EVALUATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 
SECTOR REFORM IMPLEMENTATION IN 
ST. LUCIA, ST. KITTS AND NEVIS, AND 
GUYANA
MIDLINE REPORT 
January 2020
This publication was prepared independently by Kevin Barnes-Ceeney and Lily Hoffman of Social Impact. 
It was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International Development as part of 
the Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance – Learning, Evaluation, and Research activity. 
EVALUATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE SECTOR 
REFORM IMPLEMENTATION IN ST. LUCIA, ST. 
KITTS AND NEVIS, AND GUYANA 
MIDLINE REPORT 
January 2020
AID-OAA-M-13-00011
DISCLAIMER 
The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States 
Agency for International Development or the United States Government.
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION.................................................................................................. 5
BACKGROUND ON REFORM 5
EVALUATION PURPOSE 8
USAID PROJECT BACKGROUND 8
EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODS 10
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 11
GUYANA..............................................................................................................17
LEGAL COMPLIANCE 17
COORDINATION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY 20
PRE-TRIAL DIVERSION AND ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING 23
DETENTION FACILITIES 25
ACCESS TO MEDICAL, MENTAL HEALTH, AND FAMILY SUPPORT 26
PROGRAMMING AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 27
PUNISHMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 27
PHYSICAL SPACE 29
REINTEGRATION 29
CONCLUSIONS 30
ST. LUCIA ............................................................................................................34
LEGAL COMPLIANCE 34
COORDINATION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY 35
PRE-TRIAL DIVERSION AND ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING 37
DETENTION FACILITIES 39
ACCESS TO MEDICAL, MENTAL HEALTH, AND FAMILY SUPPORT 40
PROGRAMMING AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 40
PUNISHMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 41
PHYSICAL SPACE 42
REINTEGRATION 42
CONCLUSIONS 42
ST. KITTS AND NEVIS ......................................................................................45
LEGAL COMPLIANCE 45
COORDINATION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY 46
PRE-TRIAL DIVERSION AND ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING 47
DETENTION FACILITIES 48
ACCESS TO MEDICAL, MENTAL HEALTH, AND FAMILY SUPPORT 48
PROGRAMMING AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 49
PUNISHMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 49
PHYSICAL SPACE 50
REINTEGRATION 50
CONCLUSION 50
OVERALL CONCLUSIONS...............................................................................52
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ALL THREE COUNTRIES 53
ANNEXES ............................................................................................................55
ANNEX I: TABLES 55
ANNEX II: REFERENCES 58
TABLES
Table 1: Legal Milestones Over Time .........................................................................................................................13
Table 2: Key Informants.................................................................................................................................................55
Table 3: Fieldwork Sites.................................................................................................................................................55
Table 4: Status of Programming in Detention Facilities..........................................................................................56
Table 5: Population in Detention Facilities................................................................................................................57
ACRONYMS
ART Aggression Replacement Training
BTC Boys Training Center
CJA Child Justice Act
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child
CSEC Caribbean Secondary Education Certificate
ESC Eastern and Southern Caribbean
GUY Guyana 
HMP Her Majesty’s Prison
IT Information Technology
JAC Juvenile Assessment Center
MAYSI Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument
NHC New Horizons Center
NOC New Opportunity Corps
OECS Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States
SAVRY Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth
SKN Saint Kitts and Nevis
SKYE Skills and Knowledge for Youth Empowerment
STL Saint Lucia
TBI To Be Implemented
UNCRC United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
US United States
USAID United States Agency for International Development
XCD East Caribbean Dollar
YES Youth Empowerment Services
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 5 
INTRODUCTION 
In response to rising crime rates, member states in the Caribbean have committed themselves to system￾wide juvenile justice reform in the region. Disproportionally high homicide and crime rates have 
engendered a need to prioritize reform on both a national and international level.1 The United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) has called for a shift in the status quo to both reduce crime rates and 
support the wellbeing of young people who are involved in the juvenile justice system. In response to the 
challenges of providing juvenile justice, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
is working to support member states in the transition of their juvenile justice systems from punitive to 
rehabilitative. USAID contracted Social Impact, Inc. to implement a longitudinal evaluation to examine the 
status of reform in St. Lucia (STL), St. Kitts and Nevis (SKN), and Guyana (GUY). 
This report presents midline findings of the longitudinal study which began in 2017. The evaluation draws 
from qualitative interviews with stakeholders, justice involved juveniles, and front-line staff working in 
juvenile justice systems in the three countries. It offers an update of the progress both on a systems and 
ground-level and is intended to support stakeholders and staff in their efforts to implement changes. It 
examines legislative changes, the implementation of stated acts, the process of formalizing diversion, 
facilities detaining justice involved young people, and re-integration, and provides suggestions for moving 
forward. This report draws on the experiences of staff, stakeholders, and young people who are living and 
working within the realities of the juvenile and criminal justice systems. It intends to provide a snapshot 
of the current status of juvenile justice to those jurisdictions and others looking to understand the 
complexities of implementing system-wide reforms. 
In the analysis that follows, we begin by reviewing the literature on juvenile justice reform, discussing 
USAID’s efforts to promote reform, and explaining the study methodology. Following the introductory 
material, we discuss each of the three countries in turn: Guyana, St. Lucia, and St. Kitts and Nevis. For
each country, we describe and explore changes in governing legislation, interagency cooperation, diversion 
and alternative sentencing, detention and conditions of confinement, and reintegration after detention. 
The bulk of the analysis is organized by country, rather than by research question, in order to provide 
each jurisdiction with a cohesive evaluation of progress made at midline toward respective juvenile justice 
system reform. 
BACKGROUND ON REFORM
Juvenile justice reform efforts in many countries have promoted diverting youth from the juvenile justice
system and detention facilities as a means to more effectively prevent recidivism. The term “diversion” is
often understood in several different ways. Most juvenile justice scholars view diversion as a pre-trial
1 UNDP 2016 Human Development Report available at 
http://www.bb.undp.org/content/barbados/en/home/presscenter/articles/2016/09/13/caribbean-human-development-report￾2016-launched.html; Gang violence takes rising toll on lives, threatens Caribbean economies, says UNDP. UNDP Latin America
and the Caribbean. Available at:
http://www.latinamerica.undp.org/content/rblac/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2012/02/08/gang-violence-takes-rising-toll￾in-lives-threatens-caribbean-economies-says-undp.html 
6 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
option which diverts youth away from the courts.2 This is also the focus of the 1985 United Nations 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (known as the Beijing Rules) and the 
1990 United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (known as the Riyadh
Guidelines). St. Kitts and Nevis’s Child Justice Act (CJA) (2013) similarly defines diversion as “the adoption 
of informal procedures, rather than formal court procedures, in relation to cases where it is alleged that 
a child has committed an offence.” However, other sources, including some USAID documentation, 
discuss both pre-trial and post-trial diversion.3 Post-trial diversion implies “diverting” youth from detention
rather than the courts. Finally, some view “diversion” broadly as diversion from a path to reoffending.4
These variations are largely the result of an evolution in thinking in juvenile justice reform. Early diversion
efforts aim to divert youth from the juvenile justice system to (a) reduce delinquency by limiting exposure
and stigma associated with the system and (b) reduce the administrative burden on the courts. Such diversion
is often done without conditions, alternatives, or requirements. For example, a police officer issuing a young
person a warning could be an example of diversion. Over time, however, diversion became more formalized, 
with youth not just being diverted away from the courts but diverted toward alternative programming with
a rehabilitative focus.5 By this logic, the same rehabilitative programming and focus can just as easily be
offered to youth by magistrates or judges as it can be by law enforcement or probation officers, reducing
the importance of where in the system a youth is diverted toward rehabilitative programming. To ensure
conceptual clarity, we follow the majority of scholarship and use the term diversion to refer to pre-trial
diversion, and we use the term “alternative sentencing” to refer to post-trial diversion.
Pre-trial diversion can take several forms. Diversion programs vary considerably depending on many 
factors, including the following: (1) the objectives of the program (e.g., saving judicial resources vs. reducing
recidivism), (2) who determines eligibility and provides oversight or services (e.g., police, probation, court
staff), (3) which youth are eligible (e.g., status offenders, youth accused of minor crimes), (4) the scope of 
any programming or oversight provided as part of diversion, (5) what is required of youth in diversion and 
what happens if they fail to comply, and (6) what are the incentives for youth to participate and what 
happens to the charges leveled against youth if they complete a program.6 As such, pre-trial diversion can
vary from informal “diversion,” whereby the police or courts provide a warning and release the youth 
without any conditions, services, or oversight, to more formalized diversion, whereby youth are screened
against eligibility criteria, sign an agreement laying out the conditions of the program, receive extensive
services, are closely overseen, and receive certain benefits following successful completion of the program. 
2 Blomberg, Thomas G. “Diversion’s Disparate Results and Unresolved Questions: An Integrative Evaluation Perspective.”
Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 20, no. 1 (January 1, 1983): 26; Frazier, Charles E., and John K. Cochran. “Official 
Intervention, Diversion from the Juvenile Justice System, and Dynamics of Human Services Work: Effects of a Reform Goal 
Based on Labeling Theory.” NPPA Journal 32, no. 2 (April 1, 1986): 157; Rodriguez, Nancy. “Restorative Justice at Work:
Examining the Impact of Restorative Justice Resolutions on Juvenile Recidivism.” Crime & Delinquency 53, no. 3 (July 1, 2007): 
363; Rojek, Dean G., and Maynard L. Erickson. “Reforming the Juvenile Justice System: The Diversion of Status Offenders.” Law 
& Society Review 16, no. 2 (1981): 243; Wilson, Holly A., and Robert D. Hoge. “The Effect of Youth Diversion Programs on
Recidivism: A Meta-Analytic Review.” Criminal Justice and Behavior 40, no. 5 (May 1, 2013): 505. 3 Kretschmar, Jeff M., Fredrick Butcher, Daniel J. Flannery, and Mark I. Singer. “Diverting Juvenile Justice-Involved Youth with 
Behavioral Health Issues from Detention: Preliminary Findings from Ohio’s Behavioral Health Juvenile Justice (BHJJ) Initiative.” 
Criminal Justice Policy Review 27, no. 3 (April 1, 2016): 305; Wong, Jennifer S., Jessica Bouchard, Jason Gravel, Martin
Bouchard, and Carlo Morselli. “Can At-Risk Youth Be Diverted From Crime?: A Meta-Analysis of Restorative Diversion
Programs.” Criminal Justice and Behavior 43, no. 10 (October 1, 2016): 1311. 4 Richards, Kelly (2014) Blurred lines: reconsidering the concept of ‘diversion’ in youth justice systems in Australia. Youth 
Justice: An International Journal, 14(2), pp. 122-139. 5 Frazier and Cochran. Official Intervention, Diversion from the Juvenile Justice System and Dynamics of Human Services Work
(1986)
6 Models for Change Juvenile Diversion Workgroup. Juvenile Diversion Guidebook. Models for Change. (2011) 
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 7 
There are many examples of pre-trial diversion; one from the United States (US) context is the Miami￾Dade County Post-Arrest Diversion Program.7 The program established a Juvenile Assessment Center
(JAC) within the police force. Once youth are arrested, they are sent to the JAC, where they undergo
formal risk and mental health assessments. Based on these assessments, JAC personnel use a wide network 
of community-based service providers to develop a treatment and supervisory plan. The approach involves
both the youth and their families, and parents/guardians must accept the terms of the treatment program 
and sign a deferred prosecution agreement. The program was found to have a positive impact on 
recidivism reduction.8
An example of post-trial (or post-conviction) diversion from the US is the Esperanza Program.9 As part
of a plea deal, or a sentence, the court can mandate a young person to Esperanza instead of sending that 
young person to serve time in a detention center. The program includes intensive individual and family
therapy, case management, educational and vocational support, and crisis response. It serves those 
under the age of 18 whose cases are heard either in family court or in Supreme/Criminal court and 
includes those with felony charges. The program provides a viable option for prosecutors and judges to 
support both adolescent wellbeing and accountability. 
An example of reform within detention facilities that has demonstrated a shift from punitive to 
rehabilitative is the Missouri Model, which has been implemented in several juvenile justice sectors 
throughout the US. The Missouri Model is an evidence-based approach to reducing the reliance on 
detention facilities by transferring detained youth to small community-based homes with a focus on 
therapy, formal education, integration into the community, and a reduction in the use of practices
associated with jails and prisons (cells, solitary confinement, use of force).10 The success of this model in
shifting from a punitive to a rehabilitative approach is rooted not only in a change of the physical
environment of detention facilities, but also in the provision of extensive programming, educational 
opportunities, and counseling. The Missouri Model has been implemented in several jurisdictions in the 
US with promising results. The model significantly reduced recidivism, created safer environments for the 
staff and youth (with a 14:1 difference in assault on staff members between traditional juvenile detention 
centers vs. those under the Missouri Model), increased retention in formal education (74.7 percent of 
children in custody under the Missouri Model completed a full year of school while confined for a year
versus 25 percent of the US national average of confined youth), reduced juvenile sentences, and cost the 
governments less per child than incarceration.11
These are not unique cases. Wilson and Hoge conducted a study of 73 pretrial diversion and alternative 
7 Cocozza, Joseph J., Bonita M. Veysey, Deborah A. Chapin, Richard Dembo, Wansley Walters, and Sylvia Farina. Diversion
from the Juvenile Justice System: The Miami-Dade Juvenile Assessment Center Post-Arrest Diversion Program. Substance Use
and Misuse 40 no. 7 (2005): 935-951. 8 Dembo, Richard, Wansley Walters, Jennifer Wareham, Catherimarty Burgos, James Schmeidler, Robert Hoge, and Lee
Underwood. Evaluation of an Innovative Post-Arrest Diversion Program: 12-Month Recidivism Analysis 47, no. 4 (2008): 256-
384. 
9 Esperanza Program. Available online at: https://www.esperanzany.org 10 Mendel, RA. The Missouri Model: Reinventing the Practice of Rehabilitating Youthful Offenders. Baltimore, MD: The Annie E. Casey
Foundation (2010). Jails are typically defined as short-term (less than one year) detention facilities and prisons are defined as 
long-term facilities. In practice the terms are often used interchangeably. For example, in Guyana the Timerhi Prison would be 
considered a “jail” by this standard. 11 11 Mendel, RA. The Missouri Model: Reinventing the Practice of Rehabilitating Youthful Offenders. Baltimore, MD: The Annie E. 
Casey Foundation (2010). Jails are typically defined as short-term (less than one year) detention facilities and prisons are defined
as long-term facilities. In practice the terms are often used interchangeably. For example, in Guyana the Timerhi Prison would
be considered a “jail” by this standard.
8 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
sentencing programs consisting of 14,573 youth offenders and compared them to 18,840 juveniles
processed in the traditional justice system to assess the rate of recidivism in each group. The authors
found that “in 60 of the 73 diversion programs, the recidivism rate of diverted youth was lower than that 
of youth processed by traditional justice system.”12
Given the promise of a more rehabilitative and less punitive approach, USAID and other donors have been
promoting juvenile justice sector reforms similar to these. Diversionary programming and a rehabilitative
approach to justice are relatively new in the Eastern and Southern Caribbean (ESC). The 2015 USAID Status
Report on the Juvenile Justice Sector in Selected Territories in the Eastern and Southern Caribbean
concluded that: 
“Antiquated legislation with a punitive orientation, the low age of criminal responsibility, the
absence of pre-trial diversionary measures, limited sentencing options, a lack of emphasis on 
restorative justice practices, rehabilitation and reintegration are some of the notable
characteristics of the mostly archaic juvenile justice system of the Caribbean territories.”13
This evaluation will provide valuable learning on the challenges to carrying out such a transition.
EVALUATION PURPOSE 
This implementation study seeks to understand if juvenile justice sector reforms in the three countries
have been successfully implemented. This is no small undertaking, as there are enormous challenges in
transitioning a juvenile justice system away from a detention-based, punitive approach to a diversionary
and rehabilitation-based approach. Such a reform requires legislative changes, political will, resources, and 
a cultural shift in the justice sector. As a result, this aspect of the evaluation focuses on the implementation 
of reforms and builds on existing research to track the status and quality of reform efforts in each of the
three countries. 
This midline assessment of reform implementation is intended to provide a reference point against which
to measure progress over a five-year period and to inform USAID’s Youth Empowerment Services (YES) 
activities. Specifically, we are examining what steps have been taken to implement juvenile justice reform
and what challenges stakeholders face in relation to furthering juvenile justice reform. We also hope that 
this qualitative evaluation will be a useful resource for stakeholders and staff in the juvenile justice systems
of St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Guyana, and for those interested in the implementation of system￾wide juvenile and criminal justice reform efforts. 
USAID PROJECT BACKGROUND
Reducing youth involvement in crime and violence is a priority for countries in the ESC.14 The region has 
recently experienced an increase in the rate of homicide and other violent crimes, which were partially 
attributed to “troublesome” youth groups.15 The slow economic growth following the 2009 global 
recession has made job opportunities for youth harder to come by. Scholars further point to unfavorable
12 Wilson, Holly A., and Robert D. Hoge. “The Effect of Youth Diversion Programs on Recidivism: A Meta-Analytic Review.”
Criminal Justice and Behavior 40, no. 5 (May 1, 2013): 505. 13 Forde. Status Report, pg. 2. 14 USAID PAD, December 9th, 2015. 15 Katz, Charles, and Lidia E. Nuño. Prevalence and Patterns of Troublesome Youth Groups in the Caribbean: Final Report. 
January 2017.
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 9 
trade negotiations, international corporate interests, and high rates of public debt as factors contributing
to the slow economic growth.16 In turn, informal economies such as the drug trade provide an alternative 
to those who have historically been excluded from or lack access to formal economies.17 This often 
includes youth, especially those who are racially and socioeconomically marginalized. 
In response, in 2016 USAID launched its five-year YES initiative, which seeks to reduce juvenile crime and 
violence in the Eastern Caribbean by applying a public health framework to crime reduction and violence
prevention. The public health model of crime prevention is a proactive approach to juvenile justice, which
focuses on reducing risk and increasing resiliency for at-risk youth and justice-involved youth. 18 The
framework offers an alternative to reliance on the courts and incarceration by focusing on rehabilitation 
and implementing a practical, scientifically based approach to promote and maintain prosocial behavior.19
More specifically, the YES initiative seeks to improve the management of juveniles in conflict with the law.
The YES initiative builds off previous USAID programs and partnerships developed in the region that were
designed to address the concerns of youth crime and violence. In October 2011, USAID and the 
Organization of the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) launched the Juvenile Justice Reform Project Part I,
which ran until 2016. The project’s aim was to facilitate the reformation of the juvenile justice systems in
six countries, including St. Lucia and St. Kitts and Nevis. The goal was to strengthen the juvenile justice
process through the application of national and sub-regional measures to improve the life circumstances
of youth in conflict with the law, with a strong focus on rehabilitation and reintegration.20 More specifically,
the initiative aimed to: 
(1) Improve the legal and regulatory frameworks by drafting model legislation and promoting a 
national juvenile justice strategy. 
(2) Build capacity for effective justice administration through trainings, development of operating 
procedures, and introduction of case management software and screening tools. 
(3) Modernize diversion, detention, and rehabilitative processes through investments in detention 
facilities and promotion of alternative sentencing options. 
(4) Improve linkages with civil society through public awareness and education activities.21
In Guyana, USAID also funded the Skills and Knowledge for Youth Empowerment (SKYE) project, which
also concluded in December 2016. The SKYE project sought to reduce youth crime and violence through 
targeted alternative sentencing, work readiness training, entrepreneurship development, and livelihood
16 Nunn, N. (2007). Slavery, inequality, and economic development in the Americas: An examination of the Engerman-Sokoloff
Hypothesis. Retrieved from: http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/nunn/files/domestic_slavery.pdf; Engerman, S.L., & Sokoloff K.L.
(2004). Factor endowments, inequality, and paths of development among new world economies. Working paper 9259, National
Bureau of Economic Research. 17 Berkman, H. (2007). Social exclusion and violence in Latin America and the Caribbean. Working paper #613. Inter-American
Development Bank. Retrieved from: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1820903 18 Welsh, Brandon (2005). Public Health and the Prevention of Juvenile Criminal Violence. Youth Violence and Juvenile Justice, Vol.
3 No. 1, January 2005 23-40; Office of the Surgeon General (2001). Youth Violence: A Report of the Surgeon General. Washington, 
DC: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Secretary, Office of Public Health and Science, Office of the 
Surgeon General. Retrieved from www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence; Development Services Group, Inc. (2000). 
Prevention. Literature Review. Washington, DC.: Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
http://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/Prevention.pdf
19 Hamburg, M. A. (1998). Youth Violence is A Public Health Concern. In D. S. Elliott, B. A. Hamburg, and K. R. Williams (eds.).
Violence in American Schools: A New Perspective. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press. 20 USAID. St. Lucian Youth Benefit from Juvenile Justice Reform. (March 30, 2016). https://www.usaid.gov/eastern-and-southern￾caribbean/news-information/press-releases/st-lucian-youth-benefit-juvenile 21 USAID. Juvenile Justice Reform Program for the OECS. (no date). 
10 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
coaching. SKYE originally targeted 2,000 youth who were identified as being ill-prepared for integration 
into the workforce, focusing on those who had dropped out of high school and/or were in conflict with
the law. SKYE was also expected to build capacity of local partner organizations, relevant government 
ministries, and the court system.22
The current YES project aims to build on these previous initiatives to ensure that youth in conflict with
the law are rehabilitated and reintegrated into society. More specifically, YES’s juvenile justice initiatives
aim to ensure that: 
(1) Model laws, regulations, policies and protocols are implemented in target countries.
(2) Youth in conflict with the law are placed in diversion programs. 
(3) Detention centers and diversion programs provide rehabilitative and support services sufficient
to reduce recidivism. 
(4) Youth leaving diversion programs and detention facilities successfully reintegrate into
communities.23
To achieve these outcomes, since 2018, USAID has supported the implementation of the CJA of 2018, 
which focuses on administrative reform in key institutions that manage youth who are in conflict with the 
law and provides technical assistance to the Office of Director of Juvenile Justice. The focus of this report
is on the implementation of these reform processes, including legal reform, juvenile justice sector 
management, development and use of pre-trial diversion programs, court processes and the development
and use of alternative sentencing options, rehabilitation options in detention facilities, and reintegration 
efforts. 
EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODS 
This implementation study uses a comparative, longitudinal qualitative approach. We examine three 
countries, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, and Guyana, at three different points in time: baseline (early 2017), 
midline (2019), and endline (2021). The midline report builds on the baseline report, which presented the 
baseline status of juvenile justice reform in the three countries. 
Midline qualitative data collection took place in St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Lucia in March 2019 and Guyana 
in May 2019. Data collection included interviews with: 
• 23 government officials, probation officers, detention facility staff, officers of the court systems, 
policy officers in St. Lucia; 24 in St. Kitts and Nevis and 30 in Guyana; 
• 12 youth in detention in St. Lucia; 11 in St. Kitts and Nevis; and 19 in Guyana; 
• 14 youth from the community in St. Lucia; two in St. Kitts and Nevis; and six in Guyana (See Table 
2). 
The research team maintained a sampling frame and made efforts to interview both higher and lower￾level staff providing juvenile justice services. The team aimed to gain geographic diversity in each of the 
three countries and to interview young people who were impacted by juvenile justice reforms. Prior to 
22 EDC. Skills and Knowledge for Youth Employment (SKYE). (nd) http://www.edc.org/skills-and-knowledge-youth-employment￾skye; USAID (2017). Citizen Security. Retrieved from: https://www.usaid.gov/barbados/citizen-security 23 USAID/ESC. Youth Empowerment Services (YES) Project Appraisal Document. (Dec 2015)
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 11
interviews, researchers obtained verbal informed consent and assured participants that personally 
identifiable information about them would be kept confidential. 
The interviews focused on current progress made toward juvenile justice reforms and inter– and intra￾organizational implementation challenges. Researchers followed an interview protocol; however, the semi￾structured nature of the interview allowed interviewers to follow alternative lines of inquiry and prompts 
when necessary. Where possible, researchers recorded interviews which were transcribed. In the absence 
of recordings, researchers took extensive notes. To protect participants’ confidentiality, the researchers 
avoided describing the job titles or places of employment when presenting direct quotes. Researchers 
read the Juvenile or CJAs when available and considered stakeholder comments in light of each country’s 
current juvenile justice legislation. Where legislation was unavailable, researchers utilized stakeholder 
transcripts to understand the relevant act. The following country-by-country report is drawn from 
stakeholder interviews, analysis of documents provided by participants during the interviews, and a review 
of legislation. 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS
This midline evaluation report seeks to answer the following questions which are replicated from the 
baseline implementation study conducted in 2017: 
Q1: HAVE MILESTONES IN THE JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM PROCESS BEEN ACHIEVED? 
IF NOT, WHY NOT?
To aid comparison, we follow the same format as the baseline evaluation report, by breaking individual
milestones into the following categories: legal compliance, coordination with juvenile justice service 
delivery, pretrial diversion and alternative sentencing, detention facilities, and reintegration. 
A summary of the progress made toward these juvenile justice reform milestones over the last four years 
can be seen in Table 1 below. For the purposes of the table, we determined the criteria for responses 
(yes/no) in each of these categories as follows:
• Legal compliance: To evaluate the level of legal compliance in the juvenile justice reform process, 
we ask whether the age of criminal responsibility complies with the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). We have taken the “absolute minimum age” of 12 years old 
as the benchmark for this report, although we acknowledge that the United Nations considers 
countries that raise the minimum age of criminal responsibility to 14 or 16 as “commendable.” 24
In addition, we also ask whether the model legislation has been enacted. We interpret “enacted” 
as meaning steps have been taken to implement juvenile justice reforms following passage of 
relevant legislation.
• Coordination in juvenile justice service delivery: Two critical pieces of evidence of coordination 
in juvenile justice service delivery are 1) whether administrative systems that detail how and when 
agencies work together are in operation, and 2) whether risk assessment and case management 
systems are in operation. Risk assessment involves comprehensive identification of key factors 
that have been shown through research to increase (or decrease) the likelihood of delinquency. 
Case management is the tri-fold administrative procedure through which risks are assessed, 
24 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), General comment No. 10 (2007): Children's Rights in
Juvenile Justice, 25 April 2007, CRC/C/GC/10.
12 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
resources identified, and the individual’s progress toward risk reduction followed to determine if 
adjustments need to be made.25 To evaluate whether coordination in juvenile justice delivery was 
occurring, we determined whether there were written procedures and protocols in place 
supporting inter-agency cooperation on juvenile justice issues, or looked for evidence of 
collaborative partnerships and inter-agency meetings to further juvenile justice reform in the 
interview transcripts. In addition, we considered whether there was integrated delivery of services 
with respect to juveniles, and/or the existence of risk, mental health and substance abuse 
assessments. This is a slight deviation from the inquiry conducted at baseline, which asked whether 
there was fragmentation in the delivery of services with respect to juveniles. We changed the 
emphasis from “fragmentation” to “integration” to make the table easier to digest, as the 
evaluation responses can now be interpreted in the same direction (i.e., yes means the country’s 
juvenile justice system has improved along this measure). Finally, we examined whether an 
electronic case management system was currently being implemented. 
• Pre-trial diversion and alternative sentencing: Pre-trial diversion programming is any formal 
program or initiative that seeks to divert a young person from the justice system. Although access 
to diversionary programming is typically stipulated by the courts, a young person may be diverted 
from the justice system at a number of junctures in the juvenile justice system. Thus, a young 
person may be diverted from the justice system prior to arrest, immediately post arrest, or at the 
initial hearing. To determine whether pre-trial diversion programs were in place, we looked for 
any evidence of formal diversionary programming at any stage in the pre-trial process. In addition, 
we asked whether alternative sentencing options were in place. Alternative sentencing refers to 
courts sentencing young people to alternatives to incarceration, such as probation or community 
service projects. 
• Detention facilities: We consider three key questions when evaluating progress toward improving 
detention facilities. First, are there separate accommodations for children in conflict with the law
versus children in need of care? Although such legal categories are somewhat arbitrary, given that 
children in conflict with the law are also in need of care, it is a low bar of juvenile justice reform 
to ensure that children are not incarcerated because of neglect, abuse, or familial difficulties.
Second, are there gender-specific accommodations in detention facilities? Third, are the facilities 
adequate for meeting basic shelter and health needs, adequate for the work of rehabilitating 
juveniles, and are the facilities in a good state of repair, including with adequate lighting and 
ventilation? 
• Reintegration: To evaluate reintegration, we examined whether formal protocols, procedures and 
programming to support young people transitioning from detention back into the community
were operational. Such reintegrative support could include family work interventions, substance 
abuse treatment, work to facilitate the young person’s re-engagement with school, and 
preparation for employment. In addition, we examined whether restorative justice practices were 
being implemented, including forums where young people meet with victims and community 
members to make reparation and begin a shared process of healing. Finally, we examined whether 
systems were operational to monitor young people as they transition from detention to the 
community. 
25 See: Barnes-Ceeney, 2018 
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Although Table 1 facilitates quick comparison between countries, it is important to understand nuance 
and context. One can gain a richer understanding from the qualitative analysis in the country-by country 
sections of this report. 
Table 1: Legal Milestones Over Time
Indicators GUY
2015
GUY
2017
GUY
2019
SKN
2015
SKN
2017
SKN
2019
STL
2015
STL
2017
STL
2019
LEGAL MILESTONES
Is the age of criminal
responsibility in compliance with
UNCRC?
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Has the Model legislation been
enacted? No No Yes Yes Yes TBI No No Yes
COORDINATION WITH 
JUVENILE JUSTICE SERVICE 
DELIVERY
Are there documented
procedures & protocols for inter￾agency cooperation on juvenile
issues? *
TBI - Yes No - TBI No - Yes
Is there integrated delivery of
services with respect to juveniles? Yes No Yes - No Yes No No Yes
Is there mental health and
substance abuse assessment
and/or criminal risk factor tool in
use the Structured Assessment of 
Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY)?
No No Yes TBI TBI Yes TBI TBI Yes
Are there electronic Case
Management tools in use (e.g.,
TheraScribe)?
No No No No TBI No No TBI TBI
PRE-TRIAL DIVERSION AND 
ALTERNATIVE 
SENTENCING
Are pre-trial diversion programs
in place? Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Are alternative sentencing
programs in place? Yes No No - No No Yes Yes No
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 14
DETENTION FACILITIES
Are there separate 
accommodations for children in 
conflict with the law versus those 
in need of care?
Yes Yes** Yes 
(no)** Yes Yes** No No No No
Are there detention facilities for
female juveniles? Yes Yes*** Yes*** Yes Yes Yes*** No No No
Are facilities adequate and in
good repair? Yes No No Yes Yes Yes No No No
REINTEGRATION 
Are there reintegration programs
for juveniles leaving detention
centers?
Don’t
Know No No No No No No No TBI
Are there restorative justice
practices in use? No No No Yes No No Yes No No
Are systems in place for
monitoring the progress of youth 
offenders on their release?
No No No No No No No No No
Source: 2015 data from Forde (2015); 2017 data collected at baseline evaluation; 2019 data collected by authors. Note: TBI 
stands for “to be implemented.” * Data was not collected on agency procedures. **Despite separate accommodations 
existing, children in need of care and protection are still detained with children in conflict with the law in juvenile detention 
facilities. *** Females are housed at the primarily male facilities (New Opportunity Corps (NOC)/New Horizons Center 
(NHC)), not in their own separate facility.
Q2: HOW MANY YOUTHS ARE ENROLLED IN DIVERSION PROGRAMS COMPARED 
WITH YOUTH IN MORE TRADITIONAL PROGRAMS (E.G., DETENTION, CUSTODY)? 
ARE THERE CHANGES IN THESE RATIOS OVER TIME? IF DIVERSIONARY PROGRAMS 
ARE NOT BEING USED, WHY NOT?
Detention: We were able to estimate the number of young people held in detention facilities (see Table 
5 in Annex 1). We estimate 38 youths in detention in St. Lucia; 16 in St. Kitts and Nevis; and 85 in Guyana. 
Though these are only estimates, the number of youths in detention in St. Lucia and Guyana decreased 
since baseline while the number of youths in detention in St. Lucia increased. 
Pre-trial diversion and alternative sentencing: We were unable to identify the exact number of
young people enrolled in diversion programs. Formal diversionary programs had either never been 
implemented, were not currently operational, or were more informal in nature, or data was not available
on such programming. 
In Guyana, some stakeholders considered diversionary programming to be at an “embryonic stage.” The 
organization serving the most youth is the Cops and Faith Community Network. Since its inception in 
2013, an estimated 547 young people engaging in low-level acts of delinquency have received some form 
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of diversionary services. Since baseline, there appears to be an increased role for probation officers in the 
provision of diversionary programs. We estimate that about 100 young people in Guyana are engaged in 
voluntary supervision. Fewer young people were mandated by the courts to attend probation, and even 
fewer were placed on a “bond for recidivism.” Although the number of young people receiving formal 
diversionary programming is small, it is promising that more forms of diversionary programming were 
reportedly operational than identified during the baseline evaluation. 
In St. Lucia, formal court-mandated diversionary programming was not operational. However, there are 
police-led diversionary programs, including police-facilitated summer camps and after school clubs for at￾risk youth. The existence of police-led diversionary programming is an important development compared 
to the baseline evaluation, which identified zero youths receiving diversionary programming. Other 
diversionary programming includes Probation Officers implementing evidence-based Aggression 
Replacement Training (ART). Probation officers have offered such a training on five occasions since 2015, 
in both detention and community settings, and recent trainings of ART trainers reflects ART’s
sustainability. Furthermore, recently, a juvenile specialist probation officer was established which
represents a positive step toward developing formal, youth-specific diversionary services. 
Similarly, St. Kitts lacked formal diversionary programming. This was because the Child Justice Committee 
was not operational. Stakeholders reported that pre-arrest diversion, which appeared to be informal 
diversion through police discretionary decision-making, was in operation. Youth identified by police may 
attend a roundtable with parents and police with the goal of determining a reasonable response to low 
level delinquent acts. Such responses may come in the form of police-issued warnings to the child, or the 
young person making an apology. Compared to baseline, pre-arrest diversionary efforts have improved. 
In Nevis, stakeholders identified two diversionary programs: The Boys and Girls Checkers club and the 
YES program. The Boys and Girls Checkers club, facilitated by probation officers, operates in a local school
and teaches at-risk youth thinking skills and character development. Approximately 20-30 youth attend 
each session. The emergence of the checkers club is an important development since baseline. The YES 
program provides vocational skills training to 49 youth and young adults aged 16-29 years old and has 
been ongoing since baseline. 
Q3: WHAT IS THE QUALITY AND PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS OF COURT, 
DIVERSIONARY/ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, REHABILITATION, AND REINTEGRATION 
PROCESSES? ARE THERE CHANGES OVER TIME? WHERE PROGRAMMING IS WEAK, 
WHAT ARE THE OBSTACLES TO IMPROVEMENT?
In this midline evaluation, we asked stakeholders about their perceptions of the quality and effectiveness 
of the courts, diversionary programs, alternative sentencing and reintegration processes, and we tried to 
reflect their voices in the country-by-country analyses. 
In Guyana, opening the Children’s Court is an improvement since the baseline evaluation. There remains, 
however, a critical need for formal pre- or post- conviction diversion options once a juvenile is in the 
court system. There is also an urgent need to deliver formal diversionary and alternative sentencing
options. The Department of Probation is playing a greater role assisting the court during proceedings and 
supervising voluntary and mandated young people than at baseline; however, probation officers need 
computers to effectively manage their workload. There is also a need for the development and delivery 
of a range of rehabilitative programming. Programs should focus on reducing key risk factors and bolstering 
protective factors associated with juvenile delinquency. It is hoped that the creation of the Department 
16 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
of Juvenile Justice and the Juvenile Justice Committee will provide the vision and impetus to guide the 
development of a broad range of treatment options. 
In St. Lucia, there is a lack of formal diversionary and alternative sentencing programs. Since baseline, the
Department of Probation and Parole Services has made significant changes in staffing structures to support 
alternative sentencing. As part of their efforts to prepare for the juvenile justice reforms, they have
adopted and implemented empirically grounded risk assessment tools. However, there is a need to 
develop and deliver a range of rehabilitative programming. Programs should focus on reducing key risk 
factors and bolstering protective factors associated with juvenile delinquency. The need for more 
probation staff is paramount in order to ensure that growing caseloads are effectively supervised, and 
appropriate programming developed. 
In St. Kitts and Nevis there is an urgent need for both diversionary and alternative sentencing programming
for children in conflict with the law. It is necessary to operationalize the Child Justice Committee in order 
to advance juvenile justice reforms. 
Q4: HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT REFORM EFFORTS WILL BE INSTITUTIONALIZED AND BE 
SUSTAINABLE? IF IT IS UNLIKELY, WHY NOT?
While recognizing that progress toward goals is often nonlinear and complex, we have drawn on our 
interviews with stakeholders, our knowledge of the juvenile justice implementation literature, and our 
own experience of developing justice interventions in the US and the Caribbean, to determine the steps 
that need to be taken to ensure the highest likelihood of continued progress toward juvenile justice 
reforms. At present, it is likely that juvenile justice reforms will become institutionalized in Guyana. 
Following the passage of legislation, Guyana has a dedicated Department of Juvenile Justice and a Juvenile 
Justice Committee committed to coordinating the implementation of the legislation. In St. Lucia, it is 
somewhat likely that reform efforts will be institutionalized and sustainable, but this depends on the 
development and implementation of the Initial Inquiry. The Initial Inquiry is the key meeting where the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, the child and his or her parents, a probation officer and the victim 
consider the suitability of the child for diversion. Without the Initial Inquiry, succeeding diversionary 
options are unlikely to become institutionalized. In both Guyana and St. Lucia, steps have been taken since 
baseline to legislate and coordinate the juvenile justice reform process. Without significant shifts occurring, 
reform in St. Kitts and Nevis is unlikely to be sustained. Although stakeholders in St. Kitts and Nevis desire 
juvenile justice reform and passed some reforms prior to the baseline study, the country’s reforms are 
likely to remain at an impasse until the Child Justice Committee is operational. 
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GUYANA 
LEGAL COMPLIANCE 
Guyana passed the Juvenile Justice Act in April 2018, marking a significant milestone in its efforts toward 
juvenile justice reform. In the discussion that follows, we highlight several of the positive changes 
envisioned by the act. Nonetheless, the passage of new legislation does not ensure successful 
implementation, and as such, we distinguish between intended reforms and actual changes in practice. We 
also note obstacles to implementation. 
In the broadest sense, the Juvenile Justice Act of 2018 stipulates that the juvenile justice policy is intended 
to “further the wellbeing of juveniles”26 and should focus on encouraging the young persons’ rehabilitation, 
education and reintegration.27 As one stakeholder described:
“[The purpose of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2018 is] really to ensure that children are well cared for. The 
best interests of the child is the overriding objective and just realizing that having the child away from the 
justice system is more beneficial than having them become a part of the system.” 
It seeks to accomplish this through several important changes. First, the Juvenile Justice Act of 2018 raises 
the age of criminal responsibility from ten years old to 14 years old and defines a juvenile as someone 
who appears to be 14 years old or older and less than 18 years old. The Juvenile Justice Act of 2018 
includes the presumption that no child under the age of 14 shall be capable of or guilty of committing an 
offense, unless this principle known as doli incapax can be rebutted. If the presumption is not rebutted, 
children under the age of 14 are referred to the Childcare and Protection Agency and charges are 
withdrawn. Furthermore, young people who commit an offense as a juvenile but turn 18 by the time the
offense is processed by the courts are processed as juveniles, not adults.
Second, the reform decriminalizes wandering, a status offense that allows for the detention of youth left 
unsupervised in public spaces. This status offense was previously one of the most common charges 
resulting in detention and a major concern raised at baseline. As a stakeholder commented:
“If a child runs away from home, as ludicrous as it was, the police could charge him and send them into 
the juvenile justice system. That happened for decades. But, [with] the new law now, that’s one of the 
positive outcomes, because I was at Holding Center a few weeks ago and there were no charges being 
laid for wandering.” 
Third, the legislation creates a Children’s Court in Georgetown, which opened in October of 2018. The 
children’s courtroom is separated from the criminal court entrance, and the specific magistrates are
designated with juvenile responsibilities. These changes help develop the clear understanding that the justice 
system must treat children in conflict of the law differently than adults. However, juveniles charged with 
serious violent crimes (murder, manslaughter, sexual offenses, etc.) are still committed to the high court, so
the ability for juvenile offenders to access a reformed court process is limited based on the charge. As the 
treatment and rehabilitation of juveniles becomes the driving concern of all juvenile justice actors, one hopes
26 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part I, 3(a)i) 27 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part I, 3(b)ii) 
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that the Children’s Court will develop procedures and language that are child friendly. Such a shift will
hopefully be nurtured as the Children’s Court strives to comply with the Juvenile Justice Act.
Fourth, the act exempts children and juveniles from being sentenced to death28 or imprisonment,29 and 
when the juvenile is found guilty, this finding is not documented in their record as a conviction.30 The 
courts’ response to a young person’s offending should be meaningful and proportionate, while recognizing 
the young person’s “greater dependency and reduced level of maturity.”31 Detention should only be used 
“as a last resort”32 and should be “safe, fair, and humane.”33 Furthermore, if under the age of 18, the young 
person should be held “separate and apart from any adult who is detained or held in custody.”34
Additionally, periods of custody should be served in an “open residential facility.”
35
Fifth, the act encourages diversion. The Juvenile Justice Act of 2018 defines diversion as “the diversion of 
a juvenile away from formal court procedures to informal court procedures.”36 Diversion measures may 
include an oral or written apology, placement under the supervision and guidance of the Childcare and 
Protection Agency, referral to counseling or therapy, compulsory attendance at an educational or 
vocational establishment, restitution, community service, or service or compensation to a specified victim. 
Diversion options cannot be used if the young person either denies committing the offense or wishes that 
the matter be dealt with by the court. The young person’s successful completion of the diversionary 
option will result in charges being dropped. Partial completion of the diversionary option may also result 
in the dropping of charges if further prosecution is considered unfair given the young person’s particular 
circumstances. Previous completion of a diversionary option or a previous conviction does not preclude 
the young person from receiving diversion again.37
As will be discussed below in greater detail, implementation of this section of the law remains at a 
somewhat incipient state. Under the act, the Director of Youth is responsible for the development of 
diversionary measures in Guyana. Before a young person appears in court, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions or the police must consider whether to take no further action, issue a warning or refer the 
young person to a diversionary option. The act uses language reflective of elements of restorative justice. 
For example, measures taken against juveniles should promote reconciliation between the young person 
and the victim and encourage the repair of harm done to victims and the community. However, the act 
does not specifically recognize any prior harm to youth in conflict with the law by the juvenile justice 
system pre-reform. Repairing the harms previously done to young people in conflict with the law can be 
an important step in the restorative process. 
Sixth, the Juvenile Justice Act of 2018 establishes a Juvenile Justice Committee comprised of nine people. 
These include a Chairperson, a Deputy Chairperson, an attorney-at-law, a retired probation officer who 
previously served in a senior capacity, a retired head of a vocational institution, and four other people 
with “skills, knowledge, experience and training in matters relating to juveniles, sociology, social work, 
28 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VI, 38(4)) 29 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VI, 41) 30 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VI, 42) 31 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part I, 3(b)iii) 32 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part I, 3(c)vi) 33 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VIII, 71 (1)(a)) 34 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VIII, 72) 35 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VI, 43(k) 36 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Cap. 1:01) 
37 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part I, 5(2)(a))
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and psychology.”38 The Juvenile Justice Committee appoints juvenile justice facilities’ staff and will be 
responsible for hearing complaints from incarcerated juveniles as well as initiating investigations and taking 
appropriate actions based on the recommendations of investigations. 
In summary, the passage of legislation represents a significant improvement from the baseline evaluation. 
Several aspects of the act are already in effect, including the classification of those under 14 as children, 
the development of the Children's Court, and the establishment of the Juvenile Justice Committee. Other 
aspects of the act have yet to be implemented. These include establishment of different and respective 
open and closed facilities for housing juveniles in conflict with the law, complete abolition of corporal 
punishment in detention facilities, terminating punishment considered to be “cruel and unusual” (i.e., 
solitary confinement) in detention facilities, and operationalizing diversionary programs.
There are several significant challenges to complete implementation of the act, including (1) lack of an 
ideological shift required for improved care of juveniles, (2) economic challenges, and (3) inter-agency 
coordination challenges. Such work takes time and some stakeholders were frustrated by the sluggishness
of the juvenile justice reforms. As one stakeholder stated:
“The Juvenile Justice Bill took almost a decade in gestation, and then it came into being late last year. So, 
the whole process for me is that it took so long, and, even now, much of what the new juvenile justice law 
requires is taking a long time to come into being. A lot of things are still not in place.” 
Many of the stakeholders interviewed recognized the significant ideological shift the Juvenile Justice Act 
2018 heralds for individuals and institutions. As one stakeholder noted:
“When it comes to juveniles in conflict with the law, everything should be geared toward rehabilitation. The 
way you speak with them, the way you interact with them, everything should be geared toward rehabilitation. 
From the time the juvenile enters the juvenile justice process or the system, from the time they get to the 
level of the police, from the time they go to court, everything should be geared toward rehabilitation.” 
Acknowledging that the reforms heralded by the act impact young people at all stages of the juvenile 
justice process, and that all juvenile justice actors, including policy, court, probation, and detention facility 
staff, require reorientation to meet the ideological shift is a fundamental building block of juvenile justice 
reform. This is particularly the case in the detention centers, where, as will be discussed in greater detail 
below, we find continued evidence of punitive and non-rehabilitative practices, including solidarity 
confinement and physical abuse. 
In a related vein, ongoing public sensitization to the Juvenile Justice Act is required to engender and sustain 
a cultural shift toward the treatment and rehabilitation of juveniles in conflict with the law. In this respect, 
it is positive that the act is publicly accessible online and was widely covered by national and local news 
outlets. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) has also produced a guide to the Juvenile Justice 
Act in order to facilitate the exchange of knowledge concerning the juvenile justice reforms.39 The 
implementation of an ongoing program of public sensitization is important to encourage widespread 
support of the juvenile justice reforms outlined in the Juvenile Justice Act of 2018.
38 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VIII, 82(3)) 39 UNICEF (2018) A guide to the Juvenile Justice Act, 2018. Retrieved from http://www.un.org.gy/un-media/publications/a-guide-to￾juvenile-justice-act-2018
20 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
There are also major economic barriers to implementation. These include the need for financial support 
for halfway houses and the development and implementation of diversion programs and alternative 
sentencing. Although decriminalizing wandering is important and ensures that a significant number of young 
people are not unnecessarily detained, it is imperative that services are funded to address why children 
run away. Given that young people often run away from home to escape physical, sexual, and emotional 
abuse and neglect, it is important that requisite resources are channeled to social services to address the 
traumas that the youth experienced. As one stakeholder explained:
“Well, that is one of the shortcomings that’s being created. With the new law the Government is supposed to 
have increased budgetary allocations to the children homes and alternative care centers, that will rescue children 
in such a situation. That is yet to be achieved, so there is no place—well, there are places, but they don’t have 
the facilities to intake children who are leaving the home because of various forms of abuse.” 
Part of implementing the juvenile justice act will be supporting stakeholders and staff in working through 
the complexities of juvenile justice. The challenge of inter-institutional collaboration and coordination is 
addressed in the next section. 
COORDINATION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY
Many stakeholders recognized that the biggest hurdle facing implementation of the juvenile justice reforms 
is coordination. As one stakeholder explained:
“For the agencies, I think it’s a matter of collaborating, everyone coming onboard and beginning to work 
together to see the Act being implemented. I think it’s the lack of coordination that is the biggest hurdle.” 
The Department of Juvenile Justice, formed in January 2019, fully acknowledges the need to work toward 
greater coordination among juvenile justice stakeholders. The department has conducted a rigorous 
stakeholder mapping exercise and has identified a number of youth programs that could form the 
foundation of diversionary programming. At the time of this fieldwork, the Department of Juvenile Justice 
was considering ten potential diversionary programs. Stakeholders noted that a key barrier to adhering 
to a reasonable timeline to implement reforms is that the Department of Juvenile Justice lacks its own 
independent budget. 
In general, inter-institutional coordination has improved somewhat since the baseline study. This is most 
notably marked by the creation and implementation of the Department of Juvenile Justice. There was 
evidence of key community institutions nurturing informal partnerships. Police and probation officers, 
particularly in rural areas, were cooperating to offer supportive services to some young people. As one 
stakeholder explained:
“One of the things that we’ve observed, particularly in the outlying areas, the rural areas, is that there’s 
more of a connection between probation and the police. So, in some instances, before the child is charged 
and sent to court, the police would many times refer the child to Probation for counseling. So, that’s 
somewhat a diversion measure. They’re sent to Probation for counselling, and for support, and so on.” 
Other evidence of interagency cooperation included partnerships to deliver staff training. The Guyana 
Prison Service was in the process of developing a partnership with the University of the Southern 
Caribbean to train prison staff on how to work with incarcerated adults and juveniles. 
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 21
For the previous two years, with the financial support of UNICEF, the Guyana Legal Aid Clinic has been 
representing young people held in Sophia Holding Center and the New Opportunity Corps (NOC). Staff 
from the Rights of the Child Commission identified the need for legal aid in 2015 through youth 
empowerment workshops held in Sophia Holding Center. At that time, staff identified that 99 percent of 
young people held at the center were not receiving legal representation. Ensuring that young people are 
aware of their right to instruct and retain counsel and be provided access to a legal aid program when 
available40 are important steps toward effective rule of law. 
Stakeholders recognized that the Juvenile Justice Act heralds an important cultural shift. As one 
stakeholder explained: 
“For those who are involved in the juvenile justice system it takes a mind shift. You’re accustomed to 
dealing with adults who commit crime and in my view the system is designed to treat with adults, and I 
believe that more training is needed with all stakeholders on how to properly address the needs of children 
who are in conflict with the law.” 
Certainly, individual training is important in order to bring about the ideological shift required by juvenile 
justice reform. Training alone, however, is rarely sufficient, particularly when seeking cultural change 
across a complex system involving multiple organizations. Cross-agency partnerships and cooperation are 
essential for the smooth running of the juvenile justice system. As juvenile justice system reforms struggle 
to find stable footing, emerging tensions between agencies were apparent. For example, the court’s 
inability to hear cases in a timely manner often results in unnecessarily long pre-trial or pre-conviction 
detention. In addition, some stakeholders felt that police “hanging out” in the court room waiting for their 
cases to be heard breached the right to confidentiality afforded to young people in the juvenile justice 
system. As the juvenile justice reforms become institutionalized, the roles of key juvenile justice 
stakeholders in the courtroom will need to be clarified. 
Juvenile justice reforms bridge and permeate jurisdictional and organizational boundaries, requiring a 
coordinated, multi-agency approach. To this end, an interagency working group was formed involving staff 
from the USAID supported Community, Family, & Youth Resilience program, the police, magistrates, the 
Childcare and Protection Agency, the Department of Social Services, The National Toshaos Council 
(leaders of Amerindian communities), the Legal Justice Reform Project, and the Alliance of NGOs. The 
working group’s next step is to coordinate two roundtables to discuss the problems and anomalies with 
the act as it currently stands and to agree on a way forward. A stakeholder outlined the process:
“For the first roundtable, we have given all the time needed to the drafters to present their intent and 
vision. In the next half of that roundtable, persons with the anomalies will present oral and written and 
presentations. If time permits, we will start some preliminary discussions…We’ll come back at roundtable 
too, to flush out those and to also mark the way forward.” 
Stakeholders recognized the need to nurture dialogue between the drafters of the legislation and those 
tasked with implementing it. As one stakeholder noted:
40 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part IV, 20(1-5))
22 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
“It would be good for the drafters of the laws to hear from the policy makers and the persons who actually 
use the legislation, so they can then say how have they found it useful and what would they like change, 
you know, and so that’s where we could improve it.” 
Although the establishment of a Department of Juvenile Justice and a Juvenile Justice Committee were 
regarded as necessary and important to further juvenile justice reforms, some stakeholders noted that the 
act potentially creates a conflict of interest for the Director of the Department of Juvenile Justice. The 
Director is responsible for hearing complaints from young people within the juvenile justice system as well 
as overseeing the hiring of staff and monitoring conditions within residential facilities. Such a dual role may 
pose a potential conflict for both the Director and Juvenile Justice Committee. As one stakeholder outlined:
“The Director of Juvenile Justice and Juvenile Justice Committee [are] supposed to take complaints from 
juveniles, within the juvenile justice system as to how they [are] being treated. The Director of Juvenile Justice 
has responsibility for inspection and checking out these places and to make sure that these places work well, 
then if he didn’t find this out and then it comes to him, and back to his Committee, then there is an incentive 
to kind of bury it. And, it is likely that a number of other players who have supervisory arrangements and 
policy responsibilities, might also become members of the Committee.” 
The Juvenile Justice Act of 2018 presents a number of inter-institutional administrative challenges. The act 
requires both “open” and “closed” facilities, but the classification and availability of “open” facilities is 
problematic. Although the act exempts children and juveniles from a sentence of imprisonment, it 
stipulates how, when, where, and for how long young people can be placed in secure residential facilities. 
The court may “make a custody order placing the juvenile in an open residential facility for a specified 
period not exceeding three years”41 or “commit a juvenile to custody in an open or secure residential 
facility…for a period not exceeding five years.”42 In addition, the act provides various split sentencing 
options involving custody in an open or secure residential facility with follow-up supervision. The need for 
both “open” and secure residential facilities was identified as a key challenge for stakeholders to comply 
with the Juvenile Justice Act of2018. One stakeholder outlined his perception of the difference between 
an open and a closed facility:
“The New Opportunity Corps, under the new legislation has been identified as an open residential facility 
to detain or to house juveniles who come into conflict with the law. And, by open residential facility, it’s not 
treated necessarily as a detention center per se but rather as a rehabilitation center with the focus being 
on educating, rehabilitating, reintegrating.” 
The NOC does not appear to currently meet the requirements of an open facility. In particular, the 
pervasive use of solitary confinement undermines the reform’s commitment to focusing on rehabilitation. 
Another stakeholder observed that if the NOC was considered an open facility there is currently no 
closed facility to meet the requirements of the act:
“In the description of the Juvenile Justice Act, there is talk of closed and open facilities. In Guyana the only 
facility that was considered closed was the New Opportunity Corps. The Act refers to it as wanting to be 
an open facility. This might be a good thing, but the issue at hand right now is that with the Act in place, 
41 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VI, 44(b)) 42 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VI, 44(c))
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if we follow that to the ‘T’, then we have no closed facility. So, quickly you’ve got to decide, what modality 
works for that in the long-term and what we could do in the interim.” 
In addition to interagency collaboration, the physical space, culture, and practices of the juvenile detention 
facilities and holding centers will also need to be upgraded in order to meet the act’s requirements. 
Upgrading the digital infrastructure of the juvenile justice system may also engender stronger inter- and 
intra- agency collaboration. A digital infrastructure enables greater information sharing and has the 
potential to shorten administrative delays. An electronic case management system facilitates greater 
oversight and increases accountability. Unfortunately, out of the countries involved in the current 
evaluation, Guyana has made the least progress in implementing an electronic case management system. 
At the time of the fieldwork, stakeholders could not articulate current plans for the rollout of a digitized 
case management system. Despite this. the greater efficiencies potentially afforded by a digital 
infrastructure were recognized by stakeholders. As one stakeholder explained:
“Let’s say a juvenile gets charged in Georgetown for one thing, the family moves to another region, and 
they get charged with something else. But there is no way, because of the fact that we use paper, there 
is no way you could track that it’s one and the same juvenile. Save and except if the same officer or the 
same prosecutor or probation officer would have dealt with the matter in town, is the one who’s dealing 
the matter out of town.” 
A similar issue was identified in both the court system and the probation department. Stakeholders noted 
that the court administration was largely paper-based and that probation officers lacked computers with 
which to write reports, maintain electronic case files, and engage in inter- and intra-organizational 
communications. Although some progress had been made (for example, the introduction of software to 
automatically transcribe proceedings in the Children’s Court), much work is needed to develop a 
coordinated electronic infrastructure. 
PRE-TRIAL DIVERSION AND ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING
Some stakeholders considered diversionary programming to be at the “embryonic stage” in Guyana. At 
the time of fieldwork, the police were doing some pre-charge screening of young people. However, one 
stakeholder estimated that in the entire country, police screened only three young people per week. If 
deemed appropriate, and if the Public Prosecutor agrees, young people may be referred to the Cops and 
Faith Community Network. Launched in 2013, the Cops and Faith Community Network seeks to improve 
police-community relations, create a mechanism for community problem-solving, and connect religious 
leaders to young people in conflict with the law for the first time. The religious leader may mentor, counsel 
and offer spiritual guidance to the young person and their parents. The program operates in all ten regions 
in Guyana and in almost every police station in the country. Between September 2013 and February 2019, 
547 young people aged 13 to 17 years engaged with the Cops and Faith program. Typical offenses 
committed by the young people included common assault, wandering (prior to decriminalization), larceny, 
throwing missiles, using abusive language, loitering, making threats, disorderly behavior, and public fighting. 
The Cops and Faith Community Network occupies an important space in the Guyanese Juvenile Justice 
System and is the most developed form of diversion across the three countries. The steps taken to 
implement the program on such a broad geographic scale are laudable, and programs that seek to develop 
strong bonds between institutions such as the police and religious organizations are an important element 
24 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
of crime prevention. The opportunity to divert young people from the system at the pre-charge stage has 
the potential to help some young people and their families get “back on track,” with appropriate 
community encouragement and support. 
Despite this important advance, many stakeholders, when discussing the Cops and Faith program, 
suggested that there was a need to formalize operations and conduct a program evaluation. Notably, there 
is currently no matrix adopted to decide which cases the program accepts. Programs that screen 
individuals in relation to their potential risk and provide varying intensities of individualized programming 
in response to an individual’s risk level are considerably more successful at reducing recidivism than those 
that have no initial risk screening or differentiation in programmatic delivery.43 Given the breadth, scope, 
and potential of the Cops and Faith Community Network, work is needed to develop a coherent theory 
of change, improve screening protocols such as adopting the Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in 
Youth (SAVRY) risk assessment instrument, and establish rigorous monitoring and evaluation practices. 
There is also diversion at the pre-trial stage, where young people may be diverted by the courts to the 
Department of Probation. In addition to preparing pre-sentence reports, probation officers may counsel 
the young person and his or her parent(s) and engage young people in group work. In some offices, 
interviewees report that probation officers always counsel the young person and his or her parent 
together. Although working with the family can help probation officers engage with “the bigger picture,” 
it is important that young people are also afforded the opportunity to speak with probation officers alone.
Researchers faced difficulties in accessing accurate statistics of the number of juveniles currently being 
supervised by probation officers. Approximately 77 probation officers serve both adults and juveniles in 
the ten regions in Guyana. Stakeholders estimated that, across all regions, more than 100 young people 
were attending voluntary supervision with probation. They believed that the number of young people 
attending voluntary supervision exceeded the number of young people who were under court-ordered 
supervision. One region was able to identify that in 2018, seven young people were under court-ordered 
supervision, and at the time of fieldwork in 2019, one young person was under court-ordered supervision. 
In the same region, 20 young people had been placed “on bond for recidivism” and were being supervised 
by a probation officer. It could be positive that probation officers have a presence in the daily court 
process. Such presence means that assistance is available to the court when needed, and appointments 
for court-ordered reports can be arranged. Such work helps to professionalize the probation department’s 
role, and emphasizes the important role afforded to probation officers in the Juvenile Justice Act of 2018. 
At the time of the fieldwork, a probation group work program was operational, and appeared well 
received by the young people attending. The group observed was a mixed gender group, facilitated by an 
enthusiastic and committed volunteer. The weekly groups cover diverse topics and are motivational and 
value-focused in nature. As the juvenile justice reforms become institutionalized, one hopes that the group 
work and individual programming will become more structured. Structure enables replication and 
evaluation, both of which are essential in the medium to long term. 
Probation officers were using risk assessment instruments to determine a youth’s risk level. This is a marked 
improvement from baseline, when probation officers did not complete risk assessments. There appeared to 
be some discrepancies over the use of risk assessment forms by Probation Officers across different regions. 
43 Lowenkamp, C. T., Latessa, E. J., & Holsinger, A. M. (2006). The risk principle in action: What have we learned from 13,676 
offenders and 97 correctional programs? Crime & Delinquency, 52(1), 77-93.
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Overall, the SAVRY seems to be the most commonly referred to instrument; however, other locally 
developed assessment forms were also operational. There was some confusion over what the SAVRY 
instrument actually predicts. Some stakeholders felt that the SAVRY predicts general offending, while others 
(rightly) acknowledged it predicts violent offending in the next two years. Nevertheless, a meaningful risk
assessment requires the input of accurate information, including delinquent histories, responses to previous 
supervision and interventions, and performance in and attendance at school. Without computers and an 
integrated institutional electronic infrastructure, comprehensive risk assessments are difficult to achieve. In 
addition to the need for computers, some probation officers did not have risk assessment manuals to support 
the completion of the SAVRY. Finally, the institutionalization of effective risk assessment and case 
management practices requires an ongoing commitment to rollout. Booster trainings, on-site champions, 
supervisory review, and regular case conferences can help promote inter-rater reliability, and ensure that 
the structured professional judgment has sound internal validity. The assessment of juveniles plays a critical 
role in the Juvenile Justice Act. Therefore, the development of a supportive risk assessment and case 
management infrastructure will ensure that the risk assessments are accurate, timely, and based on the best 
information available. Relatedly, some stakeholders expressed concern that probation officers were 
preparing pre-sentence reports before a young person had a trial. It is important to seek clarification 
concerning the information required by the courts from probation officers, at what stage in the court process 
this information is required, and the purpose for this information. 
Some stakeholders felt that the speed with which the Juvenile Justice Act of 2018 had been implemented 
presented challenges to building compliant infrastructure. There is an urgent need to develop formal pre￾trial diversion programming and alternative sentencing options for juveniles. As one stakeholder outlined:
“In terms of primary necessities, particularly since the Juvenile Justice Act has been brought to life, is the 
urgent need to put in place proper diversion methods. I use the word proper because they are methods 
referred toward diversion. I think there is a need for proper diversion systems.” 
Identification of potential providers is an important first step; however, as recognized by the stakeholders, 
there is a need to coordinate and institutionalize formal diversion programs. Utilizing existing structures, 
including developing the work and programming of the probation department, and formalizing diversionary 
options through existing youth programming may be appropriate ways to move the juvenile justice reforms 
forward. Such work, however, requires investment in staff, training, supervision, and above all, on-the￾ground agency champions. 
DETENTION FACILITIES
Despite the Juvenile Justice Act’s focus on treatment and rehabilitation, the detention facilities holding 
youth and young adults in Guyana remain largely punitive, which likely hinders the progression of a 
reformed juvenile justice system. While there are some programming and educational opportunities, the 
continued use of solitary confinement and physical abuse contradict legal and programmatic advances. 
Guyana has two juvenile detention facilities, Sophia Detention Center and NOC, and while youth under 
the age of 18 are not supposed to be housed in the country’s prison system, stakeholders reported that
youth are still being detained in prisons. The authors visited the two juvenile detention facilities and the 
Timehri prison, where young adults who came into the system while under 18 were housed. At the time 
of data collection, there were no youth under 18 at Timehri Prison, which is a marked shift from baseline. 
However, staff reported that there are youth under 18 housed at other adult prisons in the Guyana Prison 
26 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
System. Across the three detention centers in Guyana, there seems to be a notable disconnect between 
security staff and at least the rhetoric of those in leadership or other staff positions. While government 
officials, program directors, social workers, and civilian staff in the detention centers largely spoke in 
interviews of the need to reform and rehabilitate young people, it seems that the security staff and police 
generally do not share the same goals. Such a disconnect is a severe impediment to the progress of juvenile 
justice reforms. As at baseline, interviewees reported solitary confinement in all three detention centers 
visited by the authors. As noted at baseline, this violates international human rights laws and directly 
undermines the progress that many stakeholders are working toward. 
In addition, a seeming lack of oversight and lengthy delays in the court’s processing time of juvenile cases 
results in unacceptable lengthy periods of pre-trial detention for young people who have not yet been 
convicted of any crime. This was most notable with the young adults held at Timehri prison, some of 
whom have been in custody awaiting trial or a disposition in excess of five years. The lack of access to a 
speedy trial is likely fueled by the limited access to legal counsel to advocate for their case to be on the 
court calendar (despite the stated availability of legal aid), the overwhelming number of cases the courts 
face, and the interagency fragmentation (i.e., courts waiting on police investigation and probation reports). 
In the following sections, we explore (1) access to medical, mental health, and family support, (2) 
programming and educational services, (3) punishment in the detention facilities, and (4) the physical 
aspects of the detention facilities. 
ACCESS TO MEDICAL, MENTAL HEALTH, AND FAMILY SUPPORT
Best practices highlight the need for comprehensive access to medical, mental health, and family support in 
order to address the needs of young people in detention centers. The facilities in Guyana visited during this 
evaluation lack the basic elements for young people to access medical, mental health, and family support. 
Sophia and NOC do not have a doctor or psychiatrist on-site. Timehri Prison has one nurse on-site, a doctor 
who visits twice a week, and one social worker “welfare officer” for 115 people. There is no screening 
process or staffing at Timehri to identify those with mental health needs. One stakeholder stated:
“This place is not equipped to even properly identify people who are mentally challenged. People who are 
mentally challenged should not be here, they should be in a hospital, but they don’t even have a way to 
know who those people are.” 
In addition to clinical mental health support, family support, where it exists, remains critical in a young 
person’s development. In all three facilities, there is no sustainable or sufficient system for young people 
to contact their families. At Sophia and the NOC, young people are required to ask staff members to use 
their cell or office phones to call their families. For some young people this is granted weekly, for others 
monthly. The remote location of facilities, particularly the NOC, is challenging for families. The economic 
and time constraints associated with any travel inhibits most families’ ability to visit their children while 
they are detained. The remoteness of the facilities further perpetuates this challenge. Providing young 
people access to landline telephones in their housing areas and either re-locating facilities or creating 
systems to practically support family visits would increase access to family support. The Juvenile Justice 
Act states that “juveniles sentenced to custody have the right to regular contact with their parents or 
other family members”44 and that “the juvenile custody and supervision system facilitate the involvement 
44 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VIII, 71(2)(c))
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of the families.”45 There is an urgent need to develop a realistic and sustainable plan to facilitate young 
people’s contact with, and access to, their families. 
PROGRAMMING AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 
It is best practice to implement rehabilitative and educational programming in jails and prisons and reduce 
idle time in jails and prisons, with the goal of decreasing violence and supporting individual development. 
Sophia, NOC, and Timehri all have a degree of programming available (See Table 4). At the NOC, youth 
participate in remedial and vocational programming including agriculture, handicraft, woodworking, 
Information Technology (IT), electrical, sports and church services. While there is vocational training, there 
is no formal, on-site educational curriculum at NOC. Similarly, Sophia and Timehri offer some programming 
(including literacy, anger management, and sports) and other classes, but they also lack formal, on-site, 
educational curriculum. During interviews, some stakeholders suggested that the low literacy levels among 
young detained people justified the lack of a formal education curriculum in these facilities. One rationale of 
those who spoke against the need for formal education was that if a young person does not know how to 
read or write, they would be better off in vocational or skills training instead. However, the low literacy 
levels of detained young people are a justification for, not against, a formal educational program. Literacy can 
be one of a range of tools implemented to help young people rehabilitate and lead law-abiding, productive 
lives.46 Not providing educational opportunities to detained young people is a missed opportunity that may 
undermine long-term rehabilitative and reintegrative efforts. Providing programming and educational services 
to young people in detention facilities has the potential to significantly improve the status and prospects of 
young people in conflict with the law in Guyana. 
PUNISHMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
The use of solitary confinement negatively impacts young people’s development and rehabilitation. The 
Juvenile Justice Act prohibits “treatment that is cruel, inhumane or degrading,” “corporal punishment or 
any other form of physical violence,” and “treatment that could reasonably be expected to be detrimental 
to the physical, psychological, or emotional wellbeing of the juvenile.”47 International human rights laws 
clearly state the illegality of the solitary confinement of children (those under 18 years old). The UNCRC 
stipulates that the practice is “strictly forbidden,” and article 37 of the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) describes the solitary confinement of young people as “torture or other cruel, inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment.”48 Empirical studies have consistently shown that solitary 
confinement has negative short and long-term psychological and health effects, which is particularly true 
for young people given the vulnerable stage of their neurological and socio-emotional development during
their adolescent years.49
Despite national and international restrictions, at the time of data collection solitary confinement remained 
a pervasive punishment imposed on young people confined at Sophia, the NOC, and Timehri Prison. The 
NOC’s use and conditions of solitary confinement were the most concerning, as youth are detained in a 
dark cell with no light or access to airflow for 24 hours per day. While in solitary confinement, children 
45 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VIII, 71(2)(d)) 46 Clark, C., & Dugdale, G. (2008). Literacy changes lives: The role of literacy in offending behavior—a discussion piece. Retrieved
from: https://lemosandcrane.co.uk/resources/NLT%20-%20The%20role%20of%20literacy%20in%20offending%20behaviour.pdf 47 Juvenile Justice Act, 2018, (Part VIII, 92(3) (a, c, d)) 48 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (2007) 49 The Lancet. (2018). Solitary Confinement of Children and Young People. Retrieved from:
https://www.thelancet.com/action/showPdf?pii=S0140-6736%2818%2930943-7
28 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
are stripped to their undergarments. The heat is so oppressive that the author observed young people 
lying on the concrete ground, and young people reported that this posture was an attempt to stay cool. 
The mosquitos are described as unrelenting, and the children are given no protection from them. Some 
young people did not have a mattress or sheets, others had no toilet and were forced to defecate in a 
plastic bucket that stayed in their cell until a staff member emptied it, which was reportedly rare. The 
children in solitary confinement did not have access to running water. In addition to the inhumane physical 
conditions, the young people were not told how long they were going to be serving time in solitary 
confinement. During this time, they did not have access to educational services, which, in addition to the 
use of the solitary confinement itself, directly violates the provisions outlined in the Juvenile Justice Act. 
Stakeholders reported the conditions of confinement, and the researchers witnessed young people serving 
time in solitary confinement during data collection. In addition, stakeholders, who had visited the detention 
facilities during the previous two years, criticized the conditions. As one stakeholder described:
“[NOC] has no toilet, it has like two windows, and a bucket that they cut, and they said you have to use 
that as a toilet. So, you’re using that bucket and I don’t know how long you’re in there for.” 
The stakeholder continued:
“[Officers at NOC] have several solitary confinements. There is one which is really bad. They had somebody 
in there locked away, a girl, for about 30 days, like they sort of forgot her. Thirty days. She went through her 
period. When you see it, you could go crazy… [She] had lost so much weight. All her feces, she started to 
put it all up on the wall. But, when you see the room, just looking at it you feel like I’m going to go crazy.”
Solitary confinement undermines efforts to reform the juvenile justice system in Guyana. Thus, solitary
confinement cells at Sophia, NOC, and Timehri Prison should be destroyed in order to end solitary 
confinement as an unacceptable form of punishment. 
In addition to the unacceptable use of solitary confinement, there were reports of physical abuse at all 
three sites. Often times, it was reported that the security staff or police were responsible for the corporal 
punishment; however, security and police staff were not the exclusive perpetrators of abuse. In one 
interview, the individual described a situation where a young adult had a bag placed over their head and 
was beaten with sticks by staff. They reported that, despite having injuries, the young adult was not brought 
to a medic after the fact. Several individuals reported incidents of young people being brought to the police 
station and beaten by the police there and then returned to the detention facility. Many of the children 
described witnessing or experiencing beatings after attempting to escape the facility. When asked why 
they (or their peers) tried to escape, the majority responded that it was to be able to see their families. 
Facilitating family contact could mitigate this issue. Nevertheless, physical abuse by staff violates the 
Juvenile Justice Act of 2018 and international law. Despite the fact that physical abuse and solitary 
confinement are used as punishments for attempting to escape, escapes continue to be pervasive, 
particularly at NOC. Thus, while the authors recognize the problem of escape, the facilities and 
government leadership’s response to the issue remains problematic. Furthermore, as identified at baseline, 
Timehri prison continues to use “punishment diets.” The punishment diet starves individuals who have 
committed infractions. Starving young people when their bodies are undergoing significant developmental 
changes has serious long-term health consequences. 
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PHYSICAL SPACE 
The physical structure of all three facilities limits each institution’s ability to support a rehabilitative 
approach to juvenile justice. At Sophia, the lack of space for multiple classrooms, limited accessibility of 
the recreation room, use of metal bars, and general damage to the physical structure make it appear “as 
a jail” as described by one juvenile. At the NOC, the grounds are large and programming space is 
expansive; however, the solitary confinement spaces at NOC, as well as at Sophia and Timehri, undermine 
juvenile justice reform efforts. Timehri prison is overcrowded. The youth offenders’ unit at Timehri is in 
a dayroom where tables and the floor serve as beds. There is also a lack of outside space for exercise. As 
one stakeholder commented: 
“We are trying to operate by international standards, but our facilities are still Third World.” 
Providing jurisdictions with the resources to support necessary changes to the physical structures of the 
detention facilities will be important for implementing the reforms outlined in the Juvenile Justice Act. 
There is an urgent need to improve the conditions of confinement of young people. The use and conditions 
of solitary confinement are unacceptable, and it is imperative that a strategy is developed to cease its use. 
Stakeholders acknowledge the need to review and revise the facilities currently operating. As one 
stakeholder outlined:
“We need to put in place proper facilities to supplement and to ensure that when we refer to the necessary 
facilities that should be available such as the open facilities, the closed facilities, the halfway houses, the 
transitional houses, that they all represent the tenets as covered in the Convention of the Rights of Child
and its related guiding principles to say that we are compliant.” 
REINTEGRATION
The lack of reintegration and re-entry efforts will likely continue to contribute to recidivism in Guyana. 
At Sophia there is no reintegration system or structure to support re-entry. One young adult was released 
from detention and was home for a mere three days before being re-arrested. Another young adult who 
had been living in foster homes since he was young and ran away at age 12 to live on the street described 
the reintegration process: 
“I spoke to my probation officer before leaving the last time. They know my situation [at home], and they 
still sent me back to my family.” 
Similarly, Timehri Prison had no meaningful reintegration system. Stakeholders reported that probation 
was responsible for making a re-entry plan for the young people at the NOC, however it was estimated 
by one knowledgeable interviewee that only three out of ten young people leave the NOC with any form 
of aftercare (re-entry) plan. Without the formulation of an aftercare plan that addresses the community, 
family, and socioeconomic factors driving the involvement of young people in the criminal justice system, 
the cycle of arrest and re-incarceration will likely continue. The implementation of robust community 
programming, housing initiatives, and re-entry work that starts with building strong relationships with the 
young people in custody (starting as soon as possible in their period of incarceration) will improve 
reintegration for young people in Guyana. 
30 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
There is a critical need for the courts to reduce the time juveniles spend on remand. Some young people 
are spending five, six, or seven years waiting for their case to be resolved, particularly those who came 
into the system as juveniles before these reforms began. However, they remain in custody: many without 
a disposition on their cases. This situation requires urgent redress. One stakeholder commented: 
“A lot of young people in Timehri have wallowed in the system for so long, on remand for so long, that 
they - - a lot of them who are in Timehri came there out of the juvenile justice system. They were first 
brought into contact with the law as children and because the system took a long time, the remand took 
a long time, they were transferred to Timehri.”
There are multiple reasons for lengthy remand periods, ranging from systemic issues relating to how cases 
are prioritized for timely resolution to reported difficulties in transporting children to court. As one 
stakeholder noted:
“Often, it’s very mundane issues, things like the police van not available to take them to court and if they 
get to court late then the magistrate will postpone and then have to go back at the Holding Center and 
spend a few more weeks there. Those things are in violation of their rights for me because children are 
not supposed to be in holding facilities. As much as possible, they should be in their homes, if the evidence 
are not - - is not there to support the charge. So, all of those things, the inefficiencies, the lapses, they’ve 
been very alarming.” 
Efforts to reduce the length of time young people spend on remand certainly complements the work of 
the Guyanese government and the Inter-American Development Bank to reduce prison overcrowding. 
There is an urgent need to develop aftercare support for young people leaving prison. Planning for effective 
aftercare should begin the moment a young person enters a detention facility. Such work requires 
resources and training both for social workers within the detention facility and probation officers working 
outside of the facility. Probation Officers need a regular presence in facilities in the same way they have 
fostered a regular presence in court. 
CONCLUSIONS
Guyana has made significant progress since the baseline evaluation in the areas of legal compliance and 
developing, at the government level, systems to support the transition from a punitive to a rehabilitative 
juvenile justice system. This is exemplified by passage of the Juvenile Justice Act of 2018. Some of the 
changes outlined in the bill that speak to this reform include raising the age of criminal responsibility of a 
child to 14, a benchmark considered “commendable” by the United Nations, decriminalizing the charge of 
“wandering,” creating a process for formalized diversion, reducing the reliance on incarceration as a 
response to criminal activity by juveniles, and creating standards of how detention facilities operate in 
respect to juvenile’s fundamental human rights while detained. In addition, the development of the 
Department of Juvenile Justice within the Guyanese government marks an important commitment to 
understanding juveniles in conflict with the law differently than adults, with different needs in the system. 
It supports the development of system-level change in the field of juvenile justice. These milestones mark 
an important improvement since the baseline assessment. 
However, there is still a significant amount of work to be done regarding implementation of the juvenile
justice bill. This includes educating the public and many of those working on the ground (particularly police, 
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 31
security, and detention facility staff), on the changes outlined in the bill which create a guide for moving 
from a punitive to rehabilitative approach. This could be achieved by the development of a media strategy 
to increase the media presence of key members of the Department of Criminal Justice and the Interagency 
working group. Members of these groups have a critical role to play in advocating for and supporting 
juvenile justice reforms. Such a media strategy is critically important in the aftermath of youth-perpetrated 
violent crime in local neighborhoods.
The creation of the Department of Juvenile Justice is a considerable development since the baseline 
evaluation, and an important step toward ensuring coordination of the juvenile justice reform agenda.
Similarly, the formation of the Juvenile Justice Interagency Working Group is a significant development 
since the baseline evaluation. Such a group has the potential to ensure that a wide variety of stakeholders 
have the opportunity to collaborate to further juvenile justice in Guyana. The Interagency working group 
can be a forum to clarify issues over roles, particularly in relation to courtroom functioning. At the time 
of the midline evaluation visit, there were plans to coordinate dialogues with the drafters of the Child Just 
Act legislation. If these sessions have not occurred yet, they should; however, we caution against becoming 
ensnared in theoretical discussions. It is hoped that practical steps to address issues and the necessary 
agents for action have been identified. 
It would be pertinent to consider whether it is appropriate that the Director of the Department of Juvenile 
Justice, who has responsibility for staffing and managing the conditions of juvenile facilities, should also be 
the key point person for hearing complaints from juveniles in detention facilities. Given the potential for 
a conflict of interest, we recommend that a separate complaints board is developed comprising of juvenile 
justice system stakeholders and community members. 
In order to comply with the Juvenile Justice Act of 2018, there is a need for the Department of Juvenile 
Justice to develop a strategy to ensure Guyana has open facilities. Smaller facilities are recommended over 
large facilities, and space for educational, vocational, and leisure activities is essential. It is also fundamental 
to consider ways to facilitate family visitation. When it is determined that an out-of-home placement is 
required, consideration should be given to the possibility of short-term foster care services. 
Diversionary programming in Guyana is still considered to be in an “embryonic stage,” which remains 
unchanged since baseline and is still concerning. There is a critical lack of formal pre- or post- conviction 
diversion options once a juvenile is in the court system. There is an urgent need to deliver formal 
diversionary programs to which the courts can refer. Programs should focus on reducing key risk factors
and bolstering protective factors associated with juvenile delinquency. Thus, in order to be selected by 
courts, programs must demonstrate how they intend to address one or more of the following: substance 
abuse, mental health problems, risk taking and impulsivity, anti-social attitudes and behavior, antisocial 
peers, and educational or employment needs. Potential programs should also articulate a coherent theory 
of change and outline a rudimentary monitoring and evaluation strategy. It may be pertinent to start by 
launching one or two diversionary programs initially, rather than waiting until a full complement of 
diversionary programs is ready. 
Introducing one or two diversionary programs initially will help to develop a diversionary referral culture 
in the Children’s Court. Once one or two diversionary programs are operational, the courts should report 
demographic and offense information to the Department of Criminal Justice on a monthly basis. This data 
should be shared with the interagency working group who can then identify and document necessary 
corrective actions. 
32 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
Over a six-year period, from 2013-2019, the Cops and Faith Community Network has provided much 
needed support and assistance to young people who are committing less serious acts of delinquency. 
Certainly, diversion of young people engaged in delinquent acts of low seriousness is important. Mindful 
of some stakeholders’ skepticism of the effectiveness of the program, it would be pertinent for the Cops 
and Faith Community Network to adopt an empirically based risk assessment instrument, develop a theory 
of change, and implement an administrative system for rigorous monitoring and evaluation practices. 
Keeping in mind that the Cops and Faith Network relies on volunteer labor, it may be appropriate to 
enlist the help of university faculty member to develop a realistic assessment and monitoring and 
evaluation system. Such work could be achieved through a small grant from USAID. 
The Department of Probation plays a critical role in the delivery of a coherent and effective juvenile justice 
system. One important development since the baseline evaluation is the implementation of empirical risk 
assessment instruments, such as the SAVRY. Using such instruments is an important step in terms of being 
able to identify and address risks and needs, as well as facilitate the targeting of the most intensive 
interventions to those who pose the highest risk. However, not all probation officers have access to such 
an instrument. Thus, there is a need to ensure that all probation officers have access to risk assessment 
manuals and for the Department of Probation to deliver risk assessment booster training. The 
development of mechanisms for supervisory review and case conferences would be an important step to 
ensuring inter-rater reliability of risk assessment scores. Such supervision and conferencing would also 
serve to influence greater uniformity of service delivery. Another important development since baseline 
is the embedding of probation officers within the Children’s Court setting, so that requests for reports
can be speedily identified and important information concerning the young person’s circumstances be 
relayed to the court. 
Unchanged from baseline, there remains limited support for young people leaving detention facilities and 
returning back to the community. In the absence of a separate agency working with such young people, 
probation officers will need to address this critical and current gap in services. Such a development would 
require significant additional resources to employ and train new probation officers. 
There is an urgent need to provide probation officers with computers to write reports and correspond 
through email. Such basic electronic infrastructure should be regarded as a separate development to the 
implementation of electronic case management systems. Indeed, it may be pertinent to consider 
developing a juvenile justice electronic infrastructure whereby delinquent histories could be shared across 
agencies, and court requests and results efficiently communicated. It remains uncertain who should pay 
for such an electronic infrastructure. 
Finally, it is disappointing that the conditions of confinement in the detention centers have not changed at 
all since baseline. Solitary confinement and reports of physical abuse continue at alarming rates. A lack of 
access to comprehensive on-site medical and mental health care, access to family support, and access to 
formal education continue to jeopardize the facilities’ ability to rehabilitate a young person. While there 
are some programs in place in the detention centers, and some staff who have championed working closely 
with young people to support their needs, there is no formal structure in place to support that. 
Fundamentally, the punishment methods (solitary confinement and corporal punishment) of children in 
the detention centers directly contradict the reform efforts in other areas of Guyana. The use of solitary 
confinement and corporal punishment must stop immediately. 
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Certainly, the development of diversionary programming, foster care services, an electronic infrastructure 
and reintegrative services for young people is a daunting task and will require the investment of significant 
resources. The legislative progress in Guyana provides an important foundation for reform, and with 
continued allocation of resources to these issues and support for those on the ground to implement what 
is outlined in the bill, there is potential for the juvenile justice system in Guyana to be transformed. 
34 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
ST. LUCIA 
LEGAL COMPLIANCE
The CJA and the Child Care, Protection and Adoption Act were passed into law on November 22nd, 2018. 
The CJA represents a significant milestone in juvenile justice reform, building upon St. Lucia’s legal regime 
that included a Child Justice Bill and a process for hearing youth cases in a separate family court. 
“Wandering” was not a legal offense in St. Lucia. 
The CJA identifies all young people under the age of 18 as children; whereas previously only young people
under the age of 15 received such a designation. The CJA of 2018 emphasizes that the safety, welfare, and 
wellbeing of children should be the paramount consideration. Children under the age of 12 who are alleged 
to have committed an offense should not be apprehended by the police. Instead, the child should be 
referred to a probation officer and, when necessary, taken to a place of safety. The CJA of 2018 stipulates 
that a child in conflict with the law should be addressed in a manner appropriate to his or her age, maturity, 
and intellectual abilities, and as far as possible be afforded the opportunity to respond before significant 
decisions are made. The participation of parents and relatives is encouraged, both in terms of assisting 
their child through the legal process, as well as involvement, where possible, in decision-making processes. 
Children in conflict with the law should not be treated more severely than adults convicted of similar 
offenses under similar circumstances. 
The act stipulates that detention should be used as the last resort, with a preference for release to a 
parent or appropriate adult, bail, or release on one’s own recognizance. If a child is sentenced to attend a 
secure residential facility, the CJA of 2018 stipulates that he or she cannot be held in a correctional facility 
or police custody. Under the act, children are granted “equal access to available services,”50 when needed, 
in the areas of family and educational support, and employment opportunities if aged between 16 and 18 
years old. If detention is necessary, the least restrictive type of detention “appropriate to the child and 
the offense should be selected.”51 The CJA of 2018 prohibits sentences of life imprisonment, capital 
punishment or any form of corporal punishment for children. Sentences should “encourage the child to 
understand the implications of and be accountable for the harm caused.”52 Sentencing options should be 
“individualized,” proportionate to the circumstances surrounding the offense and promote the child’s 
reintegration into both the family and community. Any supervision, guidance, treatment or service 
provided during the sentence should be in service to the child’s rehabilitation and reintegration. 
Instead of sentencing, the act establishes a preference for diversion from the court system. The CJA of 
2018 defines diversion as “the removal of cases of a child in conflict with the law from the formal court 
procedures and the adoption of informal procedures in relation to the child.”53 The act outlines 
procedures and a timeline for probation officers to assess the child and outlines mechanisms for diversion 
of children from the justice system. It is important to note that at the time of data collection in March 
2019, the diversionary aspects of St. Lucia’s reform were yet to be implemented. In the following 
50 Child Justice Act, 2018, 4(h) 51 Child Justice Act, 2018, 4(j)(iii)) 52 Child Justice Act, 2018, 51(1)(a) 53 Child Justice Act, 2018, p. 150 
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paragraphs we lay out the diversionary policies that the act envisions, and in a later section we discuss 
what diversion existed in practice at the time of data collection. 
The act calls for a child’s suitability for diversion to be considered through an “Initial Inquiry,” to be 
attended by the child in conflict with the law, the child’s parents, a probation officer, the Director of Public 
Prosecutions, and the victim. 
The act uses restorative justice language, outlining that the purpose of diversion should be about holding 
the child accountable for any harm caused, facilitating the victim’s input on the harm experienced, 
encouraging physical or symbolic compensation, and promoting reconciliation between the child, the 
victim or community. According to the act, particular offenses, such as trespass, assault without grievous 
bodily harm, possession of controlled drugs worth less than XCD 5,000 (US$ 1,850), or theft worth less 
than XCD $5,000, should not result in police apprehension but should result in immediate release of the 
child.54 In addition, the act specifies a number of offenses where the child should not be released from 
custody. These include murder, child destruction, infanticide, manslaughter, rape, treason, burglary, 
robbery with violence or involving the taking of a motor vehicle, indecent assault on a child or indecent 
assault involving the infliction of grievous bodily harm, and drug offenses where the value of the controlled 
drug exceeds XCD 100,000 (US$ 37,000).
Three levels of diversionary options with increasing consequences are identified by the act. Whether a 
child receives level one, two or three diversion will depend upon the nature of the offense, the age and 
developmental needs of the child, the background and abilities of the child, and the proportionality of the 
option balanced against the circumstances of the child. 
The CJA of 2018 identifies three decision-makers in respect to juvenile diversion: probation officers, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions, and the courts. Although each stakeholder may petition for diversion, 
the Magistrate makes the final determination regarding whether the child should be diverted from the 
system,55 after considering the Director of Public Prosecution’s recommendation and input from persons 
attending the initial inquiry. Once the diversion order is made the court proceedings are postponed. An 
“assigned officer” then oversees the diversion order, monitoring the child’s compliance.56 When the 
assigned officer presents the court with a report detailing the child’s successful compliance with the order, 
the child is acquitted of all charges.
57 During the diversionary process, the Director of Probation is 
responsible for maintaining a register of all children subjected to diversion.58
COORDINATION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY
The stakeholders interviewed were generally welcoming of the juvenile justice reforms, however they 
were pragmatic in their recognition that implementation of the CJA of 2018 posed considerable inter￾and intra-organizational challenges. The increase in the age of adult criminal responsibility from 15 years 
to 18 years old requires considerable organizational realignment. Many agencies were considering the 
steps they needed to take in order to comply with the act. One stakeholder acknowledged: 
54 Child Justice Act, 2018, 9(2), 13(1) & (2) 55 Child Justice Act, 2018, 36(1) 56 Child Justice Act, 2018, 74(1) 57 Child Justice Act, 2018, 74(3) 58 Child Justice Act, 2018, 76 
36 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
“We’re looking at how that legislation could potentially have implications for what we do and how we do 
it and the fact that we would need to adjust our functioning and our operations.” 
The probation department had engaged in considerable preparation of its staff members, conducting 
training events and displaying informational boards concerning the CJA of 2018 in the Castries probation 
office waiting room. There was a perception that other agencies were grappling with preparations for the 
changing environment of juvenile justice reform. As one stakeholder identifies:
“I know that the Boys Training Center, Transit Home, Human Services, they’re looking at their operations 
manual to bring that in line with the requirements of the legislation. The Boys Training Center is looking 
at its programing, its physical structure in terms of numbers because… we may have more persons coming 
into the facility.” 
Certainly, it is important that individual agencies are working to realign their services to the requirements 
of the CJA of 2018. During the stakeholder interviews it was also evident that stakeholders acknowledged 
that effective justice reform implementation required inter-agency cooperation and collaboration. At the 
governmental level there was talk of reinstating the Social Protection Network, a working group of 
technical officers from ministries and agencies that interface on issues relating to social protection. 
Reinstatement of the Social Protection Network, as one stakeholder identified, could provide the 
opportunity for departments and agencies to:
“…discuss a number of issues and agree on issues and look at how they can support each other, look at 
how we can harmonize initiatives so that we get optimal benefits from various initiatives on the ground.” 
Certainly, as agencies re-align their services to be compliant with the CJA of 2018, a working group can 
help to foster a shared language and values, identify opportunities for collaboration, and address 
implementation challenges as they arise. There was concern that in the early days of the organization of 
juvenile justice reform, the police were not present in sensitization activities. Police were unable to attend 
the initial sensitization trainings (funded by the US) because of the US imposition of the Leahy Law, 
following extrajudicial killings of 12 individuals by the police in Operation Restore Confidence between 
2010-2011. Subsequently, police sensitization training organized by OECS and UNICEF in 2017 and 2018 
has begun to bridge the knowledge gap.
At the time of fieldwork, a key inter-institutional mechanism, the Initial Inquiry meetings involving the child 
in conflict with the law, the child’s parents, a probation officer, the Director of Public Prosecutions, and the 
victim, were not operational. As discussed above, the Initial Inquiry is the juncture whereby diversionary 
options are considered and recommended to the courts. Stakeholders felt that such a step required 
considerable “arranging and organizing.” Although the act stipulates the persons involved in and responsible 
for the Initial Inquiry, no venue had been established. Stakeholders hoped that the venue chosen would not 
be in a court building, and the layout of the room would be more akin to a social work conference rather 
than a formal legal proceeding. No timeline for the implementation of the Initial Inquiry had been identified. 
A small number of stakeholders spoke of waiting for a date for rollout of the CJA 2018, while many identified 
a critical need for resources before the reforms could become fully operational. 
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PRE-TRIAL DIVERSION AND ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING
As noted above and at baseline, at the time of the stakeholder interviews, no diversion orders were being 
made by the courts. Stakeholders felt that this would take time and resources to implement. In the 
meantime, stakeholders reported that some young people were being diverted from the juvenile justice 
system through police-led diversion. Such diversion is firmly rooted in the framework of community￾oriented policing,59 whereby relationships between police, community members, social service agencies, 
and young people can be fostered outside of traditional crime control models. As is the same in many 
parts of the world, the formality of police-led diversion varies in Saint Lucia, ranging from utilization of 
everyday police discretion not to lay a charge, to issuing verbal or written warnings, contacting parents, 
or referring the young person to a probation officer, social service agency, or diversionary program. 
Stakeholders reported that the police would often utilize discretion at the pre-charge stage. For example, 
marijuana may be disposed of in front of a first-time offender and a verbal warning issued. Such 
discretionary actions would be recorded in pocketbooks and the young person asked to sign the record. 
In addition to such informal diversionary practices, more formal practices include the provision of 
secondary prevention programs for youth considered at risk, specifically summer camps and an after￾school club. Two week-long free summer camps are offered: one for primary school students and the 
other for secondary school students. The camps accept referrals of at-risk youth through a quota system 
from local schools. The youth attending include those considered to be at risk of violent behavior, sexual 
promiscuity, or drug use. Located at the Community Relations Branch on Wednesdays and Saturday, the 
after-school club provides educational and emotional support, and drill training. As a police officer explains:
“A parent walks in with a child, tell you that boy is giving me a lot trouble… He smokes, he stays out late, 
he gambles and everything like, he steals, I have reports of him breaking into people houses, I have reports 
of him exposing himself to people… and the parent says, officer, I would like some continuous work with 
him, cause I need some help with him. He agrees to come in after school on a Wednesday to just stay for 
about an hour and half, we’ll work along with him... we work with both him, the teacher and his society 
as well.” 
Such police-led secondary prevention youth programs fall within the broader gamut of community policing 
initiatives in Saint Lucia. These include school presentations, neighborhood watch programs, and crime 
sensitization training for small businesses. Strong relationships between the police and local community 
individuals and institutions are important in a focused crime reduction strategy. The community 
relationships developed by the St. Lucian police are an important starting point; however, they need to be 
located within a formalized youth programming strategy. As one stakeholder observes: 
“I know in certain areas the community policing aspect is very strong. There are communities where they 
are very strong and they actually go out along with social workers and community workers to do 
interventions and to do training, to do presentations, that kind of intervention. I think it’s just a matter of 
making sure that it’s grounded, that’s it’s a policy decision, that’s the way we’re going and that everybody 
is on board.” 
59 Tallon, J. A., Spadafore, J. C., & Labriola, M. (2016). Creating off-ramps: Lessons learned from police-led diversion
programmes. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 11(2), 214-228. 
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While community policing is an effective model to strive for, many young people from the communities 
most affected by the criminal justice system reported a fragmented and contentious relationship the police. 
One young adult described this as:
 “Police are scared of the ghettos. They have smaller guns than us.” 
There is a need to focus on repairing relationships between police and young people living in at-risk 
communities. 
For the Department of Probation and Parole Services the passing of the CJA of 2018, and the related Child 
Care, Protection and Adoption Act, heralded significant change. Specifically, probation officers no longer 
supervise new referrals in need of care and protection. Instead, the Human Services Department is now the 
lead agency for children assessed as being in need of care, protection and/or adoption. At the time fieldwork, 
probation officers were still supervising some young people who were not in conflict with the law. This was 
because their period of supervision was coming to an end, and it was considered unethical to transfer such 
cases to the Human Services Department immediately. In addition, some young people who were not in 
conflict with the law were still walking into the probation office seeking help. In these cases, probation
officers would interview the young person and conduct an informal assessment, before directing the young 
person to the Human Services Department. A Probation Officer described the situation: 
“There are people coming in for all sort of reasons. They may not even really know what we do here. So, 
it’s important to verify what exactly are you here for before we send in like a referral out.” 
Stakeholders noted that the number of individuals seeking self-referral was declining as the public began 
to understand the new role of the Department of Probation and Parole Services. 
It was apparent during interviews (in all three countries) that there is some crossover between the 
categories “children in need of care and protection” and “children in conflict with the law.” Many of the 
youth participating in a focus group at Upton Gardens Girl’s Center were officially designated “children 
in need of care and protection,” yet disclosed a history of engaging in delinquent behaviors. Similarly, many 
of the young people detained at Boys Training Center (BTC) and Bordelais prison who were charged with 
crimes reported complex trauma histories and socioeconomic challenges that would likely warrant the 
status of “care and protection.” Such blurring of delinquent categories demands a careful and considered 
approach to screening and assessment processes and requires close inter-institutional coordination. 
The CJA of 2018 and the Child Care, Protection and Adoption Act give probation officers an important 
role when young people are apprehended by the police. Children apprehended for status offenses such as 
truancy, running away and “disrespect” are screened by a probation officer and subsequently referred to 
the Human Services Department. Those apprehended for more serious offenses are assessed by probation 
officers. Probation officers complete pre-sentence reports when requested by the courts. The majority 
of probation clients supervised by probation officers were directed to probation via the courts. 
Interviewees estimated that a little over 25 percent (n = 45) of the entire probation population was under 
the age of 18. Common offenses by the young people included stealing, possession of weapons, possession 
of drugs, sexual intercourse with minors, and gross indecency. At the time of data collection, there was 
one designated probation officer working with young people aged between 12 and 18 years old, and 
another responsible for offenders aged 18 to 27 years old. It is positive that probation is recognizing that 
juveniles, “emerging adults”, and “adults” have age-specific needs. However, the age ranges seem arbitrary. 
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Thus, going forward it may be pertinent to re-establish the age-range of the “emerging adult” category in 
consideration of the Saint Lucian context. 
Probation officers were using a number of empirically validated risk assessment instruments, including the 
SAVRY and the Massachusetts Youth Screening Instrument (MAYSI-2). As noted above, the SAVRY is a 
structured professional judgment approach to risk assessment which predicts a 12 to 18-year-old’s
likelihood of violence over the next two years. Also referred to as empirically guided clinical judgment 
and structured clinical judgment, the risk assessment instrument guides the assessor through a checklist 
of empirically validated risk factors. Using the SAVRY helps to focus the evaluator on relevant data to 
gather during interviews and record reviews so that the final judgment, although not statistical, is well 
informed by the best available research.60 Probation Officers were using the SAVRY to determine the risk 
level of individual youth served but are not using it to inform treatment. The MAYSI-2 is a mental health 
screening tool used to assess suicide risk, mental health needs, and substance abuse issues among 12 to 
17-year-olds. In addition, at the time of the fieldwork, Probation Officers were using a locally developed
intake form. The implementation of the SAVRY, MAYSI-2 and an intake form is an important step toward 
the standardization of assessment and a structured, empirically supported approach to case management. 
Probation offices were installing the electronic case management system Therascribe in April 2019. All 
stakeholders interviewed welcomed the system and had previously received training. It is positive that 
training had also been provided to staff at the Upton Girls Center. Such shared systems can only help 
facilitate close inter-agency working. 
The flagship probation program was ART. This is a psychoeducational intervention for aggressive and 
violent adolescents. The program seeks to develop social skills, emotional control skills, and moral 
reasoning. Attendance at the program is voluntary. Selection for the program depends upon release dates, 
and behavior within the institution. Five ART programs have been held since 2015. Four programs were 
for juveniles and one was for adults. Three were run in the BTC, one in Bordelais, and one in Probation. 
The trainers noted that the program run from the probation “did not work at all” owing to difficulties 
sustaining attendance once young people are living in the community. The program facilitators have been 
accredited as trainers for the ART. They have recently trained a cohort of trainers to assist with the 
expansion of ART in St. Lucia. Stakeholders recognized that since the CJA’s passage, the probation 
department was in a state of transition. The transition is dependent on the development of other 
organizational structures (e.g. the Initial Inquiry), cabinet ministers, and the provision of resources. 
Probation recognized that the parole function of the Department of Probation and Parole Services, 
although needed, was not yet operational. They reported that they were awaiting a cabinet decision to 
provide a budget for parole services. Certainly, additional staff, training, and resources are necessary if 
coherent programming and reintegrative services are to be offered to both young people and adults as 
they leave prison. 
DETENTION FACILITIES
In St. Lucia juveniles are held in two detention facilities, Bordelais Correctional Facility (the only prison in
St. Lucia) and the BTC. As noted above, the CJA stipulates that 16-18-year-olds are also considered
juveniles, and per the act, 16 to18 year-olds should be detained at BTC instead of Bordelais. However, at 
the time of data collection that had not been implemented, and 16 to18-year-olds were still detained at
60 Borum & Verhaagen, 2006, p. 75
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Bordelais prison within their “young adult unit.”
ACCESS TO MEDICAL, MENTAL HEALTH, AND FAMILY SUPPORT
As stated above, access to medical, mental health, and family support are considered essential to both 
meeting basic human needs and rehabilitating young people in detention. Bordelais and BTC both struggle 
to provide medical services or access to family. For example, Bordelais has one clinical social worker for 
approximately 500 incarcerated people. There is no on-site psychiatrist, and the psychiatrist visits the jail 
twice a month. The lack of accessible mental health care also inhibits the facility’s ability to provide 
counseling when it is mandated by the courts. Therefore, the magistrates may intend to provide a 
rehabilitative experience by incarcerating an individual and mandating they go to counseling; however, 
there is no system in place to facilitate counseling for incarcerated youth. In addition, the absence of 
available substance use treatment likely fuels negative outcomes of young people involved in the criminal 
justice system. Because there are no substance treatment services on site, those with court ordered 
substance use treatment mandates are taken to the public hospital (the Wellness Center). Often the 
hospital informs them that they cannot return because having people “in corrections/police custody” is 
disruptive to the other clients in their groups. 
Similarly, there is no on-site clinical mental health staff at BTC, and young people are brought off site to 
the Wellness Center for mental health care. In addition, despite the importance of maintaining and 
supporting family and community contact, Bordelais and BTC have no available phones on the units. There 
is also no public system in place to support transportation for families who live far away. This likely 
contributes to the isolation of young people and decreases their likelihood of successfully reintegrating
back into society upon release. While Bordelais and BTC certainly have structural differences (one is an 
adult prison and the other is a juvenile detention facility), as long as these important needs are lacking, a 
comprehensive change will be required in both spaces. 
PROGRAMMING AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 
BTC provides vocational training in woodworking, auto-mechanics, agriculture, and computers; however, 
as at baseline, there is no on-site formal academic education. Currently, in order to receive formal 
education, the residents are sent to a school in the community. However, one of the challenges residents 
face is the stigma the schools in the community have toward young people coming from BTC. Young 
people and other stakeholders reported that the stigma of being detained at BTC, or involved in the 
criminal justice system, created a barrier to integration into the community schools. There appears to be 
little oversight of this poor treatment of justice-affected youth in schools from the Ministry of Education. 
Without oversight, the community-based schools may not be aware of their implicit and direct biases 
toward young people coming from BTC and will likely continue to impede incarcerated youth’s access to 
education. While facilities’ offering vocational skills training is certainly positive, detention facilities appear 
to use the residents to complete manual labor for the facility without compensating them. These facilities 
should be aware of the unintended consequences of that choice. Requiring young people to perform 
unpaid labor does not likely support the development of their socioeconomic status or employment skills.
Explaining his work in the agriculture field at one of the detention centers, one youth described the 
supervisor walking around with “one hand in his pocket and one hand carrying a stick tapping the ground” 
while overseeing the kids working in the field. One youth described the experience in the following terms:
“Working on the farm it’s like slavery, at the end of the day I’m not getting paid. It feels like promoting 
slavery and this is supposed to be a rehabilitation center.” 
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Employment training is not the same as free labor, and individuals who are working, regardless of whether 
they are incarcerated, should be compensated fairly. 
Bordelais provides informal education and other vocational programming that includes classes in wood 
working, tailoring (to make the prison uniforms), working in agriculture (to supply the prison with food), 
working in maintenance (to keep up the physical structure of the prison), and cooking (to feed those 
incarcerated). Yet, similarly, requiring those incarcerated to perform free labor or labor that is paid very 
little (for example 50-80 cents for eight hours of work) should not be conflated with rehabilitative 
programming. In response to a question about the positive or rehabilitative aspects of being detained, 
when answered, residents often included a narrative about the positive experience of staff building 
supportive relationships with the young people. Some young people described this as counselors or house 
staff “taking the time” to talk to the residents and get to know them. Several young people reported that 
as the only rehabilitative or positive aspect of being detained. In addition, one young person described the 
need to include the residents more in decision making processes, stating “if you’re with me, but working 
without me, you’re against me."
PUNISHMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
As at baseline, stakeholders reported continued use of corporal punishment and solitary confinement at 
both BTC and Bordelais. As noted above this directly contradicts the rehabilitative approach. At BTC 
there seems to be a considerable disconnect between the civilian staff, comprising of teachers and social 
workers, and the security staff. There is a need for the security staff to become aligned with the principles 
and values espoused by the CJA of 2018. Until this alignment occurs it will be difficult for the institution 
as a whole to provide rehabilitation to its residents. One young adult described his placement in solitary 
confinement during his first days at the detention center and the effect it had on his view of the entire 
institution: 
“When I first came in, I was locked up (in solitary confinement) for three weeks. I remember that changed 
my whole perception of [the detention center]. After that experience, I thought ‘this whole place is corrupt 
and manipulative, and I want nothing to do with them.’ Before that happened, I was really thinking maybe 
these people can help me.” 
While programming and educational initiatives are certainly important, as long as young people are being 
detained in solitary confinement and subjected to physical abuse, rehabilitation in the facility is unlikely. As 
stated above, there is ample evidence that the effects of solitary confinement on the developing young 
adult brain and socio-emotional status are damaging both in the short and long term.61
Bordelais does not appear to have the capacity, proper physical space or staffing to safely house and 
rehabilitate young adults. On the day of the site visit the youthful offender unit was not staffed, young 
people were banging on their cells, screaming, and throwing trash because they had not been fed (by early 
afternoon). It was reported there had been no officer on post all day and that when this happens, young 
adults are left in their cells 24 hours/day. The use of solitary confinement, and even unintended solitary 
confinement as a result of a lack of staff, highlights the facilities’ inability to rehabilitate the young people 
in their custody. 
61 The Lancet (2018). 
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PHYSICAL SPACE 
The BTC facility was built in 1960 and lacks the infrastructure requirements necessitated by BTC’s 
mandate today. There are some aspects of the physical structure (ex. the lockdown cell, described as an 
empty cell with a mattress on the ground) which do not align with the rehabilitative approached outlined 
in the CJA of 2018. Having said that, stakeholders reported that one of the lockdown areas was converted 
to a counselor’s office in 2018, indicating an improvement in this area since baseline. Continuing to 
transform the physical space from one of bars (jail-like physical environment) to one that more directly 
mirrors the community setting (home-like physical environment) will likely support a culture in BTC more 
focused on rehabilitation rather than punishment. However, one stakeholder with significant knowledge 
of BTC stated, “of course the physical structure has limitations, but that shouldn’t hamper rehabilitation 
to the extent that it’s currently hampered.” This point is well taken in that while an enhanced physical 
structure would support a cultural shift at BTC, that shift (from punitive to fully rehabilitative) should not 
be precluded by the physical structure.
While the physical space of BTC is not ideal, it is significantly more evolved than that of Bordelais. Bordelais 
is a prison, and the physical structure of cell blocks and bars is not conducive for the rehabilitation of 
young people. The structure, coupled with the staffing shortages, result in young people at Bordelais 
spending the majority of their day locked in a cell. As described above, this unintended equivalent of 
solitary confinement has both short- and long-term negative effects on the detainees. 
REINTEGRATION
Bordelais had no reintegration program at the time of data collection. BTC had some reintegration 
(aftercare) programming in place, although it should be expanded if it is to be effective. In theory, all 
residents leaving BTC are afforded two years of aftercare follow-up which would include a counselor 
supporting them in the community by facilitating employment, educational, and housing opportunities. 
However, interviewees note that no such programming is provided, and rather a few residents receive a 
limited amount of aftercare services. One success story was that staff reported helping some young people 
build a house for themselves in the community after they were discharged from BTC. Reportedly, the 
young people were living in the house and working in jobs that BTC staff helped them get. This anecdote 
highlights that when re-entry care is supported, much can be achieved. Reintegration plans should involve 
staff working directly with young people while they are detained and relies heavily on the building of 
relationships during periods of detention in order to facilitate a successful aftercare plan. Without 
meaningful relationships it is unlikely that realistic aftercare plans will be developed and implemented. 
Young people need to feel supported and cared for in order to buy-in to a re-entry plan. 
CONCLUSIONS
Since baseline, St. Lucia has made critical strides in reforming their juvenile justice system. This progress 
is noted by the passage of the CJA 2018, which creates a framework for the courts, police, detention 
facilities, probation, and community-based organizations to both divert young people from the criminal 
justice system and to limit the exposure of a young person to the harmful effects of incarceration. It 
importantly raises the age of a juvenile from 15 to 18 years old and provides a guide for stakeholders to 
implement systems in their respective agencies that support the transition of a punitive to rehabilitative 
approach to justice-involved juveniles. 
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Since the baseline evaluation, the steps the Department of Probation have taken to lead the juvenile justice 
reforms should be commended. Considerable efforts have been made to educate the public and 
stakeholders about the CJA, and to realign workloads to reflect the shift in the juvenile designation from 
15 to 18 years. It is important to ensure that juvenile-specific probation officers are identified, and the 
section expanded, as at the time of the midline evaluation only one probation officer was designated to 
work exclusively with juveniles (and her exclusivity was challenged by existing caseload demands). The 
development of a dedicated juvenile section can ensure that specialization can be developed, and 
competencies shared.
Another important development since baseline was the institutionalization of appropriate empirical risk 
and need assessment instruments. Such advancements should have eased the intended rollout of the 
electronic case management system Therascribe. 
Further improvement since baseline is the development of ART. This is an evidence-based intervention 
that, when implemented with fidelity, has been shown to reduce future violent offending. It is also positive 
that the ART implementation is delivering the program in detention centers. Given the lack of success 
delivering ART within a community setting, it may be pertinent to consider two strategies. Firstly, 
attendance at ART could be mandated by the courts as part of an alternative sentencing strategy. Secondly, 
motivational interviewing techniques could be utilized by probation officers to determine whether 
potential referrals are ready for attendance at ART, and to prepare future attendees for the program. 
Motivational interviewing is considered an evidence-based practice for young people with substance abuse 
problems. The delivery of motivational interviewing training to probation staff would help shape probation 
practice and serve as a foundation for the development of other evidence-based programs and practices. 
As with risk assessment training, motivational interviewing training is not a one-off event, but rather 
requires booster sessions and inter-agency support through supervision and case discussion. 
As the Department of Probation develops the services and interventions being offered to young people, 
it may also be appropriate to consider the training needs of probation supervisors and managers. 
Undoubtedly, the need for more probation officers to deliver evidence-based programs, and more training 
to ensure the sustained quality of interventions requires considerable resources. Such investments, 
however, have been shown to reap significant savings in reductions in crime and violence in communities.
Stakeholders were considering reinstatement of the Social Protection Network to ensure greater 
coordination of services between agencies. Certainly, a forum whereby key stakeholders regularly meet 
to focus on advancing juvenile justice reforms is recommended, and it is positive that since baseline 
stakeholders are considering ways to facilitate greater coordination and information sharing. The members 
should present such a position within their agency to influence decision-making processes and get things 
done. There is a critical need to develop a timeline for the implementation of the Initial Inquiry. This 
involves identifying and securing appropriate space to hold the meeting and developing an agreed protocol 
for referrals from court and the Department of Probation and Parole Services. It is concerning that no 
diversion orders were being made at the time of the midline evaluation by the courts. Similar to our 
recommendation in Guyana we suggest that the courts should report demographic and offense 
information to the Social Protection Network (or similar coordinating body) on a monthly basis. This data 
should be shared with the interagency working group who can then identify and document necessary 
corrective actions. 
44 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
While the progress should certainly be noted, there is still significant work to be done to implement the 
stated principles in the act. The detention facilities holding young people in conflict with the law are not 
providing rehabilitative or after-care support to the extent that is likely necessary to limit recidivism and 
improve wellbeing. Having said that, at the time of data collection, BTC appeared significantly more able 
to provide rehabilitation as compared to Bordelais. Eventually, in order to be compliant with the CJA of 
2018, youth under 18 years old would be transferred out of Bordelais. As noted in Guyana, the use of 
solitary confinement and corporal punishment in detention centers contradicts reform efforts. In addition, 
implementing systems-level reforms will also require public support and sensitization about the CJA of 
2018. The antiquated perception of justice-involved youth is exemplified in the stigma Bordelais detainees
experienced when they were unable to access mental health and that BTC residents experienced when 
integrating into community-based schools. St. Lucia is at an important crossroads in juvenile justice reform 
in that the passage of comprehensive legislation provides an opportunity for leadership, stakeholders and 
staff on the ground to implement the intended changes. 
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ST. KITTS AND NEVIS
LEGAL COMPLIANCE 
St. Kitts and Nevis passed the CJA in 2013 and was the only one of the three countries to have 
reformed legislation at the time of the baseline study. 
Despite passing the CJA in 2013, St. Kitts and Nevis has yet to fully implement the juvenile justice 
reforms stipulated in the act. The Probation and Child Welfare Board, which oversees the work of 
Probation and Child Protection Services and the New Horizons Rehabilitation Center, has yet to fully 
operationalize the Child Justice Committee. The CJA stipulates that the Child Justice Committee should 
comprise of a magistrate and two social workers.62 The board has identified the members of the 
Child Justice Committee and agreed on a location in which to meet, however, the Child Justice 
Committee is awaiting further guidance before convening. This delays the implementation of 
diversionary processes stipulated in the CJA. As one stakeholder explained: 
“It creates somewhat of a difficulty because the Act prescribes that there must be an assessment for each 
juvenile and then there must be a review by the Board. Most times only the assessment is done. You can’t 
have the juvenile taken to the Committee because there’s no Committee in place and there’s no forum to 
take the juvenile to the Board.” 
One key area that appeared to be delaying the Child Justice Committee was that positions needed to be 
appointed by the Board. However, the Board lacks an operational administrative infrastructure. Such an 
administrative infrastructure includes clear processes, agreed guidelines and regulations, and approved 
paperwork. One stakeholder described the delay: 
“Their first priority is the legislation. The major holdup to the Child Justice Committee is that it needs its 
appointment because the Committee is appointed by the Board. But they don’t have any appointment 
instruments. So, they have submitted to the Ministry of Legal Affairs an entire package of forms and things 
to operationalize what the Act says. Because they can no longer just write things ad-hoc, it needs to be 
managed by that. So, I think their hands are tied [waiting for] … the forms and supporting 
infrastructures for the Act.” 
In addition, some stakeholders reported that the Child Justice Committee is not operational because the 
Probation and Child Welfare Board is awaiting guidance and regulations on the juvenile justice decision￾making process. Although such guidance and regulations are necessary, given that Board members are 
potentially liable for any decisions they make, a consequence is that juvenile cases cannot be formally 
diverted from the juvenile justice system. As one stakeholder explained: 
The legislation wasn’t well thought out and so the Board is given a lot of responsibility and at the same 
time if something goes wrong during a case, they can sue, they would sue the Board. They don’t sue 
the Department of Family Services, they don’t sue, no, the Board is liable for everything. 
The impasse has real world consequences for young people entering all levels of the juvenile justice system. 
Young people with less serious offenses are not receiving formal diversion when they appear in court. 
The lack of implementation of the CJA also impacts young people entering the juvenile justice system with 
serious charges. For example, at the time of data collection there was a 23-year-old incarcerated at Her 
“The legislation wasn’t well thought out and so the Board is given a lot of responsibility and at the same 
time if something goes wrong during a case, they can sue, they would sue the Board. They don’t sue the 
Department of Family Services, they don’t sue, no, the Board is liable for everything.” 
46 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
Majesty’s Prison (HMP) who was first incarcerated at HMP for his current charge as a 16-year-old. He 
was subsequently sentenced to life in prison at age 19 (in 2015). Had the CJA been implemented as 
designed, his current sentence would have likely not been one of life imprisonment. Additional 
consideration should therefore be made to currently incarcerated young people who have had their case 
processed after 2013 but have not received a disposition and or treatment as outlined in the CJA of 2013.
Corporal punishment, as a sentence, technically remains an option available to the court for male children 
in conflict with the law through the Magistrates Code of Procedures Act, 2009. The act states: 
In any case where any child or young person, being a male, in respect of whom a finding of guilt is 
made by a Magistrate’s Court or a Juvenile Court either Court may, in addition to or in lieu of any 
other punishment which it is empowered to inflict, order him to be whipped (Magistrates 
Code of Procedure Act, 2009, 105.(2)). 
Although stakeholders report that lashes have not been ordered by the court for a number of years, such
legislative disconnect requires further consideration.
COORDINATION IN JUVENILE JUSTICE SERVICE DELIVERY
Interviewed stakeholders in different organizations in St. Kitts and Nevis held divergent views concerning 
what juvenile diversion actually is. For some, diversion is providing opportunities for young people facing 
challenges to become positive and productive. For others, diversion is about engaging (or re-engaging) 
children with the school system. Some stakeholders responded that diversion is concerned with the 
provision of primary or secondary prevention programs or “trying to get juveniles into wholesome 
projects.” For others, diversion is about recognizing that vocational training is more appropriate for 
children struggling in the traditional school system. Still others felt it is about making a distinction between 
a child and an adult within the justice system and providing age-appropriate responses. Certainly, age 
appropriate primary and secondary prevention programs and vocational training programs are important 
programmatic elements of diversionary programs. Once the Child Justice Committee is operational and 
diversionary options are expanded, it is hoped that a shared language and consensus will emerge 
concerning the diversion of young people from the damaging impacts of the justice system. 
Although the stakeholders interviewed in St. Kitts were generally supportive of juvenile justice reform, 
there was an overall sense that individual workers could not progress until the Child Justice Committee 
is operational. There was a recognition among stakeholders that the CJA 2013 affords an increased role 
for the Department of Probation, particularly in relation to assessments, court reports, and the provision 
of programming. There were concerns, however, that probation officers were not being afforded 
professional status in the courtroom. Stakeholders described recent instances of a magistrate asking 
probation officers to leave the courtroom if a case pertaining to them was not being heard. Given that 
probation officers are officers of the court, it is imperative that they have a regular presence in 
courtrooms. Such a presence not only ensures that immediate assistance can be provided to the court 
when a young person appears, but also fosters interagency collaboration while helping disparate actors 
develop a shared language and a working consensus. 
In addition, there was evidence in St. Kitts that relationships had been developed between local schools 
and the probation department. The work tended to focus on children who were in need of care and 
protection, rather than children who were in direct conflict with the law. It was disappointing that the 
In any case where any child or young person, being a male, in respect of whom a finding of guilt is 
made by a Magistrate’s Court or a Juvenile Court either Court may, in addition to or in lieu of any other 
punishment which it is empowered to inflict, order him to be whipped (Magistrates Code of Procedure 
Act, 2009, 105.(2)). 
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probation department were unable to arrange for one single youth living in the community and receiving 
probation intervention to meet with the evaluation team. Hearing the voices of youth is an important 
cornerstone of enlightened juvenile justice practice. Although staff report that they are working with 
young people, the challenge remains for the department of probation to develop diversionary and 
rehabilitative services for young people in conflict with the law. Therascribe, a case management software 
intended to support interagency collaboration, was not being implemented at probation or detention 
facility offices at the time of data collection. Stakeholders reported they were initially trained three years 
ago, and given the time lapse without implementation, staff were in the process of being re-trained. No 
timeline was available for roll out of an electronic case management system.
PRE-TRIAL DIVERSION AND ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING
Stakeholders in Nevis reported that pre-arrest diversion occurred within the day-to-day context of police 
discretionary decision-making. For young people involved in low level offenses such as petty theft, 
disorderly conduct, fighting, and marijuana possession, the police may convene a “roundtable” with parents 
and probation officers to develop an alternative plan to the formal justice system. In lieu of formal juvenile 
justice processing, a young person may be asked to complete community services hours, attend school￾based programming, attend a group run by probation officers or be monitored through home visits. Such 
informal diversionary mechanisms appear to be a response to the lack of court mandated diversionary 
options because the Child Justice Committee is not operational. 
Work had been undertaken in St. Kitts to identify community organizations that could be providers of 
diversionary programming once the Child Justice Committee is operational. Potential community 
organizations had been briefed concerning the CJA 2013. It is positive that such efforts have been made 
to develop relationships with community organizations and to sensitize staff to the CJA. Efforts were 
underway to categorize the diversionary services each organization could potentially provide. Such service 
mapping is an important step toward ensuring that varied diversionary services will be available once the 
Child Justice Committee is operational. 
In St. Kitts, low level juvenile cases are simply dismissed from the courts in the absence of a non-carceral 
intervention. Stakeholders recognized that a dismissal process was not an effective or desirable 
diversionary strategy, rather it was indicative of systemic dysfunction resulting from the failure to 
operationalize the Child Justice Committee. Such rulings failed to assist young people with their problems 
and potentially undermined public perceptions of justice. A stakeholder questioned notions of procedural 
justice in the dismissal process:
“We have got repeat offenders, and there is no penalty, there is no punishment or regards or other what 
have you, and they go back out there and, people again become victim from these same juveniles again.
It seems to be there is no justice.” 
We concur that there is a danger that the failure to operationalize the Child Justice Committee will 
undermine prior efforts to sensitize the public to the efficacy of juvenile justice reforms. Justice does not 
necessarily need to be punitive, but the process should be completed as stipulated in the legislation. 
As at baseline, there was no court-mandated diversionary programming occurring in St. Kitts; however, 
there were two secondary prevention programs operating in Nevis, which were referred to by 
stakeholders as pre-arrest diversion programs. These include a Boys and Girls Checkers Club and the YES 
48 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
program. At the time of the interviews, the Checkers club was operating in two schools. Run by probation 
officers, the checkers club is integrated into the school curriculum during the time designated for “clubs.” 
Each club meeting, stakeholders report, is attended by between 20-30 children identified as having 
challenging behavior. Referrals to the club come from school counselors. The club aims to teach critical 
thinking skills, consequential thinking, and thinking ahead through the vehicle of the checkers board game. 
Operating for the last four consecutive years, the YES is a vocational skills training program for young 
people aged 16 to 25. The program operates five days per week and provides skill training in a number of 
key areas including hospitality, electrical work, cosmetology, landscaping, and tailoring. Governmental 
reports indicate that 33 of the 49 young people were considered “at risk”, and 16 of the 49 had some 
previous conflict with the law.62 A small amount of life skills training and counseling occurs prior to 
vocational training. Referrals for the vocational skills training are screened using the SAVRY risk 
assessment instrument and the MAYSI. 
Stakeholders described two post-conviction alternatives to detention options: community service and 
fines. Community service hours usually involved cleaning and were typically completed at a police station 
or community center. This appears to be an infrequently used alternative sentencing option for children 
in conflict with the law. Fines are determined by the age of the young person and the severity of the 
offense. Parents or guardians are responsible for paying the fines as stipulated in the Magistrates Code of 
Procedure Act, 2009.63 The threat of fines was also used to enforce compliance in the case of irregular 
school attendance. 
DETENTION FACILITIES
St. Kitts and Nevis has one detention facility for juveniles, the New Horizons Juvenile Rehabilitation 
Center, which was constructed in 2013. Per the CJA, young people should not be detained in HMP; 
however, in practice this is done. At the time of data collection, there were three 16-18-year-olds at HMP. 
The authority to house young people in that prison does not fall on the prison itself but rather the courts 
(and likely the Probation and Child Welfare Board). It appears that young people, particularly those 
charged with violent crimes, are held in detention pre-conviction for disproportionately long lengths of 
stay. This was noted among the characteristics of the young adult population at HMP who entered the 
system as children and are still detained without a disposition on their case. To note, given the heightened 
vulnerability of the young people exposed to long incarcerations, 64 and the lack of action on the part of 
the attorneys, there should be a targeted systemic approach to ensure that these young people are seen 
in court and their cases are handled carefully and in a timely manner. 
ACCESS TO MEDICAL, MENTAL HEALTH, AND FAMILY SUPPORT
HMP is severely understaffed with respect to safely meeting the needs of those incarcerated (including 
medical, mental health, programming, and educational staff). There is one medical doctor who visits the 
prison once per week and one psychiatrist who visits once per month to serve a total population of 178 
incarcerated individuals. Similarly, access to medical and mental health care at the New Horizons Center 
62 Nevis Island Administration (2018) Recurrent and Capital Budget Estimates of Expenditure and Revenue Reports on Plans 
and Priorities. Retrieved from: http://caribbeanelections.com/eDocs/budget/nv_budget/nv_budget_estimate_2019.pdf 63 St. Christopher and Nevis, Chapter 3.17, Magistrate’s Code of Procedure Act. Laws of Saint Christopher and Nevis (2009). 
Retrieved from: http://www.oas.org/juridico/PDFs/mesicic4_kna_mag_cod_proc_act.pdf 64 I. Lambie and I. Randall. (2013). The impact of incarceration on juvenile offenders. Clinical Psychology Review. Available online:
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S027273581300010X
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(NHC) is limited. Staff are required to bring the young people to the hospital for medical care. One 
individual described that he had been waiting for months to be brought to the hospital for an asthma 
pump. There is no full-time psychiatrist on-site. 
As mentioned above, it is considered best practice to maintain and support juvenile contact with their 
families. The facilities of both NHC and HMP lack telephones on the units which would enable those 
incarcerated to maintain regular contact with their families and social supports. As at baseline, calling 
family requires the use of either a counselor’s cell phone or a landline in an administrator’s office (in the 
case of HMP), which is not a sustainable solution for family contact. There is also no system in place at 
NHC to facilitate the transport of families to visit young people detained at NHC. Therefore, if a family 
does not have the economic support necessary to visit NHC, they will be unable to see their children. 
Methods to facilitate and support family engagement should be a priority for both facilities. 
PROGRAMMING AND EDUCATIONAL SERVICES 
NHC offers morning educational classes and afternoon sessions that reportedly include vocational 
woodworking and electricity skills. In addition, a church group visits on Sundays to provide religious 
programming. At the time of data collection there was no anger replacement therapy programming, which 
was occurring at baseline. Moreover, most interviewees reported that even the limited educational 
programming is irregular. There appears to be a need to formalize and increase programming and for a 
budget to support staff to conduct workshops. As a marked difference from baseline, programming at 
NHC is reportedly controlled and regulated by the Probation and Child Welfare Board, however, there 
remains limited programming and appears to be a lack of integration of on the ground staff in that program 
development process. Staff working directly with the children should be involved in the process of 
developing and implementing programming. 
HMP has one teacher to serve a total population (all ages) of 178 incarcerated individuals. They have very 
limited programming (occasional church groups and ‘drug sessions’). However, the majority of those 
incarcerated do not have access to such services. In fact, most individuals are locked in their cells 23 
hours/day with the exception of occasional recreation and leaving their cells for two to three minutes to 
pick up their food. There is no staffing structure or budget for rehabilitative programming. 
PUNISHMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
As in Guyana and St. Lucia, solitary confinement and the use of corporal punishment are common at both 
HMP and NHC, directly contradicting reform efforts and the law. The conditions of solitary confinement 
at HMP consist of young people sleeping on a concrete ground with no mattress in a cell with no natural 
or artificial light, no running water, and no way to deal with excessive heat perpetuated by the lack of 
airflow. There is a large metal door with a slot that is opened to put food in and out of the cell. Despite 
the narrative around rehabilitation, unfortunately NHC also continues to implement the use of solitary 
confinement in their “assessment center.” While the reports of physical abuse at NHC have decreased 
since the baseline data collection, it appears that the use of solitary confinement has not. One young adult 
described his experience:
“This is not a rehabilitation center. This is making me worse, this is making me more angry. This is not a 
place for nobody’s children to come. This is really just a small jail for teenagers.” 
50 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
Locking a young adult in a cell for 24 hours/day, whether as a form of punishment or as a way to “monitor” 
new admissions, likely has significant long-term negative mental and physical health effects on those young 
people. 
PHYSICAL SPACE 
HMP was built in 1840 to house 40 people. The current census includes 178 incarcerated individuals. There 
is a severe overcrowding issue with some cells holding up to 22 people. There are no landline phones; many 
of those in lockdown have no beds and no lights; and there is very limited recreation and programming 
space. Several individuals reported that the facility is so unsanitary that everyone incarcerated understood 
to never touch the walls in order to avoid contracting a skin fungus. One individual described the conditions 
thusly: “if you touch the walls or sit down on a toilet, you will get a rash, it’s so filthy in here.” The facility 
does not have the capacity to safely house and rehabilitate young people. 
The physical structure of NHC is in fairly adequate shape; however, because of inadequate staffing, 
juveniles are kept in the assessment center cells rather than in the dormitory in the main building. The 
reliance on cells to house young people seems contradictory to the development of the young people in 
custody. NHC is one of the few facilities that is in adequate condition to support a rehabilitative mission; 
however, this is not taken advantage of because of the insufficient staffing, budget, and leadership. 
REINTEGRATION
HMP has no reintegration system or staff, budget, or resources to provide reintegration services. This 
likely contributes to increased recidivism rates. The reintegration of young people leaving NHC was 
reportedly the responsibility of probation; however, it appears, at the time of data collection, that that 
was not happening. Furthermore, probation officials do not have contact with the youth during their time 
at NHC, which would leave them inadequately prepared to support a reintegration/re-entry plan. Also, 
transference of authority to probation without the involvement of NHC staff who have developed a 
relationship with the child in that re-entry plan means losing a valuable resource that could help support 
a successful transition. 
CONCLUSION
The passing of model legislation in St. Kitts and Nevis in 2013 marked an important milestone in juvenile 
justice reform. However, as noted at baseline, much of what is outlined in the act is not being implemented 
on the ground. Barriers to implementation include that the Child Justice Committee is not yet operational 
and there was a sense among many stakeholders that this inhibits the reforms outlined in the CJA 2013 
from being carried out. In addition, the act outlines that the Probation and Child Welfare Board have an 
enormous amount of responsibility with respect to the court proceedings and sentencing of young people. 
As a result, there may be a bottleneck effect happening with the Probation and Child Welfare Board in 
that many of the changes are reliant on the board. 
At the time of the midline implementation study it was disappointing to see that the Child Justice 
Committee was not fully operational, and it was concerning that six years after passage of important 
legislation, the key mechanism for implementing juvenile diversionary processes were at an impasse. It is 
sincerely hoped that in the time that has elapsed since the evaluation and the publication of this report, 
progress has been made to fully operationalize the Child Justice Committee. If progress has not been 
made it is imperative that a step-by-step implementation strategy is developed by the Child Justice 
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Committee outlining how full operationalization will be achieved. This plan should include the 
development of appointment instruments, appointment of board members, the development of detailed 
processes, guidelines and regulations, the implementation of approved paperwork, and the resolution of 
legal concerns regarding board member liabilities, All future funding of juvenile justice reforms in St. Kitts 
and Nevis should be released incrementally, as each step of the full operationalization plan is achieved.
On a more positive note, it is encouraging that since the baseline study efforts have been made to identify 
community organizations that are in a position to provide diversionary programming. Once the Child 
Justice Committee Board members have been appointed, these arrangements should be formalized. It is 
promising that sense the baseline evaluation probation staff in Nevis have launched a Boys and Girls 
Checker club and continue delivering vocational skills training through the YES program to a respectable 
number of youths. There is a critical need for formal pre- or post- conviction diversion options once a 
juvenile is in the court system. As with Guyana, programs should focus on reducing key risk factors and 
bolstering protective factors associated with juvenile delinquency. Selection of community partners, where 
possible, should be determined by whether the partner intends to address one or more of the following 
key risk factors: substance abuse, mental health problems, risk taking and impulsivity, anti-social attitudes 
and behavior, antisocial peers, and educational or employment needs. Potential programs should also 
articulate a coherent theory of change and outline a rudimentary monitoring and evaluation strategy. 
In addition, it is imperative that the probation department develops practice protocols in relation to 
working with youth in conflict with the law. Motivational interviewing training and workshops detailing 
how one-on-one cognitive behavioral interventions can be delivered to youth would be appropriate. Such 
training should furnish probation officers with cognitive worksheets to complete with young people 
concerning a range of issues, including peer associations, drug and alcohol use, decision making, 
consequential thinking, victim empathy and moral recognition. Such training should have an element of 
follow up and booster sessions incorporated given the significant cultural shift the training is seeking to 
achieve. Supervisory training for middle managers should also be considered. Finally, the implementation 
of Therascribe should be considered. 
The conditions of confinement in HMP and NHC remain unchanged from baseline. At NHC, while difficult 
to measure in exact terms, programming may have decreased since baseline. The disproportionately long 
periods of incarcerations of young people (who entered the system as children and are still detained 
without a disposition on their case, or who received life sentences) is a cause for concern. As noted at 
baseline, the harmful use of solitary confinement and corporal punishment in the detention facilities 
continue. Removing the lashes from the statute would be an important symbolic step. St. Kitts and Nevis 
are not relying on their probation departments to the extent they could be utilized as an alternative to 
incarceration. Understanding some of the challenges of implementing juvenile justice legislation in St. Kitts 
and Nevis over the past several years may serve as a guide for St. Lucia and Guyana as their jurisdictions 
newly navigate implementation.
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OVERALL CONCLUSIONS
Guyana, St. Lucia, and St. Kitts and Nevis have all made progress in transitioning their juvenile justice 
systems from purely punitive to rehabilitative. Though, there remains critical work to be done to 
implement the stated reforms. The passage of model legislation in St. Lucia and Guyana in 2018 marked 
an important change since baseline. While recent passage of this legislation is certainly notable, the 
experience of St. Kitts and Nevis, which passed model legislation six years ago, should provide a valuable 
framework for understanding the challenges to implementation. To that end, in all three countries, there 
continues to be a critical need to create systems within and across ministries and government agencies 
able to implement the principles outlined in the respective legislative reforms. 
As noted at baseline, the juvenile detention centers and adult prisons included in this analysis continue to 
rely on solitary confinement and the use of corporal punishment as responses to youth and young adults’ 
behaviors, which directly inhibits the centers ability to rehabilitate people in their custody. The 
development of the Department of Juvenile Justice in Guyana and the expansion of the role of the Ministry 
of Equity in juvenile justice reform in St. Lucia has promising potential. Since baseline there continues to 
be no formalized structures in place in all three countries to provide pre- or post- conviction diversion 
for justice involved young people. There are, however, existing programs that could act in this capacity, 
and it appears there is some political will in all three countries to implement formalized diversion. In St. 
Kitts, probation appears to be an underutilized resource that could provide direct support and an 
alternative to incarceration to justice involved youth. In all three countries probation departments 
continue to play a critical role in each stage of the juvenile justice system and will likely need ongoing 
technical and financial resources in order to serve their intended purpose.
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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ALL THREE COUNTRIES 
WHO 
RECOMMENDATION 
IS DIRECTED 
TOWARD
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Government
ministries, detention
facilities, and courts
• Immediately cease the practice of solitary confinement, corporal 
punishment, and punishment diets in police departments, juvenile 
detention centers, jails, and prisons holding young people. 
• The courts should report demographic and offense information to the 
Department of Criminal Justice on a monthly basis. 
2. Outside agency with
support from the
government/internat
ional bodies
• Create an independent oversight board with jurisdiction over the police 
and security staff to ensure the reduction of human rights violations in 
detention centers and police holding centers.
• Outside agencies should develop a theory of change for service delivery, 
and nurture monitoring and evaluation capacities
3. Ministry of
Education
• Take a more active role in training their leadership (principals) and 
teachers to reduce the stigma around youth from detention centers in 
their schools.
4. Detention facility
administration in
partnership with 
other agencies
• Implement training and sensitization for staff to understand the 
socioeconomic and emotional impacts of being involved in the criminal 
justice system.
5. Department of
Probation 
• Train all staff in motivational interviewing and cognitive skills work. 
• Ensure empirically validated risk assessment instruments are completed 
for all referrals. 
• Ensure case plans are completed on all new clients detailing what work 
will be completed, by whom, and by when. 
• Ensure that staff have access to computers and printers. 
• Ensure that all staff have access to training workshops, training materials, 
and risk assessment manuals. 
• Develop mechanisms for supervisory review and case conferences 
• Consider the training needs of probation supervisors and managers 
• Hire more probation officers to deliver evidence-based programs 
6. Ministry of
Education; Ministry
of Equity; 
Department of 
Juvenile Justice
• Develop a media strategy to advocate for juvenile justice reforms
• Implement an interagency working group comprising of key stakeholders 
to drive the juvenile justice reform agenda
• Identify diversionary programs that focus on reducing key risk factors 
and bolstering protective factors.
• Develop strategies to reduce the school to detention facility pipeline 
currently fueled by drop-out rates.
54 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
• Develop a strategy so that young people leaving detention facilities and 
returning back to the community receive reintegrative support. 
• Reconsider role of the Director of the Department of Juvenile Justice, in 
relation to hearing complaints from juveniles in detention facilities. 
7. Ministry of Finance • Include in the Ministry of Finance’s budget and approve funds for 
increased clinical mental health staff, psychiatrists, and trained medical 
professionals in detention centers across all three countries.
• Include in the Ministry of Finance’s budget and approve finds for 
diversionary programming, increased numbers of probation officers, and 
probation officer training
• Include in the Ministry of Finance’s budget and approve funds for 
electronic infrastructure development of the juvenile justice system, to 
facilitate inter- and intra-agency collaboration through the sharing of 
information. 
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ANNEXES
ANNEX I: TABLES
Table 2: Key Informants
STL SKN GUY TOTAL
KEY INFORMANTS (STAFF,
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS) 23 24 30 77
YOUTH IN DETENTION 12 11 19 42
YOUTH IN COMMUNITY 14 2 6 22
TOTAL INDIVIDUALS
CONSULTED* 49 37 55 141
Table 3: Fieldwork Sites
STL SKN GUY
YOUTH DETENTION
FACILITY
BTC NHC NOC
Sophia Holding Center 
ADULT DETENTION
FACILITY
Bordelais Correctional
Facility
HMP Timehri Prison
COURTS
Castries Family Court Nevis Magistrate Court Georgetown Magistrate
Court
POLICE
Royal St. Lucia Police
Force
The Royal St.
Christopher and Nevis
Police Force 
Guyana Police Force
PROBATION/OTHER
OFFICES
• Probation Dept.
• Ministry of Equity,
Social Justice,
Empowerment, Local
Governance and
Youth Development
• Probation and Parole
Unit
• Probation and Child
Welfare Unit (St.
Kitts)
• Ministry of Social
Services, Probation
Dept. (Nevis)
• Specialists in Sustained
Youth Development
and Research Inc.
• Child Care and
Protection Agency
• Probation Dept.,
Ministry of Social
Protection (Region 5)
• Department of
Culture/Youth/Sport,
Ministry of Education
56 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
Table 4: Status of Programming in Detention Facilities
STL SKN GUY
YOUTH
DETENTION 
FACILITY
BTC:
Vocational programming
(ex. auto mechanics,
woodworking, welding,
agriculture), informal
education however there
is no formal on-site
education (some boys go
out to the community for
school)
NHC:
Limited programming; on￾site school and vocational
training (e.g., electricity,
woodworking,
hospitality).
NOC:
No formal on-site
education (reports of
working toward
Caribbean Secondary
Education Certificate
[CSEC] exams to be
implemented). Some
remedial and vocational
programming available
(welding, electricity,
agriculture, IT, catering,
handicraft), church
Sophia:
Educational classes,
church, occasional
recreation, sports, karate
school (*requests for
skills training)
ADULT DETENTION
FACILITY
Bordelais:
Limited programming; No
on-site school; those in
juvenile unit are in cells
23 hours/day with some
exceptions (e.g., poetry
night once/month) * 
HMP:
Limited educational
services, church and
“drug sessions” available
on limited basis
Timehri:
Limited availability of
anger management, drug
rehabilitation, literacy,
church and occasional
recreation
USAID.GOV ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY | 57
Table 5: Population in Detention Facilities
COUNTRY FACILITY AGE
RANGE*
MALE
POPULATION
FEMALE
POPULATION
TOTAL
POPULATION
STL BTC 12-18 16 N/A 16
STL
Bordelais
Correctional
Facility
16-21 22 0 22
STL TOTAL 38 0 38
SKN New Horizons 15-18 12 1 13
SKN HMP 16-18 3* 0 3 
SKN TOTAL 15 1 16 
GUY
New
Opportunities
Corps
14-18 15 1 16
GUY Sophia Detention
Center 14-18 16 1 17
GUY Timehri Prison 18-30** 52 N/A 52
GUY TOTAL 83 2 85
*At time of data collection there were reportedly three individuals 16-18 at Her Majesty’s prison, the total prison
population (including all ages) was 178. 
**Youth Offenders numbers calculated by Timehri Prison to be those under 30 years old. 
58 | ESC JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM MIDLINE IMPLEMENTATION STUDY USAID.GOV
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