EVALUATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
SECTOR REFORM IMPLEMENTATION IN 
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS
ENDLINE COUNTRY REPORT 
AUGUST 2021
This publication was prepared independently by Kevin Barnes-Ceeney, Ben Morse, Rashmi Bhat, and 
Alexa Aziz of Social Impact. It was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International 
Development as part of the Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance – Learning, Evaluation, and 
Research activity. 
EVALUATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM 
IMPLEMENTATION IN ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 
ENDLINE COUNTRY REPORT 
AUGUST 2021
AID-OAA-M-13-00011
DISCLAIMER 
The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States 
Agency for International Development or the United States Government.
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................... 4
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FOR ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 4
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................. 6
BACKGROUND ON REFORMS IN THE REGION 7
ADDRESSING THE UNIQUE NEEDS OF JUVENILES 8
ORIGINS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN THE REGION 8
PROGRESS IDENTIFIED AT MIDLINE 10
CHALLENGES REMAINING AT MIDLINE 10
USAID JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAMMING IN THE REGION 11
EVALUATION OBJECTIVES 11
EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODS 12
LIMITATIONS 13
DETAILED FINDINGS........................................................................................15
BACKGROUND ON JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 15
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION 15
DIVERSION, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, AND PROBATION 17
DETENTION FACILITIES 20
COVID-19 RESTRICTIONS AND IMPACTS 20
ACCESS TO MEDICAL, MENTAL HEALTH, AND FAMILY SUPPORT 21
PROGRAMMING AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 21
PHYSICAL SPACE 21
PHYSICAL SECURITY, PUNISHMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 22
REINTEGRATION 22
SUMMARY 23
RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................24
REFERENCES.......................................................................................................25
TABLES
Table 1: Selected crime rates in St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and Guyana, 2018 7
Table 2: Juveniles in detention in St. Kitts and Nevis 20
ACRONYMS
DPCPS Department of Probation and Child Protection Services
DPP Director of Public Prosecutions
CJA Child Justice Act
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child
ESC Eastern and Southern Caribbean
GUY Guyana 
HMP Her Majesty’s Prison
IT Information Technology
OECS Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States
SKN Saint Kitts and Nevis
SKYE Skills and Knowledge for Youth Empowerment
STL Saint Lucia
UNCRC United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
US United States
USAID United States Agency for International Development
YES Youth Empowerment Services
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study assesses the progress of juvenile justice reform efforts in three countries: Guyana, St. Lucia and 
St. Kitts and Nevis. We focus on the following sets of questions: first, have key milestones in the juvenile 
justice reform process been achieved? If not, what have been the primary barriers to progress? Second, 
approximately how many youth are given diversion programs rather than traditional programs rooted in 
punitive measures, and how have these numbers evolved over time? Third, what is the quality and 
perceived effectiveness of court processes in the use of diversion and alternative sentencing options, as 
well as rehabilitation and reintegration programs? Where programming is weak, what have been the 
biggest obstacles to improvement? And finally, how likely is it that reforms will be institutionalized and 
sustainable over time?
To answer these questions, we adopt a qualitative longitudinal design in which we conducted key informant 
interviews with more than 90 stakeholders and youth across all three countries at three points in time: 
2017 (baseline), 2019 (midline), and 2021 (endline). Our interviews focused on progress achieved to date 
across the following dimensions: coordination within and across juvenile justice agencies, access to 
diversion and alternative sentencing programs, probation services, detention facility conditions, and 
reintegration programs. 
This report contains our main findings for St. Kitts and Nevis, along with a set of detailed 
recommendations, organized into two categories: recommendations that can be implemented 
immediately, and recommendations that will require time and additional resources to implement.
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS FOR ST. KITTS AND NEVIS
The government of St. Kitts and Nevis has made some progress towards reforming its juvenile justice 
system since our midline assessment in 2019. Most notably, the Child Justice Committee (CJC) was finally 
established in late 2019, a full six years after the passage of the Child Justice Act (CJA). Although the CJC 
is still a fledgling institution, it has achieved some progress in the past two years, most notably in the area 
of promoting diversion for non-violent offenses. Nevertheless, the CJC has yet to fulfill its potential in 
terms of both ensuring diversion for all those who qualify under the CJA of 2013, as well as in terms of 
ensuring coordination across agencies to promote the smooth and timely handling of juvenile cases. 
Coordination across agencies remains poor, resulting in prolonged periods of pre-trial detention for 
juveniles. 
In the New Horizons Rehabilitation Center (NHRC), conditions have remained satisfactory, and the use 
of solitary confinement has reportedly been replaced with the more limited use of single separation. 
Another area of progress is that culturally, there seems to be a genuine commitment to the principles of 
restorative justice for juveniles, and a keen interest in reforming the juvenile justice system to these ends. 
Pre-trial diversion and effective reintegration of recently released juveniles continue to be plagued by a 
lack of dedicated and accredited programs, despite years of rhetoric paid to the importance of these types 
of programs. Moreover, probation officers – who have primary responsibility for ensuring adherence to 
diversion plans and for ensuring successful reintegration – remain poorly motivated and poorly monitored, 
limiting the quality of supervision and counseling received by juveniles under their supervision.
The main endline report containing findings for all three countries is available on USAID’s Development 
Experience Clearinghouse (DEC) here. 
The endline policy briefs associated with this evaluation are also available on the DEC: 
• Guyana
• St. Lucia
• St. Kitts and Nevis
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 6 
INTRODUCTION 
Juvenile justice systems in Eastern and Southern Caribbean (ESC) states have historically had a punitive 
orientation, emphasizing incarceration and retribution rather than rehabilitation and reintegration. Yet, a 
large and growing body of research suggests that that punitive sentencing practices tend to increase, rather 
than decrease, recidivism (Wong et al., 2016). Conversely, sentencing practices grounded in restorative 
justice and rehabilitation have consistently been shown to reduce recidivism (Wilson and Hoge, 2013). 
Recognizing the potential of restorative justice practices, many governments in Eastern and Southern 
Caribbean states have begun to reform their juvenile justice systems. For over a decade, the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID) has actively supported these reforms, whether through 
violence prevention programs for at-risk youth, providing legislative frameworks for reform laws, or 
implementing programs to modernize systems of youth justice. The hope is that a more rehabilitative and 
less punitive approach to juvenile justice can break the cycle of incarceration, recidivism, and further 
incarceration, and thereby help address high rates of crime and violence in the region.
To evaluate the success of these reforms and help inform its programming, USAID contracted Social 
Impact to implement a longitudinal, qualitative study of juvenile justice outcomes in Guyana, St. Lucia, and 
St. Kitts and Nevis. The study began in 2017 with a comprehensive baseline assessment of the state of 
juvenile justice reforms based on more than 180 key informant interviews with stakeholders and youth 
across all three countries. In 2019, the research team returned to conduct another round of key informant 
interviews to assess progress made since 2017. This assessment reports the results of the endline 
assessment, which includes more than 95 interviews conducted remotely and in-person between April 
and June 2021. 
Our analysis focused on three overarching sets of questions. First, have key milestones in the juvenile 
justice reform process been achieved? If not, what have been the primary barriers to progress? Second, 
approximately how many youth are given diversion programs rather than traditional programs rooted in 
punitive measures, and how have these numbers evolved over time? Third, what is the quality and 
perceived effectiveness of court processes in the use of diversion and alternative sentencing options and 
rehabilitation and reintegration programs? Where programming is weak, what have been the biggest 
obstacles to improvement? And finally, how likely is it that reforms will be institutionalized and sustainable 
over time? 
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. First, we provide background on juvenile justice 
reforms in the region, review recent literature on the effectiveness of restorative justice reforms, and 
discuss USAID’s efforts to promote these reforms in the region. We then present the study methodology 
and key research questions. Next, we provide a detailed account of progress achieved in St. Kitts in Nevis 
to date across the following dimensions: coordination within and across juvenile justice agencies, access 
to diversion and alternative sentencing programs, probation services, detention facility conditions, and 
reintegration programs. We conclude with a set of detailed recommendations based on our findings.
USAID.GOVESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 7 
BACKGROUND ON REFORMS IN THE REGION
High rates of crime and violence remain a challenge for St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and Guyana. Table 
1 details the reported homicide, robbery, and residential burglary rates per 100,000 people in each of 
the countries in 2018. Although there has been a decrease in violent crime over the last decade, crime 
rates in all three countries remain well above global averages. For example, St. Kitts and Nevis has a 
homicide rate of 41.8, which is nearly seven times higher than the global average of 5.8 homicides per 
100,000 people. In addition to the social and psychosocial toll on affected communities, such high rates 
of insecurity have serious consequences for economic development. 
Table 1: Selected crime rates in St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and Guyana, 2018
HOMICIDE 
RATE
ROBBERY 
RATE
BURGLARY 
RATE
St. Kitts and 
Nevis
42 126 580
St. Lucia 21 164 503
Guyana 14 140 278
USA 5 86 340
Notes: Homicide, robbery, and burglary rates per 100,000 
people. Sources: OSAC, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. 
Department of State; FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program 
(USA). 
Juvenile delinquency is widely viewed as a core contributor to crime in the region. Although limited 
empirical data exist concerning crime and delinquency in each of the three countries, scholars generally 
suggest that violent crime in the Caribbean is caused by a toxic mix of guns, gangs, drugs, poverty, and a 
lack of economic opportunities. In our midline study in 2019, we asked stakeholders what the main 
drivers of juvenile delinquency were in their respective countries. Although stakeholders in each of the 
countries identified common themes such as the role of parents, the education system, and peers, 
important nuances emerged. Substance abuse was identified as a driver of delinquency in St. Kitts and 
Nevis and Guyana, but not in St. Lucia. Neighborhood-level influences including gang activity were 
considered by stakeholders to be an important driver of delinquency in all three countries (Noltrieke, 
2020; Hill & Morris, 2017). Other contributing factors include a police force that is corrupt, abusive, 
often absent from communities, and unable to effectively prevent or investigate crimes or build civilians’ 
trust (Sutton & Baxter, 2017). Corrupt and ineffective policing, in turn, contributes to low levels of trust, 
potentially deterring cooperation and further exacerbating police ineffectiveness (Tyler, 2006). 
As a result of these dynamics, juvenile justice systems in the region have become overwhelmed by youth 
who need help transitioning away from delinquent activities and need support to reintegrate into 
mainstream, law-abiding society. Historically, these systems have adopted retributive and punitive 
sentencing practices rather than focusing on rehabilitation and restorative justice practices. This has slowly 
started to change as the negative effects of punitive policies on recidivism outcomes have become better 
understood and more widely documented (Wong et al., 2016). Research from the United States (U.S.) 
and other contexts has shown that punitive sentencing practices tend to increase, rather than decrease, 
8 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
recidivism (Wong et al., 2016). Conversely, sentencing practices grounded in restorative justice and 
rehabilitation have consistently been shown to reduce recidivism (Wilson and Hoge, 2013). 1 
At the forefront of juvenile justice reforms around the world is the use of pre-trial diversion and 
alternative sentencing. (To ensure conceptual clarity, we follow the majority of scholarship and use the 
term diversion to refer to pre-trial diversion, and we use the term “alternative sentencing” to refer to
post-trial diversion). Pre-trial diversion programs vary considerably depending on many factors, including 
the objectives of the program (e.g., saving judicial resources vs. reducing recidivism); who determines 
eligibility and provides oversight or services (e.g., police, probation, court staff); which youth are eligible 
(e.g., status offenders, youth accused of minor crimes); the scope of any programming or oversight 
provided as part of diversion; what is required of youth in diversion and what happens if they fail to 
comply; and what are the incentives for youth to participate. As such, pre-trial diversion and post-trial 
diversion (i.e. alternative sentencing) can vary from “informal diversion”, whereby the police or courts 
provide a warning and release the youth without any conditions, services, or oversight, to more formalized 
diversion, whereby youth are enrolled in an accredited diversion program, sign an agreement laying out 
the conditions of the program, receive extensive services, are closely overseen, and receive certain 
benefits following successful completion of the program. Examples of these pre- and post-trial diversion 
programs include drug counseling, vocational training, community service, probation, and restitution to 
victims. 
ADDRESSING THE UNIQUE NEEDS OF JUVENILES
A central feature of juvenile justice reform is the recognition that juveniles are different from adult 
offenders. Juveniles often lack maturity, engage in risk-taking and impulsive behavior, and are less likely 
to initially consider the consequences of potential actions compared to adults. Current thinking in 
neuroscience suggests that the parts of the brain that govern impulse control, planning, and thinking 
ahead continue to develop after the age of 18 (Steinberg, 2007). Scholars have identified that the limbic 
region of the brain, where emotions and reward behaviors are processed, develops before the 
prefrontal region, where logical thinking and behavioral control lie (Casey et al., 2011). Children, when 
faced with emotionally charged situations may make decisions based upon impulse rather than careful 
cognitive consideration. Given the later development of the prefrontal cortex, it is unsurprising that 
children are relatively more susceptible to peer influence and peer pressure than adults. The influence of 
peers on adolescent offending is well established in the literature. Peers may transmit attitudes 
supportive of delinquency, sustain a historical narrative of previous delinquent acts, and provide an 
encouraging forum for the "acting out" of new delinquent behaviors.
ORIGINS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN THE REGION
The model law on juvenile justice,2 developed by the United Nations, has been the bedrock for 
advancing juvenile justice reforms in St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and Guyana. The model law provides a 
framework for developing a juvenile justice system that supports four important principles espoused in 
the 1990 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC): nondiscrimination irrespective of race, 
1 Wilson and Hoge (2013) conducted a study of 73 pretrial diversion and alternative sentencing programs consisting of 14,573 
youth offenders and compared them to 18,840 juveniles processed in the traditional justice system to assess the rate of 
recidivism in each group. The authors found that “in 60 of the 73 diversion programs, the recidivism rate of diverted youth was 
lower than that of youth processed by traditional justice system” (p. 504).
2 UNODC 2013 Justice in Matters Involving Children in Conflict with the Law: Model Law on Juvenile Justice and Related 
Commentary https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Justice_Matters_Involving-Web_version.pdf 
USAID.GOVESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 9 
sex, language, religion, ethnicity, disability, or nationality (Article 2); the primary consideration should be 
the best interests of the child (Article 3); the child’s right to survival and development (Article 6); and 
the right of the child to participate in decisions affecting him or her, and in particular, to be given the 
opportunity to be heard in any judicial or administrative proceedings affecting him or her (Article 12). 
Of the three countries, St. Kitts and Nevis was first to ratify the UNCRC in 1990, followed by Guyana 
in 1991, and St. Lucia in 1993. 
The model law enshrines the principle that children in conflict with the law should receive due process, 
provides provisions for the age of criminal responsibility, and recommends the abolishment of status 
offenses.3 The model law provides guidance on all stages of the juvenile justice process, including 
apprehension, arrest, detainment in police custody or a juvenile detention center, the establishment of 
children’s courts overseen by judges trained in juvenile matters, provisions for trial, custodial sentences 
and alternative sentencing, conditions of detention and institutional treatment, as well as the need to 
provide aftercare services. 
The model law dictates that, where possible, children should be diverted from the formal juvenile justice 
system. Such diversion could occur at the point of apprehension by the police, following arrest and 
charge, or through a formal court diversion program after the young person has appeared in court. 
Diversionary programming, informed by a thorough assessment of the child’s needs, may adopt a 
restorative justice lens, whereby efforts are made to repair potential harms for the young person, the 
victim, and the community. In a diversionary program, the child is typically referred to a Child Welfare 
Board. The Board is then responsible for overseeing any expectations regarding community service, 
educational and therapeutic interventions, curfews, and supervision requirements. 
Although many children in conflict with the law are suitable for diversionary programming, some young 
people have committed acts of delinquency that are so serious that they need to be managed within the 
formal juvenile justice system. Alternative sentencing to probation allows the child to be supervised by a 
probation officer. After a thorough assessment of the young person’s risks and needs, an appropriate 
supervision plan is designed. A strong supervision plan seeks to address those needs that, if 
unaddressed, are most likely to lead to further delinquency. The young person is expected to report to 
the probation officer on a regular basis, abide by curfews, and complete rehabilitative and educational 
programming. 
Under the model law, the deprivation of liberty through a custodial sentence should be a last resort, and 
for the shortest possible period of time relative to the seriousness of the delinquent act committed. The 
purpose of the custodial sentence in the juvenile justice system is to be reintegrative, with the aim to 
assist the child in playing a constructive role in society, rather than being a punitive or retributive 
sentence. Given the reintegrative purpose of custodial sentences for children, the provision of 
rehabilitative and educational services for incarcerated youth is fundamental. The model law requires a 
shift in institutional culture, whereby practices such as the housing of children with adult incarcerated 
3 Status offenses are those offenses that would not be deemed criminal if the individual committing the offense was over the age 
of responsibility. Typical status offenses include truancy, running away from home, and specific to some Caribbean countries,
the crime of wandering. A number of behaviors could previously be construed as “wandering,” including when a child is away 
from home all night and the parent or guardian does not know the child’s whereabouts, when a child hangs out with older 
people who may be using drugs or are engaged in other criminal activities, or when children are engaged in activities related to 
human trafficking.
10 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
people, the corporal punishment of children, and the use of solitary confinement are not allowed. Of 
note is that solitary confinement and physical abuse of children are forbidden under the UNCRC.
Re-entry and reintegration planning is a critical component of juvenile justice system reform. Planning 
for release should begin on day one of the young person’s period of detention. Best practices call for the 
probation officer to be visiting the young person in the facility and developing a good understanding of 
the home environment where the child will be returning to. Educational qualifications, employment￾focused training, housing, social supports, substance abuse treatment, and mental health services are all 
critical factors that should be considered when preparing a young person for successful community 
reintegration after detention. 
PROGRESS IDENTIFIED AT MIDLINE
Juvenile justice reform is an ongoing process that requires sustained attention and commitment by key 
champions within each country. In our midline study in 2019, we were able to identify important 
progress that had been achieved. All three countries included in the study had passed legislation 
fashioned from the model law. St. Kitts and Nevis was the first country, passing the Child Justice Act in 
2013. Guyana passed the Juvenile Justice Act in April 2018, followed by St. Lucia’s adoption of the Child 
Justice Act and the Child Care, Protection, and Adoption Act in November 2018. In St. Kitts and Nevis, 
the members of the Child Justice Committee overseeing diversionary programming had been identified 
by the Probation and Child Welfare Board. Strong relationships existed between probation officers and 
schools, creating a strong foundation for community interventions and engagement.
CHALLENGES REMAINING AT MIDLINE 
Despite progress made at midline, significant challenges remained in relation to the full implementation 
of juvenile justice reforms. In St Kitts and Nevis and St. Lucia, there was a need to formalize court-led 
diversionary programming. Also, the Child Justice Committee had yet to become operational, limiting 
the use and extent of diversionary programs. There was also a need to implement empirical risk 
assessments in probation in St. Kitts and Nevis. 
In all three countries, there was a need to formalize alternative sentencing options, including the use of 
supervision and rehabilitative programming as alternatives to incarceration. There was also a need to 
expand educational, rehabilitative programming, and mental health services for detained young people. In 
St. Kitts and Nevis, we highlighted concerns that children were detained in Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP), 
an adult prison facility. In all three countries, concerns were raised concerning the use of solitary 
confinement and corporal punishment with detained youth, in direct contravention of the UNCRC. 
Finally, there was a need for re-entry and reintegration support services for young people held in 
detention facilities. 
USAID.GOVESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 11
USAID JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAMMING IN THE REGION
Reducing youth involvement in crime and violence is a priority for countries in the ESC as well as for 
USAID. In 2016, USAID launched its five-year Youth Empowerment Services (YES) initiative, which seeks 
to reduce juvenile crime and violence in the Eastern Caribbean by applying a public health framework to 
crime reduction and violence prevention. The public health model of crime prevention is a proactive 
approach to juvenile justice, which focuses on reducing risk and increasing resiliency for at-risk youth and 
justice-involved youth (Welsh, 2005). The framework offers an alternative to reliance on the courts and 
incarceration by focusing on rehabilitation and implementing a practical, science-based approach to 
improve the management of juveniles in conflict with the law (Hamburg, 1998).
The YES initiative builds off previous USAID programs and partnerships developed in the region that were 
designed to address the concerns of youth crime and violence. In 2016, USAID and the Organization of 
the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) launched the Juvenile Justice Reform Project Part II (JJRP), building 
on JJRP I, which ran from 2011 to 2015. The project’s aim was to facilitate the reformation of the juvenile 
justice systems in six countries, including St. Lucia and St. Kitts and Nevis (but not Guyana). The goal was 
to strengthen the juvenile justice process through the application of national and sub-regional measures 
to improve the life circumstances of youth in conflict with the law, with a strong focus on rehabilitation 
and reintegration.4 More specifically, the initiative aimed to: 
(1) Improve the legal and regulatory frameworks by drafting model legislation and promoting a 
national juvenile justice strategy.
(2) Build capacity for effective justice administration through trainings, development of operating 
procedures, and introduction of case management software and screening tools.
(3) Modernize diversion, detention, and rehabilitative processes through investments in detention 
facilities and promotion of alternative sentencing options.
(4) Improve linkages with civil society through public awareness and education activities.
More recently, USAID supported the Community, Family, and Youth Resilience (CFYR) program in St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and Guyana, which aims to create pathways away from crime for youth aged 10 
to 29. Using a risk screen to identify at-risk youth, the program provides at-risk youth with services 
identified through a community-based approach in which the youth, their family, and local stakeholders 
collaboratively define problems, identify risk and protective factors, and create local solutions. The 
program ended in 2020, and a rigorous evaluation found it to be effective at some, but not all of its 
objectives (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2020). 
EVALUATION OBJECTIVES 
This implementation study seeks to understand if juvenile justice sector reforms in the three countries 
have been successfully implemented. This is no small undertaking, as there are enormous challenges in 
transitioning a juvenile justice system away from a detention-based, punitive approach to a diversionary 
and rehabilitation-based approach. This transition requires legislative changes, political will, resources, and 
a cultural shift in the justice sector. Recognizing these challenges, this evaluation tracks the status and 
quality of reform efforts in each of the three countries over a five-year time span, from 2017 (baseline) to 
4 USAID. St. Lucian Youth Benefit from Juvenile Justice Reform. (March 30, 2016). https://www.usaid.gov/eastern-and-southern￾caribbean/news-information/press-releases/st-lucian-youth-benefit-juvenile
12 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
2019 (midline) to 2021 (endline). 
Our evaluation is guided by four overarching sets of research questions:
1. Have key milestones in the juvenile justice reform process been achieved? If not, what have been 
the primary barriers to progress?
2. How many youth are currently being enrolled in diversion programs rather than in traditional 
programs rooted in punishment and incarceration? Has there been progress over time? Why or 
why not?
3. What is the quality and perceived effectiveness of court processes, diversion programs, and 
rehabilitation and reintegration programs? Where programming is weak, what have been the 
biggest obstacles to improvement?
4. How likely is it that reform efforts will be institutionalized and sustainable over time?
In addressing these questions, we aim to inform USAID’s programming in the region. We also hope that 
this evaluation will be a useful resource for stakeholders and staff in the juvenile justice systems of St. 
Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Guyana, and for those interested in the implementation of system-wide 
juvenile and criminal justice reform efforts. 
EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODS
This implementation study uses a comparative, longitudinal qualitative research design. We examine three 
countries, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Guyana, at three different points in time: baseline (2017), 
midline (2019), and endline (2021). This endline country report for St. Kitts and Nevis builds on the midline 
findings, which presented the mid-point status of juvenile justice reform in the country. 
At baseline and midline, the majority of interviews with stakeholders and youth occurred in-person and 
in-country. At endline, however, the COVID-19 pandemic prevented international travel and most in￾person interviews. As a result, the majority of stakeholder interviews took place virtually. In St. Kitts and 
Nevis, the team was unable to access detained youth owing to a spike in COVID-19 cases. The research 
team attempted to interview youth virtually, but the facilities were unable to provide the necessary 
accommodations. In the Limitations section, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of relying on 
virtual platforms for most interviews as well as the implications of not being able to access youth in 
detention in St. Kitts and Nevis. 
Data collection began in late April 2021 and lasted through June 2021. 
In St. Kitts and Nevis, the research team spoke with:
● 15 government officials, probation officers, detention facility staff, judges, and court officials
● 0 youth in detention
● 5 youth on probation
The research team in St. Kitts and Nevis did not conduct any in-person interviews or site visits due to the 
incidence of community spread of COVID-19. 
USAID.GOVESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 13
The research team interviewed both high and low-level officials across the juvenile justice sector. The 
team covered multiple regions in each of the three countries. The interview protocol covered a range of 
topics, including legal compliance with the juvenile justice legislation, inter- and intra-agency cooperation, 
diversion and alternative sentencing practices, detention facility conditions, and reintegration services. 
Although the research team followed a protocol, the semi-structured nature of the interview allowed 
interviewers to follow alternative lines of inquiry and prompts when necessary. 
Prior to interviews, researchers obtained verbal informed consent and assured participants that personally 
identifiable information would be kept confidential. To protect participants’ confidentiality, job titles and 
places of employment are omitted when presenting direct quotes in this study. 
In addition to the qualitative interviews conducted for this study, the research team reviewed relevant 
legislation, policy documents, and the grey literature on juvenile justice reforms in the Eastern and 
Southern Caribbean. 
LIMITATIONS
Our study comes with several important limitations. First, because we rely primarily on open-ended 
interview questions rather than close-ended questions, it is difficult to make precise, quantified 
comparisons across time. This design decision was deliberate, to enable the research team to capture the 
complexities and nuances of implementing comprehensive juvenile justice reform, but it does come at a 
cost. In lieu of a quantified assessment of progress on a narrow set of close-ended metrics, we offer a 
holistic assessment that captures the unique challenges that have emerged within each country over time. 
A second limitation that applies to the endline study is that most interviews were conducted virtually 
rather than in-person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Survey methodology generally places a premium 
on in-person interviewing, because it enables the interviewer to establish a rapport with the respondent 
that facilitates information sharing and truthfulness. However, despite our initial concerns and prior 
expectations, we found that the virtual interview format performed well in terms of building rapport and 
allowing for honest and substantive conversations about progress (or lack thereof) towards juvenile justice 
reform. Contrary to what would be expected if rapport were weak, we found that respondents were 
forthright and offered many critical perspectives on progress within their own agency and in adjacent 
agencies. The virtual interview format also provided some notable advantages over in-person interviewing. 
For example, the virtual format allowed the team to spread out interviews over a longer period of time 
(rather than trying to squeeze interviews into a two-week country visit). This gave the team more time 
to prepare for interviews and to update the protocol in light of emerging themes and findings. 
A third limitation to this study is that we were not able to access youth in detention in St. Kitts and Nevis
due to COVID-19 related restrictions. As a result, we are unable to affirmatively verify the statements of 
detention facility officials about conditions within their facilities. We were, however, able to cross￾reference their statements with those of more neutral actors, such as lawyers of defendants, court officials, 
and members of the child justice committees. Overall, we feel confident about the accuracy of our findings 
on detention facilities in St. Kitts and Nevis, though they should be interpreted with some caution and 
ideally be verified once COVID-19 restrictions are lifted. 
A fourth limitation to this study was the sampling methodology for youth on probation interviews. 
Because there was no available sampling frame of youth being supervised on probation in any of the 
14 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
countries, our team had to rely on a convenience sampling approach where probation officers provided 
names of youth willing to participate in these conversations. While we indicated to officers our goal to 
speak with a range of youth, supervised by different officers and with varied experiences within the juvenile 
justice system, ultimately, we had little control over the names we were provided. However, the youth 
we spoke to still provided critical perspectives on their experiences within the system. 
Our study has also been descoped since the outset of this study in 2016. Our original study design 
involved complementing the qualitative data in this report with large-N quantitative data on justice￾involved juveniles. However, administrative records on juveniles in conflict with the law proved difficult 
to access due to incomplete databases, country-specific legal requirements, and some level of hesitation 
on behalf of country officials. 
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 15
DETAILED FINDINGS
BACKGROUND ON JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN ST. KITTS AND 
NEVIS
St. Kitts and Nevis passed the Child Justice Act (CJA) in 2013 and was the only of the three countries to 
have passed reformed legislation at the time of the baseline study. 
Among the most important provisions of the CJA was the establishment of the Child Justice Committee 
(CJC). Comprised of a magistrate and two social workers, the CJC’s mandate is to review all cases 
involving juveniles, to assign youth to participate in diversion programs for those who qualify, and in the 
most general sense, to advocate on behalf of juveniles in conflict with the law to ensure that rehabilitation 
and reintegration are at the core of their case plan. 
Despite passing the CJA in 2013, St. Kitts and Nevis did not begin to operationalize the Child Justice 
Committee until 2019, causing a delay in the development of diversion programs and the establishment of 
appropriate procedures to comply with other elements of the CJA. These consequences are detailed in 
the ensuing subsections. 
In addition to establishing the CJC, the CJA increased the age of criminal responsibility to 12 (from an 
earlier age of 8). The Act also outlines how youth offenders are to be assessed, managed, and provided 
with opportunities for rehabilitation and reintegration into society. The Act stipulates that a juvenile’s 
parents and a probation officer are to be notified within 24 hours of an arrest, and that a probation officer 
conducts an initial assessment of the juvenile’s well-being and home environment within 48 hours. The 
Act also stipulates that the child is to appear before the CJC for an initial inquiry, prior to any court 
appearance. Attended by the child’s parents, probation officer, attorney (if applicable), the arresting officer, 
and a representative of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the initial inquiry is an opportunity for all 
concerned stakeholders to identify diversion options for the child that will emphasize the child’s best 
interests and rehabilitation.
Although the Act was passed in 2013, many of its tenets still need to be fully instituted, as we proceed to 
detail in the remainder of this section. 
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION
As was the case at baseline and midline, significant coordination challenges plague the administration of 
juvenile justice in St. Kitts and Nevis. These challenges lie at nearly every step in the juvenile justice chain, 
starting with the procedures the police are expected to follow when they apprehend a juvenile. 
Stakeholders were unanimous in reporting that the police need further training in the CJA as well as basic 
procedural matters, such as how to fill out required forms, where juveniles can be detained, and who to 
contact after apprehending a juvenile. Although there has been training for a select number of officers on 
these matters, most notably through the JJRP program, it appears that such training only reaches a small 
fraction of officers. Moreover, respondents indicated that many of those who had been trained had since 
been transferred to new divisions, and that new recruits are not provided juvenile justice training as part 
of their basic training.
16 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
Our interviews suggest the police’s lack of familiarity with the CJA and the appropriate procedures for 
juveniles has several negative consequences. First, when the Initial Inquiry and other appropriate 
procedures are not followed, it provides juveniles’ attorneys with grounds on which the case may be 
dismissed. The result is that juveniles are able to circumvent the law, while at the same time missing 
opportunities for assistance and intervention that would help steer them away from crime and towards 
more productive activities. In the words of one stakeholder we spoke with: 
“[The police’s failure to follow procedures] is a situation that has to be corrected because there's 
some juveniles who really need the intervention and are not getting it. But because of this system 
not really working as it should.”
A second consequence of the police’s lack of training in juvenile justice matters is that their uncertainty 
concerning appropriate paperwork and procedures gives some officers the false impression that juveniles 
are hard to deal with. According to one stakeholder we spoke with, this perception of additional work 
deters many officers from handling juvenile cases, which only further contributes to the system’s failure 
to reach juveniles in need of intervention and rehabilitation. Indeed, this individual went so far as to 
question whether the decline in juvenile cases observed over the past several years is real, or is the result 
of police increasingly shying away from juvenile cases. The solution, in our view, is to ensure that all officers 
are fully versed in the CJA, and that the appropriate forms and procedures are put in place to smoothly 
process juvenile cases, from the point of initial apprehension.
A third consequence deriving from the improper handling of juvenile cases is that it contributes to delays 
in the administration of justice. Our research found that many youth spend upwards of two years in 
detention awaiting trial, and a significant contributor to this is the lackluster investigation and preparation 
of files by the police. The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), as well, was cited by several stakeholders 
for its failure to proactively coordinate with the police during case investigations. Summarizing the 
situation, one individual stated:
“The challenge, to be honest, is that with any court you need the case files about a week ahead 
of the hearing. And what gets us upset is that the officers are coming in for the hearing with the 
juvenile and their report at the same time, not giving us any time to review the assessment. The 
officers just hand in the report as they come in. And they are not using the proper form. They’re 
just talking off the top of their head.”
To be sure, shortfalls on behalf of the police were not the only contributor to insufficient coordination in 
the juvenile justice space. Many informants said that a major unmet need was for a commonly understood 
set of protocols and procedures mapping out who does what and when across agencies, to ensure the 
smooth and timely handling of cases. As the coordinating body with a mandate to ensure proper juvenile 
case management, it would be appropriate for the CJC to step in to fill this role, but it has thus far failed 
to do so. 
Stakeholders identified several other important challenges facing the CJC. Most notably, the CJC meets 
very infrequently, and has only handled twelve cases since its inception in 2019, only a small fraction of 
those who come in conflict with the law and would benefit from their services. As one stakeholder 
reported: “the CJC meets only once every couple of months, whereas we get cases weekly.” This is a 
USAID.GOVESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 17
clear violation of the Child Justice Act, which states that “The Child Justice Committee shall meet at least 
twice monthly.”5 Another cited their lack of urgency in handling matters in the time between meetings:
“Availability is important. But the CJC doesn’t deal with cases urgently. There is much too much 
delay … if I get the case today, can they respond tomorrow with their input? So that it doesn’t 
wait another week?”
Representatives of the CJC agree on the need for improved coordination and the development of a set 
of clear procedures, but they also cite the need for intervention by the Ministry of Community 
Development, Gender Affairs and Social Services:
“There is an urgent need for a clear policy in relation to the arrest and taking the child before 
the CJC, and the dealings with the CJC before the court. Currently, responsibility is blurred because 
there’s no clear policy about this. The act says that the Minister can make regulation on this. But 
we have never really had regulation made, for the operation of the CJC. We need clear policy 
about when and how a case comes before the CJC and when it instead goes directly to the court.”
When stakeholders were questioned about the long delays in processing juvenile cases, it was noted that 
the Juvenile Magistrate only convenes to hear juvenile cases one day per month. It was suggested that 
increasing that number to two days per month would help speed things along.
Coordination failures also plague the relationship between the courts and the New Horizons 
Rehabilitation Center (NHRC). According to one respondent, “the protocols established between New 
Horizons, the probation office, and the courts still need to be developed.” This individual noted that the 
NHRC was routinely “not given enough lead time, or information about a child coming to the facility. This 
makes it difficult to plan and prepare for a child.” 
Sadly, the consequences of pervasive coordination failures fall on those most vulnerable in the system –
juveniles in conflict with the law. As one stakeholder described:
“Nobody independent is keeping anyone accountable to the guidelines laid out in the CJC. It’s 
always going to be ‘if it doesn’t happen and no one follows through, no one is held accountable 
for that.’ There is no separate oversight body. The only consequence is for the juvenile in question, 
whose case is delayed yet again, or whose needs for diversion and rehabilitation go unmet.”
DIVERSION, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, AND PROBATION
The juvenile justice system has made some progress since midline towards institutionalizing the practices 
of diversion and alternative sentencing. The most notable point of progress is the formulation of the CJC, 
which is now operational. Since its inception in late 2019, the CJC has handled twelve cases, all of which 
were for non-violent offenses. It is not known how this number compares to the total number of cases 
that were eligible to go before the CJC. When asked about this point, neither the CJC, the Probation and 
Child Protection Services Department, nor the police’s Special Victims Unit (SVU) could provide reliable 
estimates due to a lack of organized administrative databases. But based on the testimony of all the 
5 Child Justice Act of 2013, Part III, 7(1).
18 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
stakeholders we spoke with, it is clear that a more active CJC would be able to handle a much larger 
number of cases. 
To date, the CJC and the courts have focused primarily on diversion, rather than alternative sentencing. 
In the modal CJC case, the CJC works with the child’s probation officer to develop a diversion plan 
consisting of some combination of restitution, community service, curfew, and school attendance and/or 
employment. Should the juvenile fail to meet the terms of his/her diversion plan, then s/he will be 
summoned back to the Juvenile Magistrate’s court for traditional sentencing, which may include time at 
the NHRC.
All the diversion options used to date have been informal or were identified on an ad hoc basis; at present, 
the juvenile justice system still lacks dedicated diversion programs that are accredited by the government. 
“It forces us to be creative,” reported one stakeholder on the lack of formal diversion programs. “We 
have been asking for dedicated programs for a while now. If a child is stealing, there should be some 
specific program geared toward that. If it’s a weapons charge, there should be a program for that. And 
ditto for the drugs.” However, despite the appeals of the CJC, thus far the Department of Probation and 
Child Protection Services has not identified or certified any dedicated diversion program.
A stakeholder we spoke to confirmed the lack of diversion options for juveniles: “what we lack are 
programs that address the ‘root causes’ of the problem, like poverty, poor housing, and lack of family 
support.” When asked why these programs were not more readily available, the representative reported 
that “it’s basically a lack of resources.” This individual also noted that the absence of dedicated diversion 
programs is in contrast with the number of pre-arrest programs that are available, such as the Young 
Explorer’s program and the CFYR Family Matter’s program, as well as with the availability of vocational 
programs for youth in-general, such as the Advanced Vocational Educational Centre (AVEC) and the Skills 
Training Empowerment Program (STEP). 
As was the case at midline, stakeholders reported that another common form of diversion was pre-arrest
diversion, which occurs within the day-to-day context of police discretionary decision-making. For young 
people involved in low-level offenses such as petty theft, disorderly conduct, fighting, and marijuana 
possession, the police may convene a “roundtable” with their parents and probation officers to develop 
an alternative plan to the formal justice system. In lieu of formal juvenile justice processing, a young person 
may be asked to complete community service hours, attend school-based programming, attend a group 
run by probation officers, or be monitored through home visits.
In the absence of dedicated diversion or rehabilitation programs, probation officers have served as the 
primary providers of these services. This was the case at baseline and midline, and it continues to be the 
case today. Through mentoring, counseling, and job-placement assistance, probation officers play a critical 
role in this space. “We are the teeth of the juvenile justice system. We make sure everyone is on the 
same page; we do counseling, mentoring, and we provide wrap-around services,” described one probation 
official.
Probation officers are also critical to ensuring the directives of the CJC are duly carried out. As one official 
described, “success [of diversion] really depends on the probation officer, and how aggressively they 
monitor adherence to the orders of the CJC.”
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Yet, despite their critical role in the juvenile justice system, our interviews reveal significant shortfalls 
within the Department of Probation and Child Protection Services (DPCPS). To be sure, the COVID-19 
pandemic has adversely affected operations within the DPCPS, namely by preventing probation officers 
from engaging directly with the juveniles they supervise. Instead, probation officers have been forced to 
supervise their cases remotely, through phone calls with the juveniles and their families. But even beyond 
the adverse effects of COVID-19, court officials, representatives of the CJC, lawyers, and police officers 
were unanimous in highlighting a lack of robust oversight as a major barrier to diversion and rehabilitation. 
As one stakeholder described:
“We are not so pleased with the probation officers, with their level of monitoring and counseling 
of the juveniles under their supervision. … the juveniles are not given the attention that they are 
supposed to be given. The CJC makes a contract, and it’s not being adhered to. So, the main 
challenge with diversion right now is with the probation officers and the quality of their 
monitoring.”
Stakeholders also cited a lack of robust action to help find juveniles jobs, ensure they are enrolled in 
school, or identify vocational programs that match their interests. One juvenile we spoke with said that 
they were unable to attend a program they were interested in at the Advanced Vocational Education 
Centre (AVEC) for lack of bus fare – the type of modest obstacle that a proactive probation officer can 
be expected to solve. Another young person said that their probation officer only called once a month 
rather than making in-person visits, and that he often wasn’t home for the calls. A third individual had 
“aged out” of their probation when they turned 18, but received no concluding care plan or send-off from 
his probation officer.
When asked what reforms would be necessary to improve the performance of probation officers, most 
stakeholders cited greater resources, better training of probation officers, and greater oversight by 
administrators within the DPCPS. But some officials declined to offer an explanation, citing the sensitive 
nature of the problems within the DPCPS. Others cited potential nepotism as an explanation:
“Probation is falling woefully short of what is required, and it is not for lack of training or resources. 
The resources are adequate. It is that certain persons are not very interested in what they need 
to do. Sometimes certain jobs are passed on from one person to another and so it’s not always 
the most motivated or merit-based person who gets the job.” 
That said, the job of a probation officer is not easy. “You have to be aggressive. You have to actively go 
after the information you need, and you have to actively follow-up with partner agencies,” reported one 
individual. Given the demands of their position and their critical importance to diversion and reintegration, 
probation needs to be a focal point of juvenile justice reforms moving forward. Oversight and hiring 
practices within the PCPS need to be strengthened, to ensure that all probation officers are fully 
committed to their work. At the same time, reforms are needed to ensure that the PCPS has adequate 
resources and training to fulfill its mission. 
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DETENTION FACILITIES
The primary detention facility for juveniles in St. Kitts and Nevis is the New Horizons Rehabilitation 
Centre (NHRC). At the time of our interviews in May 2021, there were twelve juveniles in detention at 
this facility – seven males and five females (Table 4). In total population, this is on par with the midline 
population of 13. In a significant improvement since baseline, all of the stakeholders we spoke with 
reported that no juveniles were being detained at the adult detention facility, Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP); 
at midline, there were three. 
Table 2: Juveniles in detention in St. Kitts and Nevis
BASELINE (2017) MIDLINE (2019) ENDLINE (2021)
Males Females Males Females Males Females
New Horizons 
Rehabilitation Center
6 0 12 1 7 5
Her Majesty's Prison 0 0 3 0 0 0
Total 6 0 15 1 7 5
An important feature of the NHRC is that it hosts both juvenile offenders and juveniles who have not 
been charged with committing an offense, but are in need of care and protection. This mixing of groups is 
understandable, given that St. Kitts and Nevis is a small country with limited resources, yet it does 
introduce the risk that hardened offenders may harm or influence those in need of care and protection. 
That said, there were no reports of any such incidents from the stakeholders we spoke with. 
As noted in the Limitations section of this report, we were unable to access NHRC to observe conditions 
or interview juveniles in detention, due to the increase in the community spread of COVID-19 in May and 
June of 2021, and the resulting restrictions on non-essential visitation. The results reported in this section 
should therefore be interpreted with some caution, as most stakeholders we spoke with were employed 
by the NHRC or otherwise worked for the government. That said, we also spoke with representatives 
from legal aid institutions, who represent the interests of the juveniles and have little incentive to 
misreport; those interviews largely corroborated what we learned from government-affiliated 
stakeholders. 
COVID-19 RESTRICTIONS AND IMPACTS
The most significant impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has been felt in detention facilities, where 
visitation from parents, family, and outside observers (including the research team for this report) has 
been prohibited. The lack of family visitation is regrettable, as it is likely to weaken ties to family and 
community, making the already difficult challenge of successful reintegration even more so. Closing the 
facility off to outside observers is also a regrettable rollback of much-needed transparency and oversight 
of the NHRC facility.
Notwithstanding, to the credit of the NHRC, the facility appears to have done a good job of sustaining 
quality educational and extracurricular activities. Indeed, as we note below, the quality of these services 
appears to have improved since our midline study in 2019. 
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ACCESS TO MEDICAL, MENTAL HEALTH, AND FAMILY SUPPORT
As was the case at midline, the NHRC does not have full-time medical staff on site. Instead, residents are 
transported to medical facilities in the community on an as-needed basis. Given the small number of 
residents at NHRC, this arrangement makes financial sense. However, the research team was unable to 
verify whether access to medical care in the community is indeed adequate, due to COVID-19 restrictions 
on non-essential access to NHRC. There is no full-time psychiatrist on-site, but every resident has a 
caseworker trained in social work and counseling. In addition, residents in need of counseling may be 
referred to the Counseling Unit within the Ministry of Social Development and Gender Affairs. In our 
assessment, access to medical care and mental health care is adequate and has remained at the same levels 
since baseline and midline.
As was the case at midline and baseline, residents of NHRC lack access to telephones that would enable 
them to maintain regular contact with their families and social supports. Calling family requires the use of 
a caseworker’s cell phone, which is not a sustainable solution for family contact. And because many families 
come from disadvantaged backgrounds and do not have the time or finances to travel to the NHRC, many 
youth go long periods without seeing or contacting their families.
PROGRAMMING AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 
The NHRC provides morning educational classes and afternoon skills sessions on topics including 
woodworking, electrical skills, farming, and life skills. On weekends, residents do chores and attend to 
personal care. A church group visits on Sundays to provide religious programming.
At midline, we documented several shortcomings to the quality of these services, most notably that they 
were irregular and of low quality. Encouragingly, progress appears to have been made since that time. 
Most stakeholders agreed that programming and education services at NHRC were adequate. As one 
individual reported:
“I think that they’re doing an exceptional job at New Horizons. Everyone I’ve interacted with, 
they seem comfortable, relaxed, and like their needs are being met. They really seem to flourish 
…and when I see them with their caseworker [in court], you look at them and they seem to 
have a good relationship.”
Echoing this sentiment, another stakeholder reported: “I have no bad report about New Horizons. I 
would praise New Horizons. I have seen juveniles there who have been reformed while there. I believe 
in the work at New Horizons.” Further substantiating this point, stakeholders familiar with the daily 
routines of youth in detention recounted a structured daily routine, complete with educational and 
extracurricular programming, though we were not able to directly verify this through in-person facility 
visits due to COVID-19 restrictions. 
PHYSICAL SPACE 
Built in 2013, the New Horizons Rehabilitation Centre is a relatively new facility that remains in good 
condition. The facilities are currently in adequate condition to support a rehabilitative mission. However, 
at midline, limited overnight staffing meant that juveniles were kept in assessment center cells rather than 
22 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
in the dormitories in the main building, which is more indicative of punishment than rehabilitation.6 At 
baseline and midline, this space was reportedly used for solitary confinement. Due to COVID-19 
restrictions on non-essential visitations, the research team was not able to verify whether this was still 
the situation at endline. 
PHYSICAL SECURITY, PUNISHMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
One of the main challenges observed by the research team at midline was the use of solitary confinement. 
As we wrote at the time, “solitary confinement and the use of corporal punishment are common at both 
HMP and NHRC, directly contradicting reform efforts and the law.” When asked about this at endline, a 
representative of NHRC denied the use of solitary confinement but acknowledged that they sometimes 
use “single separation,” which occurs when a juvenile is separated from his peers due to an infraction, 
altercation, or for preventative purposes. The separated individual will have their own cell for a period of 
time, usually between three to seven days, and may be removed from communal activities like schools 
and extracurricular programming. The representative noted that this practice was recommended by an
international consultant in 2016, and falls short of conditions associated with solitary confinement, in which 
an individual is confined to a cell for 22 hours per day without meaningful human contact.
Representatives of the NHRC denied the use of corporal punishment in any form, pointing out that this 
is a major point of emphasis in their training, and that the guards pride themselves in the effective use of 
verbal commands. Authorities within the Ministry of Social Development and Gender Affairs, which 
oversees the NHRC, also stressed that any such incident would be dealt with sternly, thoroughly 
investigated, and likely result in the dismissal of the offending officer. 
The research team was not able to verify this reported improvement in conditions at the detention 
facilities due to COVID-19 restrictions, which prevented non-essential access to detention facilities. 
However, independent sources such as the legal representatives of juveniles reported that they were 
unaware of any abuses of their clients, and that their clients generally had positive things to say about the 
facility and displayed good relations with their caseworkers. 
REINTEGRATION
As was the case at baseline and midline, there are no dedicated re-entry programs available to juveniles 
released from detention. After their release, some juveniles have been able to access vocational 
programs for youth in general, such as the Advanced Vocational Educational Centre (AVEC) and the
Skills Training Empowerment Program (STEP), but they are given no preference for admissions relative 
to the general population. 
The research team also learned that it is not standard practice to assign recently released juveniles to 
probation after they are released. Furthermore, probation officials do not have contact with the youth 
during their time at NHRC, which would leave them inadequately prepared to support a 
reintegration/re-entry plan. It is our assessment that changing this state of affairs and making supervision 
6 Assessment cells are isolated from the rest of the NHRC facility for use when juveniles need to be isolated from the rest of 
the population, for behavioral reasons or for their own protection. Assessment cells are also used when detainees first arrive, 
before they are integrated with the general population.
USAID.GOVESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 23
standard practice would improve the re-entry of recently released juveniles and help reduce recidivism. 
Moreover, it is feasible with existing resources and institutions. 
Another important reform that came up repeatedly during our interviews is the need for transitional 
housing for youth after they leave detention. Because many youth come from troubled homes, returning 
them immediately to this environment risks exposing them to the same stressors that led to their 
original offense. However, transitional housing would be expensive, and could draw resources away 
from reintegration programming, which is also sorely needed. While the proper balance between 
programming and transitional housing ultimately falls to policymakers within the Ministry of Social 
Development and Gender Affairs, they should be aware of the risks of returning juveniles to the same 
environment that lead them into crime. At the least, they should ensure these individuals are given 
adequate supervision, counseling, and assistance by a probation officer. 
SUMMARY
The government of St. Kitts and Nevis has made some progress towards reforming its juvenile justice 
system since our midline assessment in 2019. Most notably, the CJC was finally established in late 2019, a 
full six years after the passage of the Child Justice Act. Although the CJC is still a fledgling institution, it 
has achieved some progress in the past two years, most notably in the area of promoting diversion for 
non-violent offenses. Nevertheless, the CJC has yet to fulfill its potential in terms of both ensuring 
diversion for all those who qualify under the CJA of 2013, as well as in terms of ensuring coordination 
across agencies to promote the smooth and timely handling of juvenile cases. Coordination across agencies 
remains poor, resulting in prolonged periods of pre-trial detention for juveniles. 
At the New Horizons Rehabilitation Center, conditions have remained satisfactory, and the use of solitary 
confinement has reportedly been replaced with the more limited use of single separation. Another area 
of progress is that culturally, there seems to be a genuine commitment to the principles of restorative 
justice for juveniles, and a keen interest in reforming the juvenile justice system to these ends. 
Pre-trial diversion and effective reintegration of recently released juveniles continue to be plagued by a 
lack of dedicated and accredited programs, despite years of rhetoric paid to the importance of these types 
of programs. Moreover, probation officers – who have primary responsibility for ensuring adherence to 
diversion plans and for ensuring successful reintegration – remain poorly motivated and poorly monitored, 
limiting the quality of supervision and counseling received by juveniles under their supervision. 
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 24
RECOMMENDATIONS
We offer six topline recommendations for the Government of St. Kitts and Nevis and its international 
stakeholders to consider, organized into two categories: recommendations that can be implemented 
immediately, and recommendations that will require time and additional resources to implement: 
Recommendations that can be implemented in the near term:
1. To ensure coordination across agencies, adherence to case management protocols and timely 
processing of cases, the Child Justice Committee should play a more proactive role in following 
juvenile cases through the justice system and intervening when appropriate to move matters along 
and advocate on behalf of the detained juvenile.
2. To ensure adherence to appropriate procedures for juvenile cases, training on juvenile justice 
matters should be incorporated into basic training for all new police recruits. This training should be 
reinforced through continuing education programs for all police officers and officials. Alongside 
these efforts, the police force should develop clear protocols and guidelines for police officers to 
follow for juvenile cases, and ensure these protocols are widely disseminated and followed
Recommendations that will require time and/or additional resources to implement:
3. To improve rehabilitation, reduce recidivism, and promote restorative justice principles, the Ministry 
of Social Development and Gender Affairs should redouble its efforts to establish dedicated pre- and 
post-trial diversion programs. This will require the Ministry to establish partnerships with local 
agencies, clubs, and youth organizations to vet and accredit programs to rehabilitate justice-involved 
juveniles. 
4. To ensure probation officers realize their potential when it comes to counseling juvenile 
probationers and helping them access available services and employment opportunities, the 
Department of Probation within the Ministry of Social Development and Gender Affairs should 
strengthen oversight of probation officers and mid-level managers and hold them accountable for 
successful case outcomes.
5. To facilitate coordination across agencies and prevent excessive delays in the processing of cases, an 
electronic case management system accessible to all agencies within the juvenile justice sector 
should be established. This database should be designed to track cases throughout the juvenile 
justice process, and to help the relevant agencies manage their cases and workloads effectively. 
6. To promote rehabilitation and successful re-entry after detention, the courts and the Ministry of 
Social Development and Gender Affairs should:
a. Make it standard practice to assign juveniles to probation after they are released from 
detention. Under the supervision of a probation officer, recently released juveniles can and 
should receive counseling, mentoring, and other forms of reintegration assistance.
b. Consider investing in transitional housing so that youth are not immediately reduced to 
adverse home environments and the same stressors that led to their detention.
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