OCTOBER 2017
This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for
International Development. It was prepared by Democracy International, Inc.
COLOMBIA 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL 
STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION 
FINAL REPORT
Submitted to: 
USAID/COLOMBIA 
Prepared by: 
Kelly McBride, Team Leader 
Marc Chernick, Senior Conflict Specialist 
Hugo Navarro, Evaluations Specialist 
Contractor: 
Democracy International, Inc. 
7600 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 1010 
Bethesda, MD 20814 
Tel: 301-961-1660 
www.democracyinternational.com
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL 
STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE 
EVALUATION 
FINAL REPORT 
October 2017 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................................................I
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ............................................................................................................................................I
EVALUATION PURPOSE, QUESTIONS, AND METHODOLOGY......................................................................................................I
PROJECT DESCRIPTION ....................................................................................................................................................II
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ...........................................................................................................................................II
RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................................................................... VII
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................... 1
BACKGROUND..............................................................................................................................................................2
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................................... 3
DATA COLLECTION TOOLS AND ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................................3
TARGETED STAKEHOLDER SURVEY ................................................................................................................. 6
ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION QUESTIONS ............................................................................................. 9
RECOMMENDATIONS ......................................................................................................................................... 19
ANNEX A: STATEMENT OF WORK ................................................................................................................... 1
ANNEX B: EVALUATION METHODOLOGY AND TEAM COMPOSITION .............................................. 1
ANNEX C: DATA COLLECTION TOOLS ......................................................................................................... 1
ANNEX D: TABLE OF FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................ 1
ANNEX E: LIST OF INFORMANTS ...................................................................................................................... 1
ANNEX F: MONITORING DATA ANALYSIS .................................................................................................... 1
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 
ACRONYMS 
ACR Colombian Agency for Reintegration
ARN Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization 
BACRIM Bandas Criminales
CDCS Country Development and Cooperation Strategy
CH&A Children & Adolescents
CHS-2F Disengaged Child Soldiers and Youth at Risk of Recruitment
CIPRUNNA
Inter-Sectorial Commission on Recruitment Prevention/Comisión Intersectorial de 
Prevención del Reclutamiento y Utilización de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes
Conpes Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y Social
CSO Civil Society Organization
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
ELN National Liberation Army/Ejército de Liberación Nacional
FARC
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia/
Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FGD Focus Group Discussions
GOC Government of Colombia
IAG Illegal Armed Group(s)
ICBF Colombian Family Welfare Institute
IOM (OIM) International Organization for Migration 
KII Key Informant Interviews
MVRO Vulnerability, Risk and Opportunity Maps
OVP Office of Vulnerable Population
RPR Reintegration and Prevention of Recruitment
SAC Special Assistance Center 
SAP Specialized Assistance Program
SENA Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje 
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USG United States Government
Victim’s Unit
Comprehensive Victim Support and Reparation/Unidad Para la Atención y Reparación 
Integral a las Victimas 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT i
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EVALUATION PURPOSE, QUESTIONS, AND METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this evaluation is to assess if the CHS-F2 program (2012-2015) achieved its expected 
results and to determine if and how those results align with the Government of Colombia’s (GOC) 
programs to reintegrate former child soldiers. In the Colombian context, the latter is referred to as the 
disengagement of children and adolescents (CH&A) and the restoration of their rights as children and 
citizens. The evaluation also looks at CHS-F2 efforts to prevent the recruitment and use of children and 
youth by illegal armed groups and criminal organizations. 
The evaluation identifies lessons learned from program implementation and offers recommendations and 
policy options for current and future programming. The evaluation questions, as identified in the Scope 
of Work, are: 
Table 1. List of Evaluation Questions and Codes 
Code Evaluation Question (EQ) 
EQ1 To what extent has the CH-2F supported the GOC policies and programs to 
reintegrate child soldiers?
EQ2 What are the strengths, weaknesses, and lessons learned from the 
institutional reintegration route and alternative models for child soldiers of 
each one of the models supported by CHS-2F?
EQ3 What have been the key challenges and bottlenecks in the GOC child 
soldiers’ reintegration process supported by CHS-F2? 
EQ4 What results has CH-2F achieved in the four key intervention areas 
(institutional strengthening, assistance to the reintegration of child soldiers, 
prevention of recruitment, and knowledge management?)
EQ5 Which are the strategic areas in which the international community, 
especially USAID, can continue to support the GOC to achieve prevention of 
recruitment and use of children by illegal armed groups? This question seeks 
to identify the most strategic approach to support GOC efforts to fight 
recruitment and use of children and adolescents by illegal armed groups and 
organized crime bands (BACRIM).
The Colombia CHS-F2 evaluation team used several data collection methods. These included reviewing 
documents, conducting 48 key informant interviews, 6 focus group discussions and an on-line survey of 
targeted stakeholders. The in-person data collection was conducted in the municipalities of Bogota and 
Soacha in the department of Cundinamarca, in the municipalities of Cali and Santander de Quiliche in 
the department of Cauca, Cartagena in the department of Bolivar, and in the municipality of Villavicencio 
in the department of Meta during a four-week period, May 10-June 16, 2017. The targeted stakeholder 
survey was conducted over a 13-day period, July 27-August 11, 2017. It was sent to 29 institutions and 
53 individuals and the questions focused on the impact of the CHS-F2 program, recruitment prevention 
and recommendations for future programming. 
An important challenge to gathering both the qualitative and quantitative research was presented by the 
fact that the evaluation was conducted 20 months after the CHS-F2 program ended. The team found a 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT ii
high turnover of GOC officials, lack of institutional memory and the current focus on post-conflict 
needs. The team did its best to identify and locate informants that had worked directly on the CHS-F2 
program. The team acknowledges that the ex-post facto nature of the evaluation also had benefits, 
primarily the ability to evaluate the long-term sustainability of the program. This is discussed further in 
the limitations section.
PROJECT DESCRIPTION 
The strategic objective of the 17-year Disengaged Child Soldiers and Youth at Risk of Recruitment 
Program (CHS) was to strengthen the Government of Colombia’s (GOC) capacity to assist disengaged 
children and youth at risk of recruitment or use by illegal armed actors. The International Organization 
implemented the technical assistance program for Migration (IOM) in collaboration with some 13 state 
and government entities at the national and local level, Colombian civil society organizations and 
Colombian officials and consultants. 
DI has been charged with evaluating the final phase (known as CHS-F2) of the program from 2012 to 
2015, with a total budget of $12 million. The evaluation encompasses the program’s second phase, 
which ran from January 2012 to December 2014, with an initial budget of $9, and the final extension 
through December 31, 2015, with an additional budget of $3.3 million. 
The goals of the CHS-F2 program were to expand and institutionalize initiatives developed in the 
previous programs and to complete the institutional strengthening process of both the Colombian 
Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) and the Inter-Sectorial Commission on Recruitment Prevention 
(CIPRUNA.) ICBF manages the disengagement of CH&A and CIPRUNA is an inter-agency working 
group on prevention of recruitment and use of CH&A by illegal groups and criminal organizations. CHS￾F2 provided technical assistance to produce methodologies, studies, policy documents, publications, and 
workshops. It funded long-term consultants that worked inside ICBF and CIPRUNA and short-term 
technical consultants. The program also procured limited amounts of supplies and equipment for 
counterparts. The program further developed prevention and social inclusion methodologies, piloted
initiatives with at-risk-youth and supported the GOC to respond to the adoption in June 2011 of the 
Victims and Land Restitution Law (“Victims Law”.) 
The 2015 extension phase occurred in the context of the ongoing peace process between the GOC and 
FARC guerrillas. (The peace process began in September 2012 and culminated in November 2016 when 
the Colombian Congress ratified the final peace accords.) At the time of the extension, it was expected 
that ICBF would be assisting massive numbers of disengaged CH&A from the FARC. CHS-F2 assisted 
ICBF to prepare for this contingency. To date, only 86 CH&A have been formally released from the 
FARC’s ranks as part of the peace process. The extension also supported the design and implementation 
of methodologies for the creation of ICBF’s community-based assistance model with an indigenous 
community and the family reunification/family ties model for disengaged CH&A. 
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 
EVALUATION QUESTION 1: 
TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE CH-2F SUPPORTED THE GOC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS TO REINTEGRATE CHILD SOLDIERS? 
Findings 
IOM provided strong technical support to several Colombian government and state entities at the 
national and local level that played roles in reintegrating CH&A and restoring their rights. The 
Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF) is the government agency primarily responsible for 
overseeing the disengagement of CH&A and the restoration of their rights as children. IOM also 
supported several state entities with human rights roles, including the Ombudsman Office/Defensor del 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT iii
Pueblo and the Office of the Inspector General/Procurador General de Colombia, and the GOC’s 
Comprehensive Victim Support and Reparation/Unidad Para la Atención y Reparación Integral a las 
Víctimas (“Victim’s Unit”) which manages indemizations, reparations and support for victims of the 
conflict. 
CHS-F2 provided crucial support to ICBF to consolidate its institutional capacity to reintegrate child 
soldiers. It achieved this by providing technical assistance, transferring methodologies, and piloting 
several new successful reintegration initiatives, i.e. the reestablishment of family ties for CH&A who are 
unable to return immediately to their families, reintegration and reconciliation with the Nasa indigenous 
community, and the rural based-indigenous youth model, INGRUMA. After a close review of official 
documents and based on interviews with ICBF officials, the evaluation team concluded that there is a 
lack of an integrated gender perspective in ICBF’s assistance to CH&A. 
EVALUATION QUESTION 2: 
WHAT ARE THE STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, AND LESSONS LEARNED OF THE INSTITUTIONAL REINTEGRATION AND 
ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR EACH ONE OF THE MODELS SUPPORTED BY CHS-F2? 
Findings 
The CHS-F2 (2012-2015) program built on the lessons learned of IOM's 2009-2011 program. CHS-F2 
was designed to document and systemize successful practices; to connect families and communities to 
the reintegration process to a greater degree; and to develop differential or tailored models to assist the 
CH&A (i.e. a community-based model with an indigenous community, an activity to reestablish and 
strengthen family ties, a rural model with indigenous CH&A. CHF-F2 worked with ICBF to design 
initiatives to expand the pathways available to restore their rights as children and citizens and to 
integrate them productively into society. 
CHS-F2 piloted differential or tailored approaches for indigenous communities and to aid in the 
restoration of family ties between the disengaged CH&A and a family member. The evaluation team 
interviewed the operators of the institutional model, managed/foster home and the differential approach 
of the Nasa indigenous community. Due to logistical constraints, the team was unable to visit and 
conduct interviews at the rural based model for indigenous youth called INGRUMA. 
The previous CHS programs had strengthen the basic ICBF models designed to assist disengaged 
children and youth and to restore their rights. These models include: 1) institutional model/modelo 
institucional, where the CH&A lives and studies in Special Assistance Center (SAC); 2) protective 
house/hogar protector, where the CH&A returns and lives with his family; 3) managed home/hogar 
gestor, where the CH&A is placed in a special program of foster care. 
The team notes that IOM reports and interviews show it put considerable effort overall into gender 
initiatives. However, two years after the programs end, the team found little evidence that gender-based 
approaches had made an impact and been consolidated in ICBF reintegration assistance work. Similarly, 
the team did not find evidence of differential approach for Afro-descendent CH&A. 
Respondents to DI’s targeted survey recommended that the education and job training component of 
the reintegration/disengagement program be strengthen, as both a reintegration and recruitment 
prevention strategy.
Conclusions 
The GOC's route for the disengagement of children and adolescents (CH&A) met its basic objectives. 
According to the performance monitor, 990 CH&A were assisted during the 2012-2015 period. This is 
113% over CHS-F2 target. At this time, the GOC is largely prepared to assume full responsibility for 
reintegration of disengaged children. The Colombian state met it international and moral obligations 
under International Humanitarian Law and Colombian law to disengage children from the armed conflict, 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT iv
to restore their rights as citizens, and to provide them with financial reparations. The CHS program, 
working with ICBF and other key Colombian and international actors, played crucial role in helping 
Colombia meet its obligations. As of May 31, 2017, only 317 CH&A remain in the Specialized Assistance 
Program. An additional 86 CH&A released from the FARC ranks in 2017 are likely to access ICBF’s 
assistance in the near future. It remains to be seen if CH&A from the ELN ranks will be released to the 
GOC as the result of on-going peace negotiations between the ELN guerrillas and GOC. 
The institutional route through the residential programs run by Don Bosco has been successful in 
providing all aspects of the needs of disengagement and restoration of rights. The foster care and 
residence programs have been in general quite successful. However, local municipalities where the 
foster care is located are often reluctant to integrate these children into the regular school system. 
Of the three routes available to CH&A, the first, return to their families, raises the most questions, as 
there is no data on this route available. The team did not have access to disengaged CH&A or their 
families because of confidentially and security concerns. 
However, many KII emphasized the importance of the family for successful reintegration of the CH&A 
and several ICBF officials at the national and local level told the team that the family reunions were 
highly successful and key to helping the disengaged CH&A reconnect and integrate into family and 
community. In this regard, the CHS-F2 more than met its performance target by 122%. 609 disengaged 
CH&A received assistance through socio-familial and community models. At the same time, CHS-F2 did 
not meet its targets regarding the percentage of disengaged CH&A receiving tailored services. Its target 
was for 63% of CH&A to receive tailored services, while only 35% did receive such services. 
Therefore, emphasis should be placed on further developing the differential approaches for indigenous 
communities that were piloted in CHS-F2. The program would benefit from the further development of 
programs that have a rural, urban and Afro-descendent focus, depending on the background of the 
CH&A. 
EVALUATION QUESTION 3: 
WHAT HAVE BEEN THE KEY CHALLENGES AND BOTTLENECKS IN THE GOC CHILD SOLDIERS’ REINTEGRATION PROCESS 
SUPPORTED BY CHS-F2? WHAT ARE THE KEY CHALLENGES AND BOTTLENECKS WHEN DISAGGREGATING THE 
INFORMATION AND ANALYSIS BY GENDER AND ETHNIC GROUPS? 
Findings 
The Colombian government developed a comprehensive program for the disengagement of CH&A 
combatants from the illegal armed groups. In most cases, these young people were provided with health 
care, counseling and educational and training opportunities that they would not ordinarily have had 
access to if they had not become members and then left an illegal armed group. 
Despite these accomplishments, there are challenges and bottlenecks in the CH&A disengagement 
program. These include: 
 We simply do not know what happens to most of the CH&A who have gone through the 
program. The GOC, either through ICBF or another government entity, does not keep track of 
the participants once they turn 18 years old. When they leave ICBF’s purview, they become 
eligible to receive reparations and support from the Victim's Unit and for benefits and services 
from the Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN), which attends demobilized 
adult combatants. However, the three government entities that potentially interact with the 
disengaged former child soldier do not coordinate to follow his/her path. 
 There has not been an adequate impact study by the GOC or another entity of ICBF’s 
comprehensive program or a full survey of beneficiaries’ life trajectories upon completing the 
ICBF program. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT v
 An unknown number of child soldiers return to their own or other communities without going 
through the ICBF program. 
 Families, or a family member, need to be more closely involved in the disengagement and 
reintegration process. ICBF’s program of family reunification meetings that were developed 
under CHS-F2 is deemed highly successful by ICBF and Ombudsman staff. However, without 
outside financial support, these family meetings are severely limited by ICBF’s scarce budget.
 The degree of pyscho-social trauma among disengaged child combatants has thus far 
overwhelmed the ability of ICBF and the Colombian health system to provide trained 
counselors. 
 ICBF tracks the number of girls and boys and the ethnic backgrounds of CH&A participating in 
the disengagement program. However, the ethnic, gender and community dimensions of the 
program were all under-developed when compared with their potential. Indigenous and Afro￾Colombian CH&A are overrepresented among the ranks of child soldiers as compared with 
their general numbers in the population. At the current time, a differential program for girls 
(some 30% of CH&A) or Afro-Colombian CH&A (some 30%) is lacking. There is a limited 
differential program for indigenous CH&A through the INGRUMA and Nasa-community models.
Conclusions 
The more comprehensive programs envisioned in the 2012-2015 CHS merit further development and 
consolidation, including the rural and urban models, differentiated approach based on ethnicity, and a 
cross-cutting gender dimension to all programming. The team understands that USAID/IOM’s 
Recruitment Prevention Program (2016-2018) continues to work in these areas and to adapt to 
dynamics of the country’s context. CH&A continue to be recruited into illegal armed groups and 
criminal organizations. However, they are more likely to stay in their communities rather than be 
deployed to another geographical area. This reality calls for community-based programs. 
The DI team understands the different disengagement models and finds them satisfactory in terms of 
restoring the rights of CH&A and providing them basic social services. However, the lack of a 
monitoring mechanism to track and support them and their progress in remaking their lives after they 
leave IBCF is of great concern to the team. 
Similarly, based on the information collected from interviews with officials at ICBF, the Victims Office 
and ACR, there is little coordination between these three GOC entities that interact with the 
disengaged CH&A. A former disengaged youth could potentially interact and receive benefits from all 
three entities at different times is his/her life. The success of the educational and training opportunities 
to equip disengaged CH&A with employable skills is also not tracked or evaluated.
There is no evidence suggesting there is an interest to establish a monitoring mechanism for the CH&A 
who went through the ICBF program, although IOM piloted a successful tracking program in 2008. 
There is talk of establishing a monitoring mechanism for the 86 CH&A who have been released by the 
FARC under the terms of the peace process. 
EVALUATION QUESTION 4: 
WHAT RESULTS HAS CHS-2F ACHIEVED IN THE FOUR KEY INTERVENTION AREAS (INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING, 
ASSISTANCE TO REINTEGRATION OF CHILD SOLDIERS, PREVENTION OF RECRUITMENT AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT? 
(INCORPORATE MONITOR STUFF HERE) 
Assistance to Reintegration of Child Soldiers 
Findings: 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT vi
USAID and OIM have successfully worked with GOC agencies, particularly ICBF, its operators, certain 
local authorities and an indigenous community to provide routes for the disengagement of CH&A and 
the restoration of their rights. The performance monitor indicates that CHS-F2 reached 990 CH&A, or 
the entire universe of ICBF beneficiaries, during 2012-2015, In doing so, CHS-F2 achieved the following 
results: 
 Raised the profile and created greater awareness of disengaged CH&A as a class of victims 
that had been largely overlooked; 
 Facilitated the strengthening of both national agencies and regional and local government for 
assisting with the disengagement of CH&A combatants and the restitution of rights; 
 Helped place the situation of CH&A squarely on the negotiating table in Havana and in the 
peace accords; 
 Advanced public policy in the area of disengaged CH&A; 
 Assisted 990 former child soldiers to have an opportunity to live a fuller and more 
productive life; 
 Supported national and local programs whose funding over time has been transferred to the 
Colombian government; 
 Developed and transferred successful methodologies, such as the family ties/reunification 
model, into ICBF’s core work. 
Institutional Strengthening and Knowledge Management 
Findings: 
CHS-F2 created and supported two GOC "Observatories" the ICBF Child Welfare Observatory and the 
Observatory of CIPRUNA’s Technical Secretariat, both founded in 2012. During 2012-2015, the 
Observatories produced methodologies, and publications. The CIPRUNA observatory enjoyed more 
political support and relevance when it was under the purview of VP Angelino Garzon (2010-2014) than 
it has over the last three years. ICBF’s Child Welfare Observatory has produced a number of 
infographics and studies, but people consulted outside of ICBF did not use or consult this information. 
Conclusions: 
While CIPRUNA worked dynamically and functioned effectively for most of CHS-F2, the DI team 
identified a number of current problems that limit its potential. These include: scare resources and 
constant rotation of personnel, lack of coordination, dialogue and commitment among the 29 entities 
composing CIPRUNA, lack of quorum and general disinterest to hold regular meetings, inability to work 
throughout the entire territory due to the presence of armed actors and staff shortages. These 
problems aside, it is clear that IOM’s support and that of several dedicated IOM-financed consultants 
inside CIPRUNA has been decisive in keeping CIPRUNA afloat. 
Prevention of Recruitment 
Findings: 
The CHS-F2’s prevention work focused on: a) implementation of public policy advocacy at the local 
level in high-risk areas; b) collaborating with the Technical Secretariat of the new Inter-Sectorial 
Commission for the Recruitment Prevention (CIPRUNA) on prevention plans and working on youth 
integration; and c) social inclusion strategies with the Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities. 
Conclusions: 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT vii
The team found CHS-F2’s prevention work with vulnerable youth to be thoughtfully, creatively and 
intelligently conceived and implemented. In general, during 2012-2105, the programs in rural areas were 
designed for the prevention of recruitment into the illegal armed groups, FARC, ELN and Bacrims. In 
urban areas, the concern from 2012 -2015, and continuing into the present has been the recruitment 
into gangs, many of which have ties to organized crime or one of the illegal armed groups. All the areas 
we visited noted a steady upturn in drug consumption throughout the entire period but accelerating 
post -2015. 
Yet despite growing attention, all of these activities are underfunded and strain for high-level attention 
from governors, mayors and senior-level national officials. In most cases, highly dedicated public 
servants, professionals and dedicated CSO’s and religious groups who work with limited resources run 
them and appreciate IOM assistance. 
EVALUATION QUESTION 5: 
WHICH ARE THE STRATEGIC AREAS IN WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, ESPECIALLY USAID, CAN CONTINUE TO 
SUPPORT THE GOC TO ACHIEVE PREVENTION OF RECRUITMENT AND USE OF CHILDREN BY ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS? THIS 
QUESTION SEEKS TO IDENTIFY THE MOST STRATEGIC APPROACH TO SUPPORT GOC EFFORTS TO FIGHT RECRUITMENT AND 
USE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS BY ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS AND ORGANIZED CRIMINAL BANDS (BACRIM.) 
Findings 
The structural issues of poverty, high rates of family and sexual violence, lack of state presence and 
social services, and presence of criminal groups and illicit activities that make youth in Colombia 
vulnerable to recruitment and use by armed groups remains largely unchanged. Despite the end of the 
conflict with the FARC in 2017 and the concomitant decrease of CH&A within ICBF’s SAP program, 
CH&A continue to face similar and evolving recruitment patterns by illegal armed groups and criminal 
organizations. 
The international community’s specific concerns include the power vacuum of power left by the FARC 
in the regions that they once dominate, the situation of CH&A soldiers from the FARC ranks who 
spontaneously demobilized, outside formal peace process, and apparently returned to already vulnerable 
communities with historic levels of coca production and high-level of violence. The international 
community is also concerned with the situation of CH&A living near-by the 26 remote transitional zones 
where the FARC has concentrated under the peace agreement. In addition, there is great concern with 
respect to the levels of gender-based violence, child labor, trafficking and sexual exploitation of CH&A 
by illegal armed groups and organized criminal bands. 
Conclusions 
Given the signing of the peace accords and the clear commitment by the international community to 
supporting the peace process, there is an unparalleled opportunity to strengthen the CH&A recruitment 
prevention program, adapted to the needs of the post-peace accord environment. The technical 
experience, partnerships, trust and credibility developed by CHS program provide an excellent 
foundation for an expanded and robust CH&A recruitment prevention program. Given the peace 
accords, there are greater opportunities for coordinated aid strategies with the GOC and international 
community on prevention programs as well. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Mission-Wide Recommendations 
 Recognize youth as key to peace-building and economic development. Support their active 
engagement with state institutions (schools, community projects, elections). 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT viii
 Identify USG inter-agency initiatives that could reinforce synergies to promote youth-related 
strategies. Conduct a USAID cross-sectorial youth assessment in anticipation of the next 
Colombia Country Development Strategy. 
 Formalize and deepen implementation of USAID’s “Youth for Development” policy (October 
2012) by strengthening youth programming, participation, and partnerships, and by integrating 
youth issues and engagement across mission initiatives and programming. 
 Engage in policy dialogue with state and government institutions/officials and presidential 
candidates on youth issues. 
 Encourage development and approval of GOC policy on prevention (i.e. new Consejo Nacional 
de Política Económica y Social (Conpes.) 
Recommendations on the Reintegration of Child Soldiers 
 The team recommends sustained focus on designing and implementing tailored programs that 
benefit indigenous and Afro-descendent CH&A, with adjustments for local customs and culture. 
A rural model, based on the successful Nasa community indigenous model, could be developed. 
 The 2012 CHS program originally envisioned expanding the focus from the CH&A to greater 
involvement with families and with communities. The current post-Accord environment will 
require such program of reconciliation that incorporates the needs of victims, families, 
communities and adult former combatants in a more integral manner. 
 Gender integration into ICBF’s disengagement program merits continued and sustained 
attention. 
 The program needs to vastly expand resources and trained professionals to address the mental 
health and psychosocial needs of all former CH&A soldiers. 
 Improve coordination between three government entities that provide services and benefits to 
disengaged youth: ICBF, ACR, and Victims Unit. 
 Replicate Nasa-indigenous community model to other indigenous or rural communities where 
disengaged children or vulnerable youth reside. 
 Establish a system to accompany disengaged youth after they leave the ICBF program and 
support them in job placement. 
 Develop programs that strengthen the family structure in high-priority municipals identified by 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Post-Conflict. 
Recommendations to Address Bottlenecks and Challenges in the Reintegration 
Process 
 Develop a coordination and data-sharing mechanism between the three GOC entities that 
interact with the disengaged CH&A, including the ICBF, Victims Office, and ACR. 
 Develop a mechanism to track and support CH&A and their progress in remaking their lives 
after they leave IBCF. The monitoring mechanism can be modeled after IOM’s successful pilot, 
CRO-J, which included job training for labor insertion. Respondents to DI’s targeted survey 
recommended educational and job training tied to the labor market as key to reintegration 
success and recruitment prevention. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT ix
 Expand and consolidate the differential approach and gender perspective in the reintegration 
models. 
Recommendations related to Prevention of Recruitment 
 Adapt current USAID-IOM “Reintegration Program” to work in the high-priority zones 
identified by the High Counselor for Post-Conflict” 
 Develop new USAID programs that focus on strengthening the community and family social 
structures that have always been envisioned as part of a successful child recruitment prevention 
program but have never been adequately funded. 
 Support the implementation of the updated GOC Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y 
Social (Conpes) - equivalent to the prevention of recruitment and use by criminal groups, soon 
to be released by the Directorate of National Planning. 
 Continue support for the social inclusion initiatives and differential approaches from CHS-F2 and 
incorporate strategies. 
 Support programs to address family violence and gender-based violence, which are a key driver 
for recruitment and use into armed groups. 
 Extend USAID’s current “Reintegration Program” with IOM to receptor communities where 
FARC CH&A are reportedly spontaneously re-locating. 
 Strengthen implementation of prevention programs at the territorial (local) level with a focus 
not only on vulnerable youth but also on the family and community structures that are keys to 
prevention. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 1
INTRODUCTION
Democracy International (DI) hereby presents its final performance evaluation of the USAID/Colombia 
Disengaged Child Soldiers and Youth at Risk of Recruitment (CHS-2F) Program. In 2001, USAID 
launched a full-fledged program and a long-term commitment to support the Government of Colombia 
(GOC) in its efforts to respond to the needs of children leaving illegal armed groups. USAID started its 
support through a small pilot project in 1999. Over the past 17 years, USAID has supported the GOC 
to successfully develop both the legal/human rights norms and the institutional architecture for handling 
the reintegration of some 5,000 children into civilian life. It has also contributed to efforts by the GOC 
and civil society organizations to prevent youth recruitment by armed illegal actors and criminal 
networks. During this time, the International Organization for Migration (IOM/OIM) has been USAID’s 
implementing partner and the GOC’s close and effective collaborator. 
USAID’s Program to Support Child Ex-Combatants (CHS) consisted of several phases: the First Phase, 
which was implemented from 2001 to 2008; the Second Phase, originally planned for three years from 
2009 to 2011 and was then extended two additional years, from January 2012 to December 2014. The 
third phase of the program which went throughout 2015 and was the final extension of the program. DI 
was charged with evaluating the second and third phases of the USAID program during the timeframe of 
January 1, 2012 to December 31, 2015 (CHS-2F). 
The overall objectives of the CHS-F2 program were to consolidate progress made in the previous 
phases of the program; to strengthen institutions and prepare for the full hand-over (‘Colombianization’) 
of all assistance activities to the GOC; and to document and transfer knowledge of methodologies, 
guidelines, lessons learned and experiences to Colombian stakeholders. It is important to note that 
USAID and IOM did not provide direct assistance to disengaged CH&A; rather the GOC, in conformity 
with Colombian and US law, was responsible for this task. 
During the Second Phase (2012-2014) the program components focused on providing technical 
assistance for 1) Assistance for Disengaged Children; 2) Recruitment Prevention; and 3) Institutional 
Strengthening. The Third and Final Phase was based on needs around the on-going peace process 
between the GOC and FARC guerrillas. Along with the same three components mentioned above, it 
incorporated a Peace Pedagogy component. Some of the strategies and methodologies developed under 
the CHS-2F program are now being implemented under USAID/IOM’s Reintegration and Prevention of 
Recruitment (RPR) Program (2016-2018.) 
The primary purposes of this evaluation are (1) to assess if the CHS-2Fprogram was able to achieve its 
expected results; and (2) to determine if and how those results aligned and supported the Government 
of Colombia’s (GOC) programs to assist children and youth who disengage from illegal armed groups, 
to prevent recruitment and to ensure children’s rights. The evaluation considers the context and impact 
of the peace process on the CHS-2F program and seeks to distill lessons learned from program 
implementation to derive recommendations and policy options for USAID/Colombia to integrate into 
the current and future programming. These lessons and recommendations will be presented in a clear 
and cogent way, with a distinct connection to evidence collected during fieldwork and corroborated by 
triangulating multiple types of data collected through different instruments. 
The evaluation team conducted fieldwork in Colombia during a four-week period in May- June 2017 to 
collect primary data from USAID staff, project implementers, beneficiaries and other key stakeholders. 
The targeted survey was conducted in August 2017. The goal of this fieldwork was to assess the 
performance of the CHS-2F project and to compare and contrast information collected with the 
projects’ indicator data, with objectives and targets set by the CHS-2F Program. By triangulating 
information from different sources, the team was able to respond to the key evaluation questions, 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 2
substantiate and validate their findings and conclusions, and draw informed recommendations on how to 
incorporate lessons learned into future and current programming. 
BACKGROUND 
The 2012-2015 CHS program built on the successful experiences of IOM's earlier program (2009-2011) 
working with the Colombian government to provide special services to children and adolescents 
(CH&A) disengaged from illegal armed groups. It was designed to strengthen and expand the pathways 
available to restore their rights as children and citizens and to integrate them productively into society. 
This new phase was designed to systematize the more successful practices; involve families and 
communities to a greater degree; and develop more tailored approaches depending on rural or urban 
origins, ethnicity and gender. 
Moreover, the renewed program represented a response to the altered political circumstances in the 
country following the 2010 election of Juan Manuel Santos and his call for peace. In 2011 the GoC 
passed the Law 1448, the "Victim's and Land Restitution Law”. In 2010, they issues a national policy 
directive (CONPES1 3673) directing the government to formulate and implement policies to prevent the 
recruitment of minors into illegal armed groups. IOM played a key role in developing the CONPES and 
in adapting the Victim's Law to recognize children’s rights. USAID's support presented a unique 
opportunity to institutionalize policies of child disengagement and prevention of recruitment within the 
new political context of a focus on victims, reparations and the then nascent strategy of searching for a 
negotiated peace with the FARC. 
USAID extended the CHS program in 2014 through 2015 to accommodate the ongoing peace 
negotiations. The Colombian Congress ratified the peace accords in November 2016. At the time of the 
2014 extension, many Colombia experts believed that a peace accord would lead to a massive 
disengagement of children from the FARC rank and file. The extension also envisioned a pedagogical 
strategy for peace and greater work with communities to prepare them for the presence of former child 
combatants. 
The CH&A disengagement program was first conceived in 1999 to help Colombia meet its treaty 
commitments and moral obligations under international law. In accordance with Colombian and 
International Humanitarian Law governing the treatment of child combatants, children and adolescents 
captured on the battlefield or whom desert from an illegal armed group are to be considered victims. 
They cannot be detained or questioned by military forces for even a day or night, as would be the case 
of an adult combatant. In Colombia, CH&A must be handed over to the Colombian Institute for Family 
Welfare (ICBF), which is charged with their welfare and the restoration of their rights. For CH&A and 
for the Colombian State, the process of disengaging from the war and separating from an illegal armed 
group is not comparable to the DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration) programs that 
the Colombian state has designed for adult combatants. The adult DDR programs are administered by 
the Ministry of Defense, in first instance, and then principally through the Colombian Agency for 
Reintegration (ACR), recently renamed Agency for Reincorporation and Normalization (ARN). 
In the years 2012-2015, most children leaving the ranks of illegal armed groups either deserted from the 
ranks of the FARC and ELN, or where identified after GOC military operations. Some CH&A came 
 
1
 A CONPES directive, issued by the National Political Economy and Social Council within the National Planning 
Department (DNP) is the highest planning decree issued by the government ordering all government agencies 
and departments to adjust their policies to comply with the guidelines and orientations specified in the 
directive. It is somewhat comparable to an Executive Order in the United States. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 3
from the illegal groups that emerged post-demobilization of the AUC paramilitaries and are generally 
referred to as BACRIM (Bandas Criminales). 
Once the CH&A is handed over to the ICBF, the different models of disengagement and restoration of 
their rights come into play. Because of issues of confidentiality and child welfare concerns, the CH&A 
disengagement program is run exclusively by the Colombian Family Welfare Institute, ICBF and its 
operators. No other governmental or state organization has jurisdiction. In our interviews, few state 
officials at the national or local levels outside of ICBF knew about the details of the program. 
When entering the ICBF program, the child or adolescent is evaluated by professionals, educators, and 
psychologists to determine placement into one of three models: 1) return to their families and to their 
hometowns, 2) placement in a specially-trained foster families 3) placement in a special residential 
program. These determinations are made based on issues of physical security, psycho-social concerns, 
medical needs, family conditions, educational and training opportunities, the individual desire of the 
CH&A, and availability of services and capacity within each of these options. 
Some 6,000 CH&A have disengaged from the armed conflict and had their rights restored by ICBF. 
During CHS-F2 (2012-2015), 990 children and adolescents went through the program and were 
directed to one of the above models. As of May 31, 2017, there were 317 CH&A remaining under 
ICBF’s purview. In addition, 86 CH&A released from the FARC guerrillas are being assisted under a 
specific program run by the Counselor for Human Rights in the Office of the President. Many of these 
CH&A eventually will be assisted by ICBF’s program. In total, there are currently some 400 CH&A 
involved in a GOC-sponsored disengagement program. The GOC does not anticipate additional CH&A 
being disengaged from the FARC ranks, nor does it anticipate massive CH&A disengagement from other 
guerrilla groups- such as the ELN- in the foreseeable future. 
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
The final performance evaluation employed a mixed-methods approach using qualitative and quantitative 
data collection methodologies including, a desk review of program documents and other secondary 
sources of information, personal in-depth interviews with key informants (KII), focus group discussions 
(FGD) with key stakeholders, site visits to specific CHS-F2 intervention zones, and a targeted survey of 
stakeholders, specifically CIPRUNA personnel involved in CHS-2F implementation. 
The team interviewed stakeholders that were, directly and indirectly, involved in the project between 
2012 and 2015 and with on-going knowledge or institutional responsibilities related to disengaged and 
vulnerable CH&A and the peace process. The team visited and spoke with counterparts and 
beneficiaries from two ICBF models for reintegration- institutional model and the community-based 
model with an indigenous community. The team was sensitive to the variables of urban, rural, ethnic 
communities and gender, and the unique conditions in the zones visited. The team evaluated the work of 
two GOC entities (known as “Observatories”) that were created to provide information and evidence 
to support government decision-making related to the protection of the rights and recruitment 
prevention. This evaluation took place through key informant interviews and an analysis of the 
program’s written knowledge management products. 
DATA COLLECTION TOOLS AND ANALYSIS 
DI developed a list of informants based on suggestions from USAID, IOM, desk research and team 
members’ local knowledge. The team considered the location, relationship to the project being 
evaluated, type of organization/position, affiliation of the informant (USAID, implementer/IOM, GOC 
counterpart/stakeholder, CSO counterpart, expert, media, and international community), gender, and 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 4
ethnic group. The team conducted 59 interviews, 8 focus groups with 146 individuals and a targeted 
survey of stakeholders. 
DOCUMENT REVIEW 
The team reviewed a comprehensive set of CHS documents including CHS-F2 quarterly reports, final 
reports, knowledge management products, the PMP, and other national and international policy 
documents relevant to this evaluation. In addition, the team reviewed articles describing the peace 
process and the current situation of CH&A. 
KEY INFORMANT INTERVIEWS 
The evaluation team conducted 59 semi-structured interviews and led 8 directed focus groups (FGD) 
with a wide range of key informants, totaling 80 individuals (55% women, 44% men), between May 10 
and June 16, 2017. The team heard from informants directly involved in the 2012-2015 CHS-F2 program 
and others without direct knowledge of the project. In the case of direct beneficiaries, identification and 
access to disengaged CH&A is sensitive and restricted by the GOC for their security and welfare. 
However, the evaluation team was able to conduct two focus groups with four beneficiaries (2 females, 
2 males) disengaged CH&A, who are now young adults, and the CSOs and individuals that provide them 
with services. 
The team conducted key informant interviews with the following categories of individuals: 
 USAID/Colombia staff from the USAID Bogota’s Office of Vulnerable Populations and the 
Agreement Officer’s Representative (GOC)
 Chief of Party and staff of the project (IOM) 
 Government of Colombia executive branch leaders and staff (GOC) 
 Government of Colombia Public Ministry, Human Rights Ombudsman, Inspector General 
leaders and staff (GOC) 
 Departmental and municipal authorities from Cauca, Meta and Bolivar departments (GOC) 
 Grantees from civil society organizations and media-related groups (CSOs) 
 International community (UN system) 
 Direct beneficiaries and service providers to them (CH&A) 
All of the interviews were conducted in person, except for one interview conducted by Skype. Most 
interviewees invited colleagues and staff to attend interviews, and usually three or more persons 
participated in a single interview session. This meant that the interview took more time and that not all 
the information discussed was directly relevant to the 2012-2015 period. In addition, conducting the 
evaluation 22 months after the project closed presented important limitations to gathering relevant 
information, as noted below. 
The team employed a semi-structured interview approach, allowing some degree of deviation from the 
protocol. This allowed the interlocutor to have a partial role in determining the path of the 
conversation and facilitated a natural flow of conversation, which allowed follow up questions to focus 
on particularly useful topics that emerged during the interview. 
ACTIVITY SITE VISITS 
The team visited several zones where CHS-F2 activities took place from 2012 to 2015 and where 
activities originally supported by CHS-F2 continue to operate. Two-person teams visited Soacha, 
Cartagena and Villavicencio, and a three-person team visited Cali and the Nasa/Toribio indigenous 
community in Santander de Quilichao. The teams interviewed officials in mayor and governor’s offices, 
local ICBF staff, CSOs grantees, communities, and vulnerable CH&A and conducted focus group 
discussions. The team collected information to better understand different models of reintegration and 
CHS-F2 initiatives related to social inclusion and prevention of the recruitment and use of CH&A by 
illegal armed groups and criminal organizations. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 5
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
The evaluation team conducted 6 focus group discussions (FGD) during the site visits with 50 project 
beneficiaries (8 individuals on average, 52% women and 48% men). These FGD included 1) religious 
leaders, staff, and disengaged CH&A, who are now young adults, at the Don Bosco reintegration center 
in Cali; 2) community leaders and CH&A from the Nasa indigenous community of Toribio in Santander 
de Qulichao, Cauca; 3) vulnerable boys, girls, and community leaders involved in prevention and social 
inclusion initiatives in Soacha, Cali, Cartagena, and Villavicencio. 
These FGD allowed for exchange and discussion among direct beneficiaries of IOM’s 2012-2015 
activities that have continued to function in some form. The team employed an open interview 
approach, which allowed for a more casual conversation appropriate for the setting and population. It 
allowed the young interlocutors and community leaders to determine the path of the conversation and 
allowed them to share sensitive personal information as they saw fit. 
To facilitate the team´s analysis of fieldwork interviews and focus groups, the team took notes in a 
Word format during the fieldwork. These notes aided the team to identify interviews and focus groups 
that provided the richest data and to guide the team’s discussions on findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations based on the data. 
TARGETED STAKEHOLDER MINI-SURVEY 
The DI team conducted a targeted stakeholder mini-survey of CIPRUNA personnel involved in CHS-2F 
implementation. Please refer to section below for details on the targeted stakeholder mini-survey. 
PERFORMANCE MONITORING ANALYSIS 
DI analyzed CHS-F2 performance monitor and found that overall the program achieved its indicator 
targets for reintegration, prevention and knowledge management. The indicators for the institutional 
strengthening component do not allow DI to carry out an analysis. The complete results from the 
performance monitor and recommendations on improving the indicators can be found in Annex G. 
LIMITATIONS AND APPROACHES TO MINIMIZING BIAS 
The CHS-F2 evaluation, like all evaluations, is subjected to several limitations. These include: 
1. Ex-post-facto nature of the evaluation - The fact that evaluation occurred some 20 months after the 
CH-F2 program ended presented several analytical challenges, including loss of institutional memory, 
deterioration of actual memory, and difficulty accessing reliable sources or personnel that worked on 
the project during the 2012-2015 time frame. The team does recognize that the ex-post-facto nature of 
the evaluation allowed for a more robust examination of sustainability. The team was able to evaluate 
how program effect had evolved over the 20 month period and gain a more nuanced understanding of 
how beneficiaries retained or did not retain benefits from program involvement. This understanding of 
sustainability allowed the team to provide more valuable recommendations for future programming than 
would otherwise have been possible. 
2. Staff turnover and lack of institutional memory– The high staff turnover in the GOC at the national, 
departmental and municipal levels and the lack of institutional memory presented challenges in accessing 
reliable information. Departmental and municipal elections were held in October 2015, two months 
before the CHS-F2 program ended, and brought in entirely new authorities to work on issues related to 
CHS. Some of these new authorities and the presence of other USAID/IOM programs caused confusion 
among some interviewees. This was less of a problem at the national level, as the Santos government 
was re-elected in 2014 and there were fewer turnovers of authorities. DI sought to minimize this 
limitation by consulting extensively with IOM and within government entities to identify as many CHS-F2 
stakeholders as possible. 
3. Selection bias – Although the team is unaware of informants who declined to participate in the 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 6
evaluation, there is a possibility of selection bias, i.e. those respondents who chose to participate might 
differ from those who did not in terms of their attitudes and perceptions or socio-demographic 
characteristics and experience among other factors. In mitigation, the team made informants aware of 
the independence of the process and the confidentiality of responses. 
4. Halo Bias - There is a known tendency among respondents to underreport socially undesirable 
answers and to change their responses to fit with what they perceive as the social norm. The extent to 
which respondents will be prepared to reveal their true opinions may also vary for some questions that 
call upon them to assess the performance of their colleagues or people on whom they depend for the 
provision of services or funding. To mitigate this limitation, the team provided the respondents with 
confidentiality and anonymity guarantees, conducted the meetings in private settings where respondents 
feel comfortable, and aimed to establish rapport between the interviewer and the respondent. For focus 
groups, the team held meetings in neutral locations and ensured that no grantee staff was present or 
able to overhear the proceedings. 
5. Timeframe - The timeframe of this evaluation required a narrow, focused approach. The team was 
not able to generalize results across the entire population of beneficiaries reached by the project. 
Nevertheless, by using a mixed-methods approach and meeting with a diverse and purposively selected 
sample of beneficiaries, the team sought to mitigate the effects of this limitation. 
The evaluation team consisted of three key experts: Team Leader, Ms. Kelly McBride, an international 
consultant with significant experience in issues of conflict mitigation and GOC and USAID projects 
related to youth, democracy, conflict and humanitarian affairs in Colombia, Ecuador and Central 
America; Dr. Marc Chernick, a senior conflict specialist who has studied the Colombian conflict, as well 
as other Latin American and international armed conflicts for over three decades, and is currently 
resident in Colombia on sabbatical from Georgetown University; and Mr. Hugo Navarro, a Colombian 
consultant with decades of international experience in quantitative and qualitative evaluation 
methodologies and project design. In designing and implementing this evaluation, the Team has followed 
the guidelines outlined in USAID’s Task Order accompanying the Scope of Work (Annex A). The team 
used both quantitative and qualitative research methods to gather data to investigate the evaluation 
questions, as described in more detail in the Evaluation Design and Methodology (Annex B). 
The Team used four main data collection methods: document review, key informant interviews (KII), 
focus group discussions (FGD), and an online survey. Information from these methods has been 
triangulated to ensure reliable findings, while discrepant observations and data have been noted and 
used as well. 
TARGETED STAKEHOLDER SURVEY
The Team carried out an on-line survey consisting of 5 questions distributed among targeted officials in 
the Government of Colombia (GOC) institutions and Colombian non-governmental organizations 
involved in implementation of the CHS program. It should be noted that the survey was not sent to a 
random selection of institutions and individuals. Rather, the team sent the survey to as many recipients 
as possible given the limited contact information available. The survey was designed to supplement the 
information gathered through other methods, enriching the pool of data and allowing more stakeholders 
to have input into the evaluation. The survey was sent to 29 institutions and 53 individuals on July 27th, 
2017 and the survey site was open for 13 days. The response rate was very high for an online survey: 
72.4% of institutions responded to the survey and 60.4% of the officials, for a total of 32 surveys 
collected. 
Because the population of respondents was selected nonrandomly, the survey results do not allow for 
statistical tests of error or significance, including margins of error. The findings are only representative 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 7
of the individuals who responded and cannot be extrapolated beyond the respondents themselves. The 
survey findings can therefore only be used to augment our in-depth qualitative analysis. There is still 
significant value in the survey in that it allowed the evaluation team to solicit input from a broader 
selection of respondents than would otherwise have been possible through key informant interviews 
and focus groups alone, but it is important to note its limitations. 
TABLE 1. SURVEY SAMPLE AND RESPONSE RATE
Population Targeted 
sample
Final
sample
Coverage
Institutions 29 21 72.4%
Officials 53 32 60.4%
 Source: Democracy International survey, 2017 
78.2% of the officials reached by this survey were from national government institutions that have 
responsibilities related to the prevention of recruitment of CH&A by illegal groups. The other survey 
respondents were from civil society and media-related groups (12.5%), public ministry institutions (6.3%) 
and the international community (3.1%), as is shown on Table 2. An important feature of this survey is 
that officials included in the sample were identified from two sources; first, a list provided by the GOC’s 
Comisión Intersectorial de Prevención del Reclutamiento y Utilización de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes 
(CIPRUNNA); second, a list of people that DI’s evaluation team interviewed during the qualitative field 
work (KII list). Of the 32 completed surveys, 18 respondents are from the CIPRUNNA list (56.2%) and 
14 respondents are from the key informant interview (KII) list (43.8%). This difference is taken into the 
analysis because people that were closer to the CHS implementation are in the KII list, and most of 
them were identified by USAID and IOM as key informants. By contrast, in the CIPRINNA list, there are 
people that are working currently in recruitment prevention, but were not necessarily involved with 
CHS-F2 in the period 2012-2015. This is because there is high turnover and few career employees in 
GOC institutions. 
TABLE 2. TYPE OF TARGETED INSTITUTIONS
Institution type CIPRUNN
A 
list 
KII 
list 
Total 
National government – ministries 50,0% 7,1% 31,3%
National government - other entities 38,9% 57,1% 46,9%
Public Ministry 11,1% - 6,3%
Grantees from civil society and media-related groups - 28,6% 12,5%
International community - 7,1% 3,1%
Number of respondents 18 14 32 
 Source: Democracy International survey, 2017
Characteristics of survey respondents are shown on Table 3. The survey was answered mainly by 
women (56.2%), one third are officials with executive duties, 83.3% of respondents have 2 or more 
years in their current jobs, and almost all respondents work in Bogotá (87.5%). 
TABLE 3. RESPONDENTS’ CHARACTERISTICS
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 8
Variables CIPRUNNA 
list 
KII 
list 
Total 
% Men 38,9% 50,0% 43,8%
% of executive officers 16,7% 50,0% 31,3%
% officials with employment of 2 
or more years in current position
88,9% 71,4% 81,3%
% of officials working in Bogotá 100,0% 71,4% 87,5%
Number of respondents 18 14 32 
 Source: Democracy International survey, 2017
The first survey question dealt with knowledge of CHS support. 65.6% of the officers reported being 
familiar with CHS support. As expected, CHS is better known by KII officers and those with more labor 
seniority (Table 4). 
TABLE 4. KNOWLEDGE ABOUT CHS SUPPORT
Time in the 
current job 
CIPRUNNA 
list 
KII 
List 
Total 
5 years or more 37,5% 100% 64,3%
4 years 100% 100,0%
3 years 100% 100% 100,0%
2 years 0% 100% 25,0%
1 years 0% 100% 50,0%
Less than 1 year 0% 66,7% 50,0%
Total 44,4% 92,9% 65,6% 
 Source: Democracy International survey, 2017
13 out of 29 institutions answered that they received direct support from the CHS program, or at least 
that they have partner institutions that are direct CHS beneficiaries (these institutions are listed on 
Table 12). This implies that the other institutions that responded to the survey have not received CHS 
support and do not work closely with institutions supported by CHS. More details on the survey can be 
found in Annex H. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 9
ANSWERS TO THE EVALUATION 
QUESTIONS
QUESTION 1: TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE CHS-2F SUPPORTED THE GOC 
POLICIES AND PROGRAMS TO REINTEGRATE CHILD SOLDIERS? 
FINDINGS 
In 2012-2015, CHS-2F focused on the systemization or documentation of knowledge of the ICBF’s 
disengagement and restoration of rights program and supported two of ICBF’s new initiatives related 
directly to child and youth disengagement. The program collaborated closely with the Colombian 
Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF) to develop policies and methodologies at the national level and help 
transfer and adapt them to the local (territorial) level. It also worked to develop and strengthen the 
differential approaches model, support family meetings between disengaged CH&A and selected family 
members, and developed a community-based assistance model with a Nasa indigenous community in 
Toribio, Cauca. 
Building on the earlier programs, ICBF and USAID/OIM had identified the benefits of returning children 
and adolescents to their families. For a variety of reasons, including security concerns, distressed family 
situations, or a lack of ICBF and Colombian state support infrastructure, it was often not possible or 
desirable to return CH&A to their families and hometowns. As a result, the CHS program worked to 
strengthen two other models: institutional protection models with residential program run by operators 
in Medellin, Cali and Rio Sucio, Caldas, and the foster care model that was originally developed in 6 
regional capitals (Pasto, Villavicencio, Bogotá, Medellin, Manizales, Barranquilla) where families and 
specifically women (foster mothers/madres tutoras) were specially trained to care for disengaged 
CH&A. It also worked to provide ICBF assistance, particularly psychosocial, life-preparation counseling 
and other support services to children who were able to their families. 
Critically and strategically, the program worked to include disengaged CH&A in the development and 
implementation of the Victims and Land Restitution Law (June 2011.) Under the law, and in accordance 
with Colombian and international law, disengaged CH&A are considered to be victims of the conflict and 
are entitled to reparations from the GOC. 
Finally, in 2015, during the final extension of CHF-F2 and in response to the peace negotiations, the 
program supported ICBF to develop contingency plans in the event of large-scale disengagement of 
CH&A from the FARC ranks. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Informants repeatedly cited the development of methodologies and protocols as one of the 
lasting contributions of the overall CHS program. IOM transferred its established methodologies 
and hired consultants to develop and train local partners in the development and use of 
methodologies. 
 ICBF’s contingency plans for managing a large-scale disengagement of FARC CH&A were 
ultimately not activated. Only 87 CH&A from the FARC ranks were released and the 
Presidential Counsellor for Human Rights, rather than ICBF, is managing the immediate 
reception of the FARC CH&A. 
 The family reunification and family ties program by ICBF is lauded by ICBF officials as a 
successful and necessary model to help disengaged CH&A reconnect and repair relations with 
their families. ICBF is still using a protocol developed with IOM support to organize the family 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 10
reunification activity. Unfortunately, the family meetings are now sporadic due to lack of ICBF 
funds for the activity. 
 The only existing community-based assistance model with the Nasa indigenous people 
successfully reintegrated indigenous CH&A into the community through restorative justice and a 
community development/eco-tourism strategy unique to the Nasa community. However, 
elements of this strategy involving community service as a form of restorative justice and the 
development of an eco-tourism strategy could be replicated in other rural communities. 
 The residential and foster care models have developed successful programs that with some 
exceptions have successfully met the goals of disengaging CH&A from the armed conflict, 
providing them with psychological services, providing access to primary and secondary 
education, and transferring them into skills and technical development programs through SENA 
and ACR (now ARN) when they turn 18 years old. 
QUESTION 2: WHAT ARE THE STRENGTHS, WEAKNESSES, AND LESSONS 
LEARNED OF THE INSTITUTIONAL REINTEGRATION AND ALTERNATIVE 
MODELS FOR EACH ONE OF THE MODELS SUPPORTED BY CHS-F2? 
FINDINGS 
The CHS-F2 (2012-2015) program built on the successful experiences of IOM's earlier program (2009-
2011) by working with the GOC to provide special services to CH&A disengaged from illegal armed 
groups and by designing initiatives to expand the pathways available to restore their rights as citizens and 
integrate them productively into society. CHS-F2 was designed to systematize or document the 
successful practices, connect families and communities to the reintegration process to a greater degree, 
and develop alternative or differential models to assist the CH&A (i.e. community-based models, model 
to reestablish family ties, and indigenous model). 
Over the course of the entire CHS program, ICBF developed four models for assisting disengaged 
CH&A: 1) Institutional model/modelo institutional. This is the first model developed to reintegrate 
CH&A by placing him/her into a Special Assistance Center (SAC) which is similar to a boarding school; 
2) Managed home/hogar gestor. In this model, selected CH&A (e.g. pregnant girls or children under age 
15) are placed in a special program of foster family care; 3) Protective house/hogar protector. In this 
model, the CH&A returns to live with his/her family and receives ICBF services in his/her community; 
and the 4) Alternative or differential reintegration models that were recently developed with indigenous 
communities under CHS-F2. 
The DI team analyzed the CH&A disengagement models that were assisted by the 2012-2015 program 
and spoke to ICBF national and local officials, regional Ombudsmen/Defensor del Pueblo official charged 
with protecting the rights of children in Cali, and those involved with staff at the Don Bosco school in 
Cali (institutional model), a foster mother (managed home/hogar gestor) in Villavicencio, and community 
leaders, parents, and two disengaged CH&A from the Nasa indigenous community from Toribio, Cauca 
(alternative or differential model.) Strict security, confidentially and welfare protocols prevented us from 
speaking directly with CH&A involved in the programs. However, the team spoke to two young adults 
who had disengaged via the institutional model and two young people who had disengaged via the Nasa 
indigenous community model. 
The initial proposals at the outset of the 2012-2015 program called for strengthening the Special 
Assistance Program of CHS to include: 
 Greater involvement, where possible, of CH&A families including family reunions for those in 
foster care or a Special Assistance Center; 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 11
 A broader focus on communities, particularly ones where CH&A ex-combatants might arrive 
directly without going through the ICBF disengagement (this had occurred with the AUC 
demobilization in 2006); 
 And a tailored approach developing special programs for ethnic groups (indigenous and Afro￾Colombian) and those with a more urban or rural background. 
In practice, the CH&A disengagement route as administered by ICBF is mostly limited to the three 
options described above. 
For CH&A integrated into foster or institutional care, IOM began a program arranging family reunions. 
This entailed subsidizing the travel of family members and, to the extent possible, working with family 
members to best involve them in the life of their child. These family reunions were to take place twice a 
year but have generally occurred only once annually because of a lack of resources. They were deemed 
highly successful though their sustainability is questionable. We were told in both Cali and in 
Villavicencio that recent reunions had been canceled due to lack of funds. 
On the outset, the program anticipated support for different models developed around ethnicity as well 
as rural and urban environments. It also planned to develop a differentiated approach to gender. 
However, we found little evidence that these approaches or concerns were integrated into the ICBF 
model. There were plans to build a rural residential center in Caquetá, which were not fulfilled in the 
2012-2015 period. 
The most significant advancement that we saw was based on a pilot program that IOM developed in 
Toribio, Cauca. There IOM worked with a Nasa indigenous community on an eco-tourism project 
designed to reincorporate young people who had joined one of the illegal armed groups as well as to 
prevent recruitment and provide skills and alternative work options for the young and for the 
community as a whole. Given that indigenous groups are sovereign in Colombia, this program was 
instituted separately from the ICBF model and, as far as we could tell, has not been replicated. This 
program is potentially a model for many other indigenous and rural communities. 
When asked about differential treatment for ethnic groups, ICBF pointed to a residential program for 
disengaged youths, the Ingruma Integration Center, in Rio Sucio, Cauca. The residential center provides 
educational and vocational training as well as psychosocial counseling. It operates in much the same 
manner as the residential facilities in Medellin and Cali run by the Silesian Don Bosco Foundation, which, 
based on our visit to Don Bosco in Cali, provide a very nurturing and pedagogical environment and has 
had success with the disengaged CH&A. The majority of the residents of Ingruma are indigenous and 
Afro-descendant. However, this in itself does not constitute a differential ethnic approach in its 
programs. 
Similarly, the team found little evidence that gender-based approaches had been incorporated into the 
CHS program in an integral or crosscutting fashion. This is not an easy thing to accomplish. The CHS 
program did assist ICBF to develop a section on gender in its Technical Guidelines for the SAP, but like 
many organizations, a gendered approach requires more than a nod towards gender in its guidelines. It 
also requires more than workshops and studies. This is not to minimize the importance of the gender￾related activities that were conducted. Rather, it is an assessment that the program has still not 
integrated gender as an integral variable in the process of disengaging child soldiers and restoring their 
rights. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The GOC's route for the disengagement of children and adolescents met its basic objectives. The state 
met its international and moral obligations under International Humanitarian Law to disengage children 
from the armed conflict, to provide them with reparations, and to restore their rights as citizens. The 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 12
CHS program, working with ICBF and other key Colombian and international actors, played a crucial 
role in helping Colombia meet its obligations. 
During the 2012-2015 period, some 990 entered the ICBF program. According to an analysis, of all the 
child soldiers who had entered the program between 2000 and 2015, 77% did so voluntarily, which 
means they had abandoned the illegal armed group and presented themselves to the authorities. 
Meanwhile, 33% were rescued or captured in combat before entering the program. Regardless of how 
child soldiers enter the program, they are all considered victims and the state is obligated to provide 
them with security, psychosocial assistance where needed, medical treatment, and educational and 
training opportunities. 
Of the routes available to non-Indigenous CH&A, the route of children returning to their own families 
raises the most questions. Data is most incomplete in this route. On one level, returning children and 
adolescents to their families represents the most humane response. However, this option is also where 
the state is least able to provide assistance, security, education, or psychosocial accompaniment. There 
needs to be a better system of tracing, monitoring, and working with the children. 
The foster care and residence programs have been in general quite successful. However, even there, 
local municipalities where the foster care is located are often reluctant to integrate these children into 
the regular school system. The disengaged CH&A are generally older than the other children in their 
grade levels, so many children find themselves being sent to night school since there are no other 
options. Night school itself poses numerous other problems, as roaming the streets at night is not an 
ideal set-up for vulnerable, often traumatized, at-risk youth. 
There is also a dearth of trained psychosocial assistance professionals as well as a major shortfall of 
resources to address the psychological and physical needs of the disengaged CH&A. Some are disabled 
either from an earlier period of their lives or because of injuries suffered during the war. Others have 
completely lost contact with their families and are unable to find them, refuse all contact or returning to 
their home communities, cannot contact their families for security reasons, or are psychologically 
traumatized from the experience of war. Some of the girls are pregnant when they enter the program. 
Both boys and girls often have some form of venereal disease or AIDS.
The residential programs run by Don Bosco seem to be the most successful in providing all aspects of 
the needs of disengagement and restoration of rights route. The professionals we met seemed 
committed and engaged and the former students we spoke with were clearly provided with educational 
opportunities, training, and in some cases access to higher education that they otherwise would not 
have had. The reintegration program had widened their opportunities. According to the general ICBF 
statistics, most originally came from a family life of extreme poverty and hopelessness. For them, even as 
young children, joining an illegal armed group presented one of the few avenues for survival or escape 
from domestic abuse and poverty. Unfortunately, these young people were only provided with basic 
opportunities after an illegal armed group illegally recruited them. Conclusions for this question are 
summarized below: 
 Emphasis should be placed on developing the differential approaches long envisioned. The 
program would benefit from the development of programs that have a rural or urban focus 
depending on the background of the CH&A demobilized combatant. 
 Numerous ICBF staff told the team that the family reunions were highly successful and the key
to helping the disengaged CH&A reconnect and feel part of a family and community. 
 More programs that work with indigenous and Afro-descendent communities, modeled where 
appropriate and with adjustments for local customs and culture on the successful Toribio 
program, are needed. ICBF and OIM could take a lead in expanding the Toribio pilot. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 13
 The 2012 CHS program originally envisioned expanding the focus from the children and 
adolescents to greater involvement with families and with communities. The initial idea was that 
this was the best way to reach former child soldiers who had bypassed the ICBF programs and 
had returned to their families, their communities, or other communities. The current post￾Accord environment will require a program of reconciliation that incorporates the needs of 
victims, families, communities, and adult former combatants in a more integral manner. 
 A gender component must be built into the programs directly. Women and girls have 
experienced the conflict and the disengagement process differently than men and boys have in 
ways that are still not well understood. Sexual abuse, though not limited to girls, has been more 
common among girls. Special psychosocial attention needs to be placed on the experience of 
girls in war and all aspects of programming needs to reflect this. 
 The program needs vastly expanded resources and trained professionals to address the physical 
and psychosocial needs of all former CH&A soldiers. 
 Currently, the disengagement of child soldiers program is largely unknown to the wider public. 
Yet, how a society treats its children and adolescents is a measure of how caring and generous 
that society is. The disengagement of child soldiers and the restoration of their rights should be 
a centerpiece of the national reconciliation process. 
 
QUESTION 3: WHAT HAVE BEEN THE KEY CHALLENGES AND BOTTLENECKS IN THE GOC 
CHILD SOLDIERS’ REINTEGRATION PROCESS SUPPORTED BY CHS-F2? WHAT ARE THE KEY 
CHALLENGES AND BOTTLENECKS WHEN DISAGGREGATING THE INFORMATION AND 
ANALYSIS BY GENDER AND ETHNIC GROUPS? 
As already noted, the program, in general, works well. The Colombian government has developed a 
comprehensive program for the disengagement of CH&A combatants from the illegal armed groups. In 
most cases, these young people were provided with psycho-social counseling and educational and 
training opportunities that they would not ordinarily have had access to if they had not taken the 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 14
circuitous and unwelcome route of joining and leaving an Illegal Armed Group. This fact alone 
underscores the importance of the much larger programs involving prevention of recruitment that 
include making educational, training, recreational and artistic activities available to young people before 
they join an illegal armed group, as discussed in other parts of this report. 
But there are challenges and bottlenecks in the child soldier disengagement program. Many of the 
weaknesses discussed in Evaluation Question 2 represent challenges and bottleneck. These include: 
 An unknown percentage of child soldiers return to their own or other communities without 
going through the ICBF program. Many of these children have severe psychosocial psychosocial 
trauma, drug addictions and other pathologies. Many hide their condition of ex-combatants. 
These children are highly vulnerable and exposed. Moreover, they join communities where many 
adults have experienced similar trauma, where there is tension between victims, perpetrators, 
and demobilized adult ex-combatants. The problem has been clearly recognized but the 
community programs that could address this issue, labeled "Finding Nemo" in some of the 
literature, were not adequately developed. 
 The degree of psychosocial psychosocial trauma among disengaged child combatants has thus far 
overwhelmed the ability of ICBF to provide trained counselors. The literature and data on the 
psycho-social traumas of CH&A disengaged combatants are devastating: 18% have killed at least 
once; 60% have seen others being killed; 70% have seem mutilated corpses; 18% have witnessed 
torture; 40% have shot at someone; 28% have been wounded; 3 in 10 think of suicide; many find 
escape in drugs and alcohol; many become overly aggressive. ICBF has created mobile units that 
can attend to the needs of some. But there are not enough trained psychologists to meet the 
needs of the CH&A in the different programs. 
 As discussed in the previous evaluation question, the ethnic, gender and community dimensions 
of the program were all under-developed when compared with their potential. Indigenous and 
Afro-Colombian CH&A combatants are overrepresented among the ranks of child soldiers as 
compared with their general numbers in the population. According to ICBF, some 6000 CH&A 
have been disengaged from illegal armed actors since 1999 through a rights-based approach that 
includes social service delivery and frequent institutional contact while the CH&A are within 
ICBF’s legal care. The ICBF tracks the gender and ethnic composition of the disengaged CH&A. 
There is no differential program for girls (some 30% of CH&A) or Afro-Colombian CH&A 
(some 30%), but there is a limited differential program for indigenous CH&A. 
 Where possible, families need to be more closely involved. The programs of family visits were 
highly successful were constrained by limited resources. 
 We simply do not know what happens to most of the CH&A who have gone through the 
program. ICBF does not keep track of the participants once they turn 18 years old. Most 
become eligible for reparations according to the Victim's law and are turned over to ARN, but 
ARN's records are incomplete. 
 There has not been an adequate impact study of the program in general or a full survey of their 
life trajectories upon completing the programs. Foster mothers, ICBF officials, and other who 
closely work on the ground with residential and foster care programs assert that there is very 
little desertion or recidivism. But this is largely anecdotal. The data on children who return to 
their birth families is even more incomplete. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The GOC has admirably met its moral and international obligations to restore the rights of the CH&A 
who have been illegally recruited into the armed conflict. It has created substantive programs and 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 15
addressed the needs of over 6000 former child combatants. Few countries in the world can show similar 
successes. 
Many of the more comprehensive programs envisioned in the 2012-2015 CHS were not fully developed, 
including rural and urban models, and a differentiated approach based on ethnicity as well as a cross￾cutting gender dimension to all programming. 
The 2016-2018 program continues to work in these areas, but the context is constantly changing. 
CH&A continue to be recruited into illegal armed groups, even after the disarming of the FARC. The 
ELN, FARC dissidents and BACRIM continue to recruit and there will still be a need to develop 
programs to restore the rights of children who have been victims of illegal recruitment or utilization. 
As underscored in the findings, we simply do not have as complete a picture, as we should about how 
many children have been illegally recruited, and what happens to them when they leave and enter one of 
the paths available to them in the path to restore their rights. 
There is no evidence there is an interest to establish a monitoring mechanism for the CH&A who went 
through the ICBF program, although IOM piloted a successful tracking program in 2008. There is talk of 
establishing a monitoring mechanism for the 86 CH&A who have been released by the FARC under the 
terms of the peace process. 
Based on information collected through interviews of GOC officials, there is little coordination between 
the three GOC entities that interact with the disengaged CH&A: ICBF, Victims Office, and ACR. A 
former disengaged youth could potentially interact and receive benefits from all three entities at 
different times is his/her life. The success of the educational and training opportunities to equip 
disengaged CH&A with employable skills is also not tracked. 
EVALUATION QUESTION 4: WHAT RESULTS HAS CHS-2F ACHIEVED IN THE FOUR KEY 
INTERVENTION AREAS (INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING, ASSISTANCE TO REINTEGRATION 
OF CHILD SOLDIERS, PREVENTION OF RECRUITMENT AND KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT? 
FINDINGS 
Assistance to reintegration of child soldiers 
This is discussed in depth in Evaluation Questions 2 and 3. USAID and OIM have successfully worked 
with GOC agencies, particularly with ICBF and its operators as well as with certain local authorities and 
indigenous groups, to provide a route for the disengagement of CH&A and the restoration of their 
rights. OIM/USAID achievements include: 
 Raised the profile and created greater awareness of child soldiers as a class of victims that 
has been largely overlooked; 
 Facilitated the strengthening of both national agencies and regional and local government for 
assisting with the disengagement of CH&A combatants and the restitution of rights; 
 Helped place the issue squarely on the negotiating table in Havana and in the peace accords; 
 Advanced public policy in the area of disengaged CH&A; 
 Assisted 990 of former child soldiers to have an opportunity to live fuller and more 
productive lives; 
 Supported national and local programs whose funding over time has been or is being 
transferred to the Colombian government; 
 And transferred methodologies of evaluation and implementation that have been fully 
integrated into GOC and local level government functioning. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 16
Institutional Strengthening and Knowledge Management: 
USAID and IOM worked with ICBF to create and support several "Observatories:" the ICBF Child 
Welfare Observatory and the Observatory of CIPRUNA’s Technical Secretariat, both founded in 2012. 
In 2014, IOM and ICBF moved to create regional ethnic observatories to better focus on the needs of 
individual regions. Through these observatories, data has been collected, organized, and evaluated on 
recruitment, prevention, utilization of children, sexual violence, and other issues related to children and 
conflict. USAID and IOM helped support the publication of bulletins focusing on thematic issues as well 
as dialogues and roundtables with experts. They also have created a network with similar observatories 
on children and conflict and conflict prevention in other countries. The aim of the observatories, as 
specifically requested by ICBF and CIPRUNA, was to provide expert knowledge to officials and 
policymakers. The roundtables and bulletins were to facilitate this exchange and the data was to help 
guide decision-making. 
However, in all of our interviews, almost no one in a position of authority said that s/he used or 
benefitted from the data from the Observatories. They were simply too busy and did not pay much 
attention to the data, information, and analyses that have been generated. This is a problem not 
exclusive to ICBF and CIPRUNA. It raises a broader question of how to bridge the gap between those 
who generate data and analyses and those who make decisions and implement programs. The 
infrastructure has been put in place thanks to the assistance of USAID and OIM. Now the question is 
how can it best be utilized? 
A similar conundrum can be found with the pedagogy for peace initiatives begun in 2014. As the peace 
negotiations advanced, it was evident that there was a need to advance communication and education 
around the implications of a peace accord as well as to work with communities and young people on 
issues of transitional justice, reconciliation, and a culture of peace. This was particularly evident given 
how disengaged much of the Colombian population was from the peace negotiations taking place in 
Havana, even in the zones of conflict. It was evident that the peace accords would have direct 
consequences on the issues of child recruitment, disengagement, and new evolving threats facing 
children in a post-Accord setting. 
IOM commissioned a paper to create a strategy on developing peace pedagogy. IOM held workshops, 
communication strategies, and public events in various regions of the country. This component was not 
directly evaluated and it represented only a small part of IOM's program. It is clear that the program had 
identified one of the most important aspects and deficiencies of the peace process: apathy and a lack of 
public engagement. IOM's minor contribution to this problem may have had an impact on some of the 
youth and counselors involved. However, there is little evidence that the peace pedagogy strategy of 
IOM and its GOC counterparts had a broader impact on public awareness and understanding of the 
peace accords or of how the accords will affect their communities. 
Prevention of Recruitment 
The CHS-F2 program expanded work on prevention, focusing on implementation of public policy 
advocacy at the local level in high-risk areas. The program collaborated with the Technical Secretariat of 
the new Inter-Sectorial Commission for the Recruitment Prevention (CIPRUNA) on implementing 
prevention plans and working youth integration and social inclusion strategies in Afro-Colombian and 
indigenous communities. 
IOM’s prevention and social inclusion strategy focuses on assisting the vulnerable youth to develop a life 
plan and sustainable livelihood with the goal of their social and economic inclusion. It is a rights-based 
human development strategy. This strategy was carried out with IOM partners in municipalities and local 
CSOs, such as World Coach in Cartagena, the Workshop Schools/Secular Talleres in Bogota and 
Cartagena, and community groups such as Fundacion Paz y Bien/Peace and Well-being Foundation in 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 17
Cartagena. The team visited all of these partners and conducted Focus Groups Discussions with youth 
participants and staff from these organizations. 
OIM has also worked with CIPRUNA and with key municipal and departmental agencies, as well as 
CSOs, to implement strategies of recruitment prevention at regional, municipal, sub-municipal, such as 
Agua Blanca in Cali, and in specific neighborhoods and schools. Each of these was developed following 
the directives of the 2010 CONPES (3673) which) that directed the government to formulate and 
implement policies to prevent the recruitment of minors into illegal armed groups. 
Development of various tools to promote and protect human rights is key to IOM’s strategy. According 
to IOM municipal and CSO partners, the most widely used and effective tool was the Vulnerability, Risk 
and Opportunity Maps (MVRO.) The MVRO is a social cartography map used by a local community and 
municipal leaders in a participatory setting to identify risk factors and vulnerabilities. The community also 
identifies opportunities to address or mitigate those risks and vulnerabilities. Most importantly, the 
community identifies youth initiatives and a local-level action plan to address recruitment. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The team found CHS-F2’s prevention work with vulnerable youth to be thoughtfully, creatively and 
intelligently conceived and implemented. The municipal and departmental authorities we visited with in 
Cali, Villavicencio and Cartagena had all designed programs and public policies for the prevention of 
youth recruitment. Collectively they covered 990 vulnerable youths. Each was fully cognizant of changing 
conditions of the armed conflict and tried to adjust their programs accordingly both during the 2012-
2015 period and afterwards. In general, during the 2012-2105 period, the programs in rural areas were 
designed for the prevention of recruitment into the illegal armed groups, FARC, ELN and Bacrims. 
Since the signing of the peace accords with the FARC, the concern has turned to the FARC dissident 
groups in some areas, particularly in the areas of Meta and northern Cauca that we visited, as well as 
increased recruitment activities by Bacrim. They have also noted a shift to utilization of CH&A, instead 
of recruitment; whereby the young person continues to lives with his or her family, go to school while 
also working with one of the illegal groups or gangs. 
In urban areas, the concern from 2012 -2015, and continuing into the present has been the recruitment 
into gangs, many of which gangs have ties to organized crime or one of the illegal armed groups. All the 
areas we visited noted a steady upturn in drug consumption throughout the entire period but 
accelerating post -2015. 
Yet despite the national, regional and local attention, all of these activities are underfunded and strain for 
high-level attention from governors, mayors and senior-level national officials. In most cases, highly 
dedicated public servants, professionals and dedicated CSO’s and religious groups who make use of the 
limited resources they have as best they can and deeply appreciate OIM assistance, run them. 
Of the latter, the partner projects that we visited in each of the regions we traveled to were also very 
compelling and on-target. However aside from anecdotal evidence from the state officials, of youth and 
partners, there is no data to prove how many youth were saved from joining a criminal group by these 
programs. However, the effectiveness and wide use of the MVRO was cited several times by CSO 
partners, municipal and ICBF staff in Cali. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 18
QUESTION 5: WHICH ARE THE STRATEGIC AREAS IN WHICH THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY, ESPECIALLY USAID, CAN CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THE GOC TO ACHIEVE 
PREVENTION OF RECRUITMENT AND USE OF CHILDREN BY ILLEGAL ARMED GROUPS? THIS 
QUESTION SEEKS TO IDENTIFY THE MOST STRATEGIC APPROACH TO SUPPORT GOC 
EFFORTS TO FIGHT RECRUITMENT AND USE OF CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS BY ILLEGAL 
ARMED GROUPS AND ORGANIZED CRIMINAL BANDS (BACRIM.) 
FINDINGS 
Despite the end of the conflict with the FARC in 2017 and the simultaneous decreased CH&A within 
ICBF’s SAP program, the structural issues of poverty, high rates of family and sexual violence, lack of 
state presence and social services, and presence of criminal groups and illicit activities that make youth 
in Colombia vulnerable to recruitment remains largely unchanged. CH&A face the same vulnerabilities 
and on-going recruitment and use of CH&A by criminal organizations as always. In fact, interviews with 
the international community and the USG leadership found great concern about a number of facts that 
may lead to an increase in recruitment and use of at-risk-youth by criminal groups. These factors include 
the lack of effective GOC presence in the areas formally controlled by the FARC and the movement of 
dissident FARC and BACRIMs into these areas, a dramatic increase in coca production over the last 
several years, the ongoing use of migrant coca-leaf pickers, including CH&A, and increased recruitment 
and use of CH&A for criminal work in urban areas where drugs, addiction, and poverty are ever￾present. 
The international community is specifically concerned with the situation of CH&A soldiers from the 
FARC ranks, who spontaneously demobilized outside of the 86 known CH&A who left through the 
formal peace process that reportedly returned to vulnerable communities with high levels of coca 
production and violence. The international community is also concerned with the situation of CH&A 
living near the 26 remote transitional zones where the FARC has concentrated under the peace 
agreement. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Given the signing of the peace accords and the clear commitment by the international community to 
supporting the peace process, there is an unparalleled opportunity to strengthen the CH&A recruitment 
prevention program, adapted to the needs of the post-Accord environment. 
However, there is great concern with respect to the vacuums of power left by the FARC in the regions 
that they once dominated. From the outset of the process concentrating the FARC in specific zones to 
facilitate the ceasefire and disarmament process, the country has witnessed the expansion of other illegal 
armed groups into these zones. This issue is larger than one of just child recruitment and will require 
the Colombian government to address these power vacuums through the increase of state presence 
with investment in security, administration, education, welfare, health and infrastructure. But as the 
country moves towards the consolidation of the post-conflict environment, it is incumbent that the 
illegal armed actors and criminal groups that remain protect children from illegal recruitment. 
The experience gained over the last five years by USAID provides much of the necessary foundation for 
an expanded and robust CH&A recruitment prevention program. Given the peace accords, there are 
greater opportunities to partner with other international aid organizations as well. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 19
RECOMMENDATIONS
The team wishes to underline the strong success of USAID’s CHS program over the past 17 years. The 
program supported the GOC’s goals to establish the legal norms, institutional architecture, and 
expertise to manage the disengagement/reintegration of some 6000 CH&A. “Colombianization” of the 
program took place and the GOC is fully capable of dealing with CH&A disengaging from future peace 
process (e.g. ELN.) However, the team considers that the lack of a monitoring mechanism to gauge the 
effectiveness of the GOC’s reintegration program to be a serious gap in the GOC’s approach. There are 
no hard facts about whether CH&A have successfully rebuilt their lives or if CH&A have been “re￾recruited” into a new criminal group. 
The structural issues of poverty, high rates of family and sexual violence, presence of criminal groups 
and illicit activities, etc. that make youth in Colombia vulnerable to recruitment and use by armed 
groups remain unchanged, despite the end of the conflict with the FARC in 2017 and the concomitant 
decrease CH&A within ICBF’s SAP program. CH&A face the same vulnerabilities and on-going 
recruitment and use of CH&A by criminal organizations continues. The change is that armed groups in 
or close to their communities now recruit the CH&A, and they most likely remain close to/or in their 
homes. Therefore, we recommend that USAID Colombia redoubles its support for prevention 
programs and, importantly, address the needs of all vulnerable youth, not just those associated directly 
with the FARC conflict, and their families and communities. 
Below the team offers recommendations that are directed at the CHS program and at the USAID 
mission as a whole. These are focused on youth in development and prevention and social inclusion 
strategies.
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Mission-Wide Recommendations 
 Recognize youth as key to peace-building and economic development. Support their active 
engagement with state institutions (schools, community projects, elections). 
 Identify USG inter-agency initiatives that could reinforce synergies to promote youth-related 
strategies. Conduct a USAID cross-sectorial youth assessment in anticipation of the next 
Colombia Country Development Strategy. 
 Formalize and deepen implementation of USAID’s “Youth for Development” policy (October 
2012) by strengthening youth programming, participation, and partnerships, and by integrating 
youth issues and engagement across mission initiatives and programming. 
 Engage in policy dialogue with state and government institutions/officials and presidential 
candidates on youth issues. 
 Encourage development and approval of GOC policy on prevention (i.e. new Consejo Nacional 
de Política Económica y Social (Conpes.) 
Recommendations on the Reintegration of Child Soldiers 
 The team recommends sustained focus on designing and implementing tailored programs that 
benefit indigenous and Afro-descendent CH&A, with adjustments for local customs and culture. 
A rural model, based on the successful Nasa community indigenous model, could be developed. 
 The 2012 CHS program originally envisioned expanding the focus from the CH&A to greater 
involvement with families and with communities. The current post-Accord environment will 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 20
require such program of reconciliation that incorporates the needs of victims, families, 
communities and adult former combatants in a more integral manner. 
 Gender integration into ICBF’s disengagement program merits continued and sustained 
attention. 
 The program needs to vastly expand resources and trained professionals to address the mental 
health and psychosocial needs of all former CH&A soldiers. 
 Improve coordination between three government entities that provide services and benefits to 
disengaged youth: ICBF, ACR, and Victims Unit. 
 Replicate Nasa-indigenous community model to other indigenous or rural communities where 
disengaged children or vulnerable youth reside. 
 Establish a system to accompany disengaged youth after they leave the ICBF program and 
support them in job placement. 
 Develop programs that strengthen the family structure in high-priority municipals identified by 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Post-Conflict. 
Recommendations to Address Bottlenecks and Challenges in the Reintegration 
Process 
 Develop a coordination and data-sharing mechanism between the three GOC entities that 
interact with the disengaged CH&A, including the ICBF, Victims Office, and ACR. 
 Develop a mechanism to track and support CH&A and their progress in remaking their lives 
after they leave IBCF. The monitoring mechanism can be modeled after IOM’s successful pilot, 
CRO-J, which included job training for labor insertion. Respondents to DI’s targeted survey 
recommended educational and job training tied to the labor market as key to reintegration 
success and recruitment prevention. 
 Expand and consolidate the differential approach and gender perspective in the reintegration 
models. 
Recommendations related to Prevention of Recruitment 
 Adapt current USAID-IOM “Reintegration Program” to work in the high-priority zones 
identified by the High Counselor for Post-Conflict” 
 Develop new USAID programs that focus on strengthening the community and family social 
structures that have always been envisioned as part of a successful child recruitment prevention 
program but have never been adequately funded. 
 Support the implementation of the updated GOC Consejo Nacional de Política Económica y 
Social (Conpes) - equivalent to the prevention of recruitment and use by criminal groups, soon 
to be released by the Directorate of National Planning. 
 Continue support for the social inclusion initiatives and differential approaches from CHS-F2 and 
incorporate strategies. 
 Support programs to address family violence and gender-based violence, which are a key driver 
for recruitment and use into armed groups. 
 Extend USAID’s current “Reintegration Program” with IOM to receptor communities where 
FARC CH&A are reportedly spontaneously re-locating. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT 21
 Strengthen implementation of prevention programs at the territorial (local) level with a focus 
not only on vulnerable youth but also on the family and community structures that are keys to 
prevention. 
Recommendations for CIPRUNA 
The policy on recruitment prevention in the context of the implementation of the Peace Agreement 
with the FARC guerrilla should be reoriented mainly towards strengthening institutional capacity. This is 
important since it is an integral part of the peace agreements and is crucial for coordination, initiatives 
and work with local authorities, efficient use of resources for road-map protocols and the strengthening 
of investigation and prosecution of criminal activities. Thus, the presence of the government can be 
reinforced in areas formerly controlled by the FARC guerrilla in order to prevent children from being 
used or linked to illegal groups or to new criminal modalities. 
Likewise, for the design of reintegration programs, in addition to adopting a community-based approach, 
it is essential to contemplate regional, cultural and ethnic differences. These programs should be 
oriented towards education and job training to provide support in productive activities and the 
empowerment of children. For this purpose, it is important to include the children and adolescents in 
the design of the public policy in each territory. 
Furthermore, in the strategic areas in which USAID should continue to support the Government of 
Colombia to prevent recruitment, use and sexual violence against children in the next 5 years, most 
institutions agree that programs regarding education for the labor insertion to the productive sectors 
and the use of free time should be supported and strengthened, especially those involving sports, arts 
and cultural formation with a territorial, cultural and ethnic approach. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT A-1
ANNEX A: STATEMENT OF WORK
SECTION C – DESCRIPTION / SPECIFICATIONS/STATEMENT OF WORK
C.1 TITLE
Strategic Performance Evaluation of its Disengaged Child Soldiers and Youth at Risk of
Recruitment (CHS) Activity.
C.2 PURPOSE
The overall objective of USAID/Colombia’s 2014 Country Development and Cooperation 
Strategy (CDCS) is to strengthen Colombia’s capacity to implement a sustainable and 
inclusive peace. As part of this process, the Mission’s Office of Vulnerable Populations 
(OVP) supports efforts to identify and address the opportunities and barriers for achieving 
sustainable peace and development in Colombia through various evaluations of its programs. 
After seven years of USAID programming supporting disengaged children and prevention of 
recruitment initiatives, OVP is conducting a strategic Performance Evaluation of its 
Disengaged Child Soldiers and Youth at Risk of Recruitment (CHS) Program.
The evaluation has the purpose to clarify if the USAID/Colombia’s Disengaged Child 
Soldiers and Youth at Risk of Recruitment (CHS) Program was able to achieve its stated 
results, and if/how those results align with the Government of Colombia (GOC) programs to 
assist disengaged child soldiers and adult ex-combatants. This evaluation would allow 
Mission’s Office of Vulnerable Populations (OVP) to identify lessons learned from the 
Program in order to inform and develop options and/or activities for the current Reintegration 
and Prevention of Recruitment Program (RPR). The key lessons learned from this evaluation 
will be shared with strategic GOC partners.
C.3 BACKGROUND
Description of the Problem, Development Hypothesis, and Theory of Change
Each year, worldwide, 300,000 children participate actively in wars.1 They must fight, spy, 
explore and provide sexual services to their superiors. In approximately 75% of the armed 
conflicts in the world, there are child soldiers who are part of illegal armed groups (IAG), 
such as guerrillas, paramilitaries, insurgent groups or criminal gangs.2 The use of children as 
combatants and their victimization by opposing actors has been a common characteristic of 
countries facing armed conflict in situations such as Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Sierra Leone, and Colombia. Although international regulations clearly prohibit the 
participation of children in war, reality has shown that, on one hand, they are an easy target 
and on the other, there are few laws related to the prevention, detection, and repression of 
these acts.
Without any doubt, recruitment and use of Children and Adolescents (CH&A) in armed 
conflicts has generated widespread concern, as it represents the denial of the most
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT A-2
1 Human Rights Watch, “Child Soldiers: The shadow of their existence”. 2007 www.warchild.nl The United 
Nations Coalition against the involvement of children and adolescents in armed conflict estimates the number of 
child soldiers to be around 250,000-300,000.
2 Human Security Report, 2005. http://www.hsrgroup.org/human-security-reports/human-security-report-aspx
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT A-3
fundamental rights. This is the reason why, worldwide, protection of children has increased, 
as well as the adoption of various prevention and attention mechanisms for CH&A.
After almost 50 years, internal armed conflict continues to affect various regions and civilian 
populations of Colombia. In the last decade, the GOC has made several attempts at 
negotiating with IAGs in order to help the country transit from a state of armed conflict to 
one of sustained peace. Following successful peace talks with the paramilitaries, Auto￾defensas de Colombia (AUC) in 2003, the administration of former Colombian President 
Alvaro Uribe (2002-2010) embarked on a Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
(DDR) process to support the dismantling of the AUC forces. During these demobilizations, 
AUC commanders allegedly returned thousands of child fighters to their homes prior to mass 
demobilizations in order to evade legal charges. The unsatisfying AUC demobilization was a 
costly error for the Colombian government in dealing with child combatants. But it offers 
lessons for today’s peace negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces in Colombia 
(FARC) and subsequent demobilizations of child combatants that will likely follow a signed 
peace agreement.
Recruiting children under the age of 15 to “participate actively in hostile activities” is a war 
crime according to the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, the United Nations 
states that 18 years is the minimum age requirement to recruit persons to participate in an 
armed conflict. Figures differ between the Ministry of Defense, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and other agencies on the numbers of children involved in the 
Colombia’s internal conflict. While more than 5,000 children have disengaged3 from illegal 
groups, some claim that more than 7,500 children were recruited between 1985 and 2014 by 
all actors, including the guerrillas, the military and state-aligned paramilitary groups.
Through its program of specialized care, the Colombian Institute of Family Welfare (ICBF) 
has recovered over 5,900 children since 1999. The authorities recognize that one of the 
populations most affected by recruitment by illegal actors is indigenous groups who represent
3% of the total Colombian population. Nevertheless children from indigenous groups make 
up 10% of the overall number of disengaged children. Afro-Colombian disengaged child 
soldiers are 6% of the overall disengaged children.
229 children and adolescents entered the Colombian “special assistance program” in order to 
begin their reintegration back into Colombian society in 2015. Of those 229 CH&A, 39 were 
rescued by the armed forces. According to the latest report from the agency Allied Children, 
Social Development and Research (www.agenciapandi.org), most of the 7,722 children who 
were recruited between 1985 and 2014 were recruited before they were 14 years old. 
Almost 36% of them came from home environments with problems such as domestic 
violence.
Forced recruitment of children by IAGs continues in Colombia. In fact, it is increasing. 
Moreover, the recruitment age for boys and girls continues to decrease. Estimates on the 
number of children and adolescents recruited in Colombia show that there could be currently 
between 5,000 and 6,600 child soldiers participating as combatants in these groups.4 In the
107 municipalities prioritized by the Inter-Institutional Committee for Prevention of
3 Children disengaged from armed groups in Colombia Integration Processes in Context. 2013. Villanueva
O’Driscoll, Julia’ Loots, Gerrit; Derlyun, Ilse. Chapter 4, pg 73.
4 Updated trends on participation of children and adolescents in illegal armed groups. Econometria 2,009 page
94.
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT A-4
Recruitment and Use of Boys and Girls currently under the Ministry of Post Conflict, there are 
around 81,000 children and adolescents at risk of recruitment and use by illegal armed groups.
Based on the analysis of the information that the ICBF gathered from disengaged children entering the 
Specialized Assistance Program, the following aspects can be concluded:
• The departments of Antioquia, Caquetá and Meta continue to be the ones with higher 
recruitment of children and adolescents by illegal armed groups, followed by 
increasing trends of recruitment within the Pacific Region.
• The trend shows that San Vicente del Caguán is the municipality where most of the 
disengaged children are being recruited by IAG, followed by the municipalities of Planadas 
(Tolima), Tame (Arauca), El Bagre (Antioquia), Barbacoas (Nariño), Cartagena del 
Chairá (Caquetá), and Puerto Guzmán (Putumayo).
• The number of disengaged children from criminal organizations (Bandas Criminales
– BACRIM) drastically increased since 2009. In 2015, 20 children entered the ICBF 
reintegration program but the Colombian Interinstitutional Committee for the 
Prevention of Recruitment of Children and Adolescents (CIPRUNNA) estimates that the 
number of youth used by criminal groups could be much higher.
While the Santos government is currently engaged in peace talks with the FARC, it is unclear what the 
final outcome will be, including if, when, and roughly how many FARC adult and child soldiers will 
demobilize. While the National Liberation Army (Ejército de Liberación Nacional -ELN) and other 
BACRIM continue to recruit, according to Human Rights Watch, “approximately 80 percent of child 
combatants in Colombia belong to one of the two left- wing guerrilla groups, the FARC or ELN. The 
remaining fight in paramilitary ranks.”
Theory of Change
USAID/Colombia’s theory of change for the reintegration program links this activity as follows: 
If motivations and incentives for violence and participation are changed among disengaged child 
soldiers and ex-combatants to mitigate recidivism, and community members are engaged in the 
reintegration process, then ex-combatants are more likely to become law- abiding members of society 
accepted by their communities.
This theory of change is based on the assumption that successful reintegration will be achieved not 
only through a focus on adults and child ex-combatants, but also through inclusion of community 
members in the reintegration process. As noted above, such an approach directly links to OVP’s 
development objective of advancing reconciliation among victims and ex-combatants, and contributes 
to the overall CDCS objective.
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT A-10
Summary of the Activity to be evaluated
In 1999, USAID agreed to support the Government of Colombia (GOC) initiative to build a 
reintegration route for child soldiers. Since then two USAID programs have supported the GOC 
to assist child soldiers, prevent recruitment of youth at risk and support knowledge management 
related to the reintegration route and restitution of rights of children affected by the conflict. The 
programs were “Support Program for Ex-Combatant Children” from March 2001 to December
2008 with a total estimated ceiling (TEC) of USD $13.8 million and “Institutional Strengthening 
Program to Support Child Ex-Combatants and Children and Youth at Risk of Recruitment by 
Illegal Armed Groups” from December 2008 to December 2015 with a TEC of 
USD$22,872,000.
The first program (2001 – 2008) focused on improving the provision of direct assistance to 
children and adolescents by helping support and strengthen policies. In particular, the program 
strengthened the design and implementation of the Colombian Family Welfare Institute (ICBF) 
Assistance Program that began in 1999. During this first program, the main objectives included:
• Direct assistance to ex-combatant children and youth
• Strengthening and training of ICBF staff
• Consolidation of assistance modalities, especially specific needs for Afro Colombian and
Indigenous communities
• Promotion of extra-institutional “family” settings
• Consolidation of pedagogic models and toolkits
• Strengthening of vocational skills training for youth
• Implementation of reparations projects to benefit ex-combatant children and youth
• Alternative methodologies for individual and community reparations and reintegration.
The second program had two phases (2008-2011) and (2012-2015). During the first phase, the 
program continued to improve assistance for disengaged children and adolescents by working 
with the ICBF and by emphasizing the prevention of recruitment and use of children and 
adolescents, supporting the CIPRUNNA, an inter-agency GOC working group that focuses on 
articulating and leading implementation of actions to prevent recruitment and use of children and 
adolescents by illegal armed groups and criminal groups. Objectives included in this phase 
include:
• Assistance: USAID provided assistance to ICBF to effectively implement the disengaged 
child soldier’s policy, which includes support for long-term sustainable economic and 
social reintegration of beneficiaries.
• Prevention: GOC implemented policy to reduce vulnerabilities of recruitment in high-risk 
areas by increasing national, regional and local capacities in the public, private and 
community networks with technical assistance provided by USAID.
• Knowledge Management and Information Dissemination: Key institutions identified and 
provided feedback on their lessons learned regarding assistance and prevention, while 
USAID worked with observatories in Colombia to generate evidence-based information 
in these areas.
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT A-11
The second phase of the second program (2012-2015) continued to implement assistance and 
prevention components, prioritizing support for strengthening various institutions including 
ICBF and CIPRUNNA. This included supporting the Childhood Observatory in both entities. 
Also, community reintegration models were developed and tried in indigenous and rural 
municipalities. The program adapted its activities to align them with the ongoing dialogues 
between the FARC and GOC by including peace pedagogic methodology for high school and 
universities, and continued support for ICBF contingency planning for massive disengagement of 
children and adolescents through institutional and community models.
The following are some of the results included in this phase:
• Over 5,900 child soldiers identified and assisted by ICBF’s specialized assistance 
program
• 184,574 at-risk youth benefited from prevention strategies
• 1,159 national and local institutions strengthened
• 83 analyses led and communicated through GOC Observatories
The components of the USAID program are summarized in the following table:
Program Component Key Activities Primary Counterparts
Assistance to disengaged 
child soldiers
- Support institutional models and 
approaches
- Support to family reintegration 
models
Support to civil society routes 
(indigenous communities, victims’ 
groups and agricultural rural model)
- Development of a tailored approach 
for various ethnic groups (indigenous 
and Afro-Colombian populations)
-Colombian Family Welfare
Institute (ICBF)
-Indigenous communities and 
authorities
-Local authorities
Prevention of recruitment - Support to GOC policy
Institutional strengthening to 10% of 
municipalities at higher risk of 
recruitment
- Use of technologies and recreational 
activities to empower youth
-Inter-Institutional Commission 
for Recruitment Prevention 
(CIPRUNNA)
- GOC initiatives 
(Tecnoacademias
5
, ICBF’s 
program General Welfare 
Program).
Knowledge Management - Support to national and local 
Observatories to track rights of 
children in the conflict
GOC oversight system to track 
municipal and departmental policy 
compliance
- Support NGOs to develop and 
disseminate methodologies
I- CBF, CIPRUNNA, national 
and local GOC authorities. 
Children and Adolescent Unit 
within the Inspector General 
Office
- Civil society operators (World 
Coach, Pandi, Familia Ayara, 
Casa Francisco Esperanza, etc).
5 Schools specialized in training CH&A in technology, including robotics, nano-technology, computer design, etc.
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT A-12
The geographic scope of the CHS program had a national focus for it supported national policy 
design and assistance. Support for municipal development plans in prevention focused in the 
following areas (highlighted in orange on the map on page 9):
Antioquia (Olaya, Peque, Sabanalarga, San Andrés, Santa Fe de Antioquia, Toledo, Valdivia, 
Yarumal); Arauca (Arauquita, Fortul, Saravena); Bolívar (Cartagena, El Carmen de Bolívar, 
Magangué, San Jacinto, San Juan de Nepomuceno, Turbaco); Boyacá (Cubara); Caquetá (San 
Vicente del Caguan); Cauca (Caldono, Corinto, Guapi, El Tambo, Morales, Puerto Tejada, 
Silvia); Chocó (Itsmina, Quibdó, Medio Atrato); Huila (Neiva, Tello); La Guajira (Dibulla, 
Maicao, Riohacha, Uribía); Magdalena (Aracataca, Ciénaga) Meta (Mapiripan, Puerto Gaitán, 
Puerto Lleras); Nariño (Ipiales, Policarpa, Ricaurte, Santa Cruz); Norte de Santander (Cúcuta, 
Tibú); Putumayo (Puerto Caicedo, Puerto Guzmán); Tolima (Planadas); Valle (Buenaventura, 
Cartago, Florida, Jamundí, Palmira).
The CIPRUNNA and GOC prioritized other municipalities (highlighted in grey). Those 
municipalities highlighted in grey did not receive any support from the CHS program due to time 
and resource limitations. As such, the evaluation would focus on the orange areas.
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT A-13
C.4 STATEMENT OF WORK
The primary audience for this Performance Evaluation is USAID/Colombia/OVP and Senior 
Management, as well as other USG agencies that follow the DDR process in Colombia. 
Secondary audiences, such as other donors and NGOs, could also benefit from the results of the 
evaluation.
a. Evaluation Questions
The evaluation will address the following questions regarding the second phase of the second 
USAID/Colombia Institutional Strengthening Program to Support Child Ex-combatants and 
Children and Young at risk of Recruitment by Illegal Armed Groups (CHS-2F) 2012-2015:
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT A-14
1. TO WHAT EXTENT HAS THE CHS-2F SUPPORTED THE GOC POLICIES AND PROGRAMS TO REINTEGRATE CHILD SOLDIERS? 
2. Which are the strengths, weaknesses and lessons learned of the institutional reintegration 
route and alternative models for child soldiers of each one of the models supported by 
CHS-2F 6?
3. What have been the key challenges and bottlenecks in the GOC child soldiers’ 
reintegration process supported by CHS-2F7? What are the key challenges and 
bottlenecks when disaggregating the information and analysis by gender and ethnic 
groups?
4. What results has CHS-2F achieved in the four key intervention areas (institutional 
strengthening, assistance to reintegration of child soldiers, prevention of recruitment and 
knowledge management)?
5. Which are the strategic areas in which the international community, especially USAID, 
can continue to support the Government of Colombia to achieve prevention of 
recruitment and use of children by illegal armed groups8? This question seeks to identify 
the most strategic approach to support GOC efforts to fight recruitment and use of 
children and adolescents by illegal armed groups and organized crime bands (BACRIM).
b. Evaluation Design and Methodology
The Evaluation Team, evaluation process, and products must:
1. Review carefully all the documentation relevant to the evaluation purpose provided by 
USAID prior to evaluation start up. The team will study a wide range of documentation, 
including the Performance Monitoring Plans (PMPs), as a means of understanding and 
comparing both expected and actual performance. Other documents provided by USAID 
should be studied, such as the USAID Gender Policy, previous CHS program evaluations 
and special reports and the National Action Plan for Women Peace and Security.
2. Use, review and analyze the indicator data provided by the monitoring activities of CHS￾2F, based on the USAID/Colombia MONITOR system.
3. Propose a mix of qualitative and quantitative analysis that will help USAID/Colombia 
understand not only what is going on, but why. The approach will provide benchmarks 
for understanding ongoing progress after the evaluation.
4. Use a mix of instruments and procedures to collect the qualitative and quantitative data 
and information proposed
5. Obtain information and knowledge from various target audiences such as: Program 
Managers, Chief of Party, Governors, Mayors, community councils, USAID 
representatives and GOC ministry officials.
6. Obtain information of individuals from all relevant demographic groups and be able to 
report on differential perception, impacts, roles in decision making and experience among
6 Not all child soldiers have gone through the official ICBF reintegration model. Some have received alternative 
assistance through indigenous community models and other community support.
7 USAID has supported virtually all parts of the reintegration process by providing institutional strengthening to
ICBF in carrying out the specialized assistance program for disengaged child soldiers
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT A-15
them, including: men and women, youth and elderly and Afro-Colombian and Indigenous 
populations.
7. Capture perceptions and reality of the participation of women and their
8. Be participatory with USAID/Colombia in ways that preserve objectivity while 
improving the quality of data collected, collective learning, and ownership of the 
evaluation results.
9. Use a differentiated evaluation approach depending on the region. The Evaluation Team 
must engage with a selection of target municipalities. The evaluation team (and to a 
certain extent the questions) need to be split between the regions and national level. 
Questions need to be refined depending on capacity within a municipality and ICBF and 
CIPRUNNA presence.
10. Provide useful recommendations that are specific, actionable, time-bound and targeted to 
specific entities related to CHS-2F
11. Include exercises to understand the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and constraints 
for the implementing partner to effectively coordinate with national and local GOC 
institutions, USAID/Colombia, other USAID programs, other donors, private actors 
among others to achieve the required results.
12. Develop or suggest tools and/or frameworks to track progress from conception, through 
adoption to implementation of the key policy elements of CHS-2F
13. Retain the ability to break up into two teams to complete a demanding data collection 
effort and complex analytic exercise.
c. Evaluation Management
The evaluation team must demonstrate familiarity with USAID’s Evaluation Policy and guidance 
included in the USAID Automated Directive System (ADS) in Chapter 203.
The contractor has discretion to propose an evaluation team composition with education, skills, 
experience, and roles, which will produce a high quality evaluation report. Additional team 
members and/or support staff not identified as Key Personnel may be proposed. The overall team 
composition must include relevant subject matter expertise, skills, and experience. The 
recruitment of local evaluators and/or local counterparts is highly encouraged.
The following three positions are designated as Key Personnel:
Evaluation Team Leader
The Evaluation Team Leader will have overall responsibility for all aspects of the study. S/he 
will be primarily responsible for communicating technical issues with USAID, developing and 
implementing the detailed evaluation methodology, managing and implementing the work plan 
and all related evaluation team activities, leading the literature review, conducting interviews, 
and writing technical products (draft and final evaluation reports, PowerPoint presentations). 
S/he shall also be responsible for presenting findings during in-briefings, out-briefings, and final 
presentations.
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT A-16
Senior Conflict Analyst/Subject Matter Specialist
At least one senior-level conflict/subject matter specialist will serve on the evaluation team and 
will support the Evaluation Team Leader with research, data collection, analysis, and writing. 
The evaluation contractor should select a Senior Conflict Analyst/Subject Matter Expert with 
prior experience working in Colombia and focusing on DDR issues. Identification of highly 
qualified local expertise is encouraged.
Evaluation Specialist
The Evaluation Specialist will provide technical expertise in the qualitative and quantitative 
program evaluation methodologies, tools, and data analyses that can be applied to peacebuilding 
and conflict resolution programs.
C.5 LOGISTIC SUPPORT
The contractor will provide all workspace, computers, printers, internet and cell phone services 
and other administrative services for the Evaluation Team. USAID/Colombia will provide a 
letter of introduction and a list of contacts to the Evaluation Team for meetings with 
implementing partners, GOC representatives, program beneficiaries, and other key stakeholders 
and contacts.
The contractor will be responsible for providing logistical personnel covering support in an 
evaluation, including professional translation services, data entry, administrative assistance, 
operations, etc.
The Mission and/or USAID implementing partners will make available relevant documents.
The Evaluation Task Order Contracting Officer Representative (TOCOR) may observe some of 
the data collection efforts, but will not serve as a member of the evaluation team.
C.6 ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE
Per USAID Environmental Procedures, certain classes of actions may qualify for a Categorical 
Exclusion, pursuant to 22 CFR Section 216.2(c)(1) and (2), for which an Initial Environmental 
Examination, or an Environmental Assessment is not required. The activities described qualify 
for a categorical exclusion per 22 CFR 216 as follows:
1. Section 216.2(c)(2)(i) Education, technical assistance, or training programs except to the 
extent such programs include activities directly affecting the environment (such as 
construction of facilities, etc.);
2. Section 216.2(c)(2)(ii) Controlled experimentation exclusively for the purpose of research 
and field evaluation which are confined to small areas and carefully monitored;
3. Section 216.2(c)(2)(iii) Analyses, studies, academic or research workshops and 
meetings; and
4. Section 216.2(c)(2)(xiv) Studies, projects or programs intended to develop the capability 
of recipient countries to engage in development planning, except to the extent designed
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL FSTRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT A-17
to result in activities directly affecting the 
environment.
C.7 
GENDER
Gender and vulnerable populations must be integrated into the design and implementation of 
the Activity. Integration of these themes should take into account women and vulnerable 
groups such as, but not limited to, indigenous personas, Afro-Colombians, persons with 
disabilities, youth, the elderly and the LGBTI community as appropriate. At a bare minimum, 
the Activity should address major existing inequalities and a plan to guard against exacerbating 
these.
C.8 GEOGRAPHIC AREAS FOR THE 
EVALUATION
The evaluation will be conducted in Colombia. Specific geographic areas that the 
Evaluation team plan to visit will be selected by the Evaluation Tam during the planning 
process. For purposes of budgeting, Contractors must assume that they will visit Bogotá and
sites near three of CHS-2F’s Regional coverage in the Departments of Antioquia; Bolivar; 
Boyacá; Caquetá; Cauca; Chocó; Hila; La Guajira; Magdalena; Meta; Nariño; Norte de 
Santander; Putumayo; Tolima; and Valle del Cauca.
[END OF SECTION 
C]
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION – DRAFT FINAL REPORT B-1 
ANNEX B: EVALUATION 
METHODOLOGY AND TEAM 
COMPOSITION
The final performance evaluation employed a mixed-methods approach using qualitative and quantitative 
data collection methodologies including, a desk review of program documents and other secondary 
sources of information, personal in-depth interviews with key informants (KII), focus group discussions 
(FGD) with key stakeholders, and site visits to specific CHS-F2 intervention zones. 
The team interviewed stakeholders that were, directly and indirectly, involved in the project between 
2012 and 2015 as well as those with on-going knowledge or institutional responsibilities related to 
disengaged and vulnerable CH&A and the peace process. The team visited and spoke with counterparts 
and beneficiaries from two ICBF models for reintegration- institutional model and the community-based 
model with an indigenous community. The team was sensitive to the variables of urban, rural, ethnic 
communities and gender, and the unique conditions in the zones visited. The team evaluated the work of 
two GOC entities (known as “Observatories”) that were created to provide information and evidence 
to support government decision-making related to the protection of the rights and recruitment 
prevention. This evaluation took place through key informant interviews and an analysis of the 
program’s knowledge management written products.
In addition, conducting the evaluation 20 months after the project closed presented important 
limitations to gathering relevant information, as noted below. 
The team employed a semi-structured interview approach, allowing some degree of deviation from the 
protocol. This allowed the interlocutor to have a partial role in determining the path of the 
conversation and facilitated a natural flow of conversation, which allowed follow up questions to focus 
on particularly useful topics that emerge during the interview. 
ACTIVITY SITE VISITS 
The team visited several zones where CHS-F2 activities took place from 2012 to 2015 and where there 
is a continuation of activities supported by the CHS-F2 program. Two-person teams visited Soacha, 
Cartagena and Villivencio, and a three-person team visited Cali and the Nasa/Toribio indigenous 
community Santander de Quilichao. The teams interviewed officials in mayor and governor’s offices, 
local ICBF staff, CSOs grantees, communities, and vulnerable CH&A and conducted focus group 
discussions. The team collected information to better understand different models of reintegration and 
CHS-F2 initiatives related to social inclusion and prevention of the recruitment and use of CH&A by 
illegal armed groups and criminal organizations. 
FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS 
The evaluation team conducted 6 focus group discussions (FGD) during the site visits with 50 project 
beneficiaries (8 individuals on average, 52% women and 48% men). These FGD included 1) religious 
leaders, staff, and disengaged CH&A, who are now young adults, at a reintegration center in Cali; 2) 
community leaders and CH&A from the NASA indigenous community of Toribio in Santander de 
Qulichao, Cauca; 3) vulnerable boys, girls, and community leaders involved in prevention and social 
inclusion initiatives in Soacha, Cali, Cartagena, and Villavicencio. 
These FGD allowed for exchange and discussion among direct beneficiaries of the activities supported 
by the IOM project in 2012-2015, which have continued to function in some form. The team employed 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION – DRAFT FINAL REPORT B-2 
an open interview approach, which allowed for a more casual conversation appropriate for the setting 
and population. It allowed the young interlocutors and community leaders to determine the path of the 
conversation and allowed them to share sensitive personal information as they saw fit. 
QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS 
To facilitate the team´s analysis of fieldwork interviews and focus groups, the team took notes in a 
Word format during the fieldwork. These notes aided the team to identify interviews and focus groups 
that provided the richest data and to guide the team’s discussions on findings, conclusions, and 
recommendations based on the data. 
TARGETED STAKEHOLDER SURVEY 
(This section will be added once the targeted stakeholder survey is complete) 
LIMITATIONS AND APPROACHES TO MINIMIZING BIAS 
The CHS-F2 evaluation, like all evaluations, is subjected to several limitations. These include: 
1. Ex-post-facto nature of the evaluation - The fact that evaluation occurred some 20 months after the 
CH-F2 program ended presented several analytical challenges, including loss of institutional memory, 
deterioration of actual memory, and difficulty accessing reliable sources or personnel that worked on 
the project during the 2012-2015 time frame. The team does recognize that the ex-post-facto nature of 
the evaluation allowed for a more robust examination of sustainability. The team was able to evaluate 
how program effect had evolved over the 20 month period and gain a more nuanced understanding of 
how beneficiaries retained or did not retian benefits from program involvement. This understanding of 
sustainability allowed the team to provide more valuable recommendations for future programming than 
would otherwise have been possible. 
2. Staff turnover and lack of institutional memory– The high staff turnover in the GOC at the national, 
departmental and municipal levels and the lack of institutional memory presented challenges in accessing 
reliable information. Departmental and municipal elections were held in October 2015, two months 
before the CHS-F2 program ended, and brought in entirely new authorities with new priorities who 
were responsible for programs related to the CHS program. In addition, IOM has other USAID-funded 
programs in place. Some of these new actors and the presence of other programs caused some 
confusion among interviewees. This was less of a problem at the national level, as the Santos 
government was re-elected in 2014 and there were fewer turnovers of authorities. DI sought to 
minimize this limitation by consulting extensively with IOM and within government entities to identify as 
many members of the original CHS-F2 staff as possible. 
3. Selection bias – Although the team is unaware of informants who declined to participate in the 
evaluation, there is a possibility of selection bias, i.e. those respondents who chose to participate might 
differ from those who did not in terms of their attitudes and perceptions or socio-demographic 
characteristics and experience among other factors. In mitigation, the team made informants aware of 
the independence of the process and the confidentiality of responses. 
4. Halo Bias - There is a known tendency among respondents to underreport socially undesirable 
answers and to change their responses to fit with what they perceive as the social norm. The extent to 
which respondents will be prepared to reveal their true opinions may also vary for some questions that 
call upon them to assess the performance of their colleagues or people on whom they depend for the 
provision of services or funding. To mitigate this limitation, the team provided the respondents with 
confidentiality and anonymity guarantees, conducted the meetings in private settings where respondents 
feel comfortable, and aimed to establish rapport between the interviewer and the respondent. For focus 
groups, the team held meetings in neutral locations and ensured that no grantee staff was present or 
able to overhear the proceedings. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION – DRAFT FINAL REPORT B-3 
5. Timeframe - The timeframe of this evaluation required a narrow, focused approach. The team was 
not able to generalize results across the entire population of beneficiaries reached by the project. 
Nevertheless, by using a mixed-methods approach and meeting with a diverse and purposively selected 
sample of beneficiaries, the team sought to mitigate the effects of this limitation. 
The evaluation team consisted of three key experts: Team Leader, Ms. Kelly McBride, an international 
consultant with significant experience in issues of conflict resolution and GOC and USAID projects 
related to youth and conflict in Colombia and Central America; Dr. Marc Chernick, a senior conflict 
specialist who has studied the Colombian conflict, as well as other Latin American and international 
armed conflicts for over three decades, and is currently resident in Colombia on sabbatical from 
Georgetown University; and Mr. Hugo Navarro, a Colombian consultant with decades of international 
experience in quantitative and qualitative evaluation methodologies and project design. In designing and 
implementing this evaluation, the Team has followed the guidelines outlined in USAID’s Task Order 
accompanying the Scope of Work (Annex A). The team used both quantitative and qualitative research 
methods to gather data to investigate the evaluation questions, as described in more detail in the 
Evaluation Design and Methodology (Annex B). 
The Team used four main data collection methods: document review, key informant interviews (KII), 
focus group discussions (FGD), and an online survey. Information from these methods has been 
triangulated to ensure reliable findings, while discrepant observations and data have been noted and 
used as well. 
TEAM ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
Kelly McBride, Team Leader - The Team Leader is responsible for overall quality of the performance 
evaluation, including ensuring methodological rigor, testing and revising instruments and approaches as 
needed, and providing leadership, coordination, and supervision of team members, including for the 
document review, work plan, and design of the evaluation tools, as well as for meetings and key 
informant interviews, data analysis, debriefing to USAID, regular reporting during fieldwork, and draft 
and final report writing. The Team Leader will oversee interviews in Bogota and other fieldwork 
locations, working closely with the other team members. During fieldwork, the Team Leader will 
troubleshoot to address any problems that arise. 
Marc Chernick, Senior Conflcit Analyst – The Senior Conflict Analyst will provide technical leadership 
to ensure that the methodology includes the best current thinking on the conflict in Colombia, child 
soldiers, reintegration issues, and the changing circumstances brought on by the newly signed peace 
agreement. The Senior Conflict Analyst will ensure that the evaluation design, informant selection, data 
collection, analysis, and the report reflect a deep understanding of the subject matter and conflict 
dynamics in Colombia. 
Hugo Navarro, Evaluation Specialist - The Evaluation Specialist will support the Team Leader in the 
design and implementation of high-quality methodological approaches, participate in data collection and 
analysis activities, and ensure that all tools and reports meet DI’s high standards for methodological 
rigor. He will assist the Team Leader in overall evaluation management, including by conducting 
background research, assisting with the development of the work plan, instrument design, and evaluation 
methodology, and participating in fieldwork. He will provide support to tailor the data collection 
instruments and to inform subsequent analysis, conclusions, and recommendations. He will work with 
the Team Leader to draft and edit the evaluation report and present key findings and recommendations. 
Local Conflict Specialist – The Local Conflict Specialist will support the evaluation team in understanding 
the local conflict dynamics and conflict drivers in Colombia. He or she will provide nuanced local 
context to inform development of all deliverables, development of data collection protocols and design, 
and participate as needed in data collection. He or she will provide support to tailor the data collection 
instruments and to inform subsequent analysis, conclusions, and recommendations. He or she will work 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION – DRAFT FINAL REPORT B-4 
with the Team Leader to draft and edit the evaluation report and present key findings and 
recommendations as needed. 
Administrative/Logistical Coordinator - DI will hire an administrative/logistical coordinator in a non-key 
personnel capacity to work with the Team Leader to plan logistics for data collection, make 
appointments with interviewees, and manage local travel arrangements for the team. The Coordinator 
will arrange travel for all team members to conduct data collection in Bogota and selected fieldwork 
locations. The coordinator will also assist in the scheduling process for interviews, focus groups, and 
field site visits. 
Home Office Support Staff - Drawing upon its experience successfully managing evaluations around the 
world, DI’s home office Analytical Services team, led by DI’s Director of Analytical Services Dr. Yemile 
Mizrahi, will oversee the entire task order and will be primarily responsible for the timely production of 
high-quality deliverables, seamless implementation of fieldwork, and the maintenance of a positive and 
productive working relationship with all stakeholders. Program Officer Michael Cowan will provide 
administrative and logistical support to this evaluation, serve as the main point of contact between 
USAID and DI from DI’s Home Office, and manage day-to-day operations of the evaluation team. DI’s 
Senior Evaluation and Survey Specialist Dr. Aaron Abbarno will provide expert evaluation technical 
support and support the survey design and analysis in coordination with the evaluation team. 
DI’s management approach includes clear lines of authority to enable timely communication between 
the evaluation team, USAID, and DI. The Team Leader represents DI in the field and oversees the rest 
of the evaluation team. The Team Leader reports to Dr. Mizrahi in DI’s home office and to USAID in 
Colombia. All other team members working in the field report directly to the Team Leader. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT C-1 
ANNEX C: DATA COLLECTION
TOOLS
INTERVIEW AND FOCUS GROUP GUIDES 
INSTRUMENTOS DE 
RECOLECCIÓN DE 
INFORMACIÓN
Mayo 21 2017
Evaluación estratégica del desempeño de la 
segunda fase del programa de apoyo a niños, 
niñas y adolescentes (NNA) desvinculados y 
para prevenir el reclutamiento por parte de 
grupos armados al margen de la ley (CHS-2F)
Este documento contiene los instrumentos de recolección de información de la evaluación, y se estructura 
en tres secciones: i) guías de entrevistas individuales; ii) guías de grupos focales y iii) encuesta 
institucional. 
1. Guías de entrevistas individuales 
Este documento contiene cuatro guías para entrevistas individuales con grupos de interés del programa 
CHS-2F. Las guías son dirigidas a los siguientes grupos: 
 Funcionarios de OIM (página 3)
 Entidades del gobierno (página 4) 
 ONG que participan como operadores (página 5) 
 Entidades bilaterales y multilaterales (página 6) 
Las guías están organizadas por bloques de preguntas que guardan coherencia temática, iniciando con 
preguntas generales y luego con preguntas sobre temáticas puntuales. Para cada pregunta se establece su 
relación con las cinco preguntas de evaluación de los términos de referencia y además se proponen 
algunos temas de profundización que pueden orientar las contra-preguntas. 
Se sugiere seguir el siguiente texto para introducir la evaluación antes de aplicar las preguntas de los 
guías de entrevistas. 
Democracy International es una empresa de consultoría contratada por USAID para realizar una 
evaluación independiente de la segunda fase del programa de apoyo a niños, niñas y adolescentes 
(NNA) desvinculados y para prevenir el reclutamiento por parte de grupos armados al margen de 
la ley (CHS-2F), ejecutado entre 2012 y 2015, el cual es coordinado desde Oficina de Poblaciones 
Vulnerables e implementado por la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM). 
En el desarrollo de la evaluación, el equipo de Democracy International está realizando 
entrevistas individuales y grupos focales con funcionarios del gobierno nacional y local, de las 
ONG que participan como operadores, y de entidades bilaterales y multilaterales. 
El propósito de esta entrevista es conocer su experiencia y percepciones generales sobre este tipo 
de programas que buscan complementar la oferta institucional para la prevención y atención de 
niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas del reclutamiento. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT C-2 
La entrevista tiene una duración aproximada de una hora y queremos solicitar su autorización 
para grabarla. El propósito de la grabación no es otro que facilitar la toma de notas durante la 
entrevista. 
2. Guías de grupos focales
Este documento contiene dos guías para grupos focales para las siguientes poblaciones: 
 Personal de los equipos técnicos de operadores (página 7): Participan 8 profesionales 
(psicólogos, médicos, docentes, etc) que prestan atención especializada a los NNA 
desmovilizados de los GAI. 
 Jóvenes egresados del ICBF (página8): Participan 8 jóvenes egresados del Programa 
Especializado de Atención del ICBF. 
Las guías están organizadas por bloques de preguntas que guardan coherencia temática, iniciando 
con preguntas generales y luego con preguntas sobre temáticas puntuales. En el caso del grupo 
focal con profesionales de los equipos técnicos de los operados se incluyó una sección especial 
sobre capacidades técnicas que sigue un formato de “taller” y está basada en el enfoque 
apreciativo2
. Cada grupo focal tiene una duración de 2 horas y 15 minutos. 
La Presentación del estudio se realiza con el mismo texto que se usa en las guías de entrevista 
individuales. 
Se sugiere establecer normas para el desarrollo de los grupos focales y leerlas a los participantes. Las 
normas sugeridas para tener una conversación interesante y fluida, los invitamos a: 
 P
 Compartir sus experiencias y opiniones sobre los temas que vamos a abordar. Todas sus 
opiniones son importantes para mejorar el apoyo que brinda el Programa 
 Escuchar atentamente las opiniones de sus compañeros de mesa, porque esta conversación 
también es una oportunidad para aprender de los demás. 
 Respetar las opiniones de los demás, en esta conversación no hay respuestas correctas o 
incorrectas, y podemos decir si estamos de acuerdo o no con las opiniones de los demás. 
 Ser concretos cuando hablamos, para permitir que otros puedan compartir sus experiencias. 
Vamos a manejar turnos de dos o tres minutos. 
 Apagar o silenciar los teléfonos celulares. 
3. Encuesta de capacidad institucional 
Se elaboraron dos versiones de la encuesta, una para evaluar la capacitación institucional de la Ruta de 
Atención (página 8) y la otra centrada en las Rutas de Prevención (página Error! Bookmark not 
defined.). 
La encuesta comprende 12 preguntas. Las preguntas iniciales están relacionadas con el conocimiento del 
encuestado de las rutas y el trabajo que realiza su entidad. Luego se pregunta por los resultados 
alcanzados con el desarrollo de las rutas. Posteriormente, se realizan preguntas sobre los desafíos de 
capacidad institucional, tomando como referente la metodología Sistema de Análisis de Capacidad 
Institucional (SADCI) del Banco Mundial. A continuación se pregunta por el desempeño de las diferentes 
entidades del ámbito municipal, departamental y nacional que participan en las rutas. La encuesta finaliza 
con preguntas acerca de la contribución del CHS-2F. 
 
2 Este enfoque se toma de www.betterevaluation .com. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT C-3 
La encuesta se aplicará de manera virtual utilizando Formularios de Google. La lista de personas que 
responderán la encuesta será proporcionada por CIPRUNNA y la OIM. El diligenciamiento de la encuesta 
toma menos de 15 minutos. 
GUÍA DE ENTREVISTA A FUNCIONARIOS DE LA OIM
Al iniciar las entrevistas tome los datos básicos del entrevistado: nombre, sexo, entidad, cargo, antigüedad 
en la entidad y datos de contacto. 
Preguntas para iniciar
¿Cuál fue el rol o responsabilidades de su equipo/dependencia/oficina en relación el programa CHS-2F?
Entre 2012 y 2015, ¿Qué actividades realizó usted relacionadas con el programa CHS-2F?
¿Actualmente qué rol o responsabilidad tiene su equipo/dependencia/oficina en relación con la política de 
prevención del reclutamiento y atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas de este delito? 
Preguntas de profundización
PE Preguntas entrevista Aspectos a focalizar
1 Para la implementación del programa CHS-2F entre 2012 y 2015, ¿Qué cambios 
incorporó la OIM en su forma de trabajo y relacionamiento con las entidades del 
gobierno colombiano, en comparación con las fases anteriores del Programa?
Buenas prácticas
Lecciones aprendidas
1 ¿Cuáles son los principales retos que enfrentó la OIM para implementar la segunda 
fase (2012 -2015) del Programa con las entidades del gobierno colombiano?
Buenas prácticas
Lecciones aprendidas
2,4 ¿En qué aspectos la asistencia técnica de la OIM entre el 2012 y 2015 permitió que 
los niños, niñas y adolescentes, familias y comunidades accedieran a una mejor 
oferta institucional para:
a. la prevención del reclutamiento de NNA? 
b. la atención a NNA desvinculados?
-Modalidades 
-Enfoques 
-Transferencia de 
metodologías
4 ¿Cuáles fueron las alianzas más estratégicas para la OIM en la implementación del 
programa CHS-2F? ¿Cuáles fueron los resultados más relevantes generados por 
estas alianzas?
- Diferenciar por áreas 
de intervención
3,4 De los resultados esperados de las políticas de prevención y/o atención, en el 
período 2012 -2015, ¿Cuáles se alcanzaron y cuáles fueron más difíciles de lograr 
en los niños, niñas y adolescentes y por qué?
Derechos
Grupos poblacionales
4 Durante la implementación de la segunda fase, ¿Qué tipo de resultados no 
esperados o no previstos por la OIM ocurrieron?
Resultados no esperados 
positivos y negativos
4,5 ¿En qué medida las entidades del gobierno colombiano a nivel nacional y 
territorial se han apropiado de los enfoques, metodologías y herramientas 
generados con el acompañamiento del CHS-2F? ¿Este nivel de apropiación 
garantiza la sostenibilidad de los resultados en ausencia de la asistencia técnica de 
la OIM? 
Áreas estratégicas
Transferencia de 
metodologías 
5 El programa CHS-2F se implementó durante el desarrollo de los diálogos de paz 
con las FARC: 
a. ¿Cuál fue la incidencia del proceso de paz en la operación del programa 
CHS-2F?
b. ¿Qué incidencia ha tenido el acuerdo final de paz dentro del desarrollo de 
las políticas de prevención y/o atención. 
Contextualización el 
Programa
Preguntas de cierre
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT C-4 
5 En su opinión, en los próximos años, ¿Cuál sería la mejor inversión de los recursos 
de la cooperación internacional, en especial de USAID, para continuar 
fortaleciendo los resultados de la política de prevención y/o atención de niños, 
niñas y adolescentes víctimas de este delito?
Áreas estratégicas
GUÍA DE ENTREVISTA CON ENTIDADES DEL GOBIERNO (NACIONALES Y 
TERRITORIALES) QUE RECIBIERON APOYO DE CHS-2F
Al iniciar las entrevistas tome los datos básicos del entrevistado: nombre, sexo, entidad, cargo, antigüedad 
en la entidad y datos de contacto. 
Preguntas para iniciar
¿Cuál es el rol o responsabilidades de su dependencia3
en relación con la prevención del reclutamiento y/o 
atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas de este delito?
En los últimos cinco años, ¿Con qué propósitos y de qué manera se relacionó esta dependencia con 
USAID/OIM? 
PE Preguntas de profundización Temas
1 Entre 2012 y 2015, ¿Qué actividades realizó usted relacionadas con la 
prevención del reclutamiento y/o atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes 
víctimas de este delito?
Experiencia en el 
programa
1,4 Entre 2012 y 2015 ¿Qué tipo de cambios internos implementó su dependencia
para responder a los objetivos y enfoques de la política de prevención y/o 
atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas del reclutamiento?
-Modalidades -
Enfoques 
1,4 ¿En qué medida el programa CHS-2F apoyó o contribuyó a estos cambios? 
¿Cuáles fueron las actividades del programa CHS-2F que generaron mayores 
transformaciones en su dependencia? 
¿Cuáles actividades tuvieron menor incidencia?
Buenas prácticas y 
lecciones 
aprendidas
1,4 ¿Cuáles enfoques, metodologías o herramientas apoyadas por el programa CHS￾2F están siendo utilizadas por su dependencia?
Transferencia de 
metodologías
3 En los programas de prevención y/o atención de su dependencia, ¿Cómo se 
incorpora el enfoque diferencial? ¿En qué le aportó el CHS-2F en este aspecto? 
¿Con cuáles poblaciones tienen los mayores desafíos?
Edad, género, etnia
1,4 Durante este período, ¿En qué medida el programa CHS-2F contribuyó a mejorar 
la coordinación interinstitucional de su dependencia?
Mecanismos
4 Para el desarrollo de las acciones de esta dependencia, ¿En qué medida y para 
qué propósitos utiliza la información que proveen los observatorios del ICBF y 
de CIPRUNNA? En su concepto, ¿cuál fue el aporte del programa CHS-2F para 
el desarrollo de esos observatorios?
Gestión de 
conocimiento
5
¿Cuál ha sido la incidencia del proceso de paz y el acuerdo final paz en la 
operación de los programas su dependencia en temas de prevención y/o atención
de niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas del reclutamiento?
Contextualización 
del programa
3,4 De los resultados esperados de las políticas de prevención y/o atención, en el 
período 2012 -2015, ¿Cuáles se alcanzaron y cuáles fueron más difíciles de lograr 
en los niños, niñas y adolescentes y por qué?
Derechos
Poblaciones
Preguntas de cierre
¿Cuáles son las áreas en las que su dependencia requiere mayor fortalecimiento -Modalidades
 
3
“Dependencia se utilizará como sinónimo de oficina, área o equipo en el que trabaja el entrevistado. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT C-5 
3,4,5 para hacer una mayor contribución a la prevención y/o atención de niños, niñas y 
adolescentes víctimas del reclutamiento?
-Enfoques
- Metodologías
- Recursos
5 En su opinión, en los próximos años, ¿Cuál sería la mejor inversión de los 
recursos de la cooperación internacional, en especial de USAID, para continuar 
fortaleciendo los resultados de la política de prevención y/o atención de niños, 
niñas y adolescentes víctimas de este delito?
Áreas estratégicas
GUÍA DE ENTREVISTA A FUNCIONARIOS DE OPERADORES (ONG)
Al iniciar las entrevistas tome los datos básicos del entrevistado: nombre, sexo, entidad, cargo, antigüedad 
en la entidad y datos de contacto. 
Preguntas para iniciar
¿Cómo ha sido la participación de esta entidad con relación a la política de prevención del reclutamiento y/o la 
atención de NNA víctimas de este delito? 
Entre 2012 y 2015, en el marco del programa CHS-2F, ¿Con qué propósitos y de qué manera se relacionó esta 
entidad con la OIM? Describa brevemente la asistencia técnica que recibió esta entidad por parte de la OIM 
durante este período.
PE Preguntas de profundización Temas
1 ¿Cuál es la oferta de servicios para la prevención y/o atención que reciben los NNA que 
atiende esta entidad?
Modalidades 
Enfoques 
2,4 En los últimos cinco años, ¿Qué tipo de ajustes han tenido los servicios que ustedes 
ofrecen directamente a los NNA y cómo incidieron en la garantía de los derechos e 
integración social de los NNA? 
Modalidades y 
enfoques
3 En la atención que reciben los NNA en su institución, ¿Cómo se incorpora el enfoque 
diferencial? ¿En qué le aportó el CHS-2F en este aspecto? ¿Con cuáles poblaciones 
tienen los mayores desafíos?
Edad, género y 
etnia
1,4 ¿Cuáles enfoques, metodologías o herramientas apoyadas por el programa CHS-2F están 
siendo utilizadas por su entidad?
Transferencia 
de metodologías
2 ¿Cómo valora usted los servicios que reciben los niños de su institución a través otras 
entidades públicas y privadas del territorio? 
Modalidades
2,5 ¿Cuáles han sido las alianzas más estratégicas para su entidad en la atención a NNA? 
¿Cuáles han sido los resultados más relevantes generados por estas alianzas? ¿Con cuáles 
actores del territorio que considere estratégicos no han logrado trabajar como aliados? 
Áreas de 
intervención
2,4 ¿Cómo promueve su entidad la participación de los NNA, familias y comunidad? ¿Qué 
beneficios y retos tiene la participación de estos actores?
Mecanismos 
Instancias
4 ¿De qué manera su entidad verifica los avances hacía la garantía de los derechos y la 
integración social de los NNA que atiende? 
Gestión de 
conocimiento
4 ¿En qué medida en este territorio se divulgan los resultados y se sistematizan las 
experiencias de la política de prevención del reclutamiento y/o atención de niños, niñas 
y adolescentes víctimas de ese delito?
Gestión de 
conocimiento
4 En los NNA que han sido atendidos por su entidad, ¿Cuáles han sido los resultados en 
relación con la reunificación familiar y la integración social?
Diferencias por 
género y etnia
2 En su concepto, ¿Cuál fue el aporte del programa CHS-2F a esos resultados? ¿Cuáles 
fueron los factores que incidieron positiva y negativamente para el logro de esos 
resultados?
Lecciones 
aprendidas
Preguntas de cierre
5 En su opinión, en los próximos años, ¿Cuál sería la mejor inversión de los recursos de la 
cooperación internacional, en especial de USAID, para continuar fortaleciendo los 
resultados de la política de prevención y/o atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes 
Areas 
estratégicas
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT C-6 
víctimas de este delito?
GUÍA DE ENTREVISTA A DONANTES BILATERALES Y MULTILATERALES
Al iniciar las entrevistas tome los datos básicos del entrevistado: nombre, sexo, entidad, cargo, antigüedad 
en la entidad y datos de contacto. 
PE Preguntas para iniciar Temas
1,5 ¿Cuáles han sido los principales objetivos y metas de esta entidad en relación con la 
política de prevención del reclutamiento y/o la atención de NNA víctimas de este 
delito? Áreas estratégicas
5 Durante este período, ¿Cuáles fueron los principales apoyos que su entidad brindó a las 
entidades que participan en las políticas de prevención y/o atención en riesgo o 
víctimas del reclutamiento? ¿En qué áreas?
5 Cuál ha sido la incidencia del proceso de paz y el acuerdo final paz en el apoyo de su 
entidad a las políticas de prevención y/o atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes 
víctimas del reclutamiento?
Contextualización
PE Preguntas de profundización Temas
2 Durante el período 2012 y 2015 ¿Cómo valora la coordinación entre las distintas 
entidades de cooperación que apoyaron la política de prevención del reclutamiento y la 
atención de NNA víctimas de este delito? Planeación 
Información 
coordinación
2 ¿Qué estrategias implementaron para evitar duplicaciones y lograr complementariedad 
entre las diferentes iniciativas? 
2 En relación con el programa CHS-2F, ¿cómo se dio esta coordinación?
4 ¿Cuáles son los principales beneficios que se generaron a partir de esta colaboración 
con el programa CHS-2F?
Diferentes tipos de 
beneficios
2 ¿Cuáles son las principales lecciones aprendidas de esta colaboración? Metodologías, 
herramientas
3,4 De los resultados esperados de la política de prevención, en el período 2012 -2015, 
¿Cuáles se alcanzaron y cuáles fueron más difíciles de lograr en los niños, niñas y 
adolescentes y por qué?
Derechos
Grupos 
poblacionales
3,4 De los resultados esperados de la política de atención en el período 2012-2015 ¿Cuáles 
se alcanzaron y cuáles fueron más difíciles de lograr en los niños, niñas y adolescentes 
y por qué?
Derechos
Grupos 
poblacionales
1 En su concepto, ¿Cuáles fueron otros factores que incidieron positiva y negativamente 
para el logro de esos resultados?
Factores de riesgo
3 Actualmente, en las rutas de prevención y/o atención, ¿cuáles son las principales 
barreras para la garantía de derechos e integración social de los niños, niñas y 
adolescentes?
Diferencias por 
género y etnia
PE Preguntas de cierre Temas
5 Con la desmovilización de las FARC, ¿Qué retos surgen para el país y la cooperación 
internacional en relación con la prevención y/o atención de niños, niñas y 
adolescentes? 
Áreas estratégicas
5 Para los próximos cinco años, ¿Cuáles son las prioridades de su entidad en relación con 
la política de prevención y/o atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes víctimas de este 
delito?
Áreas estratégicas
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT C-7 
GUÍA DE GRUPOS FOCALES CON EL EQUIPO TÉCNICO DE LOS OPERADORES 
Preguntas para iniciar (15 minutos)
¿Cuénteme por favor sus nombres y a qué se dedican?
¿Hace cuánto viven o trabajan en este municipio?
¿Qué es lo que más les gusta de este municipio?
Exposición al programa (20 minutos)
¿Cuénteme si conocen el programa de USAID/OIM de apoyo a niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA) 
desvinculados y para prevenir el reclutamiento por parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley (CHS￾2F)?
¿En cuáles actividades de este programa han ustedes participado? ¿En qué medida estas actividades han 
sido útiles para desempeñar mejor su trabajo?
Preguntas sobre la ruta de atención (40 minutos)
¿Cómo describe las condiciones de los NNA en el momento de desvinculación de los GAIL?
Durante el proceso de atención, ¿Cuáles actitudes y comportamientos de los NNA son para ustedes los 
mejores de indicadores de que están avanzando en la atención? ¿Qué tan frecuente observa estos 
indicadores?
Durante el proceso de atención, ¿Cuáles actitudes y comportamientos de los NNA son para ustedes los 
mejores de indicadores de que NO están avanzando en la atención? ¿Qué tan frecuente observa estos 
indicadores?
Al terminar la atención, ¿Cuáles son las principales expectativas y objetivos de los NNA? 
En su opinión, ¿Cuáles son las principales fortalezas que tienen los NNA para alcanzar estos objetivos y 
cuáles son los principales desafíos que enfrentan?
ACTIIVIDAD OPCIONAL: Diálogo sobre capacidades técnicas (60 minutos)
Cada uno(a) piense en una situación muy específica que haya sucedido en los últimos tres meses en el 
“Centro de Atención” en el que trabaja, en la que considere que se evidenció un trabajo planeado, 
ejecutado y ajustado con seguimiento y rigor. 
Actividad 1 (30 minutos)
Organicémonos ahora por parejas y cuéntale a tu compañero sobre esa situación lo siguiente:
 ¿De qué se trata la experiencia en la que estás pensando? Descríbela.
 ¿Qué hizo posible que las cosas se dieran de ese modo? ¿Qué asuntos pasaron de modo distinto?
 ¿De qué manera contribuiste tú directamente a que se diera el trabajo de esta forma?
 ¿Qué opiniones o consideraciones tienes ahora cuando piensas en esa experiencia?
Primero una de las personas de la pareja pregunta y, mientras el otro contesta, tomar apuntes y hace todo 
lo posible para comprender bien la experiencia que narra su compañero o compañera. Después, 
intercambian los roles 
Actividad 2 (30 minutos)
Vamos ahora a reunirnos todos. La idea es que revisemos nuestras experiencias de trabajo planeado y 
sistemático e identifiquemos qué asuntos en común tienen ellas. 
El compartir lo vamos a hacer de la siguiente manera: cada persona va a contar brevemente cuál fue la 
experiencia de su compañero o compañera y, además de referirse a los puntos principales que les 
señalaron, va a decir qué fue lo que personalmente más le tocó al escuchar la experiencia.
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT C-8 
GUÍA DE GRUPOS FOCAL CON EGRESADOS DEL PROGRAMA ESPECIALIZADO DEL 
ICBF
Preguntas para iniciar
¿Cuénteme por favor sus nombres?
¿Hace cuánto viven en este municipio?
¿Qué es lo que más les gusta de este municipio?
Si tuvieran la oportunidad, ¿Qué le cambiarían a este municipio?
Preguntas de profundización
¿Cuáles fueron los mejores momentos y las mejores experiencias durante su permanencia en el Programa 
Especializado de Atención del ICBF?
En las situaciones y circunstancias más difíciles durante su proceso en el Programa Especializado de 
Atención del ICBF, ¿cuáles apoyos fueron fundamentales para seguir adelante?
¿Cómo fue el proceso de terminación de su participación en el Programa Especializado de Atención del 
ICBF?
¿Cuáles fueron sus expectativas y metas al salir del Programa Especializado de Atención del ICBF?
Actualmente, ¿Cuáles son los principales retos para avanzar y alcanzar estas metas? 
Preguntas de cierre
¿Qué cambios le harían al Programa Especializado de Atención del ICBF?
Si todo fuera posible y existieran los recursos, ¿Qué harían para que en este municipio jóvenes como 
ustedes mejoren sus condiciones de vida?
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT C-9 
Cliente: 
USAID
Evaluación estratégica del desempeño de la segunda fase 
del programa de apoyo a niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA) 
desvinculados y para prevenir el reclutamiento por parte de 
grupos armados al margen de la ley (CHS-2F)
ENCUESTA DE CAPACIDAD INSTITUCIONAL PARA LA IMPLEMENTACIÓN DE LA ATENCIÓN 
DE NIÑOS, NIÑAS Y ADOLESCENTES DESVINCULADOS Y LA PREVENCIÓN DEL 
RECLUTAMIENTO, LA UTILIZACIÓN Y LA VIOLENCIA SEXUAL POR PARTE DE GRUPOS 
ARMADOS AL MARGEN DE LA LEY
Saludo al Informante. Muy buenos días/ tardes/ noches (Dr.) / (Dra.) (nombre del informante de la base). Mi nombre es 
(nombre y apellido), Hago parte de Democracy International, una empresa de consultoría contratada por USAID para realizar 
una evaluación independiente de la segunda fase del programa de apoyo a niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA) desvinculados y 
para prevenir el reclutamiento por parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley (CHS-2F), ejecutado entre 2012 y 2015, el cual 
es coordinados desde la Oficina de Poblaciones Vulnerables de USAID e implementado por la Organización Internacional para 
las Migraciones (OIM). USAID nos ha solicitado aplicarle esta encuesta con el propósito de enriquecer las conclusiones y 
recomendaciones de esta evaluación. 
Es muy importante que usted sepa que esta encuesta NO es ni una auditoría ni una evaluación de desempeño de su entidad. 
Por lo anterior, sus opiniones sinceras contribuirán a los resultados y recomendaciones. Su identidad, así como las respuestas 
suministradas serán de carácter confidencial y los datos se utilizarán únicamente para fines estadísticos. Le agradecería que 
dedicara 15 minutos para responder unas preguntas. ¿Puedo comenzar?
1 Fecha dd/mm/año
2 Nombre
3 Sexo 1 Hombre 2 Mujer
4 Cargo
5 Entidad
6 Municipio
7 Departamento
8
En su entidad 
usted trabaja 
principalmente en:
1 Prevención del reclutamiento, utilización y violencia sexual de niños, 
niñas y adolescentes por parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley 
(responda la Sección I, preguntas de la 9 a la 20)
2 Atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes desvinculados de grupos al 
margen de la ley (responda la Sección II, preguntas de la 21 a la 32)
3 Ninguna de las anteriores (fin de la encuesta)
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT C-10
Sección I. Prevención 
9
¿Conoce usted las siguientes rutas de prevención del reclutamiento, utilización y violencia sexual 
de niños, niñas y adolescentes por parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley?
a. La Ruta de Prevención Temprana Si 1 No 2 
b. La Ruta de Prevención Urgente Si 1 No 2 
c. La Ruta de Prevención En prevención Si 1 No 2 
10
La entidad en que usted trabaja, ¿En cuáles de las siguientes rutas de prevención participa o tiene 
responsabilidades?
a. La Ruta de Prevención Temprana Si 1 No 2 
b. La Ruta de Prevención Urgente Si 1 No 2 
c. La Ruta de Prevención en Prevención Si 1 No 2 
11
En su opinión, en los últimos 5 años, las 
Rutas de Prevención han logrado los 
resultados esperados de manera:
1 Sobresaliente
2 Satisfactoria
3 Moderada
4 Insuficiente
5 No ha logrado los resultados esperados
12
Ordene las tres rutas de prevención de acuerdo con 
su efectividad para lograr los resultados esperados, 
señalando con 3 la ruta con mejores resultados y 
con 1 la ruta con menores resultados
|___| La Ruta de Prevención Temprana
|___| La Ruta de Prevención Urgente
|___| La Ruta de Prevención en Prevención
NS/NR
13
En los últimos 5 años, ¿En qué medida los siguientes tipos de problemas, para los cuales a 
continuación se dan algunos ejemplos, han limitado la respuesta efectiva de las entidades que 
participan en las Rutas de Prevención? 
Marcando con 1 cuando el problema ha tenido ninguna o poca incidencia y 5 la mayor incidencia 
Tipos de problemas
marque con un 
1 2 3 4 5
NS/
NR
a. Las normas (leyes, decretos, etc) son insuficientes o generan trabas que impiden ciertas 
acciones, o producen vacíos jurídicos que no facultan expresamente a las entidades 
involucradas a realizarlas, o no son claras en cuanto a las responsabilidades de cada 
entidad, entre otros. 
b. La relación interinstitucional entre el conjunto de entidades se caracteriza por 
competencias superpuestas (duplicidad de funciones o competencias), falta de espacios o 
mecanismos de coordinación efectivos para la toma de decisiones, deficiente comunicación 
interinstitucional, baja colaboración interinstitucional y suministro irregular de información y 
servicios entre entidades, entre otros. 
c. Entidades con problemas de organización interna, caracterizadas por una estructura 
organizacional inadecuada, fallas en la asignación de funciones, falta de formalización de la 
unidad responsable y sin cumplimiento de las funciones asignadas y/o compromisos 
adquiridos, entre otros. 
d. La inexistencia o insuficiencia de recursos físicos o financieros limita el cumplimiento de 
tareas de las entidades.
e. El personal técnico responsable de las Rutas de Prevención no cuenta con el suficiente 
conocimiento, experiencia, información, autonomía, motivación, habilidades o continuidad en 
las actividades para dar una respuesta afectiva.
f. La gestión de conocimiento, monitoreo, seguimiento y evaluación no producen información 
oportuna y relevante que genere aprendizajes y permita el mejoramiento continuo.
g. El uso de nuevas tecnologías es aún insuficiente para alcanzar mejores resultados.
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT C-11
14
En los últimos 5 años, ¿Cómo han cambiado los problemas que afectan la respuesta efectiva de las 
entidades que participan en la Ruta de Prevención? 
Marcando 1= Empeorado; 2=Permanece igual; 3=Mejorado.
Tipos de problemas
marque con una 
1 2 3 NS/ NR
a. Las normas (leyes, decretos, etc) son insuficientes o generan trabas que impiden ciertas 
acciones, o producen vacíos jurídicos que no facultan expresamente a las entidades 
involucradas a realizarlas, o no son claras en cuanto a las responsabilidades de cada 
entidad, entre otros. 
b. La relación interinstitucional entre el conjunto de entidades se caracteriza por 
competencias superpuestas (duplicidad de funciones o competencias), falta de espacios o 
mecanismos de coordinación efectivos para la toma de decisiones, deficiente comunicación 
interinstitucional, baja colaboración interinstitucional y suministro irregular de información y 
servicios entre entidades, entre otros. 
c. Entidades con problemas de organización interna, caracterizadas por una estructura 
organizacional – inadecuada, fallas en la asignación de funciones, falta de formalización de 
la unidad responsable y sin cumplimiento de las funciones asignadas y/o compromisos 
adquiridos, entre otros. 
d. La inexistencia o insuficiencia de recursos físicos o financieros limita el cumplimiento de 
tareas de las entidades
e. El personal técnico responsable de las Rutas de Prevención no cuenta con el suficiente 
conocimiento, experiencia, información, autonomía, motivación, habilidades o continuidad en 
las actividades para dar una respuesta afectiva.
f. La gestión de conocimiento, monitoreo, seguimiento y evaluación no producen información 
oportuna y relevante que genere aprendizajes y permita el mejoramiento continuo
g. El uso de nuevas tecnologías es aún insuficiente para alcanzar mejores resultados
15
En los últimos 5 años, ¿Cómo califica el desempeño de las siguientes entidades, del ámbito 
departamental y municipal, en la implementación de las Rutas de Prevención? 
Marcando con 1 muy bajo desempeño y 5 alto desempeño
Lista de entidades
marque con una 
1 2 3 4 5 NS/NR
Gobernaciones
Alcaldías
Personerías Municipales
Defensorías de Familia
Inspecciones de Policía
Comisarías de Familia
Direcciones regionales del ICBF
Defensorías regionales
Procuradurías regionales y provinciales
Direcciones territoriales de la UARIV
Direcciones regionales del SENA
Organizaciones de la sociedad civil con acciones a nivel local
Organizaciones de cooperación internacional con acciones a nivel local
Empresas privadas con acciones a nivel local
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT C-12
16
En general, en los últimos 5 años, ¿Cómo califica el desempeño de las siguientes entidades, del 
ámbito nacional, en la implementación de las Rutas de Prevención? 
Marcando con 1 muy bajo desempeño y 5 alto desempeño
Lista de entidades
marque con una 
1 2 3 4 5 NS/NR
Comisión Intersectorial para la prevención de reclutamiento, utilización y violencia sexual 
contra niños, niñas y adolescentes por parte grupos organizados al margen de la ley -
CIPRUNNA
Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF)
Ministerio para el Postconflicto, Derechos Humanos y Seguridad
Consejería Presidencial para los Derechos Humanos
Ministerio de Interior
Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
Ministerio de Defensa Nacional
Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social
Ministerio del Trabajo
Ministerio de Educación Nacional
Ministerio de las Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones
Ministerio de Cultura
Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP)
Departamento para la Prosperidad Social (DPS)
Unidad para la Atención Integral y Reparación a las Víctimas (UARIV)
Unidad Administrativa Especial para la Consolidación Territorial
Agencia Nacional para la Superación de la Pobreza Extrema (ANSPE)
Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración (ACR)
Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (SENA)
Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz
Dirección Nacional de Acción Integral contra las Minas Antipersonal
Dirección del Sistema Nacional de Juventud “Colombia Joven”
Departamento Administrativo del Deporte, la Recreación, la Actividad Física y el 
Aprovechamiento del Tiempo Libre (COLDEPORTES)
Consejería Presidencial para la Equidad de la Mujer
Defensoría del Pueblo
Procuraduría General de la Nación
17
En los últimos 5 años, ¿Qué tanto cree usted que 
influyó la cooperación internacional en el 
fortalecimiento de las Rutas de Prevención?
1 Tuvo mucha influencia, fue decisiva
2 Tuvo influencia, pero no fue decisiva
3 Tuvo algo de influencia
4 No tuvo ninguna influencia
5 NS/NR
18
¿Conoce usted la segunda fase del programa de USAID/OIM de apoyo a niños, 
niñas y adolescentes (NNA) desvinculados y para prevenir el reclutamiento por 
parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley (CHS-2F), implementada entre los 
años 2012 y 2015?
Si 1 
No 2 
19
Entre 2012 y 2015, ¿Qué tanto cree usted que 
influyó el programa de USAID/OIM (CHS-2F) en el 
fortalecimiento de las Rutas de Prevención?
1 Tuvo mucha influencia, fue decisiva
2 Tuvo influencia, pero no fue decisiva
3 Tuvo algo de influencia
4 No tuvo ninguna influencia
5 NS/NR
Si en la pregunta anterior respondió 1 (“Tuvo mucha influencia, fue decisiva”), enumere los tres 
principales temas en que el programa de USAID/OIM (CHS-2F) tuvo una influencia decisiva:
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT C-13
20
1. _________________________________________________________________________
2. _________________________________________________________________________
3. _________________________________________________________________________
Sección I. Atención
21
¿Conoce usted la Ruta de Atención de niños, niñas y adolescentes 
desvinculados por parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley, cuyo eje 
principal es el Programa de Atención Especializada desarrollado por el ICBF?
Si 1 No 2 
22
La entidad en que usted trabaja, ¿En cuáles de las modalidades del Programa de Atención 
Especializada participa o tiene responsabilidades?
a. Modalidad institucional 
 (Hogares Transitorios, Centros de Atención Especializada (CAE) y Casa Juveniles) Si 1 No 2 
b. Modalidad socio-familiar
(Hogares Gestores y Hogares Tutores) Si 1 No 2 
c. Modalidad comunitaria Si 1 No 2 
23
En su opinión, en los últimos 5 años, la Ruta de 
Atención ha logrado los resultados esperados 
de manera:
1 Sobresaliente
2 Satisfactoria
3 Moderada
4 Insuficiente
5 No ha logrado los resultados esperados
24
Ordene las tres modalidades de atención de 
acuerdo con su efectividad para lograr los 
resultados esperados, señalando con 3 la 
modalidad con mejores resultados y con 1 la 
modalidad con menores resultados
|___| Modalidad institucional
|___| Modalidad socio-familiar
|___| Modalidad comunitaria
NS/NR
25
En los últimos 5 años, ¿En qué medida los siguientes tipos de problemas, para los cuales a 
continuación se dan algunos ejemplos, han limitado la respuesta efectiva de las entidades que 
participan en la Ruta de Atención? 
Marcando con 1 cuando el problema ha tenido ninguna o poca incidencia y 5 la mayor incidencia 
Tipos de problemas
marque con un 
1 2 3 4 5
NS/
NR
a. Las normas (leyes, decretos, etc) son insuficientes o generan trabas que impiden ciertas 
acciones, o producen vacíos jurídicos que no facultan expresamente a las entidades 
involucradas a realizarlas, o no son claras en cuanto a las responsabilidades de cada 
entidad, entre otros. 
b. La relación interinstitucional entre el conjunto de entidades se caracteriza por 
competencias superpuestas (duplicidad de funciones o competencias), falta de espacios o 
mecanismos de coordinación efectivos para la toma de decisiones, deficiente comunicación 
interinstitucional, baja colaboración interinstitucional, y/o suministro irregular de información y 
servicios entre entidades, entre otros. 
c. Entidades con problemas de organización interna, caracterizadas por una estructura 
organizacional inadecuada, fallas en la asignación de funciones, falta de formalización de la 
unidad responsable y sin cumplimiento de las funciones asignadas y/o compromisos 
adquiridos, entre otros. 
d. La inexistencia o insuficiencia de recursos físicos o financieros limita el cumplimiento de 
tareas de las entidades.
e. El personal técnico responsable de las Rutas de Prevención no cuenta con el suficiente 
conocimiento, experiencia, información, autonomía, motivación, habilidades o continuidad en 
las actividades para dar una respuesta afectiva.
f. La gestión de conocimiento, monitoreo, seguimiento y evaluación no producen información 
oportuna y relevante que genere aprendizajes y permita el mejoramiento continuo.
g. El uso de nuevas tecnologías es aún insuficiente para alcanzar mejores resultados.
h. Entidades sin estrategias o con estrategias insuficientes o metodologías inadecuadas 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT C-14
para promover o brindar atención con enfoque diferencial (ciclo vital, género, grupo étnico y 
condición de discapacidad)
26
En los últimos 5 años, ¿Cómo han cambiado los problemas que afectan la respuesta efectiva de las 
entidades que participan en la Ruta de Atención? 
Marcando 1= Empeorado; 2=Permanece igual; 3=Mejorado.
Tipos de problemas marque con una 
1 2 3 NS/ NR
a. Las normas (leyes, decretos, etc) son insuficientes o generan trabas que impiden ciertas 
acciones, o producen vacíos jurídicos que no facultan expresamente a las entidades 
involucradas a realizarlas, o no son claras en cuanto a las responsabilidades de cada 
entidad, entre otros. 
b. La relación interinstitucional entre el conjunto de entidades se caracteriza por 
competencias superpuestas (duplicidad de funciones o competencias), falta de espacios o 
mecanismos de coordinación efectivos para la toma de decisiones, deficiente comunicación 
interinstitucional, baja colaboración interinstitucional y/o suministro irregular de información y 
servicios entre entidades, entre otros. 
c. Entidades con problemas de organización interna, caracterizadas por una estructura 
organizacional – inadecuada, fallas en la asignación de funciones, falta de formalización de 
la unidad responsable y sin cumplimiento de las funciones asignadas y/o compromisos 
adquiridos, entre otros. 
d. La inexistencia o insuficiencia de recursos físicos o financieros limita el cumplimiento de 
tareas de las entidades
e. El personal técnico responsable de las Rutas de Prevención no cuenta con el suficiente 
conocimiento, experiencia, información, autonomía, motivación, habilidades o continuidad en 
las actividades para dar una respuesta afectiva.
f. La gestión de conocimiento, monitoreo, seguimiento y evaluación no producen información 
oportuna y relevante que genere aprendizajes y permita el mejoramiento continuo
g. El uso de nuevas tecnologías es aún insuficiente para alcanzar mejores resultados
h. Entidades sin estrategias o con estrategias insuficientes o metodologías inadecuadas 
para promover o brindar atención con enfoque diferencial (ciclo vital, género, grupo étnico y 
condición de discapacidad).
27
En los últimos 5 años, ¿Cómo califica el desempeño de las siguientes entidades, del ámbito 
departamental y municipal, en la implementación de la Ruta de Atención? 
Marcando con 1 muy bajo desempeño y 5 alto desempeño
Lista de entidades
marque con una 
1 2 3 4 5 NS/NR
Gobernaciones
Alcaldías
Personerías Municipales
Defensorías de Familia
Inspecciones de Policía
Comisarías de Familia
Direcciones regionales del ICBF
Defensorías regionales
Procuradurías regionales y provinciales
Direcciones territoriales de la UARIV
Direcciones regionales del SENA
Organizaciones de la sociedad civil con acciones a nivel local
Organizaciones de cooperación internacional con acciones a nivel local
Empresas privadas con acciones a nivel local
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT C-15
28
En general, en los últimos 5 años, ¿Cómo califica el desempeño de las siguientes entidades, del 
ámbito nacional, en la implementación de la Ruta de Atención? 
Marcando con 1 muy bajo desempeño y 5 alto desempeño
Lista de entidades
marque con una 
1 2 3 4 5 NS/NR
Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar (ICBF)
Departamento Administrativo de la Presidencia de la República – DAPRE
Vicepresidencia de la República
Ministerio para el Postconflicto, Derechos Humanos y Seguridad
Ministerio de Interior
Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho
Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
Ministerio de Defensa Nacional
Ministerio de Salud y Protección Social
Ministerio del Trabajo
Ministerio de Educación Nacional
Ministerio de las Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones
Ministerio de Cultura
Ministerio de Ambiente y Desarrollo Sostenible 
Ministerio de Vivienda, Ciudad y Territorio
Ministerio de Comercio, Industria y Turismo
Ministerio de Transporte
Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP)
Departamento para la Prosperidad Social (DPS)
Unidad para la Atención Integral y Reparación a las Víctimas (UARIV)
Agencia Nacional para la Superación de la Pobreza Extrema (ANSPE)
Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración (ACR)
Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (SENA)
Departamento Administrativo del Deporte, la Recreación, la Actividad Física y el 
Aprovechamiento del Tiempo Libre (COLDEPORTES)
Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil
Consejo Superior de la Judicatura
Fiscalía General de la Nación
Defensoría del Pueblo
Procuraduría General de la Nación
29
En los últimos 5 años, ¿Qué tanto cree usted que 
influyó la cooperación internacional en el 
fortalecimiento de la Ruta de Atención?
1 Tuvo mucha influencia, fue decisiva
2 Tuvo influencia, pero no fue decisiva
3 Tuvo algo de influencia
4 No tuvo ninguna influencia
5 NS/NR
30
¿Conoce usted la segunda fase del programa de USAID/OIM de apoyo a niños, 
niñas y adolescentes (NNA) desvinculados y para prevenir el reclutamiento por 
parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley (CHS-2F), implementada entre los 
años 2012 y 2015?
Si 1 
No 2 
31
Entre 2012 y 2015, ¿Qué tanto cree usted que 
influyó el programa de USAID/OIM (CHS-2F) en el 
fortalecimiento de la Ruta de Atención?
1 Tuvo mucha influencia, fue decisiva
2 Tuvo influencia, pero no fue decisiva
3 Tuvo algo de influencia
4 No tuvo ninguna influencia
5 NS/NR
Si en la pregunta anterior respondió 1 (“Tuvo mucha influencia, fue decisiva”), enumere los tres 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT C-16
32
principales temas en que el programa de USAID/OIM (CHS-2F) tuvo una influencia decisiva:
1. _________________________________________________________________________
2. _________________________________________________________________________
3. _________________________________________________________________________
DRAFT SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
 
Cliente: 
USAID
Evaluación estratégica del desempeño de la segunda fase 
del programa de apoyo a niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA) 
desvinculados y prevención del reclutamiento por parte de 
grupos armados al margen de la ley (CHS-2F)
Democracy International, una empresa de consultoría contratada por USAID para realizar una evaluación independiente de la 
segunda fase del programa de apoyo a niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA) desvinculados y prevención del reclutamiento por 
parte de grupos armados al margen de la ley (CHS-2F), ejecutado entre 2012 y 2015, el cual es coordinados desde la Oficina de 
Poblaciones Vulnerables de USAID e implementado por la Organización Internacional para las Migraciones (OIM). USAID nos 
ha solicitado aplicarle esta encuesta con el propósito de enriquecer las conclusiones y recomendaciones de esta evaluación. 
Es muy importante que usted sepa que esta encuesta NO es ni una auditoría ni una evaluación de desempeño de su entidad. 
Por lo anterior, sus opiniones sinceras contribuirán a los resultados y recomendaciones. Su identidad, así como las respuestas 
suministradas serán de carácter confidencial y los datos se utilizarán únicamente para fines estadísticos. Le agradecemos que
tome 15 minutos de su tiempo para responder unas preguntas sobre la contribución del programa de USAID/OIM a la política de 
prevención del reclutamiento y utilización de NNA. 
1 Fecha dd/mm/año
2 Nombre
3 Sexo 1 Hombre 2 Mujer
4 Cargo
5 Entidad
6 Municipio
7 Departamento
8
Conoce usted del apoyo que la Organización Internacional de 
Migraciones (OIM), con recursos de USAID, ha brindado al 
Gobierno de Colombia para fortalecer la política de prevención 
del reclutamiento y utilización de niños, niñas y adolescentes 
(NNA) por parte de grupos armados organizados al margen de 
la ley. 
Si 1 
No 2  Fin de la encuesta
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT C-17
9
En los últimos 5 años, ¿su entidad o entidades con las que 
trabajan en coordinación han recibido apoyo de OIM, con 
recursos de USAID, para el fortalecimiento de las acciones de 
prevención del reclutamiento y utilización NNA?
Si 1 
No 2  Fin de la encuesta
10
¿Con cuáles entidades coordina su entidad las 
acciones de prevención del reclutamiento y 
utilización de NNA? Enumere las 5 principales 
entidades. 
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
11
En los últimos 5 años, ¿Qué tanto ha influido el 
apoyo de OIM, con recursos de USAID, en el 
fortalecimiento de la Política de prevención del 
reclutamiento y utilización de NNA?
1 Tuvo mucha influencia, fue decisiva
2 Tuvo influencia, pero no fue decisiva
3 Tuvo algo de influencia
4 No tuvo ninguna influencia
5 NS/NR
12
En los últimos 5 años, ¿Cuáles son las tres principales FORTALEZAS del apoyo que OIM, con 
recursos de USAID, ha brindado a su entidad o a las entidades con las que trabaja para la 
implementación de la Política de prevención del reclutamiento y utilización de NNA?
4. _________________________________________________________________________
5. _________________________________________________________________________
6. _________________________________________________________________________
13
En los últimos 5 años, ¿Cuáles son las tres principales DEBILIDADES del apoyo que OIM, con 
recursos de USAID, ha brindado a su entidad o a las entidades con las que trabaja para la 
implementación de la Política de prevención del reclutamiento y utilización de NNA?
1. _________________________________________________________________________
2. _________________________________________________________________________
3. _________________________________________________________________________
14
En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es la menor contribución y 10 la mayor contribución, ¿Qué tanto 
ha contribuido el apoyo de OIM, con recursos de USAID, al fortalecimiento de la capacidad 
institucional de su entidad (o de las entidades con que trabaja en coordinación) para cumplir con los 
objetivos de la Política de prevención del reclutamiento y utilización de NNA?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
En una escala de 1 a 10, donde 1 es la menor contribución y 10 la mayor contribución, ¿Qué tanto 
ha contribuido el apoyo de OIM, con recursos de USAID, al fortalecimiento de la gestión de
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT C-18
15
conocimiento de su entidad (o de las entidades con que trabaja en coordinación) para cumplir con 
los objetivos de la Política de prevención del reclutamiento y utilización de NNA?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
16
¿Cómo se debe reorientar la Política de prevención del reclutamiento y utilización de NNA en el 
contexto de implementación de los acuerdos de paz con las FARC?
1. _________________________________________________________________________
2. _________________________________________________________________________
3. _________________________________________________________________________
17
¿Cuáles son las tres principales áreas estratégicas en las cuales la comunidad internacional, 
especialmente USAID, debería continuar apoyando al Gobierno de Colombia para prevenir el 
reclutamiento y utilización de NNA en los próximos 5 años?
1. _________________________________________________________________________
2. _________________________________________________________________________
3. _________________________________________________________________________
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINALL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT D-1 
ANNEX D: TABLE OF FINDINGS, 
CONCLUSIONS, AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Research Question Findings Conclusions Recommendations 
To what extent has 
the CHS-2F 
supported the GOC 
policies and 
programs to 
reintegrate child 
soldiers?
CHS-2F has supported the 
systemization of knowledge of 
the ICBF to develop policies 
and methodologies at the 
national level and help transfer 
and adapt them to the local 
(territorial) level. The CHS 
program worked to 
strengthen two other models: 
institutional protection models 
with residential program run 
by operators in Medellin, Cali 
and Rio Sucio, Caldas, and the 
foster care model that was 
originally developed in 6 
regional capitals 
(Pasto, Villavicencio, 
Bogotá, Medellin, Manizales, 
Barranquilla) where families 
and specifically women (foster 
mothers/madres tutoras) 
were specially trained to care 
for disengaged CH&A. It also 
worked to provide ICBF 
assistance, particularly 
psychosocial, life-preparation 
counseling and other support 
services to children who were 
able to their families.
The program worked to 
include disengaged CH&A in 
the development and 
implementation of the Victims 
and Land Restitution Law 
(June 2011.)
During the final extension of 
CHF-F2 and in response to 
the peace negotiations, the 
program supported ICBF to 
develop contingency plans in 
ICBF’s contingency plans 
for managing a large-scale 
disengagement of FARC 
CH&A were ultimately not 
activated. Only 87 CH&A 
from the FARC ranks were 
released and the 
Presidential Counsellor for 
Human Rights, rather than 
ICBF, is managing the 
immediate reception of 
the FARC CH&A. 
The family reunification 
and family ties program by 
ICBF is lauded by ICBF 
officials as a successful and 
necessary model to help 
disengaged CH&A 
reconnect and repair 
relations with their families. 
ICBF is still using a 
protocol developed with 
IOM support to organize 
the family reunification 
activity. Unfortunately, the 
family meetings are now 
sporadic due to lack of 
ICBF funds for the activity.
The residential and foster 
care models have 
developed successful 
programs that with some 
exceptions have 
successfully met the goals 
of disengaging CH&A from 
the armed conflict, 
providing them with 
psychological services, 
Support the implementation 
of the updated GOC policy 
guidance (Conpes) on the 
prevention of recruitment 
and use, soon to be released 
by the Colombian 
Directorate of National 
Planning.
Engage in a policy dialogue 
with officials from 
Colombia’s state and 
government institutions and 
the presidential candidates 
on youth issues.
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINALL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT D-2 
the event of large-scale 
disengagement of CH&A from 
the FARC ranks.
providing access to 
primary and secondary 
education, and transferring 
them into skills and 
technical development 
programs through SENA 
and ACR (now ARN) 
when they turn 18 years 
old.
What are the 
strengths, 
weaknesses, and 
lessons learned of 
the institutional 
reintegration and 
alternative models 
for each one of the 
models supported by 
CHS-F2?
On the outset, the program 
anticipated support for 
different models developed 
around ethnicity as well as 
rural and urban environments. 
It also planned to develop a 
differentiated approach to 
gender. However, we found 
little evidence that these 
approaches or concerns were 
integrated into the ICBF 
model.
The most significant 
advancement that we saw was 
based on a pilot program that 
IOM developed in Toribio, 
Cauca. There IOM worked 
with a Nasa indigenous 
community on an eco-tourism 
project designed to 
reincorporate young people 
who had joined one of the 
illegal armed groups as well as 
to prevent recruitment and 
provide skills and alternative 
work options for the young 
and for the community as a 
whole.
The team found little evidence 
that gender-based approaches 
had been incorporated into 
the CHS program in an 
integral or crosscutting 
fashion.
Regarding differential 
treatment for ethnic groups, 
ICBF pointed to a residential 
program for disengaged 
youths, the Ingruma 
Integration Center, in Rio 
Data is incomplete for 
children returning to their 
own families. Returning 
children and adolescents 
to their families is 
represented as humane, 
however, this option is 
also where the state is 
least able to provide 
assistance, security, 
education, or psychosocial 
accompaniment. There 
needs to be a better 
system of tracing, 
monitoring, and working 
with the children.
The foster care and 
residence programs have 
been in general quite 
successful. However, even 
there, local municipalities 
where the foster care is 
located are often reluctant 
to integrate these children 
into the regular school 
system.
Access to psychosocial 
assistance professionals is 
problematic to address the
psychological and physical 
needs of the disengaged 
CH&A. Health resources 
are needed as some of the 
girls are pregnant when 
they enter the program, 
and both boys and girls 
often have some form of 
venereal disease or AIDS.
. 
The family reunion part of 
Establish a system to 
accompany disengaged 
CH&A after they leave the 
ICBF program and support 
them in job training and 
placement (similar to the 
successful pilot project, 
CRO-J, developed by IOM in 
2008).
Orient reintegration 
programs towards education 
and job training tied to the 
labor market. (Note: 
respondents to DI’s targeted 
survey offered this specific 
recommendation.)
The program needs vastly 
expanded resources and 
trained professionals to 
address the physical and 
psychosocial needs of all 
former CH&A soldiers.
A gender component must 
be built into the programs 
directly. Women and girls 
have experienced the conflict 
and the disengagement 
process differently than men 
and boys have in ways that 
are still not well understood. 
Sexual abuse, though not 
limited to girls, has been 
more common among girls. 
Special psychosocial 
attention needs to be placed 
on the experience of girls in 
war and all aspects of 
programming needs to 
reflect this.
The program needs vastly 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINALL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT D-3 
Sucio, Cauca. The residential 
center provides educational 
and vocational training as well 
as psychosocial counseling. It 
operates in much the same 
manner as the residential 
facilities in Medellin and Cali 
run by the Silesian Don Bosco 
Foundation, which, based on 
our visit to Don Bosco in Cali, 
provide a very nurturing and 
pedagogical environment and 
has had success with the 
disengaged CH&A.
the program should 
continue as reunions were 
highly successful and the 
key to helping the 
disengaged CH&A 
reconnect and feel part of 
a family and community.
More programs needed 
that work with indigenous 
and Afro-descendent 
communities, modeled 
where appropriate and 
with adjustments for local 
customs and culture. ICBF 
and OIM could take a lead 
in expanding the Toribio 
pilot.
expanded resources and 
trained professionals to 
address the physical and 
psychosocial needs of all 
former CH&A soldiers.
What have been the 
key challenges and 
bottlenecks in the 
GOC child soldiers’ 
reintegration process 
supported by CHS￾F2? What are the key 
challenges and 
bottlenecks when 
disaggregating the 
information and 
analysis by gender 
and ethnic groups?
An unknown percentage of 
child soldiers return to their 
own or other communities 
without going through the 
ICBF program.
The degree of psychosocial 
trauma among disengaged 
child combatants has thus far 
overwhelmed the ability of 
ICBF to provide trained 
counselors.
The ethnic, gender and 
community dimensions of the 
program were all under￾developed when compared 
with their potential. 
Indigenous and Afro￾Colombian CH&A 
combatants are 
overrepresented among the
ranks of child soldiers as 
compared with their general 
numbers in the population.
Where possible, families need 
to be more closely involved. 
The programs of family visits 
were highly successful were 
constrained by limited 
resources.
We simply do not know what 
happens to most of the 
Many of the more 
comprehensive programs 
envisioned in the 2012-
2015 CHS were not fully 
developed, including rural 
and urban models, and a 
differentiated approach 
based on ethnicity as well 
as a cross-cutting gender 
dimension to all 
programming.
The 2016-2018 program 
continues to work in these 
areas, but the context is 
constantly changing. 
CH&A continue to be 
recruited into illegal armed 
groups, even after the 
disarming of the FARC. 
The ELN, FARC dissidents 
and BACRIM continue to 
recruit and there will still 
be a need to develop 
programs to restore the 
rights of children who have 
been victims of illegal
recruitment or utilization.
There is no political 
interest to establish a 
monitoring mechanism for 
the CH&A who went 
through the ICBF program, 
Expand and consolidate the 
differential approaches 
initiated by CHS-F2. ICBF’s 
reintegration strategies 
would have benefited from a 
more focused approach￾rural or urban, indigenous 
and Afro-descendent, 
depending on the 
background of the CH&A. 
The reintegration approach 
used with the Nasa/Toribio 
community is worth 
replicating.
Directly build a gender 
component into the 
programs. Women and girls 
have experienced the conflict 
and the disengagement 
process differently than men 
and boys, and in ways that 
are still not understood well 
enough. Sexual abuse, 
though not limited to girls, 
has been more common 
among girls. Special 
psychosocial attention needs 
to be placed on the 
experience of girls in war 
and all aspects of 
programming needs to 
reflect this.
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINALL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT D-4 
CH&A who have gone 
through the program. ICBF 
does not keep track of the 
participants once they turn 18 
years old. Most become 
eligible for reparations 
according to the Victim's law 
and are turned over to ARN, 
but ARN's records are 
incomplete.
There has not been an 
adequate impact study of the 
program in general or a full 
survey of their life trajectories 
upon completing the 
programs.
although IOM piloted a 
successful tracking 
program in 2008. There is 
talk of establishing a 
monitoring mechanism for 
the 86 CH&A who have 
been released by the 
FARC under the terms of 
the peace process.
There is little coordination 
between the three GOC 
entities that interact with 
the disengaged CH&A: 
ICBF, Victims Office, and 
ACR. A former disengaged 
youth could potentially 
interact and receive 
benefits from all three 
entities at different times is 
his/her life. The success of 
the educational and 
training opportunities to 
equip disengaged CH&A 
with employable skills is 
also not tracked.
Support programs to address 
family violence and gender￾based violence. 
What results has 
CHS-2F achieved in 
the four key 
intervention areas 
(institutional 
strengthening, 
assistance to 
reintegration of child 
soldiers, prevention 
of recruitment and 
knowledge 
management)?
Assistance to reintegration of 
child soldiers USAID, IOM, 
GOC and CHS-2F have 
collaborated to create greater 
awareness of child soldiers as 
a class of victims; facilitated 
and strengthened the 
disengagement of CH&A 
combatants and restitution of 
rights; advanced policy 
regarding disengaged CH&A; 
assisted 990 of former child 
soldiers to have an 
opportunity to live fuller and 
more productive lives; and, 
supported programs whose 
funding is being transferred to 
GOC.
Institutional Strengthening and 
Knowledge Management
USAID and IOM worked with 
ICBF to create and support 
several "Observatories:" the 
ICBF Child Welfare 
Observatory and the 
The team found CHS-F2’s 
prevention work with 
vulnerable youth to be 
thoughtfully, creatively and 
intelligently conceived and 
implemented. The 
municipal and 
departmental authorities 
we visited with in Cali, 
Villavicencio and 
Cartagena had all designed 
programs and public 
policies for the prevention 
of youth recruitment. 
Collectively they covered 
thousands of vulnerable 
youths. In general, during 
the 2012-2105 period, the 
programs in rural areas 
were designed for the 
prevention of recruitment 
into the illegal armed 
groups, FARC, ELN and 
Bacrims.
In urban areas, the 
Adapt current USAID-IOM 
“Reintegration Program” to 
work in the high-priority 
zones identified by the High 
Counselor for Post-Conflict.” 
Develop new USAID 
programs that focus on 
strengthening the community 
and family social structures 
that have always been 
envisioned as part of a 
successful child recruitment 
prevention program but have 
never been adequately 
funded.
Support the implementation 
of the updated GOC 
Conpes on the prevention of 
recruitment and use by 
criminal groups, soon to be 
released by the Directorate 
of National Planning 
Strengthen implementation 
of prevention programs at 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINALL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT D-5 
Observatory of CIPRUNA’s 
Technical Secretariat; these 
observatories had regional and 
ethnic focus. However, 
authorities are not using the 
data from the Observatories. 
Prevention of Recruitment
The CHS-2F program 
collaborated with the 
Technical Secretariat of the 
new Inter-Sectorial
Commission for the 
Recruitment Prevention 
(CIPRUNA) and IOM on 
implementing prevention 
plans and working youth 
integration and social inclusion 
strategies in Afro-Colombian 
and indigenous communities.
concern from 2012 -2015, 
and continuing into the 
present has been the 
recruitment into gangs, 
many of which gangs have 
ties to organized crime or 
one of the illegal armed 
groups. All the areas we 
visited noted a steady 
upturn in drug 
consumption throughout 
the entire period but 
accelerating post -2015. 
All of these activities are 
underfunded and strain for 
high- level attention from 
governors, mayors and 
senior-level national 
officials. In most cases
highly dedicated public 
servants, professionals and 
dedicated CSO’s and 
religious groups who make 
use of the limited 
resources they have as 
best they can and deeply
appreciate OIM assistance, 
run them.
However aside from 
anecdotal evidence from 
the state officials, of youth 
and partners, there is no 
data to prove how many 
youth were saved from 
joining a criminal group by 
these programs. However, 
the effectiveness and wide 
use of the MVRO was 
cited several times by 
CSO partners, municipal 
and ICBF staff in Cali.
the territorial (local) level, 
Continue support for the 
social inclusion initiatives and 
differential approaches from 
CHS-F2 and incorporate 
strategies.
Support programs to address 
family violence and gender￾based violence, which are a 
key driver for recruitment 
and use into armed groups
Extend USAID’s current 
“Reintegration Program” 
with IOM to receptor 
communities where FARC 
CH&A are reportedly 
spontaneously re-locating
Expand programs for the 
productive use of CH&A’s 
free time, especially those 
programs involving sports, 
arts and cultural and in line 
with local customs and 
cultures. (Note respondents 
to DI’s targeted stakeholder 
survey offered this specific 
recommendation.)
Strengthen and support 
educational opportunities 
tied to labor market 
insertion, as a tool for 
recruitment prevention and 
social integration for CH&A. 
(Note this specific 
recommendation was 
offered by respondents to 
DI’s targeted stakeholder 
survey.)
Strengthen the 
implementation of 
prevention programs at the 
territorial (local) level, in 
close collaboration with local 
elected and civil society 
entities, and by focusing on 
vulnerable youth and the 
family and community 
structures that are key to 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINALL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT D-6 
prevention.
Which are the 
strategic areas in 
which the 
international 
community, especially 
USAID, can continue 
to support the GOC 
to achieve 
prevention of 
recruitment and use 
of children by illegal 
armed groups?
Structural issues of poverty, 
high rates of family and sexual 
violence, lack of state 
presence and social services, 
and presence of criminal 
groups and illicit activities that 
make youth in Colombia 
vulnerable to recruitment 
remains largely unchanged.
Factors that may led to an 
increase in recruitment and 
use of at-risk-youth by 
criminal groups include: the 
lack of effective GOC 
presence in the areas formally 
controlled by the FARC and 
the movement of dissident 
FARC and BACRIMs into 
these areas, a dramatic 
increase in coca production 
over the last several years, the 
ongoing use of migrant coca￾leaf pickers, including CH&A, 
and increased recruitment and 
use of CH&A for criminal 
work in urban areas where 
drugs, addiction, and poverty 
are ever-present.
There is an unparalleled 
opportunity to strengthen 
the CH&A recruitment 
prevention program, 
adapted to the needs of 
the post-Accord 
environment.
There is great concern 
with respect to the 
vacuums of power left by 
the FARC in the regions 
that they once dominated. 
This includes the 
expansion of other illegal 
armed groups into these 
zones. This issue is larger 
than one of just child 
recruitment and will 
require the Colombian 
government to address 
these power vacuums 
through the increase of 
state presence with 
investment in security, 
administration, education, 
welfare, health and 
infrastructure.
Adapt current USAID-IOM 
“Reintegration Program” to 
work in the high-priority 
zones identified by the High 
Counselor for Post-Conflict.” 
Develop new USAID 
programs that focus on 
strengthening the community 
and family social structures 
that have always been 
envisioned as part of a 
successful child recruitment 
prevention program but have 
never been adequately 
funded.
Support the implementation 
of the updated GOC 
Conpes on the prevention of 
recruitment and use by 
criminal groups, soon to be 
released by the Directorate 
of National Planning 
Strengthen implementation 
of prevention programs at 
the territorial (local) level, 
Continue support for the 
social inclusion initiatives and 
differential approaches from 
CHS-F2 and incorporate 
strategies.
Support programs to address 
family violence and gender￾based violence, which are a 
key driver for recruitment 
and use into armed groups
Extend USAID’s current 
“Reintegration Program” 
with IOM to receptor 
communities where FARC 
CH&A are reportedly 
spontaneously re-locating
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT E-1 
ANNEX E: LIST OF INFORMANTS
Date Name Title, Organization Location
5/12/2017 Juan Manuel Luna OIM, Coordinador RPR
5/12/2017 Paula Rivero OIM, prevención y gestión de conocimiento
5/12/2017 Sandra Ruiz OIM, Coordinadora adjunta CHS y ahora de RPR
5/15/2017 Catalina Zapata
CIPRUNNA, asesora ST y programa “Camino 
diferencial de vida”
5/15/2017 Francisco Hurtado CIPRUNNA, Coordinador Observatorio 
5/15/2017 Juan Pablo Fayad CIPRUNNA, Coordinador Territorialización
5/16/2017 Adriana Sánchez Sierra ICBF, 2. Dirección de Niñez y Adolescencia
5/16/2017 Catalina Zapata Asesora (Consejera Presidencial de Derechos Humanos)
5/16/2017 Julio and Claudia Bueno ICBF, Observatorio del Bienestar de la Niñez
5/16/2017 Lisa Gómez ICBF, Dirección de Protección
5/16/2017 Paula Gavirina Consejera Presidencial de Derechos Humanos
5/16/2017 Viviana Pulido
ICBF, abogada de la Subdirección de Restablecimiento 
de Derechos
5/17/2017 Adriana Marín
Encargada de prevención y atención a NNA en riesgo o 
víctimas del reclutamiento, Servicio Nacional de 
Aprendizaje -Sena Bogotá
5/17/2017 Edgar Zambrano
Coordinador Grupo de Relaciones Internacionales y 
Cooperación, Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje -Sena Bogotá
5/17/2017 Gerson Arias
Asesor, Oficina del Alto Comisionado para la Paz 
(OACP) Bogotá
5/18/2017 Camilo Rojas
Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración, cooperación 
internacional
5/18/2017 Daniel Castellanos Cifras & Conceptos, Subgerente Bogotá
5/18/2017 Daniel Moreno Asesor, Coordinadora programa NNA
5/18/2017 María del Pilar Ruiz
Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración, 
Reintegración comunitaria y prevención de 
reclutamiento
5/18/2017 María Teresa Pinzón Coordinadora programa NNA
5/18/2017 Miguel Suárez
Agencia Colombiana para la Reintegración, alianzas 
estratégicas
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT F-2 
5/18/2017 Sandra Pabón USAID, Colombia
5/18/2017 Viviana Arias Cifras & Conceptos, Gerente de proyectos Bogotá
5/21/2017 Manuela Ramírez Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz Secretaría Ejecutiva
5/22/2017 Alexandra Valencia Magistrada de Tribunal Especial de Justicia y Paz
5/22/2017 Katherine Herrera
 Unidad para la Atención y la Reparación Integral a las 
Víctimas (UARIV), Coordinadora Niños, niñas y 
adolescente
5/24/2017 Grupo Focal Fundación Paz y Bien Cali
5/24/2017 Grupo Focal Don Bosco Cali
5/24/2017 Mirta Patricia Trillos
ICBF, Defensoría de Desvinculados, Defensora de 
Familia Cali
5/24/2017 Rocío Gutiérrez Alcaldía de Cali, Secretaría de Paz y Cultura Ciudadana Cali
5/25/2017 Carmelina Mamá de María Teresa, artesana Santander de Quilichao
5/25/2017 Florentino
Desmovilizado, Vicepresidente Organización de 
Turismo y tiene posada turística Santander de Quilichao
5/25/2017 Gabriel Pavi exgobernador Santander de Quilichao
5/25/2017 Jeremías
joven desvinculado, participa en el proyecto de 
Ecoturismo Santander de Quilichao
5/25/2017 Luis Yimer Pavi docente IE El Sesteadero Santander de Quilichao
5/25/2017 María Teresa
joven desvinculada y desmovilizada [doble 
reculatamiento], líder organización de mujeres Santander de Quilichao
5/26/2017 Catalina Benjumea Tecnocentro de Potrero Grande Cali
5/26/2017 David Santos CIPRUNNA, Agente Local Cali
5/26/2017 Fabio Cardozo Secretaría de Paz y Reconciliación, Secretario Cali
5/26/2017 Jaime Quevedo Director, Tecnocentro de Potrero Grande Cali
5/26/2017 Neysa Luz Silvia Tecnocentro de Potrero Grande Cali
5/26/2017
Rector – [no anoté el nombre 
del rector] Ciudadela Educativa Isaías Duarte Cancino Cali
5/30/2017 Luz Mila Cardona Defensoría del Pueblo – Primera Infancia Bogotá
5/31/2017 Ana Carmenza Molano ICBF, Dirección de Protección
6/1/2017 Diana Moreno Ministerio de Educación Nacional
6/1/2017 Luz Aidé Pachón Ministerio de Educación Nacional
6/2/2017 David Rincón Pandi Bogotá
6/2/2017 Rocio Rubio Experta en NNA víctimas del conflicto Bogotá
6/2/2017 Vanesa Acevedo Pandi Bogotá
6/2/2017 Ximena Norato Palomeque Directora, Pandi Bogotá
6/7/2017 Danela Sogamoso Defensora de Familia, Defensoría del Pueblo Villavicencio
6/7/2017 Irma Bejarano
Gerente de DDHH, Secretaría de Víctimas, Derechos 
Humanos y Paz, Gobernación del Meta Villavicencio
6/8/2017 Erika Andrea Duque Giraldo Madre sustituta ( ONG Crecer en Familia) Villavicencio
6/8/2017 John Alexander Granada
Coordinador modalidad Hogar Tutor – ONG Crecer 
en Familia Villavicencio
6/8/2017 Luis Bastidas
Profesional territorial
Gerente de Víctimas, Secretaría de Víctimas, Derechos 
Humanos y Paz, Gobernación del Meta Villavicencio
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT G-1 
ANNEX F: MONITORING DATA 
ANALYSIS
1. Reintegration 
The CHS-F2 reintegration component is measured through five monitor indicators listed below on Table 
1.
TABLE 5. REINTEGRATION INDICATORS
Code Indicators
FY2012-FY2015
Target 
(a)
Actual 
(b)
Results 
(b/a)
DO2-13 Number of child soldiers identified 880 990 113%
DO2-09 Percentage of disengaged child soldiers receiving tailored 
services 63% 22% 35%
APE-24 
Number of child and youth excombatants assisted by the 
ICBF program of Specialized Assistance participating in 
activities designed to strengthen families.
300 304 101%
APE-36 Number of disengaged CH&A receiving assistance 
through socio-familial and community models 500 609 122%
APE-37 Number of community-based models implemented 3 na na
Source: Monitor 
Analysis 
 CFS-F2 supported the total universe or 990 disengaged child soldiers (CH&A) that were enrolled 
in ICBF’s Specialized Assistance Program during CHS-F2 period.4
 
 In 2015, CHS-F2 provided services to 500 disengaged CH&A through the socio-familiar and 
community models. The PMP states that three community-based models were implemented. 
While the three models were apparently successfully implemented, the qualitative data shows that 
only the NASA indigenous-community model continues to function. It has not been replicated in 
other indigenous or non-indigenous rural contexts in Colombia. 
 CHS-F2 targeted services with a “differential or tailored approach” to 63% of the disengaged 
CH&A, ending the period with only 22% on average. The differential approach includes 
assistance through the socio-familiar/family and community models, and tailored services to girls 
and ethnic groups. These results are consistent with the interviews and focus groups conducted by 
the team that show that a differential gender approach is weak to non-existent in ICBF’s program 
and that differential services are only provided to indigenous communities through the NASA 
community model and Ingruma model, but not to other ethnic groups. 
 
4
 Monitor does not have data for the indicator DO2-13 during FY2012. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT G-2 
 The importance of the family structure to support the reintegration process of CH&A and to 
protect vulnerable children from recruitment and use by illegal groups in general is a key 
conclusion of this evaluation. For this reason, it is important to point out that the CHS-F2 
program developed ICBF’s methodology to organize family reunifications. CHS-F2 also financed 
family reunification meetings between 300 CHS&A and a family member in FY2012. 
Unfortunately, there is no data for other years. Beyond these results, qualitative data indicate that 
ICBF faces budget restrictions and limitations to carry out two family reunification meetings 
scheduled for 2017. 
M&E recommendations
 Disaggregate indicator APE-36 between the number of disengaged CH&A receiving socio￾familiar assistance and the number of disengaged CH&A receiving assistance through the 
community models. These are totally different models that merit individual assessment. 
 The concept of “differential or tailored services” is not clear in the Indicator DO2-09, as was 
inferred in this evaluation from CHS 27th Quarterly (page 8). Also, this indicator has the problem 
that it includes socio-familiar and community models, the same as Indicator APE-36.
 To measure sustainability, indicators should be calculated during the complete program period (in 
this case 2012-2015). For example, it would have been very useful to this analysis to measure the 
Indicator APE-24 during 2013, 2014 and 2015. 
1. Prevention 
CHS-F2’s prevention component is measured through four monitor indicators listed below on Table 6. 
TABLE 6. PREVENTION INDICATORS
Code Indicator
FY2012-FY2015
Target 
(a)
Actual 
(b)
Results
(b/a)
DO2-14 Number of youth at risk that benefit from prevention 
strategies 27,000 106,053 393%
APE-08 Number of residents in target municipalities who receive 
prevention messages 11,600 9,341 81%
APE-07 Number of target municipalities implementing 
prevention plans 98 46 47%
APE-35 Number of prevention plans with implementation 
monitored 70 50 71%
 Source: Monitor 
Analysis 
 The prevention indicator that was measured each year during the CHS-F2 period is “Number of youth 
at risk that benefit from prevention strategies”, a total of 106,553 youth benefited from the program
which was 4 youth over the target. The challenge to analyze this indicator is that prevention strategies 
are very diverse with different intensity, exposure and impact. According to people interviewed at the 
national and local levels, prevention activities are brief and isolated and do not produce a structural 
change in most instances. This is also a lesson learned by the CHS-F2 and in subsequent IOM 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT G-3 
programming in 2016-2017, IOM adopted the strategy of focusing several prevention interventions5
in a single municipality. This was explained to the team by USAID and observed in the municipality 
of Villavicencio. 
 The other indicators address the implementation of prevention plans at the local level. Forty-six plans, 
supported by the CHS-F2 were implemented in 2014-2015 and IOM designed the prevention strategy 
methodology Vulnerability, Risk and Opportunity Mapping (VROM.) It was cited in several 
interviews as a very useful knowledge methodology transferred by the CHS-F2. Local governments, 
such as Cali and Villavicencio, currently use the VROM methodology to design their prevention 
strategies. CIPRUNA’s Technical Secretariat also monitored these plans, with support by CHS-F2. In 
addition, monitoring activities were aimed to facilitate the inter-institutional coordination among 
different institutions at the local level. Fifty plans were monitored during CHF-F2 timeline.
M&E Recommendations
 The indicator “Number of youth at risk that benefit from prevention strategies” could be desegregated 
by the type of prevention activity implemented. Also, as evaluation strategy, a pre and post could be 
applied to measure a direct change generated by prevention activities. 
 The three prevention indicators included in the monitor with data for a single year have the potential 
to be measured during an extended period. These indicators are: i) Percentage of targeted CH&A in 
high risk areas with basic rights guaranteed, ii) Number of boys, girls, adolescents, and youths 
participating in recruitment prevention activities, and iii) Employment Opportunities. 
2. Knowledge Management 
CHS-F2 knowledge management component is measured through five monitor indicators listed below in 
Table 7. 
TABLE 7. KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT INDICATORS
Code Indicators
FY2012-FY2015
Target 
(a)
Actual 
(a)
Results 
(b/a)
APE-09 Number of knowledge management products used by 
public officials 30 35 117%
APE-30 Number of analytical documents on the forced recruitment 
of boys, girls, and adolescents 8 22 275%
APE-12 Number of analyses and fora led by GOC observatories 74 83 112%
APE-38 Number of people who participate in processes to share 
knowledge products on peace pedagogy 150 287 191%
APE-11 Number of models transferred to GOC institutions 6 2 33%
Source: Monitor 
 
5
 These activities are: i) World Coach; ii) Clubes de Lectura/Reading or Book Clubs(Fundación Rafael Pombo); iii) Familia 
Ayara, culture, art, pop y grafiti, y iv) Techno Kits (Fundación Challenger), formación para producción de tecnología/training for 
technology production. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT G-4 
All but one of the knowledge management indicators showed results higher than targets. These results 
confirm that the production of documents, analysis, forums and other knowledge products, supported by 
CHS-F2 was higher than expected. There is no indicator measuring the use and impact of the knowledge 
products. Interviews and focus groups showed that these knowledge products could have been transferred 
and used more effectively so as to have more impact in decision-making. So far, the knowledge product 
on targeted municipalities for prevention activities is the product most frequently used by CIPRUNNA 
observatory partners. 
The only indicator that did not meet its target is “Number of models transferred to GOC institutions”, 
(only 2 models out of 6 were transferred to GOC institutions.). As mentioned, the knowledge 
management transfers most valued by GOC interviewees are family meetings and the 
Vulnerability, Risk and Opportunity Mapping methodology. However, key model as NASA community 
reintegration experience was not transferred during CHS-F2 to other indigenous or rural communities. 
3. Institutional Strengthening 
Institutional strengthening indicators measured by the monitor do not allow DI to carry out an analysis 
about the results of CHS-F2. The indicator that has more information is “Percentage of institutional 
strengthening for ICBFs Assistance Program and CIPRUNA`s operations.” However, this data has an 
enormous variability among years, from 10% in FY2013 to 0% in FY2014 and then 38% in FY2015. On 
the other hand, there are indicators that do not have “actual” data or the data is only reported in one year. 
This is the case of indicators such as: “Index on incorporation of tailored approach in ICBF policy” and 
“Number of activities implemented with a differential approach.” Finally, there are two indicators related 
to the GOC’s financial contribution (“Percentage of public resources financing the ICBFs Specialized 
Assistance Program operation and “Percentage of public resources financing the operations of 
CIPRUNA’s Technical Secretariat”). In both cases the percentage does not exceed 5%. 
In this scenario, the qualitative information gathered in this evaluation are more useful than the quantative 
information to analysis the results of institutional strengthening component of the CHS-F2 program. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT H-1 
ANNEX H: TARGETED BENEFICIARY 
SURVEY
This targeted stakeholder survey is part of the quantitative data collection methods employed to answer 
CHS-F2 evaluation questions, specifically those related to recruitment prevention (EQ4 and EQ5). The 
survey was applied in an online format by sending emails to targeted officials in Government of 
Colombia (GOC) institutions and Colombian non-government organizations with a link routed to the 
survey that was stored on a google platform. 
The survey was sent to 29 institutions and 53 individuals on July 27th, 2017 and the survey site was open 
for 13 days. The response rate was very high for an online survey: 72.4% of institutions responded to 
the survey and 60.4% of the officials, for a total of 32 surveys collected. 
TABLE 8. SURVEY SAMPLE AND RESPONSE RATE
Population Targeted 
sample
Final
sample
Coverage
Institutions 29 21 72.4%
Officials 53 32 60.4%
 Source: Democracy International survey, 2017
78.2% of the officials reached by this survey were from national government institutions that have 
responsibilities related to the prevention of recruitment of CH&A by illegal groups. The other survey 
respondents were from civil society and media-related groups (12.5%), public ministry institutions (6.3%) 
and the international community (3.1%), as is shown on Table 2. An important feature of this survey is 
that officials included in the sample were identified from two sources; first, a list provided by the GOC’s 
Comisión Intersectorial de Prevención del Reclutamiento y Utilización de Niños, Niñas y Adolescentes 
(CIPRUNNA); second, a list of people that DI’s evaluation team interviewed during the qualitative field 
work (KII list). Of the 32 completed surveys, 18 respondents are from the CIPRUNNA list (56.2%) and 
14 respondents are from the key informant interview (KII) list (43.8%). This difference is taken into the 
analysis because people that were closer to the CHS implementation are in the KII list, and most of 
them were identified by USAID and IOM as key informants. By contrast, in the CIPRINNA list, there are 
people that are working currently in recruitment prevention, but were not necessarily involved with 
CHS-F2 in the period 2012-2015. This is because there is high turnover and few career employees in 
GOC institutions. 
TABLE 9. TYPE OF TARGETED INSTITUTIONS
Institution type CIPRUNN
A 
list 
KII 
list 
Total 
National government – ministries 50,0% 7,1% 31,3%
National government - other entities 38,9% 57,1% 46,9%
Public Ministry 11,1% - 6,3%
Grantees from civil society and media-related groups - 28,6% 12,5%
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT H-2 
International community - 7,1% 3,1%
Number of respondents 18 14 32 
 Source: Democracy International survey, 2017
Characteristics of survey respondents are shown on Table 3. The survey was answered mainly by 
women (56.2%), one third are officials with executive duties, 83.3% of respondents have 2 or more 
years in their current jobs, and almost all respondents work in Bogotá (87.5%). 
TABLE 10. RESPONDENTS’ CHARACTERISTICS
Variables CIPRUNNA 
list 
KII 
list 
Total 
% Men 38,9% 50,0% 43,8%
% of executive officers 16,7% 50,0% 31,3%
% officials with employment of 2 
or more years in current position
88,9% 71,4% 81,3%
% of officials working in Bogotá 100,0% 71,4% 87,5%
Number of respondents 18 14 32 
 Source: Democracy International survey, 2017
The first survey question dealt with knowledge of CHS support. 65.6% of the officers reported being 
familiar with CHS support. As expected, CHS is better known by KII officers and those with more labor 
seniority (Table 4). 
TABLE 11. KNOWLEDGE ABOUT CHS SUPPORT
Time in the 
current job 
CIPRUNNA 
list 
KII 
List 
Total 
5 years or more 37,5% 100% 64,3%
4 years 100% 100,0%
3 years 100% 100% 100,0%
2 years 0% 100% 25,0%
1 years 0% 100% 50,0%
Less than 1 year 0% 66,7% 50,0%
Total 44,4% 92,9% 65,6% 
 Source: Democracy International survey, 2017
13 out of 29 institutions answered that they received direct support from the CHS program, or at least 
that they have partner institutions that are direct CHS beneficiaries (these institutions are listed on 
Table 12). This implies that the other institutions that responded to the survey have not received CHS 
support and do not work closely with institutions supported by CHS. 
TABLE 12. INSTITUTIONS (OR PARTNERS) WITH CHS SUPPORT
Institution type Institution name 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT H-3 
National government – ministries MINDEFENSA, MINCULTURA 
National government - other entities
ICBF, Colombia Joven, Sena, Agencia para la 
Reincorporación, Consejería DDHH, Policía 
Nacional
Public Ministry Defensoría del Pueblo, 
Grantees from civil society and media-related groups
Agencia Pandi, Fundación Juan Felipe Gómez 
Escobar, Tiempo de Juego, World Coach 
Colombia
International community UNICEF
Number of respondents 18 
 Source: Democracy International survey, 2017
For the 13 CHS institutions on Table 12, officials reported that the list of five institutions with which 
they coordinate on recruitment prevention activities. The ICBF was highlighted as the institution with 
more institutional networks: 83% of the officials (from the 13 institutions supported by CHS) mentioned 
the ICBF as part of their interinstitutional coordination network. This percentage is higher than 
expected, given that in the quantitative data, ICBF was more associated with reintegration activities 
rather than prevention activities. The other institutions were mentioned less frequently, with 
percentages below 40%. It is worth noting that the CIPRUNNA secretariat is mentioned only by 39% of 
the officers, a finding that is consistent with qualitative data. Finally, IOM is mentioned by one third of 
the 13 CHS institutions (Chart 1). 
CHART 1. INTERINSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION OF INSTITUTIONS (OR PARTNERS) WITH CHS SUPPORT
 Source: Democracy International survey, 2017
Officials were asked to grade the contribution of CHS on 3 components: recruitment prevention, 
institutional strengthening, and knowledge management. Chart 2 shows the results related to
recruitment prevention. Officials from the KII list had a more positive assessment of CHS contribution 
than those from the CIPRUNNA list. While officials that were interviewed during the qualitative 
fieldwork affirmed that CHS had a high and decisive impact on recruitment prevention, none of the 
CIPRUNNA respondents thought the impact was decisive. . A majority of officials from this list (60%) 
responded that CHS had an impact, and the rest stated that CHS had only some impact on recruitment 
prevention. 
CHART 2. CHS CONTRIBUTION TO RECRUITMENT PREVENTION
83.3%
38.9%
33.3%
27.8% 27.8% 27.8%
22.2% 22.2%
16.7%
11.1% 11.1%
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT H-4 
Source: Democracy International survey, 2017
A 10 point scale was used (1 meaning the lowest contribution and 10 the highest) to grade CHS’s 
contribution for institutional strengthening. Results are divided, as shown on Chart 3, following the same 
pattern found for recruitment prevention: KII´s officials gave higher grades (77% responded between 8 
and 10) than those surveyed from CIPRUNNA list (80% responded 5 or less). 
CHART 3. CHS CONTRIBUTION TO INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING
Source: Democracy International survey, 2017
CHS’s contribution to knowledge management has better results than its contribution to institutional 
strengthening. CHS contribution was graded above 8 for 77% of the officials in the KII list and 40% from 
the CIPRUNNA list. In this analysis, it is assumed that respondents answered this question assessing the 
performance of the CIPRUNNA observatory, which was highlighted in several interviews as very 
important for targeting municipalities that have high request for prevention programs (Chart 4). 
CHART 4. CHS CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT
1 Tuvo mucha 
influencia, fue 
decisiva
54% 2 Tuvo 
influencia, pero 
no fue decisiva
15%
3 Tuvo algo de 
influencia
23%
5 NS/NR
8%
KII list
2 Tuvo 
influencia, pero 
no fue decisiva
40% 3 Tuvo algo de 
influencia
60%
CIPRUNNA list
20.0% 20.0%
40.0%
20.0%
1
lowest
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
highest
CIPRUNNA list
7.7% 7.7% 7.7%
30.8% 30.8%
15.4%
1
lowest
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
highest
KII list
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT H-5 
Source: Democracy International survey, 2017
This survey included four open question related two themes: i) CHS’s strengths and weaknesses, and ii) 
recommendations related to the recruitment prevention policy in a post conflict context and to USAID 
strategies for the next five years (Table 13). Responds to these open questions were coded to be 
analyzed. 
TABLE 13. SURVEY OPEN QUESTIONS
Categories Survey questions 
CHS strengths En los últimos 5 años, ¿Cuáles son las tres principales FORTALEZAS del apoyo que 
OIM, con recursos de USAID, ha brindado a su entidad o a las entidades con las que 
trabaja para la implementación de la Política de prevención del reclutamiento, 
utilización y violencia sexual contra niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA)?
CHS weaknesses En los últimos 5 años, ¿Cuáles son las tres principales DEBILIDADES del apoyo que 
OIM, con recursos de USAID, ha brindado a su entidad o a las entidades con las que 
trabaja para la implementación de la Política de prevención del reclutamiento, 
utilización y violencia sexual contra niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA)?
Public policy 
recommendations 
in post conflict 
context
¿Cómo se debe reorientar la Política de prevención del reclutamiento, utilización y 
violencia sexual contra niños, niñas y adolescentes (NNA) en el contexto de 
implementación de los acuerdos de paz con las FARC?
Recommendations 
to USAID 
¿Cuáles son las tres principales áreas estratégicas en las cuales la comunidad 
internacional, especialmente USAID, debería continuar apoyando al Gobierno de 
Colombia para prevenir el reclutamiento, utilización y violencia sexual contra niños, 
niñas y adolescentes (NNA) en los próximos 5 años?
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CHS 
The main strengths of the support that IOM has provided to the entities with which it works for the 
implementation of the policy on recruitment prevention, usage and sexual violence against children and 
adolescents (NNA) are divided into five categories and can be found on Table 14. 
TABLE 14. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF CHS
40.0%
20.0% 20.0% 20.0%
1
lowest
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
highest
CIPRUNNA list
7.7%
15.4%
30.8%
7.7%
38.5%
1
lowest
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
highest
KII list
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT H-6 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Professional advice and technical assistance
The continuity of the processes, the officials and 
the measurement of results is very low
Great capacity for institutional strengthening 
through the provision of financial resources
There is a need for broader coverage of the 
program
Support to the consolidation of the 
infrastructure necessary to carry out the 
program
Dissemination of the results has not been 
optimal 
The program gave more visibility to the issue 
of recruitment
Prominent management
 
First of all, IOM provided professional advice and technical assistance in strategic areas of the program. 
Second, the IOM aided institutional strengthening through the provision of financial resources for 
research, analysis and promotion of human rights. Third, IOM supported institutions to procure the 
infrastructure necessary to advance the prevention activities by investing in equipment and providing 
kitchens and robotics equipment. The fourth strength is that the program gave more visibility to the 
issue of recruitment, increasing overall understanding about children’s rights and acceptance of 
vulnerable CH&A as victims of the conflict. Finally, IOM's management was crucial for achieving greater 
inter-agency coordination and strategic allies for the program. 
However, the CHS stakeholders also emphasized that there is a lack of the continuity of the processes, 
the GOC officials and the measurement of results. Additionally, there is a need for broader coverage of 
the program in terms of vulnerable population, regions with poor accessibility; and longer periods of 
intervention. Finally, a weakness of the program is that the dissemination of the results and knowledge 
management has low coverage, which reduces the impact and use in policy design. 
STAKEHOLDER RECOMMENDATIONS 
The main policy recommendations and recommendation for USAID given by the stakeholders can be 
found on Table 15. 
TABLE 15. STAKEHOLDER’S RECOMMENDATIONS
Policy Recommendations Recommendations for USAID 
Strengthening institutional capacity Programs regarding education for the 
labor insertion to the productive 
sectors and use of the free time 
should be supported and 
strengthened, especially those involving 
sports, arts and cultural formation with 
a territorial, cultural and ethnic 
approach
The GOC presence should be reinforced in areas 
formerly controlled by the FARC guerrilla 
Reintegration programs should be oriented 
towards education and job training
It is important to include the children and 
adolescents in the design of the public policy in 
each territory
Adopt a community-based approach
The policy on recruitment prevention in the context of the implementation of the Peace Agreement 
with the FARC guerrilla must be reoriented mainly towards strengthening institutional capacity. This is 
important since it is an integral part of the peace agreements and is crucial for coordination, initiatives 
and work with local authorities, efficient use of resources for road-map protocols and the strengthening 
of investigation and prosecution of criminal activities. Thus, the presence of the government can be 
reinforced in areas formerly controlled by the FARC guerrilla in order to prevent children from being 
used or linked to illegal groups or to new criminal modalities. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT H-7 
Likewise, for the design of reintegration programs, in addition to adopting a community-based approach, 
it is essential to contemplate regional, cultural and ethnic differences. These programs should be 
oriented towards education and job training to provide support in productive activities and the 
empowerment of children. For this purpose, it is important to include the children and adolescents in 
the design of the public policy in each territory. 
Furthermore, in the strategic areas in which USAID should continue to support the Government of 
Colombia to prevent recruitment, use and sexual violence against children in the next 5 years, most 
institutions agree that programs regarding education for the labor insertion to the productive sectors 
and the use of free time should be supported and strengthened, especially those involving sports, arts 
and cultural formation with a territorial, cultural and ethnic approach. 
COLOMBIA CHS-F2 FINAL STRATEGIC PERFORMANCE EVALUATION –FINAL REPORT H-8 
