ENHANCED ACCESS TO HUMANITARIAN NEEDS: 
THE FINAL EVALUATION REPORT OF THE CRS DRIVE PROJECT
For: 
 
April 2022
By 
Source: DRIVE Fieldwork 
2
Table of Contents
Table of Contents.......................................................................................................................2
Abbreviations.............................................................................................................................3
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................4
1. Background to DRIVE VII project.....................................................................................6
2. Evaluation Methodology ....................................................................................................6
2.1 Sampling...........................................................................................................................8
3. Findings..............................................................................................................................8
3.1 Overview of the DRIVE implementation. Extent to which DRIVE was implemented as 
planned? .................................................................................................................................8
3.2 Relevance of the intervention...........................................................................................9
3.2.1 Targeting....................................................................................................................9
3.2.2 Community engagement..........................................................................................10
3.2.3 Choice of assistance delivery modalities.................................................................11
3.2.4 Complementary/Agriculture activities ....................................................................12
3.3 Appropriateness of the DRIVE project ..........................................................................13
3.4 Efficiency of the intervention: How well were resources used?....................................13
3.5 Accountability to participants........................................................................................15
3.6 DRIVE project outcomes...............................................................................................15
3.6.1 Outcome 1: ..............................................................................................................16
3.6.2 Contextualizing the DRIVE agriculture component ...............................................20
3.6.3 Outcome 2................................................................................................................21
3.6.4 Outcome 3................................................................................................................21
3.6.5 Outcome 4................................................................................................................22
3.6.6. Unintended DRIVE outcomes................................................................................24
3.7 Mainstreaming protection and gender into design, implementation, and monitoring 
activities ...............................................................................................................................24
3.8 Partnerships/collaborations in the implementation of DRIVE project...........................24
3.9 Program Knowledge Management.................................................................................25
3.10 Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) Analysis........................26
3.10.1 Strengths: What did the DRIVE project do well? .................................................26
3.10.2 Weaknesses............................................................................................................26
3.10.3 Opportunities.........................................................................................................27
3.10.4 Threats...................................................................................................................27
3.11 Challenges encountered................................................................................................27
3.12 Lessons learned and best practices for future programming........................................28
3.13 Summary and conclusions............................................................................................29
3
4. Recommendations ............................................................................................................30
4.1 Programmatic .................................................................................................................30
4.2 Host community support................................................................................................31
4.3 Partnerships and collaborations......................................................................................31
Abbreviations 
CRS: Catholic Relief Services
DRC: Democratic Republic of Congo
DRIVE: Displaced and Recent Returnees Households Invite Recovery 
FCS: Food Consumption Score
FGDs: Focus Group Discussions
HHS: Household Hunger Score
KIs: Key Informants
M&E: Monitoring and Evaluation
NFIs: Non-Food Items
rCSI: Reduced Household Coping Strategy Index
S&S: Shelter and Settlements
USAID/BHA: United States Agency for International Development / Bureau for
Humanitarian Assistance
WASH: Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
4
Executive Summary
The CRS DRIVE project was implemented from March 27th 2021 to the end of March 2022 in 
partnership with Caritas Kalemie and Caritas Kongolo, with financial support from
USAID/BHA. The goal of the DRIVE project was to ensure that vulnerable households 
affected by armed and intercommunal conflicts in Tanganyika Province (of DRC), had access 
to humanitarian food, non-food items (NFIs), water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), and 
agricultural livelihood assistance. Thus, the project assisted the project participants with food, 
shelter and settlement (S&S), and WASH NFIs and agricultural inputs. The DRIVE final 
evaluation assessed the extent to which the project had achieved its objectives, addressing what 
contributed to those achievements, challenges faced during implementation, and lessons and 
best practices learned for use in future programming. 
Overall, the DRIVE project achieved its anticipated goal, objectives, and outcomes.
1 In so far 
as the project goal is concerned, both the Reduced Coping Strategy Index (rCSI) and the 
Household Hunger Scores (HHS) indicated improved food security at the household level. For 
example, the mean rCSI changed from 22.53 at baseline to 3.24 at the end of the project, and 
the median score changed from 19.80 at baseline to 1.5 by the end of the project. Similarly, the 
HHS score also indicated improved food security, whereby households falling under the 
moderate HHS reduced from 45.18% to 34.42%, and those falling under severe HHS moved 
from 54.82% to 2.88%. The Food Consumption Score (FCS) also paint a positive story, 
whereby at baseline 96.09% of the households fell under poor, 3.26% fell under borderline,
and only 0.65% were under the acceptable. After DRIVE interventions, only 12.11% were 
under the poor category, the rest fell under borderline (52.56%) and acceptable (35.33%)
categories. The findings on food security were qualitatively reinforced by statements from 
project participants whose observations can be summarized by a statement from a female group
participant. She observed the following: “Before CRS/Caritas arrived, my family was barely 
having a decent meal. Many are times we had no meal the entire day, but CRS assisted us to 
meet our basic needs including food.”
The NFIs were also highly appreciated as essentials that enabled project participants to 
undertake kitchen and hygiene activities with ease. The following statement from a female 
respondent revealed that the NFIs also helped to reduce tensions between the hosts and project
participants: “We were in constant tensions with our hosts because we kept on borrowing their 
household wares, but after receiving our NFIs from Caritas/CRS, the tension ended and our 
relationships became stronger.” These sentiments were also repeated in other FGDs.
Quantitative data revealed an increase in the proportion of households that were using 
appropriate hygiene practices. For example, those storing clean water increased from 12.24% 
at baseline to 91.23% at the end of the project. Similarly, households with handwashing 
knowledge increased from 38.23% at baseline to 95.14% at the end of the project, and 75.95% 
of these households had handwashing stations with soap and water, an increase from 1.80% at 
baseline. These findings were also reiterated in FGDs and KIIs, who shared how project 
1 Outcome 1: Returnee households who have access to land in targeted communities of Tanganyika province 
experience improved food security by the end of March 2022, restarting their agricultural livelihoods after 
receiving seeds, tools, and training on best agricultural practices (BAP).
Outcome 2: Conflict-affected households in targeted communities of Tanganyika province receive essential 
S&S assistance to meet their basic S&S NFI needs by the end of March 2022
Outcome 3: Conflict-affected households in targeted communities in Tanganyika province cover their WASH￾related basic needs to enable appropriate hygiene behavior by the end of March 2022.
Outcome 4: Conflict-affected households in targeted communities of Tanganyika province improve their food 
security by the end of March 2022.
5
participants had adopted some hygiene practices after interacting with the project. KI 
statements summarized the feedback on WASH as follows: “Through the project we learnt the 
importance of washing our hands and since then, the majority of us have been washing our 
hands to protect ourselves from diseases like cholera” (male KI). Another said, “We have 
noticed reduced sicknesses in the community since we started washing our hands” (female KI). 
“Most of us store clean water using the water cans that we bought using the support we got 
from CRS/Caritas.”
In the agriculture component, households practicing some form of improved management 
practices or technologies increased from 0% at baseline to an overwhelming majority (96.5%),
while those that had adopted improved post-harvest storage practices increased from 0% at 
baseline to 75.90% at the end of the project. At the time of the fieldwork, project participants
were hopeful that their food security would continue to improve because their crops were 
almost ready for harvest, especially in the Sola region.
The DRIVE project was appropriate because it addressed the felt humanitarian needs (food, 
S&S and WASH NFIs, and agriculture support) of the target beneficiaries. This was
demonstrated by statements from project participants who termed the DRIVE project as “life￾saving” because it found them on the verge of giving up on life due to the suffering they were 
going through, including lack of food and household related NFIs. The activities undertaken in 
the project – including beneficiary targeting, community engagement, assistance delivery 
modalities (fairs, cash, and direct distributions), and the agricultural support – were all relevant 
and contributed to the achievement of the project goal, as demonstrated later in the report. 
Further, the project accountability system, the effective information sharing channels, the use 
of M&E data to inform project decisions, and the strong partnership between CRS and Caritas
all built towards successful delivery of the DRIVE goal. Notable also is that the flexible nature 
of the DRIVE project, in terms of choice of intervention sites and the assistance delivery 
modalities, enabled the project to achieve its set targets within the stipulated project 
implementation period. Additionally, the DRIVE project was efficiently implemented, with all 
budget items implemented as per the proposal, giving value for money to the project 
participants.
Three lessons emerge from the DRIVE project. First, being an emergency project, DRIVE
benefitted highly from the flexible approach of the project that allowed quick turnarounds in 
response to unpredictable displacement alerts, enabling timely response to the project 
participants. Second, in addition to having a strong partner on the ground (Caritas), the 
coordinating, monitoring, and guidance role of CRS was critical in the realization of the project 
objectives. Third, since the host community is the first voluntary responder to the needs of the 
displaced persons, emergency assistance should not disrupt/destabilize that humane 
community approach to displaced persons through creating compensation expectations. 
Instead, the project efforts should be geared towards boosting the community means of 
livelihoods in order to boost food availability in the community. For example, in agricultural
host communities, supporting their food production will go a long way to enhancing food 
availability in the community, even after the project has exited. 
There is no doubt that to a more significant extent, the DRIVE project was able to achieve its 
goals and objectives, as demonstrated by the quantitative outcomes and qualitative feedback 
from project participants. Considering that the DRIVE project is an emergency project, its 
achievement in the agriculture component is worth highlighting, especially to emphasize the 
need to mainstream it or have it as a core focus in strategy for early recovery. Some
6
recommendations come to the forefront. First, CRS needs to improve on its beneficiary
identification process to avoid hurting prospective project participants and/or leaving out 
genuinely displaced persons. This can be done by embracing flexibility in terms of registration 
timing and offering detailed training to the listers to impart them with skills that embrace 
human dignity. Second, consider giving preference to cash distributions to project participants
whenever possible to avoid the many complaints that come from both the vendors and project 
participants. Third, incorporate host communities as automatic project participants in the 
agriculture component. Fourth, the agriculture component design should adopt a holistic 
approach to agriculture – that is, in addition to production and storage, savings and marketing 
(including value addition) may be included as core activities. Fifth, commitment to partnerships 
with actors should be well vetted to avoid community disappointments and tarnishing of CRS’s 
name in the communities.
6
1. Background to DRIVE VII project
In 2020, the eastern part of DRC experienced outbreaks of violence, particularly in Tanganyika 
Province and its immediate neighbours, such as South Kivu and Haut-Katanga. These inter￾ethnic skirmishes resulted in a humanitarian crisis, due to the severely compromised quality of 
life and living conditions of the affected population. Apart from the tragic loss of lives that 
occurred as a result of the violence, numerous people were displaced from their homes, robbed 
of their livelihood, and faced precarious/desperate living conditions such as food shortages, 
lack of/poor shelters, unsanitary living conditions, and increased vulnerability for women and 
children. Thus, CRS, with funding from USAID BHA, launched the DRIVE project to provide 
prompt and urgent support, particularly to vulnerable households of afflicted communities in 
Kalemie, Kongolo and Manono Territories in Tanganyika Province. 
The goal of the DRIVE project was to ensure that vulnerable households affected by armed 
and intercommunal conflicts in Tanganyika province, had access to humanitarian food, non￾food items (NFIs), water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), and agricultural livelihood 
assistance. Afflicted individuals eligible for support were internally displaced persons (IDPs) 
and returnees. The strategy of implementing this critical assistance was broken down into four 
main sectors of intervention: Food assistance, shelter and settlement (which basically provided 
household and clothing items), WASH provision and promotion, and agricultural assistance. 
These assistance sectors were informed by the baseline study and DRIVE experiences from 
earlier phases of the project.
The agricultural assistance was provided to empower and support returnee households that had 
access to land. The intended support was in the form of seeds, tools, and beneficial agricultural 
practices to help them restart their agricultural livelihoods, as well as boost food production in 
the targeted communities. The WASH sector aimed at supporting afflicted households with the 
relevant NFIs to alleviate their proneness to illnesses, such as cholera and typhoid, that may 
further reduce quality of life. Moreover, hygiene promotion was conducted to ensure that 
individuals knew how to better prevent illnesses. Similarly, the S&S sector, intended to provide 
project participants with NFI assistance for household goods/items. The food sector intended 
to provide unconditional food assistance to targeted communities for three months inorder to 
improve dietary diversity and food security among internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 
recent returnee populations. 
To determine the most effective and efficient ways to deliver support to the project participants, 
CRS conducted market assessments to get market price ranges, as well as to determine the most 
efficient and effective modalities to deliver support to project participants. In addition to its six 
years of experience implementing the DRIVE project, CRS triangulated the baseline data with 
information from other humanitarian actors to identify the most appropriate modality for 
delivering support. Further, the DRIVE project embraced a flexible approach to the distribution 
modality (direct distributions, fairs, or cash) in order to serve project participants in the most 
efficient way possible to achieve its objectives.
2. Evaluation Methodology
7 
The DRIVE project final evaluation set out to determine the project achievements and 
outcomes and generate learning to be applied during future phases of implementation. To 
achieve this objective, a mixed methods approach was used, which not only allowed for the 
triangulation of quantitative and qualitative data, but also helped to generate a nuanced 
understanding of project results and factors contributing to those results. Both primary and 
secondary data was collected. Primary data was collected using both qualitative and 
quantitative methods. The quantitative data utilised was collected during the baseline, PDM, 
and the final evaluation, while qualitative data was generated from FGDs and KIIs. Secondary 
data was collected through a review of DRIVE project documents. The evaluation questions 
are presented in Table 1 below. 
Table 1: Evaluation Questions 
To what extent did the project achieve its objectives?
What were the project’s major outcomes? How did they compare to the project’s intermediate results, 
strategic objectives and goal?
To what extent was the project implemented as designed? 
What effect did the project have on participants’ well-being? What effect did the project have on local 
markets? 
What unintended outcomes or effects did the project have as concerns project participants or other project 
stakeholders (e.g., local markets, host communities)?
How did project outcomes vary by subset of the participant population? 
What factors contributed to project outcomes?
To what extent was the project strategy, including targeting strategy, community engagement strategies, 
choice of modalities, and complementary activities, relevant?
To what extent was the project strategy, including targeting strategy, community engagement strategies, 
choice of modalities, and complementary interventions, appropriate?
To what extent was project strategy efficiently executed? 
To what extent was the project accountable to participants? 
How did the project communicate with participants? 
To what extent did the project mainstream protection and gender into design, implementation, and 
monitoring of activities? 
How did the project utilize data generated by monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning (MEAL) 
systems?
What role did project partners play in the project? 
To what extent did the project coordinate with other actors?
What challenges did the project face during the execution of activities? What did the project do to adapt in 
the face of these challenges?
What lessons learned and best practices were drawn from the project that can be applied to future phases of 
implementation? 
Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis to inform future programming.
The above questions were answered using both quantitative and qualitative data. Quantitative
data was collected through a household-level survey using a questionnaire that targeted the
person who received assistance on behalf of the household. The qualitative tools anticipated 
data that would broaden understanding of the quantitative data, and also give nuance to the key 
outcomes of the project. The qualitative tools used included FGD guides, Key Informant guides 
for community, project staff and partners. Table 2 below gives a breakdown of the samples for 
the baseline, PDM, and final evaluation. 
Table 2: Sample Breakdown 
Evaluation Quantitative 
8 
sample 
Baseline 1,978
PDM 1,798
Final evaluation 493 15 FGDs and 14 KIIs
2.1 Sampling 
Quantitative data for this evaluation is drawn from the baseline and PDM studies. The 
quantitative baseline sample was 1,978 households, while that of the PDM was 1,798. These 
samples are statistically comparable and enabled analysis of the data within the various 
indicators. These households were sampled using a two-stage stratified sampling method by 
placing the project participants into two groups. Group 1 was for IDPs and group 2 was for 
returnees. The IDPs had received core emergency assistance (S&S, WASH, and food), while 
the returnees had received complementary (agriculture) support in addition to the core 
emergency support. The sample was selected using a 95% level of confidence and a margin of 
error of 6%. The baseline study was done through random sampling at the village level, while 
the PDM was done through random selection of project participants, who were interviewed 
during the fairs. The final evaluation sample was smaller than the baseline and PDM samples 
first because the final evaluation relied heavily on the baseline and PDM data, and secondly 
because 493 was considered a statistically sound sample size to represent the views of the 
project participants. 
A two-day training was held with the enumerators to enable them to understand the 
questionnaire and also to guide them on research ethics. The training focused on background 
information about the program, research ethics, processes and procedures, use of tablets, and a 
detailed question to question discussion, including conducting mock interviews. Data was 
captured using tablets through the CommCare electronic data collection application. The data 
was primarily analyzed by calculating mean, median, and standard deviation, frequencies, 
security indexes and scores for categorical variables. Additionally, independent t-test were 
conducted to assess statistical significance in the outcomes between the two strata. The data is 
presented in frequencies and scores of the key indicator variables. Further, qualitative data was 
collected using Focus Group Discussions (FGD) and Key Informants (KIs) and is presented in 
narrative forms, thematically, providing explanations for the quantitative data. 
3. Findings
This section presents the findings of the final evaluation guided by the evaluation questions, 
which are presented in the methodology section. This report is structured into: overview of the 
DRIVE implementation, relevance of the project, appropriateness of the project, efficiency, 
outcomes, gender, partnerships, knowledge management, Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities 
and Threats (SWOT) analysis, challenges, lessons learned, summary, and recommendations.
3.1 Overview of the DRIVE implementation. Extent to which DRIVE was implemented as 
planned? 
Overall, the DRIVE project activities were implemented as planned, within the stipulated time 
from March 27, 2021, to March 26, 2022. For example, the core activities of the project 
including targeting of project participants, monthly delivery of the core assistance, and the 
agriculture support, all happened as planned and within the set budget of $6,998,589. Where 
9
challenges were experienced (for example, inaccessible villages due to insecurity or 
infrastructure challenges) the project relocated to other villages that had targeted project 
participants. Some of the ways in which the project contributed to the wellbeing of the 
participants include:
Positive
 Meeting project participants’ humanitarian needs (food, S&S and WASH NFIs.)
 Enabling the returnees to re-start their agricultural livelihood activities, helping them 
produce some food. 
 The host community felt that the project had lifted the burden of taking care of the 
displaced persons from them, meaning they could concentrate on their own families.
 The project created a sense of acceptance of participants by their hosts because they 
could fend for themselves, and some also shared their assistance with the host families.
 The project created employment for project staff and community members who 
worked as agriculture extension agents.
 The project created business for vendors and also helped grow local markets in terms 
of the quantity of sales, especially during the fairs. 
 The project opened up the villages to vendors, who would sell their items in the villages 
where fairs took place, even after the project had ended. It also opened up some of the 
roads because staff frequently used them (the vehicles revived the neglected roads).
Negative
 The Project participants were of the opinion that the vendors tended to overprice their 
supplies. The vendors explained that they did this in order to meet transport costs and 
also to make profits, causing higher prices than the local ones participants were used 
to. The project participants had other ways of accessing their needs locally, at lower 
prices. For example, for food, they could buy directly from the farmers at the farm 
price. For NFIs, they do not mind walking the long distances to go to the nearest 
markets to find the same items at cheaper prices. A female participant had this to say:
“In our normal lives, we walk very long distances, so we do not need money for 
transport, we can just walk to the markets and buy the things we need. The money for 
transport can be used to cater for other needs.” 
3.2 Relevance of the intervention
Under this criterion, DRIVE’s implementation strategy was examined to establish whether it 
was doing the right things. The activities under investigation were the targeting strategy, 
community engagement strategies, choice of modalities, and complementary activities. 
3.2.1 Targeting
The DRIVE beneficiary targeting was activated by alerts that signalled population movements. 
After confirming the alerts and establishing that the populations involved fell under the CRS 
target for project participants, CRS initiated the targeting process. The targeting process 
involved identifying, interviewing and documenting the displaced persons who fit within the 
CRS criteria. The beneficiary identification phase involved visiting locations where population 
movements had occurred within the CRS operation jurisdiction to ascertain the displacements 
and also to establish whether the displaced populations met other CRS criteria, like meeting 
the minimum number threshold of 2,500 people. Those who met the criteria were recruited into 
10
the project beneficiary list on behalf of their households. In other words, an individual 
represented a household. Further, household members of those who qualified as displaced 
persons were also listed through a physical identification and documentation process. To a 
greater extent, the targeting process was successful and enabled the project to identify genuine 
project participants. However, due to the nature of population movement, where people do not 
arrive at the same time, some people were not listed and therefore, they were left out of the 
beneficiary list. A suspicious attitude towards the displaced persons made the listers not list 
some genuinely displaced persons as project participants. Some households/individuals in the 
households were not listed because the listers doubted the information 
they provided. Thus, they did not receive assistance from the project. 
The targeting activity is surrounded by various challenges. First, some 
people who are not genuinely displaced persons lie that they are 
displaced, with the hope of benefiting from the project. Second, some 
displaced persons are not present during the household identification 
process, meaning they are not listed as project participants. Third, 
during the questioning to identify genuine project participants, some 
genuinely displaced persons may not respond to the questions 
accurately, due to the trauma they have experienced. In addition, the 
tone used by the listers may scare and disorient them. In some 
incidences, the staff get bullied by those forcing to be listed, yet they 
are not genuine. Consequently, the staff find themselves in a tough 
corner where they have to decide whether a person is genuine or not, 
and in some cases, the genuine ones were left out – not intentionally, 
but because of the pressure the listers go through. It is a point where the balance between being 
humane and the quest to list only genuinely displaced persons is tested. The suspicious attitude 
by the staff has both positive and negative consequences. On the positive side, it ensures that 
only genuinely displaced persons are listed. On the negative, genuinely displaced persons are 
left out. This is the issue that the project will need to deal with in subsequent DRIVE phases. 
3.2.2 Community engagement
The DRIVE project benefited from communities in two ways. First, by using community 
leaders to reach the displaced persons. This was a good community entry strategy because 
community leaders were aware of where to find the IDPs living within host communities. 
However, not all leaders where aware of all the IDPs’ whereabouts, hence the need to use 
community members and IDP leadership as well. Second, the communities played an important 
role in welcoming and taking care of the displaced persons. They offered security to the 
displaced persons who were running away from insecurity. These communities also assumed 
the responsibility of hosting the displaced persons and taking care of some of their needs prior 
to the DRIVE project intervention. Whether actively or passively, the host communities lived 
peacefully with the displaced persons. The mere fact that communities welcomed the displaced 
persons into their villages and homes without coercion is a very important factor in the 
displaced persons’ support system that should be encouraged and supported, because it is a 
voluntary, self-sustaining practice entrenched in the human value for each other and the need 
to support each other in times of need/trouble (Ubuntu).
The question of host communities needs to be understood from two perspectives. First, the host 
community innately holds the desire to contribute to the welfare of the displaced persons,
whether through an active role by hosting them in their homes, or passively by allowing them 
We did not help them 
because we had plenty
but because it was the 
right thing to do. We too 
can find ourselves in the 
same destitute situation.
- a female FGD 
participant
We did not know they 
would be assisted. We 
did what we had to do, to 
welcome them into the 
community, because it 
was the right thing, 
-A male FGD participant
11
to live within their vicinity. This is not only positive in terms of ensuring support to the 
displaced persons, but it also has some implications for continued support post project period. 
For example, some IDPs take longer to return to their homes and continue living with the host 
communities. This happens post project support period, meaning that the displaced persons 
continue to somehow benefit from the host communities.
Whereas some host community members may expect to be assisted, this should not be 
encouraged to avoid eroding the Ubuntu spirit of assisting each other. However, the project 
should consider extending the agriculture assistance to the host communities that live with 
displaced persons. This move will not only help to increase food production within the host 
communities, but also will enhance food availability, even to the displaced persons. Although 
it is assumed that the IDPs leave after the project ends, the reality is that some remain longer 
with host communities, depending on the security situation in their homes. This means they 
continue relying on the host communities for their survival. Thus, supporting host communities 
in food production will be an indirect way of supporting the IDPs after the project has ended.
3.2.3 Choice of assistance delivery modalities
Prior to the implementation of the DRIVE project, CRS had gained experience from six earlier 
DRIVE project phases distributing assistance using three modalities, namely: the fairs, cash,
and direct distribution of items. Fairs involve bringing vendors together in an open market and 
providing vouchers to project participants to make their purchases. In direct distribution, 
project participants are supplied with the various items directly. With cash, project participants
receive physical cash to make their own purchases in their place of choice. 
Each of the modalities has its own pros and cons depending on the locality of the intervention. 
Thus, to identify the best distribution modality in the intervention sites, CRS conducted a rapid 
market assessment covering NFI, shelter, and food markets. The aim was to evaluate the local 
markets’ structure, integration with other markets, vendor capacity, and supply chains for NFIs 
and food. Further, CRS triangulated its primary data with information from other humanitarian 
actors to identify the most appropriate modality for delivering NFIs. Paper vouchers in fair 
settings, direct NFI kit distribution, cash payments, or a mix of modalities were used in this 
DRIVE. The project was flexible in the use of delivery modalities, and this allowed for change 
in the use of a modality from one site to the other, as need arose. For example, in some sites, 
the first distributions were through fairs and the subsequent ones were through cash, depending 
on the challenges experienced during the first distribution. FGDs and KIIs revealed that the 
three modalities were generally accepted, but there was a high preference for cash. Thus, the 
DRIVE project did the right thing, having flexibility in its distribution modalities because it 
allowed for switching from one to the other in situations where the first one failed to deliver as 
anticipated.
The DRIVE project categorised households into three assistance groups: Category 1: HH size 
of 1 to 3 people - $34 voucher per month; Category 2: HH size of 4 to 7 people - $62 voucher 
per month; and Category 3: HH size of 8 or more people - $90 voucher per month. Assistance
accorded per household varied depending on the number of household members, as presented 
in Table 3 below.
Table 3: Assistance accorded to the households per sector
12
Sector of Intervention 1-3 People HH 
(voucher/ Cash 
Transfer Value)
4-7 People HH
(voucher/ Cash 
Transfer Value)
8 or more 
people HH
(voucher/ Cash 
Transfer 
Value)
Average Value 
of Cash and 
Voucher 
transfers per HH 
of 6
Shelter and 
Settlement NFIs
$52 $58 $63 $56
Sanitation and 
Hygiene NFIs
$18 $22 $27 $24
Food Assistance $34 $62 $90 $186
Seeds and Tools $60 $60 $60 $60
These cash and voucher values were informed by the previous DRIVE phase whose findings 
showed that this amount of assistance was sufficient and appropriate. FGD participants and 
KIs with the project participants commended the idea of the varying assistance amounts 
depending on the household members, noting that it ensured fairness in the assistance 
allocation. 
Generally, CRS managed the assistance delivery well and it was rated a success in all the FGDs 
and KIIs. The fairs had pre-preparation activities including identification of vendors through a 
competitive process, vendor-beneficiary meeting to discuss and set price limits, and beneficiary 
sensitization on fairs conducted by CRS. Some issues emerged during the implementation and 
CRS was able to resolve some, while others remained unresolved. Table 4 below presents the 
issues raised and the actions taken.
Table 4: Stakeholder feedback on fairs
Issue Stakeholder feedback
• Project
participants
CRS Beneficiary Vendor
• High item prices 
in the fairs, in 
comparison to 
local markets
• Advised the 
project 
participants to 
negotiate prices 
during the fair
• Changed from 
fairs to cash 
• Project participants
unsuccessfully 
negotiated prices
• Project participants
purchased fewer
items than they 
would have if the 
prices were lower.
• Blamed transport costs for 
increased prices
• Blamed short notices,
meaning the demand was 
high at the market and 
therefore prices went up. 
• Poor quality of 
food in the fairs
• Changed from 
fairs to cash
• Complained that 
some food items 
were spoilt/not of 
good quality
• Denied the allegation,
noting that their items
were of good quality.
• Complained of reduced 
business, losses and 
delayed payment of up to 
2 months
3.2.4 Complementary/Agriculture activities
The main complementary activities were under the agriculture components. These included 
trainings and agricultural input provisions (seeds and tools). The agricultural project
participants were extremely appreciative of the agricultural support they received. They 
observed that the DRIVE project enabled them to re-start their agricultural activities after 
losing all they had through the conflicts. 
13
 Based on the above findings, the study determines that all the DRIVE activities 
(targeting, community engagement, delivery modalities and the complimentary 
activities) were relevant in achieving the goals of the project. Thus, the project did the 
right thing to include these activities in the project design.
3.3 Appropriateness of the DRIVE project
This section examines whether there was need for the DRIVE project at all – that is, its value 
in relation to the needs of the project participants. Whiles it is true that communities will always 
have needs, a review of DRIVE project documents revealed that prior to its implementation, 
Kongolo, Kalemie and Manono territories had experienced inter-ethnic skirmishes that resulted 
in a humanitarian crisis. People had been displaced, losing their livelihoods, exposing them to 
lack of food, shelter, and hygienic living conditions. Discussions with project participants in 
FGDs exposed the untold suffering that the displaced persons had experienced, including going 
for days without basic needs like food and shelter. 
To save their lives, IDPs escaped from their homes, leaving everything behind. The returnees 
also described their situation, noting that they came back home to nothing because their homes 
had been torched and their economic activities disrupted to an extent that they needed to start 
afresh, but they did not have the means to. In addition to the physical needs, some of the 
displaced persons also were going through psychological challenges due to the violence and 
the losses they had witnessed. As presented later in the report, the food and NFI scores at the 
baseline also depicted a very needy situation. Simply put, the DRIVE project assisted people 
who were in critical need of humanitarian assistance, and this enabled them to continue living. 
Comments from the FGD and KII participants alluded to this fact. Participants highly 
appreciated the program, calling it a religious intervention, declaring CRS/Caritas as ‘God-sent 
to save His suffering people.’ The host communities were also of the same opinion, reiterating 
that the assistance given to project participants was lifesaving and a relief to them, because it 
lifted a huge burden of meeting the needs of the displaced persons off their shoulders and 
enabled them to focus on their families’ needs. 
 Based on the accounts of the project participants and other community members (hosts), 
this evaluation determines that the project was appropriate and responded to the needs of 
the target Project participants
3.4 Efficiency of the intervention: How well were resources used?
The evaluation examined how well resources were used – that is, the 
extent to which the intervention delivered results in an economic and 
timely way. To achieve this, the evaluation investigated the budget 
expenditures across the project activities, including monitoring and 
evaluation exercises, project sectors, fairs and cash modalities, and 
logistical planning.
a) Monitoring and evaluation activities’ efficiency
The baseline was done on time, just before the project activities were 
initiated. Baseline findings informed project staff on sites and project 
indicators. The market assessments were particularly important to
"CRS found us at 
our lowest. We 
were facing 
starvation and 
disease.”
-Male FGD 
ti i t
“God sent Caritas 
to rescue us, 
otherwise some of 
us would have 
died.”
-Female FGD 
participant
14 
informing the project on the best distribution modalities and this helped to save project money, 
as discussed later. There were no delays in the start of the project. 
b) Project sectors and budget
The DRIVE total budget was $6,999,580. The project remained with this budget, with 80%
($5,842,150) being used on direct costs, while 20% ($1,157,430) was utilized on indirect costs. 
Table 5 below presents the planed and actual budget per sector:
Table 5: Project budget 
Assistance item Planned budget (USD)
Actual Budget
(USD)
Agriculture inputs 
and tools 360,000.00 341,003.13
NFI 587,900.00 570,283.20
Wash 206,800.00 209,602.56
Food 1,369,116.00 1,473,226.89
Total 2,523,816.00 (36.06%)
2,594,115.78 
(37.06%)
Project budget 6,999,580
 
The variations between the planned and actual budgets were driven by two factors: First, at the 
planning stage, the project may have anticipated larger numbers of project participants, but 
targeting revealed lower or bigger numbers than the anticipated one. Second, market 
assessments informed the project on the most efficient ways to deliver assistance. Specifically, 
the use of fairs and cash cut down on transport costs and enabled savings of the funds that 
would have been used for transportation of goods if direct distributions had been done. 
At the close of the final evaluation, some project activities were still ongoing in Nyemba 
territory. A total of 2,301 people were being supported using savings that had been realised as 
described above. 
c) Fairs/cash assistance delivery modalities
The CRS procurement department undertook vendor identification activities. The vendors were 
selected through a process where they were required qualify as vendors who could supply the 
required goods. 
The following activities demonstrate efficiency in the project:
• Use of fairs and cash modalities, which ensured that the risks of financial losses were 
eradicated from CRS. Both the vendors and the project participants were satisfied with the 
voucher amounts. 
• To ensure that the voucher process was not abused, CRS prepared unique vouchers for each 
category of support. The vouchers were well controlled to ensure that no fraud happened. 
The vendors and project participants were well warned about the repercussions of abusing 
the vouchers (which meant being removed from the list of vendors/project participants). 
• Using SOFICOM, a third-party financial services provider, to make payments to the 
vendors and project participants. This lifted the financial risk and time off of CRS.
• CRS, through the procurement department, also identified vendors who had the capacity to 
sell goods and services at the fairs. This step was meant to bring in only those vendors who 
had the capacity and integrity to provide goods and services in the fairs. 
d) Logistical planning
15
Due to its partnership with Caritas and logistical arrangements in the implementation sites, the 
project was able to cut down on logistical expenses. Considering that CRS/Caritasimplemented 
activities in areas where no other NGOs were implementing the same activities, duplication
was avoided, resource allocation was responsive, and efficiencies were gained. CRS worked 
closely with other NGOs through UN OCHA to make sure that they did not implement where 
other NGOs were implementing. 
 Based on the financial budget information presented under the efficiency section, it is 
clear that the DRIVE project displayed value for money through the various project 
activities and the funds were efficiently utilised. It is also worth noting that DRIVE not 
only meet its targets in terms of households and the sectors supported, but also saved 
funds that were being used to support project participants in Nyemba territory. 
3.5 Accountability to participants 
The DRIVE project’s accountability to participants began at the start of the project. It was 
guaranteed through both information sharing (amongst staff, to project participants, and other 
stakeholders including partners), as well as feedback and response processes to queries raised. 
These were continuous processes from the start to end of the project. The aim of sharing 
information, especially to project participants, was to enable them to be aware of their rights,
so they could question anything they felt was not going well. A number of feedback channels 
were used, namely: a beneficiary help desk at the fairs, suggestion boxes at the local leaders’
offices, a hotline, and other informal ways, like approaching a staff or a community leader to 
express an issue. The most common issues raised were about targeting and fairs. On targeting, 
some people complained that they had been left out of the list, yet they were genuine 
IDPs/returnees. On fairs, issues raised were about prices and quality of food sold.
All the raised queries were responded to by the CRS accountability team through the relevant 
project implementation sectors. The challenge, though, was that some people, especially on 
targeting, reported too late, after the process had been completed. Where the complaint came 
on time, it was verified and if found true, the complainant would be listed as a project 
beneficiary. Another challenge was that some people were lying, wanting to benefit, even 
though they were not genuinely displaced persons, as per the targeting criteria. Further, some 
people presented their issues late in the process, so it was not possible to address the queries. 
For example, a person who brings a targeting query in the third month could not be considered 
for assistance. 
 The DRIVE project was accountable to the project 
participants through the various project communication 
channels. However, there is room for improvement,
especially in making sure that the target participants are 
well aware of the channels to follow early enough to help 
them raise their issues.
3.6 DRIVE project outcomes
This section discusses the DRIVE project outcomes in response to the final evaluation 
questions that sought to establish the project’s major outcomes and how they compared to the 
project’s intermediate results, strategic objectives, and goal. The four anticipated DRIVE 
outcomes are listed in Figure 1 below.
We had lost everything and 
our farms were bushes. We 
did not have the energy to 
farm because first of all we 
were weak and hungry and 
secondly, we did not even 
have the farm inputs.
- A female participant
16
Figure 1: Anticipated DRIVE outcomes
Each of these outcomes are discussed within the sectors. Figure 2 below presents outcome 1
and its indicators.
3.6.1 Outcome 1: 
Figure 2: Outcome 1 and the associated indicators
Outcome 1: Returnee households 
who have access to land in targeted 
communities of Tanganyika province 
experience improved food security 
by the end of March 2022, restarting 
their agricultural livelihoods after 
receiving seeds, tools, and training 
on best agricultural practices (BAP).
Outcome 2: Conflict-affected 
households in targeted 
communities of Tanganyika 
province receive essential S&S 
assistance to meet their basic 
S&S NFI needs by the end of 
March 2022
Outcome 3: Conflict-affected 
households in targeted communities 
in Tanganyika province cover their 
WASH-related basic needs to enable 
appropriate hygiene behavior by the 
end of March 2022.
Outcome 4: Conflict-affected 
households in targeted 
communities of Tanganyika 
province improve their food 
security by the end of March 
2022.
Outcome 1: 
Returnee households who have access to land in targeted communities of Tanganyika 
province experience improved food security by the end of March 2022, restarting their 
agricultural livelihoods after receiving seeds, tools, and training on best agricultural 
practices (BAP)
Percentage of 
beneficiary households 
who increase their 
production after 
receiving assistance
Number of hectares 
of land 
undermanagement 
practices or 
technologies
Number of 
householdswho have 
applied improved 
management 
practices or 
technologies with 
BHA assistance
Number of participant 
households using 
improved post￾harvest storage 
practices
Indicators
17 
On the agriculture component, the project only supported households that had access to 
agricultural land (5,969 households, equivalent to 31,313 individuals), constituting 99.5% of 
the targeted 6,000 households. Of these households, 2,127 were from Kalemie, while 3,883 
were from Kongolo. The support provided was in the form of seeds, farm tools, and training 
on best agricultural practices. FGD and KII discussions revealed that prior to the displacement, 
returnees were small-scale farmers who mainly practiced subsistence farming, using basic 
farming methods. When they returned home, they had to start afresh but they had no inputs 
including seeds and tools. In their own words, “it was difficult to start farming again.” These 
sentiments were echoed across all the FGDs in different sites with participants disclosing that 
the assistance they got from CRS enabled them to start farming their own farms rather than in 
other people’s farms in search of food.
C02. Percentage of beneficiary households who increase their production after receiving 
assistance
The findings reveal increased production from 0% at baseline, where project participants had 
not undertaken any farming activities due to the displacement, to a 72.25% increase after 
getting assistance from CRS. 
The support was given in three categories, as presented in Table 6 below. 
Table 6: outcome performance per category 
Assistance 
Percentage of 
households that 
increased food 
production after 
assistance
Hectares under 
improved 
management 
practices
Individuals who had 
applied improved 
management 
practices
Percentage of 
households using 
improved post￾harvest storage 
practices
Category 1 75.52% 14.3% 16.6% 84.38%
Category 2 72.09% 72.1% 71.9% 82.69%
Category 3 64.55% 13.6% 11.5% 82.35%
It emerges that category 2 overwhelmingly topped the lists for those with land under 
improved management practices (72.1%) and those who were using improved management 
practices (71.9%). Category 1 topped the list of those who had increased their food 
production (75.5%) and those who were using improved post-harvest storage practices 
CRS ga s fish (food) 
and nets (agricultural 
assistance). They 
understood that we needed 
to be self-reliant
-Female FGD participant
18
(84.4%). Notable is that category 3 was the least performing in the three indicators. However, 
it is worth appreciating the performances within the indicators, especially the fact that the 
assistance enabled project participants to resume farming activities in the first place. FGD 
participants in Sola reported that their production had increased after receiving support from 
CRS – that is, training and input support. In Kalemie, farmers 
had yet to harvest their crops, but were happy they had crops in 
their farms and were hopeful they would get some harvest. 
Their concern, however, was that they would not have much of 
a harvest, because the seeds came late, some were not 
favorable for their region, and the rains were not enough.
A2. Number of hectares under improved management 
practices or technologies with BHA assistance
In addition to tools and seeds assistance, project participants were trained on improved farm 
management technologies.
2 The project intended to support farming in 1,800 hectares. At the 
end of the project, a total of 1,507 hectares (83.72%) of the targeted land was under improved 
management/technologies. FGDs/KIIs with community members revealed that the increase in 
land under cultivation was due to the assistance that had been given by the project. Key 
informants and FGD participants alluded to the fact that in addition to the physical support, the 
mere presence of the CRS staff in the communities also made the project participants feel 
pressured to increase the land under cultivation because they did not want to appear ungrateful 
and disinterested. They wanted their farms to have crops so that they could communicate their 
appreciation of the assistance and demonstrate they had taken heed of the training they 
received. 
A3. Number of individuals (participants) who have applied improved management 
practices or technologies with BHA assistance
Generally, households that received agriculture assistance had applied improved farm 
management practices after receiving the training. A total of 5,760 households, an equivalent 
of 28,836 individuals, (96.66% of the target) had applied improved management practices in 
their farms. While this is a positive outcome, it is important to note the following: First, the 
majority of farmers practiced mixed farming practices – that is, they retained their old ways 
and also adopted the new ones they had learned. Second, in the second agricultural season, 
some reverted back to the traditional farming methods and vice-versa. Whether or not they 
chose to retain improved farming methods or not depended on: perceived or real required labor 
to implement the improved farming practices, comparison of produce from traditional farming 
methods and improved farming methods, and pessimism or the “wait and see” attitude.
• Intensive labor requirement for improved farming practices
FGDs revealed that project participants felt that some farming practices were time intensive 
and therefore they did not want to engage in them. For example, mulching and tilling the land 
instead of burning the bushes was seen as cumbersome. 
2 No bush burning, planting in a line, crop mulching, thinning of plants, pest control, use of terraces and fallows, 
crop rotation, use of manure
Availability of food during 
the farming season enabled
us to concentrate on the 
farm activities. This helped 
us to cultivate more land 
than we used to before.
-Male Participant
Figure 3: female farmers in Sola display their DRIVE supported groundnuts and maize 
19
• Comparisons of production from traditional and improved farming practices 
This factor was multifaceted. First, in some areas the crops did well, while in others the crops 
failed. The failure of the crops was either because of the environmental conditions (inadequate 
rains or diseases) or because of late planting where seeds were not provided on time. In some 
areas, especially in Kalemie, rains failed and pests were problematic. Additionally, seeds were 
supplied late or the variety supplied was not good for the targeted area. As a result, some 
villages in Kalemie did not do well, meaning there was no major difference in production 
between farms that applied improved farming methods and those that retained the traditional 
practices.
In Sola, where the agricultural assistance activities happened at the right time, the harvest was
good and appreciated. Project participants disclosed that there was a big difference between 
the farms that used traditional methods and those that used improved farming practices. Farms 
in which improved farming practices were used were reported to be more productive and easier
to operate in, even during the harvesting phase. The training activities were highly appreciated 
and associated with improved food production.
A4. Percent of participant households using improved post-harvest storage practices
An impressive percentage (75.90%) of farmers indicated 
that they were using improved post-harvest storage 
practices. In Sola, all (100%) of the farmers reported use 
of improved post-harvest storage practices, while in 
Kalemie, only 61.71% of farmers were using it. This was 
partly due to the fact that their production was low and 
therefore they did not see the need for post harvesting 
storage practices, and partly because they had received 
assistance late. Further, some farmers doubted modern 
farming methods and opted to continue with the traditional 
post-harvest storage practices, which included storing their maize above the fireplace.
The findings on the agriculture component of the DRIVE project are testament that indeed the 
project was able to contribute to improved food security in the targeted areas and most 
importantly, it helped farmers regain their source of livelihood. While those who received NFIs 
Figure 4: Improved Groundnuts and maize farms assisted through DRIVE project
There was no difference. Look at 
the farms and you will see that 
they are all not doing well 
whether you used the improved 
methods or not. Those who used 
improved methods are at a loss 
because they spent more labour in 
the farm.
-A male FGD participant
20
only were worried about their next meals, those who were in agriculture were excited about the 
harvest they had already gotten or were expecting to get. In their words, “It is better to have 
crops in the farm because they give you hope that there will be food at some point, than not 
have anything that one is waiting for.” The following statements in Figure 5 gathered from key 
informants and FGD participants give a summary of the indicators.
Figure 5: Summary Opinions about the agriculture component of the DRIVE project
3.6.2 Contextualizing the DRIVE agriculture component
There is no doubt that the agricultural component of the DRIVE project has left an indelible
mark in the hearts of the beneficiary communities. The training and provision of farm tools,
including seeds, was highly praised – not forgetting the increased production and the hope of 
continuing after the project exit. Further, DRIVE enabled communities to resume their 
livelihood activities, and this has set them on a path of recovery. 
Key informant and FGD interviews revealed pertinent gaps in the implemented activities, 
though. For example, farmers were still not convinced about the new cassava seed varieties. It 
was criticised as rotting too quickly, unlike the traditional variety, which takes a longer time to 
mature (3 years) but does not get spoilt. The community 
members observed that the modern breed matured fast (1 
year), but it got spoilt within three months of maturity. 
Another issue of interest is the revelation that adoption of 
the improved farming methods was not fully embraced,
and some farmers criticised it on the basis of being labor 
intensive with no difference in production, when compared
to the traditional methods. 
There were also disagreements on the traditional way of laying 
seedlings on the soil. For example, the traditional way of 
placing the cassava seedling upright vs the modern way of 
slanting it. All these issues expose the attitude change dilemma 
that cannot be addressed overnight and needs more time. It also 
reveals a competition between tradition and modernity, a 
hidden call for sustained training that incorporates a practical 
demonstration component, such as demonstration farms. In the 
case of cassava, it emerged that the communities preferred the traditional variety because the 
cassava lasts longer in the farm, assuring them of food security. This thinking exposes a 
Most of the households have increased the land we are farming on since we started 
working with CRS because we got tools and seeds (KI).
Most of us have used the farming methods we were taught, although we are also 
using the traditional ones (Female FGD).
Some of us have started harvesting groundnuts and this is helping us with food and 
we expect to harvest more food (Female FGD).
At least some food is available in the community from our farms and it will increase as 
we continue to farm using the improved farming methods (KI).
The cassava seedlings they gave 
us did not grow as tall as ours. 
Then when they matured, they 
did not have big cassava like 
ours. To make matters worse, 
they could not last long in the 
farm and so it was a loss. 
A female FGD participant
We cannot eat all this 
cassava together. So our 
traditional cassava is better 
because it last for three 
years and this assures us of 
food security
-Male FGD participant
21
subsistence farming mindset that farms are only for subsistence use –that is, to meet immediate 
needs. In other words, farming is not seen as a business enterprise and, therefore, the production 
is only for subsistence use. 
The above observations expose the need for the DRIVE project to treat emergency response as 
a community entry point whereby, after the community’s humanitarian needs have been met, 
the project then embarks on the recovery phase. The recovery phase should take into 
consideration the fact that behaviour change takes time and, therefore, an adequate 
implementation timeline and budget cannot be overemphasised. Further, the project will need 
to consider taking a holistic approach to the agriculture component that goes beyond production 
and storage to include marketing, in order to enable communities to experience value for their 
farm work. 
3.6.3 Outcome 2
Conflict-affected households in targeted communities of Tanganyika province receive 
essential S&S assistance to meet their basic S&S NFI needs by the end of March 2022
The indicator for this outcome was the number and percent of individuals reporting satisfaction 
with the quality of the NFIs received. DRIVE supported 50,646 project participants with shelter 
and settlement NFIs. Of these, 6,872 were IDPs, 36,749 were returnees, and 7,025 were host 
community members. At baseline, none (0%) of the 1,798 respondents reported satisfaction 
with the quality of S&S NFIs they had, but almost all (99.26%) of the respondents interviewed 
at the end of the project reported high satisfaction with the quality of the S&S NFIs they 
received from the project. This was also confirmed by FGD participants, who revealed that 
most of the S&S NFIs they purchased was of good quality. To demonstrate that the quality was 
good, they reported that they were still using most of the items they purchased during the fairs. 
The only concern was that due to the high prices at the fairs, they were only able to buy a few 
items. 
3.6.4 Outcome 3
Conflict-affected households in targeted communities in Tanganyika province cover 
their WASH-related basic needs to enable appropriate hygiene behavior by the end of 
March 2022.
A total of 14,529 project participants were assisted with sanitation and hygiene NFIs. Of these, 
1,481 were IDPs, 12,273 were returnees, and 775 were host community members. An 
overwhelming majority of these project participants reported satisfaction with the contents 
(93.93%) and the quality (99.12%) of the WASH NFIs they bought. 
Table 7 below presents the gender breakdown of the NFI scorecard.
Table 7: NFI scorecard across genders
Baseline PDM
C01. Percent of participant households 
scoring 3 or lower on the NFI 
Scorecard
8.36% 88.00%
M&F 7.57% 87.91%
22
MNF 3.64% 92.11%
FNM 18.12% 85.55%
Generally, the NFI scorecard improved for both genders. Project participants adopted the 
WASH practices they had been trained on, including handwashing practices at the three times 
(95.14%), using soap and water, knowledge about the three critical handwashing times 
(75.95%), and hygienic storage of clean water practice (91.23%). Just like the S&S NFIs, 
respondents’ concern was the high prices at the fairs, which reduced their purchasing power.
C01. Percent of participant households scoring 3 or lower on the NFI Scorecard
Overall, there was an improvement of household hunger score, from 37.30 to 95%. There were
no major differences across the assistance categories, as presented in Table 8 below.
Table 8: Outcome 3 indicator performances
Assistance
% HH with 
Scorecard 
NFI<=3
% of HH that had 
been trained on 
WASH, including 
the three times 
handwashing 
practice.
% of HH using 
soap and water 
(and knowledge 
about the three 
handwashing 
times)
% of HH 
using 
hygienic 
storage of 
clean water 
practice
Category 1 76.45% 96.17% 78.01% 89.17%
Category 2 89.13% 95.38% 75.64% 92.75%
Category 3 84.37% 92.05% 73.41% 91.21%
Table 9 below shows that there was overwhelming improvement of the NFI Scorecard for all 
household members.
Table 9: NFI Scorecard across gender
Gender Baseline PDM
M&F 7.57 87.91%
MNF 3.64 92.11%
FNM 18.12 85.55%
On NFIs, men were more satisfied than the women, who would have wished to get more of the 
WASH and other household NFIs. This is because it is women who are involved directly in the 
use of the NFIs. However, it is clear that the project achieved its NFI objectives.
3.6.5 Outcome 4
Conflict-affected households in targeted communities of Tanganyika province improve 
their food security by the end of March 2022.
A total of 38,148 individuals were assisted with food. Of these, 6,889 were IDPs, 31,259 were 
returnees, and none were host community members. Overall, the reduced Coping Strategy 
Index (rCSI) mean for both males and females improved from 23.02 at baseline to 2.25 at end￾line. The median also improved from 20.80 at baseline to 1.5 at the end of the project. Table 
10 below provides the breakdown of the rCSI across genders.
23
Table 10: rCSI across gender
Mean and Median Baseline PDM
Mean 22.53 3.24
Median 19.80 1.5
Standard deviation 11.00 4.17
Mean rCSI - Female and Male Adults (F&M) 23.02 2.25
Median rCSI - Female and Male Adults (F&M) 20.80 1.5
Mean rCSI - Adult Female, No Adult Male (FNM) 20.15 3.09
Median rCSI - Adult Female, No Adult Male (FNM) 18.40 1
Mean rCSI - Adult Male, No Adult Female (MNF) 18.97 2.64
Median rCSI - Adult Male, No Adult Female (MNF) 17.40 1.75
Mean rCSI - Children No Adult (CNA) 0.00 0.25
Median rCSI - Children No Adult (CNA) 0.00 0.25
Clearly the rCSI improved for all household members after the food assistance. Similarly, the 
households a with moderate and severe Hunger Score (HHS) reduced from 100% at baseline 
to 37.30% at the end of the project. Table 11 gives a household breakdown of the HHS.
Table 11: Gender and HHS
Type of household Baseline Endline
Households with moderate and severe Household Hunger Scale (HHS) 
scores
100% 37.30%
Moderate HHS Score 45.18% 34.42%
Severe HHS Score 54.82% 2.88%
Percent of moderate HHs - Female and Male Adults (F&M) 43.97% 29.09%
Percent of Severe HHS - Female and Male Adults (F&M) 56.03% 0.00%
Percent of Moderate HHs - Adult Female, No Adult Male (FNM) 50.34% 33.44%
Percent of Severe HHS - Adult Female, No Adult Male (FNM) 49.66% 3.79%
Percent of Moderate HHS - Adult Male, No Adult Female (MNF) 52.86% 29.09%
Percent of Severe HHs - Adult Male, No Adult Female (MNF) 47.14% 0.00%
Percent of Moderate HHs - Children No Adult (CNA) 0.00% 0.00%
Percent of Severe HHs - Children No Adult (CNA) 0.00% 0.00%
Food assistance was structured in three categories, depending on household sizes, as presented 
in Table 12 below.
Table 12: Indicator performance per category of assistance 
Assistance FSC 
Acceptable
FSC 
Boderline FSC Poor rCSI % of HHs 
Moderate
% of HHs 
Severe
Category 1 32.56% 52.54% 15.22% 3.41 & 1.70 31.23% 2.94%
Category 2 34.26% 54.66% 11.10% 3.20 & 1.46 35.57% 1.97%
Category 3 39.43% 50.47% 10.01% 3.11 & 1.35 36.47% 3.73%
24
The findings from the food security outcome indicators reveal no major differences across three 
categories. This is an indication that the amounts shared across the categories were adequate,
a fact that was also reiterated in the FGDs. Overall, the DRIVE food intervention was the right 
decision because the food security indicators used (mean & median Reduced Coping Strategies, 
Household Hunger Scale, and Food Consumption Score) all pointed to food insecurity at 
baseline and the above findings demonstrate that this changed for the better. 
3.6.6. Unintended DRIVE outcomes
Although DRIVE is an emergency project, it has shown potential to catalyse business growth 
in the targeted communities. At the market level, fairs are associated with increased sales. The 
fairs have also opened up villages to the vendors who visit their villages to sell their goods after 
the fairs. DRIVE has also opened up the roads to villages through staff visits using vehicles 
and subsequent activities like the fairs. In support of this outcome, a project beneficiary 
recounted how when they moved to the villages, it was all bushy but now the project has helped 
to open roads that community members also use. No negative unintended outcomes were 
reported.
3.7 Mainstreaming protection and gender into design, implementation, and monitoring 
activities 
The DRIVE project design was deliberate in mainstreaming gender in all project activities. For 
example, while the project preferred women to represent 
their households, some households were represented by men.
Most importantly, though, both males and females discussed 
how to use the assistance they received. The women were 
particularly happy about the fact that they received assistance 
on behalf of the family, noting that the project did well to 
give the assistance through the women because the assistance 
benefited all household members. These sentiments were 
also echoed by the men, who said that the project’s decision 
to support households through women was strategic,
especially with food, because it is the woman who knew what 
was required in the house in so far as food was concerned. 
At the end of the project, three quarters (75.11%) of women,
compared to 26.69% at baseline, reported that they 
participated in household decisions about the use of food. 
According to them, the project helped to increase their 
participation in household decisions. For example, since they 
had access to the vouchers or cash, they were able to decide or be involved in household 
decisions on how to use the assistance given. The males reiterated the importance of involving 
women in household food decisions, noting that it is the women who are best placed to know 
what the household requires in terms of food.
3.8 Partnerships/collaborations in the implementation of DRIVE project
The project benefited from an implementation partnership between CRS and Caritas Kalemie 
and Caritas Kongolo. Caritas was a strategic CRS partner considering that it has field offices 
Women were best placed to 
receive the assistance because 
they are the ones who know 
what is best for each family 
members. They also know what 
to buy and what to leave
-A male FGD participant
I went to the market alone and 
bought everything but when I 
got home I realised had not 
bought cooking oil and salt. 
So we decided we would be 
going together with my wife 
because she knows what we 
need in the house
-A male FGD participant
25
in the targeted communities. The partnership with Caritas made it possible for CRS to assist
the hard-to-reach populations with relative ease, and also to get timely feedback on project 
activities, including alerts of any population movements. The CRS /CARITAS partnership can 
be described as a complimentary one, where CARITAS run the day-to-day implementation of 
the field activities and provided monthly progress reports to CRS. On its part, CRS took the 
lead in coordination at the cluster level, as well as monitoring, guidance, and supportive roles 
to Caritas at ground levels. The monitoring, support, and guidance roles played by CRS were
instrumental in the success of the DRIVE project. 
Other actors in the project were the Government of DRC and OCHA. Under the government, 
the project worked with the Provincial Inspectorate of Agriculture Fisheries and Livestock 
(IPAPEL) who trained farmers on the best farming practices, and the National Seed Service 
(SENASEM) who assisted in the seed certification. The Federation of Congo Enterprises(FEC)
helped in the coordination of vendors who participated in the fairs. OCHA played the 
coordination role, especially in the identification of which partner intervened. SOFICOM 
provided payment services to the vendors and project participants who received cash. 
Generally, all these actors played their part well. 
There was an unfortunate incidence in Lukwangulo, where CRS provided NFI assistance and 
ACTED was supposed to provide food assistance. However, ACTED did not provide the food 
assistance as anticipated. The FGD participants complained bitterly, blaming CRS for lying to 
them that they would supply them with food and failing to honor their promise. The females 
who had been recruited to participate in the FGD refused to be interviewed and, like their male 
counterparts, they blamed CRS for the unfortunate incidence of promising and not fulfilling 
the promise. The reason CRS was blamed in this instance is because the community could not 
tell the difference between CRS and ACTED. Since CRS had assisted with NFIs, it was easy 
to remember CRS and blame them. This incident serves as a caution to CRS to be vigilant in 
its selection of partners to avoid unintended conflicts with community members. CRS may also 
need to consider a damage control exercise in Lukwangulo village. 
3.9 Program Knowledge Management
The DRIVE project’s decisions were guided by data collected at different phases of the project. 
Decisions were made through monthly action review meetings, where information received 
from various sources was discussed and decisions made. 
Some of the decisions made using the project data included:
Change from delivery of NFIs through fairs to use of the cash modality in some areas. 
This was after the NFI data showed that the NFI scorecard remained low, prompting 
the staff to investigate the matter. The finding was that vendors were not bringing 
enough WASH NFIs, especially those that occupied larger spaces in the vehicle. Based 
on this finding, the project decided to give cash for NFIs to enable participants to buy 
the NFIs from the market instead of the fairs.
The accountability data revealed that some genuine IDPs had been left out during the 
targeting exercise and, therefore, the project investigated to verify the information. A 
total of 177 project participants were identified and assisted in the second month of 
assistance. 
During the fairs, data collected indicated low satisfaction with some of the food items.
For example, the prices for cooking oil. To respond to this, vendors were advised to 
only supply items that were being sold locally because they were cheaper.
26
On seeds, it was noted that in some places in Kalemie, some communities did not want 
the maize seeds. They preferred to have the groundnut seeds, because groundnuts did 
well in the area and it also fetched them money, which they used to buy other food 
items.
On advice from the food security cluster, DRIVE did not give slashers to the farmers 
despite persistent requests from project participants. This is because the project avoided 
contributing to violent acts through the use of slashers. However, the community 
remained in need of the slashers for clearing bushes.
3.10 Strength, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats (SWOT) Analysis
The SWOT analysis presented here is informed by discussions with project staff, participants, 
partners, and also a review of the project documents. 
3.10.1 Strengths: What did the DRIVE project do well?
• Reasonable/quick response timelines.
• Serving the hard-to-reach populations.
• Community engagement in identification and service to project participants.
• CRS logistical (vehicle) presence in the implementation sites allowed for quicker access 
to the implementation territories.
• Flexibility in choice of implementation sites allowed quick response to alerts as they 
came in, considering that alerts are unpredictable, and therefore, a predetermined choice 
of implementation sites in not feasible. 
• Adoption of a flexible implementation approach that allowed use of the most 
appropriate delivery modalities (vouchers, cash, direct distribution), as per the 
implementation context.
• Experience and learnings from other DRIVE project cycles.
• Robust targeting approach that ensures that only genuinely displaced persons are 
assisted by the project.
• Capacity to undertake prompt targeting exercises to ensure timely beneficiary access to 
project assistance.
• Relying on research, especially the M&E components, including baseline, market 
assessments, PDMs, and final evaluations, as well as other monitoring data to inform 
project decisions.
• Effective communication and feedback mechanism within various levels of project 
implementation.
• Team spirit amongst the staff, relying on each other’s experience to make urgent 
decisions where the need arose.
3.10.2 Weaknesses 
• Targeting related challenges, especially in identification and household member listing
o Leaving out genuine households.
o Under listing members of a household.
o Cases of inhumane handling of prospective project participants.
o Listers’ insecurity (incidences of violence).
o Inadequacy in delivery of information about targeting days.
• Late/out of season farm inputs supply, leading to poor harvests.
• Vendor vs beneficiary dissatisfaction
27
o Vendor complaints about thefts by beneficiary during fairs.
o Vendor complaints about losses due to low business/few project participants at
the fairs.
o Vendors complaints about delayed payments.
o Vendors complaints about reduced payments due to offered US dollar to 
Congolese Francs exchange rates.
o Beneficiary complaints about quality of food supplied at fairs.
o Beneficiary complaints about high prices at the fairs.
• Inadequate/non-engagement of IDP leadership in the project activities.
o Challenges identifying genuine IDPs, especially where IDPs are hosted in the 
homes of the host community.
o Untruthfulness by host community leadership to register non IDPs as project
participants.
3.10.3 Opportunities
• Maintaining and encouraging the spirit of ubuntu amongst host community to the 
displaced persons way:
o Host community voluntary support to the displaced persons. 
o Ways of enhancing host community food production capacity. For example,
automatically considering them as project participants of the agriculture 
component.
• Transitioning from emergency to early recovery through agricultural activities 
(production, marketing, and value addition).
• Creating an emergency project learning document grounded in the various DRIVE 
project phases to prove the theory of change and demonstrate the value of emergency 
interventions.
• Partnering with like-minded organizations, especially in the implementation of the 
agriculture component to act as an exit and sustainability plan.
• Provision of other basic needs like health and education in the target communities.
3.10.4 Threats
• Continuous conflict outbreaks and influx of displaced persons in areas the project is 
already implementing and its budget implications.
• Loss of agricultural gains, especially in the returnee communities in the event that
another conflict happens.
• Infrastructural logistics that not only affect access to target communities, but also inflate 
the transportation and security budgets.
• Insecurity.
• Climate uncertainty.
3.11 Challenges encountered
The DRIVE project was well thought out, and therefore, it anticipated and mitigated some 
challenges during the implementation stage. The anticipated risks included:
• Insecurity concerns in the volatile region rife with interethnic clashes. CRS took 
precautions through the security department that monitors the situation on the ground 
and advises staff accordingly. For example, where insecurity was rife, CRS avoided 
implementing in such places.
28
• Fraud risks: The DRIVE project has mechanisms that screen for fraud cases, especially 
amongst the vendors and project participants. Anybody found guilty is punished by 
being removed from the project activities. For example, a vendor who is found 
soliciting for favours from project participants by buying out their vouchers is punished 
by being excluded from participating in the fairs.
• Accessibility of target areas in relation to transportation: CRS partnered with Caritas
on the ground to enable smooth running of the project. 
• Displacement of project participants: No cases of displacement of project participants
were reported during the project period. However, CRS mitigates for this by ensuring 
that they intervene in relatively peaceful environments for the time the project is in 
operation. 
• Assessments to determine distribution mechanism (fair or cash option): CRS constantly 
monitors the distribution modalities and where there is need, a modality can be 
substituted with another. For example, there are instances where fairs have been 
replaced with cash. 
• Weak markets: In response to the fact that availability of food and NFIs in the target 
communities is a problem, CRS adopts fairs as its modality, whereby vendors take their 
goods to the project participants through fairs. This not only makes it easier for project 
participants to access the required items, but also provides an opportunity for the 
vendors to increase their sales.
• Cash payment insecurities: CRS uses a third party to pay project participants where 
cash is involved. 
However, the following challenges were experienced:
• Supplier delays in delivery of farm inputs, meaning late delivery to the farmers. This 
had a negative impact on production
• Inaccessible roads (state of the roads/bridges). This meant some displaced persons 
could not be reached with support 
• Vendors not having adequate stocks during fairs
• Increased price during fairs by vendors
• Delayed vendor payments
3.12 Lessons learned and best practices for future programming
The DRIVE project employed a flexible approach in its operations. This allowed for change in
choice of modalities to employ in different contexts, as well as choice of localities to implement 
the project. This enabled the project to deliver its desired outcomes. Further, the partnership 
with Caritas, who had a ground-level presence in the implementation sites enhanced CRS 
access and timely delivery of assistance to the project participants. However, CRS needs to be 
careful with the choice of partners so as to not engage those that may tint her reputation. To 
successfully support agriculture, timing of the seasons is critical. Therefore, at the design of 
the project, agricultural activities should be aligned with the farming seasons. Targeting women 
as household representatives to receive household assistance was strategic, as it not only 
ensured that support reached the households, but also enhanced women’s decision making on 
the use of the assistance. The monitoring visits and prompt feedback to the implementors 
helped to arrest any situations that would otherwise make the work not go well. The project 
learnt along the implementation curve. For example, upon realizing that the fairs were not 
working in the first distribution, they adopted the cash modality in the next deliveries.
29
3.13 Summary and conclusions
The DRIVE project design was good/clear and comprehensive in the activities that enabled it 
to achieve its set goal and objectives. Thus, the activities were in line with the humanitarian 
needs of the targeted communities. DRIVE’s flexibility in the selection of intervention site and
assistance distribution modalities was considerate and reflected the reality of an emergency 
programme, whose dynamics cannot be fully planned for until the real situations are at play. 
The implementation strategy especially the choice of hard-to-reach communities and an 
enabling partnership is commendable, and this made assistance delivery attainable within the 
stipulated time, making what would have been very difficult to achieve look like an easy
delivery. The DRIVE project served some of the most remote, hard-to-reach communities that 
had only seen Caritas/CRS since they became displaced. They were completely cut out of 
access to any type of aid and, therefore, not many humanitarian bodies could have reached
them.
The agriculture complementary assistance is a good move towards achieving the DRIVE food 
access outcomes beyond the project cycle. In a way, it can be described as a symbol or a 
footprint of the aftermath of the implementation of an emergency programme. While there was 
nothing to show from the IDPs after the assistance, the returnees had every reason to smile as 
they showed off their harvest and crops in the farm. This exposed the potential of an emergency 
programme graduating to early recovery and setting up for community development. The 
agriculture component creates a sense of continuity to the community, a lesson that should be 
entrenched in emergency programmes, especially those working with returnees. Further, the 
findings reveal a difference between IDPs and returnees in terms of hope to continue. The 
presence of food in their farms gave hope and somehow created a sense of independence. This 
was not the case with IDPs, who were still hopeful that they would get more assistance in food 
and NFIs. The returnees were only asking for more support in their farming. The fact that 
communities are able to go back to their livelihood activities, and in an improved way, is 
commendable considering that this is an emergency programme with a short implementation 
period. The DRIVE project offers lessons for future interventions that focus on building back 
communities after displacement experiences, and more so on their livelihoods.
Overall, the project achieved its set objectives and outcomes and provided relief to not only the 
project participants, but also the host communities who had assumed the role of meeting the 
needs of the displaced persons in their homes and/or communities. This in itself helped to 
enhance relationships, creating a better co-existence environment between the displaced 
persons and the host communities. The CRS-Caritas relationship worked well and enabled the 
project to achieve its intended goal. On its part, Caritas was also able to successfully manage
the emergency project on the ground with support from CRS. The DRIVE project can be 
credited for providing an opportunity to both partners to explore their strengths and weaknesses 
and learn from each other, more so on how to work better in future. More importantly, Caritas
got an opportunity to learn from CRS’s many years of experience implementing emergency 
projects. 
The DRIVE project was deliberate in addressing the question of gender right from the targeting 
exercise to delivery of assistance at the household level. This is very important, considering 
that the question of gender is fluid in emergency situations where families get separated and 
women become the sole breadwinners. CRS’s deliberate move to nominate women to be the 
household representatives was a good move towards ensuring that the assistance reached the 
other household members. The move also empowered the women, especially in the 
30
participation and decision-making in regard to household, farm, and other activities. Men 
appreciated that the women were the right persons to make sure that the assistance was received 
in the households, citing the fact that the women involved them in the use of the assistance. 
Overall, there were no gender related violence cases emanating from the assistance given.
The findings presented in this report lead to a conclusion that the DRIVE project was a success
as it achieved its goal and objectives of food and NFI provision and agriculture assistance that 
helped to address the much-needed humanitarian needs of the project participants. Asked what 
would have happened if the project had not supported them, FGD participants in various groups 
and locations repeated the same sentiments: “Some of us would have died.” The project 
participants termed the project as life-saving. 
4. Recommendations
The following recommendations are suggested to enhance performance of subsequent 
DRIVE projects.
4.1 Programmatic
1. The targeting phase is surrounded by beneficiary dissatisfaction due to various reasons,
including rigidity in accommodating displaced persons after the first targeting exercise, 
lack of clear/inadequate information about the targeting dates/timings, and ‘listers’ 
suspicious nature when handling the prospective Project participants. Therefore:
a. CRS needs to consider flexibility around targeting, especially in areas where 
displacements are on-going up to a certain amount of time. The proposal is to have 
a provision for an on-going targeting exercise that lasts for about three weeks from 
the first targeting exercise.
b. In addition to use of local leaders to communicate with the displaced persons, use 
of representatives from the displaced persons, especially among the IDPs, to help 
identify and also get information to prospective participants. This will go a long 
way to increase the chances of passing project information on to the displaced 
persons. 
c. In addition to the training that the listers receive, CRS needs to develop a detailed 
training manual to train listers, covering various topics but most importantly, the 
need to exercise a humane approach, while still ensuring that the process does not 
get flawed.
d. Recruiting the right listers. For example, social workers or those who have worked 
in humanitarian situations will go a long way to boost the outcome of this exercise.
2. The agriculture component of the DRIVE project has shown positive results in addressing 
the main objectives of the project. The current efforts can be boosted by re-designing the 
project to undertake a holistic approach to the agriculture component. This means that the 
project will use the emergency approach as a community entry point and thereafter focus 
on sustainable recovery efforts. Thus, the project needs to address the following:
a. Increase the agriculture component budget and implementation period from the 
three emergency months to about 36 months recovery period. This will allow for 
adequate beneficiary support time, at least for three seasons, before project exit. The 
first year can be used for training, including demonstration farms and production,
input support. The second year can be used for continued production. The third year 
may focus on training on value addition and market linkages.
31
b. Introduce a marketing/value addition component to the project to boost income 
generating activities within the communities. For example, groundnut processing
through trained market-oriented women groups or even youth marketing groups. 
c. Tap into local knowledge, especially to determine when to provide which support. 
For example, some crops will not do well in certain seasons, or some variety of 
seeds will not do well in one region, but will do well in another. 
d. Provide timely supply of farm inputs based on the farming seasons, considering that 
each activity happens at specific times (land preparation, planting, weeding, 
harvesting, storage, etc.).
e. The question of cultural beliefs and practices in farming (modern vs traditional 
seeds, shift from a particular farming method to another, etc.) needs to be addressed 
through continuous training in order to have an effective attitude change.
3. The three distribution modalities are good but each one of them has its own 
challenges. 
a. The project should consider cash as the preferred modality of assistance delivery.
b. Where fairs are used, CRS needs to inform the vendors about the fair dates three 
weeks from the actual fair activity to allow them ample time to prepare.
c. There is a need to pay the vendors the agreed amounts in the agreed currency and 
on time. 
4. The M&E department should initiate a study to establish whether the amounts given 
per category (1-3) are adequate in order to make informed decisions on whether to 
retain or change the amounts.
4.2 Host community support
1. The project should not encourage support to host communities with NFIs and food in order 
to avoid dependency and the risk of eroding community goodwill in hosting displaced 
persons that is deeply entrenched in their cultures. 
2. Instead, the project needs to consider extending the agriculture component to the host 
communities who frequently receive displaced persons to boost food availability and 
affordability in the community.
4.3 Partnerships and collaborations
1. CRS partnership with Caritas is strategic and complementary, and therefore, should 
continue. CRS should continue the direct support they offer Caritas, especially in 
monitoring project activities.
2. CRS should carefully select partners to collaborate with in projects to avoid
inconveniences, especially where sharing of activities is anticipated.
3. At the exit phase, CRS should try to link agricultural project participants to other actors to 
enable them to continue getting support for their farming. CRS can achieve this by 
conducting an NGO mapping exercise to establish which NGOs are operating in DRIVE 
project areas and sectors.