Civil Society Strengthening Program Mid-term Evaluation by Harry Blair (team leader) Leonardo Dayao Azwar Hasan Roy Salomo For USAID/Jakarta 18 September 2002 USAID contract AEP-I-809-00-00018-00. Management Systems International 600 Water Street, S.W. Washington, DC 20024 600 Water Street, S.W. Washington, D.C. 20024 USA 202/484-7170 Fax: 202/488-0754 i Contents Executive Summary....................................................................................................................... iii I. Introduction................................................................................................................................1 Overview....................................................................................................................................1 Review team composition and methodology.............................................................................2 The working environment CSSP faces ......................................................................................5 The national backdrop..........................................................................................................5 Provincial level. ...................................................................................................................6 CSSP’s evolution .......................................................................................................................9 Program Elements................................................................................................................9 Changing strategic objectives ............................................................................................10 The program’s early days...................................................................................................10 II. CSSP Components ...................................................................................................................12 Performance Objective 1. Analysis, articulation and effective advocacy for policy reform..12 A different way to gauge advocacy impact........................................................................13 Civil society and sectoral activities 15 Civil society and local governance 19 Using the advocacy ladder 22 The media 23 Performance Objective 2. Effective administrative management and planning.....................24 Performance Objective 3: Strengthening NGO Capacity to obtain Funding and Develop Sustainable Operations.............................................................................................................26 Performance Objective 4. Grants to Indonesian NGOs Awarded and Managed Effectively.29 Special Activities Fund (SAF).................................................................................................33 III. CSSP and Mission Management Issues: a consolidated list....................................................35 IV. Major issues.............................................................................................................................37 Issue 1. CSO survival..............................................................................................................38 Issue 2. Comparative advantage .............................................................................................40 Issue 3. Prioritizing ..................................................................................................................41 Issue 4. Institutionalizing Capacity Building..........................................................................44 Issue 5. Coordination among CSSP grantees..........................................................................46 Issue 6. Coordination Among SOs..........................................................................................47 Issue 7. Balance between PO2 and PO4 .................................................................................48 Issue 8. Building model programs ..........................................................................................49 Issue 9 (added). Modifying the contract .................................................................................52 V. Principal recommendations.......................................................................................................54 Strategy ....................................................................................................................................54 Organization and management ................................................................................................54 Operational level......................................................................................................................55 ii ANNEXES Annex A. Acronyms ....................................................................................................................56 Annex B. CSSP mid-term evaluation team interview log ............................................................58 Annex C. Scope of Work for Mid-Term Evaluation of USAID/Indonesia’s Civil Society Support and Strengthening Program (CSSP)...............................................................................................61 Annex D. References ....................................................................................................................72 Annex E. Email Comment ............................................................................................................74 iii Executive Summary This report constitutes the mid-term evaluation of the Civil Society Strengthening Program (CSSP), which has been operating under a contract with USAID/Jakarta’s Civic Participation and Transition (CPT) team since the fall of 1999. A large program by USAID democracy stan￾dards ($27 million LOP funding anticipated), CSSP’s principal purpose has been “assisting emerging, reform-minded non-governmental organizations (NGOs [more commonly referred to within CSSP and CPT as civil society organizations or CSOs]) address key issues associated with increased openness, transparency and reform.” Begun as a national effort, CSSP changed to a provincial canvas in mid-2000 in accord with the USAID Mission’s new Country Strategy Pa￾per issued at that time. Since then, it has concentrated on six provinces; among them the review team was able to visit two more mature programs in East Java and Papua, as well as the newer provincial efforts in East Kalimantan. In addition, CSSP has continued to support a number of national-level activities initiated in its original mandate; the team also visited some of these en￾terprises. The political environment faced by CSSP was a daunting one. For more than three decades the Suharto regime had occupied almost all the political space occupied by civil society in more de￾mocratic systems, meaning that CSSP had to begin for the most part by supporting brand-new organizations unacquainted with formulating strategies, managing financial flows, monitoring performance, etc. In Papua this general problematic was compounded by a military occupation focused on exploiting the province’s natural resources and repressing the local population, both of which activities have entailed significant illegal behavior and violence. Conflict reduction accordingly forms the major challenge for civil society to deal with. With its huge (34 million) population, East Java stands at center stage of Indonesia’s ambitious decentralization initiative launched in 1999. The province, its 29 kabupaten, 8 independent kota (cities) and thousands of villages were all outfitted with elected legislatures and executive bodies, but these structures lack any real experience in managing their affairs, so it made sense for CSSP to focus its program on local governance. As a vast storehouse of natural resource wealth, East Kalimantan has at￾tracted waves of transmigrants from elsewhere in the country, creating problems with environ￾mental exploitation, labor conditions and the local adat (indigenous) population, all of which in￾formed CSSP’s program there. Program components CSSP has had four main components or Program Objectives (POs), each of which the review team analyzed. In all cases the team found that CSSP had met and in some cases exceeded the results targets set for Year 3 of the contract. PO1 comprises analysis, articulation and effec￾tive advocacy for policy reform; it thus constitutes CSSP’s major “end product” impacting the political system as a whole. Accordingly, we have devoted more analysis to it than to the other POs. The team suggests appraising CSO performance for PO1 by employing an “advocacy ladder” consisting of three stages and seven tiers or rungs; the initial two stages and six rungs are rele￾vant for this report. In the first or participatory stage, a CSO engages in mobilizing constitu￾ents, creating a voice for its cause, and representing its constituency to the state; these three achievements comprise the first three rungs of the ladder. In the second or accountability stage, the state finds itself successively having to justify its behavior by becoming more transparent, iv then granting at least some of the group’s demands or empowering it, and finally in conferring benefits to the constituency – the next three rungs of the ladder. CSOs themselves can be divided into two basic groups, of which the first, consisting of constituency-based and membership-based organizations (actually two sub-types here), deals with all the advocacy ladder’s rungs. The sec￾ond type comprises “trustee” organizations, organized and led by elites acting (or claiming to act) on behalf of a reference group that cannot act on its own. They in effect skip the first two rungs of the advocacy ladder and operate on the next four (from representation through constitu￾ency benefits). Farmers’ groups are characteristic of the first type, while victims of human rights abuses offer an example of the second. Not surprisingly, given Indonesia’s early position on the democratization trajectory, only three of the 16 CSOs (10 sectoral and six local) illustrated in this report are membership-based, while fully 13 are trustee types, though three of the latter are branching out, two toward energizing constituencies and one toward building a membership. Most (11) of the CSOs have had some impact at the representation rung of the advocacy ladder, while a few (five) have had some suc￾cess in promoting transparency. Three have attained at least a degree of empowerment, and one has actually obtained some concrete constituency benefits. To be sure, these achievements need some discounting. The one instance of constituency benefits proved to be temporary, for exam￾ple, and most of the transparency successes reflected isolated instances or potentials for action rather than action itself. Even so, when viewed against the long historical backdrop of an unresponsive state, these cases of gaining a grip on the advocacy ladder’s rungs represent a significant achievement and one that would have not happened or at best taken a lot longer in the absence of a program like CSSP. The ladder, then, facilitates laying out an assessment of CSO impact attainment. It also pos￾sesses a prescriptive quality, in helping advise a CSO where it might next direct its efforts, either upward or downward on the ladder. For example, the complaint center created at the instance of another CSO (transparency on the ladder) could develop methods of pressing local authorities for redress (empowerment), thus moving upward. Or the CSO attaining benefits for the constituency it represented might be encouraged to energize that potential base to secure the benefits in future on a more enduring basis, thus moving down on the ladder. The media make up an additional component of PO1, not in the sense of a strategic program element but rather in the form of discrete support activities to promising organizations. Their most notable work consisted of “watch” monitoring efforts aimed at press freedom and human rights issues. Several CSSP-assisted institutions also monitored the press’s own activities. PO2 seeks to improve effective administrative management and planning among CSO grant￾ees, a goal often referred to more simply as “capacity building.” Using both one-on-one assis￾tance with individual CSOs and workshops involving groups of them, CSSP has established a three-phase process to strengthen financial management, beginning with pre-grant assessment and following on to continual post-grant monitoring. Through similar means it has also pro￾vided training on planning, personnel management, organizational self-assessment, monitoring, policy analysis, etc. Given the very rudimentary skills most Indonesian CSOs possessed just af￾ter the democratic transition, building these capacities has taken a great deal of work, for which CSSP deserves much credit. PO3 calls for building sustainability for CSOs, especially in terms of generating financial resources. Primarily this has meant grantees securing funding from other donors, and the grant- v ees supported by CSSP have more than met the Year 3 target in this regard. Part of the reason why they have been able to do so is to be found in CSSP’s grant-making process, which has compelled CSOs to build skills in the arts needed to win grants from other donors. This initial training was then followed up with other efforts including individual guidance and workshops to improve fund-raising. In addition, some grantees have begun pursuing plans to generate income from their own activities, such as publications. PO4 sets its target as grants to Indonesian NGOs awarded and managed effectively, to num￾ber 10-15 per year. Critical to attaining this level has been the grant awarding process, which has winnowed 44 grants so far from some 1,500 applications submitted, more than meeting the contract benchmark. This sifting process has involved a great deal of guidance through work￾shops as well as individual counseling to bring potential grantees up to the required standard in terms of writing proposals, setting up operational plans, demonstrating financial management capacity, arranging monitoring and reporting procedures, and the like – all skills almost com￾pletely absent during the New Order era. Assimilating these proficiencies has been hard work for most grantees and has generated much complaining, but it has markedly upgraded their pro￾fessionalism as CSOs. A fifth CSSP component has been the Special Activities Fund (SAF), a special mechanism in￾tended to support short-term, discrete and event-based activities in response to demands arising in the course of program implementation. By the time of our review, just over half the funding allotted to the SAF had been spent on activities mostly in support of POs 1, 2 and 3, but also for some initiatives cutting across SO sectors. Its benefits for CSSP were to facilitate add-on en￾deavors like extra workshops for grantees and to publicize CSSP to the larger universe of CSOs in Indonesia, some of whom then successfully applied for grants. Major issues for USAID/Jakarta. In the middle of its third week of work, the review team presented its initial findings to the USAID Mission, which expressed strong interest in a number of new issues, which the team then incorporated into its report. 1. CSO survival at EOP. Many things militate against CSO survival: the very novelty of civil society itself in the post-Suharto era; the likely ephemeral qualities of the youthful idealism so characteristic of CSO leadership; the short-term nature of most CSSP grants (making longer mentorship more difficult); a national government somewhat less supportive of civil society than its immediate predecessors; the probable decline of public enthusiasm for democratic participa￾tion as the 1998 transition recedes into the past, and finally a predicted decrease of significant proportions in USAID funding in the next year or two. Other factors provide more reason for hope: the Yayasan (foundation) law of 2000; the presence of other donors; potential within committed NGOs for belt-tightening, and possibilities for income-generating activities like commercial sales. 2. Comparative advantage. Though the review team was unable to make systematic compari￾sons, it did find that CSSP had done very well indeed in three particular areas: nurturing embry￾onic NGOs to become grantworthy; helping them build strong financial management systems; and assisting them to develop advocacy skills. vi 3. Prioritizing for a legacy. The probable cutback in funding now anticipated during the re￾maining LOP will constrain CSSP’s reach, but it should nonetheless be feasible to build on the program’s core elements to establish a legacy with three components: (i) a coherent community of CSOs well on the road to institutionalization and focusing on human rights and conflict reduc￾tion in Papua and Aceh, and a similarly robust CSO community concentrating on local govern￾ance issues in East Java; (ii) an institutionalized ability to build CSO capacity; and (iii) a stronger media. 4. Institutionalizing capacity building. A developed and sustainable capacity to provide exper￾tise, counseling and training to CSOs – what might be called technical assistance for civil society – should become a high priority for CSSP in its remaining LOP. Several Indonesian NGOs would appear to have the potential for such a role, and they should be encouraged to take it on, perhaps with the cooperation of other SO teams at USAID/Jakarta. 5. Coordination among CSSP grantees. The venture CSSP has begun in East Java called Matching Issues, Resources, People and Priorities (MIRPP) should be nurtured. This low-cost, networking approach endeavors to match needs with resources/people/skills among CSSP grant￾ees. 6. Coordination among SOs. USAID missions generally want more linkage between their SO teams, but this has proven an elusive goal in most places. Our field observations in East Java and Papua failed to find much coordination there either, perhaps because as elsewhere there is little incentive in the USAID system for either mission staff or contractors to pay much attention to each other. This could change, but it would take a determined will at the director’s level. 7. Balance between PO2 (building capacity among present grantees) and PO4 (funding new grantees). The very strong probability that CSSP funding will soon be reduced renders this query effectively moot. New grants will become successively fewer (though those currently in the pipeline should get funded), so available CSSP energies should go to PO4. 8. Building model provincial programs. Present programming trajectories will leave in place at LOP a number of impressive individual CSOs in operation, but no more than that. If the overall legacy is to be more than the sum of its parts, a concerted effort will be needed to build a coherent, purposeful and sustainable civil society presence at provincial level. In Papua (and making necessary adaptations Aceh as well) this effort should focus on human rights and conflict reduction. The first task would be to select a lead CSO to become a coordinating umbrella or￾ganization and then to strengthen it to provide technical assistance to the civil society community in the province. In East Java, the focus would be on building a model local governance model, and a similar approach would be called for in identifying and strengthening a lead CSO to pro￾vide leadership to the wider organizational community. 9. Modifying the contract (we added this issue, as it is implied by our recommendations on the other issues). If CSSP’s remaining energies are to be redirected toward creating a civil society program legacy in the three provinces and toward institutionalizing civil society capacity build￾ing, the present contract would have to be modified for all for POs in terms of expected results. vii Recommendations Strategy. These recommendations pertain to basic program direction – what we believe should be its core focus over remaining LOP. Implementation will require action from both CPT and CSSP in all three cases. • Creating a program legacy (priority 1). It is time to pull together CSSP’s experience at building civil society into coherent strategies that can form its legacy. The three prov￾inces of Papua, Aceh and East Java offer an excellent opportunity for crafting three pro￾vincial strategic designs – the first two based on human rights and conflict reduction, and the third on local governance. • Institutionalizing civil society capacity building (priority 2). Specific CSOs should be identified and assisted to become providers of TA to the civil society community in such areas as strategic planning, financial management, advocacy and the like. This is our second priority for strategic programming over the remaining LOP (See • Maintaining media support (priority 3). A free media will remain critical to maintain￾ing democracy in Indonesia, and support for it should be continue. Organization and management. The first of these recommendations applies to CSSP itself, the second to USAID/Jakarta and the third to relations between these two bodies. • Coordination among grantees. Grantees both present and former should be encouraged to share experience and expertise in a structured fashion. The embryonic start made with MIRPP should be pushed ahead into actuality and expanded. • Coordination among SOs. USAID/Jakarta can realize significant economies of scale through coordinating parallel efforts among the SO teams working with NGOs in such areas as financial management, workplan development, etc. The CPT SO team might take the lead in sharing advocacy expertise with others. But for coordination initiatives to succeed, leadership from the top would be required. • Modifying the contract. Refashioning the POs in the ways recommended here would necessitate modifying the contract. Operational level. Our last set of recommendations concerns how CSSP conducts its business and keeps track of how it does so. The first two pertain to CSSP, the last one to both CPT and CSSP. • Selecting grantees. To the extent that new grantees can be supported after present pipe￾line CSOs are funded, a change of direction in determining them will be called for. To find lead CSOs for the provincial programs and civil society service providers at the na￾tional level, CSSP will have to identify grantees and solicit proposals for specific activi￾ties rather than let potential grantees find it. • Outreach efforts. CSSP should be encouraged to increase its efforts at developing web￾sites, publishing case study collections, guidebooks, newsbulletins, etc. • The advocacy ladder. We hope the advocacy ladder will prove a useful tool for gauging the progress of the civil society program in its final two years as well as for planning its programming initiatives for specific CSOs. 1 I. Introduction Overview The Civil Society Strengthening Program (CSSP) formally began in autumn 1999 as a three-year contract (soon extended to five years) with the purpose of “assisting emerging, reform-minded non-governmental organizations (NGOs) address key issues associated with increased openness, transparency and reform” (Contract, p 2). In terms of total funding, the program anticipated spending just over $27 million over the course of its five-year lifetime – a large-scale effort by democracy programming standards within USAID. The CSSP consortium implementing the contract consists of several entities: Chemonics International has been the lead member or prime contractor, allied with four sub-contractors, of which CARE and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) have been the two major implementors.1 CSSP started out with a largely national focus, but then changed course significantly in mid-2000 with the emergence of the USAID Mission’s new Country Strategy Paper issued in May of that year. The revised ap￾proach kept the same overall goals and objectives, but changed the venue to concentrate on six provinces – Aceh, East Java, East Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, Papua and West Java. A second CSSP feature involved the unusually tight management control exercised by the USAID Mission’s Civic Participation and Transition (CPT) team, its implementing entity for Strategic Objective (SO) 7 – an arrangement that engendered some teething difficulties for CSSP. Over time, as CPT and CSSP became more comfortable with each other and personnel changed on both sides, the relationship attained a surer footing and by early 2002 appeared to be moving along smoothly, meeting and even exceeding the benchmark targets set for it in the con￾tract. It had been decided to conduct a mid-term evaluation of the program in early 2002, but for vari￾ous reasons this was postponed until the summer of the same year. A Scope of Work (SOW) was drawn up by CPT and a contract awarded to Management Systems International (MSI) of Washington, DC, which recruited a review team. As the review team began its work at the be￾ginning of July, the Mission modified the SOW to include more attention to program impact is￾sues, some consideration of directly supported CPT civil society efforts (i.e., civil society activi￾ties funded by CPT but outside the ambit of CSSP) and some observation of USAID-assisted ad￾vocacy activity in other SO sectors (these latter two foci were intended to provide a “360°” di￾mension to the evaluation. The review team studied documents, visited three provincial field sites, interviewed key infor￾mants at a wide variety of civil society organizations (CSOs)2 , and conducted several focus groups, all leading to a presentation to the USAID Mission Director and staff on 24 July, fol￾lowed by writing up a draft report by the beginning of August. The 24 July review requested the team to devote additional special attention inter alia to how best to assure a significant legacy 1 The two other sub-contractors are International Development Professionals (IDP), and the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE), but they have played only minor roles thus far. Except for the CARE City Forum initia￾tive centered in East Java, CSSP has operated as a joint entity between Chemonics, CARE and IFES, with Chemon￾ics taking the lead role. The review team has assessed the program as such, not attempting to evaluate it on a con￾tractor-by-contractor basis. 2 The terms CSO and NGO appear to be used interchangeably for the most part within USAID/Jakarta and CSSP itself, following general practice within the Agency, although at times a (usually implicit) distinction is made be￾tween CSOs as a special type of organization within the wider NGO community. 2 after EOP that would strengthen Indonesian civil society on a sustainable basis. This report em￾bodies the review team’s findings, analysis and recommendations on all these dimensions. These several additional evaluation tasks necessitated consolidating the original SOWs quite substantial agenda so that the review team could manage both older and newer assignments with the resources available. As we have done so, we have endeavored to address the questions and issues of most importance to the Mission; we hope we have succeeded in this regard. The report outlined. Our report consists of five main chapters. In addition to the overview pre￾sented here, the first chapter goes on to explain the review team’s composition and methodology and then provide some background on the evolution of CSSP as a program and the political con￾text or environment within which it operates. The second chapter reviews CSSP’s four Perform￾ance Objectives (POs) and the Special Activities Fund (SAF) in terms of their progress at this 2½ year mark. Our third chapter focuses on specific CSSP and USAID Mission management issues noted in the Scope of Work (SOW) for this evaluation. The fourth chapter offers our analysis of some eight issues that emerged as key in the discussion following the team’s presentation of its findings at USAID/Jakarta on 24 July 2002, and the last chapter sums up our principal recom￾mendations. Our report also includes several annexes. The first provides a list of the many ac￾ronyms used in the report, while the second lists our calendar of activities and interviews. The third annex comprises the Scope of Work guiding our evaluation, and a final fourth annex pro￾vides a list of references used in our work. Acknowledgements. The review team benefited greatly from CSSP’s enthusiastic willingness to share its facilities and even more so its expertise with us. Everyone at CSSP, from Chief of Party Peter Harris to the office assistants and drivers very graciously accommodated our (we hope mostly reasonable) requests and made our work flow smoothly, both at the home office in Jakarta and in the field. At USAID/Jakarta, Robert Hansen, the CTO for the review, along with CPT team leader Mike Calavan (succeeded by acting leader Dana Peterson) provided much sound advice and guidance as we moved along. And finally, without our very capable and ener￾getic interpreter Maggie Horhoruw, we would have been both lost and clueless on our field visit to Papua. We are most grateful to all of them. Review team composition and methodology The team. The CSSP mid-term evaluation team consisted of four persons working under con￾tract to Management Systems International (MSI), of Washington, DC. They were: • Harry Blair, who served as team leader, is Senior Research Scholar and Lecturer in Po￾litical Science at Yale University and has worked during much of the 1990s as Senior Democracy Specialist at USAID Washington in PPC/CDIE and DCHA/DG (most re￾cently under contract to MSI), focusing on civil society. • Leonardo Dayao recently retired after 18 years as a Foreign Service National at USAID/Manila, where among other assignments he served as Project Manager and Cog￾nizant Technical Officer of the Governance and Local Democracy (GOLD) Project. • Azwar Hasan has worked as an independent consultant on a wide range of donor-assisted development activities in Indonesia, including recently a final evaluation CLEAN 3 URBAN, a predecessor to CSSP. He is also a lecturer in local governance studies at the University of Indonesia. • Roy Salomo, a specialist and consultant in local governance, has worked with numerous development projects focusing on citizen participation, local public finance, and decen￾tralization policy. In addition, he serves as a lecturer in public finance at the University of Indonesia. Methodology. The Scope of Work for this evaluation, included as an annex to this report, called for a four-person team to spend approximately four weeks’ level of effort in Indonesia to conduct the necessary research, field study and analysis. An ambitious assignment, the SOW (see Annex 3) set forth some 113 questions under 38 major headings spread among 9 topics. In the course of our initial briefing at USAID/Jakarta on 3 July, the Mission modified the SOW along the follow￾ing lines, asking for: • More concerted attention to demonstrable program impact. • Greater focus on depth, if necessary at the expense of fuller coverage of CSSP’s various facets and program locales. • A more “360°”-oriented review, specifically to include illustrative analysis of other USAID-assisted civil society support efforts outside of those supported by CSSP, in par￾ticular of two kinds – -- activities directly funded by CPT; and -- initiatives supported by other SO teams within the Mission. With these additional instructions in mind, the review team set to work immediately on 4 July, setting as our first task beyond initial briefings with the CSSP staff the selection of areas for field visits. Given the rich array of provinces and program themes that had been taken up by CSSP, as shown in Table 1, this proved a difficult task. But after considerable deliberation and guidance from both CSSP and CPT, we opted for three sites among the six in Table 1, two of the three more mature provinces where CSSP efforts had been in place for some time, and one of the three newer provinces more characterized by startup activity: Table 1. CSSP regional & thematic focus Papua Conflict reduction, human rights, adat community East Java Local governance, civic participation East Kalimantan Labor, local governance, adat community Aceh Conflict reduction, human rights, women & children North Sulawesi Local governance, environment, civic participation West Java Local governance, transparency Boldface indicates province selected for review team visit. • Papua features a combination of natural resource wealth, a significant (though probably not majority) portion of the indigenous population favoring secession, and military repression and violence against civilians. It is abundantly clear why conflict resolution, human rights and indigenous community culture are CSSP’s major thematic concerns in this province. The review team spent a week in Papua, mostly in the capital at Jayapura but also including a two-day side trip to Merauke on the southern coast of the island. 4 • In contrast to the conflict and violence occurring in provinces like Papua, Aceh and Maluku, East Java is relatively calm and so more typical of most of the country. At the same time, its huge population (34 million, or about 15 percent of the national total, roughly comparable to California’s place in the Unites States) makes it vital to Indonesia’s future. Sustainable de￾velopment in East Java will require serious investment in and close attention to the prov￾ince’s 8 independent kota and 29 kabupaten along with their kecamatan, which makes CSSP’s provincial focus on local governance and citizen participation most apt. This prov￾ince also had more programs in place and pipeline than any other, making it additionally at￾tractive as a place for the team to visit. In addition to Surabaya, the provincial capital, the team visited CSSP-supported activities in kabupaten Sidoarjo, Mojokerto, Malang, Pameka￾san, Lamongan and Tuban. • Among the three newer provincial programs, East Kalimantan had the most programs al￾ready operational or in the pipeline, as well as representing another part of the country that would provide additional coverage. Here the team visited the provincial capital at Balikpa￾pan and kabupaten Samarinda. We feel compelled to state that the provinces selected are illustrative of CSSP’s provincial initia￾tives; they cannot be held to accurately and completely reflect the entire six-province program. Experiences in Aceh or North Sulawesi, for instance, may well be quite different from those we observed. But given our time and personnel constraints (plus the Mission’s injunction to seek as much depth as possible), we could not visit all six. We hope our sample of three has provided enough variation to make our conclusions reasonably valid. We should also point out that our evidence on impact is or the most part indirect, consisting mainly of assertions and claims, by grantees and subgrantees. In some cases corroborating evi￾dence emerged,3 but mainly we had to content ourselves with less than complete verification. To have tracked down every claim of impact to the point of proof would have taken far more time and personnel than the review team had available. In addition to the provincial programs, we met CSOs in Jakarta and Jogjakarta engaged in na￾tional programs and thus were able to get some understanding of this earlier and still continuing CSSP focus. Within these parameters, our data gathering effort comprised the following components: • Interviews with CPT and CSSP staff; • Document review of materials from both these sources, as well as selected others (mainly reports and papers received from CSSP grantees and other donors)4 ; • Field visits to East Java, Papua and East Kalimantan, as well as to Jogjakarta. • Interviews (see the list in the annex to this report) with: -- 34 CSSP grantees and subgrantees; -- 4 non-CSSP USAID grantees; -- 5 other entities (4 government officials and 1 informal interfaith religious group of leaders); 3 For example, enough people from different quarters mentioned a produce vendors’ demonstration sponsored by a grantee in Jayapura that we were reasonably sure it in fact occurred. 4 The CSSP quarterly reports and annual reports, as well as its two internal assessments (Merschrod 2000) and Mintz (2002) were particularly helpful to the review team. 5 -- 3 other donors. • Three focus group sessions. These activities consumed the first three weeks of our review, followed by a presentation at USAID on 24 July, at which the USAID Mission asked the team to focus on several additional lines of inquiry, as listed at the beginning of our Chapter IV. The team then turned to writing the report, with special attention to the new questions posed at the 24 July meeting. A first full draft was submitted to the CPT on 2 August 2002, to which the Mission responded in mid-August. This second draft takes into account those comments and constitutes the team’s final version, to which CSSP will provide comments. The report along with the CSSP comments (included as a supplement at the report’s end) then will become the final product for the mid-term evaluation of CSSP. The working environment CSSP faces To gauge the progress of CSSP, it is necessary to gain some understanding of the working envi￾ronment within which the program has been operating. The very brief analysis here is accord￾ingly intended to provide a skeletal outline of democratization’s major contextual features in In￾donesia, first at the national level, then for CSSP’s two more mature provincial programs in Papua and East Java, and finally for the more recent initiatives taken up in East Kalimantan. The national backdrop.5 The most salient reality for civil society in Indonesia today is the constraining dead weight of the New Order’s legacy. Over the course of more than three decades, the Suharto regime effectively occupied almost all of the political space inhabited by civil society in democratic political sys￾tems elsewhere. The citizen groups that represent people’s wants and needs to the state in other countries were for the most part either preempted by state-sponsored bodies in Indonesia or did not exist in any meaningful form. Even the service delivery NGOs found in many other non￾democratic countries were largely absent on the Indonesian scene.6 Grassroots community groups existed at the village or neighborhood level, often providing essential services like rotat￾ing credit societies, but they did not aggregate upward to larger groups to any significant extent. The net result is that civil society had to start essentially from scratch. It is instructive the compare Indonesia with the Philippines in 1986, where in effect an inter￾rupted project could be resumed after an authoritarian interregnum. Once the Marcos dictator￾ship had been ousted, people could go back to the civil society activities they had engaged in an earlier democratic dispensation before martial law’s imposition in 1972. Many of these enter￾prises had been carried on underground anyhow, while for others old leaders could resume where they had left off and new leaders easily found mentors with experience to pass on. By contrast in Indonesia, the CSOs starting operations after the Suharto overthrow in 1998 were basically brand-new creations, largely devoid of any ability to craft strategies, write proposals, construct workplans, assemble budgets, monitor progress, etc. Many were begun for idealistic 5 Many of the observations here are taken from Paul McCarthy’s insightful paper, “A Thousand Flowers Blooming” (March 2002). 6 Such institutions were not completely missing, e.g., the Islamic school system, and of course the huge Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) association headed by Gus Dur. 6 reasons by educated younger people willing to subsidize their own efforts by working long hours for low wages, although some of the new CSOs bursting forth appear to be in some measure al￾ternative engagements for recent university graduates unable to find longer term employment in a slack economy. In such circumstances, it is small wonder that so large a proportion of CSSP management time has had to be devoted to making these fledgling CSOs grantworthy. A closely allied issue comes from the pervasive corruption so endemic at all levels in Indonesia. Widely denounced as KKN (korupsi kolusi nepotisme), it is practiced by both civilian and mili￾tary wings of the government, at national and provincial levels alike. KKN seriously reduces government efficiency and effectiveness, but even more important from the civil society perspec￾tive, the corruption tends to render the state unaccountable to citizen input as it becomes instead more accountable to the sources of the venality. Corruption, in short, acts as a kind of preventive filter on citizen inputs to government at every level. Political will at the topmost levels, usually a critical factor in whatever success civil society ini￾tiatives have enjoyed elsewhere, became at least modestly available in the form of press freedom, liberty to organize, etc., during the interim Habibie government that followed the downfall of Suharto. In the succeeding administration, Gus Dur himself embodied civil society as the head of NU, appointed several civil society leaders to important cabinet posts, and opened government further to public scrutiny. The Megawati government taking over in mid-2001 has not rolled back the basic freedoms gained under Habibie and Gus Dur, but her government has become more secretive, more protective of the “political class,” and more willing to give the military a freer hand in such troublesome places as Aceh and Papua. Civil society leaders have not enjoyed the same access to the state that they previously had, human rights tribunals have stalled, and support in general for civil society has assumed a lower pitch. In addition to these constraints, Indonesia’s sheer size makes a national-level civil society initia￾tive an especially daunting one. Among all the countries receiving USAID democracy assis￾tance, only Russia begins to approach Indonesia’s population, and only Russia exceeds Indone￾sia’s vast geographical size.7 Even the relatively large USAID allocations to Indonesia begin￾ning after Suharto’s fall were unlikely to effect any fundamental and lasting changes in the polity that had been constructed over such a long time. The USAID Mission was surely on target with its 2000 Country Strategy Paper observation that the “Agency alone cannot leverage reform in Indonesia” (p 4). The switch to more manageable (if still very ambitious) selected provincial programs was a wise one, and its perspicacity has been borne out by subsequent macro-political developments. Provincial level. As with the macro-level polity, so too some backgrounding is required to understand and assess CSSP’s provincial programming efforts. Each of the three provinces visited by the review team had particular governance problems, which are very briefly explored below and as is implied by the differing program foci shown in Table 1. 7 India has had some small democracy components in its USAID activities, but nothing like the DG programming efforts in Indonesia or Russia. 7 Conflict in Papua. The picture presented here represents what the review team has learned about the political situation in Papua,8 but with some changes (particularly with respect to ethnic￾ity and religion) much the same could be said of Aceh. Papua’s most abiding problem over time has been the military occupation of the province and the violence that has accompanied it. At the upper levels of command, the Army has found the province a rich natural resource base for its official income-earning as well as a lucrative site for the illegal monies high-ranking officers are able to extort as “protection money” from businesses operating there. To maintain these income sources, however, it needs a rationale for retaining a large presence in Papua, and so it finds much convenience in labeling any deviation from complete allegiance to GOI as secessionism that must be rigorously suppressed. The need to exercise a degree of violence against the local population, in other words, fits very nicely into other military needs, and the Megawati govern￾ment so far appears to be at least condoning such a posture against anything smacking of a sepa￾ratist inclination. Meanwhile, the troops themselves have their own rationale for violence against the civilian population, which stem from the reality of single young males being sent to duty in isolated places where there is little to do except consume alcohol and abuse the locals, abetted by officers not inclined to rein them in. These unhappy realities have existed more or less since Papua was absorbed into Indonesia in the early 1960s. More recently they have been exacerbated by the militias being set up by the mili￾tary all over the province, a practice reminiscent of the militias organized for East Timor and the destruction they brought about during that territory’s last months as part of Indonesia. Finally and adding to all this have come indications that Laskar Jihad has entered the Papuan scene, spreading its own incentives to violence. In sum, a number of threads conduce toward suppression of indigenous Papuan adat culture as well as toward violence against the civilian population. CSSP’s provincial focus on conflict re￾duction, human rights and the adat community is well chosen. Bringing governance to the citizenry in East Java. Implementing Law No. 22 Year 1999 on Local Government created a wholly new system of directly and indirectly elected local govern￾ment units at the kabupaten level. Citizens now elect the legislative DPRD, which in turn elects the bupati and wakil bupati (governor and vice governor), who direct the kabupaten’s executive body, the Pemda. A similar system functions at the village level with the directly elected BPD and the executive Pemdes. Law 22/99 also devolved significant power, responsibility and re￾sources to the local level in a bold departure from the New Order’s tightly centralized control of all local governance. In theory, then, citizen control of local governance is in place. But in fact DPRD members gen￾erally have little or no experience in drafting legislation or monitoring government operations, so the exercise of this supervisory power has proven weak at best, while the Pemda houses all the bureaucratic machinery inherited from the New Order era. Clearly there is a major role for civil society to play here in providing citizen input to both the DPRD and the Pemda (and to both BDP and Pemdes), as well as in monitoring their performance. But while Law 22/99 could enact a new structure for a kabupaten-level legislature and executive, it could not create a new set of 8 The review team is indebted for much of the analysis here to Br. Theo van der Broeke of SKP, to Jonathan Simon of CSSP, and to the insightful monograph on adat culture published by CSSP (Simon et al., 2002). 8 civil society institutions where there had in effect been none earlier that could genuinely repre￾sent citizen concerns to government. The same applies to the village level as well. Civil society, in other words, has remained a blank page so far as GOI legislation goes, which after all is as it should be, for it is not the state’s function in a democracy to create civil society and CSOs. That task must be taken up by the citizenry itself. In its absence, the Indonesian nemesis of KKN can be expected to continue flourishing and even dominating local governance. The block grants that have come with Law 22/99 provide an excellent illustration of the basic problem here. Absent strong civil society institutions, marginally competent DPRDs decide on their own how to allocate the new funds, with the not surprising result that much of the money appears to flow into dubious ventures, patronage connections and even outright corruption. With its immense population (already 34 million by the turn of the millennium, about 15% of the national total) and densely populated area, East Java reflects well both the challenges and oppor￾tunities offered by Law 22/99 and its implementation. The province’s 29 kabupaten and 8 inde￾pendent kota9 provide an excellent setting in which to promote civil society as a counterbalance to the state and a means for organizing and promoting citizen participation in determining public policy.10 Local governance, natural resource exploitation and ethnic tension in East Kalimantan. Like Sumatra and Papua, Kalimantan has long been known as an incredible storehouse of natural resource wealth – oil, minerals and timber. Beginning in the 1960s, those resources have been exploited in successive waves, first focusing on oil and gas, then for timber removal, and more recently mineral resources as well. Most of this process has consisted of simple extraction taking place under foreign concessions – a rich lode of KKN – but beginning in the 1980s, there has been some local value-added component through local industry, particularly plywood processing. While it has caused severe environmental damage, all this economic activity has generated a considerable number of jobs, as well as some royalty income to the provincial government of East Kalimantan. But most of these benefits have gone to transmigrants from Java, Sulawesi and elsewhere, who now number about half the population. The indigenous inhabitants have largely been left behind, in terms of income, education, land rights and general living standards. Not surprisingly, there has been considerable resentment on the part of the adat population toward the newcomers. Even for the transmigrants, however, life has scarcely been easy, with exploitative labor condi￾tions and few public services available. Widespread KKN was good for those linked in to the New Order’s patronage networks, but provided little to the remaining population, whether in￾digenous or transmigrant. The new regional autonomy provided under the post-Suharto decen￾tralization laws offers a hope for greater equity through citizen participation, however, and it makes sense that CSSP decided to focus on East Kalimantan, pursuing themes of local govern￾ance, labor and the adat community. 9 These kota or cities exist independently of the kabupaten in which they are geographically located and have simi￾lar governmental structures. 10 East Java also offers opportunity to take on major social challenges, with its 7.5 million people below the poverty line – the highest number of any province in the country (see Debbie A. Lubis, “Government to launch drive to re￾duce poverty rate,” Jakarta Post, 30 July 2002, p2) 9 CSSP’s evolution Evidently designed amid some haste,11 CSSP was conceived to seize the opportunities offered by Indonesia’s democratic transition to (1) build up strong, influential and self-sustaining groups of CSOs that could work on policy reform and democratic policy making and practices; and (2) en￾able these groups to address a range of key issues by raising them is a constructive way with government and the community to ensure that they are resolved in a democratic manner. Program Elements In order to achieve these objectives, the Mission identified four Performance Objectives (POs) namely: (1) PO1 – Analysis, Articulation and Effective Advocacy for Policy Reform; (2) PO2 – Effective Administrative Management and Planning; (3) PO3 – Strengthening NGO Capacity to Obtain Funding and Develop Sustainable Operations; and (4) PO4 – Grants to Indonesian NGOs Awarded and Managed Effectively. Benchmark indicators were identified for each of the four Program Objectives broken down further for each expected life of the project as Year 1, Year 2, etc. Additionally, a Special Activities Fund (SAF) amounting in a sense to a PO5 was included that allowed the program to support short-term, discrete and event-based activities arising from the implementation of the program and also allowed USAID/I to respond to opportunities related to Indonesia’s democratic transition. The review team sees these several POs and the SAF as strongly related, impacting each other in a cascading fashion as shown in Figure 1, with the final overall impact affecting the political sys￾tem itself. The process begins with PO4 and the grant making process, which in most cases has involved considerable technical assistance (TA) to help potential grantees develop program strategies and acquire financial discipline. These efforts carry over to PO2 (capacity building) in that they build capacity in both these dimensions, and the financial discipline component starts grantees on the road to financial self-reliance, or PO3. The capacities enhanced under PO2 con￾tribute to PO3 also, even as they primarily build a CSO’s ability to take on the advocacy func￾tions that form the heart of CSSP’s overall objective. Meanwhile the SAF is contributing small￾scale, discrete injections of support to all the POs. Finally, PO1 impacts the constituencies being represented by the CSOs, as well as the political system itself by improving levels of participa￾tion and accountabilty. 11 There is no record of a Project Activity Assistance Document or Design Activity Document that the review team could uncover. It appears that this project was conceived and approved because of the unfolding opportunity offered after the 1998 transition. 10 Changing strategic objectives When the contract was awarded to the consortium headed by Chemonics International, Inc. in October 1999, the program’s performance objectives were lodged under the Democracy and Governance (DG) Special Objective (SO) #1, “Democratic Transition Strengthened” and its In￾termediate Result (IR) #2, “Effective CSO participation in Political Processes”. This then be￾came Strategic Objective No. 5 with 3 IRs. These 3 IRs were focused on NGOs – their organiza￾tional development and advocacy, and the rule of law. In September of 2000, amidst the rapidly changing political situation, the Mission came out with a new Country Strategy12 anchored on two basic principles: “ 1) the need to provide timely sup￾port for those leading or advocating reform in order to sustain and broaden Indonesia’s political and economic transition; and 2) the need to strengthen the capacity of key institutions so that they can meet the priority needs and expectations of the Indonesian people”. Seven Strategic Objectives (SOs) were identified, and the program was lodged in SO7, “Democratic reforms sus￾tained and deepened”, and the IR “NGOs advocate for democratic reform.” In this new strategy, USAID/I decided to focus work in six geographical areas: East and West Java, West Papua, Aceh, North Sulawesi and East Kalimantan The program’s early days The start up-year of program implementation saw some early problems owing to the basic design where a major role was given to the USAID’s Civic Participation and Transition Team (CPT). In broad terms, this role was defined as: “providing the strategic framework, the funding levels 12 USAID/Indonesia, Transition to a Prospering and Democratic Indonesia, Country Strategy paper, (USAID/Indonesia, September 2000). Figure 1. CSSP impact: a cascading process PO3 FSR PO4 Grant mgt PO2 Capacity bldg PO1 Advocacy [transparency, local govern￾ance] Constituency & Political system Exter￾nal im￾pact Stronger CSOs Inter￾nal im￾pact TA TA TA Resources Ultimate impact SAF SAF SAF 11 and the policy regulating the contractor’s activities,” and manifested in Section 9 of the contract, “Right of USAID to supersede contractors decision”13. This CPT supervisory role differed sig￾nificantly from CSSP’s view of a creative program that would deepen the advocacy role of the NGOs through a nationwide grant program and training. In managerial terms, CPT wanted more intense hands-on role than CSSP preferred, while CSSP wanted more autonomy than CPT found desirable. Further complicating the relationship was what was perceived to be a still-delicate political situation in 1999 – a feeling that likely led to a greater sense of caution on the part of CPT than it might have otherwise exercised. 14 Later changes in the management, both with CPT and CSSP, reduced the tension considerably. USAID now plays a less dominant role, and CSSP appears to be well on track with 44 grants ex￾tended and an additional 29 in the pipeline. 13 Agreement between Chemonics International, Inc. and the Agency for International Development, Contract No. 497-C-00-00053-00. 14 The principals in charge of CPT had transferred to other posts by the time of our mid-term review, so the accuracy of this speculation cannot be ascertained. 12 II. CSSP Components The contract lays out four POs as discrete components of CSSP, and at the time of our review the contractors had organized themselves along similar lines, with one senior staff member in charge of PO1 and PO3, a second dealing with PO2 and a third handling PO4. But the actual work be￾ing done does not fit so neatly into these categories, so that it often became difficult for the team to tell just under which PO a particular activity or its impact should best be assessed. If in proc￾essing a grant CSSP improves a CSO’s ability to manage its finances, has PO4 or PO2 been fur￾thered? Would improving ability to advocate a policy position best be counted under PO1 or PO2? Because of such dilemmas, we have surely misclassified some of our own analysis here, so if our readers find something missing in our discussion under one PO, we would ask them to look under the others. Performance Objective 1. Analysis, articulation and effective advocacy for policy reform. Although advocacy – which can be defined succinctly as the process by which individuals and organizations attempt to influence public policy – is not CSSP’s only “end product,” it is the primary one, as set forth in PO1. Other important themes center on transparency (the media￾related initiatives) and enhancing local government capacity (the efforts observed in East Java and East Kalimantan).15 But advocacy is clearly the principal purpose of most CSSP effort; it constitutes the immediate goal of PO1, as well as the ultimate goal of the other POs (cf. Figure 1). This centrality is highlighted in the Intermediate Result enunciated in the contract for CSSP, “NGOs advocate for democratic reform.” (Contract p 11). Advocacy is not the only outcome goal of PO1, we should note. Enhancing transparency and strengthening local governance are also program objectives in fact, even if they are not stated as such in the contract. Thus they are included in the PO1 circle in Figure 1. Because PO1 is the centerpiece of CSSP in terms of overall program impact, we devote more analysis to it in this report than to the other POs. Objective statement. In the contract (p11), CSSP is called upon to “[p]rovide technical assis￾tance (TA) to USAID/I to strengthen the capacity of Indonesian NGOs to: (1) analyze needs and policy issues; (2) articulate recommended reforms; (3) successfully advocate for needed reforms: and (4) monitor the effective implementation of those reforms.” Results indicators. The “results targets/deliverables” indicators outlined in the contract (p 12) are: Year 1 – Selected Indonesian NGOs using reliable research to develop policy positions. Year 2 – Selected Indonesian NGOs articulate polcy position through professional means (policy papers, etc.). Year 3 – Selected Indonesian NGOs effectively advocate their issues with the govern￾ment, Parliament, local leaders and the people. Year 4 – New mechanisms for NGO participation in policy making established. 15 Accordingly these two outcome goals are included in the PO1 circle in Figure 1. 13 Year 5 – Reforms advocated by Indonesian NGOs adapted and implemented.16 Main findings. Certainly a number of CSOs have met the Year 3 target in effectively “advocat￾ing their issues” in various fora. At the national level, for example, SEAPA has had its draft freedom-of-information bill accepted by the DPR for this year’s legislative docket, while YAPPIKA can claim at least some credit for MPR passage of the Foundation Law last year. At the local level, the Sidoarjo City Forum proposed an ordinance on street vendors that the DPRD accepted, and, while the review team was visiting Jayapura, AlDP fielded about 150 produce vendors in a demonstration requesting the city executive to provide transportation enabling them to bring that produce to market. CSSP appears well on target here. If we look at the Semi-Annual Benchmarks specified in the contract (p 12), we find that “two policy papers on important issues” should be forthcoming during the first half of Year 3. Strictly speaking, the team did not find this to have occurred, but on the other hand, one grantee (SEAPA) has formulated draft legislation for the national legislature for a Freedom of Informa￾tion act, and has drafted a Memorandum of Understanding on protecting journalists, which we would count as tantamount to meeting the requirement. As for the local level, now that CSSP’s main thrust has transferred there, “policy papers” would seem rather a stretch to be expected of grantees. Instead, we would also point to the several draft legislative proposals submitted to ka￾bupaten-level DPRDs.17 In short, we would argue that what grantees have done meets the benchmarks set for the third year’s halfway point. Looking for impact. For the three principal kinds of activity undertaken within PO1 – advo￾cacy, local governance and transparency – we need to trace evidence of what might be called “end impact” or “ultimate impact” in Figure 1, i.e., the outcome effects CSSP efforts are produc￾ing in terms of citizen participation and system accountability. In what follows, we will look at these three activities in order. A different way to gauge advocacy impact While the contract called for Indonesian NGOs to be “effectively advocating their issues” at this point, we would suggest a different approach to assessing achievement in advocacy, in the form of an “advocacy ladder” that measures impact on a graduated scale of steps. This ladder or hier￾archy, currently in the final stages of articulation at DCHA/DG in Washington,18 is shown in Figure 2. In brief, the central idea behind the ladder asserts that advocacy can be considered as a sequential chain, which begins with citizen participation or input into the political process. To the extent that this input succeeds, it compels the state to become accountable for its actions, to justify and modify its outputs in the form of policy change. Finally, if enough citizen input af￾fects state policy, the quality of contestation will improve beyond periodic elections to continual citizen input, i.e., more pluralism in the polity. 16 The contract also notes (p 11) that a “committee composed of the Contractor, USAID/I and NGO representatives will assess measurement of progress of grantee NGOs on a semi-annual basis, but the committee was never formally constituted. 17 The several sets of case studies issued under CSSP auspices might also be included here. For a list, see Mintz (2002, Annex A-2). 18 See Blair (2002a) and Blair et al. (2002b) for more detail on the advocacy ladder. 14 The participation stage can be broken down into three sub-levels, as indicated in Figure 2. First comes mobilization, when a potential constituency (e.g., women, farmers, domestic abuse vic￾tims) becomes self-aware and begins to mobilize as a group. As the group develops and articu￾lates an agenda, it gains a voice in public discourse, and if its voice succeeds in getting the state’s attention (e.g., a petition is accepted, a public hearing is addressed, a mayor listens to a spokes￾person), the group has attained some measure of representation. The higher-level accountability stage also has three sub-levels, beginning with transparency, which occurs when the state finds itself having to reveal and justify or account for what is has done (or failed to do). Next comes empowerment, when the state accepts at least some part of a group’s issue agenda (e.g., a regulation is issued, a bill is passed, a public promise to act is made). When the state in fact follows through and carries out its stated intention, then the group has attained constituency benefits. When a good number of important groups have attained this stage, the overall level of pluralism is enhanced. Two caveats are in order at this point. First, it should be pointed out that this third stage has gen￾erally not been included as a USAID democracy objective. Rather the goals have tended to amount to one or another of the participation or accountability sub-levels. For instance, CSSP’s goal in terms of the contract – “to successfully advocate for needed reforms” – would be closest to the empowerment tier in Figure 2’s hierarchy. But if the Agency is to fully support democ￾ratic consolidation as an objective, it makes sense to set enhanced systemic pluralism as an ulti￾mate objective. A relevant subtext here is to note that CSSP cannot be held accountable for meeting a goal that even the Agency has not accepted except perhaps by implication. Even so, increased pluralism makes a worthy final objective for democratization support. Figure 2. Civil society advocacy ladder ∆ pluralism ↑ ∆ constituency benefits ↑ ∆ empowerment ↑ ∆ transparency ↑ ∆ representation ↑ ∆ voice ↑ ∆ mobilization Accountability — outputs Participation — inputs Contestation Constituency- & membership-based CSOs Trustee-based CSOs ∆ indicates “an increase in” 15 Secondly, we should note that while some CSOs do have actual memberships, a good many of them, particularly public interest CSOs in such fields as human rights, are what some have la￾beled “trustee” organizations, acting (or claiming to act) on behalf of a reference group that can￾not mobilize and act on its own (or at least has not done so thus far).19 Typically, victims of hu￾man rights abuses are often such a group; initiatives for legal reform are another type of trustee effort. These CSOs in effect begin with the representation rung of the ladder. A third type, which can be placed between the trustee and membership groups, consists of what might best be called self-aware constituency groups. Here the CSO does connect with a constituency, which could be one already self-consciously aware that it exists and anxious for change (e.g., the pro￾duce vendors in Jayapura looking for transportation to the city that we will find AlDP assisting in the next section) or could be potentially conscientized and mobilized for civil society efforts (e.g., the adat communities in Papua hoping for relief from military depredations but not aware of what participatory political avenues might be available). In sum, we have a rank ordering of CSOs, ranging from organizations that operate as member￾ship organizations through groups that work with self-conscious (though unorganized) constitu￾encies to bodies that claim (generally but not always with legitimacy) to represent weak and vul￾nerable categories of people who cannot act on their own. The first type comprises CSOs with an organized base (labor unions and chambers of commerce would be examples), while the sec￾ond consists of CSOs working with self-conscious and energized but as yet unorganized groups of people (e.g., neighborhood citizens upset about local water supply or interested in better schools), and the third includes CSOs exercising a representative role on behalf of a category of citizens (for instance people living next to a toxic lake or victims of police extortion). Part of the challenge in assisting civil society – particularly in moving toward sustainability – is helping CSOs move from the third type to the second and first types. Civil society and sectoral activities Table 2 shows an illustrative sample of the CSOs visited by the review team in terms of the ad￾vocacy ladder, grouped by sectoral activity across the three provinces surveyed as well as some of the several national CSOs we were able to call on. We sum up the main impacts of each of Table 2’s CSOs briefly here. Foker20 works out of Jayapura, providing its own TA and training to local NGOs, as well as making subgrants to local NGOs. Of the CSOs visited in Papua, Foker was clearly the most im￾pressive. Its main initiative recently has been a Peace Campaign to promote reduced violence between the outsiders (most prominently the military but also the police) and the indigenous adat community. The Foker group active in Merauke (a good example of a trustee CSO acting on be￾half of female recipients of military abuse unable to take action themselves) proved able through establishing a dialogue between local leaders and military officers to effect a modus vivendi be￾tween the Army units posted there and the citizens, such that incidents of rape and other violence against civilians dropped dramatically. Thus actual constituency benefits were achieved. 19 For an insightful analysis of the “trustee” NGO in contrast to those based on constituencies, see Ottaway (2000). 20 See Annex A for a list of the acronyms used in this report; we have followed local custom in using the acronyms rather than the full names. 16 Table 2. Sectoral CSOs and the advocacy ladder (programs in italics not CSSP-supported) Activity type Human rights Labor Environ￾ment Religious HIV/AIDS Journalists Macro- reform CSO name Foker AlDP LPPMA LBHP LEKSIP YBML Lakpesdam NU FHI & Yas- anto SEAPA YAPPIKA CSO type T TÆC TÆM T M T M T M T Place Jayapura & Merauke Jayapura & Merauke Jayapura Jayapura Samarinda Balikpapan Lamongan Jayapura & Merauke Jakarta Jakarta Province E Java E Java Papua Papua E Kalim. E Kalim. E Java Papua National National Cont Pluralism Constitu￾ency bene￾fits Decreased military abuses, in short term Empow￾erment FOI draft accepted by DPR Influenced MPR pas￾sage of foun￾dation law Accountability Transpar￾ency Proposed Peace/Jus￾tice Com￾mission Lamongan DPRD trip exposed Represen￾tation Produce vendors’ demonstra￾tion Anticipated training im￾pact Victims of 1975 army attack Draft law rebuffed by DPRD Provided draft law to DPRD Dialogue with local govts 100% con￾dom use resolution Journalists as constit￾uency Voice Goal of the training Participation Mobiliza￾tion Community activist train- ing NGO net- work Beginning to involve fami- lies Pre-participation Mapping conflict CSO type: M = membership-based; C = constituency-based; T = trustee. 17 Like most human rights CSOs in Papua, AlDP had been working as a trustee organization to rep￾resent the interests of the adat community, but more recently it has branched out to take up more constituency-oriented efforts. At the time of the review team’s visit, AlDP’s Jayapura office or￾ganized a demonstration of produce vendors to petition the bupati to provide transport to bring their produce to the city market, or in other words mobilized a constituency, helped it set a policy agenda, gain a voice, and even attain some representation when the demonstrators presented their petition to the bupati. Whether the bupati and local Pemda will agree to their request (i.e., be￾come in some sense accountable to them) remains to be seen.21 LPPMA is an older organization, dating from 1988, focusing initially on legal aid to the adat community and later changing its basic mission to an outreach effort to mobilize indigenous communities to become aware of and stand up for their legal rights. So far, they have been using their CSSP grant to organize training for 6 local tribal councils in the Jayapura area, whom they hope to capacitate to implement the participatory rungs of the advocacy ladder. In doing so, LPPMA is trying to reach beyond energizing a constituency to build a membership-based or￾ganization. LBHP is a legal aid CSO, focusing on adat community issues. While not a direct grantee, this older group (founded in 1986) has received support to attend CSSP workshops, which it found most helpful in strengthening its abilities to research the cases it has represented. In addition to representing individuals (e.g., many land cases against the government), it has also initiated a larger action on behalf of victims of a particularly vicious military rampage in 1975. And at the accountability level on the advocacy ladder, it has proposed a Peace and Justice Commission for the province which as attracted some attention. If the commission comes into existence, it would contribute to transparency on the ladder. LEKSIP is a labor CSO, engaged mainly in representing worker interests to management at a number of local industries. In the strictest sense, such activity does not fall within the civil soci￾ety rubric (i.e., the CSO is not dealing with the state or its organs on behalf of its constituency), but in a wider interpretation it does (labor after all forms a major focus for USAID/Washington’s civil society efforts). So far it has gained acceptance for two collective bargaining agreements with Kalimantan firms. Within the more orthodox meaning of civil society, LEKSIP initiated a draft labor bill with the provincial legislature. In the event, the draft was rejected, but the initia￾tive indicates that this CSO is pursuing representational avenues in terms of the advocacy ladder. YBML is another CSO in East Kalimantan, focusing on environmental issues. Although a trus￾tee organization in our terms, it has made strenuous efforts at public consultations (held in five sub-districts) to formulate a draft environmental regulation for managing a forest reserve near Balikpapan. The city council has accepted the idea (we think, though are not completely sure), and a management board should begin work shortly. Lakpesdam NU constitutes the East Java chapter of the national Nadhlatul Ulama (NU), the country’s largest Muslim NGO, headed by former President Gus Dur. It is thus very much a mass-based organization. It has used CSSP support to build capacity within three of its local units to energize its members regarding citizen concerns and engage with local government. Be￾ginning with these participation activities, it has moved into the accountability portion of the ad- 21 Chances appeared good that it would, because one elected member of the DPRD lived near the vendors and sup￾ported the petition by joining the demonstration. 18 vocacy ladder as well, with its Lamongan unit recently having publicized what it found to be a wasteful expenditure of government monies to send DPRD members on a junket to Kalimantan. FHI & Yasanto are not CSSP grantees, but are instead supported by USAID/Jakarta’s HPN sec￾toral team. They offer a good illustration of USAID-assisted civil society endeavors outside of the CSSP ambit, however, and so we include them as part of our “360º” coverage. FHI is an HPN grantee, operating in Papua and making subgrants to several more local NGOs, including Yasanto in Merauke. Yasanto’s principal focus with their subgrant has been on HIV/AIDS, which has a high prevalence in Papua and an extraordinarily high incidence in Merauke – the highest in the entire country, evidently fueled by widespread poverty inducing women to turn to prostitution, combined with high-risk sexual behavior. Yasanto has been working as a trustee organization, providing direct assistance to AIDS patients and – more importantly from our civil society vantage point – pressing the city council to pass new regulations designed to reduce HIV exposure. Its principal current effort aims to require 100% condom use by all prostitutes in Merauke city, and it is pushing the DPRD to pass a resolution to this effect. It has also begun to reach out to families of AIDS patients, a difficult endeavor when so far the major social response has been for families to outcast members with advanced AIDS symptoms. In our terms, the in￾volvement of families opens the possibility that this trustee organization could take on a con￾stituency base that would enhance prospects for sustainability.22 Even after the shift from national to provincial level in 2000, CSSP continued to support a num￾ber of CSOs working at the larger level. The team was able to visit several of them, including the two briefly described here. SEAPA is an ASEAN regional international organization, and so in addition to its CSSP support receives a good deal of inspiration and technical support from its sister chapters, as well as from other donors aside from CSSP. Accordingly, it is difficult to sort out the impact of CSSP assis￾tance from these other factors. Even so, it would appear that the CSSP assistance, especially the training in management and financial sustainability, has helped make SEAPA a more effective organization and one better able to spend its grant moneys on its core program of advocacy for press freedom and protection of journalists. Both have come under some threat with increasing secretiveness and governmental harassment of the press under the Megawati administration. Re￾cently SEAPA succeeded in getting the national legislature (DPR) to accept a draft freedom of information act onto its docket for action in the current session, and it is working on Memoranda of Understanding to establish standards for relations between the press and police and between the press and political parties. In addition it has worked to cultivate the journalistic community as a constituency, thus moving beyond the trustee to the member-based mode of organization. Another national organization, YAPPIKA has worked on general civil society issues, in particu￾lar the national Foundation Law No. 16, passed in 2000 and due to become effective in August 2002. In lobbying to pass the law, YAPPIKA formed a coalition of like-minded groups with its CSSP support. The law should help civil society in a number of dimensions, e.g., gaining offi￾cial status for a CSP, regularizing auditing requirements. But there remain a number of areas to work on, such as tax codes applying to non-profit CSOs. 22 As has happened in a number of E&E countries, where an imploded health delivery system proved unable to re￾spond to rising AIDS incidence. Family members of patients then organized to demand assistance and rights for victims. 19 Civil society and local governance The CSOs we have looked at so far here are essentially sectoral organizations, working in areas such as human rights, environment, health, etc., whether at national or (more commonly, given the regional focus pursued after 2000) at the local level. There are also a group of organizations whose activities center on local governance issues, rather than any particular sector. A number of these are illustrated in Table 3. Table 3. Local governance CSOs and the advocacy ladder (programs in italics not CSSP-supported) Activity type Urban issues City gov￾ernance Village governance CSO name City Forum City Forum City Forum DLG Per￾form YPSDI LPKP LBBPJ CSO type T T T T TÆ C T M Place Mojokerto Pamekasan Sidoarjo Malang Malang Malang Samarinda Province E Java E Java E Java E Java E Java Papua E Kalim. Cont Pluralism Constitu￾ency bene￾fits Empow￾erment Street ven￾dor resolu￾tion passed by DPRD Accountability Transpar￾ency Public ser￾vices com￾plaint center Kota ex￾plains itself on issues City parlia￾ment watch Represen￾tation Govt pro￾mises on gambling Factory toxic waste publi￾cized Strengthen village NGOs & BPDs to work with each other Voice Using local Participation radio & TV Mobiliza￾tion Women’s crisis center? Raising citi￾zen aware￾ness Mobilizin￾gAdat com￾munity CSO type: M = membership-based; C = constituency-based; T = trustee. The City Forums came into CSSP as a legacy managed by CARE from the earlier CLEAN Ur￾ban project, which ended in March 2001.23 Under CSSP, CARE as a member of the consortium manages the City Forums in what appeared to be a loose coordination with CSSP’s other activi￾ties in East Java. The review team was able to visit three City Forums out of the 19 currently be￾ing supported.24 23 CLEAN Urban was assessed in Evans et al. (2001). 24 Of the 19 City Forums, 13 are in East Java and the remainder in adjoining Central Java province. 20 The City Forums were initiated in response to the two pathbreaking laws on decentralization passed in 1999, which in effect transferred an immense number of functions from what had been the tightly centralized Suharto government to the local level.25 In the process, elected local legis￾latures (DPRD) were set up at provincial, district (kabupaten) and city (levels), along with an executive branch (Pemda) headed by an officer elected by the DPRD. At the village level, an analogous elected council (BPD) was established, which would then indirectly elect the head of the village executive branch (Pemdes). In sum, a new set of structures were put into place with the only formal citizen involvement being the elections for the DPRDs and BPDs. The represen￾tatives elected to these bodies had virtually no experience in drafting legislation or in overseeing the executives who in theory were accountable to them. The basic City Forum concept was to erect an additional body to provide citizen input to the new local structure by establishing City Forums and then building their capacity to develop public issues and in the process increase their public legitimacy as credible citizen groups participating in local governance. The City Forums do not have a formal structure, but rather are open to any citizen concerned with a particular issue, so they have in effect a rolling membership of stake￾holders – local leaders, legislature members, private sector businessmen, local government offi￾cials – self-selected ad hoc as each new public issue becomes defined, deliberated on and a con￾sensus built for advocacy around it. CARE’s role has been to build City Forum capacity through training and technical assistance. In its own thinking, CARE sees the City Forums as a third structure in local governance, providing citizen-based inputs to the DPRD and Pemda.26 The approach is what might be called a classic trustee basis for organization, wherein local lead￾ers act on behalf of the citizenry to formulate positions on public policy issues, and then lobby the DPRD and Pemda to accept their formulations. Given the inexperience of local governments in managing public affairs after the passage of the new decentralization laws in 1999 and the vir￾tual vacuum of local CSOs just after the democratic transition of 1998, it can be argued that this approach based on recruiting local elites into public policy discourse was the appropriate step to take. Certainly it was a much faster way to inject citizen concerns into the policy process than building membership-based CSOs would have been. Each of the three City Forums visited had taken on a number of policy issues, of which several are presented in Table 3. In Mojokerto, there was much public concern about gambling, which had become a major criminal industry. The City Forum had formed an ad hoc group to lobby the city to crack down on it, had met with city officials and received promises that it would be looked into. In terms of our advocacy ladder, this would amount to representation. If the city proceeds to investigate, some transparency would hopefully result as practices came under more public scrutiny, and perhaps empowerment as well, if city ordinances were enacted to reduce gambling. In Pamekasan, the City Forum has been quite active, recently signing a contract with the kabu￾paten Pemda to provide training to all the village councils (BPDs) in the district. As for public 25 For an analysis of how these laws have played out in practice, see TAF (2002); also Antlöv (2000) and Van Zorge Report (2002). 26 CARE has developed an elaborate framework at both theoretical and applied levels to promote the City Forum concept, now available in several Bahasa publications as well as a sophisticated PowerPoint presentation. 21 policy issues, the City Forum convinced the local executive to set up a public services complaint center. If it works as intended, the center would become a focus for transparency in the area. The City Forum in Sidoarjo has involved itself in a number of areas, including serious environ￾mental problems with a leather factory discharging toxic wastes into the adjacent water supply, a matter which it has publicized sufficiently to bring about public meetings including factory rep￾resentatives and the city government. On another issue, the City Forum lobbied the DPRD suc￾cessfully to pass a regulation setting up a designated place for street vendors to operate, where they would be less subject to the intimidation and extortion traditionally exercised by local po￾lice. Finally, the Sidoarjo City Forum had opened a women’s crisis center, primarily intended to assist with domestic abuse problems. In time, the center might move to conscientizing its clients and thus begin to take on aspects of a membership-based enterprise, though at the time of the re￾view team’s visit it was just getting itself organized as a trustee operation. Another legacy of CLEAN Urban was the Perform program contracted to the Research Triangle Institute and then absorbed into the USAID Mission’s SO10 on Democratic Local Governance. Perform is similar to the City Forum program in a number of ways, focusing on the city (kota) level and building elite citizen input to the local political process, but it concentrates more on participation in urban planning, while the CARE initiative centers its efforts more on policy ad￾vocacy.27 In at least some cases, the Perform groups appeared to have effected a degree of trans￾parency by getting the city government to explain itself on budgetary issues, but it was hard to discern what else Perform was doing, despite two interviews with the program in Malang.28 YPSDI, another grantee in East Java, concentrates on city-level politics, specifically on the elected legislatures in three cities including Malang, where the team visited this CSO. YPSDI’s principal activity has been its Parliament Watch, which monitors three city-level DPRDs with the intent of making them more open and responsive to public concerns, particularly on policymak￾ing and budgeting. At the same time, YPSDI has launched an outreach effort to contact citizen groups to become more involved in public policy issues. Already the organization has had some impact, in that the Malang DPRD has launched a lawsuit against YPSDI claiming that its public image has been besmirched. Two other initiatives centering on local governance are also illustrated in Table 2. LPKP in Ma￾lang is unique within CSSP29 in that it deals with both sides of the local governance equation – the democratic side included in the advocacy ladder (local NGOs) and the local government side (BPDs). This organization works with BPDs in some 40 villages as well as 20 assorted village￾level NGOs representing farmers, women, and other local interests. A well-established organiza￾tion (it has received funding from a Belgian donor since 1993 and since then has obtained a number of other grants), LPKP constitutes a relatively mature enterprise, working in effect as an 27 In general, the two programs appeared to be more similar than different, and the review team found it difficult to distinguish between them. There appears to be some coordination between the two initiatives at the USAID Mission (i.e., between the SO7 and SO10 teams), but it was hard to tell how this worked. Where both programs worked in the same province (East Java, though the same is likely true in Central Java as well), there appeared to be very little connection if any between the two activities. 28 It would have been good to follow up these brief interviews with visits to other Perform field operations as well as the contractor and more extensive discussions with the SO10 team members, but the time we could devote to this added “360º” task was unfortunately limited. 29 So far as we could tell. There may be other CSSP efforts that are similar but which we did not get to visit. 22 intermediate service organization providing TA to other CSOs. In terms of the advocacy ladder, we could say that LPKP is working at the representation level. The last group shown in Table 3, LBBPJ, has been working on lines somewhat parallel to the City Forum program in endeavoring to enhance citizen input as a third element into the decen￾tralized political structure of legislature and executive set up in the 1999 laws. But whereas the City Forums operate at city and district level, LBBPJ works with villages, trying to energize and capacitate local tribal (adat) institutions to deal with the village BPD and Pemda. A second dif￾ference is that LBBPJ is directing its efforts at the adat community as a whole rather than at local leaders. To date, the initiative appears to have progressed beyond the mobilization stage into voice, with radio and even some TV coverage articulating the adat effort to be heard. Like LPKP, LBBPJ is also an older organization, begun in 1992 and a recipient of funding from Dutch and Japanese donors. Using the advocacy ladder A glance at Tables 2 and 3 reveals several things. First, fully 13 of the 16 CSOs supported are trustee-based, not mass or membership groups, while only three are membership-oriented and none are constituency-based. Given the embryonic state of civil society at the end of the New Order era, this is scarcely surprising. There were (and still are) relatively few constituency-based CSOs up and running, so it made very good sense to work with trustee organizations, or where there were no organizations to speak of already in place, to begin by building trustee entities (such as the City Forum groups). As time goes on, the trustee groups should be encouraged to develop constituency bases, as AlDP and LPPMA are doing, for without a membership or at least a self-conscious constituency, their chances to attaining sustainability over time are proba￾bly slim. Second, of all the 17 groups included in Tables 2 and 3, none have contributed to a more plural￾istic political system, and only one appears to have provided distinct constituency benefits so far (Foker), while three have shown some attainment at the empowerment rung of the ladder (SEAPA, YAPPIKA, and the Sidoarjo City Forum). And even these achievements need some discounting. Foker was able to bring about an understanding with military authorities that sharply decreased violence against the civilian population, but within a few months of this break￾through the military unit was transferred elsewhere, and a new unit moved in to take their place. The underlying problems of idle, isolated and undisciplined troops combined with available al￾cohol quickly re-emerged, and so too did violence against civilians. For Foker, it was back to square one, though hopefully the earlier experience would make a second military détente easier to achieve. SEAPA does appear to have been the key group in getting the Freedom of Information draft ac￾cepted on the national legislature docket for action during the current session, but it should also be noted that at slot 21 on the calendar, it will get considered after item 16 in the queue, which is a proposal to increase governmental secrecy strongly backed by the military. If the latter passes, SEAPA’s bill may well become impossible to pass. YAPPIKA asserts it was an important player in influence the passage of the Foundation Law, but there are surely other claimants here (as with any important law passed in a national legislature), and while YAPPIKA was surely important, a true accounting would almost certainly show others getting a share of the glory. From what the review team could ascertain about the Sidoarjo City 23 Forum, it does deserve major credit for the street vendors resolution passed by the DPRD, but it appeared to us that the real motive here was not so much to obtain a suitable venue in which the vendors could thrive as to relegate disruptive street hawkers to someplace where they would bother fewer people. Similarly, there may be less than immediately meets the eye with other at￾tainments on the advocacy ladder. LEKSIP’s draft labor law was after all rebuffed by the DPRD, promises about gambling given to the Mojokerto City Forum are at this stage only prom￾ises, and so on. Even after the discounting, however, the ladder still makes it possible to pinpoint some real achievements. Given the long historical backdrop of an unresponsive and unaccountable state at all levels and the smothering effect the New Order had on civil society, it does count for some￾thing when a CSO gains a grip on one of the advocacy ladder’s rungs. The ladder, then, facili￾tates assessing CSP impact attainment, making it possible to zero in on where successes occur. The advocacy ladder should also be understood as a device to gauge ambition and suggest new initiatives, not just assess attainment. Its central importance for CSSP lies in its ability to indi￾cate how far a CSO has advanced, where it now wants to go, and where it might be advised to proceed in the future. For instance, LEKSIP should be encouraged to try again with different tactics on its labor law proposal, and if it succeeds in gaining passage, to advance to promoting transparency in working conditions. The Pamekasan City Forum should be encouraged to think how the public services complaint center might lead to efforts to reform city administration, thus shifting from transparency to empowerment on the ladder. If the Mojokerto city executive fails to deliver on its gambling promises, the City Forum there could launch queries to find out why not, moving from representation to attempted transparency on the ladder. Foker should consider developing a constituency that could serve as a permanent advocate for citizen interests, so that a continuing presence would be available in Merauke to deal with the military each time a new unit gets posted there. Similar prescriptions could be made for most of the CSOs included in these two tables. In one last comment on the ladder, we should note that it should not be taken as a universal pre￾scriptive tool to exhort “upward” movement through the rungs, nor is the ranking concept of trustee/constituency/membership to be considered a directive instruction to all CSOs. Indeed, in some cases, to go “up” one ranking would mean to go “down” the other. For instance, the Sido￾arjo City Forum would perhaps be best advised to mobilize citizens affected by the toxic factory effluent to bring more pressure on the city authorities, which would mean expanding from a trus￾tee to a constituency-based approach. But while this would mean shifting up one ranking in the three-level CSO typology, it would mean moving down the advocacy ladder, from representation to mobilization and voice. What a particular CSO should be advised to do, then, is very contin￾gent upon the situation within which it is working. The value of the ladder and CSO typology is to offer a framework for making diagnoses and providing advice. The media Strictly speaking, CSSP’s media support efforts don’t exactly fit under PO1 in the same sense as the sectoral CSOs and the local governance initiatives, for the media do not consist of CSOs. Nor is there a specific media component elsewhere in CSSP. But the media certainly do fit into PO1’s second sub-objective (to “analyze needs and policy issues”) and to some extent into its third one (to “articulate recommended reforms”), as well as the fourth (to “monitor the effective 24 implementation of these reforms”), so it makes sense to evaluate media program impact under the PO1 heading. Headquartered in Surabaya, LKM/Media Watch was the most exciting of the CSSP media grantees that we visited. Founded by Sirikit Syah, an dynamic and crusading journalist, LKM has assumed a leading role in promoting press freedom, journalistic standards and ethics as well as media involvement in public affairs. Its lead activity, supported earlier by an OTI grant and now with CSSP funding, has been its monthly Media Watch Newsletter, which provides a self￾scrutiny of the media as well as monitoring press freedom issues. It has also pioneered radio journalism, most notably with a weekly radio talk show on Surabaya’s most popular radio sta￾tion. Recently the show has focused on police violence against reporters, domestic abuse, and the government’s removal of a TV station license. The “watch” approach is also embodied in another CSSP grantee program supporting ISAI, which produces a monthly Media Watch maga￾zine focusing on the media itself, particularly on media law. Though discussed above as a CSO advocate for journalists as a constituency, SEAPA should also be considered as a media organization, documenting and publicizing official harassment of the press. Like LKM and ISAI, it also publishes a monthly journal called Alert. One last media organization visited was Jubi, a weekly adat community newspaper published in Jayapura. Jubi has been supported not by CSSP but under a direct grant from the CPT team and so serves as one of our ancillary “360º” examples. Begun as an underground operation during the Suharto period, Jubi now seeks to be the “voice of the voiceless” for the adat community, which the regular press largely ignores. Allied with the Foker CSO, the paper has received CPT support for several activities, among them investigative journalism (which is very resource￾intensive for small publications). It has done in-depth reporting on topics like illegal logging and construction corruption, and has now positioned itself as the “Special Autonomy Watchdog” to monitor and report on the new legal measures that went into effect for Papua province in early 2002, designed to meet at least some of the popular adat demands for less central control.30 Performance Objective 2. Effective administrative management and planning Objective Statement. “Improve the ability of Indonesian NGOs to plan and manage their activi￾ties and resources.” (Contract, p. 12). Results Indicators. The “results targets/deliverables” indicators outlined in the contract (p 12) are: Year 1 – Selected Indonesian NGOS have suitable financial management systems in place Years 2 & 3 – Strategic Plans in Place, including performance targets and measurement Year 4 – Appropriate policies regarding personnel, travel, training, and property man￾agement in place Year 5 – Routine and surprise audits have no major findings. 30 The Jubi staff consider their reporting on the framing of the Special Autonomy Act as their best journalistic ini￾tiative, during which they were able to publish drafts of the act and to advocate for its passage. 25 Among the many components included under this PO, which is often referred to more generi￾cally as “capacity building” are financial management, internal auditing, accessing technical ser￾vices, strategic planning, target setting, defining indicators of progress, collecting data, monitor￾ing, evaluating, close-out, personnel management and policies, and property management. The impact of PO2 comes both internally in the form of stronger CSOs and externally in the form of CSOs more capable of raising resources on their own (PO3) and better able to take on the advo￾cacy work of PO1 that is the core purpose of CSSP, as shown in Figure 1. Main findings. Through the grant development and management processes, CSSP has enhanced the capacities of Indonesian NGO grantees in financial management and in developing strategic plans including performance targets and indicators. More specifically, during its first year of op￾erations, CSSP established a three-phase procedure for determining financial worthiness of the NGO grantees, which included prior assessment, software adoption, and monitoring. This sys￾tem has been followed down to the present. While it is formally a part of PO4, it is also very much a tool for strengthening CSO financial management systems (i.e., the first-year objective for PO2), so it is considered here. In the prior assessment phase, CSSP’s financial management staff looks for and endeavors to correct weaknesses in an applicant CSO’s internal system pertaining to management capabilities, financial management, accounting system, internal control, property and procurement system and budget analysis. The range of action for these categories may include disclosure of finan￾cial reports to members, developing guidelines for salaries, benefits and per diem, opening a bank account for the grant and segregation of funds, requiring multiple quotes for procurement, a monthly work plan and budget, etc. The second phase includes installation and adoption of financial management system software as part of the requirement for receiving a CSSP grant. All grantees are required to use the account￾ing software Quick-Books Pro.Ink31. Training on the use of software is provided by CSSP. In the third or monitoring phase (which begins after a grant has been received), the grantee submits monthly financial reports (needed to obtain the next month’s cash advance), and CSSP financial management unit visits grantees on a regular basis to determine compliance with established procedures.32 But the PO2 aim of improving “effective administrative management and planning” comprises much more than financial management per se. It also entails developing strategic plans and work plans, personnel management systems, non-financial monitoring schemes, and policy analysis skills among other things. Through a combination of CSSP’s ongoing one-on-one technical as￾sistance to the grantees with group training, either by CSSP itself or NGO service providers such as SATUNAMA and INSIST, partner NGOs have been enabled to develop these capacities.33 And CSSP grantees have also provided group training, as with Foker and SKP offering work￾shops in human rights advocacy. Two of the tools used by CSSP should be mentioned here in particular. The first is the self￾assessment instrument introduced to the CSOs called Participatory Advocacy Self-Assessment 31 The Quickbooks program is an applied software accounting package easily found in local markets. 32 Several grantees found particular expense items were “disallowed” after their reports were analyzed by CSSP, and there was one case in which CSSP terminated a grant because of irregularities. 33 For more specific information on measurement issues (included as part of the results indicator target for Years 2 and 3), see our discussion under PO4. 26 (PACSA), which provides them an opportunity to assess their advocacy capacity involving con￾stituents and stakeholders and refine the advocacy plan if necessary.34 The second tool is the old USAID “logical framework” approach, which was mentioned by a number of NGOs interviewed as the “most useful instrument” in the development of their individual strategic plans, including performance targets and measurements. In particular, they said that the log-frame approach pro￾vided visualization of the relevance of identified activities, time frame, action, actors and budget vis-à-vis the project objectives.35 It seems reasonable to conclude, especially in view of the very rudimentary planning and man￾agement skills possessed by most grantees at the time of their grant applications, that it has been the CSSP training that has in significant measure enabled grantees to exercise the management capability and to formulate the plans they appeared to have in place at the time of the review team’s work.36 All this took much effort from CSSP, resulting in meeting the results targets for Years 2/3. The effort included some 35 workshops, training sessions, etc., involving almost 800 participants down through the first half of calendar 2002, plus much one-on-one consultation not included in such data.37 Attribution is often a difficult claim to make in the foreign aid sphere, particularly in democracy work, where so many multiple causes are at play, and especially with training, which is traditionally difficult to trace through to outcomes, but it would seem to be in order here. Credit can be claimed.38 Performance Objective 3: Strengthening NGO Capacity to obtain Funding and Develop Sustainable Operations Objective Statement. “Designated Indonesian NGOs will be able to apply for and secure grant funding for the pursuit of their democracy- promotion activities from international donors and local sources. In addition Indonesian NGOs will plan to and raise funds through individual and institutional donations and other income generating activities.” (Contract, p. 12). Result Indicators. The “results targets/deliverables” indicators outlined in the contract (p 12) are: Year 1 – Selected Indonesian NGOs acquainted with procedure for application to USAID for funding. Year 2 - Indonesian Applications to Contractor are approved. Year 3 - Selected Indonesian NGO secure funding from other donors. Year 4 – Fund-raising plans in place. Main findings. In general, CSSP has not only met the requirements of this Program Objective including the results indicators and the attendant benchmarks but in some cases has gone beyond the required task. In making this conclusion, however, we would also observe that the hurdles 34 Among other techniques the PACSA instrument includes training in SWOT analysis, which stands for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats 35 CSSP (and evidently quite a few grantees) have found the log-frame approach valuable, even though this standard USAID procedure of the 1980s has long been out of fashion within the Agency itself. 36 We should note that several grantees, in all cases more experienced organizations, complained that they already knew everything brought up by CSSP staff or presented in training sessions, that the capacity building enterprise was too simple for them, etc. But the vast majority of grantees did appear to find it very useful. 37 The quantitative data on training is from Mintz (2002, Attachment B). 38 That credit belongs to PO4 as well as PO2, we should stress. 27 for this PO appear to have been quite modest, perhaps reflecting a feeling that a civil society so soon out of the starting blocks after Indonesia’s democratic transition would have a very hard time attaining any degree of self-sustainability. Happily any such somber prognosis has been disproved, as CSSP-assisted CSOs have made some headway toward this end. Even so, the road ahead to a genuine sustainable civil society sector remains a very long one indeed, and one that few if any CSOs will traverse completely in the near-term future. Certainly the results expected for years one and two have been achieved, in significant part no doubt because they constituted a central component of PO4 as well as PO2. That is, as part of the grant-making process, would-be grantees had to get their proposals up to an acceptable stan￾dard, for which they received considerable technical assistance and guidance from CSSP’s PO4 component. We have mentioned elsewhere, but it is worth pointing out again here that much of the arduous work required on the part of applicants did pay dividends, not only in terms of the grant money itself but also by way of making the grantee organizations more capable of propos￾ing, designing, implementing, monitoring, accounting for and reporting on their programs – all qualities that are essential to becoming self-sustaining operations. Most of the grantees – par￾ticularly the newer ones emerging after the democratic transition – entered the civil society arena thinking that good ideas and energetic leadership constituted both necessary and sufficient re￾quirements to succeed as organizations, but in the course of obtaining their grants they began to understand that a good deal more was called for. Beyond this, the PO2 training materially im￾proved grantee prospects for undertaking the strategic planning and making the proposals re￾quired to obtain funding from other donors. During the first half of 2002, CSSP began conducting a survey of its grantees, in order to get an idea of their ability to raise funds from other donors. Results are shown in Table 4. Of the 17 CSOs included so far (out of the 44 which had received grants), 11 were “older” organizations, dating from before the 1998 democratic transition, while 6 were “new” (i.e., post-Suharto) CSOs. As of the time of the survey, 5 of the 11 old CSOs and 4 of the 6 new ones had received funding from other donors. It is significant that new as well as old organizations have been able to raise resources, for it could be argued that at least some of the older ones might have developed abilities to do so on their own (though several of them have said that the CSSP training and TA helped them materi￾ally in this regard). For example LP3ES, one of the most well-established NGOs in Indonesia, had been obtaining support from other donors before the democratic transition of 1998 and will most likely continue doing so long after CSSP finishes its work. But the newer ones, which gen￾erally lacked NGO competence in all dimensions, surely would have found it much more diffi￾cult to build such skills on their own. The fact that a number of them have managed to raise funds from other donors with CSSP help provides strong evidence that the assistance was critical to their success. In any case, the performance shown in Table 4 would appear to more than ful￾fill the results indicator requirements for CSSP’s third year. 28 Table 4. CSSP-assisted CSOs and resource generation (results of a CSSP survey) CSO Organization Applied for grant Grant re￾ceived Services supplied ISAI Ford Foundation UNDP X X X X Lakpesdam NU No applications LBH Proposal under preparation LKIS TAF IFES X X X X LP3ES Ford Foundation Sasakawa Peace Foundation IFES World Bank AusAID DfID GOI – Dept of Internal Affairs GOI – Dept of Agriculture Local governments PAN (political party) Adidas Corporation X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X Muklis (Yamajo) Proposal under preparation SPEKTRA No applications WALHI PACT DfID UNDP X X X X X Yayasan Obor No applications YLKI Ford Foundation ESCAP/UN Wemos CI-ROAP X X X X X X X Older CSOs – founded before 1998 (n = 11) YPRK No applications KOAK TIFA INFID X X X X KPMS UNDP TIFA X X X X PAKTA TAF IFES AusAID Coca Cola Various organizations X X X X X X X X X SPEKHAM Proposal under preparation YPSDI UNDP Newer CSOs – founded in 1998 & after (n = 6) Yayasan Law Coali￾tion Asia Foundation AusAID Ford Foundation National Democratic Institute Yayasan TIFA X X X X X X X X X X CSOs identified in bold italics have also generated income from commercial sales. 29 Beyond submitting proposals to donors other than USAID, CSSP has introduced the concept of internal resource generation, and sent several NGOs to a fund raising workshop in Manila that was subsequently followed by two in-country workshops. While the concept is not new to some of the older NGOs (e.g., LP3ES realizes some income from selling publications), many newer organizations find it difficult to accept. Some fear that too much emphasis on commercial ven￾tures could distract them from their main mission, turning them into business or consultancy groups, while others shy away from any diversion from their civil society rationale – perhaps not surprising in a sector staffed largely by young idealists. Still others, however, have started to take advantage of previously realized opportunities such as charging fees for services (e.g. PAKTA Foundation offering short courses on website development through their training center, Bina Swagiri offering in-house capability for arranging training, facilitating workshops/seminar using the Technology of Participation approach, etc). One further option toward building a self-sufficient civil society sector is corporate philanthropy, which has enjoyed some success in countries such as India, the Philippines and Thailand, but which has heretofore been largely unknown in Indonesia. Here CSSP along with other donors – particularly TAF and Ford Foundation – organized a gathering last April called “CEO to CEO Meeting on Corporate Social Responsibility,” which involved the top management of BP and Shell oil corporations among others. The event ended with the CEOs in attendance each promis￾ing to bring 5 new CEOs for the next event with BP offering its office space, Shell volunteering to organize the event and PT Sigma Cipta Caraka offering their personnel for the administrative functions. Hopefully this initiative will lead to some serious corporate commitment to support￾ing civil society in Indonesia. Performance Objective 4. Grants to Indonesian NGOs Awarded and Managed Effectively. Under this heading of grant management, we have included attention to the grant monitoring and evaluation (M&E) process that also forms an integral component of CSSP, although it is man￾aged within CSSP as a separate activity relating to all the POs. Objective Statement. “The Contractor shall award and managed approximately 10-15 grants yearly to Indonesian NGOs and provide the technical and administrative services to these grant￾ees. These grants will also support NGOs working in democracy-promotion, but will also sup￾port NGOs focusing on long-term civil society issues such as financial sustainability, domestic constituency building, and self-accreditation and self-regulation….” (contract, p. 12). Results Indicators: The results targets outlined in the contract (p 16) are: Year 1 – Successful grant solicitation, general information, and/or review of unsolicited proposals for grants (as appropriate to the domestic political environment) under￾taken semi-annually and as necessary. Proposals for grant funding are quickly and efficiently processed and awarded; Year 2 – Grants awarded are managed effectively; Year 3 – Regular grant monitoring, evaluation, close-out services and timely reporting provided to USAID and grantees. General Findings. Though the grant making process proved a lengthy one, particularly in the program’s first couple of years, CSSP has invested very significant and generally successful ef￾forts to make potential CSOs with promising proposals become grantworthy organizations. The 30 monitoring and evaluation system initially underwent a sequence of problems, most of which were resolved, but other new ones have emerged ultimately from USAID/Washington to cause ongoing difficulties. The grant making process. A combination of dual grant approval and embryonic CSO capabil￾ity in grant application produced a very slow approval process (see Figure 4 for a graphic presen￾tation of the system). The former meant extra reviewing time, while the latter necessitated much TA from CSSP to get potential grantees up to standard in their proposals (e.g., 85% of applicants had no previous experience in making proposals). These two factors led to an average 12-month process to approve grants, which all sides (CPT, CSSP and especially grantees themselves) thought far too long. More recent grants have come within 7-8 months.39 In the year 2000, when CSSP got into full operating gear, there were 7 grantees. In 2001 there were 25 grantees, and in 2002, up to July, there have been 12 grantees. These 44 emerged from some 1,500 requests for funding, so the winnowing process has been severe. The lack of CSO capability also meant problems of absorptive capacity – CSOs could not use￾fully spend grants of the size initially contemplated, so grant size had to be reduced significantly (average Rp. 1.1b). This meant a larger number of grants were possible (44 awarded through spring 2002), but CSSP management time had to expand to accommodate them (which necessi￾tated more staff). One important step – arguably the most important one – in grant management is the strengthen￾ing of potential CSOs to be eligible as CSSP grantees. At this stage (the box labeled “CSSP GM Visit” in Figure 4) CSSP provided TA like the training in PACSA, financial management, strate￾gic planning, logical framework development, and workplan design. These efforts have contrib￾uted materially to grantee capacity to carry out their work agendas once the grants become avail￾able.40 We should note that virtually all the grantees we met had definite things to say about the grant awarding process. With only the barest hint at a question, the vast majority of grantees offered what soon became for the team a familiar litany. They found the grant process overlong, cum￾bersome and in some cases annoying (frequent comparisons were made with other less demand￾ing donors). But almost all said that in the end they found it useful, particularly its financial management aspects, and that the experience had made them more effective organizations. There were a few older NGOs who found the elaborate CSSP training and consultation some￾what simple-minded (“we knew all that, why were they wasting our time?”), but the vast major￾ity found it of great value despite the organizational pain it entailed. Some discounting is re￾quired, of course, when grant recipients bestow praise on donor practices, for after all most of them would like to obtain follow-on support for their programs, but the consistency of this “cod￾liver oil” response (tastes-awful-but-it’s-good-for-me) led the review team to conclude that the grant-making process was inducing some degree of real professionalization in the grantees. 39 A procedures manual (titled “How to be a Grant Manager”) presently under preparation should help the process further. 40 In a sense, this part of the training belongs under PO2 rather than PO4, for it is indeed building capacity, but in CSSP terms it belongs in the present discussion of PO4. 31 Figure 3. The Grant Making Process Synopsis PRC Reject No Yes CPT GM CSSP GM Under Rp. 500 mil￾lion Over Rp. 500 mil￾lion CSSP/CPT GM Visit Selection Process CSSP GM Visit Program dev. Training organi￾zation & finance assessment Full Package USAID Ap￾proval GRANT Monitoring Visits Financial reviews Audit Close out Proposal ar￾rives 32 Monitoring and evaluation. The development of an M&E system that would be both satisfac￾tory by USAID/Washington standards and useful in tracking CSSP grant implementation has been difficult, for at least three reasons. First, an underlying problem has been that the two de￾siderata mentioned in the previous sentence have not implied necessarily similar systems by any means. USAID/Washington’s concerns with Managing for Results, which led to the R4 report￾ing system with its IRs, indicators, etc., took up a considerable amount of management time without producing measurement tools that were much help to CSSP’s operations. This system has, of course, been the subject of much protracted debate throughout the Agency, and is pres￾ently in process of reformulation (to a more qualitative approach, we hope). A second problem impacting CSSP’s ability to get an M&E system operating was the demands made by CPT on CSSP’s M&E specialist in the first two years of the contract to help construct its own system, which meant that her ability to deal with CSSP’s own M&E needs was corre￾spondingly diminished. This difficulty has abated more recently, with decreased demands from CPT and a new M&E specialist on the CSSP team. The third obstacle to a smoothly operating M&E system has again come from USAID/Washing￾ton in the form of the new yes/no performance measures specified for the 2002 annual report,41 which are apparently destined to be replaced by yet another approach in the form of a Perform￾ance Monitoring Plan to be implemented in (we think) FY 2003.42 The cumulative effect of these constraining factors has been an unsure and changing M&E sys￾tem that has proven confusing and troublesome for CPT, CSSP and the reporting grantees. CSSP has undertaken several attempts to deal with the situation. From the beginning it has em￾ployed the old “logical framework” approach of the 1980s, abandoned by USAID itself in the changeover to the R4 system, but useful to help grantees track what they are doing against the backdrop of a broader strategy and to help CSSP understand where they are going. Grantees were also required to submit Semi-Annual Reports (SARs), using indicators chosen in consultation with the CSSP M&T specialist from a list of 16 assembled by CSSP. But this ap￾proach was then scrapped when USAID switched to the yes/no mechanism amid strong indica￾tions that another system would soon be coming (which is what the PMP turned out to be, we gather). Rather than train its grantees to use the yes/no tool and then have to train them again, CSSP has elected to ask their grantees to continue using the outcomes measures they had crafted as part of their logframe analyses, with CSSP taking responsibility for translating them into the appropriate yes/no answers. Then when PMP actually comes into effect for FY 2003, CSSP can begin using it with their grantees. Altogether, under the rapidly changing circumstances CSSP has faced on the M&E front over the past year or so, this appears to the team to have been a good path to take. Financial monitoring has constituted a different activity at CSSP, with its end-of-grant audits and especially its required monthly financial reports using the QUICKBOOK software package. This financial tracking system, developed by Financial Management Specialist team at CSSP, can also be used as an early warning system to detect grant misallocation or misuse. An example here was PUSBIK Lampung, a Sumatran NGO dealing with local capacity building program for local legislatures, executives and communities in Bandar Lampung. In May 2001 PUSBIK be- 41 See “USAID 2002 Annual Report Indicators,” Dated 3 December 2001. 42 See CPT, “Revised Performance Monitoring Plan,” n.d. 33 come a CSSP grantee, and seven months later in November CSSP found unusual items in the monthly financial report. CSSP then decided to send an independent auditor, who found signifi￾cant misuse of funds by the director, and the grant was terminated. In another case, CSSP review of monthly reports identified what turned out to be an internal conflict between director and fi￾nance manager of KOAK Lampung, another local NGO dealing with anti-corruption issue. In this instance, it was possible to rectify the situation and the grant continued. Special Activities Fund (SAF) Purpose/Objective. The SAF is a mechanism under the CSSP to support short-term, discrete and event-based activities that allows the program to respond to issues arising in program im￾plementation. The mechanism also allows USAID/I to respond to opportunities related to Indo￾nesia’s democratic transition Results Indicators. No indicator was identified for this activity in the contract. Instead, illus￾trative examples were provided for its use, which included among others: • Cost of production and printing of technical materials; • Cost of special studies; • Certain costs associated with organization and implementation of conferences, seminar, workshops, training programs, etc; • Limited commodity and technical support for cooperating organizations; and • Costs associated with receiving and briefing visiting professionals. Findings. So far, 59 activities have been funded since the start of the program, and just over half (51%) of the $1.6 million allocation for the SAF has been expended. By year, there were 4 SAF activities in 1999, 34 in 2000, 18 in 2001 and 3 during the first six months of 2002. The SAF-supported efforts appear to fall into two groups, with some supporting POs 1, 2 and 3, while others have largely assisted other USAID Mission SOs. Examples of more directly linked activities include: • PO1 (advocacy) – ¾ Civil Rights workshop/seminar on strategies to protect civil rights in Papua organized and presented by AlDP (an addition to the grant awarded to AlDP); ¾ Human rights training and dialogues in Ilaga, Puncak Jaya and Bidogai, Nabire, ar￾ranged and facilitated by SKP in Jayapura (an example of an ad hoc award to an or￾ganization not a regular CSSP grantee). • PO2 (capacity building) – ¾ Financial management reporting and gender workshop for CSSP and USAID/CPT partners; ¾ Journalist training for Jubi staff by ISAI • PO3 (financial self-reliance) – ¾ 8th Asia-Pacific Fundraising Workshop in Manila; ¾ Fundraising training: In Search of Sustainability by ISAI Some examples of SAF activities/events cutting across SOs are: 34 • Energy – Energy policy roundtable discussions; Women’s energy meeting; Temu Kam￾pung meetings to discuss impacts of subsidy lifting on energy prices and local develop￾ment; • NRM – Advocacy training for environmental group by Walhi; • Economics – Regional dialogues synthesis and compilation workshops. Beyond the POs and SOs categories, the activities funded under SAF can also be grouped ac￾cording to thematic areas. Examples are: • Peace and Conflict Resolution – Study tour to South Africa for truth and reconciliation and conflict management; Conflict resolution and peace building training for CSO and Community Leaders in Papua; • Human Rights – Civil rights workshop/seminar for Papua; Attendance of 13 Indonesian Women representatives to the International War Crimes Tribunal 2000 in Tokyo; Train￾ing in Participatory Action Research in Trafficking of Women; • Good Governance – Survey for and Publication of opinion poll for DPR, with evaluation; National NGO Conference: NGO and Democracy; Workshop on local autonomy; • Media Development – Production of Public service announcements; Journalist training for Jubi staff; Press conference & talk show Re: Public TV transition; Tour to U.S., Can￾ada, Korea to study public broadcasting; • Legal System – Legal drafting training at Tulane University; National Law Commission hearings on Legal Reform; • Planning – Farmers meeting to discuss development and local policy issues with govern￾ment in East Java; regional dialogues synthesis and compilation workshop; etc. Initially there was some uneasiness within CSSP that the SAF was being programmed overmuch by CPT for other SOs beside SO7, but over time a better understanding between the two entities developed, partly in consequence of personnel changes in both offices, but also because of ef￾forts like a one-day retreat funded from the SAF that led to a improved relationship.43 Overall, we found the SAF to bring at least three definite benefits to the CSSP enterprise. First, it supported small, discrete activities that were additional to the main grant program but contrib￾uted to the POs. Some of these were undertaken by regular CSSP grantees (e.g., the AlDP work￾shop on civil rights), while others were conducted by organizations having no other links to CSSP (for example, human rights training offered by SKP). Secondly, SAF-funded efforts func￾tioned to publicize CSSP to non-grantees, particularly in workshop settings. For instance, AlDP, Foker and LPPMA – all human rights CSOs in Papua – first learned of CSSP in SAF-supported workshops and then applied successfully for grants. Third, it permitted a number of initiatives (e.g., travel to foreign workshops) that appeared to benefit CSOs but which could not have been funded under the regular grant program. 43 Several CSSP members mentioned the retreat as an important event in creating better relations between CSSP and CPT. 35 III. CSSP and Mission Management Issues: a consolidated list In its SOW, CPT specified a number of “specific CSSP and Mission Management Issues” to be addressed by the evaluation team. The SOW listed nine such issues (see Annex C, pp. 69-70), but a review by the team indicated that they could be boiled down to four essential queries, which are listed below. We hope that our answers to these four questions will address all the major issues CPT is interested in. a. Was the original design adequate to the task contemplated? How did the program changes introduced in late FY 2000 change things? Given Indonesia’s sheer size and the uncertain political environment obtaining in 2000, the na￾tional scope laid out for CSSP was probably too ambitious. As the Mission’s 2000 CSP ob￾served, the “Agency alone cannot leverage reform” (p 4). The change to a regional strategy was well taken, at least on the civil society and governance front. The provincial focus has been sig￾nificantly more manageable for both CSSP and CPT. b. Has CSSP met the objectives set forth in the contract? CSSP is on track in meeting all the objectives as of the half-way point in LOP. See Chapter 2 for a detailed discussion of the objectives by PO. c. How does CSSP perceive its relationship with CPT? In the program’s early stages, CPT was perceived as having too much hands-on control, but given the macro-political sensitivities of that period in the context of USG diplomatic needs, the close supervision was probably justified. Ironically, at this same time, CSSP thought itself being encouraged to downplay its USAID sponsorship and give that connection a low profile, leading some in the Indonesian community (as well as other donors) to wonder if CSSP were an autono￾mous granting agency when in fact it was being quite tightly managed by USAID. As Indone￾sian political anxieties eased and new management came on board at CPT, program control from the Mission side became more relaxed, and a significantly more comfortable relationship has been realized. CSSP now sees itself more as a partner, though various aspects of the supervisory relationship continue to be tighter than it would prefer in terms of the grant award process and grant management. The reality is that CSSP continues to be a contract with a shorter-than￾normal leash, a condition that CSSP has shown itself willing to accept and perform well within. d. What are the linkages between CSSP/CPT and other Mission SOs? With other USAID￾supported DG players (TAF and the CPT apart from CSSP)? How are these linkages far￾ing? These linkages appear to be less well developed than they could or should be in all these direc￾tions. CSSP has few linkages with other Mission SO teams (aside from some informal ex￾changes with the DLG team), but then then CPT has not particularly encouraged such relation￾ships. As for relations between CPT and other SO teams, the review team cannot comment at any length, as its need to focus on the contractor and its grantees in depth has precluded it from spending as much time as it would have liked with people at the Mission. 36 CSSP relations with other donors and USAID grantees operating in the civil society arena ap￾peared cordial and sometimes productive (e.g., the initiative taken with the Ford and Asia Foun￾dations to interest CEOs in sponsoring democratization efforts), though they could probably be intensified with benefit to all parties. There appears to be much less interaction between CSSP and USAID-supported grantees or contractors operating outside the DG field (e.g, the PHN￾supported FHI and its grantee YOSANTO in Papua, with which some helpful advocacy syner￾gies might be effected, given the important role that advocacy efforts have come to assume for NGOS working in the HIV/AIDS sector). 37 IV. Major issues At the presentation session held on 24 July 2002 at USAID/Jakarta, presided over by Mission Director Terry Myers and attended by the CPT as well as other interested parties at the Mission, a number of new issues emerged in which the director and others expressed strong interest. The list below represents a distillation of those issues, as vetted with CPT team leader Michael Cala￾van and CSSP’s CTO Robert Hansen on 26 July. These eight issues are addressed in this chap￾ter of the report. To these eight, we add a ninth, for the thrust of our main recommendations suggesting a change in CSSP’s direction during its final two years leads us to conclude that the benchmarks and expected results set forth in the original contract would also need changing. 1. CSO survival. How many if any supported CSOs can be expected to survive on their own at EOP? Short of answering that, what degree of self-sufficiency might be expected of (at least some) CSOs? 2. Comparative advantage. What comparative advantage(s) has CSSP developed vis-à-vis other USAID SO initiatives? Other CPT efforts? Activities sponsored by other donors? 3. Prioritizing. What are the real core elements of CSSP? What ought we be thinking should stand as CSSP’s principal attainments at EOP, especially in view of what is likely to become diminished funding during the program’s remaining lifetime? 4. Institutionalizing capacity building. How might the capacity building capabilities devel￾oped over the course of CSSP be institutionalized into an enduring legacy? 5. Coordination among CSSP grantees. What kinds of coordination (networking, etc.) could be established among CSSP grantees? Between CSSP grantees and those assisted by other CO teams? 6. Coordination between SOs. What kinds of coordination could be established between the SO teams at USAID/Jakarta? 7. Balance between PO2 and PO4. During the remainder of LOP, what should be the balance between emphasizing new grants (PO4) vs. building further capacity among present (or com￾pleted) grantees (PO2)? 8. Building model programs. Here the team was asked to flesh out our ideas about building model programs in selected provinces that would form the critical legacy of CSSP: Papua and Aceh on conflict reduction/human rights, and East Java on general decentralized govern￾ance. 9. (added). Modfying the contract. If the recommendations made in this report are followed, what would be the impact on the guidelines set out in the CSSP contract? 38 Issue 1. CSO survival How many if any supported CSOs can be expected to survive on their own at the program’s end? Short of answering that, what degree of self-sufficiency might be expected of (at least some) CSOs? We can begin our answer to this question with several observations. First, some of the older ones like LP3ES, LPKP and Foker would endure, most surely, for they had been managing on their own before CSSP arrived on the scene, and indeed had even managed to carry on under the New Order regime. And at least a few of the newer ones such as AlDP have likely picked up enough organizational skills independently of CSSP support to continue on when their funding ends. Secondly, there are a few older CSOs that will eventually collapse on their own, despite whatever short-term life-support they can get from donors. And correspondingly, a number of the newer organizations will not remain on the scene beyond the end of donor support, for they are just not capable of mastering the skills they would need to survive. Given the newness of so much of civil society in Indonesia, there are probably more of these latter groups than we would like to think. If we ask how many CSOs that would otherwise have perished at EOP will CSSP have helped survive, the question becomes much more difficult to answer. The odds in many ways are not favorable, for several reasons. First, as noted just above, civil society itself is only in the first blush of life in the post-Suharto era. Compared with other political systems in the region emerg￾ing from authoritarian rule in the past 15 years or so – Bangladesh, the Philippines and Thailand are obvious examples – there was almost no earlier experience of civil activism to fall back on for inspiration, guidance or just plain inertial momentum. For most CSOs, everything has to be learned from scratch. Secondly and compounding the first problem, so many newer CSOs were begun by idealistic younger people, still in or just out of university. They brought with them the energy and enthusiasm required to launch a successful enterprise, but they lacked the experience and practical knowledge needed to make things work over time. Thirdly, CSSP grants tend to be fairly short. Of the first 44 grants made, half were for 12 months or less, while only two were for longer than 18 months. Shorter grants make good sense, given the finite size of the CSSP portfo￾lio, the modest absorptive capacity of most CSOs and the need to support a wide variety of or￾ganizations in a the time allotted, but this practice also means less time and attention can be de￾voted to helping any particular CSO build long-term skills in self-sustainability. Fourthly, the political atmosphere that was so euphoric and encouraging at the beginning of the transition has faded somewhat in the time since then. The Megawati government is still suppor￾tive of civil society but not to the extent that Gus Dur’s and Habibie’s governments were. In a confrontation between a civil society coalition and the military – say regarding human rights is￾sues – would the Megawati government be as concerned with democratic rights as the previous regimes were? The fact that it makes sense to ask such questions indicates that they have a reso￾nance today that they did not possess a little while ago. Finally, if Indonesia is like so many other new democracies, citizen enthusiasm for public issues (and public service) is likely to de￾cline as time goes on, with the result that it will become successively less easy to recruit new co￾horts of idealistic young people to fill CSO ranks vacated by their older compatriots who – if they resemble their counterparts elsewhere – gradually withdraw to get on with their careers and families. 39 On the most positive side we can point to some factors favoring CSO survival. First, the Yaya￾san (foundation) Law 16 of 2000 has served as enabling legislation allowing a relatively firm legal footing for CSO. An officially registered yayasan can acquire assets from foreign governments and organizations. It must have a certain structure (a management body, period of appointment of officers, method of replacing officer vacancies, periodic meetings, and the like), which could be seen as restrictive, but could also be interpreted as mandating a certain minimum degree of professionalism for the NGO community. The state’s powers to dissolve yayasans (e.g., court findings that public order and morality have been violated, inability to settle debts) can be viewed in the same light. These provisions could lead to repression, but they could also serve to ensure a degree of responsibility and sound management within the NGO sector. A second factor favoring survival is the presence of other donors. AusAID, DfID, Ford, TAF, and UNDP all have democracy grant support programs, as well as a number of Dutch organiza￾tions like HIVOS and NOVIB. This is not to say that if CSSP support ends for a CSO, another donor is going automatically to take up the slack. Indeed, if Indonesia is like other countries, donors will tend to move in tandem, so that assistance rises and declines among all of them more or less simultaneously. Only time will tell whether Indonesia is to follow the curve of such var￾ied countries as the Philippines, El Salvador and Poland, where democracy assistance jumped sharply up after a democratic transition but then declined again within a few years as donors moved to needs and opportunities elsewhere. So it may well be that the potential budget cuts looming on the USAID/Jakarta horizon are mirrored among other donors too. Still, the fact that a sizeable group of donors exists means that any single CSO has more than one chance to obtain support at any given time – to be cut off from a specific donor does not necessarily mean an or￾ganizational death sentence. Thirdly, a number of NGOs do have belt-tightening potentials somewhat like those that can be resorted to by small family-run businesses, in that staff can take salary cuts or work part-time to tide the organization over until better times emerge. This kind of subsidy cannot go on forever in most cases – people do have to get on with their lives – but it can serve as a short-term buffer. As an example, the current chairperson of AlDP in Jayapura is a young lawyer who practices her profession to support her civil society work, while several of her CSO colleagues work as lectur￾ers at local universities for the same purpose. A final favorable factor lies in the possibility of internal resource generation that a few CSOs have started to take on, such as membership fees, commercial sales (e.g., of publications), ser￾vice provision and the like. Aside from these generalities, we do have some data from a survey that CSSP has been conduct￾ing that has so far included 16 grantees. The sample thus constitutes a bit more than one-fourth of the total 44 grantees supported by CSSP at the time of our review. Moreover the cases have been added as it became possible to collect the data rather than on the basis of any scientific de￾sign (which would have been extremely difficult in any event, given the diverse range of loca￾tions and activities represented by the total 44 organizations). So the survey is at best illustra￾tive, not statistically valid. Even so, we can glean some interesting information from Table 4. Of the five older (founded before the 1998 democratic transition) CSOs sampled, three had found other funding sources and 40 in each case had received support from at least three other donor organizations.44 Among the 11 newer (1998 and after) groups, six had obtained such assistance, with five of these six receiving funding from two donors each. Altogether, then, nine of the 16 organizations, or just over half, had received financial support from new sources. The survey also revealed that one of the older CSOs has split into factions after internal squabbling among the leadership, while one newer group had ceased operations altogether. Finally, three groups had managed to generate some income from selling services. This small sample of CSOs does not make the case that CSSP will have created a self-sufficient civil society that can endure and thrive after the program ends, but it does indicate that at least some of them are acquiring skills that will help them survive over time. Issue 2. Comparative advantage What comparative advantage(s) has CSSP developed vis-à-vis other USAID SO initiatives? Other CPT efforts? Activities sponsored by other donors? Three aspects of CSSP in particular stood out to the review team as signal accomplishments of the program. In all three areas, CSSP has displayed a high degree of professionalism and com￾mitment, and has proven itself highly effective. Grantees and subgrantees commented positively at some length on all these efforts. Our strong impression is that CSSP does these things better than others in the field, especially in the grant-making area, but also in the other two discussed here. But the team cannot say definitively that CSSP has a comparative advantage over other Mission SO initiatives or CPT efforts or other donors in any of these program areas, simply be￾cause we could not conduct any systematic comparisons – to do so would have been well beyond our authorized level of effort. So we will have to say that in each of these spheres, CSSP has done very well indeed and should be commended for its work. Open-ended grant-making process. To judge from what we say and heard, a signal accom￾plishment of the CSSP project has been its efforts to assist new NGOs to become eligible as grantees for funding and its continuing commitment to nurture their organizational development after that. In the explosive growth of NGOs that took place after Suharto’s departure from power, very few of them had any clear sense of vision or mission with anything like a viable work plan. Realizing this condition, CSSP has developed an excellent system for culling out NGOs with promise and cultivating that promise into something that would prove grantworthy. Although this grant application process was laborious (on both sides) and took a long time com￾pared to other donors’ procedures, at the end of the day these new grantee had learned how to make an appropriate proposal to donors, how to develop a financial management system and how to define a logical framework for their young organizations. By doing so, some of them are now applying for new funding elsewhere, such as KOAK Lampung, IDEA Yogyakarta, SEAPA, etc. Financial management systems. This has been a strong component of the CSSP program and has been the one commented on most often (and often most positively) by grantees, as we have 44 A number of the CSOs shown in Table 4 were reluctant to share data on just how much funding they were receiv￾ing from each of these sources, citing government tax issues among other considerations. Given enough resources and time, it would be possible to query the donors involved to find out how much support they had given, but it was beyond our capacity to conduct such an investigation. In addition to the three older CSOs receiving support, two more attempted but failed to obtain other donor funding. 41 noted elsewhere in this report at some length. But presumably other SO teams in health, envi￾ronment, etc., demand similar levels of skills – after all, they must answer to the same auditing requirements faced by CPT – and so provide similar training to their grantees. And TAF told the team that as a USG-funded agency they must make equally strict demands of their grantees. So while CSSP does very well indeed at getting its grantees to institutionalize food financial man￾agement, it is in all likelihood not alone in this respect. Advocacy training. We strongly suspect that this may be a comparative advantage for CSSP, but again time and resources did not permit more than a brief peek through the 360° periscope at non-CSSP-funded organizations, so we cannot say for sure. But even though other SO teams (as well as other initiatives within the CPT itself) may encourage advocacy, doing so is not their central substantive mission as it is with CSSP. For this reason we think it would be worth look￾ing into how CSSP promotes advocacy compared with other USAID units. The purpose here would not be to assess who does it best, for this would be hard indeed to determine. All advo￾cacy efforts can be gauged on the advocacy ladder, we would say, and so general progress can be assessed, but it would be difficult to say just how hard it is to move a step higher in HIV/AIDS as against, say, organizing water consumers or protecting human rights. Instead, the purpose of a comparative study would be to uncover techniques and approaches to advocacy that could be shared across sectors to mutual advantage. Such a study would make an excellent SAF grant. Issue 3. Prioritizing What are the core elements of CSSP that should endure as its legacy and should be concentrated upon during the remainder of LOP, especially in view of what is likely to become diminished funding over that time? The limits of reasonable ambition. USAID by itself (and even the entire donor community col￾lectively) cannot inspire the transformation of Indonesian civil society into a vibrant, pluralist dynamo delivering participation and accountability at all levels. Such a goal would have been beyond the reach of donors in the Philippines, a significantly smaller policy much further along on the democratization trajectory, and this is even more so the case in Indonesia. As the Jakarta Mission’s 2000 Country Strategy Paper noted, the “Agency alone cannot leverage [fundamental] reform” (p. 4). And now the very real likelihood looms that over the remaining life of the pro￾gram, allocations will be significantly less than had been initially anticipated. But even with a lower ambition and reduced funding, it should be possible to set into place several significant legacies. The first would be the foundation for two types of civil society development at the pro￾vincial level, one centering on human rights and conflict reduction and the other on a more gen￾eral model of civil society activism. A third priority aims at institutionalizing capacity building for CSOs through civil society service provider organizations. Finally, continued support to the media can materially contribute to institutionalizing its critical role in safeguarding democratic freedom in Indonesia. These three priorities are spelled out below in more detail. Three provincial strategies. The three programs sketched out just below build on CSSP’s three major province-level efforts in Papua, Aceh and East Java. Whether measured by the number of grants awarded (including those in the pipeline to be awarded) or by the amount collectively al￾located, these three provinces represent CSSP’s major investment to date, as is clear from a glance at Table 5. 42 Table 5. Grants inventory by province, as of June 2002 Number of grants Province East Java West Java East Kali￾mantan North. Sula￾wesi Aceh Papua Total Completed & current grants 9 3 3 1 4 5 25 Grants in pipeline 6 3 4 4 1 2 20 Total grants 15 6 7 5 5 7 45 Grant funds allocated (Rp million) Province East Java West Java East Kali￾mantan North. Sula￾wesi Aceh Papua Total Completed & current grants 6.001 3.187 1.163 0.715 6.417 9.532 27.015 Grants in pipeline 4.098 3.165 3.123 4.416 0.672 1.245 16.719 Total grants 10.099 6.352 4.286 5.131 7.089 10.777 43.734 Note: Data shown here do not include grants to CSOs in other provinces or national organizations. Human rights and conflict reduction. CSSP’s programs in Papua and Aceh have launched impressive efforts focusing on human rights and conflict reduction amid political environments that at best can be characterized as somber. The challenge is now to institutionalize those efforts into a coherent whole that can endure and prosper beyond LOP. As noted elsewhere in this report, the prospects for human rights and conflict reduction in Papua are sobering indeed. The current political scene combines a repressive and violent military (and police) encouraged indirectly if not openly by Jakarta, a central government long known for its arrogance and intolerance toward the indigenous population, a rich natural resource base largely regarded as sites for plunder by non-Papuans, the beginnings of a potentially volatile fundamen￾talist religious offensive, and a long-simmering but in all probability doomed independence movement. In Aceh, the central government has been less arrogant toward locals, and the reli￾gious divide is essentially absent, but the GAM independence movement is arguably in a stronger position than the OPM in Papua, and the military repression in consequence more se￾vere.45 Despoliation of resources by outsiders and concomitant denial of benefit to locals per￾haps not as intense but is nonetheless roughly similar to what has been occurring in Papua. The basic challenge amid such unpromising prospects over the next five to ten years is not to construct a flourishing civil society on Tocquevillean lines of the sort imagined to exist in ad- 45 At least at the time of the CSSP mid-term review. Almost every day’s news reports alleged GAM rebels killed by the Army (see e.g., Ibnu Mat Noor, “14 killed in Aceh, thousands take refuge,” Jakarta Post, 27 July 2002, p 5). 43 vanced Western countries, but rather to enable local citizens to build a sustainable set of civil society institutions that will engage the state to reduce violence and protect human rights. A model for local civil society activism. While Aceh and Papua constitute special cases of concern among CSSP’s three more mature provincial programs, East Java stands as a more “typical” province less beset by violence and conflict. And it is in this less convulsed East Javan setting that CSSP can work on developing a civil society model able to endure past LOP and rep￾licable in other provincial settings. One of CSSP’s newer provincial programs in East Kaliman￾tan, North Sulawesi or West Java could also be harnessed to this task. Indeed, the prospect of crafting a model would likely prove considerably easier in either of the first two provinces, given their much smaller populations – around two million each, as of 2000, compared with 34 million in East Java and 32 million in West Java). But East Java has the head start, with nine grants completed or well under way and six in the pipeline, in addition to the City Forum program op￾erating there, as against far fewer in the other three provinces, as is clear in Table 5 below. The East Java program also has a resident grant manager, whose proximity will doubtless prove a critical factor in building a provincial model. Further thoughts on building these two types of model program will be offered below in connec￾tion with Issue 8. Institutionalizing capacity building. The most striking common characteristic displayed by CSSP grant applicants has been their near universal lack of experience with even the rudiments of NGO professionalism. There have been a few with track records that have enabled them to accumulate basic (or in some cases even sophisticated) ability to design strategies and work plans, draw up budgets, show financial management capacity in place, etc. But most applicants are the product of the post-1998 democratic dispensation or the period immediately leading up to the transition of that year. Accordingly, their principal dynamic has consisted of an enthusiastic passion for some aspect of democracy, generally accompanied by little capability for putting that passion into concerted action. Thus except for a very few cases, virtually all of the 1500 applica￾tions received by CSSP were at the outset basically unworthy of grant approval. In consequence, a great deal of CSSP management effort has been directed toward bringing po￾tential grantees up to a grantworthy level of capability, through workshops, individual counseling and site visits, and endless proposal reviews and requests for resubmission. Other donors have undertaken this kind of capacity building also,46 but our strong impression is that CSSP has man￾aged the task exceedingly well. Our thoughts on institutionalizing this kind of capacity building are offered below in the context of Issue 4. Media as a critical civil society factor. CSSP stands as only one of several players supporting the media in Indonesia. CPT has made direct grants to Internews and Yayasan Seth among oth￾ers, while the Asia Foundation and IFES (apart from its role as a CSSP consortium member) have been notable for their support of a free media. CSSP does not have an overall media strat- 46 It would be worthwhile to undertake a comparative analysis on this aspect of civil society support, say between CSSP, TAF, Ford, UNDP and other donors, for there is surely a rich experience that could usefully be shared among these donors. But such a task would have been well beyond our Scope of Work. Hopefully it could become the focus of another study, perhaps to be sponsored by some other donor(s) in conjunction with USAID. 44 egy in the sense that it has had a provincial strategy, but rather has supported media initiatives on a discrete ad hoc basis as proposals have come in.47 The review team was able to meet with five media-related CSSP grantees, as well as one direct CPT grantee (Jubi). Of these six, five have been focusing on transparency issues, three at na￾tional level (LKM, ISAI and IDEA), while one dealt with the provincial level (Jubi) and one the kabupaten (YPSDI). The sixth CSO (SEAPA) concerned itself with protecting journalists amid an increasing incidence of violence directed against them, as well as pressing for a freedom-of￾information act and nurturing the journalistic community as a civil society constituency. The two local level organizations fit nicely into the provincial programs discussed above and so should be considered in that context as essential elements in those civil society initiatives. The national level efforts deserve support in their own right. Uncovering malfeasance and protecting the journalists who do so are absolutely key to democratic sustainability; absent these two com￾ponents, no democracy can survive very long. Accordingly, even though they don’t exactly match up with the provincial aspects of what is being suggested as CSSP’s core elements, these media support efforts should be maintained through LOP. We would rate media support as a third priority, coming after the provincial civil society models and institutionalizing capacity building. A cautionary note. In urging that Papua, Aceh and East Java become the model legacy prov￾inces, we do not wish to suggest that CSSP efforts in the other three provinces be terminated, or that new grantees in the pipeline be abandoned before receiving any support, especially after all the demands that have been made of them and which they have extended themselves to meet. To do so would most certainly be seen as very bad donor behavior in Indonesian civil society cir￾cles, perhaps even more widely. Instead, we are recommending that these provinces be given special attention as forming the legacy of CSSP – its enduring contribution to Indonesian democ￾ratization. Issue 4. Institutionalizing Capacity Building How might the capacity building capabilities developed over the course of CSSP be institutional￾ized into an enduring legacy? As mentioned in the section on PO2 in Chapter two, the development of capacity building under CSSP has performed strongly with its financial management system and strategic planning train￾ing. Grantees have become empowered through a financial discipline that constitutes a first step on the way to self-sufficiency and through an ability to chart their course beyond current pro￾gram activity. An institutionalized capacity to provide expertise, counseling and training to CSOs – what might be called TA for civil society – should become a high CSSP priority over the final 2+ years of the project. USAID’s Europe and Eurasia region offers a number of examples of entrepreneurial CSO leaders forming what have come to be known as “intermediate service organizations” or ISOs that offer just this kind of TA on a fee-for-service basis to the NGO community in their re- 47 An exception here might be CSSP’s support for TVRI, the main government television operation, as it transited into becoming an independent public broadcasting enterprise. But that work had been essentially completed some time before the review team’s appearance and so was not included in our assessment. 45 spective countries.48 Closer to home, USAID/Manila’s recently completed civil society program fostered the development of similar organizations in the Philippines, such as the Venture for Fund Raising, the Philippine Council for NGO Certification, and the Philippine Council for NGO Certification.49 In Indonesia, at least three NGOs – PAKTA, INSIST and Satu Nama – have the potential to be￾come such civil society service providers, and in a sense have already served in this capacity by providing TA to CSSP through workshops, software development and the like. But their rela￾tionship with CSSP has been essentially a contractual one, with these organizations providing specific services funded by the SAF. We would encourage some thinking at CSSP and CPT di￾rected at helping these three organizations (and perhaps others to be identified – a large country like Indonesia could use several of them) to become self-sustaining ISOs that could function in￾definitely on a fee-for-service basis. Perhaps they have already attained this degree of self￾sufficiency (we didn’t think to put such a question to them at the time of interview, though in retrospect it would have been an excellent idea), or perhaps they could do so with some support from CSSP. With a little evangelizing from CPT, it should be possible to interest other SO teams in this pros￾pect and indeed other donors as well, so gathering the support – and even the funding – for insti￾tutionalizing civil service capacity building should not prove very expensive for CPT or CSSP. Certainly the other SO teams should have as much incentive to create an ongoing capacity build￾ing capability within the Indonesian NGO community. And the job should not prove to be hugely difficult, for all three organizations gave us the impression that they would very much like to function in such a role and indeed had begun to do so already. One further dimension to be explored along this line is building similar capacities at the provin￾cial level. If CSSP is to move substantially toward creating a serious and sustainable civil soci￾ety presence at provincial level as we are urging in this report, a capacity building NGO in each province would be extremely useful and likely essential. But the review team did not run across any candidate organizations eager and waiting in the wings to be assigned this role. In East Java, LPKP in Malang as a new grantee and Bina Swagiri in Tuban as a likely grantee both struck us as possibilities, but both these organizations, now concentrating on village governance, would take considerable strengthening to assume this larger task.50 Perhaps they could be helped along with assistance from one or more of the three macro-level organizations noted above, who would thus become national capacity builders of provincial capacity building NGOs. We also offer some ideas of some more specific ways to build capacity over the longer term, which might be incorporated into an initiative to build an ISO institution or to supplement such an effort: • Periodic publication and distribution of quick reference materials. These could take a bulletin form focusing on what works, where it is working, what processes were in￾volved, what were the results, names and address of people involved. Such quick refer￾ence materials, featuring a topic for every issue, could be informative and descriptive in a 48 For more on these ISOs, see Biddle et al. (1999). 49 Some of these Philippine developments are discussed in Blair (2002). 50 There may well be other NGOs in this large province of 34 million people that are better suited to the job envi￾sioned here. We were able to visit only a few groups during our short stay. 46 very short manner (2 pages, back-to-back) basically for information of all NGO partners and could be a source for future in-depth studies in highlighting “good practices”. • Developing Guidebooks and/or Workbooks - This could be one volume or divided into a set that could feature: a) Who are the donors in Indonesia, what are their priority concerns, what kind of activities they support, their addresses, and the names of contact person; b) How to prepare project proposal for donors featuring elements of good proposal, sample proposals, budget and work plans; c) a guide to financial management; d) Monitoring and Evaluation guidelines, e) Advocacy guidelines and analyses of successful advocacy efforts in the Indone￾sian context. • Support to institutions either CSOs or academics to develop training materials and act as service providers in such areas as project preparation, financial management, financial self-reliance, ToP, etc. A very concrete example is The Asia Foundation’s “Indonesia Rapid Decentralization Appraisal.” Rather than hiring competent individuals in rapid ap￾praisal system, TAF engaged institutional services in order to build the capacity of these institutions to conduct the studies. • Documenting best-practice experience on advocacy from different grantees also would be good material for sharing. Such documentation might include best practice according to thematic subjects such as dealing with BPDs on accommodating local advocacy efforts, or promoting Pemda budget transparency. Issue 5. Coordination among CSSP grantees What kinds of coordination (networking, etc.) could be established among CSSP grantees? Be￾tween CSSP grantees and those assisted by other SO teams? CSSP has begun a very promising venture in grantee networking with its MIRPP (Matching Is￾sues, Resources, People and Priorities) in East Java. The initiative was launched with a work￾shop in April 2002 that generated considerable interest that we hope it will be possible to follow up on. MIRPP is a low-cost, systematic approach to matching and prioritizing issues or needs with resources or cash and people or technical skills. It assumes that every organization has un￾tapped human resources and useful skills, which can fruitfully be explored and extended to other organizations. Some MIRPP precepts are that: • local knowledge is valuable – often more so than the technological sophistication that outsiders bring;51 • CSOs want to reduce dependency on costly external service providers. MIRPP should be able to accommodate differences in scale and special interests among CSOs, even niche concerns. During the initial meeting held in April in Surabaya, CSO participants pointed out that participation in large CSO forums has not generally had much impact on their organization or their programs. This they feel has been due primarily to major sectoral differ- 51 Students of development will recognize here ideas that resonate with Robert Chambers’ longstanding advocacy for “local people’s knowledge” – the concept that locals often understand a great deal more about development is￾sues pertinent to their situation than outsiders peddling lore from the “world shelf of knowledge.” See for instance Chambers (1983). 47 ences among members. They suggested that smaller network of like-minded committed CSOs would do better at generating and sharing experience and best practices. The MIRPP approach can also generate itself spontaneously, as appears to have been the case among CSSP grantees in East Kalimantan, who have informally adopted it on their own. Else￾where, MIRPP circles should be relatively straightforward to launch, as in Papua, where a num￾ber of CSO grantees are working on human rights and conflict reduction issues. Initially, it would probably be advisable to start with CSSP grantees, enabling them to build on what has already been a common experience in working through the challenging grant process – a kind of CSO “boot camp” that has made them all into more capable organizations. As MIRPP-generated knowledge builds up and momentum is generated, then other CSOs could be taken into the col￾lective. Issue 6. Coordination Among SOs What kinds of coordination could be established between the SO teams at USAID Jakarta? Coordination and synergy constitute two words that most USAID missions talk about a great length, but their realization has been elusive, despite continuous pronouncements and Mission Orders. It is an ongoing saga that missions struggle with, seeking answers and results. One prominent prescription has been to create a missionwide “expanded team” composed of Office Chiefs and “ambassadors” from various SOs. But generally after one or two session featuring a gathering of SO emissaries, the issue is soon lost in the radar screen. Even attempts to allocate some actual funding for coordination under each program/project, as in the Philippines during the early 1990s, failed to have significant results. For CSSP specifically, the team had two chances to observe inter-SO coordination in the field. In East Java, where there might have been expected to be significant linkages between CSSP’s City Forum program and DLG’s Perform initiative, we failed to find it. Neither program ap￾peared to have much idea of what the other one was doing or any real interest in finding out about the other one. Given the considerable overlap in their activities and objectives, in addition to their common ancestry in the earlier CLEAN Urban project, this seemed especially unfortu￾nate. In Papua, on the other hand, where we might have anticipated no linkage between CSSP’s activities and the HPN sector, there was a relationship between CSSP grantee Foker and HPN grantee FHI – at least to the extent that people knew each other at the Jayapura office and seemed have a fair idea of what each other were engaged in. It was unclear, however, to what extent the potentials of such a relationship had been exploited (e.g., FHI’s subgrantee Yasanto might have learned a great deal from the Foker-sponsored work in Merauke, but this had appar￾ently not yet begun to occur). The explanation for the disconnectedness between SOs appears to lie in some combination of the following factors:52 • Issues of coordination and synergy are virtually never part of program/project design or evaluation criteria nor are they part of the contract. Mission staff do not assign any im￾portance to coordination and synergy in project design or in tender documents. Neither 52 For an insightful analysis of how and why DG programs in particular gain less from potential cross-sectoral syn￾ergies than might be hoped, see Lippman (2001). 48 foreign service officers nor foreign service nationals advance their careers by devoting time and energy to the needs of other SOs. • SO teams work with various contractors and/or grantees that have different implementa￾tion strategies, sets of activities, time frames and tasks to be accomplished. A contrac￾tor’s Chief of Party has his mind set on his performance objectives and how they can be accomplished so that his organization is rated well by the Mission and his company rec￾ognizes accomplishments that form the basis for his continuing engagement. Each COP has little built-in incentive to coordinate with other SOs or their respective Chiefs of Party. • Turfing and personality differences among mission office chiefs, program officers and chiefs of party are always evident but rarely admitted or discussed openly. While some are open to coordinative activities, others are simply not. • Everyone is tasked but no one is in charge. Suggestions: • Putting someone in the Mission in charge of inter-SO coordination. This individual, ei￾ther a direct hire or PSC, should be the point person for coordination, who will continue to explore and remind everyone of opportunities or avenues of SO coordination. His/her performance at the task would become a part of what gets evaluated in the annual Per￾sonnel Evaluation Review. Coordination would also become a significant responsibility of office chiefs/program officers and included in their annual reviews. • Issuing periodic newsletter/emails that will include planned/future program activities and identifying opportunities for collaboration. If created in the Webpage, it should list planned activities of various SOs, identifying which other SOs can be involved, and should allow contractors to update their planned activities. Emails to office chiefs and chief of parties can also be done regularly as a supplementary mechanism. • Identifying what resources are needed and where to secure them. While some SOs may have PD&S-type funds incorporated in their programs, others may not. With reduced budget levels in future years and shrinking OE funds, some arrangements may have to be worked out to fund coordination activities among and between SOs. • Holding periodic Chiefs of Party meetings, with coordination and synergy always promi￾nently on the agenda. Each participant could be asked to share a copy of activities identi￾fying opportunities for inter-SO coordination. Meetings should take place once a month or perhaps once every quarter depending on the need as determined by the Mission. • Engaging high-level leadership. Given the many institutional constraints inhibiting SO coordination, in the end only a determined effort led by the mission director can assure its success. This kind of initiative is not a chore to be delegated to lower-ranking officers. Issue 7. Balance between PO2 and PO4 During the remainder of LOP, what should be the balance between emphasizing new grants (PO4) vs building further capacity among present (or completed) grantees (PO2)? The question here ostensibly asks how much emphasis should be placed on new grant-making (PO4) as against working with present grantees to build capacity (PO2). In a very real sense, however, given the very strong probability of an imminent reduction in CSSP funding, the query 49 will become effectively moot: new grants will have to be cut back, perhaps sharply.53 The real issue, then, is how best to steer PO2 during the remaining LOP. We have addressed this topic at some length above in our thoughts on Issue 4. Issue 8. Building model programs Here the team was asked to flesh out our ideas about building model programs in selected prov￾inces that would form the critical legacy of CSSP: Papua and Aceh on conflict reduction/human rights; and East Java on general decentralized governance. Our concept of a model provincial program centers on a coherent and purposeful and sustainable civil society presence that as an entity can survive the end of CSSP support. If present program trajectories are maintained, at CSSP’s end there should be in place a good number of CSOs per￾forming useful and even critical functions in strengthening civil society participation and ac￾countability in governance. But the net result will not be more than the several good works pro￾duced by these discrete initiatives; the whole will equal the sum of the parts if all works well, but unless some other donor steps in to fill the gap left by a departing CSSP, that sum as well as the parts themselves can be expected to lose momentum and integrity over time. And even if other revenue sources can sustain these efforts in place, they will continue at best as a collection of discrete activities without a collective purpose. The challenge, then, is to craft a strategy that will leave as CSSP’s legacy the foundation for a civil society in the large that will endure into the future.54 The exact strategies needed to produce such an outcome in our three suggested provinces of Papua, Aceh and East Java will of course have to be determined by CSSP and CPT with input from the USAID/Jakarta Program Office to assure maximal fit with other ongoing USAID￾assisted initiatives in these provinces. But we do have some suggestions that we hope will be useful in this effort. Our recommendations necessarily deal with the two provinces that we were able to visit during our brief mid-term review, Papua and East Java, but we would hope that many of our suggestions regarding Papua could be adapted to the context prevailing in Aceh as well. Papua. A Papua civil society program (and by extension an analogous one in Aceh) should focus fairly narrowly on issues of human rights and conflict reduction, for these problem areas loom more than large enough to occupy the full attention of any program that CSSP could mount. To the extent that such efforts are successful, program focus could later expand to other areas like gender, labor, environment, or occupational groups,55 but for the present, the concentration should remain as at present on the two paramount issues. The goal, then, would be to put into place a coherent, coordinated and sustainable mechanism able to defend human rights and reduce conflict in a precarious (unfavorable might be a better word here) situation of indeterminate du￾ration. CSSP’s remaining two years may well not be sufficient time to ensure such an outcome, but it should allow time to get a solid foundation for it well under way. 53 In saying this, we do want to reinforce our the cautionary note inserted at the end of our discussion of Issue 7 above, namely that grants already in the pipeline but not yet actually dispersed be honored. 54 The lack of such a strategy so far, we should note, does not constitute a CSSP program shortfall. The contract did not specify any such goal. 55 Some of these issues of course are already incorporated as subthemes into the human rights and conflict reduction initiatives, but in a full-blown civil society support effort, they would assume the place of major themes. 50 USAID-assisted civil society efforts in Papua fall into three types (at least from what we ob￾served – there may be others we didn’t see). First, there are constituency-based CSOs, which focus in significant part on the participation side of advocacy, endeavoring to mobilize and ener￾gize adat citizen groups to engage in the political process (AlDP and LPPMA). Second, there are local elite-managed “trustee” CSOs acting on behalf of unorganized constituencies (Foker, SKP and LPHP). And finally there is the weekly newspaper Jubi, pushing transparency and promoting a sense of Papuan consciousness and solidarity. A principal task would be to select a lead organization to coordinate civil society efforts in the province. Doing so would mean a serious change of tactical direction for CSSP, in that instead of reacting to proposals generated from would-be grantees, it would itself be choosing the grantee, recruiting it and pressing a specific program agenda in initiating dialogue and negotiating with it. An alternative path might be to issue a request for applications or request for proposals, but the basic idea would be the same: to find an organization that would carry out a specific task rather than invite all organizations to propose activities they would like to undertake. Fortunately, given CSSP’s experience in working with CSOs and the knowledge that it has built up in doing so, this switch should not be difficult to make. In the Papua case, Foker seemed to the team to be a good candidate for such a task.56 By its na￾ture it is a kind of umbrella organization (the “fo” in the acronym stands for “forum”), and it has directed a Peace Campaign to defuse military-civilian conflict as well as an interfaith dialogue between Muslim and Christian communities in the region. Each of these efforts has proceeded at both provincial and at selected kabupaten levels. In addition, Foker has functioned as the finan￾cial manager for its subgrantees at the kabupaten level. Other USAID-supported groups by con￾trast appear more specialized into particular niches. Foker would thus appear better positioned to become the lead entity. As the lead organization, Foker (or whatever other body is chosen) would be funded to launch a coordination effort involving like-minded CSOs, perhaps something on the order of a “human rights council” for the province, which would in turn become the strategic planning body for promoting human rights work in Papua. Such coalition or umbrella groups are not uncommon elsewhere in the region (e.g., Bangladesh, Philippines), so working models would be relatively easy to find and consult. In addition to strategic coordination, training would be a second clear priority for such a coordinating group. Over (not too long a) time, it should be possible with a ToT approach to build a Papua-based training capability that would offer the needed capacity building to provincial CSOs. The capacity building offered would be availed of by all three types of CSO – constituency-based, “trustee” and Jubi. Sustainability poses a special problem for CSOs (and by extension CSO coalitions) concentrating on human rights. Unlike many other types of CSOs, those engaged in defending human rights are with rare exceptions inherently not self sustainable, for the constituencies benefiting from their work generally cannot provide the support needed to fund operations in their behalf. Some organizations like Amnesty International and Americas Watch have achieved self-reliance through a combination of foundational support and membership drives among interested citizens in the West, but such a model cannot be easily exported to places like Papua. In short, any hu- 56 Obviously the review team cannot substitute its judgment for that of CSSP and CPT here, particularly on the ba￾sis of a few days’ visit in the field. Accordingly, our observations about Foker here amount only to what we hope are informed suggestions. 51 man rights apparatus erected in Papua cannot be expected to become self-reliant in the foresee￾able future. Rather it will have to rely on outside funding. Accordingly, a principal challenge to CSSP/CPT will be to help create an ability to seek such funding on a continuing basis – from other donors, from international groups like Amnesty International, perhaps from foreign foun￾dations. As capacity increases in the human rights/conflict reduction arena, consideration should be given to expanding the scope to include other areas covered by USAID programs, in particular HIV/AIDS, which has assumed an explosive dimension in the province. Incidence is higher than anywhere else in the country and carries the threat of becoming a debilitating public health pandemic as it has in parts of Africa. FHI and its subgrantees in the province have made some headway in launching local advocacy initiatives aimed at prevention and are just beginning to consider efforts to build constituencies among victims and their families. Such groups could fruitfully be taken into the ambit of an expanded civil society coalition in Papua. East Java. As the home of 15 CSSP-funded grantees (past, present and pipeline) as well as the City Forum program, East Java makes a clear choice to become the flagship for crafting a civil society strategy model having relevance for the vast majority of Indonesia’s provinces that are not currently riven by conflict. CSSP-assisted programs visited by the review team fall into several types. Two focus on trans￾parency (LKM in Surabaya with its MediaWatch and YPSDI in Malang with its DPRD parlia￾ment watch effort), one promotes local advocacy within its constituency (Lakpesdam NU), and three deal with local governance issues (LPKP in Malang, YAPSEM in Lamongan and Bina Swagiri in Tuban). Among the CSSP-assisted NGOs not visited are groups concentrating on civic education, gender issues and farmer advocacy. And finally there is the CARE-supported City Forum program that is also a part of CSSP, focusing on building a dialogue between citizen groups and city governance institutions. There is, in short, a wide range of programmatic initiatives, and even a predominant theme in the form of local governance issues, which at least 8 of the 16 past/present/future grantees take as their main interest. This certainly accords with the thematic foci on local governance and civic participation as determined by CSSP for the province. But there is not as yet an overall strategic approach to local governance or any other issue.57 Nor are there any obvious candidates among the NGOs supported that could take the lead in forming an umbrella coalition which could then be tasked with formulating a strategic plan for the province. Deciding on a strategic focus (which would in all likelihood be local governance), identifying a CSO (or forming a new one) to act as a coordinator and coalition-builder, and then strengthening the CSO and its coalition constitute the tasks for CSSP and CPT in East Java. With its 34 mil￾lion people, 29 kabupaten (plus the eight independent kota), and (unlike Papua and Aceh) lack of abundantly obvious strategy choices, it will be more difficult to arrive at a strategic vision for the CSSP program in East Java. At the same time, the possible choices to make are considerably less somber, offering the opportunity to build rather than to safeguard and protect as in the other two locales. 57 As with the provincial program strategies, this lack of strategic focus was not included in the contract and so does not constitute a program shortfall. 52 Assuming that local governance in some form would become the central strategic focus of an East Java CSSP program, we would offer some suggestions as to how it might develop: • Levels of emphasis. CSSP efforts presently focus on both kabupaten and village levels; this dual emphasis should be maintained. • Constituency building. Only one of the CSSP grantees visited by the team appeared to be engaged in constituency building activities (Lakpasdam NU); the others seemed to have a trustee orientation (in particular the City Forums). But elites cannot carry local democ￾racy by themselves very long. If democratic participation and accountability of CSOs to definite constituencies are to become the norm, more membership-based organizations will have to become players. CSOs should be encouraged to move in this direction. • Program integration. For largely historical reasons, the CARE City Forums have oper￾ated more or less autonomously from the other CSSP-supported efforts in East Java. In the interest of building a provincial strategy, all CSSP activities should be integrated. The City Forum experience should inform the provincial model, and during remaining LOP they could benefit from lessons learned in other governance arenas in East Java (e.g., the BPD-oriented efforts of LPKP and YAPSEM). • Links to DLG. The DLG team’s Perform initiative should be linked to CSSP’s drive to build a provincial civil society model. The review team was unable to discern exactly what differences exist between these two USAID-assisted programs, though we did get the impression that Perform is somewhat more oriented toward including constituency representation. In any event, there should be a much closer integration here between the SO7 and SO10 efforts in East Java. • Financial sustainability. Given the shakeouts that are sure to occur as donor funding in￾evitably dries up, serious attention must be given to financial self-reliance approaches as one of the main foci of an East Java strategy. To hope for complete CSO self-reliance in the short term would be utopian, but the scope for attaining a significant degree of fund￾ing apart from donors is larger here than with the human rights CSOs that would form the centerpiece of Papuan and Acehnese strategies. Certainly at least some CSOs should be able to move beyond the 10% level of self-financing that is contemplated for year 5 in the CSSP contract as the benchmark for PO 3. A good number58 of CSOs will need to have moved beyond that level by EOP if there is to be an optimistic long-term outlook for civil society in the province. Issue 9 (added). Modifying the contract If the main recommendations made in this report are followed, what would be the impact on the guidelines set out in the CSSP contract? The principal recommendations of this report are to concentrate CSSP’s energies in the remain￾ing LOP toward creating a civil society program legacy in the three provinces of East Java, Papua and Aceh and toward institutionalizing civil society capacity building. In terms of the POs laid out in the contract, this would mean changing the direction of PO1, PO2 and PO3, 58 “A good number” should not be taken to mean all CSOs, or necessarily even a majority of them. What will be critical is that enough CSOs will have crafted various resource-generating approaches that the civil society commu￾nity as a whole will possess the basic concepts of how to undertake this essential function. Practical knowledge about fund-raising will have to become widespread enough for the civil society community to survive. 53 while attenuating the momentum of PO4. The following formulations are only suggestions, but we hope that they convey the spirit of what we are recommending. PO1. Strengthen civil society as a sector in three selected provinces so that it can begin to (1) function as a component of the local political system enhancing citizen participation and increas￾ing governmental accountability to the citizenry, and (2) serve as a model for future program￾ming efforts in other areas. PO2. Improve indigenous NGO capacities to plan, administer and manage their activities and resources by (1) supporting individual NGOs in this regard and (2) strengthening in-country abil￾ity to provide technical assistance of this nature on a self-sustainable basis. PO3. Designated NGOS will have developed an on-going capacity to generate resources from international and local sources to include income-generating activities. PO4. Ongoing and present pipeline awards will be completed. 54 V. Principal recommendations In this brief account, we pull together our major recommendations for CSSP during its remaining two years. There are a number of minor suggestions as well, but the ones offered here constitute the review team’s main proposals, divided into three types. Each recommendation is linked back to earlier text where it is explained more fully. Strategy These recommendations pertain to basic program direction – what we believe should be its core focus over remaining LOP. Implementation will require action from both CPT and CSSP in all three cases. • Creating a program legacy. It is time to pull together CSSP’s experience at building civil society into coherent strategies that can form its legacy. The three provinces of Papua, Aceh and East Java offer an excellent opportunity for crafting three provincial strategic designs – the first two based on human rights and conflict reduction, and the third on local governance. Of the three components listed here in our strategic recom￾mendations, this initiative should become CSSP’s principal new activity during the pro￾gram’s last 2½ years. (See Issues 3 and 8). • Institutionalizing civil society capacity building. Specific CSOs should be identified and assisted to become providers of TA to the civil society community in such areas as strategic planning, financial management, advocacy and the like. These “intermediate service providers” could then offer these services on a fee-for-service basis, which would also provide another avenue to ensure an ongoing CSSP legacy. This is our second prior￾ity for strategic programming over the remaining LOP (See Issue 4). • Maintaining media support. A free media will remain critical to maintaining democ￾racy in Indonesia, and support for it should be continued as our third priority. (See Issue 3). Organization and management The first of these recommendations applies to CSSP itself, the second to USAID/Jakarta and the third to relations between these two bodies. • Coordination among grantees. Grantees both present and former should be encouraged to share experience and expertise in a structured fashion. MIRPP offers a good start in this direction but as yet is still quite embryonic; the concept should be pushed ahead into actuality. Smaller-scale MIRPP efforts along thematic lines should be pursued. (See Is￾sue 5). • Coordination among SOs. Significant economies of organizational scale stand to be realized at USAID/Jakarta through coordinating parallel efforts now being pursued among the various SO teams to upgrade the NGO community in such areas as financial management, workplan development, etc. In other areas like advocacy, the CPT SO team in particular might take the lead in sharing its expertise with others. But for coordination initiatives to succeed, interest in them would have to be built into the Mission’s incentive structure for USDH and FSN personnel. (See Issue 6). 55 • Modifying the contract. Refashioning the POs in the ways recommended here would necessitate modifying the contract. (See Issue 9). Operational level Our last set of recommendations concerns how CSSP conducts its business and keeps track of how it does so. The first two pertain to CSSP, the last one to both CPT and CSSP. • Selecting grantees. Impending budgetary cuts will likely decrease much of the PO4 ef￾fort after present pipeline grantees are funded. But to the extent that new grantees can be supported, a change of direction in determining them will be called for. To find lead CSOs for the provincial programs and civil society service providers at the national level, CSSP will have to identify grantees and solicit proposals for specific activities rather than let potential grantees find it. This latter approach has proven quite successful thus far, but a new one will now be needed. (See Issue 8). • Outreach efforts. CSSP should be encouraged to increase its efforts at developing web￾sites, publishing case study collections, guidebooks, etc. Newsbulletins outlining best practices in specific areas would be worth exploring. (See Issue 4). • The advocacy ladder. We hope the advocacy ladder will prove a useful tool for gauging the progress of the civil society program in its final two years as well as for planning its programming initiatives for specific CSOs. (See PO1 analysis). ANNEXES 56 Annex A. Acronyms AIDP Aliansi Demokrasi untuk Papua AMAN Aliansi Masyarakat Nelayan BPD Badan Perwakilan Desa CDIE Center for Development Information and Evaluation CF City Forum COP Chief of Party CPT Civil Participation and Transition CSSP Civil Society Strengthening Program CTO Cognizant Technical Officer DFID Department for International Development (U.K.) DG Democracy and Governance DLG Decentralized Local Government DPRD Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (National legislature) DPRD Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Local Council/the legislature) EOP End of Project FHI Family Health International FMS Financial Management Specialist Foker Forum Kerjasama LSM se Irian Jaya ForGRes Sidoarjo Forum Gerakan Reformasi Sidoarjo (The city forum name in City of Si￾doarjo) FPMODa Forum Partisipasi Masyarakat Otonomi Daerah GOI Government of Indonesia GOLD Governance and Local Democracy (project, Philippines) IDEA Institute of Development and Economic Analysis IFES International Foundation for Election Systems INSIST Institute for Social Transformation ISAI Institute Arus Informasi Indonesia KKN Korupsi Kolusi Nepotisme KOAK Komite Anti Korupsi LAKPESDAM Lembaga Kajian dan Pengembangan Sumber Daya Manusia LBBPJ Lembaga Bina Benua Puti Jaji LBH Lembaga Bantuan Hukum LBH Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Papua LEKSIP Lembaga Konsultasi Perburuhan LKM Lembaga Konsumen Media LOP Length of Project LP3ES Lembaga Pendidikan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Ekonomi dan Sosial LPKP Lembaga Pengkajian Kemasyarakatan Pembangunan LPPMA Lembaga Pengkajian dan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Adat MIRPP Matching Issues People and Priorities NU Nahdlatul Ulama PAKTA Pengembangan Aktivitas Kemitraan Terpadu Pemda Pemerintah Daerah (Local Government/the executive) PemDes Pemerintah Desa PERDA Peraturan Daerah (Local Government Regulation/Act) PO Performance Objective 57 POKJA 30 Kelompok Kerja 30 PPC Program and Policy Coordination (Bureau, USAID/Washington) PRC Proposal Review Committee SAF Special Activities Fund SATUNAMA Yayasan Kesatuan Pelayanan Bersama SEAPA South East Asian Press Alliance SPEKHAM Solidaritas Perempuan Solo SPEKTRA Studi dan Pengembangan Ekonomi Kerakyatan SKP Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian SO Strategic Objective SOW Scope of Work TA Technical Assistance TAF The Asia Foundation ToP Technology of Participation ToT Training of Trainers UNDP United Nations Development Programme WALHI Wahana Lingkungan Hidup YAPPIKA Yayasan Aliansi Masyarakat Sipil untuk Demokrasi YAPSEM Yayasan Pengembangan Sosial Ekonomi Masyarakat YASANTO Yayasan Santo Antonio YBML Yayasan Bina Manusia dan Lingkungan YLKI Yayasan Lembaga Konsumen Indonesia YPRI Yayasan Pendidikan Rakyat Indonesia YPRK Yayasan Pondok Rakyat Kreatif YPSDI Yayasan Pengembanga Sumber Daya Indonesia 58 Annex B. CSSP mid-term evaluation team interview log (Location in Jakarta unless otherwise stated) Date Organization Persons interviewed or occasion 19 Jun Chemonics, Washington Larry Morgan, Program Director, Asia Region Stephanie Archer & Shazia Pirani, Project Administrators Douglas Tinsler, Sr Vice President, Asia Region Michael McNulty, Asst Project Administrator 24 Jun IFES, Washington Mary Lou Schramm, Director, Asia Programs Jacqueline O’Connor, Program Officer Kellie Bethke, Pgm Assistant for Indonesia 26 Jun Chemonics, Washington John Strattner & Jennifer Brinkerhoff-Zengue Larry Morgan, Michael McNulty and Eileen ? 3 July USAID/CPT Richard Hough, Dy Director of Mission Michael Calavan, CPT team leader Robert Hansen, CSSP manager Sumali Ray-Ross, Program Office 3 July USAID/HPN Ratna Kurniawati, USAID mission Alphinus Kamboji, Save the Children Pat Madyana, Interfaith 3 July USAID/NRM Sheila Young, Energy team 3 July USAID/DLG Sri Pobo Sudarno, DLG team 3 & 4 July CSSP CSSP team 5 July CARE Bud Crandall, Country Director, Kusuma Adinugroho, Dy Director 5 July SEAPA Solahudin, Advocacy Coordinator 6 July PAKTA Rama Chandan, Executive Director Ferry Kurniawan, IT Consultant 8 July CSSP/East Java Sheila Town, Grant Manager 8 July LAKPESDAM NU, Sido￾arjo Ahmad Muhidin, Vice-Chairman Hidayat, Chairman of HRD & Coordinator for CSSP grant Amirullah, Treasurer; Erma, Women Empowerment; Helmi, Director of Press; Zainul Arfin, Research; Yulia, Women Empowerment; Anas, Administrative Staff 8 July Sidoarjo Kabupaten Pemda Saiful Ilah, Wakil Bupati The council members (c 15) 8 July Sidoarjo City Forum Hariyadi and c. 12 other members 8 July CARE office, Sidoarjo Prabowo, Director, CARE/East Java Ir. Warman, Programme Leader, and 4 other professional staff 9 July City Forum, Pamakesan Nadir, chairman; plus 3 women members 9 July Bupati, Pamakesan Dwi Atmo Hadianto, Bupati; Ahmad Safei, Chair DPRD; Imam Safei, Chair city forum 9 July LKM/Media Watch, Sura￾baya Tjuk Suwarsono, Director Henry Subiakto, Talk show host Chairul Anam, and Titin, Secretary 9 July FKKP (Mojokerto City Forum) Saifullah, FKKP; Nugraha, FKKP; Warman, CARE Jakarta; Hamidah, FKKP; Yazid, FKKP; Subari, CARE East Java; Sirmadji, CARE East Java; Anam Anis, FKKP 59 9 July USAID-Perform Project, Malang Farid Hadi Rahman, Partic Dev Specialist; Wasis, Financial Specialist; Dina, Coord. Adimistration 10 July YAPSEM, Lamongan 10 July LAKPESDAM NU, La￾mongan Rupianto, Head of Student Union of Social & Political Sc. Afandi, Election Watch Committee Farid, Indonesian Muslim Student Movement Siti Rodyah, Sanitation & Health Ali, Chairman of Advocay & strengthening 10 July Bina Swagiri, Tuban Ismael, Executive Director Budi, Staff, Mukhtar, Staff; M. Wahid, BPD Chairman; Sukirman, BPD Chairman; Ansuro, BPD Chairman; Mustafa, BPD Chairman; Syafullah, BPD Chairman 10 July LPKP, Malang S. Suripan, Director Solaikan, Program Coordinator; Ngariono, Facilitator; Wiwit, a foun￾der of LPKP 10 July PPOTODA, Malang Ibnu Tricahyo, Director & one other staff member 10 July YPSDI, Malang Ekosasmito, Executive Director Mssrs Yudi, Afan, Nuruddin, Eko Mmes Mujikartika, Henti, Kanti 11 July LP3ES Imam Ahmad, Director 11 July Ford Foundation Suzanne Siskel, Representative Hans Antlov, Program Officer 12 July Asia Foundation Doug Rammage, Director Katherine Hunter, Sr Director, Women’s Partic Pgm Nilan Fernando, Asst Representative 12 July ISAI 12 July Ausaid Kim Henderson, 2nd Secy for Development Cooperation Irene Insandjaja, Pgm Manager 12 July YAPPIKA Arfzal Tjoetra, Network and Advocacy Manager 14 July Mid-term review of UNDP Partnership Project Paul Lundberg and David Watson, consultants 15 July LEKSIP, Samarinda Yakobus Beribe, Founder and Direcror Abdul Ismail A, Direktur LKP; Eva Victoria, Coord. Financial Divi￾sion; Magdalena, Coord. Advocacy Division; Yusuf, Coord. PKBOB Division; Petrus L. Leyn, Director of Institution Development for La￾bor Economic 15 July Lembaga Bina Benua Puti Jaji (LBBPJ), Samarinda M. Rudi Raneq, Director; Herman, Program Manager; Simon Sebo￾raga, PIK; Priyama, PMA; Yuliana Husur, FD; Mendelsau, Personalia; Salvator Amir Riyantone, PIK Staff; Adriana Kila, PIK Staff; Supi￾anto, Administration Staff; Florentina Kumla, Cashier 15 July LEKSIP’s Consituents, Samarinda Karmani, OSKM Chairman; Samsu Arifin, SBSB Chairman; Ferry, SBD Chairman; Tarsan, SBGS Gerbak Sorong, Vice Chairman; Sha￾ruddin, Serikat Buruh Dawood, Vice Chairman; Misransyah, SBMJ Mahakam Jaya, Chairman; Alfian Syah, SBMJ, Secretary 15 July Foker, Jayapura Bambung Sugiomo, deputy secretary; Md Ifan, Jubi editor; Yusak Rabe, Abraham; Golda Aronggear, pgm coordinator 15 July Family Health Intl, Jayapura Gunawara Ingkokusumo, Chief Representative, Papua Zaenel Abidin, Pgm Manager 15 July AlDP, Merauke Hawdin Holidi, Frans Kamedict, Theresia Esi Samkakai, Antonius So￾rowai, Abdul Halil Hatala, Xaverius Songmen, Adam Jokor 16 July POKJA 30, Samarinda Kahar, Coordinator; Sukmto, Publication; Senei Han, Program Coordi- 60 nator; Deni Yusuf, Book Keeper; Ardian Guruh, Field Staff; Firman Hidayat, Secretariat Coord. 16 July YBML, Balikpapan Poerwanto, Director; Jufriansyah, Coord. Program; Rifan, Financial Coordinator; Bambang, Campaign Staff; Satria, NRM; Idam, NRM; M. Nasir, Universitas Balikpapan 16 July Bupati office, Merauke Benjamin Siwatupang, Wakil Bupati 16 July Police HQ, Merauke Yul A. Prabuang, Wakapolres (Dy Police Chief) 16 July Central mosque, Merauke Helmi Chan, Chairman, MUI Abdul Halim, Member MUI and Chair of Muhammadiyah Harry Woersok, SKP Kevskupam Agung 16 July YASANTO (FHI grantee), Merauke Leo Ma and Francisca Nuhuyanan, lawyers working with YASANTO 16 July Foker discussion group, Merauke Samuel Oyab, local chair of Foker and head of YAPSEL, along with 17 others belonging to the Foker group in Merauke (including some assorted others) 17 July AMAN, Balikpapan Roeslan Rivai, Coordation Executive; Heri, Program Coordinator; Is￾mail, Village Coord.; Rusdian, Financial Coord.; Ilham Jaya, Staff; Kaharuddin, Financial Staff 17 July AlDP in Jayapura Latifah Anum Siregar, chairwoman and 4 others, including Hadim from the AlDP meeting in Merauke 17 July LPPMA in Jayapura Yos Serontou, the chair, and 12 others 18 July Arrive Yogyakarta 18 July YPRI, Jogja Toto Rahardjo, Director; Doni, Education Coordinator; Dana, Secre￾tary; Djoko, Facilitator; Dewi, Financial 18 July Satu Nama, Jogja Methodius, Executive Director; Hardono, Coord. Training; Heni, Training Division; Frans 18 July INSIST, Jogja Mansour Fakih, President; Toto Rahardjo; Dita 18 July IDEA, Jogja Dati Fatimah, Program Manager Rinto Waluyo, Filed Coordinator Broto, Finance Manager Farida, Campaign Program 18 July SKP in Jayapura Theo van den Broek, OFM, Director 18 July LBH in Jayapura Yvon Monim, Asst to division on women & children Robert Korwa, head of natural resources Jimmy Moya, head of administration Paseles Letsoin, head of personnel operationsf 19 July USAID/CPT office Nori Andriani, CSSP Grant Manager and Rodd Mc Gibbon, CPT Po￾litical Analyst 19 July Rachmah Bararfie CPT Grant Manager for E. Kalimantan 19 July Jubi in Jayapura Md Kholifan, Jubi editor Frits Ramanday, reporter and chair of AJI Papua branch Sali Pelu, operational editor Pustawati, financial manager 31 July IFES Alan Wall, Project Manager 61 Annex C. Scope of Work for Mid-Term Evaluation of USAID/Indonesia’s Civil Society Support and Strengthening Program (CSSP) BACKGROUND The fluidity of the political environment in Indonesia and the magnitude of the nation’s chal￾lenges requires the CPT program to be flexible and yet focused for the next few years. Given un￾certainties in funding levels and the need to continually maximize synergy/impact and respond to new and often unforeseen opportunities, the Mission needs to critically assess on-going programs to ensure that they are strategic, cost-effective, realistic, synergistic and provide significant value added. The Civil Society Support and Strengthening Program (CSSP) was designed as a direct contribu￾tion to USAID/Indonesia's Strategic Objective No.7 defined as "Democratic Reforms Sustained and Deepened." The Program targets the intermediate result that seeks to achieve "increased citizen participation in governance." CSSP was awarded to Chemonics International, Inc. (the prime contractor) on the basis of a competitive procurement process and began operating in October 1999. Four sub-contracts were awarded to the International Foundation for Election Systems (IFES), CARE International, In￾ternational Development Professionals (IDP), and the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE). The completion date of the Contract is September 30, 2004. The USAID amount authorized for the CSSP Program is $27,438,990. To date $15,615,565 has been obligated. The Base Period of the contract is three years, and the Option Period for an addi￾tional two years was exercised in 2001. The principal revision (excluding obligations of funds) of the contract, in 2001, changed the budget from a CLIN-based budget to a cost-plus-fixed-fee line item budget, and increased the number of full-time professional staff allowed from 15 to 20. The purpose of the Civil Society Support and Strengthening Program (CSSP) as stated in its con￾tract is “…to help Indonesia during this historic period of transition from an authoritarian to a democratic society by assisting emerging, reform-minded non-governmental organizations (NGOs) address key issues associated with increased openness, transparency and reform.” The overall objective of the CSSP is that the contractor, at the end of the period of the contract, “…shall have strengthened a viable and influential group of Indonesian civil society organiza￾tions to the point where these groups can continue to work on policy dialogue with reduced USAID funding and participate effectively in policy making and implementation. In addition, the contractor shall assist Indonesian NGOs to raise certain key issues to the government, parlia￾ment, and broader society and help to ensure that these issues are resolved in favor of continued openness and democratic participation.” The CSSP contractor is responsible for achieving the following Performance Objectives, each of which has specific results targets or deliverables, and semi-annual benchmarks, described in the contract: 62 „ (Performance Objective 1) “Strengthen the capacity of Indonesian NGOs to analyze needs and policy issues; articulate recommended reforms; successfully advocate for needed reforms; and help ensure effective implementation of those reforms”; „ (Performance Objective 2) “Improve the ability of Indonesian NGOs to plan, administer and manage their activities and resources”; „ (Performance Objective 3) “Designated Indonesian NGOs will be able to apply for and secure grant funding for the pursuit of their democracy-promotion activities from interna￾tional donors and local sources. In addition, Indonesian NGOs will plan to [raise] and [will] raise funds through individual and institutional donations and other income￾generating activities”; „ (Performance Objective 4) Award and manage effectively approximately 10-15 small grants per year to selected Indonesian NGOs, and provide technical and administrative services to these grantees. (The target of 10-15 grants per year has been informally modi￾fied during Program implementation, and is discussed below.) The CSSP contract consists of two parts: “…a technical assistance (TA) component and a grant component. The CSSP TA component includes the provision of long-and short-term advisors in specific technical fields, such as rule of law, ethnic reconciliation, civil-military relations, and policy implementation, and training. The grant component includes award and administration of grants to Indonesian NGOs.” (Additional fields, such as local governance, improved facilitation skills, etc., have proven to be of greater relevance or more feasible during actual Program im￾plementation than some of the examples cited in the contract.) To facilitate implementation of the activities and efforts carried out under the Performance Ob￾jectives, the contractor manages a Special Activities Fund (SAF). Examples of activities funded by the SAF include: special studies; organizing and implementing conferences, seminars, work￾shops, training programs, etc.; limited commodity and technical support for cooperating organi￾zations; production and printing of technical materials; and receiving and briefing visiting pro￾fessionals. In addition to the above responsibilities, the CSSP contractor provides, as necessary, technical and administrative support to USAID/Indonesia’s Civic Participation and Transition (CPT) Team. (It should be noted that requests by CPT for such “support” have diminished over the course of the first half of the contract.) “The CPT Team is solely responsible for determining strategic plans and priorities, and maintaining policy relationships with grantees, Government of Indonesia, and political organizations.” “In broad terms, the CPT Team [provides] the strategic framework, the funding levels, and the policy regulating the contractor’s activities.” The contrac￾tor is “…responsible for discrete activities, which are independent but supportive of day-to-day tasks” of the CPT Team and its individual members. To accomplish these tasks, the CSSP contractor maintains an office, in Jakarta but off-site from the Embassy/USAID compound, that is currently staffed by approximately 30 persons (18 pro￾fessional or technical, and 12 administrative or support), of whom seven are expatriates. A CSSP sub-office for East Java is maintained in Surabaya and is headed by an eighth expatriate. Performance Information Sources: Following is a list of information sources that the evaluators should consult prior to conducting the evaluation: USAID/I Country Strategy Paper for democ￾racy; the SO 7 Performance Monitoring Plan; CPT Achievement Reviews/Annual Reports; the CSSP Contract and amendments; CSSP yearly Work Plans, and annual Progress Reports; CSSP 63 Self-Evaluation (for January 2000 -- February 2001); and other referential or historic docu￾ments. (It should be noted that, starting in FY 2002), USAID’s annual reporting system has been substantially modified, with significant implications for how the S.O. teams and their partners, such as CSSP, are to collect and report performance data.) OBJECTIVES The mid-term evaluation of CSSP should primarily focus on effectiveness and deliverables as stated in the contract, but also needs to address broader Mission management issues. The overall information will be helpful in making important management decisions regarding the relative value of CSSP’s approach to grant making and CSO strengthening as compared with other exist￾ing approaches. The evaluation team should make recommendations as appropriate and identify potential corrective actions as needed. The evaluation should also: Assess the results for the first 2½ years of the CSSP Program in relation to the purpose and ob￾jectives as stipulated in the contract for the corresponding period; Assess the services and assistance provided, and the impact or results achieved, to date for each of the four Performance Objectives, the Special Activities Fund (SAF), and the provision of technical and administrative support to the USAID/I CPT Team, as described in the Background section; Assess the effectiveness and efficiency of the management and administration of the CSSP Pro￾gram as provided by the prime contractor, Chemonics International, Inc., and the four sub￾contractors; Make recommendations to the USAID for any mid-course corrections to the CSSP strategy, pro￾grams, management, staffing configuration, administration or budgeting necessary to achieve the end-of-program impact and results stipulated by the contract; Make recommendations to the USAID/I CPT Team for modifications to CSSP’s purpose, objec￾tives and/or the reallocation of resources within the Program should the life-of-program funding be less than that projected at the start of CSSP. STATEMENT OF WORK This is an independent, mid-term evaluation of CSSP for USAID/Indonesia. The purpose of the evaluation is twofold: first, to assess the impact to date on the strengthening of Indonesian civil society organizations (CSOs) assisted by CSSP, and on the contribution of CSSP to an increased citizen participation in democratic governance; and second, based on these findings, to make recommendations for possible adjustments or corrections to enable the Program to achieve the maximum impact and contribution during its remaining 2½ years. Context of the USAID/Indonesia Mission: The evaluation also provides the Mission with an opportunity to review in-depth CSSP’s accomplishments and results to date and to determine if strategies pursued and lessons learned can improve our effectiveness and efficiency in strength- 64 ening CSOs and in advancing the Mission’s broader objective of strengthening democratic gov￾ernance in Indonesia. Specific CSSP and Mission Management Issues: 1) Does CSSP’s contract meet Indonesia’s Civil Society and the Misson’s current needs, priorities and objectives? If so how? If not, what corrective actions are needed? 2) What were the Mission’s expectations for CSSP in terms of results and OYB levels and legacy mechanism? Are these expectations being met? If not, why not and what will be the implications? 3) In retrospect, how well did the original design (i.e. objectives, targets, technical issues to focus on, program management, staffing configuration, etc.) meet the needs over time? Has the focus of the activities actually shifted from that laid out in the RFP? In the con￾tract? 4) Have activities not reflected in the contract (i.e. TA with the PMP, the R2, etc.) had a positive or negative impact on core/contractual program objectives? 5) Does CSSP view itself, and operate, as a partner, a direct/targeted implementing contrac￾tor or an autonomous donor? 6) Is CSSP responsive to the needs of the Mission, CPT, their consortium partners and grantees? Can collaboration among the different stakeholders be improved during the re￾mainder of the program? If so, how? 7) How is CSSP coordinating with other Mission programs (e.g., CSSP’s city forums links with DLG? The truth and reconciliation program with OTI and FFP?) to develop syner￾gies that increase CSO performance and maximize the impact of resource allocations? 8) Currently, the Mission has three parallel grant making and TA/training programs within the CPT program (i.e. the CPT direct grants, The Asia Foundation and CSSP). Can com￾parisons be made about the effectiveness and usefulness of these programs, individually and collectively, in strengthening CSOs and in enhancing the Mission’s achievement of developmental and foreign policy objectives? 9) CSSP currently provides grants for programs such as transparent, participatory governance (especially at local levels), human rights (such as those of disadvantaged groups including women and fisherfolk), media and inter-faith dialogue. How are these programs coordinated both with CPT and with other relevant offices in the Mission? Context of the CSSP Program: It will be important for the evaluators to discuss CSSP program accomplishments and continuing challenges within the context of overall civil society develop￾ment in Indonesia and the Mission’s overarching democracy and governance strategy. Underly￾ing issues, including the following, will need to be considered and incorporated into the discus￾sion of the Program in order to fully understand and evaluate it: How has civil society developed since the fall of the New Order in 1998? Since the elections in 1999? What major obstacles 65 have existed and which have been overcome? What are the principal advances that have been made by CSOs that do advocacy, focusing on those that work within the areas of rule of law, citizen participation, better governance (national and local), human rights, the media, and women in democratic consolidation? What have been the relationships of civil society organiza￾tions with governments (national and sub-national) and the private sector? What are the per￾ceived possibilities for the remainder of the Program for developing collaborative relationships among them? What are the perceived needs and priorities of civil society for the future? This contextual information should be summarized in no more than four pages in the evaluation re￾port. Assessment of CSSP’s Overall Performance: 1) How effective and efficient is CSSP in strengthening its “universe” of CSOs and in ad￾vancing USAID/Indonesia’s broader objective of strengthening democratic governance in Indonesia? 2) Are there signs of an improved enabling environment for civil society, and if so to what extent can they be attributed to CSSP interventions? Are there signs of a deterioration of the environment and, if so, can CSSP address them? 3) Are there contrasting changes in the environments of USAID’s (and CSSP’s) six geo￾graphic focus regions -- West Java, East Java, North Sulawesi, Aceh, East Kalimantan and West Papua -- which would suggest a change in the mix of CSSP resources now flowing to them? 4) What needs to be done to consolidate and increase CSSP’s effectiveness and efficiency within the total amount of USAID resources to be made available to it if that amount is less than the estimated cost of the five-year Program? 5) What overall results do we expect at the end of the contract? Under each of the objec￾tives, it is important to assess how activities will enhance overall program effectiveness and responsiveness. How will performance be measured? 6) How well has Chemonics implemented the contract? Are the benchmarks specific in na￾ture? If not, do they need to be modified? 7) During the first two years of the project, which benchmarks have been met? Which benchmarks have not been met and why? 8) At the end of the contract, it is anticipated that there will be between 60 and 100 CSOs assisted (grants, TA and training). What impact will this assistance have and will it be sustainable after the contract ends? 9) Is the overall objective of CSSP appropriate in scope? The evaluation should look at how CPT and CSSP define “viable and influential group of CSOs” and measure impact. This will have a direct bearing on how CSSP chooses its partners, provides TA, training and grants to them, and how sustainable they are once USAID funding ends. It will also im￾pact on scaling up and replication of interventions. 66 10) Under the contract have there been any major obstacles preventing CSSP from progress￾ing towards its objectives? Assessment of CSSP’s Objectives and Activities 1) Performance Objective No. 1 -- Strengthening CSO analysis, articulation and advo￾cacy for policy reform and implementation: How have CSSP’s TA, training and other support affected the capabilities of CSOs to promote policy reforms and their implemen￾tation? How can the support be made more effective? In which policy areas has CSSP been most/least successful, and how can any lessons learned be applied to the second half of the Program? 2) Performance Objective No. 2 -- Effective CSO planning, administration and man￾agement: Assess the Technical Assistance (TA) and training program effectiveness and responsiveness to meet the capacity building needs of recipients, and how to improve it in the second half of the Program. What is the quality and impact of technical assistance and training being provided to participant organizations to build their capacities? Has the appropriate TA been provided to CSSP grantees and other CSOs assisted by CSSP? Is the TA and training program designed to have a lasting effect? Does it respond to inter￾ests and needs of participants? Are useful reference materials left behind? Is there effec￾tive and adequate follow-up? Does subsequent TA or training build on earlier efforts? Is there significant participation by women? 3) Performance Objective No. 3 -- Increased capacity by CSOs to obtain funding and to achieve sustainability: It is important to review and measure whether the fund-raising capacity of CSOs increase as a result of the TA, training and grants they receive. For ex￾ample, how many CSOs have secured funding from other sources, or can reasonably be expected to secure such funding, as a result of CSSP’s assistance? How much? What measures are CSOs taking to improve their financial capabilities as a result of their par￾ticipation in the CSSP Program? Can the move towards greater self-reliance construc￾tively be accelerated over the next 2½ years as CSSP assistance winds down and is com￾pleted? If so, how? Given the absence of a tradition of corporate responsibility and phi￾lanthropy in Indonesia, what is the realistic expectation for this sector to help the CSOs attain sustainability without compromising the latter’s independence? Grants to CSOs Awarded and Managed $10 million of the $27 million estimated cost of the CSSP contract over its 5-year life is budg￾eted for grants to CSOs and NGOs; a total of 10-15 new grants per year (50-75 over the five years) was projected at the start of the Program. To date about 35 grants have been awarded, mostly to new or inexperienced organizations, for support in the following broad subject areas: rights and equity issues; consumer and environ￾mental protection; transparent, participatory governance (especially local); and the media. The focus of the majority of grants, including virtually all recent grants, is on one of the six geo￾graphic regions listed above; this is in accordance with the determination of the USAID Mission in 2001 to begin concentrating the bulk of its resources in those priority regions. 67 In addition to the 35 grants already awarded, about another 37 grants have been approved condi￾tionally and are in the design stage. Since it appears that CSSP and CPT decision makers are opt￾ing (consciously or otherwise) to award a larger number of smaller, cheaper grants (as opposed to a smaller number of larger, more-costly grants), it is probable that, with CSSP only half com￾pleted, the originally-expected maximum total of 75 grants will be substantially exceeded. Should this trend of awarding smaller, less costly grants be continued, or should the emphasis be on the larger, more costly ones? What are the advantages/disadvantages of each, and which ap￾proach will be the more effective? The more efficient? Other issues: 1) What is the role of grant making in CSSP? 2) Does the original budgeted level for grants remain appropriate? 3) Is the grant making mechanism too cumbersome? If so, why, and what are the alternatives to continuing the mechanism during the balance of the contract period? 4) Does the mechanism take a disproportionate amount of staff time (CSSP’s as well as CPT’s) away from focusing on other elements of the program? 5) Since 80 - 90 percent of the grant funds have been or soon will be committed: Should CSSP continue to give grants in the last 2 years of the program even if they will not have time to evaluate impact? Given that the CSOs who have already received grants require significant TA, will there be sufficient time to provide the required TA to the ad￾ditional grantees? If grant making remains a priority, do funds need to be reprogrammed in order to meet requirements for new grants in the next two years? 6) Is the current CSSP/CPT grant management system (two grant managers partnering per grant, one person each from CSSP and CPT) the most effective? What are the implica￾tions in terms of cost and accountability for decisions made? 7) Given the immense size, population and diversity of Indonesia, what is the utility and likely impact on civil society strengthening of providing grants to several dozen or more CSOs concentrated in six regions? Assess the grants objective in terms of its relevance to the other Performance Objectives and synergies between them and the grants. Are CSSP’s human and financial resources sufficient to develop and monitor the grants port￾folio in view of the very labor-intensive nature of the activity? 8) Cite examples of successful as well as “problem” grants and lessons learned from them that can be applied in the last half of CSSP. How can the grants component of CSSP be improved? 9) Is the screening and review process, including the operation of the Proposal Review Committee, appropriate, effective and efficient? What have been the critical assumptions underlying the grant selection process? Are RFA or Annual Program Statement mecha￾nisms used? What are the implications of using each in terms of accountability, transpar- 68 ency, competition, and the environment in which CSSP and CPT have operated in Indo￾nesia? Monitoring and Evaluation: 1) Have grantees’ performance monitoring, reporting and evaluative capabilities been im￾proved as a result of CSSP’s assistance to them? Does CSSP have an evaluation plan in place? If so, is it quantitative or qualitative in nature? 2) Are issues of cost, financial diversification and institutional sustainability addressed in the plan? What evaluation criteria and indicators does CSSP utilize to measure results? 3) Are indicators the same as CPT’s? What management information system does CSSP currently have in place to collect and monitor the data? How often does the data get re￾ported back to CPT and in what format? Has CSSP been monitoring and evaluating both its grants and TA/training (i.e. workshops and training) components of the contract? 4) How will mid-term lessons learned be applied, documented and disseminated? Special Activities Fund (SAF): Is there a measurable impact achieved by the SAF? Do the ac￾tivities under it have an effect on any of the Performance Objectives? Which activities and why? Are corrections recommended to obtain the optimal value added from the SAF? Is it appropriate to increase the funding for SAF during the remainder of the program (to date about 50% of the $1.6 million budgeted for the life-of-program has been expended)? Design, Management and Funding of CSSP: Chemonics Program Management of CSSP: Has Chemonics’ management structure been adequate and effective? Are the current staffing levels and the balance between expatriates and Indonesians appropriate? What have been the implications for the management of CSSP of the four sub-contracts? Unique contributions and/or value added by the inclusion of sub-contractors? Is there effective collaboration especially among the three principal consortium members (Chemonics, CARE and IFES)? How can CSSP and the Mission best use the institutional capaci￾ties of the consortium members to strengthen CSOs and minimize duplication of effort? Has the “Relationship between Contractor and USAID/I” clause as stated in the contract been effective in the management and implementation of the Program? How can program management be im￾proved in the last 2½ years of the contract? CSSP Funding and Budgeting: How cost-effective has CSSP been as a contract providing technical and administrative services to USAID/I? What proportion of CSSP funding is esti￾mated to support these services to USAID/I and what proportion goes to the direct strengthening of civil society? Should adjustments in these ratios be made in the remainder of the contract and, if so, how? Given uncertainties with funding, and to maximize impact in the remaining 2 ½ years, how can CSSP prioritize and make decisions about types of activities, technical areas, partners, and numbers and configuration of staffing, etc.? The number of staff under the contract has increased from 15 to more than 30. What is the implication of this growth on program related costs, including overhead? Has the increase in staffing been warranted? If so, how? A brief cost effectiveness analysis should be done as part of the evaluation. 69 Due to accounting difficulties in attributing direct costs (salaries, travel, etc.) to the separate Per￾formance Objectives, the CLIN budget was replaced in 2001 by a line item budget. This new budget, however, obscures the resources being devoted to each of the first three P.O.s (Advo￾cacy; Capacity building; and Sustainability), although line items do remain for the SAF and the grants. The evaluation shall estimate the resources going to each P.O. so as to determine if there are major deviations from the assumptions represented by the original contract budget. The contractor has stated that additional funding (above the contract’s estimated cost of $27.43 million) would be necessary to meet the needs of USAID programs (other than CPT’s) were sub￾stantial new work to be required of it in support of those programs, as only with the most strin￾gent budgeting will the contractor be able to achieve all contractual objectives at the $27.43 mil￾lion level. The evaluation shall recommend how to reduce costs to stay within the contract budget while causing the least possible diminution of the Program’s impact and results and the maximum possible synergy among the various Mission programs and strategic objectives in which the development of a democratic civil society is important. How can CSSP be given scope to supplement its USAID resources with funding from other sources, thus enhancing its overall impact on the development of civil society? Methodology 1. The evaluation contractor shall review background information including the documents listed previ￾ously in the Background section. 2. The evaluation contractor shall conduct an extensive review of the work carried out by the Program in order to assess progress toward the established overall result and the objectives, the effectiveness of overall Program strategy and Chemonics' management to date, and make rec￾ommendations for improvements for the last half of the Program. This review will include meet￾ings with USAID/Indonesia representatives, Chemonics staff in Washington, CSSP staff in Ja￾karta and Surabaya, civil society representatives (including but not limited to CSO recipients of grants; see below), and other donors active in civil society development in Indonesia. 3. The evaluation contractor shall interview a minimum of 20 CSO recipients of CSSP grants, selected to ensure coverage of all major sectoral areas of focus, including a substantial number of CSOs from at least two geographic focus regions outside Jakarta. The evaluation contractor will consult closely with the USAID CPT Team in choosing CSSP grantees for interviews to ensure balanced coverage, including exposure to organizations with differing perspectives of their rela￾tionships with CSSP. Members of the CPT Team, including the Team Leader and/or the CTO for CSSP, and/or representatives of other Mission Teams may accompany the contractor to various organizations in Jakarta and in the field. Where appropriate, CSO interviews may be combined in focus groups. Illustrative Schedule of Work The field work shall begin no later than June, 2002. Five workdays will be required in Washing￾ton of the team leader prior to departure, for appointments with Chemonics’ CSSP project offi￾cer, CSSP sub-contractor representatives and USAID/W DCHA/DG’s civil society team; for col￾lection and review of documents; and for preparation of a draft work plan and methodology. The 70 field evaluation will require a minimum of 24 workdays (4 six-day weeks) in Indonesia for each of the team members. Finally, up to 5 days will be required in Washington of the team leader in order to complete the final report. The team will conduct entry and exit briefings to be attended by Mission management, CPT and other Mission offices.. Deliverables The evaluation contractor shall submit the following deliverables to the USAID/I CPT Cognizant Technical Officer (CTO): Work Plan and Methodology: A detailed written draft work plan and methodology submitted upon the evaluation team’s arrival in Indonesia. Draft Report: By the close of business on Wednesday of week four of work the evaluation team shall submit a draft report including findings, conclusions and recommendations to USAID and conduct a briefing for USAID on the contents. USAID shall provide written comments and is￾sues to the evaluation team leader. Following the submission and briefing of USAID but before the team’s departure from Indonesia, the team also will conduct a courtesy briefing for CSSP concerning findings, conclusions and recommendations of the evaluators that are not specific to Mission-management issues. If input on the draft report raises concerns which the team is unable or unwilling to address in the final report, such concerns shall be contained in a written adden￾dum reproducing the language of the written input, together with a brief statement from the evaluation team leader explaining why the concern was not addressed in the final report. Final Report: Within two weeks (ten work days) after receipt of USAID’s inputs, the contractor shall deliver the final report to the CPT CTO. The report becomes the property of USAID/I. Fif￾teen (15) hard copies and an electronic file version in Microsoft Word must be submitted to USAID/I. The contractor will not circulate or distribute any report until formal approval is re￾ceived from USAID. Report Format and Content: The final report shall contain an executive summary (three pages maximum); table of contents; main text including findings, conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations (35 pages maximum, single-spaced); and annexes including the evaluation Scope of Work, description of the methodology used, lists of individuals and organizations consulted, and bibliography of documents reviewed. The report shall comprehensively and separately address the issues (both general and specific) listed in the Statement of Work, and ensure that the overall objectives of the evaluation (de￾scribed in the “Objectives” section) are fulfilled by the contents of the report. The report shall be structured so that interpretations, findings, conclusions, lessons learned and recommendations are clearly backed by the underlying factual, descriptive information to support them. The re￾port’s executive summary shall accurately represent the report as a whole. Team Composition and Qualifications The evaluation will be carried out by a four person contract team under a USAID IQC Delivery Order. The team shall include: 71 (1) A team leader with a professional background in international development work special￾izing in strengthening of civil society. This person shall be responsible for coordinating and directing the overall evaluation effort, including preparation and submission of the draft and final evaluation reports to USAID/Jakarta. He/she should have a minimum of 15 years experience in the design, implementation, and evaluation of foreign assistance programs including USAID related civil society programs, especially with demonstrable experience in transitional, post-authoritarian settings. At least 5 years of that experience should be focused on Southeast Asia. As assessment team leader, the incumbent should be thoroughly familiar with techniques of program impact evaluations and possess good organization and team-building skills. Knowledge of spoken and written Bahasa Indone￾sia is preferable. (2) The second team member should be a Southeast or South Asia national based in the re￾gion (but outside Indonesia), possess strong background knowledge of the region, sub￾stantial work experience in civil society development and strengthening, and knowledge of evaluation principles and methods. S/he will be fluent in English and preferably have a working knowledge of Bahasa Indonesia. (3) The third and fourth team members should be Indonesian nationals resident in the country, possess substantial experience in development work including civil society strengthening, and be familiar with evaluation principles and methods. They will have organizational and facilitation skills. In addition to Bahasa Indonesia they will have a command of written and spoken English. Each team member should possess an advanced degree (Masters or above) or equivalent based on relevant professional work experience. Strong writing and word processing skills are a re￾quirement. USAID/Jakarta may appoint a Mission employee to act in the capacity of an observer or consult￾ant where appropriate. The contractor will guarantee that substitutions will not be made for indi￾viduals selected as team members without the approval of USAID/Jakarta. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT All logistical support will be provided by the contractor to include travel, transportation, secre￾tarial and office support, interpretation, communication and report printing, as appropriate. TECHNICAL DIRECTION Technical direction will be provided by Robert R. Hansen, USAID/Jakarta Cognizant Technical Officer for the CSSP Program, (62-21) 3435-9423 or 9447, rhansen@usaid.gov. 72 Annex D. References Antlöv, Hans. 2000. “Village Governance in Indonesia: Past, Present and Future Challenges,” paper presented at the PERCIK conference “Dynamics of Local Politics in Indonesia,” Yo￾gyakarta, 3-7 July 2000. Biddle, C. Stark. 1999. Lessons in Implementation: The NGO Story: Building Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States (Washington: USAID, Bureau for Eastern Europe and Eurasia, October). Blair, Harry. 2002a (forthcoming). “Civil society strategy assessment for the Philippines,” Occa￾sional Paper Series (Washington: USAID/DCHA/DG). Blair et al., 2002b (forthcoming). DG Center civil society paper. . “Building Democratic Con￾stituencies: USAID and Civil Society Programming After the First Decade,” Technical Paper Series (Washington: USAID/DCHA/DG). Chambers, Robert. 1983. Rural Development: Putting the Last First (London: Longman). CSSP. 1999-2002. “Quarterly Report” [10 reports issued through March 2002].59 CSSP. 2000-2001. “Annual Report” [two reports issued thus far]. Evans, Hugh, Howard Edwards, Azwar Hasan, Lia Juliani, and Hal Sullivan. 2001. Final Evaluation of the CLEAN Urban Project, report prepared for USAID (Washington: Checchi and Company Consulting, Inc., December). Howard, Richard, Rodd McGibbon, and Jonathan Simon. 2002. “Resistance, Recovery, Re￾empowerment: Adat Institutions in Contemporary Papua.” (Jakarta: Indonesia Civil Society Support and Strengthening Program, March). Lippman, Hal. 2001. Linking Democracy and Development: An Idea for the Times, USAID Program and Operations Assessment Report No. 29 (Washington: USAID, Center for De￾velopment Information and Evaluation, June). McCarthy, Paul. “A Thousand Flowers Blooming: Indonesian Civil Society in the Post-New Order Era,” (n.p., March). Merschrod, Kris. 2001. “Internal Evaluation: Indonesian Civil Society Support and Strengthen￾ing Program, for the Period 1 January 2000 – 14 February 2001” (Jakarta: CSSP, February). Mintz, Steven. 2002. “Indonesia CSSP Impact Assessment,” draft (Jakarta: CSSP, July 2002). 59 The quarterly and annual reports noted here were supplemented by many internal reports, memos, outlines, etc., which CSSP generously shared with the review team. 73 Ottaway, Marina. 2000. “Social Movements, Professionalization of Reform, and Democracy in Africa,” in Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, eds., Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace). TAF (The Asia Foundation). 2002. First Indonesia Rapid Decentralization Appraisal (IRDA): Synposis Report (Jakarta: TAF, April). USAID/Indonesia, Transition to a Prospering and Democratic Indonesia, Country Strategy pa￾per, (USAID/Indonesia, September 2000). USAID/Jakarta. 1999. Contract between Chemonics International, Inc. and the Agency for In￾ternational Development, Contract No. 497-C-00-00053-00 (signed September 30, 1999). Van Zorge Report. 2002. “Regional Autonomy: Re-centralization, Guided Decentralization, or Chaos” vol. 4, no. 6 (3 April), 5-20. 74 Annex E. Email Comment -----Original Message----- From: Peter Harris [mailto:pharris@cssp.or.id] Sent: 27 September 2002 14:58 To: Hansen, Robert Cc: alene mcmahon (E-mail); roshana cohen (E-mail) Subject: RE: Final Report -- CSSP Mid-term Evaluation Dear Bob We have decided after discussion and reflection that we accept most of the main findings and rec￾ommendations of the evaluation, a number of which have already been integrated into the draft contract modification we discussed yesterday, and welcome its comments and suggestions. Under the circumstances we do not see a need for further comments or responses, though we do appreciate being given the opportunity to make them. Peter Harris