STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 1
Prepared by: 
DISCLAIMER 
This is an external evaluation. The views expressed in this document are the authors' and do 
not necessarily reflect the views of the United States Agency for International Development or 
the United States Government 
APRIL 2014
This publication was produced for review by the United States Agency for
International Development. It was prepared by Democracy International, Inc.
USAID/TANZANIA STRENGTHENING
TRANSPARENCY, ACCOUNTABILITY, 
RESPONSIBILITY (STAR) PROGRAM 
EVALUATION
FINAL REPORT
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 2
DISCLAIMER 
The author’s views expressed in this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States 
Agency for International Development or the United States Government. 
Submitted to: 
USAID/Tanzania 
Contractor: 
Democracy International, Inc. 
7600 Wisconsin Ave. Suite 1010 
Bethesda, MD 20814 
Tel: 301-961-1660 
www.democracyinternational.com
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 3
STAR PROGRAM PERFOR￾MANCE EVALUATION 
FINAL REPORT 
APRIL 2014 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 4
ACRONYMS 
AFNET Anti-FGM Network
BONGA Building Organizational Networks for Good Governance and Advocacy 
CELG Centre for Environmental law and Governance 
CETA Civic Education Teachers Association 
CCT Christian Council of Tanzania
CSOs Civil Society Organization 
DI Democracy International, Inc. 
DED District Executive Director 
DFID Department for International Development 
DRG Democracy, Rights, and Governance 
GIZ Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit 
GoT Government of Tanzania 
IoAs Institutions of Accountability 
LGA Local Government Authorities 
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation 
PETS Public Expenditure Tracking 
PMO-RALG Office of Regional Administration and Local Government 
SAHRINGO South Africa Human Rights NGO Network 
SATC Supporting Accountability to Tanzania Citizens 
SOW Statement of Work 
TACOSODE Tanzania Council for Social Development 
TAPP Tanzania Advocacy Partnership Program 
UNGO Union of Non-Governmental Organizations 
USAID United States Agency for International Development 
ZCGF Zanzibar Current Generation Forum 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 5
OVERVIEW AND PURPOSE 
At the request of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in Tanzania, 
Democracy International, Inc. (DI) conducted a post-program performance evaluation of the 
Strengthening, Transparency, Accountability, and Responsibility (STAR) program implemented 
by Pact between September 2009 and January 2012. STAR was the last of three programs im￾plemented by Pact to support Tanzanian advocacy organizations to demand transparency and 
accountability in public allocation systems and government institutions. Pact implemented the 
first program, Tanzania Advocacy Partnership Program (TAPP), from 2002 to 2005, and the 
second program, Building Organizational Networks for Good Governance and Advocacy 
(BONGA), from 2006 to 2008. DI’s evaluation team assessed STAR in the context of these two 
previous programs. 
As outlined in the Statement of Work (SOW), the evaluation had two purposes: (1) provide a 
post-program independent performance evaluation; and (2) use lessons learned from those 
programs in inform USAID/Tanzania’s current and future programming. The DI team assessed
how the program’s performance has influenced Tanzanian civil society as well as Pact’s partners 
and other stakeholders. The evaluation provides a detailed examination of the progress STAR 
has achieved toward meeting their established five expected results: 
1. Build the capacity of the citizens in selected districts to enable them to participate in the 
development plans, monitoring of local budgets and service delivery, and to strengthen 
their voice in demanding a transparent, accountable and responsive government; 
2. Enhance capacity of civil society organizations (CSOs) and citizen groups to engage in 
participatory policy making and planning process; 
3. Enhance the capacity of CSOs and citizen groups in monitoring and evaluation of public 
services and goods; 
4. Increase the ability of citizen groups to understand and demand their rights for infor￾mation by working with local government authorities to ensure that lower local gov￾ernment representatives make information publically available; and 
5. Strengthen the technical capacity of CSOs to undertake advocacy activities that grow 
out of the public expenditure tracking (PETS) process and capacity building initiatives. 
To the greatest extent possible, the evaluation sought to analyze where the program was suc￾cessful and where it was less successful, identify the factors affecting program implementation, 
identify obstacles to program success, and examine the effect of the program on 
USAID/Tanzania’s strategic objectives. The team also formulated lessons learned regarding the 
role of civil society organizations in increasing governmental accountability and transparency, 
program management and implementation, including whether resources were sufficient for pro￾gram objectives, identifying unanticipated factors that were not envisaged in the original design, 
how the program responded and adapted to these factors, and the effect of these factors on 
the program’s goals, activities, and results.
The evaluation team interviewed 14 of the 21 Pact partners under STAR, including all of the 
organizations in Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, Morogoro and Dodoma. The three-week time period 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 6
of the fieldwork did not allow the team to travel to areas far from Dar es Salaam. Moreover, as 
is typical of such evaluations, the reports of activities by the Pact partners were not very differ￾ent from one another, so the benefits of one or two additional meetings with one or two Pact 
partners in outlying areas were not cost-effective given the significant amount of time it would 
have taken to reach them. Unfortunately, the team was able to meet only half a dozen PETS 
committees, which were hard to contact, and only a few local government officials. As antici￾pated in the Evaluation and Design Methodology, memories had faded between the end of the 
STAR program in January 2012 and the October/November 2013 field trip. After the funding 
ceased, the Pact partners had moved to other projects and many of their staff had moved to 
other jobs and NGOs, many PETS committees had atrophied or disappeared altogether (only 
between 10 to 20 percent of the total PETS committees supported by STAR are still in opera￾tion), and many government officials had moved. Moreover, almost all of the CSOs ended their 
connections with, and certainly their mentorship of, the PETS committees once their STAR 
funding ended. Those that continued contact were typically the small, locally-based CSOs, such 
as Wopata (Women and Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania).1
The Mission has designed and is currently beginning implementation of a new program, Sup￾porting Accountability to Tanzania Citizens (SATC), which has similarities to STAR. Under 
SATC, however, there will be direct grants by the Mission to six CSOs. Unlike STAR, however, 
there will also be grants to four Government of Tanzania (GoT) “Institutions of Accountability” 
(IoAs). A contract for capacity building with Chemonics is already in place, but Chemonics will 
not act as a grantor like Pact did. The six CSO grantees will be working with subgrantees on 
public expenditure tracking, just like they did under STAR. SATC will be a four- to six-year 
program, however, and will be focused in five regions, not throughout Tanzania. Still, there are 
important lessons from STAR which should inform SATC during the implementation process. 
 
1 Wapota, for example, has a very small office in a string of five to six stalls along the main rural road in 
the Kilosa district near Morogoro. It continues its work on other projects and keeps touch with “its” 
PETS committees by phone and in person while it is working on other projects. But Kilosa district is 
small, Wapota works locally, and so the PETS committees it mentored are in its “neighborhood.” The 
larger, more urban, more distant CSOs had little or no contact once STAR funding ended because they 
moved on to other donor-funded projects which took their time and attention and through which they 
did not necessarily naturally encounter the PETS committees or their members. That said, these larger 
CSOs typically did not make any systematic effort to keep in touch even by phone. 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 7
BACKGROUND 
In 2002, USAID/Tanzania ‘s Democracy and Governance office began what turned out to be a 
10-year initiative to indirectly fund CSOs to track government budgets and expenditures to en￾sure that appropriated funds were actually delivered and ultimately used for their intended pur￾poses. Funding constraints, however, led USAID to divide the program into three sequential 
and technically independent programs implemented by Pact: TAPP, implemented from 2002 to 
2005; BONGA, implemented from 2006 to 2008; and STAR, implemented from 2009 to Janu￾ary 1, 2012.2
STAR aimed to empower Tanzanian citizens at community level and engage with CSOs at the 
national level to participate and demand transparency and accountability in the devolved sys￾tems for allocation and use of public resources, and in planning and delivery of public services 
for socio-economic development and poverty reduction. Under STAR, Pact trained and funded 
21 local CSOs that worked in 40 districts across Tanzania. Also referred to as Pact partners, 
these CSOs in turn trained and funded local PETS committees at the village, ward, and/or dis￾trict levels, who were the ultimate implementers and beneficiaries of the program. During 
STAR, Pact partnered with 21 CSOs: three in Arusha, seven in Dar es Salaam, two in Dodoma, 
one in Kigoma-Kasulu, one in Mbeya-Ileje, one in Mbeya-Ilomba, one in Morogoro, one in 
Mwanza, one in the Mwanza-Ukerewe islands, and one in Shinyanga, and two in Zanzibar. Each 
Pact partner created or supported between two and six PETS committees, most of which were 
spread out in different parts of the country and located far from the Pact partner. Each PETS 
committee chose to track local budget and expenditures in one or two sectors, usually health, 
education, agriculture, or the environment. Most committees chose—or were encouraged to 
choose—to track sectors similar to those in which its grantor Pact partner specialized. 
Pact trained its CSO partners in several areas, including: budget monitoring and tracking, advo￾cacy, organizational strengthening, project and grants management, and financial management. 
These were the same skills that the Pact partner in turn trained its PETS committee partners 
although the emphasis with the PETS committees was on tracking and advocacy. The PETS 
committees were designed to demand their rights to monitor public expenditures in their cho￾sen sector, to confront government officials about discrepancies between what had been budg￾eted and what had actually been delivered and expended, to hold the public officials accountable 
for the funds, and to pursue remedies for misallocations, corruption, and mismanagement. One 
Pact partner encapsulated this, saying, “PETS means following the money from the central gov￾ernment through the local governments to the end users and beneficiaries.”
The authority under which PETS committees tracked, monitored, reported, and held public of￾ficials accountable—at least during STAR—derived from the prime minister and the Office of 
Regional Administration and Local Government (PMO-RALG). In 2007, PMO-RALG issued 
guidance to public officials and the public in general (see “Prime Minister’s reflected authority,” 
below) that reinforced the bureaucratic right (established under law), and, indirectly, the politi-
 
2 BONGA was funded by the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) as part of the USAID￾implemented threshold program for Tanzania that had failed the MCC’s corruption criterion to be eligi￾ble for an MCC compact. Consequently, BONGA had a more pronounced corruption component, alt￾hough the misallocation and diversion of funds, including for personal benefit, was a primary dimension 
of all three programs. 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 8
cal right of the public, for PETS activities and required public officials to cooperate with them in 
doing so. In the six years since the guidance was issued, CSOs have proposed modifications to 
strengthen their legal rights but none have yet been promulgated and the original guidance is 
still in effect. One purpose of STAR was to give the guidance concrete effect by supporting the 
PETS committees to demand their rights and provide them with the capacity to realize those 
rights.
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 9
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY 
At the request of USAID/Tanzania, Democracy International conducted a performance evalua￾tion of STAR in October–November 2013. The DI evaluation team consisted of Gerald Hyman 
as the Evaluation Team Leader, Vivien Marles as the Evaluation Specialist, Rose Aiko as the Lo￾cal Technical Advisor, and Dorica Andrew as the Local Logistics Coordinator. The Team Lead￾er, the Technical Advisor, and the Local Logistics Coordinator spent three weeks in country, 
while the Evaluation Specialist joined the team in country for the first week of fieldwork. Two 
USAID officials from Washington, DC, jointed the team for the first two weeks of fieldwork as 
part of their training and professional augmentation opportunities. 
According to the SOW, found below in Annex A, the purpose of the evaluation was to: (1) 
provide a post-program independent performance evaluation; and (2) use lessons learned from 
those programs to inform USAID/Tanzania’s current and future programming. The DI team as￾sessed how the program’s performance influenced Tanzanian civil society as well as Pact’s part￾ners and other stakeholders. The evaluation responded to the following questions: 
 To what extent was/is STAR’s capacity building sustainable? How might current or new 
USAID programs use, leverage, or build upon that capacity? 
 What tools and mechanisms—PETS committees, citizen report cards, community score 
cards, PIMA cards, notice boards—proved most effective in helping ordinary citizens 
monitor public budgetary decisions and service delivery, under what circumstances? 
Was this appropriately measured by the program, and if not, what are methods to 
measure such a result? 
 To what extent did the (1) CSO capacity building, (2) subgrants, and (3) Strengthening 
Networking Information Sharing among Tanzania CSOs each contribute to the achieve￾ment of the program objective? 
The team also examined target communities’ awareness and attitudes toward the STAR pro￾gram, Public Expenditure Tracking, and oversight of local government. The evaluation analyzed 
where the program was most successful and where it was less successful, examined the factors 
affecting program implementation, identified obstacles to program success, and analyzed the 
effect of the program on USAID/Tanzania’s strategic objectives. Findings are structured 
around two key areas: (1) Impact and (2) Sustainability. The team formulated lessons learned 
regarding the role of civil society organizations in increasing governmental accountability and 
transparency program management and implementation, including whether resources were suf￾ficient for program objectives. Finally, the team also identified unanticipated factors that were 
not envisaged in the original design, examined how the program responded and adapted to 
these factors, and the effect of these factors on the program’s goals, activities, and results. 
As outlined in the DI’s Evaluation Design and Methodology report submitted to the Mission, the 
team relied on a comprehensive desk review and over 100 key informant interviews in Dar es 
Salaam, Dodoma, Morogoro, and Zanzibar. In addition to Dar es Salaam, the team visited Do￾doma, Morogoro, and Zanzibar to assess the program’s regional impacts. The team conducted 
interviews with: Mission DRG officers, several current and former Pact staff, 14 of the 21 Pact 
partners, several local PETS committees, approximately two dozen current Government of 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 10
Tanzania national and subnational officials, especially the PMO-RALG; several former GoT offi￾cials; major donors that had implemented similar programs, including Die Deutsche Gesellschaft 
für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) and Irish Aid; other implementers, such as the United 
Kingdom’s Department for International Development’s (DFID) implementer KPMG and the 
Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation’s implementer SNV; and the Mission’s monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E) contractor, the Mitchell Group. The list of interviewees can be found be￾low in Annex B. 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 11
METHODOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS 
Like all post-hoc project evaluations, the STAR evaluation is subject to several limitations. The 
evaluation team, however, has taken active steps to minimize bias and generate systematic, veri￾fiable, credible information. One of the greatest challenges the team faced is the fact that the 
program ended nearly two years ago, which made data collection challenging. In fact, none of 
the Pact staff that worked on STAR was still with Pact at the time of the evaluation, except for 
one staff member who worked on STAR at the very end of the program in a non-substantive 
capacity. The team, however, did locate two Tanzanian members of Pact’s STAR staff, now 
working for other organizations, who agreed to be interviewed and provided valuable insights 
into the difficulties Pact encountered (e.g., the gaps in funding between TAPP, BONGA, and 
STAR) and how they attempted to deal with them. Similarly, as the evaluation team asked 
stakeholders to recall events for a program that began over four years ago, the memories of 
some key informants may have faded. To mitigate the occurrence of recall bias, the team uti￾lized multiple data points to triangulate and substantiate participants’ responses.
It also proved exceedingly difficult to contact and interview PETS committees, as they could not 
be identified without the help of Pact partners. Many partners, however, had lost track of these 
committees, and since most members were ordinary citizens, committee members were hard 
to identify, contact, and interview. As such, the team was only able to conduct interviews with 
four or five PETS committees, out of a total of 70–80 committees nationwide. Relevant gov￾ernment officials were even more difficult to reach, especially those who were no longer work￾ing in the same area. As such, due to the nonrandom nature of the sampling, the evaluation was 
subject to selection bias, with findings reflecting the feedback of stakeholders who may not be 
fully representative. 
The evaluation timeline and logistical considerations also constitute a key limitation. The 
timeframe of this evaluation required a narrow, focused approach and precluded more rigor￾ous, quantitative evaluation techniques, such as public opinion surveys. As noted above, CSOs 
and government officials that received Pact assistance are located throughout Tanzania. Except 
for two in Zanzibar, most partners were within a seven- or eight-hour drive from Dar es Sa￾laam, where 40 percent of Pact partners are located. Given the size of the team, the timeframe 
for the evaluation, and budget considerations, the evaluation team was not able to visit all of 
these locations, thereby leaving the more rural and distant Pact partners unrepresented. While 
interviewing every project stakeholder may be impractical and undesirable, the evaluation team 
worked to carefully select and cull the interviewee list to include individuals who not only could 
provide substantive feedback but also provide them with a balanced, unbiased assessment of 
project performance. 
As noted below, Pact and its staff had general ideas about what was meant by “strengthening,” 
“helping,” or “building” the capacity of its partners but did not have concrete or explicit opera￾tional definitions of these concepts, let alone metrics. Thus, in addition to the apparent absence 
of quantitative indicators of progress in these goals, the DI team explored as explicitly as possi￾ble with current Pact staff (who are currently working on other programs) and former Pact 
staff that worked on STAR what Pact intended by way of strengthening, helping, and building, 
how successful those programs were, what limitations they encountered, and what they would 
do differently. 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 12
Despite these challenges, however, their cumulative effect was not as great as may have been 
predicted. The experiences of the various Pact partners and the PETS committees did not vary 
much. By the end of the interviews, for instance, the team was hearing variations on the same 
themes and findings converged.
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KEY FINDINGS 
Below, we present key findings in two key areas: (1) Impact, and (2) Sustainability. 
IMPACT 
TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
Given the sporadic character of the three-phase program, the design and the duration of the 
program, the distance between the Pact partners and their PETS committee mentees, and a 
host of other reasons, STAR’s achievements are remarkable. Most Pact partners the team in￾terviewed provided detailed anecdotes of the successes of its PETS committees in identifying 
misallocations or misappropriations of funds, bringing them to the attention of officials, and suc￾cessfully achieving a reversal or restoration of funds or led to a suspension, removal, or reas￾signment of culpable officials (see “Causal relationship,” below). Examples of these successes 
include: 
 According to the Centre for Environmental Law and Governance (CELG), PETS com￾mittee members reported a case of unlawful land acquisition by a potential Jatropha 
Farming Investor who was embroiled in land conflict with villagers in Kilwa. CELG inter￾vened to assist villagers to recover their land, by showing that the appropriate proce￾dures for allocating village land to investors, including consultations with villagers, were 
not followed. Failing to prove that the land was rightfully acquired, the investor aban￾doned the planned project and the land was returned to villagers.
 Attempts to share information, and transparency and accountability have increased. 
“The PETS committees sometimes turn themselves into auditors, not just monitors. 
They should serve both sides: government should present the accounts and villagers 
should be able to monitor their use and whether the quality and use is correct. People 
are not fools. They should be able to say whether value has between received,” one re￾spondent told the team. 
 A representative from the Anti-FGM Network (AFNET) reported that STAR has helped 
to increase transparency. The respondent told the team that before PETS activities, offi￾cials were unwilling to provide information, but now they are. A Bahi councilor similarly 
noted that “things are changing. Before the exercise, it was hard to know how re￾sources were allocated, but now it is displayed on the village notice board.”
 Several respondents reported diminished resistance to PETS and a cultural shift within 
government toward greater public access and accountability to the public. “In the begin￾ning,” reported a representative from the Union of Non-Government Organizations 
(UNGO), “government officials were not open and did things the way they wanted, but 
because of PETS there is now public awareness and the government officials are more 
responsible to the public. After a while, government officials followed up on PETS re￾ports or complaints, including the DED [the District Executive Director appointed by 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 14
the central government], who had to act if only because the information was public and 
document and distributed.” 
 As a representative from UNGO reported, “When PETS began, LGA [local government 
authority] officials viewed PETS committees as inspectors, but at the end they under￾stood that the PETS committees were there to help. As a result, there were a lot of 
changes as a result of PETS; for example, government budgets were posted on notice 
boards.” UNGO also reported that PETS committees in other areas formed unrelated 
to UNGO when they saw what was happening.
 In general, respondents from the Lawyers Environmental Action Team (LEAT) claimed 
that “government officials will behave differently if they know they are accountable and 
can be punished,” echoing both government guidance and the underlying hypothesis of 
the STAR program. Another representative from the Tanzanian Council for Social De￾velopment (TACOSODE) said, “The DEDS came to know that someone is watching. 
The documents used to be confidential but now they are public. Originally, they said 
‘you are not competent,’ but we gave them competencies.”
 In more subtle but perhaps more enduring ways, said an UNGO representative, “rela￾tions between officials and parents have changed because of PETS. The public is no long￾er scared. It now asks about funds received and used. PETS and social awareness cam￾paigns have brought awareness and understanding of their rights; they are no longer 
sleeping.” In an interview in Zanzibar, another respondent told the team, “villagers 
should have recourse for leaking roofs or cracked walls through village meetings and 
then to their political representatives [councilors].”
 Because the officials know that people are watching, respondents reported less spoilage 
and deflection of funds. A PETS committee in Mtwara, for instance, discovered that 
some medications had been stolen. After reporting the theft to government officials, 
some hospital staff members were fired. Similarly, a village official was removed because 
of deflection of funds identified by a PETS committee. In another case, a village official 
shifted funds from program uses to his own per diem, but the PETS committee stopped 
it. 
 AFNET reported that a PETS committee focusing on water found that “funds had been 
diverted and chased out the leaders.” Another PETS committee focusing on healthcare 
did the same. Based on their legal “right to know” about finances, PETS committees 
questioned public authorities, insisted on having village council meetings called, and de￾manded financial reports. 
 In addition to greater awareness and greater access to public budgets and greater public 
awareness, UNGO reported direct effects on government personnel as a result of its 
PETS activities: “One person was trained, then went back to his village and found that 
village officials did not report back to villagers about spending and resources. He orga￾nized the PETS work in the village and they found many problems in village administra￾tion. They decided to organize and insist on public information. After two years, things 
have changed. Now there are regular assembly meetings twice a year, including reports 
about income and spending. Similarly a village health center was supposed to get materi-
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 15
al for a health care facility but it didn’t come. The government and the villagers were 
supposed to cooperate to build the center, so villagers cooperated, took initiative and 
brought stones, water, and sand and the government provided roofing and cement.”
Although these examples are illustrations and anecdotes of funds misappropriation, they are 
too widespread and independent of one another to be simply dismissed as accidental, isolated, 
or idiosyncratic. Still, the evaluation team could not establish a causal link between PETS com￾mittee reports and the transfers, which are routine in the normal course, or whether the trans￾fers were promotions or the results of requests. A deeper and more systematic review at the 
village- and ward-level is required to conclusively establish cause and effect. Similarly, without 
adequate quantitative indicators to measure whether transparency of budgetary transfers in￾creased and public service delivery actually improved as a result of PETS committees’ activities, 
it is difficult to draw any conclusive results beyond the anecdotal reports described above. 
INCREASED AWARENESS 
There seems to be an increased awareness about the budget in communities that have or have 
had active PETS committees. “Before PETS, officials were unwilling to provide information, but 
now they are,” said a representative from AFNET. The response from a PETS committee mem￾ber in Bahi was similar but more qualified. “Before, it was hard to know how resources were 
allocated, but now the budget is displayed on the village notice board. There is now increased 
awareness in all three villages where we worked, but no sanctions or accountability,” a PETS 
committee secretary in Bahi told the team. “Accountability,” he said, “does not end with 
awareness.” Nevertheless, he went on to say that “because the officials know that people are 
watching, spoilage and deflection of funds are less. Information travels; evil shouts.” Thus 
awareness, even without direct incentives, does have some impact. “Although PETS committees 
are not auditors, and although they created some tension among local government officials, and 
although they were not originally accepted, and although there was no open government part￾nership, now information is shared, government officials recognize that they must share public 
information and there is more of a partnership,” the Bahi committee secretary said. “There was 
no openness in those days. Government officials thought they owned the information.” 
Absent a public opinion survey, however, it is difficult to definitively ascertain whether public 
awareness about the budget, public expenditure tracking, and oversight of local government 
increased as a result of the STAR program. . Although Pact partners of course knew about the 
STAR program and the PETS committees that received assistance seemed to be acquainted 
with the STAR name (although not necessarily with details of the program), the communities 
themselves would have had no exposure to STAR itself as there was no obvious branding of 
STAR. However, more generically, public expenditure tracking and even community monitoring 
(and perhaps oversight) had much greater public currency. The Government of Tanzania itself 
created public awareness around both these general concepts and around PETS committees in 
particular. As indicated below, STAR was not the only program and USAID was not the only 
donor to support PETS. PMO-RALG was a constant force supporting PETS, for example. The 
prime minister made speeches about PETS, including a reference to one of the Pact partners in 
one of them Of course speeches by themselves, even those of the prime minister, have limited 
authority, especially in rural areas. Still, those speeches, albeit not full directives, provided a kind 
of informal instruction to government officials. They announce policy, presumably. In light of 
actual governmental directives preceding them, the speeches do provide additional indirect au-
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 16
thority for PETS activities to PMO-RALG, to the CSOs, and to the PETS committees when they 
encounter bureaucratic resistance. 
RELATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF VARIOUS MONITORING TOOLS AND PRO￾GRAM COMPONENTS 
It is difficult to say with any certainty what tools or mechanisms proved most effective in help￾ing ordinary citizens monitor public decisions and service delivery. Given the absence of quanti￾tative metrics, the program did not appropriately measure the relative effectiveness of these 
tools. Our strong impression, however, is that most ordinary citizens would naturally want 
more and better services and budgetary support but would have little, if any, knowledge of PI￾MA cards, citizen report cards, or community score cards. The team did, however, observe 
public notice boards in some communities that were erected with Pact funding under STAR. 
(Photographs of some of these notice boards can be found below in Annex C.) The team only 
encountered these notice boards sporadically and many were in bad physical shape (e.g., lean￾ing, with broken glass, or in relatively untraveled places) with weathered, years-old budgets. As 
pointed out in our interview at Twaweza, it remains unclear whether ordinary citizens could 
make sense of these budgets or have an interest in them. Even assuming that ordinary citizens 
would have known what monitoring tools existed and had an opinion about their relative effec￾tiveness, a methodologically sound public opinion survey would have been required to answer 
with confidence the rank order of their effectiveness. 
For similar reasons, it was difficult to concretely determine to what extent CSO capacity build￾ing, subgrants, and Strengthening Networking Information Sharing among Tanzanian CSOs each 
contributed to the achievement of program objectives. Because so few PETS committees were 
reached, it is difficult for the team to extrapolate from these findings and determine to what 
extent these program elements contributed to STAR objectives. Pact partners, on the other 
hand, were virtually unanimous in expressing their appreciation of Pact’s training and support. 
Few, if any, partners mentioned network sharing or discussed its effectiveness in achieving pro￾gram objectives and no partners mentioned a PETS secretariat proposed by Pact as part of 
network information sharing. Subgrants augmented by training were at the heart of the pro￾gram from the perspective of Pact partners and PETS committees. However, as discussed be￾low, once these grants ended, so too did the PETS activities of most of the Pact partners, who 
also, in the overwhelming majority of cases, lost touch with the PETS committees they were 
mentoring. Consequently, while the subgrants were almost certainly the most effective of the 
three program element above, without sustainability their effects were diminished. 
TRAINING 
Pact provided quite a bit of training to its partners, primarily centered around grant solicita￾tions, grant management, organizational capacity, and management. Many of the Pact partners 
appreciated the training. “We got so many good trainings,” said the executive secretary of 
Women and Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania, a sentiment echoed by many other partners. In 
theory, but less so in practice, the Pact partners were then supposed to train the PETS commit￾tees, making Pact a trainer-of-trainers. As noted below under “Sustainability,” however, due the 
short timeframe of the grants (e.g., one year for Wopata, and four months for its PETS commit￾tee) and the short amount of time available for training, gains from training were often dimin￾ished or lost just one or two years later. 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 17
DURATION 
Although the program lasted over six years, each phase was independent of the others and only 
lasted about two years—much too short a timeframe to yield significant, let alone sustainable, 
impacts. Funding for each phase came from different sources, especially the MCC-funded 
BONGO, and, as such, each phase had a somewhat different emphasis. At least as important for 
implementation purposes, USAID, Pact, Pact partners, and the PETS committees did not have 
any assurance that an additional phase would be funded and that their work therefore could 
continue. As each phase was 75 percent completed, this uncertainty naturally prompted Pact 
and CSO staff to search for future projects and employment opportunities. As staff attention 
began to drift, it can be argued that the effective period of the grant was really only 18 months, 
a period that was even shorter given the start-up or start-over nature of programming defined 
by the “lumpy” funding.
The effective duration of PETS committee grants seems to have been even shorter, between 
three and six months. During their grant period, Pact partners were given training and other 
technical assistance on grants management, organizational strengthening, and other topics. 
While this training may have had an effect on the Pact partners, it took time and other re￾sources which might have otherwise been provided to the PETS committees, the ultimate bene￾ficiaries of the program. By the time Pact partners were finished with training, had their grants 
in place, and had created, identified, and nurtured the PETS committees, their two-year grants 
were months away from ending. Considering the months-long duration of the PETS committee 
grants, it is surprising and remarkable, and arguably fortuitous, that the PETS committees had 
any impact at all, especially given the levels of education of the villagers and the level of organi￾zation and experience of the PETS committees, many of which did not exist prior to their es￾tablishment by the Pact partners. 
GEOGRAPHY AND TRANSACTION COSTS
The distance between Pact partners and their associated PETS committees was much too far to 
establish a close mentoring relationship. Pact partners, in consultation with Pact and (apparently 
indirectly with USAID), chose local partners in various parts of the country distant from them￾selves and from one another. For example, AFNET in Dodoma mentored a PETS committee in 
Hai district in Kilimanjaro, and a second in Simanjiro (Manyara), over 500 and 300 kilometers 
away, respectively, both of which would entail multiple bus rides on difficult roads and erratic 
bus schedules. Although AFNET had member affiliates in these areas, it is not clear this was the 
best approach. Indeed, in its proposal, each partner put forward a list of districts where they 
would be interested to work and many partners proposed districts where they had a communi￾ty-based civil society network presence. A total of 40 districts were finally selected for the 
PETS undertaking. 
 No doubt USAID and the Millennium Challenge Corporation (which funded the BONGA 
phase of STAR) urged national coverage for STAR. However, Pact did not select the PETS 
committees on its own. The CSOs themselves proposed to Pact the PETS committees and lo￾cations for their work, in many cases because of their pre-existing relations with those groups 
an in those locations (for example through the CSOs’ local branches). The question then is why 
these relations did not endure once STAR funding ended. To the extent USAID provides this 
kind of funding, whether in STAR, SATC or any other program, and to the extent it retains any 
authority for selection of local beneficiaries, one criterion should be the likelihood of sustained 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 18
contact and mentorship once USAID funding ends. Certainly the wide geographic dispersion of 
the beneficiaries and their distance from the CSO’s headquarters made sustained contact more 
difficult and less likely unless the CSO had strong branches in close proximity to the PETS 
committees. Connections could be maintained by cellphone and cellphone connections are 
broadly but not universally available throughout the country. However, it is difficult to keep up 
momentum and mentorship relying solely on distant voices over cellphones phone even when 
the parties try earnestly to do so. The existence of truly vibrant local branches of the CSO 
would make that direct contact possible albeit not by the headquarters staff. 
Pact could have achieved national coverage by identifying geographically dispersed CSO part￾ners and asking them to work locally (for example, if it had vibrant branches), an approach 
which arguably might have been more sustainable after funding ended. Put differently, USAID 
and Pact could have achieved a national footprint by dispersing the Pact partners geographically 
and having them mentor local PETS committees or at least mentor several PETS committees in 
one area. Several Pact partners reached the same conclusion. “[The committees] would have 
achieved more if [they were] implemented and run by local organizations in the area,” stated a 
member of the South Africa Human Rights NGO Network (SAHRINGO). “Set up in the way it 
was meant that modalities of permanence were not there.” This alternative approach would 
have reduced the enormous travel and other transactions costs for Pact partners and allowed 
for much more continuity of relationships once the grants ended. As it was, contact between 
most Pact partners and their mentee PETS committees understandably atrophied dramatically 
once funding ended. 
ORGANIZATIONAL DEPTH
Judging primarily by their own accounts, Pact partners created most PETS committees from 
scratch under STAR. Although the committee members often knew one another, particularly at 
the village level, they had not necessarily worked together before. In short, PETS committees 
were not organic CSOs with deep, historic roots in the community, and thus would not have 
likely existed without STAR. As such, when the funding ended, the committees did as well. This 
context affected their coherence, their operations under STAR, and their post-STAR sustaina￾bility. Identifying existing organizations and then supporting them to conduct public expenditure 
tracking might have been a more sustainable approach, rather than creating organizations 
anew. However, since SATC will have four (and perhaps six) uninterrupted years of funding, 
this will make it more feasible to create new organizations and see them through their “birthing 
pains.” 
EMPHASIS ON THE LOCAL LEVEL
While the team’s interviews with Pact partners provided a good sense of what worked well and 
what did not, program effects were ultimately produced by PETS committees—not Pact or Pact 
partners—who engaged in tracing, reporting, and follow-on at the village, ward, and, less often, 
district levels. In fact, PETS committees seemed to have been more effective and sustainable at 
the village level than at the district level. It appears public funding was mostly spent at the village 
level. Moreover, since citizens at the village level are in much closer proximity to government 
officials and each other, interactions do not require significant travel and funding. As such, not 
only is neglect by government officials more apparent, citizens can also more easily monitor and 
track public expenditures and activities. Given the number of PETS committees under STAR, 
their dispersal, and their “half life,” a much longer, fuller effort would have been required to 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 19
trace impact at the PETS committee level, requiring a greater investment of time and resources. 
As such, without systematically tracing these efforts (even if a large-enough sample exists to be 
statistically significant), the true effects and impacts of the STAR program can only be ascer￾tained indirectly. Moreover, it was not possible to conclusively verify anecdotes of program 
achievements, let alone to trace causal linkages or construct a cost-benefit analysis for the pro￾gram as a whole. Still, as noted, the illustrative cases were sufficiently numerous and sufficiently 
dispersed among independent Pact partners and PETS activities to be convincing. The team 
acknowledges, however, that Pact partners may have exaggerated reports of their own impact 
as this would serve their own interest for further funding. The true impacts of STAR, therefore, 
may be more qualified in terms of impact and sustainability. As already noted, a definitive con￾clusion would require a more systematic evaluation of the work of the PETS committees them￾selves. 
PRIME MINISTER’S REFLECTED AUTHORITY 
Perhaps the most forceful, continuous, and visible form of governmental and political support 
for PETS and PETS committees comes from the Office of Regional Administration and Local 
Government. In fact, the authority PETS committees had received concrete backing from the 
2007 guidance promulgated by the Prime Minister through this office. The guidance aimed spe￾cifically at LGAs, states that: 
“PETS are a CSO tool and are a strong, participatory monitor of the integrity, transpar￾ency, and accountability of financial management systems and decision making. They 
track whether the money allegedly for public services actually gets to where it has been 
planned and promised. The government wants PETS to grow, based on quality process￾es, reporting, and follow up. This Guidance has been prepared to clarify PETS for LGAs 
and what it means for the vertical system, from PMO-RALG to service delivery points. 
PETS can be of many depths, hence this guidance is deliberately generic, to set some pa￾rameters. Experience will tell us how it will be improved in the future.” (p.1)
“The supply side is the obligation of LGAs, adhering to the principles of good govern￾ance. LGAs should ‘explain publicly, fully, and fairly how they are conducting responsibil￾ities that affect the public.’ The demand side comes from civil society (communities and 
organizations). It is the ability of citizens to hold the local authority to account. Elections 
are only every five years, therefore there has to be other ways. (sic) These are through 
free media, meetings, participatory processes, and now through PETS.” (pp. 3-4) 
“Experiences in Tanzania and elsewhere have shown that PETS have the potential to en￾hance downward accountability at all levels of government, provided that they are con￾ducted effectively, and the results are publicly discussed and actions taken to correct 
mistakes and to strengthen systems. ...[B]etter accountability and governance leads to 
better development. (p. 6, emphasis added) “... ‘LGA’ also covers both staff and elected 
officials of the LGA or sub-level….” (p. 13)
“PETS are a tool for providing information to citizens about how government money is 
used. PETS compare budgetary allocations to actual spending. This involves ‘following 
the money’ to where it is spend, comparing budgetary allocations with records of trans￾fers and receipts at each level of government. PETS will show how much of the funds in￾tended for service providers actually reach the intended beneficiaries. It will also indi-
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 20
cate at what level and leakage of diversion take place and will provide comparable statis￾tics for administrative divisions….” (p.4) 
“Article 18 [of the Constitution] goes on to foster transparency and accountability 
through the right to information: (18(1) ‘…every person has the right to…receive and 
impart or disseminate information, and….the right to be informed at all times….’” (p. 7)
“PETS is about making financial information publicly available in a format that is under￾standable and useable. In spite of official policies of transparency, it is exceedingly diffi￾cult for local stakeholders to get financial information from local authorities; or for 
LGAs to get information from central government. Local officials were (and are) often 
unwilling or unable to provide the financial information…. It was (and is) often difficult 
or not possible to tell the source of funds received….” (p. 8)
“PETS depend on collaboration between CSOs and Government bodies (at whatever 
level). It also depends on a clear understanding of the role of [civil society]; they are not 
auditors.” (p. 16)
Although CSOs and even the government-appointed Commission on Local Government Re￾form Programme have made several recommendations for improvements, including augmented 
authority for civil society, the December 2007 guidance stands as is. (Pact’s claim that the PETS 
authorities were the result of its work on BONGA appears, therefore, to be somewhat exag￾gerated, since BONGA did not begin until 2006.) Nevertheless, PMO-RALG continues to moni￾tor budgets and back PETS support in tracking expenditures. Since so much of the local budget 
comes from the central government, this backing is crucial for future PETS impact. In fact, only 
minor revenues, such as stall rentals and parking violations, are collected at the local level, with 
virtually none from direct taxation, with consequently weak local ownership of revenues that 
come from the center. 
Active support of PETS among government officials is a necessary complement to the PMO￾RALG guidance. “It wasn’t an easy relation between us and the government officials,” said the 
Bahi PETS committee secretary. “They thought PETS was trying to uncover their mistakes and 
we got conflicting budget numbers from the district treasurer, district planning officer, the 
DED, and the DALDO [district agriculture and livestock development officer].” A Bahi counci￾lor reaffirmed this response, albeit understandable, among government officials: “There were 
some good aspects and some negative aspects to PETS. They came to investigate me, so gov￾ernment officials like me were reluctant to give information when they expected to be investi￾gated, but things are changing.” Similarly, according to a PETS program officer at the Christian 
Council of Tanzania, “Government officials have never been friendly to PETS, because it touch￾es on their position and we had resistance in Babati (Manyara) and in Liwale (in Lindi), but we 
had a letter of introduction from the Prime Minister’s office and we had the Prime Minister’s 
guidance on PETS, so they let us in.” Or, perhaps a slightly different complaint: “Initially PETS 
committees were perceived as interfering with LGAs,” said a journalist at UNGO. “Others 
used more indirect routes. AFNET got resistance from the DED in one district so it worked 
through the health officers to track those expenditures.”
Government officials were, of course, right to be concerned if there were any discrepancy be￾tween funds appropriated for a particular purpose and the funds actually received. Indeed, even 
from the government’s perspective, uncovering those discrepancies and tracing them was one 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 21
of the main purposes of the PETS committees. The PMO-RALG guidance anticipated but did 
not resolve the fine line between monitoring and holding officials accountable on the one hand, 
and auditing on the other. In fact, the guidance specifically grounds the PETS committees not 
only in the government’s commitment to transparency through the right of citizens to know 
and understand the budget, but also in the government’s concern about corruption and diver￾sion of funds, which the PETS committees would help uncover and, therefore, help prosecute. 
This ambiguity, even ambivalence, was evident among the Pact partners and the PETS commit￾tees. “It was not the job of the PETs committees to prosecute but only to track,” said a repre￾sentative from TACOSODE, echoing part of the guidance that states they are monitors but not 
auditors. But, as noted above, many of the others pointed proudly—and justifiably—to the di￾verted funds restored and the officials dismissed or transferred as a result of their work. Once 
again, if there was support from senior officials, like the DED, the PETS committees could have 
sustained greater impact and diminished ambivalence surrounding its role. As stated above, a 
UNGO official told the team, “When PETS began, LGA officials viewed PETS committees as 
inspectors, but at the end they understood that the PETS committees were there to help. As a 
result, there were a lot of changes as a result of PETS, for example, government budgets were 
posted on notice boards.” However, given STAR’s lack of quantitative indicators to measure 
whether integrity of public spending increased in Tanzania as a result of PET committees’ activi￾ties, no conclusive results can be drawn aside from the anecdotal evidence described above. 
POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT
Albeit anecdotal, the support, resistance, or opposition to the PETS committees of officials with 
clout was instrumental to program results. Two sets of officials stand out in particular: (1) the 
respective centrally-appointed village or ward executive officers, the district executive director, 
and the respective sectoral officials for education, health, water and agriculture; and (2) the vil￾lage chairpersons and ward councilors. The former are employees appointed and assigned on a 
rotating basis by the central government. The latter are elected or selected by their local com￾munities. 
The findings of the PETS committees needed a champion with enough power and authority to 
achieve significant impact. For example, the Zanzibar Current Generation Forum (ZCGF) pro￾duced a report detailing construction defects in the walls, ceilings, and toilets of a local school, 
including photographs of the defects. The report was handed over to local officials and the Min￾istry of Education. Although ZCGF pursued it to some extent, there was no specific response, 
let alone remediation, to the damage or disciplinary action for the contractor or local officials 
who approved the construction. Without a political champion, the report seems to have lan￾guished. In contrast, the DED in Morogoro publicized and pursued the diversion of funds UN￾GO reported to him. As a result, the Office of the Auditor General investigated the issue and 
11 officials, including the district treasurer and several engineers, were removed or transferred. 
Absent that political or governmental interest, PETS committees were without sufficient lever￾age to create consequences for their monitoring and tracking. 
Several respondents complained that the appointed officials were dismissive or (perhaps with 
good reason) defensive about the findings of the PETS committees. In those cases, the PETS 
committees had a difficult time gaining traction for their findings and recommendations. Not￾withstanding the constitution, the law, and the PMO-RALG guidance, all of which empowered 
the PETS committees to gain access to information and demand accountability, the committees’
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 22
demands were too easily ignored with impunity. Put differently, there were many obstacles to 
changing the inertia of budget execution by the local government authorities, including the per￾sonal and entrenched interests by those officials to benefit by directly or indirectly misappro￾priating funds. Without sufficient support, how were villagers supposed to bring relatively pow￾erful LGAs to account? As the Bahi PETS committee chairman said, “What recourse did we 
have to change things—not just inform the villagers or the village councilor or executive of￾ficer? Nothing happened. We communicated with SAHRINGO but SAHRINGO never re￾sponded to us.”3
 If, however, the DED had followed through (and was willing to follow the law 
and the established guidance instead of, for example, overlooking or even benefitting from what 
PMO-RALG calls “diversions” or “leakage”), she or he could have used PETS reports to hold 
his subordinates accountable. To be sure, villagers were not without their own resources. They 
could—and we were told sometimes did—refuse to deal with an errant village or ward official. 
The DED could not dismiss this protest and was forced to take measures against these officials. 
However, these were extraordinary instances and the political balance of power favors the offi￾cials at the expense of the villagers who are disproportionately weak and suffer from collective 
action problems and high transactional costs. Partners understood that this imbalance quite 
well: “We have the capacity,” one Pact partner official told the team, “but not the clout.”
SYSTEMIC IMPACT ON PUBLIC EXPENDITURE TRACKING OR ACCOUNTA￾BILITY
STAR did not seem to have a plan for broader systemic impact , whether on its own or as an 
integral part of a larger government or donor effort to create or nurture something larger 
among Pact’s partners and their PETS committees. The program, for instance, was not part of a 
larger plan forged with the Government of Tanzania or among donors. Other bilateral donors, 
including the Dutch Ministry of Development Cooperation, DFID, and GIZ, had similar pro￾grams, but there was no comprehensive, systematic plan to coordinate assistance. STAR pro￾gram impacts were also not designed to “roll up” into something larger than the particular 
PETS committees. There may have been an intended pilot program, but this was not evident in 
the documentation and did not happen. Through PMO-RALG guidance, the Government of 
Tanzania encouraged the establishment of PETS committees across the country and provided 
authority for their operations. In this sense, however, donors might be seen as participating in a 
“national program,” there were no plans by the government or the donors to propagate these 
committees across the country but were instead established wherever they could find support. 
As such, STAR was never part of a design for systemic impact. 
Moreover, given the “lumpy,” two-years-at-a-time consideration of the three seemingly inde￾pendent phases of the program, there does not seem to have been a deliberate, coherent six￾year program that would “roll up” structurally or “roll out” geographically. As such, program 
impacts were independent, relatively self-contained, and limited both in time and geography. 
Moreover, with just a scattering of villages affected, program successes can also not be seen as 
systemic in nature. A random sample of these successes may, at best, prove that systemic ef-
 
3 It may never have been the responsibility of the Pact partners to take up the complaints of their PETS 
mentees but, if so, this was a weakness in the STAR program or an intended limitation on the program. 
From the perspective of the small and often isolated PETS committees, their Pact partner was much bet￾ter positioned to follow through and seek accountability it was, especially if there was indifference or 
resistance from the local authorities. 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 23
fects would have possible with enough funding and mentoring, but they cannot really roll up 
without it, unless the “pilots” were to nurture a full movement.
ORGANIZATIONAL IMPACT 
Apart from impacts on public expenditure tracking and accountability, there were impacts on 
the Pact partners and perhaps even on the PETS committees themselves. As stated in its pro￾gram description, Pact trained its partners to strengthen “skills and experience in democracy 
and good governance, organizational capacity building, grants management…and financial man￾agement.”4 Training and mentoring by Pact lasted several months and ultimately delayed the 
sub-grants to the PETS committees, thereby diminishing the impact of the program on the PETS 
committees and their tracking, monitoring, and accountability efforts. Nevertheless, almost all 
Pact partners appreciated the training and maintained that the assistance strengthened their or￾ganizations.5
 No quantitative metrics exists to measure these efforts. 
 CHECKS AND BALANCES
Although more effective and direct, political interest does need not necessarily come from the 
executive branch to produce accountability. Political interest can come from elected officials 
like local councilors or (presumably, though no such example was elicited) members of parlia￾ment. By chance, the team witnessed a paradigmatic example of accountability in the bimonthly 
market in a deserted field outside Bahi village. While interviewing a ward councilor, the ward 
executive officer joined the discussion. The executive officer and councilor got into a heated 
discussion over the authority of the Bahi PETS committee in tracking budgets and identifying 
misappropriations. The ward executive officer insisted that those were his responsibilities and 
those of the ward engineers. The councilor, who had taken up a PETS committee complaint, 
angrily insisted that he and the committee had the right and the responsibility to act as a check 
on the executive branch. Were there more political competition in Tanzania and were the local 
officials in general as sensitive to their constituents and to their own authorities, horizontal ac￾countability would be more developed and PETS committees would have greater leverage re￾garding the misappropriations, defects, malfeasance, and corruption they uncover. As it stands, 
the PETS committees often felt powerless in the face of indifference or resistance by officials to 
whom they report misappropriations. 
CAUSAL RELATIONSHIPS
Reports of PETS committees’ impacts suffer at times from the fallacy of temporal succession,
post hoc ergo propter hoc: because it came later, it was caused by what came earlier. Even in 
cases where officials were transferred, suspended, or terminated after a PETS report, the causal 
relationship between the reports and the discipline is uncertain. Were those transfers, suspen￾sions, or terminations actually due to the reports or were there other causes? Were the PETS 
reports part of an accumulating set of complaints or did they stand alone? Were the transfers 
made in the ordinary course of hundreds of normal governmental transfers? Did the officers 
themselves request the transfers? Were the transfers actually promotions to better positions 
or more desirable postings? To ascertain the causal relationship between the actions of the 
 
4 Pact, “Strengthening Transparency, Accountability, and Responsibility (STAR) Program Description, 
Resubmitted to USAID Tanzania, 22 July 2009”; p. 16. 
5 Unfortunately, the team was not able to independently substantiate these statements. 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 24
PETS committees and their perceived effects, a more systematic investigation of the relation is 
needed. 
INDICATIVE BUT NOT CONCLUSIVE IMPACT 
The reports of PETS committee impact are illustrative and suggestive but not dispositive in the 
absence of tighter impact reporting and, within that reporting, of demonstrated causal relations. 
Absolute causal certainty will almost certainly remain an ideal but will be illusive. Unable to con￾trol all other variables but PETS committee activity, uncertainty will remain about the causal 
relations between PETS monitoring and remedial or disciplinary action: the extent to which the 
latter is a response to the former. Still, greater certainty would be available in SATC with bet￾ter tracking of the PETS activities themselves and closer connection with the local officials who 
supervised the “offending” officials. That connection will be even less possible under SATC than 
under STAR however, because the Pact intermediary will be missing, however self-serving its 
reports might otherwise be. The Mission will almost certainly be unable to track the 25-30 
PETS committees mentored or even established by the CSOs under SATC especially since the 
CSOs not the PETS committees will collect and report on the impact indicators and data. 
RELATIVE IMPACT INDICATORS
Pact reported exactly what it proposed to report under each program phase. Pact proposed 
indicators which USAID accepted, but these impacts were relative in nature. For instance, Pact 
sought to “strengthen the technical capacity of CSOs to undertake advocacy activities by 
providing resources and support to advocacy campaigns that grow out of the PETs process and 
Capacity building initiatives”6 and “support government anti-corruption and good governance 
initiatives through awareness raising and training to government officials.”7 But, to what degree? 
According what measures? What was the baseline? What were the expected improvements? 
How much stronger would the capacity of CSOs be as a result of STAR assistance? Absent 
more concrete definitions and clear, let alone quantitative, targets, it is hard to know exactly 
what the expected impacts were under STAR. No doubt some of the vagueness derived from 
the uncertainty of funding and “lumpy” project structure. The weakness was in the primary de￾sign, not in deficient or improper execution of a well-considered blueprint. In that respect as 
well, actual PETS impacts were more fortuitous and therefore surprising than planned. 
LIMITED NATIONAL IMPACT
If STAR had a more deliberate plan with robust indicators and a longer duration, what could 
STAR and similar programs funded by other donors achieved? STAR worked with 21 CSOs, 
each with two to six PETS committees, affecting between 60 and100 villages or wards around 
the country. Tanzania, however, has 30 regions, 169 districts, over 600 wards, and thousands of 
villages. Could STAR have made much of a dent in accountability unless these villages and wards 
were pilots or examples of what might be “rolled out” on a more national scale? Absent a na￾tional PETS plan with a large number of villages similarly supported by other donors or by the 
government itself, such a small proportion of scattered villages could not have had systemic na-
 
6 It would do so by “(i) CSO Capacity Building”; (ii) Sub-Grants; (iii) Strengthening Information Sharing 
among the Tanzania CSOs [including] a. Information, Transparency and Information, b Establish and 
Support a PETS Secretariat and c. Budget Advocacy.” Ibid. pp. 11-12. 
7 Ibid. p. 12. It would do so by “(1) assessing and strengthening local governance and (2) local govern￾ment reform program” Ibid; p. 12.
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 25
tional impact. A random sample of such successes might prove that systemic effects would be 
possible with enough funding and mentoring, but they could not really roll up without it. 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 26
SUSTAINABILITY
NO FUNDING, NO PROGRAM 
The single most important factor affecting the sustainability of PETS committees was funding. 
Pact’s own work under STAR concluded with the end of USAID assistance, as did most, but not 
all, the PETS committee activities and the connections between the Pact partners and the PETS 
committees. Once the funding ended, for instance, so too did the relationship between LEAT 
and its partner, WamiMbiki, and between LEAT and its PETS committees. Many respondents 
the team interviewed referred to the program’s perceived lack of sustainability. As a repre￾sentative from Chama chaWalemavu Tanzania (CHEWTA) put it, “We had no funds to keep 
going. … The program had serious problems of continuity. Once the project funding ended, it 
became impossible to get people together.” An official from UNGO also stated that “there was 
no institutional memory by Pact and no idea about the Local Governance Barometer work by 
UNGO.” 
Some relationships forged under STAR, however, did outlive USG assistance. TACASODE, for 
example, still maintains its contacts and representatives from AFNET told the evaluation team 
that the organization “stuck with [its] PETS committee” after its grant ended. In fact, the 
Tunajali committee turned its training into a consulting business it relies on for continued exist￾ence and work. Even if PETS committees did not survive as organizations, some members con￾tinued the PETS work. As one respondent told the team, “Individuals members of the PETS 
committees still monitor funds. It takes volunteerism, initiative and commitment. 
Nevertheless, even when contact between a Pact partner and a PETS committee continued af￾ter the end of the program, mentorship atrophied. Pact partners noted that they could not af￾ford to travel to their mentees without USAID funding. Some PETS committee members re￾ported they could not travel to local farmers, schools, or clinics beyond walking distance. Even 
cell phone contact, with an attendant negligible cost, withered.
The program’s limited sustainability also weakened PETS committee activities. Some funding 
was necessary, according to several PETS committees, in order to support materials, travel, and 
lunches. “No funding, no program,” said one PETS committee member in a pithy synopsis. The 
training Pact provided its partners appeared equally tenuous. “Two or four years is a long time, 
and we have forgotten some of the training. And how can we do training ourselves without 
funding to get a room, pay bus fare or lunches?” asked a member of the Zanzibar Non￾Government Cluster for HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control (ZANGO). 
In part, the grants’ short duration and interruptions between program phases meant that track￾ing activities and organizational lessons learned were not reinforced long enough to endure. As 
noted, the Pact partners were almost entirely dependent on USAID funding since they had no 
organic ties to any sustaining community, going from project to project, funder to funder. In 
fact, GIZ was so discouraged upon finding that only five percent of the PETS committees it 
funded were sustainable that it completely abandoned the PETS committee approach. SNV had 
a similar experience but with a less far-reaching response and adjustments. As such, shortcom￾ings under STAR might be attributable to the structure of the approach. 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 27
WHOSE BENEFIT? 
PETS committees and Pact partners in particular seem to view their funded activities more like 
a job they were hired by Pact and, by extension, USAID, to do, rather than as a good in and of 
itself. For these partners, when the funding stopped, so did the work although, within their 
funding and staffing constraints, they did attempt to create a coalition for some kind of sustain￾ability. The central underlying hypothesis of the entire PETS program was based on the pre￾sumption that the misallocation or misappropriation and corruption of funding meant that 
benefits intended for the community—such as medicines, doctors, teachers, books, fertilizers, 
and irrigation—were being misdirected and corrupted and that it is in the primary interest of 
the beneficiaries, not of USAID or Pact, to see that these benefits are delivered. Naturally, par￾ents want to see their children educated and want to see teachers show up, want to receive 
medical attention for their families, and want water and fertilizers for their crops. As such, it 
would be in their interest to track malfeasance and ensure its correction and prevention. In￾deed, AFNET reported that (presumably for just this reason) some groups, like a farmers group 
tracking agricultural appropriations, used their own money to continue tracking expenditures 
after the grants ended. The Bahi committee reported an almost identical result: when public 
subsidies did not arrive, an agriculture tracking committee reported the discrepancy and pri￾vately raised funds to ensure that they had crops. 
Why was budget tracking of a community’s public goods seen as a job provided by a donor ra￾ther than as an incentive to track its own benefits? Why wouldn’t self interest incentivize dili￾gent monitoring and corrective action? One might argue that collective-action problems led in￾dividuals to not feel responsible for expending time, effort, and funds to ensure public goods 
and benefits for the community at large. This is different, however, from viewing the entire ex￾ercise as a mere response to funds provided by a foreign donor. More than one respondent 
told the team, “It wasn’t our responsibility to continue the tracking.” But then, whose responsi￾bility is it to ensure that public benefits are delivered as promised to local beneficiaries? Whose 
responsibility is it to keep these activities going or will indefinite donor funding be needed to 
“sustain” the effort of accountability? 
LINKAGES TO OTHER MORE SUSTAINABLE INSTITUTIONS
One possible approach to fostering more sustainable PETS committees would be to link the 
PETS function to other existing, sustainable organizations. Two Pact partners suggested com￾munity savings banks as organizational anchors, as villagers have a personal financial stake in 
these institutions. Other relatively permanent organizations, preferably where there are per￾sonal and enduring investments, that are formed for broader purposes around particular is￾sues—such as village committees or farmers’ groups similar to the one in Bahi—could be repli￾cated for other sectors, like PTA committees for schools. A former Pact staff member opined 
that the problem with PETS was that it was “just tracking, but had very little personal relevance 
to most members of the community.” Issues that surfaced in PETS committees were not always 
followed through on or resolved, as there was a limited ability to raise the issues sufficiently 
high in the political sphere. 
From the following discussion, it is possible to draw the following conclusions: (1) the key one 
is that the PETS committees need to have a political “champion” or at least some kind of politi￾cal leverage in order for any of their budget findings to have some kind of meaningful impact; 
(2) in some cases the centrally appointed District Executive Director (DED) took up the cause 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 28
and that could be quite effective; (3) in some cases the district or regional elected officials took 
up the case and found themselves at odds with the centrally-appointed officials but at least had 
some leverage in getting a response; (4) sometimes the village councils took a position and, for 
example, would refuse to work with a particular problematic DED who might be moved, just as 
other appointed officials might but that was an extreme reaction. For the normal cases, the 
PETS committees have no independent leverage other than to monitor and report. Were the 
political system more competitive, local opinion would have greater leverage and the PETS 
committee reports would matter more. Of course the lack of leverage also affects the extent 
to which the PETS committees remain viable and active: to the extent that they see themselves 
as relatively impotent to affect budget decisions, they have less incentive to track them. 
TAXATION AND OWNERSHIP
One reason for the disassociation between individuals and the public expenditures is the ab￾sence of personal taxation, whether indirect (e.g., through sales taxes) or direct (e.g., based on 
income). As is the case in many developing countries, an overwhelming number of individual 
citizens pay no personal taxes on income. Government revenues come indirectly, such as 
through customs or investment taxes or corporate taxes on large, multilateral companies. Con￾sequently, citizens see government benefits more as gifts rather than as entitlements earned 
through personal taxation. Citizens, for the most part, appear to be happy with what they re￾ceive and less vigilant about holding officials accountable for undelivered services. As member of 
the former Commission on Local Government Reform Programme mused, “[There are] lots of 
resource leakages, but are the local people really interested?” If government budgets were de￾rived at least in part from personal taxation, many argue that community ownership and en￾gagement would increase, as citizens would be more likely track their tax dollars and social ser￾vices derived from their own pockets. As a representative from Women and Poverty Allevia￾tion in Tanzania (Wopata) told the team, “Since the irrigation project just came to the villages 
and [citizens] didn’t pay for it, they thought they had no right to inspect it. There was no own￾ership. When [citizens] contribute funds, they are more likely to feel ownership. No matter 
where the money comes from, they need to feel ownership. If they don’t feel ownership, they 
won’t pursue implementation as vigorously.”
The problems of collective action, however, can affect the calculus of individual incentives. Ac￾cording to an official from LEAT, “If the villagers understand that the forest belongs to them, 
they will take action. But will villagers avert misdeeds by their fellow villagers? Will they be per￾sonal custodians of public goods? We need to help the rights holders hold the duty bearers to 
account.” Thus, even if there is some ownership, if it is collective, the social cost of monitoring 
and reporting malfeasance among community members may be too high.
While personal taxation is beyond the manageable interest and scope of USAID and other in￾ternational donors, a personal or familial monetary investment might increase vigilance and par￾ticipation. As one AFNET representative noted, “There needs to be a feeling of ownership by 
citizens over funds. The missing link is the importance of having their priories reflected up the 
line to the districts and above.” If citizens’ tracking efforts at the village level do not seem to 
connect to the benefits they are entitled to, tracking will lose its purpose and incentive. 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 29
WHAT IS THE MEANING OF SUSTAINABILITY? 
While sustainability seems to be an ambiguous concept among donors, some view an organiza￾tion, project, or activity as sustainable if it continues with funding from other donors, and not 
from the local population. Several Pact partners—such as Civic Education Teachers Association 
(CETA), SAHRINGO, CELG, and Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT)—indicated that because 
of the experience they gained under STAR, they were able to continue PETS activities financed 
by other donors. Sooner or later, however, donor funding will end. A more robust definition of 
sustainability, however, entails the future persistence of the organization, the activity, or both 
after the project has ended. Sustainability should be considered in SATC: what, if any, interest 
does USAID have in long-term sustainability and ownership? How can the program design en￾hance both? 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 30
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMEN￾DATIONS 
As the STAR program ended two years ago, the real value of this evaluation lies in what lessons 
it holds for SATC and other public expenditure tracking system programs. In this section, we 
outline general conclusions and lessons learned and propose recommendations for future pro￾gramming. It must be noted, however, that STAR’s shortcomings were often the result of fac￾tors beyond the control of USAID. 
OVERALL IMPACT 
 Demonstrated impact. As outlined above, STAR generated several positive benefits. 
While there were no concrete measures of or precise reporting on program impact, 
the team found extensive qualitative evidence of positive program effects. While this ev￾idence may have been partially anecdotal, these anecdotes were mutually independent 
and too broadly dispersed to be dismissed as accidental. 
 Limited influence. Unless their findings garnered political or governmental interest 
from powerful supporters, PETS committees did not have sufficient leverage to create 
consequences for their monitoring and tracking.
 Create national impact. If possible, greater attention should be placed at the outset 
of SATC to create nationwide, systematic, sustainable impact. Coordination with other 
donors would broaden this impact and program activities must not be restricted to the 
wards and districts in which “their” PETS committees operate. PETS activities need to 
find a way of spreading if they are to have national impact. 
 Increased focus on media coverage of program activities. BONGA placed sub￾stantial emphasis on media coverage and journalist training. Some interviewees spoke of 
successes that were augmented by media coverage of their activities and raising the is￾sues of public spending and accountability in the public consciousness. The coverage and 
the awareness would bolster the somewhat relative powerlessness of the PETS commit￾tees where they face political and bureaucratic resistance and should perhaps be incor￾porated into SATC.
PETS COMMITTEES 
 Limited local ownership. Under STAR, there was not enough community ownership 
over the PETS committees or understanding of their benefits and beneficiaries. Conse￾quently, there was not enough personal commitment among individuals and communi￾ties to sustain the PETS committees after USAID funding ended. While poor communi￾ties would have been hard-pressed to raise even minimal amounts, PETS committees 
and their tracking activities did continue in some areas. 
 Lower expected transactional costs. The long distance between some Pact part￾ners and their mentee PETS committees made post-funding support and personal con-
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 31
tact, let alone mentoring, difficult. SATC, on the other hand, will be more geographically 
focused. The program will be concentrated in five regions: Dodoma, Iringa, Morogoro, 
Mtwara, and Zanzibar. Several of the potential SATC CSOs are based in Dar es Salaam 
and each organization will focus on one or two functional themes, such as health, agri￾culture, education, or natural resource management. As such, transactional costs are 
expected to be lower under SATC than under STAR. Still, care should be taken to min￾imize these costs. 
 Increase integration with local institutions. To increase the likelihood of sustaina￾bility, SATC should integrate the PETS program with existing community organizations 
and activities in which local people have a vested interest. Program activities stand a bet￾ter chance of having impact if they are anchored locally. 
 Structural power imbalances limit impact. PETS committees have little practical 
leverage to voice their demands or assert their rights in the face of tenured government 
officials with funds to distribute or withhold. As one interviewee said, legal action, even 
if available and accessible in theory, is drawn-out and expensive in practice. The relative 
imbalance of power and funding is substantial, unless the government makes clear that it 
will sanction, if necessary with legal prosecution, the unwillingness of its own officers to 
share information, respond to legitimate public inquiries, formally pursue credible allega￾tions of misappropriations and corruption, and take serious action (even against politi￾cally or economically protected officials) when those inquiries prove grounded. 
 Adopt a long-term view. A PETS program will probably need three to five years of 
funding to sustain PETS committees institutionally and ground their lessons. It will take 
time for relatively powerless, unorganized, and often illiterate villagers to understand 
principles of transparency and accountability well enough to apply them after funding 
ends, let alone apply them to other unfunded sectors. Moreover, unless PETS functions 
are grounded in existing, relatively permanent organizations or institutions, new, inde￾pendent PETS committees are unlikely to survive on two years of funding. 
SUSTAINABILITY AND OWNERSHIP 
 Place greater emphasis on sustainability. From the outset under SATC, greater 
concern should be placed on the long-term sustainability of the PETS committees as well 
as fostering an enduring relationship between the CSOs and the PETS committees they 
are mentoring and funding. While an eventual atrophy of the relationship between the 
CSOs and the PETS committees may be unavoidable, the sustainability of the PETS 
committees and their value to their communities should be a priority under SATC. If 
there is no understanding and ownership of the value of the PETS committees in their 
respective communities, their sustainability will be limited. 
 Develop and strengthen relationships with PMO-RALG. PMO-RALG continues 
to monitor budgets and provide PETS support in tracking expenditures. Since so much 
of the local budget comes from the central government, this financial support is crucial 
to the future impact of PETS activities. As one of the relatively powerful internal Gov￾ernment of Tanzania supporters, PETS committees should be actively seeking to culti-
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 32
vate relationships with PMO-RALG. PMO-RALG has an interest in ensuring that its own 
guidelines are observed and the PETS committees are one resource—a local ear to the 
ground, so to speak—for helping it do so. As such, a stronger connection among the 
CSOs, their PETS committee mentees, and PMO-RALG would be a win-win relationship 
in a political environment in which PETS committees and CSOs are relatively weak. 
Hopefully, the GoT’s IoAs will also be SATC partners and provide political support to 
PETS committees. A close relationship, therefore, between the SATC partners and IoAs 
should also strengthen impact under SATC, if those relationships can be forged and if 
the IoAs are willing to use their influence to support the PETS efforts. 
 Specify intended beneficiaries. Questions USAID and the future implementer might 
consider include: In effect, whose benefit is the program for? What is the fundamental 
hypothesis about benefits and commitment? How realistic is it?
MONITORING AND EVALUATION 
 SATC should include a concrete monitoring and evaluation system to track 
impact at the local level. This system should be based on a realistic hypothesis of 
expected effects on transparency and accountability with a common understanding 
among all stakeholders of transparency and accountability and how they will be manifest. 
Questions USAID and the future implementer might consider include: What is the pro￾posed national impact of the program? To what extent are the CSOs and their PETS 
beneficiaries achieving it? What are the impediments? How can these impediments be 
ameliorated? Do the expected impacts need to be adjusted?
 Track impact at the local level. CSOs are the vehicles for PETS impact, but the ac￾tual impact will be primarily felt at the PETS committee level. As the PETS committees 
are the primary beneficiaries of the program, SATC indicators should track impact for 
PETS committees at the district, ward, and village level. 
 Focus training on PETS activities. Training is important and should be focused on 
PETS activities, with less emphasis on grants management and organizational structure. 
Sustainability will depend more on the results PETS committees achieve for themselves 
and their communities than on their organizational structure. Local PETS committees 
will develop their own local organizational modalities, subject to local conditions and 
funding. However, no matter how well organized PETS committees are, if PETS activities 
are not seen to have immediate positive impact, they are not likely to be sustained ab￾sent external funding. 
 Monitor beneficiary impacts. Actual beneficiary impacts themselves should be moni￾tored. Reliance on illustrations and anecdotes should not substitute for (preferably 
quantitative) impact indicators or on reports alone, or on the temporal relation be￾tween PETS actions and accountability action as if action that succeeds a PETS report is 
indicative of a causal relation between the two.
 Develop clear, measurable indicators. Indicators for SATC should be clear and 
measurable. STAR’s impacts were entirely relative, without clearly defined aspirations or 
STAR PROGRAM PERFORMANCE EVALUATION—REVISED DRAFT REPORT 33
specific measures. Questions USAID and the future implementer might consider include: 
To what degree and along what axes would committees be built, improved, or strength￾ened? According to what measures? What is the baseline? What are the expected or 
hoped for results and what would be considered an improvement? What are the goals, if 
not the achievement? To what extent can these indicators be plotted on a nominal, or￾dinal, interval or ratio scale?
STAR EVALUATION—DRAFT REPORT 34
ANNEX A: STATEMENT OF WORK 
SECTION C–DESCRIPTION I SPECIFICATIONS/STATEMENT OF WORK 
EVALUATION SERVICES FOR DRG PORTFOLIO, USAID/TANZANIA
C.l Purpose and Objectives:
The purpose of this accountable governance program evaluation contract with USAID/Tanzania 
is to support the USAID/Tanzania Democracy, Rights, and Governance (DRG) team's ability to 
monitor and evaluate its activities. In order to adequately fulfill the monitoring and evaluation 
(M&E) requirements of the USAID/DRG core program, Supporting Accountability to Tanzania Cit￾izens (SATC), near-term support is needed on specific tasks that will help ensure that timely, accu￾rate and useful information is reported throughout the life of the SATC program. The outputs 
from this contract will feed directly into the upcoming Mission-wide M&E contract, which is to be 
awarded in the coming year.
USAID/Tanzania is looking for an independent entity to perform specific tasks to support the im￾mediate M&E needs of the DRG portfolio over a 12 month period. These tasks should enable 
USAID/Tanzania to fulfill its performance monitoring, evaluation, reporting, and dissemination re￾quirements as mandated in the Automated Directives System (ADS) and other Agency guidance. 
The Contractor must: 
1.Conduct a post-program performance evaluation of the Strengthening, Transparency, 
Accountability, and Responsibility (STAR) program, as a culmination of two prior 
programs implemented by Pact; 
2.Conduct a desk review of programs in Tanzania similar to the DRG SATC program and 
the tools they use for measuring and assessing their programs; 
3.Draft indicators for SATC in collaboration with partners already online; 
4.Develop tools for measuring SATC outcomes; 
5.Propose a Civil Society Organization (CSO) index that looks at outcomes from SATC 
inputs; 
6.Conduct the first perception survey for SATC; 
7.Establish baseline data for SATC program; and 
8.Develop a plan for the handover of DRG M&E to the Mission-wide M&E Contractor. 
Guiding Principles:
 Utilize an asset-based approach and lens in assessing and implementing program activi￾ties (an asset-based approach takes the assets of individuals and communities as the 
starting point, as opposed to their needs, and empowers individuals and communities 
to be partners in their own development process); 
STAR EVALUATION—DRAFT REPORT 35
 Promote gender equity in the assessment, design, planning, and implementation of the 
contract activities and support women to assume leadership roles; 
 Employ a do-no-harm approach to reduce the exposure of targeted communities inad￾vertent risks; 
 Build capacity less through training than through learning-by-doing, to ensure that local 
partners build their ability and confidence to lead similar programs in the future; and. 
 Offers that creatively and appropriately adapt existing tools will be favored over pro￾posals that simply generate new tools for the sake of it. Innovation is encouraged but 
must be contextually sound. 
C.2 Program Background:
USAID/Tanzania's Democracy, Rights and Governance (DRG) program, entitled "Supporting 
Accountability to Tanzania Citizens" (hereafter referred to as the "Program"or "SATC"), is a 
three-pronged, sector-based intervention to improve accountability and oversight of public re￾sources through increased citizen participation. The program will achieve greater citizen en￾gagement in service delivery and strengthened linkages between government Institutions of 
Accountability (loA) and civil society organizations (CSO). This approach will bridge gaps in
CSOs’ and citizens' understanding of their rights and their ability to advocate for those rights. 
The program will catalyze change in governance as CSOs improve their connection with citi￾zens, as more citizens take advantage of the opportunity to understand their individual rights 
and as they better understand what role they play in the democratic process. By 2016, 
USAID/Tanzania will help achieve, in targeted geographic zones and in selected sectors, a 
more accountable, inclusive decision-making process for public resource management, where 
civic participation in public affairs is normalized. Tanzanians' informed and active participation 
in local governance will help set the stage for the 2015 presidential and parliamentary elec￾tions. More importantly, efforts to foster greater citizen engagement are expected to model 
and incentivize behaviors that can be replicated broadly. Such efforts are critical to creating 
demand for increased transparency and, ultimately, improvements in national-level government 
accountability.
The program's Prongs One (a grant-making mechanism to local CSOs) and Two (four direct 
government-to-government funding mechanisms) represent the demand and supply of account￾ability respectively, which must be targeted simultaneously to stimulate motivation for sus￾tained engagement on both sides. Those first two components will be connected by Prong 
Three: a capacity development contractor with varied local expertise that will provide tailored 
Technical Assistance (TA) and capacity development support to the Tanzanian awardees, both 
government and CSO.
Under Prong One, USAID will directly engage CSOs involved in the sectors which 
USAID/Tanzania is already targeting -health, agriculture/food security, natural resource manage￾ment (NRM), and education -through direct grants that will support these CSOs in advocacy, is￾sue-based networking, and social accountability monitoring. These activities will align with the focus 
regions of USAID's Global Health Initiative (GHI), Feed the Future (FtF), NRM, and Education Pro￾grams, namely Dodoma, Iringa, Morogoro, Zanzibar, and Mtwara. Prong Two is a set of four 
agreements with GoT IoAs to strengthen their local level staff, improve their information packag￾ing, facilitate outreach to the public, and improve their linkages with civil society and the media.
STAR EVALUATION—DRAFT REPORT 36
USAID/Tanzania is seeking support on specific tasks that are immediately needed to ensure effective
evaluation of the program over the life of SATC. 
C.3 Statement of Work:
In order to accurately evaluate achievements made under SATC's overarching goal, as well as the 
success of its three-pronged approach, tasks must be completed in the next 12 months. In estab￾lishing the means for monitoring data and eventually evaluating the three-pronged approach, the 
Contractor should appropriately adapt and/or use data collected by other stakeholders -GoT, 
CSOs, Afrobarometer, other USAID/Tanzania implementing partners, other development part￾ners' analyses. The Contractor may decide to expand existing perception surveys to be frequent 
enough and seeped appropriately to serve the needs under this contract. New data collection 
tools may still be required and the Contractor must identify them and include their design, devel￾opment, and deployment for establishing baseline data and the strategy for their continued usage 
once the long- term Mission-wide M&E contractor takes over.
Close coordination with the CDPA, which will be monitoring partner CSOs' institutional 
strengths, will be necessary. The Contractor will create and use a citizen/government percep￾tion survey mechanism as well as a CSO capacity and efficacy index.
Attribution of impacts to USAID/Tanzania interventions must be a central consideration when 
developing surveys, tools, and establishing baseline data
1) Performance Evaluation of STAR
USAID/Tanzania has the need for a program performance evaluation of USAID-funded support to 
Tanzanian advocacy organizations. This support took the form of three separate project all imple￾mented by Pact, and each building on the achievements of the previous program. This evaluation 
should focus on the last project, STAR, and encompass data from its parent programs Tanzania 
Advocacy Partnership Program (TAPP) and Building Organizational Networks for Good Govern￾ance and Advocacy (BONGA) to the extent possible. The evaluation is required to commence im￾mediately upon award. The Contractor must provide, in the proposal, illustrative information on
how such an evaluation would be approached, illustrative probable costs, and possible constraints.
The purposes for evaluating these programs are to 1) provide a post-program independent perfor￾mance evaluation; and 2) use lessons learned from those programs to inform USAID/Tanzania's 
current and future programming in similar sectors. USAID devoted considerable time and re￾sources to the STAR program and its precursors. A proper independent evaluation which provides 
recommendations for future programming will increase its learning base for accountable govern￾ance programming in Tanzania. Lessons learned from the evaluation of this program will assist in
establishing baseline data for the monitoring and evaluation of SATC.
A key hypothesis to test is the impact of Public Expenditure Tracking Systems, under donor funded 
programs like STAR, in “empowering Tanzanian citizens at local levels and organizations at the na￾tional level to participate and demand transparency and accountability in the systems for allocation and 
use of public resources, and in planning and delivery of public services for socio-economic develop-
STAR EVALUATION—DRAFT REPORT 37
ment and poverty reduction.” This is about searching for missing links to the ability and willingness 
of citizens to engage in government oversight over the long haul.
“Strengthening Transparency, Accountability, and Responsibility” Program 
In January 2012, Pact closed the 2-year "Strengthening Transparency, Accountability, and Re￾sponsibility" (STAR) program, which was a successor program to two previous Pact programs 
focused on civil society, advocacy, and participatory decision-making for good governance.
Initially, Pact Tanzania implemented, from 2002-2005, the Tanzania Advocacy Partnership Program 
(TAPP) under funding from the USAID/DG office. This program established a cadre of advocacy 
civil society organizations (CSOs) in Tanzania involved in legislation and policy reform. From 2006-
2008, Pact implemented the BONGA program (Building Organizational Networks for Good Governance 
and Advocacy and a Kiswahili word meaning "speak out!"). The United States Government's Millen￾nium Challenge Account (MCA), through USAID, supported the program as part of the Govern￾ment of Tanzania's MCA Threshold Program.
The overall goal of the BONGA program was to strengthen the capacity of Tanzanian CSOs to 
implement advocacy activities in order to increase public participation in the political process and 
holding government accountable. Ittrained over 300 journalists in investigative journalism; led to 
corruption stories being reported in the media, trained over 2,000 individuals on organizational 
development. Public Expenditure Tracking Systems activities took place in 65 districts supported 
by resources and training from Pact at the community level by civil society networks. The GoT, 
through the Prime Minister's Office Regional and Local Government (PMO-RALG), developed 
guidelines for Public Expenditure Tracking Systems based on BONGA's work and have distributed 
them to local government authorities (LGAs). Pact Tanzania subsequently followed on BONGA 
with the two-year STAR.
STAR’s objectives included:
 Building the capacity of the citizens in selected districts to enable them to participate in the 
development plans, monitoring of local budgets and service delivery, and, to strengthen their 
voice in demanding a transparent, accountable and responsive government; 
 Enhance capacity of CSO and Citizen Groups to engage in participatory policy making and 
planning process; 
 Enhance the capacity of CSO/Citizen groups in monitoring and evaluation of public services 
and goods; 
 Increase the ability of citizen groups to understand and demand their rights for information by 
working with LGAs to ensure that lower local government representatives make infor￾mation publicly available;
 Strengthen the technical capacity of CSOs to undertake advocacy activities that grow out of 
the PETs process and capacity building initiatives. 
The evaluation of the STAR program must identify, to the furthest extent possible, the degree to 
which Pact attained the objectives laid out in the funded program description: 
 To what extent was/is its capacity building sustainable? 
 How might current or new USAID programs use, leverage, or build upon that capacity? 
STAR EVALUATION—DRAFT REPORT 38
 What tools or mechanisms - Public Expenditure Tracking Survey committees, citizen report 
cards, community score cards, or PIMA cards, notice boards -proved most effective in help￾ing ordinary citizens monitor public budgetary decisions and service delivery, under what 
circumstances? Was this appropriately measured by the program, and if not what are meth￾ods to measure such a result? 
To what extent did the 1) CSO Capacity Building, 2) Sub grants, and 3) "Strengthening Networking 
Information Sharing among Tanzania CSOs" each contribute to the achievement of the program ob￾jective? 
The evaluation must also answer a question about target communities' awareness and attitudes to￾ward the STAR program, Public Expenditure Tracking, and oversight of local government. 
The Contractor must make use of the prior assessments and evaluations that were conducted for 
these activities, including: 
 Final Performance Audit MCA Threshold Program Tanzania, November 2008; 
 The Millennium Challenge Corporation’s Tanzania Threshold Country Program: End Term
 Evaluation, February 2011; 
 Pact's End of Program Evaluation Report for STAR, March 2012. 
These and other relevant documentation and program reports will be provided by USAID. 
The audience of the evaluation report includes the USAID/Tanzania Mission, specifically the DRG 
Team, the USAID Africa and Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) Bureaus, 
other USG stakeholders, the Tanzanian Government, including the PMO-RALG, local government, 
development partners, USAID/DRG implementing partners and beneficiaries. USAID will use the re￾port to share lessons learned with these stakeholders. 
The evaluation will emphasize the 65 districts targeted for Public Expenditure Tracking and the 20 
partner CSOs. The Contractor must develop an evaluation design, data collection method, and an 
analysis plan using a mixed methods approach based on sound social science tools used in a manner 
to minimize potential biases and to capture a best possible picture of the targeted districts with the 
resources available. These components will be presented to USAID for review and approval before 
conducting the evaluation. 
Although the STAR program is now closed, Pact maintains a presence in Tanzania, conducting other 
projects, including USAID-funded ones. The Contractor must propose an approach and plan for 
conducting STAR program evaluation and providing USAID/Tanzania with findings for the STAR pro￾gram and recommendations based on those findings for consideration in the design of any future, 
similar programs. The evaluation approach and plan should be fully cognizant of and state any limita￾tions, including but not limited to the closure of the program and resource constraints. Approaches 
should include, but not be limited to, intensive review of USAID, Pact, and beneficiary agen￾cy/organization documents, direct site observations, and key informant interviews, including other 
donors and NGOs working the same field such as DFID, GIZ, HakiElimu, and Policy Forum. 
2) M&E for SATC Program
STAR EVALUATION—DRAFT REPORT 39
While individual USAlD/Tanzania implementing partners under SATC will develop performance 
monitoring plans (PMPs) for their specific programs, this Contract is meant to refine the strategy 
indicators and targets for monitoring higher-level USAlD/DRG portfolio progress toward the de￾velopment objective of “Improved Accountability and Oversight of Public Resources through In￾creased Citizen Participation.” If needed, the Contractor must design a plan, and deploy an ap￾propriate tool(s) for collecting baseline data to analyze and report on that data as required by 
USAID/Tanzania. This plan should include annual data and analysis so that comparisons can be 
made to the baseline. Being able to discern if changes in status-quo can be attributed to the 
SATC program is a priority.
First, the Contractor will develop indicators, based on its initial desk review, demonstrative of
the program's impact to be tracked over the life of the SATC program. These should be devel￾oped in concert with implementing partners who are expected to be developing theirs within the 
first quarter of their year-1 activities. Most partners will sign their awards in the fiscal year 2013.
Second, the Contractor must design tools and develop baselines to support the following indica￾tors (with illustrative targets). These may be fine-tuned with the COR during the first quarter of
the first quarter of the contract:
 Changes in citizens' and local officials' views of governance in targeted locations; 
 25% positive change in citizen opinion in targeted geographical locations about the relevance 
of CSOs for advocacy;
 25% positive change in local understanding of rights around targeted issues in USAID- 
 targeted geographical areas; 
 30% increased public understanding of partner IoAs' functions; 
 Progress along CSO Index (would include effectiveness of citizen-driven advocacy such as 
the number of actions taken by USAID-supported GoT institutions in response to issues 
raised by citizens,· rate of unsolicited media coverage of CSO advocacy campaigns); 
 Change in citizens’ voicing of informed opinion.
Among the measurement tools, the Contractor must develop or modify an outcome-specific CSO in￾dex that tracks impact of USAlD support directed at CSOs on the advocacy and accountability envi￾ronment in the targeted geographical regions, with the highest possible degree of attribution to the 
SATC activities. 
Third, the Contractor will carry out the first survey of citizens and civil servant/public officials for the 
SATC program in the field, working with project stakeholders and intended beneficiaries to capture 
perceptions of government engagement, responsiveness, and accountability, and of CSO usefulness, 
reputation, and ability to represent citizen issues related to service delivery to their government. The 
survey would have to be replicable on a regular basis-say every other year unless the Contractor has a 
strong argument for higher frequency-and will be more precise and systematic than a convenience or
availability sampling. 
The findings of the initial perception survey and initial information for the CSO index will be analyzed
and used for adjusting targets for the indicators previously created and for establishing the baseline for 
the SATC program. 
STAR EVALUATION—DRAFT REPORT 40
Monitoring data collected under this program must be compatible with and support USAID/Tanzania's 
Mission-wide monitoring and evaluation system, currently managed by The Mitchell Group as T-MEMS 
(Tanzania Monitoring and Evaluation Management System, www.tanzaniamems.com/index.cfrn), or its 
successor. 
Data collected must always be disaggregated by sex and, where possible, by age. The Contractor must 
address gender considerations in the collection of research data and the implications these considera￾tions have for the appropriate gender breakdown of enumerators and other researchers trained. 
Critical to the task of evaluating USAID/Tanzania investments will be the dissemination of information 
and lessons learned from evaluations. The Contractor will be responsible for analyzing data collected 
for writing a summary report that is clear and accessible to a variety of audiences. Comparative infor￾mation from districts and CSOs outside the program should also be shared by the contractor for 
evaluative and learning purposes. 
Measurement Tools: Appropriate tools and surveys will be developed for use by USAID/Tanzania's 
DRG office. These tools and surveys will be deployed for use in evaluating the SATC program by this 
Contractor as well as USAID and its future M&E contractor. 
The Contactor must acknowledge and draw upon the state-of-the-art outcome measurement and 
monitoring tools in the democracy and governance sector. For example, myriad civil society organiza￾tion capacity and effectiveness assessment tools exist, including but not limited to the T- MEMs advo￾cacy measurement tool (www.tanzaniamems.com/tools.cfm).
Where appropriate and permissible per copyrights, general or sector-level measurement tools may be 
adaptable for the purposes outlined in this SOW. For example, the Afrobarometer public perception 
survey (www.afrobarometer.org), as conducted in Tanzania, asks questions about government respon￾siveness and civil society action for nation-level information. Also, USAID's Civil Society Organization 
Sustainability Index (www.usaid.gov/africacivilsociety) scores the Tanzanian civil society sector on, 
among other things, advocacy, organization capacity, and public image dimensions; sector-level indica￾tors may be adaptable for program-level application. 
The Contractor must coordinate and consolidate data collection or research actions under this con￾tract, or coordinate them with pre-existing research programs on-going in each location, and, where 
possible, economize expense and effort and leverage existing surveys and other research work already 
being undertaken. This may include conducting a program performance evaluation work simultaneous￾ly with portfolio-level data collection, funding a local institution for additional survey work to be con￾ducted in areas of interest where an existing survey instrument is already being used by another de￾velopment partner, funding a local institution for additional questions to be asked where quality assur￾ance can be assured, and collaborating with existing research projects to extend their scope into new 
areas of interest. 
Activities under this contract are clearly distinguishable from on-going M&E activities to be carried out 
by USAID/Tanzania's implementing partners as part of their on-going programs. Each implementing 
partner will be responsible for having a robust M&E system that serves as a resource in managing their 
programs over time and recalibrating activities to support program objectives during implementation. 
STAR EVALUATION—DRAFT REPORT 41
Evaluation activities conducted under this contract will be complementary to these implementing part￾ner M&E processes, albeit with a stronger focus on measuring progress on the attainment of higher 
order program objectives. 
Nonetheless, this M&E contractor must coordinate with USAID/Tanzania DRG implementing part￾ners to ensure that M&E tools and systems are compatible, mutually reinforcing, well leveraged, and 
properly coordinated to avoid waste of U.S. taxpayer resources. For example, to the extent the "Ca￾pacity Development Program for Partners of Accountability" implementing partner selects a particu￾lar CSO assessment tool, the Contractor should coordinate with that partner and leverage the tool 
as well as the partner's M&E system to measure DRG program-level indicators. 
3) Collaborative Partnership Responsibilities
The success of the DRG development objective requires collaboration with and among multiple 
partners, within the USAID Mission, the GoT, and civil society. The Contractor will therefore 
be responsible for working closely with a variety of partners, possibly including but not neces￾sarily limited to the following:
 USAID/Tanzania's DRG technical team; 
 At least one Tanzanian monitoring and evaluation firm or organization--this will be particularly 
important in conducting the first perception survey since the Contractor's core staff will need, 
at a minimum, the assistance of a group of local data collectors; 
 Other USAID technical teams or key staff implicated by the program's cross-cutting approach 
and working in such areas as agriculture/food security, natural resource management, health, 
education, gender, and monitoring and evaluation; 
 USAID implementing partners who are directly involved in the SATC program activities: cur￾rently expected to be four (4) GoT partners, four (4) or five (5) grantees, and one (1) capaci￾ty building contractor–the GoT partners may be eager to measure some form of impact of 
their work and close collaboration with these partners may be instrumental in informing them 
on most effective methods of culling and analyzing relevant data for practical uses, such as 
commissioning local research/analytical firms; 
 Other donors contributing to similar DRG activities or programs; 
 Producers of other measurement tools and/or indices, such as the Afrobarometer, the Civil So￾ciety Index, or the Civil Society Organizations Sustainability Index). 
The Contractor is required to define each link and working relationship with these partners as
well as any others the Contractor deems necessary to effectively monitor and evaluate attainment 
of USAID/Tanzania's DRG development objective: Improved Accountability and Oversight of Pub￾lic Resources through Increased Citizen Participation.
C.4 Staff: 
USAID seeks the services of a Contractor who will provide a multi-disciplinary evaluation team 
who have the relevant qualifications below. The contractor-furnished team members shall meet 
the minimum level of academic and work experience qualifications outlined in Section B.5 (a) (2) 
of the IQC.
STAR EVALUATION—DRAFT REPORT 42
Labor Categories–Level of Qualification
Evaluation Team Leader (senior level): This individual will be responsible for completing all delivera￾bles in the time allotted. He/she will coordinate the overall evaluation effort and be responsible for 
editing and compilation of all deliverables. This individual will have substantial experience and 
knowledge of accountable governance, civil society, and advocacy issues as well as with the moni￾toring and evaluation of development interventions. East African and Tanzania regional experience
is also preferred.
Evaluation Specialist (senior level): This individual will have significant background in the design 
and undertaking of performance evaluations and long term measurement tools. He/she will en￾sure that the design of the team's evaluation plan is adequate in answering the relevant evalua￾tions questions. He/she will be instrumental in designing the data gathering tools, developing the 
program indicators, developing relevant indices, and managing surveys. He/she will ensure that all 
findings are communicated fully and accurately in the deliverables. He/she will have experience 
and expertise in data analysis, and in discussion facilitation. Experience in Tanzania is preferred. 
This person will travel with the team throughout the data collection and stakeholder meeting pe￾riod.
Technical Advisor (mid-level): This individual will be responsible for data collection in Tanzania, 
while working closely with Evaluation Team Leader and Evaluation Specialist. This individual will 
be responsible for coordinating local enumerators for data collection. He/she should be familiar 
with national data collection and analyzing institutions and with the country and its logistics, to
assist in developing travel itineraries and make necessary arrangements in country.
C.5 General Considerations:
The Contractor must account for the following general considerations. 
Gender 
Gender issues, in particular cultural, economic and legal gender inequalities, are a critical underlying fac￾tor in making progress in all development sectors in Tanzania. Addressing gender in all USAID solicita￾tions is a mandatory requirement, and USAID/Tanzania has identified gender as a cross-cutting 
theme that is built into all USAID/Tanzania programs through the strategy development process. In 
addition to addressing gender considerations identified elsewhere in this program- gender represen￾tation in local partner(s), enumerators, data disaggregation, etc., the Contractor must identify and 
address any other gender issues anticipated in the conduct of this contract.
The Contractor must describe how the project will adequately address gender issues and 
demonstrate an integrated understanding of gender concerns in the activities and/or ap￾proaches being proposed. The program must fully subscribe to the USAID Gender Policy and 
ADS 201.3.11.6., which requires a description of how gender relations will affect the achievement 
of sustainable results and how the proposed results will affect the relative status of men and 
women. The Contractor must address relevant and important gender issues and disparities, and 
the necessary human skills, material and financial resources, and time needed to address identified 
STAR EVALUATION—DRAFT REPORT 43
gender issues. The Contractor's PMP must also include indicators and benchmarks to monitor 
progress.
C.6 Environmental Considerations:
This project consists of interventions entirely within the categories listed in paragraph (c)(l) 
and (c)(2) “Categorical Exclusions”of Title 22 CFR Part 216. The Initial Environmental Evalua￾tion has determined that these activities are categorically excluded from any further environ￾mental review requirements.
Any activities found to be outside the scope of the approved Regulation 216 environmental 
documentation shall be halted until an amendment to the documentation is submitted and writ￾ten approval is received from USAID.
C.7 Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest:
The implementer of this USAID/Tanzania evaluation contract will be excluded from participation 
in other USAID contracts or agreements that are part of the SATC program to be monitored 
and evaluated based on this Scope of Work. 
END OF SETION C 
STAR EVALUATION—DRAFT REPORT 44
ANNEX B: LIST OF INTERVIEWS 
NAME AFFILIATION
Daniel Dedeyan USAID/Tanzania
Magdalena Hiza USAID/Tanzania
Salim R Olotu Executive Director, Civic Education Teachers Association (CE￾TA)
Safari Fidelis Executive Secretary, Civic Education Teachers Association (CE￾TA)
Goodluck Justine Project Coordinator, Civic Education Teachers Association (CE￾TA)
Julieth Mushi Secretary, Civic Education Teachers Association (CETA)
Martin Mwinyi Bakari Member, Chama cha Walemavu Tanzania (CHAWATA) Kinon￾doni
Bakari Athumani Member, Chama cha Walemavu Tanzania (CHAWATA) Kinon￾doni
Sikujua Mbwembwe Member, Chama cha Walemavu Tanzania (CHAWATA) Kinon￾doni
Said J. Machaku Secretary, Chama cha Walemavu Tanzania (CHAWATA) Kinon￾doni
Elias Masamaki Secretary General, Chama cha Walemavu Tanzania (CHA￾WATA) Kinondoni
Subira Semsimbazi Chairperson, Chama cha Walemavu Tanzania (CHAWATA) Ki￾nondoni
Martina M. Kabisama National Coordinator, Southern Africa Human Rights NGO 
Network (SAHRINGON) Tanzania Chapter
Adam Lingson Program Officer, Oxfam & Former Pact (STAR) Staff
Todd Malone Country Director, Pact
Peter K. Mwakabwale Chief of Party, Capacity Development for Partners of Accounta￾bility(CDPA)/Chemonics - Pamoja Twajenga
Camilius Kapela M&E Officer, Capacity Development for Partners of Accountabil￾ity(CDPA)/Chemonics - Pamoja Twajenga
Julie Adkins Program Leader, SNV
Richard Komba Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Advisor, SNV
Philipp Schattenmann Governance & Accountability Advisor, Deutsche Gesellschaft fur 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)
Mjengi Lissu Advocate/Legal Adviser, Centre for Environmental Law and Gov￾ernance (CELG) Tanzania
STAR EVALUATION—DRAFT REPORT 45
Sylvia Madata M&E Officer, Centre for Environmental Law and Governance 
(CELG) Tanzania
Alex Donati Senzia Country Coordinator, PELUM
Theo Macha CEO, Devimpacttz
Ms. Sara Mwaga Executive Director, Anti Female Genital Mutilation Network 
(AFNET) Dodoma
Ms. Mbiki Mumba Executive Director, Anti Female Genital Mutilation Network 
(AFNET) Dodoma
Joshua Daudi Mbijili Member, Bahi Development Group (BADEGRO)
Siwazuri Dismas Member, Bahi Development Group (BADEGRO)
Mwanahamisi Ally Member, Bahi Development Group (BADEGRO)
Miraji Bakari Member, Bahi Development Group (BADEGRO)
John W. Makasi Village Executive Officer (VEO), Bahi
Juma R. Idd Ward Executive Officer (WEO), Bahi
Ramadhan J. Mtawa Councilor, Bahi
Mwancity Lyeme Secretary, CCM Women Association - Bahi District
Luciana Sangati Treasurer, CCM - Bahi District
Mwasiti Liemey Citizen, Bahi
Nicholaus Damiani 
Kosey
Citizen, Bahi
Aaron Mazubesi Citizen, Bahi
Eng. Victor Noah General Secretary, Christian Council of Tanzania (CCT)
Rev. Dr. Leonard 
Mtaita
Former Program Director Governance, Christian Council of 
Tanzania (CCT)
Angelus Mapunda Financial Management Officer, Prime Minister's Office Regional 
Administration Local Government (PMORALG)
Mariam Rajab Program Coordinator, Prime Minister's Office Regional Admin￾istration Local Government LGRP (PMORALG)
Johnson Nyingi Assistant Program Coordinator LGRP/LGDG, Prime Minister's 
Office Regional Administration Local Government (PMORALG)
STAR EVALUATION—DRAFT REPORT 46
Angelista Kihaga Permanent Secretary, Prime Minister's Office Regional Admin￾istration Local Government (PMORALG)
Jumanne A. Sagini Assistant Director ICT, Prime Minister's Office Regional Admin￾istration Local Government (PMORALG)
Erick J. Kitali Executive Secretary, Union of Non-Governmental Organization 
(UNGO) Morogoro
Iddi Mdanku Manager, Union of Non-Governmental Organization (UNGO)
David Mbezi Teacher, Union of Non-Governmental Organization (UNGO)
Mussa H. Matola Secretary, Union of Non-Governmental Organization (UNGO)
Ernest Shija Education-Coordinator
Anna Joseph Journalist
Fitina Haule Secretary, GSTF
John L. Mengele Member, Union of Non-Governmental Organization (UNGO)
Ahmed M. Mdangu Member, Union of Non-Governmental Organization (UNGO)
Shebe Mzapakolo Ex-Treasurer, Union of Non-Governmental Organization (UN￾GO)
Masudi Makullah Women and Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania (WOPATA)
Joseph Puppa Executive Secretary, Women and Poverty Alleviation in Tanzania 
(WOPATA)
Angelina Mziray Head, Twaweza East Africa
Rakesh Rajani Vice-Chair, Zanzibar NGOs Cluster (ZANGOC)
Hassan M. Mcha Member, Zanzibar NGOs Cluster (ZANGOC)
Makane M. Silerice Member, Zanzibar NGOs Cluster (ZANGOC)
Hanis Suuleiman Member, Zanzibar NGOs Cluster (ZANGOC)
Malok Salayey Member, Zanzibar NGOs Cluster (ZANGOC)
Malish Sugai UMAWA
Khamis S. Kasnga Member, Zanzibar NGOs Cluster (ZANGOC)
Mbarouic Said Ali YOSEFO
STAR EVALUATION—DRAFT REPORT 47
Mwanaisha Haji CHAKUWAZA
Slimu I. Miraji Ex-Commission Member, Zanzibar NGOs Cluster (ZANGOC)
Jumps Ghum Jump Member, Zanzibar NGOs Cluster (ZANGOC)
Haji Khatib Haji Acting Commissioner, Department of Human Resources, Plan￾ning and Development, President’s Office of Finance, Economy & 
Planning Development, Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar; 
Department of National Planning, Poverty Reduction Section
Seif Shaaban Mwinyi President, Zanzibar Current Generation Forum (ZCGF)
Yahya Omari Ex-Commission Member, Zanzibar Current Generation Forum 
(ZCGF)
Anas Malim Treasurer, Zanzibar Current Generation Forum (ZCGF)
Nassar Said Mohamed Program Associate, Search for Common Ground
Eli Groener General Secretary, Zanzibar Current Generation Forum (ZCGF)
Abushir Khatib Member, Zanzibar Current Generation Forum (ZCGF)
Rajab Omar Jumal Board Member, Zanzibar Current Generation Forum (ZCGF)
Fatma Saleh Member, Zanzibar Current Generation Forum (ZCGF) - Execu￾tive Committee
Anas Malim Member, Zanzibar Current Generation Forum (ZCGF)
Rashid Khalfan Said Director Development Advisory Service, KPMG
Michael Ward Director, DfID Programmes in Tanzania (KPMG)
Kate Dyer Program Director, Accountability in Tanzania Programme (AcT) 
KPMG (DfID)
Tixon T. Nzunda Assistant Secretary Political Leader Research Unit, Ethics Secre￾tariat (ES)
Evodia Pangani Statistician, Ethics Secretariat (ES)
Cosmas Kaitani Head-Information and Communication Technology (ICT), Ethics 
Secretariat (ES)
Masegese Kamulika Chief Accountant, Ethics Secretariat (ES)
Suleimani Dbalula Assistant Secretary Public Leader, Ethics Secretariat (ES)
Zahara S Guga Director Administration and Human Right Management, Ethics 
Secretariat (ES)
STAR EVALUATION—DRAFT REPORT 48
Emma P. Lymo Chief Internal Auditor, Ethics Secretariat (ES)
Margareth Chiwenda Head of Government Communication Unit, Ethics Secretariat 
(ES)
Sheiba Bulu Economist, Ethics Secretariat (ES)
Heri marco Director of Planning Monitoring and Evaluation, Ethics Secretariat 
(ES)
Felista Meena Acting Secretary Political Leader, Ethics Secretariat (ES)
Bazilio Mwanakatwe Manager Administration and Human Resource, Public Procure￾ment Regulatory Authority (PPRA)
Dorothy Mmbena Senior Procurement and Supplies Officer (SPSO)
Hirtrude Jisenge Internal Auditor (IA), Public Procurement Regulatory Authority 
(PPRA)
Colnely Mwamukonda Procurement and Supplies Officer (PSO), Public Procurement 
Regulatory Authority (PPRA)
Fenias Manasseh Public Relation Officer (PRO), Public Procurement Regulatory 
Authority (PPRA)
Coleta Mmjamani Director Corporate Service (DCS)/Project Coordinator, Public 
Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA)
Hannah Mwakalinga Head Planning Unit, National Audit Office Tanzania (NAOT)
Natima M.C. Nkiliji￾wando
Principle Economist, National Audit Office Tanzania (NAOT)
Pole John Magesa Economist, National Audit Office Tanzania (NAOT)
Josephina Melkiol Economist, National Audit Office Tanzania (NAOT)
Ali Kasingo STAR Committee Member, Southern Africa Human Rights NGO 
Network (SAHRINGON) Tanzania Chapter
Seif Mahumbi Member, Community Partnership Development Association 
(COPADEA)
Emanueli Maanda￾mano
Frank Kaduma Project Coordinator, T-MEMS (Mitchell Group)
Dr. Rugemeleza A.K. 
Nsala
Executive Director, Lawyers Environmental Action Team
Runyaro Adolf Lawyers Environmental Action Team
Richard Mushe Member, Former Commission on Local Government Reform 
Programme
STAR EVALUATION—DRAFT REPORT 49
Kapinga Executive Director, Tanzania Council for Social Development 
(TACOSDE)
Mathew Kihulya Executive Director, Governance Programme, Irish Aid
STAR EVALUATION—DRAFT REPORT 50