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ABSPII
MIDTERM REVIEW
February – May 2006
 Review Team 
Julian Adams
John Howard 
Jim Lorenzen
Paul Teng
June 1 2006 
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A. INTRODUCTION
The project document for the USAID Leader Award # GDG-A-00-02-
00017-00, entitled Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project II, stipulates that 
an external technical project review will be conducted at the end of the second 
year and during year 5 of the project. For each review at least two acknowledged
authorities would visit several sites in Africa and Asia.
This document reports on the findings, conclusions and recommendations 
of the mid-term evaluation mission conducted during the specified periods 
between February and May 2006. Evaluation team members visited with USAID 
personnel, research personnel and other country stakeholders in Washington 
D.C., and selected countries in Africa and Asia. 
A.1 Background and context
USAID has been funding efforts in agricultural biotechnology for over 
fifteen years. Such efforts have included the Agricultural Biotechnology Support 
Project (ABSPI), led by Michigan State University from 1990-2002, which took an 
integrated approach to biotechnology, providing support for research as well as 
the range of policy issues (IPR, technology transfer and biosafety) in developing 
countries. Recognizing that the issues associated with biotechnology product 
development and dissemination, namely technology development, policy 
development, and commercialization, have become increasingly complex, and 
recognizing the need to draw on experts from various fields to provide 
appropriate technical assistance, the Agency split its portfolio of biotechnology 
activities into two major global efforts in 2001– one focused on technology 
development and the other on biosafety policy development. The resultant 
Agricultural Biotechnology Support Project II (ABSPII) has a mandate primarily 
for technology development and for policy development in issues pertaining to 
intellectual property rights (IPR) and technology transfer. The sister project, the 
Program for Biosafety Systems (PBS) has a mandate to focus on biosafety policy 
issues. 
USAID issued Requests for Applications (RFA) in early 2002 for the two 
projects, and from the responses, selected the consortium led by Cornell 
University for ABSPII and a CG center, initially ISNAR and subsequently 
transferred to IFPRI, for PBS. The cooperative agreements for these projects were 
effective in 2002/2003. In 2004, biosafety efforts in India and Bangladesh were 
transferred from PBS to a new project, the South Asia Biosafety Project (SABP), 
which is implemented in a partnership between IFPRI and AgBios (Merrickville, 
Ontario Canada). 
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Broadly, the RFA had stipulated four program components, namely
 Technology development,
 Policy activities on intellectual property rights and technology transfer,
 Biotechnology commercialization, and
 Biotechnology outreach and communication.
ABSPII was tasked to develop partnerships to undertake activities in these 
under the overall USAID Collaborative Agricultural Biotechnology Initiative 
(CABIO). The selection criteria in the RFA were systems framework design, 
strength of the partnership, and potential to create an enabling policy 
environment.
The successful respondent to the RFA, the Cornell University consortium, 
comprised strong representation from eight U.S. public institutions, nine private 
sector entities, six international agricultural research centers, six 
NGOs/foundations, and seventeen national/regional partner organizations. The 
Cornell University-led proposal also had a transparent process of prioritizing 
GM technologies into product commercialization packages which formed the 
core set of activities around which policies, outreach and communication could 
be leveraged to ensure impact.
The ABSPII portfolio of technologies proposed by the Cornell University 
Consortium and accepted by USAID, included the following: 
1. Fruit and shoot borer resistant eggplant
2. Late blight resistant potatoes
3. Drought and salt tolerant rice
4. Tobacco streak virus resistant sunflower and groundnuts
5. Papaya resistant to ringspot virus
6. Multi-virus resistant tomatoes
7. Bananas resistant to Sigatoka and nematodes
8. Pod borer resistant chickpea
9. Cassava resistant to mosaic disease
10. Sweet potatoes resistant to feathery mottle virus
ABSPII is a five-year Leader with Associate (LWA) Cooperative Agreement 
active in Asia and Africa. The country specific programs in Asia include India, 
Bangladesh, Indonesia and the Philippines, while in Africa the current country￾specific programs are located in Uganda and Mali. ABSPII also has a mandate to 
develop sub-regional approaches to biotechnology in Africa to complement the 
Agency’s ongoing investment in sub-regional agricultural organizations to 
promote greater dissemination of technology and make effective use of scarce 
donor and African resources. The LWA form of a cooperative agreement was 
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introduced by USAID several years ago to provide additional flexibility in the 
Agency’s procurement mechanisms. The benefit of the LWA is to provide the 
opportunity for Missions and regional bureaus to support specific activities 
within the broader scope of the Leader cooperative agreement through Associate 
Awards, which require reporting specifically on the scope of the individual 
associate award. Funding for the Leader component of the ABSPII agreement is 
provided through a combination of funding from USAID, including the Office of 
Environment and Science Policy, USAID regional bureaus and field Missions. In 
addition, the project receives funds through two Associate Awards to support 
the Uganda and Mali programs.
The overall goal of ABSPII is to use biotechnology as a tool to address key 
constraints to agricultural productivity to promote economic growth, improve 
environmental quality and achieve food security in developing countries. To 
achieve this, the project is expected to integrate technology development by
creating an enabling policy environment for biotechnology product 
development. In addition, ABSPII is to work in coordination with other USAID￾funded efforts in providing technical assistance for the development of biosafety 
policies to ensure a consistent approach to these issues with recipient country 
governments. 
While the primary focus of ABSPII has been in specific technology 
development projects, the program has undertaken other activities, including a 
range of communication activities, intellectual property rights activities and 
regional priority setting in East and West Africa. 
A.2 Purpose of the Mid-term Evaluation
The goal of this mid-term evaluation is to examine the impact of ABSPII 
against USAID objectives. Further, this evaluation will provide external 
guidance and advice to assist ABSPII in strengthening the program to increase 
likelihood of success to achieve overall Agency objectives.
 Specific details of the Statement of Work (SOW) are provided in Appendix 
1. 
A.3 Team composition
The Evaluation Team comprised:
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Julian Adams, Professor of Molecular, Cellular and Developmental Biology, 
and of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Michigan, 830 N. 
University, Ann Arbor MI 48109-1048; 
John Howard, President, Applied Biotechnology Institute, 
San Luis Obispo, California.
James Lorenzen, Associate Professor, Department of Plant, Soil and 
Entomological Sciences, University of Idaho, Moscow, ID 83844 
Paul S. Teng, Professor and Head, Natural Sciences & Science Education,
National Institute of Education, Nanyang Technological University, 
1 Nanyang Walk, Singapore 637 616.
A.4. Itinerary and Schedule of work
The mid-term review took place during the period 8 February to 31 May 
2006. 
A.4.1. Briefing, Washington D.C. 
The first activity of the Mid-Term Project review team was a briefing in 
Washington D.C. between February 8-10 2006, attended by three of the four team 
members – Julian Adams (attended day 1 only), John Howard and James 
Lorenzen. 
Meeting Agenda was as follows:
Wednesday, February 8
10: 00 am 
10:30am 
Opening remarks by Frank Shotkoski
Fruit and shoot borer-resistant eggplant: Vijayaraghvan
12:30pm Review Team meets for lunch with Ray Wu
1:30pm Drought and salt tolerant rice: Ray Wu
2:30pm Virus resistant tomato in West Africa: Molly Jahn and Bob Gilbertson
4:00pm Coffee Break & meeting with Molly Jahn
4:30pm Review Team meets with the ABSPII team
Thursday, February 9
9:00am Late blight potato by K.V. Raman and Sandra Austin-Phillips
10:45am Socio-economic assessment presentation by George Norton
12:00pm Lunch with the Review Team 
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1:00pm Tobacco streak virus-resistant groundnut by Roger Beachy 
and Vijayaraghvan
2:15pm Multiple virus-resistant tomato and papaya ringspot virus￾resistant papaya by Desiree Hautea
4:15pm Communication and outreach by Andrea Besley
Friday, February 10 
9:00am - Review Team meets with USAID
The team then broke into sub-teams to visit different cooperating 
institutions and sites.
A.4.2. Visit to Mali by John Howard and Julian Adams between February 12 – 16 2006 
Throughout the visit to Mali, Drs. Howard and Adams were accompanied by 
Dr. F. Shotkoski. 
February 12. Informal discussion with Dr. F. Shotkoski
February 13. Visit to Mali USAID Mission. Discussions with the Director of the 
Mission, Alex Newton and Dr. Ram Shetty, Also present were Dr. Harry 
Bottenberg, Gregory Vaut and Robert Kagbo.
February 14. Visit to the Institut d’Economie Rurale in Sotuba near Bamako, met 
with Madame Gambey, the Director, and with Dr. Dembélé, the Scientific 
Director. 
The rest of the day was spent inspecting the tomato variety trials in 
various locations near Bamako.
February 15. Visit to the AVRDC site, located at ICRISAT. Met with the local 
Director of ICRISAT, and Drs. Virginie Levasseur and Issoufou 
Abdourhamane. 
February 15. Met with the Minister for Rural Economy in Bamako.
February 16. Visits to the University of Mali in Bamako, and the Laboratoire 
Central Vétérinaire. Meetings with the Director General of the LCV, Dr. 
Tembely, and with Dr. Oumar Niangado, a previous Director of the 
Institut d’Economie Rurale, (now with the Syngenta Foundation).
A.4.3. Visit to India by John Howard, Julian Adam, & Paul Teng
February 18. Group presentation by ABSPII South Asia team at Hotel Taj 
President Lands End, Mumbai.
February 19. Dinner with Vice Chancellor, Tamil Nadu Agricultural University 
Coimbatore
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February 20. Visit Tamil Nadu Agricultural University to meet with scientists 
and view biosafety greenhouses for transgenic eggplant research. Visit 
farmers’ fields to view eggplant fruit/shoot borer infestations and damage. 
February 21. Visit to Directorate of Rice Research, Hyderabad and ICRISAT, 
Patancheru. 
February 22: Leave for Aurangabad from Mumbai. Visit MAHYCO research 
center, Jalna and the field station.
February 23. Leave for Delhi in the evening. 
February 24. Visit with Dr. Lawrence Paulsen, USAID Mission, New Delhi.
 
A.4.4. Visit to Indonesia by J. Lorenzen
January 26. Visit to Indonesian Center for Agricultural Biotechnology and 
Genetic Resources Research and Development (ICABIOGRAD), Bogor; 
consultations with R. Coffman and ABSPII SE Asia team. 
January 27. travel to Lembang, visit Indonesian Vegetable Research Institute 
(IVEGRI). 
A.4.5 Visit to India by J. Lorenzen 
February 18. Group presentation by ABSPII South Asia team at Hotel Taj 
President Lands End, Mumbai (together with Julian Adams, John 
Howard, and Paul Teng).
February 19. Depart for Simla. 
February 20. Visit CPRI, Shimla (full-day program, facilities tour, consultations).
February 21. Travel to Modipuram, visit CPRI Modipuram, return to New Delhi.
A.4.6. Visit to the Philippines by J. Adams
January 19. Visit to Institute of Plant Breeding, University of the Philippines at 
Los Baños (UPLB-IPB), review of project activities and facilities. Meet 
with UPLB Chancellor, Luis Rey I. Velasco. Group Presentation by 
ABSPII Philippine team. Meeting with Estrella Alabastro, Secretary, 
Department of Science and Technology, the Philippines, and Chair ABSPII 
Advisory Board.
A.4.7. Visit to the Philippines by John Howard and Paul Teng. 
February 26. Visit Institute of Plant Breeding, University of the Philippines, Los 
Baños project activities and facilities. Group presentation by ABSPII 
Philippine team. 
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February 27. Visit with Philippine Council for Agriculture, Forestry and Natural 
Resources Research and Development (PCARRD) Executive Director P.S. 
Faylon; Visit with the UPLB Chancellor, Luis Rey I. Velasco, and UPLB
Executive Director, Cecilio R. Arboleda. Visit with Chair of UPLB, 
Institutional Biosafety Committee, and a member of the National Biosafety 
Committee, Philippines
A.4.8. Discussion meeting in Washington D.C. by J. Adams, J. Howard and J. Lorenzen 
between 26-28 April to plan preparation of review document. 
B. EVALUATION OF MANAGEMENT ISSUES
B.1 Overview 
 The review team was favorably impressed with several aspects of the 
management of the ABSPII project. We felt that ABSPII/Cornell University has 
done an excellent job of introducing the concepts of product development, 
regulatory, intellectual property production and public relations into the 
program. The priority setting exercise appeared to have the appropriate amount 
of rigor for this stage of the project and has been followed up with an active 
participatory ex ante analysis of potential socioeconomic impact. Although there 
may inevitably be arguments concerning the initial portfolio of projects selected, 
the review team was generally satisfied that a good faith effort was made to 
obtain the appropriate information required to arrive at the initial list. In 
addition, ABSPII/Cornell University should be commended for establishing 
linkages with local country groups to determine their priorities, and to assist in 
the selection of projects. Our impression is that the ABSPII project is favorably 
regarded in many of the locales we visited and credit for that impression must go 
to Cornell University and the general high regard which this university enjoys 
world-wide. This is an important factor that has enabled the project to build up 
its credibility and achievements to date. It is important that the catalytic role 
provided by the involvement of Cornell University be substantiated by a focus 
on substantive progress as well as on buy-in from partners – which appears to be 
significant in both India and the Philippines. Intellectual Property (IP) issues 
(Program Component 2) were apparently incorporated during the initial 
selection of the projects. However, the review team was not provided with 
enough information to determine if these (IP issues) were adequately and 
comprehensively addressed. 
The review team notes that since the beginning of ABSPII, three projects 
have been discontinued, pod borer resistant chickpea, mosaic disease resistant 
cassava, and feathery mottle virus-resistant sweet potato. Decisions to 
discontinue the chickpea and sweet potato project were taken at the 2005 board 
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meeting. It is not clear from the material presented why the cassava project was 
dropped from the portfolio particularly as the board recommended continuing 
this project in 2005. The review team considers it important to review the 
portfolio of projects at regular intervals; to consider additions to the portfolio, as 
well as removals for those projects where significant progress has not been 
achieved. Consequently the review team considers that these steps provide 
evidence that there was an evaluation for these selected early stage projects. The 
review team has not been provided with sufficient information to evaluate the
basis of these decisions. 
The review team was also favorably impressed with regional coordination 
of some of the projects in South and South East Asia. For example, coordination 
of Bt eggplant project in India, Bangladesh and the Philippines, with MAHYCO 
playing a central role, brings an extra dimension and allows for synergistic 
interactions between the three country-specific Bt eggplant projects. 
Management of the projects within India and Bangladesh has been sub￾contracted to Sathguru Management Consultants Pvt. Ltd. with headquarters in 
Hyderabad, India. The review team was very favorably impressed by Sathguru’s 
day-to day, and month-to month management of the India and Bangladeshi 
projects. There appears to be excellent communication between Sathguru and 
the individual principal investigators and interested parties in India and 
Bangladesh. Sathguru utilizes the MS-PROJECT project management system, 
which appears to enable timely tracking of tasks, at several levels of detail, and 
provide the appropriate information to interested parties. The review team was 
provided with MS-PROJECT printouts, to illustrate the level and detail of project 
monitoring that Sathguru provides. We were informed that this system, already 
used for the India and Bangladesh projects, will also likely be adopted by the S.E. 
Asia team. The level of management provided by Sathguru does not include
scientific leadership, nor was it intended to. 
Regional management in South East Asia (the Philippines and Indonesia), 
provided by Dr. Desirée Hautea, is similarly considered to be excellent. In 
distinction from the management activities provided by Sathguru in South Asia, 
Dr. Hautea lends scientific leadership to the projects as well as management 
expertise, such as detailed tracking of tasks and information dissemination. In 
Mali, local management of the tomato project is provided by Dr. Levasseur. The 
review team was impressed with Dr. Levasseur’s energy and commitment to the 
project. 
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We congratulate Cornell University on their achievements to date in 
leading ABSPII but we do have some concerns, which we describe below. 
B.2 Project Portfolio
Although the criteria used for project selection appeared to be reasonable, 
we are concerned that the final mix of projects, was weighted heavily towards 
“proof-of-concept” projects, and not enough towards projects that were in later 
phases – product development and commercialization. Thus, the review team 
considered that only two projects, Bt eggplant and PRSVR Papaya are beyond 
“proof-of-concept ” stage, and are likely to be commercialized either in the 
lifetime of ABSPII, or shortly thereafter. Since technology development and 
product commercialization and the associated IP and Technology Transfer 
activities represented three of the four program components in the RFA, the 
review committee considers it unfortunate that majority of the projects are in the 
“proof-of-concept ” stage and in some cases in the very beginning of the “proof￾of-concept” stage (e.g., PYV resistant tomatoes in Mali, and DST Rice), and not 
likely to be commercialized within the intended time frame1. 
B.3 Budget Issues
The review team was concerned that too large a proportion of the overall 
budget has been allocated to management, and too little has been allocated to 
individual projects for research and product development. The review team 
considers that minimal central management should be required for the majority 
of projects which are in “proof-of-concept” phase, beyond yearly (or longer) 
evaluations of progress of the individual projects through this initial stage. The 
review team was aware that this issue has been the subject of discussion between 
USAID and ABSPII. However we found it difficult to determine the extent of the 
reduction of management costs, as requested by USAID in 2005, as accounting 
practices have apparently changed over the last year. We understand that in 
earlier years Sathguru management costs were folded into to the overall 
management budget, whereas now they are budgeted separately in the 
respective project costs. 
B.4 Ongoing Project Management 
Although the review team was satisfied that the process used to arrive at 
the initial portfolio of projects to be funded was sound, the review team did not 
 
1 The RFA mentions 10 years. 
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see any strong evidence of coherent and overarching scientific leadership beyond 
the initial startup period for ABSPII. Thus, we could find no information 
indicating that ABSPII management exercised scientific leadership by engaging
in a continuing evaluation of the projects. Rather, the annual meetings of the 
advisory board appear to have been utilized for the assessment of progress of the 
individual projects. The review team considers it important to review the 
portfolio of projects at regular intervals by smaller more focused teams. 
Furthermore, the review team is concerned that resources and ancillary support 
appear to have been allocated to all projects regardless of their status or phase. 
Thus, the review team considers it premature to devote resources and effort to 
outreach and communication for projects in the “proof-of-concept” stage. We 
recognize, however, that communication is needed for projects which have 
clearly gone into a product development and likely commercialization phase. 
Unrealized public expectations for the efficacy or value of a particular product 
can have a significant negative impact on the future acceptance of other 
transgenic crops. The review team is aware that the leadership of ABSPII has 
undergone three changes since its inception, and that the present director, Dr. 
Frank Shotkoski has only occupied this position for one year prior to this review. 
The review team is therefore reluctant to ascribe the lack of evidence of an 
overarching and coherent scientific leadership to any shortcomings of either the 
incumbent Director or of either of the two previous directors of ABSPII. Rather,
it may simply be a consequence of the frequent changes in leadership over the 
last three years. 
B.5 Nature of the Cooperative Agreement between ABSPII and USAID
Funds to support ABSPII were awarded to Cornell University to be 
administered as a “cooperative agreement” between ABSPII and Cornell
University. USAID regulations specify that a “cooperative agreement” include 
provisions for the substantial involvement of USAID in decisions relating to the 
execution of the work specified in the RFA. However, it has become clear to the 
review team that the nature of the relationship between the ABSPII leadership 
and USAID has not approached the spirit or the letter of a cooperative 
agreement, almost since the inception of ABSPII. Rather, the ABSPII leadership 
has been operating as if USAID had awarded a grant, rather than a cooperative 
agreement, to carry out the work. The review team considers that the lack of 
cooperation between the two entities has in many cases had a significant 
negative impact on the ability of ABSPII to accomplish its goals. We understand 
however, that the more complex the scope of a project, the more difficult it may 
be to operate within USAID regulations for a cooperative agreement. The review 
committee did not consider that it was part of their charge to determine the 
genesis or to assign responsibility for this lack of cooperation. Nor do we think it 
is profitable, or constructive to do so. Rather, in the following section, we 
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suggest a modified management structure which may encourage and support a 
cooperative arrangement, and bring both entities back into conformity with 
specifications of a cooperative agreement2, and in so doing, with USAID 
regulations. 
B.6. Relations of Cornell University with Partner Institutions
Although Cornell University possesses considerable intellectual resources, 
the global nature and wide ranging scope of ABSPII inevitably requires 
partnerships with other institutions, both public and private to achieve its goals. 
The proposal submitted by Cornell University listed a number of such partners. 
However, with a few notable exceptions (e.g., Sathguru, MAHYCO), the review 
committee is concerned that implementation of some of the individual ABSPII 
projects has not taken sufficient advantage of these other resources. For other 
projects, the review committee is concerned that project design and progress 
could have been significantly advanced by the inclusion of investigators, groups 
of investigators or institutions not initially mentioned in the proposal. It is thus 
somewhat difficult to escape the conclusion that for some projects, the choice of 
implementing investigators or groups of investigators was determined more by 
their direct association with Cornell University than by their ability, or by their 
national or international stature. As a consequence, the review committee 
questions whether the association with Cornell University was a factor in 
determining the projects selected for support during the initial phase.
B.7. Global and Regional Cooperation 
Although, as we mention above, the review team was favorably 
impressed with regional cooperation in Asia, we were disappointed to see that 
the ABSPII initiatives in Africa are proceeding in apparent complete 
independence, and so lack any synergy or “value-added” benefits that could be 
gained. We note that the tomato projects in Mali and the Philippines bear 
considerable similarity to each other; both involve virus resistance to two 
different viruses, and the first goal for both projects is to develop geminivirus 
resistant varieties. The review committee felt that an opportunity for profitable 
interaction, and South-South cooperation is being lost for these projects. 
 
2 We use the terms “Cooperative Agreement”, “Contract” and “Grant” as defined by USAID.
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C. EVALUATION OF INDIVIDUAL PROJECTS
C.1. Bt Eggplant 
ABSPII has been supporting the development and commercialization of Bt 
eggplant. Three countries are involved in this work; India, Bangladesh and the 
Philippines, with India taking the lead role, as eggplant is a particularly 
important vegetable crop in India. This project is a cooperative venture 
involving a commercial enterprise, MAHYCO, as well as University partners, 
most notably Tamil Nadu Agricultural University. The field trial phase is well￾advanced, and MAHYCO expects that a Bt eggplant variety will be 
commercialized in India at the latest by June 2007. Bt eggplant is the most 
advanced of all the product development plans in ABSPII – South Asia and 
potentially could be the showcase product from this project in the near term. The 
project has achieved its major milestones in a timely manner since the first 
contact between partners in 2003. 
The concept of conferring non-tissue specific resistance to two lepidopteran 
borers is proven through a high level of resistance and subsequent bioassays 
using the Cry1Ac gene (for which Monsanto holds the patent rights) transformed 
into MAHYCO genotypes. Field efficacy trials approved by the Review 
Committee on Genetic Modification (RCGM) were conducted at 11 locations in 
India using the Bt-MAHYCO genotypes in 2004. No field trials have yet been
carried out in Bangladesh and the Philippines. First backcross seedlings (BC1) 
using local, farmer-desired varieties (10 from India, 19 from Bangladesh, and
three from the Philippines), are in greenhouses of several laboratories as of 
November 2005. 
Freedom to Operate (FTO) reviews were reported to have been completed 
and apparently show no IP issues related to the Public-Private partnership for 
technology transfer and subsequent commercial and public sector release of the 
transgenic varieties. (We note that review team was not provided with materials 
relevant to these issues.) A regulatory framework is in place in India and the 
Philippines by which final approvals required to release the hybrids and/or 
open-pollinated varieties (OPVs) may be obtained. Safety studies completed in 
2005 in India for regulatory compliance include sub-chronic oral toxicity study, 
allergenicity studies, goat study, cow feeding study, rabbit study, alkaloids and 
amino acid profiling, and second year trials conducted by the Indian Council of 
Agricultural Research (ICAR). The team was very impressed with the high 
quality containment facilities in all sites visited, and the pragmatic approach to 
biosafety that has resulted from close liaison with regulatory authorities at all 
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stages.
The project appears on target to obtain final regulatory clearances and 
commercialize Bt hybrids in 2007 and OPVs in 2008 in India. The assumption is 
that Bangladesh will follow soon after India and use Indian data for approval. It 
is significant that both Bangladesh and the Philippines will be willing to accept 
regulatory packages generated in India for their own approval systems. For the 
Philippines, a small deviation of 1-2 months from the anticipated timeline to 
obtain BC2 material was due to further approval required by The Convention on 
Biological Diversity to ship BC1 material from India to Philippines. 
Ex ante socio-economic studies show potential for value creation in hybrids 
and OPVs. The review team did not see evidence of a strategy for resistance 
management or of using Bt eggplant in an integrated pest management (IPM) 
scheme. This has to be flagged as a potential area of concern since past 
experience with unilateral pest control methods in vegetables shows that the 
evolution of resistance is likely to occur sooner without practicing IPM.
The project appears well managed by both MAHYCO and by Sathguru. 
The review team had no criticisms of the management of the execution of this 
project. However, it should be pointed out that this project was initiated by 
MAHYCO for India in 1999, well before the beginning of ABSPII. ABSPII is 
contributing to the funding of the last stages in the commercialization of Bt 
eggplant - the field trials and the construction of the regulatory package for the 
Government of India. MAHYCO estimates that the cost of the regulatory 
package for a new event is $3,000,000 - $5,000,000, and is contributing most of the 
costs. ABSPII’s support to MAHYCO for the commercialization of Bt eggplant 
amounts to ~$100,000/year. Given the high costs to put together a regulatory 
package it is not realistic to expect ABSPII to entirely fund the regulatory 
package. However the question must be asked, is the ABSPII funding for Bt 
eggplant resulting in either i) the commercialization of a transgenic crop which 
would not have otherwise be commercialized, or ii) the expediting of the 
commercialization process. MAHYCO had told us that they would have 
proceeded to commercialization with or without ABSPII contributions. 
Therefore, given the early and continuing interest by MAHYCO in the Bt 
eggplant, we conclude that the answer to the first question must be “no”. 
Furthermore, given the considerable resources invested by MAHYCO, it is 
unlikely that ABSPII’s contribution will expedite the commercialization of Bt 
eggplant hybrids. Therefore, the primary benefit of ABSPII involvement is less 
the initial commercialization of the hybrid Bt eggplant in India, and more the 
broadening of the MAHYCO effort to aid in the introduction of open-pollinated
cultivars developed by public institution, and the extension to Bangladesh and 
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the Philippines. These are useful and noteworthy accomplishments, creating 
model private-public and south-south partnerships.
C.2. Virus Resistant Tomatoes, Mali, SE Asia 
There are two projects that involve multiple virus resistance in tomato, in 
both cases dealing with natural host-plant resistance to a geminivirus (tomato 
yellow leaf curl virus; TYLCV) as the primary problem and genetic engineering 
for a virus of secondary importance, a potyvirus (PVY) in the case of W. Africa 
and a cucumovirus CMV in SE Asia. Evaluation of these two “separate” projects 
is combined in this section, consistent with the team recommendation that they 
be coordinated (see section D. Future Recommendations)
ABSPII has been supporting a project to develop a transgenic virus resistant 
tomato variety for Mali, West Africa. Currently the Mali tomato industry is 
suffering severe losses due to two similar but recognizably different virus 
infections caused by Tomato leaf curl Mali virus (TLCMV) and Tomato yellow 
leaf curl virus (TYLCV). Both these diseases are caused by geminiviruses. 
Natural host-plant resistance to geminiviruses exists in tomatoes. While we (JA 
& JH) were in Mali we visited several locations in the vicinity of Bamako where 
field trials of ~40 varieties of commercial varieties of tomatoes were being carried 
out in order to evaluate which, if any of the varieties exhibited natural resistance 
to the geminiviruses present in Mali, and which also would be adapted for 
growth under Malian conditions. We understand that additional trials are being 
conducted in neighboring West African countries, for example Benin, Togo and 
Ghana. Initial indications from the field trials in the vicinity of Bamako are that 
some established varieties exhibit resistance to the geminiviruses found in Mali. 
Assembly of the seed of the commercial varieties and the design and execution of 
the field trials has been, and continues to be under the direction of Professors 
Molly Jahn (Cornell University until summer 2006) and Robert Gilbertson 
(University of California at Davis). It is noted that Professor Gilbertson has 
already been working in Mali for the last three years on geminivirus infections, 
supported by other USAID funds. The team considers that this is very promising 
and valuable research, with very reasonable probability of success and useful 
side-benefits in infrastructure development and personnel training.
Identification of one or more pre-existing commercial varieties of tomatoes 
adapted for growth in West Africa is however an intermediate goal of this 
project. The next goal will be to develop a variety of tomatoes which is resistant 
both to geminiviruses and potyvirus in West Africa. No natural host-plant 
resistance to potyviruses has been identified in tomatoes. However, naturally 
resistant varieties of peppers (another member of the Solanaceae) are known, as 
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are accessions from several potato species. A future goal of this project is to 
transfer a cloned resistance factor from pepper to tomatoes using tested 
transgenic technologies. Although potyvirus resistance is determined by a 
recessive allele in pepper, this gene is effectively dominant when overexpressed 
as provided by Dr. Jahn's construct. Professor Jahn has already created 
transgenic tomato plants in her laboratory at Cornell University which contain 
potyvirus resistance determinants. This work will need to be repeated for the 
varieties chosen once the West Africa trials are completed, with subsequent 
transfer to geminivirus-resistant lines performed via independent transformation 
or backcrossing. However, the potyviruses represent a large virus family and the 
review team was not presented with efficacy data for the virus strains likely to be 
encountered in W. Africa. 
 
The review team was satisfied in general from the information presented to 
us in Washington D.C. and in Mali, in that tomatoes represent a significant crop 
in West Africa, furthermore that there is extensive trade in tomatoes and tomato 
products among West African countries, principally the six comprising the 
former French West African colonies. Furthermore, export of tomatoes from 
West Africa to the EU is not a factor that would limit acceptability of transgenic 
tomatoes. Thus EU policies towards transgenic crops should not impact the 
socio-economic value of transgenic tomatoes in West Africa. The work 
underway to identify geminivirus resistant commercial varieties of tomato, 
suitable for commercial growth in West Africa, seems well conceived and 
executed, and we have confidence in the abilities of both Professors Gilbertson 
and Jahn to manage this project. Identification of the geminivirus infections 
requires application of biotechnology tools, but there is no transgenic plant 
component in this phase of the work. The programs in Indonesia and the 
Philippines plan to use marker-assisted selection to facilitate gene transfer into 
adapted cultivars suitable for local markets.
The value of the next phase, creation of a transgenic tomato variety resistant 
to both potyvirus and geminiviruses, although technologically feasible, must be 
considered to be speculative. The review team was not presented with evidence 
that potyvirus infections are, at the present time, a significant threat to the 
tomato crop in Mali or in other West African countries. In contrast the review 
team saw evidence that attacks of fruit borer, Helicoverpa armigera, a lepidopteran 
pest of tomatoes, are already significant in Mali. Since Helicoverpa armigera is 
sensitive to the Bt toxin, it is not clear why the introduction of potyvirus 
resistance into a geminivirus resistant variety was chosen to be the next phase of 
this project, rather than creation of a Bt tomato strain resistant to Helicoverpa. 
The budget for this project appears to be quite modest. The review team 
learned from Professors Jahn and Gilbertson, that they receive about 
17 
$120,000/year to support their work in the U.S.A., and while in Mali, we learned 
that the West African NAR’s receive ~$4,000 to support field trials. However, 
the total funds available for the tomato project are $1.7 million over 3 years (letter 
from B. Pathak to F. Shotkoski, dated November 2 2005). We were unable resolve 
the differences between these figures. More information is needed on past, as 
well as on future projected expenditures, to fully understand the budgetary 
allocations.
Commercialization of a multiple (geminivirus and potyvirus) virus resistant 
variety is considered to be several years away, as i) the choice of the parent 
variety, resistant to geminivirus, into which potyvirus resistance will be 
introduced, has not yet been made, and ii) “proof-of-concept” for the transgenic 
plants for the target potyvirus strain(s) in West Africa remains to be 
demonstrated. Furthermore, the socioeconomic value of the transgenic 
component of this project will depend on the extent to which potyvirus 
infections of the tomato crop in West Africa become a realized threat rather than 
a potential one.
 
It is noted that Mali has not yet passed a Biosafety law, and that even Bt 
cotton may not be grown in that country. Of the neighboring countries only 
Burkina Faso has a directive allowing field trials. 
The SE Asia component of this project is slightly different. Rather than the 
basket of public and private cultivars being screened for geminivirus resistance 
in W. Africa, the SE Asia partners are evaluating two advanced resistant lines 
from AVRDC. These lines are being backcrossed to Philippine and Indonesian 
cultivars to develop locally-acceptable lines resistant to TYLCV. These programs 
will use molecular markers developed by AVRDC in an advanced marker￾assisted selection (MAS) scheme. This is important because the multigenic 
nature of the AVRDC resistant lines complicates the backcrossing scheme and 
enhances the value of the molecular markers. As in W. Africa, the severe and 
increasing nature of the geminivirus epidemic makes this an important issue for 
one of the most important vegetables. As such, this is good use of biotechnology 
to solve an economically important problem. The combined strategy of using 
conventional backcross breeding enhanced by MAS, along with using a proven 
transgenic coat protein technology (CP), gives this program a high probability of 
success. The CP events will also be provided by AVRDC.
As in West Africa, the geminivirus issue is the primary disease threat and 
this will be addressed by classical breeding. The problem addressed by the 
transgenic technology is secondary. The importance of the secondary virus issue 
has not been established for the Philippines, although the project has conducted 
a field survey to assess the relative abundance of tomato viruses in Indonesia. 
18 
The relative importance of the secondary virus will determine the importance of 
the transgenic technology. Some additional “proof-of-concept” work will be 
needed here to show efficacy for local strains of CMV, and to establish the 
importance of transgenic plants.
As previously mentioned, the Indonesia program has surveyed and archived 
tomato viruses. This archive is being evaluated using molecular analyses to 
determine diversity of the target viruses. This aspect of the project is highly 
commendable. It will be very valuable to have a diverse archive of characterized 
virus strains once resistant material is available for testing, and selection of 
strains for challenge tests will be facilitated by knowledge of genetic diversity.
 
Management at the local level appeared very competent for both countries. 
There did not seem to be much of a role for additional layers of management at 
this time either from Sathguru or from Cornell University. We would 
recommend waiting until there is clearer evidence of commercial efficacy before 
investing funds on anything besides technical progress (see Section D - Future 
Recommendations).
C.3. Drought and Salinity Tolerant Rice, India
ABSPII has been supporting work by Professor Wu’s laboratory at Cornell 
University in developing drought and salinity tolerant (DST) rice. Professor Wu 
has introduced genes coding for trehalose synthesis into rice. In earlier work he 
employed antibiotic resistance as a selectable marker to identify transformants, 
using a rice variety, that was not acceptable to India as a transgenic variety. 
More recently, using APSPII support, he has repeated these experiments using 
antibiotic-marker-free technology to transform the genes into a more acceptable 
variety. Transformants are now being tested in a greenhouse in India at the 
Directorate for Rice Research (DRR) in Hyderabad. The review team believes 
that “proof-of-concept” has not been demonstrated and that there are three sets
of concerns with this project 
First, it is not clear what relevance or correlation the greenhouse trials
presently being carried out, have to drought and salinity conditions in the field. 
It is also not clear what constitutes a commercially acceptable level of drought 
and/or salinity tolerance. This may be different for different geographic areas 
and the degree to which growers are willing to accept possible yield penalties 
may vary. Without such information which addresses these practical concerns, it 
is difficult to predict whether the current laboratory observations can lead to a 
viably commercial product. 
19 
Second, no determinations have yet been made of other characteristics of 
transgenic rice with enhanced trehalose levels - for example taste and palatability 
tests as well as agronomic characteristics such as yield or germination. It is 
likely that there may be a yield penalty associated with expression of the genes 
for drought and salinity tolerance under non-stress conditions. The extent of this 
penalty will be critical in determining the socio-economic value of this form of 
DST rice. Germination levels in rice with enhanced trehalose levels may also be 
significant as it has been shown in other organisms that trehalose plays a key role 
in germination3. 
Third, as others have argued (and Professor Wu has indicated that he 
accepts these arguments), drought and salinity tolerance is a multifactorial trait, 
and it is therefore unlikely that introduction of gene(s) coding for trehalose 
biosynthesis alone will provide acceptable tolerance levels. 
As a consequence the review team was surprised to hear from the Acting 
Project Director of the DRR in Hyderabad that he expects commercialization of a 
drought and salinity tolerant rice variety by end of 2007/beginning of 2008. In 
contrast, the review team feels that the DST rice project is still in the early “proof￾of-concept stage”, and that the expected date of commercialization is 
unattainable. The review team finds this disconcerting, as the creation of 
unrealistic expectations, (and the subsequent failure to realize these expectations) 
does much to fuel negative public perceptions of the value of agricultural 
biotechnology. Furthermore, given the present knowledge of the multifactorial 
nature of drought and salinity tolerance, we question whether focusing in one 
gene for enhanced trehalose biosynthesis is the most appropriate way to proceed. 
C.4. RSV-Resistant Papaya
The Philippines is the lead country for the Papaya ringspot virus (PRSV)-
resistant papaya, which is also the most advanced of all the product 
development plans in ABSPII-SE Asia. It potentially could be the showcase 
product for this region as it is developed with a majority of local technology and 
“know-how”. The project has achieved many milestones since the first contact 
between partners in 2003 but is about a year behind schedule. 
The concept of coat-protein mediated virus resistance in papaya has been 
previously validated and commercialized in Hawaii. Unfortunately, the SE Asia 
strains of PRSV differ enough that new constructs had to be made to use a 
 
3 A recent report (Satoh-Nagasawa, N. et al. 2006. Nature 441: 227-230.) indicating that a trehalose 
metabolic enzyme controls inflorescence architecture in maize, and appears to be conserved among the 
gramineae, further argues for the importance of evaluating the pleiotropic effects of increased trehalose 
levels in rice. 
20 
similar approach as in Hawaii. Initial efficacy tests with local PRSV strains 
appear to have validated the new technology through confirmation of gene 
expression and pathogenicity tests in containment greenhouses in the Philippines 
(achieved in 2003-04). 
The review team was told that Freedom to Operate (FTO) reviews in 2003 
show no IP issues related to the Public-Private partnership for technology 
transfer, and subsequent commercial and public sector release of the transgenic 
varieties. As with the Bt eggplant project, we have not seen these reviews and 
therefore can not comment on their suitability for the current stage of this project.
Confined experiments with T2 materials that have been approved by the 
Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBC) and the National Committee on 
Biosafety of the Philippines (NCBP) are ongoing at the University of the 
Philippines Los Baños - Institute of Plant Breeding (UPLB-IPB). Progression to T3
is being expedited using embryo rescue techniques, in addition to harvested 
seeds. Open field trials have yet to be conducted in the Philippines and have 
been delayed due to a regulatory requirement for Southern blots from 3 
generations.
First backcross seedlings (BC1) using local, farmer-desired varieties will only 
be done after efficacy trials in the field with the original transformed parents. 
A regulatory framework exists in the Philippines for final approvals required 
to release the hybrids and/or OPVs. Project personnel have contributed 
significantly towards the creation of this framework. The Philippines will be 
willing to accept regulatory packages generated elsewhere on food safety – this 
will contribute to considerable savings in time and money. However, because 
this PRSV resistant papaya product is considered a new event, additional data 
will still have to be obtained on the molecular characterization of the transgene, 
on effects on non-target species, on gene flow, on nutritional analysis, as well as 
on some feeding studies.
The team was very impressed with the high quality containment facilities in 
UPLB-IPB, and the pragmatic approach to biosafety that has resulted from close 
liaison with regulatory authorities at all stages. There is very strong local 
commitment to PRSV Papaya by the Philippine Council for Agriculture, Forestry 
and Natural Resources Research and Development (PCARRD) and UPLB 
administration. PCARRD views this as a flagship project for public sector crop 
biotechnology in the Philippines, and has committed funding for it. The project 
seems on target to conduct multi-location field trials in 2007 and to obtain final 
regulatory clearance and commercialize PRSV plantlets in 2008. This assumes 
that the limited confined “field trial” in the BL2 screen-house scheduled for mid-
21 
2006 to mid-2007 will result in satisfactory results.
UPLB-IPB through its affiliation with the National Seed Foundation, 
possesses the capacity to scale up production of the PRSV-R papaya hybrids or 
varieties for distribution. A non-exclusive franchising agreement with East-West 
Seeds Company is in place for non-transgenics, and has also been proposed as 
the model for transgenic papaya. 
Ex ante socio-economic studies show potential for significant value creation. 
The Review team did not see evidence of a strategy for resistance management 
for the PRSV-resistant papaya, or plans to use PRSV Papaya in an IPM scheme. 
C.5. TSVR Groundnut, India
Groundnut is an important oil, food, and forage crop in India, covering more 
than eight million hectares. This important cash crop is threatened by epidemics 
of Tobacco streak virus (TSV), which caused losses worth $65 M in 2000. In the 
absence of adequate host-plant resistance, the project has adopted a transgenic 
coat protein strategy for resistance to TSV. The Danforth Plant Science Center 
has taken the lead for development of the CP construct, using a visiting scientist 
from MAHYCO Research Foundation (MRF) to conduct much of the work. 
Research and project collaborators in India include MRF, the International Crop 
Research Institute for the Semi-arid Tropics (ICRISAT), MAHYCO, and 
Sathguru.
 
The project selection appeared to represent a good use of transgenic plant
technology. This project appears to have potential to have a significant impact 
on the crop and on the people in the region if it is successful.
 The technical progress has gone well to date although it is at a much earlier 
stage than most other projects because of a later start. While there appeared to 
be a high probability of overall success, there has been no guarantee of 
commercial efficacy at this stage.
Management at country level appeared very competent and the funds given 
by ABSPII appeared to be used very efficiently. This project is still at a very early 
stage, and should be supported at that level, without investing in additional 
management or commercialization aspects before “proof-of-concept” has been 
demonstrated and there is clear evidence for a viable commercial product (see 
section D. Future Recommendations). There is much more work that will need 
to be funded before commercialization can happen. Although at this stage there 
22 
is no clear source of funding, the research needs to progress to a more advanced 
stage before this is demonstrated as a serious problem.
One problem noted by the review team was that the public researchers did
not appear to have a realistic expectation for the amount of effort and investment 
required to develop a regulatory package for commercialization. 
C. 6. Late-blight Resistant Potato
 
The late blight resistant (LBR) potato project targets one of the most 
important potato pathogens in the world, using a cloned resistance gene from a 
wild potato species. Partner countries for this project are Indonesia, Bangladesh, 
and India. The “proof-of-concept” seems to have been taken as a “given” in this 
case. The RB gene is one of the most promising plant resistance genes to have 
been cloned to date with regard to commercial potential. The fact that two 
groups (University of Wisconsin, private Dutch group) independently cloned the 
same gene (the sequence of RB is nearly identical that of Rpi-blb1) from similar 
sources indicates that they have the “right gene” and that it has efficacy against 
late blight. Transgenic lines planted in high pressure plots in Toluca, Mexico 
appeared to be highly resistant. The resistance is effective in foliar tissue but 
does not provide tuber resistance. A few field trials have been done in the USA, 
but the ABSPII personnel were unable to provide results of those trials. Dr. 
Raman provided data for one field trial of four transgenic RB lines in Toluca. Dr. 
J. Bradeen of the University of Minnesota kindly allowed the review team to see 
data from a replicated field trial of another 50 transgenic lines developed from 
four cultivars. Based on these data, the RB gene provides good early- to mid￾season protection from the late blight strains evaluated in those trials.
A couple of issues regarding “proof-of-concept” remain to be settled. 
Although RB is claimed to be a “durable” and “race-non-specific” resistance 
gene, it is a single resistance gene, and the history of late blight resistance 
breeding suggests that it may be unwise to rely on a single gene being as durable 
or broad spectrum as claimed. A possibly related concern stems from a 2004 trial 
with RB conducted in Corvallis, Oregon in which RB lines appeared as 
susceptible as the susceptible control lines. The USDA-ARS scientist who 
conducted this trial, Dr. C. Brown (Prosser, WA), speculated that it was due to 
the late onset of disease pressure at a time when the lines were maturing. He 
surmised that RB may lose its effectiveness in maturing plants. This is 
apparently the basis for the statement made in the ABSPII potato PCP document, 
“For reasons still not known, the RB gene does not provide adequate late-season 
control when plants are senescing” (Potato PCP p. 4). It is impossible to discern 
23 
from the available data whether the breakdown of resistance was related to 
appearance of a compatible strain that overcame the resistance or if it was a 
maturity-related issue that affected the physiology of resistance. However, a 
similar scenario apparently exists in the Netherlands with a potato cultivar with 
LB resistance from S. bulbocastanum derived by traditional plant breeding, that 
apparently has unsatisfactory late-season resistance. Regardless of the cause, this 
trial raised a red flag indicating the need for further research (see below).
The project has assembled an impressive team of potato and biotechnology 
scientists in both India and Indonesia (the team did not visit Bangladesh). They 
have outlined a two-track approach to transfer the RB gene into cultivars suitable 
for local markets in India, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. Track 1 seeks to transfer 
RB from validated transformed lines into breeding lines via conventional 
breeding, while track 2 would transform local cultivars using Agrobacterium￾mediated transformation using the Wisconsin construct and protocol. 
Two resistant transformed lines developed from cultivar Katahdin have been 
transferred to target countries India and Indonesia; arrangements are being made 
to transfer these lines to Bangladesh. Imported plants have been multiplied by in 
vitro culture in both recipient countries, and have also been planted in the 
greenhouse to multiply via mini-tuber production and to provide source leaves 
for detached leaf assays. Both India and Indonesia anticipate field trials of these 
parental RB-lines imported from Wisconsin in the very near future (first half of 
2006). Target cultivars for intercrossing have been identified. Unusual winter 
weather led to flower abortion in the first crossing block at Modipuram, but the 
program intends to make the same crosses in a summer crossing block at the 
Central Potato Research Institute (CPRI), Simla.
The plasmid used by the Wisconsin group to generate those transgenic lines 
has also been transferred to CPRI, India and to the Indonesian Center for 
Agricultural Biotechnology and Genetic Resources Research and Development 
(ICABIOGRAD), Bogor, Indonesia to be transformed into adapted cultivars. In 
both places the plasmid has been transformed into E. coli for replication and 
molecular verification, and transformed into Agrobacterium tumefaciens for plant 
transformation. Programs in both countries have proven that they have the 
capability to transform potato and to use PCR to verify transformation. 
ICABIOGRAD has optimized their plant regeneration protocol for each of the 
target cultivars, and has commenced transformation experiments, with several 
putative transformants of two lines identified at the time of the site visit in late 
January. CPRI (India) has initiated co-cultivation to transform the target 
cultivars, and had obtained more than 12 putative transformants of each of their 
target lines at the time of the site visit, with a target of more than 100 events per 
cultivar to screen for efficacy, type, and agronomic performance. Both India and 
24 
Indonesia anticipate having their own confirmed transgenic lines within the next 
18 months - probably sooner. Although both Indonesia and Bangladesh have 
chosen European cultivars for transformation (Indonesia is also transforming 
recently released cultivars developed locally), the chosen cultivars are beyond 
variety protection, and licensing should not be an issue. The cultivars chosen by 
CPRI for transformation and crossing, Kufri Jyoti and Kufri Bahar contain 
resistance genes to late blight that may provide some additional background 
protection for the RB gene. Apparently decisions on how screening for single￾copy events should happen remain to be made. CPRI and ICABIOGRAD 
implied that they might be sending DNA to Wisconsin for analysis (Southern 
blot analysis). Probably, facilities in either country could be contracted to 
perform this analysis, e.g. the International Center for Genetic Engineering and 
Biotechnology (ICGEB) in India or the R&D Centre for Biotechnology-Indonesian 
Institute of Sciences (LIPI) in Bogor, Indonesia.
One issue that should be addressed is whether the “late season” failure is 
due to lack of gene expression, or to failure of the downstream response pathway 
to function correctly in maturing tissue (unless it is due to appearance of late￾season compatible strains). The project leader should lead efforts to understand 
this phenomenon, or at least keep abreast of related issues and inform team 
members. The University of Minnesota has developed an allele-specific real time 
RT-PCR assay that could be used to investigate expression over time and has 
initiated studies on this topic. Similarly, the University of Wisconsin has 
developed a construct in which the native RB promoter is used to drive 
expression of a fluorescent tag that could be used to investigate gene expression. 
Since potato is a photoperiod-sensitive crop, and short days lead to early 
tuberization and maturity, the efficacy of RB under short days such as might be 
experienced in the winter season in India, or tropical highlands in Indonesia 
should be examined. Once the relationship of RB efficacy to maturity and 
photoperiod is understood, management strategies to optimize deployment of 
RB can be worked out.
The project appears to be at least 6 months behind schedule for the target 
milestones suggested by the tables in the project document for the breeding 
component, but near target dates for the transformation aspect of the project. 
 
Testing for late blight resistance had commenced at both Indonesia (whole 
inoculated plants) and India (detached leaf assays; CPRI-Simla, CPRI￾Modipuram) at the time of the site visit. Although it was too soon to see definite 
results (except for Modipuram), transgenic plants appeared to be developing 
lesions similar to susceptible lines at that time.
 
25 
The timeline to commercialization is difficult to predict. ABSPII does not 
plan to have a LBR potato product ready to commercialize for several years. The 
project timeline calls for a decision-making process in 2008 to finalize events to 
advance for full regulatory package development. This timeline is possibly 
achievable for strategy II (direct transformation of local cultivars) but not 
strategy I (gene transfer by breeding). The timeline would allow two years of 
field testing of new events (2007, 2008), probably being an initial screen for 
resistance and type (2007) and multi-location trials in the second year.
Ex ante economic studies showing the anticipated benefits of late blight 
resistant potatoes have been conducted in India, Bangladesh, and Indonesia. In 
each case the economic impact of late blight and anticipated benefits of late 
blight resistance are strongly favorable for the project. The cost of late blight in 
each country is high, and the project should be rated a priority project on that 
basis.
In conclusion, the potato LBR project is a very promising project for which 
efficacy remains to be proven in the target environments in the target countries. 
Provided RB-transformed potato lines have acceptable levels of resistance, the 
project should be encouraged to consider other resistance genes (e.g. Rpi-blb2) 
and IPM strategies to delay development of compatible strains of P. infestans. 
C.7. Sigatoka and Nematode Resistant Bananas 
 The review team did not evaluate this project.
26 
D. FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS
D.1 Overview 
The most important overall recommendation from the review team is that 
USAID continue with a biotechnology program for developing countries. We 
saw ample evidence that the projects (as well as others not yet developed) could 
greatly benefit the countries concerned, but that private companies and local 
governments are unable or unwilling to carry them out for a variety of reasons. 
This program will undoubtedly have great benefits, and we are very encouraged 
to see the progress to date, realizing that this is just a small sample of the 
opportunities that exist. 
The remainder of our recommendations is focused on suggestions for 
improvements in the implementation of the program, in order to maximize the 
returns from the funds available. The review team realizes that circumstances at 
the beginning of the ABSPII program were different than they are today and will 
continue to evolve. We also recognize the progress that has been made since the 
inception of ABSPII. Consequently we did not consider it productive to attempt 
to analyze what could have been a better way to run the program from the 
beginning. Rather, our efforts were focused on the program as it exists today, 
and how best to manage ABSPII from this point forward. Our specific
recommendations for future implementation are listed below.
D.2. ABSPII Internal and External Communication
Communication for any program is always a challenge especially when 
multiple scientific and commercial disciplines are involved. This problem is 
compounded when the program also involves different countries and various 
for-profit and government institutions. While the effectiveness in 
communicating can in some cases largely be attributed to specific individuals, it 
is the belief of this review team that a system should be in place to facilitate
communication as much as possible, without relying on individuals to always 
bridge the communication gap on their own.
To the credit of ABSPII, they have developed a structured system of 
monthly conference calls between the various stakeholders involved in specific 
projects. This appeared to be working quite well for some projects. Our 
recommendation is that this system continues for all projects with the same 
discipline and regularity.
27 
 Communication is that between the management group of Cornell 
University and USAID is another issue. We do not see how this can be effective 
without at least bimonthly face-to-face meetings between the director of the 
ABSPII and USAID. There should be a detailed agenda for every meeting to go 
over future steps as well as the progress and issues of the past. The content of 
these meetings can be aided largely by the recommendations in the following 
section on stage-gates. These bimonthly meetings should be the basis to discuss 
options and make joint decisions with the management of both institutions, 
rather than one of the institutions giving notice to the other that a decision has 
been made.
 
One additional recommendation in communication is that the director of 
the PBS be included at least for some of these bimonthly meetings. There 
appears to be opportunity for synergy as well as overlap between PBS and 
ABSPII. Having these groups meet on regular basis may help facilitate better 
utilization of resources.
D.3. Develop a stage–gate product advancement system
Commercialization of products by companies always involves some type 
of formal or informal product advancement system. A structured system is 
usually used when product candidates require a large investment of resources, 
multiple disciplines or long product development cycles. In the case of the 
product candidates in ABSPII, all three conditions are present but no structured 
product advancement system is in place. Therefore it is our strong 
recommendation that a stage-gate product advancement system be put in place 
as soon as practical. There are many examples of these systems used today that 
can be found in various companies and there is an extensive literature on this 
process4. It is important to use the basic structure of the system but to also 
customize this to ABSPII’s specific needs. Using a textbook approach alone will 
most likely result in a system that has many unnecessary steps and will cause 
individuals to criticize the system without seeing the benefits. Therefore it is 
recommended that the system be developed with all the stakeholders to obtain
“buy-in” from the start, and to make sure that all steps are appropriate. In 
addition, (a) consultant(s) may be hired if needed to facilitate the process and 
help put a relevant system in place. The review team believes that the institution 
of such a system would be a great tool to help solve many of the management, 
resource allocation and communication issues described earlier in this report. 
 
4 For example, Cooper, R. 2001. Winning at New Products: Accelerating the Process from Idea to 
Launch Third Edition, Perseus Books, N.Y, 425 pp.
28 
 In order to provide this recommendation with more concrete suggestions, 
the review team further recommends that the product advancement system 
address several specific concerns. The first of which is to accurately define the 
current stage of each project. While this has been attempted in ABSPII in the 
existing tier system, we believe this needs much more rigor and definition. At 
the very least we would recommend a system that differentiates between “proof￾of-concept”, early product development, late product development, and market 
introduction. While most commercial companies would divide this last
commercialization stage into more areas including production and sales, we do 
not see this is as an essential or even appropriate part of ABSPII. Thus, market 
introduction would entail the release of the product so that entities other than 
ABSPII can assume control of the commercialization process. 
At each of these stages we recommend that specific activities be detailed 
for each of the following areas: research, regulatory, intellectual property, 
product development, marketing, production, and public relations. In this way 
resources will be allocated that are appropriate for each stage. This should 
reduce or eliminate premature allocation of resources to early-stage projects, 
thereby making adequate resources available for more mature projects. This 
process should greatly help the existing problem of trying to fund too many 
activities for too many projects simultaneously. As an example, public relations 
support may be very important during market introduction but of questionable 
value during the early stages of research, when it can unintentionally create false 
expectations.
At each stage in the system we recommend that specific quantifiable 
milestones be agreed upon in advance, and a project should not enter the next 
stage until it meets these milestones. For example, simply demonstrating pest 
resistance would not be an acceptable specific milestone. Instead, at each stage 
there would a quantitative determination as to what is an acceptable level of 
resistance and into what germplasm. For example, a milestone may read; “at 
least 70% of the transgenic plants must exhibit at least 80% resistance with a yield 
of at least 95% of the commercial variety when not infected”. The actual 
milestones may be different for each project and for various stages of the 
candidate products. Determination of milestone completion should be objective. 
Discussion would then center on the definition of acceptable milestones rather 
than whether they were met.
We further recommend that at the beginning of each stage all of the 
resources required to bring a project to the next stage are defined, as well as 
estimates of their cost. We realize that such estimates may be quite rough at first, 
but they should acquire more precision as a project proceeds. These estimates 
29 
will invaluable in making decisions concerning the availability of resources 
required. Projects should not be allowed to advance to the next stage, unless 
sufficient resources for continuation have been identified and can be allocated. 
The last recommendation with regard to the product advancement system 
is that projects be reviewed by ABSPII management and USAID at their 
bimonthly meetings. These reviews would focus on progress toward established, 
and agreed upon milestones, and whether or not the project is ready for 
advancement. We also recommend that at least one outside reviewer be present 
for these discussions. This need not be the same person for all projects but could 
be a recognized expert in the specific area relevant to the project. This individual
could participate in the discussions by phone conference to save on costs. The 
primary role of the outside reviewer would be to provide an additional objective 
resource for the projects. This individual could also help facilitate any decisions 
when USAID and ABSPII management have different interpretations of how to 
proceed. Further, we believe that the annual meetings of the advisory board are 
not the most appropriate fora at which to take these decisions. Rather they could 
be used to ratify decisions made by the more focused meetings. 
D.4. Project Management 
As noted earlier, the review team considers that the resources spent on 
management for the respective projects are inordinately high. This is not to say 
that the management group is not working hard. However, we believe that an 
inappropriately high level of management activity has been devoted to many of 
the individual projects, given their current stage of development. Typically, 
projects in the later stage of development will require more management than 
those in the early stages. Since we would define most of the projects to be in the 
early stages of development, we recommend that the overall level of central 
management decrease with the current portfolio of projects. We recommend that 
more resources go to individual researchers in local countries to advance the 
research and technical issues which are lacking, rather than spending resources 
on management of the product candidates before it is even known whether the 
project will meet commercial standards. The product advancement system 
should help identify the level of management required for specific projects.
We also recommend that the “proof-of-concept” projects be managed by 
the principal investigator (PI), much in the same way that grants are 
administered. Thus, the role for ABSPII central management would be minimal. 
ABSPII central management may be used to help select projects, but after 
selection the PI would be responsible for ensuring that a project meets its 
milestones. Once the first set of milestones has been accomplished, the 
USAID/ABSPII management group would have the responsibility of deciding if 
30 
a project was ready to advance to the next stage. 
The advancement to the next stage of product development would occur, 
i) when milestones are met, ii) if there is enough money available and, iii) if there 
is still consistency with USAID priorities. At any given time, there may be only 
enough money for one or possibly two candidates in the later stages of 
development. Therefore, even if early stage products meet the milestones, 
advancement to the next stage may be suspended or the project even terminated, 
because the product pipeline is too full. A pyramid approach to product 
pipelines is typical in commercial operations. With many projects in early stages 
of development, some may therefore not advance for a variety of reasons. The 
stage gate system provides management with a tool to facilitate decisions as to 
when it is appropriate to advance a project, to terminate a project and to allow 
new products into the pipeline. 
 
It is not clear to the review team that sufficient funds are available to 
support all of the projects to completion. Therefore, it may likely be necessary to 
eliminate some projects or put others on hold until enough resources become 
available. We feel it is better to support a few projects to completion rather than 
let several projects languish because they do not receive the needed resources. 
We have made some comments as to specific products below but we believe the 
final decision as what the product pipeline should look like should be made 
jointly with ABSPII management at Cornell University and USAID, after placing 
the candidates in the stage-gate system.
 
D.5. Definition of roles and responsibilities
The review team believes that the roles and responsibilities of the various 
participants in the project should be more clearly defined. This has been implicit 
to date, but we recommend that the roles and responsibilities be reexamined and 
explicitly stated to all stakeholders to avoid confusion. We highlight some of the 
examples about which we are most concerned. The first of these concerns the 
position of Director for ABSPII. We recommend that the Director have a similar 
role and portfolio of responsibilities as a Chief Scientific Officer in a commercial 
company. This would require examining broad strategies involving similar 
technology or intellectual property leveraged over several countries. This 
individual would provide technical oversight, act as the first line of review and 
ensure that more detailed reviews with consultants occurred when needed. The 
Director would also be one of the first to identify projects which are progressing 
exceptionally well or exceptionally poorly, and begin to make approparite 
adjustments. This person should also be one of the main conduits for 
information to USAID.
31 
We also recommend that the role of the Principal Investigator (PI) be 
defined more clearly. Currently, the responsibilities and authority of the PI
appear vague. We recommend that the PI execute the project and be responsible 
for all aspects of the management of the specific project. This individual would 
report directly to the ABSPII Director. We recognize that the expertise required 
at early stages may be very technical and that at later stages may be much more 
commercial. It is unlikely that there will be one individual PI who could handle 
this transition all the way through the system. Therefore, it is may be expected 
that the PI will change over the life of a project. In the early stages, a research
scientist may likely be the PI, and others on the team may be involved in other 
aspects of commercialization such as regulatory, IP and application testing. As 
the product moves through the system the research scientist may take a 
decreasing role. Regulatory or production issues often dominate in the later 
stages of development, and during these stages another individual may take the 
lead, while the research scientist steps into a supporting role. The ABSPII 
Director should ensure that the most appropriate person is the PI, depending on 
the concerns and stage of the specific project, but that the PI should be the 
driving force to coordinate activities and make sure progress is being made.
We further recommend that the current oversight system be strengthened 
significantly. This function may be met by an advisory board or some other 
grouping of consultants or experts. The current advisory board meets annually 
and while it can provide some oversight, we recommend that much more is 
needed. We recommend quarterly meetings to review the overall goals of the 
program, to keep the advisors familiar with the program, and to monitor 
progress. This group may be further divided up into subcommittees that would 
be responsible to provide more detailed oversight of specific areas such as IP, 
regulatory, technical evaluation, and evaluation of the ABSPII Director, much in 
the same way a board of directors may operate in a commercial company. 
D.6. Relationship to Cornell University
The review team also examined the image and the role filled by Cornell 
University as the site of the central management of ABSPII. We found evidence 
that Cornell University specifically added value because of their reputation and 
contacts with certain countries. We also found that there is a perception that a 
land grant university would be more credible entity for program management 
than USAID, even though the funds for ABSPII are derived from USAID. While 
the review team sees benefits to having Cornell University (or another 
University) manage the entire program, there is also the disadvantage of having 
one university manage the wide array of technical projects in diverse 
geographical areas. In addition, while Cornell University has arguably done as 
well as any university could for such a global program, no one university 
32 
possesses the best expertise for every project. Furthermore, universities 
inherently lack of understanding and experience in commercializing products. 
With this in mind we recommend that in the future, USAID continue to use land 
grant institutions, but USAID may want to consider a different format. Thus, for 
example, the projects could be divided up by specific technologies, or by 
geographical areas. This would allow specific universities to manage areas for 
which they possess the best expertise, and avoid one institution being spread too 
thinly on projects for which another may have better contacts or expertise. In 
addition, we recommend that as projects approach the later stages of 
development, Contracts may be better vehicles than Collaborative Agreements 
with which to fund the projects. In summary, we recommend that future 
biotechnology projects use Grants, Collaborative Agreements and Contracts5 as 
mechanisms to effectively accomplish the work. The specific product candidates 
and stage of the project would dictate which is most appropriate funding 
mechanism, rather than attempting to have one mechanism address all 
situations.
D.7. Individual Project Recommendations 
The specifics of the individual projects have been given earlier and the 
recommendations summarized here. 
D.7.1 InsectResistant Eggplant. This is the lead product candidate which has made 
excellent progress. We recommend giving this the highest priority and full 
support toward commercialization. There is little to change or criticize for this 
project.
D.7.2. Drought and Salinity Tolerant Rice. The review team considers that “proof￾of-concept” is lacking in that there are no specific requirements which define 
commercial acceptability. The rigor of placing this in the product advancement 
system and establishing milestones should help determine what technical 
hurdles need to be addressed to meet the specific market requirements for 
commercialization in individual countries. We recommend obtaining more 
specific information as to what will constitute a commercially viable product in 
specific locales. This will then determine the likelihood of the current 
technology meeting these requirements before going forward. Once this 
information is obtained, the project could be then placed in the stage gate system.
D.7.3 Virus Resistant Tomatoes. The strategy for TMVLC resistance is very 
promising but we suggest that there be could be benefits to better coordination 
 
5 As noted earlier, We use the terms “Cooperative Agreement”, “Contract” and “Grant” as 
defined by USAID.
33 
between Africa and Asia. CMV and PVY are good secondary choices but it is 
unclear as to their importance in the absence of TMVLC resistance. Therefore, 
we would encourage more effort to be spent obtaining the first product even if at 
the expense of the secondary virus resistance. We would recommend 
reexamining who is the most appropriate PI. In addition, we would suggest 
examining the use of the Bt gene for control of lepidopteran pests on tomatoes in 
the relevant countries. 
 
D.7.4. Papaya Ring Spot Virus Resistance. This project looks very promising and 
the second best candidate for commercialization. There is little to change for this 
project.
D.7.5. Disease Resistant Potato. We believe that this project has been prematurely 
advanced to second tier status. More technical data are required to demonstrate
“proof-of-concept” for target countries. The rigor of placing this in the product 
advancement system and establishing milestones should help determine what 
technical hurdles need to be addressed to meet the specific market requirements 
for commercialization in individual countries. As outlined in our earlier general 
recommendations for “proof-of-concept” projects, we recommend reduced effort 
in management as well as in activities in other non-technical areas. In line with 
those recommendations, it may be appropriate to consider who would be the 
best PI to oversee the project during this phase. 
D.7.6. Virus Resistant Groundnut. The review team considers that excellent 
progress has been made for the very early stage of this program. We recommend 
collecting better marketing data as to the potential impact of this program. 
D.7.7. Sigatoka and Nematode Resistant Bananas. The review team did not evaluate 
this project. 
34 
APPENDIX 1 
The review team were provided with this following Statement of Work
STATEMENT OF WORK (SOW)
Following is a list of key areas which USAID has asked this evaluation to 
address. The list is designed to guide the team’s findings and written report, and 
is not a comprehensive list. 
TECHNICAL REVIEW
A. PROJECT GOALS, OBJECTIVES, AND WORKPLANS: 
1. Are project goals appropriate and relevant in the context of agricultural 
biotechnology research and USAID’s objectives for international 
development? Is ABSPII well situated to achieve its goals as evidenced in 
Product Plans, annual work plans and progress reports? Is the time 
horizon allowed for achieving project goals and objectives realistic? 
2. Are ABSPII’s criteria for choice of projects reasonable to anticipate project 
success? Are ABSPII’s expectations for projects realistic in the anticipated 
timeframe? 
3. In designing and implementing its activities has ABSPII been able to build 
upon the lessons learned under the original (ABSPI) project? 
4. Has ABSPII effectively implemented the project plans per the original 
proposal?
5. Is there a mechanism for adapting goals and objectives to the changing 
context of agricultural biotechnology? How have project goals, work 
plans, and partnerships been modified to reflect changes in budgetary 
considerations, new opportunities, or other constraints?
B. RESEARCH/PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT:
1 Have the choice of projects (crop traits) been appropriate to the needs of 
developing country agricultural systems? Has there been sufficient use of 
market data in the choice of projects? 
2. Are the technology development activities considering the appropriate 
mix of activities to achieve eventual commercialization? Should the 
35 
activities under the projects be modified during the course of the program, 
and if so, how?
3. Has the ABSPII collaborative research process been an effective means of 
facilitating access to technology between US and host country 
collaborators? What should be the emphasis on the research being 
conducted by developing country scientists and US/international 
scientists and what are the implications for resource allocation given the 
biotechnology research infrastructure in many developing countries? 
4. What role has the private sector had in shaping or contributing to the 
ABSPII research agenda? Has this relationship functioned successfully? 
Should there be a greater emphasis for involving the private sector? Has 
ABSPII provided benefits to developing country partners from 
collaborations with the private sector?
C. IMPACT EVALUATION
1. The project has initiated a series of economic impact evaluations, one for 
each product under development. Is the approach taken for these 
evaluations appropriate? What additional types of impact assessments 
would be useful? Are the results of the impact assessments being used 
appropriately in ABSPII decision making?
D. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER:
1. ABSPII has taken a product-based approach to IPR issues. Has this 
approach been effective? 
2. What has been the impact of ABSPII in promoting technology transfer 
from public research institutions to the private sector in developing 
countries? Is the approach appropriate, effective and sustainable?
3. What has been the impact of addressing IPR at the institutional level in 
terms of assisting public research institutions in developing countries to 
manage IPR issues related to access to proprietary research tools?
4. What has been the impact or benefit of addressing IPR at the national 
level, e.g. in India, Indonesia, Philippines, Bangladesh and East and West 
Africa? 
5. Was the approach taken by ABSPII at the national level appropriate for 
the goals of the program? Was the approach an effective strategy? Has 
there been sufficient commensurate funding allocation for such efforts?
E. PUBLIC AWARENESS AND COMMUNICATION:
36 
1. Has ABSPII developed an effective public awareness and communication 
strategy? Is the current level of activity adequate to achieve the goals of 
the project?
2. Public awareness and communication is also a goal of the Agency funded 
biosafety efforts. How well have ABSPII efforts been integrated in this 
area with the efforts of the biosafety projects?
MANAGEMENT REVIEW
A. PROJECT MANAGEMENT/ORGANIZATION:
1. Have the various components involved in the ABSPII management and 
oversight (management team at Cornell University, ABSPII Advisory 
Board of Directors and USAID) performed effectively together and has 
each group made a positive contribution?
2. Are ABSPII expectations for projects in line with available resources? 
Have these resources been managed effectively and efficiently? 
3. What mechanisms are used to balance in identifying the research agenda 
or making modifications if required by budget cuts or changing 
opportunities? Could these mechanisms be improved? 
4. Has the ABSPII program management facilitated ownership of the 
program and made best use of the other participating institutions in the 
U.S. and in developing countries?
5. What is the working relationship between US institutional members of the 
ABSPII? How has the consortium functioned in terms of project 
participation? Have the various institutions been utilized effectively in 
achieving the project goals?
6. Has ABSPII worked effectively with other efforts, including other USAID 
funded efforts such as in biosafety, to achieve maximum impact? Are 
there specific recommendations to the project to improve these 
interactions? 
7. Has ABSPII been encouraged to work synergistically with other USAID 
programs? How successful have such interactions been in contributing to 
ABSPII’s overall goals?
8. Has the management provided the necessary liaison between and across 
countries, principal investigators (PIs), Missions and USAID/Washington 
through reports, meetings and other information to facilitate participation 
and support?
9. Has the composition and involvement of the Advisory Board been 
effective to achieve project goals? Given the complexity and size of ABSPII 
37 
would it be more effective to have a Technical Advisory Group for each 
technology project in addition to an overall Advisory Board? This 
structure was proposed in the original proposal and revised to the current 
structure by the ABSPII management and USAID.
10. What changes in ABSPII management would improve organizational 
efficiency and effectiveness? 
B. TRAINING/INSTITUTION DEVELOPMENT:
1 What impact have ABSPII projects had on U.S. institutions' international 
research or development activities/capability? Has the ABSPII program 
been integrated into other university activities or goals? Has ABSPII been 
recognized by university administration as contributing to university 
priorities both at the home institution and other institutions? 
2. What impact have ABSPII projects had on host country institutions' 
research activity/capability? 
3. PBS and SABP have taken the lead in addressing biosafety policy in the 
host countries where ABSPII is working. In some countries the efforts of 
ABSPII have shaped an environment conducive for commercialization of 
bioengineered crops. Given the mandates and expertise of these projects, 
has this been an effective approach? Are there ways to more effectively 
work on biosafety policy issues? 
4. What has been the progress in training of students, technicians and/or 
other research personnel both overseas and in the U.S? Considering the 
current and past budget resources, has training been adequately 
addressed in relation to other priorities? Which, if any, areas of specialty 
need more focus?
C. INFORMATION DISSEMINATION, USAGE AND IMPACT:
1. Is ABSPII poised to effectively analyze and disseminate its findings so as 
to contribute to the body of development knowledge and practices? What 
mechanism is used to synthesize project results for application to others? 
D. BUY-INS:
1. What are the benefits and/or detriments to add-on contracts from country 
Missions or other donors? 
38 
2. Has the project changed its focus or objectives to accommodate buy-ins? 
If so, has this represented good opportunities or distractions? 
 
E. FINANCIAL:
1. Is the cost of management appropriate for the size of the Cooperative 
Agreement? Is the present structure of management cost-effective and 
efficient? Are there examples of modifications that would improve the 
performance of the Cooperative Agreement?
2. Are the administrative costs competitive with other modes of 
administering research programs?
3. Have financial reports and vouchers been submitted in accordance with 
USAID requirements? What has been the track record of the grantee and 
sub-grantees in using funds in a timely manner?
4. Have financial reports been used to make budget or workplan
reallocations in cases where costs are higher/lower than expected or rate 
of expenditures faster/slower than anticipated?
 
F. SUSTAINABILITY:
Institutionalization of USAID supported interventions is critical for long term 
sustainability. 
1. How is sustainability addressed by the ABSPII? Is sustainability 
addressed directly in project design? Is there verifiable progress on 
institutionalization from project efforts to date in any of the 
country/regional programs?
2. How does the project take into account the financial and institutional 
requirements among its developing country partners to prepare for continued 
operation of project activities after USAID funding is terminated?