be discussed below.
The actual implementors of civic education activities are the CSOs organised in the four 
consortia and a number of non-consortia CSOs to fill gaps relating to geographical
coverage and target group outreach. For the management of the intervention, each CSO 
was equipped with a project co-ordinator, one or more programme officers, and an
accountant, and implementation was done through locally mobilised facilitators
employed by the CSOs. 
This design has a number of strengths – among others, and most importantly,
guaranteeing relatively comprehensive coverage in terms of geographical scope and
target group outreach, professional management by an interdisciplinary TAT/FMA￾team, as well as what is widely referred to as one the NCEP's main achievements, the 
strengthening of local networks and capacity building in the communities via the
facilitators. 
At least design-wise, it also established a link between political considerations at the
level of the donors (with the involvement of the HoMs), technically and financially
sound management of a large-scale intervention, and implementation of civic education 
activities on the ground.
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These strengths, however, are matched by some design weaknesses of the management 
structure, chief of which turned out to be the lack of predefined roles and
responsibilities, as well as the insufficient decision-making authorities at the various
levels. Even where roles and responsibilities had been defined beforehand (like for the 
TAT/FMA with the Terms of Reference), they kept on being changed so that, in the
words of one interview partner, "goalposts were constantly moved".
For example, the nature of the involvement of the HoMs was never specified in any of 
the programme documents which we have seen, not even in the MoU signed by the
same group. The MoU only makes mention of the Donor Steering Committee, but also 
without clearly denoting its roles and responsibilities. 
On another level, the consortia secretariats and the consortia structure feature
prominently in the NCEP Programme Document, whereby they were largely irrelevant 
when it came to actual programme implementation. Contracts were negotiated directly
between individual member-CSOs and the TAT/FMA (on behalf of the donors), and
reporting was done between CSOs and TAT/FMA, largely bypassing the consortia
secretariats. With hindsight, it can be established that only ECEP was a consortia in the 
true meaning of the word, and also acted as such. On the other hand, CRECO,
CEDMAC and the Gender Consortium were, at best, consortia-to-be. For the NCEP,
they were largely under utilised, despite the rhetoric of the Programme Document and 
despite the fact that a lot of time and effort went into building these structures. 
However, this does not imply that we see the consortia structure and the national
secretariats as completely irrelevant – only, that they have not been adequately utilised 
in the course of the NCEP. And there was definitely some benefit from having contact 
points for groups of CSOs, not least for communication purposes. 
Additionally, some of the member-CSOs of these three consortia see a more prominent 
role for their respective consortium in future activities so that the NCEP might have had 
a lasting impact on the sector, but one which can only be gauged in the medium term. 
Besides, it must not be forgotten that the minor role of the consortia during the NCEP 
was also a deliberate strategy to prevent them from being "gatekeepers" for access to
donor funds, and that the role of consortia secretariats also is associated with the politics 
– and different interests – of the member CSOs.
3.3. Efficiency
The overall efficiency of the NCEP management framework is assessed as
"Satisfactory", derived from rather poor ratings for the efficiency of the management
structure and of the relationships between the various levels, and high ratings for the
NCEP reporting and control structures and the quality of NCEP systems. 
Quite a number of efficiency-bottlenecks uncovered in the course of the evaluation are 
due to the peculiar nature of the NCEP's programme preparation, planning, and design, 
as detailed above, and only some of them will be repeated here. 
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Efficiency regarding the Management Structure – "Satisfactory" to "Less than
satisfactory"
Some design strengths and weaknesses of the NCEP management structure were
already mentioned above, the main question regarding its efficiency is whether the
inputs were optimally transformed into results on the various levels, i. e. "Were things 
done right?". 
HoMs-Level – "Less than satisfactory":
Firstly, the involvement of the HoMs came about because the NCEP was
conceptualized and implemented in a politically sensitive environment. 
It became quite clear to the evaluation team that, for most of its duration, there were a 
number of negative statements by various members of the Kenyan Government, even up 
to the President, against the NCEP, and it was also established that some donors
received quite some criticism for their involvement in the programme in their bilateral 
contacts with Government representatives. Naturally, criticism like that would be
directed towards leading exponents of the NCEP, not least the lead donor, who has an 
exposed position in Kenya anyway. 
However, the "political sensitivities" were not so obvious to all the NCEP-stakeholders. 
For example, some interview partners stated that they had done civic education before 
NCEP, and that they had never asked the Kenyan Government for permission to do so, 
neither bothered about its reaction. 
Therefore, a preliminary conclusion is that the nature of political sensitivity of the
NCEP was not adequately communicated by the donors to the other stakeholders of the 
NCEP, most importantly not to the CSOs. Occasional meetings between donors and
CSOs could have provided a platform for sharing different perspectives on the
programme.
Secondly, the HoMs were to provide political guidance to the NCEP and, implicitly (or 
potentially), a political shield for the activities of the CSOs. Political guidance was
given, indeed, and sometimes quite efficiently, for example by insisting on non￾partisanship and political neutrality of the curriculum and civic education delivery. It
was also expressed that the focus of the programme on accountability and transparency 
has proactively discouraged Government criticism that donors were funding corrupt
CSOs aligned to the opposition. Furthermore, as real as the political sensitivity of the 
NCEP was, it was only appropriate and helpful for the programme that the HoMs were 
kept informed about its progress on a regular basis. 
The (potential) function of becoming a political shield for activities of participating
CSOs was, however, flatly rejected by the HoMs (and the DSC), as far as the evaluation 
team was able to establish. This is most obvious in the adoption of a low-profile 
communication strategy, which had been debated for about a year (!) and which
essentially left CSOs to deal with their problems on an individual level, without
reference to the larger NCEP-structure. The low-profile approach went as far that there 
was hardly any public mentioning of the NCEP at all, that the name of the programme 
neither appears on the business cards of the NCEP-TAT/FMA, nor on its offices, nor on 
the NCEP-core materials. With hindsight, it appears that the low-profile strategy has
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helped the programme, to some extent, moving along almost without interruptions – but 
also almost without any publicity of a USD 8 Mio. programme. 
Thirdly, when the idea of involving the HoMs was to politically steer the NCEP, the
division of tasks between HoMs and DSC was never specified, and the HoMs (as a
group or through the lead donor), at various times, involved themselves in technical
aspects and details of the NCEP which went far beyond political guidance. This was
acknowledged by most interview partners with knowledge of the proceedings at HoMs￾meetings, but most of them also stated that it would be difficult to make the HoMs
restrict themselves to issues of major political importance. The only feasible solution
seems to draft a clear task-list for the HoMs (and the DSC), and to appeal to their
professionalism to not getting involved in day-to-day project management issues. From 
the point of view of efficiency, it was also not helpful that some matters (project
proposals, the issue of cancellation of contracts etc.) were both discussed at the DSC￾and at the HoMs-level, always with a time-lag in between. 
All this caused quite a number of delays in project implementation, up to the point
where one consortium (ECEP) was threatening to pull out completely. 
DSC-Level – "Satisfactory":
Overall, we rate the DSC's efficiency as "Satisfactory", as it ultimately delivered the
steering (or rather co-management) of the NCEP. However, this efficiency came at the 
expense of considerable time spent on doing so, and of considerable personal input by
key individuals, most notably the lead donor. 
Surprisingly, most of the DSC-members interviewed rated the efficiency of their
operations as reasonably to very high. This is surprising in a number of ways: 
Firstly, at the time of the evaluation mission, 41 DSC meetings had taken place, with an 
average attendance of 7 to 8 out of 10 donors per meeting (with sometimes two
representatives per donor) and an estimated average duration of 2 hours, which roughly 
amounts to 600 man-hours for the DSC meetings alone. Until the end of 2001, when
implementation of civic education activities had finally started, the DSC meetings were 
held every two weeks, thereafter once a month. Add to this the man-hours that went into 
the planning meetings (or programme management unit meetings or, short, NCEP
meetings), comprising the lead donor, the deputy lead donor and the TAT/FMA, which 
were held in preparation of each DSC meeting, the figure becomes even higher, still not 
counting the almost daily ad-hoc consultations between mainly the lead donor and the
TAT/FMA. It is surprising to note that some DSC members were not aware that
planning meetings were held at all.
Secondly, whereas the DSC had the task to technically "steer" (i. e. to guide) the
process, and did so with various degrees of efficiency, it in fact became a donor
management committee, involving itself in the very details of day-to-day management 
of the NCEP, as can be seen from the minutes of DSC meetings. The DSC thereby
opened itself up to the criticism of "micromanaging" the NCEP. Several reasons were 
given for this heavy involvement of the DSC in programme management, ranging from 
the need to co-ordinate and harmonise approaches among donors, to the political
sensitivities and the large number of CSOs involved, and to the dissatisfaction
expressed by some donors with the work of the TAT/FMA in the initial stages of the 
NCEP. 
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Thirdly, and on a minor point, the minutes of the DSC meetings do not adequately
reflect the NCEP's progress and discussions held and decisions taken among DSC
members. This is all the more surprising as DSC members know that most of them
rotate regularly, and that it was hardly to be expected that the group remained made up 
of the same individuals over its lifespan. Judging solely from the DSC meeting minutes, 
a proper understanding of the work of the DSC is not possible, neither for newly
arriving DSC members nor for external evaluators.
All this is taking place against the declared intention of pooling funds to lower
administrative costs and efforts for individual donors, and against the fact that a
professional TAT/FMA was hired – at some cost (see below) – to manage the
programme. 
On a positive note, despite all these shortcomings, the DSC succeeded – with, as noted 
above, considerable personal input from key individuals at the DSC, especially the lead 
donors, and at the TAT/FMA, for that matter – to create and uphold a sense of unity and 
shared responsibilities among donors, leading to a situation whereby some donors
mobilised more funds for civic education than they would have done on a bilateral
basis. Additionally, the mere fact the programme came into existence and was
eventually implemented is no small achievement. 
TAT/FMA-Level – "Satisfactory":
Overall, also in the view of most other stakeholders, the TAT/FMA succeeded in
efficiently providing technical and financial assistance both to the CSOs and the DSC. 
However, there is one important qualification to make: Some donor representatives
(especially the lead donor) at times sharply criticised the TAT/FMA (especially the
TAT) for having been too inexperienced for the management of a large programme like 
the NCEP in the initial stages, for feeding the DSC with too much detailed information 
on the programme, and for deferring decisions to the DSC which could have been taken 
by the TAT/FMA, thereby paving the way for what the TAT/FMA in turn called the
"micromanagement" of the DSC. There is a consensus, however, that the performance 
of the TAT/FMA improved in the course of the programme, especially after the
TAT/FMA's self-assessment by the middle of 2001 and after senior PwC-staff got more 
involved in internal quality control. One part of the problem was also that the role of the 
TAT was not specific enough in the Terms of Reference, and that the TAT was charged 
with several add-on tasks in the course of the programme which were not originally
foreseen (e. g. materials productions, development of a communication strategy etc.).
Other donors, however, commended the TAT/FMA for its services. Some qualifications 
in this respect also relate to the unstructured presentation of information by the
TAT/FMA to the DSC members, which however improved in the course of the
programme, and the solicitation of guidance by the TAT/FMA from the DSC members 
on issues which would normally be within the powers of an implementing agency. 
Our criticism in this respect is that the TAT/FMA could have been more proactive and 
assertive in demanding clear guidelines and criteria within which it would have been
able to carry out its functions of day-to-day management. In fact, the issue of
micromanagement was – according to the DSC meeting minutes – raised by the DSC
itself for the first time on March 30, 2001, when the DSC concluded that the "TAT
should be allowed more leeway". Obviously, however, micromanagement continued,
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for one reason or another, and the TAT/FMA itself only brought up this issue in the
DSC meeting on December 14, 2001, 17 months into the project.
On the other side, most of the CSOs were basically satisfied with the way the
TAT/FMA performed its tasks. This was expressed in the same way for both the TAT 
and the FMA. 
Regarding its overall performance in interactions with CSOs, most of the CSOs stated
that the work of the TAT/FMA had a capacity building effect on their operations, both 
in terms of increasing the CSOs' ability to professionally plan, manage and monitor
interventions, as well as in terms of putting in place transparent and accountable
financial systems.
Minor criticism was voiced relating to some aspects of the work of the TAT/FMA, like 
the "policing" manner in which field monitoring and accounting supervision was carried 
out, delays caused by the linkage between technical and financial reporting and
disbursement of funds which was done on a monthly basis, and inadequate budgets for 
some components of the CSOs' projects and the fact that budgets were not fully
harmonised across CSOs, sometimes leading to conflicts between target communities
and CSOs operating in the same area. 
Noteworthy, most CSOs made a clear distinction between their relations to the
TAT/FMA in, firstly, the project phase up to the signing of contracts, which was largely 
described as "stormy" and "difficult", and secondly in the phase of actual
implementation of civic education activities, when relations were basically described as 
"smooth" and "friction-free". This only underscores the point that a shorter and more
focussed project preparation and planning phase, with clear indicators and guidelines, 
followed by a longer implementation phase would have been beneficial to all
stakeholders involved. 
Consortia Secretariats – "Satisfactory" (to the extent applicable):
All the four consortia have developed memoranda of understanding regulating the co￾operation of their member CSOs and specifying their institutions and roles. 
By far the most detailed MoU is the ECEP "Consortia Programme Memorandum", and 
as mentioned above, out of the four consortia, only ECEP was a consortium in the true 
meaning of the word. It was only the ECEP national secretariat (the national steering
committee and the national co-ordination secretariat, in the terms of the MoU) which
centrally co-ordinated technical and financial management of the programme, including 
planning of activities, with the involvement of the regional co-ordinators. 
By contrast, the other three consortia MoUs are rather brief documents. Their
secretariats – the CRECO- and CEDMAC-secretariats and the Gender technical unit –
were, with some variations between consortia, largely confined to the role of a technical 
assistance unit for their member CSOs, performing a number of second-rate tasks, co￾ordinating, but not actually "managing" the consortium – which, again, was not really
requested for by their member CSOs.
Because the CSO proposals and budgets were discussed directly with the TAT/FMA
without (or with only minor) involvement of the consortia, there was no opportunity to 
harmonise the terms and conditions of contracts signed between TAT/FMA and CSOs
belonging to a consortium or those belonging to other consortia. A situation was created 
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whereby CSOs operating in the same area had different terms and conditions,
sometimes leading to "poaching" of facilitators. 
The evaluation team did not see much inter-consortia connectivity either. So sharing of 
experiences between the thematic groups, which could have enhanced the quality of
delivery especially among the younger CSOs, was not possible. 
In order not to create an elite of CSOs, the NCEP also involved a number of CSOs
operating outside any consortium. Discussions with the TAT/FMA reveal that the
performance of these non-consortia CSOs did not differ substantially from the consortia 
CSOs, thereby again questioning the use made of the consortia and their secretariats in 
the course of the NCEP. 
Individual CSOs – not applicable:
The evaluation team visited and interviewed 13 out of 71 participating CSOs (4 from
CRECO, 4 from CEDMAC, 4 from the Gender consortium, only 1 non-consortia CSO)2
and the ECEP regional co-ordinators in Kisumu (both NCCK and CJPC) and Mombasa 
(NCCK), apart from all the four consortia secretariats. 
Purely with information gathered from interviews with the project co-ordinators, 
programme officers and some of the facilitators of the respective CSOs, an assessment 
of their efficiency in programme management and implementation is not feasible. 
We therefore concentrated on the relationships of individual CSOs with both the other 
stakeholders of the NCEP and the target communities, on the problems they faced
during planning and implementation, on their entry and delivery strategies and on their 
assessment of the experiences gathered during the programme, of the likely impact of
their interventions, and of the sustainability of the exercise. Information on these issues 
will, however, appear in other parts of this text. 
Efficiency of the Relationships and the Collaboration between the various Levels –
"Less than satisfactory"
Overall, we judge these relationships to be "less than satisfactory", with, however, some 
substantial variations and some necessary qualifications.
Relationships between the TAT/FMA and other Stakeholders – "Satisfactory":
On of the most outstanding results of our interviews with different stakeholders was that 
the relationships between both donors and CSOs with the TAT/FMA were classified as 
being, by and large, professional and "very good" to "quite useful" (with some
 
2
 We had originally planned to see three CSOs of each consortium, plus three non-consortia CSOs. One of 
the non-consortia CSOs was present at the initial briefing with CSOs, and we intended to interview this 
CSO. They were, however, not available for an interview thereafter, because the chairman and the project 
co-ordinator had travelled. Another non-consortia CSO, which we wanted to interview in Thika, could not 
be contacted; and a third one, which we actually interviewed and which appears in the files as a non￾consortia CSO, was actually a member of the CEDMAC consortium (the reason being that this CSO
signed the CEDMAC-MoU late in 2001, and was therefore funded from the budget for non-consortia 
CSOs). Therefore, we arranged one interview with a non-consortia CSO in Nairobi in the final week of 
the evaluation. 
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qualifications with respect to certain components of the TAT/FMA's work which are
discussed above under "Efficiency" of the management structure).
Intra-Consortia Relationships – "Highly satisfactory":
The relations between individual CSOs and their respective consortium were largely
rated as being very good and strengthened in the course of the programme (mostly true 
for CRECO and CEDMAC, to a lesser extent for the Gender Consortium). ECEP is
again a special case, as it is the only consortium made up of only two organisations
(NCCK and CJPC), which had already worked together long before the NCEP. But
even with ECEP, the NCEP led to a strengthening of the co-operation of these two
entities.
Inter-Consortia Relationships – "Highly unsatisfactory":
However, one aspect of Output 1 of the NCEP Programme Document – effective liaison 
between different consortia, and subsequently cross-consortia networking – was not
achieved at all, safe for some non-institutionalised collaboration between facilitators of 
various CSOs on a very localised level. Usually, there was no contact or even
intentional networking between CSOs of different consortia, and if there were contacts 
by different CSOs working in the same area, they were mostly conflictive, with one
interview partner even describing the relationship to other CSOs as "parasitic" (referring 
to facilitators changing from one CSO to another).
Relations among Donors in the DSC – "Satisfactory":
Relations among donors in the DSC were again classified as largely collaborative and
good, fostering the unity and coherence of the group in the course of the project. There 
were some reservations expressed regarding the dominant role of the lead donor (and
the deputy lead donor), with a sentiment that the flow of information was not always
satisfactory, and that decision-making processes were sometimes not completely
transparent. However, this was also attributed to the lack of capacity of other donors to 
get fully involved in the process, and it was widely acknowledged that the work of the 
lead donor was conducive "for making NCEP take off at all". 
Relations among Donors at the HoMs-Level:
The relationship among the HoMs cannot be accurately assessed, as the HoMs-meeting 
minutes were "classified" and not available to the evaluation team. It was only through 
interviews with some HoMs and Deputy HoMs, with DSC members and the TAT/FMA, 
as well as by reviewing the minutes of the DSC-meetings, that minor insights could be 
gained. It however became obvious, and this is true for the whole of the NCEP, that
despite the relatively elaborate structures put in place for the NCEP, individual
personalities at various levels played a key role in shaping the direction and speed of the 
NCEP. Suffice to note here that in future projects, both the concrete tasks at the various 
levels will have to be specified and agreed upon beforehand and the question of the
structures within both HoMs and DSC (one lead donor, and if yes, which one; or
alternative arrangements – like division of tasks among several donors, or rotating
chairs) will have to be reviewed. 
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Relations between Donors and CSOs – "Highly unsatisfactory":
A major weakness of the relationships of the various levels, expressed in the same way 
by both most of the donors and most of the CSOs interviewed, was the complete lack of 
contacts between donors and individual CSOs. Some donors had expected a wider
contact base among CSOs through the NCEP which clearly did not materialise. The
only time when donors and CSOs met was through bilateral contacts of some donors
with some CSOs outside the framework of NCEP, and during some of the field visits to 
NCEP-implementors organised by the TAT/FMA, but even then it was only a small
fraction of NCEP-CSOs with which some of the donors interacted. On the other hand, 
quite a number of CSOs interviewed expressed their disappointment that they had never 
met any of the donors, and that communication between donors and CSOs was
exclusively through the TAT/FMA. This led to the CSOs quite often not understanding 
certain decisions taken by donors and certain delays experienced in the course of the
project, and on the other hand donors did not get the chance to appreciate the CSOs'
concerns and difficulties associated with certain aspects of the NCEP (like the necessity 
to trim budgets in line with funds available; reporting requirements, delays in pretesting 
materials and approval of contracts etc.). 
Overall Information Flow – "Less than satisfactory":
Another weakness was also the lack of transparency in communicating decision-making 
processes from the HoMs to the DSC to the TAT/FMA and on to the CSOs. For
example, only the lead donor or the deputy lead donor would be present at the HoMs￾meetings, and then communicate the results of these discussions orally to the other DSC 
members and to the TAT/FMA, from where these orally communicated decisions were 
passed on to the CSOs. This led to both a lack of understanding on the part of the
participating CSOs on how and why certain decisions were arrived at, and the reasoning 
behind these decisions, and it also led to the TAT/FMA as the professional fund
managers and technical assistants of only having a minor input into these decisions. 
We are convinced that more openness and transparency would have done more good
than harm and especially would have helped the TAT/FMA and the CSOs to appreciate 
the political concerns of the donors.
Reporting and Control Structures – "Satisfactory"
Overall, the efficiency of the reporting and control structures put in place for the
management of the NCEP are assessed to be "Satisfactory", with some qualifications
needed and discrepancies in some areas, detailed below. Yet again, some of the
weaknesses identified on this level are due to poor project preparation, planning, and
design, and issues raised under the relevant section above will not be repeated here.
Generally, the NCEP produced a huge amount of information on its various levels, the 
full potential of which has only partly been realised and utilised. It is beyond the scope 
of our evaluation to analyse all the information produced by the NCEP, and in any case, 
the focus is more on information structures and quality than on actual content. 
Most of the information generated through the NCEP is upward-information, coming
from facilitators on the ground and the individual CSOs to the TAT/FMA, where it is
being consolidated and passed on to the donors. Downward-information from HoMs to 
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DSC and on to the TAT/FMA and the CSOs is more sketchy and exclusive, mostly
consisting of instructions and rules, but rarely containing open information which would 
explain why certain decisions were taken or why certain rules were created. 
Reporting by the TAT/FMA:
According to the Terms of Reference for the FMA (including the TAT), the FMA was 
required to present fortnightly summary financial statements (spreadsheet-format), 
quarterly financial statements (including a narrative), and to be able to provide financial 
data on request. The TAT was obliged to present quarterly consolidated progress reports 
for distribution to the DSC and CSOs (possibly including separate reporting for donors 
and CSOs). Furthermore, two representatives of the FMA were required to attend the 
fortnightly meetings of the DSC for a review of the summary financial statement
(mentioned above) and an update on the implementation process (by the TAT chair). 
Whereas, basically, these reporting requirements remained the same for the FMA over 
the lifespan of the NCEP, the TAT's reporting requirements were expanded from the
original project design.
Furthermore, in addition to presenting consolidated information to the DSC, the
TAT/FMA as a team was requested to provide information for both the NCEP meetings 
(TAT/FMA and lead and deputy lead donor) as well as for the HoMs meetings. Taking 
into consideration that the DSC met twice a month until the end of 2001, that the NCEP 
meetings were always held in preparation of the DSC meetings, and that the HoMs met 
once a month, the TAT/FMA had to produce five (!) reports, partly consolidating
information from previous reports, every month – which by far exceeds normal
reporting requirements, and, naturally, reallocates considerable resources of the
TAT/FMA away from project management to reporting tasks. 
Additionally, the TAT/FMA not only produced all the above reports, but also submitted 
individual project proposals and their assessments to the DSC, and sometimes to the
HoMs, plus separate reports on other aspects of the programme (baseline survey and
mapping study, communication policy, materials development etc.).
Especially in the early stages of the programme, it was felt by some donors that the
information submitted to the DSC was "too much" and not structured enough, and the 
format of the quarterly and other reports was continuously changed over time. This was 
partly to be expected for a project of an evolutionary nature like the NCEP, but partly
also reflected a learning process within the TAT/FMA. 
In the same way, some interview partners also remarked that the information submitted 
to the HoMs was too detailed, providing the basis for the HoMs to get involved in
technical details of the programme.
Decision Making Structures and Levels of Authority – "Less than satisfactory"
Again largely due to the evolutionary nature of the NCEP and omissions in the project 
preparation and design phases, levels of authority for the various components of the
NCEP were not clearly spelt out and agreed upon beforehand (with the exception of the 
FMA). The level of authority to take decisions was heavily tilted in favour of the donors 
(both DSC and HoMs).
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This left both the TAT/FMA and the CSOs with insufficient space of manoeuvre within 
which to operate, and caused frustration among project partners. 
Views differ on why the NCEP evolved the way it did, especially regarding the issue of 
micromanagement, which the DSC exerted on to the TAT/FMA, which then passed it 
on to the individual CSOs.
For one, it is clear that the lack of a predefined set of tasks and responsibilities for the 
various levels provided a basis for the respective higher level to intervene in the
operations of the respective lower level (DSC/HoMs versus TAT/FMA, TAT/FMA
versus CSOs), thereby leading to a cascade-like picture of instructions and directives
without much flexibility.
On the other hand, it was also alleged that the TAT/FMA far too often sought the advice 
of the DSC on matters which would usually be considered to be within its jurisdiction, 
as mentioned above. 
Schedules, Critical Path and Time Variance Analysis – "Less than satisfactory"
A number of things are to be considered when attempting to do a time variance analysis 
for the NCEP, comparing the originally scheduled timeline of activities with the actual 
execution of activities.
Firstly, the preparation of the NCEP took an usually long time – considered to have
started right after the 1997 elections, it took until two and a half years later until the
TAT/FMA was finally mobilised, and the NCEP as a project started. The reasons for
this are explained above.
Secondly, when the NCEP finally started in August 2000, there was neither a finalised 
programme document available nor a proper logical framework with detailed
implementation and resource schedules.
Thirdly, the first available schedule is annexed to the Programme Document and called 
"Detailed Work Programme". However, far from being a detailed work programme, it is 
rather a rough outline of the main activities to be carried out within the NCEP, most of 
them furthermore lasting for the whole project period, but not specific enough in start 
and end dates for individual activities and intermediate targets upon which progress
could be measured.
Fourthly, the only fixed date in the whole programme was, right from the start, the end 
date – activities under the NCEP had to end three months before the next general
elections, foreseen to be held at the end of 2002, which gives a project-end date of
September 2002.
A brief analysis of the detailed work programme reveals a number of weaknesses, most 
crucially the unrealistic timing of certain activities. 
For example, contracting of CSOs should have happened from January to June 2001,
whereas the baseline survey and the mapping study, vital tools for determining the
contents of CSO proposals in terms of geographical scope and target group outreach,
were scheduled for November 2000 to April 2001 and for December 2000 to February
2001, respectively. Materials development, originally the task of NACEFCO, is not
mentioned at all in the schedule annexed to the Programme Document of January 2001. 
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Training and capacity building is inserted in the work programme as an ongoing
exercise from December 2000 to project end, without giving any details about which
activities will have to be undertaken at what point in time.
It is rather disappointing to again mention the evolutionary nature of the NCEP, but it is 
the only well-meaning reason one can give for the almost complete lack of schedules for 
the NCEP after half a year into the programme. 
Later on in the programme, especially after the TAT/FMA's self-evaluation, the
application of critical paths (for the NCEP as a whole) and roll-out plans (for individual 
CSOs) became more systematic, but due to the fact that both were constantly adapted to
changing timelines in the various components of the programme, they cannot serve as a 
basis for a time variance analysis.
The conclusion, therefore, is that a commonly used evaluation instrument like a time
variance analysis cannot be applied to the NCEP.
Budgets and Variance Analysis – "Satisfactory"
The situation is slightly better with respect to the budget variance analysis. The original 
budget is contained in the Programme Document, and the evaluation team received the 
budget figures until up to the end of September 2002 from the FMA (which is not yet 
the final budget, as this one will only be known after winding-up of the NCEP).
Table 2: Comparing the Initial and the Actual NCEP Budget (as of September 
2002)
Item Original Budget (KSh Mio.) Actual Budget (KSh Mio.)
Consortia
CRECO 153 151.8
CEDMAC 100 91.6
ECEP 90 66.2
Gender 126 102.6
Non-consortia 100 44.7
 Subtotal 569 456.9
TAT/FMA 135 161
Procurement Agent 4 -
Baseline Survey 24 -
Other programme costs - 44.5
Progr. rev. & secr. supp for Oct.
and Nov.
- 6.9
 Subtotal
Total NCEP (incl. CSOs) 732 669.3
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A number of explanations are required for this table. 
Firstly, the original budget:
The consortia budgets were not yet finalised at the time of drafting the original budgets, 
and a number of adjustments were made in the course of this process.
The figure for non-consortia CSOs was set at about 33.3 % of total consortia funds, but 
the figure of KSh 100 Mio. also included contingency for the whole programme.
At the time of preparing the initial budget, the funding commitments from donors
amounted to about KSh 431 – the funding shortfall required the trimming of consortia 
budgets, but the original budget was also based on promises by some donors to increase 
their funding in the second year of the NCEP.
Secondly, the actual budget as of September 2002:
Since a procurement agent was not employed, the costs for this position do not feature 
anymore in the actual budget.
The position "other programme costs" contains expenses incurred by CSOs and
consortia (for example for inception workshops), but paid for directly by the
TAT/FMA. The baseline survey is also included in this item.
Programme review workshops by the consortia were originally not budgeted for and
required additional funding (KSh 5 Mio.), whereas the secretariat support for October
and November (also not separately budgeted for originally) was met with available
NCEP funds.
Explaining the variations:
The variations in the figures for the four consortia and the non-consortia CSOs are
largely due to the fact that the figures in the original budget were only indicative
figures, drawn up before the budgets with individual CSOs had been assessed and
negotiated. CRECO and CEDMAC, all in all, came close to their original target 
budgets. The one for ECEP was reduced during negotiations, and the Gender
Consortium budget is smaller than originally foreseen largely because of the conflict
within the Gender Consortium and the subsequent late contracting of Gender CSOs.
Contracting, in any case, was to be done by the TAT/FMA only on the basis of
available funds. The budget for non-consortia CSOs is considerably smaller than the
original budget, however, the original budget also contained the contingency provisions 
for the whole of NCEP, therefore the original budget figure of KSh 100 Mio. is
misleadingly high. The fact that the total amounts for the Gender Consortium CSOs and 
the non-consortia CSOs are much lower than originally foreseen is partly due to their 
late mobilisation. In future projects, original or target budgets should be specified in
more detail, and then adhered to more closely.
There was an early indication of donors that each consortia should roughly receive
about KSh 100 Mio. Despite all the changes and the long process, this funding level
was, by and large, achieved.
The actual TAT/FMA-budget is considerably higher than the original budget, but there 
is a rather simple explanation for this: In the original budget, the VAT incurred for
hiring the TAT/FMA (18 % for most of the items) was not calculated, and an additional 
KSh 5 Mio. was spent for the TAT/FMA for managing the three months extension
period. Apart from the costs of the extension, the price for the TAT/FMA remained the 
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same over the lifespan of the programme (USD 2.002 Mio. was the amount of the
contract signed between PwC and DFID). As PwC had already been contracted when
the Programme Document was finalised, it is surprising that the correct amount for their 
services was not inserted in the original budget (and that this figure was also incorrect in 
some other documents provided by the FMA). 
For ease of reference and comparison, the financial reporting format (including
individual items listed) should have remained the same over time. 
Overall, it is assessed to be a success that the donors almost achieved the high level of 
funding envisaged at the beginning of the programme. Considering the original budget, 
this achievement required additional funding in the course of the programme.
Furthermore, it is also remarkable that the costs of the TAT/FMA remained the same
over the lifespan of the NCEP, notwithstanding the additional tasks with which
especially the TAT was charged. 
However, this required the trimming of CSO budgets in line with the availability of 
funds. Although most of the CSOs complained that their budgets were reduced, and
sometimes quite drastically, none of them pulled out of the programme over this issue. 
Again, this is considered to be a success of the programme. 
Some minor remarks regarding the CSO budgets: A number of CSOs complained that 
there was no uniformity in allowable budget items. Some CSOs were allowed to
provide for items such as refreshments to the participants; refund of transport costs and 
facilitator remuneration. 
The roll-out plans were too rigid in some cases – not providing for adjustments in case 
of unforeseen problems in implementation. Adjustments always had to be negotiated
with the FMA.
Because of the differential in payments to facilitators (fees or allowances), there were 
some cases of "poaching" of facilitators between CSOs – a practice which harmed
implementation since the loosing CSOs were not able to meet their targets, or had to
train new facilitators. Reports were also made of CSOs which received facilitation 
money late after the trained facilitators had abandoned post to look for jobs elsewhere. 
NCWK in Thika is one such case where some facilitators paid for activities from their 
pockets while waiting for the money. Those who could not advance money from their 
pockets left the job. Replacement was not possible to be trained due to pressure on
delivery on the part of the co-ordinator. 
Cost-Benefit Analysis – a "Phased Approach"
Due to the structure of the NCEP and its design and project objectives, it is not possible 
to present a single and clear cost-benefit analysis, which usually separates management 
and overhead costs from direct implementation costs and which details costs per unit of 
output achieved, the result of which is then comparable to similar interventions.
For one, there are 10 donors, among them 8 funding donors putting funds into a joint 
financing account, which is managed by a TAT/FMA, for financing 71 implementing
CSOs, 4 consortia secretariats, and the TAT/FMA. Secondly, the objective of the 
programme is not only "to deliver general civic education", but also to "build the
capacity (technical and financial) of participating CSOs". Due to this multitude of
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stakeholders and the objectives of civic education delivery and capacity building, with a 
number of sub-objectives also attracting costs (e. g. accountability – and the funding of 
one accountant per CSO), a clear attribution of costs is simply not feasible.
In order to comply with the requirements of our Terms of Reference and our proposal, 
we have therefore decided to adopt a "phased approach" to the issue of cost-benefit￾relationship within the NCEP. This should give readers the opportunity to assess the
cost-efficiency of the NCEP at its various levels, without making premature statements 
when only looking at the global figures.
The NCEP overall budget, its variations and elements were discussed above. As final
budgets were not yet available at the time of the evaluation, our calculations in this part 
are based on the detailed programme budget revised up to September 30, 2002
(projection; undated; main document for this section), the detailed TAT/FMA budget
(revised up to November 2002; undated), and the "NCEP Implementation: Progress
Report on Outreach", submitted to the HoMs in September 2002 (dated: TAT/FMA
September 2002). Costs in these budgets are in Kenya Shilling and USD, the exchange 
rate applied by the TAT/FMA was an average of 1 USD = 78 KSh. 
TAT/FMA-Costs:
The revised costs of the TAT/FMA were put at KSh 161 Mio., representing 24 % of the 
total NCEP budget (including CSOs budgets) of KSh 669.4 Mio.
This might seem to be a rather high figure for project management (technical and
financial), but it is definitely not a fair assessment, as the TAT/FMA had the twin tasks 
of programme management and capacity building of CSOs.
At one point, the TAT/FMA was requested by the DSC to specify the resources which 
went into programme management and into capacity building respectively. 
Based on the division of tasks among TAT/FMA-staff, the TAT/FMA came up with the 
following figures: roughly 39 % each went into both "programme management" and
"overhead costs", and the remaining 22 % went into "capacity building" of CSOs, both 
technically and financially. In terms of the total NCEP budget, this means that 9 % of 
the total budget was used for "overhead costs", another 9 % for "programme
management", and 5 % for "capacity building".3
This calculation, however, is only a rough estimate based on division of tasks and time 
spent by each TAT/FMA member for programme management and capacity building. 
Furthermore, the separation of overhead costs and programme management costs as
well as the attribution of some costs like office equipment and expenses to overhead
costs is questionable (as, for example, definitely some of the office equipment was used 
to also carry out capacity building). 
Calculating on the basis of the TAT/FMA's own estimate on how much time was spent 
for capacity building of CSOs, the programme management and implementation costs
(including the ill-defined overheads) are still at about 19 % of the total NCEP budget. 
 
3
 After submission of the draft report, the FMA provided a new – equally untitled and undated – table, 
giving slightly different figures (5 % of the total NCEP budget for overhead costs, 12 % for programme 
management, and 7 % for capacity building). As it is not clear how this new figures were arrived at, and 
as they do not differ too much from the earlier ones, they are not being considered here. 
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Taking into consideration the number of participating CSOs, the multitude of tasks to be 
performed by the TAT/FMA, and the additional tasks with which it was charged in the 
course of the programme, this percentage seems to be in line the costs of managing
other programmes known to the evaluation team.
The bottom line, however, is that it is almost impossible to come to a fair assessment of 
the TAT/FMA's programme management costs in relation to the overall NCEP budget.
One lesson learned through this exercise is that a retrospective cost-benefit analysis is
not meaningfully feasible if the foundations for this have not been laid at the project
design phase. Only if the various tasks to be performed by the management unit are
sufficiently specified before the start of the project, and only if they are adequately
costed, only then can a cost-benefit analysis become meaningful.
Two more issues are worth mentioning in this respect:
Firstly, the study by South Consulting in 1999 recommended that the total cost for the 
TAT, the financial management institution and the auditors should not exceed 13 % of
the total basekt fund. Somewhere along the line in the negotiations among donors and 
between donors and PwC, the total amount for PwC for providing the TAT/FMA was 
agreed to be USD 2 Mio. – which hasn't changed since PwC was contracted, except for 
the additional amount for the TAT/FMA for the extension period (KSh 5 Mio.). 
Secondly, when contracting a management agent to manage parts or the whole of a
programme, donors must be aware that – usually – instructions by them to this agent 
which involve extra work not specified in the Terms of Reference also attract extra
costs. That this was not the case with the TAT/FMA of the NCEP, is to the credit of the 
TAT/FMA. 
"Other" Management Costs:
The picture becomes even more complicated if one tries to specify, and integrate into
the cost-benefit analysis, "other" management costs of the programme apart from the
TAT/FMA-costs – that is either programme management costs incurred and paid for
under the NCEP at the level of the consortia, or management costs incurred, but not
quantified and not included in the total NCEP budget, at the level of the donors.
At CSO- and consortia-level: Excluding for now costs in the run-up to the NCEP (until 
the TAT/FMA was mobilised), one can ask the question whether a part or all of the
consortia secretariat budgets qualify as overhead or programme management costs, as
consortia secretariats were not directly involved in implementation of activities, apart
from training of trainers and reviews at consortia level. The costs for the CRECO- and 
CEDMAC-secretariats and the Gender technical unit (all directly funded) amount to
KSh 33.2 Mio., whereas the ECEP national secretariat was funded as part of the ECEP￾proposal, and the costs of the national secretariat are not detailed in the documents
available to us. Assuming for the ECEP national secretariat a similar amount like for the 
CRECO and CEDMAC secretariats (i. e. KSh 14.5 Mio.)4
, the total secretariat costs
 
4
 This assumptions seems fair given that probably more money was spent for the ECEP national
secretariat than for the secretariats of the other three consortia, but the ECEP national secretariat also
performed more functions (e. g. accounting was centralised at the national level in the case of ECEP,
whereas the member CSOs of the other consortia had to do the accounting themselves, and for this
purpose each CSO got an allocation for employing an accountant).
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amount to roughly KSh 48 Mio., i. e. about 7 % of the total NCEP budget. It has to be 
considered, however, that only a smaller part of the secretariat costs, compared to the 
TAT/FMA, were overheads or programme management costs, so that the total
management costs of the NCEP were increased by about 2 % through the establishment 
of consortia secretariats, which in turn were established – possibly with the exception of 
ECEP – partly because the donors wished so.
At DSC-level: What usually escapes the donors' attention is the fact that also the time 
they spend on managing the programme incurs costs (so-called "opportunity costs" in
economic terms), which are, however, never budgeted for and not included in the NCEP 
budget. It is a rather academic exercise, and we won't go into too much detail, but it is 
worthwhile briefly considering this: We have come up with the figure of 600 man-hours 
which were spent in DSC meetings alone. Calculated on a basis of an eight-hour 
working day, and a conservative rate of a senior TAT/FMA consultant of USD 500.- per 
day, this amounts to USD 37,500. Add to this at least one hour of preparation and
debriefing at the respective mission for each DSC member, one is already at USD
56,250. Additionally include the time of the lead donor and deputy lead donor spent in 
the NCEP meetings with the TAT/FMA, the ad-hoc consultations between lead donor
and TAT/FMA, and the time spent by the HoMs in their NCEP meetings, one might
easily arrive at a figure well above USD 150,000, i. e. at least another 2 % of the total 
NCEP budget.
Cost-Benefit Ratios on the Implementing Level:
At the first glance, it seems much easier to calculate cost-benefit ratios on the level of 
consortia, comparing the costs for each consortia with the number of activities
undertaken and the number of people reached. This calculation is presented in the table 
below and also includes non-consortia CSOs:
Table 3: Cost-benefit Ratios at Implementing Level
Consortia Budget
(KSh Mio.)
Activities Cost per
Activity (KSh)
People 
reached
Cost per
Person (KSh) 
ECEP 67 5,929 11,300 704,053 95
CRECO 151 13,642 11,070 828,130 182
CEDMAC 91 6,232 14,600 347,492 262
Gender 100 10,143 9,860 744,412 134
Non-Consortia 44 3,582 12,280 206,142 213
Total 453 39,528 11,460 2,830,229 160
Source: TAT/FMA NCEP Implementation: Progress Report and Outreach, September
2002.
Discrepancies in the above table in costs per activity and costs per person reached
between the consortia can largely be explained by the different delivery strategies and 
the different geographical areas covered. 
One more remark is necessary with regard to the cost-benefit ratios at CSO-level:
The cost-benefit ratios are purely quantitative measurements and do not contain any
information about the impact different types of activities (possibly associated with
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different costs and different numbers of people reached) had on the end-beneficiaries. 
Judging from the interviews with CSOs and their own assessments about the impact of 
various types of activities, it might well be that more costly activities or activities
involving a smaller group of people had a much higher impact than mass-events where 
civic education was done in the highly unparticipatory form of lecturing. In this regard, 
it is hoped that the ongoing impact assessment of the NCEP will give some answers
which should then be considered in cost-benefit analyses, as ultimately the benefit of a 
civic education activity is not mere attendance, but the impact created among those who 
participated.
Quality of NCEP Systems used for Managing the Programme – "Satisfactory" 
The systems designed for managing the NCEP represent one of its core achievements, 
in the view of the evaluation team. The systems not only harmonized the appraisal
process of CSO proposals across the 10 donors involved, they also provided for a sound 
and transparent financial and technical management of the programme. 
Some points of criticism with regard to the management systems are that, firstly, the
TAT/FMA, in its effort to satisfy donors' demands, produced too many forms. Some of 
the reporting and monitoring and evaluation requirements could have been streamlined 
and consolidated, thereby freeing up resources on the part of the CSOs for actual project 
implementation. Quite a number of CSOs stated that the NCEP was an extremely time￾consuming exercise, exactly because of the strict reporting requirements. 
Secondly, the wealth of information generated through the NCEP has hardly been
properly used so far by any of the stakeholders. Looking at it from the point of view of 
efficiency, it is questionable whether there was a real need for collecting all that
information, and whether the same output could have been achieved with less input by
the various stakeholders. 
Thirdly, before the self-evaluation of the TAT/FMA in mid-2001, some management
tools (minutes, schedules etc.) were not adequately applied, leading to some friction
between donors (especially the lead donor) and the TAT/FMA. 
Appraisal Criteria and CSO Contracting System – "Highly satisfactory":
An early version of the "Criteria for assessing applications for the joint financing
account" is contained in the MoU signed by the donors in May and June 2000. 
These criteria were slightly refined and adapted by the TAT to become the "NCEP
project assessment criteria" annexed to the Programme Document. 
By and large, these criteria set a coherent and transparent framework within which
individual CSO proposals are assessed, and give a clear indication of the process to be 
followed. 
Whereas transparency of criteria and process are strong points, the set-up of the NCEP 
led to some delays in the approval of proposals.
The CSOs were required to prepare and present proposals for funding based on a preset 
format by the TAT/FMA. Training was provided to all CSOs on how to prepare the
proposals. The TAT/FMA edited the proposals in terms of content and budget in
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consultation with the originating CSOs, but some CSOs felt that they were in a rather 
weak position in these negotiations.
Cases of undue delays in approving proposals were reported by some CSOs.
The proposals that passed the scrutiny of the TAT/FMA were presented to the DSC for 
approval. The DSC in turn sent all proposals for ratification to the HoMs. Both the
CSOs and some members of the DSC negatively assess this long chain of bureaucracy.
The involvement of the DSC and the HoMs in proposal approval was top heavy while 
adding value to the process only in some cases (i. e. where the political sensitivity of the 
programme became obvious). 
In future projects, the process could be streamlined, with some authority to be delegated 
to the management agent to proceed with the approval of proposals within a defined set 
of criteria and prior notification of the DSC (but without actually holding discussions on 
individual proposals at the level of the donors if the CSOs and their proposals are within 
the predefined set of criteria). Political sensitivities in governance programmes will,
however, require the continued involvement of the donors, even up to the level of the 
HoMs, in case of applications from organisations perceived to be politically partisan.
Monitoring and Evaluation System – "Satisfactory":
The design of the M&E system for the NCEP has been discussed above. Once the
programme was well underway, the M&E-systems became more refined and more
detailed, to finally consist of the following levels:
Firstly, activity monitoring with a) an M&E Database tracking progress of activities,
capturing activities by individual CSOs by looking at roll-out plans and activity report 
forms; b) a contract tracking checklist to track contractual obligations for each CSO; c) 
field monitoring guidelines to guide qualitative field monitoring activities; and d) a
consortium secretariat and CSO M&E plan as the main internal M&E tool, guided by
the logical frameworks and specific M&E plans.
Secondly, financial monitoring through a) an accounting database, which tracks funds
disbursed and accounted for by each CSO; b) guidelines for CSOs for financial returns, 
assisting in checking the completeness, accuracy and validity of the accounting returns 
from each CSO; c) field monitoring guidelines relating to the financial aspects of CSO 
operations; and d) NCEP accounting instructions, harmonising accounting approaches
through the "NCEP Accounting for Donor Funds – Accounting Instructions Manual".
Activity monitoring is carried out by the TAT, while financial monitoring is done by the 
FMA. 
It has turned out to be a major achievement of the NCEP to link the two functions of 
technical and financial monitoring, making disbursements dependent on the timely and 
accurate provision of both technical and financial information. A monthly disbursement 
schedule was adopted, which was seen by quite a number of CSOs to be too restrictive, 
sometimes leading to delays in the release of funds over minor issues. Over and above, 
however, this approach has helped both raising the accounting standards of CSOs in a 
sector usually not known for its capacity in this area, and also strengthened their
technical monitoring capacities and impressed the value of permanent and consistent
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internal M&E on the participating CSOs. With hindsight, most of the CSOs interviewed 
appreciated this approach, although quite a number of them also complained that the
exercise was too time consuming, especially for smaller CSOs with limited resources
and in the light of relatively short implementation periods.
Furthermore, the M&E systems have led to minimising the loss of donor funds.
According to a statistic provided by the FMA, "irregular payments" amounted to only 2 
% of the total of funds disbursed until the end of September 2002, with ECEP being the 
best performer (0 %) and the Gender consortium having the highest percentage of
"irregular payments" of all the consortia (5 %). However, "irregular payments" are not 
equal to funds misused – it only means that the FMA is questioning their accounting, 
and it can well be that in the process of consultations, the percentage of "irregular
payments" drops further.
For a programme of the magnitude of NCEP, and in an environment like the Kenyan, 
this is considered to be a major achievement. 
Databases – "Highly satisfactory":
Among the databases, the baseline survey and the mapping exercise serve as
benchmarks against which indicators were developed and actual deployment areas of
CSOs conretized. Both were carried out to provide better understanding of the issues
involved and the extent of potential coverage of the anticipated civic education. This
helped most CSOs to refocus their planned delivery and coverage – from general to
specific emphasis of the issues that the CSOs had identified as essential and needed by
the target communities.
The only drawback with regard to both the baseline survey and the mapping exercise, 
the results of which were consolidated and graphically merged with a GIS-software (to 
become the study called "Kenya: State of the Nation Baseline Survey 2001"), is that 
they came rather late in the programme's life-cycle, i. e. by the middle of 2001, one year 
into the NCEP. 
It is important to note that, in future exercises, baseline surveys and the setting of
benchmarks and targets should be done in the project preparation phase, in order not to 
cause unnecessary delays.
Apart from these tools, the NCEP created a number of databases through the internal
M&E system described above. This will give valuable information to not only draft the 
final project report, but also for future interventions – that is, if it is properly presented 
and easy to use for the stakeholders (both donors and CSOs). 
According to information received during the evaluation, neither donors nor CSOs
made adequate use of these instruments in the course of the NCEP – which again refers 
to our earlier point whether it was really necessary to collect all that information. A
judgement on this should be made in consultations between the various stakeholders
after winding up of the NCEP, and before planning future interventions. 
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3.4. Effectiveness
Project Processes – "Satisfactory"
A number of the issues touching upon the effectiveness of project processes have been 
discussed in earlier chapters of this report. Therefore, in this section we will concentrate 
on additional issues to those already mentioned, and will be rather brief. 
Donor Co-ordination – "Highly satisfactory":
Despite some of the efficiency bottlenecks regarding donor co-operation described
above, the effectiveness of this co-operation within the NCEP is assessed to be "Highly 
satisfactory".
The NCEP succeeded in bringing together 10 donors with different bureaucratic
requirements and keeping all of them on board for the whole project period, and after 
overcoming initial problems and differences regarding procedures and funding
guidelines, the co-operation worked reasonably well.
It also created a sense of unity and common purpose, as mentioned earlier. Combined 
with the involvement of the HoMs, the NCEP also withstood political pressure from
various parts of the Kenyan Government due to the cohesion of the group.
Furthermore, it allowed donors with various capacities to be part of a larger programme, 
on which neither of them would have embarked upon bilaterally, thereby also increasing 
the professionalism among donors – through the continuous "learning experience" of
the NCEP, and not least, through lessons generated at project-end.
Also regarding the effectiveness of this co-operation, it shall be noted that a good part 
of the responsibility for this was with the lead donor. In future projects, it should be
considered whether a broader division of tasks among participating donors, depending 
on their various capacities, would be more appropriate.
CSO Co-ordination and Guidance – "Satisfactory":
As noted elsewhere, co-ordination among CSOs mainly took place within the four
consortia, with hardly any inter-consortia contacts. A liaison committee between the
consortia should have taken over this role, but it only met a few times and was not 
effective in providing for inter-consortia co-ordination. To our knowledge, the non￾consortia CSOs were largely left out of inter-CSO co-ordination at all. 
As it was remarked that additional inter-consortia meetings would have been
burdensome in the context of the NCEP, especially regarding the short timeframe for 
implementation, other means of inter-consortia information exchange should be
explored in future projects (like, for example, creating a closed forum on the internet, 
accessible only to donors, TAT/FMA and consortia-CSOs).
CSO co-ordination, therefore, was mainly done either directly by the TAT/FMA or
facilitated through the TAT/FMA by the consortia secretariats, to various degrees
(ECEP is again an exception in this regard). 
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The overall effectiveness of support given to CSOs by the TAT/FMA was
"Satisfactory", with most of the CSOs interviewed appreciating both the technical and 
financial guidance received by the TAT/FMA. Some reservations were expressed with 
the attitude of the TAT/FMA. Again, this can be explained with the focus of the NCEP 
on accountability and transparency, and with some of the experiences in the initial
phases of implementation. 
Donor-CSO Relations – not applicable:
As there were no direct relations between the donors and the participating CSOs, there 
can be no rating for the effectiveness of these relationships. 
A major lesson learned from the NCEP, as noted elsewhere, is that there should be
regular fora for the main actors to meet and share their views, whether formal meetings 
or more informal gatherings, in order to enable them to understand the background to
certain decisions made, and the concrete difficulties faced on the ground. 
Relationship between the CSOs and Target Communities – "Highly satisfactory"
Generally, most of the CSOs interviewed stated that their relations to target
communities were good to very good. This is largely due to the fact that CSOs were
known to the target communities and that facilitators employed for the NCEP mostly
came from within the target communities. 
Some CSOs reported that the communities were suspicious towards their activities at
the beginning of project implementation, but that this sentiment changed once the
purpose of their engagement was explained, and once a number of activities had been
undertaken. 
Due to the experiences with the NCEP, quite a number of CSOs reported to have
changed their entry and delivery approaches to make them more effective, which might 
make a continuation of their work after NCEP easier and more sustainable.
Some smaller CSOs (mainly CBOs) also remarked that they had a much better contact 
base among communities with which they had been working for some time, compared 
to urban CSOs which had spread their activities to rural areas in the course of the
NCEP. However, they also remarked that the bigger, more established CSOs were more 
conversant with different delivery methodologies and with actually communicating the 
messages of the core-NCEP materials. 
While it cannot be assessed whether, and to which extent, this is true, it seems to be a 
sensible consideration to think of a conscious "twinning" of bigger, urban-based CSOs 
with smaller CBOs in future governance projects – not only to increase the effectiveness 
of interventions, but also to facilitate mutual learning processes. 
Relationship between Facilitators and Target Groups – "Highly satisfactory"
All the CSOs interviewed indicated that they had selected all their facilitators from
among the local people. These facilitators were then trained in the art of facilitation
using the trainer’s manual, the curriculum and the handbook. Because of the local
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knowledge and understanding of socio-cultural nuances, the facilitators have largely
been able to communicate the NCEP messages very effectively. Where necessary, the 
facilitators have adapted the message to suit the local situation.
This capacity building on the ground is considered to be a major achievement of the
NCEP, not only providing a pool of trained facilitators to the communities, but also in 
enlarging and deepening the contact base of CSOs among those communities via their 
facilitators.
Entry Strategies – "Satisfactory"
Entry strategies for individual CSOs varied considerably, and were defined at the stage 
of proposal drafting and finalisation.
Entry strategies ranged from the use of local leadership through existing networks and 
structures to contacting specific target groups and their representatives.
Remarkably, most of the CSOs interviewed stated that they had to change their entry
strategies in the course of implementation, as they had found out that the originally
envisaged approach was not the most effective. For example, some CSOs discovered
that the use of local leadership (chiefs, elders, administrative personnel) was, generally, 
much more effective in mobilising people to attend civic education activities than
relying on their pre-existing networks. Others stated that the holding of separate civic
education activities turned out to be less effective, therefore they had changed to
combining civic education with other, ongoing activities (church services, regular CBO￾meetings etc.).
The changes in entry strategies reported by most of the CSOs interviewed shed some
light on their earlier capacity (or lack of it) to adequately plan interventions. In this
respect, the experience of participating in the NCEP has created new levels of
understanding on how to effectively mobilise target groups for specific activities.
Delivery Strategies – "Satisfactory"
Corresponding to the experiences with entry strategies, most of the CSOs underwent a 
learning process with regard to the effectiveness of various delivery strategies. 
Delivery strategies again showed a variety of approaches, ranging from integrating
lectures in sermons and church services, over simple lectures by the facilitators and the 
usual workshop methodology to more participative forms of civic education delivery
like theatre, camel caravans, facilitated discussions within chief's fora or other
community fora etc.
When questioned about the likely impact and effectiveness of the various approaches,
most CSOs stated that the more participative forms of civic education delivery were
much more likely to have a lasting impact on the target group. 
Whether this is true, and to what extent, should be established with the results of the 
ongoing impact assessment of the NCEP. 
It is, however, noticeable that the much more positive assessment of participative
approaches was given by all the CSOs interviewed (which also conforms to common
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international knowledge about learning and impact), whereas the bulk of civic education 
delivery originally planned within the NCEP consisted of frontal lectures and formal
(and to a lesser extent informal) workshops. 
Therefore, in the planning of future activities, participative delivery strategies should
receive much more attention (and funding) in the individual CSO proposals than was
the case with the NCEP. 
However, it also must be noted that some delivery strategies which are supposed to have 
a high impact – like transmitting the civic education messages by radio – were
conciously not chosen due to the political sensitivities in Kenya. 
Effectiveness of M&E-Systems (technical and financial) – "Satisfactory"
Most elements of the M&E-system were discussed above already. Suffice to note a few 
additional issues here:
Firstly, it seems that the capacity of most of the CSOs to plan and implement
interventions was assessed too positively at the start of the project. With hindsight, it 
was revealed that most of the smaller and younger CSOs neither had the technical nor 
the administrative capacities to properly plan and implement more complex
interventions. Even for the larger and more established CSOs, the NCEP created quite 
some capacity, especially with regard to financial management and ongoing monitoring 
and evaluation. 
Secondly, although the NCEP M&E system largely generated the expected outputs of
financial accountability and project implementation according to schedules, it did so
with considerable input required from both the main staff of the CSOs involved and the 
facilitators on the ground. Future projects might look at streamlining and consolidating 
M&E-procedures (like, for example, switching from monthly to quarterly financial
reporting), in order to free up resources for implementation at the level of the CSOs. 
Thirdly, the feedback of results of the M&E exercise into actual programme
implementation was generally satisfactory. Feedback was given either by the TAT/FMA 
to the CSOs, after analysing reports and forms received from the CSOs, or through the 
consortia structure via regular review meetings. The effectiveness of the consortia
reviews was, however, constrained by the minor role the consortia played in project
implementation (again with the exception of ECEP). In future projects, some powers
relating to M&E should be devolved to the consortia levels, also in order to create more 
workable structures on this level. 
Financial Reporting
The system for financial reporting was the best developed and most effective one.
Starting from the background of bad governance that had plagued the public life in
Kenya, the NCEP emphasised accountability and transparency regarding the
management and application of funds granted by the donors. Accounting books to be
kept by the CSOs were detailed in the accounting manual and the responsibility of each 
CSO with respect to proper accounting was clearly spelt out. Furthermore, accountants 
were trained by the FMA.
To our surprise, the overwhelming majority of CSOs interviewed appreciated this strict 
accounting regime. For some CSOs, the systems for managing funds were new and had 
a considerable capacity building effect. Most CSOs stated that this had introduced
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discipline in the way they handled funds. Some problems were experienced where
receipts could not be obtained for petty expenditure. 
Technical Reporting
Generally the format for presenting the civic education was made uniform through
production of standardized training materials – slightly adjusted to meet specific 
thematic area needs. The CSOs were required to report on their activities on a regular 
basis in prescribed forms (monitoring guidelines and technical tools), as discussed
above. 
Form D (to be filled in by the respective facilitator for each activity undertaken) is said 
to have caused some problems by focussing on quantitative aspects only. For example, 
when reporting on activities, it is required to tick only one thematic area covered even 
where more than one important topic had been handled. The facilitators had problems in 
weighing the topics to decide which to report on. In this case, some important issues
addressed during the training were lost because of this limitation. Attempts were made 
by the CSOs to report on the topics so missed through a separate narrative report which 
was mostly meant for CSO-internal use, but which also fed into the quarterly narrative 
reports.
The roll pout plans and Form D should have been used more as guidelines provided the 
activities carried out did not drastically go out of line with the objectives of the project.
Filling in all the required forms called for thorough discipline on the part of the
facilitators, which sometimes might have overstretched their capacities, in turn leading 
to problems between some CSOs and the TAT/FMA.
The strict nature of both the TAT's and the FMA's monitoring and evaluation activities, 
as complained about by some CSOs, can, however, be explained by, firstly, the mandate 
given to it by the donors (focus on accountability and transparency), and secondly by
the relatively bad initial experiences when implementation had started with a number of 
CSOs. 
Problems faced by the Programme and Solutions – "Satisfactory"
The NCEP faced a number of problems during its lifespan, and the effectiveness with 
which these problems were solved (or not) differs substantially, leading to the overall
assessment of "Satisfactory". Below, we will briefly present some of the major
problems specified by the interview partners and discuss how they were addressed.
Duration, Timing and Schedules – "Highly unsatisfactory":
Time was a major problem mentioned in almost all the interviews we conducted, and
relates to timing, duration and schedules on various levels. 
The biggest problem regarding time was the short period left for the implementation of 
activities, which was complained about by all the CSOs interviewed, and by the
TAT/FMA and some of the donors. 
The NCEP had only one fixed date – the end-date. Very early on in the preparations, it 
was concluded that activities under the NCEP had to stop before the official campaign 
period for the next general elections starts, and with an expected date of the next
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elections towards the end of 2002, this meant a project-end date of, latest, by September 
2002. 
Despite the fact that this date was known (provided the absence of early elections), it is 
surprising that, quite obviously, this did not have a major impact on project planning
and preparation. The planning for the NCEP had started right after the 1997 elections,
and it took two and a half years until the TAT/FMA was mobilized and the NCEP had 
actually started.
Even then, though, it took another one year before the implementation of the activities 
started, with only one consortium at the beginning, and another couple of months, until 
the implementation of activities of other consortia started.
It seems that a number of stakeholders were largely oblivious of the fact that the
programme had to come to an end latest by September 2002.
Furthermore, and aggravating this problem, even when PwC had been contracted, no
detailed timetables were developed, the logical framework remained suspiciously silent 
on timelines, and a clear prioritization of tasks did not happen. 
The responsibility for the deficiencies and delays in project preparation and planning is 
with all the stakeholders: with the donors (DSC and HoMs) for not having set deadlines 
for certain tasks and for having delayed certain aspects of the programme (like the
pretesting of materials); with the TAT/FMA for not having emphasised, and
communicated to the donors, the need for a proper prioritization of activities, and for
failing to design realistic work programmes against which project progress can be
checked; and with some of the CSOs for having taken long to come up with a workable 
consortia structure and good quality proposals. 
It was only when implementation of activities had begun for most of the CSOs, and
after the internal self-evaluation of the TAT/FMA, that critical paths and
implementation schedules were developed, and largely adhered to (with minor delays).
Some part of the delays can be explained by the multitude of stakeholders and the
political sensitivities referred to above. However, a good part of it is also due to
inadequate planning, design and management of the NCEP. All this diminished, to a
certain extent, the effectiveness of the NCEP, and there is ample room for
improvements in future projects.
The Exit of NACEFCO – "Satisfactory":
Originally, NACEFCO was supposed to be a kind of umbrella consortium, facilitating 
(but not co-ordinating) the NCEP through the production of materials, and some M&E 
functions.
After the exit of NACEFCO, a good part of its tasks was taken over by the TAT/FMA, 
which then supervised and contracted the production of materials (partly with the
consortia), and centralised M&E functions at the TAT/FMA level. 
By and large, the TAT/FMA handled the additional tasks created by NACEFCO's exit 
satisfactorily, considering the fact that these tasks were not foreseen in the Terms of
Reference for the TAT/FMA. 
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Budgets – "Satisfactory":
It is difficult to imagine a situation where nobody complains about inadequate budgets, 
and this is also true for the NCEP. Two issues, which led to discussions and complaints, 
are to be distinguished: total budget levels and individual budget items.
Regarding the overall levels of the total NCEP budget and the consortia budgets, the
donors achieved to provide a considerable funding for the whole of the programme
which came close to initial (and high) indications. Equally, the consortia budgets were 
largely in the area of what was originally planned, with the exceptions discussed above.
The work of the FMA largely led to a harmonization of individual budget items across 
participating CSOs, partly based on a price databank to arrive at realistic estimates of
individual budget items. These prices, fixed by the FMA and correspondingly integrated 
into the CSO budgets, led to criticism from some CSOs when special geographical or
target group characteristics were said not to be adequately considered. It however
helped to instil fiscal discipline also into budgeting and proposal preparation, made the 
task of financial controlling easier, and finally was, by and large, accepted by most
CSOs. Some items which were not harmonized across the CSOs – like allowances for
facilitators and the issue of refreshments and meals for workshop participants –
however led to conflicts between CSOs operating in the same area (e. g. "poaching" of 
facilitators, or accusations by communities that CSOs had stolen money for meals and 
refreshments where none was budgeted for). These conflicts could have been avoided
by also harmonising these items, at least among CSOs operating in the same area and 
with similar target groups. 
Other problems mentioned by interview partners (like the top-heavy management
structure, lack of contacts between donors and CSOs etc.) are mentioned elsewhere in
the report and shall not be repeated here.
3.5. Impact
Despite some of the weaknesses detailed above, it is generally acknowledged that the
NCEP was facilitative in many ways, and did have a number of intended and
unplanned, mostly positive impacts on both donors and CSOs. Among them are:
· enhanced donor co-operation and provision of substantial funds for civic
education;
· harmonised rules and regulations governing the disbursement of funds and the
monitoring and evaluation of activities;
· capacity development under the NCEP which has enhanced both technical and
financial skills of participating CSOs considerably;
· providing the basis for enhanced collaboration and networking amongst
participating CSOs (though largely limited to intra-consortia relationships);
· localised countrywide training of communities has enabled the beneficiaries to
stand out and express themselves with greater confidence;
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· communities in some areas have picked up the promotion of civic education
using their resources;
· a pool of skilled facilitators has been created which can be used for other
purposes than civic education under the NCEP.
NCEP's Impact on Donor Co-operation – "Highly satisfactory"
The basket fund provided an opportunity for donors to work together in support of a
common agenda. Although there were some reservations expressed concerning the
degree of likemindedness among participating donors, there was general agreement in
most of the issues which influenced the structure of the NCEP (for example, concerns 
about lack of or poor governance in the public domain and, correspondingly, about lack 
of transparency and accountability among the local NGOs, CBOs and CSOs). These
concerns provided the platform for joint support.
Having said that, the donors generally found the arrangement of pooling funds for such 
a programme very suitable and useful. Some smaller donors were able to participate in 
the programme at very low costs to themselves, especially where there is no internal
capacity to handle programmes of such magnitude. Additionally, issues mentioned
above like cohesion in a political sensitive environment and harmonisation of
approaches do equally apply here.
Furthermore, the nature of the NCEP as a "learning process" for everybody involved
will provide a number of lessons for future multi-donor governance programmes, not
least by means of this evaluation. A necessary precondition for applying lessons learned 
under the NCEP is, however, that the experiences are documented and also passed on to 
newly arriving staff at the various missions. 
Impact on Participating CSOs and the wider CSO-Community – "Satisfactory"
As already mentioned, most of the longer existing CSOs were operating in the areas
they covered for the NCEP before the NCEP was commissioned. Their involvement
varied from providing civic education to advocacy for human rights and gender
mainstreaming to general developmental activities. A few CSOs were founded
obviously in response to the availability of funds for carrying out civic education
activities, and some of the participating CSOs refocused their activities towards civic
education due to the promise of funds from the NCEP. It is, however, difficult to see 
how this can be avoided in future programmes. One possibility would be to more
intentionally and comprehensively complement activities of a larger programme like the 
NCEP with bilateral funding initiatives or similar basket funds, in order not create a
donor-driven distortion of topics covered and activities undertaken.
Among participating CSOs, the capacity building effect in terms of technical and
financial project management has been very high. Even some CSOs whose contracts
were cancelled in the process appreciated these positive impacts of the NCEP.
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Contrary to fears expressed by some donors, the harmonization of approaches (common 
curriculum, standardized reporting and accounting procedures etc.) across the more than 
70 CSOs was widely appreciated by most of them and seen as a major success of the 
NCEP, creating a sense of commonness among the CSOs, not unlike the feeling of unity 
among donors.
On an individual level, most participating CSOs have gained a better understanding of 
the realities on the ground through the employment of local facilitators, and have
thereby strengthened their networks which can be used for other purposes after the
NCEP. Some are already in the process of doing so, and the change of name of the
CEDMAC consortium – from "Civic Education for Marginalised Categories (or
Communities)" to "Consortium for Empowerment and Development for Marginalised
Communities" – is an early indication of this trend. 
Whereas, also contrary to expectations, there is hardly any difference regarding the
impact of the NCEP on different types of CSOs – between larger and longer established 
ones versus younger, smaller CSOs – there are marked differences in the way different 
types of CSOs assess the NCEP and perceive the nature of relationships between donors 
and the TAT/FMA on one side and the CSOs and the consortia on the other side:
Judging from our interviews, the larger and more established, mainly Nairobi-based 
CSOs are relatively more concerned with issues like the politics of the sector, whether 
or not the NCEP was donor-driven, and the design of the management structure. On the 
other hand, smaller CSOs, mostly outside Nairobi, are basically focused on the
implementation of their activities, not really minding the exact design of the
management structure and the roles of consortia, as long as it does not negatively
impact upon their operations. 
One further issue should also be kept under close scrutiny: Most of the participating
CSOs are expecting to get easier access to donor funds through their good performance 
during the NCEP, which is only natural. It should be kept in mind that, at the time of the 
evaluation mission, the four consortia did not yet have tested procedures for new
members joining them, which bears the slight danger of creating an "elite" of CSOs,
with newcomers or those excluded from the NCEP possibly finding it difficult to be
included in future programmes. 
The issue of membership and new admissions is mentioned in only some of the
consortia MoUs. Both the ECEP MoU and the CRECO MoU "on the implementation of 
the NCEP" are silent on how to admit new members. The Gender Consortium was
formed for the NCEP, and membership is confined to the "CSOs identified for the
purpose of the implementation of the Gender component of the NCEP". The CEDMAC 
MoU is the only one specifying the procedure of admitting new member CSOs by
stating that a new member has to be recommended by the Management Committee of
CEDMAC and approved by the Council of CEDMAC.
Our recommendation in that respect is that firstly the consortia are asked to come up
with mechanisms and procedures on membership, and that secondly a significant part of 
funds for future projects will be reserved for non-consortia CSOs. 
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3.6. Sustainability
Ownership – "Less than satisfactory"
Although NCEP has been heavily donor-driven in terms of its preparations and design 
and management style, the concept has somehow taken root among the CSOs. Some
local communities are reported to have started community theatres and women groups
whose messages revolve around rights, democratization and informed choices during
elections, although such non-funded activities are still few and scattered.
Unfortunately, the idea of contributing to the financing of such activities has not been
sufficiently addressed by the CSOs.
The evaluation team, however, is convinced that some sort of counterpart funding from 
communities benefiting from civic education activities might have enhanced the impact
of such activities. Creative approaches in this direction will have to be explored in
future similar programmes. 
As noted above, there is a difference in the perception of ownership between larger,
more established CSOs, who mostly alleged (and complained) that the NCEP was
donor-driven, and smaller CSOs in the field, who did not complain about this at all, but 
rather stated that "ownership is essentially at the community level" – "if the people
accept the programme, and actively participate, then one can talk about ownership" in 
the words of one respondent. 
Essentially, the principle of ownership of the NCEP, though often referred to, had to
take a back seat compared to considerations of financial and technical accountability,
largely due to the political sensitivity of the sector. 
Sustainability regarding sustaining the positive Effects of the NCEP within the CSO￾Community and the future Focus of CSO-Activities – "Less than satisfactory"
At the moment, it is difficult to see how the positive effects of the NCEP can be
sustained without considerable funding from donors for future civic education activities. 
Due to the extremely short implementation time of mostly not more than a couple of
months, the positive effects of the NCEP are just being felt and realised by both CSOs 
and target communities. In order to have sustainable effects, comparable experiences
have shown that civic education activities would have to be undertaken with the same 
target group more often than once, which was mostly not possible due to the short
implementation time. 
Furthermore, the sudden end of activities after only a short while, without any
immediate follow-up project, also means that facilitators and project staff with the
individual CSOs will now have to look elsewhere for earning a living. Thereby,
capacities created on the ground and within the CSOs are likely to dissipate before long, 
and the investment in building these capacities will be lost.
One recommendation for future projects will be to integrate the factor of sustainability
already into the programme design, and to develop appropriate "exit scenarios", both on 
the level of the programme as a whole and on the level of individual CSOs.
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Although most of the CSOs interviewed stated that they will continue with civic 
education activities, this will largely, if not solely, depend on the future availability of 
donor funds, as hardly any of the CSOs has developed any strategy for income
generation independently of donor funding. CSOs which have a broader agenda than
only civic education – like advocacy or general development activities (mostly CBOs) –
will find it easier to sustain their operations than those purely founded on the promise of 
NCEP-funds.
Sustainability regarding future joint Donor Initiatives in the Governance Sector –
"Highly satisfactory"
Due to the largely positive experiences with the NCEP, the likelihood of future joint
donor funding in the governance sector is assessed to be high. Building on the
experiences with previous election support programmes in 1992 and 1997, the Kenya 
Domestic Observation Programme (K-DOP) or the Engendering the Political Process
Programme (EPPP) are current and ongoing examples for this. But the experiences of 
the NCEP could also serve to lead to increased co-ordination in other areas apart from
elections and civic education, as – not only in the view of the evaluation team – basket 
or joint funding carries a number of advantages, provided that bilateral activities are
maintained to complement joint initiatives.
Sustainability regarding the Management Structures created by the NCEP (both
TAT/FMA and Consortia Secretariats) 
The specific combination of technical assistants and financial managers is clearly a
structure put in place for the NCEP, and it is difficult to see this very structure being
maintained in the same form and scope for future activities. For one, although having
provided for an effective technical and financial management of the NCEP, the structure 
seems to be either too expensive for that purpose, or under utilised, depending on the 
point of view. Future efforts will both have to consider whether the focus on accounting 
and transparency shall be maintained in the same form (or whether a similar output can 
be achieved at a lesser cost, with a leaner structure), and for which purposes technical 
assistance is needed (and in which phases of the programme, and to what extent). 
One possibility is to see the NCEP as a one-time experience, having raised levels of
capacities among CSOs which can be sustained with a less heavy structure in future. 
Another possibility, which we see as the more appropriate one, is to delegate more
management authority to an implementing agency, which acts within a predefined set of 
parameters and thereby lowers the time and input required by donors. 
The future design of management structures also depends on the roles and
responsibilities of aggregates of CSOs, i. e. of the consortia. Whether the current
consortia continue to exist, and what functions they will have, is still an open question. 
In the case of ECEP, it can almost be taken for granted that the consortium will continue 
to exist and to operate as one entity. The future course of the CRECO and CEDMAC
consortia is not yet clear, but there are some indications that member CSOs largely
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appreciated this structure and have an interest in maintaining them. There are, however, 
major discrepancies among member CSOs in the views on what exactly these two
consortia should do in future. The case of the Gender Consortium is even more unclear, 
having been established as a compromise structure after the conflict between the Caucus 
and the Alliance. Contrary to what happened during the preparations of the NCEP
implementation phase, when donors and the TAT/FMA got heavily involved in building 
the consortia, especially the Gender Consortium, it is recommended that the process
shall largely be determined by member CSOs (not least in order to avoid "forced
marriages" which then create problems later on in the process of implementing
programmes). 
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4. OTHER ISSUES
4.1. Quality and Effectiveness of Educational Materials used in carrying out 
Program Activities
Part of the NCEP's mandate was to produce materials for civic education. At the
beginning, the production of materials was the responsibility of NACEFCO that was
funded by DANIDA and RNE to develop those materials and to facilitate initial
meetings to kick off civic education. NACEFCO did not take off due to political
intrigue and the fact that some CSOs disowned it as a result of NGO-politics.
As a consequence, the NCEP – that is, the consortia with strong backing and facilitation 
by the TAT – took over the responsibility of producing training materials. The process, 
however, was characterised with initial start up problems and a number of delays.
Materials were not produced until the second quarter of 2001, and pretesting of the
materials was only concluded by the middle of 2001, one year into the project. 
The following is a list of materials produced:
Making Informed Choices – A curriculum for civic education
Making Informed Choices – A trainer’s manual for civic education
Making Informed Choices – A handbook for civic education
Additionally, the Gender consortium had produced a flip chart which was subsequently 
also used by the other consortia, due to their inability to produce their own
supplementing material. The flip chart is called:
Making Informed Choices – A flip chart on facing the challenges of citizenship together
The curriculum, the trainer’s manual and the handbook formed the basis for developing 
local and thematic training materials. Need was expressed by quite a number of CSOs
of translating the material into Kiswahili for ease of use by those not very conversant 
with English. 
For some of the CSOs the topics to be handled were too many – not allowing for in￾depth treatment. Time did not allow for repeated visits to re-emphasise the message.
The workshop methodology defined in the manual was found to be appropriate by most 
CSOs, but a bit restrictive by some CSOs, which complained that it was not always
possible to divide participants in smaller groups due to cultural considerations, while –
in the case of the flip charts – some communities misinterpreted some pictures. 
For future projects, we therefore recommend a unified translation while pictures should 
be thoroughly field tested and edited before final printing.
Some facilitators and CSOs also remarked that it would have been good to have a brief 
leaflet of the NCEP contents which could have been left behind with the target groups
for them to revisit topics covered or make cross-references to the other topics. 
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Future projects should, therefore, also produce smaller folders or brochures, possibly
available in a number of vernacular languages, to increase the impact of civic education 
activities.
In the remaining part of this section, we will analyse the NCEP core materials in some 
more detail in line with our Terms of Reference.
Cover Design: 
The cover is done in very attractive colors and in glossy cover which affords durability 
and easy removal of stain. In the background of the boundaries of Kenya there was an 
attempt to present a cross-section of the Kenyan peoples by ethnic origin, race, gender 
age, levels of education. Implicit are issues of occupation, profession and religion. This 
cover design gives the image of involvement and inclusiveness. There has been an
attempt to keep out partisan look by omitting even the colors of the country's flag or
state emblem. 
The Curriculum:
Structure: The curriculum seems to be very well structured into four major units, and
the units subdivided into sections. The units are flanked by an introduction which leads 
the user into the text and also contains three annexes on methodology/presentation tools, 
evaluation and a glossary.
Presentation: The contents are presented in a plain, easy-to-read language. The
formatting of the text is done in wide spacing which enhances easy reading for the not 
too academic user.
Contents: The contents of the curriculum under the four units is all in all relevant and
well thought out. Units 1 and 2 on nationhood and the state and democracy provide
important foundations to some of the critical issues in present-day Kenya, and indeed
around the region, that is, the subjects of constitution and the practice of governance.
Limitations: In spite of the fact that the curriculum is very well developed, there are at 
least three issues worth considering in order to enrich any future efforts at developing a 
civic education programme.
The first is the failure of the curriculum to treat gender as a subject and as an issue. In 
the entire text, gender is mentioned only on page 43 as a facilitation concern and on
page 51 in definitional terms. For a document that precisely claims to have been
produced by four consortia which included the Gender consortium (back cover last
line), this was a very significant underplay of a key agenda of that consortium. For
societies that are patriarchal in form and contents of democratic processes and
constitution making, gender issues would demand due treatment.
The second issue is the subject of conflict and conflict management. In our view,
conflict appears to be engraved in the ongoing democratization and demand for viable 
constitutions in the region. While conflict is an integral and necessary feature of
politics, it may not necessarily always be harmful. However, the experience around the 
region is that it has often been disruptive of the political processes societies envisage to 
realize. It should thus be very appropriate that this issue is factored in the curriculum. 
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Thirdly from the interviews with some service providers it was revealed that some
issues peculiar to some specific ground realities may have been overlooked. One such
case was that related to conditions in North Eastern Kenya, an area of marginalized
residents. The curriculum ought to have captured issues related to those conditions. 
The Handbook:
The handbook details the contents of the subjects that were to be presented to the
beneficiaries of the programme. We would like to indicate, as we did above but more so 
here, that the material is very relevant. Also, there has been a real effort to make it as 
comprehensive as possible.
The use of highlights and pictorial representations of issues to be covered enhances the 
learning experience. Admittedly, the document is of relevant use by all levels of society 
and especially as an entry point into Kenya's political and constitutional development.
Limitations: While the document as such is relevant, its being so comprehensive may
imply its weakness. The document is 289 pages in length. One wonders how long the 
civic education is going to last to enable the facilitators to cover the entire text. An
abridged piece of work may have been more desirable. A pocket size highlight of the 
major subjects would also have been handy, ready to use and affordable (as indicated
above).
The point above is besides what was raised earlier with regard to the twin omissions
characterized. On the gender question, the basic criticism remains although we
acknowledge the scattered attempt to reflect on the subject here and there, e.g. figure 2.1 
on page 48, the mentioning of bullet 4 under Ratified Conventions on Human Rights pg. 
67, definition of gender equity, pg.69, figure 2.6 pg. 95, gender sensitivity pg. 104,
abuses of women rights by state organs pg.183, and elsewhere. While this effort is
commendable, it is disjointed and is not backed up by an attempt to analyse the issue of 
gender upon which one would be able to discern and evaluate the democratization and 
constitutional developments in present-day Kenya
With regard to the issue of conflict the omission is still glaring. It would have been very 
useful should the handbook have discussed the issue of conflict and enhanced the
discussion by looking at concrete cases as they evolve in the contestation for office
between and among political parties, in the demand for a new constitution, in politically 
motivated conflicts over resources such as land, water, etc.
Trainer's Manual: 
The trainer’s manual is what it is, an instructional document. To that extent, it mirrors
the contents of the curriculum and the handbook.
The immense value of this manual lies in the introductory chapter. This chapter ably
gives the tips on how to organize facilitation sessions as well as gives examples on the 
variety of methods the facilitator may use and its varied circumstances and subject
areas.
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4.2. Comparison between NCEP and other Basket Funding Models
As has been mentioned previously already, the concept of basket funding, as applied
under the NCEP, has quite a number of strengths, compared to bilateral funding
initiatives of individual donor, not the least of which is that the basket establishes
mechanisms of co-ordination within the donor community and of harmonized dialogue 
with the implementing agencies. By pooling funds together, it is also expected that a
basket fund would keep transaction and grant-administration costs low and thereby
increase the 'purchasing power' of the available funds (see also our discussion of the
cost-benefit implications of the NCEP, above). The basket was also able to motivate for 
extra funds from donors who would otherwise not have supported the project, or who 
would have supported civic education activities with a smaller budget.
For the purpose of comparing the NCEP with other basket funds, we will take a closer 
look at the basket fund established for voter education for the Tanzanian 2000 general 
elections, and thereafter briefly look at other ongoing joint funding initiatives in Kenya 
(K-DOP, EPPP), focusing on the design of the management structure of these other
joint initiatives.
The Tanzanian Experience of the 2000 General Elections and the NCEP
Introduction:
Apart from the NCEP, the donor community was (and is) involved in a number of other 
multi-donor basket funded projects around the region. One of it is the currently ongoing 
preparation of a joint donor initiative for civic and voter education in Uganda, another 
one the joint funding of voter education for the 2000 general elections in Tanzania.
Experiences of the Ugandan initiative will not be evaluated here, as the programme is in 
its initial stages, whereas the Tanzanian experience will give some insights for the
NCEP by way of comparison, as this project has already been concluded (and
evaluated). 
The Tanzanian basket fund for the 2000 general elections was the second basket fund 
for such a purpose in Tanzania. In 1995, the donor community had supported a similar 
fund for the elections that were held then. 
Like the NCEP, the basket fund project for the 2000 elections was established by a
group of donors. By November 1998, members to the basket comprised Denmark,
Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Canada. The United Kingdom and
Ireland joined the fund in August 1999, followed by Switzerland and Germany in May
2000. France was the last country to join it. In this short report we envisage to
summarize some of the key highlights that emerge out the comparison of experiences
with donor basket funding in Tanzania and Kenya.
Like-mindedness of Members of the Basket:
Participation in the basket funding in both Tanzania and Kenya appears to have been
based on the belief that members had a shared view, a "like mind", over the project for 
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which funding was done. In the case of Tanzania this was underlined by the members'
often stated wish to see the evolution and institutionalization of democratic practices
such as multi-party competitive elections. 
The idea of a like mind was translated into the considerable resources that were raised 
in both Tanzania and Kenya and the setting up of an institutional and management
structure to implement the projects with the participating donors at its helm.
The drive of a like mind appears to have been moderated when it came to
operationalisation of the project. In Tanzania and Kenya, individual donor country
sensitivities and concerns suffused over decision making processes on matters related to 
the implementation of the project. As a result, basket members found themselves in
frequent and long meetings dealing with technical and administrative issues in both
countries, issues that could have been handled differently.
Thus the idea of like-mindedness raises the need for the establishment of a common
denominator of rules that will guide the members to a basket, particularly its operations.
Focus:
While in both the Kenyan and Tanzanian cases, donors' interests were on the broad
theme of democratization that can be realized through civic education and technical
assistance, there is a noticeable distinction in so far that in Tanzania the focus area was 
on elections when in Kenya it was on the realization of a new constitution. This
distinction had important bearings on the donor support, especially in terms of
recipients of support and the problems that ensued from it. 
In the case of Tanzania, its focus on elections meant that the funding needed to be
disbursed to activities that would help realize the envisaged higher quality elections.
This meant that support had to be directed towards:
· the enhancement of the technical capacity of the election management body;
· monitoring activities;
· and the raising of civic competence.
Like in the Kenyan case, support for monitoring purposes and civic education went to
NGOs and CBOs that had submitted applications for funds for this purpose. As for the 
election management purposes, the funding in Tanzania had to be channeled to the
National Electoral Commission (NEC).
The NEC was a qualitatively different institution when compared to the multiplicity of 
NGOs and CBOs and therefore represented qualitatively unique problems with regard to 
basket funding for technical assistance. Three important issues come to mind: First is
the political dynamics within NEC; secondly, NEC's standing and prestige as an
election management body and the fact that the donor community had placed a full time 
consultant at the NEC headquarters was regarded by the NEC as intruding. The issues 
surrounding NEC was a source of friction and risk for the basket members which one 
does not have with institutions of lesser standing and lesser prestige, such as an NGO or 
a CBO.
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Comparing this with the Kenyan experience, it seems to have been an appropriate and 
risk-minimising decision to dissociate the NCEP from the constitutional review process 
and its commission (which, though, came only about after a long time of deliberations). 
Preliminary lessons for future multi-donor governance programmes would be to, firstly, 
only involve state agencies in the implementation of governance programmes if they are 
sufficiently credible, independent and capable, and, secondly, to institutionally separate 
support to NGOs and CSOs on the one hand and state institutions on the other hand if 
the first condition does not apply. 
Institutional Set-Up and Management Structure:
Management Structure at National level:
There are parallels and significant differences with regard to the institutional set up and 
the management structure that was put in place in Kenya and Tanzania.
Among the parallels, first, is the recognition that the donors needed an organ as a focal 
donor point for consultations, a Steering Committee for Tanzania and HoMs and DSC
for the NCEP. The HoMs did not feature prominently in the Tanzanian case. In both
cases, there was the recognized need for the appointment of a Lead Donor, the DFID in 
the case of the NCEP and the Royal Danish Embassy in the case of Tanzania.
The Royal Danish Embassy in Tanzania was authorized to negotiate and conclude an
agreement with the Government of Tanzania (GoT) and NGOs if so agreed upon by the 
partners. 
The Embassy was also given full authority to monitor and administer the basket fund,
and the donor community contracted the services of PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to 
act as the disbursement agent. 
For funds disbursed to the NGOs, implementation was carried out by two clusters of
NGOs, one on media monitoring and the other on elections monitoring, the Tanzania
Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO).
Role and Performance of the Lead Donor:
In the case of Tanzania, as was under the NCEP, the role of the Lead Donor – DANIDA 
– was very critical in ensuring that donor interest was maintained and that the project 
was always on course. 
Also, as was recognized by many in NCEP, in the case of Tanzania, DANIDA managed 
the operations of the basket competently and efficiently. Danish Embassy staff was of 
high quality and very committed. The role of the Danish Ambassador was very critical 
not only in chairing meetings but also in holding consultations with key actors and
steering the direction of the project. 
Again like the NCEP, there were concerns among some donors in Tanzania that in some 
instances the lead donor tended to dominate the operations of the basket.
The Donors and the Implementing Agencies:
It is interesting to note that like under the NCEP, in the Tanzanian case, one area of
great concern was that of the basket fund's relations with civil society. There was little if 
any dialogue between the CSOs and the HoMs in Tanzania as well. Any contact
between the donors and the CSOs was by way of presentation of proposals and filing of 
reports. 
The absence of a dialogue led to suspicion and to civil society's view of the basket
members as high-handed and patronizing. However, this suspicion was not addressed
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and was simply dismissed, even when the selection of submitted proposals took long or 
when reasons for rejection were not communicated to the applicants of grants.
Project Design:
One of the main complaints of applicants for funding under NCEP was that they took 
long to work out their proposals until they got accepted for funding. The reasons for the 
calls to improve on submitted proposals every now and then could perhaps be found in 
the same way in the Tanzanian case. One should not be oblivious to reasons such as
delays caused by the bureaucratic handling of the proposals or the limited skills of
reviewers in the case of Tanzania. However, from the donors' side, the main reason was 
that the proposals were simply too weak to qualify for funding.
But while the NCEP had a baseline survey against which to establish benchmarks from 
which to advance, those in Tanzania lacked baseline information and were not backed
up by a needs assessment, which meant that they had some important gaps.
Project Monitoring:
A big distinction between the NCEP and the Tanzanian case is that most of the projects 
in Tanzania did not monitor their activities, and where some did, indicators of
measuring results were not clearly stipulated. Similarly, those projects that did
monitoring were basically concerned with activities and not results. For instance, they
focused on whether or not some materials were distributed, or whether some seminars 
were held or not. They did not monitor the effect of the distributed materials or the
seminars, the number of participants, topics covered etc. Where some monitoring took 
place, the lessons learned were not adequately fed back into the implementation process. 
Lessons Learned:
Basket Funding:
The basket established mechanisms of co-ordination within the donor community and 
harmonized dialogue with different stakeholders. By pooling funds together, basket
funding managed to keep transaction and grant-administration costs low and to increase 
the 'purchasing power' of the available funds in both cases. The basket funding enables 
to motivate for extra funds from donors who would otherwise not have supported the 
projects.
The Basket Set-Up:
The concept of like-mindedness among basket members masks some differences that
can lead to indecision and delays in project implementation.
Overall Management Structure:
Under basket funding, direct involvement of the HoMs, albeit intermittently, may
harmonise relations between the different organs and facilitate more active and
committed implementation of the project. However, the involvement of the HoMs also 
introduces another layer in the management structure, the benefits of which have to be 
considered beforehand, and the concrete tasks and modes of operation should be
specified. 
Role and Performance of the Lead Donor:
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The lead donor is very instrumental to the implementation of the project, as the
experience in both cases demonstrates. The issue is not only who is named lead donor, 
but also the powers and concrete tasks the lead donor has in comparison to an eventual 
deputy lead donor or the other donors of the basket arrangement. Alternative
arrangements – instead of one lead donor-other basket fund members – might be
worthwhile exploring for medium- to longer-term programmes (e. g. rotating chairs; a 
trojka of leadership among donors, with shared responsibilities and tasks, etc.).
The Donors and the Implementing Agencies:
The translation of the concept of "partnership" between the donors (and their organs)
and the implementing agencies (state agencies; CSOs) is essential to avoid friction and 
misunderstanding between the various stakeholders. 
Minimum requirements should be transparency of decision making and efficiency of
information flow, in order to achieve the buy-in of all stakeholders into the process. 
The Kenya Domestic Observation Programme (K-DOP)
Our brief discussion of the K-DOP is based on the programme document dated July
2002. K-DOP was officially launched on October 9, 2002. 
K-DOP brings together four religious organisations and four independent civil society
organisations – the Kenyan Episcopal Conference/Catholic Justice and Peace
Commission (CJPC), the Institute for Education in Democracy (IED), the Media
Institute, the National Council of Churches in Kenya (NCCK), the Hindu Council of
Kenya (HCK), the Supreme Council of Muslims in Kenya (SUPKEM), Northern Aid 
and Transparency International-Kenya (TI-K) – with the aim of implementing a
domestic election observation programme. 
Regarding timing, it seems that lessons from the NCEP were not considered. A
programme document should have been in place by the beginning of February, but
largely due to difficult negotiations among participating organisations, the programme 
document was only agreed upon in June 2002.
However, another problem which has plagued the NCEP and previous election
observation exercises in Kenya, the lack of a clear definition of roles and
responsibilities, seems to have been solved early on. The K-DOP programme document 
states: "Clearly defined roles and rules for collaboration have been agreed in advance
through a memorandum of understanding between the partners in K-DOP."
However, individual and collective timetables were still to be "developed during the
inception period and shared through the Programme Technical Board". Equally, 
monitoring methodologies will only be developed and agreed at a later stage, and where 
necessary technical support will be provided, without further specifications.
Regarding the management structure, it seems that the programme again, like in the
case of the NCEP, establishes quite a heavy structure, consisting of: a Strategic Board, a 
Programme Technical Board, and a Secretariat (including technical advisors) plus an
Arbitration Board; furthermore a financial management/disbursement agency (PwC)
and a donor support group (DSG; constituted out of the LiMiD-subgroup on domestic 
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observation). In a marked difference to the NCEP, however, the roles and
responsibilities of the various partners and the various levels seem to have been
sufficiently specified, and detailed resource and implementation schedules are annexed 
to the programme document.
The indicative budget as of July 2002 was Euro 2.5 Mio. The composition of the DSG 
was not mentioned in the programme document, nor were the funding levels of
individual donors (also not in the logical framework which usually contains information 
about the source of funds).
As the K-DOP has just started, it is too early to make conclusions on how efficient and 
effective the above arrangements are. What seems clear, however, is that the K-DOP 
programme document is much more detailed and specific than the NCEP programme
document, and thereby provides a much better basis for assessing the programme and its 
progress. 
The Engendering the Political Process Programme (EPPP)
The currently also ongoing EPPP is not a basket fund in the strict sense of the word and 
therefore will only be reviewed briefly. The EPPP is based on individual contracts
signed between each donor and each implementing agency/CSO directly, under a
common framework. This option was not feasible for the NCEP, not least due to the
phased contracting of CSOs and increments in donor funds over the lifespan of the
NCEP. 
According to the cover of the EPPP-Programme Document (Second Draft, dated
February 2002), the programme is supported by six donors, whereas the section on
funding states that there are only three funding donors. The EPPP is implemented by
five CSOs, whereby the Woman Political Alliance and the Women Political Caucus act 
as focal points for different member organisations that implement different components 
of the programme. 
The summary states that "the Programme Document will be refined on an ongoing basis 
to incorporate more detailed planning and respond to changing strategic priorities", 
thereby reflecting an approach which had already created some problems in the course 
of the NCEP. Equally, as with the NCEP, the key programme outputs of the EPPP seem 
to be overly ambitious on the one hand and not specific enough on the other hand. The 
evolutionary nature of the EPPP-Programme Document is also reflected in the logical
framework, which is of a similar quality like the NCEP-logframe, but far less specific 
than the K-DOP-logframe.
By way of comparison with the NCEP, it is interesting to note that the EPPP originally 
foresaw a different arrangement for donor co-operation, that is a rotating chair.
However, according to one interview partner, this arrangement did not work, as other 
donors were not prepared to take the lead on a rotating basis. 
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4.3. Impact of the NCEP on the Constitution of Kenya Review Process (and vice 
versa)
Originally, the NCEP was supposed to be closely linked to the constitutional review
process. It was only when the review process did not take off, and there were doubts 
whether at all it would, when the NCEP was dissociated from the constitutional review 
process to the extent that one of the criteria for the appraisal of CSO proposals was that 
"the project activities should not be linked to any constitutional review process" (i. e. 
neither to the parliamentary nor to the faiths-led Ufungamano initiative). 
However, there were quite a number of concrete relations between the NCEP and the 
CKRC, mainly on two levels: firstly, on the level of the NCEP as a whole, involving the 
donors and the TAT/FMA; secondly, on the level of individual CSO activities and the 
facilitators.
Once the Professor Ghai-led CKRC was established, there were a number of contacts
(formal and informal) between donors and the CKRC, as one of the mandates of the
CKRC was also to carry out civic education on constitutional matters. At one point, the 
HoMs even adopted an official policy document regarding the collaboration between
the NCEP and the CKRC. Reportedly, the CKRC was impressed by the NCEP, but 
official contacts never went beyond briefings of the TAT/FMA for the CKRC and the 
provision of several thousand copies of the core NCEP materials to the CKRC. A more 
formal collaboration might also not have been in the interest of the CKRC, due, again, 
to political sensitivities.
On the level of individual CSOs and facilitators, however, the impact of the CKRC on 
the NCEP and vice versa became much more tangible and immediate.
CKRC impact on the NCEP:
A number of CSOs reported having problems with provincial and district
administrations when organising activities under the NCEP. Once the CKRC had started 
its activities, some of the CSOs used the credibility and official character of the CKRC 
as a means of convincing the administrations to support their activities under the NCEP 
as well. In most cases, this approach worked and had the effect of somehow giving the 
NCEP-activities the air of official recognition, paving the way for easier access to
communities through the support of chiefs and the local administration.
NCEP impact on the CKRC:
The CSOs interviewed reported an even more direct impact of the NCEP on the CKRC. 
Mostly, this happened in the form of memoranda submitted to the CKRC by
communities and groups which had benefited from civic education activities under the 
NCEP before, partly assisted by the facilitators in drafting the memoranda. But there
were also cases of a more organised input from NCEP facilitators to the CKRC – for
example, one CSO reported that its facilitators had submitted a memorandum to the
CKRC as a group. 
All the CSOs interviewed stated that it was only after the experience of the NCEP that 
many of the communities and groups with which they had been working saw
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themselves in a position to participate in the CKRC-process – which is, in our view, a 
more direct impact than could have been expected. 
With hindsight, it has turned out to be a good decision to institutionally dissociate the 
NCEP from the review process(es), even though this decision came at a rather late
stage. With hindsight, it is also questionable if there was really a need to draft a formal 
agreement of collaboration between the NCEP and the CKRC, as the HoMs eventually
did, because keeping the relations on an informal level obviously had more advantages 
for both sides. 
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5. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1. Summary of Lessons Learned
First of all, we'd like to emphasise that the NCEP has proven the possibility of
implementing large-scale multi-donor governance programmes involving a great variety 
of domestic implementing CSOs, following a common agenda, under harmonised
approaches and guidance by a technical assistance team and a financial management
agent. 
As far as this was achieved in a politically sensitive environment within the timeframe 
envisaged, and with considerable resources mobilised by the donors, the NCEP is
considered to be a success.
Below is a discussion of the key findings and lessons learned in the course of this
systems evaluation, structured along the lines of our inquiry.
Peculiarities of the NCEP
· The difficulties of applying commonly used evaluation procedures:
The NCEP did not always follow the requirements of project cycle management for a 
number of reasons. It was variously described as a "first-time experience" involving 
such a great variety of donors and implementing partners, and as a "learning process"
for everybody involved, leading to the adoption of an "evolutionary approach" to
project planning and management. Some of the key outputs usually expected to be
achieved in the planning and preparation phase (like, for example, detailed project
documents including resource and implementation schedules, quality logical
frameworks and benchmarks, clear designation of roles and responsibilities on the
various levels etc.) were not produced, making it near impossible to do, for example,
variance analyses of budgets and time variance analyses of schedules.
· Political environment and political sensitivities:
A substantial part of the problems and peculiarities influencing the NCEP are associated 
with the policital environment and the political sensitivities involved. Government
criticism of donor efforts in the sector, and the donors' reactions to this criticism, have 
shaped the NCEP in various ways, leading, among others, to some of the delays
experienced in the planning and implementation phases of the NCEP, to the adoption of 
a low-profile communication strategy, or to the focus of the programme on the
transparent and accountable use of donor funds by the participating CSOs. 
Despite the shortcomings in project preparation and implementation due to the poor
policy environment and the political sensitivities, the risk mitigation strategies adopted 
in reaction to these factors allowed the programme to go ahead, and finally to be
implemented, however for a much shorter period of time than originally envisaged.
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· The politics of the CSO-sector:
The NCEP has shown that the CSOs usually are as multifacetted as the society within
which they are operating, and that the benefits of grouping them together in consortia 
should be weighed against the time and efforts required to do so. In the NCEP, this
became most obvious with the conflict around NACEFCO, and later with the conflict in 
the Gender Consortium, which required substantial mediation by donors and the
TAT/FMA and which led to a late mobilisation of Gender Consortium-CSOs, thereby
negatively affecting the integration of gender issues into the operations of the CSOs of 
other consortia. 
Relevance, Programme Preparation, Planning, and Design
· High relevance of the NCEP:
For a programme like the NCEP to be relevant, its objectives have to be situated within 
political developments of the country within which the programme is implemented, and 
have to reflect the existing programmes and mandates of stakeholders (CSOs). The
NCEP achieved both.
· The benefits of a harmonised approach to civic education:
Working within the framework of a common curriculum according to predefined
criteria (in the case of NCEP non-partisanship, political neutrality, and non-advocacy) 
led to a more professional and holistic approach to civic education, fostered a sense of 
unity among participating CSOs and has provided the basis for the programme to be
implemented almost without disruptions in a politically sensitive environment.
· Poor integration of cross-cutting issues:
For a number of reasons, cross-cutting issues, mainly gender, were only poorly
integrated into the core NCEP-materials and into the operations of CSOs outside the
Gender Consortium.
· Long preparation and planning with low-quality outputs: 
The large number of stakeholders involved in the NCEP on various levels, and political 
sensitivities, necessarily led to delays in preparation and planning, severely impacting
upon the time left for implementation of activities. 
However, this long project preparation and planning time did not produce high-quality 
outputs, and created a number of problems later on in the programme's lifespan (due to 
unspecific programme documents and logical frameworks, lack of a detailed
stakeholder analysis and detailed schedules, late or delayed implementation of certain
activities like the baseline survey and the mapping exercise, lack of specific roles and 
responsibilities of the various levels of the management structure etc.).
For example: 
- The twin objectives of delivering civic education and of building the capacities 
of participating CSOs were not sufficiently specified and costed, making it
impossible to do a meaningful cost-benefit analysis at project-end. 
- The logical frameworks for the NCEP were too unspecific to adequately serve as 
programme management tools, leading to a poor prioritisation and sequencing of 
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tasks to be performed, and requiring considerable flexibility and personal input
from key individuals on the part of both the donors (especially the lead donor)
and the TAT/FMA.
· Adequate design of the management structure and the M&E-systems:
The basic set-up of the management structure for the NCEP was acceptable and
appropriate to the contents of the programme and the political environment.
Qualifications in this area relate to the lack of guidelines (roles and responsibilities) for 
the various levels, especially for the HoMs, and insufficient decision-making authorities 
on some levels, especially the TAT/FMA and the consortia secretariats. 
The initial M&E-outlines have adequately reflected the requirements of donors for
financial accountability and constant overview of programme progress, but were still
too unspecific in the programme document, and some of the vital M&E-tools (baseline 
survey and mapping study) only came in late in the project's lifespan.
Efficiency
· Less than possible efficiency of the management structure:
Largely due to omissions in the preparation, planning and design of the NCEP, the
management structure was less efficient than it could have been, leading to delays,
duplication of tasks, and frustrations among project partners. Therefore, key individuals 
had to provide much more input to the programme than would have been expected. 
Despite all these shortcomings, the management structure still provided the basis for the 
NCEP to finally take off and be implemented, and the various levels, especially the
DSC and the TAT/FMA, largely improved their performance in the course of the
programme, particularly once implementation of activities by most of the participating
CSOs had started towards the end of 2001.
- HoMs-level: The involvement of the HoMs in the NCEP was beneficial to
counter criticism by Government officials and to politically steer the 
programme, but the political sensitivities were only poorly communicated to
other stakeholders, especially the CSOs. However, due to the fact that their tasks 
were never specified, the HoMs got involved in details of programme
management which could have been left to the DSC or the TAT/FMA.
- DSC-level: The DSC managed to uphold the unity of the donor group, to
achieve high funding levels, and to technically steer the NCEP, but also got
directly involved in the day-to-day management of the programme for a number 
of reasons. This led to considerable time spent by all donors in DSC meetings, 
and to considerable input by, most notably, the lead donor. 
- TAT/FMA-level: There is a consensus that the efficiency of the TAT/FMA
improved in the course of the programme, but also that the tasks of especially
the TAT were not specified in sufficient detail at programme-start and that the 
TAT/FMA was not given enough space of manoeuvre within which to operate. 
This is partly to due to the evolutionary nature of the NCEP, but also to the
intention of donors to keep control of programme progress and to the lack of
assertiveness on the part of the TAT/FMA.
- Consortia secretariat-level: With the exception of ECEP, consortia secretariats
largely served as central contact points only, but were not fully integrated into 
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the management of the programme – due to some considerations by donors and 
reservations on the part of member CSOs. 
· Various degrees of efficiency in the collaboration between different
stakeholders:
The efficiency of the collaboration between the various levels had a number of strengths 
and weaknesses, with collaboration among the DSC, among the CSOs of their
respective consortia and between TAT/FMA and CSOs working reasonably well, but
with the overall information flow basically being only bottom-up and less than
satisfactory, with hardly any contacts between CSOs of different consortia and with the 
complete absence of donor-CSO relations. 
· Adequate and improving up-ward reporting:
The reporting and control structures put in place for the NCEP were basically adequate 
and provided for efficient upward-flow of information, with considerable improvements 
on the part of the TAT/FMA in the course of the programme, from a situation which
was perceived by some donors to be unsatisfactory at the beginning. 
· Insufficient levels of authority:
Decision making structures within the NCEP were top-heavy, with insufficient levels of 
authority for stakeholders other than the donors, leading to a cascade-like picture of
instructions and directives from top to bottom and some frustration among project
partners (CSOs, TAT/FMA).
· Inadequate or lacking schedules:
The lack of clearly defined work programmes, implementation schedules and a
prioritized task list for various activities had both the effects of causing delays and of 
not allowing for an ex-post evaluation of how timeframes were adhered to by the
various actors.
· High levels of funding, but unspecific budget lines:
The total level of funding for the NCEP was considerable, and variations between
original budgets and actual disbursement were minor. However, due to the absence of a 
detailed planning and costing of activities, a meaningful cost-benefit analysis after
project-end cannot be done. All in all, it is considered that the relatively high
programme management costs are largely due to the emphasis on financial and technical 
accountability.
· Generally efficient management systems:
Apart from the programme document and the logical frameworks, the quality of NCEP 
systems (appraisal criteria and processes, M&E-systems, databases) developed in the
course of the programme largely provided for an efficient management of the
programme, with some delays due to issues mentioned above relating to project
preparation and planning. 
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Effectiveness
· Effective donor and CSO co-ordination and CSO guidance:
By and large, the NCEP both provided for effective co-ordination among donors and
effective co-ordination and technical and financial guidance of CSOs. However, due to 
the consortia structure and the lack of inter-consortia contacts, CSO co-ordination 
mainly took place within the consortia, or through the TAT/FMA. Furthermore, the
NCEP did not provide for an effective exchange of information between donors and
CSOs.
· Substantial strengthening of local contact bases of CSOs:
Due to the focus of the NCEP on deploying CSOs in areas in which they had already
operated, and on employing facilitators of the area in which they undertook civic
education activities, the NCEP provided for effective relationships both between CSOs 
and target communities and between facilitators and target communities. This localised 
capacity building and the strengthening of local networks of CSOs is considered to be a 
major success of the NCEP.
· Improved entry and delivery strategies:
Most of the CSOs interviewed during this evaluation stated that they underwent a
learning process regarding different entry and delivery strategies, revealing
shortcomings in project preparation and planning. However, most of these CSOs now 
have a clearer idea of what worked, and why, which is beneficial for future activities.
· Improved technical and financial management of donor funds:
The technical and financial M&E-systems of the NCEP largely provided for an effective 
management of donor funds, minimising loss of funds, streamlining technical
implementation and providing for feedback of M&E to ongoing activities. It was,
however, questioned whether the M&E systems of the NCEP could have been more
consolidated and less labor intensive, producing similar outputs but freeing up resources 
at the level of CSOs for project implementation, instead of reporting and management.
· Varying degrees of problem solving capacity:
The problem solving capacity of the NCEP varied, with the issue of inadequate timing 
not being resolved at all (except for, possibly, the short phase of implementation of
civic education activities), to the rather satisfactory handling of the exit of NACEFCO, 
amongst others.
Impact
· Positive impact on donor co-operation in the governance sector:
The NCEP clearly had the impact of enhancing, harmonising and professionalising
donor co-ordination in the governance sector.
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· Substantial capacity building across all types of CSOs:
The NCEP's impact on participating CSOs and the wider CSO-community was largely
positive, with substantial capacity building effects (both financial and technical) across 
all types of CSOs. The harmonisation of procedures and approaches did not have an
adverse effect on participating CSOs, and was widely appreciated. 
Sustainability
· Donor-driven nature of the NCEP:
Right from the start, the NCEP was perceived to be largely donor-driven. The issue of 
ownership, however, is more important for larger, mostly Nairobi-based CSOs and
consortia secretariats than for smaller CSOs in the field, which seem to be much more 
focused on implementation than concerned with the question of "Who owns the
programme?". Apart from that, ownership did not feature prominently in the design of 
the NCEP, whatever the expectations of different stakeholders might have been. 
· Low level of sustainability on the part of CSOs:
The sustainability of the NCEP with regard to future civic education activities of CSOs 
is considered to be rather low – without substantial donor funding, civic education will 
not continue. 
· Strong likelihood of future joint donor efforts in the governance sector:
Regarding the effects of the NCEP on the sustainability of donor co-operation, however, 
the assessment is positive, due to the largely positive experiences of donors with the
pooling of their resources within the NCEP.
· Management structurs follow the concrete design and requirements of specific
programmes:
The infrastructure of the TAT/FMA is partly being used for other programmes already
(K-DOP, EPPP), but it is assessed to be unlikely that the TAT/FMA will continue to be 
used in the same form and scope in future projects.
Quality and Effectiveness of Educational Materials produced by the NCEP
· The benefits of a joint approach and harmonised materials:
The three core-NCEP materials (curriculum, handbook, trainer's manual) as well as the 
flipcharts produced by the Gender Consortium were widely appreciated and effectively 
used by most of the CSOs interviewed. 
· Room for improvement:
A quality review revealed the adequateness of the materials with regard to the
objectives of the NCEP. Improvements are suggested to more adequately incorporate
gender and some other issues, especially the topic of conflict.
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Comparison between NCEP and other Basket Funds:
· Similar problems in other basket funds:
A comparison between the NCEP and other basket funds revealed a number of similar 
problems, like: the issue of the design of the management structure; the question of lead 
donor and roles and responsibilities; relationships between donors and CSOs and other 
implementing partners; the time required for harmonisation of approaches and delays in 
project preparation and planning; and above all the need for high-quality programme
documents (logframes, schedules etc.).
· Strong benefits of joint approaches:
However, the comparison and the experiences of various basket funds also underscored 
the benefits of joint donor approaches, especially when large funds are required to
meaningfully support activities and when funding is for sectors perceived to be
politically sensitive.
Impact of the NCEP on the CKRC (and vice versa)
· Benefits of independence of donor activities in the governance sector from state 
actors:
One lesson learned from the NCEP is that there is some benefit in not formally linking 
donor efforts in the governance sector to governmental or parliamentary initiatives, as
donors (and CSOs) usually do not have any influence on the course such state-led 
activities are taking. 
· Need for maintaining high-level relations:
Informal, high-level relations between donors and the CKRC have helped to raise
mutual understanding and have led to some co-operation (NCEP materials for the
CKRC).
· Positive impact of the CKRC on the NCEP:
CSOs can benefit from the higher credibility of state-led initiatives like the CKRC for 
their own operations, as was the case in the NCEP especially regarding the support of
provincial and district administration to NCEP-CSOs.
· Direct impact of the NCEP on the CKRC:
On the other hand, the activities of the CSOs participating in the NCEP had, in a
number of cases, a direct impact on the CKRC. Generally, it was proven that donor￾funded governance activities can form the basis for enhanced participation of Kenyans 
in processes like the CKRC.
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5.2. Recommendations
The recommendations are a direct result of the findings of the report and the lessons
learned. A distinction is made between recommendations regarding, on the one hand,
the immediate future of the NCEP and, on the other hand, the recommendations for the 
improvement of the management framework of future multi-donor governance efforts,
the latter again divided into recommendations of major relevance and those concerning 
minor issues.
5.2.1. The Future of the NCEP
· Continuing civic education after the general elections:
Many respondents rate the process of civic education as a very important tool for nation 
building. It is therefore felt that the momentum created by the NCEP should not be lost. 
Advantage should be taken of the goodwill still existing among the populace to continue 
with civic education even after the general elections, especially to address the
domestication of the (yet to be instated) revised constitution and to present it within the 
context of development and overall people's rights.
· Sustaining the momentum in the short to medium term:
To sustain the momentum of civic education, well-performing CSOs should be put in a 
position to continue to provide the services even at a reduced rate and intensity in order 
not to lose the capacity in which the NCEP so heavily invested, both in terms of money 
and personal efforts. One of the major successes of the NCEP, as is discussed in the
report, was the strengthening of local networks of CSOs and the localised capacity
building effect through the creation of a trained pool of facilitators. If there is no follow￾up project, or if a second phase of the NCEP (or a similar programme) takes some time 
before it is implemented, these capacities will be lost, and future projects will have to 
start afresh.
· Taking into consideration preliminary results of the impact assessment:
In case there is a positive decision on the above, preliminary results of the ongoing
impact assessment of the NCEP shall be considered in deciding which CSOs and which 
modes of delivery should receive financing in the short to medium term to sustain the 
capacities created under the NCEP. 
· Sustaining the momentum with a substantially reduced management structure:
If an intermediate continuation of the NCEP is approved, it is assessed that this can be 
done with a substantially reduced management structure, especially at the TAT/FMA￾level, as the systems developed for managing the NCEP and the core materials and
delivery methodologies can be used without major adaptations. 
· Making use of the NCEP databases:
As was noted in the report, the NCEP has generated a wealth of information regarding 
the capacities and performance of individual CSOs, target group outreach and
geographical coverage. The TAT/FMA should be put in a position to present this 
information in a format which can be effectively used by both donors and CSOs.
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· Integrating civic education in schools' curricula:
The long term aim should be to introduce civic education in schools' curricula. The
materials developed under NCEP should form a basis for adapting civic education to
schools. The evaluation team concurs with this and recommends that efforts be made
during the transition period to sell the idea to powers to be so as to start preparing a
school curriculum for future use.
5.2.2. The Management Framework of Future Multi-Donor Governance Efforts
Issues of Major Relevance
· The need to optimise preparation and planning:
As the NCEP and other basket funds have shown, there is a strong need to focus on the 
quality and timeliness of project preparation, planning and design, taking into
considerations the key issues which will impact upon project implementation later on. 
Issues to be considered are: 
- following more closely the project cycle management requirements and its
different phases and elements, even though other factors influencing the
preparation and planning phase might seem more important at various stages; 
- possibly conducting a project cycle management workshop at the beginning of
future joint programmes with the various stakeholders, in order to impress the 
importance of elements like high-quality logical frameworks, detailed resource
and implementation schedules etc. on both donors and other implementing
partners;
- conduct a thorough stakeholder, problem and strategy analysis, in order to
adequately assess the capacity of project partners and to refine programme
documents;
- investing both time and money in the design of workable and high-quality 
programme documents, logical frameworks, resource and implementation
schedules attracts costs, but will reduce the workload for donors and
implementing partners later on in the project's lifespan and can help avoiding
points of friction; 
- where more than one institution is involved in implementation, covering more
than one theme or geographic area, design the logframes of each implementating 
institution to interlock with the overall programme logframe; this will make it 
easier for the management agency to have an overview of what it is supposed to 
achieve, when and how;
- avoid setting too many project outputs that cannot be achieved within the
stipulated timeframe;
- defining roles and responsibilities of various actors sufficiently before starting
implementation; this can help in reducing overlapping and duplication of tasks
later on and provide project partners with a predefined set of parameters within 
which to take decisions and to proceed with implementation;
- doing things at the right time, clearly prioritising tasks and realistically
sequencing them (like conducting baseline surveys and other preparatory studies 
before starting implementation etc.).
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· Efficiency of the management structure:
It is recommended that management structures are designed which provide for a smooth 
operation of the programme, but do not create unnecessary layers without specified
tasks. 
In the case of the NCEP, for example, the involvement of the HoMs was necessary
because of the political sensitivity of the intervention, but their roles – politically
steering the programme – should have been specified in relation to what the DSC was 
supposed to do, and adhered to.
Equally, when creating a structure like the consortia secretariats, future programmes
should look at how to integrate them more effectively in the management of the
programme, apart from being mere contact points for communication purposes. 
Furthermore, the efficiency of operations should be improved by providing project
partners with sufficient levels of authority, within which to take decisions, and again
clearly spell out the terms of engagement of the various levels beforehand, including
specifying the reporting requirements and the character and frequency of information
flow between the various levels. 
Unnecessary delays can be avoided by clearly prioritising tasks and streamlining
decision making processes, including the setting of deadlines within which decisions
have to be taken.
· Flexible design:
In any case, a large programme like the NCEP will have to provide for some flexibility 
in the design of the management structure (and the allocation of funds) in order to cope 
with unforeseen events (like the exit of NACEFCO in the case of NCEP) and to enable 
the adaptation of the programme according to ongoing experiences. 
Flexibility can, amongst others, be achieved: 
- by providing project partners with sufficient levels of authorities to adapt the
programme, as noted above; 
- in the area of external technical assistance required, by concluding a framework 
contract with consultants to provide services on an ad-hoc basis according to
pre-established terms of reference, and the possibility of renewing the
framework contract once the original resources have been used and more tasks 
are needed to be performed; and/or
- by specifying budget lines in enough detail beforehand and at the same time by 
providing a substantial budget for contingencies.
· Mid-term evaluations:
Related to the above, mid-term evaluations – preferrably by external consultants – shall 
be conducted to assess whether the programme is on track and to identify areas for
improvement when there is still time to implement them. 
· Facilitate direct contacts between donors and implementing partners:
The creation of a forum where donors and implementing partners (in the case of the
NCEP: CSOs) regularly meet and exchange their views can help in raising mutual levels 
of understanding, both about political concerns of donors and about difficulties faced by 
implementing partners. For a programme like the NCEP, half-yearly meetings between 
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donors and CSO-representatives – in either a formal or more informal atmosphere –
would have been sufficient, not least to enlarge the contact base of donors among CSOs 
they are financing.
· Spell out the nature of political sensitivities:
Related to the above, there is a need to clearly denote the political concerns of various 
stakeholders, especially for programmes in the governance sector. Ideally, experiences 
and expectations shall be shared before project-start, both among donors and between
donors and implementing CSOs, in order not to create suspicion due to positions taken 
in the course of the programme which are not understood by other partners. 
· Maintain the focus on capacity building:
Future programmes should continue to incorporate capacity building of project partners 
as an integral part of programme activities, as capacity building usually is the most
tangible and immediate result of such activities, whereas the benefits for the ultimate
beneficiaries mostly only materialise in the long term. A focus on capacity building,
coupled with other measures, is also more likely to achieve sustainable effects. 
· Adequately consider issues of sustainability:
The integration of sustainability on a much more systematic level already at the stage of 
project preparation and planning is necessary in order not to invest in structures which 
are immediately lost after project-end and to create a lasting impact with partner
organisations. To this end, implementing CSOs should be encouraged to integrate
appropriate exit options, or the establishment of alternative sources of funding, in their 
project proposals.
· Enhance the efficiency of basket funding:
Although basket funding has a number of advantages and is assessed to be the way
forward for efforts especially in the governance sector, there is a need to find more
efficient ways of co-operation among donors. 
Most notably, the co-operation of donors participating in a basket fund can be enhanced 
by, amongst others, allocating specific roles and responsibilities to individual donors,
depending on capacities and feasibility. Thereby, the workload for the lead donor
(which constitutes a cost factor usually not charged to the programme budget) can be 
reduced, and the sense of ownership and participation strengthened on the part of other 
donors. However, there should still be the possibility for smaller donors, lacking the
capacity to actively take part in the management of programmes, to participate in basket 
funds, not least to achieve higher levels of funding and to spread the information and 
experiences gathered during programmes like the NCEP. 
Additional Recommendations
The additional recommendations relate to issues of minor relevance for the
improvement of the management framework of future multi-donor governance
programmes, but should nevertheless be kept in mind. They mainly touch upon areas
which were either positively or negatively assessed during the evaluation of the NCEP, 
and include the following:
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· Donors should continue to develop objectives of such programmes together with 
the main stakeholders and project partners, to ensure relevance of project
objectives and complementarity to existing mandates of implementing partners.
· Although there is some benefit to donors in having aggregates of CSOs
(consortia), the experience with the NCEP (with, especially, NACEFCO and the 
Gender Consortium) implies that future efforts should encourage CSOs to come 
up with workable structures themselves, without undue interference by other
parties. 
· Project implementors should make a conscious effort to ensure that cross-cutting 
issues, especially gender issues, are adequately considered at the various levels
of the programme. This might include activities such as specially designating
resources at the level of the implementing or management agency to cover cross￾cutting issues, and/or to focus on the prior capacity building of CSOs supposed 
to be engaged with streamlining cross-cutting issues.
· Donors should continue bilateral funding activities in the governance sector to
complement joint initiatives and keep up the high levels of funding achieved for 
the NCEP, but specify individual activities and their costing in more detail.
· Future programmes should retain the positive aspects of the systems produced
for managing the NCEP as detailed in the report, but streamline and consolidate 
the many forms used for the NCEP with the aim of focusing on actual
implementation of activities, and to a lesser extent on reporting about them.
· Future programmes should also try to maintain the focus of the NCEP on
countrywide, co-ordinated coverage and the strengthening of local capacities,
but consider the issues of the need for working with the same target group over a 
longer time in order to create sustainable benefits, and of reaching out to areas
not covered under the NCEP.
· A conscious effort should also be made to avoid the creation of an elite of CSOs 
by keeping the mechanisms for joining both consortia and future basket funds
open and transparent.
· The impact of educational materials produced in course of programmes could be 
increased by providing translations (where necessary) and smaller brochures and 
leaflets which can be distributed more widely.
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ANNEXES:
A1. TERMS OF REFERENCE/STATEMENT OF WORK
To undertake a systems evaluation of the National Civic Education Program
BACKGROUND
A broad spectrum of civil society organisations have developed a National Civic
Education Program (NCEP) with the objective of promoting general awareness of
democratic principles, the practice of good governance, the rule of law and
constitutionalism. The NCEP is being funded by a group of donors, which are
represented on a Donor Steering Committee (DSC). The DSC, through the lead donor, 
have contracted the services of PricewaterhouseCoopers Consultants Ltd (PwC) to
manage the technical and financial aspects of the program. PwC has put in place a
multidisciplinary Technical Assistance Team and Financial Management Agent
(TAT/FMA).
IMPLEMENTATION
NCEP is implemented by over 70 indigenous CSOs in Kenya and has a national 
coverage. It includes over two million citizens as participants. The organizations 
implementing the NCEP have agreed on a common vision, shared principles and a non￾partisan curriculum in order to provide civic education in a co-ordinated manner and to 
establish a framework for unity among the different civic providers. To this end, a civic 
education curriculum, handbook and the trainer's manual have been developed to enable 
facilitators provide non-partisan civic education to Kenyan citizens. 
Preparatory and planning work for NCEP began in August 2001 when the PROGRAM 
office was set up and a team of experts mobilized. Implementation of program activities 
began in January 2001. The PROGRAM is anticipated to cost some USD 8 million.
EVALUATION
This program evaluation will focus principally on program organization, management 
and implementation systems. 
OBJECTIVES 
Objectives of this evaluation are to: 
1. Identify the implications of the NCEP framework for the CSOs in the governance 
and human rights sector and critically analyze these implications (e.g. donor capture, 
institutionalization, self regulation etc.)
2. Assess the effectiveness of the program management structure 
3. Assess the efficiency of the (financial and technical) systems developed for the 
management of the program
4. Asses the impact of NCEP on the Constitution Review Process and vise versa
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5. Identify the management problems faced by the program and effectiveness of the 
steps taken to solve them 
6. Draw a comparison between NCEP and other basket funding models, indicating 
where other models may have an advantage
7. Identify lessons learnt 
8. Make recommendations for improvement of the program management framework 
The evaluation should establish the following:
Effectiveness of the NCEP design focusing on program:
® Conceptualization,
® Preparation and planning,
® Implementation and,
® Management structure.
1.1 Effectiveness of the design of NCEP delivery strategies. Main focus will 
include:
® Relationship between the CSOs and target communities,
® Mobilization strategies and,
® Relationship between facilitators and target groups.
The effectiveness afficiency of the overall program management structure including 
relationships and collaboration between:
® HoM & DSC, 
® DSC & Lead Donor & TAT/FMA, 
® TAT/FMA & Consortia & Consortia members, 
® DSC & Consortia and,
® Inter and intra consortia.
The quality and effectiveness of systems designed for the implementation of the 
program at TAT/FMA, Consortia and CSO levels. These include:
® Databases,
® M&E system
® CSO evaluation and contracting system
The quality and effectiveness of educational materials used in carrying out program 
activities
The comparative advantage of NCEP funding model against other joint program 
funding models operating in Kenya, with a view to recommending best practices from 
perspectives of both donors and CSOs. 
The impact of NCEP on the Constitution Review Process and vise versa 
The potential impact of NCEP on CSOs and make recommendation on maximizing 
positives and minimizing negatives
Problems the program faced at different levels and how these were solved.
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Lessons learnt under this framework.
Recommendations for improvement of different components and aspects of the 
program. 
CONDUCT OF THE CONSULTANCY
The consultant(s) will be required to carry out this assignment as follows:
1. Organize focus group meetings with consortia representatives at the beginning of 
the consultancy 
2. Carry out interviews with relevant stakeholders – DSC, TAT/FMA, Consortia 
representatives, implementing CSOs, facilitators and beneficiaries
3. Review relevant documentation
4. Review relevant systems
5. Prepare a draft report and circulate it to all stakeholders 
6. Organize an inter-consortia debriefing meeting to review the draft report
OUTPUTS
An assessment of:
1. Effectiveness of the NCEP design 
2. Effectiveness of the NCEP management framework
3. Quality and effectiveness of the NCEP systems 
4. Effectiveness of NCEP delivery strategy
5. Lessons learnt 
6. Recommendations for improvement of the NCEP management framework
These outputs will be presented in a report following the format outlined below:
1. Executive summary: stating the key findings and recommendations of this 
evaluation
2. Introduction: providing details of the assignment including the terms of reference
3. Effectiveness of the NCEP design
4. Quality of NCEP systems and materials used for managing the program
5. Comparison between NCEP and other basket funding models
6. An analysis of the impact on the CSO sector and recommendation 
7. Problems faced by the program and solutions
8. Lessons learnt 
9. Recommendations for improvement: prioritizing the recommendations and 
providing timeframe for implementation
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A2. LIST OF INTERVIEWS
USAID:
Sheryl Stumbras
Natalie Thunberg
Millie Ngari
DSC members briefing:
David Bell DFID
Sheryl Stumbras USAID
Erastus Wamugo Royal Danish Embassy
Timo Olkkonen Embassy of Finland
Doris Danler Embassy of Austria
Mavis Nathoo CIDA – Canadian High Commission
Consortia representatives briefing:
Catherine Nduku Technical Unit Manager, Gender Consortium
Jane Ogot Technical Unit Committee, Gender Consortium
Francis Muhia Technical Unit Committee, Gender Consortium
Cecilia Kimemia Technical Unit Committee, Gender Consortium
John Ojwang’ Gender Consortium
Abdullahi Abdi Chief Executive Officer, Northern Aid &
Secretary CEDMAC
Abdi Umar Chairman, CEDMAC
Abubakar Said Programme Coordinator, CEDMAC Secretariat
Anthony Njui Joint Coordinator, ECEP (CJPC)
Samuel Kabue Joint Coordinator, ECEP (NCCK)
Sussie Mbutu Programme Officer, ECEP (NCCK)
Charles Waliaula Programme Officer, ECEP-KEC
Joseph Jakait Programme Officer, ECEP-KEC
Silas Bururia Programme Officer, ECJP
Rev. Jephthah Gathaka Programme Coordinator, ECJP
Odanyiro Wamukoya Programme Coordinator, CRECO
Cecily Mbarire Programme Officer, CRECO
Danny Irungu Programme Officer, CRECO
TAT/FMA Meetings:
Kennedy Okeri Ogoro Project Officer
Charity Wanjiru Nyaga Project Officer
Kimwadu Njai Project Officer
Jackson Karanja Project Accountant
Lee Gachanja Project Accountant
Anne Mukut Project Accountant
Caroline N Gathii Project Accountant
Mercy Kiogora Project Accountant
Carl Wesselink Joint Head of TAT
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Tom Mogeni Programme Manager, TAT
Amos Njaramba Funds Manager, FMA
Karuti Kanyinga Joint Head of TAT
Philip Kinisu PwC
Doris Mwangi ex-TAT member
CSOs:
Mburu Gitu Executive Director, Legal Resources Foundation (LRF)
Monica Mbaru Programme Co-ordinator, LRF
Joseph Mwanduka Programme Accountant, LRF
Brenda Wanjiku Churu District Coordinator, NWCK, based in Thika
Lawrence Mute Programme Co-ordinator, CLARION
Hussein Khalid Programme Assistant, CLARION
Francis Muhia Gender Technical Unit (and FREDA)
Jane Ogot Gender TU
Catherine Nduku Gender TU
Cecilia Kimemia Gender TU
Blak Wamukoya CRECO, Programme Co-ordinator
Wambua Kituku CRECO, Project Officer
Kenneth M. Anusu ICEDA, Project Co-ordinator, Kisumu
George C. Owuori ICEDA, Facilitator, Kisumu
Dolphine Okech KEFEADO, Executive Director, Kisumu
Bernard O Bondo KEFEADO, Programme Officer, Kisumu
Eunice Awino Siaya Township Women Umbrella Group, Project 
Co-ordinator, Siaya
Richard Ojwang’ Siaya Township Women Umbrella Group, Project 
Accountant, Siaya
Abdullahi Abdi Chief Executive Officer , Northern Aid 
Joel Nyae Ilishe Trust, Field Supervisor, Mombasa
Julius Lewa Ilishe Trust, Programme Co-ordinator, Mombasa
Jane Jilani ECEP Regional Co-ordinator (Coast), Mombasa
Grace Woigo Programme Director/Coordinator, KWEN, Kisumu
Margaret Mulungi Programme Officer, KWEN, Kisumu
Abubakar Said CEDMAC, Programme Co-ordinator
Jackson Kamau CEDMAC, Programme Officer
Ture Boru CEDMAC, Accountant
Hon. Njeru Kathangu CREDO, Chairman
Jamine Mbae CREDO, Programme Officer
Paul Gor ECEP (NCCK), Regional Co-ordinator (Nyanza)
Stephen Otieno ECEP (CJPC), Regional Co-ordinator (Nyanza)
Sam Kabue ECEP National Co-ordinator
Anthony Njui ECEP National Co-ordinator
Jane Kivyida ECEP, Project Accountant
Virginia Waitito ECEP, Programme Officer
Catherine Wahaula ECEP, Programme Officer
Mohammed Hyder MCET, Chairman, Mombasa
Miriam Mzee Mbaya MCET, Facilitator, Mombasa
Fatma M. Mohid MCET, Facilitator, Mombasa
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Khadija N. Mohamed MCET, Facilitator, Mombasa
Tjuma Baruwa MCET, Facilitator, Mombasa
Juma Mzee Mbaya MCET, Facilitator, Mombasa
Firoz S. Ahmed MCET, Accountant, Mombasa 
M. S. Shallo MCET, Project Co-ordinator, Mombasa
Sheik Mohammad Dor CIPK (Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya), 
General Secretary, Mombasa
Aidarus Shariff CIPK, Project Co-ordinator, Mombasa
Sheikh Fauz Twaha CIPK, Secretariat, Mombasa
Sheikh Hassan Omar CIPK, Treasurer, Mombasa
Sheikh Mohamed Omar CIPK, Financial Officer NCEP, Mombasa
Sheikh Mwinyiau CIPK, Imam-Facilitator, Mombasa
Sheikh Athman Swabir CIPK, Imam-Facilitator, Mombasa
Sister Nadya H. Rashid CIPK, Project Secretary, Mombasa
Sheikh Ali Shee CIPK, Chairman
Elijah Agevi Intermediate Technology (Eastern Africa), 
Regional Director (hosting partner for Kenya 
Pastoralists Forum)
Donors:
Yves Perrier Canadian High Commission, Commercial Counselor
Mavis Nathoo CIDA Programme Officer
Francis Ang’ila CIDA Programme Consultant
Doris Danler Austrian Embassy 
Marren Akatsa Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE)
Jos Hoenen First Secretary (Governance & Gender), RNE
Per Karlsson Swedish Embassy
HE Lauri Kangas Ambassador, Finish Embassy
Timo Olkkonen Finish Embassy
Henrik Moliis Finish Embassy
Erastus Wamugo Danish Embassy
Svein Tobiassen Norwegian Embassy
Paul Harvey Deputy High Commissioner, British High Commission
William Brencick Deputy Head of Mission, US-Embassy
Lene Jespersen European Commission
Simone Olunya DFID
Others:
Steven Finkel Management Systems International (NCEP 
Impact Assessment)
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A3. LIST OF DOCUMENTS
Note: Only major documents are listed. Apart from those listed here, the team had
access to the DFID-NCEP files, saw some of the NCEP meeting minutes as well as
some contract documents and received a number of other documents, print-outs and
information from donors, the TAT/FMA and individual CSOs.
CEDMAC: Memorandum of Understanding. February 2001.
CEDMAC/CRE-CO/ECEP/Gender Consortium: Making Informed Choices. A
Curriculum for Civic Education. Nairobi, 2001.
CEDMAC/CRE-CO/ECEP/Gender Consortium: Making Informed Choices. A
Handbook for Civic Education. Nairobi, 2001.
CEDMAC/CRE-CO/ECEP/Gender Consortium: Making Informed Choices. A Trainer's 
Manual for Civic Education. Nairobi, 2001. 
Civic Education in Kenya: Memorandum of Understanding for a Group of Donors on
Donor Co-operation and Support to Civic Education (2000). Incl. Annexes.
CRECO: Memorandum of Understanding on the Implementation of the National Civic 
Education Programme (NCEP). March 2001.
DSC-Meeting Minutes. January 2001 to July 2002.
ECEP: NCEP – Consortia Programme Memorandum. April 2001.
Finkel, Steven (Mangement Systems Inernational): Kenya National Civic Education
Impact Study. Report on Pre-Test. August 13, 2002.
FMA/TAT: Proposal for Extension of NCEP. Extension of on-going activities and
Implementation of Election Specific Civic Education. 2 April 2002.
Gender Consortium: Memorandum of Understanding. undated.
Information Leaflet. Framework for support to civic education initiatives. December
2001.
Kenya: State of the Nation – Baseline Survey 2001. (CD-ROM)
The National Civic Education Programme (NCEP) – Kenya. General Information.
National Civic Education Programme. Accounting for Donor Funds. NCEP Office
Accounting and Procedure Manual. April 2001.
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National Civic Education Programme (NCEP): Action Points following the Self
Assessment at 30 June 2001. August 2001.
NCEP Management: Summary Report on Self Appraisal. 2 October 2001.
NCEP TAT/FMA: Follow-up to Report on Management Self Appraisal. 14 December 
2001.
National Civic Education Programme (NCEP): Quarterly Progress Reports (April –
June 2002; January – March 2002; October – December 2001; July – September 2001; 
April – June 2001; January – March 2001 (Draft); August – December 2000 (Narrative 
Progress Report)).
Performance Appraisal for TAT. 27 July 2001.
Proforma Documents (Contract Document; Detailed Budget Form; Quarterly Project
Progress Report Format; Activity Report Sheet; Accounting Instructions; Checklist for
Review of CSOs Proposal/Budget; Project Application Form; Financial Management
Information – Score Sheet; Project Appraisal Form; Budget Form; Project Proposal
Format; NCEP Monitoring and Evaluation Framework; Request for Approval of
Programme Expenditure; Contract Tracking Checklist; Field Monitoring Checklist; ...) 
Royal Danish Embassy/Royal Netherlands Embassy/Swedish Embassy/Canadian High
Commission/DFID/Norwegian Embassy/Finish Embassy/Austrian Embassy/European
Commission/USAID: Programme Document. National Civic Education Programme
(NCEP). Final Draft. January 2001. Incl. Annexes.
Strategy & Tactics: Kenya: State of the Nation. A report on the baseline survey. July
2001.
South Consulting: Analysing applications to provide civic education for the Kenyan
Constitutional Review. Submitted to the Like Minded Donor Group (LiMiD).
Consultants' Report. June 1999. 
TAT note to the DSC: Communication Strategy. Final Draft. 31 October 2001.
Terms of Reference/Scope of Work for a Financial Management Agent to Manage the 
National Civic Education Programme (NCEP). 27/09/00.
Wamahiu, Dr. Sheila P./Mbeche, Prof. Isaac: Report on the National Civic Education
Methodology Workshop. 10 December 2001.
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A4. LIST OF ACRONYMS
CBO Community Based Organisation
CEDMAC Constitutional Education for the Marginalized Categories
CIPK Council of Imams and Preachers of Kenya
CJPC Catholic Justice and Peace Commission
CKRC Constitution of Kenya Review Commission
CLARION Centre for Law and Research International
CRECO Constitutional Reform Education Consortium
CREDO Civil Rights Education and Democratic Organisation
CSO Civil Society Organisation
DANIDA Danish International Development Agency
DFID Department for International Development
DSC Donor Steering Committee
ECEP Ecumenical Civic Education Programme
ECJP Ecumenical Centre for Justice and Peace
EPPP Engendering the Political Process Programme
FREDA Friends of Esther and Deborah
HoMs Heads of Mission
ICEDA Institute for Civic Education and Development in Africa
IPPG Inter-Parties Parliamentary Group
KEC Kenya Episcopal Conference
KEFEADO Kenya Female Advisory Organisation
K-DOP Kenya Domestic Observation Programme
KWEN Kenya Women Economic Network
LiMiD Likeminded Donors Group
LRF Legal Resources Foundation
MCET Muslim Civic Education Trust
NACEFCO National Constitutional Education Facilitative Committee
NCCK National Council of Churches of Kenya
NCEP National Civic Education Programme
NCWK National Council of Women of Kenya
OVIs Objectively Verifyable Indicators
PwC PricewaterhouseCoopers
RNE Royal Netherlands Embassy
SIDA Swedish International Development Agency
TAT/FMA Technical Assistance Team/Financial Management Agent
USAID US-Agency for International Development