i STRATEGIC REVIEW AND LEARNING EVENT REPORT Bringing Unity, Integrity, and Legitimacy to Democracy (BUILD) in Somalia August 2018 This publication was prepared independently by Maribel Díaz and Joakim Gundel of Social Impact, Inc. It was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International Development. ii STRATEGIC REVIEW AND LEARNING EVENT REPORT Bringing Unity, Integrity, and Legitimacy to Democracy (BUILD) in Somalia USAID Kenya and East Africa Task Order No. AID-OAA-M-13-00011 Contract No. GS-10F-0294V Prepared as part of the Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance—Learning, Evaluation, and Research (DRG-LER) Activity CONTACT Social Impact, Inc. 2300 Clarendon Blvd., Suite 1000 Arlington, VA 22201 Catherine Caligan ccaligan@socialimpact.com +1 703.465.1884 ext. 337 DISCLAIMER The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or the United States Government. iii CONTENTS STRATEGIC REVIEW OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 1 METHODOLOGY 1 1. HAS THE ACTIVITY’S TOC AND KEY ASSUMPTIONS HELD OVER THE LIFE OF THE ACTIVITY SO FAR? 3 2. HOW HAS BUILD ADAPTED? 5 3. WHAT FUTURE ADAPTATIONS ARE REQUIRED IN RESPONSE TO CHANGES IN THE CONTEXT? 6 4. WHAT CLA SYSTEMS ARE REQUIRED TO ENSURE FUTURE ADAPTATIONS? 9 ANNEXES 12 ANNEX 1: STATEMENT OF WORK 12 ANNEX II: STRATEGIC REVIEW AND LEARNING EVENT AGENDA 18 ANNEX III: LIST OF KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS 25 ANNEX IV: STRATEGIC REVIEW AND LEARNING EVENT SUMMARY NOTES 26 i TABLES Table 1: Original Theory of Change.............................................................................................................3 Table 2: Revised Theory of Change .............................................................................................................7 Table 3: ToC developed by BUILD ........................................................................................................... 38 Table 4: Action Planning............................................................................................................................... 44 FIGURES Figure 1: Scenario Trajectory.........................................................................................................................8 Figure 2: Roadmap of the Learning Event ................................................................................................ 18 Figure 3: Scenario Trajectory...................................................................................................................... 41 Figure 4: Developing a Learning Agenda .................................................................................................. 45 ii ACRONYMS ADS Automated Directives System AMELP Activity Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Plan AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia AOR Agreement Officer Representative ASWL Association of Somali Women Lawyers BBC British Broadcasting Corporation BUILD Bringing Unity, Integrity, and Legitimacy to Democracy CLA Collaborating, Learning and Adapting COP Chief of Party CPA Centre for Policy Analysis CS Civil Society CSO Civil Society Organization DCOP Deputy Chief of Party DFID Department for International Development (UK) DRG Democracy, Human Rights and Governance DRG-LER Democracy, Human Rights and Governance - Learning, Evaluation and Research EISA Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa EMB Election Management Bodies FGS Federal Government of Somalia FMS Federal Member States IESG Integrated Electoral Support Group IP Implementing Partner IRI International Republican Institute MEL Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning MoIFAR Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs, and Reconciliation MP Member of Parliament NEC National Electoral Commission (Somaliland) NIEC National Independent Electoral Commission OPOV One Person One Vote PEA Political Economy Analysis RACI Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed SI Social Impact SL Somaliland SME Subject Matter Expert SPSS Somalia Program Support Services SR Strategic Review ToC Theory of Change UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Program USAID United States Agency for International Development iii USG United States Government VR Voter Registration 1 INTRODUCTION In response to the Democracy, Human Rights and Governance – Learning Evaluation and Research (DRG￾LER) tasking S023, Social Impact (SI) conducted a Midterm Strategic Review of the Bringing Unity, Integrity, and Legitimacy to Democracy (BUILD) activity in Somalia. BUILD is a $29 million initiative implemented by Creative Associates, begun in 2016 with three focal areas: (1) encouraging citizen participation in political and electoral processes through civil society and media organization capacity building; (2) developing the capacity of election management bodies; and (3) supporting Somali political parties to be more organized, inclusive and issue-based. The BUILD activity is being implemented in a very complex and fluid country context with significant security concerns. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) contracted SI to implement a strategic review in order to guide the remaining three years of the BUILD initiative to ensure that the program design and implementation adapt based on ongoing learning. This strategic review and learning report provides an analysis of data gathered through a literature review, Key Informant Interviews and the strategic review and learning event and offers recommendations to inform programmatic decision making. STRATEGIC REVIEW OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS The strategic review was structured to a) inform the next three years of program design and implementation and b) understand how the BUILD activity can incorporate learning and respond to a highly political and operational context, by answering the following strategic review questions: • Have the activity’s Theory of Change (ToC) and key assumptions held over the life of the activity so far? • To what extent has the activity adapted in response to learning and changes in context? What has enabled or hindered that? • How have the Activity’s management and operational structures performed and adapted within Somalia's challenging programming environment? • Looking forward, how best can the Activity respond to changes in the context (for example, delays to the electoral framework or the lack of decision on key constitutional issues that will impact on elections) and to key assumptions to be more adaptive? • What kind of learning and analytical activities and/or capacities are most important for ensuring the activity can contribute to desired political and technical changes? • What managerial or organizational changes may be necessary to achieve this? METHODOLOGY SI implemented a three-part methodology composed of an initial desk review, key informant interviews, and a Strategic Review and Learning Event to address the strategic review questions: • Desk Review: SI reviewed BUILD’s quarterly and annual reports, its Activity Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Plan, and additional contextual documents. • Key informant interviews (KIIs): The strategic review team conducted a total of 16 in -person and virtual interviews with BUILD stakeholders, including USAID technical staff, BUILD field and 2 headquarters staff, the National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC), representatives of civil society organizations, Members of Parliament (MPs), the United Nations (UN) Integrated Electoral Support Group (IESG) and other donors. See Annex III for a list of KII’s. • Strategic Review and Learning Event: The learning event was informed by data collected from key informant interviews, consultations with USAID/Somalia leadership and guidance from Automated Directives System 201. Outcomes include an action plan by objective, learning questions to integrate into BUILD’s Activity Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (MEL) Plan and a revised draft of the its ToC. These outputs will guide BUILD to adaptively manage its implementation moving forward. Approaches that facilitate learning and the generation of practical solutions to contextual challenges and current findings were used throughout the engagement. USAID-endorsed learning tools that were employed during the review included the development of learning questions and a learning plan, review of the activity ToC, and the identification of opportunities to track contextual changes through scenario surveillance. 3 STRATEGIC REVIEW FINDINGS AND CONCLUS1ONS 1. HAS THE ACTIVITY’S TOC AND KEY ASSUMPTIONS HELD OVER THE LIFE OF THE ACTIVITY SO FAR? The original ToC is presented in Table 1. The ToC included a number of assumptions about legislative progress, political party development, civil society development, partners in Electoral Management Bodies (EMB) and security conditions that have not held up well over time. Challenges in these areas pose a risk to the BUILD initiative’s ability to achieve its stated objective of building trust and participation in political and electoral processes and require an adaptive approach. We discuss how each of these assumptions did not match realities on the ground in the paragraphs that follow. Table 1: Original Theory of Change IF… THEN… THEREFORE… Citizens are more aware, engaged, and confident in political/electoral processes; Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) facilitate engagement between citizens and government on constitutional and legislative processes pertaining to elections; Electoral Management Bodies are supported to develop better operational systems; Political party representatives understand the electoral legal framework AND have increased skills in poll watching, voter outreach, campaigning and developing issue-based platforms Objective 1: Citizens’ participation in local, state, and national political/electoral processes will increase. Objective 2: Election Management Bodies will have better systems to administer and manage elections effectively. Objective 3: Political parties will be able to compete in elections in a way that contributes to a free and fair electoral process and appeals to a range of citizens, including women and youth. Trust and participation in political and electoral processes by Somalis will increase. Lack of a legal framework: A legal framework outlining the electoral rules is required for parties to develop and EMB to prepare for and conduct elections in Somalia. To date, the legal framework for Somalia’s elections are yet to be developed (This was not an issue for Somaliland). Without this precondition, BUILD has not been able to make progress on many planned activities, including supporting the NIEC in developing a voter registration system, preparing for planned elections in 2020, supporting political parties, and building societal trust and participation. Weak political parties: Under Objective 3, BUILD is to support political parties to allow them to become more competitive, inclusive and representative of citizens’ interests. However, Somalia’s political 4 parties are only now able to register temporarily, and for the most part are shells without organizational structures, influence on their members, a coherent ideology, or grassroots support. Even in the more politically developed Somaliland, MPs have no ongoing or sustained relationship with their parties between elections and there are no party caucuses. While BUILD has provided support to some political parties, the lack of party development has limited progress in this area. Weak civil society: Similarly, civil society remains weak, and many organizations have emerged more as contractors than as legitimate civil society organizations. Efforts to diversify outreach to additional actors of civil society, such as traditional leaders, community-based organizations and village committees have been limited. As a result, BUILD has made limited progress toward its Objective 1, building CSO capacity to inform citizens and monitor political processes. Non-cooperative partners in Somalia’s EMB: BUILD was successful in working with Somaliland’s National Electoral Commission (NEC) despite initial difficulties; BUILD is still developing its relationship with Somalia’s National Independent Electoral Commission (NIEC). The Commission is dominated by one key individual who in many stakeholders’ views has emerged as an obstacle to progress. The NIEC has limited experience and capacity and yet has not always been receptive to BUILD support. The primary source of conflict currently is the lack of BUILD support for a NIEC proposed robust and expensive bio￾metric voter registration system, which is viewed by BUILD and others as premature at this time. This poor individual relationship has undermined efforts under Objective 2, to build the capacity of NIEC to design, administer and manage transparent, credible and accepted elections and political processes, with effective public outreach and is a key factor inhibiting BUILD’s other activities from moving forward. Poor security environment: The security environment in Somalia has not improved as was expected, and according to several interviewees it has worsened. As a result, Creative Associates has not been able to visit its local partners or project locations in Mogadishu due to security restrictions. Attacks on targeted institutions threaten to disrupt efforts to register voters and to hold future elections. The poor security situation has restrained BUILD’s efforts to achieve all three of its objectives. Other challenges to achieving BUILD’s objectives include the following: • To date the main guiding principle in Somalia politics has been the 4.5 power sharing formula, named because it provides equal representation to the main four clans and half a share of representation to the remaining clans. Most stakeholders agree that an end to the 4.5 system is necessary, but the foundations for elections discussed above are lacking. Official discourse supports the concept of “one person, one vote” (OPOV); however, there are major obstacles to achieving OPOV. This could result in a scenario whereby key political actors push for an end to the 4.5 arrangement but without a substitute in place. At the same time political actors benefiting from the 4.5 system may resist OPOV if it does not appear beneficial to them. • There are strained relations within Parliament, between Parliament and the Executive branch of government, between competing Ministries within the executive, between the MPs and the President, and between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) and Federal Member States (FMS). This hinders progress in developing a political and electoral framework. • While Somalia politics is often viewed as clan-based, there are political and business networks that cross clan groups with ties to Islamic groups and external interests. In addition, project work risks being undermined by rent-seeking behavior and corruption, including in civil society. 5 2. HOW HAS BUILD ADAPTED? The BUILD program began with an early adaptation. While it had always been planned that BUILD would operate in Somaliland, the withdrawal of support for the NEC in Somaliland by another donor resulted in a USAID request to quickly ramp up activities in Somaliland. As a result, early BUILD activities focused on Somaliland. This was a reasonable adaptation and it allowed for some early progress. As mentioned above, BUILD developed a productive relationship with Somaliland’s NEC and was able to add value through support for voter card distribution, elections management, warehouse management, operational planning and procurement. There was good cooperation with managers and heads of department, and BUILD provided financial support for election equipment voter card printing, and paper ballot printing. Towards the end of 2017, BUILD moved their office and main operations to Mogadishu and increased its focus on Somalia.1 This marked a major shift in the operational context of the program, which require a comprehensive ability to adapt to a vastly different, new context. Perhaps unexpectedly, the BUILD program partners realized that their experiences and lessons learned from Somaliland were not immediately transferrable to Somalia.2 Several of the interviewed Implementing Partners (IPs) described BUILD as a de-facto “two country program.”3 A second, and apparently inadvertent adaptation was a shift in focus from achieving the stated goal of “increased trust and participation” to achieving the goal of OPOV. Given the limited progress towards OPOV and potential lack of consensus around universal suffrage, it appears that this was a problematic adaptation that is being reconsidered. While BUILD has attempted to mitigate the challenges and threats to the ToC discussed above, it has not been able to develop effective solutions to the lack of progress in developing a legal framework, inadequate political party and civil society consolidation and capacity, and a non-cooperative NIEC. The worsening security situation is a factor largely out of the hands of BUILD, limiting their options for adaption, and prompts the need for finding creative work around solutions. BUILD has also been confronted with several management related challenges to effectively adapt. These include: Staff Turnover: The program was affected by key staff turnover in the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA) and the International Republican Institute (IRI) and delays in finding replacements. This stalled the civil society sub-grant component and the political parties work because a replacement for a key local staff member had to be found after the program moved offices to Mogadishu. It was also mentioned that changes in key decision makers at Creative Associates from mid-2017 caused some confusion and discontinuity of the program. Coordination challenges within BUILD: Reporting lines between field (Mogadishu), Nairobi, and DC have been too long and complicated, leading to delays and a lack of consensus. KII’s mentioned a need for improved coordination of activities on a daily basis, and between the implementing partners (IPs) involved directly in Objectives 1 & 2, and Objectives 2 & 3 respectively. Coordination challenges between BUILD and USAID: The processing of small grants and approval of program changes has been lengthy with complex back and forth communication between Mogadishu (BUILD IPs), Washington, DC (Creative Associates HQs) and Nairobi (USAID). In addition, there appears to have been uncertainty about the extent to which BUILD could move activities forward on their own and what USAID needs to approve under the cooperative agreement. USAID on the other hand felt that 1 BUILD Annual Report 2017 2 KII’s 3 Ibid. 6 the BUILD partners could and should have developed their own solutions to bridge the challenges faced in the Somalia context and presented them to USAID. In addition, there was disagreement over the extent to which USAID should be providing political leverage in building support for BUILD among Somalia political actors. While program adaptation has proven difficult in Somalia, there have been a number of observations and lessons to be learned that could lay the groundwork for future adaptation. For example, in respect to working with civil society, KII's offered the following considerations: • Avoid basing activities around CSOs based in the capital city as they may not be respected or trusted in the provinces. • Given the limits to Somalia’s formal civil society organizations, other approaches to civic engagement, including participatory action methods and outreach to traditional leaders and community-based organizations, should be explored. • The CSO grants system needs to include risk mitigation efforts to avoid creating a new form of patronage and attracting rent-seeking sub-grantees. • Activities need to reflect the realities on the ground. For example, awareness campaigns should not be implemented for the sake of meeting output goals, but rather they should only be held once it is clear what the election system looks like and what the campaign should focus on. 3. WHAT FUTURE ADAPTATIONS ARE REQUIRED IN RESPONSE TO CHANGES IN THE CONTEXT? Through the Strategic Review and Learning Event, BUILD stakeholders discussed a number of potential future adaptations. In this section we discuss, (1) revisions to BUILD’s ToC, (2) short and medium-term efforts to adapt to Somalia’s complex reality, and (3) the results of a scenario planning exercise to identify triggers to further adaption. Revised ToC: Given the limitations of the original ToC and several assumptions that were not proving to be true (e.g., weaker than expected political parties, opposition from NIEC), BUILD stakeholders recognized that it was important to revisit the theory and assumptions. While still subject to assumptions that might not be born out, the BUILD team developed a revised theory of change better reflective of the Somali reality presented in Table 2. The ToC reflects a renewed commitment to the overarching goal of trust and participation, rather than OPOV per se. It is recommended that BUILD continue to define the assumptions and mitigation strategies in this revised ToC in in consultation with the Program Office and the AOR. 7 Table 2: Revised Theory of Change Short-term adaptation: In addition, several short-term adaptations were identified consistent with this revised ToC. These are presented by objective in Table 4 under Action Planning in Annex IV and will require further refinement by the BUILD team. In the area of civil society, stakeholders discussed the need to conduct community-driven action research to map civil society and determine potential partners. Media has been a neglected area of BUILD, and the team will explore providing training to journalists and plans to engage BBC Media Action, the British Broadcasting Corporation’s development organization, in providing support. Recognizing the need promote the creation of a legal framework and to work with Somalia’s nascent political parties, stakeholders proposed conducting an influence mapping exercise and developing a strategy to influence key decision-makers identified. Scenario planning and triggers: As part of the strategic review, BUILD stakeholders reviewed potential scenarios developed prior to the event and identified triggers to indicate a transition from one scenario to the next. The purpose of this exercise was to create dialogue around critical trends that threaten achievement of project goals and to identify and build tangible triggers that will signal the need IF… THEN… THEREFORE… Citizens are more aware of key constitutional and electoral concepts, and engage with decision makers on participatory processes toward one-person, one-vote elections; Civil society including NGOs, traditional and religious leaders, private sector and businesses facilitate engagement between citizens and government on constitutional and legislative processes; Decision makers are supported to develop appropriate and applicable legal framework; Journalists are equipped with skills and knowledge to cover political processes in a balanced, accurate, and impartial manner; Electoral Management Bodies including NIEC and other government bodies are supported to develop operational systems; Political parties are established and functioning  Decisions makers are held accountable to developing a constitution, legal and operational frameworks for OPOV elections  Media informs the public on electoral and constitutional matters, so the public can hold political actors accountable  By the end of the project, government bodies and NIEC will have key systems to administer elections effectively  Political parties will be able to compete in a way that leads to participatory processes and appeals to a range of citizens, including women and youth Trust and participation in political and electoral processes by Somalis will increase 8 to adapt BUILD’s approach. Figure 1 lays out a Collaborating, Learning, and Adapting (CLA) tool called scenario trajectory. BUILD stakeholders identified the triggers that would indicate a shift to a “Shaky/Managed Incremental Change” (Scenario II) to “It Gets Worse” (Scenario III) in the near-to-medium context of preparations for the planned elections in 2020. Potential trends and triggers were discussed at the event to indicate when the project should adjust to the rapidly-changing environment:  Scenario 1: Voter registration problem: The national ID process starts and is designed so that the database can also be used for voter registration. However, the process moves slowly and there is a risk that it will not be ready for 2020 elections. The trigger will be inadequate progress in reaching milestones towards a National ID database. This will then trigger a “Plan B” that includes identifying and prioritizing roadblocks to address, citizen outreach, recruiting volunteers or other groups to help increase engagement for the ID process by citizens  Scenario 2: Stalled legal reforms: A bill that provides the legal framework for federal elections is developed and submitted to the Council of Ministers by the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs, and Reconciliation (MoIFAR). There is resistance by various political actors to provisions of the bill and progress comes to a stop for months while the National Security Council attempts to negotiate the political issues. The trigger would be the delay of the framework that would be verified by consulting other international donors. Plan B, once triggered will include supporting the drafting of the legal framework through working with MPs and proactively supporting the process, coordinating and engaging activist civil society groups and other influential relevant actors.  Scenario 3: Fallout of no election: In 2019, more and more politicians and pundits begin saying that holding one-person-one-vote elections in 2020 is simply not technically feasible, but a transition of power is needed. There is still no electoral law and many constitutional provisions remain undecided. These politicians say that there should be an expansion of the 2016 electoral process. The trigger will be inadequate progress in reaching set elections milestones. Plan B entails examining how to develop and help establish future activities and systems to facilitate the 2024 electoral process.  Scenario 4: NIEC funding shortfall: NIEC does not receive enough government funding to hire the number of staff needed to conduct the election in the FGS budget for 2020. This would be triggered by government budget refusal or an excessively long approval process and would result in pressuring the international donor community to fill funding gaps. Plan B entails training and technical assistance to NIEC on the essential components of a budget in order to meet government standards and mitigate approval delays. Figure 1: Scenario Trajectory 9 As discussed in the next question response, in order for this adaptation to be institutionalized within BUILD, it is essential that a robust CLA system be put in place. 4. WHAT CLA SYSTEMS ARE REQUIRED TO ENSURE FUTURE ADAPTATIONS? Amendment of activity MEL Plan with a focus on CLA Plan refinement. While the CLA Plan4 represents BUILD’s general CLA approach, including potential learning questions and mechanisms for collaboration (Learning Networks), it should be refined throughout the life of the activity. BUILD can now incorporate pause and reflect moments, learning questions and collaborative processes that aid both staff and implementing partners in practical and utilization-focused CLA applications that will lead to deeper coordination and integration, evidence-based knowledge that incorporates input from an increasingly diverse set of stakeholders, and management processes that affords flexibility and agile corrective actions. Operationalize and socialize “Pause and Reflect” within BUILD organizational processes. As an intentional process, CLA for BUILD will require that Creative Associates consider adjusting organizational and management processes in order to create space for Pause and Reflect so that evidence￾based decision making is agile and responsive to the fluid context of Somalia. Develop and execute a Learning Plan in order to mitigate gaps in knowledge that may impact activity implementation approaches. During this activity, the team identified critical gaps in knowledge and learning questions that can bridge those gaps and facilitate informed decision-making. See Annex IV for Learning questions. Refine Plan Bs and triggers. The fluid and changing political dynamics shaping Somalia’s elections context requires systematic surveillance of key trends to inform adaptive management. To mitigate the risks associated with picking a single trajectory given the uncertainty regarding whether elections will be held in 2020, USAID and the BUILD team developed a range of scenarios that could unfold over the remainder of the activity, and how BUILD’s implementation would notionally adjust. Through a participatory exercise during the Strategic Review, the team predicated its implementation around the “as is” activity implementation characterized as “Shaky/Managed Incremental Change”; otherwise understood as Plan A. The team’s reflection on current dynamics with NIEC, support for OPOV and the utilization of media to effectively promote the right of citizens to vote has led to a more concerted focus on the forces and trends that may signal a shift from “Shaky/Managed Incremental Change” (Scenario II) to “It Gets Worse” (Scenario III) in the near-to-medium context of preparations for the planned elections in 2020. While the learning event was used to “Plan B’s” through these activities and triggers identified, it will be important to more formally flush out these plans, clearly specify these triggers, and ensure internal consensus around its approach. Prepare for ongoing scenario surveillance: To operationalize a structured and periodic “where are we on the scenario trajectory” learning and adaptation process, it is recommended that BUILD develop a baseline for Scenario II / III matrix of common, contemporaneous, and revelatory trend indicators that would supplement quarterly reporting against the activity MEL plan. For example, monitoring the decision around national ID and voter registration, the development of a legal framework, the likelihood of one￾4 The CLA plan is part of the Activity MEL plan, titled "Learning" in the Activity Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Plan (AMELP) 10 person-one-vote elections taking place in 2020 and funding, taken together, may signal an emerging and demonstrative scenario shift for activity implementation. The intent of this surveillance tool is to bring 360 degree objectively curated trend information into timely deliberation on the status of scenarios and implication for programming adaptation. Integrating quarterly scenario ‘pause and reflect’ sessions into program reporting will help BUILD better understand how exogenous dynamics are influencing the attainment (or lack thereof) of 2020 elections. Moreover, seismic shifts in unique scenario trends may actuate follow-on analysis that leads to activity-specific adaptation based on information beyond the BUILD activity. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS This Strategic Review and Learning Event afforded an opportunity for reflection by BUILD stakeholders and resulted in consensus around several important course corrections. More importantly, building on the CLA methodology, an approach was developed to facilitate ongoing learning and adaptation. This will help address the major challenge for BUILD: how to avoid program paralysis and ensure meaningful progress towards building trust and participation even when core assumptions do not hold. The key conclusions of the event were: • Recognizing the limits of the original ToC, the BUILD team developed a new ToC, which will lay the foundation for an adaptive approach and enable them to specify new programming options in their newly revised workplan and Activity Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning Plan (AMELP). This should be formalized to inform next year’s planning. • For Objective 2, focused on the NIEC, BUILD will flush out the details of a “Plan B” in case key assumptions, such as passage of an Electoral Framework and other supporting legislations (e.g., citizen law), does not materialize or if technical systems, such as effective voter registration, are not put in place. This should be done in the short-term, and BUILD should adopt quarterly scenario scanning as part of its CLA processes. • Given that the poor relationship with the NIEC poses a key obstacle to the success of the intervention, efforts are required to engage and obtain the support of other key influencers in the Somali polity and higher-level US government diplomatic engagement with NIEC is needed to help rebuild and repair this relationship. These engagement efforts should be outlined as part of the upcoming year’s implementation plan. • Under Objective 1, focus on civil society and the media, and Objective 3, focus on political parties, BUILD will develop alternative approaches to engagement with targeted groups that are not overly-dependent on unrealistic assumptions and tailored to the weaknesses of these three groups. By working to increase democratic culture, BUILD can still have a positive impact even if progress towards OVOP stalls. These alternatives should be identified for inclusion in the upcoming year’s implementation plan. • The event also laid the foundations for a more robust CLA approach that will allow for ongoing learning and adaptation. BUILD stakeholders identified learning questions and gaps in information, and BUILD’s AMELP should be amended to address these gaps. In addition, BUILD stakeholders identified likely scenarios, Plan B’s to address those scenarios, and triggers to initiate these Plans; however, these will require further refinement and incorporation of regular Pause and Reflect moments to consider potential scenarios and refine plans and triggers. This more robust CLA approach should be refined as part of next year’s planning. 11 • In order to engender adaptive management practices, consider a more decentralized cooperative agreement management system, whereby the BUILD team in Kenya and Somalia has primary decision-making responsibility. Actions to mitigate the risks of such an approach should be further explored, including the development of alternative mechanisms for engaging CSOs outside of grant awards. 12 ANNEXES ANNEX 1: STATEMENT OF WORK STATEMENT OF WORK MID-TERM STRATEGIC REVIEW BRINGING UNITY, INTEGRITY, AND LEGITIMACY TO DEMOCRACY (BUILD) IN SOMALIA I. PURPOSE OF THE ACTIVITY USAID Somalia seeks the services of a Contractor to conduct a mid-term Strategic Review to inform the next three years of the Bringing Unity, Integrity, and Legitimacy to Democracy (BUILD) activity, which supports elections and political processes in Somalia. The focus of the review will be on understanding how the activity can incorporate learning and respond to a highly fluid political and operational context. As such, the Strategic Review should incorporate the principles of USAID’s Collaborating, Learning and Adapting (CLA) Framework. Description of the Intervention to be reviewed The BUILD activity is a 5-year Cooperative Agreement (AID-623-A-16-00001) awarded in March 2016 to Creative Associates International, with the International Republican Institute (IRI), the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA), Forcier Consulting, and Tacforce International as sub-partners. The total estimated amount of the award was increased in 2017 to almost $29 million. BUILD’s goal is to increase participation and trust in political processes among Somali citizens. The project works with a range of institutions and organizations in Somalia and Somaliland to incrementally increase awareness of civic rights and responsibilities while establishing and strengthening key political structures to facilitate and support citizen participation. The Activity will reach its overall goal of increasing participation and trust in political processes among Somali citizens by: 1) Encouraging citizens’ participation in political and electoral processes through building civil society organizations’ capacity to inform citizens and monitor elections and political processes and improving media capacity to cover and disseminate information on these processes; 2) Developing the capacity of Election Management Bodies (EMBs) and other relevant government bodies to manage elections legitimately and effectively and design and administer credible political processes; and 13 3) Supporting Somali political parties to be more organized, inclusive and issue-based as they compete peacefully in the electoral and political process. II. STRATEGIC REVIEW QUESTIONS Questions focus on key Activity areas and are directly linked to the purpose of the review and its expected use. The contractor will refine the questions based on the desk review and KIIs and must review and finalize questions in collaboration with USAID prior to the Strategic Review and Learning Event. USAID’s suggested questions are as follows: 1. Have the activity’s ToC and key assumptions held over the life of the activity so far? 2. To what extent has the activity adapted in response to learning and changes in context? What has enabled or hindered that? 3. How have the Activity’s management and operational structures performed and adapted within Somalia's challenging programming environment? 4. Looking forward, how best can the Activity respond to changes in the context (for example, delays to the electoral framework or the lack of decision on key constitutional issues that will impact on elections) and to key assumptions to be more adaptive? 5. What kind of learning and analytical activities and/or capacities are most important for ensuring the activity can contribute to desired political and technical changes? 6. What managerial or organizational changes may be necessary to achieve this? III. DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY USAID/Somalia seeks the methodological approach that is appropriate to answer the strategic review questions. At a minimum, the following data collection methods must be used: a. Desk Review A desk review that allows the Contractor to understand the BUILD activity in the context of Somalia’s changing political context and USG priorities in order to inform the Strategic Review process. The desk review included the following documents, among other articles and sources: ● USAID/Somalia Strategic Framework ● USAID/Somalia Inclusive Governance Project Appraisal Document ● USAID/Somalia BUILD Activity Program Description 14 ● Other BUILD Activity Materials: Annual and Quarterly Reports; Annual Implementation Plans, including annual risk assessment and strategy for inclusion of marginalized populations; Activity Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Plan (AMELP); political economy analysis documents; survey baseline report; other relevant SPSS reports related to BUILD ● USAID/Somalia Citizen Perception Survey reports ● Federal Government of Somalia National Development Plan ● A Macro-Level Analysis of Conflict Drivers and Dynamics in Somalia by the Somalia Stability Fund ● State-level political and conflict analyses conducted by Forcier ● Key research and analysis documents on the progress of constitutional review and elections planning in Somalia b. Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) Interviews must be held with a range of BUILD stakeholders in order to inform and refine the strategic review questions. The list of KIIs will be approved by USAID. Ten to twelve KIIs must be held with stakeholders including USAID technical staff, BUILD field and headquarters staff, the National Independent Electoral Commission, representatives of political parties and associations, civil society organizations, the UN Integrated Electoral Support Group, other donors, and potentially other observers. c. Strategic Review and Learning Event The Contractor will organize a three-day Strategic Review and Learning Event in Nairobi, to include participation from USAID Somalia, BUILD, and IP home office. The planned dates are July 16-18. Other stakeholders and experts may participate in some sections of the event as panelists or participants. The purpose of the event is to provide a space for USAID and BUILD staff to discuss the successes and challenges of the activity to this point, work together to address the review questions, and discuss how USAID and IP staff can work together to adaptively manage the activity for success. The event should incorporate the concepts of USAID’s Collaborating, Learning and Adapting Framework; a module on CLA should be included in the event. The first two days of the event should include the full team. The third day will bring together USAID and BUILD management to discuss the results of the first two days and discuss next steps. The Contractor is expected to provide all the logistics including a note-taker for the event and to deliver a report that incorporates the key learnings and action points from the strategic review. IV. DELIVERABLES AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 1. Strategic Review Schedule: Within 2 weeks of the award of the contract, the Contractor shall complete and present a draft schedule for the strategic review to the Contracting 15 Officer’s Representative (COR). 2. Strategic Review Design: Within 1 week of approval of the schedule, the Strategic Review (SR) team must submit a SR design to the Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) (which will become an annex to the final report). At a minimum, the design will include: 1. Data collection approach/ method 2. Draft questionnaires and other data collection instruments; 3. List of potential interviewees and sites to be visited; and 4. Draft Agenda for the Strategic Review and Learning Event. 3. In-briefing: After submission of the SR design, the SR team will have an in-briefing with USAID Somalia for introductions and to discuss the team’s understanding of the assignment, initial assumptions, strategic review questions, initial list of interviewees, draft questionnaires, and draft agenda for the Strategic Review and Learning Event. 4. Mid-term Briefing: The SR team is expected to hold a briefing with USAID Somalia staff after the desk review and KIIs and before the Strategic Review and Learning Event. The purpose of this mid-term briefing will be to provide initial feedback from the desk review and KIIs, to discuss proposed changes to the SR questions, and to finalize the agenda of the Strategic Review and Learning Event. The team will also provide the COR with periodic briefings and feedback on the team’s findings, as agreed upon during the in-briefing. 5. Final Report: The contractor will provide a draft final report that incorporates the key findings and recommendations of the Strategic Review and Learning Event within one week after the end of the event. The report will address each of the questions identified in the SOW and any other issues the team considers to have a bearing on the objectives of the review. Any such issues will be included in the report only after consultation with USAID Somalia. Once the initial draft report is submitted, the COR/AOR will have 10 business days in which to review and comment on the initial draft, after which point the COR/AOR will submit the consolidated comments to the SR team. The review team will then be asked to submit a revised final draft report within 7 business days hence, and again the COR/AOR will review and send comments on this final draft report within 7 business days of its submission. The final report will be no longer than 10 pages, exclusive of annexes. For this Task Order, one payment will be made that will be tied to the satisfactory delivery of the final report. V. STRATEGIC REVIEW TEAM COMPOSITION The contractor must provide a strong team composition based on the proposed methodology. Key personnel must have demonstrated relevant prior experiences in Somalia, particularly in 16 the area of democratization and political development, and prior assessment and facilitation experience. The contractor must provide information about the SR team members, including their CVs, and explain how they meet the requirements in the strategic review SOW. Submissions of writing samples or links to past assessments or evaluation reports and related deliverables composed by proposed team members are highly desirable. All team members are required to provide to USAID a signed statement attesting to a lack of conflict of interest in relation to the activity being evaluated (a COI form). Proposed personnel are expected to be the people who execute the work of this contract. Any substitutes to the proposed team must be vetted and approved by the Strategic Review COR before they begin work. The recruitment of local Somali speaking team members is highly encouraged. The following key personnel positions are required: 1. Somalia Political Expert (Political Expert): The Political Expert is ultimately responsible for the overall management of the Strategic Review and the final products. The Political Expert will serve as a co-facilitator of the Strategic Review and Learning Event that is the centerpiece of this activity. The Political Expert is expected to have deep knowledge of the political context and political development in Somalia, and to be able to bring that knowledge to bear at the event and in the final report. S/he will ensure high quality analysis and written reports. S/he is also responsible for quality assurance and timeliness of all deliverables. Required Qualifications:  Twelve to fifteen years’ experience in working on research, development activities, or other relevant work in Somalia;  Minimum of seven years working on issues related to political development, including elections, constitutional development, and civic engagement, preferably with a significant part of this experience in Somalia;  Experience in assessment or evaluation design, management, and implementation;  Understanding of USAID’s cross-cutting program priorities, such as gender equality and women’s empowerment.  Appropriate and relevant educational degree. 2. Collaborating, Learning and Adapting Lead and Facilitator (CLA Lead) The CLA Lead will take on the main responsibility for planning and facilitating the Strategic Review and Learning Event. 17 Required Qualifications:  Significant experience in facilitation of learning events;  Experience in assessment and evaluation design, methods, management, and implementation;  Good understanding of USAID’s Collaborating, Learning, and Adapting Framework;  Appropriate and relevant educational degree. VI. OTHER REQUIREMENTS All modifications to the required elements of the SOW, whether in technical requirements, SR questions, team composition, methodology, or timeline, need to be agreed upon in writing by the COR. Any revisions should be updated in the SOW that is included as an annex to the strategic review Report. VII. LIST OF ANNEXES Herein attached is a list of the secondary data sources and other relevant materials that will help the strategic review team effectively respond to the RTOP proposal. This includes: ● USAID/Somalia Strategic Framework ● USAID/Somalia Inclusive Governance Project Appraisal Document ● USAID/Somalia BUILD Activity Program Description ● Other BUILD Activity Materials: Annual and Quarterly Reports; Annual Implementation Plans, including annual risk assessment and strategy for inclusion of marginalized populations; Activity Monitoring, Evaluation and Learning Plan (AMELP); political economy analysis documents; survey baseline report ● Fact Sheet: Collaborating, Learning and Adapting at USAID ● USAID/Somalia Citizen Perception Survey reports ● Federal Government of Somalia National Development Plan ● A Macro-Level Analysis of Conflict Drivers and Dynamics in Somalia by the Somalia Stability Fund ● State-level political and conflict analyses conducted by Forcier ● Key research and analysis documents on the progress of constitutional review and elections planning in Somalia 18 ANNEX II: STRATEGIC REVIEW AND LEARNING EVENT AGENDA LEARNING EVENT DESIGN This learning event will build on data collected from key informant interviews, consultations with USAID/Somalia leadership and guidance from Automated Directives System 201. The expected outcomes are an action plan with prioritized activities to adaptively manage BUILD, including its ToC. During this learning event, participants will be engaged through participatory activities that build on adult learning principles and are grounded in the USAID Program Cycle guidance. Given expected outcomes by USAID/Somalia, participants will reflect on key events during the life of the activity and learn about how Adaptive Management is at the core of Collaborating, Learning and Adapting. Tools that will facilitate learning and the generation of practical solutions to contextual challenges and current findings will be used throughout the engagement. USAID-endorsed learning tools include the development of learning questions and a learning plan, reviewing the activity ToC, and the identification of opportunities to track contextual changes through scenario surveillance. The following is a roadmap of the learning event. Figure 2: Roadmap of the Learning Event Phase I: Context Setting Phase 2: Clarify & Analyze Phase 3: Results & Solutions • Introductions • Changing Environment • What are we learning? • Obstacles, Opportunities & the Way forward • Learning Activities • Scenario Surveillance • Operationalizing the Way Forward • Trade off Analysis • Action Plan 19 STRATEGIC REVIEW AND LEARNING EVENT AGENDA Day 1: INTRODUCTION Focal Areas Facilitator Notes Product/Results Introduction/opening USAID/Somalia Leadership Introduction Articulation of what leadership envisions as final product. Recognition of activity as opportunity to pause and reflect to adapt as BUILD moves forward in its implementation Expected outcomes Objectives Ground Rules Overview of objectives with group. Ask for participants to write on post its, their learning expectations. If they are outside of USAID/Somalia expectations for event, include in bike rack flip chart. (Bike rack is the same as parking lot in concept). Ground Rules regarding cooperation and safe space in addition to process for next few days Group understanding of event process Introduction to CLA as an approach Walk through graphic to identify components of learning and continuous improvement and its connection with ToC. Explain: USAID’s new development paradigm, as articulated in USAID Forward and the Automated Directives System (ADS) 201 promotes adaptive management as part of the new program cycle components of Collaborating, Learning and Adapting. Adaptive management increases efficiencies through the adoption of incremental changes during implementation based on data and its analysis. Rather than previous assumptions of activity implementation as a linear process, adaptive management promotes flexibility to respond to changes in results and context. Plenary Presentation Overview of BUILD Overview of BUILD by Creative Associates to provide context and to assure that the audience is working with the same information. Presentation by Creative Associates 20 Focal Areas Facilitator Notes Product/Results Group Exercise: Wall of Wonder How has the Somali environment changed since activity design? Explain Directions: The Wall of Wonder is an exercise in which the team identifies key events, both internal and external, during the past 2-3 years (or more) that may have had an impact on BUILD. Team members will place these events along a timeline. Group encouraged to reflect on events. Timeline and events that may have had impact on implementation to refer to during the learning event Unpacking Lessons Learned Lessons Learned from Key Informant Interviews: Joakim Gundel Lessons Learned so far for BUILD: Creative Associates Note: Remind participants that the objective is to identify the lessons. Analysis of Lessons will take place during the 5 WHY’s exercise in the afternoon KII lessons Findings from BUILD’s reflections on implementation to date Observations on BUILD support of elections and constitutional review Tom Bridle Observations on elections and constitutional review for pause and reflect Plenary presentation Unpacking Learning from Key Informant Interviews Continued Unpack sessions: • Shifting and complex political context • Operational and management experience • Non-IP perspectives Q&A and discussion regarding KIIs and desk review information Information from KIIs, other monitoring and secondary data Wrap-up Remind participants to use plus/delta to receive feedback 21 Day 2: OBSTACLES, OPPORTUNTIES AND THE WAY FORWARD Focal Areas Facilitator Notes Product/Results Recap: What have we learned so far? Review of Agenda for Day 2 Theme Review previous day’s outcomes. Assign to a select or group of participants on day 1 Pause and Reflect Has the activity’s ToC and key assumptions held over the life of the activity so far? • Walk through ToC Slide • Review ToC-what we’re trying to achieve and how you think you will achieve it • Use the ToC to identify existing knowledge, evidence, analysis as well as gaps and key assumptions embedded in our technical approach, as well as those that may come from the context in which the project we are designing will be implemented. Based on analysis of ToC, teams will generate learning questions, and suggested changes in the ToC based on data/information provided. • Terminology clarification: Learning Questions and Learning Plan, Adaptive Management Learning questions, Suggested changes/adaptation to ToC ToC analysis for modification Learning questions Wall of Wonder: Part 2 What are potential key events moving forward through the end of BUILD that may have an impact on implementation? Teams to create timeline and potential events/activities Map of how BUILD will like to move forward through the rest of activity Exercise: Map of Trends and Triggers What are obstacles to learning and adapting in environment? Introduction of Trends and Triggers Table Teams to develop Maps/Outlines of Trends and Triggers Trends/Triggers Map 22 Focal Areas Facilitator Notes Product/Results Scenario Surveillance: What is the process and trend information needed to periodically pause and reflect, and consider scenario changes for adaptive management? Walk through Scenario Surveillance Process with slide. Review the possible scenarios to track: 1- Same, 2-Shaky, incremental changes, 3-worse, 4- worst ever Have table teams identify scenario indicators that qualify for each scenario using Field Trip around the Room technique. Teams move around the room every 10 minutes to discuss and add information/indicators for each scenario on the 4 flip charts. 1. Identify scenario indicators to inform country surveillance (focus environmental scan on scenarios; observe trends; consider country context indicators) 2. Develop 1-2-page indicator trend matrix (to be updated during P&R moments) 3. Recommend that team review and discuss as part of Data and Strategy Reviews (administrative / strategic) 4. What significant changes may warrant further P&R, and other analysis for adaptive management? Scenario Surveillance Process including indicators Brainstorm/discussion What opportunities exist during the program cycle for P&R? What other P&R opportunities should be built in for context monitoring and scenario surveillance? Table team discussion followed by group discussion Provide slide with Program Cycle P&R opportunities. Ask teams to add additional opportunities based on USAID/Somalia operations and recommend other to incorporate these sessions into operations and for more frequent context monitoring P&R schedule Plenary and Group Activity What process can we use to communicate to adapt: RACI Matrix RACI-Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, Informed. This matrix is a tool promoted by USAID to enhance role clarification and ownership of key business processes. To find opportunities for more efficient and effective collaboration, it’s helpful to first differentiate who does what, when, and why RACI Matrix 23 Focal Areas Facilitator Notes Product/Results This process will assist IP and USAID with clarifying roles around the adaptive management process in order to increase efficiencies in responding to context. Teams will address different decision-making processes based on scenario surveillance. Exercise: Developing a Learning Plan What kind of learning and analytical activities are needed to support learning, adaptation, and the desired political and technical changes? Walk through slide of learning tools endorsed through the CLA framework in addition to tools that may facilitate learning and CLA. Remind team on ADS requirements regarding learning from evaluations, learning plan and opportunities for learning within the Program Cycle Table teams to take learning questions, Activity Monitoring, Evaluation, and Learning (AMELP) and work by IRI to develop components of learning plan Learning Plan to add to AMELP Wrap-up Remind participants to provide feedback 24 Day 3: OPERATIONALIZING THE WAY FORWARD Focal Areas Facilitator Notes Product/Results Recap: What have we learned so far? Review of Agenda for Day 3 Theme Review previous day’s outcomes. Assign to participants on Day 1 What adaptations can we make to our activities? Using information from KIIs, Root Cause Analysis, ToC review, learning questions, scenario surveillance and Wall of Wonder exercises, teams will brainstorm on recommended changes. Criteria for changes to be established with USAID and team. Teams divided by Objective. Gallery Walk of ideas on flip charts followed by group voting Draft list of activities to adapt and solutions/changes to implement Trade off Analysis Trade off Analysis: This is a decision-making tool in which you define your own criteria to evaluate the options. This tool is useful when there are multiple options, multiple stakeholders and when there are factors beyond cost to consider. The group will use the Tradeoff Analysis criteria to review ideas and potential activities and identify those that best meet Trade off Analysis criteria. Trade off Analysis Finalize Action Plan Based on Trade off Analysis, group will develop Action Plan with tangible steps/tasks, responsible parties identified and timeframe Action Plan Draft Next Steps Based on action plan, BUILD and USAID will identify next steps for follow-up to the Learning Event Closing Remarks USAID and BUILD provide closing remarks and reflection on activity 25 ANNEX III: LIST OF KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS If distributed more broadly than key BUILD stakeholders, this annex should be deleted. Individual Position/Organization Location Chedomir Flego Chief of Party (COP) of BUILD Mogadishu Muhammad Al Musbeh BUILD Deputy Chief of Party (DCOP) Mogadishu Ahmed Awil Mohamed, Program Officer Mogadishu Tihana Bartulac Blanc and DC based Creative staff Creative Associates Washington, DC Sa’eed Osman NEC Head of Ops Hargeisa Dr. Nur Hersi Chief Strategist, Office of the President, FGS Mogadishu Maria Gaheir Centre for Policy Analysis (CPA) Hargeysa Habiba Jimale & Alloyce Association of Somali Women Lawyers (ASWL) Mogadishu Hussein Sheikh Mohamud Senator Mogadishu Naphtaly Saekamong O1 Lead (EISA sub) Mogadishu Johanna Wilkie, Victoria Ayer USAID: AOR, A-AOR, Democracy, Rights, and Governance (DRG) Office Chief Nairobi Micol Martini UK Department for International Development (DFID) Nairobi Hama Munyikwa Former EISA lead for BUILD Mogadishu Mohamed A. Sh. Osman Upper House Nairobi Marc Dickinson & Mary Cummins United Nations Development Program (UNDP)/IESG Nairobi Halima Ismail Ibrahim, and Sayid Ali Sh. Mahamed Chair and Deputy Chair, NIEC – Somalia Nairobi Ten interviews were carried out remotely using Skype of which eight were in Mogadishu and two in Hargeysa; this included eleven persons of which five were from the IP’s and six were non-IPs. Face to face interviews were carried out with one respondent in Washington DC and eight individuals (in five interviews) in Nairobi, including two from USAID and six non-IPs. Seven requested KII’s did not materialize, including one non-IP interview request that was rejected, one from a political party, one from a donor that was not available, and four non-responders (one from a political party and three other non￾IPs). The interviews were carried out by the SI Somalia expert, except for the one in Washington that was carried out by the SI Team Leader, who also accompanied the interviews in Nairobi. 26 ANNEX IV: STRATEGIC REVIEW AND LEARNING EVENT SUMMARY NOTES Insightful discussions among this group proved valuable to BUILD and USAID. The following is a process report with session information, outputs from the group and descriptions of tools employed throughout the 2.5-day event. WHAT IS COLLABORATING, LEARNING AND ADAPTING? USAID’s new development paradigm, as articulated in USAID Forward and the Automated Directives System (ADS) 201 promotes adaptive management as part of the new program cycle components of Collaborating, Learning and Adapting. Adaptive management increases efficiencies through the adoption of incremental changes during implementation based on data and its analysis. Rather than previous assumptions of activity implementation as a linear process, adaptive management promotes flexibility to respond to changes in results and context. Development rarely happens in a straight line, but we often plan and implement our activities as if we can draw a straight So, if the actual path of development is a lot less straightforward, how can we make sense of where to go? Development is not a science. There is an assumption that activity implementation is linear, however, through the process of Collaborating, Learning and Adapting, those assumptions are checked, learning from what we see on the ground, from the monitoring results collected and adapting our actions to make for the most effective development. Collaborating, learning and adapting is not an add-on; it’s an approach to carrying out our daily work and it can significantly increase the impact of what we do. OVERVIEW: BRINGING UNITY, INTEGRITY AND LEGITIMACY TO DEMOCRACY (PRESENTATION BY BUILD) Presentation Summary • Introduction to BUILD project • BUILD Progress vs Targets • Challenges and Obstacles • M&E Recommendations Project Overview • Build electoral systems, strengthen civil society and encourage civic participation in Somalia, with a particular focus on women, youth and other marginalized groups. • Duration: March 31, 2016 – March 30, 2021 • Budget: ~$29 million • Implementer: Creative Associates • Partners: IRI, EISA, Forcier Consulting • Location: Somalia (Somaliland) Immediate Challenges • Political instability; insecure and corrupt environment • Frequent timeframe changes by Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) on political decisions • Delay of legal framework to endorse the 2020 election 27 • Limited FGS coordination with Federal Member States (FMS) & between participating stakeholders • Lack of technical capacity in political processes • Limited citizen knowledge & awareness of One-Person One-Vote election, as in traditional clan structures Towards Inclusive OPOV by 2020/BUILD: • Is cognizant of and re-evaluates incentives of the primary stakeholder groups • Has developed an approach that focuses on incrementally shifting the incentives • Uses civic education efforts to incentivize political elites to seek broad-based popular mandates • Is focused on gaining support and mobilizing citizens to participate in the political process • Encourages FGS, civil society, and political parties to build on existing structures and political traditions, and engage traditional leaders and other stakeholders to promote acceptance of the transition Build Objectives Objective 1: Enhance citizens' understanding of political and electoral processes 1.1 Build CSO capacity to inform citizens and monitor political processes 1.2 Build Media capacity to cover and disseminate information on electoral and political processes Objective 2: Build the capacity of NIEC and other relevant government bodies to design, administer and manage transparent, credible and accepted elections and political processes, with effective public outreach Objective 3: Develop political parties; competitive, inclusive and representative of citizens' interests, and support enabling legal/regulatory framework for participation in elections Key Components of Program • Conduct public outreach, voter registration, and civic education and inform citizens to freely influence public policies and participate in the One -Person-One Vote election • Build and enhance capacity of political parties, registration with the authorities • Develop processes to empower minority groups, women, and youth to participate in the electoral process • Build capacity of civil society and an independent media to ensure citizens are well informed about the electoral process and encourage participation • BUILD completed program supporting Somaliland election. Key Progress Made • 3,644 election officials of both Somalia and Somaliland were trained • 8 procedures and administrative policies were developed for both NIEC and NEC • 100% of local CSOs receiving United States Government (USG) assistance improved capacity to promote political participation and awareness • 6 clear and transparent procedures were developed by Somaliland political parties • 94% of political party polling agents trained observed presidential election • With USG assistance, three (3) political parties implemented initiatives to increase number of candidates or members from marginalized groups • With USG assistance, eight (8) women and youth obtained a formal role in their party/campaign teams in 2017 28 Monitoring & Evaluation • Project M&E manager validates data on a quarterly basis. Indicators are disaggregated by gender • Beneficiaries level database is maintained, but can be improved • Project team analyzes M&E data quarterly to identify trends and anomalies and changes, that may be required in program activities. These are reported to USAID • M&E Plan is aligned with the workplan M&E Challenges • Lack of pre-verification meeting – Somalia Program Support Services (SPSS) team • SPSS mainly relying on annual implementation plan • Lack of M&E focal point from NIEC, NEC and local CSOs Strategic Recommendations • Facilitate legislative legal framework as a higher priority • Strengthen operational capacity of Somalia National Independent Electoral Commission • Conduct sustainable civic/voter registration, and/or districting and census • Continue development & building of political parties • Conduct extensive civic awareness and activism amongst women, youth, and minority groups WARM UP EXERCISE: WALL OF WONDER (LED BY MARIBEL DIAZ) The Wall of Wonder is an exercise in which the team identifies key events, both internal and external, during the past 2-3 years (or more) that may have had an impact on BUILD and project out into the future. Its purpose is the following: • Interact with colleagues who have different perspectives on USAID/Somalia’s DRG environment over the life of project • Develop a shared understanding of key events that have led to the BUILD activity “starting point” today • Work together to identify key events and forces that will affect BUILD and USAID in the remaining years of the activity Key take-aways from the activity that focused on retrospective events include: • Important strides were made in the process leading to the election in Somaliland; Flexibility to pivot during elections and successful grant implementation. However, USAID Somalia raised a concern on the need to be aware of the CSO’s and other groups who are better placed and more appropriate to channel the smaller grants; they would be more responsive to local needs. In addition, they were concerned that CSO’s needed to adhere to their standard indicators and report on those, which can be challenging. The recommendation is to consider a participatory and conversational grant implementation process, rather than a controlling • The date of the election was postponed from March to November 2017. Funding increased in response to this delay and the closure of BUILD’s Somaliland office delayed. • NIEC changed its primary engagement from BUILD to IESG. The voter registration process is still undecided. Future key events projected for 2018, 2019 and 2020 include the following: • The passing of a citizenship law, parliament leaders join political parties, 29 • Civic and voter education activities will take place through grants to media and civil society groups • While the team projected OPOV in 2020, others projected a delay in elections and a revision of the OPOV process. • Female participation is anticipated to increase from 25% in 2016 to 50% in 2020 UNPACKING LEARNING: LESSONS LEARNED, KIIS (LED BY JOAKIM GUNDEL) 30 Unpacking learning themes based on the Key Informant Interviews and Desk Review Overview of Key Lessons Learned • Somaliland (SL) experience is not immediately transferrable to Somalia • Insufficient action in Somalia so far to generate lessons learned • Most valuable experience used now is work with civil society in SL • Media component not implemented in SL • NEC had previous learning experience and capable of acknowledging mistakes • Experienced disconnects between MPs and political parties in SL • Program flexibility in terms of activities, i.e. postponement when there was a drought Objective 1: Civil Society, Awareness and Media) Lessons Learned • Need to put things on hold or change gears as the situation changes. • There are some similarities between CSs in SL and Somalia, but there are greater challenges in Somalia. • Voter registration, education and awareness activities, now carried on in the south through small grants. • Civic education to increase participation of women and youth (new call of grants in Somalia) • Activities should go beyond the needs of CSOs to also include traditional leaders, community￾based organizations, grassroots organizations and district and village communities. • Use the identified existing structures instead of Hargeysa based NGOs going straight to villages. Objective 2: NEC (Somaliland) on Lessons Learned with BUILD • NEC reports a positive experience • Value added in voter card distribution, elections management, warehouse management and operational plan. • Good cooperation with managers and head of departments. • Financial support for acquisition of election equipment, three different contracts, Voter card printing, election material, paper ballot printing ballot • Procurement support and adoption of USAID system for the procurement. Objective 3: Political Parties • Disconnect between MPs and political parties in Somaliland • MPs had no ongoing sustained relationship of belonging to their political parties • No political party caucuses • No sustained communications between MPs with their party after elections Observations in relation to the ToC • KIs feel ToC need to be revised • ToC is not clear to the KIs and not influencing day-to-day work • ToC not adequately adopted for the Somalia context • Civil Society (CS) awareness raising may have potential • Doubts about the prospects of working with political parties • EMB do not seem capable or able to progress in the medium-term SHIFTING AND COMPLEX CONTEXT 31 Unpacking Themes from KIIs and Desk Review • Society in Somalia is more complex than in Somaliland • Political dynamics are also more complex and more difficult to predict • Challenge for BUILD is determining how to deal with: o Legal and electoral framework that is not in place o Authorities that are not institutionalized o Partners (i.e., NIEC) that are blocking agreement o Political parties that are not consolidated o Lack of civil society Political Situation & Dynamics • Political Dynamics complicated and unpredictable: main guiding principle has been the 4.5 • Strained relations within Parliament, between Parliament and Executive, within Executive • between competing Ministries, and between Members of Parliament (MPs) and President • Not just clan-politics, but also political/business networks related to various Islamic groups and external interests • Strained federal-regional dynamics and strained internal-regional dynamics • Rent-seeking and corruption undermine projects • Most agree an end to 4.5 is necessary, but road to universal suffrage may take longer as foundations such as civil society, political party, understanding, and reconciliation still are missing • Some progress on Road Map, but Parliament is still waiting for the basic electoral laws from the MoIFAR and NIEC • Constitutional Review set to be finalized by end of this year (!?) Security Restrictions • Attacks can disrupt process: Polling stations, NIEC, Political Parties, Local, Reg and Federal Governments, CS awareness campaigners, Targeted assassinations • Full elections can only take place where there is sufficient security • Lack of security also restricts taxation (Non-IP perspective) • Security has not improved. It is getting worse. President/Government is not tackling Al Shabaab (Non-IP perspective) • The new Security framework risks dividing Somalia even more (Non-IP perspective) • National army should be led by Executive, but now states have forces. To create a national army, need a basic agreement between clans/reconciliation. Working with civic society (CS) • Because it is not clear what CS in a stateless society is, it may be a challenge working with this sector, without stronger clarity in what and who CS its. • Work with CS on election awareness is limited without a defined elections system • Programs risk creating a pocket or network of patronage with the CSOs contracted through grants. • Advocacy of elections is limited without a Somali mindset ready for democracy • Local Somali CSO’s tend to select their organizational missions and activities based on available funding by the international donor community • Money on advocacy and creating new institutions or umbrella organizations risk being dead ends Working with political parties 32 • Contrary to assumptions political parties today are just shells; there are no important or major parties • We have to understand the party process and consider future scenarios: will they disappear? Will they form coalitions? Will they develop a political ideology? • If they start coalescing and merging. Will they do so along clan lines? Who will support them financially? Working with NIEC and EMB Support • NIEC Chairman appears to block progress o NIEC is mostly a one person show with no experience or capacity o Hard build a program when dependent on a one-person entity • Issue of contention is the choice of voter registration system. o NIEC wants expensive full bio-metric system and is unhappy with BUILD’s suggestions to select a more practical system that is more appropriate to the voting population profile, such as a conducting voter registration manually o Competition with National ID project, which could be used for voter registration • NIEC has no experience, and no learning curve so far. • NIEC is hiring staff but appears to be along clan/family/interest lines rather than qualifications. • NIEC appears unrealistic about what it takes to prepare elections • NIEC independence may be jeopardized due to its composition and rent-seeking behavior • Coordination and collaboration with IESG in regard to NIEC need to be improved • Government funding of NIEC is important to show that there is political will, and it is not just a rent-seeking project. • Can the NIEC contribute to the legal framework for elections? o Need to work with the National Federal Technical Committee etc., to move the legal electoral frameworks forward. OPERATIONAL & MANAGEMENT EXPERIENCE (UNPACKING THEMES 2) Staff Discontinuity • Staff turnover causing discontinuity (EISA). EISA does not manage the sub-grant process • Delays due to late arrival of objective 1 lead from EISA, took time find replacement. • Several and changing number of decision makers Coordination • Day to day coordination challenges Long Reporting Lines and Grant Process • Reporting lines between field (BUILD/Mogadishu), (USAID/Nairobi) and (Creative HQ/ Washington DC) are too long and complicated, • Reporting and communication among the IPs also need to be improved • The grants process has to go between Mogadsihu, Washington and Nairobi and can be lengthy. • It is important to be able to respond when the context changes rapidly Security of Operations 33 • Security conditions makes work more complicated; movement is restricted; dependence on security partner whenever movement is necessary Ability to face challenges with local stakeholders • Challenges working with a beneficiary that is not cooperative • Authorities want to get funds directly • Who is in a better position to address roadblocks with the local political actors and stakeholders? USAID, State Department, or the BUILD partners: Creative, IRI & EISA? The answer is the key to removing roadblocks for implementation • USAID is trying to help to work with the NIEC, and tell them that this support needs to be structured and balanced in their efforts NON-IP PERSPECTIVES (UNPACKING THEMES 3) These are perspectives and key points from non-implementing partner KII’s, presented by themes that emerged from the interviews. On the political electoral process: The non-IP KIIs found that the political process is still uncertain and emphasized that the Government(s) are not working together, and there is confusion. Factors that need to be considered include: • Lack of clarity of the constituencies. • Taxation is potentially unpopular. • Population statistics are uncertain. There is no national census to date. • The definition of citizenship needs to be clarified for the voter registration process. This may cause delays and if so, an extension will cause a major political crisis. The following statements stood out as relevant: “The consultative process on the constitution is not sufficiently inclusive but we think they (the FGS) are doing their best. In 2016 it was clear that one man and one vote was not possible, but are we able to do that now? Everything depends on how the politicians agree.” “The Somali people are ready to go through what is necessary for democratization, but the government(s) must not misuse that trust. People are very skeptical about the process now, and the talk is that the government is looking for extension, but no one will ever accept that.” “Everything depends on how people see the electoral system and how they can trust it. They should come out with a system that can be accepted by the both the regional powers, and the political parties. There needs to be more dialogue and reconciliation.” “Financial and human resources are crucial. But are they (FGS) ready to raise the funds? Then they say we need the political will to provide. They claim they can handle it, with help from the international community.” 34 “Mogadishu (Banaadir region) is also the only main source of revenue today and should be part of process. But, some people want to exclude Banaadir from the elections.” “The capacitation of parties and civil society is crucial. But, people need to learn how they can participate, have access to parties, and can reach the politicians they want. Hence, the focus needs to be more on having people to participate in process, and not just about how to vote. In general, it is important that people get equal political opportunities.” On political parties: The following statements and points on political parties stood out: “Political parties don’t really make sense, and the process towards parties now doesn’t make any sense, because they are not based on common interests or ideas.” “Now MPs have to be member of party because they have to. So, they are forced to make coalitions.” “Politics today is not based on any common program, or position. Instead it is all fragmented and comes down to individual interests.” “People will not be looking at parties’ programs but elements such as clan, personality, political heavy weights etc.” “The political party process risks fragmenting the Somali society even more.” “Do Somalis accept political parties because they need it, or because they think it is something EU want.” “The process towards a political party system is new to Somalia. We need to know about how to run political parties. As an MP, I am confused about which one to join, or maybe I need to establish my own.” “BUILD could provide training / workshop with MPs about political parties, to understand the concept of parties and how to manage this.” “What we really need, is to know much more about election process management, including how political parties should do their job. Today, no single party has experience to plan and manage elections campaigns.” “Not sure we can avoid clan-based politics. Somalis will still be considering the clan issue. Parties will need members from all Somali communities, and seats in every region of Somalia. But it will be a long way, maybe in 2030-40, realistically clan politics will continue with these elections.” Perspectives on Voter Registration System: “Contention is about grabbing the particular system for reasons of control, resort and intelligence.” “The voter registration system from Pakistan will not be accepted by ‘people’, because they think the person behind it will make money through the ID system, they will think it is his business and he will own it.” 35 “People in the regions would not trust someone from Mogadishu to register them, they would only trust someone local from their community to register.” “We have to come up with a system everyone can accept. NIEC may be viewed similarly. There should be some sort of acceptance from each and all groups on how to do this.” “We are in a very fragile situation and pushing the systems and elections too hard through risks making everything fall apart.” “Voter registration can be a political risk too, as it could change the real power balance between clans. Need to accept a system that shows we are moving forward.” “National ID is an interesting option, but I am not sure. People would have confidence if registration is done with local administrations, but not sure about their capacity to do this. I think, they need local help to do it. They need local administrations to do the enrollment, and to feed into the centralized database. Some will want NIEC to do it, because if National ID goes wrong, then they will have that at least”. “NIEC’s wish to only register voters for the 2020 elections is not realistic. NIEC do not buy the National ID idea, because it came to them as a surprise! NIEC wants to protect the independence of the registry and are afraid of manipulation by government. MOIFAR and the federal states also compete for control of registration.” Perspectives on BUILDs working relationship with NIEC: “They had someone that NIEC liked, who really sat down with them. They don’t feel like that they have it anymore. Needs to have a conversation on what you need to help bolster technical capacity to broker that space and have that conversation.” “BUILD is in a tricky position. BUILD needs to create further client relationships with NIEC. UN can’t create the critical friend role with NIEC. Not sure that they are transparent about their choices.” WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED SO FAR? • Participants were asked to reflect on discussions during Day 1 and any new or significant discoveries for themselves individually. Comments include: o Grants program and possibility of different methodologies. o CLA is a new concept to BUILD and its IPs. CLA is still trickling down from Missions to IPs across USAID programming. o Reflection and adjustment on how the project sees itself versus how others see BUILD. o How to connect with Economic Growth group and their clients. Recognition that we are siloed. o CSOs perceptions. Ideas and thinking of how to balance new ideas and risks associated with doing things differently o Good to hear others’ perceptions. o Awareness of need to look/examine politics of Somalia (need to be more advanced in understanding) o Good to hear that USAID is open to adjustments. 36 o We may need to consider our Plan B. o What do we need to do differently? o Hear from the field/program o What makes/does not make sense o To what degree do we work towards other items e.g., election management body for 2024 o We haven’t discussed media- how to we use their strengths and to address our needs? PAUSE AND REFLECT: HAVE THE ACTIVITY’S TOC AND KEY ASSUMPTIONS HELD OVER THE LIFE OF THE ACTIVITY SO FAR? During Day 2, participants reviewed the BUILD ToC to identify gaps and key assumptions embedded in the technical approach and context in which BUILD is operating. and assumptions section. As part of Learning and Adaptive Management, it’s important to adjust (or update) their Activity MEL plan through this validation process of their ToC. During this exercise, table teams were asked to identify key questions that can serve to highlight knowledge gaps and contextual uncertainties, and that uncover priority learning themes and topics for BUILD to research, conduct studies or undertake other analysis. This information will likely influence the ability of BUILD to redirect activities to achieve its purpose, and/or mitigate risks that might undermine their success. USAID/Somalia acknowledged assumptions made during activity design have changed, particularly due to influencing factors, such as lack of political will to carry through required legislations and constitutional review, and security setbacks. The Wall of Wonder captured key events that influenced activity implementation. Key Assumptions and knowledge gaps include the following: Legal Framework: The legal framework lays the foundation and provides direction for the development of systems and processes, participating institutions and other structural activities needed in order to build up to elections. To date, the legal framework for Somalia’s elections is yet to be developed. One Person, One Vote (OPOV): The assumption that citizens and decision-makers demand and support OPOV is an uncertain assumption discussed by donors and implementing organizations. Gaps regarding OPOV include: • Who are the forces willing to advocate for OPOV? • What mechanisms do they have to advocate for OPOV? • What tools do they have to facilitate this process? • How are people organizing around interests? 37 • External knowledge gaps such as corruption (who benefits, other actors)? • CSOs/Media (need to change assumption) based on their capacity and trust needed to influence. • Is there political will for OPOV? • What is political party in Somalia? Political Parties/Context: BUILD’s work with political parties under Objective 3: • ID/Voter Registration (VR) process doesn’t exist? Is this an assumption? • Political Parties are more competitive, inclusive and representative of citizens’ interests. One important assumption/knowledge gap is the question: Who is a citizen? Contextual knowledge gaps include: • Who is in charge? • How are decisions made? They are opaque, and the decision-making process appears ad hoc. • The delay in decision-making is a distraction • Who/what are the Legal drafting bodies? • Political Party Advisors (including FTWC) are unknown • Technical –NIEC-selection? • Legal framework • Financial-donor support gov’t • Don’t know when legal framework will pass/capacity of those developing drafts? • IP/donor involvement in drafting/timing • EMBs • What will govt contribute? Which assumptions still hold? • Political parties • Legislation exists. • Local stakeholders-assistance-still holds • $=yes, Money /Funding= yes • Technical Assistance = mostly yes+ + parties yes • Reform perspective? • Political parties-still yes • Advisors • NEC=yes Additional Knowledge Gaps • Legal drafting bodies • Political party advisors • National ID • Capacity of existing EMBs • Human Resources • NIEC selection criteria • Legal framework • Financial-donor support of government • Don’t know when legal framework will be developed 38 • Potential role of IP/donor involvement in drafting/timing • Better understanding of contextual factors • (Some missing) Citizen Safety • To what extent does citizen safety exist? • Partial security is good in some hotels and hosting events in gov’t areas Knowledge gaps? - threats? • Threats unknown • Will citizens be able to assemble/rally? • Who are citizens? • What will security needs be/look like? • Who is carrying out killings? No prosecution Contextual factors • Approximately 100 people assassinated since 2016- people are blackmailed/threatened to comply (won’t answer phone calls from unknowns) • Date of drawdown of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) • External/internal security actors • Advice provided to FGS/FMS on security and coordination. • Hotline? NIEC structure As a result of this exercise, BUILD developed a ToC that reflects current reality and current assumptions. Discussions were considered during this process. On Day 3, BUILD presented this draft to the group: Table 3: ToC developed by BUILD If… Then… Therefore… • Citizens are more aware of key constitutional and electoral concepts, and engage with decision makers on participatory processes toward one-person, one-vote elections • Civil society including NGOs, traditional and religious leaders, private sector and businesses • Decision-makers are held accountable to developing a constitution, legal and operational frameworks for OPOV elections • Media informs the public on electoral Trust and participation in political and electoral processes by Somalis will increase 39 facilitate engagement between citizens and government on constitutional and legislative processes • Decision-makers are supported to develop appropriate and applicable legal framework • Journalists are equipped with skills and knowledge to cover political processes in a balanced, accurate and impartial manner • Electoral Management Bodies including NIEC and other government bodies are supported to develop operational systems • Political parties are established and functioning and constitutional matters, so the public can hold political actors accountable • By the end of the project, government bodies and NIEC will have key systems to administer elections effectively • Political parties will be able to compete in a way that leads to participatory processes and appeals to a range of citizens, including women and youth This first draft is commended by the group; however, it is recommended that assumptions identified are grounded in plausible expectations from the external environment. It is recognized that assumptions are outside of the locus of control for BUILD, however, the group from USAID would like this to reflect the ToC and assumptions that are expected to hold. EXERCISE : TRENDS AND TRIGGERS What is the process and trend information needed to periodically pause and reflect, and consider scenario changes for adaptive management? During this exercise, the BUILD team identified overarching potential areas for greater examination and that may have impact on the activity. The purpose of this exercise is to create dialogue around critical trends that threatened achievement of project goals and to identify tangible triggers that will signal the need to adapt the approach. Pause and reflect moments will be used to asses these trends and if any of these triggers have been switched. 1. LEGAL PROCESSES 2. MEDIA 3. SECURITY+ CONFLICT 4. POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 5. STATE FEDERAL RELATIONSHIPS 6. VOTER REGISTRATION 40 1.LEGAL PROCESSES OPOV Trends Triggers • Lack of political leadership and/understanding of roles • Slowness • Problematic laws are passed. • No electoral law passed by end 2018 2. MEDIA Trends Triggers • Security • Low capacity • Inaccuracy • Norms • Little pay • Security threats against the media • Repressive government action against media • Fake news/intentional misinterpretation of BUILD work 3.STATE-FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP Trends Triggers • Disagreement on FGS proposal on elections (e.g., one state refuses to adopt Dec. 2020) Tense /dialogue process • A threat to pull out of the engagement. 4. NIEC-STATE RELATIONSHIP Trends Triggers Delay in clarifying processes & responsibilities Unsure 5. VOTER REGISTRATION Trends Triggers • Inability to function • Elections postponed • Elections cancelled 41 • Systems failure 6.SECURITY Trends Triggers • Geographical control (Status quo to losses) • Al Shabab attacks continue • Candidates, delegates, media vulnerable to threats/assassinations • Gov’t starts negotiations with Al Shabaab • AMISOM withdraws • Partners and/or BUILD staff are targeted SCENARIO SURVEILLANCE AND SCENARIO PLANNING: IDENTIFYING TRENDS, TRIGGERS, INDICATORS AND PLAN B This is a 360-degree’ Process in which participants are asked to reflect on how the country scenario should inform the BUILD activity’s CLA Plan? In this process, teams are asked to identify: • What are the key triggers, ‘trip-wires,’ indicators originally contemplated in the scenario? • Are the scenario quadrant concepts, descriptions, and movement still valid? Identify modifications / changes to scenario quadrants • How should we survey the country context to forewarn game-changers, trip wires, trigger events? • How should we support adaptive decision-making? Define notional process and roles. The forces and trends identified in this exercise will allow BUILD to anticipate adaptation to activities through those indicators that may signal a shift from “Shaky/Managed Incremental Change” (identified as Scenario II in Figure 3) to “It Gets Worse” (Scenario III) in the near-to￾medium context of preparations for the planned elections in 2020. BUILD identified Scenario 1 as Plan A in which minimal changes would facilitate implementation as planned. In response to triggers that would shift the activity into “Shaky/Managed Incremental Change,” groups identified what they call Plan B. This is BUILD’s response to these trends and triggers based on indicators identified in the exercise. The following four possible scenarios were discussed by table teams. Triggers and context monitoring indicators were proposed for surveillance. We discuss each in turn. Figure 3: Scenario Trajectory 42 Scenario 1: Voter registration problem The national ID process starts and is designed so that the database can also be used for voter registration. However, the process moves slowly and by mid-2019, we understand that the database will not be complete until at least 2022. Assumption-a credible election process • Trust & participation • Can national ID contribute and serve as indication or both? • T+P=OPOV- causal link What are the Triggers and Trends for entering into Plan B? • Inadequate progress in achieving milestones towards a National ID database Plan B • Guidance on same day voter registration. • Can lead to other scenarios-Those who think Somalia isn’t ready for Plan B (Can be used to their advantage) • Facilitate dialogue- have NIEC involved. Scenario 2: Stalled legal reforms A bill that provides the legal framework for federal elections is developed and submitted to the Council of Ministers by MoIFAR. There is resistance by various political actors to provisions of the bill and progress comes to a stop for months while the National Security Council attempts to negotiate the political issues. Trigger • Bill is submitted to council of ministers • Progress being made by taking to congress & passing • Individuals & behind the scenes work involved Indicator to identify trigger • NSC council is locked away Plan B • Support interest groups on what is considered a good bill • Pressure/Influence • Engage international stakeholders to advocate • Staff to engage with those in government who may be blocking process Scenario 3: Fallout of no election In 2019, more and more politicians and pundits begin saying that holding one-person-one-vote elections in 2020 is simply not technically feasible, but a transition of power is needed. There is still no electoral 43 law and many constitutional provisions remain undecided. These politicians say that there should be an expansion of the 2016 electoral process. Trigger Identify and track progress in reaching milestones to OPOV to anticipate actual trigger. (Caution; can be used against OPOV) Plan B • Messaging to Donors- campaign • Help NIEC on how explain feasibility of elections. • Help anyone on electoral law & other provisions. • Engage CSOs to message Scenario 4: NIEC funding shortfall NIEC does not receive enough government funding to hire the number of staff needed to conduct the election in the FGS budget for 2020. Trigger • Govt doesn’t accept budget proposed. • Agree but doesn’t have legal approval process-too long Indicators to identify trigger • Government dispute w/ NIEC • Direct communication • Other stakeholders • Strategic plan tracking Plan B • Discuss w/ Somalia leaders. • Early budget formulation. • Assistance on what is a government budget? Its elements/process • Prepare NIEC leader to help her with a communications strategy 44 ACTION PLANNING In addition to scenario planning, participants identified more immediate actions and adaptations to take in the short and medium term. These are summarized in Table 4. Table 4: Action Planning Objective Sub-objectives and Activities Actions and Adaptations Objective 1: Civic Engagement -CSOs CSOs capacity to inform citizens and monitor political processes increased Conduct community-driven action research oriented to CSO mapping to determine potential partners and establish which are engaged with which donors. Media Media capacity to cover and disseminate information on political process increased Consider training journalists on now to conduct journalistic research, including ethical training. Engage British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) in providing strategic communications support Objective 2: Support to Election Bodies and Management Bodies • Events to increase dialogue and knowledge • To support registration￾meet registration requirements. • Technical assistance￾Basic (all given chance) Advanced- on selected programs-focus on what’s important to manage resources. Map decision makers and identify a strategy of influence. Research and identify a strategy for influencing key decision makers. ISSUE-BASED PATTERNS • Identify issues of priority/represent￾Become relevant influential. • Conduct citizen outreach • Internal comm. And decision making • Recruitment; member/volunteer engagement INFLUENCERS • Work with MPs • Work with party members • Help MPs to join a party (required by end of 2018) CHANGES • Need to understand how the Somali informal political system works • Find a niche-join/support a party 45 • If a party is influential/individual-buy in for O-P-O-V Objective 3: Political parties are more competitive, inclusive, and representative of citizens’ interests • Coordinate with other donors and international development partners to influence and ensure complementary approaches. • Understand & support the drafting of the legal framework. This requires the above noted mapping of influencers. Work with influential MPs, civil society activities, and others to advance legislation. • Provide operational planning and assistance to drafting a realistic budget at the state level. • Ensure coordination with IESG on support to NIEC on compliance and public accountability. 46 LEARNING QUESTIONS FOR INCORPORATION INTO BUILD ACTIVITY MEL PLAN Based on gaps and learning questions BUILD will design learning activities that best suit each learning question, in terms of rigor, data availability, number and types of perspectives required, and/or timing, in terms of what we find out. The nature and scope of activities might be focused on accessing, analyzing and utilizing monitoring data, or investing in evaluations. Or a better fit might be to pursue a research activity, an assessment or focused analysis - such as a lit review - or structured peer learning. As with analysis during the design phase, the ‘right fit’ is key to matching learning activity to learning question. Finally, learning priorities need to consider utilization -- how, when, by whom will the learning be used? To share with stakeholders, partners, future project designers? And/or to inform iterative design throughout implementation? To refine the ToC or add a new intervention where gaps in the implementation plan might appear? During the Theory of Change activity during Day 2, participants developed the following potential questions 1. What is a political party in Somalia? Who are the people behind these parties? 2. Who is a citizen? 3. ID/VR process doesn’t exist. Is this an assumption? 4. The composition of the NIEC Board and the selection process of its membership unknown. Do we know what criteria was applied for selection? 5. Who will be able to assemble /rally? 6. EMBs - what will govt contribute? Additional Learning Questions • Who are the influencers or decision makers learning on political matters? • How can we best influence these influencers? • Which community should we target to identify how to best engage citizens? • Who are players in the legal framework at national & state levels? • Map influential individual re; political parties (network/association/business networks)? • Who are these members of parties to be recruited? • Who are the people in the political parties? • What may be the limitations of parties outside of Mogadishu? • What are people’s perceptions on political parties? Figure 4: Developing a Learning Agenda 47 FACILITATOR AFTER-ACTION REVIEW After-Action Reviews are an important retrospective tool for learning. It is a tool and process that is endorsed by USAID as a helpful CLA Tool. As part of Social Impact’s process, After Action Reviews were conducted by the in-country SI team in order to reflect on what was planned, what transpired and what lessons regarding process that can be learned. Given the innovative nature of this activity and its vision of being a more timely and participatory process than mid-term evaluations, the facilitation team reflected on the process, dynamics and learning for future utilization of such events. Day 1: After Action Review What was supposed to happen? • Opening to remind group on “safe space” • Follow our agenda to reflect on what’s happened so far • Wall of wonder to identify key events both internal and external to BUILD that may have had an impact on the activity. • Unpacking Lessons Learned from KIIs and BUILD • KII information • Observations on elections and constitutional review What actually happened? • USAID provided appropriate tone for openness and frank discussions • USAID open and frank on asking important questions for consideration and potential ways to conduct activity/ granting that is beyond traditional granting. Can there be other mechanisms for engaging CS? • BUILD presentation on results was a reflection of their latest quarterly report. Didn’t reflect the objective of the activity. No discussion on the complexity and learning from their environment. Was an exercise in trying to demonstrate results. • Wall of Wonder was helpful in providing context • Lessons learned. Civil society-correcting that civil society was actually from the regions to balance out participation. KIIs reflected that this was SI perception • USAID openly describing impression of BUILD during retreat in February • BUILD field team providing their impressions/agreements/disagreements regarding KII information. Did it hold true for them? • Needed to use “step up, step back” approach to allow field office to provide insights • BUILD staff holding back on contributing to discussions. Perhaps misunderstanding of safe space with field and IP and HQ? • Lots of questions from Creative HQ, but less from field. • Lots of sharing of impressions and questioning from Non-Agreement Officer Representative (AOR) staff/outside of the immediate BUILD activity. Limited to higher level impressions. 48 KII’s defensiveness: • Conversation on overlap among partners met with defensiveness. • Justification/defensiveness regarding Political Economy Analysis (PEA) memo information • Disagreement on grant process and delays • Disagreement regarding perception of NIEC leadership; not accepting current viewpoints by interviewees • Belief that sample of KIIs did not capture activity accurately (not enough #s) • February team building/reflection activity. Referenced memo regarding perceptions on BUILD by USAID. • During interviews, team members were not engaged with the Theory of Change, but at the same time, they all agreed that TOC should be changed • TOC concept is unknown generally; lack of thinking that agency to change is possible. What lessons can we learn? • Focus future discussion on BUILD staff and their on-the-ground insights • Remind team that this is an opportunity to think of things differently • Trying to help team to “feel free” to think of things differently. How to do this? • Split groups into “Field and USAID AOR” and “HQ and other USAID” • Trying to keep people to agenda. Participants passionate about answering their own particular questions. • The group can benefit from the insights of the Subject Matter Expert (SME); sometimes this ends up taking more time than anticipated Understanding and socializing that changing TOC is possible. This may be a reflection of how the participants have operated in development overall. How to convey that behaviors regarding the non￾linear approach to development is still yet to be socialized. Day 2: After Action Review What was supposed to happen? • ToC analysis • Learning Questions and Learning Plan • Scenario Surveillance presentation • Future Wall of Wonder • Trends and Triggers What actually happened? • Technology still a problem • Agenda adjustments due to technology delays • Additional conversations to break down definitions-Use of word “Nuances” • Use of scenarios to identify Triggers, Indicators and Plan B • Skipped exercises: 5 why’s, identifying Pause and Reflect moments, developing a learning plan • Delayed RACI Matrix 49 • Challenge: different versions of the ToC. Client and donor didn’t know which one to work from. • Discussion on what the goal should be: Trust and Participation and not One Person one vote. This indicates that both client and IP were unclear about their actual ToC/Development Objective. SI asked about the Strategy document and which is described as the goal. In this document it is Trust and Participation • Engagement of SME-observed good reflection. • Tendency of USAID actors being too dominant • BRIDGE people still holding back • Technical people-M&E and Grants. Although these were topics of discussion, these staff were disengaged. What lessons can we learn? • Groups who were not BUILD field team went through assumptions regarding ToC from their perspective and sometimes utilizing experiences/information from outside the context • USAID staff dominated discussion • Limit/structure donor participation • Don’t invite staff from outside of the office/activity if their role is undefined and review not understood. Proactive engagement of office leadership demonstrating interest is a motivating factor for IP openness and participation. Day 3: After Action Review What was supposed to happen? • Action Planning • RACI Matrix What actually happened? • BUILD presented amended ToC • Learning Plan review and additional learning questions based on What is New and What new activities to propose. • RACI Matrix There was a great breakthrough in the Action Planning Session. Since the ToC was amended and presented, in addition to discussion on what is different, Action Planning resulted in thinking creatively. For example, the team for Objective 1 decided to look at the grants process differently and perhaps not provide grants but engage CSO’s in a different way. 50 U.S. Agency for International Development 1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, D.C. 20004