EVALUATION
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation 
and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative
Regional Report, Central
December 2016
This publication was produced at the request of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). It was 
prepared independently by Keri Culver, Pablo Gutiérrez, Carlos Castañeda, Centro Nacional de Consultoría and Management 
Systems International.
Midterm Impact Evaluation 
of the Consolidation and 
Enhanced Livelihood 
Initiative
REGIONAL REPORT, CENTRAL
Management Systems International
A Tetra Tech Company
200 12th Street South
Suite 1200
Arlington, VA 22202, USA
www.msiworldwide.com
December 2016 
Contracted under AID-514-C-13-00003 
USAID/Colombia Evaluation and Analysis for Learning (EVAL)
DISCLAIMER
The authors’ views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States 
Agency for International Development or the United States Government.
CONTENTS
Acronyms ...................................................................................................................................................................... 1
Abstract.......................................................................................................................................................................... 3
Executive Summary....................................................................................................................................................... 5
Evaluation purpose ............................................................................................................................................... 5
Project background ............................................................................................................................................... 5
Evaluation questions, design, methods and limitations......................................................................................... 6
Findings and conclusions.......................................................................................................................................... 7
Economic development......................................................................................................................................... 8
Institutional development....................................................................................................................................11
Social development.............................................................................................................................................13
Introduction ................................................................................................................................................................. 15
Background .............................................................................................................................................................15
How to read this report............................................................................................................................................19
Methodology and design .........................................................................................................................................19
Quantitative methods..........................................................................................................................................20
Qualitative methods............................................................................................................................................23
Limitations ..............................................................................................................................................................23
Regional Context .........................................................................................................................................................28
CELI Interventions in the Central Region ...................................................................................................................41
Economic development.......................................................................................................................................42
Economic Development ..............................................................................................................................................43
Findings and conclusions........................................................................................................................................43
Direct beneficiaries.............................................................................................................................................43
Global survey: Perceptions of economic conditions...........................................................................................44
Support for productive projects...........................................................................................................................49
Markets and marketing .......................................................................................................................................50
Savings, credit, and financial services ................................................................................................................53
Transportation and infrastructure........................................................................................................................55
Land ....................................................................................................................................................................57
Recommendations...................................................................................................................................................59
Institutional Development ...........................................................................................................................................61
Findings and conclusions........................................................................................................................................61
Participation........................................................................................................................................................61
Transparency and accountability ........................................................................................................................63
Confidence ..........................................................................................................................................................67
Provision of services...........................................................................................................................................70
Recommendations...................................................................................................................................................73
Social Development.....................................................................................................................................................75
Findings and conclusions........................................................................................................................................75
Social capital: Trust ............................................................................................................................................75
Social capital: Participation in associations........................................................................................................76
Specific role of Community Action Councils (JACs in Spanish).......................................................................79
Support for producer associations.......................................................................................................................80
Women’s and victims’ associations....................................................................................................................82
Cultural associations...........................................................................................................................................83
Recommendations...................................................................................................................................................83
Annex 1: Cluster-level results, List experiment ..........................................................................................................86
Central Region: Contact with armed groups...........................................................................................................87
Central Region: Contact with illicit crops...............................................................................................................88
Annex 2: Data tables, cluster.......................................................................................................................................97
Cluster 16 ................................................................................................................................................................98
Cluster 17 ..............................................................................................................................................................100
Cluster 18 ..............................................................................................................................................................102
Cluster 24 ..............................................................................................................................................................104
Cluster 25 ..............................................................................................................................................................106
Cluster 26 ..............................................................................................................................................................108
Cluster 27 ..............................................................................................................................................................110
Cluster 28 ..............................................................................................................................................................112
Annex 3: Calculation of indicator figures..................................................................................................................114
Reporting on CELI indicators ...............................................................................................................................114
Economic indicators..............................................................................................................................................114
Institutional development......................................................................................................................................115
Social indicators....................................................................................................................................................115
TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1. Evaluation questions ...................................................................................................................................6
Figure 1.2. CELI Central PMP indicator compliance....................................................................................................8
Figure 1.3. Impact on the economic situation of households.........................................................................................8
Figure 1.4. Trends in reasons for joining forces............................................................................................................9
Figure 1.5. Trends, road network (Good/very good)...................................................................................................10
Figure 1.6. Trends in perceptions of problems with the municipality management....................................................11
Figure 1.7. Trends in the culture of legality (agree/strongly agree).............................................................................14
Figure 2.1. The three pillars of the PNCRT and their CELI peers...............................................................................16
Figure 2.2. Central Region, clusters and control municipalities..................................................................................18
Figure 2.3. How to read and interpret the statistical data in the report........................................................................19
Figure 2.4. Evaluation questions ................................................................................................................................. 20
Figure 2.5. Central sample by ethnicity (self-identified).............................................................................................22
Figure 3.1. Index of the consolidation pillars and their components...........................................................................28
Figure 3.2. Departments and Municipalities in CELI Central analyzed by the Consolidation Index ..........................28
Figure 3.3. Secondary data: The General Consolidation Index score per department.................................................29
Figure 3.4. Trends in the perception of security ..........................................................................................................31
Figure 3.5. Impacts on the perception of security........................................................................................................32
Figure 3.6. Trends in the perception of crimes ............................................................................................................32
Figure 3.7. Impacts on the perception of crimes..........................................................................................................33
Figure 3.8. Trends in the perception of state security services....................................................................................33
Figure 3.9. Trends in the perceptions with respect to illegal crops (agree or very strongly agree) .............................35
Figure 3.10. Impacts on attitudes with respect to illegal crops (agree or very strongly agree)....................................35
Figure 3.11. Trends in the inclination towards legality ...............................................................................................36
Figure 3.12. Trends in the perception of the effects of the IAGs.................................................................................37
Figure 3.13. Trends in human rights violations...........................................................................................................37
Figure 3.14. Trends in the mechanisms for gaining access to justice ..........................................................................38
Figure 3.15. Trends in the legitimacy of the state (agree or very strongly agree) .......................................................39
Figure 3.16. Secondary data: Quarterly Data on assistance from authorities ..............................................................39
Figure 4.1. CELI Performance: Fulfillment of the PMP benchmarks .........................................................................42
Figure 4.2. CELI Performance: Commitments (in US$M) by source and type of project (approx. $211.5M) ...........42
Figure 5.1. Trends in the indicators on the economic situation ...................................................................................45
Figure 5.2. Impact on the economic situation of households.......................................................................................45
Figure 5.3. Impacts on the perception of the economic situation ................................................................................45
Figure 5.4. Trends in the perception of food security..................................................................................................46
Figure 5.5. Impacts on the perception of and experiences with food security.............................................................46
Figure 5.6. Impacts on income ....................................................................................................................................47
Figure 5.7. Impacts on expectations for the future ......................................................................................................47
Figure 5.8. Secondary data: financial entities (left) and cultivated hectares (right) ....................................................48
Figure 5.9. Trends in reasons for joining associations................................................................................................. 50
Figure 5.10. Trends in marketing channels for small-farm products...........................................................................51
Figure 5.11. Trends in purchasing channels ................................................................................................................51
Figure 5.12. Trends in problems with production and marketing their goods.............................................................52
Figure 5.13. Trends in production and sales problems compared to controls..............................................................52
Figure 5.14. Trends in the use of banks (banking) and access to credit.......................................................................54
Figure 5.15. Impacts on the use of financial services and products.............................................................................54
Figure 5.16. Trends in the perception of roads............................................................................................................55
Figure 5.17. Secondary data: Trends in the perception of roads..................................................................................56
Figure 5.18. Trends in reasons for paying or being willing to pay property taxes.......................................................58
Figure 5.19. Trends in reasons for not paying taxes on property.................................................................................58
Figure 6.1. Trends in reasons for voting.....................................................................................................................62
Figure 6.2. Trends in possible new leaders..................................................................................................................62
Figure 6.3. Secondary data: Grants for financing projects ..........................................................................................63
Figure 6.4. Secondary data: Average IGA results .......................................................................................................64
Figure 6.5. Secondary data: Property compliance (left) and ICA tax (right)...............................................................64
Figure 6.6. Trends in perceptions of problems associated with the municipality management...................................65
Figure 6.7. Impact on the perception of the local government ....................................................................................65
Figure 6.8. Impacts on confidence — considerable or a lot ........................................................................................67
Figure 6.9. Trends in the citizens’ perceptions of public management........................................................................68
Figure 6.10. Trends in perceptions of the management by the Governor's office and the national government .........68
Figure 6.11. Trends in the registration of citizens for social services..........................................................................70
Figure 6.12. Trends in access to and quality of public services...................................................................................70
Figure 6.13. Impact on expectations for improvement in public services in the future...............................................71
Figure 6.14. Secondary data: Availability of electricity (left) and cell phone (right)..................................................72
Figure 7.1. Trends in confidence at the community level............................................................................................75
Figure 7.2. Trends in the reported association mechanisms........................................................................................77
Figure 7.3. Trends in active decision-making in the mechanisms of working together...............................................77
Figure 7.4. Trends in active decision-making in the mechanisms of working together...............................................78
Figure 7.5. Trends in the reported challenges of belonging to social organizations....................................................79
1 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
ACRONYMS
ARD Associates for Rural Development
BACRIM Criminal bands, Bandas Criminales (in the service of the narcotics trade)
CAR Regional Autonomous Corporations, Corporaciones Regionales Autónomas
CDCS Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CELI Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative
CELI Central CELI program in the Central region
CELI MdM CELI program in the Montes de María region
CELI Norte/Sur CELI program in the North and South regions
CERAC Conflict Analysis Resource Center, Centro de Recursos para el Análisis de Conflictos
CNC National Consulting Center, Centro Nacional de Consultoría
CNC-DoD Crime and Narcotics Center, U.S. Department of Defense
CSDI Colombia Strategic Development Initiative
CSO Civil Society Organization
DNP National Planning Department, Departamento Nacional de Planeación
DO Development objective
DoD Department of Defense (U.S.)
DPS Department for Social Prosperity, Departamento para la Prosperidad Social
ELN National Liberation Army, Ejército de Liberación Nacional
EVIDINCE Research effort associated with the Empirical Studies of Conflict (esoc.princeton.edu), a 
multi-institutional collaboration studying conflict and insurgency at the sub-national level
FARC Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia
FHH Female head of household
GLAC Local savings and loans groups, grupos locales de ahorros y crédito
GOC Government of Colombia
HH Household
IAG Illegal Armed Group
IC Illicit crops
ICO Index of Organizational Competencies, Índice de competencias organizacionales
IDI Integral Performance Index, Índice de desempeño integral
INCODER Colombian Institute of Rural Development, Instituto Colombiano de Desarrollo Rural
JAC Community Action Council, Junta de Acción Comunal
LAPOP Latin American Public Opinion Project
MADR Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Ministerio de Agricultura y Desarrollo 
Rural
2 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
MdM Montes de María
MHH Male head of household
MSI Management Systems International, Inc. 
PAR Regional Action Plan, Plan de acción regional
PMP Performance management plan
PNCRT National Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction Policy, Política Nacional de 
Consolidación y Reconstrucción Territorial
SENA National Learning Service, Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje
SGP General Participation System, Sistema General de Participación
SIJIN Judicial police, Seccional de Investigación Judicial
SIMCI Integrated Illicit Crops Monitoring System, Sistema Integrado de Monitoreo de Cultivos 
Ilícitos
SISBEN Identification and Classification system for potential social program Beneficiaries, Sistema 
de Identificación y Clasificación de potenciales Beneficiarios para programas sociales
TA Technical Assistance
UACT Territorial Consolidation Administrative Unit, Unidad Administrativa para la 
Consolidación Territorial
UARIV Victims’ Integral Attention and Reparation Unit, Unidad para la Atención y Reparación 
Integral a las Víctimas
UMATA Municipal Agricultural Extension Units, Unidades Municipales de Asistencia Técnica 
Agropecuaria
UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
URT Land Restitution Unit, Unidad de Restitución de Tierras
USAID United States Agency for International Development
VEO Verification of Organizational Status, Valorización del Estado Organizacional
3 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
ABSTRACT
USAID/Colombia designed the Colombia Enhanced Livelihood Initiative (CELI) to support the 
Government of Colombia (GOC) in its efforts to consolidate its institutional presence in areas of 
the country under the control or influence of insurgent groups engaged in illegal crops, drug 
trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and terrorist activities.
The CELI Central midterm evaluation took place 13 municipalities: Chaparral, Rioblanco, 
Planadas and Ataco in the Department of Tolima; Vistahermosa, Puerto Rico, Mesetas, San Juan 
de Arama, Uribe and La Macarena in the Department of Meta and La Montañita, and Cartagena
del Chaira and San Vicente del Caguán in the Department of Caquetá.
Economic Development 
The economic situation for the average family is getting worse, but the effects on CELI’s direct 
participants are positive. Respondents perceive that the poverty families suffer from today is worse 
than it was at baseline. However, there also seems to be an increase in employment levels and 
profitability of productive work. CELI’s productive projects provide more economic benefits than 
projects in which they did not intervene. Respondents state that thanks to the intervention the 
profitability of their productive projects and the quality of their products has improved, their 
production costs have declined, and they gained access to new markets. However, markets in these 
areas are still generally localized. 
CELI Central’s beneficiaries also report greater use of bank services and loans. Loans from 
rotating funds and the Local Savings and Loan Groups, GLACs, have been an important alternative 
to the informal mechanisms that are popular in these areas but have interest rates that are much 
higher than producers can accept. 
Respondents’ perceptions of the intra- and inter-municipal road network improved slightly 
compared to baseline, but is still perceived as generally of poor quality. CELI support for land 
ownership is important for communities but interventions are inadequate in comparison to the size 
of the problem. 
Institutional Development 
Respondents’ participation in the political process increased between the baseline and midline 
despite the lack of compelling candidates. Respondents do not believe that ex-combatants should 
become political figures. The stigma against ex-combatants affects their legitimacy as potential 
community leaders. In light of the peace process and a post-conflict environment, there is no 
evidence that guerrilla groups have the credibility to participate in politics in this region.
Respondents shares the low confidence in public institutions seen across the country. There are no 
positive effects of CELI’s efforts to improve transparency and accountability. Citizens still see 
deficiencies in availability and quality of public services.
Social Development 
Trust between community members has deteriorated. However, citizen participation has seen 
significant growth. CELI succeeded in strengthening the formation of associations and 
empowering communities to make their own decisions. The Juntas de Acción Comunal (JACs) are 
4 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
the most frequently recurring mechanism for encouraging associations and reinforcing decision￾making ability. 
Homicides, kidnapping, and the presence of IAGs have declined in CELI municipalities. 
Respondents perceive that security conditions are poor (45%), but they believe policing has 
improved. 
5 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
USAID/Colombia designed the Colombia Enhanced Livelihood Initiative (CELI) to support the 
Government of Colombia (GOC) in its efforts to consolidate its institutional presence in areas of 
the country under the control or influence of insurgent groups engaged in illegal crops, drug 
trafficking, kidnapping, extortion and terrorist activities. 
Three implementers were convened to undertake the work in four regions. The first, Chemonics
International, has worked through the CELI Norte/Sur project in the northern (Bajo Cauca in 
Antioquia and Sur de Córdoba) and southern (Tumaco) regions; the second, ARD Tetra Tech, 
implements the CELI Central project in 23 municipalities of the departments of Cauca, Valle del 
Cauca, Caquetá, Meta, and Tolima; and the third, Global Communities, finished a similar set of 
tasks in early 2015 in the municipalities of Ovejas and San Onofre (Sucre) and Carmen de Bolívar 
and San Jacinto (Bolívar) through the CELI Montes de María (MdM) project. This volume reports 
on achievements and impacts to date in the CELI Central region. 
Evaluation purpose 
In 2011 USAID/Colombia’s evaluation contractor, DevTech Systems, Inc., designed an impact 
evaluation of the CSDI interventions. The design included two more measurements: midline and 
final. EVAL (Evaluation and Analysis for Learning), a contract with Management Systems 
International, Inc. (MSI), carried out the midline. This report represents that effort, based on the 
baseline design, additional qualitative fieldwork, in-depth interviews with the CELI teams, and 
program satisfaction questions. Key audiences for the evaluation are the USAID/Colombia 
Mission Program and Technical Offices, who will use the results to plan follow-on programming. 
Three guiding principles were set for uses of the evaluation, as follows: 
Measure the change in impact indicators, and determine the extent to which the CELIs are achieving their 
goals with target populations. 
Inform decision-making processes with timely data, to identify components needing strengthening to 
achieve program goals. 
Identify best practices and lessons learned to date to inform future USAID programming. 
Project background
Based on the GOC´s National Consolidation Plan and formalized in the National Policy for 
Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (PNCRT in its Spanish acronym), the concept of 
“consolidation” refers to the expansion in the conflict zones of Colombia of the legitimate presence 
of the state. The policy, designed for implementation once minimal conditions for public safety 
were established, would create the necessary institutional mechanisms to provide basic human 
rights protections to the populations in those zones historically affected by conflict and illicit crops. 
The PNCRT was oriented to establishing the presence of state institutions capable of efficiently 
bringing the public goods needed for development. 
The U.S. Embassy developed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) to support 
the strengthening of government presence in strategically important parts of the country and reduce 
inequity in historically marginalized regions where illegal armed groups and coca production 
coexist. CSDI was conceived as a whole-of-government, geographically-focused approach aimed 
at maintaining advances in security and development and at the reduction of illicit crops and the 
6 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
presence of illegal armed groups in conflict zones. The basic premise of the CELIs, one component 
of CSDI, is that the armed conflicts and illicit economy are closely linked to the weak presence of 
the state, and their activities are oriented to bolstering state institutions, generating confidence in 
them, constructing relations between communities and their local governments, and supporting the 
improvement of sustainable ways of life. 
Within USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for Colombia, the CELIs 
were first situated within the Mission’s Development Objective 1: Civilian government present in 
CSDI zones consolidated, which focused on supporting the process of consolidation–strengthening 
of local government, formalizing property rights, social development and the alliance between 
community and state, and rural development. In the updated CDCS for 2014-2018, the CELI 
projects were placed under a revised DO 3, Improved conditions for inclusive rural economic 
growth. 
Obviously, the CELIs are no substitute for the state. They were called upon to provide support to 
the PNCRT. The existence of a minimum provision of public goods, property rights and justice 
services in the consolidation zones is a sine qua non condition for enabling the CELIs, and any 
international cooperation effort, to find a place in which they can operate and ensure that the 
resources will serve as catalysts for development and consolidation. 
Evaluation questions, design, methods and limitations
The midterm evaluation took place in 32 CELI municipalities as well as in 16 municipalities from 
three regions (Catatumbo, Cauca/Valle and Putumayo) in which the GOC intervened through its 
PNCRT activities. The midline, structured around the baseline completed by DevTech, examined 
changes since the baseline was completed across the institutional, social and economic indicators 
related to the interventions. 
Figure 1.1. Evaluation questions 
QUESTION STRATEGIC LEVEL
What specific impacts have the CSDI interventions produced among the target 
population in the areas of interventions? IR3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
Do CSDI projects show the expected level of performance in support of the 
consolidation process? Cross-cutting
Does the GOC show expected level of investments in consolidation areas following 
the assistance from USAID in PCNRT municipalities?
1 IR 3.2
What are the CELIs' specific effects of in changing the capacity and service delivery of 
local government? (To serve local people, be accountable, expand social services.) Sub-IR 3.2.1
What changes have been produced by CELI interventions to strengthen the 
organizational capacity of local CSOs in local areas? IR 3.3
How much progress has been achieved in the recovery and reconstruction of 
territory from armed conflicts (IAG presence) and illicit economic activities? Cross-cutting
To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance and 
institutionalization of the territory? Sub-IR 3.2.1
To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and 
economic development?
IR 3.2
IR 3.3
 
1 This is answered in Annex 6 of the main report with data and analysis on GOC investments in PNCRT and CELI 
municipalities.
7 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
EVAL, working with its strategic partner the Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC), used a mixed 
methods – qualitative and quantitative – approach to examine a set of indicators for each CELI 
result. The evaluation sought to understand changes in economic opportunity, social development 
and civil society, government and institutionalization, and security as a result of the CELI 
interventions. The design closely followed the baseline, with additional qualitative methods to gain 
insights into perceptions, opinions and experiences of the population. Full design considerations 
are found in Annex 3 to the main report, including the estimation of impact. Qualitative and 
quantitative data often show quite different results, given that the quantitative sample is a 
population average, while qualitative respondents were selected for their higher and more active 
levels of community and program participation. 
Limitations to the study are various and important to consider fully. There are limitations based on 
the design, such as the difficult and imperfect process of matching municipalities in a country that 
has an important history of isolation and variation among regions. The original design has also 
been deeply affected by the loss of the whole-of-government intervention, in which impact goals 
and indicators were set at a very high level, but the implementation has been far more limited than 
promised. Exogenous factors (such as the drop in world oil prices) and variations in 
implementation also condition the interpretation of the data. Please see the Limitations section of 
this volume as well as the methodology annex (Annex 3) to the main report for full details. 
Findings and conclusions
CELI Central provided information on meeting the goals that were established in the Performance 
Management Plan (PMP). This includes indicators such as the number of organizations and 
governmental offices that have received support from the project, sales from the productive 
projects, and leveraged funds, etc. On the date of the analysis, CELI Central had reached or 
exceeded the majority of the goals established in the three pillars (economic, social, and 
institutional) though the social and economic goals were more fully accomplished. The economic 
pillar also contains the largest number of indicators that are CELI’s direct responsibility. There are 
also indicators which have goals with a high probability of being attained before the program ends, 
although these goals have not been completely fulfilled. The following figure gives a summary of 
the levels at which the goals have been fulfilled for each type of indicator (an explanation of the 
calculations for the figure are found in Annex 3): 
How to read the findings and conclusions
This summary and the report that follows give two key types of data: trends and impacts. The trends 
reveal the changes over time of each variable analyzed in the CELI municipalities, while the impacts 
compare the changes in the variables in the municipalities analyzed with those in the control 
municipalities. 
Note that the trends and impacts at the cluster level are also given, i.e., individual municipalities or small 
groups of municipalities that are geographically and socio-economically similar. The results of a cluster 
analysis often differ from the regional results, which is why it is important to study them to get more 
targeted information. 
8 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 1.2. CELI Central PMP indicator compliance
Economic development
The economic situation for the average family is getting worse, but the effects on CELI’s 
direct participants are positive. According to the information obtained, those surveyed perceive
that the poverty families suffer from today is worse than it was at baseline. However, when an 
analysis is done by cluster, as will be explained below, the result is different. From that point of 
view, even though conditions of extreme poverty seem to be worse, there also seems to be an 
increase in employment levels and profitability of productive work. Despite the decline in the 
perception of the economic situation in absolute terms, it was worse in the control zones. CELI 
Central had a positive impact of almost 14pp. (Figure 1.3) 
Figure 1.3. Impact on the economic situation of households
Variable Impact
CELI vs. Control
The economic situation for the place where I am living is good or very good 0.137*
Unemployment or the lack of opportunities is a serious problem here -0.0185
The productive work people do earns very little -0.107
One of the few attractive, productive options is illegal activities -0.00663
Support for productive projects. CELI is recognized in this evaluation for its ability to provide 
technical assistance and reinforce associations of producers as well as make them more 
sustainable. CELI’s productive projects provide more economic benefits than projects in which 
they did not intervene. Nevertheless, respondents expressed concerns about their food security in 
the short and medium term. In the regions analyzed, economic concerns are an increasingly 
important factor in forming associations. Producer families seek to solve their logistics problems 
(transportation for products, etc.) and develop economies of scale for purchasing supplies, 
strengthen their capacity for negotiating product sales, and gain access to financing and loans. The 
most important issue, however, is community training. Figure 1.4 notes the improved clarity that 
producers have today for why they should join associations compared to baseline. 
9 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 1.4. Trends in reasons for joining forces 
Markets and commerce. Technical assistance and support for merchandising are fundamental 
for offsetting problems related to low profitability. Those surveyed state that thanks to the 
intervention the profitability of their productive projects and the quality of their products has 
improved, their production costs have declined, and they gained access to new markets. However, 
markets in the Consolidation territories are still generally 
localized. When markets are small, poorly developed, and 
not specialized, the transaction costs are very high and 
communities remain trapped in a vicious cycle because there 
is little incentive for increased production. At the same time, 
the increased production and efficiency of other markets 
clashes with the rigidity of the local market and its lack of 
readiness to export to other regions. Therefore, it is 
necessary to reach markets with enough demand to achieve 
prices that are above production and transportation costs. 
Many productive projects in these regions have grown out of alternative development, but if the 
market is poor and there are not sufficient access roads (or the existing ones are bad) poverty may 
increase. If pressures from armed groups persist, there is an incentive for producers to return to 
growing illegal crops.
Financial services. CELI Central’s beneficiaries report greater use of bank services and loans
between baseline and midline. Furthermore, loans from rotating funds and the Local Savings and 
Loan Groups, GLACs, have been an important alternative to the informal mechanisms that are 
popular in these areas but have interest rates that are much higher than producers can accept. 
Road infrastructure. Respondent’ perceptions of the intra- and inter-municipal road network 
improved slightly compared to the baseline (Figure 1.5), but is still perceived as generally of poor 
quality. 
[The problem] isn’t so much the supplies 
but that they pay us good prices. A load 
of coffee is worth more than the costs. 
Imagine that... and how much back￾breaking work do you have to do to get 
the crop. The serious problem we small 
farmers have is the middlemen. The 
middleman is the one who gains by the 
sweat of our brows. So that is what the 
government has to control. (Beneficiaries, 
Chaparral, Tolima)
6%
6%
9%
9%
11%
14%
9%
6%
9%
8%
15%
15%
22%
21%
19%
11%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Purchase of inputs
Processing products
Selling products
Transporting products
Joint learning
Group representation
Presenting products that are searching for financing
Applying for credit
CELI baseline CELI midline
10 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 1.5. Trends, road network (Good/very good) 
As mentioned, production and access to markets are negatively affected by the lack of roads or by 
their poor condition (especially the tertiary roads). CELI Central has designed and implemented 
improvement and maintenance projects for some of these roads through contracts awarded by the 
local JACs.
Land. Informality of land ownership in the regions where 
CELI Central has intervened is a constant. For example,
communities and families sometimes depend on letters of sale
that do not legally support formal ownership, and therefore, 
do not serve as collateral for loans and the development of 
productive projects. It is important to note that land ownership 
is a public good and the express responsibility of the state. 
CELI support has been important for communities but is 
inadequate in comparison to the size of the problem. 
To guarantee proper land use, the policy should be consistent 
with factors inherent to ownership and should consider the 
nature of the land, legal property registration, and the 
processes of issuing titles and restitution, which requires 
insight about the realities owners and landholders face. One factor to keep in mind is the owner’s 
ability to pay taxes, which is not assured since they may not have the funds available if there is a 
poor harvest. 
The evaluation recommends: (see report for details)
Take advantage of local opportunities to simultaneously improve production and marketing. 
The work CELI has done to create alliances between the private sector and mutually benefiting
associations should be duplicated. This cooperative effort should develop pilot projects to 
overcome deficiencies found in the production and marketing processes. 
Support producer associations to develop economies of scale, reduce production and 
transportation costs, expand demand (in markets outside of the local market) and improve 
marketing channels, so that even while the middlemen are playing a difficult to replace role, their 
role in the chain is minimized and profitability remains in the hands of the producers. 
Improve food security plans. Support traditional farms and other activities that generate 
resources over the short, medium, and long term, minimize dependence on a single crop, provide 
the producing families with liquid assets, and make it possible for them to consolidate production 
and marketing.
Coordinate with national initiatives (irrigation districts, drainage, collection points, refrigeration 
chains, financing and banking, technology parks and technological extension, etc.). Analyze the 
One hears that they often would rather lose 
the land and ignore the problem than file a 
complaint. [They tell you that:] -no, look, 
the man over there says, - if I open my 
mouth, bla, bla, bla, or just that he has been 
there many years and he’ll never turn it over 
to me, that he bought it from someone else. 
Do you understand? So until the Land Unit 
gets here... they are coming to Caquetá now 
like they did to Putumayo or Tolima...I don't 
think there is any guarantee that these 
people will begin to take the initiative. 
(Ombudsman's office, La Montañita, 
Caquetá)
14%
26%
18%
29%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35%
Intramunicipal road network
Intermunicipal road network
CELI baseline CELI midline
11 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Policy for Productive Development project that the National Planning Department (DNP in 
Spanish) is implementing. 
Use community models to improve the tertiary roads. Reinforce the successful work with the 
JACs to build a community-based participatory model for managing the tertiary road network in 
Colombia, based on international experiences and taking into account both the national context 
and environmental factors in order to minimize direct and indirect environmental risks or to design 
environmental compensation models. In the case of previously constructed roads that need 
maintenance, a suitable environmental plan is also essential.
Land restoration processes require greater effectiveness to guarantee proper restitution and 
provision of legal titles to properties. New relationships with the entities responsible for 
administering this program at the national level must be prioritized, especially those who are 
responsible for the functions of the now defunct INCODER, i.e., the Agency for Rural 
Development and National Land Agency. The institutionalization work with the Land Restitution 
Unit must be continued. 
Institutional development 
Participation. Based on the survey results, people’s participation in the 
political process increased between the baseline and midline despite the 
lack of compelling candidates. According to those surveyed, the fact that 
a candidate belongs to a community association or organization is a boon
for participating in politics because this increases his or her legitimacy 
and representativeness.
Respondents do not believe that ex-combatants should become political 
figures. The stigma against ex-combatants affects their legitimacy as
potential community leaders. In light of the peace process and a post￾conflict environment, there is no evidence that guerrilla groups have the 
credibility to participate in politics in this region. 
Transparency and accountability. Accountability processes are not well developed, which 
reduces confidence in government institutions. Despite CELI’s efforts to improve transparency, 
accountability, and social control, no positive effects have been seen so far. It is not possible to 
verify whether the community actively participates in planning processes, which further reduces 
community participation in accountability and oversight, even while respondents perceive that 
transparency and accountability is improving. 
This region shares the low confidence in public institutions seen across the country. Confidence in 
institutions fell, according to respondents. This affects the state’s legitimacy as the guarantor and 
protector of rights, its leadership to intervene in the countryside (because failure to meet 
commitments along with other problems still persist), and recovery of the territory from the hands 
of the armed groups. (Figure 1.6) 
Figure 1.6. Trends in perceptions of problems with the municipality management
CELI Control
Distrust of public entities
Municipal administrations do not pay attention to requests from the 
community
The administration is not able to solve the community's problems
With the hope that someday 
someone will represent the 
community to see what... and 
this year there is a lady, in 
fact she is in the Caudo 
Alliance. She is seeking 
election to the Council with 
the desire that perhaps she 
will be lucky and do 
something for the community 
now that she is there. (Rubber 
Tappers’ Association, La 
Montañita, Caquetá)
12 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
CELI Control
Deficiencies of public utilities for households
Lack of highways
Corruption
Lack of institutional services: hospitals, schools, courts, and kindergartens
Municipal administrations do not report on what they are doing
The municipal authorities invite the community to express their opinions 
about subjects that are of interest to the community
The municipal authorities take the opinions of the citizens into account 
when they make decisions
Provision of services. Even if the availability of public utilities 
is high in the official data, with the exception of the sewer 
system, garbage management, and final disposal of garbage, 
the citizenry still sees deficiencies in availability and quality, 
especially in rural areas. This implies reinforcing the capacity 
of the local entities that are responsible for providing these 
public services.
The evaluation recommends: (see report for details)
Maintain credibility in the processes and mechanisms of political participation and empower 
the communities and their new leaders. CELI and other USAID programs should be instruments 
for applying the rules that guarantee this political exercise such as the principle of gender equality 
and representation in and access to electoral debates in order to generate and consolidate proposals 
that can mobilize the electorate to support democratic consolidation. 
Two tasks must continue to be developed. One, strengthening political participation through social 
organizations and two, consolidation of expertise regarding the channels for political participation 
and influence on public administrations. 
Coordinate CELI and strategies for transparency and accountability driven by the country
and be supportive of the National Strategy for a Comprehensive Anti-Corruption Public Policy 
and for programs on the right to access public information. CELI (or USAID in future programs) 
requires organized, decisive, sustainable, and coordinated inter-institutional action that is 
consistent with PNCRT and with initiatives the country has defined in recent years. 
Use new tools in the effort to improve the provision of services. CELI’s challenge is to continue 
strengthening local governments in order to improve the provision of the municipalities’ and 
departments’ services. Decentralization is a national initiative, but, on the municipal level, capacity 
is low and finances are limited. To that effect, it becomes necessary to reinforce citizen
participation and have information that is relevant from the demand point of view and, thus, 
manage the supply and emphasize pilot projects that significantly involve civil society and, at the 
same time, support local governments with permanent technical assistance. Tools such as “score 
charts” and other measures to get citizens to rate the changes in the provision of services are very 
useful for improving this. 
Well yes, it has obviously been very 
important [CELI's support] because they 
are very concerned about development. 
They support different institutions, us, or 
rather us with projects, the court. They 
try to get all of us to work together. They 
have also supported the Ombudsman's 
office. (Sec. of Government, La 
Macarena, Meta)
13 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Social development
Social capital. The results of the survey suggest that the 
Index of Confidence between members of the communities 
has deteriorated and that mutual assistance between the 
members and the ability to work together has declined. This 
affects the strengthening of association processes and, 
therefore, the success of CELI interventions. 
However, in the regions that CELI Central covers, citizen 
participation has seen significant growth in quality and 
quantity as well as clear evidence of its benefits. CELI has 
succeeded especially in strengthening the formation of associations and decision-making. 
However, it is noteworthy that teamwork has stood out most as a weakness. 
The JACs are the most frequently recurring mechanism for encouraging associations and 
reinforcing decision-making ability. These associations play an important role in resolving 
conflicts, at least in some veredas. The JACs have also worked very successfully with CELI 
Central on infrastructure projects regarding maintenance and sustainability of tertiary roads 
through community work. 
Association and production. Economic rationale is undoubtedly 
one of the major incentives for starting to set up associations since 
they provide a way to gain access to cooperation resources and 
state resources. CELI’s positive impacts are also seen in the 
establishment of public places for training, selling products, and 
marketing. The fact that women who are the heads of their 
households are the ones who have taken advantage of these places 
the most is interesting, especially for processing, selling, and 
transporting their products. CELI is recognized for its ability to 
provide technical assistance and to strengthen and make
associations more sustainable.
The formation of associations is critical for all of CELI’s components that should favor 
cooperation and not competition. CELI’s efforts to foster associations by improving the JACs’ 
efficacy, providing support in administrative areas, strengthening small producers’ groups, and 
empowering women and young people to work together is recognized. 
Security. The security policies are making a difference as data show that homicides, kidnapping, 
and the presence of IAGs have declined in the regions under review. However, the perception of 
those surveyed is that security conditions are not good (45%), but their view of the security services 
provided by the state through the police is better (increased from 26% to 34%). The rise in the 
number of households whose perception of the security services offered by the police and the 
armed forces is notable, with differences of 3pp and 11pp respectively. 
Other data in the survey are more troubling. They show an erosion of the support for a culture that 
supports legality and more justification for disobeying the law. (Figure 1.7) 
I reiterate, the organizational topic, if we think 
as a group, because we are actually forgetting 
that this society is a mixture, that we all have 
a relationship and a shared relationship. No 
one is [alone] here. If we learn to get along 
with each other and not compete... We are 
not independent but rather we are 
interdependent in many ways. We are able to 
learn to get along. That is basic. (Beneficiary, 
La Montañita, Caquetá)
I am thankful because the truth is the 
resources that were allocated were not 
for purchasing supplies but for 
everything that had to do with 
managing the project. In other words, 
Colombia Responde funds were used 
to pay for one year of technical 
assistance. They paid for one person 
involved in the business-and￾partnership area. (Association, La 
Macarena, Meta)
14 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 1.7. Trends in the culture of legality (agree/strongly agree)
 
The evaluation recommends: (see report for details)
Adapt programming to build confidence. Guaranteeing safety and fostering the birth of new 
leadership is essential to strengthen relationships between associations and communities.
Improve the effectiveness of associations by encouraging and consolidating confidence 
between communities and their members. There are clear benefits to working together that favor 
dialogue, the generation of knowledge, economies of scale, etc. to create community identity and 
to manage community projects. It is important to recognize and coordinate national efforts to
encourage the participation of young people and women as the foundation of society, as they were 
the main victims of the armed conflict. Youth are not just the future, but also the country's present. 
Their sense of belonging is essential for the development of their community and the region. 
Increase the work done with households headed by women. Female-led households take 
advantage of cooperation and state help. Their vulnerabilities may require different solutions, such 
as the provision of childcare or calling meetings during their free time. Those who already 
participate could serve as guides for other women and encourage their participation. 
Continue to reinforce the JACs. Create multiple mechanisms for strengthening the role of the 
JACs, such as conflict resolution agents, managers of community radio stations, proponents of 
oversight and follow-up processes, etc. The main evaluation report recommends adapting the 
Organizational Competencies Index – Evaluation of the Organizational Status (ICO-VEO in 
Spanish) for the JACs and making the results public to ensure their legitimacy in the eyes of their 
communities.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Production of coca negatively affects us
Cultivating coca is not the only way to survive
I always or almost always act in accordance with the law
The law coincides with how my community acts
CELI baseline CELI midline
15 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
INTRODUCTION
Background
According to the National Consolidation Plan (PNC in Spanish), which became the National 
Policy for Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (PNCRT in Spanish) in 2011, the concept 
of “Consolidation” refers to an expansion of the state’s legitimate presence into conflict regions 
within Colombia. The Colombian government will design policies once the minimum security 
conditions are established in order to generate the necessary institutional capacities to protect
people’s fundamental rights in the territories that have historically been affected by armed conflict 
and illegal crops. It will be oriented towards establishing presence of state institutions that are 
capable of effectively providing the public services needed for development. 
The policy conceives of social, economic and institutional consolidation and social reconstruction 
as the result of a process of mobilization and continual strengthening of three pillars: (1) the 
territorial institutionalization of state institutions focused on guaranteeing security and creating the 
necessary capacities to institutionally manage the area; (2) the strengthening of citizen 
participation; and (3) the fostering of regional integration.2
 The interaction of these three pillars 
on a base of territorial security, combined with coordinated collaboration with state entities, would 
be the path to guarantee the fundamental rights of the citizenry. 
The U.S. Embassy, for its part, developed the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) 
to support the strengthening of government presence in strategically important parts of the country 
and reduce inequity in historically marginalized regions where illegal armed groups and coca 
production coexist. CSDI was conceived as a whole-of-government, geographically-focused 
approach aimed at maintaining advances in security and development and at the reduction of illicit 
crops and the presence of illegal armed groups in conflict zones. It included significant investments 
in security, antinarcotics, access to justice, and eradication activities:
USAID is already coordinating closely with other Embassy entities, including the Narcotics Affairs Section 
(NAS), the Military Group, and the Department of Justice as well as the Political and Economic sections 
of the State Department to develop an integrated USG approach for the priority CSDI consolidation zones. 
Programs will include peace and security, illicit crop eradication, access to justice, justice sector reform 
and humanitarian and development interventions targeted at a wide range of populations.3
The multi-faceted nature of security and development problems required a coordinated response. 
The joint CSDI activities were designed to address the multiple challenges remaining across 
consolidation zones, including continued presence of armed groups and the illicit narcotics trade, 
enduring poverty, and the lack of rule of law. Working with the GOC and PNCRT, the goal of 
uniting USG agencies toward consolidation was: 
 
2http://www.consolidacion.gov.co/themes/danland/descargas/entidad/planeacion/POLITICA_NACIONAL_DE_CONSOLIDACI
ON_Y_RECONSTRUCCION_TERRITORIAL_PNCRT.pdf. 3 USAID Colombia Solicitud de Aplicaciones Número 514-09-000005, “Montes de María – Enhanced Livelihoods Initiative;” 
Septiembre 15 de 2009, p. 5. 
16 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
To reach a “tipping point” where state presence and positive perception of the government is sufficiently 
well-established so that communities decide to align with their government rather than illegal armed 
groups and the coca industry.4
USAID/Colombia designed the Colombia Enhanced Livelihood Initiative (CELI) as one of the 
CSDI components and as the backbone of the integrated plan to bolster the PNCRT by supporting
efforts to consolidate the state’s institutional presence in areas of the country under the control or 
influence of insurgent groups engaged in the production of illegal crops, drug trafficking, 
kidnapping, extortion and terrorist activities. 
The basic premise of the CELIs is that the armed conflicts and illicit economy are closely linked 
to the weak presence of the state, and their activities are oriented to strengthening state institutions, 
generating confidence in them, constructing relations between communities and their local 
governments, and supporting the improvement of sustainable ways of life. The CELIs are no 
substitute for the state. The existence of a minimum provision of public goods, property rights and 
justice services in the consolidation zones is a sine qua non condition for enabling the CELIs, and 
any international cooperation effort, to find a place in which they can operate and ensure that the
resources will serve as catalysts for development and consolidation. 
The CELIs, or Colombia Responde as the projects are known in the implementation zones, 
supported the GOC through three pillars that are similar (though not identical) to those of the 
PNCRT:
Figure 2.1. The three pillars of the PNCRT and their CELI peers
PNCRT pillar CELI pillar CELI pillars defined as:
1 Territorial 
institutionalization
Strengthening 
institutional 
development
Improving local government response; formalizing 
property rights; processing cases of victims’ property 
rights; implementing a rural development strategy
2 Citizen participation and 
good government
Strengthening social 
development
Strengthening civil society organizations (CSOs); 
promoting alliances between the community and the 
state
3 Regional integration Catalyzing economic 
development
Implementation of rural development programs and 
improving competitiveness 
With this shared mandate and the assumption of the GOC’s leadership role, the CELIs developed 
strategies for institutional, social and economic development in four of the seven corridors where 
the policy was implemented: 1) Montes de María, in the departments of Bolívar and Sucre; 2) the 
Southern Corridor in the municipality of Tumaco in the department of Nariño; 3) the Central 
Corridor in Meta, southern Tolima, and the Valle del Cauca as far as Buenaventura; and 4) the 
Northern Corridor in the Bajo Cauca region of Antioquia and southern Córdoba. 
Three implementers were convened to undertake the work in four regions. The first, Chemonics 
International, implements the CELI Norte/Sur project in the northern (Bajo Cauca in Antioquia 
and Sur de Córdoba) and southern (Tumaco) regions; the second, Tetra Tech ARD, implements 
the CELI Central project in 23 municipalities of the departments of Cauca, Valle del Cauca, 
 
4 Ibid.
17 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Caquetá, Meta, and Tolima; and the third, Global Communities, finished a similar set of tasks in 
early 2015 in the municipalities of Ovejas and San Onofre (Sucre) and Carmen de Bolívar and San 
Jacinto (Bolívar) through the CELI Montes de María (MdM) project. 
Within USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS) for Colombia, the CELIs 
were first situated within the Mission’s Development Objective 1: Civilian government present in 
CSDI zones consolidated, which focused on supporting the process of consolidation – 
strengthening of local government, formalizing property rights, social development and the 
alliance between community and state, and rural development. In the updated CDCS for 2014-
2018, the CELI projects were placed under a revised DO 3, Improved conditions for inclusive rural 
economic growth.
CELI investments target Intermediate Results supporting Development Objective 3 and have much 
in common with their original results framework in spite of the shift toward economic activities. 
The current framework, tied to the CELIs’ common Performance Management Plan (PMP), 
prioritizes the following:
IR 3.1 More equitable and secure land tenure
Sub IR 3.1.1 Land restituted to displaced victims of conflict
IR 3.2 Increased private and public investment in the rural sector
Sub IR 3.2.1 Strengthened local governments’ capacity to access and manage public funds for 
 productive infrastructure
Sub IR 3.2.2 Increase private sector investment in target rural communities
IR 3.3 More effective producer associations benefitting smallholder farmers
Sub IR 3.3.1 Improve institutional capacity to producer associations
In 2011-2012 USAID/Colombia called upon its monitoring and evaluation contractor, DevTech 
Systems, Inc., to design an impact evaluation of the set of CSDI interventions and collect the 
baseline survey data. DevTech worked with Econometría, S.A., to carry out this work.5 The design 
included two subsequent measurements: a midterm after two years of program implementation, 
and a final evaluation following completion of the program. 
EVAL (Evaluation and Analysis for Learning), a contract with Management Systems 
International, Inc. (MSI), has been charged with carrying out the midterm measurement and 
reporting on CELI impacts to date. This report represents that effort, based on the baseline 
evaluation design, program satisfaction questions for participants, additional qualitative fieldwork
and in-depth interviews with the CELI teams. The evaluation design included the collection of 
data in seven corridors in which the GOC intervened through its PNCRT activities.
The midline examined changes since baseline across institutional, social and economic indicators
and established three guiding principles for their use: 
Measure the change in impact indicators and determine the extent to which the CELIs are achieving their 
goals with target populations. 
Inform decision-making processes with timely data to identify components needing strengthening to achieve 
program goals. 
 
5 DevTech Systems, Inc. and Econometría S.A. 2013. “Impact Evaluation Methodology of the USAID Strategy in CSDI Zones - 
Final Methodology Report.”
18 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Identify best practices and lessons learned to date to inform future USAID programming. 
The impact evaluation was originally linked to the full range of interventions within the CSDI 
framework. Unfortunately, funding for the other programming was curtailed, leaving the CELIs 
alone as only one component of the full strategy. Given this, it should not be expected that an 
impact evaluation designed for the larger initiative would detect results of aspects of the CSDI 
strategy that were never carried out.
This document reports on the findings, conclusions, and recommendations for evaluating the CELI 
midline in the Central Region, executed in 13 municipalities with PNCRT and CELI Central 
interventions. Chaparral, Rioblanco, Planadas and Ataco in the Department of Tolima; 
Vistahermosa, Puerto Rico, Mesetas, San Juan de Arama, Uribe and La Macarena in the 
Department of Meta and La Montañita, and Cartagena del Chaira and San Vicente del Caguán in 
the Department of Caquetá. These municipalities have common problems related to security, coca 
production, poverty, and displacement, which means significant challenges in institutional 
approaches and development.
Note that the results of this evaluation are also given for the cluster level, i.e., for individual 
municipalities or small groups of municipalities that are geographically or socio-economically 
similar and that the results of their analysis often differ from the results of the regional analysis. 
This is why studying them to get more focused information is important.
Each of the clusters in the Central region and their control municipalities are listed in the following 
figure. Throughout the document, the analysis of the variables will be done by cluster, and the 
clusters will be identified by cluster number.
Figure 2.2. Central Region, clusters and control municipalities
Cluster Treated Municipalities Control Municipality
16 Chaparral, Rioblanco (Tolima) San Antonio (Tolima)
17 Planadas (Tolima) Ortega (Tolima)
18 Ataco (Tolima) Balboa (Cauca)
24 Vistahermosa (Meta) Mapiripán (Meta)
25 Puerto Rico (Meta) Orito (Putumayo)
26 Mesetas, San Juan de Arama (Meta) San José del Fragua (Caquetá)
27 La Uribe, La Macarena (Meta) Puerto Caicedo (Putumayo)
28 Montañita, Cartagena del Chaira, San 
Vincente del Caguan (Caquetá) Lejanías (Meta)
19 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
How to read this report
An impact evaluation is a powerful tool but also includes important challenges and differences 
from other evaluation research.6 It is important to understand the different types of findings an 
evaluation like this generates and how they should be interpreted. 
Four types of findings. The report has four types of findings, shown in figures and text in the 
report. Each figure starts with one of these words. 
Impacts. These come from the survey and compare treated and control groups on key outcomes 
of interest. Impact is read as the percentage point (pp) difference between baseline and midline 
that is attributable to the intervention. Data tables show statistical significance with asterisks (*). 
Trends. These come from the survey and show change over time, without comparison to controls. 
Trends are shown in graphics, not tables. In the text we use the percent sign (%) and absolute 
values. 
CELI performance. These data come from the CELIs and they track CELI performance 
indicators. 
Secondary data. These data come from other sources like government figures and indices, and 
they help to describe the context in which CELI interventions operate. 
Figure 2.3. How to read and interpret the statistical data in the report
Table title: 
Impacts pp 
Trends % 
Secondary data Se 
CELI performance C 
Whole sample and four sub-samples. The whole sample survey is approx. 19,000 households, 
divided into four sub-samples. These are respondents from: CELI municipalities, their controls, 
PNCRT municipalities and their controls. Sometimes we refer to the “full sample,” when results 
are similar across all 19,000 households. 
Direct and indirect beneficiaries. Due to design challenges (see the Limitations section, below), 
households that were supposed to be direct beneficiaries at baseline did not always receive CELI 
interventions. As a result, this evaluation report looks at all residents of veredas in treated 
municipalities as indirect beneficiaries. There is one exception, and that is in the economic 
development chapter, where we have been able to identify a population of direct CELI participants, 
and track their progress. 
Methodology and design
EVAL, with the support of its strategic partner, the Centro Nacional de Consultoría (CNC) used a 
mixed methods – qualitative and quantitative – approach to examine a set of indicators for each 
 
6 Please see Design section at the end of the Executive Summary, Limitations there and in the main report, and Annex 3 for details.
20 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
CELI result. The evaluation sought to understand changes in economic opportunity, social 
development and civil society, government and institutionalization and security as a result of the 
CELI interventions. The design followed the baseline design from 2012-2013 very closely, with 
additional qualitative methods to gain insights into perceptions, experiences and opinions among 
treatment (CELI and PNCRT) and control groups. Full design considerations can be found in 
Annex 3 to the main report, including the estimation of impact. 
Evaluation questions
The baseline identified the evaluation questions in 2011, and have been slightly adjusted (per 
USAID; please see Annex 2 of the main report for the SOW) and are presented below.
Figure 2.4. Evaluation questions 
QUESTION STRATEGIC LEVEL
What specific impacts have the CSDI interventions produced among the target 
population in the areas of interventions? IR3.1, 3.2 and 3.3
Do CSDI projects show the expected level of performance in support of the 
consolidation process? Cross-cutting
Does the GOC show expected level of investments in consolidation areas following 
the assistance from USAID in PCNRT municipalities?
7 IR 3.2
What are the CELIs' specific effects of in changing the capacity and service delivery 
of local government? (To serve local people, be accountable, expand social services.) Sub-IR 3.2.1
What changes have been produced by CELI interventions to strengthen the 
organizational capacity of local CSOs in local areas? IR 3.3
How much progress has been achieved in the recovery and reconstruction of 
territory from armed conflicts (IAG presence) and illicit economic activities? Cross-cutting
To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance 
and institutionalization of the territory? Sub-IR 3.2.1
To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to regional integration and 
economic development?
IR 3.2
IR 3.3
These questions serve both impact (1, 4-8) and performance evaluation (2, 3) goals, and the 
evaluation reflects this blended purpose with a mixed methods design (please see section on 
Methodology and its detailed annex in the main report for full details.) The interdisciplinary team 
used data from the quantitative household survey (in a quasi-experimental pre-post design) and a 
range of qualitative instruments, secondary data research and multi-faceted analyses to answer the
questions in this report. Qualitative and quantitative data often show quite different results, given 
that the quantitative sample is a population average, while qualitative respondents were selected 
for their higher and more active levels of community and program participation. 
Quantitative methods 
The impact evaluation design included a quantitative survey of households in Consolidation 
municipalities, both with and without CELI interventions, with these data collected between July 
20 and November 30, 2015. Control municipalities were selected using an advanced matching 
 
7 This is answered in Annex 6 to the main report with data and analysis on GOC investments in PNCRT and CELI municipalities.
21 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
protocol, described in detail in the annexes to the original baseline report.8 The original design 
included an oversample of 12% for each follow-on survey, to allow for attrition. In the field, the 
midline evaluation, following a panel design, revisited the same households in order to ensure 
comparability, and lost approximately 15% of the sample to attrition. Within CELI municipalities, 
not all veredas had CELI interventions, and this was reflected in the sample. 
The baseline was done at different points over a two-year period. The time of the midline
evaluation was planned to match the increase in data captured at baseline and to prepare a seasonal 
timeline for the final evaluation. In the same discussion, it was determined that the midline
evaluation would be more useful if it were done closer to the decision-making moment for new 
programming. Therefore, gathering the data for the midline evaluation was done between July 20, 
2015 and November 30, 2015. It is important to note that local elections (for mayors and 
governors) were held on October 25, 2015. It is possible that the politicized atmosphere and 
environment affected the opinions of the respondents in both the treatment and control zones. 
The survey instrument (Annex 8 to the main report) includes modules on demographics, justice 
and security, licit and illicit economic opportunities and performance, government legitimacy, 
social capital and participation in grassroots organizations, electoral behavior, social and public 
services, land rights and ownership, victims’ rights, roads, social programs, and opinions about the 
future and about peace. Several indices are created from the data, including indices of social 
capital, government performance, and government accountability. In general, the survey measures 
perceptions (as in the case of security) which are important, but more sensitive to news and recent 
events. The survey is less adept at capturing actual experiences, in part because most respondents 
will not have had direct contact with the changes in institutions or security, for example. In this 
regard, there is subjectivity in the indicators that were designed at the time of the baseline survey. 
The evaluation added several new items for the midline on satisfaction with interventions and a 
short set on victimization from the LAPOP9 survey. The survey was administered in person in 
households, workplaces and, when issues of security prevented deployment to veredas, in 
municipal centers. 
The assessment team carried out 4,647 household surveys in the Central Region of which 2,732 of 
the respondents were men and 1,915 were women. Those interviewed reported a literacy rate of 
85%. Half of the respondents, 2,363, self-identified as mestizos and a third self-identified as white, 
as shown in Figure 2.5.
 
8 From the baseline report: “The survey interviews occurred in two phases, with the first phase providing interviews for 65 percent 
of the indirect beneficiary and control households between March 27 and July 5, 2012. The second phase, providing the remaining 
35 percent of the indirect beneficiary and control interviews, plus 100 percent of the direct beneficiary interviews, occurred between 
November 7, 2012, and May 25, 2013, with a break for the Christmas and New Year holidays.” Impact Evaluation of USAID’s 
Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) Baseline Report. Volume 1: Summary of findings. June 30, 2013. 9 The Latin American Public Opinion Survey (http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/), which has been implemented throughout Latin 
America by a team at Vanderbilt University for the past three decades. 
22 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 2.5. Central sample by ethnicity (self-identified) 
Around 86% of those surveyed in the Central Region live in scattered rural settlements, 10% in 
population centers that are not municipal capitals, and only 4% in municipal capitals. 
Approximately a third (34%) had heard of Colombia Responde’s activities in their municipalities. 
A slightly higher percentage of men (38%) than of women (29%) had heard of Colombia 
Responde’s work. It should also be noted that the people surveyed were very optimistic about the 
future since a large majority said that they expected conditions to improve. Women were the most 
optimistic. 
One notable characteristic of the sample is that the municipalities in Cauca were classified as 
PNCRT instead of CELI municipalities at baseline. However, once the program was implemented, 
CELI intervened in those municipalities. Nonetheless, for the evaluation, they continue to be 
categorized as PNCRT, i.e., part of the PNCRT sample. The result is that these municipalities 
have more positive results in general than those with political intervention but without CELI 
intervention. Of course, these results are closer to the CELI municipalities. 
Other quantitative measures included the examination of key secondary data sources. These came 
from government sources and the EVIDINCE consortium,
10 which collects quarterly municipality￾level data on outcomes of interest, such as police and judicial staff presence, among many others. 
GOC sources also provided updated data on major crimes including homicides, acts of terrorism, 
and massacres. The CELI implementing partners also provided data on their achievements to date 
in their performance management plan (PMP), including such indicators as numbers of 
organizations and government offices treated, sales of productive project outputs, and leveraged 
funds. 
 
10 EVIDINCE is a research effort associated with the Empirical Studies of Conflict (esoc.princeton.edu), a multi-institutional 
collaboration studying conflict and insurgency at the sub-national level. 
34%
9%
51%
3%
3%
White
Indigenous
Mestizo
Black/Afro-Colombian/Mulatto
None or don't know
23 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Qualitative methods 
The qualitative methods include in-depth interviews with key informants at the national, regional, 
and local levels in areas with CELI and PNCRT interventions, areas where PNCRT has 
implemented work without CELI interventions, and in control municipalities. The team carried 
out structured interviews with officials from municipalities and the Ombudsman’s office in 21 
sites chosen to capture variations between CELI and PNCRT interventions and their control zones. 
Vistahermosa, Lejanías and La Macarena in Meta; La Montañita in Caquetá; and Chaparral, Ortega 
and Coyaima in southern Tolima were visited in the Central Region. The data and reports on the 
case studies of southern Tolima and La Macarena were also consulted to develop this report.
Furthermore, leaders of civil society organizations (OSC in Spanish) and producer associations 
were interviewed and parallel subjects were covered through focus groups. Those participating in 
the focus groups were citizens from the CELI and PNCRT areas, some of whom participated in 
the interventions. The quantitative and quantitative data often have different results since the 
quantitative sample is representative of the “average population” while the qualitative respondents 
were selected due to their higher levels of community participation or participation in CELI.
Qualitative data were analyzed in Atlas.ti using thematic coding that mirrored the evaluation 
questions and allowed for emergent codes to cover issues not foreseen in the evaluation design. 
These codes were correlated to understand coincidence and patterns of importance to the 
evaluation’s response to the research questions. 
Limitations
The evaluation design followed in this study has certain limitations. These are grouped and 
discussed below, and a more detailed discussion can be found in Annex 3: Methodology. 
Factors related to the evaluation design 
The CELIs were to be evaluated as part of a much larger and more comprehensive effort 
that failed to materialize. The outcomes of interest are at a high level of generality in the Results 
Framework of USAID’s Country Development Cooperation Strategy (CDCS), relative to the 
investment, the interventions, and the duration of implementation to date. The evaluation was 
created to assess a set of programs, formerly called the Colombia Strategic Development Initiative 
(CSDI), with broader funding and goals than the current set of interventions. CSDI included a 
whole-of-government approach from both the U.S. and Colombian governments – anti-narcotics, 
security and justice, regional and local institutions, economic development, regional integration 
and roads, and civil society interventions, across the same geographic intervention area. The 
Initiative as a whole dwindled to comprise only the Colombia Enhanced Livelihoods Initiative, 
run by USAID, with significant funding but without the wider approach initially envisioned. As a 
result, the impact evaluation design includes several indicator sets for which few or no targeted 
interventions were completed. No impacts can be detected for programs that no longer exist. 
For CSDI to have produced detectable effects would have been an enormous feat; for the CELIs
to do it without the other CSDI interventions, including the interventions promised by the GOC, 
was far too much to expect. As a result, impacts found by the evaluation as measured by rigorous 
statistical techniques are few and mostly at the local level with particular direct interventions with 
producer associations.
24 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Selecting the panel of respondents at baseline was a challenge, resulting in discrepancies in 
the list of “direct beneficiaries” at midline. A further limitation in terms of determining and 
attributing impact involves the panel design of the baseline, followed closely at midline. Baseline 
data collection was carried out over 18 months, crossing various growing seasons and the three 
different starting dates of the CELIs. In order to respond to the baseline team’s request for lists of 
direct beneficiaries, CELI Central approached local leaders and called for meetings of potential 
local participants, who signed attendance lists. CELI N/S, which was already in progress, provided 
lists of those who were participating in their interventions at that time. These lists served as the 
sampling frames for the treatment sites, but they created a problem: attendees knew they would 
receive a program, thus violating the basic assumption of an impact evaluation baseline that the 
intervention has not yet begun. Knowing about the future benefit changes the population’s 
perceptions, perspectives, decisions and expectations. To some extent, the changes begin to appear 
from the time of the meeting invitation, and such changes can no longer be observed when the 
baseline information is collected, so we do not know how this knowledge may have changed their 
responses, but the relevant literature suggests a social desirability bias in which respondents who 
think they are to receive some benefit will respond more positively, in an attempt to be amenable 
to researchers – who they may presume to be involved with the intervention. This makes it very 
difficult to detect small effects on certain variables, since the baseline measurement has already 
incorporated, or lost, such effects. 
The midline evaluation found that some baseline respondents originally identified as direct 
beneficiaries did not participate (or did not recall or report participating) in CELI interventions. 
There were significant discrepancies between people who were classified as direct beneficiaries at 
baseline and the people who eventually participated in CELI programming. The evaluation team 
therefore recognized three definitions of “direct beneficiaries”: (1) direct beneficiaries per the 
baseline evaluation design (4,426 households); (2) respondents who answered a survey question 
about receiving an intervention from Colombia Responde, as the program was known in the field 
(2,198 households); and (3) direct beneficiaries from the baseline who are on the CELIs’ own 
participant lists (2,015). 
Random households in the municipalities were then selected as indirect beneficiaries, to 
complement the sample and to represent the wide-ranging set of indicators that the CSDI was to 
have impacted, such as economic integration through roads and markets, security and justice, and 
increasing and improving government presence. 
None of the three “direct beneficiary” definitions provides a sufficiently reliable gauge of 
participation and, as a result, for analysis of the more diffusely applied components of CELI 
activities in governance, infrastructure support and social development, the indirect and direct 
beneficiaries of the baseline were combined into one group of beneficiaries. However, for certain 
activities, especially with respect to participation in producers’ associations and other 
economically focused interventions, analysis was conducted on a separate “direct beneficiaries” 
subgrouping based on the three definitions just specified. When taken together, with no double 
counting (that is, counting a household only once, for example, when a participant fulfills more 
than one of the definitions such as by appearing on the original list and by responding “yes” to the 
survey question on Colombia Responde participation), there are 5,445 unique respondents among 
the three definitions. The evaluation uses this larger group to examine economic impacts on 
25 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
participants, which represents a more rigorous standard. Where impacts are found on this group, 
they are generally much more positive than the rest of the citizen population. 
The qualitative team’s experience in the field conducting focus groups helps to understand why so 
few of those identified as direct beneficiaries actually reported being participants. The first and 
key questions in the focus groups were regarding participation in Colombia Responde activities, 
and few focus group participants said they had participated. The reasons for the problems with the 
Colombia Responde name are not precisely known, but the evaluators speculate that the following 
could have contributed: i) at GOC request, USAID hid its participation under the Colombia 
Responde name so that the beneficiaries would attribute the effects of the program to the GOC; ii) 
subcontractors have other names, and beneficiaries may have been confused about the identity of 
the benefactor in the first instance; iii) the results may suffer from recall bias, since the baseline 
was established between 2012 and 2013, and certain benefits ended a long time ago; and iv) a 
combination of these and other factors that are unobservable. 
The category of indirect beneficiaries is imprecise, and capturing impacts at that diffuse level 
will take more investment and more time. Several categories of CELI and PNCRT interventions 
– essential though they may be – are likely to be invisible to average respondents, and do not reach 
a minimum treatment threshold, for one of two main reasons. First, some public goods affect few 
residents of a given area, like the strengthening of justice services or work with municipalities or 
personerías, or some social or productive infrastructure projects. Internationally, only an average 
6% of a given population ever accesses justice services in their lifetime, and only a fraction of that 
figure do so in a given year. Detecting perceptions of change among this “fraction of a fraction” 
is therefore very difficult. Second, as discussed above, the CELI programming had important goals 
and benchmarks across the pillars of social, economic and institutional development – such that 
the significant funding is fragmented across geographic sites and pillars. While a member of a 
treated productive association or civil society group knows well that they have benefited from an 
intervention, the “indirect” beneficiary is indeed very distant from the benefits. Their inclusion in 
the sample dilutes the impacts that can be detected by the evaluation design. 
Had the robust set of CSDI and GOC whole-of-government interventions continued as planned, 
perhaps more impacts in these higher-order indicators would have been detected. As it stands, 
however, the “dose” of intervention is a fraction of what was planned, in far fewer sectors, and at 
great distance from the beneficiaries, particularly the indirect beneficiaries.
Factors outside the control of the interventions
Local contexts and the absence of public entities condition the effectiveness of the CELIs.
The intervention municipalities are historically economically isolated, with stagnant local markets, 
very limited road connectivity, armed illegal group activity, minimal (and sometimes corrupt) 
government institutions, and deep intergenerational poverty. The households in these zones have 
limited access to land – in terms of either size or low productivity – and a deficit of human capital 
(education, health, nutrition, as shown in baseline statistics on education coverage, perceptions of 
service quality, and food security challenges).11 The main consequence is low productivity and 
income from land and work, which are rural families’ two main factors of production. This 
 
11 See, for example, Impact Evaluation of USAID’s Colombia Strategic Development Initiative (CSDI) Baseline Report Volume 
1: Summary of Findings – All PNCRT Zones pp 30 and 42-43; Volume 2 p. 47-50 and 69-70; plus the regional baseline reports.
26 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
constrains households in a logic of poverty perpetuation – the trap – in which poverty is reproduced 
as a consequence of low savings capacity, which prevents changing the initial amounts of capital, 
land and work. The cycles are reproduced in the short term, limiting the capacity to change the 
initial situation, and in the long term, limiting changes in the welfare of the next generation: young 
people cannot find opportunities and are pressured into migrating or joining illegal armed groups. 
In this context – and others related to unemployment and informality – violence, in its different 
forms, reinforces poverty traps. 
The other face of this poverty trap context is communal: the municipalities lack access to roads, 
political representation and market formation. Weak political representation often dilutes attention 
by the central or departmental government, such that the investment in roads is insufficient to 
develop markets in which small farmers can sell their products above production and transportation 
costs. As such, poverty is not only individual: it is poverty at a municipal level that encompasses 
the collective. There is an evident absence of public goods that are essential for the development 
of communities and entire regions. The capacity of rural interventions to generate significant 
effects on economic and social development is closely linked to land tenancy and property rights. 
However, the State’s policy has had little success on this front, and the CELIs faced the same – or 
worse – institutional roadblocks. 
Exogenous contextual factors cannot be excluded. Among exogenous factors,
12 it is important 
to mention the inflation caused by the global economic slowdown and the sharp drop in oil prices, 
resulting in recession in economic activities associated with extraction. These effects occurred at 
the moment that beneficiaries’ perceptions of the performance of the CELIs and the PNCRT were 
sought. 
The CELIs’ relationship with the Consolidation Unit was not uniformly strong, based on 
political and other factors. The Unidad Administrativa para la Consolidación Territorial (UACT) 
was a newly created government body as the CELIs began, which benefited from CELI support 
for opening regional offices and for staff capacity building. The Unit had the function of 
coordinating government agencies to deliver the state’s programs to the consolidation zones. One 
of the great difficulties it faced in realizing this task was its lower (or at best equal) status within 
the government hierarchy with respect to those entities responsible for those state programs, which 
presented challenges for the CELIs as well. The national level and regional level offices were also 
not always in sync according to some stakeholders, and one CELI COR reported better and more 
collaborative relationships at the regional than at the national level. 
The UACT faced great obstacles in successfully carrying out its role in the territories, including 
limited budgets for meeting needs in a complex geographic area with deep social, economic and 
institutional challenges. It was in the context of these conflicts and complexities that the CELIs 
had to coordinate their tasks with the national-level GOC (although, as noted, regional and local 
contacts were reportedly much more operational). The UACT was finally merged with the Social 
Prosperity Department (DPS, for its Spanish initials) in December of 2015 because of the 
termination of the National Policy of Territorial Consolidation and Reconstruction (PNCRT for its 
 
12 The role of the control municipalities is to ensure that exogenous factors do not bias results. Under perfect conditions, 
exogenous factors apply to both types of municipalities, so in principle these factors would “cancel out.” However, no quasi￾experimental design is never perfect, and as a result, the evaluation uses control co-variables and clusters in order to minimize 
possible biases.
27 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Spanish acronym). Afterwards, the CELIs in essence lost their counterpart at this midpoint in their 
programming. Nevertheless, the CELIs continue working to articulate their efforts with 
responsible institutions.
Factors related to implementation
The selection process for veredas in which to work faced challenges that could affect the 
evaluation results. The selection of veredas is a crucial foundation for implementation and for 
evaluation. The selection of municipalities and veredas in which the work is ultimately performed 
has substantial effects on the results of the strategy – and, therefore, on the impacts measured. 
Implementing partners are guided in selection by USAID and GOC preferences, and the baseline 
team for this quasi-experimental design followed up by employing a municipality matching 
system. Such systems, while imperfect, allow for the modeling of a robust counterfactual – what 
would have happened in municipalities that did not receive the interventions.
At least at the outset of the programs, the selection of veredas depended on the “stoplight” 
methodology, which relied on Colombia’s military for impartial classification of the danger of 
each vereda where the CELIs might potentially intervene. Stakeholders in USAID and the CELIs 
eventually sought a way out of this requirement, as they found the system highly politicized and, 
at times, the stoplight decision unjustified. Over time, the CELIs’ contracts were amended to allow 
implementers to amplify their reach to veredas in which local dynamics suggested potential 
positive relations – such as a shared productive project. In this way the CELIs could serve 
communities that were divided administratively but shared common agricultural goals and could 
expand to veredas that they themselves had established as safe for project activities. 
One hypothesis generated during the evaluation was that the vereda selection – guided by the 
“traffic light” methodology – tended toward the veredas closest to the municipal centers, with 
greater access, more resources, greater associativity, and greater social capital, etc., while the 
problems of illicit crops and armed groups were extended in more remote and dispersed geographic 
areas. In general, it can be asserted that the poorer the population, the greater the impacts of an 
intervention of this type. Thus, focusing on what was easiest operationally may have been 
counterproductive in terms of impact. 
28 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
REGIONAL CONTEXT
The objective of the Consolidation was to establish and reinforce the state institutions in the 
territory, economically integrate the regions, and build social fabric in the zones affected by 
Colombia’s armed conflict on the foundation of positive security results that can be attributed to 
Colombia’s armed forces. The CELI interventions supported consolidation, but not the full 
initiative. Other elements designed to accomplish this objective turned out to be less than expected. 
Security improvements are important but not absolute. Regional economic integration is promising 
but incomplete – institutional presence and good governance are still limited, especially in rural 
areas. The set of conditions that fed the armed conflict and the illegal groups has improved, but 
the regional context indicators do not show an ideal environment within which CELI can meet its 
objectives.
Consolidation Index 
The Consolidation Index is a tool designed to measure and monitor the municipalities’ progress in 
the Consolidation process. This index is built on the basis of a set of 37 indicators in three PNCRT 
pillars each of which has several components as shown in Figure 3.1 below. 
Figure 3.1. Index of the consolidation pillars and their components 
PNCRT Pillar Components
1 Territorial 
institutionalization 
Security, justice, property rights, 
and human rights
2 Citizens’ participation 
and good government
Good government, citizen 
participation, and social capital
3 Regional integration Connectedness, social services, and 
economic growth
Each pillar constitutes a third of the final score on a scale of 0 to 100. Since 2011, data from the 
Consolidation Index have been compiled for each Consolidation municipality together with 
information from a set of comparison municipalities. The scores are broken down by pillar or by 
the indicators in each pillar: time, geography (municipality, department, and region), and type of 
service.
The thirteen Consolidation municipalities measured by the Index and subject to evaluation are the 
following: 
Figure 3.2. Departments and Municipalities in CELI Central analyzed by the Consolidation Index 
Caquetá Meta Tolima
Cartagena del Chairá La Macarena Ataco
La Montañita Mesetas Chaparral
San Vicente del Caguán Puerto Rico Planadas
San Juan de Arama Rioblanco
Uribe
Vistahermosa
29 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
The trend in the ratings for each one of these regions from 2011 to 2014 has generally been 
positive, i.e., their progress towards Consolidation is incremental even when none of them has yet 
reached the category of consolidated municipality (or region) as shown in Figure 3.3:
Figure 3.3. Secondary data: The General Consolidation Index score per department
When the departmental review of the Index is done by pillar, the three regions coincide in that 
Pillar 3 (Regional Integration) has the highest scores, significantly bolstering the Index’s rating. 
Meanwhile, the Territorial Institutionalization Pillar has the lowest score in Caquetá and Meta 
while, in Tolima, the Good Government Pillar is the weakest. 
The Index of Consolidation is made up of indicators, each of which has strengths, weaknesses, and 
particular viewpoints that should be taken into account when making comparisons between the 
scores and the data obtained through the evaluation. 
First, the indicators contained in the Index correspond, in general, to data related to government 
perspectives. In many cases, they are reported by government officials at the municipal, 
departmental, and national levels, and differ from the opinions offered by citizens on the same 
issues surveyed (security, institutional structure, etc.). None is more “correct” than the other, nor 
are they precisely comparable. The decisions made based on one or another of the cases affect the 
results: on the one hand, the index takes the data from the main population centers as the basis for 
many of its indicators. In many cases, these data have been reported by government officials and, 
in other cases, by citizens, such as transportation companies that report on road conditions. By 
contrast, the index uses data from the survey sample, which includes 90% of the dispersed rural 
population, 8% of the population in towns other than the municipal capital, and 2% of those in the 
municipal capital. 
Second, the scores of many indicators are weighted in order to be compared to those of 
municipalities that have similar socioeconomic conditions. As a result, high scores are registered 
even when the absolute scores are among the worst in the country. For example, the Open 
Government indicator (figures from the GOC Open Government Index) shows that the Index score 
for Tolima in 2014 was 59.5. However, this figure is adjusted to 90.8 due to the effects of the 
comparison to similar municipalities. This is not a flaw in the Index. Nonetheless, it is important 
to consider the fact that the scores are modified this way before they are added.
Background
This region is made up of municipalities from three departments that have different economic 
contexts but common social situations: their territory is basically rural, they have suffered 
49,4
61,1
44,1
57,3
56,5 71,0
0,0
20,0
40,0
60,0
80,0
100,0
2011 2012 2013 2014
Caquetá Meta Tolima
30 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
considerable levels of poverty, they were initially settled by Amerindian communities and have 
been gradually populated by settlers in search of wealth and development, they are survivors of 
periods of violence and displacement, they were recognized as municipalities in the mid-20th 
century which means that their institutional development is recent, and they have worked with 
illicit crops and neglected the production of other crops. As a consequence, they have suffered 
from the presence of IAGs, especially the FARC. In isolated cases, paramilitary groups have also 
migrated there to defend the cultivation of illicit crops in the region. To summarize, everyone has 
suffered from the social-political conflict and problems with law and order. 
The municipalities of Ataco, Chaparral, Planadas, and Rioblanco are located in the southern part 
of the Department of Tolima. The municipality of Chaparral includes a considerable percentage of 
the total citizens in the area of interest (41%) and is considered the southern capital as well as the 
number three city in Tolima in terms of population and economic activity. In general terms, the
drug lords in this area built themselves up by buying and appropriating land that had been devalued 
by the presence of the guerrilla groups and ensured their productivity through their own armed 
forces. The contra-guerrilla self-defense groups grew in the poppy-growing areas, especially in 
Rioblanco and Planadas. 
In response, various programs have been in operation since 1982 seeking to strengthen the state’s 
presence through different mechanisms that give priority to participation linked to investment. As 
of 2014 in the area of economics, “the four municipalities in southern Tolima have a number of 
important organizations connected to coffee and supported by the CELI Central-Colombia 
Responde program: Ataco has 8, Chaparral has 3, Planadas has 3, and Rioblanco has 6.” This 
agricultural activity is supplemented by plantain, yucca, corn, sugarcane, fruit trees, and other 
crops of limited production. Animal husbandry is another economically important item.
The municipalities of La Montañita, Cartagena del Chairá, and San Vicente del Caguán, in turn, 
are located in the north central part of the Department of Caquetá. The municipality of La 
Montañita is rich in water and fish. Nevertheless, its economy is based on semi-extensive animal 
husbandry in which they breed, raise, and fatten animals for two purposes: milk and meat. They 
also cultivate rubber and cacao. Corn, rice, sugarcane, plantain, yucca, coffee and fruit are 
cultivated for their own consumption. 
The municipality of Cartagena del Chairá has an economy that is basically dependent on illicit 
crops, but also includes the rubber business and agricultural products – corn, yucca, plantain, 
rubber, cacao, and tropical fruit – as well as animal husbandry and leather-working. One 
recognized attraction is the Chairá lagoon where there is an abundance of orchids. 
San Vicente del Caguán is one of the largest municipalities (28,300 sq. km. of which 10,703 sq. 
km. are in the area the departments of Meta and Guaviare are disputing over). The Amazonian 
Forest Reserve covers 25% of its territory. Its economy is concentrated in animal husbandry, 
aquaculture production, and exotic fruits such as arazá, cocona, copoazú, and maraco. 
Last of all, the municipalities of Vistahermosa, Puerto Rico, Mesetas, San Juan de Arama, Uribe, 
and La Macarena are located in the center of the Department of Meta. Like the rest of the 
departments, agriculture in these municipalities is concentrated in plantain, yucca, corn, fruit, 
sugarcane, and citrus crops, with variations of rubber, cacao, and hibiscus flowers. Cattle, pig, 
poultry, and fish farming are also typical. Petroleum has been a very important item for the region’s 
31 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
economy but, since it is an enclave economy, it does not generate better living conditions for the 
citizens. These municipalities were benefited by the Presidential program “La Macarena 
Comprehensive Consolidation Plan - PCIM” which sought to improve conditions in the Sierra de 
La Macarena’s area of influence. 
Security 
The security component on the Consolidation Index includes the following indicators: police 
operations that do not involve the military, implementation of a public security plan, terrorist and 
subversive acts, and density and changes in coca production. 
In Tolima, subversive and terrorist acts have shown a declining trend over time. Data on police 
operations and coca cultivation are not presented. 
The density of coca cultivation in Caquetá has recently experienced a significant rise. The 
department is implementing a plan for citizen security. However, with regard to security in the 
territory, subversive actions are on the rise. 
The data do not show acts of terrorism in Meta but there are still subversive acts. Just as in the 
case of Caquetá, there is a public security plan, but it is not being implemented. The density of 
coca cultivation has increased. 
It is likely that the data from 2015 (when completed and made official) will show a significant 
deterioration in these indicators and the rise in the production of coca will become clearer (it has 
already been published by various media outlets). Based on different sources, the amount of land 
dedicated to coca cultivation in Colombia has doubled since 2013. 
According to the results obtained in CELI Central, the perception in the veredas or townships 
indicates that security has gotten worse with respect to the baseline (dropping from 57% to 55%) 
in spite of a little progress over the last two years (which went from 32% to 37%). No impact 
attributable to CELI can be seen. (Figure 3.4) 
Figure 3.4. Trends in the perception of security 
Source: CELI baseline and midline evaluations; authors’ calculations
Although impacts attributed to CELI cannot be found in these aspects from the regional point of 
view, the differences are evident when the analysis is done by cluster, as seen in the statistical 
results in Figure 3.5. 
57%
32%
84%
55%
37%
83%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
The security in the vereda/corregimiento is good or very good
The security in the vereda/corregimiento has improved in the
past two years
Would recomend that a relative return to the vereda
CELI baseline CELI midline
32 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 3.5. Impacts on the perception of security
Cluster: 16 17 18 24 25 26 27 28
Security in the vereda / township 
has improved in the last two 
years.
-0.0363 -0.0351 0.0162 -0.0716 -0.0267 -0.105* -0.0335 0.0763
You would advise a relative to 
return to the vereda 0.193. -0.109** -0.0024 -0.10** -0.23*** -0.232*** -0.0492 0.0484
The respondents from Cluster 16 had a positive impact of 19pp in their readiness to invite a family 
member to return to the vereda, but four other clusters had a negative impact on the same indicator. 
No cluster reported a level of improvement in security that would reach the level of an impact, but 
in absolute terms, five clusters reported some progress between baseline and midline. 
The things that are affecting security the most are those that can be attributed to delinquency, 
IAGs, landmines, and extortion. Nevertheless, there is a generalized trend of a declining perception 
of insecurity which is consistent with the data from the rest of the country (see main report for 
details). An increase in forced recruitment (going from 1% to 2%) as a cause of insecurity in the 
region is the only notable exception to the increased perception that there are no serious security 
problems in the vereda, which increased from 60% to 62%. 
In terms of impact, the data show that CELI had a direct effect on the results with respect to 
reducing homicides (6pp) and placing landmines (7pp). The trends are shown in the following 
figure:
Figure 3.6. Trends in the perception of crimes
CELI Baseline CELI Midline
Homicides 12% 5%
Illegal armed groups 36% 10%
Landmines 17% 5%
Displacement 9% 5%
Kidnapping or forced disappearance 5% 3%
Extortion 14% 8%
Lack of public security (theft, muggings, 
etc.) 65% 26%
Forced recruitment 1% 2%
Sexual violence 2% 2%
To understand their views on security, the respondents were asked about a variety of crimes. In 
general, those surveyed in the Central region saw a lower frequency of crimes in absolute terms in 
comparison to the baseline. However, if the control regions are reviewed, some crimes appeared 
in the CELI regions more frequently, implying that there was some impact, as shown in Figure 
3.7. It is important to note that in this table, a positive figure indicates an increase in the crime, 
while a negative figure indicates a decrease in the perception of that crime.
33 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 3.7. Impacts on the perception of crimes
Cluster: 16 17 18 24 25 26 27 28
Homicides 0.104** 0.0794** 0.0498 -0.00386 0.000678 -0.0693** -0.0970* 0.0795*
Illegal armed 
groups
0.0396 0.236*** 0.0408 0.0267 0.239*** -0.0319 0.232*** -0.193***
Landmines -0.0135 0.0689*** -0.0675*** 0.186*** 0.0973** 0.0255 0.0652 0.0510
Displacement -0.00026 -0.0206 -0.0780* -0.0113 0.0554 -0.0161 -0.0727 -0.101***
Kidnapping or 
forced 
disappearance 
0.0110 -0.0417* -0.00347 -0.00772 0.126*** 0.0326 -0.0686** 0.0498*
Extortion 0.0373 -0.0275 -0.0140 0.224*** 0.0323 0.0547 -0.0486 -0.0105
Lack of public 
security (theft, 
muggings)
-0.0937 0.00425 0.0146 0.0148 -0.264*** -0.0725 -0.580*** 0.0428
Forced 
recruitment -0.0186 -0.00238 0.0382** 0.00500 0.0168 0.0229 0.0292 -0.0116
Sexual violence -0.00352 0.0557** 0.107*** -0.0168 0.0205 0.00110 -0.0495** -0.0192
Each one of the clusters has a different pattern in their perception of crime and, in absolute terms, 
there are some crimes, such as extortion, that were seen as having increased according to 
perceptions in some clusters (see the descriptive statistics in Appendix 2 for more details). There 
were statistically significant increases in four categories of crimes in Cluster 17 and in three 
categories in Cluster 25. In Cluster 27, the perception of delinquency had the most statistically 
significant decline.
According to reports, progress on security at the regional level is in line with progress in the view 
of security services provided by the state through the police (increasing from 26% to 34%). 
However, there is a notable decline (from 81% to 51%) in how the armed forces’ security services 
are seen compared to baseline, as well as a slight reduction in the quality of service. Nevertheless, 
this is offset by how the service offered in the last two years is perceived, increasing from 34% to 
36%. The improvement in the perception of the security services offered by the police and the 
armed forces is notable with differences of 3pp and 11pp respectively. 
Figure 3.8. Trends in the perception of state security services
35%
26%
18%
81%
56%
34%
19%
34%
23%
51%
55%
36%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Police citizen security services exist
Police services are good or very good
Police services have improved over the past two years
Military forces services exist
Military forces services are good or very good
Military forces services have improved over the past two years
CELI baseline CELI midline
34 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
The positive perception services provided by the police is related to the progress in attention given 
to calls made by the respondents, which went from 49% unanswered calls reported at baseline to 
23% after the intervention, and service rated as "fast" went from 30% to 43%. This increase was 
substantial in the CELI municipalities, which went from 30% to 43%, compared to the control 
municipalities, which went from 29% to 25%. 
In the information gathered by fieldwork, the communities stated that, in general, the police 
presence in the region has risen: 
Right now security is super good ... everyone thinks that the war is entrenched here and that they kidnap us 
there and that there, well…, but no; so that’s why more than 1,000 tourists have been visiting our 
municipality; I think that if security wasn’t good no one would dare come here. ... there is military 
[presence] in almost all of the population centers. (Secretary of Government, La Macarena, Meta)
And they report a positive change in the security conditions: 
I say that now we live sort of in peace ... We eat our yucca feeling rather content ... the change that has 
been seen ... there are a lot of police, more than there were previously, a lot more, there is a lot of security 
... no one bothers you, everybody goes their own way and does what they have to do, and everyone is just 
what they are and that’s all, and they leave people alone. (Beneficiaries, Chaparral, Tolima) 
At the same time, the focus groups also show that trade is affected by issues related to market 
access, presence of IAGs, and quality of infrastructure: 
We don’t feel that the Government has done its job of giving the families of La Macarena a better life, 
because it doesn’t exist. At the moment, there is no stable economy in the municipality. Animal husbandry 
is the only thing available ... It’s not profitable. It only provides subsistence, and we have to transport
them to Bogota and ... and sometimes they buy them, sometimes they don’t. We have to pay taxes to the 
guerilla groups. We have to pay taxes to the whole world and, in the end, the one who earns the least is the 
small farmer. (Producer association, La Macarena, Meta)
Basically I would say that the problem lies in the distances, and that’s their excuse to lower the price of 
milk; that the roads..., that something went wrong with the car, so it is more difficult. (Beneficiary, 
Vistahermosa, Meta)
Illegal Crops and the Culture of Legality 
According to the survey results about the security/presence of illicit crops ratio, CELI Central did 
not report any changes in the perception (which remains at 7%) of households that reported the 
presence of illicit crops in their vereda. 
Like all the municipalities evaluated, those that are part of this region have been characterized by 
the presence of illicit crops and have been under the influence of illegal armed groups. This has 
been the target of all interventions intended to establish state presence. 
In general, the households surveyed did not perceive illicit crops as a variable that would represent 
damage to their family economy or social environment. As can be seen in figure 3.9, the question 
of whether coca negatively affects the families that cultivate it registered a drop of approximately 
20%. No significant impact of CELI can be seen in these results. (Figure 3.9) 
35 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 3.9. Trends in the perceptions with respect to illegal crops (agree or very strongly agree)
These figures that show the erosion of support for legality are unevenly distributed among the 
clusters in the Central region. Clusters 24, 27, and 28 showed a positive impact in these responses, 
meaning that respondents were more likely to agree or strongly agree with statements related to 
the culture of legality. Clusters 17, 25, and 26 revealed a negative impact. (Figure 3.10) 
Figure 3.10. Impacts on attitudes with respect to illegal crops (agree or very strongly agree)
Cluster: 16 17 18 24 25 26 27 28
Coca (poppy plants, marijuana) should 
not be grown because it is illegal 0.0460 -0.102** -0.0326 0.0560 -0.117*** -0.183*** 0,200*** 0.368***
Coca production (poppy, marijuana) 
affects the families who are cultivating it 
and the community negatively
0.0766 -0.102** -0.0577 0.0057 -0.176*** -0.228*** 0.269*** 0.326***
Cultivating coca is not the only way to 
guarantee a livelihood for a family that is 
raising that crop
0.198*** -0.144*** -0.12** 0.0314 -0.190*** -0.202*** 0,186*** 0.415***
My family and friends think that growing 
coca is bad 0.0461 -0.0520 0.0089 -0.0535 -0.176*** -0.113** 0.308*** 0.267***
Likewise, Clusters 18 and 27 registered a positive impact (13pp and 19pp respectively) on the 
question of whether they agree that there were no serious security problems in their veredas. 
Both the CELI and the control municipalities exhibit a lower tendency towards legality (Figure 
3.11). On the one hand, the answer indicating that neither the respondent (from 93% to 67%) nor 
the community (from 75% to 57%) act in accordance with the law increased. On the other, based 
on the answers, there is a stronger opinion that there are reasons that justify disobeying the law. 
The respondents in control municipalities showed the same or very similar results.
91%
92%
94%
92%
71%
72%
68%
73%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Coca (poppy, marijuana) should not be grown because it is
illegal
Coca production (poppy, marijuana) negatively affects
farming families and the community
Growing coca is not the only way to guarantee the survival of
families that grow it
My family and friends think that growing coca is bad
CELI baseline CELI midline
36 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 3.11. Trends in the inclination towards legality 
Based on what was reported in the qualitative information survey, the small farmers tied 
eradicating their illicit crops to receiving support for sustainable projects. However, the households 
stated that the producer associations help the small farmers replace illegal crops with legal ones: 
[The small farmers] are not refusing to eradicate coca, but are saying: Be careful, government people, 
because if you don’t offer us any sustainable productive projects that are sustainable over time, we can’t
devote ourselves to them and forget about coca. (Secretariat of Government, La Montañita, Caquetá)
[...] With all the support, not because it’s Colombia Responde or the Consolidation Unit, all the rubber 
and cacao has greatly helped communities to also look at other ways of producing, more than coca, leaving 
behind that “famous delusion” that without coca we can’t do anything and with coca we can make money. 
Actually, they have already realized that many times well-handled cacao, or well-handled rubber produces 
much more than coca itself. I have heard that a lot from small farmers. (Ombudsman's Office, La Montañita, 
Caquetá) 
In a post-conflict scenario, it is essential that the state support productive projects, improvement 
in the use of public servicesrequired for development, and reintegration programsfor the guerrillas 
that are eventually demobilized:
Achieving peace is what all Colombians dream of. But ... there is crime ... the state would have to start to 
strengthen its own programs, the ones it can offer these people, yes, because as long as, or rather it is that 
people have spent their lives on that, on the war itself, so they don’t know what to do, how to get ahead in 
life, ... I would say, reinforce the projects or companies so that they can provide an entry or the possibility 
for these people to do something. Also educational reinforcement, because if there is nothing to offer them 
then we will end up generating general crimes ... not everyone will hire a person who has been demobilized. 
(Secretariat of Government, La Macarena, Meta)
On the other hand, the improvement in perception that the IAGs affect municipal government 
performance (going from 5% to 22%) is noteworthy, although 33% perceive the effect to be 
negative (compared to 43% at baseline). The reason, apparently, is that the presence of these 
groups forces their activities to be better controlled and the perception of this goes from 68% to 
86%. However, the view that the presence of IAGs negatively affects the performance of local 
governments is mainly justified by the lack of effective access to public information (increasing 
from 49% to 64%). CELI does not have a significant effect on this phenomenon. (Figure 3.12) 
93%
75%
2%
2%
2%
3%
13%
16%
67%
57%
7%
7%
9%
10%
19%
23%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Always or almost always act in accordance with the law
The law coincides with the way the community acts
It is justified to disobey the law when…
Others have done it and they have done well
It is very profitable economically
It is relatively certain that you won't be punished
It is the only way to achieve your goals
To defend property
It is the only way to support your family
CELI baseline CELI midline
37 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 3.12. Trends in the perception of the effects of the IAGs 
Human rights, justice, and the legitimacy of the state
Regarding the violation of human rights, those surveyed indicated that there was a slight rise in 
the number of violations seen (5% to 8%), and guerrilla groups are seen to be the main party 
responsible (increasing from 36% to 39%), followed by the armed forces for which, in contrast, 
the perception has a downward trend (declining from 13% to 12%). 
There is a rise in the perception that criminal gangs (Bacrim) are responsible for violations, going 
from no violation at baseline to 4% at midline. The figure on the lack of response to claims filed 
against these violations is of concern, despite the progress compared to what was reported at 
baseline (from 47% to 41%). There was a significant impact on the decline of reported cases of 
rights violations of up to 6pp. (Figure 3.13) 
Figure 3.13. Trends in human rights violations 
In the focus groups, citizens state that the challenges are very difficult. In the La Macarena region, 
the perception of security in relation to the presence of illegal armed groups has improved even 
though they are still present in the region: 
There are still illegal crops... There are people who are still involved in that ... Security goes up and 
down. The UP, which was exterminated, was here, and there was marijuana. After the UP, the 
paramilitaries arrived. The guerrilla groups came after the paramilitaries and the demilitarized zone. The 
demilitarized zone was shut down, but the guerrilla groups and paramilitaries, army, police remained, and 
5%
36%
2%
0%
13%
7%
12%
28%
47%
8%
39%
3%
4%
12%
7%
4%
31%
41%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Families that have had their rights violated
Guerrillas are responsible for the violation
Paramilitares are responsible for the violation
Bacrim are responsible for the violation
The military is responsible for the violation
The police are responsible for the violation
National entities are responsible for the violation
The responsible party is unknown
There was no response to the rights violation
CELI baseline CELI midline
43%
5%
25%
33%
22%
15%
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
IAGs negatively affect the performance of the municipal
government
IAGs positively affect the performance of the municipal
government
IAGs do not affect the performance of the municipal
government
CELI midline CELI baseline
38 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
now we have guerrilla groups, paramilitaries ... ordinary criminals extorting the producers, for example, 
the dairy farmers have been ruined. (Government Secretariat, Vistahermosa, Meta) 
Well, now there is more confidence because previously one could not even talk to a mayor, with someone, 
one had to ... What was hidden, the groups did not allow anyone, if one came to speak with the mayor then 
you were a snitch. But now one can go out. One who needs to can go out and talk to him ... They would 
not even let us vote. (Beneficiary, Vistahermosa, Meta) 
Another factor that affects the security of the region is access to the formal justice system and other 
mechanisms the state has available. Those who stated that they had filed a complaint before the 
formal justice system at baseline dropped significantly at the midline assessment, declining from 
71% to 37%. Likewise, the perception of formal justice service as good or very good went from 
33% to 27%, which certainly gives leeway for groups outside the law to provide their own justice 
in these regions. (Figure 3.14) 
Figure 3.14. Trends in the mechanisms for gaining access to justice 
Despite efforts to improve access to the formal justice system, the communities say that although 
the armed conflict has declined, it has not disappeared. The number of victims continues to grow 
today: 
When the demilitarized zone was emptied here, there was a terrible attack in which 8 or 9 people from the 
urban area were killed. They were located there. I was not here, but it was terrible because they chased 
them. They were located and they were killed right there, right in front of their children, their families, I 
mean in 2001 ... This has diminished. I have helped – what – let’s say about 4 families, 5 families who are 
victims and come from the veredas ... Recently I received one that came from Caquetá. But no, it is not
that exaggerated either… that every day, that 20 arrive every day, and there is no way to help them. 
(Government Secretariat, La Macarena, Meta) 
Finally, compared to the baseline, the citizens surveyed perceived the state as less legitimate. This 
is explained by the difficulty in providing public services and exerting a presence in the region, 
which is still limited, though better than what it was a few years ago (Figure 3.15). This, of course, 
reduces the citizens’ confidence in the institutions, as was explained in the chapters on institutional 
and social development. 
71%
3%
6%
18%
18%
37%
7%
2%
8%
3%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%
Denounced before formal justice
Filed for legal guardianship
Petitioned a community leader
Petitioned the municipal ombudsman or the mayor
Petitioned the national government
CELI baseline CELI midline
39 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 3.15. Trends in the legitimacy of the state (agree or very strongly agree) 
The justice system figures prominently in the survey, as well as in the Consolidation Index, and, 
in a third source of data cited in this survey – EVIDINCE’s quarterly municipal data. In the survey, 
trust in the courts of justice did not receive a good score. As shown in the previous figure, only 
10% of those surveyed in this region feel that the courts guarantee a fair trial. The survey measures 
the perceptions of justice in Colombia while the Consolidation Index reports on the presence of 
the "judicial apparatus": formal, administrative judicial power, the Ombudsman’s office and the 
Public Defender’s Office and, where applicable, Amerindian jurisdiction. The resulting scores on 
the Consolidation Index averaged close to 79 points out of 100 in Caquetá, 86 in Meta, and 91 in 
Tolima.
The data from EVIDINCE's quarterly panel, which were collected by local people, measure the 
presence of judges and other officials at their places of work and how well they serve the citizens 
on a specific day. Figure 3.16 shows the data for all CELI municipalities (T1 in the table), and 
PNCRT (T2) and their controls (C1 and C2 respectively). 
Figure 3.16. Secondary data: Quarterly Data on assistance from authorities
Source: Data from EVIDINCE panel, authors’ calculations
13%
66%
23%
53%
58%
10%
41%
18%
31%
37%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
The courts guarantee a fair trial
I respect the political institutions of the country
Basic rights of the citizen are protected
I am proud to live under the country's political system
I believe that I should support the country's political system
CELI baseline CELI midline
40 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
The information on assistance to the public provided by authorities at their place of work shows 
considerable variation over the three years of data collection. The CELI municipalities showed a 
steadier growth trend, reaching on average 2.7 functionaries present, of the four functionaries 
whose activities were reviewed. PNCRT municipalities in the study (where CELI has no 
interventions) and their controls had more volatile data, and the control municipalities had 
consistently lower results regarding officials present and their service to the public. 
Peace process
CELI implementation occurred during the same time period that the peace negotiations with the 
FARC were being held in Havana. CELI Central’s intervention municipalities have been a FARC 
stronghold due to its presence and deep cultural roots. In some cases, such as in the municipalities 
of southern Tolima, this has been a result of their history as the cradle of the FARC. In the case of 
municipalities in Meta and Caquetá, it is because the demilitarized zone, where the FARC had 
absolute control, was established there during the government of President Pastrana. 
In the context of qualitative research, the respondents in Caguán affirm that they are involved in
the peace process, in which the communities were not consulted. They think that they were not 
considered in the peace negotiations that were recently concluded:
Just as there are many who are convinced [of peace] ... we are not prepared, at all ... because of lack of 
information for the communities. It is hoped that what happened during the demilitarized zone does not 
happen again. They came and brought the Public Defender’s Office to give a course on human rights and 
that was all ... They left the communities adrift. You know that at that time they removed the police and 
the army, the courts, the notary office, everything. There wasn’t any Prosecutor's Office so they left the 
community in the guerrilla group’s hands. They are afraid that concentration camps may be set up. 
(Government Secretariat, Vistahermosa, Meta)
These municipalities have historically lived together with the guerrilla groups. Thus, they know 
that they will have to live with them in the future. They need information on the implementation 
of the post-conflict process:
Almost everyone has been involved with the guerrilla groups. Now they are complaining – that 
concentration camps, no – but what if they have a relative there, you understand me. We also have to play 
our part, but yes, it would be good if the National Government would come and have more direct contact 
with the community and institutions on the post-conflict subject and give us some preparation. (Government 
Secretariat, Vistahermosa, Meta)
They emphasized the role that the component concerning truth telling must play to achieve true 
reconciliation:
We want to live in peace and, yes, we must forget the past. But we want them to tell us the truth, that I can 
know that this one beside me was the one who harmed me. That is what we want to know, so that I can 
have the ability that God gives one to forgive ... The truth, only the exact truth. (Victims’ Association, 
Vistahermosa, Meta)
41 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
CELI INTERVENTIONS IN THE 
CENTRAL REGION 
The CELI interventions included the following components to achieve the results proposed in the 
framework: 
• Provide help for productive activities that concentrate on agricultural value chains (such as 
technical assistance and training in cultivation, processing, and marketing) and on 
supporting young people's entrepreneurial initiatives by developing their skills in business 
and trade.
• Support training in planning, budgets, taxes, royalties, formulating and managing projects, 
and accountability to strengthen local and regional governments. 
• Provide assistance on issues of land ownership for communities and individuals, including 
formal land titles and private property rights, claims for restitution, regularization of the 
status of public lands, and dealing with the special rights reserved for ethnic groups. 
• Support infrastructure, provide assistance for building social goods (schools, highways, 
health clinics, improvement in sanitation and electricity), and productive infrastructure 
(such as improvements in processing plants, stores, and shopping centers). 
• Develop social capital and civil society by training and supporting JACs, producer 
associations, community councils in indigenous and Afro-Colombian areas. 
• Provide support for developing credit and financial institutions and programs in the 
selected areas.
CELI Central has met a high percentage of its goals in the three pillars as of the information cutoff 
date for the PMP. The most important achievements in terms of goals are in the economic 
development pillar (which has the most indicators), which to date has met 81% of the 
commitments. The other two pillars have met two-thirds of their goals. In what is left for program 
implementation, it is estimated that the red portions will be accomplished. This means that the 
goals for economic development will be 87% fulfilled; the social issues, 83%; and the institutional 
pillar, 100%. (Figure 4.1: an explanation of the calculations for the figure are found in Annex 3) 
42 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 4.1. CELI Performance: Fulfillment of the PMP benchmarks 
Economic development
CELI Central’s financial commitments, as they appear in the USAID/Colombia MONITOR 
database, are broken down by the source of funds (figure on the left) and by the type of intervention 
(figure on the right). The management of leveraging resources, especially state resources that the 
program achieved should be noted. This work will generate greater empowerment and 
sustainability for the initiatives once CELI closes out the year. Furthermore, close to half of the 
resources have been focused on institution building, which fosters development of local technical 
capacity to improve the provision of public services. 
Figure 4.2. CELI Performance: Commitments (in US$M) by source and type of project (approx. 
$211.5M) 
Source: MONITOR database, May 1-9, 2016
The CELI interventions are described in the subsections below. 
 Met or exceeded >85% of the goal Did not meet 
67%
33%
67%
16%
17%
Social (6 indicators) Institutional (6 indicators)
81%
6%
13%
Economic (16 
indicadores)
26%
7%
5%
47%
11%
4%
Small
infrastructure
Productive projects
Training
Institutional
development
Research
PPP-GDA
$58.007 
$12.844 
$122.264 
$17.093 $1.287 
USAID
Community
Public Sector
Private Sector
Other
43 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
Evaluation question: To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to regional integration 
and economic development?
Findings and conclusions
As mentioned above, the activities that propel the economy of the departments in the Central region 
differ due to geographical factors. The main economic category for southern Tolima is coffee in 
terms of acreage planted, employment generated, and contribution to exports. Special types of 
coffee, which still receive support from various programs, were positioned as the ones offering a 
possibility of added value and better income for the coffee farmer. The livestock sector is second 
in terms of strategic investment, with cattle production at close to 12% of the total in the entire 
department, in addition to the fishing sector. The agricultural sector, in turn, also includes the 
production of plantain, yucca, corn, sugarcane, and fruit trees. 
In the municipalities of La Montañita, Cartagena del Chairá, and San Vicente del Caguán in the 
Department of Caquetá, the economy is characterized by specialization in semi-extensive 
breeding, raising, and fattening of livestock for both milk and meat and the cultivation of rubber 
and cacao. Corn, rice, sugarcane, plantain, yucca, and coffee are common as well; exotic fruit such 
as arazá, cocona, copoazú, and maraco are grown for self-consumption. 
In the municipalities of Vistahermosa, Puerto Rico, Mesetas, San Juan de Arama, La Uribe, and 
La Macarena in the Department of Meta, economic activity is concentrated in the cultivation of 
palm trees, plantain, yucca, corn, fruit trees, sugarcane, and citrus crops, with variations of rubber, 
cacao and hibiscus flowers. Cattle, pigs, poultry, and fish are also raised. In addition, starting in 
2002, Meta's economy has developed a high degree of specialization in petroleum. This has 
stimulated GDP growth in the department and has also been an important factor in the changes 
that have been taking place in municipalities such as La Macarena and Uribe. However, because 
this is an enclave economy, it does not translate into a better quality of life for the citizens. Finally, 
in municipalities such as La Macarena, tourism related to Caño Cristales is being consolidated and 
is helping to overcome the stigma of insecurity that has affected the area. 
The focus groups stated the following on this topic: 
There are people that go to the different veredas just to go to Cristales. Before, nobody dared to go ... 
tourism is an indicator ... more than 1,000 tourists ... that means that we are already ok. It is also the 
perception that outsiders have, and it is very funny because I feel like the perception foreigners have is 
much better than that of people from other cities. (Government Secretariat, La Macarena, Meta)
Direct beneficiaries
Compared to the baseline, the direct beneficiaries in the Central region are about 7pp more likely 
than the general population to say that their economic situation is good or very good, and they 
are less likely to be victims of famine (7pp positive impact) or extreme poverty (9pp positive 
impact). According to the survey, fewer beneficiaries were left without food the week before due 
to lack of money (5.5pp positive impact), or were afraid they would be left without food for lack 
of money (8.5pp positive impact). They also had a higher income than their non-beneficiary 
44 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
peers as measured by the income proxy of average monthly expenditure. The increase in average 
monthly income was approximately 60,000 COP or about $21.50 USD, using an exchange rate 
of 2,800 COP per dollar. 
 
At the same time, the direct beneficiaries of CELI Central had mixed opinions about their 
regions’ economic challenges. While the perception of low income improved about 6.5pp from 
the baseline, 4.5pp more say that unemployment or the lack of opportunities are problems in 
their communities, and more than 3pp say that illegal crops are a more attractive option than at 
baseline.
 
The direct beneficiaries in the Central Region reported more sales to middlemen or wholesalers 
in comparison to the baseline as well as to their non-participating neighbors (from 6 to 10 pp 
positive impact since the beginning of the study). In general, the problems seen by the 
beneficiaries at baseline largely declined according to the intermediate measurement. Abuse by
middlemen decreased by 6.5pp, receiving low prices for their products declined 8.4pp, the 
perception of high transportation costs fell 10.5pp, the perception of poor soil quality declined 
10pp, the perceptions of a lack of water decreased 11.5pp, interference from armed groups 
declined 4 percentage points, and the lack of credit dropped 8pp. 
 
The direct beneficiaries of CELI Central generally report very positive results with respect to 
associating with other producers on their productive projects with special appreciation for 
working together to sell their products (5.5pp positive impact) and receiving training (between 4 
and 14pp positive impact). One inconsistency is that these beneficiaries do not refer to the 
benefits of joining associations in particular, although they say they are doing it more and more. 
Global survey: Perceptions of economic conditions
When the data from the respondents were analyzed, 18% stated that the economic situation in the 
places where they live is good or very good, compared to 25% of respondents reporting the same 
situation at baseline. However, since there is a greater decline in the control groups, there was a 
positive impact of almost 14pp in the CELI municipalities.
In addition, the survey reported that there is significant progress in the perception of those 
households that claim that legal productive work is profitable. Only 5% believe that these activities 
do not lead to positive outcomes, compared to 85% at baseline. An improvement in household 
perception of access to work opportunities and the resulting increase in employment is reported.
(Figure 5.1) 
45 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 5.1. Trends in the indicators on the economic situation
CELI’s impact on these questions as well as on the perception of the productive projects’ 
profitability is positive, with an impact of 11pp. (Figure 5.2) 
Figure 5.2. Impact on the economic situation of households
Variable Impact
CELI vs. Control
The economic situation for the place where I am living is good or very good 0.137*
Unemployment or the lack of opportunities is a serious problem here -0.0185
People earn very little for the productive work they do -0.107**
One of the few attractive, productive options is illegal activities -0.00663
In cluster analysis, there are negative impacts on how those surveyed saw the economic situation. 
In Clusters 18, 24, 25, and 27, the negative impact fluctuates between 10 and 45pp. Only Cluster 
28 shows a significant positive impact of 14pp as shown in Figure 5.3. 
Figure 5.3. Impacts on the perception of the economic situation 
Cluster: 16 17 18 24 25 26 27 28
The economic 
situation for the place 
where I am living is 
good or very good
-0.0629 0.0463 -0.103** -0.20*** -
0.390*** -0.0483 -0.45*** 0.141**
Unemployment or the 
lack of opportunities is 
a serious problem 
here
0.308*** -0.132** -0.109** 0.111** -0.0312 -0.14*** -0.115** 0.327***
People earn very little 
for the productive 
work they do
-0.08*** 0,097*** 0.239*** 0.289*** -0.0143 0.129*** 0.153*** -0.00633
One of the few 
attractive, productive 
options is illegal 
activities
-0.0111 -0.0147 -0.16*** -0.09*** -0.0322 -0.12*** -0.0233 0.172***
For the rest of the questions in the figure, the numbers for negative (and significant) impact show 
that the situation has improved. In the majority of the cases, there is a decrease in the percentage 
of those surveyed who thought that unemployment and lack of opportunities were serious 
problems, or that illegal activities were one of the few attractive productive options. Cluster 28 is 
25%
86%
85%
5%
18%
68%
5%
2%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
The economic situation where you reside is good or very
good
Unemployment/Lack of opportunity
Productive activities make very little money
One of the few attractive productive options are illegal
activities
CELI baseline CELI midline
46 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
an exception in both cases. However, a negative impact was found in the responses that confirmed 
that productive activities produce little money in four of the eight clusters. 
The results of the survey showed that the perception that their families “were suffering from 
hunger” had risen 18 points in spite of the fact that they simultaneously showed less concern about 
the urgent lack of food due to lack of money. There is a noticeable increase (23% to 64%) in the 
number of households who believe that their families are living in extreme poverty (Figure 5.4) 
and just like in the rest of the CELI and PNCRT regions and controls, views on food security have
gotten worse. In that regard, and due to the fact that the responses in the control municipalities 
were worse, the conclusion can be drawn that CELI Central had a 15pp positive impact in that the 
conditions in their area of influence are less difficult than in the control municipalities. In other 
words, the households in these regions of influence would have suffered even more without CELI 
Central’s intervention. 
Figure 5.4. Trends in the perception of food security 
Per cluster, the results were concerning, since the reports from five clusters showed significant 
rises in the perception that families are suffering from hunger. Four report significant increases in 
extreme poverty, and three reported worried about not having food within the last week (Figure 
5.5). Only Cluster 28 reports a difference in these trends and, in contrast, shows a 13pp 
improvement on the question of whether their families are suffering from hunger. 
Figure 5.5. Impacts on the perception of and experiences with food security 
Cluster: 16 17 18 24 25 26 27 28
The family is suffering from 
hunger -0.0014 0.121** 0.112** 0.195*** 0.140*** 0.0911** -0.0469 -0.13***
The living conditions are those of 
extreme poverty
0.302*** 0.421*** 0.170*** 0.0616 0.0535 0.0619 0.104** 0.0604
Was worried that food would 
run out within the past week due 
to lack of money 
0.453*** 0.0570 -0.0368 0.00723 -0.0470 0.0521 0.00958 0.0610
At some point in the past week, 
food ran out due to lack of 
money
-0.0341 -0.0014 0.0150 -0,007 0.267*** 0.132*** -0.0724 -0.0542
Income for those surveyed in the Central region measured by their estimated monthly expenditures 
rose 10% on average from COP 451,601 at baseline, to COP 498,240 at midline (USD$161 to 
USD$178). This finding cannot be attributed to CELI intervention since a greater increase in 
7%
23%
66%
20%
25%
64%
57%
23%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
The family is going hungry
The family lives in conditions of extreme poverty
Over the last week, worry about food insecurity
because of lack of money
Over the last week, there was no food because of lack
of money
CELI baseline CELI midline
47 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
income was registered in the control municipalities. The differences were significant and negative 
in Clusters 25 and 26. The impacts are shown below in Figure 5.6. 
Figure 5.6. Impacts on income 
Cluster: 16 17 18 24 25 26 27 28
Income proxy 
(estimated household 
monthly expenditures)
-50.832 48.800 39.995 35.647 -113.399*** -175.010** -74.625 51.362
In absolute terms, all of the clusters, except for 26, showed a 10% to 20% increase in income, but 
the control municipalities had equal or better increases in each case. Therefore, no impact was 
found in the rest of the clusters. 
In order to understand respondents’ expectations, the survey posed a series of questions about the 
future. The general trend reveals a rise in optimism throughout the sample. However, some control 
municipalities were even more positive, which gave the intervention a negative or null impact. In 
general, Clusters 16, 27, and 28 were much more positive than at baseline and more positive than 
their control municipalities yielding multiple positive impacts in these regions. (Figure 5.7)
Figure 5.7. Impacts on expectations for the future 
Cluster: 16 17 18 24 25 26 27 28
Do you believe that your living 
conditions might possibly improve 
in the next few years?
0.120** 0.0555 0.0261 0.0341 0.0106 0.00248 0.0971** 0.0853*
Do you believe that the income 
your household receives from the 
legal activities you are going to 
carry out will improve?
0.141*** 0.0708 0.157*** 0.0444* -0.0761 0.0694 0.0642 0.127***
In the next two years, do you 
expect the economic situation for 
the people in your vereda or 
township to improve?
0.146*** 0.0694 -0.0151 -0.033* -0.122*** -0.0083 0.0938** 0.184***
Will your housing conditions 
improve? 0.0983** 0.0723 0.0314 0.0311 -0.139*** 0.0200 0.163*** 0.0407
Are you thinking about making 
investments that will be key two 
years from now for the productive 
activity of your household’s 
business?
0.120** 0.0555 0.0261 0.0341 0.0106 0.00248 0.0971** 0.0853*
Clusters 17 and 26 are notable for their lack of significant changes with respect to their control 
groups, and Cluster 25 is notable for the more negative impact on questions about expectations.
The Consolidation Index, in contrast, measures economic growth in the Consolidation regions by 
two indicators: presence of financial services and number of hectares cultivated. Regarding the 
first one, the department that lagged the most in the first measurement was Caquetá, but it showed 
a growth trend in the years following the baseline, although it did not reach Tolima’s growth level, 
which saw an overall growth of 30%. Meta, in turn, showed a drop last year that went dipped to 
levels below the baseline measurement. Both low population density and vast distances affect Meta 
and Caquetá. Granada, the municipality in Meta where financial activity is concentrated, is not 
part of the intervention nor of the Consolidation policy. With respect to the number of hectares 
48 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
with licit crops, Meta and Caquetá have shown a sustainable growth trend since the second year. 
In Tolima, which is more agricultural than the other departments, there were significant levels in 
the Year 1 measurement, but this declined in Year 3 and recovered, but not to the original level, in 
Year 4. (Figure 5.8) 
Figure 5.8. Secondary data: financial entities (left) and cultivated hectares (right)
 Source: Consolidation Index, authors’ calculations
Results from the focus groups, the economic situation relative to the baseline, the fall in the price 
of coffee in foreign markets, and weather phenomena (El Niño in particular) all contribute to 
perceptions of the causes of the decline in the number of hectares planted in Tolima. The existence 
of an impact derived from CELI is not explicit:
There are no avocados, coffee in November maybe and if so ... they are also waiting for rain ... This is a 
hard time for people in the country ... The milk is also drying up, and the pastures ... even the sugarcane 
is drying up, so at this time all the crops are dying. On my farm, the water has dried up now, I can’t grind 
because without water one can’t do anything. (Direct beneficiaries, Chaparral, Tolima) 
This situation, they say, arises because many of the crops are late-yielding ones such as those 
supported by Colombia Responde, with support based on providing sustainable productive projects 
with technical assistance. Even so, the people are optimistic: 
I would say that [the economic situation] is just ok because what Colombia Responde has given us has not 
produced anything yet, they are long-term. So, we still have to work and save from what we have in order 
to sustain it ... As long as there is fruit, it still takes time, because we are now in the process of sustaining 
the crops ... That’s the hope and, of course, improving employment there. That is where everything is. 
That's where people are on the move, money works, the workers, the merchant ... not having sustenance ... 
everyone is still, but we have hope. (Direct beneficiaries, La Montañita, Caquetá) 
Conclusion 1: The economic situation for the average family is getting worse, although the 
effects on CELI’s direct participants are positive. These effects may vary by cluster. The
perception of living in extreme poverty rose but this was offset by the perception of increased 
employment and that of the improvement in the profitability of productive activities. In the case 
of household income, there were many differences by cluster such as the case of Clusters 25 and 
26. 
19,5
49,3
31,0
29,6
46,2
62,0
0,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
90,0
100,0
2011 2012 2013 2014
Caquetá Meta Tolima
19,4
50,0
29,4
58,3
80,6
75,0
0,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
90,0
100,0
2011 2012 2013 2014
Caquetá Meta Tolima
49 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Positive effects due to CELI were seen in the analysis thanks to the technical assistance for 
productive projects in which families sought to apply technology to labor in order to develop better 
productivity. Another goal of CELI’s support is to foster associations to bring about financing of 
productive projects. 
Support for productive projects
The priorities established for CELI workers changed from an approach towards strengthening the 
state's presence to reinforcing agricultural production, rural value chains, and mobilizing public 
services. This change in orientation is evident, as was mentioned at the beginning of this document, 
in the relocation of CELI workers from CDCS DO 1 “Civil government presence in the 
consolidated CSDI areas” to their current location in DO 3 “Conditions for an improved, inclusive 
rural economic growth.” In that regard, based on the new definition of the CDCS Development 
Objectives, it has been a priority to work with producer associations as a guide to help them reach 
those objectives. 
Thus, at the beginning, CELI Central developed activities based on a traditional view of alternative 
development, in which they even provided supplies for the first associations with which they 
worked. With the change in strategy, CELI focuses on reinforcing the formation of associations 
and building alliances with national, regional and local state entities such as Autonomous Regional 
Corporations (CAR in Spanish), municipal governments and governor’s offices, and with the 
private sector to improve the quality and price of products, strengthen producer associations’ 
organizational capacities, and develop more robust infrastructure for specific projects (e.g., 
refrigeration chain for dairy products in Meta). 
Training for producer associations encompassed a broad range of topics including improvement 
of agricultural production, which is done through technical assistance to reinforce the entire chain 
of production, the introduction of new crops, innovation in organizational management, marketing, 
and sales and training for young people so that knowledge and resources are passed on to younger 
generations. Specific cases of this work can be found in the coffee projects in southern Tolima, 
animal husbandry in Meta, and rubber in Meta and Caquetá. 
As mentioned, one of CELI’s most important objectives is to reinforce or increase the formation 
of associations. It has already been noted that those surveyed perceive that this work generates 
benefits for their families. According to the reported data, the reasons behind the formation of 
associations have to do with generating better conditions for purchasing supplies, generating 
economies of scale for transportation, gaining access to community training and to financing, and 
improving marketing. Compared to baseline, the reasons for joining fast-growing associations are 
training (increasing from 11% to 22%) and the search for financing (increasing from 9% to 19%). 
However, when the performance of these variables in the control groups is observed, this positive 
change cannot be attributed to CELI interventions. (Figure 5.9) 
50 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 5.9. Trends in reasons for joining associations 
The collection of qualitative data revealed that the direct beneficiaries appreciate the support 
received and feel empowered to face the future. In the case of late-yielding crops, they understand 
the financial difficulties related to supporting their families until harvest comes, but even so, they 
are willing to plant these crops:
[Rubber begins to yield] after 6 years, 7 years. At the moment, what people are doing is sowing the corn, 
interspersing rubber trees ... with that they support themselves and buy the supplies for the rubber crops 
the next year ... The project included the delivery of supplies for just one year. So for the second, the third, 
the fourth, the fifth, until the trees produce rubber, up to the sixth year, the producer must buy supplies 
using income from the corn crops or using his own resources. 
With great pride, with a lot of gratitude, I’ve been able to highlight the work done by the Colombia 
Responde program. Actually, the program gave these two projects [rubber and animal husbandry] more 
than what the Ministry [of Agriculture] itself gave them. The resources that were allocated were perhaps 
not for purchasing supplies ... They were for everything that had to do with managing the project, that 
means, a year of technical assistance paid for by Colombia Responde resources. (Producer Association 
Leader, La Macarena, Meta) 
Conclusion 2: CELI’s productive projects show evidence of economic changes for families 
and households. The beneficiaries are grateful for the technical assistance provided by CELI, the 
National Learning Service (SENA in Spanish), and by other governmental institutions since this 
knowledge will result in more capital for them. However, those interviewed and surveyed have 
major concerns regarding food security in the short and medium term, in particular when it comes 
to late-yielding crops.
Markets and marketing
The work CELI Central has done to attract the private sector and incorporate it into the value 
chains is notable. With respect to rubber production in Caquetá and coffee in southern Tolima, 
important lessons have been learned in establishing win-win arrangements between producers and 
the market. In Caquetá, for example, the alliance between 1,100 rubber tappers from 16 municipal 
committees and an international buyer succeeded in getting the quality certification needed to 
export their product. The alliance established in the coffee chain linked nine productive 
associations with specialized services to profile their products. Training programs in coffee tasting 
were set up as well as models of organizational reinforcement for marketing with high standards 
and access to special niches in international markets. The experiences of these chains in the private 
6%
6%
9%
9%
11%
14%
9%
6%
9%
8%
15%
15%
22%
21%
19%
11%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Purchase of inputs
Processing products
Selling products
Transporting products
Joint learning
Group representation
Presenting products that are searching for financing
Applying for credit
CELI baseline CELI midline
51 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
sector were extended to other products, regions, and markets to help producers to be partners in 
the process, add value, and earn higher incomes. 
Based on survey responses, the most preferred channels for marketing products are direct sales at 
the municipal capitals (55%) and sales through middlemen (49%), which has fallen in preference 
with respect to other channels compared to the baseline. Even when the tendency to sell in the 
market plazas grew with respect to the baseline, their limited use compared to other channels is 
notable when they have historically been the centers for selling the typical food items in the great 
majority of the municipalities around the country. (Figure 5.10) 
Figure 5.10. Trends in marketing channels for small-farm products
When asked about the places where the inhabitants go to buy their products, the municipal capital 
is still most preferred, followed by the nearest populated centers. This variable has increased in 
comparison to the baseline. In addition, the tendency to buy products in their own vereda or nearby 
veredas as well as in other municipalities has dropped. This may be related to issues of accessibility 
and road infrastructure. See the following figure.
Figure 5.11. Trends in purchasing channels 
The results of the study, in relation to the information gathered in the focus groups, show that the 
issues related to high prices of supplies, low sale prices for harvests, the perception of abuse on 
the part of middlemen in fixing prices, and the high cost of transportation still persist. The lack of 
water, due to environmental phenomena, was a high incidence factor. A positive effect on gaining 
access to loans was evident: 
[The problem] is not so much about the supplies, but rather that they buy at fair prices ... A load of coffee 
is worth more than the costs. Imagine that... and how much back-breaking work do you have to do to get 
11%
22%
52%
11%
5%
60%
20%
0%
6%
9%
7%
27%
55%
7%
4%
49%
20%
2%
16%
13%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%
On the farm
In the closest population center
In the municipal capital
In the vereda or in neighboring veredas
Outside of the municipality
To intermediaries
To cooperatives or guilds
To the public on market days
To the public on the market plaza
To the public in general
CELI baseline CELI midline
1%
24%
61%
9%
5%
2%
30%
61%
5%
2%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
To street vendors who come to the vereda
In the closest population center
In the municipal capital
In the vereda or in neighboring veredas
Outside of the municipality
CELI baseline CELI midline
52 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
the crop. The serious problem we small farmers have is the middlemen. The middleman is the one who 
gains by the sweat of our brows. So that is what the government has to control. (Beneficiaries, Chaparral, 
Tolima) 
An additional problem that those surveyed have identified is the presence of IAGs, which has 
increased compared to the baseline. In the control groups, this variable shows a slight decrease 
(from 7% to 6%). (Figure 5.12) 
Figure 5.12. Trends in problems with production and marketing their goods
When the results for the CELI municipalities and the people in the control groups are compared, 
positive trends from the interventions are identified in product prices, cost of transportation, quality 
of the soil, and access to credit (Figure 5.13). There are persistent problems in the cost of supplies, 
abuse by middlemen, lack of water, and interference from IAGs. In the control municipalities, 
problems such as the high cost of transportation and the poor soil quality are noted. 
Figure 5.13. Trends in production and sales problems compared to controls
CELI Control
Very high costs for supplies
Abuse by the middlemen
Very low prices for products
Very high transportation costs
Poor soil quality
Lack of water
Interference from illegal armed groups
Ban on coca
Lack of access to credit
Conclusion 3: Technical assistance and support for merchandising help to counteract the 
problems related to the low profitability. Even if the productive projects receiving help from 
CELI have recovered their levels of profitability, they still need to open up new markets, reduce 
costs – especially transportation – and improve productivity to get sales prices that are above 
production costs. Productive projects counteract the incentives to cultivate illegal crops but, in the
context of inadequate markets, pressure from armed groups, and the persistent lack of access roads, 
it is difficult for programs and policies to have the desired effects. The historical presence of these 
structural problems, which are ultimately the responsibility of the GOC and the state’s absence for 
80%
56%
88%
61%
28%
21%
9%
6%
25%
84%
62%
73%
60%
26%
38%
13%
4%
10%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
The high costs of inputs
Abuse by intermediaries
Product prices are very low
Transport costs are very high
The poor soil quality
The lack of water
The interference of illegal armed groups
The prohibition of coca
The lack of access to credit
CELI baseline CELI midline
53 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
decades, make it very unlikely that programs like CELI or even PNCRT itself will produce 
sustainable effects. 
Conclusion 4: Markets in the consolidation territories continue to be local and regional. As 
a share of the sales, markets in territories that are being consolidated continue to be local and 
regional. The export markets are still limited. Small producers are affected by the high costs of 
marketing that small, slightly developed, and non-specialized markets are characterized by. In this 
case, the transaction costs are very high and the communities remain trapped in a vicious cycle 
where there is little incentive to increase production and, at the same time, the rise in production 
generated by external markets clashes with the rigidity of the local market and lack of preparation 
to export to other regions. 
Conclusion 5: Abuse by middlemen continues to be a critical issue in this region due to the 
inadequacy of the market, the producers’ limited ability to negotiate, and poor marketing channels. 
Savings, credit, and financial services
In order to strengthen access to financial services and loans for small farmers and producer 
associations, etc., Local Savings and Loan Groups (GLACs) were created which support the 
development of rotating funds to productive associations and offer technical assistance to expand 
capacity with information and financial tools. CELI Central has supported 14 productive 
associations in Tolima, Caquetá, Meta, and Cauca using more than USD$600,000 to strengthen 
the management of the rotating funds, encourage the use of financial tools, and improve 
information management for accountability. CELI Central has made alliances with national 
financial institutions such as Bancolombia, Banco Agrario, Banca de Oportunidades, and 
Colpensiones to expand services like mobile banking, create more than 100 savings plans, and 
support and train 12 associations to handle loan applications for FINAGRO, among others. 
Regarding banking, CELI has helped almost 8,000 individuals to access financial products or 
services. 
However, the survey findings show a decline in the number of households that report having a 
savings account, although the use of banks and non-bank correspondents (e.g., stores or retailers) 
for paying public utilities has risen.
Although the number of families that report having a current loan rose, the number of households 
reporting that they have requested one at some point has decreased. No significant impact derived 
from access to loans and banking services for the families’ economic development has been 
reported. (Figure 5.14) 
54 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 5.14. Trends in the use of banks (banking) and access to credit
At the cluster level, several of these measurements show an impact, as can be seen in Figure 5.15:
Figure 5.15. Impacts on the use of financial services and products 
Cluster: 16 17 18 24 25 26 27 28
They have a savings account 0.160*** -0.23*** 0.122** 0.0360 -0.0170 0.0962 -0.0947 0.0913
They have a checking account -0.101** -0.11*** -0.0437 -0.025** 0.0466* 0.0262 -0.0539* -0.0275
They have paid for public 
utilities at banks or at non￾bank correspondents
0.298*** -0.26*** -0.36*** 0.0525** -0.17*** 0.228*** -0.0325 0.258***
They have asked a bank, 
financial institution, 
cooperative, or an NGO for a 
loan 
0.0341 -0.0833 0.0208 -0.00681 0.0108 0.0813 0.0166 0.129**
They currently have a loan 
from a bank, cooperative, or 
NGO
-0.0156 0.195*** 0.103 0.144*** -0.102 0.233** -0.00697 -0.120
They have debts -0.0288 -0.22*** -0.133** -0.00912 -0.0706 0.150** 0.0353 -0.0683
If the analysis is run by cluster, there is a 16pp increase in Cluster 16 and 12pp increase in Cluster 
18 in the indicator that measures whether the people have savings accounts. In Cluster 17, in 
contrast, the indicator declined by 17pp. Three clusters registered a decline in the number of 
checking accounts, which represents a small percentage of the respondents. The results were 
positive in four clusters regarding respondents using banking and non-banking entities to make 
utility payments, but the results were negative for three others. It is probable that banking services 
and payment options are not the same in all municipalities. Debt has fallen significantly in Clusters 
17 and 18, and only Cluster 28 showed an increase in the number of loan applications. 
When the results from the focus groups were reviewed, the participants stated that associating is 
important to guarantee access to loans: 
These are just regular loans. What happens is that one as an association ... one feels that the association is 
recommending that person ... If he does not pay well then you don’t recommend him, you don’t certify him. 
So out of 50, 60 partners, you can find 20 who are very diligent. Then with that certification, they do not 
need a cosigner ... everything is done through the Banco Agrario. (Community Leader, Vistahermosa, 
Meta)
However, indebtedness and payment of obligations is critical, according to some respondents: 
51%
5%
31%
51%
73%
71%
37%
11%
46%
49%
78%
61%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
Have a savings account
Have a checking account
Have made public service payments in banks or non-bank…
Have applied for credit in a bank, financial entity cooperative…
Have current credit in a bank, financial entity cooperative or NGO
Have debt
CELI baseline CELI midline
55 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
I got five million and paid back two and a half million. But then they go back and do the paperwork again 
and then you have to pay the 5 million again. So, what is the benefit ... it is of no help, there is no benefit 
... And they reduce it too. they do not give you 5 million, but instead, they give you 4 million, 7 hundred, 
so they take away 300 or 400. And the interest kicks in at that time when they approve the loan. They 
charge it at 10% or 11% and the paperwork is added with more interest on top. (Group of Beneficiaries, 
Chaparral, Tolima) 
When asking about informal loans, it is striking that there were no statements about this like there 
are in other parts of the country. 
Conclusion 6: The use of banking services and formal loans has fallen in both CELI zones 
and control municipalities. Loans from rotating funds and GLACs are also important alternatives 
to informal loans because of their significant links to associations and increased confidence. 
Transportation and infrastructure 
In general, the road conditions in rural areas around the country are very poor. According to the 
latest report on the tertiary roads in the Central region (July 2016), the conditions of 987 kilometers 
have improved and become passable, but there are still 125 kilometers to be improved in 2016. 
The results of the survey show that the perception of the road network within and between 
municipalities has improved with respect to the baseline, although scores are still low (see the 
following figure). 
Figure 5.16. Trends in the perception of roads
The Consolidation Index, in turn, measures the road situation in the Consolidation areas by means 
of two indicators in the connectedness component of the Regional Integration pillar. These results 
are provided in Figure 5.17. 
14%
26%
18%
29%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
The network of roads connecting the place where you live
with the rest of the municipality is good or very good
The network of roads connecting your municipality to
other municipalities is good or very good
CELI baseline CELI midline
56 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 5.17. Secondary data: Trends in the perception of roads
 
Source: Consolidation Index data, authors’ calculations
The first indicator measured the percentage of the main population centers in the municipality that 
are connected (by road, river or sea) to the municipal capital throughout the whole year. The overall 
score is very high, 100% in Tolima and around 90% in the other two regions, but far from 
perceptions of respondents in rural areas. The second indicator makes it possible to know whether 
there are paved roads from the municipality to a main city. The indicator showed that there were 
more paved roads in the three departments in 2014, although Caquetá showed a significant 
decrease in 2013. 
CELI Central has done important work for roads by means of targeted interventions to improve 
sections that are impassable at some periods of the year. CELI worked with the people and with 
the JACs to determine which parts of the roads should be prioritized for repairs and then hired the 
JACs to supply local labor. Since the project started, approximately USD$5 million has been 
invested in road improvements. 
Respondents recognize that interventions regarding roads improves the profitability of the 
products: 
We did [have road improvement]. The opening of the road, that was a benefit for us ... [before] we barely 
got a single car through. There was no way to reach the market since the one who got there said: - I’ll pay 
for the milk at 500 and if you want to sell it to me, fine, if not, fine too – because he was the only one ... 
right now they are paying us $780. So look, there is a change because income rises. (Beneficiary, La 
Montañita, Caquetá) 
The biggest impact ... has been the roads since here, the roads are damaged so badly by the rain. So they 
have made a good investment together with the municipal government in terms of roads. (Government 
Secretariat, La Montañita, Caquetá) 
Just by arriving on my little motorcycle, just by being able to take my small bag of potatoes out, a small 
bag of plantains, well, just that paving they did is really a lot of help. (Ombudsman's Office, La Montañita, 
Caquetá) 
87,9
75,2
51,9
92,2
100,0 100,0
0,0
20,0
40,0
60,0
80,0
100,0
2011 2012 2013 2014
Caquetá Meta Tolima
100,0
100,0
66,7
81,2
50,0
0,0
20,0
40,0
60,0
80,0
100,0
2011 2012 2013 2014
Caquetá Meta Tolima
57 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Conclusion 7: Road infrastructure is an unresolved issue. Access to markets is affected by the 
scarcity or poor condition of tertiary roads. This phenomenon affects the costs of production, the 
price of products and, therefore, the profitability of the productive projects. CELI has intervened 
in some of the roads the community has prioritized, and they, through the JACs, have provided 
support for improving them. 
Land 
One of CELI’s lines of action is, along with other objectives, supporting small farmers and 
displaced families by implementing processes associated with land ownership in order to 
encourage a return to land that was abandoned during the armed conflict. The main obstacle in 
these areas has been the weakness of the government, especially INCODER. The challenges for 
restoring the land ownership rights or for compensating victims are enormous. 
Regarding land restitution, CELI Central gave special support to reinforcing the institutional 
capacity of the Land Restitution Unit (URT in Spanish) through arbitration experts in 2014. With 
respect to giving titles to vacant lands, they supplied INCODER with technical assistance between 
2012 and 2014 to improve the topographic survey and real estate appraisal processes. In spite of 
the fact that the Cauca municipalities are not part of the CELI sample, it should be noted that 
thanks to Colombia Responde’s support, INCODER bought 107 plots of land (a total of 8,267 
hectares) to resolve departmental land disputes and distributed them as follows: 
• Cauca Amerindian Regional Council, 52 plots 
• Amerindian Authorities of Colombia, 2 plots 
• Norte del Cauca Association of Amerindian Cabildos, 1 plot 
• Small farmers, 36 plots 
• Afro-Colombians, 16 plots 
Apart from institutional support, CELI has helped communities and organizations to certify land 
titles. They helped families build their legal cases to ask for restitution of their land. They helped 
civil society organizations (JACs, producer associations and women’s associations) to understand 
the land registration process and get their land titled, and they held workshops on the restitution 
and titling process with producer associations in Norte del Cauca and Sur del Valle, where small 
farmers usually have informal ownership.
In both the baseline and midline surveys, results show that small farmers who have a plot of land 
to work mostly focus on agricultural output, although this decreased from 79% to 69% between 
the two measurement periods. 
There is a decrease in the number of respondents who report that they work land without a title, 
which supports the evidence showing that more respondents overall report that they have property 
titles. Nevertheless, there are still challenges to receiving formal titles for half of the respondents. 
When the results of the survey about the methods used to acquire land are reviewed, purchase-sale 
is still the most used method (in more than 70% of cases), followed by cases of inheritance (23%). 
There are no significant changes between what was reported at baseline and after the CELI 
intervention. 
58 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Despite the weak results in issuing formal titles, there is an upward trend in families who pay taxes 
and their willingness to pay because it is an obligation for citizens. These opinions are stable 
between the baseline and in this evaluation. (Figure 5.18) 
Figure 5.18. Trends in reasons for paying or being willing to pay property taxes 
With a 28% increase between baseline and midline, the reason why the few individuals who said 
they were not willing to pay property tax would not pay is that the productive agricultural projects 
were not profitable enough. (Figure 5.19) 
Figure 5.19. Trends in reasons for not paying taxes on property
Moreover, the Consolidation Index reported results that allow us to conclude that there is variable 
performance in each region with regard to overcoming land issues, at least since the first data 
collection was completed in 2011. The zoning process has been very slow in the department of 
Meta over the last four years. However, Caquetá and Tolima made significant progress in this area, 
so much so that the latter already has two municipalities micro-targeted in preparation for land 
restitution.
The process of getting property titles is critical for respondents, according to information gathered 
from focus groups discussions. Although performance is perceived as better in urban areas, the 
greatest challenge is concentrated in the rural ones in terms of restitution, legal titles for property, 
and transference of titles from the municipality to the owners. This transfer, although feasible, 
requires special oversight. This process is affected by fear of threats, which means that people 
sometimes prefer to lose the land rather than start the registration process. Policies should be 
implemented by the agricultural sector as well as the state to ensure the citizens’ safety. Serious 
security problems are still reported in these regions: 
Many times people do not have any documents, as such, they are just settlers. So what you can do is help 
them to get a document, so that they can do what they call "the improvements" on that property. And they 
43%
95%
64%
10%
9%
14%
51%
95%
69%
12%
6%
13%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Have paid in the last two years
Open to paying
It is the obligation of the citizen
The government should have resources for public works
If you don't pay then your property can be taken
To legalize the property
CELI baseline CELI midline
8%
0%
6%
21%
6%
4%
4%
49%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%
No one does it anymore
I don't pay because I don´t trust the government to manage
the funds
I don't pay because rich people should pay instead
I don't pay because farming doesn't provide me with enough
money to pay taxes
CELI baseline CELI midline
59 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
can also have that document in hand so that they can make progress, or start the registration to get their 
own deed. (Ombudsman's Office, Vistahermosa, Meta)
This is an area where everyone came and grabbed their plot of land ... It is a fairly serious problem, and 
perhaps Colombia Responde tried to do its job, and it did it at the right time. (Government Secretariat, 
Vistahermosa, Meta)
As far as I know, nothing has been done to issue legal titles to land here ... These are plots of property that 
people squatted on back then and they have not yet gotten legal title. Because, since the owners are asking 
for restitution of their land, whether or not they will get legal title to the lands is not exactly known until 
they negotiate... A project is being implemented to grant deeds to the people who live there because the 
land belongs to the municipality. (Government Secretariat, La Montañita, Caquetá) 
One hears that they often would rather lose the land and ignore the problem than file a complaint. [They 
tell you that:] -no, look, the man over there says, - if I open my mouth, blah, blah, blah, or just that he has 
been there many years and he’ll never turn it over to me, that he bought it from someone else. You 
understand me? So, until the Land Unit comes... they are coming to Caquetá now like they did to Putumayo 
or Tolima... I don’t think there is any guarantee that these people will start to take the initiative. 
(Ombudsman's Office, La Montañita, Caquetá) 
Conclusion 8: The factors inherent in the ownership of land demand greater knowledge and 
intervention on the part of public policy with respect to land, giving title to, and restoring it. 
The progress made in the proceedings that CELI reports continue to be limited with respect to the 
massive scale of the requests for registering titles and restitution. While CELI is able to support 
these processes, it is ultimately the state that must resolve the differences between citizens and the 
interests involved in the land issue. 
The implementation of the restitution policy is being affected by threats, which, in some cases, 
have resulted in people preferring to lose the land rather than undertake the process of legalizing 
the titles. This also comes along with the incentive the settlers have to take formal ownership of 
the land, generating conflicts over ownership. 
Recommendations
Make simultaneous improvements in production and trade (conclusions 2-3, 5-7, and 10)
Increased production must go hand-in-hand with market improvements. Low quality, intermittent 
and seasonal production is not attractive for a market that exports goods to the rest of the country. 
In contrast, good quality and regular production has better results when that production is directed 
at adequate markets. Transport to markets is never guaranteed. The GOC must endeavor to resolve 
market and infrastructure inadequacies and establish programs that improve relationships with 
commercial allies and middlemen. This is and must be one of the most important concerns for 
post-conflict policies in Colombia. While support from international funding sources is certainly 
important, it may be wise for the latter to lead small focused pilots that treat these interconnected 
structural failings holistically, or to support GOC efforts that do so, rather than dilute the effects 
by intervening across broad geographic areas with expansive mandates.
Support initiatives to open up new markets (conclusions 2, 3, and 4) in order to achieve 
equilibrium between supply and demand and a suitable price level that would generate profit for 
the producer. These types of programs include creating alliances between small producers and 
middlemen or merchants, improving product quality, implementing the quality and/or 
phytosanitary standards demanded by purchasers, gathering market intelligence, producing added-
60 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
value goods, etc. The advantage of these types of alliances is that the producer is not the direct 
exporter to foreign markets, but is rather a supplier with the ability to export, which strengthens 
the entire chain.
Place a greater emphasis on coordinating with national initiatives (conclusions 1-4) CELI’s 
interventions to help production processes require better coordination, use of technology, and 
innovation using instruments that the country has designed to improve productivity. These 
instruments are related to the implementation of irrigation districts, drainage, collection points, 
refrigeration chains, access to financial services, technical assistance that is coordinated with 
technological facilities, and strategies for technological extension for those initiatives that show 
commitment and maturity, access to document registration, etc. An analysis of the draft policy for 
the production development that the DNP is working on is recommended, with respect to the 
existing instruments or those being designed to correct market failures and improve economic 
growth.
Make improvements to guarantee food security (conclusion 1) CELI and USAID should 
consolidate their efforts to ensure that productive projects guarantee food security for families, 
especially for those projects with late-yielding crops. Prepare for this situation – common for these 
types of USAID projects – and plan technical assistance for traditional farms or other activities to 
minimize dependency and provide some liquidity while the producing families consolidate their 
production and marketing. 
Use community models to improve and maintain tertiary roads (conclusions 3, 4, and 7)
Ensuring that the tertiary road infrastructure is in reasonable shape is fundamental for access to 
regional, national, and international markets. USAID has supported the design of the Tertiary 
Roads National Policy, but it has also fostered models of participative operations through CELI 
Central for the improvement and maintenance of tertiary roads by JACs. Reinforcing these 
community models by learning from the successful experiences in Bolivia, Guatemala, and Costa 
Rica in the framework of Colombian regulations is recommended. The environmental factors must 
be kept in mind to minimize the risk of direct or indirect environmental impacts.
Continue supporting processes for formal registration and restitution of land (conclusion 8)
To do this, strengthening relationships with the new authorities responsible is recommended – the 
National Land Agency and Rural Development Agency – as well as making progress on 
collaboration with the Land Restitution Unit.
Various USAID interventions play an important role in encouraging protection of property rights 
to land through formal titles and developing productive activities and environmental services that, 
in addition to being profitable, should be compatible with the existing categories of environmental 
management. 
Continue working to expand financial services (conclusion 6) Rotating funds have proven to 
be a useful instrument for meeting the loan needs of communities and families. Similarly, EVAL 
recommends reinforcing these funds with clear norms and rules on management and 
accountability, monitoring systems, exchanges of successful experiences, and performance 
incentives. 
61 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
Evaluation questions: 
To what extent have CELI interventions contributed to participation, governance and 
institutionalization of the territory?
What are the CELIs' specific effects of in changing the capacity and service delivery of local 
government? (To serve local people, be accountable, expand social services.)
Findings and conclusions
Participation, transparency, accountability, and confidence generally show neutral or negative 
results in the midline evaluation. This seems to be a trend that is exacerbated by factors that are 
beyond CELI’s influence.
CELI Central worked closely with state entities on many fronts, including institutions in the 
agricultural sector and alliances with the private sector. CELI team members say that the 
institutional framework that should have come with the Consolidation was weak. “We wanted to 
be the catalysts for the state’s and the private sector’s work. But we didn't have permanent 
partners. Once the alliance was made, the Minister of Agriculture and Rural Development, for 
example, did not appear again.” The CELI team, which said they had worked well with the 
regional offices of the Territorial Consolidation Unit, was disappointed in the limited capacity of 
agricultural sector services (Epsagro and UMATA): “They have good intentions but little capacity.
They are not able to extend.” However, CELI was able to make long-term commitments with the 
Colombian Agricultural Institute (ICA in Spanish) and SENA, and has also had positive 
experiences when turning to organizations trained in capacity building for new associations. 
Participation
Participation was measured in the survey by an index that included variables such as participation 
in political parties, JACs, watchdog and oversight groups, view of participation in elections, voter 
registration, and voting in the last presidential election. The average score in CELI was 35 out of 
100 points, one point above what was reported at baseline and with no impact when compared to 
the control sites.
Although the number of people willing to vote (going from 88% to 97%) and that exercised their 
right to vote in 2010 (80% to 89%) rose compared to the baseline, there is no evidence of a 
significant CELI impact on electoral practices since these variables also rose in control areas. 
Among the few who did not vote, the non-voting trend rose under the argument that they did not
like the candidates (8% increase vis-à-vis the baseline).
In contrast, it is significant that those who voted did so because, first, their vote is valuable (this 
variable increased from 89% to 94%) and, second, it is their responsibility (this variable increased 
from 95% to 96%). There were no significant changes in the variable that measures any type of 
pressure, gift, or cash as a reason for voting. The trends in the control municipalities were very 
similar, so the conclusion is that CELI had no impact. (Figure 6.1) 
62 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 6.1. Trends in reasons for voting
In addition, a large majority of respondents believe that women could be leaders in the community 
at both baseline and the midline measurement, increasing from 96% to 98%. Likewise, in spite of 
a slight decline from 88% to 83%, the respondents perceived young people as having a high degree 
of legitimacy as leaders. These results contrast with the perception of the possibility of an ex￾combatant being a community leader, declining from 20% at baseline to 18% at midline. There is 
no evidence of CELI impact on the consolidation of new leadership. (Figure 6.2) 
Figure 6.2. Trends in possible new leaders
According to focus groups, there has been an increase in electoral participation. Based on what was 
reported, having led or belonged to an association may improve a candidate’s chances of getting 
elected: 
It was scary to go and vote. Many people abstained ... They were forbidden to vote. Now there is more 
police presence. There are more political parties. There is more freedom in all aspects of life, and that 
has generated a lot of participation in every area. I would say that is one of the main engines. (Victims’ 
Association, Vistahermosa, Meta) 
It has changed a lot. Here, a mayor could be elected with maybe 600 votes. Now a mayor who does not 
get more than 2,500 votes will come out in front (Government Secretariat, Vistahermosa, Meta)
The hope that someday someone will represent the community to see what...And this year also there is a 
lady, in fact she is part of the Rubber Alliance. María Yineth Cardona, she is seeking election to the Council 
with the desire that perhaps she will be lucky and do something for the community now that she is there. 
(Rubber Tappers’ Association, La Montañita, Caquetá) 
95%
3%
81%
89%
11%
3%
96%
4%
78%
94%
9%
3%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%
It is your responsibility
To give gack
A candidate piqued your interest
Believe your vote counts
Received money or gifts to vote
Know someone who has been pressuredor forced to vote for
someone
CELI baseline CELI midline
96%
20%
88%
98%
18%
83%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
A women can be a leader in the community
An excombatant can be a leader in the community
A young person can be a leader in the community
CELI baseline CELI midline
63 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
The change in the relationship between the community and the police has been immense, which is 
the first step in establishing an institutional framework. However, this depends on its permanence 
over time and coordination with other institutional stakeholders: 
The police have earned a very important position. When they came, the population accommodated itself to 
the stakeholder present at the time. If there are guerrilla groups, then they adjust to the guerrilla groups. 
If there are paramilitaries, then they adjust themselves to the paramilitaries. If the army is there, then they 
work with the army. If there are police, they do the same. (Government Secretariat, Vistahermosa, Meta) 
Conclusion 1: Participation in political processes is increasing. The intention to vote and the 
real exercise of this right has increased. Some of the reasons for voting are associated with new 
leadership (young people and women), who represent the evolution of their communities and are
offering innovative proposals. The democratic efforts that CELI carried out coincide with greater 
participation. However, there is still a high perception that the electoral process is difficult.
Conclusion 2: The stigma of being a former IAG combatant affects their legitimacy. Facing
the peace process and a post-conflict environment, there is no evidence that the guerrilla groups can 
have credibility or provide representation in the communities where they have been operating. 
Transparency and accountability
The Consolidation Index measures good governance through a set of indicators such as getting grants 
to finance projects, the GOC’s Open Government Index (IGA in Spanish), and the number of eligible 
people who pay their taxes (property and industry/commerce ICA). 
The indicator measuring the distribution of grants for financing projects around the region shows 
that the department of Caquetá dropped back to the same score it received in 2011 after having hit a 
significant peak in 2013, which was close to 100% of the resources allocated. Meanwhile, Tolima’s 
loss of ground is visible even with a growth trend in the last four years. Meta had significant growth 
between 2012 and 2013, but it then declined (Figure 6.3). Generally speaking, none of the 
departments are able to obtain grants on a regular basis to finance their investment projects, 
interrupting the path for development and growth of the region. 
Figure 6.3. Secondary data: Grants for financing projects
Source: Consolidation Index, authors’ calculations
31,3 31,7
16,6
43,5
0,0
25,0
0,0
20,0
40,0
60,0
80,0
100,0
2011 2012 2013 2014
Caquetá Meta Tolima
64 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Likewise, the information gathered from ICA shows an interesting change in the scores, which went 
from an average of 74.6 to 96.6. Recall that scores are adjusted or normalized to scores of similar 
municipalities based on the explanation in the Consolidation Index section. (Figure 6.4) 
Figure 6.4. Secondary data: Average IGA results 
2011 2014
Raw score Standardized 
score
Raw score Standardized 
score
Caquetá 48.2 72.2 64.9 99.0
Meta 48.0 72.0 70.0 100
Tolima 53.6 79.8 59.5 90.8
With respect to compliance in paying property taxes, the index reports a score of approximately 62% 
for Meta with a slight increase over the last year. This increase can be explained by better fiscal 
management. Caquetá reported a sharp drop in year 3 but a recovery in year 4, which suggests a 
possible difficulty in gathering data. Tolima is the department that is lagging behind the most. The 
three departments show a growth trend in industry and commerce taxes with the highest scores going 
to Caquetá with 90%, followed by Tolima with 77% and Meta with 68%. 
Figure 6.5. Secondary data: Property compliance (left) and ICA tax (right) 
Source: Consolidation Index, authors’ calculations
Regarding the perception of problems associated with municipal administration in the Central region, 
the municipalities receiving interventions showed greater mistrust of the public entities than the 
control municipalities did, even though the citizens notice that in both cases, the administrations do 
not report on their activities. In contrast, the perception of corruption has declined and the provision 
of public services has improved in both the municipalities that received interventions and in control 
municipalities. There was no positive impact in either of the two cases (treatment or control) on the 
citizens’ position regarding public issues nor their participation in decisions. (Figure 6.6) 
47,7
90,1
63,9 67,9
52,6
76,7
0,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
90,0
100,0
2011 2012 2013 2014
Caquetá Meta Tolima
52,7
64,1 62,8
68,5
43,6 40,6
0,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
90,0
100,0
2011 2012 2013 2014
Caquetá Meta Tolima
65 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 6.6. Trends in perceptions of problems associated with the municipality management
CELI Control
Distrust of public entities
Municipal administrations do not pay attention to requests from the 
community
The administration is not able to solve the community's problems
Deficiencies of public utilities for households
Lack of highways
Corruption
Lack of institutional services: hospitals, schools, courts, and kindergartens
Municipal administration does not report on what it is doing
Municipal authorities invite the community to express their opinions about 
subjects that are of interest to the community
Municipal authorities take the opinions of the citizens into account when 
they make decisions
Impacts on these trends emerge in the cluster analysis. Respondents’ perceptions of municipal 
governments, with respect to these variables, show a downward trend although, in some cases, the 
impact was stronger in CELI municipalities than in control municipalities. This is a good sign, as 
data were collected during the electoral period. 
For example, two clusters showed positive effects on the way the municipality is governed, and 
two clusters claimed that management was better two years ago, compared to the opinions of their 
controls. 
Furthermore, the data revealed that the municipal governments in the CELI and control zones are 
not very inclined to listen to citizens’ opinions or consider those opinions. Only one cluster stated 
that the municipal government regularly reported on expenditures and their perception was higher
at midline and better than that of the control municipalities. Nonetheless, confidence that the 
municipal government is committed to carrying out a project rose significantly in three clusters. 
The same cannot be said with respect to confidence in the president of the JACs’ commitment – 
three clusters see this situation as worse than at baseline. More negative responses are seen in the 
treatment areas than in the controls. (Figure 6.7) 
Figure 6.7. Impact on the perception of the local government
Cluster: 16 17 18 24 25 26 27 28
Rate municipal government's 
management as good or very good 0.0431 0.0589 0.0961** 0.00409 0.0551 -0.041 0.173*** -0.00554
Think that the municipal government's 
management has improved in 
comparison to two years ago
0.268*** -0.0337 0.128*** -0.069*** 0.0283 -0.018 0.00407 0.0911
The city mayor regularly informs the 
community about what the funds have 
been spent on and how
-0.104** 0.0521 -0.0290 0.0388** -0.0135 -0.07* -0.0753* -0.140***
The municipal authorities invite the
community to express their opinions 
about subjects that are of interest to 
the community
0.0867*** -0.0070 0.0223 -0.0108 0.0286 0.0339 -0.0265 -0.0133
The municipal authorities take the 
opinions of the citizens into account 
when they make decisions
0.0362 -0.0220 0.0129 0.0111 0.0140 0.0291 0.00272 -0.00590
66 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Cluster: 16 17 18 24 25 26 27 28
Have quite a bit or a lot of confidence 
in the mayor of the municipality’s 
commitment to managing a 
construction project
0.0874 -0.0618 0.104** 0.0648*** -0.0193 0.0222 0.115*** -0.0695
Have considerable / a lot of trust in 
the chairman of JAC's commitment to 
managing a construction project
-0.0540 0.0293 -0.0438 -0.0662** 0.0344 -0.13** 0,172*** -0.134**
The Consolidation Index indicates the percentage of the municipal funds that are subject to legally 
registered oversight mechanisms. Caquetá and Tolima report 69% and 75% respectively. No data 
are reported for Meta. The three departments achieved a 75% operating level for their institutional 
framework for citizen participation with the minimum number of regular meetings of the 
Municipal Council for Social Policy and the Municipal Council for Rural Development. In 
contrast, the respondents in the survey of scattered rural areas believe that they enjoy less 
participation.
One of the components of transparency is the degree to which citizens participate in oversight 
processes. The survey instrument contains questions that were combined into an accountability index 
with a total score of 100 points. The survey asked about the extent to which the mayor kept citizens 
informed about public spending, the presence or absence of public mechanisms for citizen oversight, 
and the degree to which the local government welcomes citizens' opinions for decision-making. In 
the Central Region, the index fell by three points (from 28 to 25), similar to what happened in the 
control zones, so there was no CELI impact. Nonetheless, this general decline shows that the issues 
associated with transparency and accountability, which are fundamental to fighting corruption, still 
pose major challenges in the consolidation areas. 
In the Central region, participation in oversight committees had a slight increase compared to the 
baseline. It went from 1% to 3% of respondents and had a positive impact of 1.6pp compared to 
the control municipalities. According to the qualitative information collected in the focus groups, 
the diversity of political parties and the presence of the police have encouraged greater citizen 
participation in decision-making. The participation of associations is greater and has encouraged 
the creation of citizen oversight committees. These have focused on monitoring the use of public 
resources which, as a result, has led to increased trust in the institutions. The Consolidation Unit 
and CELI are recognized as leading these initiatives: 
Before, there were no oversight committees. In other words, a project was done and ... well, they didn’t 
know, no one took notice and then they came to criticize. Now they know, in fact, they create the oversight 
committee and follow up on what is being done in the project. So that has also strengthened the institutional 
framework greatly. (Leader, Women’s Organization, Chaparral, Tolima) 
In the projects, they name the oversight committee, depending on the project and on the municipality where 
it is. The people know the technical part ... When they are going to bring material, then the community is 
ready; It plays the part of the community’s watchdog, but the technical part is done by the controller. 
(Beneficiaries, La Montañita, Caquetá) 
In terms of accountability, the focus groups show progress in controlling the use of resources: 
67 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
There is a lot of surveillance now. What the government has implemented is very good. The follow up that 
they really do to the resources that come from the municipality is very good. (Association, La Montañita, 
Caquetá) 
Conclusion 3: The processes for accountability still require consolidation and are affecting 
confidence in institutional development. In spite of the efforts to implement practices that have 
been in development for a number of years and that have been managed by CELI, positive effects 
have not yet been achieved. There is no evidence of exercise in participatory planning, 
implementation, or follow-up. This is also affected by the gaps in community participation in 
control and oversight, even though better performance has been seen in these mechanisms. While 
the focus groups show greater participation, there are no specific data that prove this is permanent. 
Confidence
Confidence in institutions and their exercise of power has generally fallen. According to the 
responses from those surveyed, the perception of confidence in institutions fell, with the exception 
of the national police. The decrease in this perception was similar in the treatment and control 
municipalities, so these changes cannot be attributed to a CELI impact. There is a decrease in 
confidence in the Public Defender, Ombudsman’s office, municipal government, and the JACs at 
the local level which brings about a decline in confidence in national entities that depend on their 
management (for example, the Victims Unit depends on the management of the ombudsman’s 
offices for Single Registry of Victims [RUV in Spanish]).
It is reasonable to assume that the publicity of the electoral period affected the responses to the 
extent that the current government's problems were public before the elections and highly 
controversial. The impacts on confidence at the cluster level vary. (Figure 6.8)
Figure 6.8. Impacts on confidence — considerable or a lot 
Cluster: 16 17 18 24 25 26 27 28
Governor’s office -0.0047 0.0439 0.121*** 0.0799*** 0.00421 -0.0839 0.0264 -0.0757
The national government 0.0715 0.107* 0.248*** 0.149*** -0.120** 0.0560 -0.122** -0.0987*
Formal justice institutions 0.00612 -0.0262 0.102** 0.0349 -0.0793 -0.0016 -0.14*** -0.0550
Alternative justice institutions 0.0262 0.00324 0.0935* 0.114*** -0.0018 0.147*** -0.0454 0.0688
Agricultural sector institutions 0.118** -0.0389 -0.0177 0.0480** 0.0863 -0.0251 -0.17*** -0.115**
Social organizations and 
NGOs -0.0997* -0.0958 0.00730 0.112*** -0.101 0.0727 -0.0671 -0.0412
Training and educational 
centers
0.170** -0.0807 -0.0896 -0.00861 -0.117* 0.129* -0.35*** 0.131*
Public Defender's office 0.0370 -0.0827 0.0505 0.0474* -0.139** 0.0553 -0.0378 -0.0626
Municipal councils -0.0265 -0.0196 0.0556 0.0670*** -0.0570 0.0528 -0.0266 -0.0634
The National Police 0.116** 0.116** 0.106** 0.0819*** -0.125** 0.00254 -0.0914* -0.0641
The National Army 0.194*** -0.0161 0.120** 0.0777*** -0.0211 -0.0220 -0.23*** -0.112*
The National Navy 0.0118 -0.26*** -0.0124 -0.0103 -0.24*** 0.0292 -0.22*** -0.0820
The municipal ombudsman's 
office -0.0341 -0.145** 0.00888 0.0233 -0.124* 0.0380 -0.0577 -0.154**
Municipal government 0.0286 -0.0046 0.0452 0.0507** -0.0588 0.0317 -0.0184 -0.0595
JAC -0.0861 -0.0837 -0.0475 -0.0293 -0.0101 -0.153** 0.117* 0.0422
The changes in absolute values are better for those surveyed in the Central region than in other 
regions, warranting a review (Annex 2 of this report). The impact calculations given in the table 
above indicate more positive results in Clusters 18 and 20, while the other clusters varied in 
68 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
comparison to the control municipalities. Among the rated institutions, the army and police have 
higher impacts, although Clusters 25, 27, and 28 do not share that trend.
The survey delved into the management of the JACs, municipal governments, governor's office, 
and national government in more detail. In that regard, perceptions fell in both the control and 
treatment municipalities. See the following figure: 
Figure 6.9. Trends in the citizens’ perceptions of public management
CELI Control
The municipal government's management is described as good or very good
The administration of the Governor's office is described as good or very good
The national government’s management is described as good or very good
Have considerable / a lot of trust in municipal government's commitment to managing a 
construction project
Have considerable / a lot of trust in the chairman of JAC's management of a construction 
project
No impact was found for these indicators as is reported in Figure 6.10: 
Figure 6.10. Trends in perceptions of the management by the Governor's office and the national 
government 
Cluster: 16 17 18 24 25 26 27 28
The administration of the 
Governor's office is described 
as good or very good
0.0718 0.0223 0.0771 0.0340 -0.0454 -0.34*** 0.101 0.0919
Think that the management by 
the Governor's office has 
improved in comparison to 
two years ago
0.0551 -0.0189 0.00365 -0.0300 -0.107* -0.19*** 0.217*** 0.0684
The national government’s 
management is described as 
good or very good
0.190*** 0.0365 0.358*** 0.167*** -0.0765 0.0272 -0.123* -0.0464
Think that the management by 
the national government has 
improved in comparison to 
two years ago
0.181*** -0.102** 0.0951* 0.0865*** -0.17*** -0.0557 0.0172 -0.0356
When those surveyed were asked about their perception of governmental management at the 
departmental and national levels, the trends registered were consistently negative. Nevertheless, 
there were positive points in some clusters, mainly regarding their views on the national government. 
This perception declined in absolute terms, but not as much as it did in the controls. As a result, for 
Clusters 16, 18, and 24, the opinions on the national government showed a significant positive impact 
among the CELI municipalities. The opinions about the management of the departmental 
government were closer to the baseline, and thus, the impact was lower. There is one notable 
exception, Cluster 26, where the opinions about the departmental government fell dramatically. 
Coordinated services offered to help victims are provided by different state agencies at the national, 
regional and municipal levels (UARIV, DPS, ombudsman’s offices, and municipal government) and
69 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
have been important vehicles for implementing the individual and collective reparation models 
established in the Victims' Law. While progress has been made in preventing the forced recruitment 
of minors, there are still large challenges regarding the efficiency and effectiveness of the process, 
as well as delays in humanitarian aid delivery. There is a shortage of communication channels with 
victims and, in general, the victim registration census process must be improved. 
The focus groups said that recovering trust is a gradual process: 
They [the population] have already realized that the state has finally succeeded in reaching out to the 
forgotten rural areas. Well, it became active against different outlaw groups ... already their perspective 
and their concept ... has improved more than 80%. They know that there are other organizations that have 
a very specific interest in starting as collaborators, but that is done in coordination with different 
institutions [...] they are working precisely with Consolidation and Colombia Responde so that they can 
gain access to these veredas and recover the state’s credibility and strengthen those companies, those 
associations, and those Juntas de Acción Comunal.. (Government Secretariat, Vistahermosa, Meta)
There is more confidence because before one couldn’t go to speak with a mayor, with someone, one had to 
... What was hidden, the groups did not allow you to, if you came to speak with the mayor then you were a 
snitch. Now you can go, anyone who needs can go and talk to him. (Beneficiaries, Vistahermosa, Meta) 
The shortage of permanent UARIV offices in the municipalities and of financial mechanisms for 
payment of indemnities makes it difficult to serve and provide reparations to the victims: 
The Victims Unit and also the Secretariat of Victims had offices here until last week. The attention given 
is quite slow in coming. Aid is delayed. The notifications that the law supposedly says must be given in less 
than sixty days never arrive. If the Ombudsman’s office does not send a petition of rights, they are delayed. 
They have been delayed for up to six months. (Ombudsman's Office, La Macarena, Meta) 
We had a payment point at the Agrarian Bank here for victims which... Starting that year, the news came 
from the Victims Unit, “we made an agreement with Davivienda now.” It turns out that the municipality 
does not have a Davivienda here. The Victims Unit established a payment office in San Vicente del Caguán. 
That meant that the victims in the municipality of La Macarena who get humanitarian aid had to go to San 
Vicente del Caguán...It is a dirt road; you can easily find yourself at a guerilla group checkpoint. 
(Ombudsman's Office, La Macarena, Meta)
In the southern region of Tolima, registering and taking a census of victims has been difficult due 
to the lack of coordination between UARIV and the local governments: 
The victims were handled by the Secretariat of Government, the Ombudsman’s office before the censuses. 
Today the victims’ database is handled by the Victims Unit at the national or regional level. There is no 
Victims’ Unit in Chaparral. What you find in Chaparral and in municipalities like Chaparral and others 
around the country are “victims’ liaisons,” which are the ones placed to link the victims and the Victims’ 
Unit. If not, it turns into an errand-handler with a link as such. In Chaparral, there are about 7 thousand 
[victims] but this is obviously something unofficial that is for the same Victims’ Unit, but that makes it 
possible for there to be no description here. We tried as a municipality to do it, but it is very complex to 
develop an internal description of the census because the victims are not interested in that. It’s that simple. 
They are not interested and that way it is very complicated to be able to give better support for the 
programs. (Government Secretariat, Chaparral, Tolima) 
Conclusion 4: Confidence in institutions and their exercise of power has dropped, which has 
a direct impact on the state’s legitimacy as the guarantor and protector of rights. This affects the 
leadership that is needed to implement the interventions that the state is responsible for, and the 
70 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
recovery of territory from the hands of armed groups. It also negatively affects the peace process. 
A failure to honor commitments persists. 
Provision of services
CELI has supported the work of local entities to provide services to the community, in particular, in 
relation to building local technical capabilities and coordinated work: 
Well yes, it has obviously been very important [CELI's support] because they are very concerned about 
development. They support different institutions, us, or rather us with the projects, the court. They try to 
get all of us to work together. They have also supported the Ombudsman's office. (Government Secretariat, 
La Macarena, Meta) 
Access to state services for the most vulnerable people implies having completed the procedures 
for obtaining an ID and having been a subject of the survey for (and later registration into) the 
Identification and Classification System for potential social program Beneficiaries (SISBEN in 
Spanish), which is the way the GOC seeks to guarantee that the rights of the most vulnerable 
people in the country are safeguarded. As shown in Figure 6.11 below, the perception that people 
have an ID is nearly 100%, in addition to 90% responding that vulnerable people who have been 
given the SISBEN survey. This survey will improve the state’s ability to reach the most vulnerable 
populations. 
Figure 6.11. Trends in the registration of citizens for social services
There are no significant changes nor impact attributable to CELI on provision of public services. 
For the public services below (Figure 6.12), people were asked about access to services, quality, 
and progress made in the last two years. 
Figure 6.12. Trends in access to and quality of public services
Access 
(2015)
Change in 
access
Change in 
quality
Has it improved 
in the last two 
years?
Health outpost -2% No
Children under 5 years of age with access to 
health care services 19% 7% 26% No
Children between 5 and 11 years of age that 
attend school 95% 1% -7% No
People between 12 and 18 years of age that 
attend school 77% 9% -12% No
Electricity 72% 3% -1% No
Propane gas 54% 3% 1% Yes
Water 45% -4% 14% Yes
92%
99%
90%
100%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Completed the SISBEN survey
Have an identification document in the home
CELI baseline CELI midline
71 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Access 
(2015)
Change in 
access
Change in 
quality
Has it improved 
in the last two 
years?
Sewer system 21% 1% 11% Yes
Garbage collection 24% 0% 3% Yes
Cell phone service 96% 0% -2% No
The widespread attitude towards service providers reflects the lack of confidence in governmental 
entities at all levels. Despite the low scores provision of services received, those surveyed were 
optimistic. The trend data (Annex 2) show that the people have high expectations for the future, 
perhaps due to their hopes for the signing of a possible peace agreement. This translates into a 
positive impact, especially in Clusters 16, 17, and 26. (Figure 6.13) 
Figure 6.13. Impact on expectations for improvement in public services in the future
Cluster: 16 17 18 24 25 26 27 28
Will access to health services 
improve? 0.106** 0.152*** -0.0690 -0.252*** -0.0742 0.232*** 0.0115 -0.0205
Will access to education 
improve? 0.114** 0.0812 -0.0181 -0.238*** -0.0677 0.153*** 0.0532 0.0763
Will access to public utilities 
improve? 0.118** 0.122** -0.0295 -0.206*** -0.110** 0.184*** 0.0319 0.0603
Will the roads to the leading 
municipality improve? 0.237*** 0.134*** 0.0289 -0.202*** -0.16*** 0.0680 0.215*** 0.0390
The pattern for Clusters 18 and 28 has been one of little optimism or high impacts. Clusters 24 and 
25 (to a lesser extent) are characterized by their negative impacts.
The Consolidation Index numbers for the public utilities component tend to be lower regarding 
electricity coverage and more positive in cell phone service. The indicators for social services, in 
turn, vary depending on the region. 
The indicators for education in Caquetá show a slight decline in availability of elementary 
education (99% to 92%) and high school (84% to 77%), and register a higher rate of dropouts than 
in 2011. This was largely derived from data from San Vicente del Caguán. Health coverage from 
the subsidized system went from 89% to 75% and the availability of the mobile health centers in 
areas without clinics also declined, with Cartagena del Chairá being the worst affected. 
The trend for the education numbers in Meta is positive for availability of services, dropout rates, 
and teacher positions filled, although the increases are relatively small. On average, and with the 
data adjusted for municipalities, 76% of respondents have access to elementary education, and 
65% have access to high school education. Health coverage has declined 22pp since 2011. 
Tolima's educational coverage is high, but with a slight drop in primary school access since 2011. 
Teacher coverage and dropout rates receive a high rating (100%). Health coverage is 96%, and for 
areas where there are no clinics, coverage declines from 87% to 64%. 
Based on the results from the focus groups, the issue of access to quality higher education persists,
due not only to problems related to infrastructure and provision of services but also to high costs.
Participants also argue that it is difficult to enter the labor market even after obtaining technical or 
professional degrees: 
72 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Colombia Responde established its presence here only 3 years ago, almost 4 years ago. Because Chaparral 
has been deteriorating for 15, 20 years because there were 6 mayors ... They do not have defined programs. 
So far [the young people] are thinking like well... - I’ll return to the country after I get an education - They 
still do not have it clear. Yes, there are no opportunities here. There are only very few universities, just 2 
or 3. 
Yes, because the problem is that you have to study, but one goes around town and it turns out that there are 
thousands of people studying and the complaint is that they can’t get anything, because there is no one to 
help them find a job. At least I have a girl who graduated from high school. She had finished high school 
and can’t find anything to do because she has to have a university degree or she’s toast. There is nothing 
you can do there, so we are being left alone in the country. That's why, moving forward, struggling to see 
if they can get ahead, but it turns out that there are many requirements for a job. (Beneficiaries, La 
Montañita, Caquetá) 
The Consolidation Index also measures the availability of electricity services and cell phone 
reception. The data show a decline in electrical service and a growing coverage of cell phone 
reception, although service in Caquetá reached only 44% at its highest point (2014). Tolima is the 
lowest in availability of electricity, declining from 44% to 41% over the four years of data 
collection.
Figure 6.14. Secondary data: Availability of electricity (left) and cell phone (right)
 Source: Consolidation Index, authors’ calculations
Conclusion 5: The provision of public services remains low – at levels that do not guarantee 
the full enjoyment of rights. Although it is true that the availability of public services reported in 
the official data is high (with the exception of the sewer system, handling of garbage, and final 
waste disposal), according to those surveyed, there have been negative changes in access to and 
quality of the services provided. Improving the capability of the local institutional structure should 
continue to be a priority, as well as guaranteeing budgetary efficiency and suitable municipal 
planning processes. 
96,8
82,6
91,5 86,4
43,6 40,6
0,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
90,0
100,0
2011 2012 2013 2014
Caquetá Meta Tolima
28,7
44,0
64,6 72,2
52,6
76,7
0,0
10,0
20,0
30,0
40,0
50,0
60,0
70,0
80,0
90,0
100,0
2011 2012 2013 2014
Caquetá Meta Tolima
73 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Victims’ rights
The percentage of households in the Central region where a member of the family has experienced 
a human rights violation went from 5% at baseline to 7.6% at midline. The only variable that shows 
the impact of citizens’ perceptions of state entities responsible for violations is a 17pp decline in 
the indicator. Those surveyed in the Central region, however, are more inclined to do nothing when 
their rights are violated (17pp) or not tell anyone. In absolute terms, they are more likely to start 
an action for fundamental rights protection, but with respect to the baseline, less inclined to take 
their case to the courts.
From the point of view of the Consolidation Index, and in terms of human rights and victimization, 
only one municipality in Caquetá has a human rights committee. Four municipalities in Tolima
have committees, as do six municipalities in Meta, where five of them are still partially 
functioning. These data show that there were no massacres and political homicides in the three 
departments in 2014. 
Displacement is trending downward in the three departments, even though close to 3,200 people 
were displaced in Tolima, 4,500 in Caquetá, and 1,300 in Meta in 2014. Incidents with landmines 
were still a critical issue in 2014 in Mesetas, Uribe and Vistahermosa (Meta); La Montañita 
(Caquetá); and Chaparral and Planadas (Tolima). There was a case of kidnaping for ransom in 
Vistahermosa, Meta, one in San Vicente del Caguán in Caquetá and one in Chaparral, Tolima. 
Recommendations
Maintain the credibility of political participation’s processes and mechanisms and empower 
communities and their new leaders (conclusions 1 and 2)
In support of the implementation of Statutory Act 1475/2011, CELI must encourage the 
application of those norms oriented towards reinforcing gender equality for participation in 
political activities, representation, and access to electoral debates. Interventions should foster 
participation and political activity to bring about consolidation and generate proposals that 
mobilize the electorate towards strengthening democracy.
This includes strengthening political participation through social organizations and improving 
expertise on the best channels for political participation and influence on public administration, as 
was done on the ADAM project. These strategies would help to provide support for the following: 
Help young people and women in the rural areas to get their ID documents and get registered on 
the electoral rolls.
Promote women’s organizations to further their participation in all of the spheres of public life. 
Use schools as sites for training, discussing, and fostering values, practices, and democratic 
institutions among children and young people in general, with a special emphasis on the 
importance of the elections.
Support reinforcing transparency laws for political parties to prevent the undue concentration of 
power. 
Coordinate CELI with the country's strategies for transparency and accountability 
(conclusions 3, 4, 5, and 6) Support the National Strategy for a Comprehensive Anti-Corruption 
Public Policy and the right to have access to public information. CELI (or other future USAID 
74 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
programs) requires action that is organized, decisive, sustainable, and coordinated with the 
government’s inter-institutional activity.
Use new tools in the effort to improve the provision of services (conclusions 3, 4, and 5)
CELI’s challenge is to continue strengthening local governments in order to improve the provision 
of the municipal and departmental services. Decentralization is a national, constitutional initiative, 
but, at the municipal level, capacity is low and finances are limited. Therefore, it is necessary to 
reinforce citizen participation and have information that is relevant from the demand point of view. 
Pilot projects should be emphasized that involve civil society and supporting local governments 
with permanent technical assistance. Tools such as “score charts” and other measures to get 
citizens to rate the changes in the provision of services are very useful for improvement. 
75 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT 
Evaluation question: What changes have been produced by CELI interventions to strengthen the 
organizational capacity of local CSOs in local areas?
Findings and conclusions
Social capital: Trust
The index of social capital is composed of trust (60 points) and participation (40 points – see the 
next section under the Social Capital heading), for a total of 100 points. Trust was identified at 
different levels: family, neighbors, friends, the JAC, legal and state oversight bodies, development 
institutions, municipal and national government, and the police and military. 
For the measurement, it should be mentioned that several of the factors that affect the index are 
being handled by cooperation programs, including CELI, and should be considered indicators of 
contextual conditions. Nevertheless, an analysis of the CELI subcomponents makes it possible to 
understand the strengths and weaknesses of the social capital index. 
In the CELI Central municipalities the index rose with respect to the baseline, while the trend is 
stable in the control municipalities. This resulted in a 1.6pp impact attributable to CELI. The 
subcomponent of participation in CELI municipalities went from 6 to 8 points (over 40) while the 
score for confidence fell slightly, going from 17.7 to 16.3, (over 60). This was less than in the 
control zones. 
When the results of the survey are reviewed, they report a decline in confidence compared to the 
baseline. The greatest difference is in the commitment value of help from neighbors in the face of
possible difficulties (declining from 26% to 20%). The tradition of working as a group to do 
community projects was reported by 52% of the households and decreased 5% vis-à-vis the 
baseline. When this tradition is reviewed in control groups, it declined from 59% to 48%. This 
shows no evidence of CELI impact. (Figure 7.1) 
Figure 7.1. Trends in confidence at the community level
Those surveyed are optimistic about the future of their relationships and their feelings of trust in 
their communities. However, some control municipalities were even more positive. Looking at the 
cluster results, this resulted in some negative and some positive impacts. When asked about their 
feelings regarding the evolution of their relationships in the future, those in Clusters 18 and 24 saw 
these relationships as worsening at the significant levels of 15pp and 18pp respectively. Only 
Clusters 16 and 26 saw these relationships as better with a positive impact of 15pp. The other four 
clusters had no significant impact compared to their controls. 
26%
57%
27%
20%
52%
26%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Trust in a neighbor who helped you through a difficult time
Tradition to work in groups to complete community projects
Confidence in people in the community
CELI baseline CELI midline
76 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
The stigmatization, as reported in the focus groups, is notable due to its association with confidence 
in the communities: 
Unfortunately, the settlers in the municipality of La Macarena never asked the national government to 
declare this municipality a demilitarized zone ... We are left with that stigma, that the settlers are the 
municipality of La Macarena. What there is there is guerrilla ... Here there are small farmers. There are 
families of victims here. Here also the scourge of war has touched them. Even so, the national government, 
through, like... that entity [Incoder] that continues stigmatizing the people, continues stigmatizing the small 
farmers and preventing them from generating productive projects or developing the land. (Government
Secretariat, La Macarena, Meta)
Nevertheless, progress in security conditions in the municipality has made it possible to participate 
in community initiatives and feel pride in and ties to their region:
I like all the parts, let’s say the pretty parts in Vistahermosa. You know, we have Caño Cristales which is 
among the seven wonders of the world. The tourist spots that Vistahermosa has, that we can take a lot of 
advantage of and preserve them, I like that, and the peace that we have now. (Beneficiaries, Vistahermosa, 
Meta)
The contribution of the association projects as promoters of coexistence and tolerance among 
neighbors, families, and community is highlighted: 
I reiterate, the organizational topic, if we think as a group, because we are actually forgetting that this 
society is a mixture, that we all have a relationship and a shared relationship. Nobody here is [alone], if 
we learn to live together, rather than to compete ... We are not independent but rather we are interdependent 
in many ways. We are able to learn to get along. That is basic. (Beneficiary, La Montañita, Caquetá) 
Conclusion 1: Community confidence has dropped. The confidence levels among members of 
communities have decreased, which reduces mutual support among members and their ability to 
work together. This phenomenon affects association activities. One of the causes that is indicated 
is stigmatization. In the case study of La Macarena, for example, settlers in some municipalities 
were stigmatized as "guerrillos" and the settlers in other municipalities as "paracos".
Social capital: Participation in associations
CELI Central supported and reinforced different types of associations. A series of interventions 
were carried out that focused on existing grassroots organizations, such as the JACs, which are the 
main forum in the municipalities for participation in public life and, in addition, created or 
strengthened productive associations. Another objective was to support victims’ and cultural 
associations in the intervention areas, which function as a way of building confidence, collective 
identity, and belonging in the territories, rooted in the community's intangible heritage.
CELI measures organizational development through the Index of Organizational Capacity (ICO in 
Spanish), a tool that is designed and adapted to register changes in a few key organizational 
elements. Between 2011 and 2014, CELI showed a growth of more than 20 points (out of 100), 
which generated a 40 to 60-point improvement on average. Nevertheless, CELI implementers still 
encounter restrictions: “when we put aside this tool,” said a team member, “we will finally have 
the freedom we need to work more on what these organizations need.” Another team member 
described ICO as a USAID requirement that made gathering information difficult and was more 
focused on the internal workings of the organization than the external. This is necessary to generate 
income, which is what CELI recommends in practice. In that regard, CELI’s appropriation of that 
77 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
tool is limited. At the same time, CELI reported that they were able to focus on important aspects, 
such as how to make the producer associations be partners in businesses and managers of their 
companies rather than just producers of a product. 
As was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the index of participation in community 
associations shows a slight rise from the baseline, going from 6 to 8 points (over 40). The JACs 
remained the mechanism with the highest profile in spite of the decline reported in household 
participation with respect to the baseline (from 88% to 78%). Likewise, the increase in associations 
of fathers with families or voluntary groups who are also gaining ground as mechanisms for 
community relationships is notable. CELI's positive effect is shown in engaging the participation 
of those surveyed in associations. This participation generally shows a rising trend with respect to 
what was reported at baseline. (Figure 7.2) 
Figure 7.2. Trends in the reported association mechanisms 
When the results are compared to the decision-making process, consistent progress is seen for all 
of the participation mechanisms with respect to what was reported at baseline. The groups that, to 
a larger extent, succeeded in getting their members to actively participate in decision-making are 
the victims’ organizations (increasing from 4% to 25%), and the producer or marketing 
associations (increasing from 22% to 47%). (Figure 7.3) 
Figure 7.3. Trends in active decision-making in the mechanisms of working together
14%
88%
25%
5%
2%
6%
17%
6%
8%
50%
78%
21%
7%
9%
18%
20%
8%
4%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Community meetings
JAC or other community group
Productive associations or businesses
Organizations of displaced or vulnerable people
Movement or political party
Voluntary group
Father associations
Sport, cultural or environmental group
Women's groups
CELI baseline CELI midline
29%
31%
22%
4%
14%
26%
41%
40%
43%
47%
25%
23%
36%
49%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%
Community meetings
JAC or other community group
Productive associations or businesses
Organizations of displaced or vulnerable people
Movement or political party
Father associations
Sport, cultural or environmental group
CELI baseline CELI midline
78 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
In addition, according to the data reported, a general trend is seen for household participation in 
the decisions of their associations to improve, which is demonstrated by the rise in this type of 
participation compared to the baseline (from 9% and 30%). 
The Consolidation Index shows a significant decline in organization activity in Caquetá, with its 
report that the percentage of organizations that renewed their certificate of incorporation at the 
Chamber of Commerce went from 82% to 61% and the indicator for active JACs improved, going 
from 40 to 68 points. Meta did not show data for 2014, but in 2013, 90% of the organizations were 
active and in 2014, 100% of JACs were active. Tolima reported only 22% of the organizations as 
active in 2014, which is lower than the 73% the previous year. About 82% of the JACs in Tolima 
were reported as active.
Another positive finding is the perceived use of these mechanisms for households where there is a 
generalized trend – much more than there was on the baseline – that participating in some social 
organization is good for obtaining various benefits. These trends appear in both the CELI and 
control municipalities and show the value that these organizational processes have in building 
social fabric.
Figure 7.4. Trends in active decision-making in the mechanisms of working together
A key issue is the perception of CELI's assistance facing associations related to economic 
development, which has implications for the economic rationale of families and communities. 
However, there are still goals to achieve in this regard: 
Another aspect is that the projects for these organizations have been deeply cut. Why? Because they always 
ask that the projects they get be association projects. Our society, our community in Vistahermosa, we don’t 
have the education to work collectively yet. So I've always said, well, send them to us as associated, but 
here we will divide them up. If they give us 100 hens and if there are 100 people and they donate 100 hens 
to us, each person is going to be responsible for that hen and in this we’ve really had a tremendous failure. 
(Social Organization Leader, Vistahermosa, Meta)
Nevertheless, the positive benefits must be contrasted with the poor teamwork results, perceived 
as the biggest problem with joining associations (56%, slightly worse than at baseline). The 
authorities are likewise warned that they are required to facilitate the organizational processes, an 
issue that showed an increase of 2% compared to what was reported at baseline. Other challenges 
in the organizational processes dropped in importance from the baseline to the midline evaluations 
(see the following figure). 
48%
39%
44%
56%
73%
55%
93%
84%
74%
86%
91%
84%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
To get to know other people
To have fun and participate in activities that you enjoy
Improve aspects of the productive activity
To participate in community decision making
So that the community can benefit
In case of a future emergency
CELI baseline CELI midline
79 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Figure 7.5. Trends in the reported challenges of belonging to social organizations 
A factor that affects the practice of associating and effective participation has to do with customs 
and the effect of the conflict:
The people who have grown up with the conflict and subversion have great difficulty getting away from 
them, away from that ideology, that there is another possibility with filing complaints, that it’s necessary 
to complain, it’s necessary to say no more. Actually, the municipality of La Montañita still has lots of roots, 
lots of roots from those former parents, so subversion still really influences the community, considerably 
in spite of the law. (Ombudsman's Office, La Montañita, Caquetá) 
Conclusion 2: The region saw an increase in the quality and quantity of participation,
although the increase in the latter was slight with many data supporting the value of participating 
and its benefits for the community. CELI has succeeded in increasing the participation of families 
in the formation of associations that result in perceived benefits for the families. In general, 
participation in decision-making through these participatory mechanisms has been strengthened. 
It is notable that teamwork has been the feature that is most commonly considered a weakness. 
Specific role of Community Action Councils (JACs in Spanish)
CELI Central developed a deep commitment to work with JACs in generating technical capacity 
to improve their effectiveness. CELI trained individual JACs from the community and the 
associations that combine multiple JACs. For example, in southern Tolima, CELI Central worked 
to strengthen the management of 633 JACs by training them in project development, 
empowerment, hiring, and access to public services. The training was transformative for the JAC 
participants in Tolima, where the head of the JACs got the opportunity to test their new skills in 
meetings with the local and national governments to pressure them to implement projects 
prioritized in the Development Plans. 
CELI Central turned to the JACs as implementers for improvement and maintenance of the tertiary 
roads, especially in Meta and Caquetá. CELI has raised approximately USD $879,000 for labor, 
food and housing for the workforce, and these funds have also been used to leverage additional 
funds from the communities themselves. The JACs have taken on the responsibility for managing 
41%
56%
53%
41%
24%
9%
5%
31%
42%
56%
33%
20%
11%
5%
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
People are very distrustful
People are not interested in participating
Working in groups is very difficult
People don't have the training necessary for organized
processes
Organizational work do not plan for the future to attain the
necessary support
Authorities do not facilitate organizational processes
Other political groups make it difficult
CELI baseline CELI midline
80 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
and fulfilling the terms of the contracts, which is providing them with experience in community 
management and infrastructure maintenance. 
Participation in JACs in the municipalities has declined between the baseline and the midline (from 
88% to 78%), even though their participation in decision-making increased (from 31% to 43%).
The patterns are similar in control zones. As a result, no impact is seen.
The participants recognize the importance of the JACs as a first step in resolving conflicts among 
neighbors. In addition, they are responsible for creating an environment of coexistence in the 
community: 
[In the JAC] we have a Conciliation Committee. First, is tolerance, brother. If you don’t tolerate your 
neighbor, then you end up in a bad situation. There the process is [first] the Community Action Council, 
the Association Committee when you can no longer put up with your neighbor, maybe there is Committee... 
because there will be a fine or something ... Usually, most cases are solved there, between neighbors. 
(Beneficiaries, La Montañita, Caquetá) 
CELI's support for the JACs has enabled greater empowerment and communication and has made 
the community interested in participating in community processes:
There has been more support ... The community is more awake ... They are now informed. They have 
already figured out that: listen, that international cooperation – look at what they gave us. And that is 
something else, it’s another thing since it was only for some veredas. Then they started to say: Come on, 
and why did they leave me out? I need to be there too. What should I do? (Women’s Organization, 
Chaparral, Tolima) 
Conclusion 3: Despite the decline in the number of associations registered in the Chamber of 
Commerce, the JACs are still the mechanism most respondents looked to for stimulating the 
formation of associations. Where the security situation allows, and where the JACs have the 
people’s confidence, this type of organization is the nucleus of political life and participation in 
the veredas. In these cases, the JACs play a central role in giving access to what is available in 
terms of political participation, building infrastructure, and social control. 
Support for producer associations 
The support CELI Central gave the producer associations was delivered on different fronts: 
technical assistance and training, support for marketing and relationships with the public and 
private sectors, and financial services to support production and marketing. According to what a 
member of the CELI team said: “the approach has increasingly been to empower and mobilize 
associations of small producers and increase private sector investment in rural communities in 
order to create economic opportunities for stakeholders in the community within the context of 
legal markets and the rule of law.”
CELI Central worked with 21 producer associations on AgroColombia activities with respect to 
administrative and accounting topics, according to CELI’s COR. This included support for rules 
and norms for managing rotating funds, a culture of teamwork and leadership, financial education, 
and 1,114 financial products provided by the associations’ rotating funds. Young people were also 
invited to the training sessions to create the conditions for sustainability, and the CELI facilitated 
the opening of a bank branch where there had been no financial services before. 
81 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
In order to plan the interventions, it is interesting to review the reasons why families join 
associations. After the interventions, the results of the survey reveal a similarity between the 
treatment and the control groups, whose perceptions are focused on the need to be trained within 
the community, have representation as a group, seek financing, and transport and sell their 
products, thereby creating economies of scale. Although the results are equivalent, this is attributed 
to the positive impact of CELI on encouraging common training frameworks. This variable had 
the highest growth (from 11% to 22%), and the sale of products and the presentation of projects to 
obtain financing grew 6% and 10% respectively (see Figure 5.9).
In the focus groups, participants believe that it is essential to join an association in order to get 
financing. This partially coincides with the quantitative information:
The state and the government give us aid, but we have to be associated or, if not, there is nothing. So it is 
something that we should be aware of that today, for a long time now, the thing is to join an association in 
order to receive the aid that the government is giving. (Beneficiaries Focus Group, Vistahermosa, Meta)
The government’s support models foster creating associations in order to get access to resources, 
according to the beneficiaries: 
Year after year there were more and more associations and today there are like 72, 76, something like that 
... Every time they come from the Ministry or from any governmental entity to give us training, they always 
emphasize that if we don’t join an association, then we won’t get resources. So that's why people are so 
tremendously into associations. There are associations of 10, 18, 20 people. (Beneficiaries, Vistahermosa, 
Meta)
I belong to an association that, as my friend said, we are organizing. Two years ago we started to found 
it. There are 49 people. But so we have not yet seen any help at all because we are starting. We are 
beginning to see how... because since many entities have told us that you can no longer receive any help or 
anything, if you don’t belong to an association, So, we have found ourselves forced to participate in an 
association. (Group of Beneficiaries, Chaparral, Tolima) 
However, the benefits of association models are recognized. CELI’s resources have served to 
reinforce the associations from an administrative and technical point of view: 
I am thankful because the resources allocated were actually not used for purchasing supplies but for 
everything that had to do with managing the project. In other words, Colombia Responde funds were used 
to pay for one year of technical assistance. They paid for one person involved in the business-and￾partnership area. (Association, La Macarena, Meta) 
The exchanges of experiences with other productive associations are recognized positively and 
remembered with gratitude, not only because of the increase in economic capacities, but also the 
sharing of social reinforcement experiences:
They gave us a trip to Cartagena de Indias ... to exchange ideas with people that had already begun working 
much longer ago. We went to Montes de Maria, which is very advanced there, and very good, I love it ... 
In Córdoba, we were also in La Libertad. There are some huge schools. Those kids are very well prepared. 
Another thing that I liked very much there was the attention given to old people. Here we, the old people, 
are abandoned. There no, there the old people are the ones who dance, sing, the ones who laugh, 
everything. There it is like that, they give them a lot of participation, but not here. (Cacao Farmers’ 
Association, La Montañita, Caquetá) 
Conclusion 4: The economic rationale is an incentive for associating. The economic rationale 
82 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
is an incentive to join associations and face the logistical challenges of transportation and sale of 
products. CELI has had a positive impact on creating a common framework for training, sales of 
products, and seeking financing for projects. CELI is recognized for its ability to provide technical 
assistance and make associations more sustainable.
Conclusion 5: The formation of associations is critical for all of CELI’s components that 
should favor cooperation and not competition. CELI has encouraged associations by enhancing 
the effectiveness of the JACs as advocates for coexistence and as partners in administrative issues 
and technical assistance. They also exchange experiences with other productive associations, 
reinforce associations of small producers, empower women and young people, and make resources 
available for association to present their projects. 
Women’s and victims’ associations 
The participation of women declined, according to the quantitative data. Household participation 
in women's groups went from 8% to 4%. In addition, the survey reflects the low participation rate 
of women in politics, with only 1% of mayors being women. However, in terms of their leadership 
in the JACs, there is an increase from 19% to 24%. 
The participants in focus groups believe that the women’s role is critical: 
In the municipality, because of the leadership that I have ... I gather them, some gentlemen also, because 
men also have their rights violated, but it has been very productive. All the training that [CELI] gives us 
through other people, has served me even to educate my children because sometimes one, with so much 
conflict, sometimes those who carry the dead, as the saying goes, are our children so in that sense my 
organization has changed a lot. (Victims’ Association, Vistahermosa, Meta)
Female participation in the electoral process has also improved: 
We have 32 women running for the Council ... from different associations and from different political 
parties. Someone said we were the filling, but if they said so ... But, look, that quota law was turned against 
them because we see all 32 women in politics and selling the idea. And one sees that the women are very 
confident that they will be supported and will be elected ... They have proposals and they already have it 
clear. In other words, these women clearly understand already that it is necessary to be part of the Council 
and that we have to participate. A woman from Calarma was also strengthened by Colombia Responde and 
ran for the Council ... She was trained in politics. She came to a training class given by “More Women, 
More Democracy,” I think that was the name of the program, and there she began to feel empowered. 
(Leader, Women’s Organization, Chaparral, Tolima) 
One of the axes of the training supported by CELI Central was the gender and youth topic, which 
generates empowerment for these two social groups in the community: 
There was a program where these two axes worked together: one was boys, girls, adolescents, and young 
people, and the other was women. In other words, they worked on the same project ... We worked with a 
diagnosis for this community which will serve the municipality for public policies on women and young 
people. (Ombudsman's Office, La Montañita, Caquetá) 
Conclusion 6: Women can be critical and influential stakeholders in conflict resolution and 
the peace process, and the qualitative results show significant efforts in this respect. However, 
their participation in political leadership and families’ participation in women’s groups dropped in 
quantitative terms. The women have not succeeded in getting positions in spite of the importance 
of their roles in their communities. An increase in leadership of JACs is the only thing observed. 
83 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Cultural associations
The areas of culture, sports, and other group activities for social development are gaining terrain 
as a result of associations. When the results of family participation in these activities is reviewed, 
an increase compared to the baseline can be seen (from 41% to 49%), thus a better position 
compared to other mechanisms was gained. The members are increasingly active in the decision￾making process. A review of the control municipalities revealed that CELI had an impact on the 
increase in cultural activities but not in the sense of decision-making scenarios. In the qualitative 
analysis, CELI support for cultural activities was not evident although the participants referred to 
the importance of these activities:
La Macarena holds two annual events. One is called Fiesta del Campesino and the other is called Fiesta 
de la Velloussea. It is the municipality’s native flower. It is a party ... where the llanero folklore, the 
joropodromo, is strengthened a lot. Troubadours come, everything that has to do with the plains region. 
(Productive Association, La Macarena, Meta) 
They felt important. That’s what we need. Because here there is classical dance, bambuco, guabina, and 
so on. And there is a school for that. There is a school for theater plays, but it needs to get more support 
for that. Now, it is necessary and here there is a lot of talent, a lot. I don’t know if it is because of natural 
character. Yes, in Chaparral we are deeply into this, we like it. But here you see girls with extraordinary 
voices, boys with talent ... But no, there is so much talent wasted, yes, so much. It would be great if it were 
done like that here and that area were strengthened. (Women’s Organization, Chaparral, Tolima) 
Conclusion 7: The development of sports and cultural activities is a mechanism for 
generating resilience. Communities and other groups recognize that these activities encourage 
coexistence, respect, and solidarity. Nevertheless, neither institutional backing nor sustainable 
support are evident for formation processes, use of free time, work preparation, or generation of 
productive and social projects. Regional cultural traditions strengthen these activities. 
Recommendations
Adapt programming to build confidence (conclusions 1 and 5 and the related section in the 
chapter on Institutional Development) The decline in the indicators of trust in the government, 
in neighbors, and in the community cannot be solved exclusively by cooperative projects. It is 
essential to continue efforts to find mechanisms to link communities to each other and to the 
government with the support of coordinated interventions from international agencies. Taking 
advantage of the good relationships and credibility that USAID program implementation partners 
have with the associations and communities is key to generating trust in institutions.
There are demonstrable benefits to association models that favor dialogue and duplicate 
communities’ implicit knowledge, including anchoring their identity and improving project 
management. Any initiative, strategy, intention, and action that CELI or another cooperation 
program devises to increase collaboration is key to the consolidation of the democratic state and 
the sustainable construction of peace. CELI must recognize and coordinate national efforts that 
have been defined for the participation of young people and generation of opportunities as defined 
in CONPES 173/2014 and the participation of women as defined by CONPES 3784/2013, which 
gives guidelines for risk prevention, protection, and guaranteeing the rights of women who are 
victims of the armed conflict. 
84 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
Associations should foster cooperation and not competition. Therefore, it is important to review 
models that were historically used to encourage cooperation beyond the North American model. 
The incentive to access government resources encourages the creation of social organizations that 
may not necessarily meet their stated objectives and may not be sustainable. The design and 
implementation of monitoring systems should be a task that will guarantee, first, the sustainability 
of the organizations and, second, the adaptation of new productive models. 
Increase collaboration with households headed by women by using participatory models 
(conclusions 2, 4, 5, and 6) With respect to participation, the positive results seen in male headed 
households should be extended to female headed households. Male heads of household take 
advantage of what is offered by both cooperative agencies and the state, and this can be duplicated 
to mobilize female heads of household. Their vulnerability may require different empowerment 
strategies, such as the provision of childcare when there are meetings or offering to have meetings 
when they have free time.
Furthermore, those that already participate in organizations for victims, for women or other groups 
can serve as guides for other women thinking about joining these organizations. Likewise, the 
leaders of community associations and other groups whose commitment and participation already 
represent high levels of social stability serve as a resource for accomplishing this objective. CELI 
should continue to investigate different ways of using this association leadership resource in the 
final months of their interventions and conduct outreach activities with community members 
whose behavior indicates a growing isolation. 
Continue to reinforce the JACs to bring about their development and consolidation 
(conclusion 3) The current norm allows for the creation of multiple mechanisms for reinforcing 
the role of the JACs as conflict resolution agents. That is how the JACs have been expected to 
encourage reconciliation and develop peace. The work the JACs do to implement infrastructure 
projects (tertiary roads with a participatory component, for example), manage community radio 
stations, and perform oversight and monitoring of public policies could be effective for
strengthening the social fabric. The main report on the evaluation specifically recommends 
adapting the ICO-VEO instrument for the JACs and, along with other steps, making the results 
public to ensure their legitimacy in the eyes of their communities.
Reinforce cultural and sports initiatives to encourage peaceful communities (conclusion 7)
Culture and sports bring people and communities together. The dynamics of the conflict have 
affected the communities across multiple dimensions, including the destruction of social bonds, 
trust, integration, and respect for others. CELI's intervention should be aligned with the programs 
offered through the communication, culture, and innovation strategy that the Ministry of Culture 
has been implementing since June 2016 regarding issues of cultural diversity, access to 
information, communication skills, participatory citizenship, and education and innovation in 
communication and culture. 
In the sports sector, USAID programming should be coordinated with Coldeportes’ Program for 
Coexistence and Peace, which seeks to provide children and young people with sports activities in 
order to improve coexistence, prevent violence, encourage respect for human rights, and build
peace to enhance participation through proper emotional control and conflict resolution. 
85 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
86 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central
ANNEX 1: CLUSTER-LEVEL RESULTS, 
LIST EXPERIMENT
List experiment results in this annex are presented by cluster, which are: 
Cluster Treatment municipality(s) Control municipality(s)
16 Chaparral, Rioblanco (Tolima) San Antonio (Tolima)
17 Planadas (Tolima) Ortega (Tolima)
18 Ataco (Tolima) Balboa (Cauca)
24 Vistahermosa (Meta) Mapiripán (Meta)
25 Puerto Rico (Meta) Orito (Putumayo)
26 Mesetas, San Juan de Arama (Meta) San José del Fragua (Caquetá)
27 La Uribe, La Macarena (Meta) Puerto Caicedo (Putumayo)
28 Montañita, Cartagena del Chaira, San Vicente del 
Caguan (Caquetá) Lejanías (Meta)
Results are shown for the question on contact with illegal armed groups, and then for contact with 
illicit crops. For the region and then for each cluster, three graphs are presented. The first shows 
the results at baseline, the second at midline, and the third shows the impact, if any, using the 
differences in differences calculation. As will be seen across the graphs, there is an overall 
diminution of respondent reports that they have contact with either illegal armed groups or with 
illicit crops, in many cases approaching zero at midline. However, this trend crosses the treatment 
(CELI) and control sites, and as such, the trend cannot be attributed to any intervention. 
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 87
Central Region: Contact with armed groups
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 88
Central Region: Contact with illicit crops
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 89
Central Region, Cluster 16 
Contact with armed groups
Contact with illicit crops
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 90
Central Region, Cluster 17
Contact with armed groups
Contact with illicit crops
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 91
Central Region, Cluster 18
Contact with armed groups
Contact with illicit crops
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 92
Central Region, Cluster 24
Contact with armed groups
Contact with illicit crops
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 93
Central Region, Cluster 25
Contact with armed groups
Contact with illicit crops
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 94
Central Region, Cluster 26
Contact with armed groups
Contact with illicit crops
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 95
Central Region, Cluster 27
Contact with armed groups
Contact with illicit crops
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 96
Central Region, Cluster 28
Contact with armed groups
Contact with illicit crops
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 97
ANNEX 2: DATA TABLES, CLUSTER 
This annex presents data tables for the clusters that make up the Central region sample. These 
clusters are:
Cluster Treatment municipality(s) Control municipality(s)
16 Chaparral, Rioblanco (Tolima) San Antonio (Tolima)
17 Planadas (Tolima) Ortega (Tolima)
18 Ataco (Tolima) Balboa (Cauca)
24 Vistahermosa (Meta) Mapiripán (Meta)
25 Puerto Rico (Meta) Orito (Putumayo)
26 Mesetas, San Juan de Arama (Meta) San José del Fragua (Caquetá)
27 La Uribe, La Macarena (Meta) Puerto Caicedo (Putumayo)
28 Montañita, Cartagena del Chaira, San Vicente 
del Caguan (Caquetá) Lejanías (Meta)
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 98
Cluster 16
CELI: Chaparral, Rioblanco (Tolima) Control: San Antonio (Tolima) 
Variable
Cluster 16
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The economic situation is good or very good 0,268 0,275 0,082 0,170 -0.0629
The family is experiencing hunger 0,150 0,085 0,381 0,293 -0.00137
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty 0,316 0,238 0,907 0,517 0.302***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems 0,772 0,816 0,881 0,654 0.308***
Productive activities earn very little money 0,969 0,940 0,021 0,071 -0.0806***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity 0,010 0,021 0,000 0,025 -0.0111
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money 0,696 0,728 0,701 0,272 0.453***
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money 0,144 0,137 0,160 0,160 -0.0341
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses) 401773 409384 413144 491679 -50,832
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
FINANCIAL SERVICES 0,562 0,522 0,351 0,140 0.160***
Have a savings account 0,036 0,076 0,067 0,221 -0.101**
Have a checking account 0,289 0,476 0,392 0,331 0.298***
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities 0,613 0,631 0,515 0,527 0.0341
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,748 0,815 0,770 0,845 -0.0156
Currently have debt 0,778 0,776 0,562 0,585 -0.0288
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
The mayor’s office is run well or very well 0,197 0,353 0,353 0,455 0.0431
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago 0,186 0,329 0,274 0,128 0.268***
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses 0,057 0,142 0,057 0,254 -0.104**
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to 
express their opinions on community interests 0,031 0,104 0,062 0,043 0.0867***
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ opinions into 
account when making decisions 0,021 0,043 0,062 0,046 0.0362
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a project 0,159 0,306 0,236 0,284 0.0874
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project 0,547 0,603 0,392 0,508 -0.0540
The departmental government runs well or very well 0,262 0,361 0,258 0,264 0.0718
The departmental government runs better than two years ago 0,201 0,223 0,077 0,037 0.0551
The national government runs well or very well 0,416 0,466 0,420 0,282 0.190***
The national government runs better than two years ago 0,221 0,283 0,176 0,040 0.181***
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
TRUST (a lot or very much) CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
The departmental government 0,136 0,154 0,173 0,193 -0.00467
The national government 0,192 0,246 0,242 0,212 0.0715
Justice sector institutions 0,116 0,161 0,160 0,168 0.00612
Alternative justice institutions 0,218 0,274 0,180 0,187 0.0262
The institutions of the agricultural sector 0,255 0,254 0,349 0,223 0.118**
Social organizations and NGOs 0,213 0,146 0,119 0,144 -0.0997*
Training centers 0,434 0,542 0,542 0,491 0.170**
The Defensoría del Pueblo 0,165 0,259 0,154 0,179 0.0370
The municipal council 0,160 0,189 0,140 0,190 -0.0265
The national police 0,204 0,206 0,377 0,267 0.116**
The army 0,264 0,367 0,419 0,349 0.194***
The navy 0,263 0,245 0,217 0,200 0.0118
The municipal personería 0,205 0,249 0,124 0,205 -0.0341
The mayor’s office 0,167 0,326 0,234 0,346 0.0286
The JAC 0,518 0,553 0,335 0,454 -0.0861
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 99
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
SECURITY CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved 0,301 0,279 0,273 0,267 -0.0363
I would recommend that a family member return to the vereda 0,912 0,888 0,907 0,695 0.193***
Serious security problems in the vereda:
Homicides 0,057 0,125 0,077 0,025 0.104**
Illegal armed groups 0,245 0,318 0,015 0,041 0.0396
Antipersonnel mines 0,113 0,102 0,010 0,013 -0.0135
Displacement 0,094 0,102 0,015 0,015 -0.000264
Forced disappearances 0,038 0,011 0,062 0,018 0.0110
Extortion 0,075 0,068 0,057 0,018 0.0373
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.) 0,774 0,591 0,216 0,094 -0.0937
Forced recruitment 0,000 0,000 0,005 0,015 -0.0186
Sexual violence 0,000 0,011 0,005 0,015 -0.00352
There are no serious security issues in the vereda 0,727 0,776 0,722 0,835 -0.0478
There is police presence 0,263 0,331 0,052 0,081 0.0565
The police here are good or very good 0,114 0,222 0,200 0,313 0.0162
The police have improved in the last two years 0,023 0,087 0,100 0,094 0.0796
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
There is currently coca in the vereda 0,005 0,029 0,005 0,005 0.0210
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda 0,005 0,040 0,005 0,029 0.0116
(Agree or strongly agree)
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are 
illegal 0,979 0,939 0,689 0,620 0.0460
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities 
negatively 0,979 0,959 0,693 0,610 0.0766
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living 0,990 0,954 0,699 0,500 0.198***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad 0,979 0,956 0,690 0,639 0.0461
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
EXPECTATIONS CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years? 0,926 0,886 0,698 0,855 -0.177***
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve? 0,655 0,753 0,933 0,924 0.120**
In the next two years, will your licit income increase? 0,639 0,725 0,928 0,888 0.141***
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or 
corregimiento improve? 0,598 0,723 0,938 0,926 0.146***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve? 0,649 0,761 0,954 0,962 0.0983**
In the future, will access to health services improve? 0,500 0,580 0,964 0,934 0.106**
In the future, will access to education improve? 0,485 0,588 0,969 0,949 0.114**
In the future, will access to public services improve? 0,464 0,560 0,969 0,952 0.118**
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve? 0,464 0,669 0,974 0,941 0.237***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve 0,443 0,598 0,959 0,934 0.153***
In the future, will municipal government improve? 0,500 0,560 0,969 0,936 0.0837*
Do you think you’ll stay in your current residence for the next two 
years? 0,940 0,908 0,944 0,858 0.0595
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 100
Cluster 17
CELI: Planadas (Tolima) Control:Ortega (Tolima)
Variable
Cluster 17
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The economic situation is good or very good 0,251 0,289 0,192 0,183 0.0463
The family is experiencing hunger 0,153 0,041 0,463 0,226 0.121**
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty 0,312 0,215 0,975 0,459 0.421***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems 0,921 0,769 0,719 0,698 -0.132**
Productive activities earn very little money 0,861 0,964 0,015 0,038 0.0966***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity 0,005 0,013 0,010 0,033 -0.0147
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money 0,793 0,589 0,803 0,515 0.0570
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money 0,241 0,127 0,286 0,173 -0.00143
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses) 311857 521138 333448 503355 48,800
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
FINANCIAL SERVICES CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Have a savings account 0,424 0,617 0,187 0,604 -0.227***
Have a checking account 0,020 0,076 0,020 0,183 -0.105***
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities 0,424 0,437 0,424 0,693 -0.257***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,458 0,769 0,345 0,764 -0.0833
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,538 0,855 0,814 0,894 0.195***
Currently have debt 0,670 0,881 0,379 0,825 -0.224***
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
The mayor’s office is run well or very well 0,130 0,224 0,061 0,116 0.0589
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago 0,195 0,216 0,020 0,090 -0.0337
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses 0,030 0,117 0,074 0,107 0.0521
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to 
express their opinions on community interests 0,069 0,086 0,020 0,030 -0.00703
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ opinions into 
account when making decisions 0,039 0,033 0,010 0,028 -0.0220
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a project 0,133 0,133 0,055 0,119 -0.0618
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project 0,436 0,574 0,363 0,499 0.0293
The departmental government runs well or very well 0,361 0,430 0,250 0,326 0.0223
The departmental government runs better than two years ago 0,193 0,256 0,057 0,130 -0.0189
The national government runs well or very well 0,420 0,433 0,335 0,316 0.0365
The national government runs better than two years ago 0,232 0,234 0,058 0,153 -0.102**
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
TRUST (a lot or very much) CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
The departmental government 0,183 0,178 0,197 0,158 0.0439
The national government 0,246 0,235 0,270 0,195 0.107*
Justice sector institutions 0,208 0,142 0,182 0,158 -0.0262
Alternative justice institutions 0,242 0,262 0,150 0,193 0.00324
The institutions of the agricultural sector 0,276 0,338 0,231 0,380 -0.0389
Social organizations and NGOs 0,261 0,198 0,207 0,247 -0.0958
Training centers 0,560 0,506 0,550 0,592 -0.0807
The Defensoría del Pueblo 0,201 0,209 0,194 0,290 -0.0827
The municipal council 0,167 0,136 0,154 0,145 -0.0196
The national police 0,232 0,151 0,383 0,195 0.116**
The army 0,452 0,269 0,488 0,327 -0.0161
The navy 0,456 0,239 0,219 0,255 -0.259***
The municipal personería 0,255 0,195 0,144 0,225 -0.145**
The mayor’s office 0,199 0,182 0,165 0,154 -0.00462
The JAC 0,477 0,523 0,348 0,507 -0.0837
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 101
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
SECURITY CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved 0,215 0,339 0,202 0,384 -0.0351
I would recommend that a family member return to the vereda 0,862 0,820 0,842 0,904 -0.109**
Serious security problems in the vereda:
Homicides 0,028 0,098 0,030 0,023 0.0794**
Illegal armed groups 0,111 0,348 0,020 0,043 0.236***
Antipersonnel mines 0,000 0,098 0,000 0,015 0.0689***
Displacement 0,069 0,065 0,020 0,028 -0.0206
Forced disappearances 0,042 0,022 0,000 0,018 -0.0417*
Extortion 0,069 0,098 0,025 0,063 -0.0275
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.) 0,806 0,652 0,355 0,152 0.00425
Forced recruitment 0,014 0,022 0,000 0,008 -0.00238
Sexual violence 0,000 0,043 0,020 0,008 0.0557**
There are no serious security issues in the vereda 0,645 0,766 0,621 0,784 0.00577
There is police presence 0,291 0,305 0,163 0,102 0.0654
The police here are good or very good 0,291 0,148 0,242 0,342 -0.196
The police have improved in the last two years 0,091 0,017 0,121 0,154 -0.0621
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES CELI Control CELI Control (Impact)
There is currently coca in the vereda 0,015 0,000 0,005 0,021 -0.0338**
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda 0,035 0,005 0,000 0,008 -0.0302**
(Agree or strongly agree)
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are 
illegal 0,975 0,969 0,668 0,763 -0.102**
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities 
negatively 0,980 0,961 0,688 0,769 -0.102**
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living 0,975 0,974 0,620 0,762 -0.144***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad 0,964 0,966 0,731 0,799 -0.0520
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
EXPECTATIONS CELI Control CELI Control (Impact)
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years? 0,948 0,960 0,800 0,879 -0.0772*
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve? 0,739 0,777 0,906 0,871 0.0555
In the next two years, will your licit income increase? 0,719 0,754 0,916 0,865 0.0708
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or 
corregimiento improve? 0,719 0,766 0,941 0,911 0.0694
In the future, will your housing conditions improve? 0,768 0,764 0,980 0,891 0.0723
In the future, will access to health services improve? 0,591 0,619 0,975 0,822 0.152***
In the future, will access to education improve? 0,670 0,650 0,975 0,865 0.0812
In the future, will access to public services improve? 0,616 0,629 0,961 0,820 0.122**
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve? 0,606 0,668 0,961 0,878 0.134***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve 0,670 0,635 0,956 0,863 0.0462
In the future, will municipal government improve? 0,635 0,563 0,926 0,868 -0.0264
Do you think you’ll stay in your current residence for the next two 
years? 0,874 0,941 0,921 0,946 0.0554*
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 102
Cluster 18
CELI: Ataco (Tolima) Control: Balboa (Cauca) 
Variable
Cluster 18
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The economic situation is good or very good 0,359 0,268 0,117 0,142 -0.103**
The family is experiencing hunger 0,063 0,141 0,330 0,294 0.112**
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty 0,393 0,309 0,883 0,641 0.170***
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems 0,951 0,826 0,772 0,757 -0.109**
Productive activities earn very little money 0,835 0,936 0,136 0,013 0.239***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity 0,136 0,010 0,000 0,035 -0.158***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money 0,908 0,739 0,782 0,658 -0.0368
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money 0,214 0,190 0,325 0,311 0.0150
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses) 181748 398176 274345 469722 39,995
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
FINANCIAL SERVICES CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Have a savings account 0,447 0,501 0,495 0,420 0.122**
Have a checking account 0,005 0,053 0,049 0,134 -0.0437
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities 0,325 0,362 0,257 0,620 -0.361***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,403 0,648 0,510 0,714 0.0208
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,675 0,777 0,781 0,773 0.103
Currently have debt 0,626 0,759 0,476 0,719 -0.133**
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
The mayor’s office is run well or very well 0,163 0,221 0,112 0,075 0.0961**
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago 0,137 0,188 0,122 0,036 0.128***
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses 0,150 0,096 0,087 0,063 -0.0290
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to 
express their opinions on community interests 0,078 0,041 0,092 0,020 0.0223
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ opinions into 
account when making decisions 0,049 0,025 0,063 0,025 0.0129
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a project 0,173 0,191 0,143 0,054 0.104**
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project 0,517 0,402 0,379 0,314 -0.0438
The departmental government runs well or very well 0,182 0,350 0,197 0,261 0.0771
The departmental government runs better than two years ago 0,142 0,201 0,086 0,126 0.00365
The national government runs well or very well 0,321 0,501 0,433 0,256 0.358***
The national government runs better than two years ago 0,289 0,244 0,232 0,096 0.0951*
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
TRUST (a lot or very much) CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
The departmental government 0,034 0,166 0,085 0,087 0.121***
The national government 0,133 0,306 0,240 0,156 0.248***
Justice sector institutions 0,038 0,199 0,113 0,178 0.102**
Alternative justice institutions 0,057 0,243 0,090 0,177 0.0935*
The institutions of the agricultural sector 0,217 0,310 0,254 0,354 -0.0177
Social organizations and NGOs 0,083 0,244 0,106 0,264 0.00730
Training centers 0,382 0,500 0,408 0,580 -0.0896
The Defensoría del Pueblo 0,201 0,287 0,210 0,231 0.0505
The municipal council 0,125 0,163 0,123 0,100 0.0556
The national police 0,110 0,253 0,177 0,215 0.106**
The army 0,240 0,436 0,342 0,403 0.120**
The navy 0,205 0,375 0,167 0,329 -0.0124
The municipal personería 0,188 0,233 0,185 0,214 0.00888
The mayor’s office 0,216 0,214 0,126 0,083 0.0452
The JAC 0,583 0,405 0,466 0,302 -0.0475
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 103
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif
SECURITY CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved 0,239 0,305 0,293 0,350 0.0162
I would recommend that a family member return to the vereda 0,917 0,858 0,932 0,871 -0.00238
Serious security problems in the vereda:
Homicides 0,058 0,035 0,087 0,018 0.0498
Illegal armed groups 0,330 0,244 0,180 0,046 0.0408
Antipersonnel mines 0,097 0,012 0,015 0,003 -0.0675***
Displacement 0,175 0,035 0,092 0,030 -0.0780*
Forced disappearances 0,010 0,012 0,010 0,013 -0.00347
Extortion 0,068 0,105 0,019 0,051 -0.0140
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.) 0,806 0,756 0,267 0,180 0.0146
Forced recruitment 0,000 0,023 0,015 0,003 0.0382**
Sexual violence 0,000 0,105 0,015 0,010 0.107***
There are no serious security issues in the vereda 0,500 0,782 0,602 0,752 0.132**
There is police presence 0,704 0,423 0,117 0,228 -0.395***
The police here are good or very good 0,148 0,256 0,333 0,471 -0.0557
The police have improved in the last two years 0,093 0,141 0,083 0,169 -0.0179
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
There is currently coca in the vereda 0,378 0,005 0,448 0,019 0.0645*
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda 0,005 0,083 0,015 0,069 0.0263
(Agree or strongly agree)
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal 0,798 0,952 0,530 0,730 -0.0326
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities 
negatively 0,777 0,967 0,510 0,763 -0.0577
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living 0,878 0,972 0,517 0,729 -0.120**
My family and friends think growing coca is bad 0,731 0,951 0,550 0,769 0.00893
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
EXPECTATIONS CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years? 0,809 0,935 0,718 0,814 0.00744
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve? 0,748 0,815 0,874 0,896 0.0261
In the next two years, will your licit income increase? 0,612 0,742 0,850 0,803 0.157***
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or 
corregimiento improve? 0,767 0,775 0,898 0,911 -0.0151
In the future, will your housing conditions improve? 0,689 0,732 0,908 0,914 0.0314
In the future, will access to health services improve? 0,592 0,527 0,883 0,878 -0.0690
In the future, will access to education improve? 0,631 0,618 0,913 0,909 -0.0181
In the future, will access to public services improve? 0,612 0,582 0,913 0,899 -0.0295
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve? 0,646 0,681 0,922 0,916 0.0289
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve 0,699 0,557 0,913 0,906 -0.154***
In the future, will municipal government improve? 0,660 0,519 0,922 0,914 -0.143***
Do you think you’ll stay in your current residence for the next two 
years? 0,921 0,969 0,942 0,966 0.0159
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 104
Cluster 24
CELI: Vistahermosa (Meta) Control: Mapiripán (Meta) 
Variable
Cluster 24
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The economic situation is good or very good 0,495 0,327 0,136 0,172 -0.203***
The family is experiencing hunger 0,082 0,103 0,348 0,167 0.195***
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty 0,308 0,263 0,778 0,661 0.0616
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems 0,862 0,928 0,697 0,661 0.111**
Productive activities earn very little money 0,677 0,890 0,106 0,024 0.289***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity 0,215 0,083 0,045 0,010 -0.089***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money 0,737 0,712 0,672 0,639 0.00723
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money 0,263 0,235 0,232 0,213 -0.00697
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses) 444242 436078 518636 468644 35,647
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
FINANCIAL SERVICES CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Have a savings account 0,399 0,475 0,338 0,448 -0.0170
Have a checking account 0,015 0,017 0,101 0,063 0.0466*
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities 0,222 0,271 0,141 0,390 -0.171***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,414 0,424 0,424 0,414 0.0108
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,585 0,651 0,524 0,713 -0.102
Currently have debt 0,657 0,649 0,455 0,518 -0.0706
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
The mayor’s office is run well or very well 0,208 0,320 0,104 0,164 0.0551
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago 0,214 0,351 0,041 0,152 0.0283
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses 0,056 0,085 0,061 0,107 -0.0135
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to 
express their opinions on community interests 0,005 0,044 0,025 0,036 0.0286
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ opinions into 
account when making decisions 0,015 0,034 0,020 0,024 0.0140
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a project 0,251 0,226 0,081 0,071 -0.0193
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project 0,503 0,562 0,340 0,346 0.0344
The departmental government runs well or very well 0,386 0,366 0,287 0,349 -0.0454
The departmental government runs better than two years ago 0,340 0,297 0,108 0,180 -0.107*
The national government runs well or very well 0,438 0,362 0,318 0,313 -0.0765
The national government runs better than two years ago 0,335 0,228 0,106 0,172 -0.170***
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
TRUST (a lot or very much) CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
The departmental government 0,253 0,242 0,164 0,158 0.00421
The national government 0,352 0,210 0,168 0,153 -0.120**
Justice sector institutions 0,220 0,169 0,139 0,173 -0.0793
Alternative justice institutions 0,270 0,250 0,170 0,158 -0.00181
The institutions of the agricultural sector 0,205 0,197 0,214 0,139 0.0863
Social organizations and NGOs 0,312 0,242 0,151 0,186 -0.101
Training centers 0,698 0,497 0,628 0,542 -0.117*
The Defensoría del Pueblo 0,425 0,328 0,313 0,360 -0.139**
The municipal council 0,246 0,168 0,156 0,137 -0.0570
The national police 0,298 0,142 0,236 0,198 -0.125**
The army 0,458 0,334 0,480 0,370 -0.0211
The navy 0,474 0,206 0,293 0,257 -0.236***
The municipal personería 0,391 0,311 0,283 0,325 -0.124*
The mayor’s office 0,309 0,259 0,153 0,158 -0.0588
The JAC 0,500 0,570 0,388 0,454 -0.0101
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 105
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif
SECURITY CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved 0,297 0,362 0,355 0,480 -0.0716
I would recommend that a family member return to the vereda 0,747 0,772 0,753 0,877 -0.102**
Serious security problems in the vereda:
Homicides 0,086 0,073 0,066 0,058 -0.00386
Illegal armed groups 0,679 0,615 0,242 0,148 0.0267
Antipersonnel mines 0,049 0,312 0,020 0,102 0.186***
Displacement 0,062 0,073 0,030 0,073 -0.0113
Forced disappearances 0,012 0,015 0,005 0,019 -0.00772
Extortion 0,062 0,322 0,091 0,128 0.224***
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.) 0,296 0,551 0,106 0,346 0.0148
Forced recruitment 0,000 0,010 0,010 0,019 0.00500
Sexual violence 0,000 0,015 0,000 0,034 -0.0168
There are no serious security issues in the vereda 0,591 0,504 0,636 0,470 0.0637
There is police presence 0,136 0,174 0,172 0,194 0.0233
The police here are good or very good 0,320 0,324 0,441 0,342 0.0735
The police have improved in the last two years 0,200 0,118 0,265 0,275 -0.0897
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
There is currently coca in the vereda 0,494 0,157 0,302 0,134 -0.162***
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda 0,000 0,033 0,006 0,022 0.0243
(Agree or strongly agree)
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal 0,809 0,867 0,691 0,680 0.0560
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities 
negatively 0,828 0,897 0,642 0,706 0.00570
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living 0,835 0,895 0,646 0,671 0.0314
My family and friends think growing coca is bad 0,842 0,833 0,672 0,728 -0.0535
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
EXPECTATIONS CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years? 0,881 0,859 0,860 0,873 -0.0461
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve? 0,843 0,818 0,924 0,889 0.0106
In the next two years, will your licit income increase? 0,818 0,738 0,864 0,847 -0.0761
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or 
corregimiento improve? 0,793 0,709 0,944 0,966 -0.122***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve? 0,813 0,709 0,899 0,947 -0.139***
In the future, will access to health services improve? 0,768 0,579 0,859 0,918 -0.252***
In the future, will access to education improve? 0,828 0,642 0,899 0,952 -0.238***
In the future, will access to public services improve? 0,707 0,588 0,838 0,927 -0.206***
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve? 0,803 0,671 0,899 0,954 -0.202***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve 0,727 0,584 0,899 0,935 -0.176***
In the future, will municipal government improve? 0,793 0,630 0,884 0,927 -0.228***
Do you think you’ll stay in your current residence for the next two 
years? 0,835 0,925 0,870 0,916 0.0292
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 106
Cluster 25
CELI: Puerto Rico (Meta) Control: Orito (Putumayo) 
Variable
Cluster 25
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The economic situation is good or very good 0,556 0,258 0,048 0,146 -0.390***
The family is experiencing hunger 0,027 0,063 0,310 0,196 0.140***
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty 0,349 0,169 0,877 0,630 0.0535
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems 0,973 0,894 0,759 0,732 -0.0312
Productive activities earn very little money 0,849 0,865 0,043 0,074 -0.0143
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity 0,065 0,066 0,000 0,027 -0.0322
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money 0,856 0,700 0,733 0,583 -0.0470
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money 0,209 0,310 0,337 0,132 0.267***
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses) 291070 411558 312257 534328 -113,399***
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
FINANCIAL SERVICES CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Have a savings account 0,519 0,452 0,428 0,315 0.0962
Have a checking account 0,000 0,050 0,037 0,067 0.0262
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities 0,251 0,171 0,524 0,216 0.228***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,316 0,342 0,412 0,362 0.0813
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,525 0,609 0,740 0,596 0.233**
Currently have debt 0,487 0,576 0,465 0,407 0.150**
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
The mayor’s office is run well or very well 0,220 0,202 0,077 0,082 -0.0414
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago 0,220 0,155 0,105 0,066 -0.0179
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses 0,203 0,124 0,091 0,089 -0.0707*
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to 
express their opinions on community interests 0,070 0,067 0,043 0,010 0.0339
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ opinions into 
account when making decisions 0,037 0,050 0,021 0,007 0.0291
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a project 0,217 0,226 0,109 0,073 0.0222
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project 0,516 0,452 0,276 0,341 -0.131**
The departmental government runs well or very well 0,377 0,342 0,096 0,392 -0.341***
The departmental government runs better than two years ago 0,333 0,199 0,102 0,173 -0.194***
The national government runs well or very well 0,302 0,390 0,305 0,360 0.0272
The national government runs better than two years ago 0,349 0,264 0,155 0,126 -0.0557
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
TRUST (a lot or very much) CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
The departmental government 0,180 0,249 0,067 0,215 -0.0839
The national government 0,181 0,289 0,148 0,208 0.0560
Justice sector institutions 0,087 0,251 0,043 0,218 -0.00159
Alternative justice institutions 0,065 0,314 0,040 0,159 0.147***
The institutions of the agricultural sector 0,133 0,255 0,046 0,218 -0.0251
Social organizations and NGOs 0,055 0,288 0,066 0,229 0.0727
Training centers 0,440 0,644 0,506 0,579 0.129*
The Defensoría del Pueblo 0,209 0,408 0,109 0,256 0.0553
The municipal council 0,138 0,221 0,079 0,110 0.0528
The national police 0,128 0,244 0,109 0,230 0.00254
The army 0,268 0,503 0,198 0,477 -0.0220
The navy 0,177 0,457 0,113 0,383 0.0292
The municipal personería 0,185 0,368 0,109 0,256 0.0380
The mayor’s office 0,191 0,248 0,071 0,090 0.0317
The JAC 0,508 0,421 0,296 0,363 -0.153**
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 107
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
SECURITY CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved 0,235 0,451 0,250 0,509 -0.0267
I would recommend that a family member return to the vereda 0,893 0,831 0,706 0,891 -0.229***
Serious security problems in the vereda:
Homicides 0,174 0,103 0,107 0,022 0.000678
Illegal armed groups 0,293 0,538 0,096 0,089 0.239***
Antipersonnel mines 0,065 0,197 0,053 0,050 0.0973**
Displacement 0,228 0,205 0,139 0,042 0.0554
Forced disappearances 0,000 0,154 0,011 0,032 0.126***
Extortion 0,022 0,145 0,032 0,107 0.0323
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.) 0,728 0,333 0,294 0,156 -0.264***
Forced recruitment 0,011 0,034 0,016 0,015 0.0168
Sexual violence 0,000 0,017 0,016 0,010 0.0205
There are no serious security issues in the vereda 0,508 0,710 0,529 0,697 0.0444
There is police presence 0,578 0,471 0,235 0,184 -0.0426
The police here are good or very good 0,171 0,342 0,300 0,473 0.0387
The police have improved in the last two years 0,134 0,241 0,159 0,459 -0.205*
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
There is currently coca in the vereda 0,286 0,095 0,202 0,103 -0.0753*
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda 0,044 0,003 0,011 0,003 -0.0362***
(Agree or strongly agree)
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are 
illegal 0,844 0,940 0,650 0,865 -0.117***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities 
negatively 0,839 0,912 0,660 0,902 -0.176***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living 0,919 0,942 0,675 0,884 -0.190***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad 0,795 0,866 0,652 0,892 -0.176***
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
EXPECTATIONS CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two 
years? 0,921 0,890 0,800 0,810 -0.00788
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve? 0,845 0,854 0,898 0,913 0.00248
In the next two years, will your licit income increase? 0,759 0,829 0,898 0,898 0.0694
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or 
corregimiento improve? 0,775 0,821 0,898 0,953 -0.00827
In the future, will your housing conditions improve? 0,733 0,784 0,909 0,950 0.0200
In the future, will access to health services improve? 0,717 0,663 0,845 0,881 -0.0742
In the future, will access to education improve? 0,765 0,727 0,866 0,918 -0.0677
In the future, will access to public services improve? 0,695 0,630 0,856 0,896 -0.110**
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve? 0,850 0,730 0,904 0,943 -0.159***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve 0,674 0,663 0,963 0,908 0.0437
In the future, will municipal government improve? 0,797 0,710 0,882 0,935 -0.136***
Do you think you’ll stay in your current residence for the next two 
years? 0,887 0,884 0,914 0,905 -0.0112
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 108
Cluster 26
CELI: Mesetas, San Juan de Arama (Meta) Control: San José del Fragua (Caquetá) 
Variable
Cluster 26
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The economic situation is good or very good 0,212 0,256 0,116 0,185 -0.0483
The family is experiencing hunger 0,026 0,043 0,212 0,120 0.0911**
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty 0,158 0,223 0,682 0,688 0.0619
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems 0,781 0,863 0,616 0,824 -0.138***
Productive activities earn very little money 0,760 0,813 0,081 0,007 0.129***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity 0,148 0,056 0,000 0,017 -0.119***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money 0,586 0,637 0,591 0,576 0.0521
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money 0,187 0,215 0,283 0,163 0.132***
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses) 510177 455956 391111 531951 -175,010**
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
FINANCIAL SERVICES CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Have a savings account 0,601 0,488 0,419 0,427 -0.0947
Have a checking account 0,040 0,044 0,030 0,083 -0.0539*
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities 0,207 0,463 0,348 0,637 -0.0325
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,414 0,563 0,414 0,544 0.0166
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,756 0,649 0,854 0,735 -0.00697
Currently have debt 0,727 0,710 0,596 0,546 0.0353
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
The mayor’s office is run well or very well 0,144 0,261 0,171 0,115 0.173***
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago 0,160 0,177 0,037 0,060 0.00407
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses 0,187 0,078 0,207 0,176 -0.0753*
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to 
express their opinions on community interests 0,040 0,032 0,005 0,027 -0.0265
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ opinions into 
account when making decisions 0,030 0,037 0,005 0,010 0.00272
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a project 0,144 0,195 0,113 0,047 0.115***
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project 0,549 0,608 0,451 0,343 0.172***
The departmental government runs well or very well 0,172 0,447 0,121 0,293 0.101
The departmental government runs better than two years ago 0,108 0,343 0,038 0,074 0.217***
The national government runs well or very well 0,432 0,423 0,238 0,361 -0.123*
The national government runs better than two years ago 0,211 0,277 0,054 0,090 0.0172
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
TRUST (a lot or very much) CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
The departmental government 0,169 0,267 0,074 0,144 0.0264
The national government 0,301 0,293 0,103 0,211 -0.122**
Justice sector institutions 0,222 0,215 0,068 0,216 -0.143***
Alternative justice institutions 0,223 0,327 0,047 0,198 -0.0454
The institutions of the agricultural sector 0,305 0,370 0,081 0,321 -0.174***
Social organizations and NGOs 0,198 0,300 0,084 0,257 -0.0671
Training centers 0,711 0,649 0,399 0,671 -0.345***
The Defensoría del Pueblo 0,297 0,418 0,126 0,293 -0.0378
The municipal council 0,162 0,217 0,063 0,145 -0.0266
The national police 0,215 0,238 0,137 0,242 -0.0914*
The army 0,411 0,428 0,245 0,479 -0.230***
The navy 0,393 0,292 0,138 0,269 -0.221***
The municipal personería 0,250 0,342 0,099 0,260 -0.0577
The mayor’s office 0,250 0,245 0,119 0,135 -0.0184
The JAC 0,515 0,598 0,457 0,419 0.117*
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 109
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
SECURITY CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved 0,141 0,360 0,116 0,435 -0.105*
I would recommend that a family member return to the vereda 0,823 0,815 0,707 0,939 -0.232***
Serious security problems in the vereda:
Homicides 0,167 0,040 0,061 0,015 -0.0693**
Illegal armed groups 0,489 0,327 0,136 0,044 -0.0319
Antipersonnel mines 0,167 0,193 0,056 0,039 0.0255
Displacement 0,089 0,058 0,045 0,029 -0.0161
Forced disappearances 0,011 0,045 0,020 0,032 0.0326
Extortion 0,100 0,175 0,056 0,078 0.0547
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.) 0,633 0,650 0,182 0,280 -0.0725
Forced recruitment 0,000 0,009 0,025 0,010 0.0229
Sexual violence 0,011 0,018 0,005 0,012 0.00110
There are no serious security issues in the vereda 0,545 0,456 0,697 0,629 -0.0285
There is police presence 0,313 0,263 0,101 0,122 -0.0600
The police here are good or very good 0,379 0,448 0,053 0,571 -0.463***
The police have improved in the last two years 0,207 0,281 0,000 0,388 -0.316**
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
There is currently coca in the vereda 0,388 0,053 0,257 0,035 -0.144***
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda 0,005 0,012 0,000 0,010 0.000223
(Agree or strongly agree)
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are 
illegal 0,789 0,931 0,525 0,867 -0.183***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities 
negatively 0,851 0,926 0,582 0,886 -0.228***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living 0,853 0,953 0,587 0,896 -0.202***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad 0,764 0,945 0,565 0,873 -0.113**
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif
EXPECTATIONS CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years? 0,750 0,858 0,690 0,857 -0.0543
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve? 0,707 0,780 0,884 0,878 0.0971**
In the next two years, will your licit income increase? 0,636 0,712 0,843 0,859 0.0642
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or 
corregimiento improve? 0,576 0,759 0,879 0,966 0.0938**
In the future, will your housing conditions improve? 0,581 0,734 0,929 0,927 0.163***
In the future, will access to health services improve? 0,399 0,629 0,894 0,890 0.232***
In the future, will access to education improve? 0,530 0,695 0,914 0,929 0.153***
In the future, will access to public services improve? 0,439 0,654 0,904 0,927 0.184***
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve? 0,611 0,737 0,899 0,959 0.0680
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve 0,465 0,627 0,919 0,934 0.148***
In the future, will municipal government improve? 0,475 0,641 0,924 0,956 0.145***
Do you think you’ll stay in your current residence for the next two 
years? 0,890 0,926 0,927 0,928 0.0353
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 110
Cluster 27
CELI: La Uribe, La Macarena (Meta) Control: Puerto Caicedo (Putumayo) 
Variable
Cluster 27
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The economic situation is good or very good 0,497 0,198 0,036 0,158 -0.445***
The family is experiencing hunger 0,031 0,040 0,287 0,355 -0.0469
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty 0,210 0,153 0,882 0,720 0.104**
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems 0,954 0,758 0,723 0,693 -0.115**
Productive activities earn very little money 0,764 0,844 0,133 0,078 0.153***
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity 0,077 0,051 0,005 0,008 -0.0233
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money 0,749 0,528 0,795 0,575 0.00958
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money 0,328 0,175 0,374 0,270 -0.0724
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses) 339975 481448 394103 597225 -74,625
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
FINANCIAL SERVICES CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Have a savings account 0,462 0,513 0,390 0,343 0.0913
Have a checking account 0,010 0,053 0,026 0,093 -0.0275
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities 0,149 0,258 0,441 0,275 0.258***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,333 0,575 0,369 0,505 0.129**
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,723 0,730 0,625 0,728 -0.120
Currently have debt 0,554 0,730 0,410 0,663 -0.0683
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
The mayor’s office is run well or very well 0,401 0,271 0,382 0,207 -0.00554
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago 0,374 0,321 0,382 0,235 0.0911
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses 0,185 0,123 0,149 0,203 -0.140***
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to 
express their opinions on community interests 0,118 0,058 0,103 0,065 -0.0133
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ opinions into 
account when making decisions 0,087 0,043 0,092 0,058 -0.00590
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a project 0,342 0,254 0,243 0,217 -0.0695
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project 0,500 0,571 0,345 0,553 -0.134**
The departmental government runs well or very well 0,296 0,427 0,317 0,332 0.0919
The departmental government runs better than two years ago 0,268 0,377 0,200 0,225 0.0684
The national government runs well or very well 0,384 0,387 0,355 0,399 -0.0464
The national government runs better than two years ago 0,279 0,335 0,148 0,242 -0.0356
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
TRUST (a lot or very much) CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
The departmental government 0,214 0,251 0,102 0,178 -0.0757
The national government 0,279 0,243 0,141 0,190 -0.0987*
Justice sector institutions 0,122 0,174 0,053 0,150 -0.0550
Alternative justice institutions 0,142 0,281 0,061 0,133 0.0688
The institutions of the agricultural sector 0,201 0,248 0,089 0,228 -0.115**
Social organizations and NGOs 0,132 0,235 0,091 0,216 -0.0412
Training centers 0,596 0,672 0,570 0,511 0.131*
The Defensoría del Pueblo 0,230 0,355 0,150 0,346 -0.0626
The municipal council 0,182 0,196 0,103 0,170 -0.0634
The national police 0,147 0,194 0,097 0,200 -0.0641
The army 0,273 0,381 0,153 0,347 -0.112*
The navy 0,248 0,294 0,108 0,236 -0.0820
The municipal personería 0,252 0,373 0,082 0,316 -0.154**
The mayor’s office 0,273 0,295 0,206 0,239 -0.0595
The JAC 0,455 0,673 0,354 0,540 0.0422
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 111
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif
SECURITY CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved 0,200 0,393 0,263 0,480 -0.0335
I would recommend that a family member return to the vereda 0,877 0,870 0,841 0,875 -0.0492
Serious security problems in the vereda:
Homicides 0,152 0,110 0,072 0,090 -0.0970*
Illegal armed groups 0,182 0,543 0,051 0,198 0.232***
Antipersonnel mines 0,015 0,250 0,021 0,155 0.0652
Displacement 0,121 0,098 0,062 0,085 -0.0727
Forced disappearances 0,045 0,012 0,015 0,038 -0.0686**
Extortion 0,061 0,128 0,015 0,135 -0.0486
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.) 0,864 0,476 0,164 0,285 -0.580***
Forced recruitment 0,000 0,030 0,015 0,015 0.0292
Sexual violence 0,030 0,018 0,010 0,023 -0.0495**
There are no serious security issues in the vereda 0,662 0,590 0,749 0,513 0.199***
There is police presence 0,492 0,455 0,092 0,203 -0.182***
The police here are good or very good 0,202 0,274 0,118 0,259 -0.284*
The police have improved in the last two years 0,079 0,189 0,056 0,296 -0.190
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
There is currently coca in the vereda 0,348 0,142 0,301 0,170 -0.0602
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda 0,079 0,003 0,109 0,008 0.0132
(Agree or strongly agree)
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are 
illegal 0,731 0,866 0,734 0,673 0.200***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities 
negatively 0,644 0,904 0,667 0,696 0.269***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living 0,682 0,946 0,658 0,732 0.186***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad 0,641 0,899 0,724 0,690 0.308***
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
EXPECTATIONS CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years? 0,735 0,845 0,667 0,798 -0.0320
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve? 0,605 0,858 0,795 0,960 0.0853*
In the next two years, will your licit income increase? 0,554 0,808 0,785 0,928 0.127***
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or 
corregimiento improve? 0,472 0,835 0,795 0,970 0.184***
In the future, will your housing conditions improve? 0,492 0,745 0,759 0,955 0.0407
In the future, will access to health services improve? 0,344 0,588 0,723 0,933 0.0115
In the future, will access to education improve? 0,436 0,713 0,738 0,933 0.0532
In the future, will access to public services improve? 0,395 0,615 0,738 0,908 0.0319
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve? 0,441 0,835 0,744 0,930 0.215***
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve 0,441 0,630 0,759 0,905 0.0513
In the future, will municipal government improve? 0,467 0,660 0,749 0,923 0.0138
Do you think you’ll stay in your current residence for the next two 
years? 0,885 0,908 0,922 0,950 -0.00487
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 112
Cluster 28
CELI: Montañita, Cartagena del Chaira, San Vicente del Caguan (Caquetá) 
Control: Lejanías (Meta)
Variable
Cluster 28
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The economic situation is good or very good 0,178 0,262 0,203 0,145 0.141**
The family is experiencing hunger 0,023 0,012 0,153 0,277 -0.133***
The family’s conditions are of extreme poverty 0,178 0,239 0,668 0,652 0.0604
Unemployment and lack of opportunities are grave problems 0,787 0,893 0,827 0,617 0.327***
Productive activities earn very little money 0,770 0,819 0,025 0,070 -0.00633
One of the only attractive options is illegal activity 0,034 0,177 0,030 0,008 0.172***
Last week they feared running out of food for lack of money 0,609 0,688 0,649 0,664 0.0610
Last week they did run out of food for lack of money 0,213 0,246 0,173 0,316 -0.0542
Income proxy (estimated monthly household expenses) 391193 588996 477891 577891 51,362
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
FINANCIAL SERVICES CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Have a savings account 0,490 0,457 0,337 0,438 -0.150**
Have a checking account 0,030 0,043 0,074 0,090 -0.0267
Have paid for services through bank and non-bank entities 0,698 0,203 0,599 0,352 -0.297***
Have applied for credit with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,609 0,406 0,594 0,402 -0.0798
Have an active loan with a bank, cooperative or NGO 0,732 0,760 0,758 0,738 0.0885
Currently have debt 0,673 0,742 0,604 0,680 -0.0681
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
GOVERNMENT AND INSTITUTIONS CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
The mayor’s office is run well or very well 0,301 0,257 0,213 0,227 -0.0505
The mayor’s office is run better than two years ago 0,179 0,341 0,102 0,260 -0.00727
The mayor’s office reports regularly on its expenses 0,054 0,168 0,168 0,184 0.0748
Municipal authorities frequently or always invite the community to 
express their opinions on community interests 0,064 0,047 0,020 0,023 -0.0235
Municipal authorities frequently or always take citizens’ opinions into 
account when making decisions 0,045 0,023 0,020 0,012 -0.00997
I trust a commitment from the mayor’s office to run a project 0,280 0,219 0,105 0,165 -0.105*
I trust a commitment from the JAC president to run a project 0,569 0,561 0,388 0,617 -0.213***
The departmental government runs well or very well 0,478 0,188 0,485 0,144 0.0621
The departmental government runs better than two years ago 0,261 0,193 0,138 0,067 0.0123
The national government runs well or very well 0,479 0,402 0,359 0,228 0.0681
The national government runs better than two years ago 0,251 0,402 0,072 0,126 0.0819
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
TRUST (a lot or very much) CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
The departmental government 0,323 0,154 0,237 0,077 -0.0190
The national government 0,295 0,237 0,226 0,127 0.0326
Justice sector institutions 0,265 0,157 0,213 0,093 0.00147
Alternative justice institutions 0,381 0,203 0,152 0,093 -0.120**
The institutions of the agricultural sector 0,333 0,252 0,282 0,181 0.0195
Social organizations and NGOs 0,208 0,258 0,225 0,202 0.0811
Training centers 0,714 0,623 0,690 0,554 0.0237
The Defensoría del Pueblo 0,377 0,358 0,343 0,242 0.0766
The municipal council 0,249 0,177 0,209 0,141 -0.0108
The national police 0,337 0,125 0,385 0,104 0.0349
The army 0,500 0,236 0,563 0,216 0.0621
The navy 0,380 0,265 0,458 0,175 0.153**
The municipal personería 0,383 0,261 0,238 0,228 -0.131*
The mayor’s office 0,301 0,248 0,193 0,193 -0.0400
The JAC 0,580 0,614 0,440 0,539 -0.0838
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 113
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
SECURITY CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Security in the vereda or corregimiento has improved 0,386 0,290 0,510 0,323 0.0763
I would recommend that a family member return to the vereda 0,896 0,859 0,911 0,844 0.0484
Serious security problems in the vereda:
Homicides 0,063 0,207 0,015 0,066 0.0795*
Illegal armed groups 0,365 0,300 0,050 0,156 -0.193***
Antipersonnel mines 0,073 0,221 0,015 0,086 0.0510
Displacement 0,042 0,036 0,005 0,090 -0.101***
Forced disappearances 0,010 0,036 0,050 0,012 0.0498*
Extortion 0,063 0,107 0,054 0,098 -0.0105
Citizen insecurity (robberies, attacks, etc.) 0,719 0,786 0,257 0,273 0.0428
Forced recruitment 0,000 0,000 0,005 0,016 -0.0116
Sexual violence 0,000 0,021 0,000 0,027 -0.0192
There are no serious security issues in the vereda 0,525 0,453 0,698 0,563 0.0777
There is police presence 0,317 0,699 0,153 0,133 0.438***
The police here are good or very good 0,667 0,149 0,586 0,091 -0.0446
The police have improved in the last two years 0,367 0,097 0,333 0,206 -0.185
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
ILLICIT ACTIVITIES CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
There is currently coca in the vereda 0,026 0,450 0,020 0,386 0.0448
There is currently illegal mining in the vereda 0,005 0,004 0,000 0,004 -0.00352
(Agree or strongly agree)
Coca, poppy and marijuana should not be grown because they are illegal 0,949 0,846 0,965 0,506 0.368***
Growing coca, poppy and marijuana affects families and communities 
negatively 0,965 0,854 0,990 0,560 0.326***
Growing coca is not the only way a family can make a living 0,985 0,953 0,960 0,510 0.415***
My family and friends think growing coca is bad 0,938 0,857 0,935 0,581 0.267***
Baseline Midline Dif-Dif 
EXPECTATIONS CELI Control CELI Control (Impact) 
Do you plan to invest in your productive project in the next two years? 0,801 0,897 0,801 0,791 0.0562
In the next two years, will your living conditions improve? 0,723 0,754 0,856 0,910 -0.0840
In the next two years, will your licit income increase? 0,653 0,680 0,822 0,816 -0.00224
In the next two years, will the economic situation in your vereda or 
corregimiento improve? 0,589 0,727 0,916 0,941 0.0572
In the future, will your housing conditions improve? 0,644 0,699 0,911 0,953 -0.0494
In the future, will access to health services improve? 0,540 0,578 0,916 0,941 -0.0205
In the future, will access to education improve? 0,614 0,715 0,936 0,938 0.0763
In the future, will access to public services improve? 0,520 0,598 0,911 0,918 0.0603
In the future, will roads to the municipal capital improve? 0,629 0,723 0,946 0,965 0.0390
In the future, will relations with neighbors improve 0,540 0,645 0,921 0,926 0.0630
In the future, will municipal government improve? 0,589 0,641 0,941 0,945 -0.000697
Do you think you’ll stay in your current residence for the next two 
years? 0,912 0,921 0,905 0,953 -0.0390
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 114
ANNEX 3: CALCULATION OF 
INDICATOR FIGURES 
Reporting on CELI indicators 
Below are tables specifying how indicators were grouped into the three categories of 
economic, institutional, and social for presentation in the CELI Midline Evaluation general 
and regional reports. The present grouping is admittedly arbitrary but represents the best 
judgment of the evaluators, recognizing that other arrangements are possible. In discussions 
with the implementers, the present grouping was acknowledged and confirmed.
Economic indicators
These are the sixteen indicators that were used to calculate the Economic Indicators pie chart. 
Indicators in yellow are reported by the implementers and those in green are taken from the 
midline survey data. While certain indicators provided by government sources were not 
included due to the irregular pace of reporting, indicators DO3-041 and DO3-040 had reliable 
numbers, compiled by government sources and reported by the implementers - since in all 
cases targets were met. DO3-038 was not included because of a lack of confidence in the 
numbers reported. 
1 DO3-005 Avg monthly household income of USAID's beneficiaries
2 DO3-041 # of restitution cases supported in CELI municipios
3 DO3-040 # of formalized properties supported by CELI municipalities
4 DO3-036. Total value of CELI projects approved
5 DO3-037. Total value of CELI projects completed
DO3-038. Total public investment in consolidation zones
6 DO3-006 Public funds leveraged in CELI zones att to USG interventions
7
DO3-030 # of strategic rural and economic development programs with territorial 
approach implemented in CELI municipios
8
DO3-031 # & % of people benefitted by strategic rural and econ development 
programs with territorial approach, implemented in CELI municipios
9 DO3-034 # of rural households benefiting directly from USG interventions
10
DO3-032a Private sector funds leveraged in CELI zones attributable to USG 
interventions
11
DO3-032b Private sector funds leveraged in CELI zones attributable to USG
interventions (for-profit, crops, social enterprises)
12 DO3-033a # of private-public alliances formed
13 DO3-033b # of private-public alliances formed
Midterm Impact Evaluation of the Consolidation and Enhanced Livelihood Initiative – Central 115
14 DO3-035 # of people with financial product includes mobile wallet, leasing, etc.
15 DO3-042 Community funds leveraged in CELI Zones attrib to USG Interventions
16 DO3-029 Value of incremental sales of key supported products in CELI zones
Institutional development
These are the six indicators included under institutional development: 
1 DO3-006 Public funds leveraged in CELI zones attributed to USG interventions
2 DO3-010 # of strategic national social programs implemented in CELI zones
3
DO3-011 # & % of people benefitted by national social programs impl in CELI 
municipios
4 DO3-012 # of beneficiaries receiving improved infrastructure services
5 DO3-013 Governance capacity index
6 DO3-028 Level of accountability in CELI municipios
Two indicators that would be included in this category but which were to be provided by the 
GOC were not updated and have been deleted and are not reported or counted: 
D03-004 – Public Social Services Municipal Index
D03-009 – Amount and Average Percent of annual change in municipal own-source income 
Social indicators
Six indicators included in the calculation of the Social Indicators pie chart: 
1 DO3-008 # of rapid impact projects implemented by USG 
implementers
2 DO3-024 Social Capital Index
3 DO3-029 Value of incremental sales of key supported products in 
CELI zones
4 DO3-025 # of CSO members supported by USG assistance
5 DO3-026 (a) Change in Index of Org Capacity (ICO) of CSOs 
supported by USG assistance
6 DO3-026 (b) Index of Org Capacity (ICO) of CSOs supported by USG 
assistance
DO3-026(a) and DO3-026(b) are closely related. Information was partially available for 
both, and targets were met. For 26(a) this was listed as “not reported” for Montes de María 
and Central, but “exceeded” for CELI Norte/Sur. For 26(b), this was reported as exceeded 
for all three CELIs.
U.S. Agency for International Development
1300 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20523