SWIFT MINDANAO PROJECT EVALUATION:
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS ON PROGRAM IMPACTS1
Office of Transition Initiatives
Bureau for Humanitarian Response
United States Agency for International Development
Evaluation Team
John Heard
Lisa Magno
 
1
 This summary is extracted from a longer report submitted to OTI on October 20, 2000. For a copy of the
64-page report, please contact the OTI Information Officer, (202) 712-1299 or E-mail: OTI@usaid.gov.
EVALUATION
SWIFT MINDANAO PROJECT
I. INTRODUCTION
This evaluation was contracted by the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) of the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID). The purpose was to evaluate the
OTI financed Support with Implementing Fast Transition (SWIFT) project in Mindanao.
This project, now close to completion, was designed to provide targeted, sustainable
livelihood assistance to Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) ex-combatants and in
the process strengthen local capacity and organizational linkages that would contribute to
peace and stability in the former zone of conflict.
Field visits and interviews for the evaluation were conducted over a three-week period in
Mindanao in September 2000. They were somewhat limited geographically by security
restrictions at the time of the evaluation. Nonetheless, a broad cross section of views was
secured from both beneficiary groups and concerned stakeholders.
The evaluation was charged with determining performance and impact of the SWIFT
project. It provides a number of findings on program impact and relevance to key
hypotheses posited by OTI, along with recommendations on design and implementation.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROGRAM HISTORY
On September 2, 1996, the GRP and the MNLF signed a peace agreement putting an end
to almost thirty years of conflict. In the agreement, the GRP committed itself to military,
political and development measures designed to establish a framework for stability, peace
and economic growth within Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) in 14
provinces and 9 cities with significant Muslim populations in Southern and Western
Mindanao, Palawan, and the island provinces of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi. The
agreement promised that “…public and private investments shall be channeled to these
areas to spur economic activities and uplift the conditions of the people therein.”
Other key measures of the Peace Agreement called for: (1) the establishment of a
Southern Philippines Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD), representing the
Muslim, Christian and Cultural Communities, which was to monitor, promote and
coordinate development efforts in the area; (2) the incorporation of over 7,500 MNLF
elements within the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine National
Police (PNP), and (3) a political formula for Muslim autonomy to be implemented
through a plebiscite to determine the area and form of a new autonomous government in
the region under the authority of the President of the Republic.
2
The first two of these measures have been implemented partially.2
 The third has not and
is now expected for May 2001. With regard to promised public and private investments
(a “Mini Marshall Plan”), although a substantial international donor effort is underway,
the GRP itself has lagged far behind in allocating financial and human resources for the
SZOPAD and is perceived by MNLF rank and file as not in compliance with the
agreement.3
In early 1997 the GRP requested assistance from the international donor community in
support of the Peace Agreement. USAID was able to respond rapidly thanks to two
ongoing projects in place in the region - GEM and Governance and Local Democracy
(GOLD). At the same time (May 1997), the USAID Mission Director requested that OTI
review the situation in Muslim Mindanao and develop a transition program to augment
Mission supported activities.
The subsequent OTI assessment, in June 1997, designed an Emergency Livelihood
Assistance Program (ELAP) to facilitate reintegration of Muslim ex-combatants and their
families into Philippine society. On August 8, 1997, a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) was signed between the SPCPD and the U.S. Embassy establishing the program.
After reviewing available options for implementation, OTI and the Mission decided to
utilize the GEM contractor, Louis Berger International Inc. (LBII), which already had
fully staffed offices in Mindanao and was well positioned to provide support for
agriculture and other activities within ex-combatant communities.
A. GEM/ELAP Phase 1 (August 1997 – March 1999)
The program commenced in September 1997 under a contract amendment utilizing
Mission funding for operating costs and OTI funding ($2.15 million) for production
inputs and supporting NGO activities. OTI also assigned a senior field officer (Asia
Regional Manager) to Mindanao, to manage program implementation.
The principal objectives of the program were to provide emergency livelihood assistance
to former MNLF combatants and their families and to promote political stability. The
program included three main activity components: (1) Livelihood assistance (farm inputs,
training and technical support for corn and seaweed production), (2) establishment of
participant managed community funds, and (3) a pilot functional literacy program
(FUNLIT) for 600 ex-combatants and female family members. Within a month of signing
the MOU the first participants had entered into production.
During the 18-month period of Phase I, the program assisted 4,000 MNLF ex-combatants
in corn and seaweed production in eight mainland and three island provinces of the
 
2
 “Partially” because the SPCPD has been created, but it has little authority and no program resources. The
creation of the Mindanao Coordinating Council (MCC) is also perceived to have marginalized the SPCPD.
3
 In field interviews with recipient groups the Evaluation Team was told again and again that the GRP had
not lived up to its commitment to implement the Peace Agreement, despite the fact that field staff
consistently pointed out that the donor programs were in fact the result of GRP agreements to support
development in the region. (See Hypotheses section under Impact, below)
3
SZOPAD. Program criteria called for minimum groups (“clusters”) of 75 ex-combatants
farming in a contiguous production area and with access to land through two production
cycles “croppings” (the limit of assistance for a given beneficiary). Program oversight
was provided by a Management Committee (MANCOM), chaired by the SPCPD and
with representatives from the National Economic Development Authority (NEDA), the
Bangsamoro Women’s Foundation for Peace and Development (BMWFPD) and USAID.
At the MNLF State level, a community committee (COMCOM), chaired by the MNLF
State Chairman, with representatives from the BMWFPD and MNLF national unit
commands (NUC), was responsible for participant and site selection.
The program was successful in that it achieved its purpose (delivery of emergency
assistance) in a rapid and visible manner at a time when other donor efforts were still on
the drawing board. Although corn production returns were mixed due to drought brought
on by El Nino and price deterioration during the second harvest (seaweed fared better),
the program generated hope and stability through concrete action in the target areas. Ex￾combatant beneficiaries were kept busy and engaged early in the demobilization period.
In October 1998 the community fund component was implemented under which
livelihood recipients were to repay the cash value of their production inputs to a fund to
finance community projects. The program, which was not extended beyond
GEM/ELAP’s Phase 1, met with limited success. Its implementation started over a year
after the agricultural production component due in part to lack of GEM-OTI agreement
on management of implementation. Proper introduction and training on the concept was
critical as farmers lacked experience in such financial schemes. However, training arrived
too late in relation to the harvest season. The Community Fund component did not have
adequate village-based field support or the critical linkage to the ELAP agricultural
production component. Finally, the weather conditions (El Nino and La Nina) negatively
impacted agricultural production and income.
The third component, for a pilot functional literacy activity, was launched in September
1998 through a grant to World Education, a US NGO. At project end, May 2000, 934
learners had completed functional literacy classes. Twenty eight classes of levels 1-3
were organized during project execution.
B. SWIFT (April 1999-December 2000)
The SWIFT/ELAP activity (now just called “SWIFT”) began in April 1999, with the
signing of a MOU with the SPCPD. A task order for implementation of the program was
signed three days later under OTI’s SWIFT Contract with DAI. Administrative,
operational and staff systems were established in Mindanao and field staffs deployed to
MNLF target area offices by mid-May (mobilization in less than a month).
Officially stated objectives of the SWIFT activity are basically the same as the original
GEM/ELAP, i.e., targeted livelihood assistance to ex-combatants, provision of a tangible
peace dividend and political stability. There is a major difference in practice, however.
The SWIFT program is designed to achieve:
4
(1) Tangible alliances between MNLF communities and local and GRP units through
meaningful interactions. This is to change perceptions on GRP delivery in
compliance with the Peace Agreement. It also facilitates sustainability through
creation of an external supporting structure for each village recipient.
(2) Establishment of post harvest facilities and social infrastructure which will assist
the group to add value to its production on a sustainable basis and provide an
organizational vehicle for growth through economies of scale in processing.
(3) Strengthened group capacity to manage and mobilize resources through
participatory decision-making.
(4) Improved relations between the Muslim ex-combatant communities and other
non-combatant, Christian and indigenous elements of society through open
cooperative organizations and the sharing of benefits.
One additional objective was established late in the project period, from April 2000
forward. This was to promote peace in Mindanao and reduce tension through
reconciliation activities implemented by civil society groups in the form of peace rallies,
caravans and various fora at local and regional levels. Consulting assistance provided by
the GOLD project identified and developed the majority of these grants.
As of the end of September 2000, 420 TAGs had been approved and 300 delivered. The
end of August was the cutoff date for approval of all new TAGs. The remainder of the
project period (until March 31, 2001) will be utilized to complete deliveries and provide
needed training and follow-up assistance to organizational recipients.
The effectiveness of the SWIFT program will be examined in detail in the sections to
follow.
III. OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY
A. Objectives
1. Focus - According to the Scope of Work (SOW), the evaluation was to focus on the
impact of OTI’s transition assistance in Mindanao, both Phase I (GEM/ELAP) and Phase
II (SWIFT), with the primary focus on SWIFT.
2. Principal Tasks - The SOW set forth four principal tasks as follows:
a. Test Hypotheses: The SOW listed four hypotheses for testing by the evaluation.
These included three related to the goal of promoting peace and stability in
Mindanao, and one related to the creation of economic opportunity for ex￾combatants.
5
b. Document the Impact of OTI’s program on Muslim Communities: This was
to be analyzed within the context of Strategic Objectives and indicators established
by OTI for purposes of TAG assessments currently underway.
c. Review OTI’s Exit Strategy and Recommend Future Activities: The SOW
called for guidance on development of a “hand-off” strategy. A draft strategy has
been proposed by the Asia Regional Manager.
d. Document SWIFT Program Processes (management, procurement, grant
making, finance): SWIFT has developed a highly articulated set of procedures
linked by the mentioned integrated database program.
B. Methodology
1. Structured interviews of TAG recipient groups in the field and the principal
stakeholders in the program. Field interviews were curtailed somewhat by
restrictions placed on travel by the Regional Security Officer (RSO). The team was
able to cover about 70% of the originally planned site visits.
In interviews the team systematically covered points of interest to the evaluation,
including economic and social impact, group capacity to plan and manage resources;
linkage with LGUs, the GRP and other entities; attitude toward the conflict, and
perceptions of GRP compliance with the Peace Agreement. Where possible, the team
tried to get a reading on the impact of the GEM/ELAP activity and its relationship, or
lack thereof, to the SWIFT program. The team also interviewed a wide range of
stakeholders in Washington, Manila and Mindanao to obtain views on SWIFT
program performance and importance, coordination aspects, the conflict situation,
political factors of the setting and recommendations.
2. Analysis of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Reports. Since April 2000 a three￾person Project Analysis Team (PAT) has been carrying out individual monitoring and
evaluation (M&E) exercises on all TAGs (with the exception of the “Reconciliation”
group). The team reviewed all M&E reports and analyzed impact on 80 TAGs with at
least some economic activity utilizing equipment or infrastructure delivered. The
M&E reports were analyzed utilizing previously established indicators related to the
project’s strategic objectives (SOs).
Finally, the team had various meetings with SWIFT program staff, particularly the
Project Development Officers (PDOs), PAT team members, the DAI Field
Representative and the OTI Asia Regional Manager. The team also carried out a
comprehensive review of available documentation on the program and related aspects
including Mission strategy.
6
IV. FINDINGS RELATED TO IMPACT AND HYPOTHESES
A. Impact
In March 2000 the SWIFT staff met with the OTI/Washington Evaluation Specialist to
develop program impact indicators. In April a final list was defined and incorporated
within the program database for TAGs4
. Thereafter, the indicators were consistently
applied on all village-based TAGs.5
 The PAT team then began to evaluate each TAG
based the established indicators.
The schedule of the assessments focused first on early TAG recipients. (Processing of
new TAGS and deliveries were still ongoing when the PAT started the assessments.) The
PAT team used a M&E report form that isolated the effect of SWIFT assistance as
opposed to other contributions to the same group, facilitating attribution. To generate the
M&E report, the PAT team used a “Progress Analysis Form”, a comprehensive interview
guide, which provided a series of questions designed to get at key data from various
angles. This facilitated consistency in measurement of qualitative indicators.
The PAT assessment was still ongoing at the time of the evaluation and is now scheduled
for completion by February 2001. The M&E reports are the evaluation team’s source of
data for this section. It was not the team’s intention to review or modify established
indicators, although it offered some suggestions to improve results in future exercises.
Since the PAT exercise is ongoing, findings are tentative. But they do indicate
noteworthy trends, and, together with interviews, provide a valuable basis for assessing
the program. Early conclusions from the M&E reports are discussed here in tandem with
findings from the field interviews. In many cases, field interviews reinforced M&E data.
It is important to complete the M&E exercise. Once the PAT team has assessed a more
substantial number of TAGs, it would be useful to revisit early conclusions.
Strategic Objective 1 Group Livelihood Improved
Output Indicator 1.1: Equipment/Infrastructure Delivered
For the 80 TAGs with production days, a total of 216 pieces of post-harvest equipment,
machinery, and/or infrastructure activities were provided. These represented
contributions from SWIFT, the LGUs, the DA, and cooperative members themselves.
Below is a breakdown of the equipment, machinery, and infrastructure provided.
 
4
 SWIFT has a database for its TAGS, which serves as a management tool for PDOs and program
management. The database is discussed in Section V.C SWIFT Program Processes.
5
 Consistent use of the same set of indicators was mandated in instructions to the PDOs to provide a
common basis for measurement.
7
Table 1
Equipment, Machinery, Infrastructure Delivered to 80 TAGs
Equipment
Abaca stripper 1
Banca (small boat) 9
Baobao (turtle tiller) with engine 16
Corn mill 0
Corn sheller 4
Corn sheller with engine 21
Engine 16
Generator 1
Hauler 11
Hauler with engine 13
Power tiller with transmission (K700) 5
Kuliglig (local power tiller) 13
Mechanical Dryer 6
Rice mill 5
Rice thresher 4
Rice thresher with engine 9
Total Equipment 134
Infrastructure
Road rehabilitation 1
Shed house 55
Solar drier 11
Warehouse 7
Water systems 8
Total Infrastructure 82
GRAND TOTAL 216
From this sample 1-3 pieces of equipment or infrastructure were provided to each group.
From field interviews, it was obvious that most of the groups were first time recipients of
such assistance. Given their weak organizational and financial status, they were unlikely
to be able to procure these on their own. Also, many were in relatively remote areas had
not received any other donor assistance. Some interviewees disclosed that they used some
of the equipment, such as the hauler, to transport people to the town health center for
medical emergencies, children to school, and other “social” purposes.
The more striking point about the quantity of equipment and infrastructure delivered is
that a significant number came from LGUs and the national government (primarily the
DA). Over and over, the farmer associations (and high-ranking SPCPD officers)
highlighted the catalytic role that SWIFT had played in engaging the LGU and the DA. It
was also common to see tripartite efforts in a single activity. For example: for solar
driers, SWIFT would provide raw materials like cement; the LGU would provide a mixer
or contribute sand and gravel; and cooperative members would provide the labor. The
8
Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) often contributed food for
work for community labor during construction.
Field interviews (with farmer organizations and LGUs alike) elicited consistent positive
comments about SWIFT’s short project timeframe. Requirements for livelihood activities
were determined through a participatory process. The equipment arrived on the projected
delivery date. PDOs showed up consistently on scheduled dates and on time. An LGU
official summed it up: “SWIFT lives up to its name. It is really swift”.
Nevertheless, improvements can be made on timing of delivery to ensure that facilities
arrive before the start of the harvest season. Where GEM/ELAP is also present, better
sequencing of input and post-harvest assistance is needed.
In conclusion, equipment and facilities are being delivered in a timely fashion and
productively utilized by beneficiary groups, including for social purposes.
Impact Indicator 1.2: Employment Generated and Income Mobilized
Results to date on employment generation have been minimal. Of the 80 TAGs, 57
generated employment of 3,567 person days. Many of the organizations did not yet
operate the facilities at full capacity. This often involved several hours a day for a few
days during the harvest season. Nonetheless, while employment generated was limited,
there would otherwise be no employment at all. Alternative employment is not available
and many organizations cited new employment as an important benefit. So far, only a
handful of the recipient groups had successfully marketed their post harvest facilities to
other groups and non-members, but this does represent potential future earnings.
Lessons from earlier experience on the TAGs have highlighted the need for operator
training by equipment suppliers. This has since been incorporated in the program through
the procurement process. There were a few cases of breakdown, inappropriate accessories
and refurbished equipment. These are also now being addressed through the procurement
selection process (including blacklisting). The PAT team has been highlighting such
cases for corrective action.
Modest increases in income have occurred. Of the 80 groups, 62 reported net income for
the organization. Most realized incomes of P2,500 or below, however. In many groups,
income was for only one harvest. Table 2 shows the distribution of income mobilized per
farmer organization.
Several factors influenced the level of income realized. One was the timing of the
delivery. In some cases, use of the facilities was limited by arrival late in the harvest
season. For this reason, SWIFT has pressured the DA to accelerate its delivery of
counterpart equipment6
. Second, there were disruptions due to GRP-MILF fighting,
 
6
 The DA did not actually commence delivery of machinery until April 2000 with the bulk of the deliveries
arriving from July onward. The pace of the delivery is now accelerating due to continuing follow-up
efforts by SWIFT management.
9
especially in Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur. Third, there were cases of operating
problems with the equipment.
Table 2
Net Income Distribution of Farmer Organizations
Net Income Range (pesos)7 No. of organizations
0-2,500 34
2,501-5,000 10
5,001-7,500 2
7,501-10,000 2
10,001-20,000 7
20,001-30,000 2
30,001-40,000 1
Above 50,000 4
There are three interesting conclusions with regard to income:
a. While income realized has not been dramatic so far, it is noteworthy that most of
it has been reinvested in productive assets or capitalized in the organization’s
accounts, rather than paid out as member dividends.
b. The obvious benefits to date have been significant reductions in processing costs
and increases in hectares farmed, thus increasing total output. However, income is
not maximized for three main reasons: poor quality seeds and unaffordable
fertilizers; high interest rates and margins paid to traders; and inefficient
marketing. From interviews, the team gathered that traders’ markup on a bag of
fertilizer is about 30%. A small loan with a term of three months has 40% interest
or 160% per annum.8
 Where the produce is sold to the trader, the trader’s buying
price is also typically lower by 2.5% than the prevailing market price.9
c. Unfortunately, M&E reports do not capture data on individual farmer incomes.
However, PAT team and field interviews indicate that, increases in farmer income
(relative to the organization’s income) is much more impressive. To illustrate, the
average farmer benefits include about P5,000 savings in transportation costs per
cropping season, 5 centavos savings per kilo for shelling, a 50% increase in area
farmed, and reduced costs in land preparation. With an average area of 2 hectares
per farmer and 2 cropping seasons per year, the estimated increase in farm income
could be as much as P10-12,000 a year ($217-$260).
 
7
 At the time of the evaluation, the exchange rate was about P46 to $1.
8
 A P2,000 loan from a trader is paid with two sacks of rice at the end of the cropping season, about 2-3
months. At an estimated price of P400 per sack of rice, the interest is P800 on a P2,000 loan. This
translates to an interest rate of 40% for 3 months or 160 % interest per annum.
9
 P0.20 is shaved off for every kilo of rice, which would otherwise sell at P8.00 per kilo.
10
Impact Indicator 1.3: Changes in Quality of Life of Groups Assisted
This indicator required a subjective, qualitative analysis based on group perceptions in
response to a series of established questions. As shown below, an overwhelming majority
of the groups affirmed improvement in their quality of life.
Table 3
Beneficiary Perception Improvements to Quality Life
Rating No. of Groups Percent
Great Improvement 8 10.0
Satisfactory Improvement 36 45.0
Slight Improvement 26 32.5
No Improvement 10 12.5
Total 80 100.0
Without exception, cooperative respondents confirmed a positive correlation between
SWIFT assistance and a better life, although it was difficult to extract specific changes.
From the M&E reports, changes included home improvements, more rest, the purchase of
small appliances and farm animals, and more interaction with other community members,
including government. While findings are tentative, there is clear potential for significant
improvement. Sustained follow-up is needed, however.
SO2: Group Capacity Improved
Output Indicator 2.1: Training Conducted
Of the 80 groups with production days, 79 had received training in 214 on-site sessions in
the community. Two contractors are conducting the training: Notre Dame Business
Resource Center (NDBRC) through a consortium of Notre Dame colleges in SZOPAD
and the Orient Integrated Consultants, Inc. (OIDCI), a Manila-based consulting firm. The
courses typically include bookkeeping, cash management, cooperative principles,
leadership, and strategic management. The NDBRC training module, which started much
earlier than OIDCI, consists of one day of training with no follow-up. Because NDBRC
could not cover all SWIFT-assisted groups within the needed timeframe, OIDCI was
subsequently contracted. The OIDCI module was based on NDBRC’s, although
improvements were made from experience to date. The basic OIDCI course now runs
three days and a follow-up visit is made after two weeks. At the end of the course, the
organization must have installed books of accounts.
Beyond the basic course the PDO’s encourage counterpart training and technical
assistance (TA) contributions from LGU and GRP agencies. Training and TA at the
community level predominantly comes from the devolved DA technician, the local
cooperative officer, and in a few instances (notably in Lanao and later in Sultan Kudarat)
from the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI).
11
SWIFT has also arranged for technical training from Kubota, a major supplier of farm
machinery. An arrangement with the Agricultural Training Institute (ATI) of the DA is
being negotiated as part of DA’s partnership with SWIFT. ATI, with a P10 million
training budget on post-harvest facilities, will include SWIFT beneficiaries in its training
sessions.
The need for capacity development across the board is glaringly obvious. An
overwhelming number of ex-combatants still have not been trained or have received
inadequate training.
Training follow-up is critical. (See discussion under the indicator for Training Impact
below) A one- to three-day training session is a start, but it is not adequate for all but an
exceptional minority of recipient groups.10 While government agency personnel, such as
the Municipal Agricultural Officer (MAO) or the Cooperative Development Officer
(CDO), provide some technical assistance, the volume of follow-up needed can not be
borne solely by the LGUs.
There are two serious factors that should be considered with regard to capacity
development. One is the low level of literacy. Numeracy skills are also lacking, which
makes financial management training difficult. Second, organizational leadership is still
drawn from the old military scheme. With few exceptions, the group’s chairman is the
former commander. Unless the training is carefully designed or the participant selection
process more democratic, the cadre of leaders will remain the same. A new generation of
leaders needs to be developed to handle the reins in the future. One way is to ensure that
this generation has excellent access to management and technical training, including the
operation and repair of farm equipment.
Impact Indicator 2.2: Additional Members Joining The Group
SWIFT beneficiaries are a mix of non-registered organizations, farmer associations and
cooperatives. Average membership is around 45. Active members normally total about
30. Actual increases in membership have occurred only in a few organizations. For the
most part, membership has remained stagnant. M&E data show only 292 new members
from among the 80 recipient groups.
Three factors can explain the constancy in membership size. First, increases in
membership were observed mainly in those groups that had already had two or three
successful cropping cycles. Many of the groups assisted by SWIFT had no more than one
cycle since delivery of post-harvest facilities. Second, many of the organizations are quite
young and still in early development. Some have a waiting list for membership, but
acceptance of new members is deferred until the organization has consolidated early
gains and established policies. Third, in at least one case (New Utara, Cotabato), the
groups had instead formed a cooperative federation (46 primary groups), recognizing that
 
10 There are isolated cases of groups with the good fortune to have one or more college educated members
who have the ability to understand and absorb new concepts rapidly. That is very rare, however. In most
cases, the majority of members are functionally illiterate.
12
they would have a “bigger voice” and would better maximize resources if they worked
together.11 There were also a few cases in Lanao where membership was drastically
reduced. The ex-combatant groups had moved due to AFP-MILF fighting in the area.
Regarding integration, most of the groups have declared an open membership policy.
However, the true extent of their openness is difficult to determined since many have
deferred processing of applications, and others have not grown despite the obvious
benefits to be gained by joining.
Lastly, the hierarchical structure of the organizations, typically chaired by the former
commander, appears to have served well for initial results. The question is, will those
results be sustained without more substantive participation over time? The team believes
they will not and that existing governance structures will erode as organizations grapple
with the challenges to come, which will put traditional management structures under
increasing stress. A future indicator, if the program is extended, should be a free and fair
election of officers and peaceful transfer of authority.
Impact Indicator 2.3: Training Impact and Overall Organizational Management
Capability
This indicator is the PAT evaluator’s assessment of cooperative member skills, based on
questions and a review of the organization’s books. Of the 80 groups, roughly 47% still
had below average or poor skills, highlighting the need for follow-up.
Table 4
Assessment of Beneficiary Skills
Assessment of Skills No. of Groups Percent
Excellent 4 5.0
Above average 38 47.5
Below Average 32 40.0
Poor 6 7.5
Total 80 100.0
For many cooperative members, SWIFT training was the first training received. The
response and eagerness for the training has been overwhelming. One of the difficulties in
conducting the training has been limiting the courses to a small enough group of
members tasked with financial management responsibilities. Typically, most members
want to attend sessions. Participation normally drops to a more select group as the
training becomes more hands-on and technical.
From field observation of books and interviews, there is still a long road ahead. Clearly,
a single course of one to three days is inadequate. Follow-on training is critical, and in a
 
11 The formation and development of this federation was being actively advised by the SWIFT PDO for the
zone.
13
wider range of subject areas, especially in participatory management and internal
governance. But other subject areas are also important in such areas as diversification,
processing, marketing, advocacy, project design and resource mobilization.
The M&E exercise also assessed member confidence in organizational management
based on a series of 25 questions on member views of their leaders’ abilities to manage in
an open and transparent manner. Interestingly, an overwhelming 70% of the 80 groups
have high or above average confidence in their management. This is more likely a case of
“benign” leadership, than good management practices.12
Table 5
Assessment of Members’ Confidence in Organization Management
Rating No. of Groups Percent
High 19 23.7
Above average 38 47.5
Below Average 17 21.2
Low 6 7.5
Total 80 100.0
SO3 GRP Linkage
Impact Indicator 3.1: Interactions facilitated by SWIFT
Based on M&E data, 645 interactions were facilitated by SWIFT for 73 of the 80 groups.
These interactions included physical contributions to the project, technical assistance, and
visits by the various barangay, municipal, provincial and line agency officials.
A major success of the SWIFT program is the extent to which it has effectively involved
local and national GRP agencies in counterpart contributions at the community level.
This is true for regional as well as community specific inputs. The provincial government
of North Cotabato has allocated P1.0 million, for example. The DA has committed at
least $575,000, thus far, and the upcoming ATI training will draw from a P10 million
budget for SWIFT and other training.
From the onset, the importance of counterpart contributions has been emphasized, both
for the value of the resources and the alliances established which are critical to the peace
effort. The inputs from SWIFT are contingent upon the actual delivery of corresponding
counterpart from the LGUs and the groups themselves. Commitments for continuing TA
from the LGU through the MAO are also being secured beyond SWIFT’s project term.
(Groups located in weak municipalities or provinces may experience reduced support, but
are not excluded from the program.) PDOs have also used creative alternative strategies,
 
12 The military mindset is still very much at play here. Members have apparent or expressed confidence in
their commanders regardless of skill in management of a civilian organization. Another question is to what
extent were members answering these questions honestly. It is an obviously touchy subject area, and PAT
team members had to dance around the issue through a series of proxy questions to get at the truth.
14
such as generating more resources from within the groups and linking beneficiaries with
NGOs or other organizations in the community.
In a few cases, particularly in Lanao del Norte, some groups have avoided counterpart
contributions from local mayors for fear of incurring political liabilities.
Impact Indicator 3.2: Non-SWIFT Facilitated Interactions
Only 52 of the 80 groups successfully realized interactions apart from those that SWIFT
had brokered. However, the number of interactions is quite impressive at 744. This
indicates that many of the groups do have the capacity to successfully relate to their
principal stakeholders, primarily LGUs. Many also acknowledge the role SWIFT played
in “introducing” them to local officials and they had since initiated interactions on their
own. This also applies in the other direction. Often, following program initiation, LGUs
will initiate follow-up interventions.
Impact Indicator 3.3: Perceptions of GRP delivery and implementation of Peace
Agreement
M&E data show that there is a strong negative perception of GRP performance
throughout recipient groups, notwithstanding significant counterpart contributions that
have in fact been made by LGUs and the DA at the community level. For line agencies,
however, other than the DA (which provides tangible contributions in the form of
machinery), little credit is given. Perversely, the more donors assist, the more glaring is
the absence of GRP performance. Donor assistance is not perceived as made possible by
the GRP. Line agencies need to reach out to communities directly (as do other donor
agencies, for that matter). Below are data pertaining to beneficiary group perceptions of
GRP performance..
Table 6
Beneficiary Perception on GRP Delivery of Services
Rating No. of groups Percent
Full delivery 1 1.3
Satisfactory Delivery 15 18.8
Inadequate Delivery 43 53.7
No Delivery 21 26.3
Total 80 100.0
The 1996 Peace Agreement had three main components: political (i.e. autonomy);
economic; and military (integration of ex-combatants into the AFP and PNP).
Compliance with the Agreement by the GRP is perceived as acceptable only with regard
to the military component.13 At the community level, low GRP performance is associated
 
13 Assignment of ex-MNLF combatants in regiments assigned in SZOPAD’s island provinces has been
acknowledged as a highly positive move.
15
with lack of attention to severely needed livelihood improvements. From the perspective
of MNLF leaders and SPCPD officials, the GRP has faltered most on the Autonomy
component. As stated by its Vice-Chairman, autonomy is not an MNLF demand but a
GRP commitment.14
Table 7
Beneficiary Assessment of Implementation of the Peace Agreement
Rating No. of Groups Percent
Full Implementation 13 16.3
Satisfactory Implementation 20 25.0
Inadequate Implementation 43 53.7
No implementation 4 5.0
Total 80 100.0
B. Hypotheses
The SOW asked the team to test four hypotheses formulated by OTI in order to determine
the effect of the program on the peace and development process in Mindanao. Three of
these hypotheses relate directly to the peace objective and are treated together in the first
section below. The fourth, on development, is covered in the subsequent section.
Hypotheses related to the goal of creating peace and stability in Mindanao.
1. Assistance targeted to MNLF ex-combatants will promote peace and stability
that leads to longer-term development.
The team found this hypothesis valid for one main reason – attitude, especially hope for
the future.
On more than one occasion in interviews, at both village and MNLF command levels, the
team was told that were it not for SWIFT and GEM/ELAP, the combatants would have
“gone back to the mountains” by now. These are the two programs that have “delivered”
and that are “felt” by the rank and file. It was further stressed that SWIFT had penetrated
areas that no other program had reached, including GEM/ELAP, which tends to target
easier to reach areas for reasons of logistics, cost and manpower. The courage, energy,
and dependability of the SWIFT program have clearly given hope to the target group for
a longer-term solution to the problem of poverty and isolation. It was telling that SWIFT
assistance did not stop during the height of GRP-MILF fighting earlier this year.
In multiple interviews the team was told that SWIFT delivers when it says it will. False
expectations are not created. Promises are kept. As such, SWIFT has had more impact
than the size of the program would indicate, because other donor and government
programs have not arrived at large segments of the ex-combatant community. Line
 
14 Interview with Hatimil E. Hassan, Vice Chairman, MNLF
16
Agencies of the GRP are only now beginning to deliver at the grass roots level, mainly
the DA. LGUs are doing a bit better, but human and financial constraints place severe
limits on their capability. Other donor programs have benefited some communities, but
have been felt more at the state command level than in the village, with the exception of
the Canadian financed Philippine Development Assistance Programme (PDAP), which
has had mixed success over a small number of communities.15 The World Bank’s Social
Fund has also benefited a number of communities with social and productive
infrastructure, but it has been difficult to access and slow to deliver.
The SWIFT program has also provided its target communities with the opportunity to
work collectively toward a better future. It was not just a quick fix for the present.
Something more than the familiar daily grind of production and harvest was being
offered - something which encouraged the participants to do something new and more
profitable, increase their volume and productivity, take better care of their families and,
importantly, to stay busy.16 In village after village groups told the team that they saw a
better life on the horizon, even though they were not necessarily feeling it yet.17 Almost
universally, groups said their organizations were “open” and that they wanted to reach
out to Christians and Lumads alike.
Caution is in order, however. The strategy could backslide if expectations created cannot
be realized due to the lack of follow-up assistance to consolidate initial gains. Longer￾term development will depend on a continuing effort to assure essential human capacity
elements are in place to sustain term improvements to livelihood. This is also true for
internal governance. These groups are still living in a command society with decades of
dependence on traditional hierarchal structures for decision-making and resource
allocation. This must change if dependency is to give way to self-reliance and the sense
of ownership and the commitment necessary for continued stability and growth.
2. Development and peace are enhanced when LGUs and GRP Line Agencies
provide counterpart commitments, thus demonstrating their tangible commitment
to the 1996 Peace Agreement.
The team found the hypothesis to be correct for those cases where counterpart
commitments were evident from both the LGU and national levels. This was rarely the
case, however. Far more commonly, only the corresponding LGU was making an official
commitment. Nevertheless, this had a clearly positive effect on peace and development at
the local level. The groups felt connected and had a vested interest in preserving the
 
15 The PDAP has reached 84 groups, with a budget of P82 million. The assistance ends in December 2000
but a second phase is anticipated. A proposal to continue for another three years, with a budget of about
P80 million, is in process.
16 Staying busy is an important factor, particularly for young people. This was mentioned in interviews. In
Colombia today, for example, it is also an important factor relative to guerilla recruitment efforts in the
countryside.
17 Most of the TAG recipient groups have only had their machinery for a few months, often not having
completed one crop cycle. Thus measurable economic benefits were difficult to gather. There is also a
learning curve with the equipment and full benefits come with time and practice. Groups could see the
benefits coming, though, and were almost uniformly optimistic.
17
relationship. There is no desire to go back to war. Ex-combatants interviewed indicated a
heartfelt commitment to making their experiment with normal life work. Precisely how
much of this can be attributed to the “counterpart” argument and how much to fatigue
from living on the edge, is hard to say.18 But, certainly the LGU counterpart commitment
is a significant contributing factor.
At barangay and LGU levels, the team found highly positive attitudes on the need to
work with “Muslim brothers”. SWIFT linkages had obviously facilitated this attitude,
evident in Barangay Captains, Mayors and LGU staffs interviewed.
What was not recognized by communities was the GRP contribution by devolved
personnel assigned to municipalities including MAOs and CDOs. Nor did communities
see LGUs as part of a greater GRP. Thus, as shown under Impact, GRP compliance with
terms of the Peace Agreement was consistently rated inadequate. This did not mean,
however, that these groups were giving up on either peace or development.
It is important to note that SWIFT has been uniquely effective in mobilizing municipal
support and linkages, which have been critical to changing perceptions. This has been
part of the SWIFT formula from the beginning and has been pursued with single-minded
dedication. Timely and quality LGU delivery on project commitments has sometimes
been a problem, but most cases, contributions have been made and linkages created.
It has been far more difficult with respect to GRP Line Agencies, with the exception of
the DA’s recent delivery on its earlier commitment of post harvest machinery. SWIFT
began the DA resource mobilization campaign in July 1999 and systematically pursued
collaboration, eventually resulting in a November 1999 commitment of $575,000. Initial
funds, $135,000, were released in February 2000, and the arrangement was formalized
with an MOU Amendment between USAID, the DA and the SPCPD on March 8, 2000,
officially establishing the DA-SWIFT Village Partnership and significantly expanding
program coverage. Since the signing, a total of 259 TAGs have been approved with DA
contributions. Delivery was initially slow, but thanks to persistent follow-up, including
with Secretary Angara himself, and with support from USAID management, the pace of
compliance with commitments has recently picked up considerably. There has been a
recognition of the political mileage to be had from collaboration, and the Secretary is
now actively pressuring DA regional directors in Mindanao. Where DA equipment had
been delivered, it made a positive impression on the attitude of recipient groups.
Other GRP Line Agency commitments have been notable for their absence in the SWIFT
target areas. There are a few exceptions, such as contributions in kind from DSWD, the
 
18 The team repeatedly heard the notion at various levels that the MNLF ex-combatant community is tired
of war and has no desire to go back to the forest, provided that there is some hope of living a life with basic
human needs met and a modicum of dignity. The earlier evaluation in Guatemala found the same factor at
play with an ex-combatant community exhausted from 30 years of insurgency. The key will be in building
sufficient sustainability into recovery schemes such that the incentive to return to combat will be
minimized. This is where the team is concerned. (See following hypothesis and Section VII)
18
Cooperative Development Authority (CDA) and the DTI. These contributions largely
came about as a result of networking efforts by the PDOs.
As a result, the MNLF believes the GRP is shirking its responsibilities under the Peace
Agreement. There is a perceptual disconnect in this area as most of the donor programs,
in fact, reflect a GRP commitment. The perception needs to be countered, but it will take
a more aggressive effort by the GRP in the field. Donors also need to use their leverage to
encourage the GRP’s presence. SWIFT has an edge in this area, born from successful
experience to date with the DA. SWIFT also has unique leverage derived from high
levels of performance on the ground.
Recent developments (military campaigns against the MILF and Abu Sayyaf) and GRP
rhetoric, including the formation of the high level Mindanao Coordinating Council
(MCC), are not helping the situation and could backfire if not followed by delivery on
development and other commitments.
3. Communities that receive SWIFT support will become “zones of peace” that
may create stability and encourage other rebel groups’ members to consider the
pursuit of peace.
The “zones of peace” hypothesis appears accurate to the evaluators from its sample
exposure to the ex-combatant community. As expressed above, these groups are not
satisfied with GRP delivery or compliance, but they still want to make it work, and the
SWIFT project has given them an investment in peace that they want to preserve.
At command and village levels, the “arms to farms” slogan of the SWIFT program has
high resonance and a strong following. Virtually all groups visited said that their
associations were “open” and that Christian and indigenous membership was encouraged.
The team did not see anger or animosity reflected in groups interviewed.
The extent to which these zones are encouraging other rebel groups to pursue peace is
uncertain. The situation has been made significantly more complex by the recent
aggressive AFP campaign against MILF rebel strongholds. However, it is quite likely that
some MILF members are mixed into MNLF recipient communities and are probably
benefiting in some degree from SWIFT projects. Also, the MILF is in a position,
geographically, to observe benefits of the program in action. It is likely that elements of
the MILF are also tired and would appreciate the opportunity to return to a normal life for
the first time in many years. 19 Obviously, the longer these peaceful zones are maintained
and showing real benefits to participation, the better the probability that other rebel
groups will want to “come in from the cold”.
 
19 Following Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) attacks on MILF camps in March of this year, there
has been a general dispersion of MILF forces throughout much of the project area. Also, the notion was
expressed a number of times to the team that a program of assistance should be mounted for the MILF to
demonstrate to them in tangible terms the benefits of peace and the benign attitude of the GRP. That, of
course, won’t happen under the GRP’s current policy framework. Nor, as a matter of law, can USAID
knowingly assist an active combatant group.
19
There could be negative consequences, however, if gains are not consolidated. The
project is successful now. It must “stay successful” for its true benefits to be realized.
Some elements have put down the Peace Agreement, claiming that the benefits have been
minimal or beyond reach. A premature pullout could cause added stress and resentment.20
At present the project does not appear to have produced appreciable gains in membership
in target communities. On the other hand, a difficult to measure result may be retention of
membership that otherwise would have dropped out. As mentioned in interviews, the
evaluators were told that SWIFT made the difference between staying or going. This may
be true as well of some unidentified MILF membership. This is speculation, but is logical
and was supported in team interviews.
4. Agricultural and Post-Harvest assistance will provide improved economic
opportunities to ex-combatants and their families.
This hypothesis is self-evident on its face. Data, as shown under impact, are encouraging,
but won’t be conclusive until completion of the M&E exercise.
Principal gains to date appear to have primarily been: (a) cost-reduction from cheaper
transportation and reduced labor requirements in tilling and processing and (b) increases
in output from mechanized farming allowing for an increase in area planted. The team
also believes that individual and family benefits have been considerably higher than those
recorded for the recipient organizations at the consolidated group level.
Opportunities created will be short lived if adequate capacity is not developed to properly
manage the resources provided. As with all farmer associations, the secret is to operate as
a business enterprise with efficiency and transparency. This is a major challenge for
ordinary people, yet alone for ex-combatant groups that have been in the mountains for
the past 30 years and admit, “We know guns, not farming.”
From the team’s interviews, a great deal of additional capacity building activity is needed
for most groups if they are to survive as viable vehicles for social and economic
development. There is also a major marketing constraint, which has not been addressed.
Self-governance in particular requires strengthening for stability along with the
development of participatory planning capacity. The necessary process has really only
just begun. Most of these groups only became operational within the past year.
The evaluation team is concerned that if the necessary follow-through assistance is not
arranged somehow, many of these groups could disintegrate and produce a disillusioned
cadre ripe for the picking by MILF or other forces with disruptive agendas.
 
20 Other donor programs (such as CIDA/PDAP, World Bank, and the UNDP Multi-Donor Fund) are also in
a “slowdown” phase as follow-on tranches of funding for MNLF programs are still pending.
20
C. SWIFT Program Processes
This section is not intended to provide a detailed description of the various processes and
procedures of the SWIFT program. Instead, it will highlight their relationship to the
achievement of project results. Recommendations with regard to selected elements are
deferred to the section on Recommendations.
1. Project Development Process
· Beneficiary Selection: SWIFT is directly involved in beneficiary group selection.
While MNLF State leadership is consulted, they are not the only source of
information. Data provided by State leadership is validated through site visits and
consultation with other MNLF groups. This has allowed better inclusion of the
National Unit Command (NUC) ex-combatants, which do not fall under the
leadership of the State Chairman. Groups like the Networking Council of Central
Kutawato have also assisted in certifying ex-combatants.21
· Participatory Approach: PDO visits to a community number from 3 to 8 during
proposal development. This encourages participation by group members in needs
identification. SWIFT has written and enforced procedures on proposal development
based on participatory organizing. They emphasize that the PDO facilitates but does
not lead community discussions. This results in assistance that is genuinely needed
and translates into a greater sense of ownership by the community, thus improving
chances the equipment will be maintained. This approach also filters out questionable
groups or infeasible project ideas early in the project cycle.
· Counterpart Contributions: PDOs are required to conduct protocol meetings in their
areas not only with MNLF leadership but also with LGU GRP officials. More
importantly, SWIFT requires at least three contributing partners, the ex-combatant
group, one or more government offices, and SWIFT. Thus, while protocol meetings
serve as introductory sessions on the SWIFT program, they also provide an entrée for
the PDO to establish continuing contact with stakeholders. The LGUs, in a few cases,
have identified barangays with predominantly ex-combatant residents, which have not
been identified by the MNLF State chairman.
Each TAG Agreement clearly defines counterpart commitments and is signed by all
parties. Thus, a serious message is delivered at the onset. SWIFT does not deliver
unless counterpart commitments are actually met. PDOs rigorously monitor the status
of contributions during project implementation.
· Target Setting: PDOs have quantified targets set jointly with SWIFT management.
This provides clear goals for PDOs within specified timeframes. The high volume of
 
21 The Networking Council is an ad hoc association of 70 individual coop/farmers’ group who assists the
State Chairman with coordinating implementation of various programs, including SWIFT. It strongly
advocates for GRP and donor assistance to MNLF groups that have not been reached.
21
TAGs generated under SWIFT (a total of 420, with each PDO having a portfolio of
40-68 grants) can be attributed to targets that are realistic, jointly determined, and
consistently tracked. There is a concern here, though. Some of the PDOs may be
overextended and have trouble providing the intensive follow-up assistance required
by the often-precarious state of their recipient communities. SWIFT holds periodic
retreats for its PDOs where targets, procedures and methodology are discussed and
issues resolved. There is a lot of coaching by management. Standards are set.
2. Procurement Processes
· Contractor Selection: Due to the high volume of procurement required under SWIFT,
the process was streamlined through the use of contracts similar in principle to
USAID’s IQCs. A Request for Proposals (RFP) was issued and a major suppliers
conference conducted in January 2000. A contract for each area by type of machinery
and input (including construction materials) was signed for specified timeframes.
These contracts include a penalty of 1% of total price per day of delayed delivery.
SWIFT’s procurement procedures (based on USAID regulations) have helped
“professionalize” some contractors in program areas. Suppliers are dropped from the
roles for lack of performance or transparency, a healthy message for the supplier
community and a lesson for recipient groups.
3. Financial Management
· Contractor/Supplier Payment: One of the key factors that has provided SWIFT
leverage with suppliers is timely payment. Once an “acknowledgement receipt” is
certified by both the PDO and the community, it generally takes no more than three
(3) days to make full payment. Because of this track record, SWIFT has been able to
maintain a stable and loyal list of contractors and suppliers.
· Management vs. Program Costs: Based July 2000 data, the average expenditure for
monthly management cost, including overhead and fees, is under $75,000. At this
level, the range and depth of SWIFT’s reach is impressive. If one compares grant
expenditures (which totaled below $445,000 as of the same date), a skewed picture
results. The inference is that $2.34 of management costs are needed for every dollar
of grant assistance. However, it is important to note that at the time of the evaluation
about $1.1 million had already been committed for TAGs. The skewed picture is the
result of the natural time lag between TAG approval and actual delivery and payment.
It is projected that the budget of $1.3 million for TAGs will in fact be fully utilized.
Remaining funds for management cost are projected to be adequate for at least a
three-month no-cost extension, until March 2001. Assuming a 22-month project, the
estimated ratio is $1.25 of management cost for every $1 of grant assistance.
Programs of this nature are typically management intensive and therefore expensive
(although salaries are extraordinarily low in the Philippines, especially in this project
22
as most employees are relatively young). There is no choice if resources are not going
to be wasted. However, in this case counterpart commitments have been so
substantial, that the true relative cost of management has been significantly reduced.
Including total TAG counterpart contributions, management cost is only roughly
$0.56 for every $1.0 of grant assistance delivered.
4. Access Database System
· Management Tool: SWIFT’s database provides a high performance tool for program
management and implementation. It has facilitated genuine horizontal management
wherein all functional groups (PDOs, engineering, procurement, finance, and the
manager) get involved in the project cycle. It has become vital to project
implementation. The database system is structured such that certain fields can only
be updated by appropriate SWIFT staff. For instance, the “approved” or
“disapproved” field can only be filled up by the OTI representative or his designee.
The PDO cannot unilaterally proceed to the next implementation step unless certain
established prerequisites have been met.
The database has laid the basis for the M&E system as well and can provide
comprehensive data at both the micro and consolidated program levels. The TAG
database is linked to the M&E reports, saving significant time. More importantly, it
ensures consistent data and more accurate measurement of program results.
Finally, the database makes for speed and greatly reduces the management burden in
administrative and processing operations, thus freeing valuable time and energy for
planning and problem solving.
· Timely and Widely Shared Information: The key to success of SWIFT’s database
system is that information is timely, and more importantly, widely shared. Data on
every project, from the proposal development to completion, including all related
email exchanges, is on the system. Information is kept up to date. For managers,
current data is always available for decision-making. For the PDOs, they know at a
glance actions, decisions, or issues from the procurement and finance sections or from
management. Each PDO is provided with a laptop that allows access to updated
information on the system. This is vital since PDOs are in the field 80% of the time.
Project information is accessible to all SWIFT staff, even to remote users. PDOs and
others (such as the PAT teams) have access to project data while in the field.
The database also has a uniform format for all TAGs. This facilitates consolidation of
information for program analysis. It also “disciplines” PDOs to secure all the
necessary data on each TAG.
23
Obviously, for successful functioning of the database, all staff must know the system
and use it. This requires organizational commitment and discipline. To SWIFT’s
credit, these qualities are very much in evidence.22
One final benefit of the system is that it makes possible comprehensive monthly
reports to interested stakeholders in the program including State Chairmen, Provincial
Governors and other donors.
5. Monitoring and Evaluation
The M&E exercise represents a serious intent on the part of SWIFT to review the
performance of all TAGs and the program. The M&E system will also be very useful in
linking the ex-combatant groups with other interested NGOs and donor organizations.
The M&E report provides a ready, credible analysis and rating of each of the groups. For
interested NGOs and other donors involved in the SZOPAD area, this could save
valuable time in identification and selection of potential beneficiary groups.
6. Program Approach
There has been a serious lack of coordination between management of the two programs,
GEM/ELAP and SWIFT, since the beginning of Phase 2.This has resulted in part from
fundamental philosophical differences in program approach. Essentially GEM/ELAP is
still dedicated to short-term “emergency” assistance while SWIFT is focused on longer￾term organizational viability concerns. Further, the two programs face structural
impediments to effective collaboration in that one is committed to working with farmer
organizations and the other with selected individuals. Nevertheless, for whatever
combination of reasons, the lack of coordinated programming has more than likely
resulted in reduced performance of both programs at a time when performance should be
maximized. In a situation like Mindanao, to have two contractors working on separate
and unsynchronized tracks, with ostensibly the same target group, is counterproductive
and should be corrected.
Despite the lack of integration, each activity has been relatively successful in pursuit of
its respective objectives. The objectives themselves, however, should now be reconciled
within the context of a working level strategy framework designed to address the
evolving situation on the ground, especially given increasing upheaval in target areas
commencing early this year. The potential increase in impact from full collaboration
between the two programs could be substantial.
 
22 The database is also available to OTI/Washington and USAID Mission management, although there is
no record of the Mission ever having actually used the system as its data has never been “synchronized”.
OTI/Washington and the DAI Home Office have “read only” copies.
24
V. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
A. Recommendations Based on Lessons Learned
1. Design and Structure
· Integration of OTI assistance through pre-existing Mission project mechanisms face
difficult structural hurdles and must be carefully planned and negotiated. OTI should
assure that the corresponding management structure defines how the OTI resident
advisor fits within or relates to mission staff and that its oversight and management
roles are clear, understood, and accepted by all parties.
· OTI projects involving community-based development should be designed with a
sufficient time horizon to allow for adequate sustainability measures to take hold. The
SWIFT project’s timeframe is clearly inadequate. Three years would have been about
right, under earlier conditions. Now, at least two additional years are recommended.
23
Program closeout dates need to be reviewed within the context of evolving
conditions. OTI should not be arbitrarily tied to a fixed departure timetable,
particularly in areas characterized by precarious, fluid, or volatile conditions. A
phase-out at a pre-determined end date (without the benefit of a review) can
inadvertently send the wrong message, create a backlash or damage gains earlier
achieved. In general two years is a good benchmark target for conceptual purposes,
but adequate closure and hand-off is more important.
2. Implementation Arrangements
· The quality of coordination and synergy between Mission and OTI interventions is
determined to a large extent by the level of clarity in defining relationships and
structures during the design phase and refined during implementation. It is essential
that sufficient management attention (on the part of both OTI and the Mission) be
dedicated to this aspect. Clearly, this was not done in the Mindanao case. As a result,
the combined impact of both projects was less than what was potentially achievable
and probably considerably more costly from duplication of delivery systems.
· New program activities should only be initiated when enough time is available to see
them through to adequate closure or there is a readily available and committed hand￾off structure in place. The “reconciliation” group of TAGs under the SWIFT project
illustrates this point. 24
 
23 The evaluators understand the limitations of IDA funding and congressional pressure to terminate
transition programs within two-year periods of time. Nevertheless, the rule should be applied flexibly.
Different settings and constraints require different levels of effort and timeframes. It is also understood that
SWIFT started 18 months after OTI began its interventions in Mindanao. The evaluators would argue that
the clock should have been restarted at the time of SWIFT commencement.
24 Midway through SWIFT’s implementation period, “reconciliation” TAGs were developed in response to
the worsening peace situation brought about by the more aggressive GRP stance against the MILF. The
25
3. Execution
· The “directness” of assistance at the local level (in both phases) generated
tremendous amounts of goodwill and provided the basis for forging institutional
relationships with target communities. In the case of SWIFT, this has greatly
facilitated direct, face-to-face relationships between the ex-combatant communities
and their barangay and local government executives. This has also bolstered
continued support for the village projects and the ex-combatant communities
following termination. Where possible OTI should strive to preserve this principle in
its interventions.
· There is a major benefit to be achieved from forcing the issue on counterpart
contributions at the community level. As of August 2000, matching funds of $1.6
million exceeded OTI’s contribution of $1.3 million. The aggressive networking of
the OTI resident advisor has been instrumental in leveraging major counterpart
contributions from the national line agencies and LGUs. This has also strengthened
the vital “linkage” aspect of the project immeasurably.
· Sustainability is assured to the extent that the capacity of recipient organizations has
been sufficiently strengthened and linkages formed with appropriate supporting
stakeholders (GRP, LGUs, NGOs, etc.), but it does require a substantial period of
time. SWIFT has made a good start, but serious follow-on work is critical. As PAT
data show, most of the groups continue to need serious follow-up assistance and
training. Further, moving out of transition presumes that groups have reached a
certain level of capacity and sustainability and that the external situation has
normalized. This is certainly not the case for Mindanao and for MNLF ex-combatant
groups.25
· Hand-off strategies should be negotiated with resident USAID missions as far in
advance as possible, preferably a year prior to termination. There should be constant
communication on the evolution of the plan over that period so there are no surprises
when time draws short. SWIFT did attempt to do this, but conditions changed
dramatically during the second half of the implementation period.
 
reconciliation TAGs were intended to be a quick, one-time response to douse increasing tensions in
program areas. However, due to the overwhelming number of TAGs developed within a relatively short
period of time and the corresponding management burden (particularly for SWIFT’s procurement unit), this
program activity was terminated earlier than anticipated. Impact is uncertain, although there probably was
some at the local level. Adequate follow-up and monitoring capability is not in place due to time and
resource constraints. Reconciliation TAGs represent a useful vehicle for facilitating transition. When
introduced, they should have sufficient time to achieve adequate closure. While they may serve a purpose
in the very short-term, their impact will be enhanced if the activities are guided by a sense of strategic
direction.
25 Interview with Fr. Eliseo Mercado, President of Notre Dame University and Member of SPCPD’s
Consultative Assembly.
26
B. Recommendations for SWIFT Project Management
1. Although the first priority for PDOs and the program must be delivery of approved
TAGS, consistent and thorough follow-up with recipient groups over the months prior to
closeout is vital. Every group where follow-on assistance is required should have a basic
plan of action developed in a participatory mode.
2. PDOs now appear somewhat overextended (large portfolios of active TAGs). An
exercise, based on PAT reports to the extent possible, should be carried out soon to
determine which groups merit follow-up and which do not so that PDOs may concentrate
on priority communities. The current efforts to “hand-off” beneficiary groups to
corresponding LGUs, NGOs, or other donors should be aggressively pursued.
3. PDOs are now in a unique position to help lay the path for further organizational
development of recipient groups. It would be useful to bolster PDO skills in participatory
techniques through training. These techniques can then be applied to groups that do merit
follow-up during the remaining time of the program. This effort may not break down the
typically hierarchical structure of the ex-combatant groups, but it will chip away at their
traditional modes of top-down decision making.
4. The Monitoring and Analysis exercise should be completed as soon as possible, but
prior to termination there should be a master data clean-up exercise to document
consistent findings. More time may need to be spent on this by project management. The
product of this exercise will be invaluable for follow-up efforts with these groups in the
future.
5. Follow-up training for selected recipient groups should be continued, as
comprehensively as possible, until close to project termination. Cooperative and financial
management will be the first priority in most cases along with technical training on the
equipment.
6. The project should facilitate relationships and cross-fertilization experiences between
stronger and weaker recipient groups so as to provide additional support to the latter on
management and technical issues.
C. Other Recommendations
1. The database for this project should be documented and widely circulated as a model
of for effective management use in similar projects.
2. The Monitoring and Evaluation element for OTI projects should be established as
early as possible during implementation. It should be designed with professional
assistance to capture impact data all levels required, including the family level.
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3. The project implementation model for this project should be documented and
circulated for replication in other similar settings. It has a number of outstanding features,
especially those related to the leveraging of counterpart commitments from the
community and local government and establishment of strategic alliances among key
stakeholders and the target community.