EVALUATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
SECTOR REFORM IMPLEMENTATION IN 
ST. LUCIA, ST. KITTS AND NEVIS, AND 
GUYANA
ENDLINE REPORT 
AUGUST 2021
This publication was prepared independently by Kevin Barnes-Ceeney, Ben Morse, Rashmi Bhat, and 
Alexa Aziz of Social Impact. It was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International 
Development as part of the Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance – Learning, Evaluation, and 
Research activity. 
EVALUATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE SECTOR REFORM 
IMPLEMENTATION IN ST. LUCIA, ST. KITTS AND 
NEVIS, AND GUYANA 
ENDLINE REPORT
AUGUST 2021
AID-OAA-M-13-00011
DISCLAIMER 
The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States 
Agency for International Development or the United States Government.
CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................... 5
GUYANA 5
ST. LUCIA 6
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 7
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................. 8
BACKGROUND ON REFORMS IN THE REGION 9
ADDRESSING THE UNIQUE NEEDS OF JUVENILES 10
ORIGINS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN THE REGION 11
PROGRESS IDENTIFIED AT MIDLINE 12
CHALLENGES REMAINING AT MIDLINE 12
USAID JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAMMING IN THE REGION 14
EVALUATION OBJECTIVES 15
EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODS 15
LIMITATIONS 17
GUYANA..............................................................................................................19
BACKGROUND ON JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN GUYANA 19
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION 20
DIVERSION, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, AND PROBATION SERVICES 22
DETENTION FACILITIES 24
COVID-19 RESTRICTIONS AND IMPACTS 25
ACCESS TO MEDICAL, MENTAL HEALTH, AND FAMILY SUPPORT 25
PROGRAMMING AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 26
PHYSICAL SPACE 27
PHYSICAL SECURITY, PUNISHMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 27
REINTEGRATION 27
SUMMARY 29
ST. LUCIA ............................................................................................................31
BACKGROUND ON REFORMS IN ST. LUCIA 31
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION 32
DIVERSION, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, AND PROBATION SERVICES 34
DETENTION FACILITIES 37
COVID-19 RESTRICTIONS AND IMPACTS 39
ACCESS TO MEDICAL, MENTAL HEALTH, AND FAMILY SUPPORT 40
PROGRAMMING AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 40
PHYSICAL SPACE 41
PHYSICAL SECURITY, PUNISHMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 42
REINTEGRATION 43
SUMMARY 45
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS ......................................................................................47
BACKGROUND ON JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 47
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION 47
DIVERSION, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, AND PROBATION 49
DETENTION FACILITIES 51
COVID-19 RESTRICTIONS AND IMPACTS 52
ACCESS TO MEDICAL, MENTAL HEALTH, AND FAMILY SUPPORT 52
PROGRAMMING AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 53
PHYSICAL SPACE 53
PHYSICAL SECURITY, PUNISHMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 54
REINTEGRATION 54
SUMMARY 55
RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................56
GUYANA 56
ST. LUCIA 58
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 60
REFERENCES.......................................................................................................61
TABLES
Table 1: Selected crime rates in St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and Guyana, 2018 9
Table 2: Juveniles in detention in Guyana 24
Table 3: Juveniles in detention in St. Lucia 38
Table 4: Juveniles in detention in St. Kitts and Nevis 52
ACRONYMS
ART Aggression Replacement Training
BTC Boys Training Center
DPCPS Department of Probation and Child Protection Services
DPP Director of Public Prosecutions
CJA Child Justice Act
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSEC Caribbean Secondary Education Certificate
ESC Eastern and Southern Caribbean
GUY Guyana 
HMP Her Majesty’s Prison
IT Information Technology
JAC Juvenile Assessment Center
JAIS Juvenile Assessment and Intervention System
MAYSI-2 Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument
NHC New Horizons Center
NOC New Opportunity Corps
OECS Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States
RCC Rights of the Child Commission – Guyana
SAVRY Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth
SKN Saint Kitts and Nevis
SKYE Skills and Knowledge for Youth Empowerment
STL Saint Lucia
TBI To Be Implemented
UNCRC United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
US United States
USAID United States Agency for International Development
XCD East Caribbean Dollar
YES Youth Empowerment Services
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 5 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study assesses the progress of juvenile justice reform efforts in three countries: Guyana, St. Lucia, 
and St. Kitts and Nevis. We focus on the following sets of questions: first, have key milestones in the 
juvenile justice reform process been achieved? If not, what have been the primary barriers to progress? 
Second, approximately how many youth are given diversion programs rather than traditional programs 
rooted in punitive measures, and how have these numbers evolved over time? Third, what is the quality 
and perceived effectiveness of court processes in the use of diversion and alternative sentencing options, 
as well as rehabilitation and reintegration programs? Where programming is weak, what have been the 
biggest obstacles to improvement? And finally, how likely is it that reforms will be institutionalized and 
sustainable over time?
To answer these questions, we adopt a qualitative longitudinal design in which we conducted key 
informant interviews with more than 90 stakeholders and youth across all three countries at three 
points in time: 2017 (baseline), 2019 (midline), and 2021 (endline). Our interviews focused on progress 
achieved to date across the following dimensions: coordination within and across juvenile justice 
agencies, access to diversion and alternative sentencing programs, probation services, detention facility 
conditions, and reintegration programs. 
Our main findings are as follows, organized by country. In the final section of this report, we provide a 
set of detailed recommendations for each country, organized into two categories: recommendations 
that can be implemented immediately, and recommendations that will require time and additional 
resources to implement.
GUYANA 
The Government of Guyana has made uneven progress towards reforming its juvenile justice system 
since our midline assessment in 2019. There has been progress towards reducing the number of 
juveniles held in detention, with 40 percent fewer juveniles held in detention in 2021 compared with 
2019. However, those that are in detention continue to face a lack of access to high-quality education, 
counseling, and extra-curricular activities. 
Progress towards ensuring smooth coordination across agencies remains mixed. On the one hand, the 
Childcare and Protection Agency has made considerable progress towards standardizing the procedures 
for handling juvenile cases and towards preparing pre-charge reports for the Courts, which are critical 
to contextualizing the root causes leading to a juvenile’s offense and laying the foundation for more 
lenient, alternative sentencing options. On the other hand, the police, who serve as the primary entry
point into the justice system, remain unfamiliar with the protocols and procedures for handling juvenile 
cases. Limited coordination between the police, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), the Courts, 
and the Juvenile Justice Board have resulted in excessive delays in processing cases and prolonged pre￾trial detention for many juveniles.
In terms of diversion and alternative sentencing, little progress has been made towards establishing 
accredited programs; instead, diversion and alternative sentencing plans and protocols are developed on 
a case-by-case basis and are usually implemented by probation officers. However, due to limited 
oversight within the Probation and Social Services Department, the quality of probation services that 
6 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
juveniles receive is strongly dependent on whether they happen to be assigned to an officer that is 
intrinsically motivated to help them through coaching, counseling, and reintegration assistance.
Rehabilitation and reintegration remain plagued by a lack of advanced planning prior to a juvenile’s 
release from detention, and there remains a critical need for dedicated rehabilitation programs, job 
assistance, and halfway housing. 
Although challenges remain in all these areas, there does appear to be a widespread consensus among 
key stakeholders on the importance of juvenile justice reform and the need for a more restorative 
system. It appears that the will for reform exists, even if implementation remains a work in progress.
The endline policy brief for Guyana is available on USAID’s Development Experience Clearinghouse 
here. 
ST. LUCIA
Notable progress has been made by the government of St. Lucia toward advancing the juvenile justice 
reform process since the midline assessment. With respect to coordination amongst agencies involved 
in juvenile justice service delivery, this progress includes putting in place a Technical Committee to 
coordinate efforts across agencies, drafting a diversion strategy, and starting the Initial Inquiry process 
both pre-trial and within the Family Court. To ensure this progress is sustained, the government will 
need to ensure that the Technical Committee remains in place until either a coordinating body, like the 
Child Justice Management Unit recommended by the Juvenile Justice Reform Project (JJRP), or 
equivalent cross-agency coordinating mechanism is officially put in place. Though all stakeholders 
asserted that juvenile justice reform is a coordinated effort across multiple agencies, our research 
suggests that BTC and Probation carry much of the responsibility in providing guidance and services to 
youth. 
In terms of diversion and alternative sentencing, a key achievement since midline is that pre-trial 
diversion is now taking place, led by Probation, and the Family Court is now issuing diversion orders in 
cases involving juveniles. It will also be crucial for the Cabinet to approve a diversion strategy to help 
officially institutionalize and operationalize diversion as a core juvenile justice process and pave the way 
for government funding for diversion programs. Currently, diversion orders issued by the court are 
mostly for Supervision and Guidance, with probation officers given the responsibility of designing each 
youth’s supervision strategy and of identifying programs for youth to participate in. There is still a critical 
need for a set of official diversion programs to be formalized so that the Court and probation officers 
have more structured options to divert youth to. 
The number of juveniles housed at the adult correctional facility (Bordelais) has decreased drastically 
from baseline to endline (from 16 to one). Additionally, youth interviewed at both the juvenile detention 
facility (Boys Training Center, BTC) and Bordelais reported almost no instances of physical abuse. We 
find that forms of solitary confinement are still being employed — either intentionally as punishment, or 
unintentionally due to COVID-19 protocols or youth being kept in a separate unit at Bordelais. The 
educational curriculum at BTC still requires strengthening, a persisting issue from baseline and midline. 
Youth at Bordelais were not receiving any programming at endline, a marked step backwards from 
midline. 
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 7 
Our findings suggest that there are significant management challenges at BTC in particular that need to 
be addressed in order for it to be a more effective rehabilitative environment for youth. Also, St. Lucia’s 
juvenile justice system at large demonstrates a primary focus on rehabilitating juveniles who have 
committed only minor offenses. There still seems to be little progress or plan in place for juveniles who 
have committed serious offenses, and these juveniles are often still sent to Bordelais where youth were 
not receiving any programming at the time of endline data collection. Futhermore, St. Lucia has few 
options for juvenile females in conflict with the law. Though this is a widely acknowledged fact, there 
seems to be little data available about juvenile female offenders beyond anecdotal information. Without 
data, it is difficult to identify the most feasible interventions for serving this population. Lastly, 
reintegration efforts are still largely driven by individual officers and counselors, and there is still a lack 
of formal and coordinated programs for reintegration of juveniles in conflict with the law. 
The endline policy brief for St. Lucia is available on USAID’s Development Experience Clearinghouse
here. 
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS
The government of St. Kitts and Nevis has made some progress towards reforming its juvenile justice 
system since our midline assessment in 2019. Most notably, the Child Justice Committee (CJC) was 
finally established in late 2019, a full six years after the passage of the Child Justice Act. Although the 
CJC is still a fledgling institution, it has achieved some progress in the past two years, most notably in 
the area of promoting diversion for non-violent offenses. Nevertheless, the CJC has yet to fulfill its 
potential in terms of both ensuring diversion for all those who qualify under the CJA of 2013, as well as 
in terms of ensuring coordination across agencies to promote the smooth and timely handling of juvenile 
cases. Coordination across agencies remains poor, resulting in prolonged periods of pre-trial detention 
for juveniles. 
In the New Horizons Rehabilitation Center (NHRC), conditions have remained satisfactory, and the use 
of solitary confinement has reportedly been replaced with the more limited use of single separation. 
Another area of progress is that culturally, there seems to be a genuine commitment to the principles of 
restorative justice for juveniles, and a keen interest in reforming the juvenile justice system to these 
ends. 
Pre-trial diversion and effective reintegration of recently released juveniles continue to be plagued by a 
lack of dedicated and accredited programs, despite years of rhetoric paid to the importance of these 
types of programs. Moreover, probation officers – who have primary responsibility for ensuring 
adherence to diversion plans and for ensuring successful reintegration – remain poorly motivated and 
poorly monitored, limiting the quality of supervision and counseling received by juveniles under their 
supervision.
The endline policy brief for St. Kitts and Nevis is available on USAID’s Development Experience 
Clearinghouse here. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Juvenile justice systems in Eastern and Southern Caribbean (ESC) states have historically had a punitive 
orientation, emphasizing incarceration and retribution rather than rehabilitation and reintegration. Yet, a 
large and growing body of research suggests that that punitive sentencing practices tend to increase, 
rather than decrease, recidivism (Wong et al., 2016). Conversely, sentencing practices grounded in 
restorative justice and rehabilitation have consistently been shown to reduce recidivism (Wilson and 
Hoge, 2013). 
Recognizing the potential of restorative justice practices, many governments in Eastern and Southern 
Caribbean states have begun to reform their juvenile justice systems. For over a decade, the United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) has actively supported these reforms, whether 
through violence prevention programs for at-risk youth, providing legislative frameworks for reform 
laws, or implementing programs to modernize systems of youth justice. The hope is that a more 
rehabilitative and less punitive approach to juvenile justice can break the cycle of incarceration, 
recidivism, and further incarceration, and thereby help address high rates of crime and violence in the 
region. 
To evaluate the success of these reforms and help inform its programming, USAID contracted Social 
Impact to implement a longitudinal, qualitative study of juvenile justice outcomes in Guyana, St. Lucia, 
and St. Kitts and Nevis. The study began in 2017 with a comprehensive baseline assessment of the state 
of juvenile justice reforms based on more than 180 key informant interviews with stakeholders and 
youth across all three countries. In 2019, the research team returned to conduct another round of key 
informant interviews to assess progress made since 2017. This assessment reports the results of the 
endline assessment, which includes more than 95 interviews conducted remotely and in-person between 
April and June 2021. 
Our analysis focused on three overarching sets of questions. First, have key milestones in the juvenile 
justice reform process been achieved? If not, what have been the primary barriers to progress? Second, 
approximately how many youth are given diversion programs rather than traditional programs rooted in 
punitive measures, and how have these numbers evolved over time? Third, what is the quality and 
perceived effectiveness of court processes in the use of diversion and alternative sentencing options and 
rehabilitation and reintegration programs? Where programming is weak, what have been the biggest 
obstacles to improvement? And finally, how likely is it that reforms will be institutionalized and 
sustainable over time? 
The remainder of this report is organized as follows. First, we provide background on juvenile justice 
reforms in the region, review recent literature on the effectiveness of restorative justice reforms, and 
discuss USAID’s efforts to promote these reforms in the region. We then present the study 
methodology and key research questions. Next, we provide a detailed, country-by-country account of 
progress achieved to date across the following dimensions: coordination within and across juvenile 
justice agencies, access to diversion and alternative sentencing programs, probation services, detention 
facility conditions, and reintegration programs. We conclude with a set of recommendations for each 
country based on our findings.
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 9 
BACKGROUND ON REFORMS IN THE REGION
High rates of crime and violence remain a challenge for St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and Guyana. Table 
1 details the reported homicide, robbery, and residential burglary rates per 100,000 people in each of 
the countries in 2018. Although there has been a decrease in violent crime over the last decade, crime 
rates in all three countries remain well above global averages. For example, St. Kitts and Nevis has a 
homicide rate of 41.8, which is nearly seven times higher than the global average of 5.8 homicides per 
100,000 people. In addition to the social and psychosocial toll on affected communities, such high rates 
of insecurity have serious consequences for economic development. 
Table 1: Selected crime rates in St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and Guyana, 2018
HOMICIDE 
RATE
ROBBERY 
RATE
BURGLARY 
RATE
St. Kitts and 
Nevis 42 126 580
St. Lucia 21 164 503
Guyana 14 140 278
USA 5 86 340
Notes: Homicide, robbery, and burglary rates per 100,000 
people. Sources: OSAC, Bureau of Diplomatic Security, U.S. 
Department of State; FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program 
(USA).
Juvenile delinquency is widely viewed as a core contributor to crime in the region. Although limited 
empirical data exist concerning crime and delinquency in each of the three countries, scholars generally 
suggest that violent crime in the Caribbean is caused by a toxic mix of guns, gangs, drugs, poverty, and a 
lack of economic opportunities. In our midline study in 2019, we asked stakeholders what the main 
drivers of juvenile delinquency were in their respective countries. Although stakeholders in each of the 
countries identified common themes such as the role of parents, the education system, and peers, 
important nuances emerged. Substance abuse was identified as a driver of delinquency in St. Kitts and 
Nevis and Guyana, but not in St. Lucia. Neighborhood-level influences including gang activity were 
considered by stakeholders to be an important driver of delinquency in all three countries (Noltrieke, 
2020; Hill & Morris, 2017). Other contributing factors include a police force that is corrupt, abusive, 
often absent from communities, and unable to effectively prevent or investigate crimes or build civilians’ 
trust (Sutton & Baxter, 2017). Corrupt and ineffective policing, in turn, contributes to low levels of trust, 
potentially deterring cooperation and further exacerbating police ineffectiveness (Tyler, 2006). 
As a result of these dynamics, juvenile justice systems in the region have become overwhelmed by youth 
who need help transitioning away from delinquent activities and need support to reintegrate into 
mainstream, law-abiding society. Historically, these systems have adopted retributive and punitive 
sentencing practices rather than focusing on rehabilitation and restorative justice practices. This has 
slowly started to change as the negative effects of punitive policies on recidivism outcomes have become 
better understood and more widely documented (Wong et al., 2016). Research from the United States 
(U.S.) and other contexts has shown that punitive sentencing practices tend to increase, rather than 
10 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
decrease, recidivism (Wong et al., 2016). Conversely, sentencing practices grounded in restorative 
justice and rehabilitation have consistently been shown to reduce recidivism (Wilson and Hoge, 2013). 1 
In our own research of 377 youth in conflict with the law in Guyana, we found that 36 percent of 
respondents indicated that they were rearrested within three years, and 65 percent admitted to 
engaging in a delinquent or criminal act following their initial juvenile justice system involvement (Barnes￾Ceeney et al., 2021). On a positive note, these recidivism rates appear somewhat lower than recidivism 
rates in the United States. 
At the forefront of juvenile justice reforms around the world is the use of pre-trial diversion and 
alternative sentencing. (To ensure conceptual clarity, we follow the majority of scholarship and use the 
term diversion to refer to pre-trial diversion, and we use the term “alternative sentencing” to refer to 
post-trial diversion). Pre-trial diversion programs vary considerably depending on many factors, including 
the objectives of the program (e.g., saving judicial resources vs. reducing recidivism); who determines 
eligibility and provides oversight or services (e.g., police, probation, court staff); which youth are eligible 
(e.g., status offenders, youth accused of minor crimes); the scope of any programming or oversight 
provided as part of diversion; what is required of youth in diversion and what happens if they fail to 
comply; and what are the incentives for youth to participate. As such, pre-trial diversion and post-trial 
diversion (i.e. alternative sentencing) can vary from “informal diversion”, whereby the police or courts 
provide a warning and release the youth without any conditions, services, or oversight, to more 
formalized diversion, whereby youth are enrolled in an accredited diversion program, sign an agreement 
laying out the conditions of the program, receive extensive services, are closely overseen, and receive 
certain benefits following successful completion of the program. Examples of these pre- and post-trial 
diversion programs include drug counseling, vocational training, community service, probation, and 
restitution to victims. 
ADDRESSING THE UNIQUE NEEDS OF JUVENILES 
A central feature of juvenile justice reform is the recognition that juveniles are different from adult 
offenders. Juveniles often lack maturity, engage in risk-taking and impulsive behavior, and are less likely 
to initially consider the consequences of potential actions compared to adults. Current thinking in 
neuroscience suggests that the parts of the brain that govern impulse control, planning, and thinking 
ahead continue to develop after the age of 18 (Steinberg, 2007). Scholars have identified that the limbic 
region of the brain, where emotions and reward behaviors are processed, develops before the 
prefrontal region, where logical thinking and behavioral control lie (Casey et al., 2011). Children, when 
faced with emotionally charged situations may make decisions based upon impulse rather than careful 
cognitive consideration. Given the later development of the prefrontal cortex, it is unsurprising that 
children are relatively more susceptible to peer influence and peer pressure than adults. The influence of 
peers on adolescent offending is well established in the literature. Peers may transmit attitudes 
supportive of delinquency, sustain a historical narrative of previous delinquent acts, and provide an 
encouraging forum for the "acting out" of new delinquent behaviors.
1 Wilson and Hoge (2013) conducted a study of 73 pre-trial diversion and alternative sentencing programs consisting of 14,573 
youth offenders and compared them to 18,840 juveniles processed in the traditional justice system to assess the rate of 
recidivism in each group. The authors found that “in 60 of the 73 diversion programs, the recidivism rate of diverted youth was 
lower than that of youth processed by traditional justice system” (p. 504).
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 11
ORIGINS OF JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN THE REGION 
The model law on juvenile justice,2 developed by the United Nations, has been the bedrock for 
advancing juvenile justice reforms in St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and Guyana. The model law provides a 
framework for developing a juvenile justice system that supports four important principles espoused in 
the 1990 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC): nondiscrimination irrespective of race, 
sex, language, religion, ethnicity, disability, or nationality (Article 2); the primary consideration should be 
the best interests of the child (Article 3); the child’s right to survival and development (Article 6); and 
the right of the child to participate in decisions affecting him or her, and in particular, to be given the 
opportunity to be heard in any judicial or administrative proceedings affecting him or her (Article 12). 
Of the three countries, St. Kitts and Nevis was first to ratify the UNCRC in 1990, followed by Guyana 
in 1991, and St. Lucia in 1993. 
The model law enshrines the principle that children in conflict with the law should receive due process, 
provides provisions for the age of criminal responsibility, and recommends the abolishment of status 
offenses.3 The model law provides guidance on all stages of the juvenile justice process, including 
apprehension, arrest, detainment in police custody or a juvenile detention center, the establishment of 
children’s courts overseen by judges trained in juvenile matters, provisions for trial, custodial sentences 
and alternative sentencing, conditions of detention and institutional treatment, as well as the need to 
provide aftercare services. 
The model law dictates that, where possible, children should be diverted from the formal juvenile justice 
system. Such diversion could occur at the point of apprehension by the police, following arrest and 
charge, or through a formal court diversion program after the young person has appeared in court. 
Diversionary programming, informed by a thorough assessment of the child’s needs, may adopt a 
restorative justice lens, whereby efforts are made to repair potential harms for the young person, the 
victim, and the community. In a diversionary program, the child is typically referred to a Child Welfare 
Board. The Board is then responsible for overseeing any expectations regarding community service, 
educational and therapeutic interventions, curfews, and supervision requirements. 
Although many children in conflict with the law are suitable for diversionary programming, some young 
people have committed acts of delinquency that are so serious that they need to be managed within the 
formal juvenile justice system. Alternative sentencing to probation allows the child to be supervised by a 
probation officer. After a thorough assessment of the young person’s risks and needs, an appropriate 
supervision plan is designed. A strong supervision plan seeks to address those needs that, if 
unaddressed, are most likely to lead to further delinquency. The young person is expected to report to 
the probation officer on a regular basis, abide by curfews, and complete rehabilitative and educational 
programming. 
2 UNODC 2013 Justice in Matters Involving Children in Conflict with the Law: Model Law on Juvenile Justice and Related 
Commentary https://www.unodc.org/documents/justice-and-prison-reform/Justice_Matters_Involving-Web_version.pdf 
3 Status offenses are those offenses that would not be deemed criminal if the individual committing the offense was over the age 
of responsibility. Typical status offenses include truancy, running away from home, and specific to some Caribbean countries,
the crime of wandering. A number of behaviors could previously be construed as “wandering,” including when a child is away 
from home all night and the parent or guardian does not know the child’s whereabouts, when a child hangs out with older 
people who may be using drugs or are engaged in other criminal activities, or when children are engaged in activities related to 
human trafficking.
12 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
Under the model law, the deprivation of liberty through a custodial sentence should be a last resort, and 
for the shortest possible period of time relative to the seriousness of the delinquent act committed. The 
purpose of the custodial sentence in the juvenile justice system is to be reintegrative, with the aim to 
assist the child in playing a constructive role in society, rather than being a punitive or retributive 
sentence. Given the reintegrative purpose of custodial sentences for children, the provision of 
rehabilitative and educational services for incarcerated youth is fundamental. The model law requires a 
shift in institutional culture, whereby practices such as the housing of children with adult incarcerated 
people, the corporal punishment of children, and the use of solitary confinement are not allowed. Of 
note is that solitary confinement and physical abuse of children are forbidden under the UNCRC.
Re-entry and reintegration planning is a critical component of juvenile justice system reform. Planning 
for release should begin on day one of the young person’s period of detention. Best practices call for the 
probation officer to be visiting the young person in the facility and developing a good understanding of 
the home environment where the child will be returning to. Educational qualifications, employment￾focused training, housing, social supports, substance abuse treatment, and mental health services are all 
critical factors that should be considered when preparing a young person for successful community 
reintegration after detention. 
PROGRESS IDENTIFIED AT MIDLINE 
Juvenile justice reform is an ongoing process that requires sustained attention and commitment by key 
champions within each country. In our midline study in 2019, we were able to identify important 
progress that had been achieved. All three countries had passed legislation fashioned from the model 
law. St. Kitts and Nevis were the first country, passing the Child Justice Act in 2013. Guyana passed the 
Juvenile Justice Act in April 2018, followed by St. Lucia’s adoption of the Child Justice Act and the Child 
Care, Protection, and Adoption Act in November 2018. In St. Kitts and Nevis, the members of the Child 
Justice Committee overseeing diversionary programming had been identified by the Probation and Child 
Welfare Board. Strong relationships existed between probation officers and schools, creating a strong 
foundation for community interventions and engagement.
In St. Lucia, Probation and Parole Services had taken an exemplary role in the juvenile justice reform 
process. Empirical risk assessment instruments were being used by probation officers to assess risks and 
needs, and accredited Anger Replacement Training (ART) programs had been delivered with both 
community and detained youth. Considerable restructuring had occurred, with children charged with 
status offenses being diverted from the justice system entirely, with a referral to social workers in the 
Human Services Department. 
Similarly, children in Guyana under the age of 14 years were being referred to social workers in the 
Childcare and Protection Agency, and the status offense of “wandering” had been decriminalized. At the 
governmental level, a Department of Criminal Justice and a Juvenile Justice Committee were operational. 
Furthermore, the Children’s Court was opened in Georgetown in October of 2018.
CHALLENGES REMAINING AT MIDLINE 
Despite progress made at midline, significant challenges remained in relation to the full implementation 
of juvenile justice reforms. In St Kitts and Nevis and St. Lucia, there was a need to formalize court-led 
diversionary programming. Also, the Child Justice Committee had yet to become operational, limiting 
the use and extent of diversionary programs. Similarly, in St. Lucia, there was a need to operationalize 
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 13
Initial Inquiry Meetings, in order for juveniles to be processed outside of the formal court system. There 
was also a need to implement empirical risk assessments in probation in St. Kitts and Nevis. 
In all three countries, there was a need to formalize alternative sentencing options, including the use of 
supervision and rehabilitative programming as alternatives to incarceration. There was also a need to 
expand educational, rehabilitative programming, and mental health services for detained young people. In 
St. Kitts and Nevis, we highlighted concerns that children were detained in Her Majesty’s Prison (HMP), 
an adult prison facility. Similarly, there were concerns in St. Lucia that children were being detained at 
Bordelais. In all three countries, concerns were raised concerning the use of solitary confinement and 
corporal punishment with detained youth, in direct contravention of the UNCRC. Finally, there was a 
need for re-entry and reintegration support services for young people held in detention facilities. 
14 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
USAID JUVENILE JUSTICE PROGRAMMING IN THE REGION
Reducing youth involvement in crime and violence is a priority for countries in the ESC as well as for 
USAID. In 2016, USAID launched its five-year Youth Empowerment Services (YES) initiative, which seeks 
to reduce juvenile crime and violence in the Eastern Caribbean by applying a public health framework to 
crime reduction and violence prevention. The public health model of crime prevention is a proactive 
approach to juvenile justice, which focuses on reducing risk and increasing resiliency for at-risk youth and 
justice-involved youth (Welsh, 2005). The framework offers an alternative to reliance on the courts and 
incarceration by focusing on rehabilitation and implementing a practical, science-based approach to 
improve the management of juveniles in conflict with the law (Hamburg, 1998).
The YES initiative builds off previous USAID programs and partnerships developed in the region that were 
designed to address the concerns of youth crime and violence. In 2016, USAID and the Organization of 
the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) launched the Juvenile Justice Reform Project Part II (JJRP), building 
on JJRP I, which ran from 2011 to 2015. The project’s aim was to facilitate the reformation of the juvenile 
justice systems in six countries, including St. Lucia and St. Kitts and Nevis (but not Guyana). The goal was 
to strengthen the juvenile justice process through the application of national and sub-regional measures 
to improve the life circumstances of youth in conflict with the law, with a strong focus on rehabilitation 
and reintegration.4 More specifically, the initiative aimed to: 
(1) Improve the legal and regulatory frameworks by drafting model legislation and promoting a 
national juvenile justice strategy.
(2) Build capacity for effective justice administration through trainings, development of operating 
procedures, and introduction of case management software and screening tools.
(3) Modernize diversion, detention, and rehabilitative processes through investments in detention 
facilities and promotion of alternative sentencing options.
(4) Improve linkages with civil society through public awareness and education activities.
In Guyana, USAID also funded the Skills and Knowledge for Youth Empowerment (SKYE) project, which 
concluded in December 2016. The SKYE project sought to reduce youth crime and violence through 
targeted alternative sentencing, work readiness training, entrepreneurship development, and livelihood 
coaching. SKYE originally targeted 2,000 youth who were identified as being ill-prepared for integration 
into the workforce, focusing on those who had dropped out of high school and/or were in conflict with 
the law. 
More recently, USAID supported the Community, Family, and Youth Resilience (CFYR) program in St. 
Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and Guyana, which aims to create pathways away from crime for youth aged 10 
to 29. Using a risk screen to identify at-risk youth, the program provides at-risk youth with services 
identified through a community-based approach in which the youth, their family, and local stakeholders 
collaboratively define problems, identify risk and protective factors, and create local solutions. The 
program ended in 2020, and a rigorous evaluation found it to be effective at some, but not all of its 
objectives (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2020). 
4 USAID. St. Lucian Youth Benefit from Juvenile Justice Reform. (March 30, 2016). https://www.usaid.gov/eastern-and-southern￾caribbean/news-information/press-releases/st-lucian-youth-benefit-juvenile
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EVALUATION OBJECTIVES 
This implementation study seeks to understand if juvenile justice sector reforms in the three countries 
have been successfully implemented. This is no small undertaking, as there are enormous challenges in 
transitioning a juvenile justice system away from a detention-based, punitive approach to a diversionary 
and rehabilitation-based approach. This transition requires legislative changes, political will, resources, and 
a cultural shift in the justice sector. Recognizing these challenges, this evaluation tracks the status and 
quality of reform efforts in each of the three countries over a five-year time span, from 2017 (baseline) to 
2019 (midline) to 2021 (endline). 
Our evaluation is guided by four overarching sets of research questions:
1. Have key milestones in the juvenile justice reform process been achieved? If not, what have been 
the primary barriers to progress?
2. How many youth are currently being enrolled in diversion programs rather than in traditional 
programs rooted in punishment and incarceration? Has there been progress over time? Why or 
why not?
3. What is the quality and perceived effectiveness of court processes, diversion programs, and 
rehabilitation and reintegration programs? Where programming is weak, what have been the 
biggest obstacles to improvement?
4. How likely is it that reform efforts will be institutionalized and sustainable over time?
In addressing these questions, we aim to inform USAID’s programming in the region. We also hope that 
this evaluation will be a useful resource for stakeholders and staff in the juvenile justice systems of St. 
Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Guyana, and for those interested in the implementation of system-wide 
juvenile and criminal justice reform efforts. 
EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODS 
This implementation study uses a comparative, longitudinal qualitative research design. We examine three 
countries, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Guyana, at three different points in time: baseline (2017), 
midline (2019), and endline (2021). This endline report builds on the midline report, which presented the 
mid-point status of juvenile justice reform in the three countries. 
At baseline and midline, the majority of interviews with stakeholders and youth occurred in-person and 
in-country. At endline, however, the COVID-19 pandemic prevented international travel and most in￾person interviews. As a result, the majority of stakeholder interviews took place virtually. Interviews with 
detained youth in Guyana and St. Lucia were conducted in-person by local researchers.5 In St. Kitts and 
Nevis, the team was unable to access detained youth owing to a spike in COVID-19 cases. The research 
team attempted to interview youth virtually, but the facilities were unable to provide the necessary 
accommodations. In the Limitations section, we discuss the advantages and disadvantages of relying on 
5 At the time of our study, COVID rates were exceedingly low in these two countries, and most workplaces and community 
events were operating without restrictions. Nevertheless, we took extensive measures to ensure these in-person interviews 
could be done safely. Researchers received COVID tests prior to arrival at detention facilities, wore masks throughout their 
visit, and conducted all interviews outside or in well-ventilated indoor spaces. 
16 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
virtual platforms for most interviews as well as the implications of not being able to access youth in 
detention in St. Kitts and Nevis. 
Data collection began in late April 2021 and lasted through June 2021. 
In Guyana, the research team spoke with:
● 23 government officials, probation officers, detention facility staff, judges, and court officials
● 6 youth in detention
● 10 youth on probation
In addition, the research team visited the following sites in-person: The New Opportunity Corps (NOC), 
the Sophia Detention Center, and the New Amsterdam Probation Department. 
In St. Lucia, the research team spoke with:
● 29 government officials, probation officers, detention facility staff, judges, and court officials
● 6 youth in detention
● 4youth on probation
In addition, the research team visited the following sites in-person: The Boys’ Training Center (BTC) and 
Bordelais Correctional Facility. 
In St. Kitts and Nevis, the research team spoke with:
● 15 government officials, probation officers, detention facility staff, judges, and court officials
● 0 youth in detention
● 5 youth on probation
The research team in St. Kitts and Nevis did not conduct any in-person interviews or site visits due to 
the incidence of community spread of COVID-19. 
The research team interviewed both high and low-level officials across the juvenile justice sector. The 
team covered multiple regions in each of the three countries. The interview protocol covered a range of 
topics, including legal compliance with the juvenile justice legislation, inter- and intra-agency cooperation, 
diversion and alternative sentencing practices, detention facility conditions, and reintegration services. 
Although the research team followed a protocol, the semi-structured nature of the interview allowed 
interviewers to follow alternative lines of inquiry and prompts when necessary. 
Prior to interviews, researchers obtained verbal informed consent and assured participants that 
personally identifiable information would be kept confidential. To protect participants’ confidentiality, 
job titles and places of employment are omitted when presenting direct quotes in this study. 
In addition to the qualitative interviews conducted for this study, the research team reviewed relevant 
legislation, policy documents, and the grey literature on juvenile justice reforms in the Eastern and 
Southern Caribbean. 
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LIMITATIONS
Our study comes with several important limitations. First, because we rely primarily on open-ended 
interview questions rather than close-ended questions, it is difficult to make precise, quantified 
comparisons across time. This design decision was deliberate, to enable the research team to capture 
the complexities and nuances of implementing comprehensive juvenile justice reform, but it does come 
at a cost. In lieu of a quantified assessment of progress on a narrow set of close-ended metrics, we offer 
a holistic assessment that captures the unique challenges that have emerged within each country over 
time. 
A second limitation that applies to the endline study is that most interviews were conducted virtually 
rather than in-person due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Survey methodology generally places a premium 
on in-person interviewing, because it enables the interviewer to establish a rapport with the respondent 
that facilitates information sharing and truthfulness. However, despite our initial concerns and prior 
expectations, we found that the virtual interview format performed well in terms of building rapport and 
allowing for honest and substantive conversations about progress (or lack thereof) towards juvenile 
justice reform. Contrary to what would be expected if rapport were weak, we found that respondents 
were forthright and offered many critical perspectives on progress within their own agency and in 
adjacent agencies. The virtual interview format also provided some notable advantages over in-person 
interviewing. For example, the virtual format allowed the team to spread out interviews over a longer 
period of time (rather than trying to squeeze interviews into a two-week country visit). This gave the 
team more time to prepare for interviews and to update the protocol in light of emerging themes and 
findings. 
A third limitation to this study is that we were not able to access youth in detention in St. Kitts and 
Nevis due to COVID-19 related restrictions. As a result, we are unable to affirmatively verify the 
statements of detention facility officials about conditions within their facilities. We were, however, able 
to cross-reference their statements with those of more neutral actors, such as lawyers of defendants, 
court officials, and members of the child justice committees. Overall, we feel confident about the 
accuracy of our findings on detention facilities in St. Kitts and Nevis, though they should be interpreted 
with some caution and ideally be verified once COVID-19 restrictions are lifted. 
A fourth limitation to this study was the sampling methodology for youth on probation interviews.
Because there was no available sampling frame of youth being supervised on probation in any of the 
countries, our team had to rely on a convenience sampling approach where probation officers provided 
names of youth willing to participate in these conversations. While we indicated to officers our goal to 
speak with a range of youth, supervised by different officers and with varied experiences within the 
juvenile justice system, ultimately, we had little control over the names we were provided. However, the 
youth we spoke to still provided critical perspectives on their experiences within the system. 
Our study has also been descoped since the outset of this study in 2016. Our original study design 
involved complementing the qualitative data in this report with large-N quantitative data on justice￾involved juveniles. However, administrative records on juveniles in conflict with the law proved difficult 
to access due to incomplete databases, country-specific legal requirements, and some level of hesitation 
on behalf of country officials. Ultimately, we were only able to access administrative records for Guyana. 
Using these data, we published a report measuring the degree to which juveniles who came in conflict 
with the law have recidivated or become successfully reintegrated into their communities (Barnes-
18 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
Ceeney et al, 2021). This report is cited throughout the Guyana section of the report. However, we 
were unable to provide this complementary analysis for the St. Lucia and St. Kitts and Nevis sections of 
this report. 
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GUYANA 
BACKGROUND ON JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN GUYANA 
At the heart of Guyana’s juvenile justice reform process is the Juvenile Justice Act of 2018. In the 
broadest sense, the act stipulates that juvenile justice policy should “further the wellbeing of juveniles” 
by advancing their rehabilitation, education, and reintegration.6
The act seeks to accomplish this through several important measures. First, the act raises the age of 
criminal responsibility from ten years old to 14 years old and narrows the definition of juvenile to an 
individual between the ages of 14 and 18 years old. The act includes the presumption that no child under 
the age of 14 shall be capable of committing an offense, unless the principle of doli incapax can be 
rebutted. If the presumption is not rebutted, children under the age of 14 must be referred to the 
Childcare and Protection Agency and charges must be withdrawn.
Second, the reform decriminalizes “wandering,” a status offense that allows for the detention of youth 
left unsupervised in public spaces. Wandering was previously one of the most common charges leading 
to detention and a major concern raised at baseline. As one stakeholder commented in 2019:
“If a child runs away from home, as ludicrous as it was, the police could charge him and send 
them into the juvenile justice system. That happened for decades. But, [with] the new law now, 
that’s one of the positive outcomes, because I was at Holding Center a few weeks ago and there 
were no charges being laid for wandering.”
Third, the legislation creates a Children’s Court in Georgetown, which opened in October of 2018. The 
children’s courtroom is separated from the criminal court, and specific magistrates are assigned 
responsibility for handling juvenile cases. By segregating juveniles from adults, the Children’s Court 
sought to give all parties the clear understanding that the justice system must treat children in conflict 
with the law differently than adults. However, juveniles charged with serious violent crimes (murder, 
manslaughter, sexual offenses, etc.) are still committed to the high court, so the ability for juvenile 
offenders to access a reformed court process is limited to those with misdemeanor offenses. 
Fourth, the act exempts children and juveniles from being sentenced to death7 or imprisonment,8 and 
when the juvenile is found guilty, this finding is not documented in their record as a conviction.9 The 
court’s response to a young person’s offending should be meaningful and proportionate, while 
recognizing the young person’s “greater dependency and reduced level of maturity.”10 Detention should 
only be used “as a last resort” and should be “safe, fair, and humane.”11 Furthermore, if under the age of 
6 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part I, 3(b)ii) 
7 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VI, 38(4))
8 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VI, 41) 
9 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VI, 42)
10 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part I, 3(b)iii) 
11 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VIII, 71 (1)(a))
20 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
18, the young person should be held “separate and apart from any adult who is detained or held in 
custody.”12 Additionally, periods of custody should be served in an “open residential facility.”13
Fifth, the act encourages diversion. The Juvenile Justice Act of 2018 defines diversion as “the diversion of 
a juvenile away from formal court procedures to informal court procedures.”14 Diversion measures may 
include an oral or written apology, placement under the supervision and guidance of the Childcare and 
Protection Agency, referral to counseling or therapy, compulsory attendance at an educational or 
vocational establishment, restitution, community service, or compensation to a specified victim. 
Diversion options cannot be used if the young person either denies committing the offense or wishes 
that the matter be dealt with by the court. The young person’s successful completion of the diversionary 
option will result in charges being dropped. Previous completion of a diversionary option or a previous 
conviction does not preclude the young person from receiving diversion again.15 
Sixth, the Juvenile Justice Act of 2018 establishes a Juvenile Justice Committee comprised of nine people. 
These include a Chairperson, a Deputy Chairperson, an attorney-at-law, a retired probation officer who 
previously served in a senior capacity, a retired head of a vocational institution, and four other people 
with “skills, knowledge, experience, and training in matters relating to juveniles, sociology, social work, 
and psychology.”16 The Juvenile Justice Committee appoints juvenile justice facilities’ staff and will be 
responsible for hearing complaints from incarcerated juveniles, as well as initiating investigations and 
taking appropriate actions based on the recommendations of investigations. 
In summary, the passage of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2018 represents a significant milestone in Guyana’s 
juvenile justice reform process, because it codifies in law a vision for a juvenile justice system centered 
around rehabilitation rather than punishment. However, as any legal scholar well knows, the de jure
vision does not necessarily translate to de facto conditions on the ground. Indeed, a recent quantitative 
survey of justice-involved youth in Guyana found that an alarming proportion of the justice-involved 
juveniles (32 percent) experienced police brutality at the hands of the police. It also found that 
employment and educational opportunities for justice-involved youth continue to be limited, and that 
current reforms have thus far failed to reduce recidivism, which remains at very high levels (Barnes￾Ceeney et al, 2021).
This report complements the survey, by delving into the details of how the act has been implemented 
and highlighting where progress has been made, as well as where critical elements remain to be 
implemented. 
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION 
The Juvenile Justice Act provides clear and precise instructions for how juvenile cases should be 
handled. Within 24 hours of apprehension, the police must give written notice to the parents and/or 
guardians of the child. Also within 24 hours of apprehension, the police must contact the Childcare and 
Protection Agency (CPA) to request a pre-charge report that will assess the child’s home environment, 
12 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VIII, 72)
13 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VI, 43(k)
14 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Cap. 1:01)
15 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part I, 5(2)(a))
16 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VIII, 82(3))
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previous criminal involvement, and suitability for diversion. With the pre-charge report in hand, the 
police must submit the case to the Directorate of Public Prosecutions (DPP). The DPP has three 
options: it may recommend the case to the Juvenile Justice Department for diversion; it may 
recommend that the child be placed under the care of CPA; or it may recommend that the case 
proceed to the Magistrate’s court for charges to be laid. If the case is to proceed to court, then the 
Probation and Social Services Department must first complete and submit a probation report.
As is clear, the workflow laid out in the Juvenile Justice Act requires close coordination and cooperation 
across numerous agencies. At baseline, such coordination was noted as a major struggle. Coordination 
improved modestly at midline with the establishment of the Department of Juvenile Justice and the 
formation of an interagency working group involving staff from the USAID-supported CFYR program, 
the police, magistrates, the Childcare and Protection Agency, the Department of Social Services, and key 
voluntary organizations. 
However, our interviews during the endline study made clear that such progress has stalled. The most 
important friction point is how the police handle juvenile cases. As one stakeholder described:
“Our main challenge with juvenile justice at the moment is at the level of the police. Most police 
officers are not aware of the processes that need to be followed when interacting with juveniles; 
they’re not using the system. There are significant cases that do not go into the system and are 
not handled appropriately. The act makes clear that any case involving a child should come to 
Childcare and Protection Agency for a pre-charge assessment; this is not happening regularly, 
especially outside of Georgetown.” 
Stakeholders also expressed disappointment in the police’s failure to coordinate with the appropriate 
agencies:
“By virtue of the act, the structure is in place for proper coordination, but the follow-through is 
not there. Sometimes the police send cases to the DPP with no probation report. Other times, 
they send the case directly to the court, only for us to realize that it didn’t go through any of the 
channels. And then we have to send the case back through the whole process: childcare and 
protection, probation, pre-charge assessments, everything. I think the police need training to follow 
step by step what they have to do. They need a lot more coaching.” 
Even the police readily acknowledged their performance shortfalls. As one individual noted:
“The biggest challenge we face is not enough training as it relates to juvenile cases. Juvenile issues
are not covered in basic police training, so many of us are not familiar with how to handle these 
cases. Some of the biggest training gaps are with respect to how to conduct an investigation 
involving juveniles, how to interview them, how to detain them, and when to take the cases to the 
DPP in accordance with appropriate procedures.”
Beyond the police’s inability to effectively coordinate with key juvenile justice agencies, another 
coordination area where progress has not been achieved since baseline or midline is in the DPP’s 
22 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
clearing of cases in a timely manner.17 At the time of our interviews in May 2021, the DPP was working 
through cases that occurred in 2017. As a result of these long and excessive delays within the DPP, 
juveniles at the Sophia Detention Center have become accustomed to spending years on remand, often 
“aging out” and moving on to adult detention facilities before their cases are heard in court. Meanwhile, 
juveniles miss important developmental milestones and experiences while awaiting their court date. The 
problem according to respondents is that investigators at the police and DPP take an exceedingly long 
time to investigate cases; meanwhile, neither the courts nor any of the agencies charged with advocating 
for juveniles have been successful in pushing for cases to be heard in a timelier manner. Moreover, there 
is no policy within the DPP for prioritizing juvenile cases over adults. 
An important point of progress towards improved coordination is the work of the Childcare and 
Protection Agency. Leadership within the agency has standardized forms procedures for how and when 
to coordinate with other agencies; these procedures were institutionalized in the form of flowcharts 
disseminated widely among agency staff and with our research team. Speaking about coordination with 
the Childcare and Protection Agency, one respondent remarked:
“They [the CPA] are always there when we need support, especially when it comes to doing 
interviews with family members; The CPA is just a phone call away at any moment, and they’re 
in touch on a weekly or daily basis.”
DIVERSION, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, AND PROBATION 
SERVICES
There remains a critical need for formal pre-trial diversion and alternative sentencing options such as 
vocational training, drug counseling, community service, and restitution to victims.18 Progress on this 
front has improved little since the midline assessment in 2019 or the baseline assessment in 2017. As 
was the case at midline and baseline, the Department of Juvenile Justice in the Ministry of Public 
Security, which has primary responsibility for developing and accrediting diversion programs, still does 
not have a dedicated budget. As a result, the department has yet to formally accredit a diversion or 
alternative sentencing program. 
This situation gives the DPP, the Magistrate’s Court, and the Children’s Court in Georgetown few 
options for diversion and alternative sentencing. In terms of pre-trial diversion, the most common 
approach is for juveniles to submit to voluntary supervision by the Department of Probation. Similarly, in 
terms of alternative sentencing, Magistrates may sentence adjudicated juveniles to probation in lieu of a 
custodial sentence. In effect, probation officers have continued to serve as a “last resort” form of 
diversion and alternative sentencing, as they did at baseline and midline. As was the case at baseline and 
17 Note that the DPP only handles the most serious cases that move forward with prosecution. Although exact numbers are 
not available, it is believed that the majority of cases do not make it to the DPP, and instead are dismissed or handled through 
diversion programs, as described below. 
18 We use the term “formal pre-trial diversion” to refer to diversion programs that have been vetted and accredited by the 
Department of Juvenile Justice, and which are currently “up and running” with regular beneficiaries and reliable funding. We use 
the term “informal pre-trial diversion programs” to refer to the various ways that police officers, probation officers, court 
officials, and juvenile justice stakeholders work together in a somewhat ad hoc manner to design and implement case plans 
involving diversion through programs and regiments that are not formally accredited by the Department of Juvenile Justice. 
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 23
midline, accredited community service programs, drug rehabilitation programs, or vocational education 
programs dedicated to juvenile offenders are much needed. 
An important area of progress is that the Children’s Court in Georgetown has become institutionalized, 
and works effectively within its power to promote alternative sentencing options and ensure that 
juveniles are educated and rehabilitated in preparation for reintegration into society. However, the 
Children’s Court in Georgetown is not above the broader, resource-constrained context in which it 
operates, and its effectiveness is hampered by the lack of formal diversion and alternative sentencing 
programs. Further, there is a need to decentralize the services of the Children’s Court by expanding 
into rural areas outside of Georgetown.
In many of the diversion and alternative sentencing cases we learned about through our interviews, 
probation officers worked tirelessly to closely monitor, mentor, and advocate for the juveniles assigned 
to their supervision. Many hosted weekly or bi-weekly counseling sessions, which continued during the 
COVID-19 pandemic in virtual form. Probation officers also played a critical role in referring youth to 
available services, such as the USAID-funded Community, Faith, and Youth Resilience (CFYR) program 
or the Youth Empowerment Services (YES) program, which ended in November 2020. 
However, despite the important and commendable role of individual officers, challenges remain within 
the Department of Probation. Some officers continue to report having to use their own money to fund 
their supervision activities. This was a problem at baseline and midline that continues to present. 
Another problem is limited oversight of individual officers and cases by leadership within the 
Department of Probation. Our interviews revealed that while some probation officers are active and 
motivated, others routinely fail to adequately supervise and mentor youth under their purview, a sign 
that leadership within the Department of Probation is not effectively monitoring the performance of 
probation officers. In speaking with juveniles under supervision, we found significant variation in terms of 
how frequently they were contacted by their probation officer (despite these youth having otherwise 
similar circumstances, in terms of age, background, and criminal history). Some reported meeting with
their probation officer on a weekly basis, while others reported that they hadn’t heard from their 
probation officer “for the longest time.” Others said that they had fallen out of touch with their 
probation officer since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic.
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a profound impact on how juveniles experience probation. Probation 
officers are no longer able to visit in person with juveniles under their supervision on a regular basis. 
Instead, they rely on phone calls to coordinate care, check in with juveniles and their parents, and track 
progress against the case plan. Another critical impact of the pandemic is that it has become harder for 
probation officers to find services, jobs, training, and other resources for those under their supervision. 
These resources were scarce before the pandemic and have become scarcer still since the pandemic 
took hold.
Another challenge that came to light during our interviews is that the Juvenile Justice Act is not clear on 
what should happen if the youth under supervision violates the terms of their supervision. Because the 
Act is unclear on this point, probation officers do not have the leverage to ensure young people comply 
with the terms of their probation and follow through with the activities designed to help them 
reintegrate. The result is that many young people fail to attend counseling sessions, group therapy 
meetings, or abide by the terms of their curfew. 
24 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
Informal forms of pre-trial diversion at the police-station level, including warnings and mediation 
facilitated by individual police officers, are common and continue at a rate similar to levels at baseline 
and midline. The Cops & Faith initiative, wherein officers involve faith leaders to help counsel troubled 
youth, also remains in place and continues to play an important role in diverting youth from the criminal 
justice system. 
DETENTION FACILITIES
Guyana has two youth detention facilities: the Sophia Detention Center (SDC), and the New 
Opportunity Corps (NOC). As of May 2021, there were 18 youth in detention at SDC and only one 
youth at the NOC. At midline, there were 17 and 16 juveniles at SDC and NOC, respectively, as shown 
in Table 2. Collectively, these numbers constitute a large and substantial decrease in the number of 
youth housed in these facilities since the passage of the Juvenile Justice Act in 2018. There is less of a 
consensus, however, on the reasons for this decline. Encouragingly, some attributed the decline to a 
greater focus on diversion and alternative sentencing, and a generally less punitive culture within the 
juvenile justice system. Others attributed the decline not to a change in culture but to the limits within 
the act on when youth can be detained. As one stakeholder described:
“[The reason for the decline in youth detained] is not so much that the mindset has changed 
among the police and courts, as much as the Juvenile Justice Act has been put in place and now 
limits how and under what conditions they can use detention.” 
The most commonly cited limit to when youth can be detained is the decriminalization of the offense of 
wandering, a status offense that allows for the detention of youth left unsupervised in public spaces (e.g. 
youth who have run away from home). This status offense was previously one of the most common 
charges resulting in detention and a major concern raised at baseline and midline. 
Whether because of a change in culture or binding constraints imposed by the act, both explanations 
are complementary and constitute an encouraging development toward a less punitive juvenile justice 
system. 
Table 2: Juveniles in detention in Guyana
BASELINE (2017) MIDLINE (2019) ENDLINE (2021)
Males Females Males Females Males Females
New Opportunities Corps 40 41 15 1 1 0 
Sophia Detention Center 15 10 16 1 18 0 
Timehri Prison 16 0 NA 0 0 0 
Total 71 51 31 2 19 0 
But the news is not all positive on this front. For starters, although none of the informants interviewed 
in this study mentioned COVID-19 as an explanation for the decline in the number of youth in 
detention, this factor cannot be ruled out entirely. Another issue is in regard to the NOC, Guyana’s 
only open facility for youth under custodial sentences, which housed only one person as of May 2021. 
Located on a sprawling, rural campus two hours outside of Georgetown, it offers a wide range of 
facilities, classroom spaces, and open space that is ideally suited for rehabilitation and reintegration 
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 25
programming. At midline, the facility offered remedial and vocational training on agriculture, handicraft, 
woodworking, information technology, electrical, sports, and church services. Our research team also 
noted that its presence outside of Georgetown exposed youth to a new environment far removed from 
that which led them into criminality. However, the distance from home also makes it challenging for 
families to visit their children and maintain relationships.
And yet despite all its potential, the NOC is woefully underutilized. More than one respondent indicated 
that the underutilization of this state-of-the-art facility was due to politics and links to the recent change 
in administration, specifically the reluctance of the current administration to continue a project initiated 
by its predecessor. Needless to say, successful implementation of juvenile justice reform requires that 
past, present, and future administrations work collaboratively to institute reforms and maintain 
continuity over time.
During the midline assessment, the research team visited Timehri prison, which houses adult prisoners, 
to find out if juveniles under the age of 18 were being housed in that facility, as there were during the 
baseline study in 2017. Encouragingly, the midline study found that no youth were detained at Timehri 
prison at the time of data collection. Although we were not able to visit Timehri again at endline due to 
COVID-19 restrictions, none of the informants we spoke with were aware of youth in detention at 
adult facilities.
COVID-19 RESTRICTIONS AND IMPACTS
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a profound impact throughout the juvenile justice system, but 
nowhere more so than in how juveniles experience life in detention. These impacts are felt from the 
moment juveniles enter the detention facilities, where new entrants are required to quarantine for 14 
days in isolation prior to joining the general population. A more humane and rehabilitative approach 
would be to test new entrants for COVID-19 and shorten the quarantine period to seven or three days 
accordingly.
Beyond juveniles having to quarantine in isolation, the implementation of fledgling vocational education 
and rehabilitation programs has been halted as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, as we discuss in 
more detail later in this section. Given that successful rehabilitation requires programming throughout a 
juvenile’s time in detention, the adverse effects of the pandemic on recidivism, reintegration, and youth 
employment are likely to be felt for years to come. 
Another area where COVID-19 has had a major impact is in the protocols for visitors to the facilities. 
This includes both family visits to detained juveniles, as well as visits from juvenile advocates at the 
Rights of the Child Commission – Guyana (RCC). Whereas before the pandemic, RCC representatives 
visited the Sophia Detention Center without prior approval or warning, their visits are now required to 
be scheduled in advance with SDC officials, weakening the RCC’s essential oversight role. In terms of 
family visits, these are no longer occurring; instead, juveniles rely on detention facility officials to lend 
their personal phones for family calls. We discuss the issues with this arrangement and its likely 
consequences for juvenile rehabilitation and reintegration below.
ACCESS TO MEDICAL, MENTAL HEALTH, AND FAMILY SUPPORT
Juveniles in detention at the Sophia Detention Center receive a health screening on arrival. Though there 
is no on-site nurse or doctor, youth in detention have access to medical care through local clinics located 
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nearby. During our interviews, neither youth in detention, SDC staff, nor any other stakeholder 
complained of inadequate medical care. This pattern of adequate medical care is consistent with conditions 
at baseline and midline.
International standards dictate that juveniles in detention should be given access to mental health 
counseling when needed. None of the youth we spoke with while in detention were receiving counseling 
or other forms of mental health care. Nor was this reported to be a part of the screening process that 
youth receive at intake. Given their troubled upbringing and criminal history, it is likely that there are 
youth with mental health conditions that are not currently being adequately addressed. This situation has 
not improved since our baseline assessment in 2017.
The Juvenile Justice Act dictates that a juvenile who is sentenced to custody is entitled to regular contact 
with parents or other family members. However, our interviews with juveniles in detention indicate that 
this is not always the case. At SDC, youth routinely complained that depending on the officer in charge, 
family visits may be denied without cause or notice. As one juvenile explained:
“Every Friday we get a phone call [to our families]. I hear my grandmother is coming today.
Depending on the Police shift, I will get to see her because some of the Police do not like you and 
then don’t let you see her … sometimes I get to see my grandmother when she comes, and 
sometimes, I don’t get to see her.”
The revocation of visitation privileges without cause, advance notice, or approval from detention facility 
administrators is a clear violation of juveniles’ rights under the Juvenile Justice Act, one that causes undue 
hardship to juveniles in detention and their families. As was the case at midline, there is an urgent need to 
ensure young people’s contact with, and access to, their families.
PROGRAMMING AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 
The Juvenile Justice Act enshrines in law that the purpose of juvenile custody and supervision is to 
expose juveniles to programs that assist them to be rehabilitated, educated, and reintegrated into their 
communities. However, although the NOC is well-equipped to meet this vision, it is not being used to 
its potential. This development represents a step backwards from conditions at midline, when there 
were 16 juveniles benefiting from the services of the NOC.
Instead, the vast majority of juveniles in custody are housed at the Sophia Detention Center, which is a 
much smaller facility and has only limited services. Whereas the NOC population declined from 16 
residents to one between midline and endline, the SDC population has increased by two, from 16 to 18
(see Table 2). Residents of this facility are on remand, waiting for their cases to be heard in court. 
At midline, we reported that residents had access to occasional sports and classes, but more limited 
educational opportunities compared to the general population. At endline, the situation remains much 
the same. Residents described a daily routine with limited structure and extensive amounts of idle time. 
A typical day starts with bathing and cleaning of the dormitory, followed by school classes in the 
morning. In the afternoon, juveniles are sometimes allowed to play football or other sports outside, but 
more often are restricted to idle time in their dormitories. Class time is often spent watching non￾educational movies, rather than receiving instruction.
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The persistent need for improved rehabilitation services at Sophia Detention Facilities was corroborated 
by interviews with adult stakeholders familiar with the facility, who noted the need for greater structure 
in the daily routine, dedicated teachers with training in remedial education, and greater access to 
vocational training. As one stakeholder summarized:
“There needs to be more structure in terms of their daily routine. Outdoor activities need to be 
improved.… Everything must look towards reform. From the time they get up, to the time they 
go to bed, there must be structure oriented toward rehabilitation. That’s not happening at the 
moment.”
PHYSICAL SPACE 
Our interviews revealed numerous deficiencies to the physical space at the Sophia Detention Center. 
The chief complaint was that its prison-like construction is fundamentally at odds with the goal of 
rehabilitation. The presence of cells with bars and surveillance cameras sends the message that youth 
are prisoners, rather than a vulnerable population in need of rehabilitation.
Another important issue that arose was the security implications of the dormitory-style living, in which 
juveniles as young as 14 years old are housed with youth as old as 17 years old. This creates an 
environment prone to bullying and physical abuse of younger juveniles.
Neither the prison-like appearance nor the dormitory-style living conditions have improved since the 
midline study in 2019. 
PHYSICAL SECURITY, PUNISHMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
Most juvenile respondents did not report acts of abuse by staff. There is a room for solitary separation, 
which detention facility officials describe as a “cooling off” area, where youth can be separated 
temporarily after a physical altercation, for their own safety. Juveniles describe the solitary separation 
room more plainly, as punishment for fighting. According to one youth we spoke to, three to four days 
in solitary separation is a standard punishment for fighting. Another juvenile reports the solitary 
confinement cell was used as a place to quarantine upon arrival, due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The more limited use of solitary separation represents an improvement from the state of affairs at 
midline, when solitary confinement was used regularly as punishment for bad behavior for periods as 
long as 30 days. Stakeholders attributed this improvement to leadership within the Ministry of Home 
Affairs, which made clear to facility administrators that conditions for children in detention must adhere 
to international standards.
Although the majority of stakeholders and juveniles we spoke with denied knowledge of physical abuse 
by facility staff, there was one reported incident of abuse by a police officer assigned to the facility. This 
officer was known for her ill-temper and for slapping juveniles without provocation. She would also 
routinely revoke privileges without cause. Numerous complaints were lodged against this officer, by 
civilian facility staff and by juveniles in detention, and she was ultimately removed from her position. 
However, the experience highlights the pitfalls of relying on police officers without training in 
corrections or juvenile matters to guard the detention center. 
REINTEGRATION
A recent quantitative survey of justice-involved youth in Guyana found that current reforms have thus far 
failed to effectively reduce recidivism: 36 percent of respondents were rearrested or reappeared in court 
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and 65 percent admitted to committing a crime since they were released or their original case was settled 
(Barnes-Ceeney et al., 2021). It also found that employment and educational opportunities for justice￾involved youth continue to be limited; only 47 percent of respondents were either employed (36 percent) 
or in school (13 percent).
In the field of juvenile rehabilitation, widely accepted best practices dictate that reintegration planning 
starts at the outset of a case, long before a juvenile is released. Within detention facilities, juveniles should 
be given family conferencing and access to high-quality education, counseling, and extra-curricular planning. 
Also crucial, is that a reintegration plan be developed while they are still in the facility, which should include 
concrete plans for securing a job, school, or vocational training, in addition to community support and 
reintegration. 
Yet, our interviews suggest that robust 
reintegration plans are not consistently developed. 
Instead, reintegration is done on an ad hoc basis, 
with little concrete planning. 
Apart from a lack of robust advance planning for 
reintegration, our interviews revealed three main 
challenges to effective reintegration, all of which 
remain unchanged since midline. First, there 
continues to be a near-total lack of formal re-entry 
or reintegration programs for juveniles released 
from detention. The problem starts with the limited number of vocational education programs available 
to those in detention at SDC and NOC, which leaves residents ill-equipped to productively re-enter 
society. The COVID-19 pandemic appears to have only made matters worse by putting a stop to the 
fledgling vocational education programs that were in operation at SDC prior to the pandemic. The 
problem continues after release from detention due to the dearth of vocational training, counseling, 
apprenticeships, and other services for recently released juveniles.
The second challenge to more effective reintegration services is the lack of a halfway house for juveniles 
once they leave the SDC. Many juveniles in conflict with the law come from unstable home environments 
that are not conducive to successful reintegration. Meanwhile, the Childcare and Protection Agency is not 
positioned to place these individuals in foster care, because they’ve been in conflict with the law. The 
result is that many youth end up staying in SDC for longer than necessary, because the facility serves as 
the only viable option. Conversely, youth may be released into the community and back into the same 
unstable home environment that contributed to their detention in the first place.
These challenges are well-summarized by a young person we spoke with, who had bi-weekly calls with his 
probation officer, but was not otherwise receiving any services. When asked what changes he would make 
to probation if he were in charge, the juvenile responded:
“I would make sure that young people on probation get assistance with jobs and a kind of home 
because where lots of us live is bad and leads to us getting into bad activities.”
A 2019 survey of justice-involved juveniles in Guyana 
found:
• 36 percent were rearrested or reappeared in 
court after their initial release or case 
settlement
• 65 percent admitted to committing a crime 
since their initial release or case settlement
• Only 47 percent were employed or in school
Source: Barnes-Ceeney et al. (2021)
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The final challenge identified in our interviews relates to the critical work of the Department of Probation 
in linking juveniles to re-entry services and ensuring that they duly enroll in those services as a condition 
of their probation. One important challenge to the department’s ability to fill this role is weak oversight 
of probation officials by leadership within the Department of Probation. Our interviews with key 
stakeholders in this space, as well as with youth on probation, indicated wide variation in the degree to 
which probation officers actively monitored and counseled their probationers. It was reported to us by a 
knowledgeable stakeholder that re-entry/aftercare plans are seldom developed for youth leaving 
detention, even though this responsibility falls under the Department of Probation. 
In addition to inadequate oversight and management of probation officers, a critical problem is that 
probation officers have few means to sanction probationers for failure to comply with the terms of their 
probation. As one stakeholder described:
“Juveniles now know that there is no proper monitoring to ensure they adhere to the terms of 
their probation. So they end up missing out on the services that would help them reintegrate, and 
instead they continue recidivating.” 
Moving forward, it will be important to ensure that probation officers actively monitor and advocate for 
the juveniles under their supervision and that they have the leverage to ensure those juveniles comply 
with the terms of their probation. Equally important is the need to create formal re-entry and reintegration 
programs to address the root causes of their delinquency and reduce recidivism.
SUMMARY
The Government of Guyana has made uneven progress towards reforming its juvenile justice system 
since our midline assessment in 2019. There has been progress towards reducing the number of 
juveniles held in detention, with 40 percent fewer juveniles held in detention in 2021 compared with 
2019. However, those that are in detention continue to face a lack of access to high-quality education, 
counseling, and extra-curricular activities. 
Progress towards ensuring smooth coordination across agencies remains mixed. On the one hand, the 
Childcare and Protection Agency has made considerable progress towards standardizing the procedures 
for handling juvenile cases and towards preparing pre-charge reports for the Courts, which are critical 
to contextualizing the root causes leading to a juvenile’s offense and laying the foundation for more 
lenient, alternative sentencing options. On the other hand, the police, who serve as the primary entry
point into the justice system, remain unfamiliar with the protocols and procedures for handling juvenile 
cases. Limited coordination between the police, the DPP, the Courts, and the Juvenile Justice Board has 
resulted in excessive delays in processing cases and prolonged pre-trial detention for many juveniles.
In terms of diversion and alternative sentencing, little progress has been made towards establishing 
accredited programs; instead, diversion and alternative sentencing plans and protocols are developed on 
a case-by-case basis and are usually implemented by probation officers. However, due to limited 
oversight within the Probation and Social Services Department, the quality of probation services that 
juveniles receive is strongly dependent on whether they happen to be assigned to an officer that is 
intrinsically motivated to help them through coaching, counseling, and reintegration assistance.
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Rehabilitation and reintegration remain plagued by a lack of advanced planning prior to juvenile’s release 
from detention, and there remains a critical need for dedicated rehabilitation programs, job assistance, 
and halfway housing. 
Although challenges remain in all these areas, there does appear to be a widespread consensus among 
key stakeholders on the importance of juvenile justice reform and the need for a more restorative 
system. It appears that the will for reform exists, even if implementation remains a work in progress.
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ST. LUCIA 
BACKGROUND ON REFORMS IN ST. LUCIA 
St. Lucia’s Child Justice Act and the Child Care, Protection, and Adoption Act were passed in 
November 2018. The CJA represents a significant milestone in juvenile justice reform, providing a clear 
framework for juvenile justice reforms.
The CJA identifies all young people under the age of 18 as children, whereas previously only young 
people under the age of 15 received such a designation. The CJA of 2018 emphasizes that the safety, 
welfare, and wellbeing of children should be the paramount consideration. Children under the age of 12 
who are alleged to have committed an offense should not be apprehended by the police. Instead, the 
child should be referred to a probation officer and, when necessary, taken to a place of safety. The CJA 
of 2018 stipulates that a child in conflict with the law should be addressed in a manner appropriate to his 
or her age, maturity, and intellectual abilities, and as far as possible be afforded the opportunity to 
respond before significant decisions are made. The participation of parents and relatives is encouraged, 
first in terms of assisting their child through the legal process, as well as involvement in decision-making 
processes where possible. The act also stipulates that children in conflict with the law should not be 
treated more severely than adults convicted of similar offenses under similar circumstances. 
According to the act, detention should be used as the last resort, with a preference for release to a 
parent or appropriate adult, bail, or release on one’s own recognizance. If a child is sentenced to attend 
a secure residential facility, the CJA of 2018 stipulates that he or she cannot be held in a correctional 
facility or police custody. Under the act, children are granted “equal access to available services,”19 when 
needed, in the areas of family and educational support, and employment opportunities if aged between 
16 and 18 years old. If detention is necessary, the least restrictive type of detention “appropriate to the 
child and the offense should be selected.”20 The CJA of 2018 prohibits sentences of life imprisonment, 
capital punishment, or any form of corporal punishment for children. Sentences should “encourage the 
child to understand the implications of and be accountable for the harm caused.”21 Sentencing options 
should be “individualized,” proportionate to the circumstances surrounding the offense, and promote 
the child’s reintegration. Any supervision, guidance, treatment, or service provided during the sentence 
should be in service to the child’s rehabilitation and reintegration. 
Instead of sentencing, the act establishes a preference for diversion from the court system. The CJA of 
2018 defines diversion as “the removal of cases of a child in conflict with the law from the formal court 
procedures and the adoption of informal procedures in relation to the child.”22 The act outlines 
procedures and a timeline for probation officers to assess the child and outlines mechanisms for 
diversion. The act calls for a child’s suitability for diversion to be considered through an “Initial Inquiry,” 
to be attended by the child in conflict with the law, the child’s parents, a probation officer, the Director 
of Public Prosecutions, and the victim. The act uses restorative justice language, outlining that the 
purpose of diversion should be about holding the child accountable for any harm caused, facilitating the 
victim’s input on the harm experienced, encouraging physical or symbolic compensation, and promoting 
19 Child Justice Act, 2018, 4(h)
20 Child Justice Act, 2018, 4(j)(iii))
21 Child Justice Act, 2018, 51(1)(a)
22 Child Justice Act, 2018, p. 150
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reconciliation. Three levels of diversionary options with increasing consequences are identified by the 
act. Whether a child receives level one, two, or three diversion will depend upon the nature of the 
offense, the age and developmental needs of the child, the background and abilities of the child, and the 
proportionality of the option balanced against the circumstances of the child. 
According to the act, particular offenses, such as trespassing, assault without grievous bodily harm, 
possession of controlled drugs worth less than XCD 5,000 (US$ 1,850), or theft worth less than XCD 
$5,000, should not result in police apprehension but should result in immediate release of the child.23 In 
addition, the act specifies a number of offenses where the child should not be released from custody. 
These include murder, child destruction, infanticide, manslaughter, rape, treason, burglary, robbery with 
violence or involving the taking of a motor vehicle, indecent assault on a child or indecent assault 
involving the infliction of grievous bodily harm, and drug offenses where the value of the controlled drug 
exceeds XCD 100,000 (US$ 37,000).
The CJA of 2018 identifies three decision-makers involved in juvenile diversion: probation officers, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, and the courts. Although each stakeholder may petition for diversion, 
the Magistrate makes the final determination regarding whether the child should be diverted from the 
system,24 after considering the Director of Public Prosecution’s recommendation and input from 
persons attending the initial inquiry. Once the diversion order is made, the court proceedings are 
postponed. An “assigned officer” then oversees the diversion order, monitoring the child’s compliance.25
When the assigned officer presents the court with a report detailing the child’s successful compliance 
with the order, the child is acquitted of all charges.26 During the diversionary process, the Director of 
Probation is responsible for maintaining a register of all children subjected to diversion.27 
Much progress has been made in the past couple of years to implement various aspects of the CJA in St. 
Lucia, particularly in the areas of diversion and reducing the number of youth being held in detention. 
Certain gaps do persist, especially in terms of institutionalizing diversionary processes, addressing the 
quality of care provided to detained youth, and creating programs aimed at supporting reintegration and 
rehabilitation of youth in the longer term. The remainder of this section discusses these aspects in more 
detail. 
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION 
At midline, though stakeholders generally welcomed the juvenile justice reforms, they were cognizant
that implementation of the CJA of 2018 posed considerable inter and intra-organizational challenges. At 
endline, though coordination challenges persist, the majority of individuals we spoke to noted that there 
is good coordination between various entities involved in juvenile justice service delivery. 
At the national level, there is a Technical Committee that has been set up specifically to look after issues 
related to the JJRP. This committee is co-chaired by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Equity, 
Social Justice, Empowerment, Youth Development, Sports and Local Government (hereafter referred to 
23 Child Justice Act, 2018, 9(2), 13(1) & (2) 
24 Child Justice Act, 2018, 36(1)
25 Child Justice Act, 2018, 74(1) 
26 Child Justice Act, 2018, 74(3) 
27 Child Justice Act, 2018, 76
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as the Ministry of Equity for brevity) and Director of Upton Gardens, and comprised of representatives 
from the Department of Probation and Parole, Boys Training Center, and Human Services. The 
committee typically meets monthly and is tasked with providing oversight to the juvenile justice reform 
process, and serving as a forum for stakeholders to discuss issues they are facing and identify potential 
actions to resolves those issues. For instance, one stakeholder noted that under the CJA, the 
Department of Probation and Parole was required to complete certain forms as part of their 
administrative process, but that those forms had yet to be finalized by the Attorney General’s office. 
The Technical Committee submitted a letter to the AG’s office requesting these forms to be finalized. 
One recommendation of the JJRP that has yet to be implemented is the setting up of a Child Justice 
Management Unit to continue to oversee the reform process after the close of the JJRP. Some 
stakeholders noted that the setting up of this unit is a challenge, given the current resource constraints. 
“[The Child Justice Management Unit] seems to be a tall order for us now in Saint Lucia. Given 
our lack of resources, particularly the funding that this particular unit would require at this time. 
But it's one that is needed tremendously needed here.”
Another stakeholder elaborated further on alternatives that may be pursued in lieu of setting up this 
unit. 
“I know that there was a model put forward in terms of establishing a child justice 
management unit. In my contributions on that discussion, I did highlight again the issue of our 
very limited resources and I was not sure that within this COVID environment, we would have 
been able to set up a unit. However, we can look at what has been proposed as the functions 
of that unit and look at what we're doing currently and see how we can enhance what some 
individuals are doing now -- how we can do things differently to be able to still perform the 
functions that are required. We also spoke about perhaps just having an individual as a focal 
entity within each organization. That would make sure that the conversation keeps going and 
we can provide that holistic support.”
There appears to be willingness to keep the Technical Committee in place even after the close of JJRP in 
June 2021 until this unit can be set up, or for an alternative to be identified. For the reform process to 
sustain, it will be crucial for there either to be a dedicated standalone entity to look after juvenile justice 
matters, or a clearly outlined system for coordination between focal people in each organization. 
At midline, the Initial Inquiry meetings involving the child in conflict with the law, the child’s parents, a 
probation officer, the Director of Public Prosecutions, and the victim, were not yet operational. One 
important point of progress as of endline is that stakeholders report that these Initial Inquiry meetings 
have been initiated to identify if there are measures that can be taken other than taking the youth to 
court (e.g. restorative conferences, supervision orders, youth groups). Prior to sending a youth to the 
Family Court, Probation would have to demonstrate that they explored pre-trial diversion options in 
their pre-sentence reports. One respondent noted a recent example where this pre-trial step had been 
skipped, and the youth’s case was delayed until it could be completed. If a child does end up at the 
Family Court, Initial Inquiry meetings are also conducted in the presence of a Magistrate where 
probation, the prosecutor, and the defense provide their recommendations for the course of action that 
should be taken, after which the Magistrate adjudicates on the matter. 
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One persisting issue in coordination noted by respondents is the perception that the police have yet to 
be integrated into and sufficiently sensitized on the juvenile justice reform process. As indicated in the 
midline report, the inability of police to attend initial sensitization trainings was a consequence of U.S. 
imposition of the Leahy Law. Even now, stakeholders within and outside the police force believe that the 
police have not been adequately trained on the CJA, and the communication protocols that the CJA 
mandates when a child is apprehended. 
“Our police are the first responders and have a very heavy or critical role with respect to the 
Act. However, they were not able to be part of the juvenile justice training because of our Leahy 
Law issues, so we found that the police were really not embracing the Act because they did not 
get the training…. It's not through their fault or anybody else’s, it was the circumstance. So, one 
of the first priorities is to start that training with the police.”
It is worth noting that, as noted at midline, the Royal St. Lucia Police Force, primarily through the 
Community Relations Branch, has continued to employ community policing practices that directly and 
indirectly support juvenile justice objectives. Examples of these activities include school-based sensitization
and awareness programs. 
DIVERSION, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, AND PROBATION 
SERVICES
Over the past two years, St. Lucia has made notable progress towards integrating diversionary 
processes into the juvenile justice system. The most significant achievement noted at endline is that 
youth are being diverted from the system via pre-trial and post-trial diversion mechanisms, which are 
discussed later in the section. 
In terms of formal administrative steps, a diversion working group has been set up consisting of 
representatives from concerned agencies, an inventory of potential diversion programs and options has 
been developed, and a national diversion strategy has been drafted and submitted to the Cabinet for 
approval. Obtaining Cabinet approval for the diversion strategy will be an important step in cementing 
diversion as a juvenile justice process and institutionalizing this crucial element of the reforms. 
While aspects of the formalization of diversion are still in process, stakeholders report that there has 
been progress in terms of accepting diversion as an approach, and in implementing the procedures 
associated with diversion that are outlined in the CJA. As one respondent summarized: 
“In terms of us adopting the diversion approach and people actually going down that route, in 
the last two years we've had significant progress and I could see impact and change in terms of 
the country. We've had our first use of assessment tools for young persons, and we've had 
Initial Inquiries, which we never had in Saint Lucia prior to these two years … in a traditional 
court-based system.”
Regarding assessment tools, probation officers report that they regularly utilize the Structured 
Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY) tool to assess youth. Some noted that they also use the 
Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument (MAYSI-2) or the Juvenile Assessment and Intervention 
System (JAIS) tools. The SAVRY is a structured professional judgment approach to risk assessment that 
predicts a 12- to 18-year-old’s likelihood of violence over the next two years. Also referred to as 
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empirically guided clinical judgment and structured clinical judgment, the risk assessment instrument 
guides the assessor through a checklist of empirically validated risk factors. Using the SAVRY helps to 
focus the evaluator on relevant data to gather during interviews and record reviews so that the final 
judgment, although not statistical, is well informed by the best available research.28 The MAYSI-2 is a 
mental health screening tool used to assess suicide risk, mental health needs, and substance abuse issues 
among 12- to 17-year-olds. The JAIS is a supervision model that incorporates both a gender-specific risk 
assessment and a needs assessment to help identify priority areas of need and recidivism risk and 
provides guidance on supervision strategies.29 For case management, Therascribe is being used by some 
agencies, though a few respondents noted that there have been issues in ensuring consistent use of the 
system and interagency connectivity, similar to the situation at midline. 
As noted in the Interagency Coordination section, Initial Inquiry meetings have been taking place, both 
pre-trial and within the Family Court. Stakeholders report that these meetings are not 100 percent on 
stream yet, but have been happening for the majority of cases involving youth. This is an important 
development since the midline. At midline, no diversion orders were being made by the courts and 
stakeholders noted some informal, police-led, pre-trial diversion efforts. At endline, Probation appears 
to be leading pre-trial diversion processes by collecting necessary information from youth and involved 
stakeholders, and coordinating Initial Inquiry meetings. Post-trial diversion (i.e. alternative sentencing) via 
the Family Court has also been operationalized.30 The CJA lists a variety of options that may be 
recommended in lieu of custodial sentencing. According to individuals we spoke to, by far the most 
common diversion order given by the Court is for Supervision and Guidance. Others that have been 
applied are compulsory school attendance, community service, and formal apologies. Though the Initial 
Inquiry process is meant to be collaborative, with all present stakeholders providing recommendations, 
from the interviews it seems that there is a lot of weight given to recommendations given by Probation. 
Though Magistrates can provide inputs on the design of a specific child’s Supervision and Guidance plan, 
it seems that it is mostly left to Probation to develop the plan for the child once the Court has issued 
the order. At the time the order is issued, the Court would set a date for a progress report to be 
provided by Probation, typically shortly before the diversion order is set to be complete. Regularly 
following up with diverted youth is the responsibility of Probation. Concrete data on the number of 
youth who have been diverted from the juvenile justice system till date was not available at the time of 
writing this report, but the Probation Department reported having six youth on court-ordered 
Supervision and Guidance orders at the time of data collection (i.e. youth on post-trial diversion
orders). 
As probation officers are the ones who speak with the youth, interact with the youth’s family and 
community, and conduct the assessments, this reliance on Probation during this process may be 
warranted and the CJA does indicate that Probation should take the leading role in this. Yet, if Probation 
is to take a leading role in this, they should also be provided sufficient resources and diversion options 
to help ensure that the supervision provided to youth is effective. 
28 Borum & Verhaagen, 2006, p. 75 29 For more information on the MAYSI-2, visit http://www.nysap.us/maysi2/index.html. 
For more information on the JAIS, visit https://www.evidentchange.org/assessment/juvenile-assessment-and-intervention￾system-jais. 30 Throughout this section, we use the term “post-trial diversion” rather than “alternative sentencing” as stakeholders in St. 
Lucia exclusively used the term “diversion” rather than “alternative sentencing” during interviews. 
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As was the case at midline, at the time of data collection there was one designated officer working with 
youth. In addition, the Department has identified three additional officers to support supervision of 
youth, though these individuals also supervise adults. Though it is a positive development that Probation 
now has four officers designated for youth clients, the Department could consider having more than one 
officer dedicated to supervising young people to allow for more focused guidance and rehabilitation, 
which was a suggestion made by multiple respondents. The needs of youth being supervised on 
probation are often different from adults, therefore requiring a different supervision approach. For 
instance, officers supervising youth may need to engage with schools to ensure that youth receive access 
to education, or may need to more intensively interact with parents and guardians to understand and 
help address issues at home that may contribute to risk of recidivism. Having an additional officer who 
exclusively supervises youth could enable that officer to further specialize in youth supervision and to 
develop deeper working relationships with other agencies involved in the rehabilitation of youth. 
On diversion programming, there is a general consensus that there is a lack of sufficient diversion 
programs for youth. A list of existing programs that could potentially be used as diversion programs has 
been developed, and probation officers we spoke with mentioned organizations they commonly liaise
with to provide services to youth, but formal diversion programming is still not in place. From our 
interviews, it seems that the process that probation officers use to design supervision strategies for 
youth who have been diverted is more informal. 31 One respondent summarized the current situation: 
“We use Probation as one of those diversion options basically, and more specifically do 
psychosocial activities and other programs with them. Nothing has been added to the current 
options we have… I cannot safely say there’s any particular diversion program. Probation does 
conferencing. You know, trying to bring the two parties together and trying do some programs 
with them.” 
Probation continues to conduct Anger Replacement Therapy (ART) trainings, as was the case at 
midline. Virtual ART sessions were attempted by Probation during the COVID-19 pandemic, but
were reported to be not as effective. An in-person ART program was also run at BTC during 
the pandemic. Neither ART facilitators nor the youth we spoke to provided any specific 
information on the perceived effectiveness ART. Stakeholders who had participated in ART 
facilitation trainings conducted in St. Kitts and Nevis in 2015 expressed a desire to conduct ART 
sessions on a more regular basis in the future, and to train more individuals involved in the St. 
Lucia juvenile justice system on ART facilitation to expand the roster of trainers. As at midline, 
stakeholders noted logistical challenges to arranging ART programs. In community settings, 
ensuring regular attendance for a 10-week program is a difficult task, and ensuring attendance of 
virtual sessions was noted to be even more difficult. Even at residential facilities like BTC, 
stakeholders remarked that enforcing on-time attendance and completion of required 
homework is difficult. Another challenge noted was the need for coordination between agencies 
to arrange for ART facilitation. ART sessions require at least two to three facilitators and 
currently, most organizations only have one staff member trained in ART facilitation. Therefore, 
31 “Formal diversion programs” are programs that would be officially vetted and recognized by the government as diversion 
options for youth in conflict with the law, with regular beneficiaries, reliable funding, and an established standard operating 
procedure for accepting youth who have been diverted. We use the term “informal” to refer to the various ways that 
probation officers and juvenile justice stakeholders work together in a somewhat ad hoc manner to design and implement case 
plans for youth who have been diverted. 
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organizing ART sessions requires coordination between organizations to ensure facilitator 
availability. If at least two individuals could be training in ART facilitation at key organizations 
(like BTC, Probation, Bordelais), this could alleviate some of the logistical burden. 
In addition to ART, Probation conducts psychosocial programs (e.g. on emotional intelligence, 
social skills), substance abuse sessions, critical thinking sessions, sexual education programs, and 
goal setting exercises. Most of these activities are organized by Probation and external 
individuals are brought in to facilitate, as needed. Officers routinely liaise with external 
organizations to facilitate mental health or substance abuse counseling, vocational skills training, 
and school supply assistance for youth under their supervision. Stakeholders note that some of 
these services are paid and funds must be identified each time a youth is referred to one of 
these programs. 
Our conversations with youth seem to substantiate the need for more structure in the 
supervision and availability of more programming for youth being supervised on probation. Some 
youth report speaking with their probation officer twice a week, while others mention they 
speak “once in a while.” A couple of youth remarked they found these interactions helpful, 
either because of the kindness of the officer or because the officer was trying to “keep them 
away from what they did that wasn’t right.” Only one youth reported participating in any formal 
programming (counseling), while others were unable to identify or describe any programs they 
had participated in. 
The COVID-19 pandemic undoubtedly has influenced the way that probation officers work, and 
the intensity of supervision they have been able to provide. For instance, typically probation 
officers would go into communities to conduct social inquiry investigations after a youth had 
been apprehended to gather background information to inform their recommendations. These 
investigations, as well as regular supervision of youth already on probation, had to be conducted 
via phone. Additionally, many external programs that program officers refer youth to have 
either been scaled back or shut down due to the pandemic. 
DETENTION FACILITIES
In St. Lucia, juveniles are still being held in two detention facilities, Bordelais Correctional Facility (the 
only prison in St. Lucia) and the Boys Training Center (juvenile facility for males housing a combination 
of youth under Care and Protection, and juveniles in conflict with the law). There is still no residential 
facility for juvenile females in conflict with the law. Stakeholders note that there are rarely cases where 
juvenile females are given custodial sentencing. When they are, they are sent to Bordelais. Female 
offenders who are not given custodial sentencing are reportedly placed on Probation. A common 
response across all interviews was that there are relatively much fewer juvenile female offenders in St. 
Lucia than males, and that there are very few options for their rehabilitation. One key issue is that there 
does not seem to be any clear record of the number of justice-involved juvenile females over time. 
Stakeholders spoke anecdotally about one or two juvenile female offenders who they had either heard 
about, or interacted with, in the past. The issue of lack of data is not unique to girls in conflict with the 
law, but a problem that emerged throughout the interviews. In this case, lack of data is particularly 
problematic because without even basic information on the number of juvenile female offenders, type of 
offense committed, and pre-trial or post-trial decisions, it becomes difficult to understand the scope and 
scale of the issue and dedicate resources towards targeted support and rehabilitation of these girls. 
38 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
Upton Gardens Girl’s Centre is the only option available for girls in St. Lucia and is a non-residential 
facility whose primary clients are girls with behavioral issues or at risk of being in conflict with the law. 
At the time of data collection, the majority of referrals came from schools, social services, or parents, 
with little to no referrals coming from the Court or Probation. Therefore, their primary focus is still not 
on girls who are in conflict with the law. Sometimes girls who are referred by schools to Upton are 
already on Probation. Though the Centre does offer a range of educational and therapeutic services, 
many respondents noted that its status as a day facility, rather than a residential one, presents a 
challenge for achieving rehabilitation. With more data on juvenile female offenders, the government 
could make a more informed decision on what interventions would be most appropriate and feasible 
(converting BTC into a co-ed facility, strengthening Upton’s capacity to serve girls in conflict with the 
law, etc.). 
At the time of data collection, there were 12 juvenile males at BTC, and one juvenile male at Bordelais 
(Table 3).32 These numbers represent a change from midline (16 at BTC, and 2233 at Bordelais). The 
aggregate number of youth in detention facilities declined substantially between midline and endline from 
38 to 13. Some attribute this reduction to more juveniles being diverted to options other than custodial 
sentencing, while others note that this reduction is partially due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Table 3: Juveniles in detention in St. Lucia
BASELINE (2017) MIDLINE (2019) ENDLINE (2021)
Males Females Males Females Males Females
Boys Training Center 31 0 16 0 12 0 
Bordelais Correctional Facility 16 1 22 0 1 0 
Total 47 1 38 0 13 0 
Though the CJA stipulates that 16-18-year-olds are also considered juveniles, and therefore should not 
be detained in an adult prison, juveniles who have been charged with serious (typically Schedule 3) 
offenses are still often detained at Bordelais. Examples of Schedule 3 offenses include murder, 
manslaughter, rape, and aggravated or violent robbery. Participants we spoke to assert that Bordelais is 
viewed as a “last resort” option. These youth are typically sent to Bordelais on remand until alternative 
solutions can be identified, or until they age out of juvenile status soon after reaching Bordelais to then 
join the general prison population. The inability for BTC to handle youth accused of more serious 
offenses is the primary reason why juveniles are still detained at Bordelais (at the time of the endline 
study, one juvenile was being detained at Bordelais). 
“As it stands right now, our juvenile facility cannot accommodate these individuals [serious 
juvenile offenders], because of the physical construct of the place and the human resources you 
require to manage these individuals. The next option is to have them at a prison for their own 
safety and security, and for their own safety and security of the state. However, the challenge 
32 On the day our team visited the facility, two more juveniles had just arrived. 
33 Numbers for Bordelais at midline are for individuals ages 16 – 22 as this was the age range of individuals detained in the 
“young adults unit” at the time. Therefore, these numbers are not strictly comparable to the endline figures which are for 
individuals under the age of 18. 
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 39
we have is that [Bordelais] was not built for that. We had to create that sort of environment to 
accommodate with all the amenities and resources.”
This issue of where to accommodate juveniles accused of committing serious offenses consistently 
surfaced throughout our conversations, and stakeholders believe that there does not seem to be a clear 
answer. Per the CJA, there is a clear answer – juveniles cannot be held at Bordelais irrespective of 
logistical challenges, and that holding youth in an adult prison is a violation of the law. There is, however, 
a consensus among stakeholders that holding youth at Bordelais is not the solution. Some mention that 
youth who have committed serious offenses should be held at BTC where they can be exposed to a 
rehabilitative environment more suitable for youth, but there is also an acknowledgment that BTC is not 
equipped to accommodate serious offenders as it is a low-security facility. 
In addition, our interviews revealed more institutional issues at BTC related to dysfunctional 
management, challenges in managing the behavior and mindset of line staff (security staff in particular), 
and lack of sufficient external oversight. Related to formal mechanisms for managing the behavior of 
staff, one stakeholder interviewed at endline in 2021 noted recently attending a staff disciplinary hearing 
for an incident from 2018. Although it is positive that disciplinary cases are being heard, a three-year 
waiting period considerably slows the rate of hoped-for institutional change. Though efforts are being 
made to recruit and train new staff better suited to working with youth, this process of recruitment and 
replacement is dependent on which government entity the position falls under. This dysfunction has 
even been noted by the youth. One youth even noted that “It’s time for them [staff] to be working with 
each other instead of against each other.” Without addressing management and human resource issues in a 
timely manner, BTC will not be able to provide a strong, rehabilitative environment for youth. 
COVID-19 RESTRICTIONS AND IMPACTS
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on operations at both BTC and Bordelais and has
posed numerous challenges for the management of these facilities. Both facilities had to put rigorous 
screening, isolation, and COVID-testing procedures in place to mitigate the risk of COVID-19 spreading 
through the staff and resident populations. As discussed in a subsequent section, these public health
procedures sometimes meant that youth spent prolonged periods in isolation, which contravenes 
regulations against the solitary confinement of youth. 
Programming at both facilities was also scaled back substantially to reduce face-to-face group 
interactions. For instance, a JJRP-supported cinematography program had to be halted and had yet to be 
restarted at the time of data collection. BTC did make efforts to provide programming to youth despite 
these restrictions, including obtaining devices to enable online learning and switching to lower-contact 
sporting activities. Programming was mostly halted at Bordelais, though youth’s lack of access to 
programming at the facility appears to be driven by factors other than COVID, as is discussed in the 
Programming and Education Services section. 
At both facilities, there was a substantial period during the pandemic’s peak where in-person visitation 
was completely halted. In fact, at the time of data collection, visitation by family members had yet to be 
re-instated at Bordelais and virtual visitation had yet to come online. The following section contains a 
detailed discussion of the impacts of COVID-19 on in-person visitation at both facilities. 
40 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
ACCESS TO MEDICAL, MENTAL HEALTH, AND FAMILY SUPPORT
Access to medical and mental health services for youth at BTC and Bordelais remains similar to its 
condition at midline. At BTC, youth receive a health screening on arrival, and are provided necessary 
healthcare at local hospitals or clinics. At Bordelais, there is an on-site medical unit and each inmate is 
given a medical examination upon arrival. 
With respect to mental healthcare, as at midline, youth are sent to the Wellness Center (a public 
hospital) as needed to be evaluated and treated before being sent back to BTC. There is no clinical on￾site mental health staff at BTC. Some youth mentioned attending counseling sessions, but none of them 
were able to provide details about the sessions or whether they feel these sessions to be helpful. BTC 
employs four counselors and one social worker to provide counseling services to youth. Frequency of 
counseling is variable and is said to depend on the needs of the child, though one stakeholder mentioned 
that counseling sessions can be conducted twice a week. This is almost identical to the status of 
counseling services noted at midline. 
At Bordelais, there is still only one clinical social worker for approximately 500 prisoners and there is 
no on-site psychiatrist. The clinical social worker conducts an initial evaluation and refers prisoners for 
psychiatric evaluation as needed. Stakeholders noted that having another social worker, or an on-site 
psychologist would help to provide better mental health services to inmates. 
Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, family visitation was completely halted during the pandemic’s peak. At 
the time of writing this report, family member visitation was still not permitted at Bordelais. Most youth 
we spoke to at BTC report either being able to call their family frequently or being visited by family 
regularly. A few noted that being able to call family was dependent on a counselor being present, 
indicating that there are still no freely available phones for youth to use for this purpose. 
At Bordelais, though family visitation is not permitted, probation officers are allowed to visit the facility. 
Family is only permitted to drop off packages and money outside the facility for those incarcerated. This 
separation is taxing and difficult. The prolonged isolation from family, coupled with isolation in a 
separate unit, undoubtedly impact an individual's mental well-being and is a serious concern. To combat 
this issue, prison officials mentioned attempts to set up virtual visitation systems, however, they are yet 
to be fully on-stream due to technical difficulties. At this stage in the pandemic, officials should find a way 
for families to safely visit those incarcerated to mitigate the effects of the separation. 
PROGRAMMING AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 
BTC offers some recreational programming to youth, including sporting activities, music programs and a 
JJRP-supported cinematography program.34 BTC continues to offer vocational training in woodworking, 
welding, and mechanics, as well as having an agriculture and hydroponics program. These programs were 
also offered at midline. Some of these programs are conducted with the collaboration of organizations 
such as CARE and NSDC. 
With respect to academic education, there still appears to be little to no oversight of the education 
being provided to youth at BTC from the Ministry of Education. This is similar to the findings at midline. 
BTC did, however, manage to procure devices so that youth could join school virtually during the 
34 Some of these programs had to be halted or modified due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
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COVID-19 pandemic. A couple of the youth we spoke to mentioned that they were able to join online 
classes during the pandemic. Stakeholders mention there have been dialogues with the Ministry of 
Education to see if online education can be continued to allow them to continue taking classes at 
mainstream schools. Describing the need for a more rigorous education program, one individual noted: 
“And in terms of education, remedial education, academics that is lacking severely and it is time 
that the Ministry of Education steps in to do something about this element at the Center 
because, yes - you give him the vocational skills and you're giving him life skills, but he is still 
going out there and he really can't write properly. So that sort of defeats the purpose.”
Meanwhile, from our conversations it seems that individuals in the education system do not view 
juveniles in conflict with the law as coming under their purview, as the agencies looking after them are 
primarily under the Ministry of Equity. It is unclear why the Ministry of Education does not have a 
stronger mandate when it comes to educating those in conflict with the law. The UNCRC indicates that 
education is a human right, regardless of one’s status in the juvenile justice system, and that all children 
should have access to formal education. 
Additionally, despite the existence of programming and education options, from our interviews with 
youth, it seemed that there was little structure to the programming provided. Few youth we spoke to 
expressed interested in the programs or classes they had been involved in since coming to the Centre. 
This perhaps suggests that a more intensive needs assessment should be conducted to understand if the 
programming being provided matches the interests and needs of the youth in conflict with the law who 
are at the Centre. The need to ensure more structured educational and rehabilitative programming at 
BTC was well recognized by stakeholders. As one individual described:
“I think these are very realistic issues and we have recognized that we need to strengthen the 
programming and the structure of what is offered at the Boys Training Center so that we 
encourage the young people to participate according to what is planned for them. So the 
current structure is being looked at to recognize the deficiencies and conduct a general analysis 
of what needs to be done at the center.”
Bordelais does offer some education, vocational skills, and life skills programs, but it is the researcher’s 
understanding that juveniles housed at Bordelais at the time of endline data collection did not have access 
to any of these programs. The primary reason given for this was an attempt to fulfill mandates outlined in 
the CJA to keep juveniles as separated as possible from the adult inmate population. The CJA mandates 
that youth should be exposed to programs that can aid in their education and rehabilitation. Undoubtedly, 
it does present a logistical challenge for an institution to provide dedicated programming for youth, when 
they are already resource constrained (e.g. there are only two teachers for 500 inmates). Yet when 
education and skills building play such a large role in the rehabilitation and reintegration of justice-involved 
youth, it is necessary for stakeholders to actively support the facility and identify solutions to address 
these challenges, rather than keeping youth in isolation without opportunities for growth. This is a step 
backwards from the situation observed at midline. At midline, it was noted that young people at Bordelais 
could participate in informal education and vocational programming. 
PHYSICAL SPACE 
There are still significant challenges related to the physical space at BTC and Bordelais. 
42 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
BTC is 60 years old and much of its infrastructure has not been significantly upgraded since its 
establishment. As one individual summarized: 
“We all complain about the structure the building. New legislation just came on, but nothing 
was done to the physical structure. Now, the age of a child has been changed from 16 to 18. 
Before 16-year-old offender wouldn’t be sent to BTC …. Now people up to 18 years come 
here, but we remain in the same building that we had 61 years ago and it wasn't built exactly 
for the purpose that it's serving right now.” 
On the positive side, at the time of data collection, the exterior of the facility appeared to be well kept. 
A new security booth and visitation room were also being constructed. Most of the interior areas, 
though clean, were quite bare. In particular, the facility has two separate dormitory areas – one 
designated for youth under Care and Protection and separate area for juveniles in conflict with the law, 
though stakeholders note that Care and Protection youth are sometimes housed with juveniles in 
conflict with the law. Stakeholders suggested that a child in need of care and protection may be housed 
with children in conflict with the law if he is older, has a large physical stature, and displays behavior that 
poses a risk to (smaller) children in need of care and protection. Similar individualized decision-making 
was noted at midline. The juvenile offenders’ dormitory was quite sparsely furnished with minimal 
amenities and bars on the windows. Juveniles are also not allowed to keep personal items with them; 
however, they can store them in lockers. There are also cameras throughout the campus. One youth 
noted a mixed reaction to these cameras — that beatings of youth by security staff had stopped after 
installation of these cameras, but also that “we don’t like the cameras because everywhere we go 
they’re seeing us.”
In the case of Bordelais, one juvenile was being held at the facility at the time of data collection. In 
accordance with the act, this juvenile is being housed in a separate unit. This particular unit is actually 
the “Mother-Child” unit that is used to house pregnant inmates. Previously, there was a juvenile/young 
offenders’ unit at the prison, until its redesignation in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. In recent 
times, juveniles have only come to Bordelais one or two at a time, making housing manageable through 
the use of the “Mother-Child” unit, yet challenges arise when this unit is required by other incoming 
inmates. For instance, one stakeholder described a situation where a female prisoner needed to be 
placed in this unit while it was being occupied by a juvenile male. Prison officials responded by reshuffling 
living arrangements to allow this female to stay at the “Mother-Child” unit, by emptying out adult 
inmates from one of the other cell blocks to ensure that the juvenile had a dedicated space to stay 
temporarily. It is positive that serious efforts are being made to ensure children are kept separate from 
adults at Bordelais. Yet, while prison officials appear to be doing the best to abide by the CJA with the 
resources available, such reshuffling causes logistical burden. 
PHYSICAL SECURITY, PUNISHMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
The majority of juvenile respondents did not report any acts of physical abuse, neither at BTC nor 
Bordelais, which is certainly a positive development compared to baseline and midline. Management at 
both facilities assert that use of physical punishment is neither “advocated nor sanctioned.” Despite this, 
the disconnect that was noted at midline between the mindset of management and civilian staff 
(counselors and teachers), and that of security staff appears to persist. 
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 43
“You still have some staff who are very old school. They've been here for a while and to them 
that [corporal punishment] is how they used to get the boys in line before… You have staff 
who will still get frustrated at the boys’ reactions, some of them still don't know how to deal 
with the boys when they act up. But it’s a learning process, it will take some time.”
During our interviews, we recorded one reported incident of a juvenile who engaged in an altercation 
with a member of security staff, resulting in injuries to both the juvenile and staff member. Though the 
official disciplinary process has yet to be completed, the stakeholder indicated that the staff member 
“had to leave,” following the incident. Officials note they are trying to reduce the likelihood of violent 
altercations through trainings (such as de-escalation trainings) and hiring new staff.
Other forms of punishment described include labor (such as landscaping) or being “put on the step.” 
BTC has a solitary confinement space that consists of a small cell secured with an iron gate, located at 
the top of the stairs leading to the juvenile offenders sleeping area (referred to staff and youth at BTC as 
“the step”). The room is sparsely equipped with a small mattress placed on the ground and is described 
as the room used to temporarily house a boy who becomes uncontrollable. The use of unpaid labor and 
this type of solitary confinement as punishment was also reported at midline. At endline, the reasons for 
and duration of solitary separation provided by youth we spoke to varied. Some mentioned being placed 
in this area as part of their intake process upon arriving at the facility — “When you just reach, they put 
you on the steps and then after a couple weeks pass and everything is good with you, they put you in the dorm 
with the rest of the boys.” Many of the youth we spoke to arrived at the facility during the COVID-19 
pandemic, therefore it is unclear whether this was a public health-motivated protocol or a standard 
intake procedure. Regardless, youth in quarantine for COVID-19 should not be subjected to solitary 
confinement under any circumstances. Others mentioned being placed in solitary separation for 
anywhere between a couple of days to two weeks as punishment for fighting or trying to abscond from 
the facility. 
Though the youth housed at Bordelais at the time of data collection did not report any punishment, 
juveniles at Bordelais are clearly subjected to unintended solitary confinement by way of being the only 
juvenile at the prison. The positioning of the “Mother-Child” unit does allow youth to interact with staff, 
and to have passing interactions with other inmates. Despite this, youth housed by themselves at 
Bordelais are exposed to prolonged periods of complete solitude, a concern shared by all stakeholders. 
REINTEGRATION
Across all interviews, reintegration was mentioned as one of the highest priority areas for moving 
forward with juvenile justice reforms in St. Lucia. Some stakeholders noted a trade-off — that part of 
the price paid for making advancements in diversion was that focus could not be given to building 
reintegration programs. 
“Even if we could do the programs and give them everything on compound, the greatest 
challenge is when they return to the same communities and the same homes. And yes, this is 
the biggest challenge. You give them everything, but when they go back out this is when you see 
the criminal activity. And those with the mental issues, they will not go to the Wellness Center. 
This is where we get the dysfunction really plays out. Even if they [the youth] do try the 
programs, it's still a struggle [when they return].”
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Starting while youth are at the facility, reintegration plans should involve staff working directly with 
young people while they are detained and relies heavily on the building of relationships during periods of 
detention in order to facilitate a successful aftercare plan. Experiences reported by youth at both 
facilities varied widely — some youth reported having no conversations at all with family, counselors, or 
probation officers related to rehabilitation and re-entry till date, while others had already secured a job
ahead of leaving the facility through support and vocational training received at BTC. According to 
stakeholders interviewed, BTC counselors hold weekly direct care meetings with youth (and sometimes 
family members) to discuss their progress, including eventual plans for reintegration, but we were not 
able to verify if these meetings are systematically conducted. Across agencies, stakeholders noted that 
encouraging participation of parents and other family members in this process is both crucially 
important, and often quite difficult to ensure. 
BTC still has a two-year aftercare program in place, however, this program appears to have contracted 
from its recorded state at midline. A single counselor coordinates the entire program, supervising 18 
youth in aftercare at the time of data collection (in addition to any youth set to exit the facility). Prior to 
re-entry, the counselor attempts to set up a case conference with the young person, family members,
facility staff, the social worker and/or probation officer to discuss the re-entry plan. With information 
available, it is unclear whether the conferences happen consistently and whether there is concrete 
follow-up on plans made during these conferences. Aside from these case conferences, and the regular 
vocational and educational programming at the facility, there is currently no formal transition program 
for youth who are about to re-enter society. 
Other counselors sometimes also conduct follow-ups after a youth leaves the facility, however, this is up 
to the counselor’s discretion and is not mandated by protocol. Although there were plans to provide 
more funding for this aftercare plan through support from the Caribbean Development Bank, these 
efforts did not pan out due to COVID-19. Currently there is a proposal to fund a “pilot” of this 
aftercare program using remaining funds from JJRP, but it is unclear whether this will prove successful, 
or whether there are longer-term plans to ensure sufficient and sustained funding for this crucial 
component. 
There is also follow-up that is conducted by Probation with youth as they are re-integrating into society. 
Officers may engage with schools or try to enroll youth in available skills programs, sometimes working 
together with BTC and other entities to support particular youth. These efforts do not seem to be 
systematic or consistent across all officers and youth. The youth we spoke to reported a range of 
experiences with their supervisors — some mentioned that counselors and/or probation officers had 
spoken to them about re-entry or helped them to get a job, while others mentioned that no such 
conversations had taken place. On efforts probation officers make to connect youth with employment 
opportunities, one respondent described the current situation as follows: 
“It's an informal process… There's nothing written to say that probation officers are supposed 
to do this [help youth find jobs]… but officers do it to help them because there is a real 
physical need there. To be employed and to be able to earn money. That in itself reduces the 
risk of them reoffending because they are able to take care of themselves.”
As was the case at baseline and midline, Bordelais still has little in place with regards to re-entry 
programming. In the past, individuals from external agencies (such as the National Skills Development
Centre) would come to the prison to conduct vocational training sessions, but these initiatives have 
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 45
halted due to funding issues. The clinical social worker conducts goal setting, and life skills and stress 
management sessions, but these programs are not being conducted on a large scale due to COVID-19 
and the resource constraints of being the sole social worker assigned to 500 inmates. 
Stakeholders in BTC, Bordelais, and Probation assert that they require the support of more external 
agencies with skills building capacities, connections to employment networks, and specialized knowledge 
in mental/social support provision to ensure success of reintegration efforts, along with the support of 
youths’ families and communities. 
SUMMARY
Notable progress has been made by the government of St. Lucia toward advancing the juvenile justice 
reform process since the midline assessment. With respect to coordination amongst agencies involved 
in juvenile justice service delivery, this progress includes putting in place a Technical Committee to 
coordinate efforts across agencies, drafting a diversion strategy, and starting the Initial Inquiry process 
both pre-trial and within the Court. To ensure this progress is sustained, the government will need to 
ensure that the Technical Committee remains in place until either a coordinating body, like the Child 
Justice Management Unit recommended by the JJRP, or equivalent cross-agency coordinating mechanism 
is officially put in place. Though all stakeholders asserted that juvenile justice reform is a coordinated 
effort across multiple agencies, our research suggests that BTC and Probation carry much of the 
responsibility in providing guidance and services to youth.
In terms of diversion and alternative sentencing, a key achievement since midline is that pre-trial 
diversion is now taking place, led by Probation, and the Family Court is now issuing diversion orders. It 
will also be crucial for the Cabinet to approve a diversion strategy to help officially institutionalize and 
operationalize diversion as a core juvenile justice process and pave the way for government funding for 
diversion programs. Currently, diversion orders issued by the court are mostly for supervision and 
guidance, with probation officers given the responsibility of designing each youth’s supervision strategy 
and of identifying programs for youth to participate in. There is still a critical need for a set of official 
diversion programs to be formalized so that the Court and probation officers have more structured 
options to divert youth to. 
The number of juveniles housed at Bordelais has decreased drastically from baseline to endline (from 16 
to one). Additionally, youth interviewed at both BTC and Bordelais reported almost no instances of 
physical abuse. We find that forms of solitary confinement are still being employed — either 
intentionally as punishment, or unintentionally due to COVID-19 protocols or requirements to keep 
youth in a separate unit at Bordelais. The educational curriculum at BTC still requires strengthening, a 
persisting issue from baseline and midline. Youth at Bordelais were not receiving any programming at 
endline, a marked step backwards from midline. 
46 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
Our findings suggest that there are significant management challenges at BTC in particular that need to 
be addressed in order for it to be a more effective rehabilitative environment for youth. Stakeholders 
from multiple agencies noted that facility management are often in open disagreement with one another, 
that the mentality of security staff is still not aligned with 
creating a rehabilitative environment for youth, and that 
the contractual status of certain staff make hiring and 
firing more difficult. Also, the system at large 
demonstrates a primary focus on rehabilitating juveniles 
who have committed only minor offenses. There still 
seems to be little progress or plan in place for juveniles 
who have committed serious offenses, and these 
juveniles are often still sent to Bordelais where youth were not receiving any programming at the time 
of endline data collection. Futhermore, St. Lucia has few options for juvenile females in conflict with the 
law. Though this is a widely acknowledged fact, there seems to be little data available about juvenile 
female offenders beyond anecdotal information. Without data, it is difficult to identify the most feasible 
interventions for serving this population. Currently, most are put on probation and serious offenders 
are sent to Bordelais. Lastly, reintegration efforts are still largely driven by individual officers and 
counselors, and there is still a lack of formal and coordinated programs for reintegration of juveniles in 
conflict with the law. 
The current juvenile justice system in St. Lucia 
demonstrates a primary focus on rehabilitating 
juveniles who have committed minor offenses, 
with little progress or planning for youth who 
have committed serious offenses. 
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ST. KITTS AND NEVIS 
BACKGROUND ON JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN ST. KITTS AND 
NEVIS
St. Kitts and Nevis passed the Child Justice Act (CJA) in 2013 and was the only of the three countries to 
have passed reformed legislation at the time of the baseline study. 
Among the most important provisions of the CJA was the establishment of the Child Justice Committee 
(CJC). Comprised of a magistrate and two social workers, the CJC’s mandate is to review all cases 
involving juveniles, to assign youth to participate in diversion programs for those who qualify, and in the 
most general sense, to advocate on behalf of juveniles in conflict with the law to ensure that 
rehabilitation and reintegration are at the core of their case plan. 
Despite passing the CJA in 2013, St. Kitts and Nevis did not begin to operationalize the Child Justice 
Committee until 2019, causing a delay in the development of diversion programs and the establishment 
of appropriate procedures to comply with other elements of the CJA. These consequences are detailed 
in the ensuing subsections. 
In addition to establishing the CJC, the CJA increased the age of criminal responsibility to 12 (from an 
earlier age of eight). The act also outlines how youth offenders are to be assessed, managed, and 
provided with opportunities for rehabilitation and reintegration into society. The act stipulates that a 
juvenile’s parents and a probation officer are to be notified within 24 hours of an arrest, and that a 
probation officer conducts an initial assessment of the juvenile’s well-being and home environment 
within 48 hours. The act also stipulates that the child is to appear before the CJC for an initial inquiry, 
prior to any court appearance. Attended by the child’s parents, probation officer, attorney (if applicable), 
the arresting officer, and a representative of the Director of Public Prosecutions, the initial inquiry is an 
opportunity for all concerned stakeholders to identify diversion options for the child that will emphasize 
the child’s best interests and rehabilitation.
Although the act was passed in 2013, many of its tenets still need to be fully instituted, as we proceed to 
detail in the remainder of this section. 
INTERAGENCY COORDINATION 
As was the case at baseline and midline, significant coordination challenges plague the administration of 
juvenile justice in St. Kitts and Nevis. These challenges lie at nearly every step in the juvenile justice 
chain, starting with the procedures the police are expected to follow when they apprehend a juvenile. 
Stakeholders were unanimous in reporting that the police need further training in the CJA as well as 
basic procedural matters, such as how to fill out required forms, where juveniles can be detained, and 
who to contact after apprehending a juvenile. Although there has been training for a select number of 
officers on these matters, most notably through the JJRP program, it appears that such training only 
reaches a small fraction of officers. Moreover, respondents indicated that many of those who had been 
trained had since been transferred to new divisions, and that new recruits are not provided juvenile 
justice training as part of their basic training.
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Our interviews suggest the police’s lack of familiarity with the CJA and the appropriate procedures for 
juveniles has several negative consequences. First, when the Initial Inquiry and other appropriate 
procedures are not followed, it provides juveniles’ attorneys with grounds on which the case may be 
dismissed. The result is that juveniles are able to circumvent the law, while at the same time missing 
opportunities for assistance and intervention that would help steer them away from crime and towards 
more productive activities. In the words of one stakeholder we spoke with: 
“[The police’s failure to follow procedures] is a situation that has to be corrected because there's 
some juveniles who really need the intervention and are not getting it. But because of this system 
not really working as it should.”
A second consequence of the police’s lack of training in juvenile justice matters is that their uncertainty 
concerning appropriate paperwork and procedures gives some officers the false impression that 
juveniles are hard to deal with. According to one stakeholder we spoke with, this perception of 
additional work deters many officers from handling juvenile cases, which only further contributes to the 
system’s failure to reach juveniles in need of intervention and rehabilitation. Indeed, this individual went 
so far as to question whether the decline in juvenile cases observed over the past several years is real, 
or is instead the result of police increasingly shying away from juvenile cases. The solution, in our view, 
is to ensure that all officers are fully versed in the CJA, and that the appropriate forms and procedures 
are put in place to smoothly process juvenile cases, from the point of initial apprehension.
A third consequence deriving from the improper handling of juvenile cases is that it contributes to 
delays in the administration of justice. Our research found that many youth spend upwards of two years 
in detention awaiting trial, and a significant contributor to this is the lackluster investigation and 
preparation of files by the police. The DPP, as well, was cited by several stakeholders for its failure to 
proactively coordinate with the police during case investigations. Summarizing the situation, one 
individual stated:
“The challenge, to be honest, is that with any court you need the case files about a week ahead 
of the hearing. And what gets us upset is that the officers are coming in for the hearing with the 
juvenile and their report at the same time, not giving us any time to review the assessment. The 
officers just hand in the report as they come in. And they are not using the proper form. They’re 
just talking off the top of their head.”
To be sure, shortfalls on behalf of the police were not the only contributor to insufficient coordination 
in the juvenile justice space. Many informants said that a major unmet need was for a commonly
understood set of protocols and procedures mapping out who does what and when across agencies, to 
ensure the smooth and timely handling of cases. As the coordinating body with a mandate to ensure 
proper juvenile case management, it would be appropriate for the CJC to step in to fill this role, but it 
has failed to do so thus far. 
Stakeholders identified several other important challenges facing the CJC. Most notably, the CJC meets 
very infrequently, and has only handled twelve cases since its inception in 2019, only a small fraction of 
those who come in conflict with the law and would benefit from their services. As one stakeholder 
reported: “the CJC meets only once every couple of months, whereas we get cases weekly.” This is a 
clear violation of the Child Justice Act, which states that “The Child Justice Committee shall meet at 
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least twice monthly.”35 Another cited their lack of urgency in handling matters in the time between 
meetings: 
“Availability is important. But the CJC doesn’t deal with cases urgently. There is much too much 
delay … if I get the case today, can they respond tomorrow with their input? So that it doesn’t 
wait another week?”
Representatives of the CJC agree on the need for improved coordination and the development of a set 
of clear procedures, but they also cite the need for intervention by the Ministry of Community 
Development, Gender Affairs and Social Services:
“There is an urgent need for a clear policy in relation to the arrest and taking the child before 
the CJC, and the dealings with the CJC before the court. Currently, responsibility is blurred because 
there’s no clear policy about this. The act says that the Minister can make regulation on this. But 
we have never really had regulation made, for the operation of the CJC. We need clear policy 
about when and how a case comes before the CJC and when it instead goes directly to the court.”
When stakeholders were questioned about the long delays in processing juvenile cases, it was noted 
that the Juvenile Magistrate only convenes to hear juvenile cases one day per month. It was suggested 
that increasing that number to two days per month would help speed things along.
Coordination failures also plague the relationship between the courts and the New Horizons 
Rehabilitation Center (NHRC). According to one respondent, “the protocols established between New 
Horizons, the probation office, and the courts still need to be developed.” This individual noted that the 
NHRC was routinely “not given enough lead time, or information about a child coming to the facility. 
This makes it difficult to plan and prepare for a child.” 
Sadly, the consequences of pervasive coordination failures fall on those most vulnerable in the system – 
juveniles in conflict with the law. As one stakeholder described:
“Nobody independent is keeping anyone accountable to the guidelines laid out in the CJC. It’s 
always going to be ‘if it doesn’t happen and no one follows through, no one is held accountable 
for that.’ There is no separate oversight body. The only consequence is for the juvenile in question, 
whose case is delayed yet again, or whose needs for diversion and rehabilitation go unmet.”
DIVERSION, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, AND PROBATION
The juvenile justice system has made some progress since midline towards institutionalizing the practices 
of diversion and alternative sentencing. The most notable point of progress is the formulation of the 
CJC, which is now operational. Since its inception in late 2019, the CJC has handled twelve cases, all of 
which were for non-violent offenses. It is not known how this number compares to the total number of 
cases that were eligible to go before the CJC. When asked about this point, neither the CJC, the 
Probation and Child Protection Services Department, nor the police’s special victims unit (SVU) could 
provide reliable estimates due to a lack of organized administrative databases. But based on the 
35 Child Justice Act of 2013, Part III, 7(1).
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testimony of all the stakeholders we spoke with, it is clear that a more active CJC would be able to 
handle a much larger number of cases. 
To date, the CJC and the courts have focused primarily on diversion, rather than alternative sentencing. 
In the modal CJC case, the CJC works with the child’s probation officer to develop a diversion plan 
consisting of some combination of restitution, community service, curfew, and school attendance and/or 
employment. Should the juvenile fail to meet the terms of his/her diversion plan, then s/he will be 
summoned back to the Juvenile Magistrate’s court for traditional sentencing, which may include time at 
the NHRC.
All the diversion options used to date have been informal or were identified on an ad hoc basis; at 
present, the juvenile justice system still lacks dedicated diversion programs that are accredited by the 
government. “It forces us to be creative,” reported one stakeholder on the lack of formal diversion 
programs. “We have been asking for dedicated programs for a while now. If a child is stealing, there 
should be some specific program geared toward that. If it’s a weapons charge, there should be a 
program for that. And ditto for the drugs.” However, despite the appeals of the CJC, thus far the 
Department of Probation and Child Protection Services has not identified or certified any dedicated 
diversion program.
A stakeholder we spoke to confirmed the lack of diversion options for juveniles: “what we lack are 
programs that address the ‘root causes’ of the problem, like poverty, poor housing, and lack of family 
support.” When asked why these programs were not more readily available, the representative 
reported that “it’s basically a lack of resources.” This individual also noted that the absence of dedicated 
diversion programs is in contrast with the number of pre-arrest programs that are available, such as the 
Young Explorer’s program and the CFYR Family Matter’s program, as well as with the availability of 
vocational programs for youth in-general, such as the Advanced Vocational Educational Centre (AVEC) 
and the Skills Training Empowerment Program (STEP). 
As was the case at midline, stakeholders reported that another common form of diversion was pre-arrest
diversion, which occurs within the day-to-day context of police discretionary decision-making. For 
young people involved in low-level offenses such as petty theft, disorderly conduct, fighting, and 
marijuana possession, the police may convene a “roundtable” with their parents and probation officers 
to develop an alternative plan to the formal justice system. In lieu of formal juvenile justice processing, a 
young person may be asked to complete community service hours, attend school-based programming, 
attend a group run by probation officers, or be monitored through home visits.
In the absence of dedicated diversion or rehabilitation programs, probation officers have served as the 
primary providers of these services. This was the case at baseline and midline, and it continues to be the 
case today. Through mentoring, counseling, and job-placement assistance, probation officers play a 
critical role in this space. “We are the teeth of the juvenile justice system. We make sure everyone is on 
the same page; we do counseling, mentoring, and we provide wrap-around services,” described one 
probation official.
Probation officers are also critical to ensuring the directives of the CJC are duly carried out. As one 
official described, “success [of diversion] really depends on the probation officer, and how aggressively 
they monitor adherence to the orders of the CJC.”
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Yet, despite their critical role in the juvenile justice system, our interviews reveal significant shortfalls 
within the Department of Probation and Child Protection Services (DPCPS). To be sure, the COVID-19 
pandemic has adversely affected operations within the DPCPS, namely by preventing probation officers 
from engaging directly with the juveniles they supervise. Instead, probation officers have been forced to 
supervise their cases remotely, through phone calls with the juveniles and their families. But even 
beyond the adverse effects of COVID-19, court officials, representatives of the CJC, lawyers, and police 
officers were unanimous in highlighting a lack of robust oversight as a major barrier to diversion and 
rehabilitation. As one stakeholder described:
“We are not so pleased with the probation officers, with their level of monitoring and counseling 
of the juveniles under their supervision. … the juveniles are not given the attention that they are 
supposed to be given. The CJC makes a contract, and it’s not being adhered to. So, the main 
challenge with diversion right now is with the probation officers and the quality of their 
monitoring.”
Stakeholders also cited a lack of robust action to help find juveniles jobs, ensure they are enrolled in 
school, or identify vocational programs that match their interests. One juvenile we spoke with said that 
they were unable to attend a program they were interested in at the Advanced Vocational Education 
Centre (AVEC) for lack of bus fare – the type of modest obstacle that a proactive probation officer can 
be expected to solve. Another young person said that their probation officer only called once a month 
rather than making in-person visits, and that he often wasn’t home for the calls. A third individual had 
“aged out” of their probation when they turned 18 but received no concluding care plan or send-off 
from his probation officer.
When asked what reforms would be necessary to improve the performance of probation officers, most 
stakeholders cited greater resources, better training of probation officers, and greater oversight by 
administrators within the DPCPS. But some officials declined to offer an explanation, citing the sensitive 
nature of the problems within the DPCPS. Others cited potential nepotism as an explanation:
“Probation is falling woefully short of what is required, and it is not for lack of training or resources. 
The resources are adequate. It is that certain persons are not very interested in what they need 
to do. Sometimes certain jobs are passed on from one person to another and so it’s not always 
the most motivated or merit-based person who gets the job.” 
That said, the job of a probation officer is not easy. “You have to be aggressive. You have to actively go 
after the information you need, and you have to actively follow-up with partner agencies,” reported one 
individual. Given the demands of their position and their critical importance to diversion and 
reintegration, probation needs to be a focal point of juvenile justice reforms moving forward. Oversight 
and hiring practices within the PCPS need to be strengthened, to ensure that all probation officers are 
fully committed to their work. At the same time, reforms are needed to ensure that the PCPS has 
adequate resources and training to fulfill its mission. 
DETENTION FACILITIES
The primary detention facility for juveniles in St. Kitts and Nevis is the New Horizons Rehabilitation 
Centre (NHRC). At the time of our interviews in May 2021, there were twelve juveniles in detention at 
this facility — seven males and five females (Table 4). In total population, this is on par with the midline 
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population of 13. In a significant improvement since baseline, all of the stakeholders we spoke with 
reported that no juveniles were being detained at the adult detention facility, Her Majesty’s Prison 
(HMP); at midline, there were three. 
Table 4: Juveniles in detention in St. Kitts and Nevis
BASELINE (2017) MIDLINE (2019) ENDLINE (2021)
Males Females Males Females Males Females
New Horizons 
Rehabilitation Center 6 0 12 1 7 5 
Her Majesty's Prison 0 0 3 0 0 0 
Total 6 0 15 1 7 5 
An important feature of the NHRC is that it hosts both juvenile offenders and juveniles who have not 
been charged with committing an offense, but are in need of care and protection. This mixing of groups 
is understandable, given that St. Kitts and Nevis is a small country with limited resources, yet it does 
introduce the risk that hardened offenders may harm or influence those in need of care and protection. 
That said, there were no reports of any such incidents from the stakeholders we spoke with. 
As noted in the Limitations section of this report, we were unable to access NHRC to observe 
conditions or interview juveniles in detention, due to the increase in the community spread of COVID￾19 in May and June of 2021, and the resulting restrictions on non-essential visitation. The results 
reported in this section should therefore be interpreted with some caution, as most stakeholders we 
spoke with were employed by the NHRC or otherwise worked for the government. That said, we also 
spoke with representatives from legal aid institutions, who represent the interests of the juveniles and 
have little incentive to misreport; those interviews largely corroborated what we learned from 
government-affiliated stakeholders. 
COVID-19 RESTRICTIONS AND IMPACTS
The most significant impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has been felt in detention facilities, where 
visitation from parents, family, and outside observers (including the research team for this report) has 
been prohibited. The lack of family visitation is regrettable, as it is likely to weaken ties to family and 
community, making the already difficult challenge of successful reintegration even more so. Closing the 
facility off to outside observers is also a regrettable rollback of much-needed transparency and oversight 
of the NHRC facility.
Notwithstanding, to the credit of the NHRC, the facility appears to have done a good job of sustaining 
quality educational and extracurricular activities. Indeed, as we note below, the quality of these services 
appears to have improved since our midline study in 2019. 
ACCESS TO MEDICAL, MENTAL HEALTH, AND FAMILY SUPPORT
As was the case at midline, the NHRC does not have full-time medical staff on site. Instead, residents 
are transported to medical facilities in the community on an as-needed basis. Given the small number of 
residents at NHRC, this arrangement makes financial sense. However, the research team was unable to 
verify whether access to medical care in the community is indeed adequate, due to COVID-19 
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 53
restrictions on non-essential access to NHRC. There is no full-time psychiatrist on-site, but every 
resident has a caseworker trained in social work and counseling. In addition, residents in need of 
counseling may be referred to the Counseling Unit within the Ministry of Social Development and 
Gender Affairs. In our assessment, access to medical care and mental health care is adequate and has 
remained at the same levels since baseline and midline.
As was the case at midline and baseline, residents of NHRC lack access to telephones that would enable 
them to maintain regular contact with their families and social supports. Calling family requires the use of 
a caseworker’s cell phone, which is not a sustainable solution for family contact. And because many families 
come from disadvantaged backgrounds and do not have the time or finances to travel to the NHRC, many 
youth go long periods without seeing or contacting their families. 
PROGRAMMING AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 
The NHRC provides morning educational classes and afternoon skills sessions on topics including 
woodworking, electrical skills, farming, and life skills. On weekends, residents do chores and attend to 
personal care. A church group visits on Sundays to provide religious programming.
At midline, we documented several shortcomings to the quality of these services, most notably that they 
were irregular and of low quality. Encouragingly, progress appears to have been made since that time. 
Most stakeholders agreed that programming and education services at NHRC were adequate. As one 
individual reported:
“I think that they’re doing an exceptional job at New Horizons. Everyone I’ve interacted with, 
they seem comfortable, relaxed, and like their needs are being met. They really seem to flourish 
…and when I see them with their caseworker [in court], you look at them and they seem to 
have a good relationship.”
Echoing this sentiment, another stakeholder reported: “I have no bad report about New Horizons. I would 
praise New Horizons. I have seen juveniles there who have been reformed while there. I believe in the 
work at New Horizons.” Further substantiating this point, stakeholders familiar with the daily routines of 
youth in detention recounted a structured daily routine, complete with educational and extracurricular 
programming, though we were not able to directly verify this through in-person facility visits due to 
COVID-19 restrictions. 
PHYSICAL SPACE 
Built in 2013, the New Horizons Rehabilitation Centre is a relatively new facility that remains in good 
condition. The facilities are currently in adequate condition to support a rehabilitative mission. 
However, at midline, limited overnight staffing meant that juveniles were kept in assessment center cells 
rather than in the dormitories in the main building, which is more indicative of punishment than 
rehabilitation.36 At baseline and midline, this space was reportedly used for solitary confinement. Due to 
36 Assessment cells are isolated from the rest of the NHRC facility for use when juveniles need to be isolated from the rest of 
the population, for behavioral reasons or for their own protection. Assessment cells are also used when detainees first arrive, 
before they are integrated with the general population.
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COVID-19 restrictions on non-essential visitations, the research team was not able to verify whether 
this was still the situation at endline. 
PHYSICAL SECURITY, PUNISHMENT, AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
One of the main challenges observed by the research team at midline was the use of solitary 
confinement. As we wrote at the time, “solitary confinement and the use of corporal punishment are 
common at both HMP and NHRC, directly contradicting reform efforts and the law.” When asked 
about this at endline, a representative of NHRC denied the use of solitary confinement but 
acknowledged that they sometimes use “single separation,” which occurs when a juvenile is separated 
from his peers due to an infraction, altercation, or for preventative purposes. The separated individual 
will have their own cell for a period of time, usually between three to seven days, and may be removed 
from communal activities like schools and extracurricular programming. The representative noted that 
this practice was recommended by an international consultant in 2016, and falls short of conditions 
associated with solitary confinement, in which an individual is confined to a cell for 22 hours per day 
without meaningful human contact.
Representatives of the NHRC denied the use of corporal punishment in any form, pointing out that this 
is a major point of emphasis in their training, and that the guards pride themselves in the effective use of 
verbal commands. Authorities within the Ministry of Social Development and Gender Affairs, which 
oversees the NHRC, also stressed that any such incident would be dealt with sternly, thoroughly 
investigated, and likely result in the dismissal of the offending officer. 
The research team was not able to verify this reported improvement in conditions at the detention 
facilities due to COVID-19 restrictions, which prevented non-essential access to detention facilities. 
However, independent sources such as the legal representatives of juveniles reported that they were 
unaware of any abuses of their clients, and that their clients generally had positive things to say about 
the facility and displayed good relations with their caseworkers. 
REINTEGRATION
As was the case at baseline and midline, there are no dedicated re-entry programs available to juveniles 
released from detention. After their release, some juveniles have been able to access vocational 
programs for youth in general, such as the Advanced Vocational Educational Centre (AVEC) and the
Skills Training Empowerment Program (STEP), but they are given no preference for admissions relative 
to the general population. 
The research team also learned that it is not standard practice to assign recently released juveniles to 
probation after they are released. Furthermore, probation officials do not have contact with the youth 
during their time at NHRC, which would leave them inadequately prepared to support a 
reintegration/re-entry plan. It is our assessment that changing this state of affairs and making supervision 
standard practice would improve the re-entry of recently released juveniles and help reduce recidivism. 
Moreover, it is feasible with existing resources and institutions. 
Another important reform that came up repeatedly during our interviews is the need for transitional 
housing for youth after they leave detention. Because many youth come from troubled homes, returning 
them immediately to this environment risks exposing them to the same stressors that led to their 
original offense. However, transitional housing would be expensive, and could draw resources away 
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM ENDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 55
from reintegration programming, which is also sorely needed. While the proper balance between 
programming and transitional housing ultimately falls to policymakers within the Ministry of Social 
Development and Gender Affairs, they should be aware of the risks of returning juveniles to the same 
environment that lead them into crime. At the least, they should ensure these individuals are given 
adequate supervision, counseling, and assistance by a probation officer. 
SUMMARY
The government of St. Kitts and Nevis has made some progress towards reforming its juvenile justice 
system since our midline assessment in 2019. Most notably, the CJC was finally established in late 2019, 
a full six years after the passage of the Child Justice Act. Although the CJC is still a fledgling institution, it 
has achieved some progress in the past two years, most notably in the area of promoting diversion for 
non-violent offenses. Nevertheless, the CJC has yet to fulfill its potential in terms of both ensuring 
diversion for all those who qualify under the CJA of 2013, as well as in terms of ensuring coordination 
across agencies to promote the smooth and timely handling of juvenile cases. Coordination across 
agencies remains poor, resulting in prolonged periods of pre-trial detention for juveniles. 
At the New Horizons Rehabilitation Center, conditions have remained satisfactory, and the use of 
solitary confinement has reportedly been replaced with the more limited use of single separation. 
Another area of progress is that culturally, there seems to be a genuine commitment to the principles of 
restorative justice for juveniles, and a keen interest in reforming the juvenile justice system to these 
ends. 
Pre-trial diversion and effective reintegration of recently released juveniles continue to be plagued by a 
lack of dedicated and accredited programs, despite years of rhetoric paid to the importance of these 
types of programs. Moreover, probation officers — who have primary responsibility for ensuring 
adherence to diversion plans and for ensuring successful reintegration — remain poorly motivated and 
poorly monitored, limiting the quality of supervision and counseling received by juveniles under their 
supervision. 
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RECOMMENDATIONS
GUYANA 
We offer nine topline recommendations for the Government of Guyana and its international 
stakeholders to consider, organized into two categories: recommendations that can be implemented 
immediately, and recommendations that will require time and additional resources to implement: 
Recommendations that can be implemented in the near-term: 
1. To ensure coordination across agencies, adherence to case management protocols, and timely 
processing of cases, the Department of Juvenile Justice should convene representatives from all 
agencies involved in juvenile justice on a semi-regular basis. These meetings can serve as a forum to 
clarifies each agencies’ roles and responsibilities and discuss emerging issues and challenges. 
2. To ensure adherence to appropriate procedures for juvenile cases, training on juvenile justice 
matters should be incorporated into basic training for all new police recruits. This training should be 
reinforced through continuing education programs for all police officers and officials.
3. To reduce pre-trial detention, the Department of Juvenile Justice and the Juvenile Justice Committee 
should play a more proactive role in following juvenile cases through the justice system and 
intervening when appropriate to move matters along and advocate on behalf of the detained 
juveniles.
4. To encourage juveniles to comply with the terms of their probation, alternative sentencing, or 
diversion, the Courts and the DPP should set clear terms and benchmarks that must be achieved 
and specify what actions will come into effect if the juvenile does not meet those terms and 
benchmarks. By the same token, the Juvenile Justice Act of 2018 should be updated to clarify what is 
to be done if juveniles do not adhere to the terms of their diversion or alternative sentencing 
agreements. 
5. To ensure that juveniles in detention maintain family ties that are critical for successful re-entry and 
rehabilitation, the Sophia Detention Center should ensure that juveniles have frequent and regular 
contact with their families, through both in-person visits and phone calls. Visitation privileges should 
not be revoked without cause or notice. 
Recommendations that will require time and/or additional resources to implement:
6. To facilitate the vetting, approval, and accreditation of formal diversion, alternative sentencing, and 
reintegration programs, the Ministry of Public Security should equip the Department of Juvenile 
Justice with a dedicated budget, while simultaneously holding it accountable for progress towards 
accrediting new programs that will be viewed as attractive options to the courts, probation officers, 
and juveniles in conflict with the law.
7. To ensure probation officers realize their potential when it comes to counseling juvenile 
probationers and helping them access available services and employment opportunities, the 
Department of Probation within the Ministry of Social Protection should strengthen oversight of 
probation officers and mid-level managers and hold them accountable for successful case outcomes.
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8. To ensure that juveniles in detention have access to adequate mental health care, the Sophia 
Detention Center should screen juveniles for mental health conditions and provide counseling and 
other mental health services for those that need them.
9. To facilitate successful re-entry and reintegration, the Sophia Detention Center should strengthen 
and expand its education and vocational education programs. This effort should be done in 
coordination with the Ministry of Education, the Department of Juvenile Justice, and other 
stakeholders. By the same token, officials should consider making greater use of the facilities at the 
New Opportunity Corps, which has become an underutilized asset.
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ST. LUCIA
We offer eight topline recommendations for the Government of St. Lucia and its international 
stakeholders to consider, organized into two categories: recommendations that can be implemented 
immediately, and recommendations that will require time and additional resources to implement: 
Recommendations that can be implemented in the near-term: 
1. Given the stated interest of stakeholders to implement ART sessions on a more regular basis, the 
government can arrange for a training session for staff at key institutions involved in the juvenile 
justice system to expand the roster of ART facilitators in St. Lucia. ART manuals are already 
available and current stakeholders trained in ART seem willing and interested to train others, 
therefore arranging these trainings would involve identifying a suitable time and getting necessary 
permissions for participants and trainers to attend. 
2. Since our research suggests that BTC and Probation carry much of the responsibility in providing 
guidance and services to youth, the government needs to ensure that these entities have the 
resources they need to adequately fulfill the responsibilities within their scope, and that both entities 
are rigorously monitored. There are few recommendations that can be implemented in the near￾term to help with this: 
a. To ensure proper identification of gaps and root causes of issues at BTC, the government 
can consider conducting a deep study of the facility, including interviews with all members of 
staff, youth, and observations of day-to-day activities. The aim of these exercises would not 
be to find fault, but to identify strengths and weaknesses of the current operational 
strategies, and guide decision-makers on the resources the institution requires to fulfill its 
responsibilities and the types of changes that need to be made. Many of the issues at BTC 
seem to be related to staffing and management. Therefore, a Human Resources audit could 
be helpful for identifying precise recommendations for addressing these issues. 
b. A similar study can be conducted with the Department of Probation and Parole to 
understand how officers currently supervise youth, and what type of support would be most 
effective to help create a more systematic and rehabilitative experience. 
c. As discussed in the Diversion, Alternative Sentencing, and Probation section, the 
Department of Probation and Parole can consider designating one additional officer as fully 
dedicated to supervising juveniles to help provide more specialized and focused supervision 
and guidance for youth. 
3. Some stakeholders mentioned that a monitoring and evaluation mechanism is reportedly in place. 
However, use of systems does not appear to be consistent and reliable data appears to be lacking as 
stakeholders often could not provide the evaluation team with definitive numbers (e.g. number of 
juveniles at Bordelais, number of juveniles who have been diverted, number of female juvenile 
offenders, juvenile recidivism rates). Reliable data on a few key indicators should be captured on an 
ongoing basis to facilitate monitoring of progress and to help identify areas that may require further 
intervention. Since this information is held by multiple agencies, one challenge will be to identify who 
is responsible for collecting and reporting this information. The Ministry of Equity seems best placed 
to take on this responsibility. We include this as a near-term recommendation as this data could 
play an important role in informing St. Lucia’s long-term strategy. 
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4. In the near-term, to promote rehabilitation and successful re-entry after detention, the Ministry of 
Equity can:
a. Identify dedicated funding to expand and systematize BTC’s two-year aftercare program. 
From our interviews, it seems that even a small increase in funding for this program could 
make a tangible difference. This funding could be used to strengthen both pre-exit transition 
programming and planning at BTC, and post-exit follow-up with youth in their home 
environments. 
Recommendations that will require time and/or additional resources to implement:
5. To ensure that all stakeholders involved in the juvenile justice system are aware of their roles and 
responsibilities as per the CJA, the government should continue training and sensitization activities, 
including trainings on the proper process and procedures for handling cases involving juveniles. For 
the police in particular, these activities should not be limited to the Community Relations Branch, 
but training should be conducted for all officers on the force.
6. To ensure that diversion programs are utilized by youth, the government should consider logistical 
and financial provisions when finalizing the diversion strategy and protocols. For instance, some 
vocational skills programs are still paid, and youth may not have the funds to cover these fees.37
Additionally, sometimes youth also face barriers in finding transportation to reach places where 
programs are conducted. If provision can be made at the outset to budget for these costs to ensure 
access to programming during these planning stages, this may improve the actual uptake of programs 
and retention.
7. To ensure that juveniles are no longer sent to Bordelais, the government should seriously consider 
making changes to resources and infrastructure at BTC to make it better equipped to house 
juveniles charged with serious offenses. The changes that need to be made may be drastic, but the 
current status quo of sending juveniles to Bordelais and keeping them in a separate unit is not in 
compliance with the CJA, and our interviews suggest that Bordelais is not equipped to provide a 
rehabilitative environment for youth. 
8. In the long-term, to promote rehabilitation and successful re-entry after detention, the Ministry of 
Equity can:
a. Collaborate with the Ministry of Education in developing, executing, and monitoring 
educational and vocational programming provided to youth while in detention.
37 It is the researchers’ understanding that if the Court specifically appoints a child to a program, then youth and parents need 
not pay for this program. But in the majority of cases, the Court’s diversion order is for Supervision and Guidance to be 
provided by Probation. In this case, it is left to probation officers to design a supervision strategy for each youth. Some 
programs that probation officers typically refer youth to as part of their supervision strategy are paid programs. If the youth 
does not have the resources to pay, then probation officers work to source funds on a case-by-case basis.
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ST. KITTS AND NEVIS
We offer six topline recommendations for the Government of St. Kitts and Nevis and its international 
stakeholders to consider, organized into two categories: recommendations that can be implemented 
immediately, and recommendations that will require time and additional resources to implement: 
Recommendations that can be implemented in the near term:
1. To ensure coordination across agencies, adherence to case management protocols, and timely 
processing of cases, the Child Justice Committee should play a more proactive role in following 
juvenile cases through the justice system and intervening when appropriate to move matters along 
and advocate on behalf of the detained juvenile.
2. To ensure adherence to appropriate procedures for juvenile cases, training on juvenile justice 
matters should be incorporated into basic training for all new police recruits. This training should be 
reinforced through continuing education programs for all police officers and officials. Alongside 
these efforts, the police force should develop clear protocols and guidelines for police officers to 
follow for juvenile cases, and ensure these protocols are widely disseminated and followed
Recommendations that will require time and/or additional resources to implement:
3. To improve rehabilitation, reduce recidivism, and promote restorative justice principles, the Ministry 
of Social Development and Gender Affairs should redouble its efforts to establish dedicated pre- and 
post-trial diversion programs. This will require the Ministry to establish partnerships with local 
agencies, clubs, and youth organizations to vet and accredit programs to rehabilitate justice-involved 
juveniles. 
4. To ensure probation officers realize their potential when it comes to counseling juvenile 
probationers and helping them access available services and employment opportunities, the 
Department of Probation within the Ministry of Social Development and Gender Affairs should 
strengthen oversight of probation officers and mid-level managers and hold them accountable for 
successful case outcomes.
5. To facilitate coordination across agencies and prevent excessive delays in the processing of cases, an 
electronic case management system accessible to all agencies within the juvenile justice sector 
should be established. This database should be designed to track cases throughout the juvenile 
justice process, and to help the relevant agencies manage their cases and workloads effectively. 
6. To promote rehabilitation and successful re-entry after detention, the courts and the Ministry of 
Social Development and Gender Affairs should:
a. Make it standard practice to assign juveniles to probation after they are released from 
detention. Under the supervision of a probation officer, recently released juveniles can and 
should receive counseling, mentoring, and other forms of reintegration assistance.
b. Consider investing in transitional housing so that youth are not immediately reduced to 
adverse home environments and the same stressors that led to their detention.
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