March 2017
This publication was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It 
was prepared independently by Keri Culver, Pablo Gutiérrez, Carlos Castañeda, Ana María Rivera, Juan Guillermo 
Rubio, Centro Nacional de Consultoría and Management Systems International.
EVALUATION
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation 
and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative
Regional Report, PNCRT Zones
 
 
Midterm Impact Evaluation 
of the Consolidation and 
Enhanced Livelihood 
Initiative
REGIONAL REPORT, PNCRT ZONES
Management Systems International
A Tetra Tech Company
200 12th Street South
Suite 1200
Arlington, VA 22202, USA
www.msiworldwide.com
March 2017 
Contracted under AID-514-C-13-00003 
USAID/Colombia Evaluation and Analysis for Learning (EVAL)
DISCLAIMER OF RESPONSIBILITY 
The contents of this evaluation are the exclusive responsibility of the authors and do not necessarily 
reflect the opinions of USAID or the government of the United States.
CONTENTS 
Acronyms ...................................................................................................................................................................... 1
Abstract.......................................................................................................................................................................... 3
Executive Summary....................................................................................................................................................... 5
Purpose of the evaluation...................................................................................................................................... 5
Design of the evaluation: guiding questions, methods and limitations................................................................. 6
Findings and conclusions.......................................................................................................................................... 8
Regional context........................................................................................................................................................ 8
Economic development......................................................................................................................................... 9
Institutional development....................................................................................................................................13
Social development.............................................................................................................................................16
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................. 20
Background..................................................................................................................................................................20
How to read this report............................................................................................................................................25
Evaluation design and methods...............................................................................................................................26
Quantitative methods..........................................................................................................................................27
Qualitative methods............................................................................................................................................30
Limitations ..............................................................................................................................................................30
Regional Context .........................................................................................................................................................33
Peace process ......................................................................................................................................................46
Recommendations...................................................................................................................................................48
Economic Development ..............................................................................................................................................49
Findings and conclusions........................................................................................................................................49
Support for productive projects...........................................................................................................................52
Markets and marketing .......................................................................................................................................54
Savings, credit and financial services .................................................................................................................58
Transportation and infrastructure........................................................................................................................58
Land ....................................................................................................................................................................60
Recommendations...................................................................................................................................................62
Institutional Development ...........................................................................................................................................64
Findings and conclusions........................................................................................................................................64
Participation........................................................................................................................................................64
Transparency and accountability ........................................................................................................................66
Trust....................................................................................................................................................................69
Provision of services...........................................................................................................................................70
Recommendations...................................................................................................................................................76
Social Development.....................................................................................................................................................79
Findings and conclusions........................................................................................................................................79
Social capital: Trust ............................................................................................................................................79
Social capital: Participation in associations........................................................................................................79
Productive associations.......................................................................................................................................81
Recommendations...................................................................................................................................................82
Annex 1: List Experiment: Cluster-level results..........................................................................................................84
Catatumbo Region: Contact with armed groups .....................................................................................................85
Catatumbo Region: Contact with illicit crops.........................................................................................................86
Cauca Region: Contact with armed groups.............................................................................................................90
Cauca Region: Contact with illicit crops.................................................................................................................91
Putumayo Region: Contact with armed groups.......................................................................................................95
Putumayo Region: Contact with illicit crops...........................................................................................................96
Annex 2: Descriptive Data Tables, by Cluster...........................................................................................................101
Cluster 2 ................................................................................................................................................................101
Cluster 10 ..............................................................................................................................................................105
Cluster 11 ..............................................................................................................................................................108
Cluster 19 ..............................................................................................................................................................111
Cluster 20 ..............................................................................................................................................................114
Cluster 21 ..............................................................................................................................................................117
Cluster 29 ..............................................................................................................................................................120
Cluster 30 ..............................................................................................................................................................123
Cluster 31 ..............................................................................................................................................................126
Cluster 32 ..............................................................................................................................................................129
TABLE OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1. Evaluation questions ...................................................................................................................................7
Figure 1.2. Trends in the perception of the levels of compliance with the law from individual and collective 
perspectives ...................................................................................................................................................................9
Figure 1.3. Trends in estimated monthly expenses (income proxy) in Colombian pesos............................................10
Figure 1.4. Trends in the reasons for creating associations in the Putumayo region ...................................................10
Figure 1.5. Trends in the perception of production and marketing problems in the Catatumbo region ......................11
Figure 1.6. Territorial indicators and micro-targeting (Consolidation Index) .............................................................12
Figure 1.7. Trends in the changes in respondents’ perceptions of the government’s performance .............................14
Figure 1.8. Trends in the community’s levels of trust in the mayor and the JAC president........................................14
Figure 1.9. Trends in the changes in perception of access to and quality of public services in the Catatumbo region15
Figure 1.10. Trends in the levels of community trust in Putumayo.............................................................................16
Figure 1.11. Trends in the perceptions of the benefits from belonging to social organizations in the Cauca/Valle del 
Cauca region................................................................................................................................................................17
Figure 1.12. Trends in the perception of the reasons for joining associations in the Cauca/Valle del Cauca region...18
Figure 2.1. The three pillars of the PNCRT and their equivalents in the CELI...........................................................22
Figure 2.2. PNCRT Municipalities..............................................................................................................................24
Figure 2.3. How to read and interpret the statistical data in the report........................................................................25
Figure 2.4. Evaluation questions ................................................................................................................................. 26
Figure 2.5. Sample by sex, region and literacy levels..................................................................................................28
Figure 2.6. Sample by ethnicity...................................................................................................................................29
Figure 2.7. Sample by rurality .....................................................................................................................................29
Figure 3.1. Index of consolidation pillars and their components.................................................................................34
Figure 3.2. Secondary data: Consolidation Index: municipalities in the three PNCRT regions..................................35
Figure 3.3. Consolidation Index: General scores by region.........................................................................................35
Figure 3.4. Perception of security (security is good or very good)..............................................................................37
Figure 3.5. Perception of security (belief that security has improved) ........................................................................38
Figure 3.6. Trends in illegal mining ............................................................................................................................38
Figure 3.7. Secondary data: EVIDINCE quarterly Insecurity Index ...........................................................................39
Figure 3.8. Secondary data: EVIDINCE Insecurity Index...........................................................................................40
Figure 3.9. Trends: Perception that coca should not be cultivated because it is illegal (agree/strongly agree)...........40
Figure 3.10. Trends: Opinions on the value of laws and compliance with them (always/almost always)...................41
Figure 3.11. Trends: Perceptions about actors with negative opinions of the GoC.....................................................41
Figure 3.12. Trends: Negative impact of the presence of IAGs on municipal performance........................................42
Figure 3.13. Trends: Where citizens resolve disputes ................................................................................................. 43
Figure 3.14. Trends: Where citizens resolve their disputes, according to Consolidation Index data...........................44
Figure 3.15. Trends: Respect for national institutions................................................................................................. 45
Figure 3.16. Secondary data: EVIDINCE survey data on the presence of justice sector officials in their jobs...........46
Figure 4.1. The economic situation in my place of residence is good or very good....................................................49
Figure 4.2. Impact on the perception of food security................................................................................................. 50
Figure 4.3. Trends in estimated monthly expenses (income proxy) in COP ...............................................................51
Figure 4.4. Secondary data: Consolidation Index score with respect to the presence of financial entities and number 
of hectares cultivated ...................................................................................................................................................51
Figure 4.5. Trends in the type of support received for productive project activities in the Catatumbo region............52
Figure 4.6. Trends in the reasons for joining associations in the Putumayo region.....................................................53
Figure 4.7. Trend in marketing places in the Catatumbo region..................................................................................54
Figure 4.8. Trends in sales to wholesalers or middlemen............................................................................................54
Figure 4.9. Trends in places where purchases are made..............................................................................................55
Figure 4.10. Trends in the perception of production and marketing problems in the Putumayo region......................55
Figure 4.11. Trends in the perception of production and marketing problems in the Catatumbo region ....................56
Figure 4.12. Trends in the perception of production and marketing problems in the Cauca/Valle del Cauca region..57
Figure 4.13. Trends in bancarization and access to credit ...........................................................................................58
Figure 4.14. Trends in the perception of road quality..................................................................................................59
Figure 4.15. Secondary data: Consolidation Index, roads ...........................................................................................59
Figure 4.16. Trends in the payment of real property taxes in the last two years..........................................................60
Figure 4.17. Consolidation Index: Advances in Land Use Planning and Micro-targeting for the Land Restitution 
Process.........................................................................................................................................................................61
Figure 5.1. Trend in the number of people registered to vote (left chart) and the number of people who voted (right 
chart) in the 2014 presidential election........................................................................................................................65
Figure 5.2. Trends in the Accountability Index scores................................................................................................66
Figure 5.3. Consolidation Index: Access to Royalties and Open Government Index..................................................67
Figure 5.4. Average results of the OGI........................................................................................................................67
Figure 5.5. Secondary data: Compliance with the payment of real property and ICA taxes.......................................67
Figure 5.6. Trends in citizens’ perceptions of municipal institutions..........................................................................68
Figure 5.7. Trends in the perception of government performance...............................................................................68
Figure 5.8. Trends in trust in institutions in Putumayo................................................................................................70
Figure 5.9. Trends in trust in the mayor’s and JAC president’s commitment to the implementation of a project ......70
Figure 5.10. Secondary data: Comprehensive Performance Index for the CELI and PNCRT municipalities and their 
respective control municipalities, 2012-2014..............................................................................................................71
Figure 5.11. Secondary data: Comprehensive Performance Index, 2012 (left) and 2014 (right) ................................72
Figure 5.12. Trends in citizens’ registration for social services ..................................................................................73
Figure 5.13. Trends in access to and quality of public services in the Catatumbo region ...........................................73
Figure 5.14. Trends in the perception of access to and quality of public services.......................................................74
Figure 5.15. Secondary data: Electric power and cell phone coverage........................................................................75
Figure 6.1. Trends in trust among members of the community...................................................................................79
Figure 6.2. Trends in the benefits reported from belonging to social organizations....................................................80
Figure 6.3. Trends in the organizational problems reported in Catatumbo..................................................................81
Figure 6.4. Trends in the reasons for joining associations, Cauca/Valle del Cauca ....................................................82
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
ACRONYMS
ARD Associates for Rural Development
BACRIM Criminal bands, Bandas Criminales (in the service of the narcotics trade)
CAR Regional Autonomous Corporations, Corporaciones Regionales Autónomas
CDCS Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CELI Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative
CELI Central CELI program in the Central region
CELI MdM CELI program in the Montes de María region
CELI Norte/Sur CELI program in the North and South regions
CERAC Conflict Analysis Resource Center, Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos
CNC National Consulting Center, Centro Nacional de Consultoría
CNC-DoD Crime and Narcotics Center, U.S. Department of Defense
CSDI Colombia Strategic Development Initiative
CSO Civil Society Organization
DNP National Planning Department, Departamento Nacional de Planeación
DO Development objective
DoD Department of Defense (U.S.)
DPS Department for Social Prosperity, Departamento para la Prosperidad Social
ELN National Liberation Army, Ejército de Liberación Nacional
EVIDINCE Research effort associated with the Empirical Studies of Conflict (esoc.princeton.edu), a 
multi-institutional collaboration studying conflict and insurgency at the sub-national level
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FHH Female head of household
GLAC Local savings and loans groups, grupos locales de ahorros y crédito
GOC Government of Colombia
HH Household
IAG Illegal Armed Group
IC Illicit crops
ICO Index of Organizational Competencies, Índice de competencias organizacionales
IDI Integral Performance Index, Índice de desempeño integral
INCODER Colombian Institute of Rural Development, Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural
JAC Community Action Council, Junta de Acción Comunal
LAPOP Latin American Public Opinion Project
MADR Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo 
Rural
MdM Montes de María
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
MHH Male head of household
MSI Management Systems International, Inc. 
PAR Regional Action Plan, Plan de acción regional
PMP Performance management plan
PNCRT National Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction Policy, Política Nacional de 
Consolidación y Reconstrucción Territorial
SENA National Learning Service, Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje
SGP General Participation System, Sistema General de Participación
SIJIN Judicial police, Seccional de Investigación Judicial
SIMCI Integrated Illicit Crops Monitoring System, Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos 
Ilícitos
SISBEN Identification and Classification system for potential social program Beneficiaries, Sistema 
de Identificación y Clasificación de potenciales Beneficiarios para programas sociales
TA Technical Assistance
UACT Territorial Consolidation Administrative Unit, Unidad Administrativa para la 
Consolidación Territorial
UARIV Victims’ Integral Attention and Reparation Unit, Unidad para la Atención y Reparación 
Integral a las Víctimas
UMATA Municipal Agricultural Extension Units, Unidades Municipales de Asistencia Técnica 
Agropecuaria
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
URT Land Restitution Unit, Unidad de Restitución de Tierras
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VEO Verification of Organizational Status, Valorización del Estado Organizacional
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
ABSTRACT
USAID/Colombia designed the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihoods Initiative (CELI) for the 
purpose of supporting the Government of Colombia (GoC) in its efforts to consolidate its 
institutional presence in zones under the control or influence of insurgent groups.
The Government of Colombia has prioritized eight regions for the implementation of its National 
Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction Policy (PNCRT), some of which were targeted by 
the CELIs. This report contains the results found in the following sixteen (16) PNCRT target 
municipalities which were not CELI beneficiaries (hereinafter PNCRT municipalities): 
Convención, El Carmen, Hacarí, San Calixto, Teorama and Tibú (Catatumbo); Florida and Pradera 
(Valle del Cauca); Caloto and Santander de Quilichao (Cauca); and Puerto Leguízamo, Puerto 
Asís, Valle de Guamuez and San Miguel (Putumayo). 
Regional Context
Security. Security in the PNCRT zones improved as a result of the implementation of government 
policies. However, the armed conflict, the presence of IAGs, organized crime and common crime 
persist. Increases in coca cultivation are also of concern. Nevertheless, the improved provision of 
security services perceived by citizens has resulted in a more positive image of the police.
Illicit crops. Based on the perceptions of the respondents and interviewees, there is awareness in 
the PNCRT municipalities of the problems caused by illicit crops and the importance of replacing 
them. However, given that in a large percentage of cases illicit crops are grown based on economic 
rationality, replacement must be supported by infrastructure and public goods to enable farmers to 
market their products. 
Human rights violations. Despite efforts to legitimize the presence of the State, there is still no 
significant reduction in human rights violations in these regions, the municipalities do not have 
the capacity to attend to all of the complaints, and shortcomings persist in access to formal justice 
services. 
Economic Development
The economic situation for the average family is getting worse, even as the proxy for monthly 
income grew between the baseline and the midline. However, when midline income values are 
analyzed in absolute terms, they prove to be less than the legal minimum wage in effect for that 
year ($644.350). In addition, support for productive projects declined in both the PNCRT 
municipalities and CELI municipalities. 
Institutional Development
The community’s participation in political processes grew, with more people intending to vote and 
actually voting. The respondents indicated that their votes are valuable and that the electoral 
process is important to them. Trust in institutions and their ability to exercise power decreased. 
The respondents in the three regions perceive that corruption has declined. 
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Social Development
With regard to social capital, there is a reduction in the community trust, mutual aid, and joint 
work capacity indices, which negatively affects associative processes and the cohesion of the 
social fabric.
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
USAID/Colombia designed the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihoods Initiative (CELI) for the 
purpose of supporting the Government of Colombia (GoC) in its efforts to consolidate its 
institutional presence in zones under the control or influence of insurgent groups involved with 
illicit crops, drug trafficking, kidnapping, extortion, and terrorist activities. 
Three implementers have developed this project in four regions: the first, Chemonics International, 
which operates in the North region (Bajo Cauca Antioqueño and Southern Córdoba) and in the 
South region (municipality of Tumaco in Nariño) through the CELI North/South project; the 
second, ARD Tetra Tech, operates in the Central Region (23 municipalities in the departments of 
Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Caquetá, Meta and Tolima) through the CELI Central project; and finally, 
Global Communities, which in 2015 completed similar work through CELI Montes de María 
(MdM) in the municipalities of Ovejas and San Onofre (Sucre) and in Carmen de Bolívar and San 
Jacinto (Bolívar). 
The Government of Colombia has prioritized eight 
regions for the implementation of its National Territorial 
Consolidation and Reconstruction Policy (PNCRT), some 
of which were addressed by the CELIs. This report 
contains the results found in the following sixteen (16) 
PNCRT target municipalities which were not CELI 
beneficiaries (hereinafter PNCRT municipalities): 
Convención, El Carmen, Hacarí, San Calixto, Teorama 
and Tibú in Norte de Santander (Catatumbo); Florida and
Pradera in Valle del Cauca; Caloto and Santander de 
Quilichao in Cauca (Cauca); and Puerto Leguízamo, 
Puerto Asís, Valle de Guamuez and San Miguel in 
Putumayo. 
Purpose of the evaluation
In 2011, DevTech Systems, Inc., USAID/Colombia’s contractor, designed the impact evaluation 
of the interventions of the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), which includes two 
measurements in addition to the baseline: a midline and a final measurement. The EVAL Program 
(Evaluation and Analysis for Learning), operated through a USAID contract with Management 
Systems International, Inc. (MSI), carried out the midline evaluation. This report contains the 
results of the evaluation for the 16 PNCRT municipalities, which was carried out using the 
baseline, qualitative fieldwork and questions regarding satisfaction with the programs 
implemented under this policy. The key audiences of the evaluation are the Program Office and 
Technical Offices of the USAID/Colombia Mission, which will use the results to design future 
interventions. 
Three guiding principles were established for the uses of the evaluation: 
1. Measure the change in the impact indicators, determine the extent to which the CELIs are 
achieving their goals with the target populations. 
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
2. Provide timely data to the decision-making processes, in order to identify the components 
that need to be strengthened in order to achieve the program’s goals. 
3. Identify the best practices and lessons learned to date, in order to guide future USAID
interventions. 
Background of the project
According to the National Consolidation Plan (PNC), which subsequently evolved into the 
National Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction Policy (PNCRT), the concept of 
“Consolidation” refers to the expansion of the legitimate presence of the State in the regions of 
conflict in Colombia. The Policy was designed to be implemented once the minimum security 
conditions are established for generating the institutional capacities necessary for access to, and 
protection of the fundamental rights of, the population in the territories historically affected by the 
armed conflict and illicit crops.
1
 It is aimed at establishing the presence of State institutions that 
are capable of effectively delivering the public goods and services necessary for development. 
The United States Embassy developed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) in 
order to support the strengthening of the State’s presence in strategic zones of the country, and to 
reduce inequality in historically marginalized regions, in which illegal armed groups and coca 
production coexist. The CSDI was conceived as a whole-government strategy, with a geographic 
focus whose objective was to maintain the advances in security and development, and the reduction 
in illicit crops and in the presence of illegal armed groups in conflict zones. 
The basic premise of the CELIs, one of the components of the CSDI, is that armed conflicts and 
the illegal economy are closely related to the weak presence of the State and, therefore, its activities 
are aimed at strengthening the institutions, generating trust in them, building relationships between
the communities and local governments, and supporting the enhancement of sustainable 
livelihoods. 
Within the Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS), CELI was part of Development 
Objective (DO) 1: Civil government present in consolidated CSDI zones, focused on supporting
the Consolidation process with respect to the strengthening of the local government, formalization 
of property rights, social development, alliance between the community and the State, and rural 
development. In the 2014-2018 CDCS, the CELIs form part of DO 3, Improved conditions for 
inclusive rural economic growth. 
It is important to mention that the CELIs do not replace the function of the State. They were created 
to provide support to the PNCRT. The minimum provision of public goods, advances in the 
formalization of property rights and access to justice by the State in the consolidation zones 
constitute a sine qua non condition to enable the CELIs, and any international cooperation effort, 
to operate and ensure that the resources serve as a catalyst for development and consolidation. 
Design of the evaluation: guiding questions, methods and limitations
The midline evaluation was carried out in 33 CELI municipalities, and in 16 municipalities in three 
regions (Catatumbo, Cauca/Valle and Putumayo) in which the GoC intervened through the 
activities of the PNCRT (the PNCRT municipalities). The midline evaluation, structured on the 
 
1 http://www.consolidacion.gov.co.
7 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
basis of the baseline developed by DevTech, analyzed the changes through institutional, social and 
economic indicators related to the interventions. The research questions are presented below: 
Figure 1.1. Evaluation questions
QUESTION STRATEGIC LEVEL
1. What specific impacts have the CSDI interventions produced among the target 
populations in the intervention zones? IR3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
2. Do the CSDI projects show the expected level of performance in supporting the 
consolidation process? Cross-cutting
3. Does the GoC show the expected level of investment in consolidation areas after 
USAID’s assistance in the PNCRT municipalities? IR 3.2
4. What are the specific effects of the CELIs on changing the local government’s 
capacities and provision of services (serving the local population, being accountable, 
expanding social services)? 
Sub-IR 3.2.1
5. What changes have been produced by the CELI interventions to strengthen the
organizational capacities of civil society organizations (CSOs) in local areas? IR 3.3
6. How much progress has been made in the recovery and reconstruction of the 
territory affected by the armed conflicts (presence of IAGs) and unlawful economic 
activities? 
Cross-cutting
7. To what extent have the CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance 
and institutionalization of the territory? Sub-IR 3.2.1
8. To what extent have the CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and 
economic development?
IR 3.2
IR 3.3
 
EVAL, with support from the National Consulting Center (CNC), used a mixed-methods approach 
– qualitative and quantitative – to examine a set of indicators for each result of the CELIs. The 
evaluation sought to understand changes in economic opportunities, social development and civil 
society, government and institutionalization, and security as a result of the CELI interventions. 
The design replicated the baseline methodology, and used qualitative methods to obtain 
information about the population’s perceptions, opinions and experiences. Annex 3 of the main 
report presents the complete design considerations of the evaluation, which include an impact 
estimate. 
The study has many limitations that must be taken into account. There are limitations based on the 
design of the evaluation (such as the difficulty of the process and results of the pairing of
municipalities, in a country with a long history of isolation and differences between regions). The 
original design was also affected because the government did not have an intervention that was as 
broad as planned, in which goals and impact indicators associated with the original design were 
established. 
The limitations based on exogenous factors (such as the fall in the price of oil and differences in 
the implementation of the project by the different operators) also condition the interpretation of 
the data. For more details, see the Limitations section of this report, as well as Annex 3 of the main 
report. 
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Findings and conclusions
Regional context
Security. Security in the PNCRT zones has improved as a result of the implementation of 
government policies in this area. However, phenomena derived from the armed conflict, the 
presence of IAGs, organized crime and common crime persist. Also of concern is the growth of 
areas cultivated with coca in these regions, as evidenced by figures from the United Nations 
Integrated Illicit Crop Monitoring System (SIMCI). 
Nevertheless, the improved provision of security services perceived by citizens has resulted in a
positive image of the police. 
Illicit crops and the culture of illegality. Based on the perceptions of the respondents and 
interviewees, there is awareness in the PNCRT municipalities of the damage caused by illicit crops 
and the importance of replacing them. However, given that in a large percentage of cases illicit 
crops are grown based on economic rationality, replacement must be supported by the minimum 
infrastructure and public goods necessary to enable farmers to market their products. Food security 
problems are frequent in these regions, so one strategy involves crops for self-consumption. 
With respect to the culture of legality, the survey asks, “How often do you act in compliance with 
the law?” and “How often do you believe that what is ordered by the law coincides with the way 
in which your community acts?” A comparison of the baseline and midline responses reveals a 
significant downward trend in compliance with the law by the populations in these regions. They 
appear to have few incentives for adopting a culture of legality. 
How to read the findings and conclusions
This summary and the report below present two key types of data: trends and impacts. The trends reveal the changes 
over time in each variable analyzed in the PNCRT municipalities, while the impacts compare the changes in the 
variables in the municipalities analyzed with the changes in the control municipalities. 
It is worth mentioning that the trends and impacts are also presented at a cluster level, that is, individual municipalities 
or small groups of similar municipalities from a geographic and socio-economic point of view. The results of the 
cluster analysis often differ from the regional results, and so their study is important for obtaining more focused 
information. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Figure 1.2. Trends in the perception of the levels of compliance with the law from individual and 
collective perspectives 
Human rights, justice and the legitimacy of the State. Despite efforts to legitimize the 
presence of the State, there is still no significant reduction in human rights violations in these 
regions, the municipalities do not have the capacity to attend to all of the complaints in this regard, 
and shortcomings persist in access to formal justice services. Of note is the large number of cases 
in which there has been no institutional response to reported violations and no identification of 
those responsible, which represents significant challenges for the State in promoting a sustainable 
order that generates trust. 
Land titling processes are critical and have been affected by security problems. The planned 
land restitution goals have not been achieved. On the one hand, they are subject to micro-targeting 
processes that depend on security agencies for determining the zones in which the Land Restitution 
Unit can intervene; and on the other, they impose a costly evidentiary burden on claimant families. 
Also, the restitution of property does not necessarily imply the existence of all of the conditions 
necessary for the return, and therefore comprehensive restitution. 
The formalization processes have been affected by, among other things, the presence of armed 
actors, which prevents families from accessing productive assets. Consequently, the productivity 
and the income-generating capacity of their productive projects have declined. 
Economic development
The average family’s economic situation has worsened. Given the difficulty of establishing 
the income level of families in these regions, the study established, as a method of approximation, 
the population’s level of expenses, assuming a low or non-existent savings capacity.
The proxy for monthly income grew between the baseline and the midline in the three regions: 
Cauca/Valle del Cauca by 44%; and smaller growth in Putumayo at 12%, and in Catatumbo at 
11%. However, if the midline income values in the three regions are compared in absolute terms, 
as shown in Figure 1.3, they are in all cases less than the legal minimum wage in effect for that 
year ($644.350), particularly in the case of Putumayo. 
91% 95% 95%
68%
80% 77%
55%
69% 64%
45%
56%
48%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
Baseline Midline Individual perspective Collective perspective
10 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Figure 1.3. Trends in estimated monthly expenses (income proxy) in Colombian pesos
Support for productive projects. Support for productive projects 
declined in both the PNCRT municipalities and CELI municipalities. The 
general trend was to migrate from a type of theoretical support to a more 
practical model. The associative processes are increasingly more important 
for the respondents and interviewees, due to the positive effects of the 
technical assistance provided to the productive projects, through which the 
families seek to enhance labor productivity by adopting technological 
methods. 
According to the reported data, the associative processes in general 
increased in the three PNCRT regions studied. The case of Putumayo is 
emblematic of this change, with greater effect in terms of representation, 
training and funding processes. In the case of the purchase of supplies and 
the processing of products, there was a positive impact, of 6pp and 4pp, 
respectively, in the PNCRT municipalities in Putumayo. (Figure 1.4) 
Figure 1.4. Trends in the reasons for creating associations in the Putumayo region 
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589750
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
PNCRT baseline PNCRT midline
There are many problems with the 
middlemen, they pay per month, pay 
per 15 days, not all, because [some] 
don’t pay. When we were going to 
the trainings they told us that they 
were going to help us sell directly to 
the supermarkets, and they haven’t 
gone back to having meetings… 
They were going to help market 
them in order to have a better price 
and everything. But so far they 
haven’t done any of that for us. Just 
promises. (Women’s focus group, 
Florida, Valle del Cauca)
2%
3%
4%
4%
7%
7%
5%
1%
7%
7%
7%
11%
17%
24%
16%
3%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
To purchase inputs
To process products
To sell products
To transport products
To jointly build capacity
To have group representation
To present projects for potential financing
To solicit credit
PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline
11 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Markets and marketing. The markets in the Consolidation 
territories are local and regional. Small producers are negatively 
affected by the high cost of marketing that characterizes the 
inefficiencies of small markets, which provides very little 
incentive for greater production. An increase in production 
above the size of these markets collides with the rigidity of the 
local market and the lack of capacity to export to other regions. 
However, as reflected in the Catatumbo data in the next figure, 
the respondents and interviewees believe that these problems 
have decreased thanks to the technical assistance provided. 
Figure 1.5. Trends in the perception of production and marketing problems in the Catatumbo 
region 
However, markets with sufficient supply and demand, and prices higher than the costs of 
production and transportation, are required. Productive projects counteract the incentives for 
planting illicit crops, but the context of deficient markets, the pressures imposed by armed groups, 
the environmental crisis, and the persistent lack of access roads make it difficult for alternative 
development programs and policies to have the desired effects. These structural problems, which 
the GoC is responsible for solving, reduces the possibility that the PNCRT will produce 
sustainable effects. 
Transportation and infrastructure. Road infrastructure is an unresolved issue. Access to the 
markets is affected by the deficit of tertiary roads and by the presence of intermediaries who play 
a leading role in the process of purchasing supplies and marketing the products, which reduces the 
profitability of farmers’ crops. 
Our products, the products of Valle de 
Guamuez, of La Hormiga, are products that 
have suffered, they are products of an intense 
war, that distinction is important. Products of 
peace. We have asked the National 
Government many times to take a different 
approach to the products that come from 
Putumayo, from Valle del Guamuez, from La 
Hormiga, maybe a kilo of cacao here has 
more meaning that in any other place. 
(Secretary of Economic Development, Valle 
de Guamuez, Putumayo)
94%
81%
94%
73%
54%
10%
83%
49%
63%
60%
48%
15%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Cost of inputs is very high
Abuse by intermediaries
Prices of products are very low
Cost of transport is very high
Lack of water
Interference of armed groups
PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline
12 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Land. The factors inherent in land tenure require greater 
knowledge and public policy intervention with respect to the 
structure of land ownership and restitution. This policy must 
be consistent with the use of land for agricultural purposes, 
the legalization of property, titling and restitution, which 
require greater knowledge of the realities of those who own 
and possess land. One factor to be taken into account is the 
reduction in the payment of taxes by owners due to the low 
profitability of their crops. 
The regional data of the Consolidation Index between 2011 
and 2014 are not similar. The land use figures in Catatumbo 
are stable but low, while there is a steady growth trend in 
Putumayo. The Cauca/Valle del Cauca region received the 
highest score, despite the existence of contradictory data, 
according to the qualitative information available (Figure 
1.6). Micro-targeting is low in Catatumbo and relatively 
higher and more stable in Putumayo. 
Figure 1.6. Territorial indicators and micro-targeting (Consolidation Index) 
Recommendations
Improve agricultural production and marketing simultaneously, taking advantage of local 
opportunities, for which the GoC should endeavor to resolve the infrastructure and marketing 
deficiencies and establish programs to correct problems in producers’ relationships with 
intermediaries and commercial partners. 
Support market diversification programs. It is critical for the government to support projects 
with production and marketing components to enable them to supply not only the local market, 
but also regional and international markets. Projects like those supported by the CELIs (chocolate 
in Tumaco, rubber in Meta, and coffee in Southern Tolima) are replicable experiences. 
Use community models for the improvement and sustainability of tertiary roads. Replicate 
the successful work carried out by CELI North/South in Bajo Cauca, Antioqueño and Sur de
Córdoba in creating a participatory grass-roots community model for managing the tertiary road 
network in Colombia. It is important to take into account both the national context and the 
environmental element in order to minimize direct and indirect environmental risks or to design 
The biggest conflict is knowing who [the land]
belongs to… For us as a municipality or for 
any type of entity it is very difficult. The 
problem is when the need for legalization is 
already great. I also think that when you 
change from unlawful to lawful, you need the 
land to be yours. (Secretary of Rural 
Development, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo)
We haven’t had a basic land use plan since 
2002. That is an issue that the Planning 
Office and the Municipal Council are working 
on. The Land Use Plan has to be worked on 
because there are some indigenous people 
here, the El Triunfo Cristal Páez and Nasa 
Kiwe indigenous reservations, which have had 
their own territories for many years. 
(Secretary of Government, Florida, Valle del 
Cauca)
30 30 39 27
71 71 57
96
19 19
38
60
0
50
100
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014
Catatumbo Cauca/Valle Putumayo
Land use planning Micro-targeting
13 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
environmental compensation models. It is also essential to have an adequate environmental plan 
for the existing road network, which requires significant maintenance work. 
The land formalization and restitution processes require more effective management and 
public instruments, cadastral updating processes, and coordinated actions at a national level. There 
is a high likelihood that land proceedings will involve new forms of conflict over disputed plots 
of land in the post-conflict scenario, for which the government should develop adequate and clear 
responses for all stakeholders, including ethnic groups and farmers. 
Institutional development 
Participation. The community’s participation in political 
processes has grown, in particular with regard to the 
intention to vote and the actual exercise of this right. The 
respondents indicated that their votes are valuable, and so 
their mobilization in electoral processes is important to 
them. 
It is noteworthy that women in the three regions give high 
scores, above 96%, to the possibility of being leaders in 
their communities. Approximately 83% of young people 
stated that they have the possibility of being leaders. 
On the other hand, the possibility of legitimizing an ex-combatant as a community leader is low, 
according to the respondents: below the baseline from 16% to 14% in Putumayo, still at 11% in
Catatumbo, and slightly higher, from 18% to 19% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca. 
Transparency and accountability. The accountability 
processes in these regions are still incipient and affect trust 
in the institutions. Despite the efforts made in the 
implementation of this practice, the expected effects have 
not been achieved, and there is no information that 
demonstrates the existence of a permanent, broad and 
visible exercise. Gaps also persist between citizen control 
and the organized oversight offices, despite a slight 
improvement in the performance of these mechanisms. 
The respondents in the three regions perceive that corruption has declined. The responses 
regarding the lack of institutional services and the deficiency of residential public services have 
better scores in the midline survey. 
However, the perception that the administration is not paying attention to the community’s 
requests has grown, and distrust in public entities has increased in Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del 
Cauca. The perception that the administration does not provide information about what it is doing 
stayed the same in Catatumbo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca, but decreased in Putumayo. 
The respondents gave uniformly lower scores to government performance at a municipal and
departmental level. The figures in Putumayo are the lowest of the three regions. 
Here they have citizen oversight offices for 
projects, and there has been very active 
support from the regional Comptroller’s Office 
in Putumayo in advising the communities 
about how to create an oversight office... We 
meet with the people, I also do so, but the 
Comptroller’s Office has also been very active 
in that aspect. (Municipal Solicitor’s Office, 
Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo)
This administration [has improved] because 
the majority of council members are almost all 
from here, from the same municipality. Before 
they had the problem of coming from other 
places and becoming council members. The 
community is the one that chooses a council 
member, one or two council members are 
chosen from each area, so there are more 
ways to manage things. (Focus group, Valle de 
Guamuez, Putumayo)
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Figure 1.7. Trends in the changes in respondents’ perceptions of the government’s performance
Putumayo Catatumbo
Cauca/Valle 
del Cauca
Good or very good performance by the Mayor’s Office
-25% -3% -1%
Good or very good performance by the Governor’s 
Office -33% -3% -11%
Good or very good performance by the National 
Government -12% 8% -3%
Trust. Trust in institutions and their ability to exercise power decreased in the midline evaluation, 
which has implications for the legitimacy of the State as the guarantor and protector of rights. This
affects the leadership processes required for the implementation of the State’s interventions, and 
creates conditions for the reintroduction of armed groups. It also negatively affects the peace 
process, because the institutions’ breach of their commitments persists. 
When the respondents were asked whether they trust the mayor’s or the JAC president’s
commitment to the implementation of a project, their perception declined with respect to the 
baseline, especially in Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca. 
Figure 1.8. Trends in the community’s levels of trust in the mayor and the JAC president 
The Comprehensive Performance Index (IDI) shows increases in all of the municipalities of 
the sample, with significant gains in management, effectiveness, and legal requirements. It is likely 
that the support of the CELIs and the Government, under the Consolidation Policy, in the 
preparation of the Development Plans and Action Plans has contributed to these increases. 
However, respondents’ views of State services and users’ experiences with these services is less 
positive. 
Public and social services. The level of coverage of public and social services is relatively high 
in these three regions. The official data show high coverage for primary and secondary education, 
but low coverage for preschool-age children (younger than 5). The survey shows increases in the 
perceptions of the quality of education and health care in the three regions. 
The quality of and access to residential public services increased with respect to the baseline. 
However, more than half the population still lacks sewer, water and gas service. 
32%
10% 12% 11% 18% 12%
55%
39% 48% 47% 53%
36%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Baseline Midline Baseline Midline Baseline Midline
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
Mayor President of the JAC
15 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
In order to access social services, households need to register with the System of Identification 
and Classification of Potential Beneficiaries for Social Programs (SISBEN). Unlike the other 
regions studied in this evaluation, Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca have a low percentage of 
households registered with the SISBEN. The respondents were asked about access to and the 
quality of the following public services. The figure below shows the variation between the baseline 
and the midline for Catatumbo. 
Figure 1.9. Trends in the changes in perception of access to and quality of public services in the 
Catatumbo region 
Access
(2015)
Change in 
access
Change in 
quality
Has it 
improved in 
the last two 
years?
Health center 2% Yes
Children under 5 with access to care services 24% 13% 13% Yes
Children between 5 and 11 who attend school 98% 2% 14% Yes
People between 12 and 18 who attend an educational 
institution 76% 14% 22% Yes
The trends in the opinions about primary schools in Putumayo were even more positive than in 
Catatumbo, and with positive impacts compared to the responses in the control municipalities. In 
all of the education-related figures presented here, the responses in Cauca/Valle del Cauca were 
less positive than in the other two regions. In terms of residential public services, the respondents 
reported improvements in access and quality in most cases. These figures coincide with those for 
the public services component of the Consolidation Index. 
Recommendations 
The State has to guarantee the human rights and security of the population. This is a sine 
qua non condition for the post-conflict era. The historically marginalized municipalities and 
regions will be the scenarios of new conflicts and criminality in the near future, and if they do not 
perceive the protection of national government entities, the residents will not feel that they are part 
of a new, peaceful Colombia. 
Maintain the credibility of political participation processes and mechanisms, empowering 
the communities and their leaders. Strengthen the associations and leadership of women and 
young people in order to develop proposals to mobilize the electorate and strengthen democratic 
norms. In this regard, it is important to increase political participation through social organizations 
and reinforce citizens’ understanding of political participation and its influence on public 
administration. 
Actively support the transparency and accountability strategies promoted by the country. 
In its interventions, the PNCRT should be the promoter of the National Comprehensive Anti￾corruption Public Policy Strategy established in CONPES Document 167 of 2013 and in the right 
of access to public information promulgated by Law 1712 of 2014. 
In addition, accountability processes should provide information about what has been planned, 
executed and achieved, particularly with the public resources allocated to the territories. The 
implementation of these initiatives, which the country defined years ago, requires organized, 
decisive and sustainable actions and an interinstitutional coordination effort consistent with these 
16 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
policies. The IDI and the Open Government Index (OGI), as well as the Consolidation Index,
measure the processes more than the results that the public can perceive. 
Use new tools to improve the service provision. Strengthen the citizen consultation and 
participation processes from the perspective of both supply and demand. It is necessary to 
emphasize the meaningful involvement of civil society, and at the same time support local 
governments with ongoing technical assistance. Balanced scorecards and other tools are very 
useful for mobilizing citizens and grading the provision of services, with the objective of learning 
from successes and failures. It is important to continue rigorous intervention to strengthen local 
government institutions in the same skills that they expect from the civilian population. 
Social development
Social capital: Trust. With regard to social capital, there is a reduction in the community trust, 
mutual aid, and joint work capacity indices, which affects the associative processes and the 
cohesion of the social fabric. 
The region with the greatest declines with respect to the baseline is Putumayo, in which the 
percentage of respondents who trust their neighbors or other people from the community is well 
below 50%. The tradition of working in groups is relatively high, but a decrease of eight points 
leads to the conclusion that the level of trust in one’s peers is declining. 
Figure 1.10. Trends in the levels of community trust in Putumayo 
Social capital: Citizen Participation. In all regions of the study, there was an increase during 
the period between the baseline and midline in the number of associations and organizations 
created, and in the participation quality. The creation of associations does not imply a successful 
participatory model per se. Through the data collected, the respondents indicated the value of 
participation for themselves, for the community, for families and for decision-making purposes. It 
should be noted that the perception of problems related to participation has fallen, but the absence 
of teamwork and lack of people’s interest are pointed out as weaknesses. 
Despite the decline with respect to the baseline, the JACs, in which there is greater household
participation today, are the most common mechanisms for encouraging associativity. An important 
element is the strengthening of decision-making processes. The benefits most perceived by the 
respondents have to do with the strengthening of the social fabric, meeting more people, mutual 
aid in cases of emergency, and recreational activities, as shown by the responses from Cauca/ 
Valle del Cauca below. 
22%
72%
25%
13%
64%
15%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
High or very high confidence that a neighbor will help you in
the event of a problem
A tradition of working in groups exists to complete
community projects
High or very high confidence in community members
PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline
17 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Figure 1.11. Trends in the perceptions of the benefits from belonging to social organizations in the
Cauca/Valle del Cauca region 
However, there are still gaps with respect to the community’s interest in teamwork and in training 
in organizational processes. On the other hand, the community feels that significant obstacles 
persist, including authorities and political groups that create a sense of distrust. 
Of particular note in these regions is the decline in the participation of women’s groups, which
have not attained significant influence despite the importance of their role in their communities. 
For example, their participation in leadership processes within the JACs has declined, implying 
that community leadership positions in the Consolidation zones continue to be dominated by men. 
However, there was an increase in the participation of women in decision-making processes, 
which is encouraging. Respondents also stated that women can be leaders, they can influence the 
resolution of the armed conflict, and they can be decisive in the peace process. 
Productive associations. Economic rationality is an incentive for associativity. Economic 
rationality is the best incentive for families to join associations and strengthen their participatory 
mechanisms. These families are, for the most part, households headed by women. For these 
communities, joining associations makes sense because products become easier to sell, and 
enables them to be trained and achieve greater representation as a group. The following chart for 
the Cauca/Valle del Cauca region shows the reasons why the population prefers to join
associations: 
68%
56%
32%
65%
85%
80%
92%
87%
72%
85%
90%
93%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
To get to know others
To have fun and do activities that you like
To improve things relating to your productive activity
To participate in community decision making
To improve the community
Because it is important in the case of a future emergency
PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline
18 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Figure 1.12. Trends in the perception of the reasons for joining associations in the Cauca/Valle del 
Cauca region
Recommendations
Adapt the government’s interventions in order to build trust. In order to stop the decline in 
the community’s trust in the government, it is essential for the government to guarantee the 
security and rights of the leaders. The benefits of associative schemes are clear because they rely 
on community dialogue and collective wisdom to develop and manage projects. In this regard, we 
recommend strengthening support to civil society and farmers in order to encourage community 
cohesion. 
Increase work with households headed by women, using participatory models. Participatory 
and associative processes, mostly led by men, have shown impressive results in this region. 
Learning and experience are fundamental for mobilizing the participation of women, who have 
different needs and requirements due to their role in the nuclear family or their status as head-of￾household mothers (for example, the provision of childcare). In this regard, we recommend 
focusing the support on strengthening new models of participation by head-of-household mothers, 
taking advantage of the experiences of existing organizations and community leaders whose 
commitment already represents social roots. 
Continue to strengthen the JACs to improve development and consolidation. The continued 
progress of the JACs deserves special attention, as they are probably the most powerful civil 
society instruments for promoting citizen participation and dialogue with national, departmental 
and municipal governments. For example, current law2 allows for the creation of multiple 
mechanisms for converting them into dispute resolution agents and promoters of conciliation for 
the development of peace, as well as implementers of infrastructure projects (tertiary roads with a 
participatory component, for example), administrators of community radio stations, and 
generators of public policy oversight and monitoring processes. In this regard, and in order to 
strengthen their performance, we recommend adapting the ICO-VEO instrument3
 and making the 
results public, in order to ensure their legitimacy with the communities.
 
2 Law 743 of 2002, which develops Article 38 of the Political Constitution of Colombia with regard to community action organizations, and 
National Decree 2350 of 2003, which regulates this law. 3 The Organizational Capacity Index (ICO) is a tool that is designed and adapted to record changes in organizations as a result of institutional 
strengthening processes related to key elements (organizational, administrative, financial, etc.). It is an assessment of the organizational state.
5%
6%
4%
3%
4%
4%
2%
1%
10%
9%
25%
19%
25%
24%
16%
12%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
To purchase inputs
To process products
To sell products
To transport products
To jointly build capacity
To have group representation
To present projects for potential financing
To solicit credit
PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline
19 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Strengthen cultural and sports initiatives in order to promote peaceful communities. Culture 
and sports programming have the potential to heal the community wounds by the conflict, 
especially concerning the destruction of social bonds and a lack of trust, integration and respect 
for others. Based on our findings, we recommend that future interventions include a cultural 
component. 
20 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
INTRODUCTION
Background
According to the National Consolidation Plan (PNC), which evolved into the National Territorial 
Consolidation and Reconstruction Policy (PNCRT) in 2011, the concept of “Consolidation” refers
to the expansion of the legitimate presence of the State in the regions of conflict in Colombia. The 
Policy was designed to be implemented once minimum security conditions were established for 
generating the institutional capacities necessary for access to, and protection of the fundamental 
rights of, the population in the territories historically affected by the armed conflict and illicit 
crops.4 It is aimed at establishing the presence of State institutions that are capable of effectively 
delivering the public goods and services necessary for development. 
The policy conceives of consolidation and social, economic and institutional reconstruction as the 
result of a process of mobilization and the permanent establishment of three pillars: (1) state 
institutions in the targeted territories in order to guarantee security and create the capacities 
necessary to control the territory institutionally; (2) strengthening citizen participation and local 
governance; and (3) promoting regional integration.5 The interaction of these three pillars, on the 
basis of Territorial Security, combined with close collaboration with state entities, would serve as 
the path for guaranteeing the fundamental rights of citizens. 
The Consolidation Policy inherited the approach of Presidential Directive 01 of 2009, which 
during President Uribe’s second term prioritized territories that were strategic corridors for the 
trafficking of weapons and drugs. The objective was to cut off passage through these corridors by
illegal armed groups, gain control of the territory by military means, and subsequently consolidate 
the permanent presence of the State and democratic institutions, as well as to ensure trust among 
citizens, in order to guarantee stability in these territories. Later, Decree 2933 of 2010 created the 
national consolidation system, which would finally give rise to the National Territorial 
Consolidation and Reconstruction Policy (PNCRT). 
The Consolidation Policy was established on three fundamental pillars: 1) institutionalization of 
the territory; 2) social participation and good governance; and 3) regional integration, which has 
the objective of integrating the consolidation regions with the social, economic and political 
dynamics of the rest of the country, through the provision of public services and goods. The 
PNCRT included the municipalities of Arauca, which had not been among the territories served 
by consolidation. 
 
4 http://www.consolidacion.gov.co.
5
http://www.consolidacion.gov.co/themes/danland/descargas/entidad/planeacion/POLITICA_NACIONAL_DE_CONSOLIDACION_Y_RECON
STRUCCION_TERRITORIAL_PNCRT.pdf.
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
The Consolidation Policy operates with a traffic light that measures the levels of security in the 
target municipalities. Villages with green or yellow security levels have the minimum security 
levels necessary to carry out interventions. 
 
In addition, the United States Embassy developed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative 
(CSDI) in order to support the strengthening of the State’s presence in strategic zones of the 
country, and to reduce inequality in historically marginalized regions, in which illegal armed 
groups and coca production coexist. The CSDI was conceived as a whole-government strategy, 
with a geographic focus whose objective was to maintain the security and development advances 
and the reduction in illicit crops and in the presence of illegal armed groups in conflict zones. The 
policy included significant investments in security, access to justice, combating drugs, and 
eradication activities.
USAID is…coordinating closely with other Embassy entities, including the Narcotics Affairs 
Section (NAS), the Military Group, and the Department of Justice, as well as the Political and 
Economic sections of the State Department, to develop an integrated United States Government 
approach for the priority consolidation zones. Programs will include peace and security, illicit 
crop eradication, access to justice, justice sector reform, and humanitarian and development 
interventions targeted at a wide range of populations.6
The nature of the security and development problems required a coordinated response. The joint 
CSDI activities were designed to confront the multiple problems that persist in consolidation 
zones, including the continued presence of illegal armed groups (IAGs), illegal drug trafficking, 
structural poverty, and the lack of rule of law. 
 
6 USAID Colombia Request for Applications Number 514-09-000005, “Montes de María – Enhanced Livelihoods Initiative;” September 15, 2009, 
p. 5.
Source: 2013 CSDI Strategy Baseline Impact Evaluation Report
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
In working with the GoC and the PNCRT, the objective of linking United States government 
agencies with consolidation was 
To reach a “tipping point” where state presence and positive perception of the government is 
sufficiently well-established so that communities decide to align with their government rather than 
illegal armed groups and the coca industry.7
USAID/Colombia designed the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative (CELI) as one 
of the CSDI components and as the backbone of this integrated approach for supporting the 
PNCRT, in order to support the consolidation of the institutional presence in zones under the 
control or influence of insurgent groups involved with illicit crops, drug trafficking, kidnapping, 
extortion, and terrorist activities. 
The basic premise of the CELIs is that armed conflicts and the illegal economy are closely related 
to the weak presence of the State and, therefore, its activities are aimed at strengthening the 
institutions, generating trust in them, building relationships between the communities and local 
governments, and supporting the enhancement of sustainable livelihoods. The CELIs are not 
substitutes for the function of the State. The State’s minimum provision of public goods, advances 
in the formalization of property rights and access to justice in consolidation zones or corridors are 
basic premises on which the CELIs, and any international cooperation effort, can operate and 
ensure that resources are used as a catalyst for development. 
Through the permanent presence of the State and the provision of services, the PNCRT sought to 
break the circuits of the illegal economy and the economic and social development gaps of these 
territories, which are marginalized from the development dynamics of the rest of the country. It 
also had the objective of coordinating and mobilizing investments by different sectors. The
PNCRT seeks to serve as a catalyst for local development and the strengthening of local 
institutions, so that institutional capacity and development are not merely premises, but rather 
goals to be achieved. 
The CELIs, or Colombia Responde (CR) as this strategy is known in the territories, supported the 
GoC through three pillars that are similar (although not identical) to those of the PNCRT, as shown 
below. 
Figure 2.1. The three pillars of the PNCRT and their equivalents in the CELI
PNCRT Pillar CELI Pillar CELI Pillars defined as:
1 Territorial
institutionalization
Strengthen 
institutional 
development
Improvement in the response of the local government; 
formalization of property rights; processing of cases 
involving victims’ property rights; implementation of a 
rural development strategy
2 Citizen participation and 
good governance
Strengthening of 
social development
Strengthening of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs); 
promotion of alliances between the community and the 
State
3 Regional integration Catalyze economic 
development
Implementation of rural development programs and 
improved competitiveness
 
7 Ibid.
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
With this shared mandate, and based on the leadership of the GoC, the CELIs created strategies 
for institutional, social and economic development in four of the policy’s seven corridors: 1) 
Montes de María in the departments of Bolívar and Sucre; 2) the South Corridor in the municipality
of Tumaco in the Department of Nariño; 3) the Central Corridor in Meta, Southern Tolima and 
Valle del Cauca up to Buenaventura; and 4) the North Corridor in Bajo Cauca Antioqueño and 
Southern Córdoba. 
Three implementers have executed the CELIs in these four regions: first, Chemonics International, 
which operates in the North and South regions through the CELI North/South project; second, 
ARD Tetra Tech, which executes the project in the Central region (23 municipalities in the 
departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, Caquetá, Meta and Tolima) through the CELI Central
project; and, finally, Global Communities, which completed similar work in 2015 through the 
CELI Montes de María (MdM) in the municipalities of San Jacinto, Ovejas and San Onofre (Sucre)
and in Carmen de Bolívar (Bolívar). 
It is important to mention that, within the Country Development Cooperation Strategy for 
Colombia (CDCS), the CELI formed part of Development Objective (DO) 1: Civil government 
present in consolidated CSDI zones, focused on supporting the consolidation process with respect 
to the strengthening of local government, the formalization of property rights, social development, 
the alliance between the community and the State, and rural development. In the 2014-2018 
CDCS, the CELIs form part of DO3, Improved conditions for inclusive rural economic growth. 
The CELI investments are aimed at the Intermediate Results of DO3, and have much in common 
with their original results framework, despite the change toward economic activities. The current 
framework is tied to the CELI’s Performance Management Plan (PMP), and gives priority to the 
following: 
IR 3.1 More equitable and secure land tenure 
Sub IR 3.1.1 Land restituted to victims displaced by the conflict
IR 3.2 Increased private and public investment in the rural sector
Sub IR 3.2.1 Strengthening of local governments’ capacity to access and manage public funds for 
 productive infrastructure
Sub IR 3.2.2 Increased private sector investment in target rural communities
IR 3.3 More effective producer associations that benefit small farmers
Sub IR 3.3.1 Improved institutional capacity of producer associations
Between 2011 and 2012, USAID/Colombia tasked its Monitoring and Evaluation contractor, 
DevTech Systems, Inc., with the design of an impact evaluation of the group of CSDI interventions 
and the collection of baseline survey data. DevTech worked on this with Econometría, S.A.8 The 
design included two subsequent measurements: one after two years of program execution, and a 
final evaluation upon completion of the program. 
The USAID EVAL program (Evaluation and Analysis for Learning), under a contract between 
USAID and Management Systems International, Inc. (MSI), is responsible for carrying out the 
midline measurement, and for reporting on the impacts of the CELIs to date, which was done based 
on the design of the initial evaluation, program satisfaction questions posed to the participants, 
 
8 DevTech Systems, Inc. and Econometría S.A. 2013. “Methodology for the evaluation of the impact of USAID's strategy in CSDI zones - Final 
Methodology Report.”
24 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
qualitative fieldwork, and in-depth interviews with the CELI teams. The design of the evaluation 
included the collection of data in seven corridors in which the GoC implemented the PNCRT.
The midline evaluation examined the changes using institutional, social and economic indicators, 
and three main guidelines for their use were established: 
1. Measure the changes in the impact indicators, and determine the extent to which the CELIs
are achieving their goals with the target populations. 
2. Provide timely data to the decision-making processes, in order to identify the components 
that need to be strengthened in order to achieve the program’s goals. 
3. Identify best practices and lessons learned to date, in order to guide future USAID 
interventions. 
The impact evaluation that was originally designed was linked to the full range of interventions 
within the CSDI framework. Unfortunately, funding for the rest of the programming was reduced, 
leaving the CELIs alone as the only component of the entire strategy. It is therefore not possible 
to have a comprehensive evaluation of CSDI’s results. 
The results of this evaluation are also presented at the cluster level (individual municipalities or 
small groups of municipalities with similar geographical and socioeconomic traits), and that the 
results of the cluster analysis often differ from the results of the regional analysis, and so their 
study is important for obtaining more focused information. 
In the case of the PNCRT municipalities, the surveys were conducted in three consolidation zones 
in which there were no CELI interventions – Catatumbo, Cauca/Valle del Cauca and Putumayo – 
distributed in nine (9) clusters. The clusters of the 16 PNCRT municipalities and their control
municipalities are presented below. 
Figure 2.2. PNCRT Municipalities
Cluster Consolidation Zone Treatment Municipality Control Municipality
10 Catatumbo Tibú Dabeiba (Antioquia)
11 Teorama, Convención, El Carmen San Carlos (Antioquia)
19 Cauca/Valle del Cauca Florida, Pradera Coyaima (Tolima)
20 Miranda, Corinto Cumbitarra (Nariño)
21 Caloto, Santander de Quilichao Totoró, Cauca
29 Putumayo Puerto Leguizamo Santa Rosa (Cauca)
30 Puerto Asís Puerto Concordia (Meta)
31 Valle de Guamuez Algeciras (Huila)
32 San Miguel Florencia (Caquetá)
The evaluation included all of the municipalities in which the PNCRT was implemented (except
Arauca), but it should be noted that they were included under a more ambitious results framework, 
which was to evaluate the CSDI strategy as a whole. The CSDI was focused on 33 of the 51 
consolidation municipalities. The CELI programs were designed to serve these 33 municipalities, 
and at the time of establishing the baseline, the decision was made to measure the same variables 
in the 18 consolidation municipalities, regardless of whether or not USAID was going to intervene 
in these municipalities, but this would also allow for the establishment of the impact of the CSDI
strategy. In the end, the CSDI intervention was reduced to the CELI interventions. 
25 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
At the end of 2012, the decision was made to conduct 19,220 surveys in 31 clusters in which the 
municipalities were grouped based on their characteristics. In the PNCRT regions, 7,050 surveys 
were conducted, that is, 2,350 in each of the three regions.
9
How to read this report
An impact evaluation is a powerful tool that has significant challenges and differences in 
comparison with any other type of evaluation. These differences are described in the Limitations 
section, and are explained in greater detail in Annex 3 of the main report, which provides an 
understanding of the different types of results that this kind of evaluation generates, and how they 
should be interpreted. 
Types of results. There are four types of quantitative results in the report, as described below: 
1. Impacts. The impacts come from the analysis of the survey. They are the result of the 
difference-in-differences design and of the differences between the key results of the 
treatment and control groups. The impact figures are read as the difference in percentage 
points (pp) between the beginning and the midline that is attributable to the intervention. 
The impact data tables show the statistical significance with asterisks (*) and their titles 
begin with the word Impact. 
2. Trends. These figures also come from the survey and show how a sample changes over 
time. The trends are shown in charts rather than tables, and the titles of the figures always 
begin with the word Trends. These figures are also mentioned in the text with a percentage 
sign (%), and in absolute values. 
3. Secondary data. These data come from other sources, such as government figures and 
indices, and they help to describe the context in which the PNCRT and CELI interventions 
operate. The tables with these data are titled Secondary data.
Figure 2.3. How to read and interpret the statistical data in the report
Table title: In the text: How to read it:
Impacts pp (percentage point) Relative change over time (in comparison with control groups) 
attributable to the intervention
Trends % (percentage) Change over time in a sub-sample
Secondary data Secondary data Shows context to support the findings and/or explain the 
challenges
Entire sample and four sub-samples. From the survey, there is a large sample (of approximately 
19,000 households), which is divided into four sub-samples, whose respondents correspond to the 
CELI municipalities and their control municipalities, and the PNCRT municipalities and their 
controls. Reference is occasionally made to the complete sample, when the results for the 19,000 
households are similar. 
Direct and indirect beneficiaries. Due to the challenges confronting the design of the midline 
evaluation (see the Limitations section below), it was not possible to confirm whether all of those 
identified as beneficiaries at the beginning of the study actually received benefits from the CELIs. 
 
9
 Impact Evaluation of USAID’s CSDI Strategy. Baseline, May 2013. 
26 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
As a result, in this evaluation report all residents of villages in the treatment municipalities are 
recognized as indirect beneficiaries, with the exception of those participants in the chapter on 
Economic Development, in which it is possible to identify a population of direct CELI 
beneficiaries and to observe their progress differently from the rest of the citizens of those 
municipalities. In the case of the PNCRT municipalities, no direct beneficiaries were identified, 
that is, all beneficiaries are indirect. 
Evaluation design and methods 
EVAL, with support from the National Consulting Center (CNC), used a mixed-methods approach 
– qualitative and quantitative – to examine a set of indicators for each result of the CELIs. The 
evaluation sought to understand changes in economic opportunities, social development and civil 
society, government and institutionalization, and security as a result of the CELI interventions. 
The design replicated the baseline methodology, and used qualitative methods to obtain 
information about the population’s perceptions, opinions and experiences. Annex 3 of the main 
report presents the considerations of the complete design of the evaluation, which includes an 
impact estimate.
It should be recalled that the evaluation had a broader framework, which was to evaluate the CSDI 
strategy, and it included all 33 CELI municipalities and 18 PNCRT municipalities, for a total of 
51 consolidation municipalities (with the exception of the municipalities in Arauca). At the time 
of establishing the baseline, the decision was made to measure the same variables in the 18 
consolidation municipalities, regardless of whether USAID was going to intervene in these 
municipalities, as this would also allow for the establishment of the impact of the CSDI strategy. 
In the end, the CSDI intervention was reduced to the CELI interventions. 
This document contains the results of the evaluation in the PNCRT municipalities that were not 
beneficiaries of the CELI interventions. 
Evaluation questions
The baseline identified the evaluation questions in 2011, which were adjusted slightly (by USAID; 
see Annex 2 of the main report) and are presented below: 
Figure 2.4. Evaluation questions
QUESTION STRATEGIC LEVEL
1. What specific impacts have the CSDI interventions produced among the target 
populations in the intervention zones? IR3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
2. Do the CSDI projects show the expected level of performance in supporting the 
consolidation process? Cross-cutting
3. Does the GoC show the expected level of investment in consolidation areas after 
USAID’s assistance in the PNCRT municipalities? IR 3.2
4. What are the specific effects of the CELIs on changing the local government’s capacities 
and provision of services (serving the local population, being accountable, expanding 
social services)?
Sub-IR 3.2.1
5. What changes have been produced by the CELI interventions to strengthen the
organizational capacities of civil society organizations (CSOs) in local areas? IR 3.3
6. How much progress has been made in the recovery and reconstruction of the 
territory affected by the armed conflicts (presence of IAGs) and unlawful economic 
activities?
Cross-cutting
7. To what extent have the CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance 
and institutionalization of the territory? Sub-IR 3.2.1
27 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
QUESTION STRATEGIC LEVEL
8. To what extent have the CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and 
economic development?
IR 3.2
IR 3.3
These questions serve to measure impact (questions 1, 4-8) as well as performance (questions 2 
and 3), and they adopt a mixed-methods design in order to achieve this purpose (see the 
Methodology section and Annex 3 of the main report for more details). The interdisciplinary team 
used data from the quantitative household survey (in a pre- and post-quasi-experimental design), 
a series of qualitative instruments, a secondary data search, and a multifaceted analysis in order to 
answer these questions, whose analysis is presented in this report.
Quantitative methods 
The design of the impact evaluation includes a quantitative study of households in the 
consolidation zones, with and without CELI interventions. The control municipalities were 
selected using an advanced pairing protocol, which is described in detail in the Annexes of the 
original baseline report. The original design included an additional 12% sample, to account for the 
possibility of attrition. In the field, the midline evaluation, following a panel design, re-surveyed 
the same households in order to ensure comparability, but approximately 15% of the sample was 
lost due to attrition. Not all of the villages in the CELI municipalities had an intervention, a 
situation that was reflected in the sample. 
 
The baseline was carried out at various times over two years.
10 The timing of the midline 
evaluation was planned to be compatible with the increase in data captured in the baseline, and to 
prepare a seasonal timeline for the final evaluation. In that same discussion, it was felt that the 
midline evaluation could be more useful if carried out closer to the time when decisions about the 
new programming would be made. In that regard, the midline evaluation data were collected 
between July 20 and November 30, 2015. It is important to note that local elections (for mayors 
and governors) were held on October 25, 2015; it is possible that the atmosphere and the very 
politicized environment affected the respondents’ opinions for both the treatment and control 
zones. 
The survey instrument (Annex 8 of the main report) includes modules on demography, justice and 
security, lawful and unlawful economic opportunities and performance, government legitimacy, 
social capital and participation in community organizations, electoral behavior, social and public 
services, rights to land and property, victims’ rights, roads, social programs, and opinions about 
the future and peace. Indices such as the social capital index, the institutional performance index, 
 
10 From the baseline report: “The survey interviews were conducted in two phases: in the first phase, 65% of indirect beneficiaries and control 
families were interviewed between March 27 and July 5, 2012. In the second phase, the remaining 35% of indirect beneficiaries and control 
families, plus 100% of the direct beneficiaries, were interviewed between November 7, 2012, and May 25, 2013, with a break for Christmas and 
New Year’s.” Impact Evaluation of USAID’s Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) Baseline Report. Volume 1: Summary of findings.
June 30, 2013.
28 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
and the accountability index11 are created from the data. In general, the survey measures 
perceptions (as in the case of security), which are important and more sensitive than news and 
recent events. The survey is less effective for capturing real experiences, because most of the 
respondents have not had direct contact with changes that have occurred in the institutions or in 
security matters, for example. In this regard, there is subjectivity in the indicators that were 
designed at the time of the baseline survey. 
The evaluation added several new elements to the midline on the level of satisfaction as a result of 
the CELI intervention, and a small group of elements on victimization, extracted from the LAPOP 
survey.12 The survey was applied personally in homes, workplaces, and the municipal centers 
when it was not possible to travel to the villages for security reasons. 
The evaluation team carried out 5,671 household surveys in the three PNCRT regions studied, of 
which 2,718 were answered by men and 2,953 by women. The respondents reported unequal 
literacy rates, with the lowest in Catatumbo (75%) (Figure 2.5). In terms of ethnicity, the three 
regions have different self-identification behaviors, as can be seen in Figure 2.6. Cauca and Valle 
del Cauca, in the Colombian Pacific region, has a larger Afro-Colombian population, while the 
population in Catatumbo tends to self-identify as white or mestizo. In Putumayo, the largest 
percentage of the population self-identifies as mestizo. Indigenous communities make up a 
significant percentage of the population in Cauca/Valle del Cauca and Putumayo. What this 
information reveals is that the interventions should be differentiated in the regions. Standardized 
actions cannot necessarily respond to all population types. 
Figure 2.5. Sample by sex, region and literacy levels
Men Women Total Reported literacy 
rate
Catatumbo 1,061 863 1,924 75%
Cauca/Valle del Cauca 717 1,107 1,824 82%
Putumayo 940 983 1,923 85%
Total 2,718 2,953 5,671
 
11 Accountability.
12 The Latin American Public Opinion Project Survey (http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/), which has been implemented throughout Latin 
America by a team from Vanderbilt University over the last three decades.
29 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Figure 2.6. Sample by ethnicity
The vast majority of respondents in these three regions live in dispersed rural areas, while a small 
group lives in population centers that are not municipal seats. A small fraction lives in the 
municipal seat. (Figure 2.7) 
Figure 2.7. Sample by rurality
Dispersed rural Population center Municipal seat
Catatumbo 93% 6% 1%
Cauca/Valle del Cauca 81% 17% 2%
Putumayo 77% 19% 3%
The respondents were very optimistic about the future. The vast majority have hope that their 
conditions will improve. However, while approximately 90% of respondents in regions with some 
CELI intervention gave very positive answers about the future, the responses in Catatumbo and 
Cauca/Valle del Cauca ranged between 84% and 89%. There was very little difference between
the responses of men and women, except in Putumayo, where women were slightly more 
optimistic. 
It is worth mentioning that around 21% of respondents in Cauca/Valle del Cauca knew about the 
Colombia Responde program, which is reasonable given that CELI Central deployed its actions in 
these areas after completing the baseline. 
Other quantitative measures include an examination of key sources of secondary data, including 
the government and the EVIDINCE consortium,13 which collects quarterly municipal data on 
results of interest, such as the presence of police personnel and judicial branch officials. The GoC 
sources also provided updated data on high-impact crimes, such as homicides, acts of terrorism 
and massacres. The GoC data used in the report also include the Consolidation Index, described in 
the chapter on Regional Context below. 
 
13 A research effort associated with empirical studies of conflict (esoc.princeton.edu), a multi-institutional collaboration that studies conflicts and 
insurgency at a sub-national level.
30 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Qualitative methods 
The qualitative methods include in-depth interviews with key informants at national, regional and 
local levels in zones with CELI interventions and government interventions through the 
implementation of the PNCRT, as well as in the control municipalities. The team conducted 
structured interviews with officials of the municipalities and municipal solicitor’s offices in 21 
select locations that enabled them to capture variations between the CELI and PNCRT 
interventions and their control zones. In the PNCRT regions, visits were made to the municipalities
of Florida and Pradera in Valle del Cauca; Santander de Quilichao in Cauca; and Puerto Asís and 
Valle de Guamuez in Putumayo. Coyaima in Southern Tolima and Totoró in Cauca were also 
visited and serve as control municipalities. 
In addition, EVAL conducted interviews with leaders of civil society organizations (CSO) and 
producer associations, and issues that were parallel to those of the survey were covered in focus 
groups of citizens from the CELI and PNCRT zones, some of whom participated in the 
interventions.
The qualitative data were analyzed in Atlas.ti14 using thematic coding that reflects the evaluation 
questions and allowed for the generation of emerging codes in order to cover issues that were not 
included in the design of the evaluation. These codes were correlated to understand the coincidence 
and patterns of importance for responding to the research questions. 
The qualitative and quantitative data often have different results, because the quantitative sample 
is representative of the “average population,” while those who responded to the qualitative 
instruments were randomly chosen households in the village,
15 in a randomly selected sample of 
the universe of villages in which the intervention will be developed. 
Limitations 
The design of the evaluation used in this study has the limitations described below and are detailed
in Annex 3 of the main report: 
Factors related to the design of the evaluation: 
1. The CELIs were going to be evaluated as part of a broader and more complete 
initiative (CSDI) that did not materialize. The interventions’ results of interest are found 
in the more general levels of the Results Framework of USAID’s CDCS. The evaluation 
was designed to evaluate a set of programs that formed part of the CSDI, for which several
United States government agencies were responsible, with broader funding and objectives 
than the current set of interventions. CSDI, included in the same intervention zones, was a 
comprehensive approach designed by the United States and Colombian governments with 
regard to combating drugs, security and justice, regional and local institutions, economic 
development, regional integration, roads, and the strengthening of civil society. The 
initiative was reduced to the implementation of the CELIs, under the responsibility of 
USAID and with significant resources, but without the comprehensive approach that was 
initially envisaged. As such, the design of the impact evaluation includes sets of indicators 
 
14 Qualitative data analysis software. 15 In accordance with the baseline methodology, village leaders were contacted and they helped to create a list of village households, and a 
random selection of households to be surveyed was made from the universe of residents. Taken from the 2013 baseline.
31 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
for which there was little or no intervention. Therefore, it is not possible to detect the 
impacts of programs that no longer exist. 
If the originally planned effects had been produced, it would have been an enormous 
achievement for the CSDI. However, achieving the same impact only with the CELIs, 
without the interventions of the rest of the CSDI programs, and without the interventions 
promised by the GoC, is to expect too much. As a result, the impacts found in the 
evaluation, measured using rigorous statistical techniques, are few. The observable impacts 
occurred mainly at a local level, in direct interventions aimed at producer associations. 
2. The category of indirect beneficiaries is imprecise, and capturing the impacts of that
rather diffuse level will require more investment and more time. Several categories of 
CELI and PNCRT interventions – although they may be a priority – are probably invisible 
to the average respondent, and do not meet the minimum requirements for being recognized 
as beneficiaries, for the following reasons. First, some public goods, such as the 
strengthening of justice services or work in the mayor’s or municipal solicitor’s offices, or 
some social or productive infrastructure projects, affect very few residents in a given area. 
For example, at an international level, an average of only 6% of a specific population 
routinely accesses justice services in their lives, and a fraction of that figure does so in a 
given year. Detecting perceptions of change among this “fraction of a fraction” is very 
difficult. Second, as previously mentioned, the programming of the CELIs had goals and 
important points of reference for each of the pillars (social, economic and institutional 
development), in such a way that the resources need to be distributed among geographic 
sites and pillars. While members of a benefited productive association or civil society 
group are clear that they are part of an intervention, indirect beneficiaries are very distant 
from the benefit itself. Their inclusion in the sample dilutes the impacts that can be detected 
by the design of the evaluation. 
Had the broad set of global CSDI and GoC interventions continued as planned, perhaps 
more impacts on these higher-order indicators would have been detected. The “dose” of 
the intervention was only a fraction of what had been planned, in a much small number of 
sectors and beneficiaries, in particular indirect beneficiaries. 
Factors beyond the control of the interventions
3. Local contexts and structural poverty condition the effectiveness of the PNCRT. The 
intervention municipalities have historically been isolated with respect to their economies, 
with stagnant local markets, very limited land connectivity, activities by illegal armed 
groups, little presence of government institutions, and deep intergenerational poverty. The 
households in these areas have limited access to land – in terms of size or low productivity 
– and a deficit of human capital (education, health, nutrition), as shown in the reference 
statistics on education coverage, the perception of quality of services, and food security 
challenges.
16 The main consequence is low productivity and minimum income from the 
land and labor, which are the two main production factors of rural families. This limits 
households because it keeps them in poverty – the poverty trap – in which poverty is 
reproduced as a consequence of low savings capacity, which prevents changes in the initial 
amounts of capital, land and labor. The cycles are repeated in short periods, which does not 
 
16 See, for example, Impact Evaluation of USAID Colombia’s Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI), Baseline Report Volume 1: Summary of 
Results - All PNCRT Zones, pp. 30 and 42-43; Volume 2, pp. 47-50 and pp. 69-70; as well as the baseline reports. 
32 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
allow for the initial situation to change, and over the long-term they limit changes in the 
well-being of the next generation: young people cannot find opportunities and are forced 
to migrate or to join illegal armed groups. In this context – and others related to 
unemployment and informality – violence, in its different forms, reinforces the poverty 
trap. 
The other side of the poverty trap is communitarian: the municipalities lack access roads, 
political representation, and market formation. Political representation is generally very 
weak, which dilutes the attention of the central or departmental government, such that 
investment in roads is insufficient for developing markets in which small farmers can sell 
their products above production and transportation costs. Poverty is not only individual: 
poverty at a municipal level encompasses the collective. There is an evident absence of 
public goods that are essential for the development of entire communities and regions. The 
capacity of the rural interventions to generate significant effects on economic and social 
development is closely linked to land tenure and property rights. However, the State’s 
policy has had little success on this front, and the CELIs have faced the same – or worse –
institutional obstacles. 
4. Exogenous contextual factors that cannot be excluded. Among the exogenous factors,
17
it is important to mention the increase in inflation, caused by the global economic 
slowdown and the sharp drop in oil prices, which results in recession in economic activities 
associated with the extraction of this mineral. This occurred when information was being 
collected about the beneficiaries’ perceptions of the performance of the CELIs and 
PNCRT.
Factors related to the implementation
5. The process of selecting villages in which to work faced challenges that could affect 
the results of the evaluation. The selection of villages is the fundamental basis for the 
programs’ implementation and evaluation. The selection of the municipalities and villages 
has substantial effects on the results of the strategy and, therefore, on the impacts. The 
baseline team employed a municipality pairing system for this quasi-experimental design. 
Such systems, while imperfect, can be used to define the contrasting hypothesis about what 
would have happened in municipalities that did not receive an intervention. 
The selection of villages depended on the GoC’s “traffic light” methodology,18 which the 
Colombian army used to make an objective classification of the villages based on risk level, 
and where the PNCRT interventions could potentially be carried out. 
 
17 The role of the control municipalities is to ensure that the exogenous factors do not skew the results. Under perfect conditions, the exogenous 
factors are applicable to both types of municipalities, so that, in principle, these factors would cancel each other out. However, no quasi-experimental 
design is always perfect, and as a result, the evaluation uses covariate and cluster control to minimize possible biases.
18 The traffic light classifies the zones based on their level of security risk as follows: green: low risk; yellow: medium risk; orange: high risk; and 
red: critical risk. 
33 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
REGIONAL CONTEXT
The objective of consolidation was to establish and strengthen State institutions in the territories, 
integrate the regions economically, and build the social fabric in the zones affected by the armed 
conflict in Colombia, based on the good security results attributable to the armed forces of 
Colombia. 
The security advances are important, but not absolute; regional economic integration is promising 
but incomplete; and the institutional presence and good governance are still scarce in some zones, 
especially in rural areas. The set of conditions that fueled the armed conflict and illegal groups has 
improved, but the regional context indicators still do not show the existence of a perfect 
environment in which any intervention can achieve its objectives. 
Catatumbo Region. The Catatumbo region 
is located in the northeastern part of 
Colombia, in the Department of Norte de 
Santander, between the eastern cordillera
(mountain range) of Colombia and the 
border with Venezuela. For purposes of the 
PNCRT intervention, this region covers 
seven municipalities: Tibú, Hacarí, San 
Calixto, Teorama, Convención, El Carmen
and El Tarra. It is a region that borders 
Venezuela. The border location of 
Catatumbo, as well as the natural corridors 
and means of communication toward the 
center and the Caribbean coast have 
facilitated the legal and illegal transit of 
merchandise and people between the two 
countries.19 In general, the municipalities in 
the Catatumbo region have been affected by 
drug trafficking, the presence of IAGs, and conflicts over land tenure. According to the UACT, 
more than 6 billion pesos was invested in this region in 2015, of which 73% was in rapid response 
and alternative development programs, and 27% was in other activities co-financed by different 
levels of government and international cooperation organizations.
20
 
19 http://www.co.undp.org/content/dam/colombia/docs/Paz/undp-co-catatumbo-2014.pdf.
20 http://www.consolidacion.gov.co/?q=content/m%C3%A1s-de-6-mil-millones-de-pesos-fueron-invertidos-en-el-catatumbo-en-2015.
Source: 2013 CSDI Strategy Baseline Impact Evaluation Report, Catatumbo
Region
34 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Cauca-Valle del Cauca. The Cauca-Valle 
del Cauca region is located in the western 
part of the central cordillera of Colombia. 
For the PNCRT, this region covers seven 
municipalities: Pradera and Florida in the 
Department of Valle del Cuca, and Miranda, 
Corinto, Toribio, Caloto and Santander de 
Quilichao in the Department of Cauca. 
According to the information on the 
UACT’s website, more than 39 billion pesos 
has been invested in the five municipalities
in Cauca, of which 33 billion was directed 
to the Program against Illicit Crops, and 6 
billion was directed to rapid response 
projects.
21
 
Putumayo. The Putumayo region is located in 
the southeast of the country. The PNCRT 
intervention covers four municipalities: Puerto 
Leguízamo, Puerto Asís, San miguel and Valle 
del Guamuez.
According to the information published by the
UACT, this region has received an investment 
of more than 50 billion pesos under the 
PNCRT, which includes 23 billion from the 
Program against Illicit Crops, 8.3 billion in 
rapid response projects, and 2.9 billion pesos in 
strengthening productive organizations.22 
The Consolidation Index. The Consolidation 
Index is a tool designed to measure and monitor 
advances in the consolidation process in the 
municipalities. This index is developed from a set of 37 indicators in the three pillars of the 
PNCRT, each of which has several components, as shown in Figure 3.1 below: 
Figure 3.1. Index of consolidation pillars and their components 
Pillar Components
1 Territorial
institutionalization 
Security, justice, property rights 
and human rights
2 Citizen participation and 
good governance
Good governance, citizen 
participation, and social capital 
 
21 http://www.consolidacion.gov.co/?q=content/regional-cauca.
22 http://www.consolidacion.gov.co/?q=content/regional-putumayo.
Source: 2013 CSDI Strategy Baseline Impact Evaluation Report, Cauca-Valle 
del Cauca Region
Source: 2013 CSDI Strategy Baseline Impact Evaluation Report, Putumayo 
Region
35 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Pillar Components
3 Regional Integration Connectivity, social services, and 
economic growth
Each pillar constitutes a third of the final score on a scale of 0 to 100. Since 2011, Consolidation 
Index data have been compiled for each consolidation municipality, together with information 
about a group of corresponding comparison municipalities. The scores are disaggregated by pillar 
or through the indicators that make up each pillar: by time, by geography (municipality, 
department and region), and by type of service. 
As mentioned above, the PNCRT regions included in this study are Catatumbo (Norte de 
Santander), Cauca and Valle del Cauca, and Putumayo. Their municipalities are the following: 
Figure 3.2. Secondary data: Consolidation Index: municipalities in the three PNCRT regions
Norte de Santander
(Catatumbo)
Cauca/ Valle del 
Cauca Putumayo
Convención Caloto Puerto Asís
El Carmen Corinto Puerto Leguízamo
El Tarra Miranda San Miguel
Hacarí Santander de Quilichao Valle del Guamuez
San Calixto Toribío
Teorama Florida
Tibú Pradera
There was a positive trend in the scores of the index for each of these regions between 2011 and 
2014, with Catatumbo presenting the smallest increase and Putumayo the largest, as shown in 
Figure 3.3: 
Figure 3.3. Consolidation Index: General scores by region
53,6 56,1 56,4 54,9 61,2 63,0
63,9 70,4 68,9 62,9
72,6 73,2
45,6 49,6
58,9 64,1
0,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
90,0
100,0
2011 2012 2013 2014
Catatumbo Cauca Valle Putumayo
36 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
The index’s general score for the municipalities analyzed grew during the period 2011-2014, with 
the exception of those in the Catatumbo region. Pillar 3 (regional integration) obtained the highest 
score of the three pillars and marks the general scores at various points. Pillar 1, territorial 
institutionalization, received the lowest score for the Catatumbo, Cauca and Valle del Cauca
municipalities, while Pillar 2, good governance, was the weakest in Putumayo. 
The Consolidation Index is made up of indicators, each of which has strengths, weaknesses and 
particular points of view that must be taken into account when making comparisons between the 
scores and evaluation data. 
First, the Index’s indicators are, in general, data from a government perspective, reported in many 
cases by municipal, departmental and national public officials, and are far from the perceptions 
reported by citizens with regard to the same issues of the survey (security, institutionality, etc.). 
Neither is more “correct” than the other, and they are not precisely comparable. Decisions made 
on the basis of one or the other case affect the results: On the one hand, many index indicators are 
based on data from the main population centers (reported in many cases by public officials and in 
other cases by citizens). In contrast are the data that come out of the survey, with 90% of its sample 
from dispersed rural areas, 8% from population centers other than the municipal seat, and only 2% 
from the municipal seat. 
Second, the scores of many indicators are weighted in order to be compared with municipalities
that have comparable socioeconomic levels, and as a result high scores are obtained even when 
the absolute scores are among the worst in the country. For example, in the Open Government 
indicator (figures from the GoC’s Open Government Index), the Index score in 2014 in Tolima 
was 59.5, but this was adjusted or normalized to 90.8 for purposes of the comparison with similar 
municipalities. This is not an index flaw, but it is important to take into consideration that the 
scores are modified in this way before being added. 
Security component. The security component of the Consolidation Index measures the 
percentage of a municipality’s main population centers in which the police carry out control 
operations without the assistance of the military forces, the implementation of comprehensive 
citizen coexistence and security plans, the number of terrorist and subversive acts, and density and 
changes in the production of coca. The following findings were made in the period between the
first measurement of the index and the midline (2014): 
• In the Catatumbo region, although a citizen security plan had been formulated, there was a 
consistent downward trend in the rest of the indicators. There was an upward trend in the 
density of coca crops. 
• In the Cauca/Valle del Cauca subregion, there were 59 terrorist and subversive acts in 2014, 
for an average of 24.95 in the measurement of these two indicators of the Consolidation 
Index.
23 At the time, there was only a general scheme for the security plan. 
• The most positive indicator in Putumayo in 2014 was the total absence of subversive 
actions; the level of establishment of the Comprehensive Citizen Security Plan (PICS) for 
 
23 It should be noted that the indicator reaches 100 whin there is a total absence of terrorist and subversive actions. 
37 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
this region was 75%, on average.
24 The situation with respect to coca is very precarious, 
although slightly better than in 2013. 
• The military presence in the four regions continues to be high in relation to the police 
presence. 
It is likely that the 2015 data25 will show a significant deterioration in the security indicators, and 
that they will evidence the increase in coca production that has already been reported by different 
media. According to various data sources, the area of coca cultivation in Colombia increased from
80,000 to 159,000 hectares between 2013 and 2015.26
On the other hand, the respondents in the Catatumbo region perceive that the security situation has 
worsened. While 60% of the respondents in the baseline survey stated that the security situation in 
their place of residence was good or very good, only 45% did so in the midline survey. Only 28% 
responded that security had improved over the last two years, in comparison with 33% in the 
baseline survey. Eighty-six percent of respondents in the baseline survey stated that they would 
recommend that a relative return to the area, but this percentage fell to 81% in the midline survey. 
In the Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca regions, the perception of security was stable between
the baseline and the midline, while in Catatumbo, 14% more respondents in the midline believed 
that there was more insecurity (Figure 3.4). On the other hand, the percentage of respondents in 
Putumayo who thought that the security situation had improved over the previous two years rose 
from 23% in the baseline to 37% in the midline. The percentage of such respondents in 
Cauca/Valle del Cauca rose from 15% to 19% in the same period of time. 
Figure 3.4. Perception of security (security is good or very good) 
Source: Data from the baseline and midline evaluations, authors’ calculations 27
 
24 This is the result of the weighting of the measurement of the indicator for the implementation of the PICS in the four municipalities in Putumayo. 
Puerto Asís and Valle del Guamuez appear with 100% implemented, while Puerto Leguízamo and San Miguel have 50% implemented. It should 
be noted that these are the results obtained after the weighting made by the Consolidation Index. 
25 The Consolidation Index data had still not been published by the time this evaluation was completed.
26 The Crime and Narcotics Center (CNC) of the Central Intelligence Agency (USA) produces an annual estimate of the area cultivated with coca 
in the Andean region. Its latest results were presented to the GoC in March 2016. The main conclusions, from national statistics, were disseminated 
in the media. The cultivation of coca in Colombia reached a historic low in 2013 (in both SIMCI and CNC-DoD measurements). Over the next two 
years, however, the growth was sustained and drastic. In the last CNC measurement, the number of cultivated hectares doubled, from 80,000 to 
159,000, with a proportional increase in the production of cocaine, from 290 to 442 metric tons. The complete report is not accessible to the public. 
The statistics cited here are found in the articles published in the El Tiempo newspaper, Semana magazine and the El Espectador newspaper on 
March 15, 2016 (http://www.eltiempo.com/mundo/ee-uu-y-canada/ee-uu-advierte-de-aumento-de-cultivos-de-coca-en-colombia/16537123). 27 The source for all of the report’s tables and charts is the database of the baseline and midline surveys conducted for the impact evaluation of the 
CELI interventions, unless otherwise indicated. 
40%
60%
41% 46% 45% 45%
0%
50%
100%
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
2012 2015
38 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Figure 3.5. Perception of security (belief that security has improved) 
Source: Data from the baseline and midline evaluations, authors’ calculations28
An important element to review with regard to security is illegal mining. The three regions reported
a significant increase over what was reported in the baseline (Figure 3.6). That is, a higher 
percentage of respondents reported that illegal mining currently exists in their town or village. 
Figure 3.6. Trends in illegal mining
Baseline Midline Impact
Putumayo 2.2% 6.7% 0.0387**
Catatumbo 0.9% 5.9% 0.0628
Cauca/Valle del Cauca 5.7% 6.4% 0.0726
As mentioned above, the EVIDINCE consortium carried out an independent collection of data at 
a municipal level for a set of indicators related to security, good governance, citizen participation, 
social capital, and economic growth. Its security-related data have been added to an Insecurity 
Index, in which higher scores reflect higher insecurity. The information collected by EVIDINCE 
is related to such variables as the homicide, robbery and theft rates; informal or illegal mining 
managed by illegal armed groups; and the presence of notices or graffiti alluding to illegal armed 
groups in the municipal seat on the day of the data-collection visit. 
The data below show the quarterly variations in the above-described index in the PNCRT
municipalities (T2) and their control municipalities (C2) (Figure 3.7). The data show a sustained 
positive trend in security for the PNCRT regions, and greater volatility in the control zones, 
suggesting a positive impact due to the presence of the Territorial Consolidation Policy. 
 
28 Id. 
23%
33%
15%
37% 36%
19%
0%
20%
40%
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca
Línea base Línea media
39 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Figure 3.7. Secondary data: EVIDINCE quarterly Insecurity Index 
Note: Index created using the principal factor method for variables
related to the presence of homicides, robberies, thefts, illegal mining 
exploitation managed by illegal armed groups, and notices alluding to 
illegal armed groups in the municipality
The three regions reported a decline in the presence of the police and military forces in the region. 
In Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca, the respondents reported an improvement with respect 
to the quality of security services provided by the police and military forces in the places in which 
they remained. There was no major change in this indicator in Catatumbo between the baseline 
and midline surveys. 
The data of the EVIDINCE consortium show that the police presence increased, at least in the 
municipal seats of the control municipalities. The municipal seats of the PNCRT municipalities 
experienced a slight reduction in police presence in 2015, as shown in the following figure: 
40 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Figure 3.8. Secondary data: EVIDINCE Insecurity Index
Note: Logarithm of the number of police in the municipal seat
Conclusion 1. Security policies have had a positive effect in these regions despite the 
persistence of common crime, extortion, forced recruitment, the presence of IAGs and illegal 
mining. Respondents have a more positive image of the police due to improvement in service 
delivery. 
Illicit crops and a culture of legality. At the regional level, respondents in Putumayo reported a 
decline in coca crops in their villages, from 35% (baseline) to 33% (midline). Respondents in 
Catatumbo reported a significant increase, from 17% to 29%. Respondents in Cauca also reported 
an increase, from 6% to 8%, which is small in absolute terms. 
In general, households’ perceptions of the legality of coca crops worsened between the baseline
and the midline, as they did in the control municipalities (Figure 3.9), and responses to the three 
survey questions on this topic show a similar pattern. As can be seen, a smaller percentage of 
respondents in the three regions (13% on average) believe that coca should not be cultivated 
because it is illegal. According to the data, there is a greater tolerance for cultivation. This finding
coincides with the 2014 Consolidation Index data and other sources that indicate significant growth 
in coca cultivation in these regions over the last two years. 
Figure 3.9. Trends: Perception that coca should not be cultivated because it is illegal (agree/strongly 
agree) 
84%
95%
94%
69%
82%
83%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Putumayo
Catatumbo
Cauca/Valle
Baseline Midline
41 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
On the other hand, the respondents in Putumayo, like those in their control municipalities, 
indicated their willingness to report crimes at the same rate as in the baseline. They are more likely
(around 80%) to report kidnappings or the theft of livestock or crops, and less likely (around 45%) 
to report illicit crops in the area. About 65% were willing to report extortion, bribery, and threats. 
The respondents in Catatumbo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca were 10 percentage points more likely
in the midline to report all types of crime. 
The preference for a culture of legality expressed by respondents in municipalities with 
Consolidation Policy interventions, their controls, and municipalities with CELI interventions
decreased with respect to the baseline. They responded to two questions (Figure 3.10) related to 
their conduct and the conduct of their communities: (1) How often to you act in accordance with 
the law?” (left side of Figure 3.10); and (2) In your opinion, how often does your community act 
in accordance with the law?” (right side of the Figure 3.10). The decrease in the percentage of 
affirmative responses (always or almost always) is evident. That is, there was a significant 
deterioration (36 points in the worst case) in the culture of legality in regions where there had been 
some type of intervention, in this case by the government. 
Figure 3.10. Trends: Opinions on the value of laws and compliance with them (always/almost 
always)
The survey asked about respondents’ positions with regard to people who have negative opinions 
about the Colombian government. They were asked whether they approve of people who refer to 
the government in a negative way. The percentage of respondents who said “I approve” or “I 
strongly approve” increased in all regions in which the PNCRT was implemented (Figure 3.11). 
Also, several questions were asked about whether people who have negative opinions about the 
government should be able to vote, engage in peaceful protests, be elected to public office, and 
give speeches on television. The results were more positive than in the baseline, particularly in 
Catatumbo. 
Figure 3.11. Trends: Perceptions about actors with negative opinions of the GoC
Conclusion 2. There is awareness about the benefits of crop substitution, but the efforts need 
to be supported. While the data demonstrate that the respondents in the midline measurement 
were more aware of the damage caused by illicit crops, a fact that could result in a reduction of 
plantings, the evaluation team believes that the eradication policy should be strengthened, as 
91% 95% 95%
68%
80% 77%
55%
69% 64%
45% 56% 48%
0%
50%
100%
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
Baseline Midline
22% 6% 16% 29% 39% 31%
0%
50%
100%
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
Baseline Midline
42 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
should the provision of public goods necessary to generate lawful economies (road infrastructure, 
for example). 
Another element analyzed by the evaluation team was respondents’ perceptions of the impact of 
the presence of IAGs. The percentage of respondents in the PNCRT municipalities who believe 
that IAGs have a negative effect on municipal performance declined with respect to the baseline. 
(Figure 3.12) 
Figure 3.12. Trends: Negative impact of the presence of IAGs on municipal performance
Human rights, justice and the legitimacy of the State. The Consolidation Index data show 
that human rights violations persist in the PNCRT municipalities, even though some of the 
following indicators have improved:
• No massacres or murders of leaders or high-profile authorities have been reported since 
2011 in any of the four departments studied. 
• In 2014, Catatumbo reported 3,900 displaced persons (more than triple the number reported 
in 2013), 14 mine incidents, and 10 cases of extortive kidnapping, with figures higher than 
the period 2011-2013. The implementation of Human Rights Committees in the 
municipalities in this region has progressed 30% to date, on average. 
• Putumayo has a Human Rights Committee with good performance grades. The number of 
mine incidents and forced displacements has declined from previous years. However, the 
four municipalities in the zone have reported a total of 3,120 displaced persons. There were 
no extortive kidnappings in 2013, but there were two in 2014. 
• In Cauca/Valle del Cauca, no kidnappings were reported in 2014, but the number of 
displaced persons (2,194) and mine incidents (8) increased with respect to 2013 (768 and 
5, respectively.) Three municipalities have operating Human Rights Committees, while the 
implementation of these committees in the remaining four municipalities has progressed 
only 30%. 
The survey data report low levels of human rights violations. Around 8% of the respondents in
Putumayo reported having experienced some violation of their human rights, the same as in the 
baseline. In Catatumbo, the number rose from 4% to 7% between the baseline and the midline, and 
in the Cauca/Valle del Cauca region it rose from 5% in the baseline to 6% in the midline. 
Citizens in PNCRT municipalities were less likely than residents of CELI zones not to report the 
violation of their rights. In the baseline survey, victims in Cauca were more likely to blame the 
guerrilla for the reported violations, and less likely to blame the military forces or state entities. 
Victims in Catatumbo were less likely to accuse state forces, and more likely to report being 
victims of the guerrillas, bacrim (criminal bands) or paramilitaries. Victims of these kinds of 
violations in Putumayo were more likely to report that they did not know who was responsible. 
42% 51% 59%
28% 22% 26%
0%
50%
100%
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
Baseline Midline
43 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
According to the information collected from focus groups, municipalities in the southeast part of 
Valle del Cauca faced a difficult security situation, due to the presence of common crime, drug 
trafficking and illegal armed groups. The police have few resources. The police station in the 
municipality of Florida was destroyed in a capture by guerrillas, and has not been rebuilt: 
Three years ago I requested that Consolidation help me with the security part that Florida badly 
needs, it needs a new police station, it needs vehicles, it needs manpower strength, men… just plans, 
but nothing real. In the security part, the Army did its work with few resources, in the rural part, 
and the National Police in the urban part … that’s how security has arrived there little by little. So 
I say that Consolidation or Colombia Responde has not responded to me, as Secretary of 
Government, with security. (Secretary of Government, Florida, Valle del Cauca) 
An additional factor that affects regional security and the institutionalization of the territory is 
access to justice in cases of violations of citizens’ rights. A majority of respondents in the PNCRT, 
CELI and control regions stated that they do not believe that the courts guarantee fair trials, despite 
slight increases in the number of respondents who do. This opinion rose from 5.5% to 8.3% in 
Putumayo; from 7% to 10.4% in Catatumbo; and from 7.3% to 7.5% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca.
The percentage of respondents who have resorted to the formal justice system to resolve their own 
or their family’s disputes fell in Putumayo and Catatumbo, contrary to what occurred in the
Cauca/Valle del Cauca region. (Figure 3.13) 
Figure 3.13. Trends: Where citizens resolve disputes
In both the baseline and midline surveys, the respondents in the three regions were inclined to 
resolve their disputes without support from any state entity or the JACs. Seventy percent of 
respondents in the baseline survey stated that there were formal justice institutions available in 
their zones of influence, but this percentage fell to 23% in Putumayo, 18% in Catatumbo and 4% 
in Cauca/Valle del Cauca in the midline. 
It is interesting that among those who responded positively to the existence of justice institutions, 
there was a permanent increase between the baseline and the midline in the percentage who 
confirmed that these services had improved: from 16% to 18% in Putumayo, from 14% to 23% in 
Catatumbo, and from 11% to 36% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca. 
0,0% 10,0% 20,0% 30,0% 40,0% 50,0% 60,0% 70,0% 80,0% 90,0% 100,0%
Baseline
Midline
Baseline
Midline
Baseline
Midline
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
Formal justice institutions Police or military JAC Resolve with another party Do nothing
44 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
The Consolidation Index also has access-to-justice indicators. In Figure 3.13, the Consolidation 
Index data show a high presence of the judicial apparatus in Cauca/Valle del Cauca, and a moderate 
presence in Putumayo. This would appear to contradict the survey responses regarding the 
presence of formal justice services, which fell by more than 70% on average in the three regions, 
to 23% in Putumayo, 18% in Catatumbo, and 4% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca. Even so, between the 
baseline and the midline, each region reported an increase in the perception of the quality of justice 
services. 
The justice brigades sent to rural areas comprise the second Consolidation Index indicator, which
has low scores in the three regions, with the lowest in Catatumbo, where it was below 20%. In 
Putumayo the indicator peaked in 2013, and then dropped back to zero in 2014. The figure in 
Cauca/Valle del Cauca was better during the first two years in which Index data was collected, 
around 30%, but then fell again in 2013 and 2014. 
Figure 3.14. Trends: Where citizens resolve their disputes, according to Consolidation Index data
The focus groups reported that the judicial system is perceived as slow and saturated with 
proceedings. The courts in the municipalities in northern Cauca are small, have few resources, and 
must deal with drug trafficking, public order crimes, extortion by armed groups, and common 
crimes (fights, domestic violence and civil proceedings). The criminal accusatory system seems to 
have collapsed: 
Justice in Colombia, I see it as a very pachydermic system … for me, this new system has collapsed, 
because it is a system of hearings. … they catch more than two thousand kilos at the checkpoints 
on a daily basis …So hearings for Law 30 (of 86) [National Narcotics Statute], hearings for 
domestic violence, hearings for failure to pay child support, hearings for personal injuries, 
hearings for thefts, here they have hearings for everything … the Sectional Prosecutor should be 
working from Toribio, but he is working from here because there is no security there. (Municipal 
Solicitor’s Office, Caloto, Cauca)
The legitimacy of the State in consolidation zones is limited by its weak capacity to equitably 
provide services in any region (Figure 3.15). The data on the perception of respect for the 
institutions fell between the baseline and the midline, which coincides with the findings related to 
citizens’ trust in the government (see the chapters on institutional and social development). It is 
reasonable to assume that the local elections, which were held during the same period in which 
data was collected for this evaluation, negatively affected these figures. 
79 79
57 61
95 95 86 98 78 78 91 84
0
50
100
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014
Catatumbo Cauca/Valle Putumayo
Judicial apparatus Brigades
45 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Figure 3.15. Trends: Respect for national institutions 
The question aimed at ascertaining whether the GoC should be supported received similar 
responses in the three PNCRT regions, with a downward trend in the Putumayo municipalities. 
The respondents were also asked their opinion about the protection of their basic rights in 
Colombia, and only 10.5% of the respondents in Putumayo answered in a positive manner, which 
represents a decline from the 13% of the baseline. The figures for Cauca/Valle del Cauca were 
similar, and the responses in Catatumbo were slightly more positive, rising from 12.3% in the 
baseline to 15% in the midline. 
The Consolidation Index measures the presence of the “judicial apparatus,” that is, the formal 
judicial and administrative system, the Municipal Solicitor’s Office, the Ombudsman’s Office and 
(where applicable) the indigenous jurisdiction. The scores related to the presence of these bodies 
were on average 93 out of 100 in Cauca/Valle del Cauca, 69 in Catatumbo and 83 in Putumayo. 
EVIDINCE collects information about the presence of judges and other officials on a given day.29
Figure 3.15 shows the results of this survey for the PNCRT municipalities (T2) and their controls 
(C2). There was a more sustained upward trend in the PNCRT municipalities, despite variations 
in some years. There was a small increase between August 2012 and August 2015 in the number 
of officials present and attending to citizens, reaching an average of 2.5 out of the four (4) types 
of officials reviewed: prosecutor, judge, municipal solicitor and notary. 
 
29 The data are collected by local residents who go to the judicial offices to observe whether the officials are present and attending to citizens.
57,1% 52,2% 54,2%
27,2% 41,1% 36,1%
0,0%
50,0%
100,0%
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
Baseline Midline
46 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Figure 3.16. Secondary data: EVIDINCE survey data on the presence of justice sector officials in 
their jobs 
Source: EVIDINCE panel of quarterly data, authors’ calculations. 
Conclusion 3. Despite efforts to achieve the legitimacy of the State, human rights violations
by State actors have not decreased significantly, and deficiencies in access to formal justice 
services persist. According to the survey responses in these regions, the guerrillas are seen as the 
most responsible for human rights violations, with a growing number of violations being attributed 
to bacrim. But the most surprising fact is the poor capacity of the State to defend the population. 
The respondents indicated low levels of response by the competent entities to reported violations, 
and lack of recognition of those who violate the rights of citizens, which ultimately means less 
legitimacy of the formal justice system. Access-to-justice mechanisms continue to be a great 
challenge for promoting a sustainable order that generates trust. 
Peace process 
Approximately one third of the survey respondents (in all regions) supported the peace talks in 
Havana “a lot” or “very much”. The Montes de María region had the highest index of support for 
the peace process, with 41% of respondents giving positive responses with regard to the cause of 
peace with the FARC, followed by Tumaco with 38%. The regions with the lowest levels of 
approval of the peace talks were Bajo Cauca and Southern Córdoba, with 29%, and Catatumbo, 
with 31%. Around a quarter of the respondents reported very little support for the peace talks. It is 
worth mentioning that the data obtained by specialized companies varied a lot over the period 
during which their opinion polls were conducted, and so when this evaluation is completed in 
August 2016, the information collected in the field may be different from the opinion polls in some
ways. 
From a qualitative point of view, the evaluation team found that the government’s peace 
negotiations with the FARC guerrillas have had specific security-related effects for the 
communities in the regions of influence of this armed group. In Putumayo, the cessation of 
hostilities by the guerrillas made it possible to engage in productive and transportation activities 
that had not been possible because of the armed conflict. 
47 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
…It started to change a little five months ago. I think that the conversations that the 
National Government has had with the illegal groups have had exceptional results. We are 
now fortunate that people can come even by the road from Puerto Vega, Teteyé, Campo 
Alegre, El Tigre, without any problem. This was impossible seven months ago. (Secretary 
of Rural Development, Valle del Guamuez, Putumayo) 
In these regions, where the conflict has been experienced directly and has left a large number of 
victims, the peace agreement has been very positively received. For the population of Putumayo, 
peace is a necessity: 
Peace… I mean, in the center of the country, I don’t know, they don’t see the need for it so 
much, but here in this territory it is impressive how... [the people] clamor for that and 
practically everybody is saying yes. If the government and the other people reach those 
agreements and those common agreements are good, and peace is signed in March, believe 
me, it will be sustainable, they themselves will sustain it. (Secretary of Agriculture of La 
Hormiga)
We are the ones who have suffered, we are the ones who have had to hide under the tree, 
under the bed, in a hole, with everyone on top of each other. So for us it is [better] for there 
to be no conflict, no armed confrontation. Since, ultimately –don’t give us roads, don’t give 
us I don’t know what – but let us live in peace. I think that the peace process [is important] 
for us, we are begging all the spirits of life and God and whoever... because that is going 
to bring us tranquility, so that we can move ahead. I do believe that there is hope for the 
indigenous peoples here, because they have earned it and we hope that we will continue to 
strengthen ourselves. (Indigenous focus group, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo) 
However, there are concerns in the community about the incorporation of ex-guerrillas into 
society, and in particular there are great fears about the possible emergence of criminal bands 
from dissident portions of the FARC: 
We have to look at the issue of production in the post-conflict era, what we are producing. 
And we will have to see what is going to happen with “those people,” because someone 
who is taught to receive one, two, three million pesos a week, and they tell him, look, the 
government is offering you a minimum wage, and work, and the other with only an extortion 
call. So the government does have to look very carefully at what it is going to do, because 
the question is very difficult, for the post-conflict issue. (Municipal Solicitor’s Office, 
Caloto, Cauca) 
One of the primary needs of the communities with regard to the peace process is to arrive at the 
truth and to ensure that the perpetrators recognize their responsibility in order to return the dignity 
of the victims, in some way: 
Well, as an organization, I mean us, I would have raised that concern with the committee, 
it’s that at least now they are saying that they are going to disarm, they are talking about 
that now, after they sign the agreement. But as I said to the people, those on the committee, 
Will the guerrillas not recognize the victims, everyone whom they have victimized? 
(Leader, Victims’ Association, Caloto, Cauca) 
However, the residents of the southern part of Valle del Cauca, for example, are skeptical about 
the Havana peace talks, since they do not perceive changes in the security situation in their
municipality, as armed groups, criminal bands and common crime are still present: 
48 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Yes, many threats, the FARC are here underground, the guerrillas, the Gabriel Galvis 
column is here underground. It’s that the dialogues are just in Cuba, they are happy there 
in Cuba, there are in peace there, having breakfast, lunch and dinner, a nice breeze, good 
rum, good cigars and good sea. But here common citizens continue to be victims of 
landmines, here they haven’t carried out humanitarian demining, peace is for those who 
are resting comfortably in the middle of an island where no one is going to attack them. I 
am the Secretary of Government, I am exposed, I don’t have any type of security, neither 
does the community, there is a lot of common crime here… common because there is no 
investment by the State, the politicians come here only for votes, but not for anything else. 
(Office of the Secretary of Government, Florida, Valle del Cauca) 
Conclusion 4. The clarification of the truth generates positive effects. Memory-building 
processes are key for achieving true reconciliation. However, fears persist of a possible increase 
in violence after the demobilization. 
Conclusion 5. There is hope in the peace process, but there are fears. The peace process is 
seen as an opportunity, but the population perceives the possibility of an increase in violence in 
the region after the demobilization. 
Recommendations 
1. Continue with strategies to guarantee security and the presence of the Public Forces and 
control bodies. The security of the territory requires having effective regional information 
systems (about acts of terrorism, common crime, identification of the frameworks of operation 
of the IAGs, modalities, responsible parties), and mechanisms for responding to the 
communities’ reports. EVAL recommends the development of an instrument that will enable 
detection of local justice needs in order to apply differential criteria in each region. 
2. The technical assistance provided to productive processes should be sustainable. The 
sustainability of productive processes by the communities is ensured to the extent that the 
interventions are based on rigorous knowledge of the communities’ traditions and how they use 
the land, and to the extent that these characteristics are present throughout the chain in order to 
empower the farmers and to advance the crop substitution processes in a disciplined manner. 
Another key element for the sustainability of the interventions is the transformation of realities 
based on effective training and communication processes, and the improved provision of public 
goods, such as road infrastructure, in order to increase market access. 
3. The peace process must overcome the stigmatization of demobilized militants. The regional 
contexts that the National Center for Historical Memory develops are essential for the truth￾clarifying processes established in the Victims’ Law and for reconciliation. It is recommended 
that future interventions incorporate these strategies in order to understand and strengthen 
community of demobilized militants. 
49 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Evaluation question: To what extent have the CELI interventions contributed to regional 
integration and economic development? 
Findings and conclusions
According to the information from the respondents, the economic situation has been stable in the 
regions in which the National Territorial Consolidation Policy has been implemented and which 
have not had CELI interventions, although it has worsened in some cases. This reality is similar to 
that found in the control municipalities and even the CELI municipalities. Therefore, the lower 
development scores in these zones cannot be attributed to actions of the government through the 
PNCRT. 
The opinions on the deterioration of the economic situation were most negative in Putumayo and 
Cauca/Valle del Cauca. The situation is different in Catatumbo, where there was an increase of 
three percentage points in the responses to the question about whether the economic situation in
the respondents’ places of residence is good or very good. (Figure 4.1) 
Figure 4.1. The economic situation in my place of residence is good or very good 
On the other hand, the respondents in the PNCRT zones (like those in the CELI and control zones) 
were more optimistic than at baseline about problems related to their productive projects. 
Performance and lack of opportunities are considered less problematic than at baseline, and 
unlawful activities are considered as a less attractive option. To the question about whether the 
low income generated by the productive projects is a problem, only a fraction of those who 
responded in the affirmative in the baseline did so in the midline. Income has increased: the 
respondents reported monthly expenses that were 12% higher in Putumayo, 11% higher in 
Catatumbo and 44% higher in Cauca. These increases are not attributable to the PNCRT 
interventions or an improvement in conditions, since they were similar in the control zones. 
On the other hand, the households perceived that there is less food security at midline than at 
baseline, as shown in Figure 4.2. The gray bars represent respondents whose families are 
experiencing hunger, based on their responses. This perception increased significantly in the three 
regions between the baseline and the midline: a little more than a quarter of the households stated 
that they are experiencing hunger. The red bars show the responses of families as to whether or 
not they are living in extreme poverty. The percentage of respondents who answered in the 
affirmative has tripled in the three regions. The light blue line represents the percentage of
respondents who were worried about running out of food for lack of money during the week prior
to the survey. More than three quarters of the families had this concern. The dark blue line, which 
corresponds to more than a quarter of the families surveyed, shows the number of households that
stated that they ran out of food during the week prior to the survey because of a lack of money. 
49%
22% 28%
7%
25% 19%
0%
50%
100%
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
Baseline Midline
50 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
There is an upward trend in this indicator in all regions between baseline and midline. Respondent 
data in the control zones are similar, and so there is no impact. 
Figure 4.2. Impact on the perception of food security 
Similarly, it was found in the focus groups that the economic situation of small agricultural 
producers in southeast Valle del Cauca is quite difficult because of the low prices for their 
products, the costs of middlemen, and the difficulty of marketing directly: 
There are many problems with the middlemen, they pay once a month, they pay once every 15 days, 
not all, because [some] don’t pay… When we were going to the trainings they told us that they 
were going to help us sell directly to the supermarkets, to have another…, how it won’t happen to 
us, and they haven’t returned to have meetings … they were going to help market them in order to 
have a better price and everything. But so far they haven’t done any of that. Just promises. 
(Women’s focus group, Florida, Valle del Cauca). 
Despite the negative findings regarding the economic situation, monthly income (measured in 
terms of estimated household expenses) has grown in the three regions (Figure 4.3). Cauca/Valle 
del Cauca reported the biggest improvement in income (44%). Catatumbo reported an 11% 
increase and Putumayo a 12% increase. However, in absolute values the three regions continue to 
be below the minimums established by the government of Colombia for exceeding the poverty line 
and the monthly minimum wage, particularly in Putumayo. 
6%
29%
7%
27%
10%
29% 26%
86%
14%
61%
26%
91%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Baseline Midline Baseline Midline Baseline Midline
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
The family is experiencing hunger
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money
51 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Figure 4.3. Trends in estimated monthly expenses (income proxy)30 in COP
The Consolidation Index measures economic growth with two indicators: the presence of financial 
services and hectares cultivated. The Consolidation Index data show stable growth in financial 
services in Putumayo, and an improvement in the number of hectares cultivated (Figure 4.4). The 
most stable growth in the number of hectares cultivated is in Cauca. 
Figure 4.4. Secondary data: Consolidation Index score with respect to the presence of financial 
entities and number of hectares cultivated
Source: Consolidation Index data, authors’ calculations
From the point of view of development, the young population merits particular analysis. It can be 
concluded from the survey responses that the most critical situation is experienced by young 
people, primarily due to the lack of educational services that would enable them to access a 
professional or technical degree. Consequently, young people often take precarious and poorly 
paid jobs. This situation worries the mothers of these young people, because a lack of opportunities 
can lead to involvement in criminal activities: 
[Finding work] is more difficult for men, at least where I live there are a lot of guys who are 
unemployed, guys who have finished high school and don’t have the resources to enter a university. 
 
30 The survey asked about monthly expenses instead of income, since it has been demonstrated that income measurements are not reliable in 
household surveys. This phenomenon has been documented over decades in developed countries and in a large part of Latin America. Rural surveys 
tend to present the worst performance in correctly capturing family income, for several reasons: income comes from various sources; the households 
receive payments in kind; they receive irregular payments and their income changes based on the season; and illegal payments will probably not 
be reported, etc. Estimates show that reported expenses are in some cases higher than the income reported in the same survey (Rogers and Gray 
1994; Jencks 1997; Sabelhaus and Groen 2000); Bruce D. Meyer and James X. Sullivan (2003), Measuring the Wellbeing of the Poor Using Income 
and Consumption. National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper Series; Working Paper 9760, consulted on February 2, 2014 at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9760, p. 18. Expenses are considered to be more precise because there are fewer reasons to under-report them. 
However, in order to obtain good estimates, very detailed instruments are needed, which adds some 20 to 30 minutes to a survey. We decided not 
to take this type of measurement, but rather to continue using the measurement established in the baseline, in order to preserve comparability and 
minimize the burden imposed by the instrument. See, for example, Pettersson, Hans. (2005), Chapter XXIV: Survey design and sample design in 
household budget surveys, in Household Sample Surveys in Developing and Transition Countries, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Statistics Division, Studies in Methods Series F No. 96, available at http://unstats.un.org/unsd/pubs/gesgrid.asp?id=349. 
314518
435130 410891 353437
480927
589750
12% 11%
44%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
PNCRT baseline PNCRT midline % Cambio
33 33
66
52 58 58
76 68
48 48
72
87
0
20
40
60
80
100
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014
Catatumbo Cauca Putumayo
Financial entities Hectares in cultivation
52 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
To work they can occasionally carry a load, but that isn’t constant for them. If they send trainings 
for the young people, I think that we would lower [the number of …] so many young people who
are ruined by vice. (Women’s focus group, Florida, Valle del Cauca) 
On the other hand, from a sectoral point of view, in the opinion of those interviewed in the 
qualitative analysis, one of the issues that affects the economic situation is the extractive industries. 
The focus groups stated that oil production in the Department of Putumayo has been a very 
important area of the economy, but the communities are critical of it because of its environmental 
consequences. They also believe that it generates precarious employment, and that it causes 
farmers to refrain from engaging in agricultural production: 
One of the factors is that, anyway, the subsoil belongs to the State and the protection of that 
resource is the [responsibility] of the State. The other situation could be security with respect to 
the environment, so sometimes we say that we don’t know whether or not it’s a blessing to have the 
oil, the few jobs that it generates, the bad habits it causes people to adopt, those few who live in 
that situation, because it separates them from the land. (Secretary of Agricultural Development, 
Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo) 
Conclusion 1. Families’ economic situations have worsened. There was an increase in 
respondents’ perceptions that their lives would always be marked by extreme poverty. However, 
in the midline survey they stated that they have greater opportunities and that their productive 
activities are more profitable. They also stated that they are aware of the positive effects of 
associative processes and assistance in adopting technological methods in their productive 
projects. 
Support for productive projects
The pattern of support for productive projects in the PNCRT and CELI municipalities is similar, 
and the types of assistance received varied between the baseline and the midline. To illustrate the 
point, the support provided in Catatumbo through the provision of supplies, plant material and 
technical assistance, although moderate, experienced growth. However, there were significant 
declines in other support that is critical for the population, such as training and obtaining loans. 
(Figure 4.5) 
Figure 4.5. Trends in the type of support received for productive project activities in the 
Catatumbo region 
76%
44%
32%
55%
43%
69%
68%
35%
36%
35%
54%
34%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Have a business or company
Received help for your business
Received in-kind aid: seedlings, plants
Received courses or capacity building trainings
Received technical assistance
Received credit
PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline
53 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
On the other hand, associative processes generally increased in the three PNCRT regions studied. 
In the Putumayo region, for example, producers seek to join associations primarily to obtain group 
representation. This means that their perception (24% of the respondents in the midline survey) is 
that they will be stronger within the chain as a group than as individuals. They also seek to improve 
their capacity to transport and sell their products and to obtain financing. It should be mentioned 
that the percentage of people who responded positively to all criteria for joining associations grew 
between the baseline and the midline. In the case of the purchase of supplies and the processing of 
products, there was an impact in the PNCRT municipalities of 6pp and 4pp respectively. (Figure 
4.6) 
Figure 4.6. Trends in the reasons for joining associations in the Putumayo region
The support provided in these associative processes has been very important in these regions. CELI 
Central, in partnership with local and departmental authorities, supported several coffee producer 
associations, mainly through the provision of supplies and improvements in environmental 
management in northern Cauca, a region with a large indigenous population in which the 
associative work model has deep cultural roots. It should be mentioned that CELI arrived in this 
region approximately two years ago to support the implementation of the PNCRT: 
Colombia Responde has had a presence here for two years, I think... we are working hard with 
them on supporting productive projects, such as, in this case, coffee …we receive many funds
through the Association, the resources come from Colombia Responde, from the Municipal 
Administration of Caloto and from the Department, they are the three basic components that are 
injecting resources into those programs. (Indigenous focus group, Caloto, Cauca) 
In the Department of Putumayo, international cooperation agencies and national programs have 
participated substantially in the substitution of illicit crops, introducing products such as heart of 
palm, cacao, rubber and peppers, which did not exist in the region and have been adapted to the 
conditions of the Amazonian foothills: 
They told you what you were going to plant. They came to conduct a kind of survey depending on
the land, they said there is this option … In the case of hearts of palm, when they came, there wasn’t 
any, nor was there any cacao… they were products that they came with and said that it was possible 
that they would work here, but, say, in the old days, no. (Producer focus group, Valle de Guamuez, 
Putumayo) 
From the opinions of the focus groups, it can be concluded that the climatic conditions of the 
northern Cauca and southern Valle del Cauca regions allow for the production of citrus and other 
2%
3%
4%
4%
7%
7%
5%
1%
7%
7%
7%
11%
17%
24%
16%
3%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
To purchase inputs
To process products
To sell products
To transport products
To jointly build capacity
To have group representation
To present projects for potential financing
To solicit credit
PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline
54 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
fruits. Producer associations have emerged in this area in an effort to open markets for their 
products, avoid middlemen, and maintain a constant level of production: 
I am the vice president of a citrus growers association that we have formed, and so through the 
association we also have the market for supplying Miranda and the Sexta supermarket … that is 
how we subsist, we are 27 members and each member has his/her property … if I don’t have 
oranges, and another member has tangerines, we complement each other. One has to have the idea 
that one needs to join an association in order to get [the product] out, because if you are alone the 
suppliers will take advantage of you. (Producer focus group, Florida, Valle del Cauca) 
Conclusion 2. The frequency of support given to productive projects has diminished in the 
PNCRT municipalities, and the trend is toward more practical support. The growing importance 
of associativity is reflected in the benefits related to advantages for their agricultural projects, and 
improvements in production and marketing perceived by members of the associations. 
Markets and marketing
According to the respondents in the three regions, the preferred place for marketing their products 
is the municipal center, through direct sales. In Catatumbo, more than a third (37%) of sales are 
made in this way, and 22% are made in the closest population center, a modality that had an 
increase of 12% over the baseline (Figure 4.7). Sales outside the municipality account for 28% of 
the cases, but, according to the surveys, preference for them declined with respect to the baseline. 
The trends are similar in the other regions studied. 
Figure 4.7. Trend in marketing places in the Catatumbo region 
In response to questions about who the biggest purchasers are, the respondents noted a decline in 
sales to wholesalers or middlemen in the three regions. (Figure 4.8) 
Figure 4.8. Trends in sales to wholesalers or middlemen
From the point of view of purchasers, products continue to be purchased most often in the 
municipal seat, although sales in nearby villages have grown with respect to what was reported in 
the baseline in the three regions. The trend toward purchasing products in the same or nearby 
villages declined. The purchase of products in the municipal seat or nearby villages is related to 
issues of accessibility and infrastructure. (Figure 4.9) 
39%
61%
43%
21% 36% 23%
0%
50%
100%
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
PNCRT baseline PNCRT midline
10%
33%
9%
48%
22%
37%
13%
28%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
In the nearest population center
In the municipal capital
In the vereda or a neighboring vereda
Outside of the municipality
PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline
55 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Figure 4.9. Trends in places where purchases are made 
The survey results show that some problems persist with the production and marketing of 
agricultural products, and that they vary based on the PNCRT region. In Putumayo, for example, 
the high cost of supplies and transportation, abuse by middlemen, and low sales prices for crops 
were reported by approximately 50% of the surveyed population. 
One aspect of relevance is the scarcity of water due to the effects of environmental phenomena 
(Catatumbo, Cauca/Valle del Cauca), as shown in Figures 4.10, 4.11 and 4.12. The increase in the 
perception of poor soil quality is particularly notable in Putumayo. 
Figure 4.10. Trends in the perception of production and marketing problems in the Putumayo
region 
6%
61%
1%
28%
60%
2%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
En el centro
poblado
más
cercano
En la
cabecera
municipal
En la
vereda o
veredas
vecinas
Cauca/Valle
14%
44%
16%
25%
41%
15%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
En el centro
poblado
más
cercano
En la
cabecera
municipal
En la
vereda o
veredas
vecinas
Catatumbo
8%
82%
10%
22%
73%
4%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
En el centro
poblado
más
cercano
En la
cabecera
municipal
En la vereda
o veredas
vecinas
Putumayo
In the nearest 
population 
center
In the 
nearest 
population 
center
In the nearest 
population 
center
In the 
municipal 
capital
In the 
municipal 
capital
In the 
municipal 
capital
In the 
vereda or 
neighboring 
vereda
In the vereda 
or 
neighboring 
vereda
In the vereda 
or 
neighboring 
vereda
67%
42%
93%
57%
47%
6%
13%
14%
30%
87%
53%
83%
58%
56%
22%
16%
13%
19%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Cost of inputs is very high
Abuse by intermediaries
Prices of products are very low
Cost of transport is very high
Poor soil quality
Lack of water
Interference of armed groups
Prohibition of coca
Lack of access to credit
PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline
56 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
The perception of the following production and marketing problems decreased in Catatumbo, 
abuse by middlemen (from 81% to 49%), and very low product prices (from 94% to 63%) (Figure
4.11). The decrease in the problems of transportation costs and abuse by middlemen had a positive 
impact of 35pp and 27pp, respectively, due to the fact that the control municipalities had lower 
levels of decline. 
Figure 4.11. Trends in the perception of production and marketing problems in the Catatumbo 
region 
The perception of production and marketing problems in the Cauca/Valle del Cauca region has 
decreased, especially with regard to transportation costs, very low product prices, abuse by 
middlemen, and access to credit. As mentioned, the surveyed population that perceives water
scarcity as a problem increased from 49% in the baseline to 66% in the midline (Figure 4.12). 
Finally, there was a positive effect on access to credit in the three regions, with the most positive 
result occurring in Cauca/Valle del Cauca, where the perception of the lack of access to credit fell 
from 45% in the baseline to 10% in the midline. 
94%
81%
94%
73%
51%
54%
10%
11%
35%
83%
49%
63%
60%
44%
48%
15%
14%
22%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Cost of inputs is very high
Abuse by intermediaries
Prices of products are very low
Cost of transport is very high
Poor soil quality
Lack of water
Interference of armed groups
Prohibition of coca
Lack of access to credit
PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline
57 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Figure 4.12. Trends in the perception of production and marketing problems in the Cauca/Valle del 
Cauca region
It is important to note that, in absolute terms, a large part of the population still perceives these 
situations as problematic, in spite of the declining trend. In most cases, the control zones 
experienced the same trends, so there was no observable impact by the PNCRT interventions. 
From a qualitative point of view, the respondents in southern Valle del Cauca commented that, 
despite their proximity to Cali and Palmira and the existence of acceptable infrastructure, 
agricultural products have low prices and there are many difficulties in marketing them. This has 
resulted in the growth in marijuana cultivation in this region and in northern Cauca: 
What do we gain with planting good fruits and good crops there in the village, if the government 
doesn’t open markets for us, they can grow anything but not be able to sell it, what do we gain if 
we grow good yucca [cassava], good potatoes, and the best arracacha in the country, if the 
municipality’s plaza does not have optimal conditions for selling the products…it is sad to say that 
yucca and vegetables don’t give results that are as good as marijuana or illicit crops … I invite 
you to stand in the traffic circle on the way to Florida… there you will see the marijuana 
greenhouses in the rural area, all because the people don’t believe in crop substitution. (Secretary 
of Government, Florida, Valle del Cauca) 
Respondents in Putumayo maintained that there are great problems with the marketing of their 
products, due to the long distances, lack of infrastructure, and the remoteness of the centers of 
consumption. One of the ideas for improving marketing, prices and access to markets is to 
implement a differential treatment through a type of peace certification, which would represent a 
way for the communities to create a market for their products. 
Our products, the products of Valle de Guamuez, of La Hormiga, are products that have suffered, 
they are products of an intense war, so that differential part is important... Products of peace. Yes, 
that is what we have been through, I mean, we have proposed a lot to the National Government 
that it take a differential approach to the products that come from Putumayo, from Valle del 
Guamuez, from La Hormiga, maybe a kilo of cacao here has more meaning that in any other place. 
(Secretary of Economic Development, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo).
Conclusion 3. The markets in consolidation territories are still local markets, and in some cases
reach a regional level. Export products are still a limited proportion of sales. Small producers are 
affected by the high costs of marketing that is characteristic of the inefficiencies of small markets, 
which are not well developed or specialized and have very high transaction costs. Thus, 
communities are trapped in a vicious circle, in which there is little incentive for increasing
86%
59%
92%
66%
39%
49%
10%
10%
45%
84%
49%
69%
48%
43%
66%
6%
3%
10%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Cost of inputs is very high
Abuse by intermediaries
Prices of products are very low
Cost of transport is very high
Poor soil quality
Lack of water
Interference of armed groups
Prohibition of coca
Lack of access to credit
PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline
58 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
production, and when production increases above the size of the market, it collides with the rigidity 
of the local market and the lack of preparation for exporting to other regions. 
Conclusion 4. Technical assistance and marketing support help to counteract the problems related 
to the low profitability of the productive projects, which undoubtedly encourages migration to a 
legal economy. However, this requires the creation of markets with sufficient supply and demand, 
a reduction in the costs of production and transportation, and improved product prices. For the 
respondents/interviewees, support has declined. 
Savings, credit and financial services
The findings of the evaluation present a reduction, in both the treatment and control municipalities, 
in the number of families with a savings account, an increase in the number of families with a 
current account, and greater use of banks and non-banking correspondents for the payment of 
public services (Figure 4.13). The number of families that reported having applied for a loan is 
more stable, while the number of families that reported having a loan from a bank, NGO or 
cooperative rose in the three zones. 
Figure 4.13. Trends in bancarization and access to credit
Conclusion 5. The percentage of bancarized households in these regions is still very low. The 
use of savings accounts decreased in all of the regions, and the growth in current accounts is very 
marginal. Formal credit, with a slight increase, is important for strengthening associative 
processes and the movement toward formality. 
Transportation and infrastructure 
Infrastructure is one of the factors that most affects commerce and access to markets. In the 
Department of Putumayo and the Amazon basin in general, the road infrastructure is very 
precarious, and tertiary roads are almost nonexistent. It should be noted that in many cases access 
is by waterway. This situation increases the costs of production, making productive projects in 
remote regions unviable: 
Agricultural development has to be comprehensive, for example, you see that unmet basic needs 
are extremely high, here for example in the urban center, we don’t have an aqueduct, we don’t have 
58%
43%
52% 46% 42%
25%
3% 5% 3%
11%
2% 7%
29%
48%
56%
65%
24%
32% 36% 32%
49% 52%
40% 41%
66%
74% 74% 77%
62%
72%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
PNCRT baseline PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline PNCRT midline
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
Have a savings account
Pay public services in banks/branches
Have current formal credit
Have a checking account
Have applied for formal credit
59 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
water, imagine that more than 40 and 65% of the population does not have electric service … Fish 
farming cannot be developed with more advanced technological systems, yes, because we lack 
energy. There aren’t even bridle paths, you have to go by river or by dirt roads. It is very difficult 
to get the products out. (Secretary of Agricultural Development, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo) 
The survey results show that the perception of the condition of the roads has improved since the 
baseline, not only from a municipal point of view (except in Putumayo), but from an inter￾municipal point of view as well (except in Cauca/Valle del Cauca). However, the percentage of 
respondents who believe that road quality is good is very low, especially in Putumayo and
Catatumbo (Figure 4.14). The information reported by the control municipalities is similar.
Figure 4.14. Trends in the perception of road quality
The Consolidation Index includes two road-related indicators in the pillars of Connectivity and 
Regional Integration. As shown in Figure 4.15, the first indicator measures the percentage of 
population centers that are connected with the municipal center (through roads, rivers or the sea). 
Based on the high percentages (100% in 2014), the Index would indicate that all of the population 
centers are connected. However, the definition of “population centers” is not clear. The survey 
data are far from these scores, and so we conclude that the discrepancy can be explained by the 
difference in the definition of “population center” for the two measurements. The second indicator 
measures the existence of a paved road from the municipality to a main city. These scores were 
very high in 2014 for Cauca/Valle del Cauca and Putumayo, and a little lower in Catatumbo. 
Figure 4.15. Secondary data: Consolidation Index, roads 
Source: Consolidation Index Data, authors’ calculations
Conclusion 6. Road infrastructure is an unresolved issue. Access to new markets is limited 
because of the deficit of tertiary roads and the presence of middlemen, which continue to be one 
75 75
86 100
81 84 100 100 95 100
73
100
0
20
40
60
80
100
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014
Catatumbo Cauca/Valle Putumayo
Connection municipal center Asphalted connection to city
19% 19%
5%
15%
26%
37% 31% 37%
5%
15%
53% 49%
0%
20%
40%
60%
PNCRT baseline PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline PNCRT midline
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
The roads that connect the place you live with the rest of the municipality
The roads that connect your municipality with neighboring municipalities
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
of the most used channels for marketing and purchasing supplies, despite the fact that they increase 
costs and, therefore, reduce profitability.
Land
According to the baseline and midline survey data, land use is concentrated in agricultural 
activities, even though the percentage of respondents involved in such activities fell from 81% to 
60% in Putumayo, from 74% to 72% in Catatumbo, and 61% to 36% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca. 
Land tenure, that is, the proportion of households with land titles, increased moderately (by 4.5%, 
on average) in the three regions. Approximately 46% of respondents in the midline survey stated 
that they had land titles. Given the similar trend in the control municipalities, it is not possible to 
attribute this result to the implementation of the PNCRT. 
Seventy-five percent of the respondents in Putumayo acquired their property through a purchase￾sale process, as did 60% in Catatumbo and 30% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca. Almost all of the other 
respondents acquired their properties through some type of inheritance. 
Real property taxes constitute one way of measuring land ownership. There was a slight increase 
in the three regions in the proportion of households that have paid these taxes in the last two years
(Figure 4.16). A comparison with ownership data leads to the conclusion that there is a lag in the 
payment of real property taxes in Putumayo, which poses significant challenges for the municipal 
administrations. 
Figure 4.16. Trends in the payment of real property taxes in the last two years
However, the proportion of households that were willing to pay real property taxes rose to 92%, 
and more than half of the respondents in the three regions would do so because it is a civic duty. 
Smaller fractions said that they would be willing to pay in exchange for the formalization of their 
properties (one quarter), or not to lose their properties (around 15%). 
The above contrasts with the responses of those who would not pay taxes because “productive 
agricultural projects are not sufficiently profitable to enable this payment.” The percentage of 
respondents with this view increased from 36% in the baseline to 49% in the midline in 
Cauca/Valle del Cauca, and from 50% to 53% in Putumayo, and it declined from 54% to 40% in 
Catatumbo. Other reasons given for why they would not pay property taxes were: (1) nobody else 
does so; (2) rich people should do so; and (3) they do not trust the management of funds collected 
by the municipal government.
The Consolidation Index analyzes seven indicators related to property rights, including the 
following: (1) advances in land use planning and (2) micro-targeting for the land restitution 
process. With respect to the former, the Index reports low scores with a stable trend in Catatumbo, 
and a growing trend in Putumayo. Cauca/Valle del Cauca, on the other hand, had close to the 
26%
46% 42% 30%
52% 52%
0%
50%
100%
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
PNCRT baseline PNCRT midline
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
maximum scores in 2014. From a micro-targeting point of view, Catatumbo continues to have a 
stable trend with low scores, Putumayo has had no movement in four years, and Cauca/Valle del 
Cauca fell to zero between 2012 and 2014, which suggests to the evaluation team that there is an 
error in the collection of data. (Figure 4.17) 
Figure 4.17. Consolidation Index: Advances in Land Use Planning and Micro-Targeting for the 
Land Restitution Process
In 
complementary fashion, according to the qualitative information obtained from the focus groups, 
property title registrations in the Putumayo region are almost nonexistent. However, residents are 
well aware of the boundaries of their properties, such that disputes are resolved without 
intermediaries. An important factor has been that a large part of the property registration in the 
Amazonian foothills occurred with the arrival of the so-called “coca colonization,” in which the 
planting of coca led to great process of deforestation and destruction of the jungle. When farmers
have access to illicit crop substitution programs, they understand the need for having title to their 
property: 
The biggest conflict is knowing whose it is … For us as a municipality or for any type of entity it is 
very difficult. The problem is when the need for legalization is already great. I also think that when 
you change from unlawful to lawful, you need the land to be yours. On the other hand, when there 
is an unlawful situation, with a crop that is not legal, you also have no interest in having that land. 
(Secretary of Rural Development, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo). 
There are different forms of land use in the municipalities on the southeast slope of the Central 
Cordillera, which makes it difficult to design and implement an adequate land use plan: 
environmental reserves (Las Hermosas Páramo) coexist with armed actors (FARC), agricultural 
smallholdings in the mountainous areas, agroindustrial activity (sugarcane) in the flat area of Valle 
del Cauca, and indigenous reservations: 
We haven’t had a basic land use plan since 2002. But that is an issue that the Infrastructure 
Planning Office and the Municipal Council are working on. The guerillas wanted it for a quote￾unquote peace territory, and I think that Consolidation was that they were looking to consolidate 
subversion here. But the Land Use Plan has to be worked on because there are some indigenous 
people here, the El Triunfo Cristal Páez and Nasa Kiwe indigenous reservations, which have had 
their own territories for many years. (Secretary of Government, Florida, Valle del Cauca)
However, according to the Consolidation Index data, northern Cauca has a score of 96 out of 100 
with respect to land use planning, although in this case there are also smallholdings on State-owned 
land (baldíos) and semi-feudal forms of production, such as sharecropping (of colonial origin), 
which make land titling and land use planning processes very difficult. 
30 30 39
27
71 71
57
96
19 19
38
60
0
20
40
60
80
100
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014
Catatumbo Cauca/Valle Putumayo
Land use planning Micro-targeting
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Law 1551 [of 2012, “to modernize the organization and functioning of municipalities”] which has 
provided a little more order to this, because property in Caloto, one can be an owner, or tenant, or 
possessor, and in some situations an occupant in the case of government baldíos…but they come 
with false title histories because they haven’t done the paperwork, they haven’t done the succession, 
their grandparents own that part, some will be occupants of government properties, and others are 
holders, or sharecroppers who pay rent in order to farm the land. (Municipal Solicitor, Caloto, 
Cauca) 
There are property disputes in this region because the indigenous Nasa communities claim, as part 
of their reservations, territories that they consider to be ancestral. But there are ranches on these 
lands today, as well as peasant smallholdings, and Afro-Colombian community settlements which 
seek to be recognized as Community Councils. In some cases the indigenous communities have 
resorted to occupying properties owned by these groups. 
The Council of Toribio possesses [land], and it is registered with the Public Records Office as 
owner of that property. It would be subject to restitution, but there would have to be a procedure
… They haven’t wanted to make restitution because they say that if the property is for restitution, 
that precautionary measures have been ordered for its protection, so if the government is going to 
purchase it for the indigenous people… it could not be purchased (Municipal Solicitor’s Office, 
Caloto, Cauca) 
Despite the difficulties, the residents remain hopeful that a post-conflict scenario, with a signed 
peace agreement with the FARC, will provide the conditions necessary for the return and 
restitution of land. 
Here there are two points, let’s say very important, regarding displacement and restitution, here is 
where they carried out the two biggest massacres… We believe that we are the municipality with 
the greatest progress in land restitution … their rights and their lands have been restored, and they 
are advancing … The country’s biggest opportunity is after March, when rights will be restored 
without war, because it is very difficult to restore your land to you, and the next day... Many people 
are waiting for peace to be signed, in order to return. (Victims’ Association, La Hormiga, 
Putumayo) 
Conclusion 7. The factors inherent in land tenure require greater knowledge and 
intervention by the public policies that address the problems in the territory. The 
implementation of the policy should more strongly address issues such as the vocation of the land, 
and enhancing the efficiency of the formalization, titling and restitution processes, which will 
require broad knowledge of the realities of landowners. The survey data evidence the low capacity 
of local entities to collect property taxes, which is a source of financing public goods. A high 
percentage of respondents noted the low profitability of production, and so it is fundamental to 
work on improving productivity and access to markets. 
Recommendations 
1. Improve agricultural production and marketing, taking advantage of local 
opportunities. Any increase in production should be accompanied by improvements in 
quality and the marketing of products. Intermittent or seasonal production and low quality 
are not attractive for the national market. PNCRT activities that have promoted the creation 
of partnerships between the private sector and producer associations have achieved 
qualitative advances for both actors, and it is therefore recommended that they be 
strengthened and reproduced. The GoC should work to resolve infrastructure and market 
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
deficiencies, and to establish programs to improve relations with intermediaries and 
commercial partners, and to expand and replicate the advances of the CELIs that have been 
implemented in other regions. 
2. Support initiatives for opening new markets in order to achieve a balance between 
supply and demand and adequate prices, and to generate profitability for producers. These
kinds of programs entail the formation of partnerships between small producers and 
middlemen or merchants, improvements in product quality, the implementation of quality 
and/or phytosanitary standards required by purchasers, the gathering of market 
intelligence, and the production of goods with greater added value. The advantage of these 
kinds of partnerships is that the direct exporter, in the case of external markets, is not the 
producer, but rather the supplier that has the capacity to export, which strengthens the entire 
chain. 
3. Use community models for improving tertiary roads. Improvements to road 
infrastructure will improve access to markets and remove the need to depend on middlemen 
for the purchase of supplies for productive projects and the sale of final products. The 
mechanisms for achieving appropriation for the care and maintenance of tertiary roads, and
the contracting model for the construction and maintenance of these roads together with 
the community, should be strengthened. The model that is being implemented by the CELIs
has seen results. 
4. The land formalization and restitution processes need to be more effective. The land 
restitution processes require more efficiency in the public records offices, the updating of 
cadastral records, and coordinated action at a national level. In the post-conflict period, 
new forms of land conflicts should be taken into account, and timely responses should be 
developed for ethnic groups, farmers and economic groups. 
5. Strengthen the activities for expanding financial services. While the presence of 
banking at a regional level has grown, difficulties persist in accessing formal financial 
services. It is thus essential for the government and international cooperation agencies to 
encourage the financial sector to provide services where they still do not exist. Revolving 
funds are interesting because they enable communities to meet credit requirements, but it 
is necessary to strengthen their organization and management models with management 
guidelines, monitoring and control systems, an exchange of successful experiences, and 
performance incentives. For large projects, it is important to promote partnerships with 
banks in order to increase access to capital. 
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Evaluation questions: 
To what extent have the CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance and 
the institutionalization of the territory? 
What are the specific effects of the CELIs on changing the local government’s capacities 
and provision of services (serving the local population, being accountable, expanding 
social services)?
Findings and conclusions
The results of the variables associated with participation, transparency, accountability, 
responsibility and trust were stable between the baseline and the midline, with a downward trend 
in some cases. Following is an analysis of each of these factors, based on the data obtained from 
the survey, interviews and focus groups, as well as the information obtained through the
Consolidation Index. 
Participation
In this evaluation, citizen participation was measured through an index that includes indicators for
perception and participation in political parties, participation on Community Action Boards, 
participation on citizen oversight committees, electoral participation, voter registration and actual 
voting in the last presidential election. The maximum possible score of the index is 100 points. 
The index had a midline score of 37.7 in Putumayo, an increase of 0.8 points in relation to the 
baseline. Given that there were no differences in the control municipalities, it is not possible to 
attribute this increase to the implementation of the Consolidation Policy. There was a two-point 
decline in Catatumbo, Cauca/Valle del Cauca and their control municipalities. Catatumbo is the 
region with the lowest score (less than 30 points). 
As shown in the chart below, all of the regions experienced an increase in willingness to vote 
(measured by registrations at the polls) and actual voting. The Catatumbo region had the largest
growth in registrations, and Putumayo had the largest growth in actual voting. The increases were 
slight, but the scores were relatively high in percentage terms: a large percentage of the population 
registered to vote and actually voted. However, there is no evidence that the PNCRT had a 
significant impact on electoral practices, since there were similar increases in these scores in the 
control municipalities. 
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Figure 5.1. Trend in the number of people registered to vote (left chart) and the number of people 
who voted (right chart) in the 2014 presidential election 
 
The most common reason why between 25% and 33% did not vote was lack of interest in the 
election issues. For the others who did not vote, the reasons ranged from not liking any candidate
(<24%), difficulty to vote (<20%), and fear (<8%). There was a significant increase in the latter 
factor in Catatumbo. As for those who voted, the most common reason given for voting was the 
idea that “your vote counts” (more than 95% in the three regions).
In Catatumbo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca, fewer respondents than in the baseline indicated that 
they had received something in exchange for their vote (<4%), while in Putumayo this indicator 
increased from 1% to 4%. 
The participants in the focus groups in Putumayo stated that electoral participation had increased in 
their region, and that today citizens have a greater interest in running for office, particularly with 
regard to the municipal councils. In the past, participation in the municipality’s public affairs was 
low due to the dominance of illegal actors and economies. However, the respondents now believe 
that there is greater political participation and interest in public affairs as a result of the migration to 
lawful economies: 
This administration [has improved] because the majority of council members are almost all from 
here, from the same municipality. Before they had the problem of coming from other places and 
becoming council members. The community is the one that chooses a council member, one or two 
council members are chosen from each area, so there are more ways to manage things. (Focus 
group, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo). 
As mentioned above, it is noteworthy that women’s perception that it was possible for them to 
become leaders in their communities surpassed 96% (in the three regions), and young people’s 
perception of their chances of doing so remained the same as in the baseline (approximately 83% 
in the three regions). This differs from the perception of the possibility that an ex-combatant could 
legitimately become a community leader, which fell from 16% to 14% in Putumayo, remained at 
11% in Catatumbo, and increased slightly from 18% to 19% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca. 
Conclusion 1. Participation in political processes increased in these regions in terms of the intention
to vote as well as the actual exercise of this right, with the respondents stating that their votes are 
valuable. 
81% 81%
92% 90% 90% 92%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
Baseline Midline
90% 84%
96% 95% 92% 95%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
Baseline Midline
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Conclusion 2. The stigma of having been a member or combatant of an IAG affects one’s legitimacy 
as a potential community leader. It is not evident that in a post-conflict context the guerillas would 
be able to become credible representatives of the communities in which they have operated. 
Transparency and accountability
One component of the Transparency indicator is the degree of citizen participation in the supervision 
and oversight of public activities. The survey incorporated questions that, taken together, constitute 
an Accountability Index, whose maximum score is 100 points. 
The variables of this index measure the degree to which the mayor has informed citizens about 
public expenditures, the presence (or absence) of public opportunities to perform citizen oversight, 
and the degree to which the local government relies on citizens’ opinions in making decisions. 
According to the index scores in the PNCRT regions studied, there were better practices in 
Catatumbo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca, and a considerable decline in Putumayo. (Figure 5.2) 
Figure 5.2. Trends in the Accountability Index scores
Baseline Score Midline Score Change
Putumayo 31,270 25,382 -8,699
Catatumbo 20,266 34,327 2,717
Cauca/Valle del Cauca 21,314 32,775 2,873
Furthermore, the survey reported a slight increase in the number of households that participate on 
citizen oversight and supervisory committees. Even so, the percentage of households that 
participated on these committees was low in all cases: 1% of residents in Putumayo, 2% in
Catatumbo, and little less than 4% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca. 
Unlike other types of participation,31 and with the exception of Cauca/Valle del Cauca, those who 
participate on oversight committees were less likely in the midline survey to report their participation 
in decision-making within social organizations. 
From the point of view of the Consolidation Index, good governance is measured on the basis of the 
following indicators: (1) the number of projects approved by the municipal OCADs and financed 
with specific and direct allocations from the regional compensation fund as a percentage of total 
allocations; (2) the Open Government Index; (3) the percentage of potential property tax payers who 
actually pay the tax; and (4) the percentage of potential ICA tax payers who actually pay the tax. 
With respect to the first indicator, only Cauca/Valle had a positive trajectory with a constant trend. 
The figures for Putumayo rose drastically in 2013 and then fell almost to zero in 2014, while 
Catatumbo obtained only 29 points (Figure 5.3). It could be inferred that it is difficult to design 
projects for accessing these kinds of resources. It should be remembered that these projects are 
reviewed by the OCADS under strict selection standards.
32
 
31 See the chapter on social development for more details.
32 Administration and Decision Committees
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Figure 5.3. Consolidation Index: Access to Royalties and Open Government Index
Source: Consolidation Index data, authors’ calculations
With respect to the Open Government Index, as mentioned above, the GoC grades the municipalities
and the scores are normalized in the Consolidation Index based on the scores for similar
municipalities. While the “normalized” scores were in the “good” and “very good” range (Figure
5.4), the “raw” scores were in a more moderate range of achievements. 
Figure 5.4. Average results of the OGI
2011 2014
Raw score Weighted score Raw score Weighted score
Catatumbo 46.6 69.8 60.9 94.7
Cauca/Valle 49.3 73.9 63.7 96.1
Putumayo 44.6 66.9 55.0 85.1
Source: Consolidation Index data, authors’ calculations
With respect to the third indicator, around half of those who are obligated to pay real property taxes
do so, although compliance varies among the three regions. Compliance is a little more than half in
Cauca/Valle, it has been growing in Catatumbo since 2011, but is still less than 50%, and there has 
been a fall of around 15% in Putumayo since 2012. (Figure 5.5) 
Figure 5.5. Secondary data: Compliance with the payment of real property and ICA taxes
Source: Consolidation Index data, authors’ calculations
In order to respond to the evaluation questions regarding Institutional Development, this study also 
measures citizens’ perceptions of problems related to municipals organizations. According to Figure
5.6, which shows the incremental variation in the perception of problems in red, and the decreasing 
variation in green, respondents in the three regions perceive less corruption, a smaller shortage of 
institutional services, and fewer deficiencies in residential public services. But the perception of a 
33
43 47 48
59 67
53 55 51 53
43 38
0
20
40
60
80
100
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014
Catatumbo Cauca/Valle Putumayo
Predial ICA
0 0
36 29 28 28
56
71
16 16
94
1
0
20
40
60
80
100
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014
Catatumbo Cauca/Valle Putumayo
Royalties Open Government Index
68 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
lack of attention to community requests has grown. Distrust of public entities has grown in Putumayo
and Cauca/Valle del Cauca. 
The perception that institutions do not provide information about their activities remained the same 
in Catatumbo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca, but declined in Putumayo. In some cases, these findings 
show an impact that is attributable to the implementation of the law, given that there were no 
differences in the control groups between the baseline and the midline. These cases are highlighted 
in bold, and the level of their impact is expressed in percentage points (pp) rather than percentages
(%). 
Figure 5.6. Trends in citizens’ perceptions of municipal institutions
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
Distrust of public entities 8% -13% 13%
The administration does not pay attention to requests from the community 10% 6% 19%
The administration does not have the capacity to respond to requests from the 
community 0% -7% 11%
Deficiencies in residential public services -21pp -25pp -30%
Lack of roads 4% -2% -8%
Corruption -8% -4% -3%
Lack of institutional services: hospitals, schools, courts, gardens -12pp -4% -31%
The administration does not provide information about what it is doing -4% 8% 3%
There are no serious problems associated with the institutions 4% 3% 1%
In grading municipal, departmental and national government performance, the respondents’ 
perceptions declined in almost all cases (Figure 5.7), with the exception of the Catatumbo region, 
where the respondents’ perception of the performance of the national government rose by 8% in 
the midline survey. It should be noted that the largest declines occurred in Putumayo, in which 
there was a negative impact of 10pp with regard to the perception of the performance of the 
Governor’s office, in comparison with their control municipalities. 
Figure 5.7. Trends in the perception of government performance
Putumayo Catatumbo
Cauca/Valle 
del Cauca
Good or very good performance by the Mayor’s Office -25% -3% -1%
Good or very good performance by the Governor’s Office -33% -3% -11%
Good or very good performance by the National Government -12% 8% -3%
At the same time, the participation module of the Consolidation Index measures the evolution of 
the following indicators: (1) the percentage of municipal public investments with legally 
established and registered oversight committees; and (2) the operability of institutional 
participation opportunities. 
For the first indicator, Catatumbo reported a score of 31%, Cauca/Valle del Cauca had an average 
score of 33% and Putumayo recorded only 8% of public investments subject to oversight. 
Cauca/Valle del Cauca and Putumayo reported a level of operability of institutional opportunities 
for citizen participation of more than 80%, based on the minimum number of regular meetings of 
the Municipal Social Policy Council (COMPOS) and the Municipal Rural Development Council
(CMDR). Catatumbo reported a level of operability of these opportunities of 64%, with almost all 
quarterly COMPOS meetings being held, and a much lower number of CMDR meetings. 
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
According to the focus groups, Citizen Oversight Committees have been created in Putumayo to 
monitor public works, in which the role of the control bodies has been fundamental. 
Here they have citizen oversight offices essentially for projects, and there has been very active 
support from the regional Comptroller’s Office in Putumayo in advising the communities about 
how to create an oversight office... We meet with the people, I also do so, but the Comptroller’s 
Office has also been very active in that aspect. (Municipal Solicitor’s Office, Valle de Guamuez, 
Putumayo) 
However, the local governments in southern Valle del Cauca are perceived as corrupt, since 
citizens are not clear about the management of public resources, and promises made to the 
community have not been kept, which generates distrust in State institutions and discourages 
participation: 
We had the aqueduct, we had a meeting and they told us – now we’re going to disburse 50 million 
pesos so that Tamboral can have a decent aqueduct and drinking water and water can be given to 
Santa Rosa. That money was diverted, it was lost … they were trying to make the Las Cañas bridge 
for us and that money didn’t appear. So then they made a sewer at the other entrance to Santa Rosa 
which apparently cost 50 million, and the first time that the river flooded it took out the sewer. 
(Focus group, Florida, Valle del Cauca) 
In southern Valle del Cauca, part of the population see the political participation processes as a 
way of obtaining individual benefits for supporting a candidate. 
In Florida the people do not trust the institutions. Think that Florida was politicized and the people 
to not think socially, but rather politically … The community learned to do what the big leaders or 
bosses do, to think politically, but not socially, to see how strategically to get more from here and 
more from there, how to get a cut for oneself. (Secretary of Government, Florida, Valle del Cauca)
In Putumayo, relations between the local administrations and the community have improved due 
to the interaction with the JACs, which are consulted about the community needs and processes 
that can be supported, even for interaction with PNCRT instruments: 
Here things are done with the Community Action Boards …from eradication processes, 
althernative development processes, they go to the Community Action Board, now the [Territorial 
Consolidation] Unit, the rapid response projects are carried out based on the needs of the 
community …They are planned with the administration and in the case of the Mayor, the liaison of 
the Unit or the entity that is intervening in the area. (Secretary of Agricultural Development, Valle 
de Guamuez, Putumayo) 
Conclusion 3. The accountability processes need to be strengthened and consolidated. Their 
current operation affects trust in the institutions. Despite the efforts made over the years to 
implement these practices, positive effects have still not been achieved. While the focus groups 
stated that the accountability processes are better today than at the time of the baseline survey, 
there are no concrete data that evidence a permanent, broad and visible exercise in these regions. 
This is also affected by the gaps in community participation in control and oversight, despite the 
perception that the performance of these mechanisms has improved. 
Trust 
The low level of trust in public institutions (generalized throughout the country) is also evident in 
two of the three regions studied. According to the responses obtained in Putumayo and Cauca/Valle 
del Cauca, the perception of trust fell for almost all institutions, similar to the phenomenon in the 
control municipalities. In Putumayo, the decline in trust was generalized for all institutions, as shown 
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
in Figure 5.8, similar to the case in Cauca/Valle del Cauca, with the exception of a 2% increase in
the level of trust in the Municipal Council. In Catatumbo, there were slight increases in the level of 
trust in several national government agencies and in the JACs. 
Figure 5.8. Trends in trust in institutions in Putumayo 
To illustrate the reasons for the distrust, the survey examined the respondents’ level of trust in the 
mayor’s or JAC president’s commitment to the implementation of a project. There was an evident 
increase in distrust of these actors in the three regions, particularly in Cauca/Valle del Cauca and 
in Putumayo. (Figure 5.9) 
Figure 5.9. Trends in trust in the mayor’s and JAC president’s commitment to the implementation 
of a project
Conclusion 4. Trust in institutions has declined, affecting the legitimacy of the State as 
guarantor and protector of rights and the leadership needed for the implementation of the State’s
interventions and the recovery of territories held by IAGs. 
Provision of services
The Comprehensive Performance Index. The measurement of the performance and institutional 
capacities of the municipal administrations is a crucial for achieving good governance and 
improving efficiency in the use of public resources. This is because municipal governments have
18%
25%
11%
16%
20%
18%
57%
24%
18%
13%
26%
25%
25%
35%
59%
10%
17%
7%
5%
7%
7%
45%
14%
9%
9%
16%
12%
11%
8%
35%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
Departmental government
National government
Formal justice institutions
Alternative justice institutions
Agricultural sector
Social organizations and NGOs
Capacity-building centers
Public defender
Town council
National police
Military
Navy
Municipal ombudsman
Mayor's office
Community Action Council (JAC)
PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline
32%
10% 12% 11% 18% 12%
55%
39% 48% 47% 53%
36%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Baseline Midline Baseline Midline Baseline Midline
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
Mayor JAC president
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
great responsibilities for public social expenditures, whose effective management depends in large 
part on social development goals. 
With the definition and application of the methodology for measuring and analyzing performance,
it is possible to evaluate municipalities’ public management, public policy decision-making, and 
allocation of resources based on results and local problems. The GoC created the Comprehensive 
Performance Index (Índice de Desempeño Integral – IDI) to monitor the performance of mayors 
and governors in six dimensions: efficacy, efficiency, legal requirements, administrative capacity, 
fiscal performance and management.
33 
This chapter analyzes the evolution of the IDI between 2012 and 2014. The IDI data were grouped 
and classified in the four groups of municipalities that were studied: CELI, PNCRT and their 
respective control groups (Figure 5.10). 
In general terms, the IDI score for all groups was “good” in the CELI and PNCRT municipalities 
in the midline (2014), 34 which represents better performance with respect to the baseline (2012), 
in which the score in all cases was classified as “low.” Between 2012 and 2014, the CELI 
municipalities and their controls recorded an average increase of 7pp, while the PNCRT 
municipalities and their controls recorded increases of 8pp and 12pp, respectively. The changes in 
the index itself from one year to another are significant in some cases, which may be explained by 
the quality of the public officials during that period. 
Figure 5.10. Secondary data: Comprehensive Performance Index for the CELI and PNCRT 
municipalities and their respective control municipalities, 2012-2014 
Source: Comprehensive Performance Index data, National Planning Department
In the disaggregation of the index into its components, the most significant differences appear 
mainly in three dimensions: efficacy, legal requirements and management, as shown in Figure
5.11. 
 
33 The DNP explains the results, methodology and sources of information of the documents on the following website: 
https://colaboracion.dnp.gov.co/CDT/Desarrollo%20Territorial/Docuemnto%20Desempe%C3%B1o%20Integral%202013.pdf.
34 The “good” rating is for municipalities with between 60 and 69 points, and the “low” rating is for those with between 40 and 59 points.. 
58
60
60
57
65
67
68
74
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
CELI
Control
PNCRT
Control
2012
2014
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Figure 5.11. Secondary data: Comprehensive Performance Index, 2012 (left) and 2014 (right) 
Efficacy. The efficacy component analyzes the implementation of the Development Plan and the 
achievement of its goals. Between 2012 and 2014, there was an increase of between 20pp to 40pp 
in the scores in the municipalities analyzed. 
Legal requirements. The score for the legal requirements component improved 4pp for the CELI 
municipalities, and 7pp for the control municipalities. This higher score reflects better 
management of resources from the General Participation System (SGP) in accordance with current 
budgetary regulations. This score was stable in the PNCRT municipalities. 
Management. This component is used to evaluate the municipality’s capacity to manage 
resources and convert them into goods and services for the population, by measuring strategic 
planning, project monitoring and accountability tools. The score for the management component 
improved in the four groups of municipalities, and was the highest of the six IDI components. 
Other components. The rest of the IDI components were relatively stable in the municipalities
studied. Fiscal performance measures tax collections, debt management, and compliance with Law
617 of 2000 with regard to the sustainability of public finances. The fiscal performance scores 
were the most stable, and they increased between 1pp and 3pp between 2012 and 2014. The 
efficiency component evaluates the results obtained with SGP resources in the areas of health, 
education, water and sanitation, and it was also stable. Administrative capacity measures the 
stability of personnel, professionalization, the availability of computers, the automation of 
processes, and the implementation of models and control standards. The scores for this component 
remained stable and satisfactory. 
Conclusion 5. The Comprehensive Performance Index shows progress at a municipal level 
throughout the sample, with significant increases in the management, efficacy and legal 
requirements components. This trend is common to the four groups of municipalities analyzed, so 
it is not possible to attribute the progress to any type of intervention. 
However, it is reasonable to mention that the CELI and PNCRT interventions included support for 
the preparation and implementation of the Municipal Development Plans and for the Regional 
Action Plan (PAR). It is thus reasonable to conclude that these interventions may have helped to 
improve the IDI, especially given that the management component is the largest part of the index
of progress. 
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
In comparison, it is useful to examine the Governmental Capacity Index that results from the 
survey data of this evaluation, in order to balance the government’s perspective of the services that 
it provides, as measured by the IDI, with the experiences and opinions of the recipients of said 
services. In this regard, much remains to be done. 
Residential public services and social services. The first step that households must take in order 
to access the State’s social services is registration in the System of Identification and Classification 
of Potential Beneficiaries for Social Programs (SISBEN). Unlike what occurred in the other 
regions studied in this evaluation, in Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca there was a decline in 
the percentage of households registered in the SISBEN (Figure 5.12). The trends in the control 
areas were similar, so it is not possible to attribute any impact to the interventions. 
Figure 5.12. Trends in citizens’ registration for social services
In absolute terms, there was no impact on the public services provided by the State, only some 
changes in the different services investigated in the survey. 
The survey asked about access to health and education services (Figure 5.13), as well as changes 
in quality over the last two years. The following figure shows the changes between the baseline
and the midline with regard to the services evaluated for Catatumbo, and it shows progress in the 
perception of the quality of services in the four cases analyzed. The changes in terms of access are 
representative in education for children between the ages of 5 and 11, and there was an 8% increase 
for ages 12 to 18. It is worth mentioning that similar results were obtained for the control 
municipalities, and so no impact is seen from the interventions. 
Figure 5.13. Trends in access to and quality of public services in the Catatumbo region
Access
(2015)
Change in 
access
Change in 
quality
Has it improved 
in the last two 
years?
Health center 2% Yes
Children under 5 with access to care services 24% 13% 13% Yes
Children between 5 and 11 who attend school 98% 2% 14% Yes
People between 12 and 18 who attend an educational 
institution 76% 14% 22% Yes
In this regard, the Consolidation Index measures the provision of services with two health 
indicators and five education indicators: 
97% 94% 91% 87% 94%
74%
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle
Baseline Midline
74 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
• The two health indicators rose in Catatumbo with respect to previous years, with a 
coverage of 94% of the General System of Social Security in Health (SGSSS), and 86% 
in areas without clinics. In these regions, services are provided through health brigades.
The gross coverage scores for primary and secondary education also increased, and there 
was a positive change in the index with respect to vacant teacher positions and school 
dropout rates.35 
• Cauca/Valle del Cauca and its control municipalities reported the maximum score in terms 
of the school dropout rate and vacant teacher positions. Their SGSSS coverage is 94%, 
and 81% in villages without clinics. Primary and secondary school coverage is greater than
90%. 
• Putumayo reported the maximum score in terms of the school dropout rate and vacant 
teacher positions. Primary education coverage is 75%, and secondary education coverage 
is in the range of 85%. Close to 83% of residents in Putumayo are registered in the SGSSS, 
and the index reported that 92% of the villages without clinics have received visits by 
health brigades. 
The respondents reported improvements in access to and quality of residential public services in 
most cases (Figure 5.14). The figures in green represent increases between the baseline and the 
midline, and the figures in red represent decreases: 
Figure 5.14. Trends in the perception of access to and quality of public services
Access (2015) Improved Quality
Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle Putumayo Catatumbo Cauca/Valle 
del Cauca
Electric power 63% 96% 98% 23% 21% 30%
Propane gas 60% 34% 57% 28% 9% 19%
Aqueduct 5% 38% 86% 31% 24% 22%
Sewer service 21% 28% 34% 13% 16% 16%
Garbage collection 26% 33% 45% 13% 22% 22%
Cell phone service 90% 98% 92% 17% 19% 17%
The figures for the public services component of the Consolidation Index show almost complete 
electric power coverage in Catatumbo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca. Putumayo had the worst scores 
and a decline since 2011 (Figure 5.15). These figures are relatively consistent with the information 
from the survey. 
As for cell phone coverage, Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca received close to the maximum 
scores, while Catatumbo had a score of 66/100 in 2014, lower than what was reported in the survey. 
 
35 An increase in the Consolidation Index with respect to vacant teacher positions and school dropout rates means a reduction in the absolute values 
of these measurements. 
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Figure 5.15. Secondary data: Electric power and cell phone coverage 
Source: Consolidation Index data, authors’ calculations
Conclusion 6. The provision of public and social services in the three regions are at relatively 
high levels, even though it is necessary to review some indicators, such as the low access to 
childcare services for children under five. The perception of quality is positive in the three regions. 
There tends to be better access to and quality of residential public services than what was reported 
in the baseline. Even so, 50% of the population still does not have access to sewer, aqueduct and 
gas services. The quality of public services has also improved in most cases. 
Victims’ rights. Catatumbo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca had increases in the percentage of 
households in which a family member suffered a violation of his/her rights in the previous twelve 
months. That percentage rose from 4% in the baseline to 7% in the midline in Catatumbo, and 
from 5% to 6% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca. The figure in Putumayo remained stable, at around 
8.5%. 
A larger number of respondents in Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca who experienced a 
violation of their rights do not know who the responsible party was. Fewer respondents in the three 
regions blamed the guerillas for recent violations of their rights. Because there were similar trends 
in the control municipalities, no impact was found. 
The phenomenon of displacement and incidents with anti-personnel mines persist in these regions. 
According to the information reported, Human Rights Committees are still not fully operational in 
many municipalities. 
It was observed that the focus groups valued the emergency humanitarian assistance provided to 
victims by the UARIV and the economic stabilization processes available to victims. However, 
one problem that concerned the participants, especially in southern Valle del Cauca, is the 
existence of a large number of anti-personnel mines that continue to claim victims in the rural and 
urban populations. The government’s demining plans, which are considered to be an immediate 
necessity, have not yet been implemented: 
The issue of victims in Florida I think has worked well for us and the assistance has been given, in 
the urban part [as well as the] rural part and the indigenous [territories]. But something else has 
not worked... humanitarian demining was just propaganda. Here they haven’t demined even a 38-
long shell that is in the main park. There have been many victims here in the urban part and the 
villages. (Secretary of Government, Florida, Valle del Cauca) 
In regions that have suffered from the armed conflict for a long time, such as Putumayo, the 
implementation of Law 1448/11 faces great challenges. The number of applications for the 
registration of and assistance to victims has exceeded the capacities of the assigned officials: 
67
90 94 95 89 98 99 99 95 79 75 71
0
20
40
60
80
100
2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014 2011 2012 2013 2014
Catatumbo Cauca/Valle Putumayo
Electric power Cell phone
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
The victims’ office works relatively well, because it also has assigned another group of functions 
that do not correspond to it, so it works a little bit... It’s overwhelmed … its work is to provide 
guidance to the victims … The service center, terrible... The people wait in line for hours. They 
arrive early, stay overnight and sleep. There are only two officials for three municipalities, San 
Miguel, Orito and Valle del Guamuez… We’ve taken almost 4,000 declarations in these four years, 
and we took them practically alone, my secretary and I, because there was no support. (Municipal 
Solicitor’s Office, Valle de Guamuez, Putumayo) 
According to the results of the focus groups, the displaced population in the municipalities of 
northern Cauca are generally located in the urban center, in self-built housing that lacks public 
services. It has been observed that, with emergency aid, these families are living in rented rooms 
in houses that have been converted into tenements, which are characterized by high levels of 
overcrowding. One of the programs that is most valued by the community involves the 
construction of housing for the displaced population, in which the local governments, the Ministry 
of Housing and the UARIV worked together: 
Well, I would especially rescue the work done by the municipal administration with the Ministry of 
Housing and Territory with regard to the 300 homes built in the municipality for the victims of the 
conflict, in this case the displaced population, of those 300 homes they delivered 210 homes to the 
victims of forced displacement who reside here in the municipality… we had never seen a housing 
plan like the one that we just saw. (Municipal Solicitor’s Office, Santander de Quilichao, Cauca) 
Conclusion 7. Human rights violations persist in the three PNCRT regions evaluated. 
According to all of the sources consulted, the violation of rights persists, although with different 
victimizers in some cases. It should be noted that, according to the study data, the State is the party 
least likely to be identified as victimizer in these regions. Also, the demand for services for victims, 
as well as for the most immediate services for displaced persons arriving in the capital cities, 
appears to have exceeded the institutional capacity of the Victims’ Unit. Demining is a matter that 
requires an urgent solution in these regions. 
Recommendations 
1. Maintain the credibility of political participation processes and mechanisms, empowering 
the communities and their leaders. (Conclusions 1 and 2)
In support of the implementation of Statutory Law 1475 of 2011,36 the interventions at a local 
level should encourage political participation in order to achieve the consolidation of the 
territory. They should also promote the application of standards aimed at strengthening the 
principle of gender equality and the inclusion of young people in political activities, 
representation and access to electoral debates, in order to generate and consolidate proposals 
that mobilize the electorate toward the strengthening of democracy. 
This means continuing to strengthen political participation through social organizations, and 
reinforcing knowledge about the channels of political participation and advocacy in public 
administration, as has been done in the implementation of oversight projects. The following
specific strategies and actions would support those aims: 
 
36 This law establishes rules for the organization and operation of political parties and movements, and electoral processes. 
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
• Help rural youth and women obtain their identification documents and register in 
the electoral registries. 
• Promote the participation of women’s organizations in all areas of public life. 
• Use the schools as sites for training, socialization and the promotion of 
democratic values, practices and institutions for children and youth in general, 
with a special emphasis on the importance of elections. 
• Support the strengthening of the political parties under criteria of transparency in 
order to prevent the concentration of power. 
2. Actively support strategies to improve transparency and accountability. Public policies to 
achieve transparency and effective accountability at the different levels of the State are broad 
and have been instrumentalized. It is recommend that the PNCRT interventions promote the 
National Comprehensive Anti-corruption Public Policy Strategy established in CONPES 
Document 167 of 2013, and the right to access public information enshrined in Law 1712 of 
2014. This has been promoted by the Secretariat of Transparency, and proposals have been 
made for improving instrumentalization in the territorial entities in the coming months. 
In addition, accountability should include the obligation to provide information about what is 
being planned, executed and achieved, particularly with the resources that are allocated to the 
territories. In this regard, it is important for the PNCRT and the programs that support its 
implementation to show local governments the importance of managing for results in order to 
ensure the effective delivery of public goods and social services. For the Consolidation Index, 
consideration should be given to using the raw scores of the Open Government Index in order
to make a more rigorous estimate of the achievement of these goals. 
Another recommendation is related to the GoC’s ability to strengthen the mayor’s offices and 
associations to enable them to incorporate contract oversight mechanisms that mitigate the risk 
of diverting public resources. 
The implementation of the initiatives that the country has been defining for several years 
requires organized, decisive, sustained and coordinated interinstitutional action. The IDI and 
the IGA, as well as the Consolidation Index, tend to measure processes more than results that 
the public can perceive. 
3. Use new tools in the efforts to improve the provision of services. There is a national 
imperative to enhance decentralization. However, local capacity remains low and municipal 
resources are limited. Emphasis should be placed on the meaningful involvement of civil
society and on supporting local governments with ongoing technical assistance. Scorecards and 
other measures can be used to mobilize citizens to rate the changes in the provision of services, 
with the objective of learning about failures as well as successes, identifying best practices in 
different sectors and circumstances. 
It is necessary to strengthen citizen participation, from the perspective of both supply and 
demand. The fact that citizens do not feel involved in decision-making and that trust in the 
institutions has declined requires that decisions be made on the basis of citizen consultation and 
participation. Local government institutions should be strengthened while generating capacities 
in civil society for the exercise of an active citizenship, such that people are more connected, 
better informed and more demanding. 
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
4. Strengthening the country’s health and education models. In 2016, the country updated its 
Comprehensive Health Care Policy, in accordance with the Statutory Health Law and the Ten￾Year Public Health Plan (Law 1751 of 2015), which provides for specific services for the 
territories with dispersed populations. It includes the Comprehensive Health Care Model 
(MIAS), which is formulated in response to the health situation of the communities (focused on 
personal, family, community and environmental aspects), and which seeks to make an impact 
on the population’s state of health, guaranteeing greater attention to health events, with either
collective or individual actions, and recognizing the communities’ traditions, especially in cases 
involving ethnic groups. 
5. The State has to guarantee human rights and security of the population. This is a sine qua 
non condition for the post-conflict era. The historically marginalized municipalities and regions 
will be the scene of new conflicts and criminality in the near futures, and if the residents do not 
perceive that national government entities are protecting them, they will not feel part of a 
Colombia in peace. 
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
Evaluation question: What changes have been produced by the CELI interventions to strengthen 
the organizational capacities of local CSOs? 
Findings and conclusions
Social capital: Trust
The Social Capital Index, whose maximum score is 100 points, is comprised of indicators related 
to trust (60 points) and participation (40 points). Trust was measured at the level of family, 
neighbor, friend, Community Action Board (JAC), control bodies, municipal and national 
governments, police and army. 
As is evident, many of the factors that influence trust are beyond the scope of individual programs, 
and should be considered as indicators of conditions of context. However, analysis of the 
subcomponents at a program level provides a greater understanding of their strengths and 
weaknesses. 
The survey results show a decline in trust in Putumayo with respect to the baseline measurement 
in response to the three key questions regarding community trust (Figure 6.1). This decline in trust 
occurred in the other two regions as well, but with smaller differences between the baseline and 
midline than in Putumayo. 
Figure 6.1. Trends in trust among members of the community in Putumayo
Conclusion 1. Low community trust. The indices of trust among community members have 
fallen, which in turn has reduced the provision of mutual assistance and the capacity to work 
together on projects, a phenomenon that affects associativity and construction of the social fabric. 
Social capital: Participation in associations
The JACs continue to be the primary vehicle for participation in public life in the municipalities. 
The productive associations are also important in the villages, as are political groups, supervision 
and oversight groups, parents’ associations, and sports groups. 
Citizens also participate in women’s associations, youth associations, victims’ associations and 
cultural, collective identity and territorial associations, rooted in the intangible heritage of the 
community. 
Based on the survey results, the JACs remain the primary mechanism for generating associative 
22%
72%
25%
13%
64%
15%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
High or very high confidence that a neighbor will help you
in the event of a problem
A tradition of working in groups exists to complete
community projects
High or very high confidence in community members
PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
processes, despite the decline reported in relation to the baseline (from 89% to 67% in Putumayo, 
91% to 84% in Catatumbo, and 83% to 40% in Cauca/Valle del Cauca). 
There was a notable increase in the proportion of participants in the JACs who reported being 
involved in decision-making, from 23% to 45% in Putumayo, and from 19% to 44% in 
Cauca/Valle del Cauca. This figure fell in Catatumbo from 42% to 33%. However, the quality of 
participation on the JACs rose, at least in two regions. 
Participation increased in other types of associations, such as parents’ associations, organizations 
of displaced or vulnerable persons, cultural and sports groups, volunteer groups, and associations 
of producers and marketers, and community meetings were encouraged. The respondents stated 
that they have participated more in decision-making in many cases, as observed in the JACs. This 
indicator rose substantially in Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca, but not so much in 
Catatumbo, which had the lowest score for the participation subcomponent of the Social Capital 
Index, with a decrease of almost 1pp in comparison with its control municipalities. 
The Consolidation Index shows a significant decline in organizational dynamics in Catatumbo, 
and reports that the percentage of organizations that renewed their bylaws in the Chamber of 
Commerce fell from 100% in 2013 to 35% in 2014. However, that 35% included all of the 
Community Action Boards. Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca also reported that almost 100% 
of their JACs have been formalized, but only around one fifth of their organizations have renewed 
their bylaws. 
Another positive fact is the perceived utility of these mechanisms for households, in which the 
general trend is that participation in a social organization has been useful for obtaining some 
benefit. The following figure shows the benefits for the Cauca/Valle del Cauca region and the 
changes since the baseline: 
Figure 6.2. Trends in the benefits reported from belonging to social organizations in Cauca
Although there is a positive result in terms of improvements in the quantity and quality of 
participation in the PNCRT municipalities studied, there are still important challenges for 
associativity. The main problem perceived by respondents in the midline survey is that people are 
not interested in participating. The second problem identified, in order of importance, is the 
difficulty of working as a team, in all cases falling below the baseline. In Catatumbo, for example, 
it declined from 57% to 38%. In Putumayo, the perception of these problems declined 
significantly, while in Cauca/Valle del Cauca it remained the same. 
The respondents also indicated that the authorities need to facilitate organizational processes. The 
68%
56%
32%
64%
85%
80%
92%
87%
72%
85%
90%
93%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
To get to know others
To have fun and do activities that you like
To improve things relating to your productive activity
To participate in community decision making
To improve the community
Because it is important in the case of a future emergency
PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
perception of this problem remained at 10%, as reported in the baseline. 
The following figure shows the problems reported in Catatumbo, which, despite having lower 
participation in the midline, showed significant reductions in the perception of organizational 
problems: 
Figure 6.3. Trends in the organizational problems reported in Catatumbo
Community leadership continues to be more male than female in consolidation zones. The 
percentage of female JAC presidents declined drastically in Putumayo, from 39% to 10%, while it 
remained at around 30% in Catatumbo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca. 
Participation in women’s associations also fell in Putumayo and Cauca/Valle del Cauca, from 5% 
to 3% and from 10% to 7%, respectively. Nevertheless, members of women’s associations in 
Cauca/Valle del Cauca and Putumayo said that they had improved the quality of their participation 
by becoming involved in decision-making at higher levels than in the baseline. The results in
Catatumbo were different, with participation in women’s groups increasing from 6% to 8%. 
Conclusion 1. The regions saw an increase in the quality of participation. The data collected 
in the PNCRT municipalities show the value of participating for their inhabitants and the benefits 
perceived by the families. In general, participation in decision-making has been strengthened. It is 
noteworthy that the perception of participation-related problems has declined, but that teamwork 
and people’s lack of interest are indicated as greater problems or challenges. 
Conclusion 2. The JACs encourage associativity. Despite a decline from the baseline, the JACs 
are the most common mechanism for encouraging associativity. Households have increased their 
participation in the JACs, which has had an impact on the benefits perceived by the families. In 
general, the process of making structured decisions in the JACs has been strengthened. 
Conclusion 3. Women have not achieved positioning despite the importance of their role in 
their communities. Although the respondents stated that women can be leaders and influential in 
resolving conflicts and implementing peace, female leadership of the JACs and participation in 
women’s groups declined. The increase in women’s participation in decision-making is 
encouraging. 
Productive associations
One of the conditions for gaining access to government resources is membership in a productive 
association, since by law the resources cannot be allocated to individuals. As a result, different 
42%
36%
57%
52%
39%
10%
2%
30%
40%
38%
27%
21%
10%
5%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
People are very untrustworthy
People are not interested in participating
Group work is very difficult
People do not have the training necessary for organizing
Unable to get the necessary help outside the community
Authorities do not help us to organize
Other political groups make it difficult to organize
PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
associations have arisen in northern Cauca linked to products such as pineapple, coffee, fruit trees 
and dairy products: 
Well, associativity has been promoted in part, also since the Mayor began, he said “well, it is the 
only way that we can invest and allocate resources as ordered by the law.” …The Mayor needs to 
allocate the investments always to a group, and not to individuals. (Productive association focus 
group, Caloto, Cauca) 
The respondents indicated that there are economic incentives for joining associations and thus 
support their productive projects. The survey results in the PNCRT municipalities and their 
controls were very positive. In Cauca/Valle del Cauca, for example, 25% of the respondents in the 
midline sample joined associations in order to sell their products, train together, and be represented 
as a group, in comparison with 4% in the baseline. The respondents were also more likely to join 
associations in order to transport their products, seek financing for their projects, and apply for 
credit. (Figure 6.4) 
Figure 6.4. Trends in the reasons for joining associations, Cauca/Valle del Cauca
The data disaggregated by sex show that female-headed households are driving this growth in 
associativity in order to process, sell and transport their products, as well as to obtain financing for 
their projects. 
Conclusion 4. Economic rationality is an incentive for associativity. Economic rationality 
operates as an incentive for families to joint associations and strengthen the mechanisms of 
participation. Associativity around economic issues of female-headed households is a very 
important part of this finding. 
Recommendations 
1. Adapt the programs in order to build trust. The fall in the indicators of trust in the 
government, neighbors and the community cannot be resolved with PNCRT programs only. 
The supply- and demand-related tools recommended in the institutional development chapter 
are part of the answer; guaranteeing the security and rights of leaders is another; and 
strengthening the associations and communities is a third part.
The benefits of associative schemes that favor dialogue and replicate the implicit knowledge 
of the communities have been demonstrated. They generate the roots of community identity 
and the effectiveness of project management. All initiatives, strategies, intentions, and actions 
5%
6%
4%
3%
4%
4%
2%
1%
10%
9%
25%
19%
25%
24%
16%
12%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%
To purchase inputs
To process products
To sell products
To transport products
To jointly build capacity
To have group representation
To present projects for potential financing
To solicit credit
PNCRT midline PNCRT baseline
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that are defined to increase associativity are key inputs for the consolidation of the democratic 
state and sustained and sustainable peacebuilding. This exercise can benefit from recognizing 
and coordinating national public policy efforts to promote the effective participation of 
different segments of the population, such as young people, and the generation of 
opportunities for them. Also, CONPES Document 173 of 2014 promotes the effective 
participation of women, and CONPES Document 3784 of 2013 provides guidelines for the 
prevention of risks, and the protection and guarantee of the rights of women victims of the 
armed conflict. 
As indicated, associativity requires the promotion of cooperation and not competition. As 
such, it is important to reduce the incentive that exists for the creation of social organizations 
for the purpose of obtaining resources, and rather monitor the creation and maturation of 
existing associations in order to promote good practices and the consolidation of new 
productive orders. 
2. Enhance the work of female-headed households through the use of participatory models. 
The positive participation results achieved with male-headed households should be extended 
to female-headed households. While the latter take advantage of the services offered by 
cooperation agencies as well as the State, it is important to implement different mechanisms 
of differential attention that address the vulnerability of female heads of households, such as 
the provision of child care during meetings, or the scheduling of meetings when they have 
free time to participate more. 
In addition, those who are already participating in women’s, victims’ or other groups can serve 
as guides to encourage other women to participate in the groups. 
Moreover, the leaders of community associations and other groups, whose commitment and 
participation already represent greater levels of social roots, can serve as resources to advance 
this goal. The different ways of using this associative leadership resource should be 
investigated through activities that promote associativity with community members whose 
behavior indicates a growing isolation. 
3. Continue to strengthen the JACs in an effort to develop and consolidate them. Current 
law37 allows for the creation of multiple mechanisms for strengthening the role of the JACs 
as dispute-resolution agents. It is thus expected that they will promote conciliation for the 
development of peace. The JACs can also execute infrastructure projects (for tertiary roads, 
for example), manage community radio stations, and implement public policy oversight and 
monitoring processes, as well as serve as key agents for strengthening the social fabric. 
The main report of the evaluation recommends, in particular, adapting the instrument used by 
the CELIs to measure the organizational capacities of the JACs, and to make the results public, 
among other steps to ensure their legitimacy with their communities
 
37 Law 743 of 2002, which develops Article 38 of the Political Constitution of Colombia with regard to community action organizations, and 
National Decree 2350 of 2003, which regulates that Law. 
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ANNEX 1: LIST EXPERIMENT: CLUSTER￾LEVEL RESULTS
List experiment results in this annex are presented by the four PNCRT regions studied and by the ten survey 
clusters that composed the regions. These clusters are:
Cluster Region DEPTO Treatment Control
2 CATATUMBO N SANTAN Hacarí, San Calixto Simití, Bolivar
10 CATATUMBO N SANTAN Tibú Dabeiba, Antioquia
11 CATATUMBO N SANTAN Teorama, Convención, El 
Carmen San Carlos, Antioquia
19 CAUCA/V V DE CAUCA Florida, Pradera Coyaima, Tolima
20 CAUCA/V CAUCA Miranda, Corinto Cumbitara, Nariño
21 CAUCA/V CAUCA Caloto, Santander de 
Quilichao Totoró, Cauca
29 PUTUMAYO PUTUMAYO Puerto Leguízamo Santa Rosa, Cauca
30 PUTUMAYO PUTUMAYO Puertto Asís Puerto Concordia, Meta
31 PUTUMAYO PUTUMAYO Valle de Guamuez Algeciras, Huila
32 PUTUMAYO PUTUMAYO San Miguel Florencia, Caquetá
Results are shown for the question on contact with illegal armed groups, and then for contact with illicit 
crops. For the region and then for each cluster, three graphs are presented. The first shows the results at 
baseline, the second at midline, and the third shows the impact, if any, using the differences in differences 
calculation. As will be seen across the graphs, there is an overall diminution of respondent reports that they 
have contact with either illegal armed groups or with illicit crops, in many cases approaching zero at midline. 
However, this trend crosses the treatment (PNCRT) and control sites, and as such, the trend cannot be 
attributed to any intervention. 
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Catatumbo Region: Contact with armed groups
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Catatumbo Region: Contact with illicit crops
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Catatumbo, Cluster 2 - Contact with armed groups
Contact with illicit crops
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Catatumbo, Cluster 10 - Contact with armed groups
Contact with illicit crops
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Catatumbo, Cluster 11- Contact with armed groups
Contact with illicit crops
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Cauca Region: Contact with armed groups
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Cauca Region: Contact with illicit crops
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Cauca, Cluster 19 - Contact with armed groups
Contact with illicit crops
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Cauca, Cluster 20 - Contact with armed groups
Contact with illicit crops
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Cauca, Cluster 21 - Contact with armed groups
Contact with illicit crops
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Putumayo Region: Contact with armed groups
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Putumayo Region: Contact with illicit crops
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Putumayo, Cluster 29 - Contact with armed groups
Contact with illicit crops
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Putumayo, Cluster 30 - Contact with armed groups
Contact with illicit crops
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Putumayo, Cluster 31 - Contact with armed groups
Contact with illicit crops
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Putumayo, Cluster 32 - Contact with armed groups
Contact with illicit crops
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
ANNEX 2: DESCRIPTIVE DATA 
TABLES, BY CLUSTER 
This annex presents the descriptive data tables for the 10 clusters in the PNCRT areas:
Cluster Region DEPTO Treatment Control
2 CATATUMBO N SANTAN Hacarí, San Calixto Simití, Bolivar
10 CATATUMBO N SANTAN Tibú Dabeiba, Antioquia
11 CATATUMBO N SANTAN Teorama, Convención, El 
Carmen San Carlos, Antioquia
19 CAUCA/V V DE CAUCA Florida, Pradera Coyaima, Tolima
20 CAUCA/V CAUCA Miranda, Corinto Cumbitara, Nariño
21 CAUCA/V CAUCA Caloto, Santander de 
Quilichao Totoró, Cauca
29 PUTUMAYO PUTUMAYO Puerto Leguízamo Santa Rosa, Cauca
30 PUTUMAYO PUTUMAYO Puertto Asís Puerto Concordia, Meta
31 PUTUMAYO PUTUMAYO Valle de Guamuez Algeciras, Huila
32 PUTUMAYO PUTUMAYO San Miguel Florencia, Caquetá
Cluster 2
PNCRT: Hacarí, San Calixto (N de Santander) Control: Simití (Bolívar)
Variable
Cluster 2
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
PNCRT Control PNCRT Control (Impact) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The economic situation is good or very good 0,390 0,325 0,124 0,175 0.118**
The family is experiencing hunger 0,038 0,157 0,381 0,341 -0.151***
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty 0,403 0,058 0,907 0,513 -0.0474
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave 
problems
0,891 0,821 0,827 0,780 0.0193
Productive activities earn very little money 0,938 0,997 0,127 0,105 -0.0798**
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity 0,081 0,404 0,009 0,003 -0.335***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of 
money
0,703 0,841 0,731 0,806 -0.0589
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money 0,263 0,398 0,375 0,459 -0.0826
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses) 490433 396175 435882 527940 227,421***
 Baseline Midline
Dif-Dif 
(Impact) 
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FINANCIAL SERVICES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Have a savings account 0,415 0,392 0,356 0,420 0.103*
Have a checking account 0,034 0,013 0,031 0,105 0.105***
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities 0,059 0,382 0,201 0,666 0.137***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,446 0,455 0,483 0,519 0.0581
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,701 0,790 0,782 0,810 -0.0688
Currently have debt 0,743 0,879 0,656 0,729 -0.0313
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS (Impact) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The mayor’s office is run well or very well 0,473 0,263 0,502 0,301 0.0127
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago 0,727 0,364 0,397 0,304 0.246***
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses 0,050 0,156 0,146 0,108 -0.152***
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the 
community to express their opinions on community 
interests 
0,040 0,076 0,015 0,115 0.0567**
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ 
opinions into account when making decisions
0,034 0,057 0,022 0,086 0.0372
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a 
project 0,498 0,244 0,379 0,341 0.229***
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a 
project 0,676 0,511 0,510 0,531 0.219***
The departmental government runs well or very well 0,160 0,278 0,530 0,280 -0.410***
The departmental government runs better than two years 
ago 
0,221 0,180 0,285 0,153 -0.146***
The national government runs well or very well 0,534 0,368 0,452 0,324 0.0295
The national government runs better than two years ago 0,344 0,257 0,205 0,164 0.00567
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) TRUST (a lot or very much) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The departmental government 0,121 0,094 0,232 0,125 -0.0930**
The national government 0,394 0,166 0,202 0,163 0.192***
Justice sector institutions 0,166 0,117 0,115 0,169 0.106**
Alternative justice institutions 0,236 0,173 0,118 0,151 0.0639
The institutions of the agricultural sector 0,164 0,252 0,183 0,346 0.0600
Social organizations and NGOs 0,234 0,150 0,217 0,152 0.0555
Training centers 0,684 0,307 0,423 0,355 0.326***
The Defensoría del Pueblo 0,382 0,138 0,213 0,254 0.290***
The municipal council 0,272 0,154 0,245 0,241 0.114**
The national police 0,149 0,115 0,191 0,180 0.0107
The army 0,442 0,151 0,287 0,188 0.190***
The navy 0,358 0,090 0,236 0,119 0.153***
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The municipal personería 0,431 0,191 0,218 0,266 0.300***
The mayor’s office 0,538 0,192 0,381 0,279 0.268***
The JAC 0,642 0,546 0,478 0,628 0.259***
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) SECURITY PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved 0,541 0,199 0,302 0,211 0.229***
I would recommend that a family member return to the 
vereda
0,861 0,879 0,876 0,911 0.0116
Serious security problems in the vereda:
Homicides 0,065 0,156 0,037 0,013 -0.0885**
Illegal armed groups 0,287 0,422 0,291 0,137 -0.281***
Antipersonnel mines 0,120 0,178 0,019 0,057 -0.0465
Displacement 0,046 0,044 0,022 0,073 0.0209
Forced disappearances 0,037 0,000 0,080 0,013 -0.0267
Extortion 0,361 0,044 0,115 0,006 0.255***
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.) 0,472 0,467 0,235 0,096 -0.138*
Forced recruitment 0,028 0,000 0,003 0,006 0.0239
Sexual violence 0,046 0,000 0,009 0,013 0.0440*
There are no serious security issues in the vereda 0,666 0,857 0,560 0,726 -0.0652
There is police presence 0,805 0,201 0,022 0,102 0.672***
The police here are good or very good 0,120 0,380 0,286 0,333 -0.0923
The police have improved in the last two years 0,102 0,163 0,429 0,063 -0.380**
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) ILLICIT ACTIVITIES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
There is currently coca in the vereda 0,344 0,454 0,311 0,467 0.00739
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda 0,192 0,043 0,103 0,086 0.152***
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because 
they are illegal
0,891 0,874 0,903 0,765 -0.113***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and 
communities negatively
0,913 0,857 0,916 0,785 -0.0550
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living 0,894 0,869 0,926 0,810 -0.0746*
My family and friends think growing coca is bad 0,770 0,696 0,862 0,798 0.0324
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) EXPECTATIONS PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the 
next two years? 0,810 0,861 0,928 0,873 -0.111***
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve? 0,830 0,611 0,913 0,863 0.161***
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In the next two years, will your licit income increase? 0,768 0,522 0,904 0,809 0.155***
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your 
vereda or corregimiento improve?
0,811 0,596 0,907 0,898 0.218***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve? 0,737 0,529 0,873 0,847 0.185***
In the future, will access to health services improve? 0,554 0,411 0,811 0,803 0.119**
In the future, will access to education improve? 0,545 0,525 0,842 0,825 -0.00213
In the future, will access to public services improve? 0,573 0,347 0,820 0,732 0.140***
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve? 0,709 0,500 0,851 0,806 0.175***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve 0,746 0,490 0,814 0,780 0.235***
In the future, will municipal government improve? 0,851 0,462 0,839 0,777 0.325***
Do you think you’ll stay in your current residence for the 
next two years?
0,912 0,923 0,934 0,918 -0.0359
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Cluster 10
PNCRT: Tibú (N de Santander) Control: Dabeiba (Antioquia) 
Variable
Cluster 10
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
PNCRT Control PNCRT Control (Impact) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The economic situation is good or very good 0,272 0,159 0,160 0,290 0.229***
The family is experiencing hunger 0,125 0,040 0,358 0,171 -0.112***
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty 0,305 0,160 0,824 0,645 -0.0278
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave 
problems
0,766 0,790 0,793 0,583 -0.221***
Productive activities earn very little money 0,785 0,800 0,086 0,093 -0.0173
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity 0,022 0,090 0,003 0,019 -0.0491**
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of 
money
0,769 0,682 0,559 0,623 0.139***
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money 0,373 0,246 0,417 0,271 -0.0338
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses) 280569 503741 377574 515365 -75,322*
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) FINANCIAL SERVICES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Have a savings account 0,364 0,517 0,451 0,424 -0.167***
Have a checking account 0,009 0,059 0,040 0,140 0.0516*
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities 0,370 0,408 0,552 0,474 -0.140**
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,358 0,380 0,417 0,386 -0.0598
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,655 0,525 0,726 0,661 0.0279
Currently have debt 0,546 0,664 0,469 0,486 -0.0983*
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS (Impact) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The mayor’s office is run well or very well 0,156 0,109 0,286 0,093 -0.152***
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago 0,131 0,076 0,112 0,100 0.0490
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses 0,108 0,140 0,077 0,047 -0.0564*
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the 
community to express their opinions on community 
interests 
0,040 0,025 0,046 0,009 -0.0199
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ 
opinions into account when making decisions
0,028 0,022 0,037 0,012 -0.0129
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a 
project 0,121 0,070 0,140 0,080 -0.00670
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a 
project 0,494 0,492 0,444 0,449 0.00397
The departmental government runs well or very well 0,448 0,178 0,618 0,179 -0.196***
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The departmental government runs better than two years 
ago 
0,154 0,082 0,195 0,115 -0.0143
The national government runs well or very well 0,568 0,394 0,583 0,350 -0.0679
The national government runs better than two years ago 0,188 0,263 0,170 0,170 -0.0763
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) TRUST (a lot or very much) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The departmental government 0,313 0,083 0,299 0,070 -0.0203
The national government 0,411 0,190 0,305 0,188 0.0852
Justice sector institutions 0,219 0,113 0,235 0,156 0.00746
Alternative justice institutions 0,126 0,129 0,208 0,143 -0.0819*
The institutions of the agricultural sector 0,346 0,153 0,298 0,206 0.120**
Social organizations and NGOs 0,194 0,196 0,225 0,132 -0.109**
Training centers 0,504 0,523 0,436 0,583 0.127**
The Defensoría del Pueblo 0,299 0,202 0,302 0,249 0.0431
The municipal council 0,158 0,116 0,229 0,125 -0.0572
The national police 0,326 0,155 0,320 0,169 0.00877
The army 0,374 0,299 0,369 0,301 -0.00308
The navy 0,327 0,208 0,265 0,234 0.0499
The municipal personería 0,369 0,183 0,272 0,149 0.0690
The mayor’s office 0,222 0,135 0,235 0,087 -0.0866**
The JAC 0,474 0,533 0,416 0,487 -0.00408
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) SECURITY PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved 0,236 0,310 0,518 0,365 -0.223***
I would recommend that a family member return to the 
vereda
0,870 0,875 0,880 0,857 -0.00875
Serious security problems in the vereda:
Homicides 0,060 0,145 0,031 0,062 -0.0661
Illegal armed groups 0,482 0,315 0,046 0,153 0.276***
Antipersonnel mines 0,145 0,073 0,028 0,028 0.0791**
Displacement 0,048 0,040 0,043 0,044 0.0205
Forced disappearances 0,000 0,024 0,003 0,006 -0.0214
Extortion 0,084 0,065 0,009 0,022 0.0329
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.) 0,386 0,661 0,080 0,346 -0.0231
Forced recruitment 0,012 0,016 0,012 0,006 -0.00374
Sexual violence 0,024 0,065 0,022 0,034 -0.0292
There are no serious security issues in the vereda 0,744 0,614 0,821 0,555 -0.1000*
There is police presence 0,386 0,318 0,052 0,206 0.214***
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The police here are good or very good 0,408 0,362 0,706 0,394 -0.260
The police have improved in the last two years 0,224 0,235 0,353 0,273 -0.103
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) ILLICIT ACTIVITIES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
There is currently coca in the vereda 0,038 0,130 0,036 0,234 0.111***
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda 0,028 0,006 0,020 0,042 0.0436**
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because 
they are illegal
0,962 0,931 0,845 0,790 -0.0251
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and 
communities negatively 
0,949 0,949 0,833 0,829 -0.0163
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living 0,968 0,940 0,845 0,761 -0.0591
My family and friends think growing coca is bad 0,959 0,904 0,851 0,820 0.0149
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) EXPECTATIONS PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the 
next two years? 0,857 0,817 0,728 0,847 0.162***
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve? 0,806 0,766 0,917 0,916 0.0391
In the next two years, will your licit income increase? 0,821 0,760 0,910 0,885 0.0453
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your 
vereda or corregimiento improve?
0,833 0,769 0,938 0,935 0.0605
In the future, will your housing conditions improve? 0,852 0,754 0,941 0,947 0.105***
In the future, will access to health services improve? 0,821 0,607 0,944 0,888 0.138***
In the future, will access to education improve? 0,836 0,692 0,932 0,894 0.112***
In the future, will access to public services improve? 0,827 0,626 0,886 0,891 0.203***
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve? 0,802 0,629 0,895 0,891 0.172***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve 0,815 0,639 0,889 0,869 0.146***
In the future, will municipal government improve? 0,809 0,601 0,873 0,872 0.197***
Do you think you’ll stay in your current residence for the 
next two years?
0,895 0,900 0,868 0,919 0.0422
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Cluster 11
PNCRT: Teorama, Convención, El Carmen (N de Santander)
Control: San Carlos (Antioquia)
Variable
Cluster 11
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
PNCRT Control PNCRT Control (Impact) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The economic situation is good or very good 0,191 0,353 0,160 0,198 -0.117**
The family is experiencing hunger 0,052 0,047 0,166 0,269 0.0881**
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty 0,125 0,130 0,799 0,632 -0.175***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave 
problems 0,770 0,879 0,740 0,876 0.0299
Productive activities earn very little money 0,780 0,997 0,028 0,025 -0.206***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity 0,010 0,102 0,025 0,003 -0.124***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of 
money
0,611 0,814 0,524 0,836 0.0975*
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money 0,166 0,334 0,245 0,452 0.00705
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses) 398569 393663 587737 463068 -111,001*
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) FINANCIAL SERVICES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Have a savings account 0,461 0,585 0,376 0,625 0.155***
Have a checking account 0,016 0,028 0,044 0,142 0.104***
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities 0,373 0,709 0,442 0,842 0.0903*
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,408 0,746 0,467 0,749 -0.0721
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,708 0,822 0,819 0,872 -0.0245
Currently have debt 0,599 0,876 0,639 0,811 -0.115**
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS (Impact) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The mayor’s office is run well or very well 0,611 0,142 0,672 0,135 -0.0656
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago 0,439 0,159 0,436 0,051 -0.0919*
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses 0,085 0,084 0,197 0,065 -0.135***
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the 
community to express their opinions on community 
interests 0,125 0,022 0,116 0,019 -0.00661
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ 
opinions into account when making decisions 0,113 0,034 0,078 0,009 -6.85e-05
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a 
project 0,539 0,142 0,604 0,092 -0.118**
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Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a 
project 0,740 0,572 0,625 0,505 0.0597
The departmental government runs well or very well 0,611 0,248 0,716 0,260
The departmental government runs better than two years 
ago 
0,226 0,106 0,310 0,085
The national government runs well or very well 0,669 0,372 0,473 0,396
The national government runs better than two years ago 0,236 0,172 0,153 0,139
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) TRUST (a lot or very much) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The departmental government 0,441 0,104 0,496 0,097
The national government 0,540 0,244 0,331 0,178
Justice sector institutions 0,348 0,136 0,293 0,134
Alternative justice institutions 0,289 0,176 0,260 0,133
The institutions of the agricultural sector 0,442 0,271 0,345 0,244
Social organizations and NGOs 0,331 0,181 0,399 0,109
Training centers 0,558 0,409 0,681 0,454
The Defensoría del Pueblo 0,421 0,211 0,372 0,218
The municipal council 0,319 0,133 0,316 0,117
The national police 0,425 0,153 0,432 0,200
The army 0,443 0,252 0,507 0,290
The navy 0,413 0,188 0,435 0,144
The municipal personería 0,595 0,182 0,472 0,173
The mayor’s office 0,541 0,178 0,619 0,115
The JAC 0,682 0,555 0,659 0,559
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) SECURITY PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved 0,345 0,253 0,554 0,232 -0.237***
I would recommend that a family member return to the 
vereda
0,966 0,907 0,940 0,898 -0.00563
Serious security problems in the vereda:
Homicides 0,068 0,170 0,013 0,003 -0.146***
Illegal armed groups 0,017 0,226 0,003 0,065 -0.154***
Antipersonnel mines 0,034 0,047 0,009 0,031 0.00465
Displacement 0,034 0,047 0,000 0,022 0.0219
Forced disappearances 0,017 0,094 0,000 0,022 -0.0592**
Extortion 0,034 0,123 0,019 0,040 -0.0777**
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.) 0,644 0,783 0,172 0,146 -0.0991
Forced recruitment 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,003 0.00353
110 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Sexual violence 0,017 0,009 0,009 0,012 0.00800
There are no serious security issues in the vereda 0,815 0,672 0,806 0,768 0.102**
There is police presence 0,671 0,065 0,270 0,025 0.370***
The police here are good or very good 0,564 0,524 0,590 0,250 -0.277
The police have improved in the last two years 0,236 0,190 0,280 0,125 -0.121
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) ILLICIT ACTIVITIES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
There is currently coca in the vereda 0,029 0,055 0,015 0,207 0.171***
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda 0,065 0,000 0,065 0,000 0.00372
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because 
they are illegal
0,936 0,975 0,818 0,946 0.0940***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and 
communities negatively
0,962 0,972 0,842 0,956 0.0989***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living 0,969 0,959 0,823 0,876 0.0738**
My family and friends think growing coca is bad 0,980 0,858 0,861 0,914 0.176***
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) EXPECTATIONS PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the 
next two years? 0,887 0,873 0,884 0,920 0.0718*
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve? 0,837 0,700 0,893 0,882 0.122***
In the next two years, will your licit income increase? 0,846 0,638 0,893 0,870 0.176***
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your 
vereda or corregimiento improve?
0,890 0,666 0,862 0,898 0.271***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve? 0,915 0,492 0,918 0,892 0.388***
In the future, will access to health services improve? 0,824 0,381 0,774 0,833 0.485***
In the future, will access to education improve? 0,853 0,409 0,875 0,864 0.433***
In the future, will access to public services improve? 0,803 0,359 0,831 0,820 0.441***
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve? 0,856 0,424 0,815 0,848 0.463***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve 0,828 0,409 0,837 0,861 0.433***
In the future, will municipal government improve? 0,853 0,387 0,730 0,858 0.579***
Do you think you’ll stay in your current residence for the 
next two years?
0,922 0,932 0,978 0,937 -0.0529*
111 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Cluster 19
PNCRT: Florida, Pradera (Valle de Cauca) Control: Coyaima (Tolima)
Variable
Cluster 19
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
PNCRT Control PNCRT Control (Impact) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The economic situation is good or very good 0,431 0,268 0,132 0,258
The family is experiencing hunger 0,361 0,140 0,711 0,252
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty 0,526 0,133 0,949 0,834
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave 
problems
0,952 0,960 0,476 0,599
Productive activities earn very little money 0,800 0,827 0,029 0,056
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity 0,000 0,113 0,010 0,026
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of 
money
0,961 0,672 0,907 0,619
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money 0,379 0,252 0,582 0,281
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses) 297765 481651 228248 576919
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) FINANCIAL SERVICES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Have a savings account 0,476 0,457 0,174 0,212 0.0327
Have a checking account 0,006 0,023 0,006 0,123 0.0941***
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities 0,334 0,450 0,302 0,649 0.197***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,228 0,427 0,125 0,397 0.0801
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,437 0,620 0,667 0,600 -0.188
Currently have debt 0,543 0,583 0,186 0,470 0.253***
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS (Impact) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The mayor’s office is run well or very well 0,282 0,170 0,226 0,134 0.0336
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago 0,327 0,148 0,073 0,145 0.262***
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses 0,141 0,070 0,084 0,053 0.0620*
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the 
community to express their opinions on community 
interests 
0,032 0,036 0,023 0,040 0.0234
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ 
opinions into account when making decisions
0,023 0,026 0,016 0,026 0.0180
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a 
project 0,200 0,143 0,105 0,070 0.0473
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a 
project 0,486 0,514 0,275 0,275 -0.0134
112 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
The departmental government runs well or very well 0,331 0,243 0,295 0,227 0.00104
The departmental government runs better than two years 
ago 
0,198 0,105 0,042 0,122 0.163***
The national government runs well or very well 0,530 0,461 0,464 0,321 -0.0608
The national government runs better than two years ago 0,284 0,218 0,099 0,129 0.125***
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) TRUST (a lot or very much) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The departmental government 0,194 0,140 0,144 0,089 -0.00747
The national government 0,353 0,266 0,265 0,124 -0.0555
Justice sector institutions 0,254 0,193 0,188 0,099 0.00136
Alternative justice institutions 0,279 0,233 0,165 0,126 -0.00534
The institutions of the agricultural sector 0,151 0,325 0,163 0,158 -0.157***
Social organizations and NGOs 0,178 0,290 0,155 0,108 -0.176***
Training centers 0,412 0,702 0,512 0,664 -0.0967
The Defensoría del Pueblo 0,221 0,270 0,192 0,175 -0.0691
The municipal council 0,166 0,131 0,141 0,075 -0.0311
The national police 0,339 0,284 0,493 0,154 -0.242***
The army 0,503 0,427 0,546 0,318 -0.123**
The navy 0,408 0,412 0,285 0,278 -0.0108
The municipal personería 0,290 0,242 0,148 0,169 0.0665
The mayor’s office 0,211 0,181 0,227 0,090 -0.0963**
The JAC 0,505 0,508 0,403 0,241 -0.158***
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) SECURITY PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved 0,162 0,182 0,161 0,201 0.0107
I would recommend that a family member return to the 
vereda
0,897 0,785 0,768 0,831 0.156***
Serious security problems in the vereda:
Homicides 0,050 0,158 0,093 0,083 -0.121***
Illegal armed groups 0,050 0,288 0,016 0,056 -0.204***
Antipersonnel mines 0,008 0,179 0,000 0,036 -0.114***
Displacement 0,033 0,130 0,039 0,073 -0.0590
Forced disappearances 0,000 0,027 0,003 0,003 -0.0307**
Extortion 0,017 0,027 0,006 0,060 0.0485*
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.) 0,934 0,739 0,476 0,526 0.232***
Forced recruitment 0,008 0,005 0,003 0,007 0.00829
Sexual violence 0,124 0,043 0,045 0,033 0.0922***
There are no serious security issues in the vereda 0,611 0,391 0,479 0,397 0.159***
113 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
There is police presence 0,762 0,563 0,167 0,268 0.286***
The police here are good or very good 0,340 0,385 0,442 0,420 -0.00496
The police have improved in the last two years 0,136 0,195 0,192 0,359 0.175**
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) ILLICIT ACTIVITIES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
There is currently coca in the vereda 0,030 0,003 0,003 0,014 0.0327**
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda 0,093 0,010 0,013 0,011 0.0705***
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because 
they are illegal
0,955 0,966 0,764 0,606 -0.181***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and 
communities negatively 
0,987 0,960 0,760 0,698 -0.0352
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living 0,984 0,987 0,733 0,661 -0.0909**
My family and friends think growing coca is bad 0,941 0,953 0,760 0,767 0.00904
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) EXPECTATIONS PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the 
next two years? 0,860 0,815 0,648 0,750 0.154**
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve? 0,595 0,742 0,942 0,927 -0.160***
In the next two years, will your licit income increase? 0,556 0,722 0,923 0,894 -0.182***
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your 
vereda or corregimiento improve?
0,553 0,762 0,968 0,927 -0.258***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve? 0,633 0,738 0,974 0,930 -0.157***
In the future, will access to health services improve? 0,466 0,583 0,981 0,911 -0.209***
In the future, will access to education improve? 0,537 0,629 0,984 0,911 -0.182***
In the future, will access to public services improve? 0,502 0,510 0,977 0,884 -0.128***
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve? 0,592 0,540 0,974 0,921 0.00545
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve 0,508 0,629 0,971 0,887 -0.203***
In the future, will municipal government improve? 0,508 0,560 0,958 0,874 -0.138***
Do you think you’ll stay in your current residence for the 
next two years?
0,927 0,873 0,913 0,912 0.0594
114 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Cluster 20
PNCRT: Miranda, Corinto (Cauca) Control: Cumbitara (Nariño) 
Variable
Cluster 20
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
PNCRT Control PNCRT Control (Impact) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The economic situation is good or very good 0,532 0,299 0,113 0,183 0.313***
The family is experiencing hunger 0,084 0,058 0,319 0,162 -0.158***
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty 0,465 0,237 0,700 0,912 0.411***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave 
problems 0,939 0,982 0,523 0,577 -0.0181
Productive activities earn very little money 0,926 0,737 0,081 0,021 0.115***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity 0,290 0,032 0,019 0,004 0.245***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of 
money
0,829 0,637 0,719 0,687 0.149***
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money 0,268 0,229 0,332 0,239 -0.0789
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses) 251813 417308 440810 463666 -165,513*
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) FINANCIAL SERVICES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Have a savings account 0,348 0,465 0,290 0,370 -0.0512
Have a checking account 0,010 0,000 0,074 0,053 -0.0235
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities 0,187 0,141 0,468 0,285 -0.135**
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,248 0,338 0,281 0,377 -0.0181
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,623 0,563 0,724 0,692 0.0434
Currently have debt 0,716 0,577 0,497 0,408 0.0428
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS (Impact) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The mayor’s office is run well or very well 0,199 0,279 0,397 0,269 -0.238***
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago 0,254 0,286 0,323 0,138 -0.246***
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses 0,048 0,116 0,165 0,056 -0.189***
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the 
community to express their opinions on community 
interests 
0,035 0,063 0,119 0,046 -0.129***
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ 
opinions into account when making decisions
0,029 0,032 0,087 0,035 -0.0581**
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a 
project 0,157 0,272 0,296 0,261 -0.158***
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a 
project 0,362 0,491 0,268 0,398 -0.0113
The departmental government runs well or very well 0,214 0,290 0,480 0,217 -0.392***
115 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
The departmental government runs better than two years 
ago 
0,172 0,162 0,258 0,091 -0.199***
The national government runs well or very well 0,287 0,457 0,570 0,313 -0.495***
The national government runs better than two years ago 0,205 0,318 0,336 0,100 -0.385***
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) TRUST (a lot or very much) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The departmental government 0,074 0,143 0,151 0,090 -0.184***
The national government 0,116 0,282 0,277 0,180 -0.308***
Justice sector institutions 0,064 0,176 0,086 0,109 -0.106***
Alternative justice institutions 0,066 0,171 0,079 0,088 -0.123***
The institutions of the agricultural sector 0,141 0,228 0,171 0,153 -0.121**
Social organizations and NGOs 0,151 0,224 0,096 0,130 -0.0249
Training centers 0,377 0,669 0,263 0,537 0.00138
The Defensoría del Pueblo 0,116 0,281 0,178 0,170 -0.198***
The municipal council 0,157 0,144 0,136 0,138 -0.0135
The national police 0,069 0,294 0,135 0,264 -0.0833*
The army 0,124 0,504 0,214 0,349 -0.260***
The navy 0,073 0,463 0,134 0,177 -0.368***
The municipal personería 0,094 0,218 0,167 0,142 -0.186***
The mayor’s office 0,140 0,291 0,306 0,239 -0.247***
The JAC 0,308 0,470 0,247 0,296 -0.133**
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) SECURITY PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved 0,288 0,155 0,384 0,198
I would recommend that a family member return to the 
vereda
0,690 0,901 0,832 0,880
Serious security problems in the vereda:
Homicides 0,115 0,098 0,090 0,039 -0.0166
Illegal armed groups 0,833 0,137 0,281 0,039 0.467***
Antipersonnel mines 0,173 0,039 0,100 0,018 0.0317
Displacement 0,404 0,059 0,200 0,039 0.182***
Forced disappearances 0,077 0,010 0,026 0,004 0.0520**
Extortion 0,128 0,010 0,071 0,011 0.0899**
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.) 0,276 0,765 0,123 0,292 -0.312***
Forced recruitment 0,006 0,000 0,010 0,000 0.00283
Sexual violence 0,013 0,039 0,026 0,018 -0.0463*
There are no serious security issues in the vereda 0,497 0,641 0,529 0,665 -0.00480
There is police presence 0,377 0,944 0,365 0,239 -0.652***
116 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
The police here are good or very good 0,160 0,322 0,339 0,529 0.0725
The police have improved in the last two years 0,114 0,146 0,265 0,254 -0.0906
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) ILLICIT ACTIVITIES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
There is currently coca in the vereda 0,461 0,046 0,352 0,056 0.120**
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda 0,134 0,007 0,031 0,032 0.130***
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because 
they are illegal
0,761 0,947 0,441 0,809 0.165***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and 
communities negatively 
0,778 0,911 0,514 0,855 0.164***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living 0,752 0,960 0,439 0,869 0.185***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad 0,666 0,911 0,535 0,862 0.0527
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) EXPECTATIONS PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the 
next two years? 0,770 0,764 0,612 0,683 0.0110
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve? 0,577 0,796 0,774 0,912 -0.0976*
In the next two years, will your licit income increase? 0,474 0,718 0,755 0,880 -0.137**
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your 
vereda or corregimiento improve?
0,548 0,697 0,874 0,933 -0.0794
In the future, will your housing conditions improve? 0,448 0,736 0,890 0,937 -0.249***
In the future, will access to health services improve? 0,494 0,581 0,906 0,915 -0.0557
In the future, will access to education improve? 0,513 0,687 0,916 0,954 -0.126***
In the future, will access to public services improve? 0,468 0,592 0,903 0,923 -0.123**
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve? 0,529 0,563 0,916 0,926 -0.0257
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve 0,506 0,577 0,916 0,937 -0.0589
In the future, will municipal government improve? 0,513 0,595 0,903 0,926 -0.0799
Do you think you’ll stay in your current residence for the 
next two years?
0,870 0,895 0,851 0,914 0.0520
117 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Cluster 21
PNCRT: Caloto, Santander de Quilchao (Cauca) Control: Totoró (Cauca) 
Variable
Cluster 21
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
PNCRT Control PNCRT Control (Impact) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The economic situation is good or very good 0,247 0,294 0,211 0,146 -0.122**
The family is experiencing hunger 0,094 0,114 0,143 0,304 0.143***
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty 0,342 0,279 0,825 0,939 0.193***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave 
problems
0,919 0,990 0,753 0,761 -0.0436
Productive activities earn very little money 0,844 0,912 0,010 0,055 -0.0326
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity 0,007 0,084 0,010 0,006 -0.0762***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of 
money
0,782 0,786 0,776 0,809 0.0740
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money 0,295 0,304 0,273 0,411 0.149***
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses) 282406 372912 351458 627401 65,405
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) FINANCIAL SERVICES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Have a savings account 0,399 0,382 0,584 0,188 -0.379***
Have a checking account 0,000 0,016 0,049 0,042 -0.0272
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities 0,068 0,178 0,318 0,194 -0.246***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,461 0,388 0,558 0,382 -0.0927
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,613 0,617 0,733 0,729 -0.0972
Currently have debt 0,506 0,579 0,474 0,434 -0.108*
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS (Impact) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The mayor’s office is run well or very well 0,359 0,141 0,351 0,149 0.0211
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago 0,312 0,190 0,247 0,060 -0.0383
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses 0,169 0,104 0,071 0,052 0.0489
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the 
community to express their opinions on community 
interests 
0,214 0,026 0,182 0,045 0.0580
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ 
opinions into account when making decisions
0,143 0,026 0,162 0,045 0.00841
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a 
project 0,245 0,143 0,315 0,046 -0.180***
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a 
project 0,366 0,508 0,321 0,364 -0.103*
118 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
The departmental government runs well or very well 0,215 0,172 0,189 0,167 0.0109
The departmental government runs better than two years 
ago 
0,121 0,142 0,068 0,031 -0.0629*
The national government runs well or very well 0,363 0,356 0,292 0,282 0.00662
The national government runs better than two years ago 0,218 0,245 0,143 0,104 -0.0693
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) TRUST (a lot or very much) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The departmental government 0,079 0,078 0,065 0,064 -0.0194
The national government 0,151 0,167 0,140 0,162 0.0127
Justice sector institutions 0,124 0,107 0,130 0,089 -0.0244
Alternative justice institutions 0,101 0,177 0,081 0,064 -0.100**
The institutions of the agricultural sector 0,203 0,214 0,134 0,138 0.000850
Social organizations and NGOs 0,085 0,147 0,061 0,151 0.0223
Training centers 0,519 0,530 0,448 0,497 0.0179
The Defensoría del Pueblo 0,190 0,183 0,167 0,161 -0.00773
The municipal council 0,169 0,113 0,156 0,122 0.00297
The national police 0,289 0,155 0,263 0,205 0.0749
The army 0,369 0,236 0,279 0,336 0.236***
The navy 0,266 0,228 0,128 0,207 0.142***
The municipal personería 0,256 0,116 0,205 0,145 0.0676
The mayor’s office 0,292 0,156 0,312 0,098 -0.0714
The JAC 0,426 0,458 0,406 0,379 -0.0766
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) SECURITY PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved 0,094 0,114 0,182 0,165 -0.0398
I would recommend that a family member return to the 
vereda
0,938 0,806 0,932 0,880 0.0744**
Serious security problems in the vereda:
Homicides 0,127 0,243 0,039 0,081 -0.0658
Illegal armed groups 0,127 0,198 0,023 0,100 0.0324
Antipersonnel mines 0,007 0,011 0,003 0,013 0.0165
Displacement 0,007 0,017 0,026 0,032 0.00675
Forced disappearances 0,000 0,011 0,016 0,045 0.0232
Extortion 0,067 0,079 0,019 0,036 -0.00985
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.) 0,881 0,853 0,334 0,557 0.259***
Forced recruitment 0,007 0,006 0,000 0,010 0.00990
Sexual violence 0,045 0,068 0,081 0,100 -0.0266
There are no serious security issues in the vereda 0,565 0,427 0,614 0,353 -0.155***
119 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
There is police presence 0,727 0,346 0,127 0,210 0.478***
The police here are good or very good 0,294 0,242 0,692 0,400 -0.0672
The police have improved in the last two years 0,055 0,081 0,179 0,200 -0.0510
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) ILLICIT ACTIVITIES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
There is currently coca in the vereda 0,003 0,136 0,013 0,124 -0.0266
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda 0,007 0,077 0,010 0,095 0.0182
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because 
they are illegal
0,881 0,915 0,635 0,892 0.226***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and 
communities negatively
0,937 0,934 0,717 0,908 0.204***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living 0,960 0,935 0,710 0,925 0.221***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad 0,910 0,910 0,730 0,932 0.195***
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) EXPECTATIONS PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the 
next two years? 0,742 0,802 0,775 0,745 -0.102*
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve? 0,575 0,683 0,828 0,948 -0.00729
In the next two years, will your licit income increase? 0,532 0,576 0,779 0,951 0.102**
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your 
vereda or corregimiento improve?
0,516 0,638 0,890 0,971 -0.0568
In the future, will your housing conditions improve? 0,526 0,618 0,896 0,971 -0.0456
In the future, will access to health services improve? 0,451 0,563 0,873 0,961 0.00107
In the future, will access to education improve? 0,558 0,583 0,903 0,971 0.0476
In the future, will access to public services improve? 0,442 0,502 0,886 0,968 0.00560
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve? 0,614 0,505 0,899 0,948 0.176***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve 0,575 0,518 0,877 0,922 0.0712
In the future, will municipal government improve? 0,565 0,498 0,899 0,948 0.113**
Do you think you’ll stay in your current residence for the 
next two years?
0,933 0,935 0,924 0,911 -0.0266
120 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Cluster 29
PNCRT: Puerto Leguízamo (Putumayo) Control: Santa Rosa (Cauca)
Variable
Cluster 29
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
PNCRT Control PNCRT Control (Impact) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The economic situation is good or very good 0,407 0,325 0,066 0,208 0.223***
The family is experiencing hunger 0,029 0,087 0,403 0,316 -0.146***
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty 0,336 0,293 0,951 0,688 -0.186***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave 
problems
0,946 0,769 0,770 0,680 0.117**
Productive activities earn very little money 0,863 0,852 0,037 0,030 -0.00167
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity 0,021 0,031 0,008 0,009 -0.0178
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of 
money
0,728 0,736 0,724 0,753 0.0152
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money 0,206 0,433 0,362 0,385 -0.188***
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses) 264775 401266 272737 380520 -29,458
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) FINANCIAL SERVICES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Have a savings account 0,469 0,437 0,457 0,372 -0.0556
Have a checking account 0,000 0,030 0,016 0,043 -0.00712
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities 0,016 0,048 0,510 0,342 -0.196***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,185 0,316 0,251 0,294 -0.112*
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,511 0,479 0,770 0,574 -0.0967
Currently have debt 0,510 0,377 0,420 0,377 0.0750
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS (Impact) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The mayor’s office is run well or very well 0,224 0,391 0,142 0,224 -0.0758
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago 0,233 0,377 0,062 0,161 -0.0573
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses 0,193 0,156 0,074 0,126 0.0946**
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the 
community to express their opinions on community 
interests 
0,066 0,087 0,033 0,048 -0.00517
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ 
opinions into account when making decisions
0,053 0,087 0,016 0,017 -0.0246
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a 
project 0,246 0,368 0,093 0,162 -0.0685
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a 
project 0,498 0,584 0,266 0,366 0.0240
121 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
The departmental government runs well or very well 0,156 0,346 0,156 0,266 -0.113*
The departmental government runs better than two years 
ago 
0,134 0,270 0,057 0,121 -0.0741
The national government runs well or very well 0,373 0,571 0,311 0,360 -0.148**
The national government runs better than two years ago 0,155 0,305 0,105 0,137 -0.124**
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) TRUST (a lot or very much) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The departmental government 0,068 0,213 0,038 0,105 -0.0707
The national government 0,198 0,447 0,132 0,123 -0.245***
Justice sector institutions 0,117 0,266 0,066 0,093 -0.116**
Alternative justice institutions 0,161 0,293 0,054 0,079 -0.118**
The institutions of the agricultural sector 0,146 0,265 0,058 0,117 -0.0509
Social organizations and NGOs 0,149 0,300 0,091 0,128 -0.0813
Training centers 0,478 0,605 0,478 0,448 -0.183**
The Defensoría del Pueblo 0,292 0,368 0,190 0,218 -0.0531
The municipal council 0,156 0,207 0,062 0,108 0.0187
The national police 0,184 0,288 0,135 0,178 -0.0539
The army 0,266 0,565 0,188 0,243 -0.240***
The navy 0,211 0,583 0,050 0,260 -0.170***
The municipal personería 0,299 0,250 0,102 0,204 0.143**
The mayor’s office 0,263 0,458 0,076 0,193 -0.0779
The JAC 0,427 0,605 0,218 0,362 -0.0192
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) SECURITY PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved 0,187 0,166 0,212 0,278 0.133**
I would recommend that a family member return to the 
vereda
0,881 0,944 0,728 0,918 0.143***
Serious security problems in the vereda:
Homicides 0,029 0,039 0,086 0,022 -0.0800
Illegal armed groups 0,162 0,176 0,062 0,017 -0.0895*
Antipersonnel mines 0,029 0,000 0,033 0,000 0.00945
Displacement 0,044 0,039 0,066 0,035 -0.0263
Forced disappearances 0,000 0,039 0,008 0,017 -0.0331
Extortion 0,000 0,078 0,016 0,013 -0.0832***
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.) 0,838 0,882 0,350 0,177 -0.197**
Forced recruitment 0,000 0,000 0,016 0,009 -0.00256
Sexual violence 0,015 0,000 0,012 0,026 0.0169
There are no serious security issues in the vereda 0,720 0,779 0,551 0,788 0.177***
122 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
There is police presence 0,831 0,459 0,128 0,372 0.640***
The police here are good or very good 0,309 0,423 0,194 0,341 0.00588
The police have improved in the last two years 0,138 0,183 0,161 0,198 0.0413
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) ILLICIT ACTIVITIES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
There is currently coca in the vereda 0,084 0,040 0,035 0,018 0.0510*
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda 0,154 0,111 0,060 0,110 0.102**
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because 
they are illegal
0,909 0,869 0,586 0,619 0.0932*
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and 
communities negatively
0,905 0,917 0,623 0,635 0.00962
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living 0,917 0,921 0,627 0,635 0.00773
My family and friends think growing coca is bad 0,871 0,907 0,616 0,658 0.00499
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) EXPECTATIONS PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the 
next two years? 0,724 0,808 0,868 0,775 -0.149**
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve? 0,667 0,753 0,889 0,918 -0.0534
In the next two years, will your licit income increase? 0,601 0,723 0,893 0,922 -0.104**
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your 
vereda or corregimiento improve?
0,597 0,641 0,926 0,944 -0.0206
In the future, will your housing conditions improve? 0,556 0,632 0,922 0,918 -0.0735
In the future, will access to health services improve? 0,502 0,429 0,885 0,879 0.0682
In the future, will access to education improve? 0,506 0,541 0,889 0,896 -0.0315
In the future, will access to public services improve? 0,490 0,416 0,897 0,870 0.0277
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve? 0,502 0,329 0,909 0,892 0.132**
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve 0,502 0,576 0,905 0,948 -0.00994
In the future, will municipal government improve? 0,535 0,610 0,881 0,874 -0.102*
Do you think you’ll stay in your current residence for the 
next two years?
0,909 0,908 0,899 0,944 0.0383
123 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Cluster 30
PNCRT: Puerto Asís (Putumayo) Control: Puerto Concordia (Meta)) 
Variable
Cluster 30
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
PNCRT Control PNCRT Control (Impact) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The economic situation is good or very good 0,314 0,422 0,127 0,108 -0.113**
The family is experiencing hunger 0,065 0,060 0,339 0,347 0.00782
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty 0,355 0,331 0,780 0,785 0.0276
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave 
problems
0,905 0,880 0,737 0,669 -0.0272
Productive activities earn very little money 0,814 0,825 0,102 0,135 0.0256
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity 0,100 0,084 0,030 0,004 -0.0141
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of 
money
0,695 0,813 0,640 0,789 0.0326
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money 0,254 0,371 0,284 0,363 -0.0471
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses) 387252 303717 403835 377251 56,336*
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) FINANCIAL SERVICES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Have a savings account 0,453 0,434 0,538 0,319 -0.228***
Have a checking account 0,021 0,012 0,068 0,024 -0.0354
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities 0,208 0,084 0,144 0,171 0.157***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,347 0,259 0,335 0,382 0.158**
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,695 0,508 0,671 0,781 0.245**
Currently have debt 0,691 0,394 0,479 0,450 0.252***
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS (Impact) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The mayor’s office is run well or very well 0,330 0,251 0,197 0,085 -0.0351
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago 0,246 0,362 0,153 0,123 -0.143**
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses 0,068 0,187 0,110 0,036 -0.189***
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the 
community to express their opinions on community 
interests 
0,102 0,032 0,038 0,024 0.0579**
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ 
opinions into account when making decisions
0,076 0,024 0,030 0,020 0.0386
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a 
project 0,307 0,306 0,163 0,061 -0.0891*
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a 
project 0,470 0,624 0,392 0,388 -0.124*
124 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
The departmental government runs well or very well 0,395 0,264 0,487 0,187 -0.176***
The departmental government runs better than two years 
ago 
0,200 0,259 0,251 0,145 -0.186***
The national government runs well or very well 0,341 0,444 0,343 0,265 -0.185***
The national government runs better than two years ago 0,164 0,266 0,187 0,168 -0.129**
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) TRUST (a lot or very much) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The departmental government 0,240 0,197 0,268 0,082 -0.153***
The national government 0,242 0,310 0,227 0,085 -0.204***
Justice sector institutions 0,194 0,148 0,205 0,076 -0.0729
Alternative justice institutions 0,218 0,237 0,189 0,044 -0.150***
The institutions of the agricultural sector 0,214 0,167 0,222 0,036 -0.131**
Social organizations and NGOs 0,146 0,208 0,223 0,071 -0.229***
Training centers 0,518 0,622 0,620 0,513 -0.185***
The Defensoría del Pueblo 0,250 0,266 0,330 0,145 -0.174***
The municipal council 0,221 0,119 0,188 0,076 -0.00311
The national police 0,230 0,184 0,246 0,091 -0.106**
The army 0,425 0,363 0,424 0,160 -0.177***
The navy 0,282 0,333 0,330 0,126 -0.251***
The municipal personería 0,254 0,168 0,270 0,075 -0.0946*
The mayor’s office 0,320 0,310 0,218 0,078 -0.128**
The JAC 0,426 0,687 0,454 0,419 -0.275***
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) SECURITY PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved 0,358 0,185 0,378 0,251 0.0539
I would recommend that a family member return to the 
vereda
0,856 0,924 0,822 0,888 0.0206
Serious security problems in the vereda:
Homicides 0,092 0,157 0,140 0,088 -0.115**
Illegal armed groups 0,796 0,169 0,144 0,064 0.546***
Antipersonnel mines 0,173 0,145 0,004 0,052 0.0733*
Displacement 0,051 0,096 0,051 0,072 -0.0183
Forced disappearances 0,000 0,024 0,008 0,020 -0.0146
Extortion 0,102 0,012 0,064 0,040 0.0801**
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.) 0,418 0,759 0,246 0,151 -0.445***
Forced recruitment 0,041 0,000 0,013 0,004 0.0328
Sexual violence 0,010 0,000 0,008 0,004 0.000949
There are no serious security issues in the vereda 0,585 0,669 0,593 0,749 0.0789
125 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
There is police presence 0,288 0,458 0,186 0,032 -0.352***
The police here are good or very good 0,368 0,155 0,357 0,375 0.272
The police have improved in the last two years 0,281 0,175 0,275 0,250 0.0982
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) ILLICIT ACTIVITIES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
There is currently coca in the vereda 0,244 0,442 0,145 0,412 0.102*
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda 0,030 0,012 0,009 0,012 0.0228
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because 
they are illegal
0,885 0,766 0,884 0,660 -0.109**
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and 
communities negatively 
0,828 0,780 0,775 0,595 -0.117**
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living 0,902 0,780 0,809 0,580 -0.105*
My family and friends think growing coca is bad 0,848 0,720 0,797 0,602 -0.0823
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) EXPECTATIONS PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the 
next two years? 0,783 0,711 0,828 0,742 0.0109
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve? 0,797 0,657 0,932 0,857 0.0318
In the next two years, will your licit income increase? 0,708 0,578 0,881 0,837 0.0795
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your 
vereda or corregimiento improve?
0,767 0,550 0,945 0,869 0.139***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve? 0,682 0,534 0,932 0,904 0.130**
In the future, will access to health services improve? 0,585 0,422 0,890 0,869 0.126**
In the future, will access to education improve? 0,661 0,486 0,886 0,892 0.172***
In the future, will access to public services improve? 0,674 0,482 0,924 0,873 0.129**
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve? 0,695 0,562 0,936 0,880 0.0846
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve 0,636 0,562 0,894 0,888 0.0790
In the future, will municipal government improve? 0,644 0,562 0,903 0,876 0.0480
Do you think you’ll stay in your current residence for the 
next two years?
0,783 0,903 0,888 0,903 -0.0934*
126 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Cluster 31
PNCRT: Valle de Guamuez (Putumayo) Control: Algeciras (Huila)
Variable
Cluster 31
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
PNCRT Control PNCRT Control (Impact) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The economic situation is good or very good 0,183 0,522 0,183 0,061 -0.459***
The family is experiencing hunger 0,054 0,061 0,171 0,298 0.124***
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty 0,210 0,322 0,554 0,865 0.248***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave 
problems
0,741 0,951 0,638 0,637 -0.195***
Productive activities earn very little money 0,933 0,873 0,013 0,065 0.108***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity 0,098 0,086 0,000 0,008 0.0116
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of 
money
0,746 0,906 0,592 0,865 0.156***
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money 0,117 0,327 0,242 0,355 -0.0961*
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses) 437900 291020 444146 298204 -3,569
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) FINANCIAL SERVICES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Have a savings account 0,638 0,588 0,467 0,424 0.00337
Have a checking account 0,054 0,020 0,071 0,033 0.000157
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities 0,600 0,310 0,483 0,482 0.258***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,604 0,343 0,613 0,408 0.0678
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,814 0,714 0,905 0,750 -0.0566
Currently have debt 0,846 0,608 0,733 0,478 -0.00955
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS (Impact) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The mayor’s office is run well or very well 0,295 0,406 0,288 0,160 -0.252***
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago 0,267 0,452 0,056 0,097 -0.145***
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses 0,146 0,118 0,213 0,094 -0.0965**
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the 
community to express their opinions on community 
interests 
0,088 0,090 0,058 0,053 -0.0216
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ 
opinions into account when making decisions
0,021 0,049 0,004 0,029 -0.0159
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a 
project 0,223 0,363 0,152 0,116 -0.193***
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a 
project 0,397 0,536 0,613 0,391 -0.360***
127 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
The departmental government runs well or very well 0,344 0,378 0,281 0,237 -0.0502
The departmental government runs better than two years 
ago 
0,156 0,411 0,046 0,094 -0.187***
The national government runs well or very well 0,470 0,444 0,277 0,435 0.174**
The national government runs better than two years ago 0,251 0,471 0,063 0,262 -0.0117
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) TRUST (a lot or very much) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The departmental government 0,132 0,199 0,054 0,082 -0.0308
The national government 0,227 0,217 0,067 0,178 0.126**
Justice sector institutions 0,100 0,096 0,032 0,057 0.0547
Alternative justice institutions 0,273 0,147 0,046 0,054 0.140***
The institutions of the agricultural sector 0,292 0,193 0,106 0,066 0.0704
Social organizations and NGOs 0,104 0,151 0,054 0,053 -0.0474
Training centers 0,433 0,548 0,480 0,418 -0.140**
The Defensoría del Pueblo 0,175 0,277 0,110 0,109 -0.101*
The municipal council 0,131 0,263 0,109 0,097 -0.114**
The national police 0,097 0,137 0,127 0,063 -0.0952**
The army 0,236 0,212 0,269 0,138 -0.112**
The navy 0,111 0,195 0,077 0,113 -0.0319
The municipal personería 0,218 0,257 0,092 0,105 -0.0165
The mayor’s office 0,222 0,388 0,127 0,071 -0.228***
The JAC 0,435 0,587 0,536 0,326 -0.339***
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) SECURITY PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved 0,366 0,295 0,172 0,467 0.362***
I would recommend that a family member return to the 
vereda
0,867 0,861 0,725 0,833 0.126**
Serious security problems in the vereda:
Homicides 0,135 0,218 0,008 0,053 -0.00907
Illegal armed groups 0,191 0,613 0,133 0,180 -0.370***
Antipersonnel mines 0,416 0,266 0,050 0,114 0.201***
Displacement 0,191 0,242 0,025 0,143 0.0440
Forced disappearances 0,022 0,008 0,008 0,016 0.0130
Extortion 0,112 0,032 0,025 0,106 0.146***
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.) 0,404 0,508 0,283 0,237 -0.105
Forced recruitment 0,034 0,000 0,004 0,004 0.0383**
Sexual violence 0,011 0,000 0,008 0,012 0.0180
There are no serious security issues in the vereda 0,629 0,494 0,658 0,482 -0.0470
128 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
There is police presence 0,146 0,453 0,033 0,216 -0.156***
The police here are good or very good 0,235 0,225 0,714 0,269 -0.487**
The police have improved in the last two years 0,059 0,149 0,286 0,226 -0.176
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) ILLICIT ACTIVITIES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
There is currently coca in the vereda 0,000 0,296 0,008 0,272 -0.0446
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda 0,000 0,004 0,004 0,057 0.0480***
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because 
they are illegal
0,962 0,879 0,538 0,700 0.226***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and 
communities negatively
0,966 0,896 0,587 0,679 0.148***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living 0,991 0,876 0,642 0,688 0.153***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad 0,974 0,888 0,636 0,643 0.0788
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) EXPECTATIONS PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the 
next two years? 0,928 0,900 0,845 0,833 0.0621
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve? 0,846 0,910 0,850 0,910 0.0160
In the next two years, will your licit income increase? 0,804 0,820 0,854 0,910 0.0511
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your 
vereda or corregimiento improve?
0,829 0,890 0,917 0,927 -0.0247
In the future, will your housing conditions improve? 0,825 0,853 0,875 0,922 0.0276
In the future, will access to health services improve? 0,700 0,816 0,829 0,894 -0.0588
In the future, will access to education improve? 0,742 0,849 0,838 0,922 -0.0181
In the future, will access to public services improve? 0,742 0,788 0,846 0,914 0.0417
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve? 0,796 0,898 0,850 0,918 -0.0268
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve 0,646 0,841 0,867 0,922 -0.147***
In the future, will municipal government improve? 0,713 0,914 0,888 0,935 -0.161***
Do you think you’ll stay in your current residence for the 
next two years?
0,955 0,886 0,951 0,898 0.0320
129 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
Cluster 32
PNCRT: San Miguel (Putumayo) Control: Florencia (Caquetá)
Variable
Cluster 32
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
PNCRT Control PNCRT Control (Impact) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
The economic situation is good or very good 0,278 0,551 0,124 0,070 -0.337***
The family is experiencing hunger 0,040 0,037 0,316 0,218 -0.0696
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty 0,241 0,326 0,739 0,872 0.0447
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave 
problems
0,848 0,959 0,709 0,700 -0.112**
Productive activities earn very little money 0,826 0,876 0,064 0,091 -0.0247
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity 0,009 0,161 0,000 0,004 -0.146***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of 
money
0,615 0,934 0,684 0,823 -0.162***
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money 0,282 0,230 0,363 0,309 0.00212
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses) 420247 245872 366154 386601 182,462***
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) FINANCIAL SERVICES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Have a savings account 0,568 0,638 0,419 0,424 -0.0456
Have a checking account 0,034 0,021 0,047 0,062 0.0216
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities 0,402 0,247 0,466 0,436 0.125**
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,496 0,284 0,385 0,317 0.158**
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,655 0,623 0,833 0,701 -0.0630
Currently have debt 0,573 0,481 0,517 0,416 0.0385
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS (Impact) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The mayor’s office is run well or very well 0,131 0,139 0,071 0,092 0.0129
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago 0,131 0,250 0,009 0,088 -0.0483
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses 0,162 0,119 0,073 0,115 0.0851*
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the 
community to express their opinions on community 
interests 
0,021 0,058 0,004 0,025 -0.0189
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ 
opinions into account when making decisions
0,017 0,037 0,000 0,016 -0.00154
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a 
project 0,122 0,157 0,048 0,071 -0.00761
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a 
project 0,552 0,496 0,526 0,329 -0.163**
130 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
The departmental government runs well or very well 0,171 0,200 0,107 0,189 0.0814
The departmental government runs better than two years 
ago 
0,161 0,194 0,014 0,099 0.0734
The national government runs well or very well 0,466 0,295 0,251 0,341 0.285***
The national government runs better than two years ago 0,193 0,377 0,064 0,175 -0.0727
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) TRUST (a lot or very much) PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
The departmental government 0,205 0,079 0,056 0,095 0.189***
The national government 0,447 0,186 0,073 0,110 0.320***
Justice sector institutions 0,183 0,085 0,052 0,060 0.121***
Alternative justice institutions 0,268 0,069 0,066 0,044 0.192***
The institutions of the agricultural sector 0,269 0,158 0,113 0,044 0.0534
Social organizations and NGOs 0,289 0,043 0,127 0,036 0.193***
Training centers 0,722 0,518 0,514 0,307 -0.0104
The Defensoría del Pueblo 0,413 0,141 0,193 0,110 0.213***
The municipal council 0,104 0,098 0,122 0,071 -0.0347
The national police 0,288 0,042 0,176 0,046 0.121***
The army 0,543 0,104 0,341 0,105 0.209***
The navy 0,549 0,059 0,198 0,065 0.355***
The municipal personería 0,231 0,171 0,107 0,073 0.0392
The mayor’s office 0,150 0,151 0,108 0,055 -0.0460
The JAC 0,496 0,488 0,586 0,275 -0.299***
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) SECURITY PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved 0,211 0,236 0,129 0,339 0.207***
I would recommend that a family member return to the 
vereda
0,962 0,856 0,726 0,798 0.170***
Serious security problems in the vereda:
Homicides 0,000 0,209 0,017 0,074 -0.136***
Illegal armed groups 0,019 0,500 0,077 0,284 -0.262***
Antipersonnel mines 0,010 0,547 0,013 0,263 -0.303***
Displacement 0,019 0,176 0,013 0,226 0.0595
Forced disappearances 0,010 0,041 0,009 0,045 0.00416
Extortion 0,010 0,061 0,017 0,074 0.0184
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.) 0,981 0,466 0,312 0,206 0.434***
Forced recruitment 0,000 0,007 0,004 0,016 0.00238
Sexual violence 0,000 0,000 0,009 0,016 0.00755
There are no serious security issues in the vereda 0,560 0,391 0,654 0,387 -0.116*
131 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – PNCRT Zones
There is police presence 0,453 0,469 0,141 0,169 0.0155
The police here are good or very good 0,412 0,051 0,182 0,205 0.399***
The police have improved in the last two years 0,225 0,052 0,030 0,100 0.258***
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) ILLICIT ACTIVITIES PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
There is currently coca in the vereda 0,027 0,487 0,022 0,577 0.0996*
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda 0,000 0,004 0,000 0,025 0.0189*
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because 
they are illegal
0,910 0,786 0,536 0,564 0.150**
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and 
communities negatively
0,906 0,759 0,619 0,591 0.123**
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living 0,918 0,868 0,679 0,668 0.0405
My family and friends think growing coca is bad 0,883 0,792 0,723 0,621 0.0106
 Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
(Impact) EXPECTATIONS PNCRT Control PNCRT Control
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the 
next two years? 0,841 0,895 0,740 0,764 -0.0443
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve? 0,791 0,790 0,889 0,914 0.0206
In the next two years, will your licit income increase? 0,731 0,737 0,838 0,860 0.0185
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your 
vereda or corregimiento improve?
0,658 0,831 0,940 0,922 -0.185***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve? 0,684 0,679 0,936 0,905 -0.0345
In the future, will access to health services improve? 0,410 0,646 0,885 0,909 -0.207***
In the future, will access to education improve? 0,517 0,708 0,876 0,918 -0.152***
In the future, will access to public services improve? 0,530 0,626 0,885 0,868 -0.100*
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve? 0,650 0,811 0,906 0,901 -0.147***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve 0,615 0,671 0,944 0,897 -0.0907*
In the future, will municipal government improve? 0,538 0,728 0,923 0,938 -0.169***
Do you think you’ll stay in your current residence for the 
next two years?
0,876 0,925 0,963 0,919 -0.0881**
.
U.S. Agency for International Development
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20523