August, 2018
This publication was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International Development. It was 
prepared independently by the Evaluation and Analysis for Learning Project (EVAL) of Management Systems 
International, a TetraTech Company.
EVALUATION
MID-TERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF 
THE COLOMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVITY

MID-TERM PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION OF THE 
COLOMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS 
ACTIVITY
August 2018
Contracted under AID-514-C-13-00003
Colombia Evaluation and Analysis for Learning (EVAL) Project
Prepared by:
Irene Velez
María Angélica Alvarado
Natalia Estupiñán
Susan Minushkin
Photo Caption: Training with women in the indigenous guard in Ituango, Antioquia
Credit: Human Rights Activity
DISCLAIMER
The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States 
Agency for International Development or the United States Government.

Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA i
CONTENTS
Contents.................................................................................................................................................................i
Acknowledgments................................................................................................................................................ iii
Abstract................................................................................................................................................................ iv
Acronyms............................................................................................................................................................... v
Executive Summary ...............................................................................................................................................6
Introduction......................................................................................................................................................... 20
Evaluation Purpose.............................................................................................................................................. 20
Evaluation Questions........................................................................................................................................... 20
Activity Description ............................................................................................................................................. 21
Background ............................................................................................................................................... 21
Activity Overview ...................................................................................................................................... 21
Development Hypotheses ......................................................................................................................... 23
Evaluation Approach............................................................................................................................................ 24
Sampling Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 24
Data Collection Methods........................................................................................................................... 25
Data Analysis Methods.............................................................................................................................. 28
Evaluation Team Composition ................................................................................................................... 28
Evaluation Limitations............................................................................................................................... 29
Findings and Conclusions..................................................................................................................................... 30
Evaluation Question 1 ............................................................................................................................... 30
Evaluation Question 2 ............................................................................................................................... 39
Evaluation Question 3 ............................................................................................................................... 46
Evaluation Question 4 ............................................................................................................................... 53
Evaluation Question 5 ............................................................................................................................... 60
Evaluation Question 6 ............................................................................................................................... 69
Recommendations............................................................................................................................................... 77
Recommendations for HRA’s relevance and adequate adaptation to the changing human rights context 77
Recommendations for improving the understanding of human rights standards...................................... 78
Recommendations for promoting sustainability........................................................................................ 79
Recommendations for maximizing effects on beneficiaries....................................................................... 80
Recommendations for advancing the objective of increasing investigations and prosecutions of human 
rights violations......................................................................................................................................... 80
Annexes............................................................................................................................................................... 81
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA ii
ANNEXES: 
Annex A: Evaluation Statement of Work .....................................................................................................................82
Annex B: Evaluation Methods .....................................................................................................................................98
Annex C: Municipality Characteristics and List..........................................................................................................106
Annex D: Sources of Information...............................................................................................................................109
Annex E: Data Collection Instruments.......................................................................................................................115
Annex F: Context Analysis..........................................................................................................................................125
Annex G: Indicator Progress......................................................................................................................................136
LIST OF FIGURES:
Figure 1: HRA Results Framework..............................................................................................................................23
Figure 2: Homicides of Human Rights Defenders and Leaders, by Month........................................................34
Figure 3: Number of HRA Grants, by Demographic Characteristics.................................................................35
Figure 4: Distribution of Grant Duration ..................................................................................................................51
Figure 5: HRA Deliverables Progress Tracker .........................................................................................................69
Figure 6: HRA Municipality Characteristics............................................................................................................ 106
Figure 7: HRA Municipalities...................................................................................................................................... 108
LIST OF TABLES:
Table 1: Municipality Sample Summary.......................................................................................................................25
Table 2: List of Municipalities and Department Capitals in the Evaluation Sample..........................................25
Table 3: Key Informant Interview Distribution ........................................................................................................26
Table 4: Group Discussions by Beneficiary Group..................................................................................................27
Table 5: Strategy Overlap between HRA and JSP....................................................................................................61
Table 6: Sustainability Factors.......................................................................................................................................99
Table 7: Evaluation Design Matrix ............................................................................................................................ 104
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The evaluation team thanks the study participants, including government officials, civil society 
representatives, and community members who shared their insights and time to participate in this study. 
They also thank Chemonics and the entire HRA team for their collaboration and support throughout 
the planning and implementation of this evaluation. Special acknowledgement goes to the field research 
team, including Dario Alvarado, Alejandro Cruz, and Diana Leal for assisting the core evaluation team 
members in conducting interviews and group discussions; Natalia Restrepo for conducting interviews in 
Bogota and qualitative analysis; Cristina Querubín and Laura Castro for leading the logistics and 
transcribing support teams and providing quality oversight of transcripts, and Pablo Gutierrez and Luisa 
Fernanda Torres for coding support during the qualitative analysis. The evaluation team also benefited 
from technical reviews from Roger Rasnake, Ana Maria Rivera, and Daniel Nowicki at Management 
Systems International. Finally, the evaluation team thanks USAID staff, Omar Lopez, Leonardo Reales, 
and Sol Gaitán, for their support during this study. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA iv
ABSTRACT
This mid-term performance evaluation of the USAID/Colombia Human Rights Activity employs a 
qualitative methodology to assess HRA’s advancements towards its intended outcomes, relevance in the 
changing human rights context, and promotion of sustainability of its activities. The evaluation team 
conducted 136 key informant interviews and 15 group discussions to answer six evaluation questions. 
The evaluation found that HRA remains relevant through its regional presence and technical and 
contextual expertise. While HRA has incorporated activities that adequately respond to the institutional 
challenges that governmental entities face, there are particular strategies that can be strengthened, 
including issues on illegal mining, targeting Afro-Colombians, and protecting human rights leaders and 
defenders. HRA has contributed to and improved understanding of human rights standards among the 
most relevant municipal government officials and vulnerable beneficiary groups. The additional effects on 
beneficiaries include leadership, empowerment, and self-esteem at the individual level, which spill over 
into strengthening civil society and their community and family spheres. HRA’s institutional 
strengthening strategy is oriented toward sustainability through its emphasis on supporting activities and 
processes linked to public policy. However, two challenges under HRA’s control undermine the 
sustainability of its activities: 1) intensive technical assistance runs the risk of creating dependency from 
government officials on its regional advisors, and 2) short-term grants limit CSOs from fully 
implementing their projects. Finally, HRA has limited capacity and a constrained sphere of influence to 
achieve the objectives of its response component under the status quo. In the absence of high-level 
discussions between USAID and AGO officials, HRA has been strategic in approaching the AGO. 
However, this has resulted in a piecemeal strategy rather than a high-level comprehensive strategy that 
aligns with the ambitious objective of this component.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA v
ACRONYMS
ADS Automated Directives System
AGO Attorney General’s Office
CDCS Country Development Cooperation Strategy
COMPOS Municipal Social Policy Committee (Consejo Municipal de Política Social)
CSO Civil Society Organization
CPDH Presidential Advisor for Human Rights (Consejería Presidencial de Derechos 
Humanos)
DEC Development Experience Clearinghouse
ELN National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional)
EVAL Evaluation and Analysis for Learning Project
EQ Evaluation Question
EWS Early Warning System
FARC-EP Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo)
FENALPER National Federation of Personeros (Federación Nacional de Personeros)
GBV Gender-based Violence
GD Group Discussion
GOC Government of Colombia
HRA Human Rights Activity
IGO Inspector General’s Office
IR Intermediate Result
JAC Community Action Board (Junta de Acción Comunal)
JEP Special Jurisdiction for Peace (Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz)
KII Key Informant Interviews
LGBTI Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transexual, Intersex
MEV Elimination of Violence against Women Roundtable (Mesa de Erradicación de 
Violencia contra la Mujer)
MOE Ministry of Education
MOI Ministry of the Interior
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NPU National Protection Unit
PDET Territorial-Focused Development Program (Programa de Desarrollo con Enfoque 
Territorial)
PPGNR Prevention, Protection, and Guarantees of Non-Repetition
SOW Statement of Work
UNOHCHR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
USG United States Government
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report presents the findings, conclusions, and recommendations from the mid-term performance 
evaluation of the Human Rights Activity (HRA) in Colombia. The evaluation was commissioned by the 
USAID Colombia Mission and was designed and implemented by the Evaluation and Analysis for 
Learning contract. 
This performance evaluation aims to assess HRA’s implementation progress near the midpoint in the life 
of the Activity and advancements towards its intended outcomes, its relevance in the changing human 
rights context, and its promotion of sustainability of its activities. The evaluation is expected to 
contribute to Mission and implementing partner program management and learning as HRA proceeds 
through the remaining time in its implementation period.
Background 
In November 2016, the GOC and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army 
(FARC-EP) signed a finalized peace accord to end its 52-year conflict. The Accord’s implementation has 
been challenging, resulting in a recent upsurge in violence against local human rights advocates. With the 
demobilization of FARC-EP combatants, the government’s ability to provide security for at-risk 
populations, while ensuring access to justice and addressing impunity of human rights violations, is being 
sorely tested. Many of the inroads made with support from previous human rights programs are still 
fragile and need ongoing assistance to ensure their sustainability.
Activity Description
Over the past 16 years, USAID/Colombia has developed the largest U.S. stand-alone human rights 
program in the world. HRA, implemented by Chemonics, is the fourth phase of USAID’s human rights 
program in Colombia. It is a $14.1 million Activity with a period of performance from April 2016 to 
April 2019, with two options years to continue through April 2021. HRA aims to consolidate prior gains 
from previous human rights programs, as well as to more effectively confront the human rights concerns 
of vulnerable populations. 
HRA’s overall strategy is to support the GOC and civil society in promoting a culture of human rights, 
preventing abuse and violations of human rights, and responding effectively to human rights violations 
once they have occurred. The Activity is focused primarily on regional human rights efforts in 40 
municipalities across seven departments, while maintaining some national actions, particularly with 
respect to policy reforms and the implementation of post-accord measures. Activities include a 
differentiated approach ensuring that initiatives targeting vulnerable groups are tailored to their cultural 
characteristics and needs, geographic realities, and conflict circumstances.
Evaluation Questions
The evaluation answers the following evaluation questions (EQs):
1. Do the overarching and specific strategies of the Activity remain relevant in the changing human 
rights context from a municipal, departmental and national perspective? Has HRA adapted 
adequate and relevant strategies to address this changing human rights context?
2. To what extent do Colombian government officials, civil society representatives, and 
beneficiaries in target areas demonstrate an improved understanding of human rights standards 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 7
and view compliance with those standards as the norm?
3. Are HRA’s strategies and approaches promoting sustainability of the initiatives supported by the 
Activity at the GOC and civil society levels?
4. What effect has HRA had on the beneficiaries of the organizations supported by the Activity, 
especially on human rights defenders and social leaders, LGBTI persons, women, local 
journalists, youth and ethnic communities in conflict affected municipalities covered by HRA?
5. Are HRA's strategies effective and adequate for the objective of increasing investigations and 
prosecutions of human rights violations? Is HRA effectively coordinating with other programs or 
international organizations working on impunity, such as UNOHCHR?
6. What have been the achievements, bottlenecks and lessons learned during the implementation 
of the three components of HRA and its cross-cutting themes?
Evaluation Methodology
This performance evaluation employed a qualitative approach, consisting of 136 key informant 
interviews, 15 group discussions, a desk review of project documents, and a context analysis by human 
rights experts which also used third-party data from national and regional institutions. This research 
included eight weeks in-country, with two weeks of desk review and planning and six weeks of primary 
data collection in 13 municipalities and department capitals across the seven departments where HRA 
operates. The different stakeholders included in this evaluation are national, departmental, and municipal 
government officials, CSO grantees, and beneficiary groups (i.e. social leaders, youth, women, LGBTI, 
indigenous, and Afro-Colombian groups).1 The team used planned/actual comparisons and 
pattern/content analysis to analyze these data and develop findings and conclusions for each EQ. While 
the evaluation triangulates evidence across different data sources and stakeholder categories to 
strengthen the validity and reliability of the findings, some limitations include the inability to demonstrate 
attribution, lack of baseline information, potential respondent bias, and non-random selection of the 
beneficiaries in the group discussions. 
Findings and Conclusions 
EQ1: Do the overarching and specific strategies of the Activity remain relevant in the 
changing human rights context from a municipal, departmental and national 
perspective? Has HRA adapted adequate and relevant strategies to address this 
changing human rights context?
The evaluation team found that the changing human rights context presents the GOC with several 
institutional challenges relating to implementing the Accord as well as territorial challenges relating to 
the demobilization of the FARC-EP and a reconfiguration of armed groups participating in illegal 
economies, which in turn exposes vulnerable populations to different risks. 
The Accord alters the institutional structure of the national entities and imposes new obligations on 
local governments. The challenges that stem from these changes result in an increased demand from 
government officials for 1) human and financial resources, 2) engagement between government entities 
and across levels of government, and 3) knowledge and understanding by national and local government 
officials of what the GOC and FARC-EP agreed to in the Accord.
 
1 While all of these stakeholders are HRA beneficiaries, throughout the report “beneficiaries” refers only to the population 
groups that participated directly in the CSO grant projects as well as social leaders. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 8
All active armed groups have some relationship with illegal economies, including drug trafficking, illegal 
mining, and illegal logging, but not all aspects of the illegal economies are present in all municipalities in 
which HRA works. The armed groups’ actions have affected a variety of vulnerable groups including 
human rights defenders and leaders, children and youth, women, Afro-Colombians and indigenous 
groups, the LGBTI population, and demobilized FARC-EP members. The risks to these vulnerable 
populations are not new. Yet, the reconfiguration of armed actors has worsened the situation for human 
rights defenders and leaders as well as indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities who are closely 
tied to the territory.
Key Conclusions:
• HRA stays relevant and adjusts activities in a changing human rights context through its regional 
presence and expert knowledge of the geographical areas in which it works.
• In this changing human rights context, HRA has incorporated activities that adequately respond to 
the institutional challenges that governmental entities face.
• While HRA assesses risks that stem from the presence of illegal economies, their strategy explicitly 
includes human rights issues related to illegal mining. However, it does not address illegal mining in a 
direct and comprehensive manner.
• The restrictions imposed by the USG on working with demobilized members of the FARC-EP 
prevents HRA from adequately addressing this, increasingly critical, segment of the population at risk 
of human rights violations. Moreover, this restriction can create legitimacy issues in the institutions 
that HRA intends to support. One example that illustrates this risk is the case where a dupla
financed by HRA was not able to help a victim of sexual violence because she was a demobilized 
member of FARC-EP. This has important implications for HRA’s relevance and “do no harm” 
principle.
• HRA focuses on the population groups most affected by human rights violations, with the notable 
exception of demobilized members of the FARC-EP, and has contributed to strengthening CSOs 
representing these groups.
• HRA’s differentiated approach for the Afro-Colombian group is not reflected by most of the CSOs 
targeting this group and their beneficiaries, who describe their activities through a gender and youth 
lens, and mostly focus on the mere inclusion and participation of Afro-Colombians in these activities, 
which does not constitute a differentiated approach for this group.
• HRA’s strategy for human rights defenders and leaders is clear at the national level, through its work 
with the IGO and NPU; however, the strategy is not comprehensive at addressing the severity of 
the situation due to increasing homicides at the regional and local levels.
EQ2: To what extent do Colombian government officials, civil society representatives, 
and beneficiaries in target areas demonstrate an improved understanding of human 
rights standards and view compliance with those standards as the norm?
HRA has contributed to improving the understanding of human rights standards for departmental and 
municipal government officials. Learning has focused on: 1) new obligations and public policies resulting 
from the Accord; 2) new competencies regarding human rights prevention and protection mechanisms, 
such as risk diagnostic, conflict resolution, and responding to GBV cases; and 3) better understanding of 
the functions of national entities such as the Ministry of Interior and National Protection Unit. The 
application of this knowledge is done with close support from HRA regional advisors and is evident in 
the formulation of public policy instruments and in the creation and activation of institutional 
mechanisms. It is uncertain whether the application of this knowledge will continue independently. 
However, government officials demonstrate limited knowledge, within the framework of their functions, 
on gender issues, particularly on how to assist the LGBTI population. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 9
More than half of CSO grantees report already having internal capacity on human rights standards so 
their understanding of human right standards did not change due to HRA. The HRA strategy towards 
CSOs focuses more on strengthening capacity rather than on conceptual issues, as the latter support is 
only provided following requests from CSOs. While six local grantees report receiving thematic support 
from HRA, a few grantees state they did not receive training or technical support from HRA but think 
they would have benefitted from it. Social leaders who participate in the PPGNR sub-committees 
demonstrate a clear understanding about the relevant government entities regarding human rights as 
well as their responsibilities. While they confirm HRA has supported them in participating in these 
mechanisms, this knowledge cannot be directly attributed to HRA as it is very likely they already knew 
this information due to their role as leaders.
HRA has contributed to improving the understanding of human rights standards for vulnerable 
beneficiary groups. All the beneficiary groups have increased their knowledge about human rights and 
value this knowledge. There is also recognition of the enforceability of their rights. However, they 
express that there is a gap between the enforceability of their rights and the lack of response from the 
State and distrust of police. Not all beneficiaries can identify the entities responsible for guaranteeing, 
protecting, and respecting human rights.
Key Conclusions:
• Government officials’ focus on developing and updating public policies on human rights comes from 
the obligation to comply with the MOI’s orders, rather than from the need they see in their 
communities. 
• HRA has contributed to improved understanding of human rights standards among the most 
relevant municipal officials, including personeros, victims’ liaisons, family commissaries, and women’s 
secretariats.
• Grassroots CSOs value and recognize HRA’s technical support on conceptual issues related to 
human rights and gender. However HRA provides this support reactively, after receiving requests 
from CSOs. Some HRA grantees who could have benefitted from this support did not receive it. 
• Beneficiaries frequently mention economic, social, and cultural rights when talking about human 
rights and their needs. This is an important outcome particularly in regions such as Cordoba, where 
even five years ago these rights were not part of the discourse and only violence and international 
humanitarian law were discussed. 
• Widespread dissemination of the various response rutas is important to continue strengthening 
beneficiaries’ – especially women’s – knowledge about the enforceability of their rights and who to 
turn to for help and support. 
• Not all beneficiaries can identify the entities responsible for guaranteeing, protecting, and respecting 
human rights. Experiential methodologies, such as the Diócesis de Tumaco’s field trip to meet the 
public officials that are part of the rutas, may be an effective way to ingrain this knowledge. 
EQ3: Are HRA’s strategies and approaches promoting sustainability of the initiatives 
supported by the Activity at the GOC and civil society levels?
From a policy perspective, HRA aims to provide institutional strengthening assistance that is linked to 
national level human rights policy. HRA supports the creation or activation of Human Rights 
Committees and of multi-stakeholder dialogue mechanisms, such as the Peace Councils, which also 
enables formalization of human rights related policies. Most Governor’s offices report that HRA is 
enabling sustainability by connecting its activities with the goals of the departmental development plans. 
Municipal and departmental government officials highly value HRA’s technical assistance for the design 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 10
and implementation of public policies related to prevention of and protection from human rights abuses. 
However, they are concerned that it will be difficult to comply with their obligations and continue these 
efforts when HRA ends. 
HRA focuses on strengthening community participation in public policy mechanisms, such as the PPGNR 
sub-committees, to increase their ownership of human rights issues and to hold government entities 
accountable, especially due to the high turnover of government officials. Most CSOs feel ownership of 
their projects, as these are based on their own strategies and were designed by them. While some 
design adjustments by HRA may be necessary to strengthen these projects, a few CSOs report adjusting 
their projects to meet HRA’s needs, which reduced their sense of ownership.
HRA increases government capacity through trainings, technical assistance, the creation and activation of 
PPGNR sub-committees, and in developing or updating prevention and protection plans. Moreover, 
municipal government officials and CSOs agree that support on the documentation and systematization 
of good practices and methods contributes to sustaining the capacity in the face of turnovers, helps 
transfer knowledge between new and departing officials, and helps to replicate successful processes.
These approaches reduce reliance on individual officials. Nonetheless, local authorities also note that the 
constant turnover in officials is an obstacle to generating and sustaining local capacities. 
HRA’s technical assistance is highly valued by government officials, particularly the systematic and direct 
support they provide on processes and plans to implement and fulfill the requirements from the MOI. In 
many cases, HRA’s technical assistance is indispensable to local government officials who lack bandwidth 
capacity and technical knowledge to perform these functions independently. As such, there is an over 
reliance on HRA advisors to perform technical and operational functions, as they are available at any 
time of the day, either in person or by telephone. HRA regional advisors recognize their highly involved
support, although some municipalities require this constant support due to the initial state of their 
institutional capacity.
Municipal and departmental government officials concur that the lack of budgetary resources for local 
administration puts the sustainability of HRA’s work at risk. In addition, securing sufficient financial 
resources depends largely on the political will of the mayor or governor. The continuity of activities 
from most CSOs, particularly those operating at the local level, is highly dependent on financial 
resources from external donors, such as HRA. Moreover, almost all CSOs express concern over the 
grants’ short timeframe. Almost forty percent of HRA grants have a period of performance of nine 
months or less, and grants to local or regional CSOs, which interact directly with the beneficiary 
population groups, are not longer than 12 months. However, HRA’s short three-year period of 
performance with uncertain approval of its two option years, along with an over-prescription of the 
quantity and types of grants it is contractually obligated to fund, make it difficult for HRA to address this 
issue.
Key Conclusions:
• The sustainability of HRA’s activities with local governments depends on a number of factors that 
are beyond its control, including the budgetary resource allocation, turnover in government staff and 
consultants, and political will. HRA aims to influence these factors by strengthening policy 
development processes and mechanisms, such as PPGNR sub-committee, instilling institutional 
capacity, and increasing civil society participation to minimize the reliance on individual officials.
• HRA’s institutional strengthening strategy is oriented toward sustainability through its emphasis on 
supporting activities and processes linked to public policy and by responding to the risks and needs 
of the most vulnerable groups.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 11
• While technical assistance is greatly valued by government officials, there is an over reliance on HRA 
regional advisors to perform technical and operational functions. While HRA aims to instill 
institutional capacity, a continued highly involved technical assistance to municipal governments 
could undermine the sustainability of HRA’s activities.
• MOUs between USAID and departmental governments enhance interdepartmental coordination, 
enable departmental governments to identify and take ownership of the initiatives that USAID 
proposes, and streamline USAID activities in regions where there are multiple and sometime 
overlapping programs. 
• HRA’s activities bring together the local government and civil society. This can generate 
sustainability as long as local governments identify firsthand the community needs, community 
members are informed of government obligations, and trust is promoted between communities and 
their governments.
• HRA grants to CSOs typically have a period of performance of 9 to 12 months. The short period of 
performance limits the grantee’s ability to have the desired impact, creates expectations from 
beneficiaries of continued support that cannot be fulfilled, and undermines the sustainability of the 
grant activities. Unfortunately, as HRA is currently set-up, it does not have much flexibility to extend 
the grants’ duration. 
EQ4: What effect has HRA had on the beneficiaries of the organizations supported by the 
Activity, especially on human rights defenders and social leaders, LGBTI persons, 
women, local journalists, youth and ethnic communities in conflict affected 
municipalities covered by HRA?
HRA has contributed to the increased participation in institutional mechanisms as well as engagement 
with institutional entities for social leaders and nascent groups. However, it is still not clear if 
beneficiaries from nascent groups can sustain this independently. The support from HRA and its 
grantees gives them legitimacy and beneficiaries recognize that they would have not have the same 
access to or reciprocity from government entities without this support. 
Empowerment is the most prevalent effect across the beneficiary groups, except for the social leaders 
groups, as this group already stood out on this front. Beneficiaries take ownership of the knowledge 
gained, which spills over into their immediate nucleus (i.e. families, schools, neighbors) rather than into 
participation in institutional mechanisms (i.e. local councils, community action boards, etc.). All women 
beneficiaries express a recognition of their own value (agency) and an increased internal locus of 
control, that is, they feel they have greater control over the things that happen to them. They express a 
gained attitude of empowerment with respect to their own abilities and value as a person, not only as a 
mother and wife. 
All of the beneficiaries, except for the social leaders, express that participating in the HRA grantee 
projects raised their self-esteem since it made them recognize their abilities and resiliency despite the 
abuse they have survived or the abandonment they had felt as a community. Social leaders did not 
report experiencing this, maybe because as leaders their self-esteem is already high. Most women and 
young beneficiaries express that the HRA grantee projects helped them lose their shyness to be able to 
speak publicly and with more confidence, to participate in meetings, and to express their opinions.
Most young beneficiaries express a change in how they treat others, especially with regards to the 
respect and tolerance of others. They state that before they participated in the project they were rude 
to teachers, friends, and siblings, sometimes racist and homophobic, but after learning about human 
rights they recognize that respect goes both ways.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 12
Young beneficiaries and women report that they have taught what they have learned to their families 
and this has improved how siblings treat each other, how parents treat them (youth), and the support 
women feel from their husbands. Nonetheless, all beneficiaries recognize there is a sexist culture that 
discredits women, especially in political participation, and confines them to the roles of mother and wife. 
During the GDs, beneficiaries offered solutions of inclusion and strategies to demand their rights when 
presented with a vignette that discriminated against women’s participation.
Key Conclusions:
• HRA grants aimed at empowering young people show positive contributions in forming leaders and 
role models. Given that youth are increasingly vulnerable to force recruitment, and illegal use and 
utilization for activities related to the illicit economy, grants targeted at youth play an important 
role, not only in the promotion, but also in the prevention of human rights violations. 
• Vulnerable population groups, in particular LGBTI groups who are starting to organize formally, 
highly value the support and accompaniment of HRA and its grantees to strengthen their nascent 
groups. This also shows that grassroots CSOs may need and value more than just financial support. 
• The grantee projects are generating respect and recognition from beneficiaries of different 
population groups, resulting in new allies, as well as facilitating dialogues between groups that do not 
normally sit down together (i.e. leaders, police, and government officials).
• Grassroots CSOs seem to contribute greater positive effects on beneficiaries because they provide 
close, consistent, and localized support.
• Empowerment goes hand in hand with increased risks that beneficiaries feel by becoming more 
visible in their communities or more exposed after filing complaints. This risk is exacerbated by the 
lack of effective response from the State. Moreover, CSOs cannot guarantee protection and 
beneficiaries may be left exposed to violations. 
• Beneficiaries perceive a lack of knowledge and capacity from the State for an effective response to 
their claims. There is also to a lack of trust in the authorities, especially in the police.
• The LGBTI population continues to face prejudice due to the lack of knowledge and sensitivity on 
the part of government officials that are an assault to their dignity and integrity. 
EQ5: Are HRA's strategies effective and adequate for the objective of increasing 
investigations and prosecutions of human rights violations? Is HRA effectively 
coordinating with other programs or international organizations working on impunity, 
such as UNOHCHR?
Representatives of the AGO, USAID, and UNOHCHR concur that the implementation of a 
prioritization approach, which has been supported by HRA, has allowed progress in the response to 
human rights violations by enabling assessments on the structures and patterns of these violations. In 
addition, AGO officials agree that HRA’s support has contributed to a wider adoption of the 
prioritization strategy, unified its strategy regarding the response to human rights violations, and 
obtained an institutional vision that transcends beyond the individual officials linked to the entity.
The implementation of the prioritization strategy at the regional level is important for both HRA and
USAID’s Justice for a Sustainable Peace (JSP) Activity. However, the roles and responsibilities of each 
program for this strategy remains uncertain and may create obstacles in implementation if not addressed 
strategically within USAID. The overlap in strategy between HRA and JSP present an opportunity for 
USAID to design a clear implementation strategy with the two programs that makes the best use of 
their resources and capacity.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 13
HRA’s engagement with the AGO has been through individual offices with “champions” to advance in 
their strategy and work plan. The AGO officials reflect that this approach enables HRA to have a 
strategic focus, since they do not provide assistance on just any subject. AGO representatives recognize 
HRA’s limited resources and capacity. They acknowledge that HRA adjusts to the needs of the AGO, 
takes into account its proposals, and focuses on specific supporting tasks to different Units within the 
AGO. However, UNOHCHR representatives believe that HRA’s support could be leveraged with a 
more comprehensive strategy. Nonetheless, there are two underlying factors, which limit HRA’s ability 
to pursue a more comprehensive strategy. 
First, the AGO is a complex entity with a rigid hierarchical organizational structure that requires top￾down decision-making. HRA representatives explain that changes to the organizational structure and 
personnel within the AGO, after the arrival of the new Attorney General in August 2016, have 
hampered the continuation of the projects that are being carried out, as well as the implementation of 
new phases of their strategy. However, the AGO officials interviewed recognize HRA’s consistent 
ongoing relationship with the AGO that is focused on developing, implementing, and following-up on 
policies which allow the Activity to adapt to these changes. 
Second, there is a lack of clarity in USAID’s comprehensive strategy toward the AGO. The current lack 
of specificity has an impact on the planning and implementation of the work that the different programs, 
specifically HRA and JSP, carry out with the AGO, as well as on the different levels of coordination that 
should exist between these programs and external stakeholders that also work with the AGO. 
Moreover, no high-level dialogues between USAID and the AGO have taken place. 
Representatives of USAID, HRA, and JSP, as well as external stakeholders (UNOHCHR and AGO), have 
different interpretations of what “effective coordination” entails. There is a lack of clarity from USAID 
as to what type of relationship its two programs should have with UNOHCHR, as well as the type of 
coordination that should exist between these stakeholders. There is also a gap in the perceived benefits 
or value-add that would result from greater external coordination.
Key Conclusions:
• HRA has limited financial and human resources capacity and a constrained sphere of influence to 
achieve the objectives of Component 3 under the status quo. The perceived lack of clarity in 
USAID’s comprehensive strategy toward the AGO coupled with the fact that the AGO is a complex 
entity with a rigid hierarchical organizational structure that requires top-down decision-making, 
makes the adoption and implementation of HRA projects dependent on individual officials, which 
can restrict HRA in meeting all of its deliverables.
• In the absence of high-level discussions between USAID and AGO officials, HRA has been strategic 
in approaching the AGO through individual offices with “champions” to maximize its small budget, 
limited capacity, and sphere of influence. However, this has resulted in a piecemeal strategy rather 
than a high-level comprehensive strategy that aligns with the ambitious objective of IR 3. 
• While increasing engagement with other stakeholders, such as UNOHCHR, could enhance HRA’s 
work, it is not the barrier to achieving an increase in investigations and responses to human rights 
violations. Without strategic coordination within USAID and without high-level engagement 
between USAID and the AGO, HRA remains constrained in how it can provide support. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 14
EQ6: What have been the achievements, bottlenecks and lessons learned during the 
implementation of the three components of HRA and its cross-cutting themes?
Component 1: Promotion
Key Achievements:
• Contribute to increasing visibility and awareness of the human rights situation in areas where it 
previously was not possible to address these issues.
• Departmental and municipal officials demonstrate an improved understanding about human rights, 
especially with respect to the regulatory framework.
• In Meta and Tolima, designed models and proposals for Human Rights and Peace Schools as a 
strategy to strengthen the culture of peace and respect for human rights.
• Diploma course facilitate engagement and interaction between stakeholders that do not tend to 
dialogue with each other, due to the historical conflict. These courses also serve to strengthen ties 
and relations between civil society and local authorities.
• Contributed to empowering vulnerable communities, specifically LGBTI, youth, women, and 
indigenous beneficiaries through its grant support of local CSOs.
• HRA has been successful in empowering women and LGBTI grassroots CSOs by increasing their 
knowledge and strengthening their leadership and organizational capacity. The support provided by 
HRA was not only financial (through grants) but also through mentoring support.
Bottlenecks and Challenges:
• While local government officials apply newly acquired knowledge to the design of public polices, 
their capacity to interact in an informed manner with vulnerable communities, particularly women 
and LGBTI members, continues to be limited. 
• The multi-actor dialogues (police, local authorities, and community members) were not 
implemented as planned due to low interest from the mayor’s office and low participation from 
police officers.
• Although the duplas are mentioned repeatedly by HRA staff in Bogota and by the National 
Ombudsman’s Office, only one interviewee at the department and municipality level speak about 
their activities or results.
• The challenge for the differentiated rutas for GBV against women and LGBTI communities lies in 
their effective implementation by the local institutions. 
• There is a large dispersion of activities within the promotion component as HRA simultaneously 
supports a variety of initiatives, education entities, and institutions that are not all tied to the 
Ministry of Education. Without close communication and coordination there is a risk that HRA 
would be supporting activities that do not coincide with the standards set in national public policies.
• The activities for the promotion of human rights are mostly limited to urban areas due to logistics 
and operational issues for HRA staff and current CSO grantees.
Lessons Learned:
• HRA’s training activities, where a variety of actors participate, serve a dual purpose of promotion of 
human rights and bringing the community into closer contact with local government institutions and 
with other actors they have historically been distant from.
• The four Human Rights Student Olympics held in only a couple of municipalities in Antioquia create 
incentives for youth to learn more about human rights issues.
• The experiential methods used by organizations such as Diócesis de Tumaco have demonstrated 
stronger results in terms of gained knowledge and feelings of ownership in young beneficiaries. HRA 
should promote the replication of these experiential methods with other grantees. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 15
• The grantees with the greatest contributions on the population are the grassroots CSOs, as they 
respond clearly to the situation in the territory and have been able to empower the communities in 
which they work. The current human rights context requires that these organizations are known to 
the communities and have members who live in the area.
Component 2: Prevention
Key Achievements:
• HRA’s strong regional staff with technical and contextual expertise, have positioned the Activity as a 
credible expert and strategic partner to department and municipal government officials, CSOs, and 
the MOI, especially on matters of public policy for the prevention and protection of human rights.
• HRA’s technical assistance has resulted in significant progress in formulating and updating the 
prevention and protection plans as well as in the creation or activation of PPGNR sub-committees 
in most of the municipalities it supports. 
• HRA has strengthened LGBTI organizations in the identification of risk and in their capacity to 
demand respect for their rights. This has contributed to their empowerment and increased 
engagement with local authorities, resulting in the creation of institutional mechanisms, such as the 
LGBTI roundtable in Tumaco. 
• HRA coordinated with the National Police to organize the first meeting of police human rights 
coordinators from across the country. Additionally, HRA supported the design of a protection ruta 
for human rights defenders, which was incorporated into the Police Conduct Guide for Vulnerable 
Populations (this guide was designed by HRA’s predecessor program).
Bottlenecks and Challenges:
• HRA regional advisors report that administrative work takes up too much of their time that could 
be used implementing HRA activities. 
• The limited local budgets, lack of political will of some mayors, and high turnover of public officials 
create bottlenecks for the implementation of prevention and protection policies.
• One of the most visible challenges for HRA, in terms of sustainability, is the over reliance on HRA 
regional advisors from a large proportion of government officials. 
• There is a large variation on CSOs’ expertise with self-protection methodologies. Some of them did 
not have a clear understanding of the concept (for example, LIMPAL) or of how to initially design the 
plans and mechanisms (for example, Consejo Comunitario de Rio Gualajo). Given HRA’s expertise in 
these topics, and upcoming Grants RFA oriented at self-protection projects, it is important for HRA 
to provide technical assistance to CSOs from the time projects are designed.
• HRA supported the formalization of the Observatory of Human Rights in the Mayor’s Office, who 
has transitioned its operations to the Diócesis de Tumaco. However, municipal officials express 
concern that permanent funding of stronger technical staff is needed for the Observatory to meet 
its objectives and for the Diócesis to sustain it.
• Although HRA supported the preparation of a study on the impacts of illegal mining and other illegal 
economies on human rights with the Ombudsman's Office, the utilization of this study is uncertain.
• Results 2.6 under this component consists of strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations 
to “advocate and monitor” development and implementation of human rights protections. However, 
the evaluation found that actions under this result focus only on the advocacy part; no actions were 
identified that are specifically aimed at monitoring.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 16
Lessons Learned:
• The initial stage of technical assistance at the department and municipal level required systematic 
and constant support, as well as a direct presence in the territory. However, developing an exit 
strategy for the technical assistance activities is fundamental to establishing sustainable processes. 
• Several CSOs value HRA’s presence as an effective strategy to approach government institutions, as 
they feel HRA gives them greater receptivity and credibility. 
• Designing and implementing self-protection methodologies is not a generalizable or standardized 
process. HRA can leverage its expertise to train CSOs and provide technical support to identify and 
analyze risks and to design plans of prevention, mitigation and response to human rights violations.
• Local CSOs create bridges between their beneficiaries and government institutions. HRA should 
continue working strategically with these local CSOs as a strategy to reach vulnerable populations, 
to make their needs visible, and to give them access to government entities. 
• Extending HRA for two more years until April 2021 would give the Activity the opportunity to 
participate in the design process of new municipal and departmental development plans, which can 
enable HRA to influence the allocation of resources, the design of strategies, and the setting of 
objectives towards human rights.
Component 3: Response
Key Achievements:
• HRA’s support has enabled the AGO to implement a prioritization approach in investigations, which 
implies advancing investigations from a context analysis lens rather than following the perpetrator 
who committed a specific violation. This support has resulted in several achievements that are 
important for the AGO’s mission and that enable it to fulfill its functions more effectively.
• The documentation of cases of human rights violations, particularly of GBV cases, has an important 
role in the strategic litigation in courts. In addition, it contributes to the rehabilitation and recovery 
of the women affected, so they can overcome the emotional impact of the violence faced.
• HRA, through its CSO grantee, Corporación Humanas, has developed case guides on GBV for 
regional prosecutors, which include research, documentation, and judicial tools that are 
disseminated within dialogue mechanisms with these officials. 
Bottleneck and Challenges:
• There is a perceived lack of clarity, among HRA, JSP, and UNOHCHR, on the comprehensive 
strategy USAID wants to advance with the AGO, along with an absence of high-level discussions
between USAID and the AGO. This results in a lack of buy-in and involvement from the key 
decision-makers in the entity. AGO’s rigid hierarchical organizational structure makes the need for 
high-level dialogue and agreement between USAID and the AGO even more critical.
• In the absence of these high-level discussions between USAID and top AGO officials, HRA has been 
restricted to, but strategic, in approaching the AGO through individual offices with “champions” to 
maximize its small budget, limited capacity, and sphere of influence. However, this has resulted in a 
piecemeal strategy rather than a high-level comprehensive strategy that aligns with the ambitious 
objective of IR 3. 
• HRA’s implementation is also being affected by USAID assigning overlapping areas of action under 
this component to its two programs, HRA and JSP. This is generating a different understanding, 
between the two programs, of who and how the prioritization strategy will be implemented at the 
regional and local level.
• The documented cases related to GBV do not necessarily serve as inputs for the prosecution of the 
perpetrators of the violations, due to the continued distrust in the judicial system by the women 
involved and the ongoing presence of armed actors that deter formal complaints.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 17
• The new institutional framework established for the post-conflict period and the new obligations for 
those entities that the Accord creates, such as the Truth Commission and the Special Jurisdiction 
for Peace, represent challenges for an effective response to human rights violations.
Lessons Learned:
• A clearly defined comprehensive strategy from USAID may facilitate a more effective adoption, 
implementation, and monitoring of a program such as HRA. Harmonizing this strategy across its 
different programs requires taking into consideration the resources, capacity, and sphere of 
influence of each program.
• Refining a strategy that focuses on working with a centralized and hierarchical government entity, 
such as the AGO, can be facilitated by engaging high-level officials in dialogue to obtain buy-in and 
commitment for specific projects.
• Coherence between the grants linked to the AGO and the work carried out in the AGO at the 
national level is needed to prevent confusion among officials at the regional and municipal level.
Recommendations
Recommendations for HRA’s relevance and adequate adaptation to the changing human 
rights context
1.1 Economic, social, and cultural rights are priorities for the communities where HRA is working, so 
USAID should consider how to integrate these rights into its human rights programming. 
1.2 Given USG restriction on working directly with demobilized FARC-EP members, HRA should focus 
their support on public policy formulation and implementation with national and local government 
institutions rather than supporting human resources in institutions that have direct contact with this 
population group. This would avoid creating legitimacy issues in the institutions that HRA intends to 
support. 
1.3 HRA should more clearly develop its differential approach for the Afro-Colombian population to 
close the gap between what CSO grantees and their beneficiaries report and what is developed 
conceptually for these activities.
1.4 USAID should assess how it can expand HRA’s strategy on human rights issues associated with 
illegal mining to include relevant issues on working conditions of small-scale workers miners. 
1.5 Given the changing human rights context and increasing risks to human rights leaders and defenders 
in the regions where the Activity operates, HRA should expand its strategy to work with this 
population group as a cross-cutting task. 
Recommendations for improving the understanding of human rights standards
2.1 HRA should continue supporting the personeros through its grantee, FENALPER. 
2.2 Given that organizing and facilitating dialogues between the police and vulnerable populations in at 
least seven departments is an expected result (Result 1.1.2), and activities implemented so far have 
fallen short, HRA should reassess its approach with the police to achieve this result.
2.3 HRA should enhance its LGBTI thematic focus in its training activities for government officials, 
including the police force. 
2.4 HRA should conduct a strategic and formal review of their grantees’ needs with respect to thematic 
support. This is not only relevant for grassroots organizations. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 18
2.5 HRA should promote the replication of experiential methods that have been effective tools for 
beneficiaries to learn about human rights, such as field trips to meet relevant government entities. 
One potential way of doing this would be to establish a Community of Practice for its grantees, 
where CSOs come together to share and learn from each other’s experiences and challenges. 
Recommendations for promoting sustainability
3.1 HRA’s short three-year period of performance, along with two separate option years, limit HRA’s 
ability to promote the sustainability of its activities. The evaluation team recommends extending 
HRA’s period of performance for two years from now, until April 2021. 
3.2 USAID should continue to promote and leverage the signing of MOUs with departmental 
governments. 
3.3 As HRA continues to support local development plans, it should work with local governments to 
define actions that are financially possible. 
3.4 HRA should start developing exit strategies for their technical assistance activities to government 
officials that focus on strengthening institutional capacity, through the further documentation of 
processes and best practices, and minimizing over reliance on HRA advisors. The handover of 
functions and action plans should be tailored based on the municipality’s current and projected 
capacity with consideration to not overburden officials.
3.5 HRA should continue promoting the creation of mechanisms and processes where government 
officials and community members can engage in dialogue and increase their confidence in each other.
3.6 HRA should strategically support and engage the JACs, as another stakeholder to minimize reliance 
on individual officials and to increase local ownership and participation in public policy in rural areas.
3.7 HRA should prioritize grants to local CSOs with a strong local presence to increase local capacity 
and ownership, and to more closely reach local populations.
3.8 USAID and HRA should reassess the structure of the Grants Fund to better meet the diverse needs 
of the different organizations they fund and to provide support through a sustainability lens. Two 
potential enhancements could include:
o Funding stages for grassroots organizations: A dynamic model to strengthen local CSOs and 
support the scaling up of grassroots organizations while enabling HRA to manage risk 
sensibly. 
o Sliding scale funding to graduate CSOs: Longer timeframe grants with two or three rounds, 
where financial and technical support are on sliding scales, depending on the needs of the 
CSO. 
Recommendations for maximizing effects on beneficiaries
4.1 HRA should strategically continue to fund youth-targeted projects with longer timeframes and 
evaluate the grantees previously funded for a second round. 
4.2 HRA should strategically expand its holistic support – financial, technical, and organizational – to 
grassroots organization and continue to leverage the expertise of more established CSOs for 
mentoring. 
4.3 Given the new or increased risks faced by beneficiaries, HRA should make strategic revisions to its 
risk and context analysis to develop specific methodologies for contingency plans and more formal 
“do no harm” plans.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 19
Recommendations for advancing the objective of increasing investigations and 
prosecutions of human rights violations
5.1 USAID should define and design a comprehensive strategy regarding its relationship with the AGO. 
It should include clearly defined objectives, focused on implementable projects that can that aim to 
advance these objectives. The relationship between USAID and the AGO must be strategic and not 
a sum of activities through the different USAID programs. 
5.2 Following recommendation 5.1, USAID should pursue high-level meetings with AGO officials with 
the purpose of getting buy-in from the entity, finalizing this strategy, and defining the adoption and 
implementation of the different projects linked to it. 
5.3 Rather than simply focusing on coordination between HRA and other organizations, such as 
UNOHCHR, USAID should shift toward a collaboration, learning, and adaptation (CLA) framework
to leverage or maximize its efforts across these stakeholders. 
5.4 HRA, with participation from USAID, should coordinate with the Justice for Sustainable Peace 
Program on taking the prioritization strategy to the local level. 
5.5 Under the status quo, and in the absence of high-level engagement between USAID and the AGO, 
HRA and USAID should assess whether it might be efficient to invest more efforts in supporting 
CSOs who engage with the AGO (such as Corporación Humanas, Caribe Afirmativo, and CODHES). 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 20
INTRODUCTION
This report presents the mid-term performance evaluation for the Human Rights Activity (HRA, also 
referred to as “the Activity”) in Colombia. The evaluation was commissioned by the USAID Colombia 
Mission and was designed and implemented by the Evaluation and Analysis for Learning (EVAL) contract.
Annex A provides USAID’s Statement of Work for the evaluation.
The first section of the report describes the purpose of the evaluation, presents the evaluation 
questions, and provides background information and an overview of HRA. The second section explains 
the evaluation methodology, data collection and analysis methods, and limitations. The third section 
presents the findings and conclusions of the evaluation. The last section presents the evaluation team’s 
recommendations. 
EVALUATION PURPOSE 
The purpose of this performance evaluation is to assess HRA’s implementation progress near the 
midpoint in the life of the Activity, to determine 1) whether HRA is on-track in implementing its 
deliverables to achieve its intended outcomes, 2) if the activities and outcomes are still relevant based 
on the current local context, and 3) if HRA’s institutional strengthening interventions are sustainable. In 
accomplishing this purpose, the evaluation team assessed if the support provided by HRA has 
contributed to changes in key Government of Colombia (GOC) institutions that support the promotion 
of human rights, and the prevention of and response to human rights violations.
The primary audience of this evaluation is USAID/Colombia and HRA. The evaluation is expected to 
contribute to Mission and implementing partner program management and learning as HRA proceeds 
through the second half of its remaining implementation period. Since HRA works closely with the local, 
regional, and national partners, Colombian officials in the justice sector, legislators, and other 
government administrators are also expected to benefit from the evaluation findings and conclusions. 
This evaluation provides USAID with lessons learned and recommendations to improve HRA’s 
implementation to achieve expected results. It also indicates which selected strategies or activities 
across the three HRA components should be further emphasized, modified, or eliminated, and why. 
Finally, it provides information to help USAID make decisions for improving the sustainability of HRA 
initiatives at the GOC and civil society levels, and offers input to help USAID make human rights 
programming decisions.
EVALUATION QUESTIONS
Per USAID’s SOW, with slight revisions made and approved by USAID on 7 February 2018, this 
performance evaluation answers the following evaluation questions (EQs):
1. Do the overarching and specific strategies of the Activity remain relevant in the changing human 
rights context from a municipal, departmental and national perspective? Has HRA adapted 
adequate and relevant strategies to address this changing human rights context?
2. To what extent do Colombian government officials, civil society representatives, and 
beneficiaries in target areas demonstrate an improved understanding of human rights standards 
and view compliance with those standards as the norm?
3. Are HRA’s strategies and approaches promoting sustainability of the initiatives supported by the 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 21
Activity at the GOC and civil society levels?
4. What effect has HRA had on the beneficiaries of the organizations supported by the Activity, 
especially on human rights defenders and social leaders, LGBTI persons, women, local 
journalists, youth and ethnic communities in conflict affected municipalities covered by HRA?
5. Are HRA's strategies effective and adequate for the objective of increasing investigations and 
prosecutions of human rights violations? Is HRA effectively coordinating with other programs or 
international organizations working on impunity, such as UNOHCHR?
6. What have been the achievements, bottlenecks and lessons learned during the implementation 
of the three components of HRA and its cross-cutting themes?
ACTIVITY DESCRIPTION
Background
In November 2016, the GOC and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army
(FARC-EP for the initials in Spanish, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo) 
signed a finalized peace accord to end its 52-year conflict. As expected, the peace accord’s 
implementation has been challenging. Nowhere have these difficulties been more evident than the recent 
upsurge in violence against local human rights advocates. The FARC-EP demobilization catalyzed 
violence at the local level, as armed groups and dissidents continue to fight over former FARC territory 
and the lucrative illegal economies and trade routes they contain. 
With the demobilization of FARC-EP combatants, the government’s ability to provide security for social 
leaders, human rights defenders, journalists and ethnic communities, while ensuring access to justice for 
victims and addressing impunity of human rights violations, is being sorely tested. Many of the inroads 
made with support from previous human rights programs are still fragile and need ongoing assistance to 
ensure their sustainability. Substantial challenges remain with respect to institutional structures, 
implementation of laws and policies at the national and local levels, adaptation capacity, and overall 
understanding of and support for human rights among Colombians at large. Civil society organizations 
(CSOs) are playing a more relevant role in this context, serving as a bridge and trust-builders between 
an absent state and communities abandoned for decades. 
As for the threats and homicides of human rights defenders and social leaders, recent scrutiny over 
related figures by some Colombian government entities, including the Inspector General’s Office (IGO) 
and the National Ombudsman’s Office, has generated a fierce debate over whether these cases 
constitute a trend. More importantly, each regional dynamic is different and the profiles of homicide 
cases have broadened the traditional definition of human rights defenders and social leaders to be 
inclusive of community leaders (i.e., community action board presidents, campesino leaders, land 
restitution leaders, victims, etc.). Most government/state entities have been hesitant to label these 
killings as systematic, and instead assess the majority to be isolated cases. On a larger scale, the silencing 
of those denouncing illegal presence and activities stands to jeopardize any progress made under the 
nascent and fragile post-accord implementation phase. This complex situation directly impacts HRA’s 
activities in its targeted regions.
Activity Overview
Over the past 16 years, USAID/Colombia has developed the largest U.S. stand-alone human rights 
program in the world. HRA, implemented by Chemonics, is the fourth phase of USAID’s human rights 
program in Colombia. It is a $14.1 million Activity with a period of performance from April 2016 to 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 22
April 2019, with two options years to continue through April 2021. HRA aims to consolidate prior gains 
from previous human rights programs, as well as to more effectively confront the human rights concerns 
of vulnerable populations. HRA is focused primarily on regional human rights efforts in 40 municipalities 
across seven departments, while maintaining some national actions, particularly with respect to policy 
reforms and the implementation of post-accord measures. 
HRA’s overall objective is to support the GOC and civil society in promoting a culture of human rights, 
preventing abuse and violations of human rights, and responding effectively to human rights violations 
once they have occurred. The Activity’s three core components have the following specific objectives:
• Component 1 - Promotion of a culture of human rights: Colombian government 
officials, civil society representatives, and the general public in target areas demonstrate an 
improved understanding of human rights standards and view compliance with those standards as 
the norm.
• Component 2 – Prevention of human rights violations: Policies to prevent human rights 
violations are developed and implemented.
• Component 3 – Adequate and effective response to human rights violations: 
Investigation and prosecution of human rights violations are increased.
In addition, HRA is guided by six main principles which are built into all program tasks and activities:
• Regional/local emphasis: HRA’s primary focus is to implement interventions and assist with the 
implementation of national policies at the local level. HRA emphasizes building on public 
participation, strong institutions, and tailored solutions at the local level with support from a 
decentralized team of regional human rights advisors, a community grants fund, and close 
partnerships with local leaders. 
• Empower vulnerable groups: HRA focuses on strengthening policies and projects that prevent 
human rights violations against at-risk groups, which include human rights defenders, indigenous 
and Afro-Colombians, journalists, women, youth, members of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, 
transsexual, and intersex (LGBTI) community, and victims of the conflict, with a focus on sexual 
and gender-based violence (GBV). The ultimate objective is to increase GOC authorities’ 
awareness of specific risks faced by certain vulnerable populations and enable them to fulfill their 
obligations to provide for their protection.
• Flexibility and information-driven decisions: To respond to the dynamic context of the country,
HRA incorporates continual contextual and thematic analyses to engrain flexibility in 
programming to respond to evolving local human rights issues. HRA design and strategies can 
and are expected to be altered to seize opportunities to achieve better outcomes with existing 
resources. 
• Differentiated approach: Activities include a differentiated approach ensuring that initiatives 
targeting vulnerable groups are tailored to their cultural characteristics and needs, geographic 
realities and conflict circumstances.
• Promote sustainability: HRA applies a strategy in which local, regional and national partners build 
capacities sufficient to not only participate, but lead human rights initiatives. Sustainability is a 
key goal for HRA and, accordingly, is integrated into programming from the design phase.
• Other USAID, USG, and donor coordination and private/public partnerships: HRA plans and 
carries out program activities with a clear understanding of the scope and impacts of other 
donors or programs, not only to increase complementarities and avoid duplication or 
inconsistencies in effort, but to leverage opportunities to optimize impact through joint 
implementation or collaboration. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 23
Development Hypotheses
The theory of change that underlies HRA is that if the Activity strengthens government institutions and 
civil society organizations to effectively serve as agents of change at the local level, then respect for 
human rights and peace will be improved, and policies will reflect special considerations for vulnerable 
populations. The results framework, shown in Figure 1 below, guides HRA’s approach to implementing 
USAID’s vision for the project, linked directly to USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy 
(CDCS) for 2014-2018. The results framework incorporates crosscutting responses, including a 
differentiated approach on gender inequity and vulnerable populations.
Figure 1: HRA Results Framework
DO1: Effective presence of democratic institutions and processes in targeted areas
Intermediate Result 1.3: Improved administration of justice and protection of human rights
IR 1: Improved 
understanding of 
human rights standards
IR 2: Policies to prevent human 
rights violations developed and 
implemented
IR 3: Investigation and 
prosecution of human rights 
violations Increased.
Result 1.1: Key human rights 
actors supported to promote 
awareness of and respect for 
human rights, particularly in 
potential areas of FARC 
demobilization.
Result 2.1: National, regional, and local 
officials` capacity to develop and 
implement human rights policies 
strengthened with sustained meaningful 
engagement.
Result 3.1: Prioritization plans for 
investigations and prosecutions by the 
AGO developed, strengthened and 
implemented.
Result 2.2: Communication/dialogue 
between and among citizens and police 
and other local officials in target areas 
improved to better service delivery.
Result 3.2: Reforms that decrease 
discretion and increase transparency 
institutionally embedded into AGO 
practices.
Result 1.2: Public officials´ 
capacity to interact with 
vulnerable groups 
strengthened with sustained 
meaningful engagement.
Result 2.3: Community protection plans 
developed and effectively implemented 
in target municipalities.
Result 3.3: Standard operating 
procedures and AGO capacity to 
investigate and prosecute human 
rights violations strengthened with 
demonstrable results from court 
cases.
Result 1.3: Media messages 
promoting respect for human
rights produced and 
distributed and investigative 
journalism capacity increased.
Result 2.4: Self-protection systems, 
strategies, and measures in place for at￾risk populations, with a focus on sexual 
and gender violence.
Result 3.4: GOC enforcement and 
prosecutorial response to gender￾based violence improved with media 
coverage.
Result 3.5: Civil society mechanisms to 
facilitate an improved state response 
to human rights violations, including 
GBV cases, developed or 
strengthened and supported by the
government.
Result 1.4: Human rights 
education curricula in primary 
and secondary schools in 
targeted areas promoted and 
sustainability enhanced. 
Result 2.5: Capacity of the National 
Ombudsman´s office to prevent and 
address human rights violations 
resulting from legal and illegal mining 
and other possible post demobilization 
challenges strengthened.
Result 3.6: Threats of violence to land 
restitution claimants, leaders, and 
organizations investigated and 
prosecuted.
Result 1.5: Official and 
effective oversight provided 
by CSO and/or the media.
Result 2.6: Civil society capacity to 
advocate for and monitor development 
and implementation of human rights 
protections strengthened.
Result 3.7: Civil society capacity to 
advocate for victims and serve as 
watchdogs with respect to GOC 
response to human rights is 
strengthened.
Result 3.8: Partnerships between 
government and local communities 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 24
formed to combat human rights 
violations resulting from illegal mining, 
leading to improved GOC response.
Cross Cutting Tasks
Differentiated and Vulnerable Populations Approach
EVALUATION APPROACH
This performance evaluation employed a qualitative approach that relies on semi-structured key 
informant interviews (KIIs) and group discussions (GDs), supplemented with a range of qualitative and 
quantitative reporting data from a comprehensive desk review of HRA results and available outcome 
measures as well as third-party data from national and regional institutions. The team triangulated
findings across the primary and secondary data sources to explore the contribution of HRA activities on 
outcomes of interest related to their component objectives and guiding principles. This type of 
evaluation provides details about activity processes, general relationships between activity inputs and 
outputs, and relevance to the changing context, but cannot definitively attribute outcomes to the HRA 
activities. Annex B provides a more detailed description of the evaluation approach and includes the 
evaluation design matrix summarizing data sources, data collection methods, and limitations. 
Sampling Methodology
Municipality Selection
The evaluation team visited a purposive sub-sample of the 40 HRA municipalities and all department 
capitals, except for Pasto (Nariño). A random sample of municipalities was not chosen since HRA’s 
strategic approach is not to cover their 40 municipalities homogeneously. Instead, the municipality 
selection process was intentional in reaching both broad geographic coverage of the HRA 
implementation area and broad activity coverage. First, the evaluation team set the target number of 
municipalities to be visited to 13, based on the evaluation timeline and scope. Second, this target number 
of municipalities was divided proportionally across all seven departments to account for the larger 
number of municipalities and therefore HRA investments in certain departments, such as Antioquia. 
Third, within each department the evaluation team selected individual municipalities to balance 
important characteristics, including HRA activities, number of CSO grantees, population size and 
proportion of rural population, indigenous and Afro-Colombian population, homicide rates (2015 and 
2016), forced displacement rates (2016 and 2017), demobilization zone status, and security conditions. 
Finally, the evaluation team consulted with HRA and USAID to finalize the list of municipalities. Table 1
and Table 2 below show the evaluation sample, consisting of 13 municipalities (one-third of the total 
HRA coverage area) and 6 department capitals. Annex C includes the municipality characteristics matrix 
used for the sample selection and a list of the HRA municipalities.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 25
Table 1: Municipality Sample Summary
Department Total HRA 
Municipalities
Evaluation Sample
Municipalities Department 
Capital
Antioquia 12 4 Medellín
Córdoba 3 1 Montería
Tolima 6 2 Ibagué
Cauca * 6 2 Popayán
Nariño 3 1 ---
Meta 6 2 Villavicencio
Caquetá * 4 1 Florencia
Total 40 13 6
* An additional municipality was visited in Caquetá and Cauca, but are not reflected in this table 
because only one interview was completed in each of them. 
Table 2: List of Municipalities and Department Capitals in the Evaluation Sample
Department
Evaluation Sample 
Municipalities Department 
Capital
Antioquia
Ituango
Medellín Remedios
Segovia
Caucasia
Córdoba Tierralta Montería
Tolima Chaparral Ibagué Cajamarca
Cauca
Caloto
Santander de Quilichao Popayán
Buenos Aires *
Nariño Tumaco ---
Meta Mesetas Villavicencio Vistahermosa
Caquetá San Vicente de Caguán Florencia La Montañita *
* Only one interview was completed in each of these municipalities. 
Data Collection Methods
The evaluation team conducted a desk review of HRA documents and an initial context analysis using 
third-party data from 22 January to 9 February. Annex D includes a list of the documents reviewed and 
the bibliography for the context analysis. Primary data collection (KIIs and GDs) took place from 12 
February to 16 March. The evaluation team visited 13 municipalities and six department capitals across 
the seven departments where HRA is currently operating and completed a total of 136 KIIs and 15 GDs.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 26
The different stakeholders included in this evaluation are national, departmental, and municipal 
government officials, CSO grantees, and beneficiary groups (i.e. social leaders, youth, women, LGBTI, 
indigenous, and Afro-Colombian groups).2 The evaluation team obtained informed consent from all 
respondents before carrying out any interviews and GDs. All GDs and all, but six, interviews were audio 
recorded. The interviews with USAID and the AGO were not recorded since electronic equipment was 
not allowed onto the premises, and one municipal official in Meta refused to be audio recorded. For 
these six interviews, extensive notes were taken and incorporated into the data analysis. 
Key Informant Interviews
The evaluation team conducted semi-structured interviews with a range of HRA stakeholders at the 
national, departmental, and municipal levels. In Bogota, KIIs included government entities, regional and 
national CSOs, international organizations, HRA staff and USAID representatives. At the department 
level, the evaluation team conducted between 4 and 8 interviews with different officials, such as the 
Secretary of Social Inclusion, advisor to the Departmental Committee on Human Rights, Human Rights 
Directorate, and regional Ombudsman’s Office, as well as any CSO grantees operating at the 
department level and HRA regional staff. At the municipal level, KIIs included various officials at the 
Mayor’s Office who had knowledge of and direct involvement in HRA activities, the Police, Family 
Commissaries, Personerías
3, and local CSO representatives. The evaluation team conducted interviews 
with all of HRA’s GOC partners and all but two CSO grantees.
4 While almost all KIIs were conducted 
face-to-face at the interviewee’s office or preferred location, four interviews were conducted via Skype 
due to scheduling conflicts. Table 3 shows the breakdown of KIIs by stakeholder category. Annex D
includes the complete list of interviewees. 
Table 3: Key Informant Interview Distribution
Stakeholder Category Number of 
Interviews
National government officials 13
Departmental government officials 19
Municipal government officials 34
Civil society organizations (grantees) 29
Social leaders (beneficiaries) 15
USAID 3
UNOHCHR 2
UNDP 1
HRA (Bogota staff and regional advisors) 20
Total 136
The selection of KII respondents was done in consultation with HRA to identify the most relevant 
respondents within the government entities and CSOs. The list of government entities and CSOs was 
 
2 While all of these stakeholders are HRA beneficiaries, throughout the report “beneficiaries” refers only to the population 
groups that participated directly in the CSO grant projects as well as social leaders. 
3 Personerías are municipal offices under the Public Ministry responsible for monitoring the management and conduct of public 
officials in the Mayor’s Offices and other decentralized entities; guarding the promotion and protection of human rights; 
monitoring due process, the conservation of the environment, the public patrimony and the efficient provision of public 
services, to guarantee citizens the defense of their rights and interests. 
4 Fundación Mi Sangre was unavailable for an interview, after multiple scheduling attempts from the evaluation team. The grant 
to Consejo de Redacción was awarded in January 2018 so the evaluation team did not interview them because they had only 
recently begun implementation of their project. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 27
compiled with HRA’s support and supplemented by the evaluation team through the review of HRA’s
ongoing activities, work plans, and contract deliverables. HRA provided contact information for all of the 
selected respondents. While the evaluation team coordinated with the HRA regional advisors on 
logistics and scheduling, the evaluation team called all respondents directly to schedule the KIIs. The 
evaluation team reached a 96 percent response rate from the initial list of respondents. 
The evaluation team developed KII guides linked to the EQs and stakeholder categories by creating an 
evaluation framework. This evaluation framework consisted of deriving research questions from each 
EQs. From those research questions, sub-questions and themes were defined. Then the stakeholder 
categories were linked to the sub-questions. This process resulted in KII guides that covered key themes 
to answer each EQ and ensured that multiple information sources were linked to each EQ. The KII 
guides were then prepared for each stakeholder category, covering the relevant themes from the 
evaluation framework. Annex E includes the interview guides.
Group Discussions
In addition to KIIs, the evaluation team conducted GDs to understand the process and results associated 
with beneficiaries’ increased knowledge of human rights standards (EQ2) as well as the effects on 
beneficiaries of the CSOs supported by the Activity (EQ4). The GDs allowed respondents to reflect 
upon and make sense of shared experiences and provided evaluation team with a clear picture of the 
beneficiary experience. The GDs were led by an evaluation team member and a second team member
provided logistical support. The evaluation team prepared semi-structured GD guides that covered (i) 
key discussion topics identified through the evaluation framework process described above, and (ii) 
situational vignettes describing hypothetical situations to which participants reacted, thereby revealing 
their knowledge, perceptions, values, social norms, and impressions of the events.5
The evaluation team conducted at least two GDs per beneficiary category, including women, LGBTI 
persons, youth, indigenous and Afro-Colombians, and social leaders (members of the human rights 
committees, prevention subcommittees, and municipal social policy committees), as shown in Table 4
below. The GDs were dispersed across the departments; however, more than one GD was conducted 
in some municipalities that had a larger number of CSO grantees, such as Tumaco. In total, the 
evaluation team conducted 15 GDs, which included 109 beneficiaries. 
Table 4: Group Discussions by Beneficiary Group
Beneficiary Category # GDs Participants M / F
Youth * 3 23 10 / 13
Women * 4 30 0 / 30
GBV victims (women) 1 4 0 / 4
Social leaders 3 19 9 / 10
LGBTI persons 2 13 9 / 4
Indigenous persons 2 20 5 / 15
Total 15 109 33 / 76
* One of these GDs were completely composed of Afro-Colombian persons, that is, Afro￾Colombian women and Afro-Colombian youth. 
Afro-Colombian persons were also present in other GDs (social leaders and LGBTI groups).
 
5 Hughes, R., & Huby, M. (2012). The construction and interpretation of vignettes in social research. Social Work and Social 
Sciences Review, 11(1), 36-51.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 28
GD participant recruitment was done in collaboration with HRA and CSO grantees. While a random 
selection of beneficiaries was proposed in the Evaluation Design Report, in practice the evaluation team 
was not able to accomplish this. The grantee CSOs did not agree to provide anonymized lists of their 
beneficiaries. The stated reasons included: security concerns since their beneficiaries are vulnerable 
populations; internal organization regulations that prohibit them from sharing beneficiary data; and a 
preference for contacting their own beneficiaries directly. Instead of random selection, the evaluation 
team coordinated with the CSOs by indicating the profiles of the required persons, focusing on 
beneficiaries who had attended the project activities. For each GD, ten beneficiaries were invited to 
participate in order to obtain the attendance of at least eight beneficiaries. 
Data Analysis Methods
During each week of fieldwork, evaluation team members reviewed their interview notes and filled out a 
regional report with the most important information and insights gained on each EQ from the KIIs and 
GDs conducted that week. All interview audio files were transcribed and after fieldwork was completed,
the evaluation team conducted content analysis using Atlas.ti software. The evaluation framework, 
described above, served as the foundation for the set of codes to capture themes and broader trends. In 
addition, open coding captured emerging themes, especially those unanticipated, during an initial review 
of the data. The content analysis aggregated responses around themes and trends relevant to each EQ. 
The evaluation team also analyzed data within and across geographic strata and stakeholder category to 
develop a thorough understanding of responses, address contradictory findings, and highlight common 
themes and narratives. The evaluation team also paid close attention to similarities and differences in 
responses and experiences among beneficiary groups (women, youth, Afro-Colombian and indigenous 
populations, and LGBTI) to address how HRA’s approach is tailored to the needs and priorities of these 
different vulnerable groups.
To answer the evaluation questions, the evaluation team analyzed all data collected from all of the 
sources, including HRA documents, third-party data and reports, and primary data transcripts (KIIs and 
GDs). The answers that each data source provided was compared to the others to determine whether 
they converge or diverge. This triangulation process was also conducted for the responses from the 
different stakeholders, taking into account their different geographic areas and varying needs and 
priorities that may affect their perceptions and experiences. 
Following this data analysis process, the evaluation team conducted an internal findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations workshop to assess the evidence against each EQ, consolidate preliminary findings, 
and develop conclusions and recommendations. Following this workshop, the evaluation team held a 
debrief session with USAID/Colombia and presented the preliminary findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations as an opportunity to validate results and receive and incorporate feedback.
Evaluation Team Composition
The evaluation team consisted of a technical advisor, an evaluation specialist and team leader, human 
rights experts, qualitative researchers, and logistics assistants. 
• Irene Velez – Team Leader and Evaluation Specialist
• Maria Angelica Alvarado – Local Human Rights and Institutional Strengthening Expert
• Natalia Estupiñán – Local Human Rights Expert
• Natalia Restrepo – Local Judicial Sector Expert
• Dario Alvarado, Alejandro Cruz, and Diana Leal – Local Qualitative Field Researchers
• Susan Minushkin – Technical Advisor
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 29
The evaluation team also received support from EVAL’s subcontractor, the Centro National de 
Consultoría, including fieldwork logistics, transcription, quality assurance, and administrative oversight. 
The team members signed conflict of interest disclosure statements, which are retained by MSI and 
available upon request. 
Evaluation Limitations
The design and implementation of this evaluation faced several limitations and potential biases from 
respondents, which the evaluation team sought to mitigate to the best of its ability.
• Inability to demonstrate attribution: Since the evaluation does not include a comparison 
group, the findings do not support causal inference. While stakeholders report about their gained 
knowledge and understanding of human rights issues that stem directly from their participation in 
HRA interventions, it is not possible to rigorously determine causality for other identified effects, 
such as leadership and empowerment. These effects are presented as associations with HRA 
interventions. 
• Lack of baseline information: HRA collected baseline information for their indicators as 
required. However, this does not encompass all of the data necessary to answer the evaluation 
questions, in particular with respect to EQ2 and EQ4. The KII and GD guides were constructed to 
estimate whether change may have occurred, when and how HRA may have contributed to that 
change. Nonetheless, these are self-reported changes that require deductive interpretation.
• Assessing sustainability: Since the sustainability of initiatives can only be verified ex-post, the 
method to assess sustainability uses factors that theoretically would contribute to the sustainability 
of the initiatives. The answer to EQ3 describes the likelihood of sustainability, based on evidence 
collected by the evaluation team and the literature regarding sustainability indicators for 
interventions of this nature. 
• Respondent bias: Key informants constitute the primary source of information in answering all 
evaluation questions. However, interview data is subject to cognitive biases, including recall bias. The 
evaluation team conducted systematic triangulation of interview and document sources, and 
appropriate selection of a range of HRA stakeholders at the national, departmental, and municipal 
levels to strengthen the validity and reliability of the findings. This reduces the potential for bias 
across the research.
• Selection bias in the Group Discussions: Random selection of GD participants was not 
possible, so the sample of beneficiaries invited to participate by the CSOs could be different from 
the average beneficiaries. It is possible that those invited were the most committed, most willing to 
participate, or those with the most favorable opinions of the CSO. This potential selection bias must 
be taken into consideration when interpreting the GD findings (EQ2 and EQ4). 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 30
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
Evaluation Question 1
Do the overarching and specific strategies of the Activity remain relevant in the changing 
human rights context from a municipal, departmental and national perspective? Has HRA 
adapted adequate and relevant strategies to address this changing human rights 
context?
The evaluation team conducted a context analysis, included in Annex F, based on third-party data and 
the team’s human rights expertise prior to the start of data collection. This analysis was corroborated 
and supplemented with the information gathered from the KIIs and GDs. The evaluation team assessed 
relevance based on whether the Activity is in line with national, departmental, and municipal needs and 
priorities as they relate to human rights and whether it is flexible enough to respond to the changing 
dynamics. The evaluation team found that the changing human rights context presents the GOC with 
several institutional challenges relating to implementing the Accord as well as territorial challenges 
relating to the demobilization of the FARC-EP and a reconfiguration of armed groups participating in 
illegal economies, which in turn exposes vulnerable populations to different risks. HRA’s overarching 
and specific strategies aim to support the GOC in addressing these challenges.
Findings
The GOC and the FARC-EP signed and ratified the Havana Peace Accord in November 2016. The 
Accord is one of the principal factors shaping the context of human rights in Colombia. Implementing 
the Accord creates challenges for GOC capacity at the national and local level. In addition, the Accord 
and the end of armed conflict between the GOC and the FARC-EP has led to a reconfiguration of 
armed groups in Colombia which is having negative repercussions on the human rights situation of 
certain populations.
Institutional challenges as a result of the signing and implementation of the Accord
The Accord alters the institutional structure of the national entities and imposes new obligations on 
local governments. The challenges that stem from these changes, as reported by government official 
interviewees, can be summarized into increased demand for 1) human and financial resources, 2) 
engagement between government entities and across levels of government, and 3) knowledge and 
understanding by national and local government officials of what the GOC and FARC-EP agreed to in 
the Accord.
At the national level, government institutions have had to modify their processes and adjust their 
structures to comply with their new obligations under the Accord. For example, the GOC 
Ombudsmen’s Office has had to revise and adjust its Early Warning System (EWS) to monitor armed 
conflict that threatens grave violations of fundamental human rights so that the information it collects 
and provides complies with the terms of the Accord. At the local level, officials complain that they do 
not have the resources to comply with the new obligations that the Accord imposes on them and that 
there are many challenges related to the reincorporation of demobilized former combatants to civilian 
life. Regarding this point, while in some municipalities, such as in the north of Cauca, residents have been
receptive to the reintegration of ex-combatants, reconciliation has been more difficult in other localities, 
such as those in Antioquia, because of the perception of some residents that the government is favoring 
the victimizers without providing similar support for the victims of the armed conflict.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 31
“As a victim, help doesn’t come to me. I have no house. No one has given me back my lands. 
They haven’t given me what I deserve as a victim. But the government is paying the FARC. It is 
giving them housing and creating productive projects to give them jobs.” (Victims’ Roundtable
representative, Remedios, Antioquia)
More than three-fourths of all government authorities interviewed affirm that HRA has responded in a 
timely manner to the challenges they identified in this changing institutional context, regarding the new 
responsibilities and capabilities required by the implementation of the Accord. At the national level, 
HRA has supported government entities through financing the hiring of consultants. For example, the 
Ombudsman Office has support from four EWS analysts, financed through HRA, who carry out human 
rights risk analysis and issue warnings as necessary in the regions where HRA operates. Moreover, HRA
is providing technical assistance on design and implementation of human rights prevention and 
protection public policy. For example, HRA is supporting the IGO with the implementation of 
Colombia’s Directive 002, which seeks to improve the situation of human rights defenders and leaders, 
as well as the National Protection Unit (NPU) in the inclusion of a gender approach in the rutas6 of 
collective protection for organizations of women leaders and women human rights defenders. 
Nonetheless, not all national government institutions believe HRA is responding to their needs in the 
post-Accord context. Specifically, according to the Office of the Presidential Advisor on Human Rights 
(CPDH for the initials in Spanish, Consejería Presidencial para Los Derechos Humanos), HRA is not 
supporting actions they deem priorities and that are included in the Accord. In response to this, HRA 
states that they cannot fund all of the priorities from each government entity, so they focus on those 
aligned to their own objectives and within their financial capacity. While the CPDH does value the 
support of HRA and reports achieving significant progress given the limited resources, they believe that 
HRA acts according to its own priorities and not those of their Office:
“Well, I believe that they have left out some topics, some topics were left out. It was difficult, 
each topic was discussed strongly. Obviously, they (HRA) have reasons, justifications for saying 
no for this or that and they have that right. But, in the end it isn’t the CPDH that says, ok these 
will be the priorities for your work and we look to you on how to do this. That is to say, the 
CPDH had to align its objectives and priorities to those of [HRA] and not the reverse.” (CPDH, 
Bogota)
At the local level, HRA has supported 30 municipalities to activate or reactivate their human rights and 
peace council, as specified in the Accord. This mechanism enables engagement and articulation between 
the different municipal government entities and CSOs to avoid duplication of efforts. Similarly, HRA has 
supported departmental and municipal government institutions in understanding the implications of the 
implementation of the Accord with respect to human rights. For example, HRA’s main strategy in its 
prevention component is aimed at providing technical assistance to government institutions towards the 
fulfillment of their responsibilities within the legislative framework. Since 2017, multiple laws, decrees,
and resolutions have been issued to implement the Accord. HRA supports the new legislative 
framework by serving as a bridge between the national government and the departmental and local 
institutions to activate mechanisms like the human rights and peace councils and to implement public 
policy guidelines such as the Cátedra de Derechos Humanos. 
 
6 The rutas lay out the responsibilities of each institution in terms of preventing and responding to violence as well as the 
compliance and follow-up processes by civil society and other authorities. HRA supports the construction, promotion, and 
implementation of different types of rutas, including prevention and response rutas, GBV-focused rutas, self-protection rutas, 
prevention rutas regarding forced recruitment, illegal use and utilization of children and youth, prevention rutas of anti￾personnel mine accidents. Each region poses its own challenges regarding these issues so every ruta has differential focus 
measures.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 32
Reconfiguration of armed groups motivated by illegal economies
In addition to the institutional challenges related to governmental obligations included in the Accord, the 
GOC faces new territorial challenges due to the demobilization of FARC-EP members, their exit from 
areas that they previously controlled, and the GOC’s limited capacity to assert control over these 
formerly FARC-controlled areas. In the absence of government control, different armed groups that are 
motivated primarily by their involvement in illegal economies have been able to move into some of the 
formerly FARC-controlled areas. Organized Armed Groups (GAO for the initials in Spanish, Grupos 
Armados Organizados) and Organized Criminal Groups (GDO for the initials in Spanish, Grupos 
Delincuenciales Organizados) are present in all of the departments in which HRA works.7 Furthermore, 
the National Liberation Army (ELN for the initials in Spanish, Ejército de Liberación Nacional), a guerrilla 
group that was not party to the Accord, has strengthened its hold in the territories it which it has 
historically been active including the south and center of Cauca, Nariño, and Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, 
and is entering new zones where it has not historically been active as well as other zones that were 
previously controlled by the FARC.
8 Finally, dissident factions of the FARC-EP, which according to the 
AGO includes 16 groups located in 48 municipalities with about 800 to 1,000 members, have 
demonstrated their ability to significantly affect the population where they are active. FARC-EP
dissidents are active in the HRA areas of Nariño, Meta, Cauca, Caquetá, and Antioquia. While some of 
the FARC-EP dissidents have economic motives, such as participation in the illegal economy, changes in 
leadership and group strategies as well as the way the Accord is being implemented have brought to 
light the lack of incentives for ex-combatants to remain in the demobilization process. This is magnified 
by the slow reincorporation of demobilized combatants into civilian life.
9
All of these armed groups have some relationship with the illegal economies, including drug trafficking, 
illegal mining, and illegal logging,
10 but not all aspects of the illegal economies are present in all 
municipalities in which HRA works. For example, in Tumaco, where more coca is grown than any other 
municipality in the country (16 percent of total national production11), armed groups are heavily 
involved in activities related to drug trafficking. This situation makes the implementation of crop 
substitution programs more difficult. In areas that the GOC has prioritized for crop substitution there 
has been nearly constant tension between forced eradication and voluntary substitution. This is due to 
the slow progress in creating conditions that enable families that cultivate coca to transition into legal 
crops and to the legal uncertainty faced by families that have traditionally cultivated coca.
12 Moreover, 
some families that have signed agreements with the GOC under the National Integrated Program for 
the Substitution of Illegal Crops have faced reprisals. In municipalities with coca cultivation, homicides 
have increased 11 percent between 2017 and 2018, whereas in municipalities where crop substitution 
has begun, the homicide rate has increased 33 percent during the same time period.
13
 
7 According to Directives 015 and 016 of the Ministry of Defense, GAOs have centralized and organized structures, hierarchical 
command positions, and territorial control, while GDOs are smaller groups that tend to operate as subcontractors of larger 
organizations, but which still generate a high impact on the population. The GAOs present in the Activity’s coverage area include 
the Clan del Golfo, Los Puntilleros, the Ejército Popular de Liberación, the Bloque Meta, and the Bloque Libertadores del Vichada. 
Among the GDOs present in these areas, are Los Rastrojos, La Cordillera, the Constru, and La Empresa. 
8 Fundación Ideas para la Paz (2017). Crimen organizado y saboteadores armados en tiempos de transición. 
9 Fundación Ideas para la Paz (2018). ¿En qué va la sustitución de cultivos ilícitos? Balance 2017 y lo que viene en 2018. 
10 Fundación Ideas para la Paz (2016). Economías criminales en clave de posconflicto: Tendencias actuales y propuestas para hacerles 
frente. 
11 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2017). Colombia - Monitoreo de territorios afectados por cultivos ilícitos 2016.
12 FIP (2018). 
13 Ibid.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 33
Separately, in municipalities such as Segovia and Remedios, the illegal economy is dominated primarily by 
illegal mining, although northwest Antioquia also has coca cultivation and drug transit routes as it is a 
strategic connection corridor with Urabá and Magdalena Medio. With respect to mining, national 
legislation has created social conflict between small-scale miners defending their right to work and the 
mining company, Gran Colombian Gold, which has the mining title in the area, according to residents 
that the evaluation team interviewed. These residents say there has been a lack of respect for the local 
small-scale mining traditions and that the legislation provides no work guarantees for local miners. In this 
sense, challenges related to mining go beyond civil and political rights and involve economic, social, and 
cultural rights.
Illegal logging is also becoming a problem in territories that were FARC-controlled, such as Caquetá and 
Tolima. Issues relating to illegal logging has created social tensions with implications for the human rights 
context. In these two departments, the FARC-EP regulated the market for timber, allowing community 
members to cut one hectare per year. Without the FARC-EP playing a regulatory role, there has been a 
considerable increase in logging and burning the land to graze cattle, creating new social conflict 
between community members as well as environmental concerns.
HRA consistently conducts analyses of the human rights situation in its project areas to be able to adjust 
to the changing regional context. For example, after the baseline analysis, which confirmed the increased 
presence of organized armed groups, HRA decided not to open its office in Arauca and to close its 
office in Norte de Santander. However, the regional teams conduct their ongoing analyses without a 
systematic or standardized approach. This means that they do not necessarily use the same sources of 
information or the same approach to gather and analyze the information. The analyses are carried out 
based on the information gathered by the specific regional program advisors who are aware of the 
factors that affect the human rights context. These analyses inform HRA on issues related to illegal 
economies that affect the dynamics of the armed actors and that have repercussions on the human 
rights context. 
Of the three different illegal economies mentioned, HRA directly works on the issue of mining and 
supports government entities and organizations in the preparation of reports and documents. In 
particular, the report “Illegal economies, armed actors and new risk scenarios in the post-accord period” was 
published and is under review by the Ombudsman’s Office. Regarding the illegal economies of drug 
trafficking and logging, HRA has no direct strategies. This does not mean, however, that HRA should 
take action in these areas.
Risks of human right violations for vulnerable populations 
The presence of these armed groups result in clashes between them and the police. They are also 
responsible for threats, extortion, selective assassination, social behavior control, intimidation through 
public pamphlets, massive displacement and confinements, planting land mines to prevent coca 
substitution, sexual violence, and child and adolescent recruitment into illegal activities and armed 
groups. These risks to the population are not equally present across all regions where HRA operates. 
For example, there are reports of massive displacements and confinements in Bajo Cauca Antioqueño, 
while in Meta and Caquetá, residents note that they are now able to freely move around the territory 
without the mobility restrictions previously imposed by the FARC-EP.
In general, interviewees recognize that since 2017 there has been a deterioration of the human rights 
situation compared to the years just before, and immediately after, the signing of the Accord. One 
interviewee summarized this well:
“During 2015 and 2016, just before the signing of the Accord, we were here and people at that time 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 34
were impressed at how the situation had changed from that of earlier years. It was very peaceful in the 
municipalities and people started to go out at night again. We could see the infrastructure and parks 
that had been built in the municipality. Unfortunately, the situation is very different now. Well, not very 
different, but it has changed since October 2017 when the killing of community leaders began. Now, we 
have the uncertainty again, but with new actors and new problems.” (Escuelas de Paz, Bogota)
The armed groups’ actions have affected a variety of vulnerable groups including human rights defenders 
and leaders, children and youth, women, Afro-Colombians and indigenous groups, the LGBTI 
population, and demobilized FARC-EP members. The risks to these vulnerable populations are not new. 
Yet, the reconfiguration of armed actors has worsened the situation for human rights defenders and 
leaders, as well as increased the violence against groups whose identity has a strong connection to a 
specified territory, such as indigenous communities that are vulnerable to displacement, where their 
leaders are being threatened and assassinated because of issues associated to land restitution and illicit 
crop substitution. Figure 2 shows that 291 human rights defenders and leaders have been killed since the 
signing of the Accord through April 2018. 
Figure 2: Homicides of Human Rights Defenders and Leaders, by Month
Source: Instituto de Estudios para el Desarrollo y la Paz (May 2018). 
Children and youth also are vulnerable to forced recruitment and illegal use and utilization into activities 
related to the illicit economy such as tending to illegal crops, transporting illegal products, providing 
information, and collecting “taxes” and extortion payments. The Clan del Golfo is particularly 
noteworthy in its ongoing recruitment of children and youth in its activities, in spite of the capture of 
some of its most important members.14
In contrast to other groups, there has not been an increase in actions against women and members of 
the LGBTI community. Rather, they say there has been an increase in the visibility of the ongoing human 
rights violations these groups face as well as a recognition of the lack of an official response to these 
violations. According to interviewees, since the withdrawal of the FARC-EP from territories where it 
used to be the primary regulator of social conflict, there has been an increase in the number of GBV 
 
14 FIP (2017).
10
13
23
14
10
16 14
16
5
12
10
30
19
22
27
17
21
12
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Nov-16
Dec-16
Jan-17
Feb-17
Mar-17
Apr-17
May-17
Jun-17
Jul-17
Aug-17
Sep-17
Oct-17
Nov-17
Dec-17
Jan-18
Feb-18
Mar-18
Apr-18
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 35
reports by women to the authorities because victims were previously not allowed to report these 
violations:
”Well, what we are seeing is an increase in reports of gender-based violence, the question is why. 
Before, people were not allowed to go to government institutions to resolve conflicts or to report 
violations of their rights. So what happens once the Accord is signed? Well, it is no longer them [FARC]
who resolve conflicts in the more remote parts of the municipality and people start to go to the local 
public administration or institutions in search of help or for conflict resolution. There is some 
disillusionment with the pace of response, because we are tied to procedures, terms and conditions 
when claims or requests are submitted, and people are used to an immediate response [from the 
FARC]. So, there was a shock at this, but it seems like people are adapting. So, you can see the increase 
in reports as positive because this means there is access. People can now come. Before, maybe they 
wanted to, but they couldn’t. As a woman said to me, “one used to be so anxious to come here and just 
enter the municipality government offices.” (Family Commissary, Ituango, Antioquia)
For the LGBTI population, while the issues they face are now more visible and tolerance in communities 
is improving, discrimination and stigmatization persist, particularly for the transgender population. 
Furthermore, when people from the LGBTI community have been killed, the authorities tend to classify 
the cases to issues of local drug trafficking without any type of investigation on whether it is a case of 
GBV. This lack of official and accurate figures makes it difficult to assess patterns on crimes targeting the 
LGBTI population.
HRA funds activities to support the populations mentioned above. In general, these activities are carried 
out through the Grants Fund and involve training and empowering these population groups. Figure 3
shows the distribution of HRA grants by demographic characteristics. While women, youth, and LGBTI 
groups are generally targeted separately, indigenous and Afro-Colombian beneficiaries can also be part 
of these groups (i.e. indigenous women, Afro-Colombian youth, etc). The figure below depicts the 
overlap of demographic characteristics in some grants. For example, of the five grants targeting youth, 
one is for Afro-Colombian youth and another one includes both Afro-Colombian and indigenous youth. 
Figure 3: Number of HRA Grants, by Demographic Characteristics
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 36
For the most part, the grantee projects implement a differentiated approach when working with the 
different beneficiary groups. For example with youth, CSOs grantees such as FUNDAMOR, aim to 
improve their knowledge on human rights issues, through participatory strategies such as developing 
audiovisual initiatives to promote and socialize them with their peers as well as using music and arts as a 
medium for learning and empowerment. In the case of indigenous people, the Organización Indígena de 
Antioquia (OIA), another HRA grantee, strengthens its members’ knowledge regarding the way of 
operating the special indigenous jurisdiction and the role played by members of the indigenous guard.
15
While only one HRA grant, Consejo Comunitario Rio Gualajo, specifically focuses on the Afro-Colombian 
community, six other grants focus on Afro-Colombian women, youth, and LGBTI groups. However, the 
evaluation team found a gap between the documented differential approach for these grants (except 
with ASOM and Hermanas Laura) and the interviews with the CSO grantee representatives and GDs with 
grantee beneficiaries. During those conversations, the topics discussed by them centered around and 
kept shifting towards gender and youth issues, not specifically related to the Afro-Colombian 
community, and referred mostly to the inclusion and participation of this vulnerable population group.
Moreover, only ASOM includes Afro-Colombian ethnic rights in the context of the implementation of 
the Accord, through their participation in the design of the PDETs.
With respect to human rights defenders and leaders, at the national level, HRA is supporting the IGO 
with the implementation of Colombia’s Directive 002. At the local level, HRA’s strategy towards leaders 
is less targeted at protecting and responding to the high number of homicides and instead focuses on 
including leaders in their activities towards increasing political participation and strengthening 
organizational capacity for self-protection and demand for their rights. 
HRA’s gender strategy seeks to increase the knowledge and skills of public officials, the police, and civil 
society on issues related to GBV prevention and response. This is carried out through activities such as 
the human rights diploma courses for public officials and social leaders, as well as through grants to 
CSOs, such as Caribe Afirmativo and Asociación Municipal de Mujeres Buenos Aires (ASOM), where the 
emphasis is on improving the knowledge of women and LGBTI beneficiaries on their rights, the rutas,
and the entities responsible for responding and protecting those rights. In addition, HRA has supported 
mechanisms of inter-institutional dialogue to implement differentiated response rutas for women and 
LGBTI victims of GBV. HRA has supported the reactivation of the Elimination of Violence against 
Women roundtables (MEV for the initials in Spanish, Mesas de Erradicación de Violencia contra la Mujer) in 
17 municipalities, and included this issue in the municipal social policy councils (COMPOS for the initials 
in Spanish, Consejo Municipal de Política Social). HRA also supports the Ombudsman’s Office in the 
financing of duplas16 in the departments of Tolima and Caquetá to improve the quality and access to legal 
and psychosocial assistance provided to women and LGBTI victims of GBV. With the national police, 
activities have recently started to update the Police Gender Guide and to examine internal and external 
policies and practices addressing GBV issues and cases. 
One of the population groups with greater risks in terms of human rights are the demobilized 
combatants of the FARC-EP. In fact, Colombia’s Article 13 of Decree 895 establishes a presumption of 
“extraordinary risk” for these people. According to the latest UN Verification Mission Report, 44
demobilized combatants have been killed since the signing of the Accord.
17 Additionally, the Accord calls 
for the creation of the Comprehensive Security System for the Exercise of Politics in order to: (i) prevent 
threats to life, integrity, freedom and security of human rights defenders, leaders of organizations and 
 
15 Indigenous guards are elected by their communities and mandated to protect indigenous lives and territory without the use 
of arms.
16 Duplas provide legal and psychosocial assistance to women and LGBTI GBV victims. 
17 Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia. 2 April 2018.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 37
social movements, and members of the FARC-EP in the process of reincorporating into civilian life; (ii) 
provide guarantees for mobilization and social protest; and iii) protect all political parties, including the 
political movement or party that emerges from the transition of the FARC–EP into legal political activity. 
Despite the above, HRA does not work with the demobilized population due to United States
Government (USG) restrictions on working with ex-members of the FARC-EP, even when they are 
participating in legal social or political activity. The evaluation team found, for example, that an HRA￾financed dupla of the Ombudsman’s Office, whose role is to guide victims of sexual violence in the 
processing of their cases, did not assist a victim of sexual assault because she was a demobilized member
of the FARC-EP. 
The risks posed to the different populations groups are not necessarily met with a response from 
governmental institutions. In municipalities such as Segovia, the community states that neither human 
rights violations nor threats of violations are investigated by the authorities. The lack of response to 
human rights violations brings with it a lack of community confidence in the authorities. The actions of 
armed groups have created fear in the populations in departments like Antioquia and Córdoba, and even 
created the perception that there are agreements between the armed groups and the authorities.
Armed groups are present in both rural and urban areas. Nonetheless, rural areas continue to be more 
vulnerable to violations of human rights given that the government’s attention and institutions, as well as 
international assistance, are centered predominantly in urban areas.
Finally, in all of the regions where HRA is active, demands for economic, social, and cultural rights are 
increasingly present in the discourse. When asked about rights, community members also speak about 
the right to water, the right to a job, improving working conditions, and poverty alleviation.
Conclusions
• HRA stays relevant and adjusts activities in a changing human rights context through its regional 
presence and expert knowledge of the geographical areas in which it works. This permanent 
presence, with highly capable regional advisors in each department, keeps HRA informed of the 
principal factors affecting the human rights context for different vulnerable groups. HRA 
adequately uses the regional advisors’ local knowledge and network in their risk analyses and to 
fine-tune their activities in each area. Nonetheless, these analyses are not undertaken in a 
standardized way.
• In this changing human rights context, HRA has incorporated activities that adequately respond 
to the institutional challenges that governmental entities face. The financial and technical support 
provided to the Ombudsmen’s Office, IGO, and NPU enable these national entities to respond 
to the situation of human rights defenders and leaders. In addition, HRA is very knowledgeable 
about the institutional rules, regulations, and procedures related to the post-conflict context 
and the Accord and is accompanying and supporting departmental and municipal governments to 
implement the Accord.
• While HRA assesses risks that stem from the presence of illegal economies, their strategy 
explicitly includes human rights issues related to illegal mining. However, it does not address 
illegal mining in a direct and comprehensive manner. HRA’s activities are focused at the macro 
level, such as an analysis of the human rights situation related to mining and the publication of 
reports related to illegal mining, and do not address relevant local issues such as working 
conditions of small-scale miners.
• The restrictions imposed by the USG on working with demobilized members of the FARC-EP
prevents HRA from adequately addressing this, increasingly critical, segment of the population at 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 38
risk of human rights violations. This has important implications for HRA’s relevance and “do no 
harm” principle. HRA is limited in participating in and influencing institutional and community 
mechanisms where there is a presence of demobilized FARC-EP members. Moreover, it is not 
able to recognize this group as a population at risk of human rights violations. Finally, this 
restriction can create legitimacy issues in the institutions that HRA intends to support, as was 
seen in the case between the duplas and the demobilized FARC-EP woman who was a victim of 
sexual assault but could not be assisted.
• The three HRA components continue to be relevant in the changing human rights context:
o Component 1 is relevant because in order to achieve effective protection and guarantee 
of human rights, it is essential that government institutions, civil society organizations 
and communities recognize the importance of issues related to human rights and how to 
apply human rights concepts to their work. In this sense, promoting human rights is not 
only important for local government officials to comply with their responsibilities in the 
implementation of the Accord, but it gains even more relevance in areas, such as 
Caucasia, where just a few years ago, before the Accord, it was not possible to even 
broach the topic of human rights. In other areas where there has been more attention 
paid to human rights, as in the north of Cauca, HRA has developed activities to increase 
awareness and knowledge of human rights issues among strategic stakeholders.
o Component 2, focusing on the prevention of human rights violations, emphasizes 
strengthening national institutions charged with preventing human rights abuses as well 
as supporting the creation or reactivation of the required local institutional bodies, such 
as the prevention, protection, and guarantee of non-repetition (PPGNR) sub￾committees, for the development of their respective documents, in particular the local 
prevention and protection plans. Because the most advanced plans were finalized at the 
end of 2017, it is still too soon to make any conclusions regarding their implementation.
o Component 3 focuses on responding to human rights violations. It is important to note 
that since the Activity was designed and started before the signing of the Accord, HRA’s 
strategy is limited exclusively to traditional justice mechanisms and does not include the 
transitional justice mechanisms in the Accord. While responses to human rights 
violations are a matter handled through the justice system and thus the AGO is the 
adequate government institution that HRA should be supporting, transitional justice also 
opens opportunities to respond to human rights violations. New entities such as the 
Special Peace Jurisdiction and the Truth Commission represent opportunities to 
respond to human rights violations through a reparative justice approach rather than a 
punitive focus as with the formal justice sector institutions such as the AGO.
• HRA focuses on the population groups most affected by human rights violations, with the 
notable exception of demobilized members of the FARC-EP, and has contributed to 
strengthening CSOs representing these groups. Specifically, under Component 1, HRA’s 
activities have adequately emphasized promoting the human rights of indigenous groups, women, 
youth, and the LBGTI population. In addition, HRA’s gender strategy has contributed to positive 
effects on the beneficiaries who participate in grantee CSO projects with a gender focus. Both 
women and LGBTI beneficiaries demonstrate an improved understanding of their rights which 
has empowered them to organize for the demand of their rights. 
• HRA’s differentiated approach for the Afro-Colombian group is not reflected by most of the 
CSO grantees targeting this group and their beneficiaries, who describe their activities through a 
gender and youth lens, and mostly focus on the mere inclusion and participation of Afro-
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 39
Colombians in activities, which does not constitute a differentiated approach for this population 
group. 
• HRA’s strategy for human rights defenders and leaders is clear at the national level, through its 
work with the IGO and NPU; however, the strategy is not comprehensive at addressing the 
severity of the situation due to increasing homicides at the regional and local levels.
Evaluation Question 2
To what extent do Colombian government officials, civil society representatives, and 
beneficiaries in target areas demonstrate an improved understanding of human rights 
standards and view compliance with those standards as the norm?
To answer this question, the evaluation team assessed not only the extent to which interviewees had 
improved their understanding of human rights standards but also the extent to which they had 
applied the learning in their work or projects. As part of the contribution analysis, the evaluation team 
also took into consideration the interviewees’ reactions to the trainings and the value derived from 
them. Assessing learning through these three levels (reaction, understanding, and application) provides a 
holistic understanding of HRA’s contribution to and advancement of Intermediate Result (IR) 1. 
Findings
Government Officials
Of the 19 departmental government officials interviewed, five officials (26 percent) report benefitting 
directly from HRA trainings and demonstrate an improved understanding of human rights standards, and 
eleven officials (58 percent) report not participating directly in the HRA activities but witnessing an 
improved understanding of human standards among direct reports within their offices and/or other 
municipal level officials that participated in these activities. The remaining three officials (16 percent)
were from offices where these training activities were not relevant, such as the Departmental Office of 
International Cooperation. 
At the municipal level, 14 officials (41 percent) report benefitting directly from HRA trainings and 
demonstrate an improved understanding of human rights standards, and 11 officials (32 percent) report 
not participating directly in the HRA activities but witnessing an improved understanding of human 
standards among other officials that participated in these activities. Nine officials (26 percent) did not 
attend any trainings or did not demonstrate improved understanding of human rights standards when 
asked about what they learned or how it had been applied to their work functions. 
The evaluation team found that initial knowledge levels on human rights standards varied greatly among 
government officials, from a few officials stating they had no prior work experience or knowledge of 
human rights issues even though it was now relevant to their role, to a few officials having held more 
specialized positions on human rights issues over time, and everything in between. Nonetheless, even 
those with more prior knowledge of human rights report that they benefitted from the trainings and 
technical assistance provided by HRA. 
In general, departmental and municipal officials value the capacity building support provided by HRA. 
Several municipal officials agree that HRA trainings are effective because they are not lecture-based 
theoretical workshops; instead, their methodology is focused on implementation and applying the 
knowledge into their work as well as accompaniment through the process rather than support on 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 40
individual tasks. Almost all government officials state that the HRA trainings align to their capacity 
building needs and priorities.
Increased knowledge of new obligations and public policies resulting from the Accord
Almost 90 percent of government officials report that HRA trainings have primarily contributed to their 
improved understanding and awareness of public policies related to human rights, especially with respect 
to the new legislative framework following the signing of the Accord, which resulted in new obligations 
for local government entities. For example, in Chaparral, a municipal government official states that:
“Even though I studied these issues in University, all of the information was jumbled up in my head. 
HRA’s assistance has given me a better understanding of our operational responsibilities as a 
municipality and has enabled the municipality to fulfill its Development Plans objectives. It has made the 
municipality more organized on these matters. I have leaned on HRA a lot, and thanks to HRA I have 
learned about the municipality’s obligations.” (Personería, Chaparral, Tolima)
Government officials, in particular those within the municipal government’s secretariat, praise HRA for 
instructing them on the process to develop and update their prevention and protection plans and to 
create or re-activate institutional mechanisms, such as the PPGNR sub-committees. Officials within the 
departmental government’s secretary of interior value HRA’s assistance in merging the Human Rights 
Committees and the Peace Councils as an efficient strategy. These officials recognize that HRA’s 
participatory and proactive technical assistance has given them a greater understanding of the regulatory 
framework related to human rights standards and compliance with them. 
“HRA has been an immense support to us because really when I started working as the government 
secretary I had absolutely no experience on human rights issues. None. It has been an immense support 
because their way of working is very participatory and very proactive […] so with their support we now 
have an updated municipal human rights, international humanitarian law, and peace council that fulfills 
the national orders received by the Mayor.” (Government Secretary, Mesetas, Meta)
The evaluation team noted, however, that all application of what is learned is implemented with close 
support of HRA and not independently by the government officials. 
The improved understanding of human rights standards reported by public officials is corroborated by 
social leaders. In particular, some social leaders confirm that they have witnessed better understanding 
and capacity from public officials who participated in the diploma courses supported by HRA. 
“HRA’s diploma courses trains public officials, so you have the Personeria, Family Commissaries, the 
Family Welfare Institute learning how to respond to and assist victims and their responsibilities in these 
matters. These are the institutions that we lean on for assistance to victims. So now with the knowledge 
we have gained and the knowledge that the public official has gained it is easier to know the 
responsibilities of the different offices.” (Social Leader from the Victims’ Roundtable, Tierralta, 
Cordoba)
New competencies regarding human rights prevention and protection mechanisms
In addition, 38 percent of municipal officials report that the trainings have given them new competencies 
regarding human rights prevention and protection mechanisms. For example, in Mesetas and Tierralta, 
the government’s secretariats report that HRA has taught them how to identify cases of human rights 
violations that they were not aware of before, and that as public officials they are also violating people’s 
rights by not providing them protection and guarantee measures. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 41
Three-fourths of the personeros interviewed highlight that the HRA-supported trainings by the National 
Federation of Personeros (FENALPER for the initials in Spanish, Federación Nacional de Personeros)
provided them with practical tools for conflict resolution and responding to cases of GBV. The personera 
in Chaparral states that she notices this improved knowledge when she meets with personeros from 
other municipalities that have not received this training. Officials in the Family Commissaries and the 
women’s secretariat express that their gained knowledge on GBV has been applied in the construction 
and implementation of the response rutas and has improved the assistance they provide to citizens. 
However, this reportedly improved assistance is not yet perceived by civil society or community 
members. On the contrary, in some departments, like in Cauca, civil society members state that the 
response rutas are not well disseminated across the different government institutions and that 
comprehensive understanding is required not only by high-level officials but by all the personnel within 
these entities, including hospitals, where victims arrive to be treated. 
The police in Chaparral reports that the trainings provided by Fundación Ideas para la Paz (FIP) gave 
them a better understanding of human rights standards and communication strategies that they found 
useful for conflict resolution and facilitating dialogue between different actors, such as police, community 
members, and municipal government. Unfortunately, police participation in the FIP activities was 
extremely low, with less than 10 police officers participating in three municipalities, and the dialogue 
activities were not implemented as planned, so the effect of this outcome is very limited. 
A less frequently stated outcome at the department level is that the trainings increase the government’s 
ability to define the needs of different population groups and enable them to better serve communities. 
However, a departmental government official in Caquetá, as well as several civil society leaders and 
beneficiaries in Tolima and Antioquia, state that authorities continue to lack understanding of the 
specific needs and risks faced by the LGBTI population, so they are not fulfilling their obligations to 
provide protection to this group, in particular. 
Informed officials can better engage with and respond to the communities
The increased knowledge and new competencies of government officials is also improving their 
interactions with the communities. For example, in San Vicente del Caguán, the Councilor feels 
empowered with the knowledge gained because he can share that knowledge with the community when 
he does outreach or when they approach him within institutional mechanisms. In Ibagué, the secretary 
of social inclusion states that as both the public servant and the community gain knowledge about their 
rights, a common language is built that enables more effective interactions between communities, the 
municipal government, and the police force regarding human rights standards and compliance of these 
standards. 
Civil Society Representatives
The evaluation team interviewed two types of civil society representatives. The first corresponds to 
representatives of CSOs that are HRA grantees, and the second corresponds to civil society leaders 
that were not grantees but were directly involved in HRA activities. 
More than half (56 percent) of regional HRA grantees report already having internal capacity on human 
rights standards so their understanding of human right standards did not change due to HRA. 
Nonetheless, six local grantees (such as ASOM, Rio Gualajo, Círculo de Estudios Culturales y Políticos) report 
receiving valuable technical support from HRA.
“HRA has been one of the entities that has supported human rights issues the most. Their technical 
team is great, their staff has many years of experience and in-depth knowledge about gender issues and 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 42
the justice sector. They really provide technical support, they don’t simply give you the financial 
resources, they know how to engage and strengthen grassroots CSOs. During our grant, I really liked 
that we had someone helping us with our monitoring, someone else helping with communications, and 
we received technical support from different perspectives. So for a small organization like us, it felt like 
we had an extended team.” (Grantee Círculo de Estudios Culturales y Políticos, Bogota)
A few grantees (such as Red Caquetá and Fundamor) however, stated they had not received training or 
technical support from HRA, but felt that they would have benefitted from it. 
“It would have been good to receive training from HRA on human rights issues. This is a new topic for us 
to work on, so deepening our knowledge on these topics would be helpful.” (Grantee Red Caquetá, 
Florencia, Caquetá)
During the GDs, social leaders easily and correctly identify human rights violations presented in the 
vignettes. When defining human rights, they also express that these rights come with duties and they see 
human rights as a commitment they make towards society. 
“I know my rights, but I also have duties. I also have duties towards society, the State, my family, and 
those around me. This isn’t about just demanding rights, I also have to contribute. I see human rights as 
the commitment I have towards society”. (Social leader GD, Chaparral, Tolima)
The social leaders who participate in the PPGNR sub-committees demonstrate a clear understanding 
about the relevant government entities regarding human rights as well as their responsibilities. While 
they confirm HRA has supported them in participating in these mechanisms, this knowledge cannot be 
directly attributed to HRA as it is very likely they already knew this information due to their role as 
leaders.
Civil society leaders such as members of the women’s or victims’ roundtables express that HRA’s 
trainings, where they learned about and constructed the response rutas, have given them the knowledge 
to know who to turn to and how to file claims. This knowledge has empowered them to start 
demanding respect for their rights. 
“We have learned to come together, we have learned about the rutas – who we need to turn to, how to 
go through the process and file claims, and what different entities are responsible for. So after a few 
workshops you can see people are motivated, they have more clarity about these topics, because before 
we didn’t know them, but now we do.” (Victims’ Roundtable representative, Remedios, Antioquia)
Some social leaders also express that their increased knowledge contributes to their role as human 
rights defenders, particularly in the Human Rights Committees, where it is their role to bring informed 
observations to the government officials and demand action. This change is also perceived by 
government officials who report that social leaders have demanded specific actions and response from 
the government. 
“What one notices is a gained interest of many public officials and many social leaders about the need 
to work on prevention of human rights violations. This is a very big gain. Social leaders are demanding 
actions, pushing forward these actions themselves. For example, here they are telling us to set up a 
Human Rights Observatory, these are specific matters that are now being brought to the table.”
(Government Secretariat, Caucasia, Antioquia)
Beneficiaries
Increased knowledge on human rights
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 43
All of the beneficiaries groups easily identify human rights violations presented in the vignettes during 
the GDs, including the right to participation, right to equality and non-discrimination, right to liberty and 
security of person, right to equal protection of the law, right to fair trial and due process, and women 
and LGBTI rights, among others. Moreover, they identify and recognize why human rights violations are 
a problem and voice solutions without being prompted for one. Nonetheless, some beneficiaries across 
the groups incorrectly identify the specific human right pertaining to a situation or could not explicitly 
name the human right even though they could say it was a human rights violation.
During the GDs, the beneficiaries describe human rights as “laws, norms, and fundamental rules” and 
“legalized values” that “every human being is entitled to, simply for being human, regardless of race, skin 
color, age, employment or gender”. When speaking about the importance of human rights, all 
beneficiary groups mention rights that go beyond political and civil rights, especially the right to water, 
territory, autonomy, health, education, and work. Moreover, the LGBTI groups also talk about human 
rights as a matter of integrity and dignity, specifically with respect to institutional recognition and
increased visibility, as this affects their access to public services and to the justice system. Some 
beneficiaries from the indigenous and Afro-Colombian women’s groups also emphasize that human 
rights violations are not individual since they carry an emotional burden which consequently affects the 
collective sphere (families and communities). The women’s groups also talk about recognizing different 
forms of violations that go beyond physical violence, such as verbal and emotional abuse; and they talk 
about their economic and property rights. 
Beneficiaries across the groups express that what they learned goes beyond identifying human rights. 
They also learned that they have the right to demand respect for and protection of their rights, and that 
this right to demand respect and protection is a right in and of itself. They are aware of their right to 
justice and to protection measures. Nonetheless, they also state there is a gap between their demands 
and the State’s response, which is exacerbated by their distrust in the police. 
“The tools are there, the government entities are there, but many times they do not operate well. The 
truth is that at times we find there is a sort of apathy [from these entities], many times you don’t see 
that response that you should receive from those entities” (Women GD, Buenos Aires, Cauca)
Beneficiaries attribute the lack of State response to apathy, lack of capacity, and lack of attendance of 
public officials in multi-stakeholder mechanisms such as municipal roundtables and councils. In several 
GDs, beneficiaries state that many times public positions are filled for political reasons rather than based 
on competency, and thus, these officials are not equipped with the knowledge or desire to respond to 
the community. The sentiment about a lack of State response was also expressed by most social leaders.
“The concern that we have as community leaders is that we start telling people we are going to help 
defend our rights, but the entities responsible for responding and protecting our rights do not do 
anything.” (Social Leader, Segovia, Antioquia) 
The youth groups express that the hands-on dynamic exercises during the workshops, where lessons 
about human rights were incorporated into photography and painting lessons, helped them to better 
understand and grasp concepts. This knowledge was reflected in their comprehensive responses and 
thoughtful conversations throughout the GDs.
“What I liked was that we didn’t sit down and have someone talk to us about human rights. Instead, 
these lessons were part of our arts workshops. For example, one time the teacher divided us into groups 
and gave each group only one pot of paint. At first some people started arguing over sharing the paint, 
so the teacher guided us through resolving this conflict and talked to us about human rights and how it 
applies to us and our community.” (Youth GD, Chaparral, Tolima) 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 44
Initial changes in perceptions and attitudes about human rights
Some beneficiaries, especially youth and women, state that while they had a general idea of human rights 
prior to their participation with the HRA grantee, they did not have a clear understanding of what 
human rights entail or that these rights should be recognized and can protect them from abuses. 
Beneficiaries from indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations value their newly gained knowledge 
about human rights, laws and norms because they recognize that these have historically served their 
communities in resistance and liberation from oppression. However, during the GDs some youth still 
express prejudice against the LGBTI community, despite stating they are people with the same rights as 
anyone else and should be respected.
“I am the type of person who…I mean I don’t approve of homosexuals, but I do respect them, I have to 
respect them because they are people like everyone else…but I’d rather they keep their distance from 
me.” (Youth GD, Tumaco, Nariño)
Increased knowledge about entities responsible for guaranteeing, protecting, and respecting 
human rights
Beneficiaries across the different groups express that they feel supported by HRA grantees and HRA 
itself when they have to seek help, make claims or access justice and public services. However, there is 
variation amongst beneficiaries regarding how prepared they feel to be able to do this on their own. 
Some beneficiaries recognize that they are only starting to learn about human rights but know they can 
turn to the HRA grantee for support. Despite not feeling completely ready or capable of approaching 
government entities on their own, they now feel trained to ask, seek help, and not stay silent. 
“We have the support of the [HRA grantee], and they say don’t worry, this is the process and if it is not 
being executed then we go to the Prosecutor, and if not then to the Ombudsmen’s Office. So if there 
wasn’t an organization mentoring us then abuses and violations would continue to happen. Also, as 
women having that accompaniment to file formal claims is important for our safety.” (Women’s GD, 
Vistahermosa, Meta) 
There is also variation amongst beneficiaries regarding the identification of the specific entities 
responsible for defending and guaranteeing human rights, especially between the women, youth, and 
indigenous/Afro-Colombian groups. While knowledge about the rutas has helped beneficiaries to know 
the entities involved in the human rights process, many beneficiaries cannot correctly identify these 
entities and instead refer to government entities in general. This finding is not surprising, since most of 
the municipalities where HRA is working did not have well developed rutas prior to the program. HRA 
has been supporting the formation of subcommittees where the rutas are constructed, and is only now 
starting the process of socializing and implementing the rutas. Thus, this finding comes at an opportune 
time for the program. 
The youth group from Tumaco, however, stands out positively in this case. Participants are very 
knowledgeable about the entities involved in the rutas and their roles and responsibilities. During their 
workshops, the HRA grantee, Diócesis de Tumaco, took them on a field trip to visit and meet the public 
officials from the different entities, including the Family Commissaries, Personería, Ombudsman’s Office, 
and Mayor’s Office, amongst others. The young beneficiaries expressed that they valued this exercise 
and that it helped them know where they can seek help and what each entity is responsible for. This 
exercise even led one of the beneficiaries to explain to her mother about the different entities and to 
convince her to appeal to one of them for a personal matter. 
“I learned [about the relevant entities] with the Diócesis. I learned that the Personeria and 
Ombudsmen’s Office existed, and it was with the Diócesis that we did a field trip to visit each one so 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 45
that was when I started distinguishing them and knowing their different roles. So then at home I told my 
mom let’s go over there and I told her what I had learned, and thank god, thanks to that knowledge my 
mom was able to file a claim and now we live a bit more at peace.” (Youth GD, Tumaco, Nariño)
In contrast to other groups, the beneficiaries from indigenous and Afro-Colombian groups tend to 
mention their own communities as the first instance for complaint and response rather than an 
institutional entity. This is due to both cultural and historical reasons; culturally these communities are 
more focused on communitarian action and historically they have felt abandoned by the government. 
The demand for the enforcement of rights is also related to the knowledge of the prevention and 
response rutas. In some municipalities, the rutas do not yet exist and some beneficiary groups confirm 
they are participating in the construction and socialization of these rutas. These beneficiaries confirm 
that HRA has improved engagement between civil society and the municipal government and has led a 
participatory process. Other beneficiaries state that knowing the rutas is what has helped them know 
how to demand their rights. The different beneficiary groups, although not everyone within each group, 
also demonstrate knowledge about various laws and regulations that protect their rights, such as 
“habeas corpus”, “Ley 70”, “the Constitutional Court ruling on the name change and gender in the 
identity card”, and legal action through the “tutela”. 
The improved understanding of human rights standards demonstrated by beneficiaries during the GDs is 
confirmed by many municipal officials, especially those in functions that interact directly with the 
community, such as the personeros, victims’ liaisons, and family commissaries.
“The presence of HRA in the region, in my professional opinion as part of this entity, is that it has 
generated a lot of progress in the municipality and it has empowered the communities because now 
people know their rights, they know the different relevant entities that exist in their locality and in the 
municipality and they know where they can take their petitions. We are seeing that people are not just 
showing up anywhere; now they know where they can go for a response. We are also seeing people 
form associations and groups that we didn’t see before.” (Personería, Chaparral, Tolima)
Conclusions
• Departmental and municipal officials demonstrate an improved understanding about human 
rights, especially with respect to the regulatory framework. The application of this knowledge is 
done with close support from HRA regional advisors and is tied to fulfilling the departmental 
and municipal governments’ obligations. It is uncertain whether the application of this knowledge 
will continue independently.
• Government officials’ focus on developing and updating public policies on human rights comes 
from the obligation to comply with the MOI’s orders, rather than from the need they see in 
their communities. 
• HRA has contributed to improved understanding of human rights standards among the most 
relevant municipal officials, including personeros, victims’ liaisons, family commissaries, and 
women’s secretariats.
• Grassroots CSOs value and recognize HRA’s technical support on conceptual issues related to 
human rights and gender. However, HRA proves this support reactively, after receiving requests 
from CSOs. Some HRA grantees who could have benefitted from this support did not receive it. 
• All of the beneficiary groups, as well as social leaders, demonstrate increased understanding 
about human rights standards, and they value this improved knowledge. Beneficiaries frequently 
mention economic, social, and cultural rights when talking about human rights and their needs. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 46
This is an important outcome particularly in regions such as Cordoba, where even five years ago 
these rights were not part of the discourse and only violence and international humanitarian law 
were discussed. 
• Widespread dissemination of the various response rutas is important to continue strengthening 
beneficiaries’ – especially women’s – knowledge about the enforceability of their rights and who 
to turn to for help and support. 
• Not all beneficiaries can identify the entities responsible for guaranteeing, protecting, and 
respecting human rights. Experiential methodologies, such as the Diócesis de Tumaco’s field trip 
to meet the public officials that are part of the rutas, may be an effective way to ingrain this 
knowledge. 
Evaluation Question 3
Are HRA’s strategies and approaches promoting sustainability of the initiatives 
supported by the Activity at the GOC and civil society levels?
To assess the promotion of sustainability at the GOC and civil society levels, the evaluation team 
focused on five domains (i.e. relevant factors and conditions) that are likely to influence the continuation 
of initiatives supported by the Activity: 1) policy, 2) participation and ownership, 3) management and 
organization, 4) technical training, and 5) financial.18 It is worth noting, the sustainability of initiatives can 
only be verified ex-post, so this performance evaluation can only assess factors that theoretically would 
contribute to the sustainability of the initiatives. While some of these domains, such as policy and 
financial resources, are beyond the direct control of the Activity, HRA provides close support on the 
other three domains in a manner that is highly valued by GOC officials and civil society representatives
but that runs of risk of creating dependency. HRA is in an opportune time to reassess and strengthen its 
sustainability strategies during the remaining time of its performance period. 
Findings
Policy
Municipal and departmental government officials say that they highly value HRA’s technical assistance for 
the design and implementation of public policies related to prevention of and protection from human 
rights abuses. These officials particularly note the assistance that HRA provides to help form the PPGNR 
sub-committees, and to develop and revise their prevention and protection plans. They also say that 
when HRA ends, complying with their obligations and continuing the efforts related to prevention and 
protection will be difficult because HRA organizes their activities, guides them to develop work plans for 
the PPGNR sub-committees, and updates them on national level requirements related to human rights.
Given the high turnover rates of local government officials, both CSOs and local officials state that one 
way to increase the sustainability of HRA’s contributions is to formalize and institutionalize their 
strategies and practices through policy documents that require local government compliance, such as 
ordinances, resolutions, and administrative acts. Otherwise, in the words of a government official in 
Meta, “When the international cooperation leaves, it seems like everything will come apart.” HRA supports the 
creation or activation of Human Rights Committees and of multi-stakeholder dialogue mechanisms, such 
as the Peace Councils, which also enables formalization of human rights related policies. Another 
 
18 AusAID (2000). Promoting Practical Sustainability. https://www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/dcdndep/31950216.pdf 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 47
example is HRA’s support to formalize the Human Rights Observatory into the municipal government
so that the municipal government takes ownership of and makes a commitment to the continuity of the 
Observatory once HRA ends. CSOs also want HRA support formalized into the local government. For 
example, Fundación Arcoíris in Tumaco recommends that the LGBTI roundtable be incorporated into 
local government through an administrative act.
Mayor’s Offices told the evaluation team that HRA keeps them up to date on new human rights policies 
coming from the national government and, in many cases keeps them informed about local government 
requirements imposed by the Ministry of the Interior (MOI). In general, local government authorities 
appreciate that HRA has helped them develop contact and networks with national institutions, such as 
the MOI, the NPU, and the President’s Office, among others.
Most Governor’s offices also report that HRA is enabling sustainability by connecting its activities with 
the goals of the departmental development plans. In Meta, the Governor’s Office particularly noted the 
Human Rights School as an example of how HRA coordinated its strategies with the departmental 
development plan. Moreover, the Governor’s Offices in Meta, Caquetá and Cauca highly value the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between USAID and their offices for coordinating different 
projects with what is in the development plans. The MOUs have contributed to organizing USAID 
assistance in these departments and to linking USAID’s strategies with the government’s processes. The 
advisor from the Office of International Cooperation in Cauca, sees benefit from the coordination 
roundtables created under the MOU with USAID, which enables the different secretariats within the 
departmental government to engage with all of the USAID implementing partners. She states that the 
MOU has resulted in more streamlined and strategic support as well as commitment from the 
secretariats towards these initiatives. The MOU in Meta has also resulted in more efficient coordination 
between HRA and other USAID programs, such as the Regional Governance Activity.
HRA regional advisors also express these same opinions regarding the sustainability of their activities 
from a policy perspective, emphasizing that they promote sustainability by ensuring that the institutional 
strengthening they are providing to local governments is linked to national level human rights policy. 
Participation and Ownership
HRA focuses on strengthening civil society participation in public policy mechanisms, such as the PPGNR 
sub-committees, to increase their ownership of human rights issues and to hold government entities 
accountable, especially due to the high turnover of government officials. CSOs agree that providing 
human rights training contributes to community ownership and knowing when, how, and to whom they 
can demand that their rights be respected.
“Knowledge breaks barriers, at the least when someone knows what their rights are and what they are 
entitled to.” (Grantee Fundación Arcoíris, Tumaco, Nariño)
In addition to the training provided, CSOs point out that HRA activities, such as the identification of 
risks and needs and the development of agendas and workplans related to human rights, spark 
community members’ interest and empower them to participate in public policy mechanisms and engage 
in dialogue with local government authorities and institutions.
“There are mechanisms that people have to take advantage of, otherwise other people will be making 
decisions for them.” (Grantee Corpomanigua, Florencia, Caquetá)
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 48
“Women, themselves, identify their needs…it gives women a voice and the opportunity for them to 
express themselves: what they feel, what they want, and what they need in their communities.”
(Grantee AMII, Ituango, Antioquia)
“The important thing is that people know, communities know…the activities are sustainable to the 
extent in which people empower themselves.” (Grantee Consejo Comunitario Rio Gualajo, Tumaco, 
Nariño)
Local government officials, social leaders, and CSOs report that working with youth through the Peace 
Schools, and strengthening their leadership and creative abilities to build peace, are fundamental to 
increasing citizen participation in public policy and including them in community oversight. 
One-third of local CSOs and municipal government officials stressed the importance of strengthening 
the Community Action Board (JAC for the initials in Spanish, Junta de Acción Comunal) to create more 
space for community participation in public policy:
“[The JAC] is the institution at the rural level, they are the ones who need to take ownership of these 
issues.” (Secretary of Interior, Ibagué, Tolima)
Most CSOs and local authorities also agree that the rutas need to be disseminated in communities so 
that communities can take ownership of them and know how to demand their rights to the responsible 
authorities.
Most CSO grantees express a sense of ownership over the design and purpose of the projects they are 
implementing. While some design adjustments by HRA may be necessary to strengthen these projects, a 
few organizations, such as Corpomanigua, told the evaluation team that it had to adjust its initial project 
proposal to HRA’s preferences. This took significant time and effort and reduced their feelings of 
ownership over the work to be done. Corpomanigua told the evaluation team that they nearly withdrew 
their project because it took a lot of time to launch their revised activities. By the time work began 
some activities had lost their relevance.
HRA advisors affirm that strengthening community participation in public policy so that community 
members are directly involved in the processes with the government is a fundamental part of their 
sustainability strategy.
Management and Organization
Several local government officials told the evaluation team that HRA increases government capacity 
through trainings, technical assistance, the creation and activation of PPGNR sub-committees, and in 
developing or updating their prevention and protection plans. These approaches reduce reliance on 
individual officials. Nonetheless, local authorities also noted that the constant turnover in officials is an 
obstacle to generating and sustaining local capacities. They suggest that capacity building should focus on 
permanent government employees rather than short-term employees working under contracts.
Some municipal government officials told the evaluation team that they consider the systematization of 
good practices and methods, and the documentation and formalization of processes that HRA supports 
them with to be part of the capacity building efforts. They believe that this contributes to sustaining the 
capacity in the face of turnovers, helps transfer knowledge between new and departing officials, and 
helps to replicate successful processes. It also supports connecting government processes with 
communities.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 49
“There wasn’t a single file left behind by the previous administration, so this has been a process of 
documentation from zero. So if I were to leave tomorrow, I can now hand over all of the files and 
documentation to the new person. I can show them, this is the document you need to update this year, 
this is the template you can use, this is the document with the contingency plans in case of emergencies, 
and this database has to be updated this way. So they don’t have to worry about starting from scratch 
or not knowing what to do, like the experience I had. HRA’s support has always been in the 
documentation of these processes, from start to finish.” (Victims’ Liaison, San Vicente del Caguán, 
Caquetá) 
Some CSO grantees told the evaluation team that they learned to be more organized with their 
documentation and how to better plan activities through their work with HRA. They received support 
to strengthen their organizations administratively, financially, and with monitoring their actions and 
results.
“Having been able to develop a strategic plan with indicators has strengthened FENALPER. Since we 
first received HRA support, we have had 25 new international cooperation agreements. This is thanks to 
the support we have received from HRA.” (FENALPER, Bogota)
Other CSOs, such as Corpomanigua in Caquetá and LIMPAL in Meta, consider having an increased 
capacity from learning about new topics and competencies. Corpomanigua reports that learning about 
historical memory from HRA allowed them to develop and propose a new project to USAID, which was 
approved. LIMPAL reports increased capacity in developing proposals of higher quality and developing 
more robust programs. 
“I think that HRA has helped strengthen our organization. We received trainings in various areas: 
administrative and financial issues, communications, developing our M&E framework, indicators, and 
monitoring systems, and technical assistance from their gender coordinator. The training on developing 
methodologies and reports, as well as the interaction with HRA has been very useful. As the person who 
designs and develops projects and programs, I feel better equipped and prepared to put together 
proposals of higher quality. We have received plenty of support from HRA and that has strengthened 
our organization.” (Grantee LIMPAL, Villavicencio, Meta)
HRA staff told the evaluation team that one way to sustain increased capacity and maintain processes is 
by empowering civil society through grants. This helps to mitigate the effects of public official turnover 
because even though the officials change, civil society and community leaders remain and can hold 
governments accountable.
Technical Training
All of the municipal government officials, and particularly those in the Mayor’s Offices, highly value 
HRA’s technical assistance. Fundamentally, they value the systematic and direct support they receive to 
implement and fulfill the requirements they receive from the MOI. They particularly note that HRA 
advisors are available to help them at any time of the day, either in person or by telephone.
“More than me, it is HRA that knows how to do this. They convene, prepare the topic, do 
everything…They even help us with the refreshments.” (Government Secretariat, Mesetas, Meta)
Local officials also said that HRA’s support and dedication has been fundamental in improving local public 
management. Municipal administrators say that thanks to HRA’s technical assistance and support, they 
now have PPGNR sub-committees as well as prevention and protection plans.
“So, sometimes there wasn’t the capacity and budget to respond as we should and HRA has become an 
ally in generating this capacity.” (Government Secretariat, Santander de Quilichao, Cauca)
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 50
In many cases, HRA’s technical assistance is indispensable to government officials who lack bandwidth 
capacity and technical knowledge to perform these functions independently. As such, there is a high 
reliance on HRA advisors to perform technical and operational functions. 
“[HRA could improve their support] by having more advisors because they…uyy…I need them but they 
are always so busy, so the time I have with them is not enough […] sometimes things come up that 
need immediate attention but they already have a scheduled week and are bus..but at least they are 
very responseive over telephone, the next day the latest.” (Office of Human Rights, Ibagué, Tolima) 
Almost all HRA regional advisors expressed the same sentiments as the local officials. They told the 
evaluation team that they believe that sitting with local government officials and helping them comply 
with their obligations has created results, especially in municipalities that require constant support due 
to the initial state of their institutional capacity. An HRA advisor described what they do as “operación 
sirirí” –very insistent and ready to answer any question whenever the question arises.
Financial Resources
Municipal and departmental government officials concur in saying that the lack of budgetary resources 
for local administration puts the sustainability of HRA’s work at risk. This is because the logistical and 
operational requirements for increasing local government coverage to rural and urban areas are high. In 
addition, most municipal administration officials say that securing sufficient financial resources to assure 
the sustainability of HRA’s support depends largely on the political will of the mayor. Not all mayors 
have the same commitment to human rights.
“If the next mayor places his bets on social issues and is passionate about these issues, then believe me 
the mayor will find the financial resources and maintain them. But, if it isn’t a priority then unfortunately 
these are programs that are going to be left behind.” (Family Commissary, Chaparral, Tolima)
“And, if you go and ask the municipal government, they don’t have resources to transport the people (to 
the municipal center), nor the vehicles, nor places for them to stay or meals. And it’s not just one person, 
it’s ten that come. To maintain the participatory process, you need resources and I feel like the 
municipal administrations don’t have these resources.” (CIPRUNNA, Villavicencio, Meta)
“When you go to the mayor and say, well Mayor, we are going to have an activity with this or that 
community, and we are going to show them a film on the topic of human rights…there is no money, 
there is no money.” (Victims’ Liaison, Cáceres, Antioquía)
Although public policies on the prevention and protection of human rights are obligatory for local 
governments, the lack of financial and human resources impede the implementation of these policies. 
Government official agree on the need to ensure that there is a specific budget line for human rights in 
local development plans.
For the MOI, HRA is a strategic ally for the design and implementation of human rights prevention and 
protection public policy at the local level. HRA is also a financial ally, which the MOI considers to be of 
critical value given the national government’s budget limitations.
In general terms, officials from the Mayor’s Office demonstrated interest in and recognize the 
importance of replicating HRA’s successes in municipalities where HRA does not operate. However, 
they note that the lack of personnel and budgetary resources constitute an obstacle to doing this. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 51
Most CSOs, and particularly those operating at the local level, say that replicating what has been done 
through HRA is a great challenge given the lack of financial resources. Assuring participatory processes 
requires a budget. CSO grantees told the evaluation team that the sustainability of their projects would 
be more certain if the financing that they receive was for a longer period of time. 
“It would be good if the programs had a longer duration…the interventions are short-term and it makes 
it difficult for them to be sustainable.” (Grantee Escuelas de Paz, Bogota)
“As a smaller organization, it is very difficult to be able to have an impact on long-term issues when the 
projects that are financed are of such short duration.” (Grantee CREER, Bogota)
“One thing that can be improved is enabling the sustainability of our interventions. The grants have a 
fixed short period and then our project ends. It would be good to have the opportunity to propose a 
second phase or continuation of the work we are doing, to have a conversation about it during the 
implementation of the initial project. Right now the time is up and it all ends.” (Grantee Círculo de 
Estudios Culturales y Politicos, Bogota)
Figure 4 shows that almost forty percent of HRA grants have a period of performance of nine months 
or less, and grants to local or regional CSOs, which interact directly with the beneficiary population 
groups, are not longer than 12 months.
Figure 4: Distribution of Grant Duration
Local CSOs raise the concern that the grant’s short period of performance creates expectations from 
beneficiaries, especially youth and women, of continued support that cannot be fulfilled, and might 
actually expose them to risks if they are left without additional support when they are starting to 
become leaders or starting to overcome. 
“I think it would be good to plan a second phase of the project with the groups that displayed greater 
interest and potential, because it’s important that we leverage the individual and collective leadership we 
are supporting. So a second phase of the grant would strengthen the peace promotion initiatives we 
have been launching. It is important to recognize that working with women at the base, women who 
0
1
10
15
1 1
0
1
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
< 3 mos. 4 - 6
mos.
7 - 9
mos.
10 - 12
mos.
13 - 15
mos.
16 - 18
mos.
19 - 21
mos.
22 - 24
mos.
Frequency
Frequency Cumulative %
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 52
have been victims, is a long road, because she has to overcome emotional and psychological trauma, so 
you can’t approach her about political participation right away, we can’t ask them to jump into a stage 
that is so visible, it would be violent to put her in that stage and walk away. So a second phase would 
focus on deepening their knowledge and positioning and accompanying women in those stages to 
eventually increase their participation.” (Grantee Corpomanigua, Florencia, Caquetá)
“Continuity to this project is necessary. A year is not enough time, we are left short. We have identified 
the potential leaders in the groups…there are youth with big potential, they are energized and 
interested, but the year is now up. If we had more time we could also generate a strategy to then link 
and strengthen youth organizations that are starting to form.” (Grantee Fundamor, Santander de 
Quilichao, Cauca)
However, HRA’s short three-year period of performance with uncertain approval of its two option 
years, along with an over-prescription of the quantity and types of grants it is contractually obligate to 
fund, make it difficult for HR to address these concerns.
For larger national CSOs with greater financial capacity and experience with international assistance 
projects, sustainability is made possible by consistently securing resources from other financing sources 
that support their efforts in human rights. In this way, sustainability does not depend on continued HRA 
financing in the future. However, this consistent funding flow is not attainable for local CSOs, such as 
Diócesis de Tumaco, Casa Teatro, and LIMPAL, who will no longer continue these specific projects once 
the grant ends.
Some HRA regional advisors emphasize that financial resource allocation to ensure the sustainability of 
their initiatives can be dependent on the mayor’s political will. For example, despite legal obligation 
granted through ordinances and municipal agreements, most of the Human Rights Committees do not 
have financial resources allocated to them. HRA advisors also say that most municipalities where they 
work have very limited budgets so sometimes even the timing of implementation can create budgetary 
conflicts for the municipal governments. For CSOs, HRA has also provided organizational support to 
eight CSOs (seven of those are grantees and one was done by request from USAID) on administration
and accounting, monitoring and evaluation, communications, and budgeting and financial procurement, 
with the aim of strengthening their capacity to implement programs and procure funds from other 
donors. However, HRA has limited financial resources to provide this support more widely. 
Conclusions
• The sustainability of HRA’s activities with local governments depends on a number of factors 
that are beyond its control, including budgetary resource allocation, turnover in government 
staff and consultants, and political will. HRA aims to influence these factors by strengthening 
policy development processes and mechanisms, such as PPGNR sub-committees, instilling 
institutional capacity, and increasing civil society participation to minimize reliance on individual 
officials. 
• HRA’s institutional strengthening strategy is oriented toward sustainability through its emphasis 
on supporting activities and processes linked to public policy and by responding to the risks and 
needs of the most vulnerable groups.
• While technical assistance is highly valued by government officials, there is an over reliance on 
HRA regional advisors to perform technical and operational functions. While HRA aims to instill 
institutional capacity, a continued highly involved technical assistance to municipal governments 
could undermine the sustainability of HRA’s activities.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 53
• MOUs between USAID and departmental governments enhance interdepartmental 
coordination, enable departmental governments to identify and take ownership of the initiatives 
that USAID proposes, and streamlines USAID activities in regions where there are multiple and 
sometime overlapping programs. 
• HRA’s activities bring together the local government and civil society. This can generate 
sustainability as long as local governments identify firsthand the community needs, community 
members are informed of government obligations, and trust is promoted between communities 
and their governments.
• HRA grants to CSOs typically have a period of performance of 9 to 12 months. The short 
period of performance limits the grantee’s ability to have the desired impact, creates 
expectations from beneficiaries of continued support that cannot be fulfilled, and undermines 
the sustainability of the grant activities. Unfortunately, as HRA is currently set-up, it does not 
have much flexibility to extend the grants’ duration.
• Most CSOs feel ownership of their projects, as these are based on their own strategies and 
were designed by them. This potentially contributes to the sustainability of these initiatives, 
holding all other sustainability factors constant. While some design adjustments may be 
necessary to strengthen these projects, a few CSOs reported adjusting their projects to meet 
HRA’s needs, which reduced their sense of ownership.
Evaluation Question 4
What effect has HRA had on the beneficiaries of the organizations supported by the 
Activity, especially on human rights defenders and social leaders, LGBTI persons, 
women, local journalists, youth and ethnic communities in conflict affected
municipalities covered by HRA?
As described in the Evaluation Methods section, the evaluation team conducted 15 GDs with different 
beneficiary groups from the HRA grantees, to assess the effects that they report HRA has had on them. 
As shown in EQ2, HRA has contributed to improving beneficiaries’ knowledge about human rights and 
changing perceptions and attitudes about them. The effects that stem from the capacity building activities 
and this increased knowledge are aligned to the theory of change, and include leadership, 
empowerment, and self-esteem at the individual level, which spill over into strengthening civil society 
and the community and family spheres. The evaluation team also identified some unintended risks on 
beneficiaries that HRA could address more strategically going forward. While the evaluation team only 
reports the effects associated with HRA activities, there may be some selection bias in the GD sample, 
as explained in the limitations section above. The rest of this section describes the different effects on 
beneficiaries associated with HRA.
Findings
Individual Leadership
Some young beneficiaries have become leaders in their schools and state that their peers recognize 
them as leaders and approach them when there is a case of injustice or abuse at school. They attribute 
this to their participation in the HRA grantee projects. A few young beneficiaries also identify 
themselves as peace promoters because they seek to form dialogue groups with their peers, recruit 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 54
more young people to participate in the HRA grantee projects, and have served as mediators during 
bullying situations in their schools. 
“This year I was elected as class representative and my classmates are very happy because they say they 
needed someone to be their voice in front of teachers and school administration, and well they are very 
happy because I bring what I learned in this project”. (Youth GD, Santander de Quilichao, Cauca)
“In school, teachers used to kick you out of class if you were late, and I would think, what is going on 
here with my right to an education? I checked the school regulation handbook where it states that the 
teacher cannot keep me out of class for tardiness. Yes, there can be an academic sanction, so I could 
get a bad grade, but they can’t take away my right to an education. So I approached a teacher and I 
told her all this, and she supported me, so now we are preventing teachers from keeping us out of class. 
So now anytime something similar comes up, my classmates ask me, ok is this a violation of our rights, 
who do we turn to…so I have learned so much, before I would have stayed quiet and not stood up to 
teachers, without knowing they are violating my rights”. (Youth GD, Santander de Quilichao, Cauca)
A few young beneficiaries also report participating in their JAC or in the indigenous guard, but they 
already had these leadership positions before participating in the HRA grantee projects. Still, other 
young beneficiaries complain that their communities do not view them as leaders, stating that open 
spots in sub-committees or boards are generally given to adults, even though they now feel competent 
to participate in institutional mechanisms given the new knowledge they have acquired. 
Indigenous community members explain their role within the indigenous guard and commitment to their 
communities as new leadership responsibilities.
“We learned that when we put on the vest, a symbol of authority, we take on the role of guard and with 
this comes a lot of responsibility. This means that we are committed as authority within our community. 
Once you take on this commitment you have to be aware of the activities happening in our territory, you 
have to safeguard the rights of others.” (Indigenous community GD, Segovia, Antioquia)
Some women report that they are now seen as mediators and resources in their communities. When a 
situation arises, they are present and seek solutions since now they know where to go, with whom to 
talk, and who can support and help them. Their leadership was evident in the examples they provided 
from their own lives but also when discussing the vignettes: 
“If I were Sandra [hypothetical character] I would be more revolutionary. I would get my female neighbors, 
who also have the water access problem, and I would bring them with me to the JAC. I would motivate 
them so that a lot of us showed up to the meeting…we’ll see if they don’t let us participate then (laughs).” 
(Women GD, Buenos Aires, Cauca)
Some women say that neighbors recognize them as new leaders and have even encouraged them to run 
for public office, while other women report that some neighbors have insulted them for getting involved 
and helping to report domestic abuse and have been told not to step into couple’s problems. 
“Recently, a neighbor insulted us. The husband was hitting his wife…horrible, horrible…we heard it 
from inside our house and ran outside when we heard her scream <Help!> so obviously we immediately 
called the police. As soon as the police arrive, the husband and the police start insulting us for being 
nosy, and that we shouldn’t step into couple’s problems. In other words, she gets killed and he goes 
unpunished, and one shouldn’t step into couple’s problems.” (Women GD, Buenos Aires, Cauca)
Empowerment 
One of the most pronounced and widespread effects across the different beneficiary groups is a new 
sense of empowerment that has been gained, not only from having a better understanding of their 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 55
human rights, but also from having the formal support of HRA grantees and HRA itself. The potential 
selection bias of the GD sample should be taken into account when interpreting these findings. 
Nonetheless, many of these beneficiary groups have felt an institutional abandonment due to the armed 
conflict, and are now feeling empowered with the accompaniment of these grantee organizations and 
HRA. Common phrases during the GDs included “they have opened our eyes” and “the bandages have 
been taken off” to describe how the gained knowledge about human rights has empowered them to 
demand and claim respect for their rights, especially with their neighbors and in their communities. 
“When you see a neighbor doing something they shouldn’t and you already have the knowledge and 
understanding of these issues, then you feel capable of approaching them and speaking up. That has 
been very enriching, to be able to speak up and express my opinions without fear” (Women GD, 
Ituango, Antioquia)
Although most beneficiaries say that with this knowledge they will no longer remain silent, not all of 
them would formally file a complaint, as there is still fear of reprisals, stigmatization due to lack of 
confidentiality, distrust of the police, and lack of response from the Prosecutor’s Office. 
All women beneficiaries express a recognition of their own value (agency) and an increased internal 
locus of control, that is, they feel they have greater control over the things that happen to them. All of 
them express an attitude of empowerment with respect to their own abilities and value as a person, not 
only as a mother and wife, and they feel that they can achieve their goals and contribute to their 
communities. This sense of empowerment is also strengthened by the sense of support and camaraderie 
they feel within these groups. However, they recognize that they still rely on HRA grantee support to 
turn this empowerment into action:
“What I hope for us, women, is for there to no longer be the need to go accompanied by anyone. But 
for us to say I do not need company, I can do this on my own, I am capable. And she, herself, can file a 
complaint, she can have that sense of empowerment and leadership to say I am capable of losing this 
fear.” (Women GD, Vista Hermosa, Meta)
The beneficiaries, especially in the women and LGBTI groups, emphasize that the difference between the 
projects from the HRA grantees and other workshops they have attended is that they feel close support 
and accompaniment from the grantees; it is “not a four-hour workshop where they simply take your signature 
and your picture”. However, they also express that they do not want the support to end, that they are 
just now “learning to walk” and the project has finished. Almost all beneficiaries in every GD agreed that 
the HRA grantee projects are too short. 
Self-Esteem and Public Speaking
All of the beneficiaries, except for the social leaders, express that participating in the HRA grantee 
projects raised their self-esteem since it made them recognize their abilities and resiliency despite the 
abuse they have survived or the abandonment they had felt as a community. Social leaders did not 
report that their self-esteem increased; this may be because as leaders their self-esteem is already high. 
The youth and women groups state that they learned to express themselves without fear of being made 
fun of or of what others will think. 
Most women and young beneficiaries also express that the HRA grantee projects helped them lose their 
shyness to be able to speak publicly and with more confidence, to participate in meetings, and to 
express their opinions. The women of Ituango, in particular, also value learning about self-care and the 
exercise of historical memory to heal and let go of the guilt they felt from previous abuse. 
The young beneficiaries also enjoyed having access to art, music, and photography since they report not 
having access to these tools in their schools. They enthusiastically express a thirst for learning, not just 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 56
about the arts but also about political science to be more informed about elections and political 
processes. 
Civil Society Strengthening
The strengthening of the LGBTI community is evident through the mentoring support of Caribe 
Afirmativo to nascent CSOs like Fundación Arcoíris in Tumaco and the creation of offshoot grassroots 
organizations, such as Caucasia Diversa and Tapir Dorado in Antioquia, which were formed by 
beneficiaries of Caribe Afirmativo. HRA, along with Caribe Afirmativo, also supported the LGBTI group in 
Tumaco when a group leader and a community member were killed. They provided the local group with 
support during the complaint process as well as protection measures, launched public campaigns, and, 
thanks to HRA’s leadership and timely presence of the Chief of Party, met with the Governor’s 
Secretary and re-established the LGBTI inter-institutional roundtable. This dedicated support has 
strengthened and empowered them as an organized group. 
Similarly, the social leaders in the GDs attribute to HRA the strengthening of their participation and 
incidence in institutional mechanisms, such as the Human Rights Committees, the PPGNR sub￾committees, and the victims’ roundtables. These beneficiaries express that they now have greater 
knowledge and competencies to present actions and actively engage in these matters. However, they 
also recognize that this participation only goes so far since response to human rights violations is the 
responsibility of the authorities. 
Nonetheless, both social leaders and LGBTI beneficiaries state that if it were not for the accompaniment 
of the HRA grantee or HRA itself, they would not receive the same access or reception from the 
government entities. Thus, there is still a dependency and need for support from established 
organizations or from international cooperation programs like HRA. 
“It is very different when Caribe Afirmativo or HRA arrive and they tell the Governor’s Office, <come, 
listen to these people>…but when we go to their office on our own and knock and introduce ourselves 
as part of the LGBTI community…no, they don’t even talk to you, you need to schedule an appointment 
and they give you a number that no one answers or send you to someone who won’t talk to you. So this 
roundtable that was created through HRA’s support is so valuable, we are starting to see engagement 
with the government, we aren’t 100 percent there yet but we now have a foundation.” (LGBTI GD, 
Caucasia, Antioquia)
Women beneficiaries also attribute their participation and engagement in institutional mechanisms to 
the HRA grantee projects. For example, in Cauca, the HRA grantee, ASOM, enabled them to participate 
in the Territorial-Focused Development Plans (PDETs for the initials in Spanish, Programas de Desarrollo 
con Enfoque Territorial). The Afro-Colombian women express being proud of their group for demanding 
to participate in the PDETs and for the important contributions they made in this process since they 
recognize themselves as the nucleus of their communities. They also express that the ASOM project 
empowered them to not only to be members of the community council but also to run for the 
executive committee to be part of the decision-making body. They feel that with the new knowledge 
obtained they can contribute in these mechanisms. In Meta, women beneficiaries of HRA grantee, 
LIMPAL, now participate in the Human Rights Committee and the municipal women’s roundtable to 
discuss issues of gender-based violence.
The construction, development, and socialization of the rutas has also served to further engage civil 
society with government entities. Women groups and social leaders, as well as the relevant entities, 
participate in this process. The beneficiaries recognize HRA and its grantees as the facilitators of this 
participatory process. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 57
Community and Social Effects
The evaluation team found that the beneficiary groups have different interpretations of “self-protection”. 
Some women beneficiaries report that strengthening social networks with nearby communities is a tool 
for self-protection. However, other women talk about self-protection as an individual issue that consists 
of self-care and being cautious in their daily activities so as to not put themselves at risk. In the 
indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, collective support is a tool for self-protection and 
guaranteeing rights. They explain that the self-protection strategies sometimes do not take into account 
the particularities of indigenous communities; they express a tension between individual and collective 
measures of self-protection. In the LGBTI community, they use a collective of local LGBTI groups, to 
offer each other protection and security, especially when formal complaints are filed. 
Almost all beneficiaries across the different groups see the benefits received as an opportunity to 
strengthen their communities and to change attitudes. Indigenous beneficiaries talk about strengthening 
the social fabric, women beneficiaries talk about the collective support they have gained, and the LGBTI 
beneficiaries have allies that help to make them more visible in society.
“HRA and USAID have left a mark on us. Their vision has left us with tools so we can live and leave 
behind the fear that our communities live with. So I think that HRA has created dialogues between 
people in the community, has changed attitudes. So I think HRA and USAID have left an imprint in each 
of our communities.” (Indigenous GD, Caucasia, Antioquia)
“I value the support that we give each other…we cry together, we support each other because we have 
become friends, we are like sisters after this. That support is invaluable, to get this support from people 
to help overcome the pain we have endured is something so great.” (Afro-Colombian women GD, 
Tumaco, Nariño)
“For example, I am not gay but I want to defend their rights. As a citizen you can take action, you can 
advocate as a citizen and intervene in different ways. […] So through our radio show we talk about 
inclusion and we all have to take a stake in this. […] One of our slogans is “You don’t have to be, to 
defend”. I don’t have to be Afro-Colombian to defend our fellow Afro-Colombians, I don’t have to be 
indigenous to defend the indigenous populations” (LGBTI GD, Caucasia, Antioquia)
Most young beneficiaries express a change in how they treat others, especially with regards to the 
respect and tolerance of others. They state that before they participated in the project they were rude 
to teachers, friends, and siblings, sometimes racist and homophobic, but after learning about human 
rights they recognize that respect goes both ways:
“Human beings are all equal, no matter is we are different color, different whatever…on the inside we 
care the same. So in this project I have learned many things. If I am disrespecting someone, then how 
can I expect respect? I should act the way I want to be respected. To be respected, I must respect other. 
I can’t demand respect if I don’t do it, and this project has taught me that.” (Afro-Colombian youth 
GD, Tumaco, Nariño)
Some beneficiaries also report wanting to share what they learned with their neighbors and friends, or 
in the case of social leaders going to rural communities to talk to the JAC. However most beneficiaries 
talk about this as something they would like to do and not as something they have done. They would 
like to replicate what they have learned for their communities. They also want to encourage others to 
participate in the HRA grantee projects, as more people learn about human rights, the stronger the 
community will become. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 58
Family Life and Gender Roles
Young beneficiaries and women report that they have taught what they have learned to their families 
and this has improved how siblings treat each other, how parents treat them (youth), and the support 
women feel from their husbands. Some women report having more support from their husbands to go 
after their goals and to continue learning and empowering themselves. Others report that their 
husbands are now starting to share household responsibilities, including cleaning and child rearing. Some 
women also report they have taught their sons that home duties should be shared between men and 
women, and have taught their daughters that they can have a place or position in the community and 
that their voice and opinion matters. Some youth and women beneficiaries report they have not felt this 
type of family support; however none have been forbidden or discouraged from attending the HRA 
grantee project activities. 
All of the beneficiaries recognize there is a sexist culture that discredits women, especially in political 
participation, and confines them to the roles of mother and wife. During the GDs, beneficiaries offered 
solutions of inclusion and strategies to demand their rights when presented with a vignette that 
discriminated against women’s participation. During the GDs with women beneficiaries, gender roles 
kept coming up in the conversation. Women beneficiaries declare that they want equality inside and 
outside their homes, they want partners not owners, and they want to continue learning and 
empowering themselves. Although some women beneficiaries perceive greater female participation in 
political stages and sense a change in gender roles and support from men, most women beneficiaries 
agree that machismo and structural resistance to gender role still exist and continue to be obstacles for 
their equality. 
Risks to the Beneficiaries
Some social leaders, including LGBTI and indigenous beneficiaries, express that by building their capacity 
as human rights defenders they are exposed to more risks. The leader of the Red de Mujeres de Ituango, 
for example, feels she is at a crossroads. On the one hand, she wants women supported by the HRA 
grantee to continue learning and empowering themselves to fight for their rights. Yet on the other hand, 
she is aware that there are no guarantees of an institutional response, so this exposes women to risks of 
reprisals and as an organization she does not feel capable of protecting them. The LGBTI community 
also protests that the State response is very slow, that during the 90 days of waiting for a response “they 
have already killed you”, and that the State’s protection measures of sending a police officer actually puts 
them at greater risk. They report that even approaching government entities must be done subtly and 
with sensitivity so as to not expose the organization members. The social leaders in Caquetá share that 
they mitigate security risks by maintaining open and transparent communications with the communities 
they work with, especially when it is a new community they are approaching and engaging. 
Obstacles Faced by Beneficiaries
Throughout the GDs, beneficiaries mention different obstacles that prevent them from applying what 
they learned during the projects or that keep them exposed to human rights violations and abuse.
There is a lack of institutional support and protection for human rights defenders who continue to put 
themselves at risk to fight for human rights for all. Social leaders do not see concrete proposals to 
implement Directive 02, which outlines obligations to local authorities for the protection and guarantees 
for human rights defenders and leaders.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 59
All of the beneficiaries of HRA grantees are waiting for a second phase and continuity in the project. 
They say that they have only now started learning and getting involved and want more support. There is 
a consensus that the projects are too short. 
There continues to be machismo and structural resistance against the LGBTI community, not only in the 
communities but within the institutional framework. Women are victimized when they report sexual 
abuse. Public officials across entities do not have the knowledge or training necessary to address specific 
issues of the LGBTI community, from how to address people (by name) to how to guarantee access to 
health services. 
Most beneficiaries across all the groups explain that the lack of formal complaints is due to a lack of 
trust in the authorities, especially in the police. During these conversations, beneficiaries describe their 
lack of trust stems from personal experiences with the police’s rampant corruption, abuse of power, 
and mismanagement of information (lack of confidentiality) that exposes them, especially women and the 
LGBTI community, to stigmatization and possible reprisals.
The majority of beneficiaries across the groups also protest a lack of response from the State. They 
express that all the knowledge and empowerment they have gained, all the engagement and 
participation, all of the demands and claims come to nothing if there is no response from the State. 
There is a lack of agreement among the beneficiaries on whether there would be an effective response 
from the Prosecutor’s Office if they filed a complaint. Some believe there would be, while others believe 
it stays on paper. However, they say this also depends on the nature of the complaint. The beneficiaries 
add that there is a lack of knowledge and capacity within the government entities which exacerbates the 
lack of State response to human rights violations.
Conclusions
• HRA grants aimed at empowering young people show positive contributions in forming leaders 
and role models. Given that youth are increasingly vulnerable to force recruitment, and illegal 
use and utilization for activities related to the illicit economy, grants targeted at youth play an 
important role, not only in the promotion, but also in the prevention of human rights violations. 
• Vulnerable population groups, in particular LGBTI groups who are starting to organize formally, 
highly value the support and accompaniment of HRA and its grantees for the strengthening of 
their nascent groups. Moreover, the mentoring model between Caribe Afirmativo and these 
nascent LGBTI groups is proving successful and is highly valued by beneficiaries. This also shows 
that grassroots CSOs may need and value more than just financial support. 
• HRA has contributed to the increased participation in institutional mechanisms as well as 
engagement with institutional entities for social leaders and nascent groups. However, it is still 
not clear if beneficiaries from nascent groups can sustain this independently. The support from 
HRA and its grantees gives them legitimacy and beneficiaries recognize that they would have not 
have the same access to or reciprocity from government entities without this support. 
• Empowerment is the most prevalent effect across the beneficiary groups, except for the social 
leaders groups, as this group already stood out on this front. Beneficiaries take ownership of the 
knowledge gained, which spills over into their immediate nucleus (i.e. families, schools, 
neighbors) rather than into participation in institutional mechanisms. 
• The grantee projects are generating respect and recognition from beneficiaries of different 
population groups, resulting in new allies, as well as facilitating dialogues between groups that do 
not normally sit down together (i.e. leaders, police, and government officials). 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 60
• Grassroots CSOs seem to contribute greater positive effects on beneficiaries because they 
provide close, consistent, and localized support.
• Empowerment goes hand in hand with increased risks that beneficiaries feel by becoming more 
visible in their communities or more exposed after filing complaints. This risk is exacerbated by 
the lack of effective response from the State. Moreover, CSOs cannot guarantee protection and 
beneficiaries may be left exposed to violations. 
• Beneficiaries perceive a lack of knowledge and capacity from the State for an effective response 
to their claims. There is also to a lack of trust in the authorities, especially in the police.
• The LGBTI population continues to face prejudice due to the lack of knowledge and sensitivity 
on the part of government officials that are an assault to their dignity and integrity. 
Evaluation Question 5
Are HRA's strategies effective and adequate for the objective of increasing investigations 
and prosecutions of human rights violations? Is HRA effectively coordinating with other 
programs or international organizations working on impunity, such as UNOHCHR?
HRA’s strategy towards increasing investigations and prosecutions of human rights violation centers 
around supporting the AGO, strengthening civil society on case documentation and strategic litigation, 
and developing instruments and dialogues to assess the impact of mining on human rights. This section 
focuses on the support provided to the AGO; the latter two strategies are addressed fully in EQ6. In 
order to comprehensively answer this evaluation question, the evaluation team conducted interviews 
with key informants from HRA, GOC AGO, USAID, USAID’s Justice for a Sustainable Peace Program 
(JSP), and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR). Within 
the AGO, the evaluation team interviewed an official from the Delegate for Citizen Security,
19 the 
Director of the Support Office for Citizen Security Research and Analysis, and the Sub-Director of the
Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy.
Findings
Strategy Implementation
Support in the implementation of the AGO’s prioritization plans
HRA’s activities with the AGO consist of supporting the development and implementation of 
prioritization plans at the national and regional level. Specifically, HRA supports the Office for Citizen 
Security Research and Analysis in the investigation of homicides and threats against human rights 
defenders. HRA hired four experts, who travel to prioritized regions such as Cauca, to provide support 
in the analysis of case files through standardization of context analysis, criminal profiles, and geographic 
reference systems. Moreover, HRA funds Corporación Humanas, Caribe Afirmativo, and CODHES, which 
work with the AGO to increase capacity in the response to cases related to GBV, LGBTI, and land 
restitution, respectively.
Representatives of the AGO, USAID, and UNOHCHR concur that the implementation of a 
prioritization approach, which has been supported by HRA, has allowed progress in the response to 
 
19 The evaluation team scheduled the interview with the Director from the Delegate for Citizen Security, but at the time of the 
interview he delegated it out to one of his officials. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 61
human rights violations by enabling assessments on the structures and patterns of these violations. 
Moreover, HRA’s support on the AGO’s prioritization plans has survived a change in the AGO 
administration at the national level. 
While it is unclear if there has been an increase in investigations and prosecutions due to HRA’s 
support, interviewees agree that an accomplishment has been the AGO’s shift in focus towards 
contextual analyses rather than simply going after the perpetrator who committed the violation. The
three AGO officials state that AGO’s prioritization plan is one of the most relevant policies within the 
entity and that HRA’s support has enabled the AGO to make a strategic shift towards its 
implementation, while taking into account the entity’s limitations:
“HRA’s support has been critical in one of the AGO’s important policies, that of prioritization. I think it is 
one of the policies that has given the AGO a strategic shift because it allows us to think strategically 
about prioritizing, and accepting we cannot do everything, so then let’s make a rational and informed 
decision of what we can do and let’s think about what it means to prioritize [investigations] […] and 
HRA is supporting these efforts.” (Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy, AGO, Bogota)
They also describe that the implementation of the prioritization plans is changing the narrative within 
the AGO, since in all of the management mechanisms there has been an appropriation of the language 
and the logic of the prioritization approach. The three AGO officials state that HRA’s support has 
resulted in the adoption and utilization of technical instruments, documentation of cases, training for 
prosecutors, and the establishment of the implementation strategy as a mandatory directive for all 
Sectional Offices across the AGO. In addition, they acknowledge that the AGO has responded better in 
the prioritized crimes. For example, the official of the Delegate for Citizen Security explained that, 
thanks to the implementation of the prioritization policy, the following results were obtained: (i) 468 
human rights violations cases launched, (ii) orders were given to the judicial police in 318 cases, (iii) 28 
processes changed procedural stage, (iv) 14 indictment hearings and five accusation hearings were held, 
and (v) seven convictions were obtained.
Uncertain implementation of the regional prioritization strategy
HRA’s implementation of the prioritization strategy at the regional level has been slow due to delays in 
working with the new Sub-Director of the Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy. Moreover, 
there is overlap with the USAID JSP Activity’s strategy20 and a lack of clarity regarding how the 
prioritization strategy with the AGO will be taken down to the local level by these two programs. Table 
5 below shows the work plan tasks, implementation progress, and identified bottlenecks for the two 
overlapping programs with respect to their support to the AGO at the regional level.
Table 5: Strategy Overlap between HRA and JSP
Strategy HRA JSP21
Work Plan • Work with the AGO in three 
regions to provide support for the 
• Support the AGO in the 
investigations and case processing of 
 
20 USAID’s JSP Activity (April 2017 – February 2021) aims to strengthen the effectiveness and responsiveness of the Colombian 
justice system, increase citizen support for the rule of law in conflict-affects regions, and address the critical justice needs of 
victims of the armed conflict in 45 priority municipalities.
21 JSP information from this table compiled from a JSP Project Document shared by USAID on August 10, 2018. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 62
Strategy HRA JSP21
implementation of the prioritization 
plans for human rights defenders and 
social leaders (Task 3.1.2.1)
• Develop strategies for the 
prioritization and advancement of 
cases at regional level (Task 3.1.2.2)
homicides of human rights defenders 
and social leaders in the regions 
where JSP operates (Result 3.4.1) 
Implementation 
Progress 
• HRA hired four experts, under the 
Support Office for Citizen Security 
Research and Analysis, who are 
traveling to prioritized regions such 
as Cauca, to provide support in 
analysis of case files through 
standardization of context analysis, 
criminal profiles, and geographic 
reference systems.
• HRA funds Corporación Humanas,
who supported AGO regional office 
in Norte de Santander on 
investigation of 17 sexual violence 
cases and developed case guides on 
GBV for regional prosecutors.
• JSP has a draft project proposal to 
support the Delegate for Citizen 
Security in the processes,
determined through the AGO’s 
prioritization system, of cases in the 
regions where it operates.
This project plans to:
• Support the dissemination and 
application of internal protocols, 
directives, and analysis 
methodologies developed by the 
AGO, and promoted by 
UNOHCHR, for the investigations 
of homicides of human rights 
defenders and social leaders. 
• Technical support through hire of 
experts
• Support and strengthen regional 
prosecutors and Sectional Offices
Bottlenecks
• As of the drafting of this report (May 
2018), HRA had a pending proposal 
with the Sub-Director of the Office 
of Public Policy and Institutional 
Strategy. Delay in moving this 
forward has made it difficult to 
implement the prioritization strategy 
at the regional level. This is 
recognized by HRA and the AGO, 
and is reflected in the HRA 
deliverables tracker.
• JSP started a year after HRA and had 
difficulty engaging initially with the 
AGO. Also faced uncertainty on 
how to utilize the work HRA has 
done at the national level with the 
AGO. 
• JSP approached UNOHCHR for 
access to the AGO and are only 
now drafting a proposed project for 
the AGO. 
Besides the strategy overlap between the two USAID programs, conversations with their 
representatives reveal a lack of clarity about which program will support the implementation of the 
prioritization strategy at the regional level. On one hand, the JSP representative mentions that the work 
HRA has supported at the national level will be used by JSP to implement at the regional level, including 
the protocols on GBV, and states that there will not be an overlap between the two programs because 
HRA only works at the national level with the AGO. On the other hand, HRA is also pushing for the 
implementation of the regional prioritization strategy in their work with the Office of Public Policy and 
Institutional Strategy, as it is also part of their work plan: 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 63
"The prioritization strategy has worked well, that is by thematic areas, at the national level. But the 
prioritization approach has still not reached the local prosecutor, it still needs to be adapted to the 
needs of the local prosecutor […] so then the idea of the project with the Office of Public Policy and 
Institutional Strategy is to take those developed tools, see how they can become something useful and 
appropriate, and disseminate them so that local prosecutors can prioritize, especially regarding these 
human rights issues."
The strategy overlap and lack of clarity about each program’s implementation plans can result in a 
duplication of efforts and even confusion among regional officials, especially in the geographic areas 
where both programs operate. JSP and HRA agree that USAID should clearly define the programmatic 
coverage of each program during the design stage not during implementation. The overlap in strategy 
between HRA and JSP present an opportunity for USAID to design a clear implementation strategy with 
the two programs that makes the best use of their resources and capacity so that important steps can 
be taken towards the objective of HRA’s Component 3.
Implementation support offered to individual Offices at the AGO
HRA’s support has been focused on the Office for Citizen Security Research and Analysis, which is 
under the Delegate for Citizen Security, rather than directly to the Delegate for Citizen Security. While 
HRA attempted to work with the Delegate for Citizen Security, they report that the Director has 
always been busy and pushed them towards working with the other Office. Because of this, HRA has 
also been trying to move forward on supporting the implementation of prioritization plans at the 
regional level through the Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy. Thus, HRA’s engagement 
with the AGO has been through individuals offices with “champions” to advance in their strategy and 
work plan. 
The AGO officials reflect that this approach enables HRA to have a strategic focus, since they do not 
provide assistance on just any subject. AGO representatives recognize HRA’s limited resources and 
capacity. They acknowledge that HRA adjusts to the needs of the AGO, takes into account its 
proposals, and focuses on specific supporting tasks to different Units within the AGO. The officer from 
the Support Office for Citizen Security Research and Analysis explained that HRA, having limited 
resources, has greater clarity to know what can and cannot be done, making it easier to make decisions 
regarding the projects that can be jointly undertaken. The officials from the Delegate for Citizen 
Security and the and Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy also state that HRA’s support has a 
strategic focus, since they do not provide assistance on just any subject; on the contrary it is 
concentrated on specific and previously defined topics. 
“I think one thing that has been great about [HRA] is that we have a lot of continuity. It is great that we 
have worked with the program on the issue of prioritization and that now we will continue working on 
other facets of that [issue]. In other words, if we really develop…and I think that even gives institutional 
sustainability to the projects because it forces us to continuously think which direction we will take in the 
areas where we work together. So I definitely believe that we have a strategic relationship with HRA.”
(Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy, AGO, Bogota) 
UNOHCHR representatives, who have a longstanding relationship with the AGO, believe that HRA’s 
support, which currently focuses on specific supporting tasks to different Units within the AGO, could 
be leveraged with a more comprehensive strategy, not only from HRA but from USAID as well. 
However, there are a couple of underlying factors, which limit HRA’s ability to pursue a more 
comprehensive strategy, including the complex and hierarchical structure of the AGO and the lack of a 
high-level strategy between USAID and the AGO. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 64
Factors Affecting HRA’s Approach
Challenging organizational structure of the AGO
Representatives from the two USAID programs that work with the AGO (HRA and JSP), as well as 
representatives from UNOHCHR, concur that the AGO’s hierarchical organizational structure makes it 
difficult to implement their strategies. For example, these three implementers working with the AGO 
state that it is a complex entity, with a rigid hierarchical structure, which makes it difficult to get buy-in 
for the implementation of projects at the regional level. A representative from UNOHCHR states that 
“the AGO is a very hierarchical institution, the director of the Sectional Offices will only work with you if their boss 
gives the order.” Similarly, a representative from JSP confirms the following:
“The AGO is too big for us to reach consensus [...] they do not take you seriously because there is no 
unity, so then how did we do it…we did this with a previous strategy…the first thing was to talk to the 
deputy prosecutor, well we tried talking with the head, but the prosecutor did not grant us a meeting, so 
we reached out to the deputy prosecutor, and he gave us 15 minutes and we left happy because he sat 
with us, like five of us…but the deputy prosecutor was removed. So we did the same meeting 4 times 
with the same people and the tasks were established but they never started…and they have never 
started. So the difficulty with the AGO is that it is so complex, the Offices are divided and you cannot 
work with them.” (JSP representative, Bogota). 
HRA representatives explain that changes to the organizational structure and personnel within the AGO 
have hampered the continuation of the projects that are being carried out, as well as the implementation 
of new phases of their strategy. They report that meetings have stalled and it has been difficult to 
maintain open and consistent communication with new officials who are overburdened with new work. 
HRA believes this has created bottlenecks for the adoption and implementation of the specific projects 
within their response strategy.
"We have a pending project with the AGO to improve the implementation of prioritization plans, […] it 
has been very difficult to carry it out since the arrival of [a new official] to the Office of Public Policy and 
Institutional Strategy, because we spoke with her in September, there is a draft that she sent me about 
a month ago, but it is still too rudimentary to start implementing it.” (HRA staff member, Bogota)
The bottlenecks created by the personnel changes within the AGO are also mentioned by the JSP 
program: 
“The issue with the AGO is that we have not been able to work with them because the management 
from the Offices with whom we had meetings planned for this year have been changing, so we have not 
had any meetings so far.” (JSP representative, Bogota)
Despite these challenges, the three AGO officials recognize HRA’s adaptability to changes that have 
occurred within the entity, including the arrival of the new Attorney General in August 2016 and the 
organizational structure changes that came with it. For example, the officials from the Delegate for 
Citizen Security and the Support Office for Citizen Security Research and Analysis state that HRA’s 
consistent ongoing relationship with the AGO is focused on developing, implementing, and following-up 
on policies which allow the Activity to adapt to the different changes. They also state that HRA has 
always interacted with the relevant actors responsible for each issue, regardless of the changes that take 
place within the entity. In addition, the official from the Office of Public Policy and Institutional Strategy
states that the prioritization strategy will remain in the AGO despite personnel changes: 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 65
“I think that one of the things we have accomplished from our relationship with HRA is how to develop 
and put in place institutional initiatives rather than personal ones. I think that the prioritization strategy 
will stay in the AGO even if all of the USAID people change, even if all of the AGO people change and 
new teams come in, we will still be talking about this strategy.” (Office of Public Policy and 
Institutional Strategy, AGO, Bogota)
Undefined strategic relationship between USAID and AGO
USAID, as an agency, has not conducted any high-level dialogues with the AGO to define a strategic 
relationship that can then be laid out for its overlapping programs. Moreover, representatives from 
UNOHCHR and JSP perceive that USAID has not analyzed or thought strategically about the needs at 
the AGO in the design and implementation of its various programs. UNOHCHR remarks that USAID 
offers its projects to the AGO without taking into consideration the implications that stem from AGO’s 
complex structure and recent structural changes. Similarly, the JSP representative stated that USAID’s 
engagement with the AGO has been through individual mid-level officials without high-level dialogues to 
obtain buy-in:
“USAID does not talk to the deputy prosecutor or the prosecutor, and over there everything comes down 
from the top. It isn’t convenient for us that UNOHCHR talks to the head but USAID does not. You have 
to go meet face-to-face with the decision-maker. But that high-level dialogue does not take place and I 
think that is where you have to start. We have been able to work well with all of the other institutions 
within the national judicial sector, except for the AGO, because we have engaged with the top-level 
officials. If you engage with mid-level officials, they may be good, but it all stays in writing, everything is 
ready to be implemented but what is missing is the green light from the top. I think what is missing is 
that USAID needs to have high-level engagement with the AGO, with the deputy prosecutor, to define 
concrete projects and then they give the order and all of the Units start working, that is the way the 
AGO operates.” (JSP representative, Bogota)
HRA’s engagement approach toward the AGO has been restricted to individuals offices with 
“champions”, which is not the most effective way of supporting an entity with a hierarchical and rigid 
organizational structure to advance on an ambitious objective. However, given the lack of a 
comprehensive strategy between USAID and the AGO with directives to the relevant Delegates and 
clearly laid out projects, HRA, as an individual Activity, has a limited sphere of influence for the objective 
of increasing investigations and prosecutions of human rights violations.
Coordination Aspects between Stakeholders
Lack of consensus on external coordination among stakeholders
USAID holds that, given the complexity of the AGO and the engagement of multiple stakeholders with 
this entity, better coordination between HRA and UNOHCHR might leverage HRA’s work so that they 
can more effectively undertake their projects and meet their pending deliverables. The evaluation team 
discussed the issue of coordination with the different stakeholders to gain insights on this perspective. 
First, the evaluation team found that UNOHCHR and HRA have a clear understanding of their roles 
with the AGO, given each of their mandates and competencies. They also have a clear understanding of 
each other’s mandates, as well as the nature and objective of the support they each provide to the 
AGO. A representative of UNOHCHR summarized the difference between their strategy and USAID’s 
strategy: 
“We have different mechanisms for public advocacy, we have the representatives, the annual report, the 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 66
Colombian government consults with us consistently; we are able to pressure the GOC. In the case of 
determining the figures regarding the homicides of human rights defenders, the government calls us, not 
the AGO. The AGO responds on the list of homicides based on what UNOHCHR reports. But that 
doesn’t come out of thin air, that comes from a process of combining efforts with the AGO, we have a 
political relationship with them that allows us to provide technical assistance and work from within the 
entity. It isn’t the same for the AGO to approach USAID as it is for them to approach the United 
Nations. ” (UNOHCHR representative, Bogota)
Likewise, the official of the Delegate for Citizen Security states that the work of both, HRA and
UNOHCHR, are delimited and that, in a certain way, complement each other. For example, she stated 
that, on one hand, UNOHCHR is in charge of constantly monitoring the human rights situation in 
Colombia and issuing recommendations to the different GOC entities; on the other hand, USAID 
(through HRA) provides technical and logistic support, collaborates at the local level, and helps to 
launch investigations.
Second, representatives from USAID, HRA, JSP, and UNOHCHR have different interpretations of what 
“effective coordination” entails. There is no consensus on what “coordination” implies. USAID states 
that currently, programs coordinate for the division of activities rather than a strategic coordination 
based on a common objective. HRA explained that coordination entails that each program understands 
what work corresponds to them to avoid duplicating efforts when implementing different projects with 
the AGO.
“We have held a couple of meetings with JSP to discuss how to coordinate, and what came out of that 
was that when they have a meeting with the AGO, at least with the Support Office for Citizen Security 
Research and Analysis, they would let us know so that we can be involved. That is probably the best way 
for us to coordinate.” (HRA staff member, Bogota)
The JSP representative discussed coordination with UNOHCHR and HRA to be about sharing 
information over certain methodologies. He then added that coordination with HRA has mostly 
happened at the regional level and that sharing office space has made it easier to share resources and 
coordinate activities to minimize overlap. 
Third, there is a lack of clarity from USAID as to what type of relationship its two programs should have 
with UNOHCHR, as well as the type of coordination that should exist between these stakeholders. A 
USAID representative expressed concern that HRA has not been able to coordinate with UNOHCHR 
to achieve more progress with the AGO. However, he recognized that the nature of this greater 
coordination with UNOHCHR is difficult to specify in detail. He also considered that it would be an 
advantage for UNOHCHR to work in a more coordinated manner with HRA to benefit from the 
Activity’s resources, given that UNOHCHR has a small team and could potentially leverage the 
technical, logistical, personnel and financial support that HRA could provide. However, UNOHCHR 
expressed that the relationship with USAID’s programs is mostly focused on not duplicating efforts with 
regards to the support given to the AGO: 
"Well, our relationship is practically based on a dialogue with [our representative of USAID] who is then 
the focal point with us ... with her, through the programs that USAID implements, we have been 
monitoring the situation of human rights defenders and they obviously ask us what we are doing with 
the AGO to try to avoid duplicating support or even so that through our experience they can improve the 
projects and concrete actions their programs are carrying out. For example last year we had a couple of 
meetings with HRA, who is providing support to the Delegate for Citizen Security.” (UNOHCHR
representative, Bogota)
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 67
The evaluation found that while USAID may have directed its Activities to coordinate, there is a lack of 
clarity about what coordinating entails and for what purpose. Moreover, since a coordination plan was 
not put in place from the beginning of the Activities, each Activity recognizes each other’s mandates and 
have focused efforts on simply sharing information while advancing on their own contractual obligations. 
Once again, a comprehensive strategy between USAID and the AGO would solidify specific ways these 
two Activities can coordinate to leverage their efforts and maximize resources. It can help set the 
ground for defined objectives and purpose for collaboration. 
Different collaboration relationships with UNOHCHR marked by initial engagement 
The evaluation team also found that HRA and JSP approached UNOHCHR differently due to their 
different initial needs, namely differences in independent access to the AGO, and this determined the 
type of relationship that exists between each USAID program and the United Nations office. The 
relationship between HRA and UNOHCHR has consisted of sporadic engagement to share information 
because HRA had initial access to the AGO on their own. One of the UNOHCHR representatives 
interviewed said that HRA did not engage them as an ally, it simply sought them out as a source of 
information when it already had projects underway and not when they were starting to design their 
projects. In contrast, the relationship between the JSP and UNOHCHR has been less sporadic because 
JSP engaged the UN office early on to get access to the AGO. In turn, UNOHCHR assisted them in 
making that connection and in identifying the needs of the AGO that were relevant and appropriate to 
what JSP could offer them. UNOHCHR added that this engagement set them up as allies in the work 
strategy that the AGO requested from JSP.
Weak internal coordination within USAID
Finally, it is important to note that all of the stakeholders interviewed agree that there is a coordination 
problem within USAID (among its different programs), as well as between USAID and other programs 
of the US Embassy. In addition, it is not clear that USAID presents its program portfolio to the AGO in 
a comprehensive manner, which has consequences on USAID’s resource allocation and management 
strategy. Stakeholders external to USAID and HRA also agree on this point. The official of the Support 
Office for Citizen Security Research and Analysis says that although there has been an attempt to build a 
strategic relationship between USAID and the AGO, it has been difficult because of what she sees as a 
lack of coordination inside USAID and the US Embassy regarding all of the programs they manage. She 
added that while it is understandable that there can be challenges in coordinating different programs, she 
recommends that there be greater communication and engagement between the different programs so 
they can operate in a complementary manner and not duplicate efforts.
“There needs to be more agreement within USAID and between their programs to approach the AGO 
with a more unified presentation. Here’s an example…currently there is a strategy to address threats 
that we have been working on with a specific unit in the AGO. And across the USAID programs there is 
no clarity of which program could do what, but they are all interested in working on it, so they approach 
the AGO independently. So now the AGO says yes, they have approached us…we’ve had meetings but 
we don’t know with whom or for what. So yes, more coordination within USAID and between their 
programs, engage with each other more and then approach the AGO with a more unified proposal.” 
(UNOHCHR representative, Bogota)
The UNOHCHR representatives add that the coordination challenges within USAID have implications 
on HRA because they limit the support the Activity can give to the AGO to individual tasks rather than 
enabling a comprehensive strategy:
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 68
"Something that we are witnessing is that while the program [HRA] has lines of action there are other 
programs that are also interested in providing concrete support to the AGO and we can see that they 
are not sharing information between themselves, they are not talking and that is generating a perception 
in the AGO that there are many people who want to assist but in a disorganized manner. Also given the 
AGO’s complex structure, obviously each Unit tries to grab on to something, but that is not appropriate 
from a strategic point of view […] you have different Units involved without a common goal. Therefore, 
the international assistance needs to be thought through strategically and not on specific individual 
support." (UNOHCHR representative, Bogota)
Conclusions
• All of the key stakeholders interviewed perceive that supporting the implementation of a 
prioritization approach in the investigations has allowed progress in the response to human 
rights violations. In addition, AGO officials believe that HRA’s support has contributed to a 
wider adoption of the prioritization strategy, unified its strategy regarding the response to 
human rights violations, and obtained an institutional vision that transcends beyond the 
individual officials linked to the entity.
• The implementation of the prioritization strategy at the local level is important for both HRA 
and JSP. However, the roles and responsibilities of each program for this strategy remains 
uncertain and may create obstacles in implementation if not addressed strategically with USAID. 
• All of the key stakeholders interviewed perceive a lack of clarity in USAID’s comprehensive 
strategy toward the AGO. The aforementioned, in addition to the fact that the AGO is a 
complex entity with a rigid hierarchical organizational structure that requires top-down 
decision-making, makes the adoption and implementation of HRA projects dependent on 
individual officials, which can restrict HRA in meeting all of its deliverables.
• In the absence of high-level discussions between USAID and AGO officials, HRA has been 
strategic in approaching the AGO through individual offices with “champions” to maximize its 
small budget, limited capacity, and sphere of influence. However, this has resulted in a piecemeal 
strategy rather than a high-level comprehensive strategy that aligns with the ambitious objective 
of IR 3. 
• Representatives of USAID, HRA, and JSP, as well as external stakeholders (UNOHCHR and 
AGO), have different interpretations of what “effective coordination” entails, and what benefits 
or value-add would result from greater external coordination. 
• Greater clarity about the relationship that USAID would like its different programs to have with 
each other and with external stakeholders such as UNOHCHR regarding the support it gives to 
the AGO would also be beneficial. The current lack of specificity has an impact on the planning 
and implementation of the work that the different programs, specifically HRA and JSP, carry out 
with the AGO, as well as on the different levels of coordination that should exist between its 
programs and external stakeholders that also work with the AGO. 
• While increasing engagement with other stakeholders could enhance HRA’s work, it is not the 
barrier to achieving an increase in investigations and responses to human rights violations. 
Without strategic coordination within USAID and without high-level engagement between 
USAID and the AGO, HRA remains constrained in how it can provide support. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 69
Evaluation Question 6
What have been the achievements, bottlenecks and lessons learned during the 
implementation of the three components of HRA and its cross-cutting themes?
This section describes the key achievements, bottlenecks, and lessons learned on the implementation of 
HRA’s three components and cross-cutting themes. Thus, it is not structured into findings and 
conclusions as the other evaluation questions. Given that Component 1 and Component 3 are discussed 
extensively in EQ2 and EQ5, respectively, and parts of Component 2 are discussed across the first four 
EQs, this section may repeat some of the conclusions from the other EQs; however, examples and 
findings from the other EQs are not repeated. The cross-cutting themes are included under each 
Component. 
To report on HRA’s overall implementation progress, the evaluation team reviewed HRA’s deliverable 
tracker from December 2018 and adjusted it based on a desk review and findings from interviews with 
HRA staff and counterparts during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2018. Figure 5 shows that overall, 
HRA is on track with meeting its 86 deliverables. HRA has started or completed more than 80 percent 
of its deliverables. Only 16 deliverables have not been started, with slightly more than half of those (56 
percent) corresponding to Component 3. HRA also reports the progress made on its indicators, which 
the evaluation did not review, but are included in Annex G. 
Figure 5: HRA Deliverables Progress Tracker
Source: Data from the HRA deliverables tracker, as of December 2018 (FY2018Q3), adjusted with desk review of project 
documents and updated with findings from interviews with HRA staff and counterparts during FY2018Q4. 
Note: This progress tracker varies from the deliverables trackers used by HRA. HRA includes in its tracker, as completed, 
those deliverables that are fully met or that already have an action/activity that once fulfilled will complete the deliverable in its 
entirety. This progress tracker only marks as “completed” those deliverables that are fully met. Deliverables with ongoing 
actions for the life of the Activity are marked as “in progress”. 
11
10
14
8
11
16
9
5
2
Component 3
Component 2
Component 1
Completed In Progress Not Started
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 70
Component 1: Promotion 
Key Achievements
HRA’s activities have contributed to increasing the visibility and awareness of the human rights situation 
in areas where it previously was not possible to address human rights issues, such as Córdoba, given 
that active armed groups and the stigmatization of human rights defenders had impeded efforts in the 
past. HRA has also contributed to bringing human rights to the forefront of various inter-institutional 
mechanisms through the creation or activation of Human Rights Committees and of multi-stakeholder 
dialogue mechanisms, such as the Peace Councils.
HRA has supported the Victim’s Secretariat in Meta and the Government Secretariat in Tolima in 
designing models and proposals for Human Rights and Peace Schools as a strategy to strengthen the 
culture of peace and respect for human rights. Since the Schools are part of the non-formal education, 
they will not be incorporated into the official curriculums, known as Proyecto Educativo Institucional (PEI).
Government officials and community leaders have participated in human rights diploma courses that 
have increased their legal and practical knowledge of human rights and has allowed them to learn more 
about their responsibilities to protect and defend against human rights abuses (See EQ2 for more details 
on this achievement). Moreover, the diploma course has facilitated engagement and interaction between 
stakeholders that do not tend to dialogue with each other, due to the historical conflict, such as 
community leaders and members of the army. Participants indicated that before the diploma course they 
had never had the opportunity to work with these other actors. Therefore, learning about the 
challenges and opportunities of others served to strengthen ties and relations between civil society and 
local authorities.
Personeros, in particular, report that they highly valued the training they received through HRA grantee, 
FENALPER. They told the evaluation team that not only did they deepen their knowledge, they also 
affirmed that they have been able to apply what they learned in their work, particularly on gender￾related issues and conflict resolution tools. This is an important achievement given that the more 
common requests for support from these officials have to do with logistics and supplies.
HRA has contributed to empowering vulnerable communities, specifically LGBTI, youth, women, and 
indigenous beneficiaries through its grant support of local CSOs (See EQ4 for more details on this 
achievement). These beneficiary groups report that they now understand and recognize their rights and 
that learning about the rutas allows them to demand their rights. 
HRA has been successful in empowering women and LGBTI grassroots CSOs by increasing their 
knowledge and strengthening their leadership and organizational capacity. The support provided by HRA 
was not only financial (through grants) but also through mentoring support. In particular, HRA has 
supported the creation of grassroots LGBTI organizations (Caucasia Diversa and Tapir Dorado in 
Antioquia), and strengthened nascent ones (Fundación Arcoíris in Tumaco), by leveraging the experience 
and capacity of the more established CSO, Caribe Afirmativo. 
“Caucasia Diversa emerges as an organization in favor of the needs of the LGBTI population in Bajo 
Cauca (Antioquia), a region where the LGBTI population has suffered violence and displacement for 
many years. Since we started working with Caribe Afirmativo [HRA grantee], they have mentored us 
through leadership training and capacity building to defend LGBTI rights, rights we are entitled to. So out 
of the need to raise awareness to the government and to society that the LGBTI community needs 
support and protection, Caucasia Diversa is born, with support from Caribe Afirmativo, for the defense 
of human rights and of the LGBTI community, in particular.” (Caucasia Diversa, Caucasia, Antioquia)
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 71
HRA has also supported increasing the visibility and demands of women and LGBTI issues by facilitating 
the participation of these groups’ leaders in institutional mechanisms where they can dialogue with 
government officials. For example, a representative from the LGBTI community now has a seat on the 
Human Rights Committee in Caucasia. Similarly, HRA has supported the reactivation of the MEV 
roundtables and the COMPOS in 17 municipalities.
Bottlenecks and Challenges
While government officials report having greater knowledge about human rights, the challenge emerges 
in the application of this knowledge. Local government officials apply newly acquired knowledge to the 
design of public polices, such as the prevention and protection plans, and to new competencies, such as 
risk analyses, with close support from HRA regional advisors. It is unclear if this knowledge will stick and 
application will continue once the Activity ends. Moreover, local government officials’ capacity to 
interact in an informed manner with vulnerable communities continues to be limited. Specifically, 
communities continue to report that women and LGBTI issues do not receive an adequate response 
given officials’ lack of knowledge and sensitivity to the needs of these groups: 
“The level of local government officials’ knowledge about the LGBTI community is very low. For example, 
they invited me to participate in the Municipal Council, and I asked them in which category of LGBTI I 
would be considered a part of, no one answered. What I mean is that they don’t know if I am gay, if I 
am trans, the basic stuff.” (Caucasia Diversa, Caucasia, Antioquia)
The evaluation team found that there is a gap between national level perceptions and what is reported 
by interviewees in the municipalities regarding the multi-actor dialogues (police, local authorities, and 
community members) that HRA supports through one of its subcontracts, as well as with the duplas
from the Ombudsman’s Office. While at the national level, there is an affirmation that these dialogues 
have been successful in bringing together the different actors, in reality the dialogues and collaborative
work phase did not take place in two of the three selected municipalities. Moreover, there was very low 
participation in the trainings, with less than 10 police officers participating in the three municipalities, 
because of misaligned incentives. While the police lieutenants recognize the importance of these 
activities, their performance is evaluated based on indicators such as number of apprehensions, not 
participation in community activities, so they do not have an incentive to pull their officers from duty to 
attend the trainings. Regarding the duplas, although they are mentioned repeatedly by HRA staff in 
Bogota and by the National Ombudsman’s Office, the interviewees at the department and municipality 
level, except for the Departmental LGBTI Liaison in Caquetá, do not speak about their activities or 
results. 
The challenge for the differentiated rutas for GBV against women and LGBTI communities lies in their 
effective implementation by the local institutions. This depends on the comprehensive understanding of 
the steps to be taken to implement the rutas, not only by the officials who participated in their 
construction, but also by the officials who respond to and assist women and the LGBTI community on a 
daily basis. While the rutas have only recently been constructed and the dissemination process for 
implementation is only beginning, this is critical for HRA to focus on during the second half of its 
performance period. 
The Havana Peace Accord requires that the GOC develops and implements a National Rural Education 
Plan. The Ministry of Education (MOE) is leading the design of procedures, methodologies, and tools for 
education institutions to implement the plan systematically. Although HRA is supporting this initiative at 
the national level, it also is conducting parallel education activities at the departmental level, such as the 
Peace Schools, which are not part of formal education overseeing by the MOE. There is a large 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 72
dispersion of activities within the promotion component as HRA simultaneously supports a variety of 
initiatives, education entities and institutions (MOE – Cátedra de Paz, Peace Schools, diploma courses, 
and education activities through CSOs grantees), that are not all tied to the MOE. Without close 
communication and coordination there is a risk that HRA would be supporting activities that are not 
harmonized with the standards set in national public policies.
The activities for the promotion of human rights are mostly limited to urban areas due to logistics, 
security, and operational issues for HRA staff and current CSO grantees. However, vulnerable 
communities, especially indigenous groups, highlight the importance of bringing such activities closer to 
their territories. 
Lessons Learned
HRA’s training activities where a variety of actors participate, such as local government officials, 
community leaders, and civil society organizations, serve a dual purpose of promotion of human rights 
and bringing the community into closer contact with local government institutions. The HRA diploma 
course represents a neutral space where participants not only learn about human rights but also interact 
with individuals from groups that they have historically been distant from.
The four Human Rights Student Olympics held in only a couple of municipalities in Antioquia create 
incentives for youth to learn more about human rights issues. HRA should continue supporting these 
Student Olympics in the municipalities where they have been held and expand it to other municipalities 
as well.
The experiential methods used by organizations such as Diócesis de Tumaco have demonstrated stronger 
results in terms of gained knowledge and feelings of ownership in young beneficiaries. HRA should 
promote the replication of these experiential methods with other grantees. 
Personeros are relevant government officials for HRA to support given their role to guarantee citizens 
the defense of their rights and their direct contact with the community. Continuing the strengthening of 
the Personeros through FENALPER is a good strategy, because they feel represented by this federation.
The grantees with the greatest contributions on the population are the grassroots CSOs, as they 
respond clearly to the situation in the territory and have been able to empower the communities in 
which they work. While many local organizations do need additional support from HRA or larger, 
national civil society organization, the closer the organization is to the beneficiary population and the 
greater understanding it has of the local human rights context, the greater impact that can be expected 
from the grant. The current human rights context requires that these organizations are known to the 
communities and have members who live in the area.
Threats
The presidential elections and the change in administration to take place in August 2018 represents a 
threat to the sustainability of the national level initiatives, such as the Rural Education Plan included in 
the Accord. To date, the MOE has only completed the design of one of the three components of the 
Plan, making the Plan’s continuity and sustainability highly dependent on the incoming government’s 
priorities.
Given the high turnover of government officials, due to rotations or being hired on short-term 
contracts, HRA runs the risk of knowledge drain from the institutions it supports. This generates a loop 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 73
of continuous training from the beginning. This can also affect the momentum of certain initiatives as 
new officials may not have the same knowledge or political will to support them. 
The short-term duration of HRA grants limits the grantees’ abilities to have the desired impact, creates 
expectations from beneficiaries of continued support that cannot be fulfilled, and undermines the 
sustainability of the grant activities. Moreover, as youth and LGBTI become empowered and more 
visible in their communities, ending these projects without continuity can leave them exposed when they 
need more support. This threatens HRA’s “do no harm” principle. 
Component 2: Prevention
Key Achievements 
HRA is viewed as a credible expert and strategic partner by department and municipal government 
officials, CSOs, and the MOI, especially on matters of public policy for the prevention and protection of 
human rights. This is largely due to HRA regional staff’s strong technical knowledge as well as local 
contextual knowledge since almost all of them are from the area or have been working in the area for 
many years. 
HRA’s technical assistance has resulted in significant progress in formulating and updating the prevention 
and protection plans as well as in the creation or activation of PPGNR sub-committees in most of the 
municipalities it supports. 
HRA has strengthened LGBTI organizations in the identification of risk and in their capacity to demand 
respect for their rights. This has contributed to their empowerment and increased engagement with 
local authorities, resulting in the creation of institutional mechanisms, such as the LGBTI roundtable in 
Tumaco. 
HRA coordinated with the National Police to organize the first meeting of police human rights 
coordinators. Seventy-seven officers and eight coronels and lieutenants from across the country 
gathered for a training on Police Conduct Guide for Vulnerable Populations (designed and implemented 
by HRA’s predecessor program). Additionally, HRA supported the design of a protection ruta for human 
rights defenders to be implemented by the police. This ruta was officially introduced as part of 
mandatory police officer training and incorporated into the Police Conduct Guide for Vulnerable 
Populations.
Bottlenecks and Challenges
HRA’s regional presence consists of only two regional advisors, who have to carry out the work plan 
across all three components and travel long distances to visit all of the municipalities in their 
departments. While all regional teams have an efficient division of labor between themselves, most HRA 
regional advisors state that administrative work (travel and event logistics, receipt legalization, among 
other) takes up too much of their time that could be used implementing HRA activities.
The limited local budgets, lack of political will of some mayors, and high turnover of public officials 
create bottlenecks for the implementation of prevention and protection policies. In addition, one of the 
most visible challenges for HRA, in terms of sustainability, is over reliance on the HRA regional advisors
to perform technical and operational functions. In some municipalities, HRA advisors are highly involved 
in the convening of institutional mechanisms, complying with orders issued from the national 
government, and implementing the scope of what is established in the prevention and protection plans. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 74
This contant and highly involved support can undermine the institutionalization and sustainability of HRA 
support if an exit strategy is not developed. 
The analyses carried out to identify risks and the design of self-protection plans are valued positively by 
local CSOs, especially those from the LGBTI community. However, there is a large variation on CSOs’ 
expertise with self-protection methodologies. Some CSOs did not have a clear understanding of the 
concept (for example, LIMPAL) or of how to design the plans and mechanisms (for example, Consejo 
Comunitario de Rio Gualajo). Given HRA’s technical expertise in these topics, and upcoming grants RFA 
oriented at self-protection projects,it is important for HRA to provide technical assistance to CSOs on 
self-protection methodologies from the time projects are designed. 
HRA supported the formalization of the Observatory of Human Rights in the Mayor’s Office, who has 
transitioned its operations to the Diócesis de Tumaco. A couple of municipal officials in Tumaco, 
however, express concern that permanent funding of stronger technical staff is needed for the 
Observatory to meet its objectives and for the Diócesis to sustain it.
Although HRA supported the preparation of a study on the impacts of illegal mining and other illegal 
economies on human rights with the Ombudsman's Office, the utilization of this study is uncertain. It is 
necessary to assess who is aware of this study and if the findings and recommendations are taken into 
consideration and implemented by the different actors. Given that the report was launched in April of 
this year, it is still premature to make conclusions about the influence that research activities, such as 
this report, have in the effective prevention of human rights violations resulting from illegal economies.
Result 2.6 under this component consists of strengthening the capacity of civil society organizations to 
“advocate and monitor” development and implementation of human rights protections. However, the 
evaluation found that actions under this result focus only on the advocay part; no actions were identified 
that are specifically aimed at monitoring. The monitoring of what is established in the prevention plans, 
within the framework of the legally constituted institutional mechanisms, could be a more grounded way 
of achieving this result.
Lessons Learned
Under this component, the initial stage of technical assistance required systematic and constant support 
as well as a direct presence in the territory, given that it is not only about transferring knowledge but 
also about designing and implementing public policy instruments. However, developing an exit strategy 
for the technical assistance activities is fundamental to establishing sustainable processes and for HRA to 
prioritize the allocation of its limited human resources to municipalities that continue to require 
technical support.
Several CSOs value HRA’s presence as an effective strategy to approach government institutions, as 
they feel HRA gives them greater credibility. “It is easier to get the government to listen to us when we 
approach them with the program than when we go alone. So for us, the program is not only a bridge, but also an 
effective strategy to reach the government institutions.” (Grantee ASOM, Buenos Aires, Cauca) 
Designing and implementing self-protection methodologies is not a generalizable or standardized 
process. HRA can leverage its expertise to train CSOs and provide them technical support to identify 
and analyze risks and to design plans of prevention, mitigation and response to human rights violations.
Local CSOs that are based in the municipalities have been creating bridges between their beneficiaries 
and government institutions. HRA should continue working strategically with these local CSOs as a 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 75
strategy to reach vulnerable populations, to make their needs visible, and to give them access to 
government entities. 
Extending HRA for two more years from now, until April 2021, would give the Activity the opportunity 
to participate in the design process of new municipal and departmental development plans, which can 
enable HRA to influence the allocation of resources, the design of strategies, and the setting of 
objectives towards human rights.
Threats
One of the main threats to the implementation of this component is the possibility that the new 
government, through the MOI, will make significant changes or take different approaches towards 
prevention and protection public policy, which implies starting again with these processes at the 
departmental and municipal level.
The lack of security in some of the regions where HRA operates can be a serious threat to promoting
processes of participation for leaders or to carrying out risk identification exercises. Community leaders
are, nowadays, the group most exposed to risks against their life, liberty, integrity and personal safety, 
due to the activities they carry out and the locations where they live or carry out their activities.
While the rutas play an important role in the empowerment of communities and constitute the first step 
toward response to human rights violations, they are developed under the assumption that people 
demanding their rights and reporting abuses coupled with trained government officials to implement the 
rutas will result in an effective response to human rights violations. However, there is skepticism on the 
part of government officials and social leaders that the rutas might fall short or potentially increase the 
risks of those who file claims. As one government official in Tumaco stated, “I fear that these rutas, like 
the one that focuses on gender, are designed for impunity. I know this from experience, the ruta is put in place 
to enable claims, but after the complaint is filed nothing happens.”
Component 3: Response
Key Achievements
HRA’s support has enabled the AGO to implement a prioritization approach in investigations, which 
implies advancing investigations from a context analysis lens rather than following the perpetrator who 
committed a specific violation. This support has resulted in several achievements that are important for 
the AGO’s mission and that enable it to fulfill its functions more effectively. First, the strategic shift 
towards a prioritization framework has contributed to better engagement and consolidation of efforts 
within the AGO. AGO officials interviewed report that there has been a mainstreaming of the 
prioritization language and framework in all of the managerial mechanisms. Moreover, they report that 
there are currently no Sectional Offices that do not have prioritization plans, so these Offices are now 
conducting comprehensive analysis of their work and of their strategic vision. These results place the 
prioritization approach as a policy at the institutional level, which can help guarantee its duration over 
time, withstanding personnel changes within the AGO. Second, the prioritization of investigations from 
human rights violations (homicides and threats) to vulnerable populations, such as human rights leaders 
and defenders and victims of GBV, allows the AGO to develop diagnostic assessments of the work being 
conducted inside the entity and to develop guidelines that strengthen the work that is currently 
underway. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 76
The documentation of cases of human rights violations, particularly of GBV cases, has an important role 
in the strategic litigation in courts. In addition, it contributes to the rehabilitation and recovery of the 
women affected, so they can overcome the emotional impact of the violence faced.
HRA, through its CSO grantee, Corporación Humanas, has developed case guides on GBV for regional 
prosecutors, which include research, documentation, and judicial tools that are disseminated within 
dialogue mechanisms with these officials. Also, HRA grantee, Caribe Afirmativo, provided technical 
assistance to the AGO delegate for LGBTI affairs, and jointly developed a best practices guide (currently 
in draft form) for case investigations of violence against LGBTI persons.
Bottlenecks and Challenges
As discussed in EQ5, the main challenges in HRA’s implementation of Component 3 are the lack of 
clarity from USAID on the comprehensive strategy it wants to advance with the AGO and the absence 
of high-level discussions between USAID and the AGO, which result in a lack of buy-in and involvement 
from the key decision-makers in the entity. This makes it harder for HRA to advance in the 
implementation of certain projects (such as taking the prioritization strategy to the regional and local 
level) because mid-level officials do not have the “green light” from top-level decision makers to move 
these actions forward. AGO’s rigid hierarchical organizational structure makes the need for high-level
dialogue and agreement between USAID and the AGO even more critical. 
In the absence of these high-level discussions between USAID and top AGO officials, HRA has been
restricted, but strategic, in approaching the AGO through individual offices with “champions” to 
maximize its small budget, limited capacity, and sphere of influence. However, this has resulted in a 
piecemeal strategy rather than a high-level comprehensive strategy that aligns with the ambitious 
objective of IR 3. 
HRA’s implementation is also being affected by USAID assigning overlapping areas of action under this 
component to its two programs, HRA and JSP. This is generating a different understanding, between the 
two programs, of who and how the prioritization strategy will be implemented at the regional and local 
level. Guidelines from USAID on how the two programs should coordinate more effectively, beyond 
simply not duplicating efforts, would further harmonize the relationship with the AGO. 
The documented cases related to GBV do not necessarily serve as inputs for the prosecution of the 
perpetrators of the violations. This is due to the continued distrust by the women involved in the 
judicial system and the ongoing presence of armed actors that deter formal complaints. 
The short duration of the grants under this Component limit the ability to assess the contributions or 
impacts of their activities and initiatives. In the case of Corporación Humanas in its work with the regional 
prosecutors, there is a lack of evaluation instruments to determine if the knowledge is effectively being 
applied or how its application is impacting the response of the Prosecutor’s Office in cases of sexual 
violence.
The new institutional framework established for the post-conflict period and the new obligations for 
those entities that the Accord creates represent challenges for an effective response to human rights 
violations. Given that there is little clarity in the processes to implement the Accord, the actions of the 
relevant entities are limited. For example, the lack of clarity on how the Special Jurisdiction for Peace 
(JEP) will operate, and what the mechanisms for presenting information and processing cases will be, 
potentially means that the efforts of organizations such as Corporación Humanas may become limited. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 77
The challenge lies in determining how the documentation of cases can serve in instances foreseen in the 
Accord, in particular, the Truth Commission and the JEP.
Lessons Learned
A clearly defined comprehensive strategy from USAID may facilitate a more effective adoption, 
implementation, and monitoring of a program such as HRA. Harmonizing this strategy across its 
different programs requires taking into consideration the resources, capacity, and sphere of influence of 
each program.
Refining a strategy that focuses on working with a centralized and hierarchical government entity, such 
as the AGO, can be facilitated by engaging high-level officials in dialogue to obtain buy-in and 
commitment for specific projects. This would minimize some of the delays and roadblocks HRA has 
faced with respect to the adoption of the prioritization strategy, not only at the national level, but also 
at the regional and municipal level.
The coherence between the grants linked to the AGO and the work carried out in the AGO at the 
national level needs to be more carefully assessed. The actions of these CSOs should align with the 
prioritization strategy investigations of violations against human rights leaders and defenders. According 
to interviews, Corporación Humanas was not aware of the prioritization methodology being pursued at 
the AGO. Consequently, Humanas’ own methodology was applied, which can generate confusion among 
officials at the territorial level. 
Threats
Although the AGO officials interviewed state that the prioritization strategy is being adopted as an 
institutional policy, the replacement of officials at the management level with the arrival of the new 
administration after the elections may result in delays that affect the advancement of HRA’s projects and 
deliverables. These delays would be exacerbated if HRA’s current period of performance, planned to 
end in April 2019, is not extended. 
There is a potential conflict in competencies between the AGO and the newly created institutions under 
the Accord, such as the JEP. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations for HRA’s relevance and adequate adaptation to the 
changing human rights context
1.1 Economic, social, and cultural rights are priorities for the communities where HRA is 
working, so USAID should consider how to integrate these rights into its human rights 
programming. For example, within Component 1, it may be possible to include activities related 
to economic, social, and cultural rights within more general activities oriented toward civil and 
political rights. Moreover, USAID should facilitate coordination between HRA and other USAID 
programs focused on economic, social and cultural issues, such as agriculture and food security, 
water and sanitation, and education. HRA should be informed on the general activities implemented 
by USAID in those sectors in order to correctly transfer this information to communities.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 78
1.2 Given USG restriction on working directly with demobilized FARC-EP members, HRA 
should focus their support on public policy formulation and implementation with 
national and local government institutions rather than supporting human resources in 
institutions that have direct contact with this population group. This would avoid creating 
legitimacy issues in the institutions that HRA intends to support. As previously documented, the 
dupla financed by HRA was not able to help a victim of sexual violence because she was a 
demobilized member of FARC-EP. While this may be an isolated case, it does illustrate the problem 
that the USG restriction poses for HRA’s assistance.
1.3 HRA should more clearly develop its differential approach for the Afro-Colombian 
population to close the gap between what CSO grantees and their beneficiaries report 
and what is developed conceptually for these activities. This implies, for example, 
incorporating ethno-education, community councils, and Law 70 of 1993 into the projects that are 
implemented through the grants, as well as more focus on ethnic rights in the context of 
implementation of the Accord. This does not imply stopping work on the pertinent issues for Afro￾Colombian youth and women. However, it is necessary to make explicit the relevant topics for the 
Afro-Colombian population within the Activity. 
1.4 USAID should assess how it can expand HRA’s strategy on human rights issues 
associated with illegal mining. Currently, the focus is on studies and dissemination of the 
consequences of illegal mining on human rights violations, but there is demand to also focus on 
working conditions of small-scale workers miners. In this sense, it is necessary that USAID 
coordinates the activities from HRA with its other programs, such as Oro Legal, to guarantee a 
comprehensive approach towards mining.
1.5 Given the changing human rights context and increasing risks to human rights leaders 
and defenders in the regions where the Activity operates, HRA should expand its 
strategy to work with this population group as a cross-cutting task. While HRA is 
currently working with human rights leaders and defenders, its strategies and activities are not well 
defined under each component. Establishing it as a cross-cutting task would harmonize efforts to 
promote, protect, and respond to human rights violations for this at-risk group. 
Recommendations for improving the understanding of human rights 
standards
2.1 HRA should continue supporting the personeros through its grantee, FENALPER. 
2.2 Given that organizing and facilitating dialogues between the police and vulnerable populations in at 
least seven departments is an expected result (Result 1.1.2), and activities implemented so far have 
fallen short, HRA should reassess its approach with the police to achieve this result.
2.3 HRA should enhance its LGBTI thematic focus in its training activities for government officials, 
including the police force. The training modules include topics to minimize discrimination and 
protect their rights, but equally important are topics about how to treat this community with dignity 
and integrity, from how to greet persons of different genders to how to facilitate access to public 
services.
2.4 HRA should conduct a strategic and formal review of their grantees’ needs with respect to thematic 
support. This is not only relevant for grassroots organizations. 
2.5 HRA should promote the replication of experiential methods that have been effective tools for 
beneficiaries to learn about human rights, such as field trips to meet relevant government entities. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 79
One potential way of doing this would be to establish a Community of Practice for its grantees, 
where CSOs come together to share and learn from each other’s experiences and challenges. 
Recommendations for promoting sustainability
3.1 HRA’s short three-year period of performance, along with two separate option years, limit HRA’s 
ability to promote the sustainability of its activities. The evaluation team recommends extending 
HRA’s period of performance for two years from now, until April 2021. 
3.2 USAID should continue to promote and leverage the signing of MOUs with departmental 
governments. This contributes to better alignment and integration with local development plans as 
well as increased coordination within the departmental governments and with other international 
assistance partners. 
3.3 As HRA continues to support local development plans, it should work with local governments to 
define actions that are financially possible. While this may result in actions that are smaller in scale 
and coverage, it has a greater likelihood of being implemented given that municipalities face financial 
constraints. 
3.4 While the initial stage of technical assistance required systematic and constant support as well as a 
direct presence in the territory, HRA should start developing exit strategies for their technical 
assistance activities to government officials that focus on strengthening institutional capacity, through 
the further documentation of processes and best practices, and minimizing over reliance on HRA 
advisors. The handover of functions and action plans should be tailored based on the municipality’s 
current and projected capacity with consideration to not overburden officials.
3.5 HRA should continue promoting the creation of mechanisms and processes where government 
officials and community members can engage in dialogue and increase their confidence in each other.
3.6 HRA should strategically support and engage the JACs as another stakeholder to minimize reliance 
on individual officials and to increase local ownership and participation in public policy in rural areas.
3.7 HRA should prioritize grants to local CSOs with a strong local presence to increase local capacity 
and ownership, and to more closely reach local populations.
3.8 USAID and HRA should reassess the structure of the Grants Fund to better meet the diverse needs 
of the different organizations they fund and to provide support through a sustainability lens. HRA 
grantees range from nascent grassroots organizations to community-based and regional 
organizations to nationally recognized CSOs, so their technical and financial needs are varied. A 
flexible Grants Fund to tailor the support HRA can provide to these CSOs could result in a more 
responsive and efficient use of HRA’s resources and capabilities. Two potential enhancements could 
include:
o Funding stages for grassroots organizations: A dynamic model to strengthen local CSOs and 
support the scaling up of grassroots organizations while enabling HRA to manage risk 
sensibly. Seed funding can be provided in the first stage to grassroots organizations or 
CSOs with no track record. Those who have demonstrated success, through an internal 
evaluation process, can then receive a larger grant in a second stage, without having 
programming interruptions due to funding or having to go through the entire proposal 
process again.
o Sliding scale funding to graduate CSOs: Longer timeframe grants with two or three rounds, 
where the first round consists of mostly financial support to implement the proposed 
project and the next round(s) consist of less financial support but more mentoring or 
technical support for sustainability of the CSO, depending on the needs of the CSO. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 80
Recommendations for maximizing effects on beneficiaries
4.1 HRA should strategically continue to fund youth-targeted projects with longer timeframes and 
evaluate the grantees previously funded for a second round. This population group, specifically, is 
vulnerable to risks of recruitment, theft, and illicit consumption, so these HRA-supported activities 
serve a double bottom line of promotion and prevention. 
4.2 HRA should strategically expand its holistic support – financial, technical, and organizational – to 
grassroots organization and continue to leverage the expertise of more established CSOs for 
mentoring. 
4.3 Given the new or increased risks faced by beneficiaries, HRA should make strategic revisions to its 
risk and context analysis to develop specific methodologies for contingency plans and more formal 
“do no harm” plans.
Recommendations for advancing the objective of increasing 
investigations and prosecutions of human rights violations
5.1 USAID should define and design a comprehensive strategy regarding its relationship with the AGO. 
It should include clearly defined objectives, focused on implementable projects that can that aim to 
advance these objectives. The relationship between USAID and the AGO must be strategic and not 
a sum of activities through the different USAID programs. To do this, USAID should:
• Conduct a needs assessment of the AGO and develop a proposal for a comprehensive 
strategy with this entity;
• Link this strategy to its different program offerings, while taking into consideration each 
program’s conceptual framework, human and financial resources, and sphere of 
influence; 
• Clearly define the roles of each program within this comprehensive strategy, while 
taking into consideration the practical and operational challenges of working with the 
AGO as an external implementer. 
5.2 Following recommendation 5.1, USAID should pursue high-level meetings with AGO officials with 
the purpose of getting buy-in from the entity, finalizing this strategy, and defining the adoption and 
implementation of the different projects linked to it. 
5.3 Rather than simply focusing on coordination between HRA and other organizations, such as 
UNOHCHR, USAID should shift toward a collaboration, learning, and adaptation (CLA) framework
to leverage and maximize its efforts across these stakeholders. This framework can facilitate a more 
systematic planning and implementation of strategies that enhances the efforts of other partners 
while also meeting one’s own goals. USAID would have to clearly lay out the objectives, structure, 
and benefits for an external stakeholder, like UNOHCHR, to buy-in to a CLA framework. 
5.4 HRA, with participation from USAID, should coordinate with the Justice for Sustainable Peace 
Program on taking the prioritization strategy to the local level. Roles and responsibilities should be 
clearly defined in order to minimize duplication of efforts and to avoid confusing regional 
prosecutors.
5.5 Under the status quo, and in the absence of high-level engagement between USAID and the AGO, 
HRA and USAID should assess whether it might be efficient to invest more efforts in supporting 
CSOs who engage with the AGO (such as Corporación Humanas, Caribe Afirmativo, and CODHES). 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 81
ANNEXES
ANNEX A: EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK
ANNEX B: EVALUATION METHODS 
ANNEX C: MUNICIPALITY CHARACTERISTICS AND LIST
ANNEX D: SOURCES OF INFORMATION
ANNEX E: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS
ANNEX F: CONTEXT ANALYSIS
ANNEX G: INDICATOR PROGRESS
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 82
ANNEX A: EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK
SCOPE OF WORK FOR THE MID-TERM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF 
USAID/COLOMBIA’S HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVITY (HRA)
October 2017
2. PURPOSE OF THE EVALUATION
The purpose of this mid-term performance evaluation is to assess if HRA’s deliverables and outcomes are 
being accomplished within schedule, to determine if they are still relevant based on the current local 
context and if its institutional strengthening interventions are sustainable. In accomplishing this purpose, 
the Evaluation Team will assess if the support provided by the Activity has contributed to positive changes 
in key Government of Colombia (GOC) institutions. It will provide information on to what extend the 
Activity is advancing in its strategy22 of strengthening Colombian institutions and civil society organizations 
in its targeted areas so that they are capable of promoting a culture of human rights, preventing abuse and 
violations of human rights, and providing meaningful and effective responses to human rights violations 
once they have occurred.
The Evaluation findings and conclusions must be constructed through evidence-based information and will 
support USAID/Colombia and HRA Implementing Partner (IP) accountability among stakeholders. It will 
also offer lessons learned and recommendations that will contribute to improve HRA’s implementation 
and achieve the expected results and will provide input to help USAID/Colombia make programming 
decisions extension. This evaluation is scheduled to begin at just past the mid-point of HRA’s base period 
of performance.
3. SUMMARY INFORMATION 
Activity: Human Rights Activity (HRA) Period of Performance : 05 April 2016 to 
04 April 2019
Contract No: AID-OAA-I-13-00032
Order No: AID-514-TO-16-00009
Contracting Mechanism: Rule of Law 
Indefinite Quantity Contract (IQC) (ROL IQC)
TEC: USD $14,109,806 Contractor: Chemonics
DO 3: Effective presence of democratic institutions 
and processes in targeted areas
IR 1.3: Improved administration of justice and 
protection of human rights
Purpose: Support the GOC and civil society to 
promote a culture of human rights, prevent 
abuse and violations of human rights, and 
provide meaningful and effective responses to 
human rights violations once they have 
occurred. 
Contracting Officer Representative: 
Leonardo Reales
Alternate Contracting Officer 
Representative: 
Sol Gaitan
Evaluation Activity Manager (EAM): 
Omar López - Monitoring and Evaluation 
Specialist; Program Office USAID/Colombia 
 
22 This is a strategy in which local, regional and national partners build capacities sufficient to not only participate, but lead 
human rights initiatives. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 83
4. BACKGROUND
In November 2016, the Government of Colombia (GOC) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP) signed a finalized peace accord to end its 52-year conflict. As 
expected, the peace accord’s implementation has been challenging and the human rights situation in the 
country remains a concern. The rapid shifting dynamics of violence at the local level, the arrival or 
strengthening of illegal actors and the presence of illegal economies in the majority of critical regions have 
resulted in an increase of specific determined forms of violence (i.e. against human rights defenders and 
social leaders) and the appearance of new methods for violating human rights. 
With the demobilization of FARC-EP combatants, the government’s ability to provide security for social 
leaders, human rights defenders, journalists and ethnic communities, while ensuring access to justice for 
victims and addressing impunity of human rights violations, is being sorely tested. 
Many of the advances and inroads made with support from previous human rights programs are still fragile 
and need ongoing assistance to ensure their sustainability. Substantial challenges remain with respect to 
institutional structures and strength, implementation of laws and policies at the national and local levels, 
adaptation capacity, and overall understanding of and support for human rights among Colombians at 
large.
Civil society organizations are playing a more relevant role in this context, serving as a bridge and trust￾builders between an absent state and communities abandoned for decades. CSOs have privileged access 
to difficult territories and information that may serve the GOC in adapting and better responding to 
changing challenges. 
Over the past 16 years, USAID/Colombia has developed the largest U.S.-stand-alone human rights 
program in the world. Beginning in 2001, as part of Plan Colombia, the first phase of the Human Rights 
Program (HRP I) was designed and implemented with the participation of human rights organizations, 
academics, Colombian authorities, and a broad cross-section of Colombian civil society. HRP I sought to 
prevent human rights abuses, protect vulnerable groups and communities, and increase the capacity of 
state agencies and civil society organizations to respond to human rights threats or violations.
USAID launched its second phase of the Human Rights Program (HRP II) in 2006. HRP II built off of the 
same framework as HRP I, but expanded the program to respond to changed circumstances, including the 
effects of enhanced security policies and the demobilization of paramilitary forces. HRP II continued HRP 
I’s focus on prevention, protection, response, and assistance to the Public Ministry23and government 
institutions, but also expanded into other areas, such as support for civil society as a full partner in human 
rights dialogue and initiatives. HRP II also undertook to “Colombianize” or “nationalize” these efforts, i.e., 
promoting greater Colombian ownership of and financing of human rights efforts.
HRP III was launched in March 2012 and shifted attention to regional human rights efforts, in particular 
the implementation of national policies and practices at the local level, and increasing the capacity of 
regional representatives of national institutions. The continuous field presence of human rights advisors 
in program’s regions was a critical part of it. HRP III also recognized the need for sufficient flexibility to 
adapt to changing circumstances, and undertook permanent monitoring and ongoing assessment of the 
impact of the program, particularly with respect to victims of human rights violations.
 
23 The Colombian Public Ministry is comprised of the Ombudsman’s Office, the Inspector General’s Office, and municipal 
personeros.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 84
During HRP III’s implementation period, USAID established a strong relationship and signed a 
memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the Attorney General’s Office (AGO) based on the 
understanding of the importance of prosecution of prosecuting human rights violations as a key protection 
factor. HRP III supported AGO’s implementation of a new approach for prioritizing investigations and 
prosecutions.
HRA is focused primarily on regional human rights efforts, while maintaining some national actions, 
particularly with respect to policy reforms and the implementation of post-accord measures. The design 
and implementation of effective prevention and protection measures as a part of community, municipal 
and departmental policies is a priority. Additional priorities are the investigation and prosecution of human 
rights violations, as well as increased AGO and CSOs capacity and effectiveness at regional and local levels.
As for the threats and homicides of human rights defenders and social leaders, it is important to highlight 
that recent scrutiny over related figures by some Colombian government entities has generated a fierce 
debate over whether these cases constitute a trend. More importantly, each regional dynamic is different 
and the profiles of homicide cases have broadened the traditional definition of human rights defenders and 
social leaders to be inclusive of community leaders (i.e. community action board presidents, campesino 
leaders, land restitution leaders, victims, etc.). By virtue of their high visibility within their communities 
and outspokenness in denouncing human rights violations, these “other” social leaders have been folded 
into the rising number of homicides of human rights defenders. Most government/State entities are 
hesitant to label cautious in considering these killings as to be systematic, and instead assess the majority 
as isolated cases. Driven by the power vacuum left by the FARC-EP demobilization, these killings have 
been linked to emerging illegal armed groups waging violent conflicts to gain territorial control. On a 
larger scale, the silencing of those denouncing illegal presence and activities stands to jeopardize any 
progress made under the nascent and fragile post-accord implementation phase. No doubt this complex 
situation may have a direct impact on HRA’s activities in its targeted regions. 
A. Description of Theory of Change and Results Framework
The theory of Change that underlies HRA is that if the program strengthen government institutions and 
civil society organizations to effectively serve as agents of change at the local level, then respect for human 
rights and peace will be improved, and policies will reflect special considerations for vulnerable 
populations.
The following results framework guides HRA’s approach to implementing USAID’s vision for the project, 
linked directly to USAID’s CDCS 2014-2018. The results framework incorporates crosscutting responses 
to tasks, including a focus on our differentiated approach on gender inequity and vulnerable population.
DO1: Effective presence of democratic institutions and processes in targeted areas
Intermediate Result 1.3: Improved administration of justice and protection of human rights
IR 1: Improved 
understanding of 
human rights 
standards
IR 2: Policies to prevent human 
rights violations developed and 
implemented
IR 3: Investigation and prosecution 
of human rights violations Increased.
Result 1.1: Key human 
rights actors supported 
to promote awareness of 
and respect for human 
rights, particularly in 
Result 2.1: National, regional, and 
local officials` capacity to develop and 
implement human rights policies 
strengthened with sustained 
meaningful engagement.
Result 3.1: Prioritization plans for 
investigations and prosecutions by the 
AGO developed, strengthened and 
implemented.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 85
potential areas of FARC 
demobilization.
Result 2.2: Communication/dialogue 
between and among citizens and 
police and other local officials in 
target areas improved to better 
service delivery.
Result 3.2: Reforms that decrease 
discretion and increase transparency 
institutionally embedded into AGO 
practices.
Result 1.2: Public 
officials´ capacity to 
interact with vulnerable 
groups strengthened 
with sustained 
meaningful engagement.
Result 2.3: Community protection 
plans developed and effectively 
implemented in target municipalities.
Result 3.3: Standard operating 
procedures and AGO capacity to 
investigate and prosecute human rights 
violations strengthened with 
demonstrable results from court cases.
Result 1.3: Media 
messages promoting 
respect for human rights 
produced and distributed 
and investigate 
journalism capacity 
increased.
Result 2.4: Self-protection systems, 
strategies, and measures in place for 
at-risk populations, with a focus on 
sexual and gender violence.
Result 3.4: GOC enforcement and 
prosecutorial response to gender-based 
violence improved with media coverage.
Result 3.5: Civil society mechanisms to 
facilitate an improved state response to 
human rights violations, including GBV 
cases, developed or strengthened and 
supported by the government.
Result 1.4: Human rights 
education curricula in 
primary and secondary 
schools in targeted areas 
promoted and 
sustainability enhanced. 
Result 2.5: Capacity of the National 
Ombudsman´s office to prevent and 
address human rights violations 
resulting from legal and illegal mining 
and other possible post 
demobilization challenges 
strengthened.
Result 3.6: Threats of violence to land 
restitution claimants, leaders, and 
organizations investigated and 
prosecuted.
Result 1.5: Official and 
effective oversight 
provided by CSO and/or 
the media.
Result 2.6: Civil society capacity to 
advocate for and monitor 
development and implementation of 
human rights protections 
strengthened.
Result 3.7: Civil society capacity to 
advocate for victims and serve as 
watchdogs with respect to GOC 
response to human rights is 
strengthened.
Result 3.8: Partnerships between 
government and local communities 
formed to combat human rights 
violations resulting from illegal mining, 
leading to improved GOC response.
Cross Cutting Tasks
B. Summary of the Activity to be Evaluated
The overall HRA objective is to support the GOC and civil society to promote a culture of human rights, 
prevent abuse and violations of human rights, and provide meaningful and effective responses to human 
rights violations once they have occurred. By the end of the activity term, USAID’s goal is to strengthen 
the capacity of Colombian institutions and civil society organizations such that they can face changing 
human rights challenges and deliver required services on their own, especially the prosecution of human 
rights violations. Another priority is increasing the capacity and effectiveness of local representatives of 
national institutions and regional liaisons.
The Project has three specific objectives, as follows (see Annex A for greater detail):
1. GOC officials, civil society representatives, and the general public in target areas demonstrate 
an improved understanding of human rights standards and promote compliance with those 
standards. 
2. Policies to prevent human rights violations developed and implemented. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 86
3. Investigation and prosecution of human rights violations increased.
In addition, HRA considers the following organizing principles and tactics when designing and implementing 
all of its activities: 
Regional/local vs. national emphasis: Understanding that Colombia’s extensive human rights 
framework, as well as the peace agreement with the FARC, are only as good as their implementation in 
the regions and municipalities affected by the conflict, HRA’s primary focus is to implement interventions 
and assist with the implementation of national policies at the local level. HRA emphasis is building on public 
participation, strong institutions, and tailored solutions at the local level through the support from a 
decentralized team of regional human rights advisors, a community grants fund, and close partnerships 
with local leaders. 
Although some assistance is provided at the national level, this assistance aims to support the development 
of national policies that weigh and respond to regional variances and dynamics. HRA mainly partners with 
local authorities and regional offices of national institutions, in addition to civil society organizations. 
HRA’s activities are planned based on current conditions and strengths and weaknesses of local actors. 
HRA acts as a liaison and in a consultative, educational, and advisory role and capacity with civil society, 
GOC, and Public Ministry representatives.
HRA’s local capacity building strategies anticipate and address the regular changes of personnel in public 
institutions and its effects on sustainability.
Empower vulnerable groups and including a differential approach: HRA focuses on strengthening 
policies and projects that prevent human rights violations against at-risk groups, which include human 
rights defenders, indigenous and Afro-Colombians, journalists, women, members of the LGBTI 
community, and victims of the conflict, with a focus on sexual and gender-based violence. The ultimate 
objective is to increase GOC authorities’ awareness of specific risks faced by certain vulnerable 
populations and enable them to fulfill their obligations to provide for their protection. 
HRA prioritizes vulnerable populations in all technical support and collaboration with institutions, by 
developing special protocols, changing management processes, and by emphasizing civil society 
accompaniment of state reforms to improve treatment of these groups. Activities include a differentiated 
approach ensuring that initiatives targeting vulnerable groups are tailored to their cultural characteristics 
and needs, geographic realities and conflict circumstances.
Flexibility and information-driven decisions: To respond to the dynamic context of the country 
HRA has an information-driven approach that incorporates continual contextual and thematic analyses to 
engrain flexibility in programming (including financial and technical) to respond to evolving local human 
rights issues. HRA design and strategies can and are expected to be altered to seize opportunities to 
achieve better outcomes with existing resources. 
Promote sustainability: HRA applies a strategy in which local, regional and national partners build 
capacities sufficient to not only participate, but lead human rights initiatives. Sustainability is a serious 
investment goal for HRA and accordingly, is integrated from the design phases of programming. 
Other USAID, USG, and Donor Coordination and Private/Public Partnerships: USAID’s 
priority is to strengthen collaboration and partnership within programs; with other USG agencies and with 
bilateral donors, multilateral, and international organizations to increase complementarities and avoid 
duplication. HRA plans and carries out program activities with a clear understanding of the scope and 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 87
impacts of other donors or programs, not only in order to avoid duplication or inconsistencies in efforts, 
but to leverage maximum impact, and identify opportunities for joint implementation or collaboration. In 
addition, HRA is urged to investigate and utilize the potential for private/public partnerships and alliances 
to ensure sustainability of activities and processes after the end of the program.
Other principles and tactics can be consulted in Section C of the HRA contract (ANNEX II). 
C. Summary of Relevant Documents, Information and Data of HRA
The following documents contain the information regarding the design, implementation, reporting and 
monitoring of HRA:
● Base Task Order and Modifications
● Program Annual Work plans
● Monitoring and Evaluation Plan
● Annual and Quarterly Reports
● Quarterly or other Financial Reports
● Biweekly Highlights and quarterly snapshots
● CSO Grants and GOC projects’ concept papers
● USAID/Colombia Country Development Cooperation Strategy 
The project utilizes the USAID/Colombia MONITOR system to report on the indicators described in the 
Monitoring and Evaluation Plan. For the indicators which required a baseline, HRA collected baseline data. 
The Evaluation team must do a careful and detailed review and analysis the HRA documents, information 
and data listed and described above.
5. EVALUATION QUESTIONS
Considering the HRA purpose stated above, the evaluation must answer the following questions24 in order 
of priority, to assess the performance of the Activity:
1) Do the overarching and specific strategies of the Activity remain relevant in the changing human 
rights context from a municipal, departmental and national perspective? Has HRA adapted 
adequate and relevant strategies to address this changing human rights context?
2) To what extent do Colombian government officials, civil society representatives, and the 
beneficiaries in target areas demonstrate an improved understanding of human rights standards 
and view compliance with those standards as the norm?
3) Are HRA’s strategies and approaches promoting sustainability of the initiatives supported by the 
Activity at the GOC and civil society levels? 
4) What effect has HRA had on the beneficiaries of the organizations supported by the Activity, 
especially on human rights defenders and social leaders, LGBTI persons, women, local journalists, 
youth and ethnic communities in conflict affected municipalities covered by HRA?
5) Are HRA's strategies effective and adequate for the objective of increasing investigations and 
prosecutions of human rights violations? Is HRA effectively coordinating with other programs or 
international organizations working on impunity, as UNOHCHR?
6) What have been the achievements, bottlenecks and lessons learned during the implementation of 
the three components of HRA and its cross-cutting themes? 
 
24 Minor revisions to the evaluation questions, reflected here, were approved by USAID on February 7, 2018.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 88
According to the findings and conclusions obtained from the answers to these questions, the evaluation 
must help provide finding, conclusions information and recommendations for improving the achievement 
of HRA results and outcomes. It should offer findings that will allow USAID to make decisions for 
improving the sustainability of the initiatives supported by the Activity at the GOC and civil society levels. 
Also, it should indicate which selected actions or cross-cutting themes and corresponding activities for 
the three HRA components should be further emphasized, modified, or eliminated, and why. It may also 
offer relevant information for follow-on human rights programming of USAID/Colombia. 
To the extent possible for relevant for each question above, the evaluation findings should be 
disaggregated into the following categories: should help USAID understand the differential issue related 
to human rights defenders, women, youth, Afro-Colombian and Indigenous communities and LGBTI 
persons.
6. EVALUATION DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
The evaluation team must propose the design and methodology that will generate the highest-quality and 
most credible evidence that corresponds to the evaluation purpose and questions. This design and 
methodology should take into account the following general methodological principles and guidance.
a. Identification of the dimensions, variables and indicators of the evaluation 
Based on the three objectives of HRA and the results framework laid out herein as well as the evaluation 
questions, the Evaluation Contractor must propose the dimensions, variables and indicators of the study. 
The dimensions, variables and indicators constructed proposed will also include those linked to key 
assumptions and other economic, cultural, social and institutional context factors linked to HRA 
interventions and human rights status in the regions selected. This context information must take into 
account recent human rights phenomenon such as threats and homicides of human rights defenders and 
social leaders and institutional and policy changes linked to institutional reforms related to the 
implementation of the peace agreement. 
This identification of the dimensions, variables and indicators of the evaluation must entail a careful review 
and understanding of HRA design and implementation and a careful and detailed review of available 
information regarding institutions and organizations supported by this Activity and human rights trends 
and status in the regions receiving HRA support. 
The Evaluation Contractor may receive feedback from USAID and HRA implementer in this selection of 
these dimensions, variables and indicators. The Evaluation Contractor must also clarify the units of 
intervention of each component of HRA and according to it, specify the unit of analysis for each indicator 
and variable selected25. 
b. Methodological approach and sources of information
To reach the purpose and the evaluation questions described above, the Evaluation must offer empirical 
quantitative and qualitative information of HRA performance and context linked to the dimensions, 
 
25 Depending on the component, the unit of intervention may be regions, municipalities, veredas, communities, organizations, 
households or individuals.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 89
variables and indicators defined, constructed and selected. The Evaluation must use a mix of secondary 
and primary data sources at the national, departmental, municipal, organizational, and (if necessary) 
household levels. For collecting quantitative information, primary sources may include surveys on of 
stakeholders, organizations and household and national and municipal institutions. For collecting qualitative 
information it may include instruments such as key informant structured, semi-structured interviews and 
focus groups. Structured or semi-structured interviews should also be developed with human right 
defenders, Attorneys and Procuraduría officers, police officers and other relevant actors. Such interviews 
must be crossed-referenced with primary or secondary quantitative data (primary or secondary 
information) so personal biases and perceptions are reduced.
The Evaluation must do a careful and detailed collection, review and use of data, information and analysis 
coming from secondary sources. These sources used and reviewed must include:
1) Relevant data available coming from relevant national GOC institutions such as the Victims Unit, 
Ombudsman’s Office, the Attorney General’s Office, the Inspector General’s Office and the 
National Police; international organizations such as the United Nations Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCHR); and regional institutions such as Mayors’ and 
Governors’ offices;
2) Available assessments, evaluation, data initiatives and studies carried out by third party GOC 
institutions, NGOs, the Academia and private entities; and
3) Previous studies and regional case studies carried out or supported by USAID/Colombia that will 
be available as ancillary sources of information as well as data sets.
Regarding primary source surveys, depending on the variables/indicators and the universe, the Evaluation 
Contractor may concentrate efforts either in a sample or the whole universe. For example, data for some 
performance indicators of organization and institutions supported may be collected at the universe level, 
while for some others at the household level may require a sample. For the cases of using a sample, the 
contractor must clearly specify the techniques to use (randomized, purposively, etc.), as well as the unit 
of measurement linked to the respective variable/indicator. Samples should allow representativeness for 
the most relevant variables at the clusters of interventions with a margin of error of less than + 10 percent.
The Evaluation contractor must construct a Design Matrix26 template according to the USAID template 
(#2) and corresponding guidance for constructing the USAID Evaluation Design Matrix. The matrix must 
have the following columns:
1. Researchable Question(s)
2. Information Required and Source(s)
3. Scope and Methodology
4. Limitations and assumptions
5. What the answer to the researchable question will likely allow the Evaluation to Say
Given the diversified and heterogeneous geographic scope of this study and the secondary information 
that should be taken into consideration, the contractor must present specific approaches to analyze and 
deliver the requested information, allowing accounting for meaningful geographic comparisons and 
presenting presentation of results, with emphasizing an emphasis on combined graphic displays and 
dashboard-like output simple, easy to understand charts and graphs.
 
26 https://usaidlearninglab.org/sites/default/files/resource/files/evaluation_design_matrix_templates.pdf
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 90
A central aspect of the baseline’s design will be the definition of the universes of beneficiaries and the 
identification of those the will be surveyed or interviewed. The Evaluation Contractor must work closely 
with USAID/Colombia and HRA implementer to determine these definitions and identification.
c. Analysis Plan and Other Provisions
Once the contractor defines and agrees upon the design and methodology with USAID/Colombia, they 
must collect, organize, filter, compile, analyze, summarize and present the field information collected. 
Once that is finalized, the contractor must deliver existing statistics, records, studies or qualitative 
information available in secondary sources and all the data sets of the Evaluation to USAID/Colombia. The 
analysis will offer findings and conclusions that will concretely respond to the evaluation questions.
The evaluation process and products must:
1. Enhance ownership among stakeholders of HRA and its objectives.
2. Be participatory, including GOC partners, USAID, and the IP in ways that preserve objectivity 
while improving the quality of data collected, collective learning, and ownership of the evaluation 
results.
3. Provide useful recommendations that are specific, actionable, time-bound and targeted to specifics 
of the human rights environment in each region
4. Obtain information of individuals from all relevant demographic groups (and be able to report on 
differential perception, impacts, and experience among them), including:
● Men and women
● Youth 
● Afro-Colombian and Indigenous populations
● LGBTI
5. Include exercises to understand the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and constraints for the 
implementing partner to effectively coordinate with national and local GOC institutions, 
USAID/Colombia, other USAID programs, other donors, private actors among others to achieve 
the required results.
6. Develop or suggest tools and/or frameworks to track progress to implementation of the key 
policy elements of HRA.
7. Have the ability to adapt the team to complete a demanding data collection effort and complex 
analytic exercise
8. The Evaluation Team must elaborate protocols for ensuring respondents of primary sources 
instruments are not harmed (especially if there are sensitive questions involved) and for the 
collection and safety of private data.
As part of the overall security requirements, the Evaluation Contractor must report any security threats 
and/or incidents verbally in person or by telephone, immediately to USAID/Colombia. Subsequently, a 
written report must be promptly submitted within no more than three days after the incident occurred. 
All subcontractors will be required to report any threats/incidents to the prime Contractor, who will 
immediately after, notify the USAID/Colombia
7. DELIVERABLES AND REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
The Evaluation Team is expected to begin work immediately upon contract signature and to begin 
fieldwork in country within 30 working days of contract signature. The Team must submit to the USAID 
/Colombia the deliverables detailed in the following table, taking into account the illustrative timeframes 
presented below.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 91
Deliverable Timeframe Description
1. Draft Evaluation 
Design and Work 
Plan
Within 30 business 
days of contract 
signature
A pre-departure preparation through a desk study that 
will cover all relevant materials and identification of 
stakeholders’ interviews will be held prior to the start 
of the evaluation field work in country. During this 
time, the evaluation team will hold initial conference 
calls with USAID and HRA to seek their guidance and 
feedback on the draft evaluation design and list of 
stakeholders27. The revised draft evaluation design and 
work plan will be sent for review by USAID at least 
two weeks before the arrival of the evaluation team in 
country for final review and comments.
2. Evaluation 
Planning Meeting 
completed
During the Evaluation 
Expat Team’s 
members first week 
in Colombia
The Evaluation Team is expected to hold a meeting in 
Bogotá, at the outset of the work, in which the Team 
will invite experts to brief them on the context and 
project and the Team will finalize preparations for the 
evaluation. 
3. Final Evaluation 
Design and Work 
Plan
By the end of the 
evaluation team’s 
second week in￾country
The work plan must include the final written 
evaluation design, including data collection instruments 
and a timeline, highlighting any agreed-upon changes 
from the draft submitted to USAID.
4. Weekly Reports Each week, beginning 
with the third week 
in country, until 
fieldwork is 
completed. The 
fieldwork is to be 
completed within 10 
weeks of beginning 
work in Colombia
The fieldwork will begin within 6 to 8 weeks after the 
start of the Activity. This fieldwork may imply the 
implementation of the instruments to collect 
qualitative and quantitative data in Colombia.
The Team will report to the EAM or his designate 
each week. Whether format will be in person, by 
telephone, or in writing will be agreed during the 
planning phase. Reports of bulleted lists (no more than 
5-10 bullets) must be delivered.
5. Pre-Drafting 
Debriefing 
completed
By the 11th week in 
country of the Expat 
Team’s members
The Evaluation Team will hold an informal debriefing 
with the EAM, and any others that the Team and EAM 
consider should attend, to share their preliminary 
insights to findings, conclusions and recommendations 
from the analysis to that point. Some of these 
preliminary notions will change as analysis and drafting 
continue.
6. Draft evaluation 
report
Two weeks after the 
data collection in 
primary sources have 
been completed the 
evaluation Team 
The Evaluation Team must submit to USAID/Colombia 
and present orally a draft hard copy and electronic 
report including conclusions, findings, 
recommendations, best practices and lessons learned 
 
27 The Evaluation Team will revise the draft evaluation design and work plan included in the proposal, highlighting any changes 
based on the desk study, the proposed stakeholders for interview, and agreed-upon changes from the proposal submitted to 
USAID.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 92
Deliverable Timeframe Description
should deliver a draft 
of the report. 
for USAID’s review, discussion, and feedback prior to 
the evaluation team departure from Colombia. 
USAID will submit comments on the draft report to
the evaluation team, two weeks after receipt of the 
draft report
7. Final report Two weeks after 
receiving USAID’s 
comments
The Evaluation Team will submit the final report 
electronically to USAID/Colombia. This report will 
incorporate all comments received by the Mission. 
Recognizing that USAID will not agree with all 
comments, and to be sure that each and every 
comment is considered carefully by the Evaluation 
Team, the Contractor will also submit a table that lists 
each comment, the response of the Evaluation Team 
to the comment, and where the changes resulting from 
the comment – if any – can be found in the document. 
This same cell will also indicate if no changes were 
made.
Recognizing that the peer review of the report led by 
USAID, will not agree with all comments, and to be 
sure that each and every comment is considered 
carefully by the Evaluation Team, the Contractor will 
also submit a table that lists each comment, the 
response of the Evaluation Team to the comment, and 
where the changes resulting from the comment – if 
any – can be found in the document. This same cell will 
also indicate if no changes were made and why not.
After this submission, USAID can still send comments 
that may entail final adjustments before approval and 
acceptance of the final report. These comments will be 
based in the criteria for ensuring the quality of the 
Evaluation a listed above in this section.
8 Presentations of 
the Evaluation 
The evaluation team is expected to hold 
dissemination/debriefing/workshop services. It may 
include at least 2 (and no more than 4) final 
presentations in person to discuss the summary of 
findings and recommendations with USAID/Colombia, 
the Evaluation contractor and other key stakeholders 
identified by USAID. These presentations will be 
scheduled as agreed upon USAID.
9. Evaluation 
documentation
Must be included in 
the final annexes of 
the report
The Evaluation Team must submit to USAID a listing 
of data sources used, such as: populated databases and 
records of data collected from interviews of key 
informants and focus groups conducted. These must 
be included along with the following, per the 
Evaluation Policy and consequent USAID guidance:
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 93
Deliverable Timeframe Description
1. The evaluation Statement of Work, including any 
adjustments agreed in writing during the course of 
the evaluation.
2. Detailed description of the evaluation design and 
methods, and any instruments, surveys, question 
lists, etc.
3. Disclosure of any conflict of interest – a signed 
statement by evaluation team members that 
attests to a lack of conflict of interest or describes 
an existing conflict of interest relative to the 
project being evaluated
8. GEOGRAPHIC AREAS FOR THE EVALUATION
The evaluation will be conducted in Colombia. Specific geographic areas that the Evaluation Team plans 
will visit are the HRA geographic coverage including Bogotá where national institutions are based. The list 
of municipalities covered by HRA is included in Annex D.
The definite list of municipalities where the qualitative and quantitative instrument will be implemented 
may be defined in the design stage of the evaluation. 
9. PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE 
It is estimated that this evaluation will be carried out over a five-month period.
10. TEAM COMPOSITION
The key personnel that the Evaluation Contractor must furnish for the performance of this Evaluation are 
as follows and may constitute the Evaluation Team:
a) Mid-term Evaluation Team Leader Team Leader
b) Humans Rights Expert in human rights
c) Evaluation Specialist
This team may be supported with short-term advice experts in human rights, institution strengthening and 
social capital when designing the study and when preparing the analysis of the information obtained. These 
experts may have masters or other advanced degrees and have at least five (5) years of experience in each 
respective field. This team may also be supported by assistants with at least 3 years of experience in its 
respective field.
The field collection of data must be implemented by an experienced team doing this task. This work can 
be done through a sub-contract and may need to be coordinated by a survey manager having at least six 
(6) years of experience in coordinating surveys to collect quantitative and qualitative data; a data and 
statistics specialist having at least four (4) years in processing and data mining; and field work supervisors 
and interviewers having at least three (3) years of experience working with surveys.
The initial starting salaries for all key personnel positions, unless previously approved and budgeted for in 
the Evaluation Contract, must be approved in advance and in writing by the Contracting Officer.
a) The key personnel that the Contractor must furnish for the performance of this contract are as follows:
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 94
Team Leader
The Team Leader will have overall responsibility for all aspects of the study. S/he will be primarily 
responsible for communicating technical issues with USAID, developing and implementing the detailed 
baseline methodology, managing and implementing the work plan and all related mid-term evaluation team 
activities, leading the literature review, guiding the collection of data through surveys, conducting 
interviews, and leading the writing of the baseline technical products. S/he will also be responsible for 
presenting findings during briefings, out-briefings, and final presentations.
Required Qualifications:
- Masters or other advanced degrees in international development, economics, public policy, 
sociology, evaluation, or other relevant related areas.
- At least eight (8) years of experience in participating in field-based evaluations of development 
program and projects. Of these, three (3) may be in managing and leading field-based evaluations; 
(2) years in evaluating international cooperation funded projects; three (3) years in evaluating 
human rights of other Democracy and Governance programs28; three (3) of these eight (8) years 
can be replaced by experience in monitoring development projects. 
- Understanding of project administration, finance and management of USAID.
- Knowledge extensive k of human rights issues in Colombia, specifically territorial political and 
social conditions in conflict affected areas.
- Relevant subject matter expertise as demonstrated by published evaluations or peer reviewed 
articles.
- Good understanding of gender and ethnic minority issues in Colombia.
- Strong analytic skills.
- Excellent written and oral communication skills in English and Spanish.
Human Rights Expert
The Expert in Human Rights will serve on the evaluation team and will support the Team Leader with 
research, data collection, analysis, and writing.
Required Qualifications:
- Master’s or an equivalent advanced degree in social sciences, Public Policy or a related area.
- At least six (6) years of experience working in Colombia on human rights issues.
- At least four (4) years of experience working in conflict and post-conflict areas.
- Human rights, democracy and governance expertise as demonstrated by published studies or peer 
reviewed articles.
- Strong knowledge regarding human rights conditions in conflict affected areas.
- Relevant expertise and experience conducting program evaluation or similar research and 
analytical work.
- Working-level written and verbal communication skills in English and Spanish and ability to 
conduct interviews and focus groups in Spanish and provide presentations and documents in 
English.
Evaluation Specialist
 
28 These years do not have to be cumulative. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 95
The Evaluation Specialist will provide technical expertise in the qualitative and quantitative program 
baseline and evaluation methodologies, tools, and data analyses that can be applied to rural social and 
economic development and conflict resolution programs. 
Required Qualifications:
- At least five (5) of experience in conducting and leading field-based evaluations of development 
program and projects Two (2) of these five (5) years can be replaced by experience in monitoring 
development projects. 1 (one) of these years may be in monitoring development projects. 
- Substantial knowledge and experience in evaluation quantitative and qualitative methodologies, 
preferably in the context of rural and alternative development and territorial socio-economic 
conditions in conflict affected areas.
- Demonstrated capability in designing evaluation tools, conducting evaluation interviews, focus 
groups, managing and interpreting qualitative and quantitative data collection, analysis processes 
and utilizing secondary data.
- Experience working with survey statistics, integrating and analyzing different datasets, and 
conducting group interviews/focus groups.
- Ability to manage logistics, including arranging key informant interviews and group 
interviews/focus groups, accommodations, and travel.
- Excellent oral and writing skills in Spanish and English
b) Key personnel are considered essential to the work being performed under this contract. The Evaluation 
Contractor will provide key personnel fully dedicated (100% level of effort) for the term of this contract 
unless otherwise approved by USAID. Each key person will be under the direct supervision of the prime 
Contractor (not under a subcontractor), unless otherwise approved by USAID.
c) Failure to provide key personnel may be considered nonperformance unless such failure is beyond the 
control of the Evaluation Contractor. All individuals listed as Key Personnel must reside in Colombia for 
the duration of the Activity.
d) The Contractor must immediately notify USAID of any key personnel’s departure and the reasons 
therefore. The Contractor must promptly propose a replacement for each vacated position. The 
proposed replacement must possess the qualifications listed above for the corresponding personnel. A 
budget impact statement must also be submitted in sufficient detail to permit evaluation of the impact 
on the program. The Contractor must not replace any of the Key Personnel without the prior written 
approval of USAID
e) USAID reserves the right to adjust the number of Key Personnel during the performance of this contract.
Team members should not have past or current business relationships with HRA or prior phases of the 
Human Rights Program.
11. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
The Evaluation Team is responsible for arranging all logistical support for the evaluation. However, given 
the difficulties of travel within project intervention sites, HRA will be available to provide advice on 
security issues to the Evaluation Team.
12. OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT
The Evaluation Team will report to USAID’s Evaluation Activity Manager, as named above, or 
subsequently delegated. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 96
13. FINAL REPORT FORMAT
The evaluation final report should include an abstract; executive summary; background of the local context 
and the strategies/projects/activities being evaluated; the evaluation purpose and main evaluation 
questions; the methodology or methodologies; the limitations to the evaluation; findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations. For more detail, see “How-To Note: Preparing Evaluation Reports” and ADS 
201mah, USAID Evaluation Report Requirements. An optional evaluation report template is 
available in the Evaluation Toolkit. 
The executive summary should be 2–5 pages in length and summarize the purpose, background of the 
project being evaluated, main evaluation questions, methods, findings, conclusions, and recommendations 
and lessons learned (if applicable). 
The evaluation methodology shall be explained in the report in detail. Limitations to the evaluation shall 
be disclosed in the report, with particular attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation 
methodology (e.g., selection bias, recall bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.)
The annexes to the report shall include: 
● The Evaluation SOW;
● Any statements of difference regarding significant unresolved differences of opinion by funders, 
implementers, and/or members of the evaluation team;
● All data collection and analysis tools used in conducting the evaluation, such as questionnaires, 
checklists, and discussion guides;
● All sources of information, properly identified and listed; and 
● Signed disclosure of conflict of interest forms for all evaluation team members, either attesting 
to a lack of conflicts of interest or describing existing conflicts of.
● Any “statements of difference” regarding significant unresolved differences of opinion by 
funders, implementers, and/or members of the evaluation team.
● Summary information about evaluation team members, including qualifications, experience, and 
role on the team.
In accordance with ADS 201, the contractor will make the final evaluation reports publicly available 
through the Development Experience Clearinghouse within three months of the evaluation’s conclusion.
14. CRITERIA TO ENSURE THE QUALITY OF THE EVALUATION REPORT
Per ADS 201maa, Criteria to Ensure the Quality of the Evaluation Report, draft and final 
evaluation reports will be evaluated against the following criteria to ensure the quality of the evaluation 
report.29
● Evaluation reports should represent a thoughtful, well-researched, and well-organized effort to 
objectively evaluate the strategy, project, or activity. 
● Evaluation reports should be readily understood and should identify key points clearly, distinctly, 
and succinctly. 
 
29 See ADS 201mah, USAID Evaluation Report Requirements and the Evaluation Report Review Checklist from the 
Evaluation Toolkit for additional guidance.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 97
● The Executive Summary of an evaluation report should present a concise and accurate 
statement of the most critical elements of the report.
● Evaluation reports should adequately address all evaluation questions included in the SOW, or 
the evaluation questions subsequently revised and documented in consultation and agreement 
with USAID. 
● Evaluation methodology should be explained in detail and sources of information properly 
identified. 
● Limitations to the evaluation should be adequately disclosed in the report, with particular 
attention to the limitations associated with the evaluation methodology (selection bias, recall 
bias, unobservable differences between comparator groups, etc.).
● Evaluation findings should be presented as analyzed facts, evidence, and data and not based on 
anecdotes, hearsay, or simply the compilation of people’s opinions. 
● Findings and conclusions should be specific, concise, and supported by strong quantitative or 
qualitative evidence.
● If evaluation findings assess person-level outcomes or impact, they should also be separately 
assessed for both males and females. 
If recommendations are included, they should be supported by a specific set of findings and 
should be action-oriented, practical, and specific.
15. OTHER REQUIREMENTS
All quantitative data collected by the evaluation team must be provided in machine-readable, non￾proprietary formats as required by USAID’s Open Data policy (see ADS 579). The data should be 
organized and fully documented for use by those not fully familiar with the project or the evaluation. 
USAID will retain ownership of the survey and all datasets developed.
All modifications to the required elements of the SOW in technical requirements, evaluation questions, 
evaluation team composition, methodology, or timeline, need to be agreed upon in writing by the COR. 
Any revisions should be updated in the SOW that is included as an annex to the Evaluation Report.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 98
ANNEX B: EVALUATION METHODS
Evaluation Approach
This section provides a description of the approaches that are used to answer each of the EQs. The 
Evaluation Design Matrix is included at the end of this Annex.
EQ1: Relevance of HRA Strategies in the Changing Human Rights Context
To answer EQ1, the evaluation team conducted a context analysis to define the changing factors at the 
regional and national levels. This context analysis explains the factors that have contributed to a shifting 
operational context for HRA and defines the variables (e.g., types of human rights violations, population 
groups affected, structural changes, etc.) that track the deteriorating human rights situation. It also 
provides insights into the changing power dynamics due to the expansion and reconfiguration of new 
illegal actors (e.g., GAOs) as well as the relationships between different actors with respect to territorial 
disputes, social control and conflict, and community organizing. Following the context analysis, the 
evaluation team incorporated HRA’s context information and conducted KIIs with sector experts, 
government officials, local CSOs and other actors to gain additional insights on the changing human 
rights context. 
In order to assess the relevance of HRA’s strategies in the defined changing context and whether the 
Activity has adapted to address this changing human rights context, the evaluation team conducted a 
desk review of the HRA activities as they relate to each component and its objectives. This review was 
linked to the context analysis. This desk review was complemented with KIIs of key HRA regional staff, 
GOC officials, municipal leaders, and CSO grantees to assess the relevance of the HRA strategies in the 
changing human rights environment. The evaluation team assessed relevance based on whether the 
Activity is in line with national, departmental, and municipal needs and priorities as they relate to human 
rights and whether it is flexible enough to respond to the changing dynamics. 
EQ2: Improved Understanding of Human Rights Standards 
In order to assess the extent to which Colombian government officials, civil society representatives, and 
beneficiaries in target areas demonstrate an improved understanding of human rights standards and view 
compliance with those standards as the norm, the evaluation team reviewed the topics and trainings 
provided by HRA and conduct KIIs and GDs with training participants to determine whether there has 
been a change in the understanding of human rights. Once the team identified whether and to what 
extent change has occurred, it used contribution analysis to assess the relative contribution of the HRA 
to the observed change.
The contribution analysis involved assessing whether and how much the Activity has contributed, vis-à￾vis other factors, to observed results/changes. To do this, the causal logic model on how HRA activities 
would be expected to improve understanding of human rights standards was mapped out. Then, data 
collected through KIIs and GDs was used to assess whether the anticipated results in the causal logic 
model have been achieved and/or whether other factors external to HRA may have significantly 
influenced the achievement of the results. For example, CSO representatives may demonstrate a clear 
understanding of human rights standards but they may also report various other venues, besides the 
HRA activity, where they get information and support, so other factors may also be contributing to this 
positive effect. 
EQ3: Promoting Sustainability of Entities and Initiatives
To assess the promotion of sustainability at the GOC and civil society levels, the evaluation team 
focused on five domains (i.e. relevant factors and conditions) that are likely to influence the continuation 
of initiatives supported by the Activity: policy, participation and ownership, management and 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 99
organization, technical training, and financial (see Table 6 below).30 In addition, sustainability is more 
likely when an activity, action or behavior is valued by the recipient. A beneficiary assessment from the 
KIIs with GOC officials and civil society organization representatives provided insights into beneficiaries’ 
perceptions of the value of HRA interventions and results. It is worth noting, the sustainability of 
initiatives can only be verified ex-post, so this performance evaluation can only assess factors that 
theoretically would contribute to the sustainability of the initiatives.
Table 6: Sustainability Factors
Factors Description Guiding Questions
Policy
Support is consistent with 
government sectoral policies 
and these policies are 
implemented at the local level.
• Are the initiatives supported by HRA 
consistent with, and supportive of, relevant 
national and local human rights policies?
• Has the State’s response to the protection 
and defense of human rights increased or 
improved at the local government levels?
Participation 
and Ownership
Local stakeholders participate 
in and support the 
interventions, which respond 
to clearly expressed local 
needs.
• Have local stakeholders actively participated 
in the identification and design process of the 
initiatives supported by HRA?
• Are leaders or senior representatives of 
stakeholder groups clearly supportive?
• Are participatory approaches a clear element 
of the implementation strategy?
• Have HRA-supported initiatives been 
implemented independently elsewhere?
Management 
and 
Organization
Local actors are equipped 
with management and 
organizational skills to be 
adaptive and resilient. The 
project builds on local 
management structure rather 
than establishing new or 
parallel structures. 
• Do the local entities/organizations have the 
institutional and absorptive capacity to 
support the sustainability of the initiatives 
supported by HRA?
• Is the institutional structure sufficient and 
flexible to withstand turnover or does it 
depend on specific individuals?
• Has a phase-out strategy been included or 
discussed with local stakeholders?
Technical 
Training 
The project assessed the 
technical expertise (non￾managerial or financial skills) 
of project stakeholders and 
developed training that 
addressed these needs
• Were the local needs for information 
dissemination and awareness training 
assessed in the design of the initiatives? 
• Has a training strategy been developed to 
address sustainability issues?
Financial 
Local institutions are capable 
and committed to continued 
operation in core capacities 
even if external funding is 
withdrawn
• Is it clear how local organizations will access 
financial resources from “own” sources 
during and after implementation? 
• Are there viable alternative sources of 
financing that can be accessed?
 
30 AusAID (2000). Promoting Practical Sustainability. https://www.oecd.org/development/evaluation/dcdndep/31950216.pdf 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 100
EQ4: Effects on Beneficiaries and Vulnerable Groups
In order to assess the effects from HRA on the beneficiaries of the organizations supported by the 
Activity, the evaluation team mapped out the causal logic model on how the HRA activities would be 
expected to affect different beneficiaries, including human rights defenders and social leaders, LGBTI 
persons, women, local journalists, youth and ethnic communities in conflict affected municipalities 
covered by HRA. Once the anticipated effects were mapped out, the evaluation team conducted KIIs
and GDs to determine what has changed since the initiation of the HRA. These interviews and GDs also 
provided insights into unintended or unanticipated effects. Once the team identified whether changes 
occurred, they conducted a contribution analysis, as described under EQ2, to assess the relative 
contribution of HRA to the observed changes. 
EQ5: Strategies for Objective of Increased Investigations and Prosecutions of Human 
Rights Violations
In order to assess whether HRA’s strategies are effective and adequate for the objective of increased 
investigations and prosecutions of human rights violations (e.g., homicides, forced displacement, 
kidnapping, child recruitment, disappearances, sexual violence, among others), the evaluation team 
conducted KIIs and secondary sources to determine whether there has been an increase in the 
investigations and prosecutions of human rights violations since the start of the program, per USAID’s 
request. Given the longer timeframe needed observe changes in the number of investigations and 
prosecutions, it is unlikely that there will be a measureable change in less than two years of HRA 
implementation. Thus, the evaluation team also focused on triangulating perceptions and insights about 
HRA’s strategies from different relevant stakeholders inside the AGO as well as stakeholders external 
to the AGO but also providing support to this government entity.
In order to assess the sub-question of whether HRA is effectively coordinating with other programs or 
international organizations working on impunity, the evaluation team conducted KIIs with HRA staff, 
USAID, and other programs such as UNOHCHR and USAID’s Justice for Sustainable Peace activity to 
inquire about processes for coordination and anticipated results. 
EQ6: Achievements, Bottlenecks, and Lessons Learned
The findings, conclusions, and recommendations from the other evaluation questions serve as the basis 
for identifying many of the achievements, bottlenecks, and lessons learned to answer EQ6. For HRA’s 
Component 1 and Component 3, the achievements were in large part based on an analysis of findings 
for EQ2 and EQ5, respectively. However, the evaluation team did not limit its lines of inquiry and 
analysis to those two question categories. The broad language of EQ6 provides a venue for the 
provision of bottlenecks and lessons learned that may not fit neatly within the parameters of the other 
two questions. Thus, a Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats (SWOT) analysis was conducted 
on the implementation of the three components and its cross-cutting themes. This conceptual 
framework integrates quantitative metrics from primary and secondary sources (e.g. reporting 
documents and publicly available contextual and demographic data) and qualitative information from key 
informants and high-level decision-makers to identify strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats. 
Observation and analysis by the evaluation team’s human rights experts was also an essential part of 
identifying important lessons learned for future human rights programming. 
Data Collection Methods
Key Informant Interviews
The evaluation team conducted face-to-face in-depth interviews with a range of HRA stakeholders at the 
national, departmental, and municipal levels, including individuals who have knowledge of and direct 
involvement with the HRA activities, individuals who are experts on the human rights context in 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 101
Colombia, and individuals who may have indirect involvement with the HRA activities but are leaders in 
their municipalities. The purpose of these interviews was to gain a qualitative understanding of the 
perspectives, experiences, and opinions from various HRA stakeholders concerning the relevance of the 
strategies, underlying interactions, and contributions of HRA. KIIs are also especially appropriate for 
addressing sensitive topics that people might be reluctant to discuss in a group setting. The semi￾structured nature of the interviews maintained a balance between keeping the interviewee on the topic 
of interest and allowing sufficient scope for a free-flowing discussion to take place. The semi-structured 
interviews primarily relied on open-ended questions. Information derived from semi-structured 
interviews was used to address all of the evaluation questions. 
The evaluation team designed KII guides linked to the EQs and stakeholder categories. This process 
consisted in first creating an evaluation framework where research questions were derived from each 
EQ. From those research questions, sub-questions and themes were defined. Then the different 
stakeholder categories were linked to the sub-questions. This resulted in KIIs guides that covered key 
themes to answer each EQ and ensured that multiple information sources were linked to each EQ. The 
KII guides were then prepared for each stakeholder category, covering the relevant themes from the 
evaluation framework. While the guides vary based on stakeholder category, most had some variation of 
the following sections:
• Perception of human rights context and changing dynamics 
• Understanding of human rights issues and standards 
• Respondent’s relationship to HRA activities
• Participation in HRA activities and perceived benefits or effects
• Experience with HRA activity coordination and outreach
• Relationship with other activities, stakeholders or other factors that could affect HRA outcomes
• Sustainability dimensions
• Bottlenecks and recommendations for improvement 
The selection of KII respondents was done in consultation with HRA to identify the most relevant 
respondents within the government entities and organizations. The list of government entities and 
organizations was compiled with HRA’s support and supplemented by the evaluation team through the 
review of HRA’s ongoing activities, work plans, and contract deliverables. HRA provided contact 
information for all of the selected respondents. While the evaluation team coordinated with the HRA 
regional advisors on logistics and scheduling, the evaluation team called all respondents directly to 
schedule the KIIs. The evaluation team reached a 96 percent response rate from the initial list of 
respondents. 
Group Discussions
In addition to semi-structured interviews, the evaluation team collected data through group discussions 
where the key objective of the research was to identify why classes of respondents espouse a specific 
view and to explore group norms. GDs were mainly used to understand the process and results 
associated with increased understanding of human rights standards (EQ2) and the effects on 
beneficiaries of the organizations supported by the Activity (EQ4). GDs allowed respondents to reflect 
upon and make sense of a shared experience, as well as allowed them to probe one another’s 
understanding in a where the evaluation team could develop an in-depth understanding of the key
drivers and barriers behind the impacts that have been experienced. These group approaches also allow 
the evaluation team to validate evidence obtained through other sources, such as KIIs and HRA 
document review. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 102
GDs were led by a member of the evaluation team, who ensured that key areas of interest were 
covered and fully documented while allowing discussion to flow freely, intervening when required to 
ensure all participants have an opportunity to voice their opinions. The evaluation team prepared semi￾structured GD guides that cover key discussion topics identified through the evaluation framework 
process described above, as well as situational vignettes which describe a hypothetical situation to which 
participants will respond thereby revealing their knowledge, perceptions, values, social norms, and 
impressions of the events.31
The vignettes were constructed as locally relevant short stories about a hypothetical person 
experiencing a situation where their human rights are threatened or violated. Participants were then 
asked what they thought of the situation, what they would do if they were the person in the vignette, 
whether there would be any positive or negative implications for their actions, and how frequent this 
type of situation occurs in their community. These vignettes provided an opportunity for participants to 
reveal their knowledge and perceptions about human rights and about the mechanisms to report human 
rights violations in a more practical way rather than being directly asked what they know about human 
rights standards and enforcement of these standards. It also provided insights into the social norms 
related to these types of events and the perceived risks and consequences for their actions. The 
vignettes also provided a less personal and therefore less threatening way of exploring sensitive topics. It 
also allowed participants to voice their opinions on topics which they may not have had a personal 
experience. In order to reduce social desirability bias, where participants respond with answers of what 
should be done rather than what they would do, participants were asked to respond from characters’ 
perspective as if they were that person in the vignette situation, rather than on the basis of their own 
lives. The responses to these vignettes were not used to determine the actions that participants would 
take, but rather to assess their knowledge on human rights issues and perceived risks and social norms 
tied to them. 
GD participant recruitment was done in collaboration with HRA and CSO grantees. While a random 
selection of beneficiaries was proposed in the Evaluation Design Report, in practice the evaluation team 
was not able to accomplish this. The grantee CSOs did not agree to provide anonymized lists of their 
beneficiaries. The stated reasons included: security concerns since their beneficiaries are vulnerable 
populations; internal organization regulations that prohibit them from sharing beneficiary data; and a 
preference for contacting their own beneficiaries directly. The CSOs refused the proposed random 
selection process even after the evaluation team explained that the random selection could be made 
without sharing all of their data by creating a code key and then only sending the necessary data of the 
selected beneficiaries. Instead of random selection, the evaluation team coordinated with the CSOs by 
indicating the profiles of the required persons. For each GD, ten beneficiaries were invited to participate 
in order to obtain the attendance of at least eight beneficiaries. The evaluation team reimbursed 
participants’ transportation, lodging, and food expenses, when necessary, due to long distances that 
some had to travel from their homes to participate in the discussion (this occurred primarily with the 
indigenous communities). All GDs included refreshments during the session. 
Privacy and Confidentiality
The evaluation obtained informed consent from all respondents before carrying out any KIIs or GDs. 
Respondents were read a consent form in Spanish. Careful attention was paid to ensure that 
respondents understood that their responses would be used for research purposes and were expected 
to be made public without compromising their confidentiality and anonymity. The evaluation team 
maintained high standards in methods, quality, and data security throughout the entire evaluation period. 
 
31 Hughes, R., & Huby, M. (2012). The construction and interpretation of vignettes in social research. Social Work and Social 
Sciences Review, 11(1), 36-51.
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 103
All data collection activities adhered to the professional standards of the American Evaluation 
Association and all data were handled in such a manner as to protect the identities of informants in any 
situations where their comments could potentially have a negative impact on their security. The 
evaluation team safeguarded the confidentiality and anonymity of GD and KII respondents. 
Table 7 shows the Evaluation Design Matrix summarizing the evaluation approach, data collection 
methods, and limitations. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 104
Table 7: Evaluation Design Matrix
EQ Focus Information Required and 
Sources Scope and Methodology Limitations 
What the Evaluation 
will be likely allowed 
to say
1 Relevance of 
HRA strategies in 
changing human 
rights context
• Desk review of project 
documents and 
performance data; 
• KIIs with USAID and HRA 
• KIIs with selected human 
rights experts, GOC 
officials, department and 
municipal officials, and 
CSOs representatives
• Context analysis at the 
national, departmental, 
and municipal levels
• Pre-Current 
comparison: HRA 
activity cataloguing and 
comparison of work 
plans and actual 
implementation
• Relevance assessment
• Complex 
environment 
resulting in changing 
context with multiple 
actors and 
relationships
Whether the HRA 
strategies remain 
relevant to the changing 
human rights context 
and if they have been 
able to adapt and 
respond to the changing 
context, and if not, then 
why not.
2 Improved 
understanding of 
human rights 
standards
• KIIs with trained public 
officials, CSO grantees, 
and FENALPER.
• Group discussions with 
trained beneficiary groups
• Review of training 
materials 
• Site visit to Escuelas de Paz
• Pre – current 
comparison
• Contribution analysis
• Limited baseline 
information
• Recall bias from 
respondents
• Attribution to HRA 
is not possible
Whether government 
officials, civil society 
representatives, and 
beneficiaries report 
improved understanding 
of human rights 
standards and whether 
there is evidence to 
support HRA’s
contribution to this 
change
3 Promoting 
sustainability of 
entities and 
initiatives
• KIIs with USAID and HRA 
• KIIs with GOC and CSO 
grantees
• Site visits
• Sustainability criteria 
assessment
• Beneficiary assessment
• The presence or 
absence of the 
domains identified 
may not be necessary 
nor sufficient to 
result in sustainability
• Sustainability of an 
intervention can only 
be verified ex-post
Whether there is 
evidence to support that 
HRA is promoting 
factors that would 
theoretically contribute 
to the sustainability of 
the initiatives it supports 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 105
EQ Focus Information Required and 
Sources Scope and Methodology Limitations 
What the Evaluation 
will be likely allowed 
to say
4 Effects on 
beneficiaries and 
vulnerable 
groups
• KIIs with HR defenders, 
social leaders, and local 
journalists 
• Group discussions with 
vulnerable groups (LGBTI, 
women, ethnic 
communities, youth)
• Causal tracing
• Pre – current 
comparison
• Contribution analysis
• Limited baseline 
information
• Recall bias from 
respondents
• Attribution to HRA 
is not possible
What intended and 
unintended effects are 
reported by 
beneficiaries of 
vulnerable groups and 
whether there is 
evidence to support 
HRA’s contribution to 
these changes
5 Strategies for 
objective of 
increased 
investigations and 
prosecutions of 
human rights 
violations
• Third-party data analysis 
on human rights violations 
and investigation / 
prosecution trends
• KIIs GOC, municipal 
leaders 
• KIIs with HRA staff, 
USAID, other programs 
such as UNOHCHR
• Pre – current 
comparison
• Bottleneck analysis
• Timeframe too short 
to expect measurable 
change in this result 
given HRA’s limited 
sphere of influence
• Most of the activities 
under this 
component depend 
on the AGO
Whether HRA’s 
strategies are adequate 
for the Component 3 
objective and what 
might be some 
bottlenecks for fulfilling 
the deliverables.
Whether and how HRA 
is coordinating with 
other donors / 
programs in this area
6 Achievements, 
bottlenecks, and 
lessons learned
• Desk review of project 
documents and analysis of 
performance data
• KIIs with HRA staff, 
USAID, GOC and 
municipality counterparts, 
CSO grantees
• Data compiled to answer 
all other evaluation 
questions
• Beneficiary assessment
• SWOT analysis
• Evidence Synthesis
• The evaluation team 
cannot visit all 40 
municipalities, so 
might miss some 
specific cases
What the achievements, 
bottlenecks, and lessons 
learned are for the 
three components and 
cross-cutting tasks
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 106
ANNEX C: MUNICIPALITY CHARACTERISTICS AND LIST
The 13 municipalities selected as part of the evaluation sample are highlighted in blue. In Meta, Mesetas and La Macarena were originally selected; 
however the week of the field visit there was no air access in La Macarena as part of the landing strip was closed for maintenance and the other 
part was being used to respond to a forest fire. Thus, La Macarena was replaced with Vistahermosa. The municipalities in underlined italics
correspond to the ten new municipalities added to HRA’s coverage area after the Activity closed its office in Norte de Santander and decided to 
not open an office in Arauca.
Figure 6: HRA Municipality Characteristics
Department Municipality PDET
Homicide 
Rate 
(2015)
Homicide 
Rate 
(2016)
Forced 
Displace￾ment 
(2016)
Forced 
Displace￾ment 
(2017)
FARC 
Demob.
Zone
Indigenous 
Population 
(2005)
Afro￾Colombian 
Population 
(2005)
Pop.
Urban 
Pop.
(%)
# of 
HRA 
Grants
ANTIOQUIA
Anorí Yes 22 10 129 67 Yes 0% 2% 17,737 40% 2
Briceño Yes 23 17 436 161 No 0% 11% 8,673 30% 2
Ituango Yes 17 5 296 218 Yes 1% 3% 19,919 29% 5
Remedios Yes N/A N/A 196 205 Yes 0% 15% 31,333 37% 0
Segovia Yes 67 56 626 484 No 1% 16% 41,711 79% 4
Valdivia Yes 25 25 264 439 No 0% 3% 23,931 30% 2
El Bagre Yes 45 38 2,580 552 No 2% 16% 50,557 52% 3
Cáceres Yes 27 21 612 431 No 2% 20% 41,012 23% 6
Caucasia Yes 45 37 651 451 No 1% 7% 120,479 83% 4
Nechí Yes 8 2 502 390 No 0% 23% 28,585 54% 3
Tarazá Yes 27 20 544 572 No 0% 6% 46,343 65% 4
Zaragoza Yes 29 32 523 200 No 5% 31% 31,884 45% 3
CÓRDOBA
Tierralta Yes 25 32 681 404 Yes 4% 20% 107,302 44% 5
Montelíbano Yes 17 25 355 262 No 2% 16% 86,858 79% 3
Puerto 
Libertador Yes 10 12 982 396 No 9% 1% 52,371 41% 3
TOLIMA
Ataco Yes 10 6 176 61 No 3% 10% 22,752 24% 3
Chaparral Yes 9 11 471 77 No 5% 0% 47,344 57% 3
Cajamarca No N/A N/A 189 41 No 0% 0% 19,611 51% 1
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 107
Department Municipality PDET
Homicide 
Rate 
(2015)
Homicide 
Rate 
(2016)
Forced 
Displace￾ment 
(2016)
Forced 
Displace￾ment 
(2017)
FARC 
Demob.
Zone
Indigenous 
Population 
(2005)
Afro￾Colombian 
Population 
(2005)
Pop.
Urban 
Pop.
(%)
# of 
HRA 
Grants
Ortega No N/A N/A 169 59 No 41% 0% 32,256 25% 0
Planadas Yes 13 8 518 90 Yes 5% 3% 30,066 26% 2
Rioblanco Yes 11 6 361 48 No 3% 1% 24,244 19% 3
CAUCA
Corinto Yes 40 31 288 131 No 31% 19% 33,107 40% 4
Santander de 
Quilichao Yes 72 77 231 126 No 19% 33% 97,965 58% 6
Caloto Yes 10 13 61 62 No 23% 63% 17,736 26% 3
Buenos Aires Yes N/A N/A 123 78 Yes 16% 69% 34,037 8% 1
Caldono Yes N/A N/A 71 21 Yes 71% 0% 33,910 4% 0
Miranda Yes 13 16 92 133 Yes 17% 53% 41,925 73% 5
NARIÑO 
Tumaco Yes 130 147 5,282 3,683 No 4% 63% 212,692 57% 6
Barbacoas Yes N/A N/A 1,157 630 Yes 12% 60% 40,429 43% 0
Francisco 
Pizarro Yes N/A N/A 214 547 No 0% 65% 16,461 51% 0
META
Mesetas Yes 5 1 42 79 Yes 2% 3% 11,481 34% 3
Uribe Yes 14 3 69 77 No 1% 0% 17,329 24% 1
La Macarena Yes 4 2 208 116 Yes 0% 0% 35,766 13% 2
El Castillo No N/A N/A 25 35 No 0% 1% 6,184 34% 0
Puerto Rico Yes 9 9 151 75 No 1% 3% 33,623 43% 1
Vistahermosa Yes 22 10 174 83 Yes 0% 1% 26,790 37% 3
CAQUETÁ
Cartagena del 
Chaira Yes 17 7 456 272 No 0% 2% 34,953 37% 4
San Vicente 
del Caguan Yes 34 33 1,051 516 Yes 0% 0% 71,704 64% 5
Valparaiso Yes N/A N/A 125 40 No 2% 5% 11,772 33% 0
La Montañita Yes 4 4 315 109 Yes 0% 9% 24,140 21% 6
Sources: 
PDET (Agencia de Renovación del Territorio); Homicide rates (National Police data - HRA baseline); Forced displacements (Registro Único de la Unidad de Victimas); FARC 
demobilization zone; Indigenous and Afro-Colombian populations (Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística - DANE); Population and Urban population (DANE).
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 108
Figure 7: HRA Municipalities
Department Municipalities HRA Office Location
Antioquia
Anorí
Medellín
Briceño
Ituango
Remedios
Segovia
Valdivia
El Bagre
Caucasia
Cáceres
Caucasia
Nechí
Tarazá
Zaragoza
Córdoba
Tierralta
Montelíbano Montería
Puerto Libertador
Tolima
Ataco
Ibagué
Chaparral
Cajamarca
Ortega
Planadas
Rioblanco
Cauca
Corinto
Popayán
Santander de Quilichao
Caloto
Buenos Aires
Caldono
Miranda
Nariño
Tumaco
Barbacoas Tumaco
Francisco Pizarro
Meta
Mesetas
Villavicencio
Uribe
La Macarena
El Castillo
Puerto Rico
Vistahermosa
Caquetá
Cartagena del Chairá
Florencia San Vicente del Caguán
Valparaiso
La Montañita
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 109
ANNEX D: SOURCES OF INFORMATION
The evaluation team reviewed the following documentation provided by HRA:
• Base Task Order and Modifications 
• Program Annual Work plans 
• Strategic Review
• Monitoring and Evaluation Plan 
• Annual and Quarterly Reports 
• Biweekly Highlights and Quarterly Snapshots 
• CSO Grants and GOC Projects’ Concept Papers 
• Gender and Vulnerable Populations Strategy
• HRA Baseline Report
• HRA’s deliverables tracker and performance indicators
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Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 110
List of Interviews Conducted
# Date Department Municipality Entity Stakeholder 
Category Sex
1 2/13/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Human Rights Activity HRA HQ F
2 2/14/2018 Tolima Ibagué Secretary of Social 
Inclusion
Departmental 
Government M
3 2/14/2018 Tolima Ibagué Secretary of the Interior Departmental 
Government M
4 2/14/2018 Tolima Ibagué Human Rights Activity HRA Regional F / F
5 2/15/2018 Tolima Chaparral Police Municipal Government M
6 2/15/2018 Tolima Chaparral Family Commissary Municipal Government F
7 2/15/2018 Tolima Chaparral Personería Municipal Government F
8 2/15/2018 Tolima Chaparral Municipal Government 
Secretary Municipal Government M
9 2/15/2018 Tolima Chaparral Casa Teatro Antonio 
Camacho CSO (grantees) F
10 2/15/2018 Tolima Chaparral Fundación Ideas para la 
Paz CSO (grantees) F
11 2/15/2018 Tolima Ibagué Ombudsmen's Office -
EWS
Departmental 
Government M
12 2/16/2018 Tolima Cajamarca Family Commissary Municipal Government F
13 2/16/2018 Tolima Cajamarca Municipal Government 
Secretary Municipal Government M
14 2/16/2018 Tolima Cajamarca Victims' Liaison Municipal Government M
15 2/16/2018 Tolima Ibagué Office of Human Rights Departmental 
Government F
16 2/20/2018 Bogotá Bogotá IGO National Government F
17 2/20/2018 Bogotá Bogotá CPDH National Government F
18 2/20/2018 Caquetá Florencia Red Caquetá Paz CSO (grantees) F
19 2/21/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Fundación Ideas para la 
Paz CSO (grantees) M
20 2/21/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Corporación Humanas CSO (grantees) F
21 2/21/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Fundación Escuelas de 
Paz CSO (grantees) F
22 2/21/2018 Bogotá Bogotá CREER CSO (grantees) F
23 2/21/2018 Caquetá Florencia Human Rights Activity HRA Regional M
24 2/21/2018 Caquetá Florencia Ombudsmen's Office Departmental 
Government M
25 2/22/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Ombudsmen's Office -
EWS National Government M
26 2/22/2018 Bogotá Bogotá MOE National Government M
27 2/22/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Colombia Diversa CSO (grantees) F
28 2/22/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Comisión Colombiana de 
Juristas CSO (grantees) F
29 2/22/2018 Caquetá San Vicente 
de Caguán Municipal Council Municipal Government M
30 2/22/2018 Caquetá San Vicente 
de Caguán Personería Municipal Government F
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 111
# Date Department Municipality Entity Stakeholder 
Category Sex
31 2/22/2018 Caquetá San Vicente 
de Caguán Victim's Liaison Municipal Government F
32 2/23/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Viva la Ciudadanía CSO (grantees) M
33 2/23/2018 Caquetá Florencia Corpomanigua CSO (grantees) M
34 2/23/2018 Caquetá Florencia Education Secretary Departmental 
Government
M
35 2/23/2018 Caquetá Florencia LGBTI Liaison Departmental 
Government M
36 2/23/2018 Caquetá La Montañita Personería Municipal Government M
37 2/27/2018 Cordoba Montería Human Rights Activity HRA Regional F / F
38 2/27/2018 Cordoba Montería Women's social 
organizations network Social Leader F
39 2/28/2018 Cordoba Tierralta Guarantees Roundtable Social Leader M
40 2/28/2018 Cordoba Tierralta Victims' Roundtable Social Leader M
41 2/28/2018 Cordoba Tierralta Hermanas Misioneras de 
la Madre Laura
CSO (grantees) F
42 2/28/2018 Cordoba Tierralta Municipal Government 
Secretary Municipal Government M
43 2/28/2018 Nariño Tumaco Human Rights Activity HRA Regional F
44 2/28/2018 Nariño Tumaco Diócesis de Tumaco CSO (grantees) F
45 2/28/2018 Nariño Tumaco Concejo Comunitario Rio 
Gualajo CSO (grantees) M
46 2/28/2018 Nariño Tumaco Municipal Government 
Secretary Municipal Government F
47 2/28/2018 Nariño Tumaco Personería Municipal Government F
48 3/1/2018 Nariño Tumaco Ombudsmen's Office Municipal Government M
49 3/1/2018 Antioquia Caucasia Human Rights Activity HRA Regional F / M
50 3/1/2018 Antioquia Caucasia Caribe Afirmativo CSO (grantees) M
51 3/1/2018 Antioquia Caucasia Corporación Rio Abajo CSO (grantees) M
52 3/1/2018 Antioquia Caucasia Fundación Oleoducto 
Colombia Social Leader M
53 3/1/2018 Antioquia Caucasia Personería Municipal Government F
54 3/1/2018 Antioquia Caucasia Gender Equity Liaison Municipal Government F
55 3/1/2018 Antioquia Caucasia Municipal Government 
Secretary Municipal Government M
56 3/1/2018 Antioquia Caucasia Victims' Liaison Municipal Government F
57 3/2/2018 Cordoba Montería Office of Human Rights Departmental 
Government F
58 3/2/2018 Bogotá Bogotá CPDH National Government M
59 3/2/2018 Bogotá Bogotá USAID USAID M
60 3/2/2018 Bogotá Bogotá USAID USAID F
61 3/2/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Human Rights Activity HRA HQ M
62 3/2/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Human Rights Activity HRA HQ M
63 3/2/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Human Rights Activity HRA HQ F
64 3/4/2018 Cordoba Montería ARN Departmental 
Government F
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 112
# Date Department Municipality Entity Stakeholder 
Category Sex
65 3/5/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Círculo de Estudios 
Culturales y Políticos CSO (grantees) F
66 3/5/2018 Cauca Popayán Women's Secretary Departmental 
Government F
67 3/5/2018 Cauca Popayán
Technical Office of 
International 
Cooperation
Departmental 
Government F
68 3/5/2018 Cauca Popayán Human Rights Activity HRA Regional F / M
69 3/5/2018 Meta Vistahermosa Civil society 
representative Social Leader F
70 3/5/2018 Meta Vistahermosa Civil society 
representative Social Leader F
71 3/5/2018 Meta Vistahermosa Personería Municipal Government M
72 3/6/2018 Cauca Buenos Aires Asociación Municipal de 
Mujeres - ASOM CSO (grantees) F
73 3/6/2018 Cauca Caloto Victim's Liaison Municipal Government M
74 3/6/2018 Cauca Caloto Women's Secretary Municipal Government F
75 3/6/2018 Cauca Caloto Personería Municipal Government M
76 3/6/2018 Cauca Caloto Diploma course 
participant - Teacher Social Leader M
77 3/6/2018 Meta Mesetas Municipal Government 
Secretary Municipal Government F
78 3/6/2018 Meta Mesetas Secretary of Social 
Participation Municipal Government F
79 3/6/2018 Meta Vistahermosa Municipal Government 
Secretary Municipal Government F
80 3/7/2018 Cauca Santander de 
Quilichao
Municipal Government 
Secretary Municipal Government F
81 3/7/2018 Cauca Santander de 
Quilichao Personería Municipal Government F
82 3/7/2018 Cauca Santander de 
Quilichao Indigenous social leader Social Leader M
83 3/7/2018 Cauca Santander de 
Quilichao AMBULUA CSO (grantees) F
84 3/7/2018 Cauca Santander de 
Quilichao Fundamor CSO (grantees) F
85 3/7/2018 Meta Villavicencio CIPRUNNA Departmental 
Government F
86 3/7/2018 Meta Villavicencio Women and Gender 
Equity Secretary
Departmental 
Government F
87 3/7/2018 Meta Villavicencio Secretary of Victims, 
Human Rights, and Peace
Departmental 
Government F
88 3/7/2018 Meta Villavicencio
Technical Office of 
International 
Cooperation
Departmental 
Government F
89 3/7/2018 Meta Villavicencio Ombudsmen's Office -
EWS
Departmental 
Government M
90 3/7/2018 Meta Villavicencio Human Rights Activity HRA Regional F
91 3/7/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Police National Government M
92 3/9/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Police National Government F
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 113
# Date Department Municipality Entity Stakeholder 
Category Sex
93 3/9/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Human Rights Activity HRA HQ F
94 3/9/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Human Rights Activity HRA HQ F
95 3/12/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Human Rights Activity HRA HQ F
96 3/12/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Human Rights Activity HRA HQ F
97 3/12/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Human Rights Activity HRA HQ F
98 3/12/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Human Rights Activity HRA HQ F
99 3/12/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Human Rights Activity HRA HQ F
100 3/12/2018 Bogotá Bogotá CODHES CSO (grantees) M
101 3/13/2018 Bogotá Bogotá USAID / JSP USAID / JSP M
102 3/13/2018 Meta Villavicencio LIMPAL CSO (grantees) F
103 3/13/2018 Antioquia Remedios Victims' Roundtable Social Leader M
104 3/13/2018 Antioquia Remedios Victims' Roundtable Social Leader F
105 3/13/2018 Antioquia Remedios Personería Municipal Government M
106 3/13/2018 Antioquia Remedios Municipal Government 
Secretary Municipal Government F
107 3/13/2018 Antioquia Ituango Asociación de Mujeres 
Ideales de Ituango CSO (grantees) F
108 3/13/2018 Antioquia Ituango Red de Mujeres Unidas 
del Norte Social Leader F
109 3/13/2018 Antioquia Ituango Beneficiary - Corporación 
Paz y Democracia Social Leader M
110 3/13/2018 Antioquia Ituango Family Commissary Municipal Government F
111 3/14/2018 Antioquia Ituango Personería Municipal Government M
112 3/14/2018 Antioquia Segovia Municipal Government 
Secretary Municipal Government M
113 3/14/2018 Antioquia Segovia Personería Municipal Government M
114 3/14/2018 Antioquia Segovia Mining Roundtable - IPC 
beneficiary Social Leader M
115 3/15/2018 Antioquia Segovia Community Action Board Social Leader F
116 3/15/2018 Antioquia Segovia Corporación Tapir 
Dorado CSO (grantees) M
117 3/15/2018 Bogotá Bogotá FENALPER CSO (grantees) M
118 3/15/2018 Antioquia Medellín Human Rights Activity HRA Regional F
119 3/15/2018 Antioquia Medellín Human Rights Activity HRA Regional F
120 3/15/2018 Antioquia Medellín Education Secretary Departmental 
Government M
121 3/15/2018 Antioquia Medellín Women's Secretary Departmental 
Government F
122 3/15/2018 Antioquia Medellín Office of Human Rights Departmental 
Government M
123 3/15/2018 Antioquia Medellín UNDP International
Organization F
124 3/15/2018 Antioquia Medellín Organización Indígena de 
Antioquia CSO (grantees) F
125 3/15/2018 Antioquia Medellín IPC CSO (grantees) F
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 114
# Date Department Municipality Entity Stakeholder 
Category Sex
126 3/15/2018 Antioquia Medellín Corporación Paz y 
Democracia CSO (grantees) F
127 3/16/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Fundación para la 
Libertad de Prensa CSO (grantees) M
128 3/18/2018 Bogotá Bogotá UNOHCHR International 
Organization M
129 3/18/2018 Bogotá Bogotá UNOHCHR International 
Organization F / F
130 3/20/2018 Bogotá Bogotá CINEP CSO (grantees) F
131 3/20/2018 Bogotá Bogotá Ombudsmen's Office -
EWS National Government M
132 3/20/2018 Bogotá Bogotá National Protection Unit National Government M
133 3/22/2018 Bogotá Bogotá AGO National Government F
134 4/3/2018 Bogotá Bogotá MOI National Government F
135 4/16/2018 Bogotá Bogotá AGO National Government F
136 4/26/2018 Bogotá Bogotá AGO National Government F
List of Group Discussions Conducted
# Date Department Municipality Beneficiary Group HRA Grantee
1 2/15/2018 Tolima Chaparral Youth Casa Teatro Antonio 
Camacho
2 2/15/2018 Tolima Chaparral Social leaders ---
3 2/22/2018 Caquetá San Vicente 
de Caguán Social leaders ---
4 2/28/2018 Nariño Tumaco Women (Afro-Colombian) Círculo de Estudios 
Culturales y Políticos
5 2/28/2018 Cordoba Tierralta Women (Indigenous) Hermanas Misioneras de la 
Madre Laura
6 3/1/2018 Antioquia Caucasia Indigenous population Corporación Rio Abajo
7 3/1/2018 Nariño Tumaco Youth (Afro-Colombian) Diócesis de Tumaco
8 3/1/2018 Nariño Tumaco LGBTI (Afro-Colombian) Fundación Arcoíris
9 3/5/2018 Meta Vistahermosa Women LIMPAL
10 3/6/2018 Meta Mesetas Social leaders ---
11 3/6/2018 Cauca Buenos Aires Women (Afro-Colombian 
and indigenous) ASOM
12 3/7/2018 Cauca Santander de 
Quilichao Youth Fundamor
13 3/14/2018 Antioquia Ituango Women Asociación de Mujeres 
Ideales de Ituango
14 3/14/2018 Antioquia Segovia Indigenous population OIA
15 3/15/2018 Antioquia Segovia LGBTI Caribe Afirmativo
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 115
ANNEX E: DATA COLLECTION INSTRUMENTS
Key Informant Interview Guides
GUÍA DE ENTREVISTAS
Presentación de la actividad
Buen día/tarde. Muchas gracias por permitirnos realizar esta entrevista. Mi nombre es ____________ y 
hago parte del Centro Nacional de Consultoría, una empresa privada con sede en Bogotá dedicada al 
estudio de los mercados, la opinión y las políticas públicas. Actualmente nos encontramos realizando un 
estudio sobre el bienestar y calidad de vida de la población en diferentes zonas del país, sobre cómo está 
cambiando el contexto de derechos humanos en su departamento y para documentar los aprendizajes y 
recomendaciones para el mejoramiento y orientación del Programa de Derechos Humanos de USAID.
Para el estudio es muy importante conocer sus opiniones. Esta entrevista es confidencial y sus opiniones 
solo van a hacer usadas para efectos de la evaluación.
¿Me permite grabar la entrevista? ¿Podemos comenzar?
Para empezar por favor indíqueme cuál es su cargo y hace cuánto tiempo lleva en el mismo.
GOBERNACIÓN
Contexto y Relevancia del Programa
1. ¿Cree que han habido cambios en el contexto de derechos humanos en su departamento desde la 
firma del acuerdo de paz? Si es así, ¿cuáles son esos cambios?
2. En su departamento, ¿cuáles son las principales afectaciones/ violaciones a los derechos humanos 
que se presentan?
3. ¿Hay alguna(s) población en particular que usted considere esté siendo más afectada?
4. ¿Qué retos ha implicado para su administración estos cambios en el contexto de DDHH?
5. Desde la perspectiva de las competencias de la Gobernación, ¿han surgido nuevas obligaciones en 
materia de prevención y protección para la entidad una vez firmado el acuerdo de paz? 
6. ¿Cuál cree que es el objetivo principal del PDH?
Apoyo del PDH
7. ¿Me puede mencionar algunas actividades que haya realizado su Gobernación de la mano del PDH? 
¿Cuáles resaltan o han sido más relevantes? ¿Por qué?
• ¿Cómo decidieron enfocarse en estas actividades? ¿Cuál fue el proceso?
• ¿Estas actividades fueron diseñadas y concretadas de manera conjunta?
8. ¿Han implementado las iniciativas o actividades creadas por el PDH en otros municipios por su 
cuenta?
9. ¿Usted cree que el apoyo del PDH se alinea con las necesidades de este departamento?
10. ¿Que beneficios ha sacado la Gobernacion del apoyo del PDH?
• ¿Considera que el apoyo del PDH ha contribuido a visibilizar la situación de derechos 
humanos en su departamento? ¿Como? o ¿porque no?
• ¿Considera que el apoyo del PDH ha contribuido a implementar las políticas nacionales en 
su departamento? ¿Como? o ¿porque no?
• ¿Qué otros aspectos debería priorizar o tener en cuenta el PDH para mejor la situación de 
DDHH en su departamento? ¿Y para hacer frente a los cambios identificados?
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 116
11. Si no hablaron de esto antes: ¿Han recibido asistencia técnica del PDH?
12. ¿Cree que esta asistencia técnica ha fortalecido a su entidad? ¿De qué manera?
• ¿En qué área de la gestión de la entidad se han mejorado las capacidades como resultado del 
apoyo del PDH?
• ¿Qué competencias, capacidades ha ganado gracias al apoyo del PDH?
• ¿Ha habido algún cambio en sus actividades como producto de esta asistencia técnica?
Conocimiento de DDHH y su aplicación 
13. En los últimos dos años, ¿usted ha asistido o ha recibido alguna capacitación sobre temas de DDHH 
de parte del PDH? ¿De otro programa, entidad u organización?
14. Antes de asistir a esta capacitación, ¿se sentía familiarizado con el tema de derechos humanos?
• ¿Cómo/dónde/ cuándo aprendió esto?
15. ¿Qué ha aprendido sobre diferentes temas de derechos humanos? ¿Ha ampliado o profundizado sus 
conocimientos en materia de derechos humanos?
• ¿Qué temas en particulares fueron los nuevos que aprendió?
• ¿Recibió algún material de capacitación, como un manual?
16. ¿Cómo aplica estos conocimientos en su trabajo? 
• ¿Podría darme ejemplos concretos de cómo el apoyo del PDH le ha servido en su trabajo?
17. ¿Ha habido algún cambio en sus actividades como producto de las capacitaciones que recibió?
• ¿Estos conocimientos han aportado a la interacción y el diálogo con la comunidad?
• ¿Ha incorporado el tema de los derechos humanos en espacios e instrumentos de política 
pública? Si es así, ¿cuáles son esos instrumentos/ espacios? Si no es así, ¿por qué?
• ¿El PDH le ha hecho seguimiento después de la capacitación para ver cómo ha aplicado el 
conocimiento de esta capacitación en su trabajo?
18. ¿Cómo se podría mejorar la capacitación del PDH?
19. ¿Con respecto a las principales afectaciones en este departamento en el tema de derechos humanos, 
cree que las entidades responsables están cumpliendo su deber? 
• ¿Quiénes son los responsables de que se cumplan/respeten los derechos humanos en su 
departamento?
• ¿Qué responsabilidad tiene la Gobernación en materia de garantía y protección de los 
derechos humanos?
• ¿Cómo está cumpliendo con esta responsabilidad la Gobernación?
• ¿Las demás entidades están cumpliendo con sus responsabilidades en su departamento?
• ¿Ha contribuido el PDH a un mayor acercamiento de su Gobernación con las organizaciones 
de sociedad civil? 
Sostenibilidad
20. ¿Ha habido incremento de recursos (financieros/técnicos/etc.) en su departamento para cubrir las 
temáticas relacionadas con los derechos humanos?
21. Si el PDH se fuera en un mes, ¿podría cubrir y responder por las actividades que realizan? ¿Qué 
haría falta para que el departamento pudiera responder a las demandas de la población?
22. Si pudiera cambiar algo sobre el apoyo del PDH para garantizar la sostenibilidad de sus 
actividades/acciones, ¿qué cambiaría? O qué pudiera hacer el PDH para apoyar su sostenibilidad?
Coordinación
23. ¿Cree que el PDH se articula con otros actores en el territorio? Si es así, ¿me podría describir 
cómo? Si no es así, ¿por qué cree que pasa esto?
24. ¿Cuál es la diferencia del PDH con otros actores que trabajan en su territorio?
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 117
Logros y dificultades
25. Tomando en cuenta el contexto complejo de DDHH, ¿qué logros se han alcanzado en su 
departamento con el apoyo del programa? 
• ¿Se han cumplido las metas propuestas en relación a los resultados, a la cobertura y los 
tiempos programados??
26. ¿Qué dificultades se han presentado para la implementación de las actividades previstas?
27. ¿Cuáles son los obstáculos más difíciles de sobrepasar, atender o cambiar dentro de los contextos 
locales?
28. ¿Qué recomendaciones le haría al Programa para apoyarle a sobrepasar esos obstáculos y tener un 
mayor impacto en sus objetivos?
29. ¿Qué recomendaciones le haría al Programa para mejorar la implementación de sus estrategias y 
apoyo? 
ALCALDÍAS
Contexto y Relevancia del Programa
1. ¿Cree que han habido cambios en el contexto de derechos humanos en su municipio desde la firma 
del acuerdo de paz? Si es así, ¿cuáles son esos cambios?
2. En su municipio, ¿cuáles son las principales afectaciones/ violaciones a los derechos humanos que se 
presentan?
3. ¿Hay alguna(s) población en particular que usted considere esté siendo más afectada?
4. ¿Qué retos ha implicado para su administración estos cambios en el contexto de DDHH?
5. Desde la perspectiva de las competencias de la Alcaldía, ¿han surgido nuevas obligaciones en materia 
de prevención y protección para la entidad una vez firmado el acuerdo de paz? 
6. ¿Cuál cree que es el objetivo principal del PDH?
Apoyo del PDH
7. ¿Me puede mencionar algunas actividades que haya realizado la Alcaldía de la mano del Programa? 
¿Cuáles resaltan o han sido más relevantes? ¿Por qué?
• ¿Cómo decidieron enfocarse en estas actividades? ¿Cuál fue el proceso?
• ¿Estas actividades fueron diseñadas y concretadas de manera conjunta?
• ¿Han implementado las iniciativas o actividades creadas por el PDH por su cuenta?
8. ¿Usted cree que el apoyo del PDH se alinea con las necesidades de este municipio?
• ¿Considera que el apoyo del PDH ha contribuido a visibilizar la situación de derechos
humanos en su municipio? ¿Como? o ¿porque no?
• ¿Considera que el apoyo del PDH ha contribuido a implementar las políticas nacionales en 
su municipio? ¿Como? o ¿porque no?
• ¿Qué otros aspectos debería priorizar o tener en cuenta el PDH para mejor la situación de 
DDHH en su municipio? ¿Y para hacer frente a los cambios identificados?
9. ¿Qué tipo de asistencia técnica ha recibido del PDH?
10. ¿Cree que esta asistencia técnica ha fortalecido a su entidad? ¿De qué manera?
• ¿En qué área de la gestión de la entidad se han mejorado las capacidades como resultado del 
apoyo del PDH?
• ¿Qué competencias, capacidades ha ganado gracias al apoyo del PDH?
• ¿Ha habido algún cambio en sus actividades como producto de esta asistencia técnica?
Conocimiento de DDHH y su aplicación 
11. En los últimos dos años, ¿usted ha asistido o ha recibido alguna capacitación sobre temas de DDHH 
de parte del PDH? ¿De otro programa, entidad u organización?
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 118
12. Antes de asistir a esta capacitación, ¿se sentía familiarizado con el tema de derechos humanos?
• ¿Cómo/dónde/ cuándo aprendió esto?
13. ¿Qué ha aprendido sobre diferentes temas de derechos humanos? ¿Ha ampliado o profundizado sus 
conocimientos en materia de derechos humanos? 
• ¿Qué temas en particulares fueron los nuevos que aprendió?
• ¿Recibió algún material de capacitación, como un manual?
14. ¿Cómo aplica estos conocimientos en su trabajo? ¿…en la atención a la ciudadanía?
• ¿Podría darme ejemplos concretos de cómo el apoyo del PDH le ha servido en su trabajo?
15. ¿Ha habido algún cambio en sus actividades como producto de las capacitaciones que recibió?
• ¿Estos conocimientos han aportado a la interacción y el diálogo con la comunidad?
• ¿Ha incorporado el tema de los derechos humanos en espacios e instrumentos de política 
pública? Si es así, ¿cuáles son esos instrumentos/ espacios? Si no es así, ¿por qué?
16. ¿El PDH le ha hecho seguimiento después de la capacitación para ver cómo ha aplicado el 
conocimiento de esta capacitación en su trabajo?
17. ¿Cómo se podría mejorar la capacitación del PDH?
18. ¿Con respecto a las principales afectaciones en este municipio en el tema de derechos humanos, 
cree que las entidades responsables están cumpliendo su deber? 
• ¿Quiénes son los responsables de que se cumplan/respeten los DDHH en su municipio?
• ¿Qué responsabilidad tiene la Alcaldía en materia de garantía y protección de los DDHH?
• ¿Cómo está cumpliendo con esta responsabilidad la Alcaldía?
• ¿Las demás entidades están cumpliendo con sus responsabilidades en su municipio?
• ¿Ha contribuido el PDH a un mayor acercamiento de la Alcaldía con las organizaciones de 
sociedad civil? ¿…con la Gobernación?
Sostenibilidad
19. ¿Ha habido incremento de recursos (financieros/técnicos/etc.) en su municipio para cubrir las 
temáticas relacionadas con los derechos humanos?
20. Si el PDH se fuera en un mes, ¿podría cubrir y responder por las actividades que realizan? ¿Qué 
haría falta para que el municipio pudiera responder a las demandas de la población?
21. Si pudiera cambiar algo sobre el apoyo del PDH para garantizar la sostenibilidad de sus 
actividades/acciones, ¿qué cambiaría? O qué pudiera hacer el PDH para apoyar su sostenibilidad?
Coordinación
22. ¿Cree que el PDH se articula con otros actores en el territorio? Si es así, ¿me podría describir 
cómo? Si no es así, ¿por qué cree que pasa esto?
23. ¿Cómo se relaciona la Alcaldía con las organizaciones de sociedad civil y la ciudadanía para mejorar 
la protección y defensa de DDHH?
24. ¿Cuál es la diferencia del PDH con otros actores que trabajan en su territorio?
Logros y dificultades
25. Tomando en cuenta el contexto complejo de DDHH, ¿qué logros se han alcanzado en su municipio 
con el apoyo del programa? 
• ¿Se han cumplido las metas propuestas en relación a los resultados, a la cobertura y los 
tiempos programados?
26. ¿Qué dificultades se han presentado para la implementación de las actividades previstas?
27. ¿Cuáles son los obstáculos más difíciles de sobrepasar, atender o cambiar dentro del contexto local? 
28. ¿Qué recomendaciones le haría al Programa para apoyarle a sobrepasar esos obstáculos y tener un 
mayor impacto en sus objetivos?
29. ¿Qué recomendaciones le haría al PDH para mejorar la implementación de sus estrategias y apoyo? 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 119
ORGANIZACIONES DE LA SOCIEDAD CIVIL
Contexto y Relevancia del Programa
1. ¿Cómo cree que ha cambiado el contexto de derechos humanos desde la firma del acuerdo de paz?
• ¿Cuáles son los principales factores de cambio en las comunidades donde trabajan?
• ¿Cuáles son las afectaciones a la población? ¿Y al grupo que sirve? 
2. ¿Qué rol cumplen las organizaciones de sociedad civil, como esta, en el contexto de derechos 
humanos?
• ¿Qué oportunidades y limitaciones se le presentan para cumplir con esa labor desde la firma 
del acuerdo de paz?
3. ¿Cuáles son las solicitudes que le hacen las personas o los grupos con los que su organización 
trabaja? ¿Cómo responde su organización a esas necesidades?
4. ¿Cuál cree que es el objetivo principal del PDH?
5. ¿Usted cree que el apoyo del PDH se alinea con las necesidades de los municipios donde trabaja y 
las afectaciones a los grupos de las personas que su organización sirve?
6. ¿Qué otros aspectos debería priorizar o tener en cuenta el PDH para mejorar la situación de 
DDHH en los municipios donde trabaja? ¿Y para hacer frente a los cambios identificados?
Apoyo del PDH
7. ¿Cuál es el proyecto que apoya el PDH? 
• ¿Es un proyecto nuevo o son actividades que ya vienen haciendo desde antes? 
• ¿En cuáles municipios implementa este proyecto?
• ¿Planea continuar implementando estas actividades en este u otros municipios por su 
cuenta, después de que termine su donación con el PDH?
8. Aparte de la donación, ¿está recibiendo otro tipo de apoyo del PDH?
• ¿Asistencia técnica? ¿Capacitación?
9. ¿Me puede describir el proceso para conseguir la donación del PDH?
• ¿Su organización hizo la propuesta y diseño el Proyecto?
• ¿Hubo alguna dificultad en la entrega de los recursos financieros, humanos, físicos, y de la 
información necesaria para comenzar a implementar su proyecto? ¿Cómo lo resolvieron?
• ¿Hubo algún cambio a la cobertura, actividades, o tiempos propuestos inicialmente? ¿Por qué 
ocurrieron estos cambios?
10. ¿Qué tipo de contacto mantiene con el PDH desde que le aprobaron la donación?
11. ¿Su organización participa en espacios públicos o interinstitucionales relacionados con los derechos 
humanos? 
• ¿En cuáles? ¿Cuál ha sido su rol o participación en este espacio? 
• ¿Qué beneficio ha sacado de esta participación? ¿El PDH ha facilitado o apoyado en estos 
espacios?
12. ¿El PDH le ha ayudado a coordinar con otras organizaciones que están haciendo actividades 
similares u otras OSC en los municipios donde trabaja?
• ¿Cree que el PDH coordina con otras OSC y donantes para no duplicar esfuerzos? ¿…para 
incrementar el impacto de las acciones realizadas?
• ¿Hay algo que el PDH pudiera hacer mejor para aprovechar lo que otras OSC están 
haciendo en el ámbito de derechos humanos?
Si recibieron asistencia técnica:
13. ¿Qué tipo de asistencia técnica recibió del PDH?
14. ¿Cree que esta asistencia técnica ha fortalecido a su organización? ¿De qué manera?
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 120
• ¿En qué área de la gestión de la organización se han mejorado las capacidades como 
resultado del apoyo del PDH?
• ¿Qué competencias, capacidades ha ganado gracias al apoyo del PDH?
• ¿El PDH les apoyo en temas administrativos, comunicación, monitoreo/evaluación, 
presentación de propuestas y consecución de recursos?
Si recibieron capacitación sobre DDHH directamente del PDH:
15. Antes de asistir a esta capacitación, ¿se sentía familiarizado con el tema de derechos humanos? 
16. ¿Qué ha aprendido sobre diferentes temas de derechos humanos? ¿Ha ampliado o profundizado sus 
conocimientos en materia de derechos humanos?
• ¿Qué temas en particulares fueron los nuevos que aprendió?
• ¿Recibió algún material de capacitación, como un manual?
17. ¿Cómo aplican estos conocimientos en su trabajo? 
• ¿Podría darme ejemplos concretos de cómo el apoyo del PDH le ha servido en su trabajo?
• ¿Ha habido algún cambio en su organización o proyecto como producto de las 
capacitaciones que recibió?
• ¿El PDH le ha hecho seguimiento después de la capacitación para ver cómo ha aplicado el 
conocimiento de esta capacitación en su trabajo?
18. ¿Cómo se podría mejorar la capacitación?
19. ¿Qué otro apoyo o capacitación sobre DDHH ha recibido diferente al PDH?
20. ¿Con respecto a las principales afectaciones en este municipio en el tema de derechos humanos, 
cree que las entidades responsables están cumpliendo su deber? 
• ¿Cómo es su relación con estas autoridades municipales? 
• ¿Ha contribuido el PDH a un mayor acercamiento de estas autoridades municipales con las 
organizaciones de sociedad civil? 
Sostenibilidad
21. Si el PDH se fuera en un mes, ¿su organización pudiera cubrir y responder por las actividades que 
realizan? ¿Qué haría falta para que pudiera responder a las demandas de la población?
22. Si pudiera cambiar algo sobre el apoyo del PDH para garantizar la sostenibilidad de sus actividades, 
¿qué cambiaría? O qué pudiera hacer el PDH para apoyar su sostenibilidad?
Logros y dificultades
23. ¿Qué ha logrado cumplir que no hubiera logrado sin el apoyo del PDH?
24. ¿Se le ha presentado alguna dificultad al tratar de alcanzar o trabajar con [grupos vulnerables]?
25. ¿Cuáles son los obstáculos que ha enfrentado al tratar de abogar por víctimas? ¿Para servir como 
veedores a las acciones del gobierno? (preguntar dependiendo de la organización)
26. ¿Cómo está apoyando el PDH para afrontar/disminuir estos obstáculos?
27. ¿Qué apoyo del PDH les hace falta o ayudaría más para afrontar estos retos/obstáculos y tener un 
mayor efecto con su trabajo?
28. ¿Qué recomendaciones le haría al PDH para mejorar la implementación de sus estrategias y apoyo?
Group Discussion Guide
GUÍA GRUPOS FOCALES - BENEFICIARIOS
Presentación de la actividad
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 121
Mi nombre es _________ y hago parte del Centro Nacional de Consultoría, una empresa privada 
dedicada a realizar estudios de opinión y sobre políticas públicas. Actualmente nos encontramos 
realizando un estudio sobre el bienestar y calidad de vida de la población en diferentes zonas del país y 
sobre cómo está cambiando el contexto de derechos humanos en su municipio/departamento. 
Ustedes fueron seleccionados para participar en este estudio por su participación en el proyecto 
[NOMBRE DE LA ACTIVIDAD] de la [NOMBRE DE LA ORGANIZACIÓN]. 
Esta actividad es una conversación abierta con ustedes. Nos interesan sus opiniones y experiencias. Yo 
les voy a ir proponiendo una serie de preguntas para que ustedes las comenten, debatan y expresen sus 
ideas. Lo que se diga en esta mañana/tarde va a ser confidencial y solo será usado en el contexto de este 
estudio. Sus datos y opiniones son confidenciales y solamente van a ser usados para efectos de este 
estudio.
En este ejercicio no hay respuestas buenas o malas: lo importante son las opiniones e ideas que ustedes 
tienen sobre los temas que les proponemos. Con fines del registro y posterior análisis de la información 
les pedimos permiso para grabar esta sesión. 
¿Tienen alguna pregunta antes de comenzar?
Presentación de los participantes 
Inicialmente le voy a pedir el favor a cada participante que se presente y nos diga su nombre, dónde vive 
y cuánto tiempo tiene viviendo en su comunidad. 
• Ahora, para irnos conociendo un poco mejor, ¿por qué no me cuentan qué es lo que más les 
gusta y lo que menos les gusta de vivir en este municipio? 
Situaciones
Ahora les voy a presentar una situación o historia y luego les voy a formular preguntas para que me digan 
que piensan sobre esta historia. 
FACILITADOR: Escoja 2 situaciones dependiendo de la zona, la población con la que desarrolle la actividad y el 
tiempo. Verifique que los nombres de las historias no coincidan con los de ningún participante, de ser así cambie 
los nombres de la situación hipotética.
Situación 1
Juan vive en la vereda Candelaria del municipio de Simajuga. El vecino de Juan es un importante 
comerciante de la región y amigo de gente poderosa. El vecino lleva meses insistiéndole a Juan que le 
deje abrir una trocha por la finca para sacar material del rio. Juan se ha negado porque la trocha que 
quiere abrir el vecino pasa por la mitad de sus cultivos de café. El vecino se ha puesto agresivo y le 
envenenó a algunos animales como amenaza.
• ¿Si usted fuera Juan, que haría frente a esta situación?
• ¿A quién/quiénes pudiera acudir para solucionar esa situación?
• ¿Con que mecanismos cuenta para enfrentar esa situación?
• ¿Qué creen que pasará si usted hace x o x? Dependiendo de lo que opinen que debería hacer
• ¿Qué creen que haría su comunidad como reacción a esta situación?
• ¿Qué autoridad debería implicarse en esta situación? ¿Qué debería hacer?
• ¿Cuál cree que sería la reacción de las autoridades locales (alcaldía, gobernación, personería, 
defensoría, policía)?
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 122
• Si esto estuviera pasando con un vecino suyo, alguien de aquí de este municipio, ¿qué haría?
Incremento 1. Un día el vecino llegó con un grupo de hombres y mujeres armados y con maquinaria 
(bulldozer) para empezar la obra por la finca de Juan. Le tumbaron la reja y parte de la matas de café.
• ¿Si usted fuera Juan, que haría ahora?
• ¿A quién/quiénes pudiera acudir para solucionar esa situación?
• ¿Cuál cree que sería la reacción de las autoridades locales (alcaldía, gobernación, personería, 
defensoría, policía)?
• ¿Qué tan frecuentes ocurren situaciones como esta en su municipio?
Situación 2 
María vive en la vereda Candelaria del municipio de Simajuga, ella quiere participar en las actividades de 
la JAC y ha empezado a asistir a las últimas reuniones porque le interesa que cuando hagan las gestiones 
para el acueducto, este pase por su finca porque actualmente no tiene acceso al agua.
María es madre cabeza de familia y cuando asiste a las reuniones tiene que ir con sus hijos. Por esa 
razón, la han sacado de dos reuniones. Las personas de la JAC, mayoritariamente compuesta por 
hombres, le han dicho que deje de molestar, y que mejor regrese a la casa a cuidar a los niños y hacer 
oficio.
• ¿Qué opinan sobre esta situación?
• Si fueran Maria, ¿qué harían frente a esta situación?
• ¿A quién/quiénes pudiera acudir para solucionar esa situación?
• ¿Con qué mecanismos cuenta María para enfrentar esa situación?
• ¿Qué tan frecuentes ocurren situaciones como esta en su municipio?
Situación 3
Fernando vive en el barrio Santo Domingo de Simajuga. Fernando ha sido acusado falsamente de 
cometer un robo en su población, bajo el argumento de que él se asemeja al perfil del ladrón según los 
testigos del hecho.
Fernando es detenido en la tarde, tipo 4 pm y llevado a la estación de policía. Queda bajo arresto 
durante la noche. 
Imagínense que ustedes son familiares cercanos de Fernando y que un vecino ve la detención de 
Fernando y los llaman diciéndoles que Fernando está detenido, pero que él no ha hecho nada y a 
ustedes no les queda ninguna duda que es inocente. 
• ¿Qué harían en este momento? ¿Y qué esperan de esta acción? 
• ¿Qué creen que va a pasar con Fernando?
• ¿A quién/quiénes pudieran acudir para solucionar esa situación?
Incremento: Al día siguiente, Fernando es liberado porque no hay pruebas concluyentes en su contra. En 
ese momento, te cuenta que durante su detención en la estación de policía fue golpeado, y ves que tiene 
un moretón/morado. 
• ¿Qué harían en esta situación? ¿Y qué esperan de esta acción?
• ¿Qué creen que pasará si usted hace x o x? Dependiendo de lo que opinen que debería hacer
• ¿A quién/quiénes pudieran acudir para solucionar esa situación?
• ¿Con que mecanismos cuenta Fernando para enfrentar esa situación?
• ¿Qué tan frecuentemente ocurren estas situaciones en su municipio?
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 123
Situación 4
Manuel, un líder cansado de la ineficiencia de los gobernantes de las pasadas administraciones de su 
municipio, decide lanzarse al concejo municipal con el apoyo de la gente de su comunidad, que le ha 
pedido que los represente por su buena gestión. Parte de sus propuestas han tocado las fibras de 
quienes se han amañado en la administración. Manuel ha notado que siempre hay dos personas 
vigilándolo en todo momento.
• Si usted fuera Manuel, ¿qué haría frente a esta situación?
• ¿A quién/quiénes pudiera acudir para solucionar esa situación?
• ¿Con que mecanismos cuenta para enfrentar esa situación?
• ¿Qué creen que pasará si usted hace x o x? Dependiendo de lo que opinen que debería hacer
• Si esto estuviera pasando con un vecino suyo, alguien de aquí de este municipio, ¿qué haría?
Incremento: Manual llega a la casa y le dicen que retire su candidatura o si no habrá consecuencias para 
él y su familia. – Atentado?
• ¿Ahora, qué harían en esta situación? ¿Y qué esperan de esta acción?
• ¿A quién/quiénes pudieran acudir para solucionar esa situación?
• ¿Con que mecanismos cuenta Manuel para enfrentar esa situación?
• ¿Qué creen que pasará si usted hace x o x? Dependiendo de lo que opinen que debería hacer
• ¿Qué autoridad debería implicarse en esta situación? ¿Qué debería hacer?
• ¿Cuál cree que sería la reacción de las autoridades locales (alcaldía, gobernación, personería, 
defensoría, policía)?
• ¿Qué tan frecuentes ocurren estas situaciones en su municipio?
Situación 5
Pedro y José viven en el barrio Providencia del municipio de Simajuga, viven juntos hace 2 años pero han 
sido pareja hace 5. En el pueblo abrieron una nueva cafetería y ellos deciden ir a conocerla. Ellos entran 
cogidos de la mano y antes de que se puedan sentar y ordenar, los meseros de la cafetería les dicen que 
no los pueden atender y que por favor se retiren del establecimiento. 
• ¿Qué opinan sobre esta situación?
• ¿Si ustedes estuvieran sentados en la cafetería y ven lo que ocurre, que harían? 
• ¿Qué creen que debería hacer la pareja frente a esta situación?
• ¿Qué creen que pasará si ellos hacen x o x? Dependiendo de lo que opinen que debería hacer
• ¿A quién/quiénes pudieran acudir para solucionar esa situación?
• ¿Con que mecanismos cuenta la pareja para enfrentar esa situación?
• ¿Qué tan frecuentes son estas situaciones en su municipio?
Derechos humanos y justicia
1. Después de todo esto que hemos venido hablando, ¿qué son para ustedes los Derechos Humanos? 
2. ¿Qué pasó frente a los derechos humanos en las situaciones vistas antes? 
3. ¿Qué han aprendido sobre los derechos humanos que les sirve en sus actividades o vida diaria?
4. ¿Ustedes le han enseñado a alguien sobre estos temas que han aprendido? ¿A quiénes? (familiares, 
amigos, compañeros en la escuela, vecinos) ¿Cómo reaccionaron esas personas?
5. ¿Qué hacen ustedes diferente frente a situaciones como las que vimos antes, que antes no hacían? ¿En 
los últimos años han cambiado la forma como actúan frente a cosas como esas? 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 124
6. ¿Qué tipos de situaciones ven en su comunidad que son violaciones a los derechos humanos?
7. ¿Cuáles son los temas/ aspectos más difíciles en la protección de los derechos humanos en su 
municipio?
Institucionalidad
8. ¿Cuáles instituciones son las que más les ayudan en sus necesidades de acceso a la justicia y a hacer 
valer sus derechos? Identificar las instituciones estatales de las se hace uso. Tener en cuenta personerías, 
jueces, abogados, policía, FFAA., ONGs, cooperación internacional, etc.
9. ¿Creen que la las organizaciones sociales, políticas o culturales son importantes para defender y 
proteger los derechos humanos? ¿Por qué creen que eso pasa?
10. En qué casos se acude a la policía, defensoría, ejército,… ¿creen que en este municipio cumple con las 
funciones que ustedes esperan de esa institución?
Participación en las actividades
11. ¿Qué actividades ha desarrollado [la organización] en su municipio?
12. ¿Cómo se enteraron de ese programa? ¿Qué los/las motivo a participar?
13. ¿Qué expectativas tienen o tenían cuando empezaron a asistir a las actividades desarrolladas por 
[esta organización]? ¿Qué tanto se cumplieron estas expectativas?
14. ¿Después de haber participado en esta actividad, que cambios han habido en su vida? ¿Cuál(es) han 
sido su principal logro(s)? ¿Qué efectos ha tenido esta actividad en su vida? 
15. ¿Cómo sienten que pueden aportar a mejorar la situación de derechos humanos en su comunidad/ 
organización?
16. ¿Se le han presentado dificultades después de participar en las actividades de [la organización]?
17. ¿Qué otras organizaciones o entidades los ha apoyado con estos cambios/logros?
Entendiendo la situación
Si queda tiempo y si estos temas surgieron durante la discusión se pueden plantear estas preguntas. Evalúe 
si para el ambiente y la población con la que está reunida es pertinente hacerla.
18. Después de todo lo que hemos hablado con respecto a los derechos humanos, las instituciones, la 
[organización] y demás, ¿cómo explican ustedes que sigan habiendo violaciones a los derechos 
humanos? ¿Cómo puede explicar uno que a pesar de que haya tantos esfuerzos de parte de líderes, 
grupos organizaciones, programas y algunas autoridades todavía haya personas amenazadas, 
asesinadas, violentadas?
Recomendaciones
19. De todo lo que hemos venido hablando ¿Qué creen que el Estado puede hacer para mejorar la 
situación del municipio? Tener en cuenta: derechos humanos, seguridad, justicia.
20. ¿Qué recomendaciones haría a [la organización] para mejorar la actividad y el apoyo que le dan a la 
comunidad? 
21. ¿Qué otras estrategias o actividades serian pertinentes para hacer frente los problemas de derechos 
humanos en este municipio?
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 125
ANNEX F: CONTEXT ANALYSIS
Contexto de los Derechos Humanos en Colombia tras la firma del Acuerdo de Paz
Elaborado por: María Angélica Alvarado y Natalia Estupiñán (9 febrero 2018)
El 24 de noviembre de 2016 el gobierno de Colombia y la guerrilla de las FARC – EP firmaron el Acuerdo 
Final para la Terminación del Conflicto y la Construcción de una Paz Estable y Duradera. Su ratificación marcó 
oficialmente el fin del conflicto armado entre las dos partes.
El presente documento sintetiza los principales aspectos en materia de derechos civiles y políticos en 
Colombia. Para este análisis se tuvo como referente inicial tanto la línea base32, como la revisión estratégica 
desarrollada por el Programa de Derechos Humanos33. Asimismo, se consultaron diversas fuentes 
secundarias, y se constataron los factores aquí incluidos en la aplicación de los instrumentos desarrollados 
por el equipo tanto a nivel nacional como territorial.
1. Aspectos generales 
1.1 Reacomodamiento de actores armados: disidencias de las FARC, ELN, Grupos Armados 
Organizados y Grupos Delincuenciales Organizados 
El país se encuentra en una fase de transición caracterizada por la continuidad del crimen organizado, de 
algunos grupos guerrilleros y de otro tipo de expresiones armadas que se han hecho más visibles o que 
están en proceso de formación ( FIP, 2017. p.8).
Por un lado, se encuentran las disidencias de las FARC que, según la Fiscalía General de la Nación, se han
ubicado en 48 municipios del país. Si bien numéricamente no pareciesen tener mayor impacto (500 
personas aproximadamente) en alguna subregiones ya han demostrado que tienen capacidad de afectar a 
la población de manera significativa. Los departamentos donde se concentran las acciones de las disidencias 
son Meta, Caquetá, Guaviare, Amazonas y el municipio de Tumaco (El Tiempo, 2017). Desde esas 
zonas se estaría intentando controlar las 7.102 hectáreas de hoja de coca que, según el Sistema Integrado 
de Monitoreo de Cultivos Ilícitos (Simci), hay en esas regiones (El Tiempo, 2017).
En Tumaco por ejemplo, una de las zonas con mayor presencia de disidencias, hay al menos 11 grupos 
que vienen afectando la seguridad ciudadana. Asimismo, en dicho municipio el grupo de disidentes se ha 
venido fragmentando, disputándose el control territorial tanto en el casco urbano como en la zona rural. 
Una de las razones principales que explican las disidencias es el lento avance que se ha tenido para lograr 
la reincorporación económica de los desmovilizados. A falta de respuesta oportuna institucional, las 
deserciones comenzaron a aumentar desde mediados del año 2017. 
Por otro lado, el contexto actual en Colombia se caracteriza por la presencia de los Grupos Armados 
 
32 El Programa desarrolló a través de la FIP, una línea base que identifica los principales aspectos en materia de derechos 
humanos por cada uno de los departamentos. 
33 El Programa actualizó la información de la línea base a finales del 2017, y clasificó los departamentos en tres categorías de
contexto según el accionar de los grupos armados. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 126
Organizados (GAO) y los Grupos Delincuenciales Organizados (GDO).34 De acuerdo con las Directivas 
015 y 016 del Ministerio de Defensa, los primeros cuentan con estructuras organizadas y centralizadas, 
mandos responsables y control territorial, mientras que los segundos, son grupos de menor envergadura 
que operan como subcontratistas de organizaciones mayores, pero que igual generan un alto impacto en 
la población. 
El accionar de estos grupos en diferentes regiones del país, más allá de enfrentamientos entre sí y con la 
fuerza pública, incluye amenazas, extorsiones, asesinatos selectivos, imposición de normas de conducta, 
intimidación por medio de panfletos, capacidad de generar impacto humanitario (desplazamiento y 
confinamiento de poblaciones), violencia sexual y reclutamiento de niños, niñas y adolescentes (entrevistas 
equipo evaluación, 2018).
En tercer lugar, está el ELN que se ha fortalecido en sus zonas de presencia histórica como el Catatumbo, 
sur y centro de Cauca, Nariño, Bajo Cauca Antioqueño y está llegando a zonas donde no tenía presencia 
como el Vichada y a otras que antes controlaban las FARC (FIP, 2017).
Es preciso anotar que no se puede hablar de una presencia homogénea en el territorio de estos grupos, 
situación que ha sido comprobada a través de la consulta de fuentes primaras y secundarias y que se 
detallarán más adelante en el análisis en los contextos regionales. 
1.2 Cultivos ilícitos y economías ilegales
Las economías ilegales están teniendo procesos de reacomodamiento y expansión con nuevos acuerdos 
entre las guerrillas y las organizaciones criminales. Los cultivos de coca se han incrementado, la minería 
ilegal se ha expandido y otras economías ilegales como el tráfico de madera y la extorsión aparecen como 
prácticas recurrentes (Garzón, Llorente, Álvarez y Preciado, 2016). 
En este escenario, se resalta las dificultades que se han tenido en materia de sustitución de cultivos ilícitos.
Las zonas priorizadas están caracterizadas por el choque continuo entre la erradicación forzada y la 
sustitución voluntaria; por el lento avance en la generación de condiciones que permitan el tránsito a la 
legalidad de las familias dependientes de los cultivos de coca y por la incertidumbre legal para las familias 
cultivadoras (FIP, 2018). 
Se ha identificado además que aquellas familias que han firmado acuerdos con el gobierno en el marco del 
Programa Nacional Integral de Sustitución de Cultivos de Uso Ilícito (PNIS) han sido víctimas de 
represalias. De hecho, a diferencia de la tendencia a nivel nacional, la tasa de homicidios aumentó 11% en 
aquellos municipios con presencia de cultivos de coca y 33% en aquellos donde la sustitución comenzó 
(ibíd.). 
El deterioro de la seguridad no solo se ha expresado en el alza en los niveles de homicidio sino en amenazas 
y ataques directos al proceso de sustitución. La incidencia violenta por parte de los actores criminales ha 
ido más allá de hechos aislados, con ataques y amenazas en distintos territorios. Esto ha sido recurrente 
en la costa pacífica de Nariño y en el bajo Cauca Antioqueño. 
Finalmente, el proceso de sustitución ha conllevado a un incremento de la protesta social, con 
comunidades que impiden el ingreso de la Fuerza Pública, argumentando el incumplimiento de lo pactado 
 
34 En la categoría de GAO se reconocen al Clan del Golfo, Los Puntilleros, el EPL, el Bloque Meta y el Bloque Libertadores del 
Vichada. Dentro de los GDO más conocidos están Los Rastrojos, La Cordillera, la Constru y La Empresa. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 127
y en varias zonas del país se ha informado sobre la instalación de nuevas minas antipersona por parte de 
diferentes grupos armados, lo que afecta a las familias que tienen la voluntad de sustituir los cultivos ilícitos. 
Hasta agosto de 2017 se registraron 25 víctimas en operaciones de erradicación manual, superando los 
niveles presentados desde 2014 (FIP, 2018, p. 17). 
1.3 Contexto electoral
El actual escenario electoral está incidiendo en la efectiva protección y garantía de los derechos humanos. 
Hay varios factores y riesgos en el marco del conflicto que puedan constituir violaciones al derecho de 
participar en la conformación, ejercicio y control del poder político (Defensoría, 2018).
De acuerdo con el Sistema de Alertas Tempranas, para las próximas elecciones, se han identificado 287 
municipios de 29 departamentos con riesgo electoral por incidencia de grupos armados ilegales, que 
corresponden al 25% de los municipios del país. 
De estos, 87 han sido calificados en riesgo extremo, 91 en riesgo Alto, y 109 en riesgo Medio. Al clasificar 
los departamentos según la cantidad de municipios que registran nivel de riesgo extremo, el más afectado 
es el departamento de Antioquia con veinte (20) municipios. Le siguen los departamentos de Bolívar con 
13, Chocó con 12, Nariño con 10, Norte de Santander con 8, Cauca con 7, Arauca con 5, Guaviare con 
4, Caquetá con 3, Meta con 2, y finalmente Casanare, Putumayo y Risaralda con 1 municipio en riesgo 
extremo, cada uno. 
Como se muestra en la tabla a continuación, de los municipios focalizados por el PHD, 18 registran nivel 
de riesgo extremo (rojo), 9 riesgo alto (amarillo) y dos riesgo medio (verde). 
DEPARTAMENTO MUNICIPIO
ANTIOQUIA
El Bagre
Ituango
Tarazá
Valdivia
Anorí
Briceño
Cáceres
Nechí
Zaragoza
Caucasia
Remedios
Segovia
CÓRDOBA
Tierralta
Montelíbano
Puerto Libertador
TOLIMA
Ataco
Chaparral
Cajamarca
Ortega
Planadas
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 128
DEPARTAMENTO MUNICIPIO
Rioblanco
CAUCA
Corinto
Santander de Quilichao
Caloto
Buenos Aires
Caldono
Miranda
NARIÑO 
Tumaco
Barbacoas
Francisco Pizarro
META
Mesetas
Uribe
La Macarena
El Castillo
Puerto Rico
Vistahermosa
CAQUETÁ
Cartagena del Chaira
San Vicente del Caguan
Valparaíso
La Montañita
Fuente: elaboración propia
Algunos factores que caracterizan el contexto en dichos municipios son la estigmatización hacia los 
pobladores y organizaciones sociales de los territorios donde tenía presencia las FARC EP; la persistencia 
de la violencia política hacia líderes y defensores de derechos humanos; y el reacomodamiento de grupos 
armados ilegales y economías criminales en estos territorios ( Defensoría, 2018, p. 2).
2. Principales afectaciones
2.1 Desplazamiento forzado:
En materia de desplazamiento forzado, el Registro Único de la Unidad de Víctimas muestra que 54.684 
personas fueron desplazadas en el 2017. Los departamentos más afectados fueron el Chocó (9.684 
víctimas), seguido por Nariño (7.776) y Antioquia (6.982) (Registro Único de Víctimas, febrero 2018.) 
En relación con el 2016 hay una disminución de un 41%, sin embargo, se dio un incremento en los casos 
de desplazamientos masivos. Según cifras de OCHA, hasta octubre de 2017 unas 13.096 personas habían 
sido afectadas por desplazamientos masivos, un 32 % más que en el 2016 (Humanitarian Needs Overview, 
2018). Los municipios afectados por desplazamientos crecieron en un 40% al pasar de 20 a 28 en el último 
año según el ACNUR. El 68% está en la región Pacífica, lo que significa que la población más afectada es la 
afrocolombiana y la indígena. 
Según monitoreo de OCHA, el 31 % de los desplazamientos tienen participación de grupos armados 
desconocidos tanto en acciones unilaterales como en enfrentamientos. Los departamentos de Valle del 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 129
Cauca, Antioquia, Chocó, Nariño, Cauca y Norte de Santander concentraron el 61% de la población 
desplazada, evidenciándose un impacto en las comunidades indígenas (6%) y afrocolombianas (17%) (Ibíd.
p.10). Todos estos territorios cuentan con presencia de economías ilegales, como la coca y la minería. 
2.2 Uso y utilización de niños, niñas y adolescentes
En materia de reclutamiento de niños y niñas, la Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en 
Colombia, afirma que existen constantes denuncias acerca del reclutamiento de menores por parte de 
GAI, especialmente de comunidades indígenas en los departamentos de Caquetá, Cauca y Chocó. (Informe 
del Secretario General sobre la Misión de Verificación de las Naciones Unidas en Colombia, diciembre 
2017. p. 17) 
Asimismo, se ha observado la utilización y uso de niños, niñas y adolescentes para actividades como el 
cuidado de cultivos, transporte de mercancías, otorgación de información, cobro de vacunas y 
extorsiones. Esto se da a cambio de dinero, promesas en materia de poder y control territorial, drogas y 
tecnologías (OIM, 2017). Se destaca el caso del Clan del Golfo, grupo que logra mantenerse a causa del 
reclutamiento de jóvenes de manera permanente, a pesar de las capturas que se han dado a algunos de 
sus miembros más importante (FIP, 2017. p.41). 
3. Las regiones y las afectaciones a los derechos humanos
Las dinámicas que afectan la efectiva garantía y protección de los derechos humanos en Colombia, varían 
dependiendo de las regiones y subregiones donde se presenten. Tal como lo indica la FIP la violencia no 
se ha desarrollado de manera homogénea: la intensidad, los protagonistas, la duración, los motivos, las 
expresiones han variado en niveles locales y regionales, y han adquirido dinámicas propias, incluso 
autónomas de lo que sucede a nivel nacional. 
Por esta razón, si bien el contexto presenta algunas temáticas generales que son necesarias tenerlas en 
cuenta para efectos de la evaluación, se enfoca sobre todo en aspectos específicos que varían según la 
región de análisis. Así, para cada región se incluyen las características más relevantes que se deberán tener 
en cuenta en el marco de la evaluación al Programa de Derechos Humanos.
Factores relevantes por cada región
3.1 Zonas antigua hegemonía Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia.
Departamentos priorizados: Meta, Caquetá y Tolima. 
• Reducción de las confrontaciones armadas en el marco del conflicto armado interno. Esto a su vez 
ha incidido en los descensos presentados en el número de muertes en combate. De acuerdo con la 
FIP, durante el 2015 y el 2016 el cese al fuego y el proceso con las FARC influyeron en el descenso 
de las tasas de homicidio en algunos departamentos (Putumayo, Caquetá y Meta y el noreste de 
Antioquia). No obstante, si se comparan las cifras del primer semestre de 2016, en La Montañita 
(Caquetá) y la Macarena (Meta), el número de muertes violentas en ese mismo periodo del 2017 subió 
(FIP).
• Nuevas dinámicas de conflictos sociales a raíz de la salida de las FARC como actor regulador de 
conflictos. 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 130
• Normalmente son zonas de coexistencia donde las estructuras de crimen organizado han creado 
alianzas y pactos con los grupos armados para evitar la confrontación, dividirse el territorio y 
administrar de manera más efectiva las rentas provenientes de las economías ilegales. En Meta por 
ejemplo, coexisten las AGC, el Bloque Meta y el Bloque libertadores del Vichada. 
3.2 Zonas en disputa con presencia histórica de la Guerrilla.
Departamentos priorizados: Cauca y Nariño, Córdoba y Antioquia
• Las dinámicas del conflicto armado, aunque han disminuido, siguen siendo una constante y en esa 
medida, las violaciones a los derechos humanos siguen ligadas de manera importante a las 
confrontaciones armadas. 
• Incremento en la tasa de homicidios (especialmente Tumaco) y como resultado de la reestructuración 
de los actores ilegales en la cadena del narcotráfico. En todas las zonas existe una alta influencia de 
organizaciones armadas al margen de la ley (ELN y EPL), facciones criminales de distinto tipo y 
economías ilegales. 
• En particular, en Antioquia, no solo hay presencia del Clan del Golfo, sino la intención del ELN de 
ocupar territorios dejados por las FARC. 
• Asesinatos y amenazas de tipo selectivo como forma de intimidación ocurren en zonas de alta 
conflictividad por la consolidación de territorialidades y de pactos, tanto a nivel urbano como rural. 
En la ruralidad impacta gravemente zonas de poblaciones indígenas, afro descendientes y de economía 
campesina.
• Nuevas temáticas en torno a los conflicto sociales, que obedecen fundamentalmente a: (a) tensiones 
entre campesinos y colectivos étnicos por el acceso a tierras; especialmente en zonas donde se han 
establecido las ZVTN y PTN al interior de territorios colectivos étnicos, o en territorios ancestrales 
en proceso de saneamiento o ampliación, caso Tumaco (Nariño) y Tierralta (Córdoba). (b) Tensiones 
entre comunidades y nuevos actores armados por el control sobre la actividad minera, como se 
evidencia en los consejos comunitarios ubicados en el pacífico colombiano. (c) Tensiones al interior 
de comunidades generadas por la política de erradicación forzada (Tumaco). (d) Tensiones alrededor 
de los intereses económicos y políticos en los diálogos locales para aterrizar los acuerdos de paz. (e) 
Tensiones entre nuevas organizaciones y nuevos liderazgos con organizaciones tradicionales históricas 
en las zonas; (f) organizaciones más grandes que buscan imponerse frente a las más pequeñas de 
arraigo local. (Vigésimo Tercer Informe del Secretario General al Consejo Permanente sobre la Misión 
de Apoyo al Proceso de Paz en Colombia de la MAPP/OEA).
• Disputas y alianzas por el control territorial por parte de los grupos armados ilegales con el objetivo 
de asegurar las áreas estratégicas y de implementación de economías ilegales: (a) narcotráfico (control 
de zonas de cultivo de uso ilícito, puntos estratégicos y corredores o rutas para el tráfico de drogas, 
tráfico de insumos para el procesamiento; propiedad sobre los laboratorios, e inversión en 
infraestructura). (b) Minería (control de zonas mineras, explotación y comercialización). (c) Tráfico 
de madera. (d) Servicios de seguridad privada. (e) Lavado de activos. (f) Extorsión. (g) Contrabando. 
(h) Micro tráfico / narcomenudeo. 
• Riqueza aurífera que se constituye en una posibilidad financiera mucho más rentable que la hoja de 
coca. La disputa en Antioquia radica principalmente en las extorsiones a los mineros por el derecho 
a trabajar y a usar la maquinaria ( FIP, 2017. p.54) 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 131
• Alto ejercicio de control social a través de métodos violentos, coercitivos, vulnerando especialmente 
derechos asociados a las libertades. El control social evita la configuración de procesos sociales que 
puedan jugar un papel alternativo en el escenario de posconflicto.
• Vinculación de jóvenes bajo incentivos económicos.
• Alta dosis violencia contra las mujeres, a partir de actos de violencia sexual y explotación sexual de 
menores. 
4. Grupos poblaciones de interés 
4.1 Defensores de derechos humanos y líderes sociales.
Una de las grandes preocupaciones en las diferentes regiones del país es las agresiones a líderes sociales 
y defensores de derechos humanos. Estas agresiones sin embargo, deben ser leídas según el contexto y 
el tipo de reivindicaciones que moviliza cada líder. De acuerdo con la FIP, las amenazas y agresiones son 
producto de un ejercicio de coerción a favor de intereses concretos, anclados en poderes locales de 
diversa índole que ven en estos líderes una amenaza a sus agendas (FIP, 2017).
Esta visión coincide con la hipótesis presentada por la organización Somos Defensores, quienes indican
que los activistas se han convertido en una “piedra en el zapato para los poderes reales que actúan en los 
distintos territorios del país. Es decir, para quienes tienen las armas, controlan las economías ilegales, 
ejercer el poder político de manera corrupta, continúan con la tenencia de la tierra a gran escala o estén 
detrás de grandes intereses económicos en las regiones” ( Somos Defensores, 2018, p. 6). 
La presión sobre las comunidades y los líderes sociales y comunitarios, fundamentalmente en las zonas 
rurales, se ha afianzado durante los tres últimos años como una estrategia por parte de los GAI, para 
garantizar el control de las rentas legales e ilegales que se desarrollan en determinadas zonas y para evitar 
la consolidación de procesos sociales que puedan jugar un papel alternativo en el escenario de 
construcción de la paz. A esto se suma la estigmatización política y la persecución a la que son sometidos 
por ser considerados colaboradores de la guerrilla. 
La distribución geográfica de las violaciones al derecho a la vida de líderes sociales se centró en ciertas 
zonas del país con una o varias de las siguientes características: (i) presencia de GAI; (ii) alta militarización; 
(iii) fuertes procesos de organización social; (iv) presencia de cultivos de uso ilícito o de rutas del 
narcotráfico; (v) existencia de actividades extractivas legales e ilegales, particularmente minería; (vi) 
presencia en o cercanía a ZVTN o puntos Transitorios de Normalización y (vii) priorizadas para la 
adopción de los Programas de Desarrollo con Enfoque Territorial. 
La Organización No Gubernamental Somos Defensores denunció 90 asesinatos de dirigentes sociales y 
defensores de derechos humanos (77 hombre y 13 mujeres) en el período comprendido entre enero y 
finales de noviembre de 2017, frente a 68 en ese mismo período de 2016, lo que significa un aumento del 
32%.
Por su parte la Defensoría del Pueblo afirma que la mayor parte de los homicidios contra los líderes 
sociales, comunitarios y defensores(as) de derechos humanos durante el 2016 y el 2017, se concentró en 
98 municipios de 14 departamentos del país y por lo menos el 69% de las víctimas desarrollaban su labor 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 132
de organización comunitaria e impulso de acciones de reivindicación de derechos en zonas rurales.
(Defensoría del Pueblo, 2017)
Lo anterior se constata en Informe Anual del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos 
Humanos en Colombia 2016, en el cual se afirma que 43 (73%) de los casos de asesinatos verificados, las 
víctimas desarrollaban su labor en zonas rurales. El Informe afirma que esta situación está 
relacionada “con los vacíos de poder que han dejado las FARC EP; la escasa o débil presencia del Estado; 
la percepción de los actores criminales que los defensores de derechos humanos afectan sus intereses; la 
persistente estigmatización de los defensores de derechos humanos; el uso de la violencia para resolver 
disputas en las comunidades; la competencia entre grupos criminales por el control de actividades 
económicas ilegales; y el limitado acceso a los derechos económicos, sociales y culturales”. (Informe 
Anual del Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los Derechos Humanos en Colombia, 2016)
Distintas fuentes coinciden en afirmar que durante el 2016 y el 2017 Cauca fue el departamento con 
mayor número de asesinatos de líderes sociales, seguido por Antioquia, Valle y Nariño. Los municipios 
más afectados fueron Tumaco (Nariño), El Bagre (Antioquia), Corinto, Caloto, El Tambo (Cauca) y 
Buenaventura (Valle). Se resalta que en lo que va del 2018, la situación de orden público se ha deteriorado 
significativamente en el Bajo Cauca antioqueño (Cáceres y Tarazá) y en el Norte de Antioquia (Ituango y 
Valdivia).
Dentro de los perfiles de población, los estudios han determinado que los líderes con más casos de 
homicidios corresponden a defensores relacionados con la tierra y el territorio con enfoques étnicos y 
poblacionales como campesinos, indígenas, afrodescendientes, y Juntas de Acción comunal de zonas 
rurales ( Somos Defensores, 2018, p. 10).
Según el Observatorio de Tierras, desde el punto de vista de las organizaciones, las más afectadas son las 
Juntas de Acción Comunal, seguidas por las asociaciones indígenas, las organizaciones campesinas no 
relacionadas con la restitución y las organizaciones de restitución. Esta misma fuente afirma que las 
organizaciones más afectadas son del ámbito municipal con el 77% de los casos, seguidas por las 
departamentales con 16% de los eventos y en menor medida las nacionales con 7% de las afectaciones. 
Esto significa que las organizaciones de base son las más fuertemente atacadas (Observatorio de Tierras, 
2017) 
En materia de impunidad, los niveles continúan siendo alarmantes. La Fiscalía General de la Nación 
manifestó que había obtenido condenas en 5 de más de 80 asesinatos documentados por OACNUDH 
desde enero de 2016. A su vez, y de acuerdo con un estudio del Programa Somos Defensores, de los
asesinatos de líderes sociales documentados entre 2009 y 2016, el 87% de los casos no se han investigado 
ni sancionado a los responsables.
4.2 Mujeres – Violencia sexual 
En Colombia, la violencia sexual se ha inscrito en las lógicas del conflicto armado, y ha operado como una 
violencia comunicativa que le envía a la población y a la víctima un mensaje sobre quién manda en un 
territorio (Centro de Memoria Histórica, 2017, p. 23)
Si bien todos los actores armados han hecho uso de la violencia sexual, no todos lo han hecho de la misma 
forma, o en la misma magnitud. Como lo indica el Centro de Memoria Histórica, “el escenario está 
determinado por la relación que cada grupo armado establece con la población civil en un contexto 
geográfico e histórico particular y en una dinámica específica y que se define, principalmente, por la 
experiencia vivida de las víctimas en dichos contextos ” ( CNMH, 2017, p. 51). 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 133
No existen en Colombia, datos robustos sobre las magnitudes de la violencia sexual en el marco del 
conflicto armado lo que contribuye a reforzar la impunidad frente a esta modalidad de violencia y a 
obstaculizar las demandas de justicia. Pese a esto, se ha identificado cómo los diferentes actores armados 
continúan haciendo uso de la violencia de género y sexual como parte de sus estrategias. De hecho, el 
60,6% de los municipios PDET han mantenido tasas altas y muy altas de violencia sexual. En 2017 la 
Defensoría del Pueblo registró 61 alertas tempranas de violencia sexual por parte de actores armados en 
dichos municipios (Dejusticia, 2017, p.31)
Por su parte, la Encuesta de Prevalencia de Violencia Sexual en contra de las mujeres en el contexto del 
conflicto armado colombiano 2010-2015, publicada en agosto de 2017, da cuenta de algunas de las 
modalidades de violencia sexual en el país y de las intersecciones entre un contexto armado y uno de 
violencia cotidiana. La encuesta concluyó que la percepción generalizada de las mujeres es que la violencia 
sexual en el espacio público se incrementa con la presencia de actores armados. Sin embargo, la violencia 
sexual no se limita a la presencia de actores armados, sino que la violencia en el espacio privado, 
perpetrada por familiares, es una constante.
5. El contenido de los acuerdos y la nueva institucionalidad para el posconflicto 
5.1 Garantías a la participación política 
El punto 2 del Acuerdo- Participación política- busca fortalecer la participación de todos los colombianos 
en la política, los asuntos públicos y la construcción de la paz, y la ampliación de la democracia como 
camino para tramitar los conflictos de manera pacífica y el rompimiento definitivo del vínculo entre política 
y armas. 
Mejorar el entendimiento en materia de derechos humanos, y empoderar a la población para que abogue 
por la efectiva protección y garantía de sus derechos es uno de las herramientas que facilitan dicha 
participación. 
El acuerdo reconoce que el ejercicio de la política no se limita exclusivamente a la participación en el 
sistema político y electoral, sino que se requiere del reconocimiento tanto de la oposición que ejercen 
los partidos y movimientos políticos, como de las formas de acción de las organizaciones y los 
movimientos sociales y populares que pueden llegar a ejercer formas de oposición a políticas del Gobierno 
Nacional y de las autoridades departamentales y municipales.
5.2 Garantías a la seguridad 
Uno de los aspectos más relevantes a tener en cuenta es la protección de los derechos de las personas 
que están en el proceso de reintegración y que hacen parte del partido político Fuerza Alternativa
Revolucionaria del Común (FARC). El gobierno está en proceso de conformar el Sistema Integral de 
Seguridad, que tiene como fin la protección de quien ejercen política, por medio del fortalecimiento de 
las capacidades institucionales para combatir la impunidad, lo que se ajusta al componente 3 del Programa. 
Es importante mencionar que las garantías no son exclusivas para quienes dejan las armas, sino que se 
incluye a las familias de los desmovilizados, a las personas que viven en los territorios priorizados para la 
implementación, y a la actividad de aquellos líderes que existente y a quienes surjan del tránsito de las 
FARC a la política ( FIP, 2018).
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 134
Las garantías a la seguridad son una pieza fundamental para la paz territorial que invoca el Acuerdo. Por 
esta razón el texto del Acuerdo plantea un diseño institucional que establece estrategias para el 
esclarecimiento de fenómeno paramilitar y el desmantelamiento de organizaciones criminales. 
La Comisión Nacional de Garantías de Seguridad será la encargada de diseñar y hacer seguimiento 
a la política pública en materia de desmantelamiento de organizaciones criminales. A su vez, en la Fiscalía, 
estará la Unidad Especial de Investigación para el Desmantelamiento de esas organizaciones, así como un 
nuevo Sistema de Prevención y Alerta en la Defensoría. Este Sistema tendrá que mapear y monitorear las 
amenazas, generar instrumentos de verificación y respuesta a denuncias. 
En el mismo sentido, se destaca que el Acuerdo insta al gobierno a revisar el marco normativo para 
elevar el costo de los delitos contra líderes y lideresas de organizaciones y movimientos 
sociales y defensores y defensoras de derechos humanos, y fortalecer las capacidades 
investigativas y de judicialización contra quienes atenten contra estas personas, pues como se vio en el 
aparte anterior, dichas afectaciones continúan siendo una de las principales problemáticas en materia de 
protección y garantía de derechos humanos. 
Asimismo, el acuerdo establece medidas para lograr no estigmatización a grupos en condiciones de 
vulnerabilidad o discriminados como las mujeres, los pueblos y comunidades étnicas, población LGBTI, 
los jóvenes, niños y niñas y adultos mayores, las personas con discapacidad, las minorías políticas y las 
minorías religiosas. 
El punto 2.1.2 plantea un compromiso de garantizar la seguridad para el ejercicio de la política, cuyo 
objetivo final debe ser el afianzamiento de una cultura de convivencia, tolerancia y solidaridad que permita 
la ampliación de la democracia participativa, sobre la base de prevenir la estigmatización por causas de 
opinión o el ejercicio de la oposición y el empleo de la violencia por la defensa o contradicción de ideas 
en el debate y participación en el espectro político nacional. 
El Acuerdo final, prevé la construcción de un Sistema Integral de Seguridad para el Ejercicio de la Política 
(punto 3.4) adecuando las normas y estableciendo elementos de coordinación y corresponsabilidad 
institucional (punto 3.4.1), bajo una perspectiva de seguridad basada en el humanismo y valores 
democráticos. La asunción de este sistema de seguridad debe conllevar al fin del conflicto (punto 3 
Acuerdo Final). 
El Sistema Integral de Seguridad para el Ejercicio de la Política, debe prevenir las amenazas a la vida, 
integridad, libertad y seguridad de: i) líderes y lideresas de organizaciones y movimientos sociales y 
defensoras y defensores de derechos humanos; ii) garantías para la movilización y la protesta social; iii) 
partidos y movimientos políticos, en especial aquellos que se declaren en oposición. 
Específicamente, el artículo 13 del DL 895 – 17 establece una presunción de riesgo extraordinario para 
integrantes del partido que surgió del tránsito de las FARC – EP a la vida civil, hoy Fuerza Alternativa 
Revolucionaria del Común – FARC. Para la protección específica de integrantes de la FARC, sus sedes y 
actividades, deberá implementarse el: “Programa de Protección Integral para las y los integrantes del nuevo 
movimiento o partido político que surja del tránsito de las FARC-EP a la actividad política legal”.
5.3 Sistema de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y no Repetición
Uno de los pilares del Acuerdo, es el relativo al Sistema Integral de Verdad, Justicia, Reparación y No 
Repetición, que comprende instancias como la Comisión de la Verdad; la Unidad para la búsqueda de 
personas dadas desparecidas; y la Jurisdicción especial para la paz (JEP). Se requerirá que los funcionarios 
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 135
públicos y la ciudadanía en general conozcan del acuerdo en general, pero sobre todo de los avances y 
funcionamiento de las instancias previstas en el Sistema. 
Asimismo, la implementación del Acuerdo de Paz debe aprovechar las estructuras e iniciativas existentes 
del Estado, y procurar la articulación entre entidades con la institucionalidad e instrumentos de política 
pública existentes. 
De igual forma, es preciso tener en cuenta aros instrumentos de política pública que se han expedido en 
aras de facilitar la implementación de las medidas previstas en el Acuerdo como los siguientes:
Mid-Term Performance Evaluation of USAID/Colombia HRA 136
ANNEX G: INDICATOR PROGRESS
Indicator progress, as reported directly by HRA in their Quarter 3 Fiscal Year 2018 report (data as of 
December 31, 2018). 
# Indicator Target LOP % Achievement 
LOP
AO: Support the GOC and civil society in promoting a culture of human rights, preventing 
violations of human rights and responding effectively to violations that occur.
1
Number of sub-national entities receiving USG 
assistance that improve their performance. 33 21%
2
Number of human rights defenders trained and 
supported. 14,400 82%
IR 1: Improved understanding of human rights
3
Number of stakeholders with broader knowledge and 
understanding of human rights. 5,040 136%
4
Number of domestic NGOs engaged in monitoring 
or advocacy work on human rights receiving USG 
support.
20 130%
5
Number of media products produced through 
national and local media outlets which contribute to 
effective oversight on human rights issues in target 
regions.
120 62%
IR 2: Policies to prevent human rights violations developed and Implemented
6
Number of sub-national entities receiving USG 
assistance that improve their performance on 
prevention.
32 Stage 4 72%
7
Number of government entities that improve 
prevention service delivery according to the 
community scorecard methodology.
20 55%
8
Number of local authorities trained to implement 
prevention policies. 400 178%
IR 3: Investigation and prosecution of human rights violations increased
9
Number of individuals/groups from low income or 
marginalized communities who received legal aid or 
victim’s assistance with USG support.
300 203%
10 Number of mechanisms implemented by government 
entities to advance efforts to curtail impunity.
10 50%
11 Number of strategic cases related to human rights 
defenders and GBV documented. 9 67%
12 Number of municipalities in which local gender policy 
is being implemented. 25 Stage 3 72%
U.S. Agency for International Development
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